#!/bin/sh # ========================================================= # linux-ssh-init-sh # Server Init & SSH Hardening Script # # Author: 247like # GitHub: https://github.com/247like/linux-ssh-init-sh # License: MIT # # Release: v4.7.8 (Enterprise Hardening — 18th-round red-team / scenario fixes) # # POSIX sh compatible (Debian dash / CentOS / Alpine / Ubuntu / RHEL) # # Changelog v4.7.8 (post-v4.7.7 18th-round red-team + scenario walk-through): # - [HIGH] PATH inheritance hardening: previously, $PATH was inherited # unsanitized from the caller. In CI / sudo-with-env_keep+=PATH # scenarios an attacker controlling the calling shell's env could # plant fake passwd/useradd/stat/whoami/etc binaries that the # script then executes as root. Now sets a fixed PATH at the top. # - [HIGH] restart_sshd refuses early when in a chroot. v4.7.7 only blocked # the direct-spawn fallback; the systemctl path could still cross # the chroot boundary via /run/dbus and restart the HOST's sshd # with the CHROOT's modified config. Now bails at the function # entry via in_chroot_or_unknown. # - [MED W1-1] update_system: SYSTEM_UPDATE_START + SYSTEM_UPDATE_DONE # audit_log entries (apt/dnf/yum/apk upgrade is a major mutation). # - [MED W2-2] FIREWALL_OPENED audit only fires when rule was ACTUALLY # installed; pre-existing rules emit FIREWALL_NOOP. Stops every # idempotent re-run from polluting the audit log. # - [MED W6-1] KEY_FETCH_FAILED audit entry after 3 retries exhausted # (forensic breadcrumb for why STRICT mode aborted). # - [MED W8-1] STRANDED_MUTATIONS_DETECTED audit when --yes + non-empty # prev-run artifact mirror. Cron-driven runs no longer silently # accumulate detected-but-unreconciled mutations. # - [LOW] --key-gh=USERNAME value redacted in START audit entry (parity # with --key-url and --key-raw). # - [doc] README "公钥失败" / "Key Failure" table row clarified: managed # block writes PasswordAuthentication=yes (preserves existing # password-login path) AND new user is kept locked. # - [doc] README audit-log enumeration completed — all 37+ ACTION names # now listed, with high-priority alert candidates bold-marked # (ROLLBACK_RM_FAILED / STRANDED_MUTATIONS_DETECTED / etc). # - [doc] README "Files modified" table now lists script.lock and # last-artifacts-UID paths (v4.7.6 additions previously omitted). # # Changelog v4.7.7 (post-v4.7.6 16th-round perf/FS/container/exotic-shell audit): # - [HIGH] Direct-spawn sshd fallback now refuses ALSO when in a chroot # without separate PID namespace (e.g. operator did # `chroot /mnt/target` from host console). Previously, only the # SSH-into-host scenario was guarded; chroot-from-console would # let `pkill -x sshd` reach the HOST's sshd and drop every SSH # session on the machine. New in_chroot_or_unknown helper does # this via /proc/1/root inode comparison. # - [MED] Script-level mutex liveness check now uses both /proc/$pid AND # kill -0 as a fallback, and REFUSES when the holder's status is # ambiguous (chroot without /proc, etc) rather than reclaiming # and letting two concurrent runs race-corrupt sshd_config. # - [MED] setup_rollback's snapshot cp now fails LOUDLY on ENOSPC / NFS # errors AND verifies non-empty result. Previously a silent cp # failure left an empty snapshot — and the eventual rollback would # cp that empty snapshot OVER /etc/ssh/sshd_config, bricking the # box. Refuses to proceed without a valid snapshot. # - [MED] backup_config_persistent's snapshot cp same hardening; on # failure removes the partial file (restore.sh would otherwise # install a 0-byte sshd_config) and warns. # - [MED] record_last_applied now writes atomically via tmp+mv. Previous # direct truncate-then-write left partial state on signal/ENOSPC. # - [LOW] audit_log falls back to stderr (`AUDIT-FALLBACK ...`) when # /var/log is unwritable. The ROLLBACK record is the most # important forensic event; losing it silently would leave the # operator with no idea why rollback fired. # - [INFO] README adds a logrotate(8) snippet for /var/log/server-init*.log # (zh+en). Operators of high-frequency installs (CI / fleet) need # a hint that there's no built-in rotation. # - [CLEAN] Exotic shells (yash, ksh93, mksh, posh, OpenBSD pdksh) and old # tool versions verified: no new portability issues found. # # Changelog v4.7.6 (post-v4.7.5 13th-round adversarial audit): # - [CRIT] handle_selinux now initializes __selinux_done="n" at function # entry. Previously, the "all 3 semanage attempts failed" path # left it unset; under `set -u` the subsequent test crashed the # script and triggered a full rollback — defeating the non-strict # graceful-degrade design. # - [HIGH N1] Script-level mutex at $RUNTIME_DIR/script.lock prevents # concurrent invocations from interleave-corrupting sshd_config. # Stale-PID detection allows recovery from crashed prior runs. # - [HIGH N2] artifact_track now ALSO mirrors to $RUNTIME_DIR/last-artifacts-UID # (RUNTIME_DIR survives across script invocations; TMP_DIR doesn't). # On SIGKILL/OOM/power-loss, the next script run surfaces the # stranded artifacts so the operator knows to manually clean. # - [HIGH N3] audit_log strips newlines from $action and $details. Without # this, a $details derived from a tampered /etc/passwd field 6 # could inject forged "ACTION: FAKE" entries into the audit log. # - [MED] validate_port rejects leading-zero ports. `--port=03306` used to # decimal-pass to 3306, bypass is_hard_reserved's string-only # case match, and write `Port 03306` to sshd_config — silently # shadowing MySQL on that port. Same vector for `--port=0022` # that script-treated as non-standard while sshd parsed as 22, # racing firewall/SELinux state vs the daemon's reality. # - [MED N5] Rollback rm-failure now audit-logged (ROLLBACK_RM_FAILED) and # sets rollback_clean=0. Read-only /etc previously left stale # sudoers entries after user deletion — a privilege primitive # for any future re-created user with the same name. # - [MED N6] MOTD_BAK-missing during rollback now surfaces as ROLLBACK_ # MOTD_BAK_MISSING audit + non-clean rollback (was silent). # - [MED] Strip block for SELINUX_* lines: previous `grep -v ... && mv || # rm` broke when grep matched zero lines (file was all SELINUX_*). # Now uses `|| true` after grep so mv always runs. # - [MED] Duplicate `--user=` / `--port=` / `--key-*` now hard-fails instead # of silently last-wins. Empty `--port=` and `--key-X=` values # are also rejected (previously caused interactive-prompt EOF → # silent port-22 downgrade). # - [LOW] validate_username + --key-gh now reject embedded newlines BEFORE # grep (POSIX grep is per-line-anchored — multi-line values # silently bypassed). Closes the log-disclosure / future-refactor # footgun. # - [LOW] public_ip from ipify is sanitized to digits/dots only (≤15 char). # Prevents a MITM'd response from injecting ANSI CSI sequences # into the operator's terminal scrollback via the summary box. # # Changelog v4.7.5 (post-v4.7.4 11th-round audit): # - [MED] SELinux NOOP-vs-ADD provenance: v4.7.4 tracked NOOP labels the # same as ADDED labels, which let rollback and stale-cleanup # `semanage port -d` labels we never installed (sysadmin-set or # cross-tool-set). NOOP path no longer artifact_tracks; persisted # state gains `SELINUX_OWNED=y/n` so stale-cleanup only deletes # OWNED labels and emits STALE_SELINUX_KEPT for the rest. # - [MED] Stale SELinux residue across mid-state crash: after a successful # cross-run `semanage port -d`, the SELINUX_PORT= and SELINUX_OWNED= # lines are STRIPPED from LAST_APPLIED_FILE immediately (not just # overwritten by the post-handle_selinux record_last_applied call). # Eliminates the brief window where the file claimed ownership of a # label that had just been deleted. # - [MED] CI: test-distros now asserts the v4.7.4 audit entries # (USER_CREATED / PASSWORD_CLEARED / KEYS_DEPLOYED / # MANAGED_BLOCK_INSTALLED) actually fire on the happy path. # - [MED] CI: new test-restore-checksum-gate job verifies restore.sh # refuses missing checksums.sha256 AND that FORCE=1 bypasses. # - [LOW] Forensic gap: `INSECURE_KEY_URL` audit entry fires when a # plaintext http:// key URL is fetched in non-strict mode. # - [LOW] STALE_SELINUX_KEPT / STALE_SELINUX_REMOVE_FAILED / # STALE_SELINUX_SKIP audit entries for full state coverage. # - [INFO] Both READMEs now document the audit-log action names (for SIEM # integration) and the v4.7.5 SELinux ownership semantics. # # Changelog v4.7.4 (post-v4.7.3 9th-round audit): # - [LOW] --key-raw \c/\0 check now uses raw printf+exit (the previous # `die` call was unreachable: die() is defined AFTER the argv loop, # so an undefined-function "command not found" would silently # proceed, bypassing the defense-in-depth check). # - [MED] SELinux port label leak across runs: LAST_APPLIED_FILE now # records SELINUX_PORT=N; remove_stale_firewall_port also calls # `semanage port -d` on the OLD port. No more cruft accumulation. # - [MED] Idempotent same-port SELinux re-run: handle_selinux now # pre-checks `semanage port -l` and emits SELINUX_PORT_NOOP # instead of the misleading "previous SELinux type was # overwritten" warning. # - [MED] Forensic audit gap: USER_CREATED, PASSWORD_CLEARED, KEYS_DEPLOYED # now in the audit trail (previously only artifact_track + info). # - [MED] README documents `FORCE=1 sh restore.sh` for the case where # checksums.sha256 was lost and operator must bypass verification. # - [LOW] Symlink-defense hardening: 5 sites now call unlink_if_symlink # before write (init_log_files / record_last_applied / sudoers / # systemd override / motd banner). BBR sysctl path refuses to # append when /etc/sysctl.conf is a symlink. All require prior # root-equiv compromise to weaponize but tightens defense. # # Changelog v4.7.3 (post-v4.7.2 fresh-eyes audit): # - [HIGH H2] finalize_user_password_policy now surfaces double-failure # (passwd -d AND usermod -U both failing) via ACCOUNT_LOCKED_REASON # + audit_log instead of silently leaving account broken. # - [HIGH H3] deploy_keys defensively rejects home directories that are # not owned by the target user (defends against tampered # /etc/passwd → privilege-escalation primitive). # - [HIGH H4] cleanup_sshd_config_d will not overwrite a pre-existing # .bak_server_init from a prior crashed run — uses timestamped # name instead. # - [HIGH H5] Persist last-applied port/backend in /var/lib/server-init/last-applied; # on next run with different --port, clean the stale firewall # rule (no more "every prior port stays open"). # - [HIGH H6] setup_rollback skips .bak_server_init files when snapshotting # so stage-3 rollback restore cannot reintroduce stale data. # - [HIGH H7] SELinux `semanage port -m` path audit-logs the overwrite + # warns loudly; STRICT mode refuses to silently overwrite. # - [HIGH H8/H9] CI: existing-user-safe now asserts `passwd -S` reports P; # cross-user comment corrected. # - [INFO C1] enhanced_ssh_test ssh-client login test is INHERENTLY # inconclusive (root has no client privkey) — kept warn+return-0 # behavior but added LOGIN_TEST_PASSED / LOGIN_TEST_INCONCLUSIVE # audit_log entries. # - [MED] --key-raw rejects literal \\c and \\0 escapes (printf %b truncation # hazard); interactive raw paste uses real newline (no %b at all). # - [MED] cleanup_old_backups grep -c fix — empty backup_list no longer # produces "0\\n0" that broke numeric -gt compare. # - [MED] ensure_port_tools tries multiple nc package names (netcat-openbsd, # ncat, nmap-ncat, netcat) for cross-distro coverage. # - [MED] restore.sh REFUSES when checksums.sha256 is missing or sha256sum # unavailable; set FORCE=1 to override. # - [MED] fetch_keys via wget uses --quota=$KEY_MAX_BYTES (wget has no # --max-filesize) to bound on-disk damage. # - [MED] sanitize_sshd_config stops at first `Match` line — operator's # Match-block-scoped directives are no longer silently commented out. # - [MED] update_motd grep anchored to start-of-line; operator's MOTD lines # containing "Login User:" etc. are no longer accidentally stripped. # - [MED] print_final_summary suppresses ssh command when ACCOUNT_LOCKED. # - [MED] --delay-restart explicitly tells the operator about the # systemd override.conf that will apply on next manual restart. # - [MED] restart_sshd direct-spawn fallback REFUSES when SSH_CONNECTION # is set (would kill operator's own session in a chroot/container). # - [MED] audit_log added for BBR_ENABLED, FIREWALL_OPENED, SUDOERS_WRITTEN, # DROPIN_RENAMED, MANAGED_BLOCK_INSTALLED, SYSTEMD_OVERRIDE_WRITTEN, # MOTD_BANNER_WRITTEN, SELINUX_PORT_ADDED/MODIFIED/FAIL. # - [LOW] STALE_FIREWALL_REMOVED audit entry on port-change cleanup. # - [LOW] DIRECT_SPAWN / DIRECT_SPAWN_REFUSED audit entries. # # Changelog v4.7.2 (post-v4.7.1 audit fixes): # - [HIGH] safe_configure_sudo: validate + write the NEW stable file BEFORE # touching any legacy files (prevents lockout-of-admin when visudo # fails on the new template). # - [HIGH] Legacy-sudoers cleanup glob now requires digits-only suffix, # preventing cross-user deletion (running script for "admin" no # longer deletes "server-init-admin-bot"). Operator-managed files # like "server-init--special-policy" are preserved. # - [MED] rollback_handler skips restart_sshd when restored sshd_config # fails `sshd -t` — pushing a broken config to the live daemon # could crash sshd and leave the machine unreachable. # - [MED] finalize_user_password_policy: keep new account LOCKED when # sudo deployment also failed (avoid passwordless+no-sudo combo). # - [LOW] CI test-existing-user-safe comment corrected (sudoers is NEVER # written for pre-existing accounts — that's by design). # - [LOW] CI: new test-cross-user-sudoers-safe job (regression test for # the HIGH glob bug). # - [LOW] CI: new test-legacy-sudoers-cleanup job (verifies v4.6.x # timestamped files are removed AND audit-logged). # # Changelog v4.7.1 (post-v4.7.0 audit fixes): # - [CRIT R1] passwd -d regression: only clear password for NEW accounts; # pre-existing admin passwords are preserved # - [CRIT R2] rollback now RENAMES .bak_server_init back instead of deleting # (prevents permanent loss of original drop-in content) # - [CRIT R3] update_motd modifications tracked via MOTD_BAK artifact; # rollback restores from .bak # - [CRIT R4] restart_sshd grew a direct-spawn fallback (pkill+sshd) for # minimal/no-init environments; CI live-restart job now passes # - [HIGH H1] safe_configure_sudo failure is no longer silent (audit_log + # STRICT abort) # - [HIGH H2] FIREWALL_PORT artifact tagged with backend (ufw/firewalld/ # iptables) — rollback only undoes that backend # - [HIGH H3] sshd -T fallback warns loudly + STRICT mode refuses approximate # grep-based validation # - [HIGH H4] Rollback path forces sshd restart even under --delay-restart # - [HIGH H6] safe_configure_sudo cleans up pre-v4.7.0 timestamped sudoers # variants (one stable file per user) # - [MED M1] Stdout AUTO_SKIP message redacts --key-raw / --key-url values # - [MED M2] --key-gh validates GitHub-username regex before URL substitution # - [MED M3] fetch_keys downloads via temp file (max-filesize errors no # longer masked by SIGPIPE → curl exit 0) # - [MED M4] rollback while-read tolerates torn last-line writes (no LF) # - [MED M5] pkill -KILL -u $user before userdel in rollback # - [MED M6] iptables-restore explicit warning about wiping other rules # - [MED M8] ipify probe uses --proto '=https' --max-redirs 2 # - [LOW] --version / --help clean up TMP_DIR before exit # - [LOW] dropped GNU-only `xargs -r` (BusyBox compat) # # Changelog v4.7.0 (Enterprise Hardening): # - [CRIT] Defer `passwd -d` until key deployment confirmed (avoids passwordless+password-auth window) # - [CRIT] Rollback now tracks all created artifacts (sudoers, systemd override, motd, BBR, user) # - [CRIT] Rollback restores iptables.backup + re-validates sshd -t + listening port # - [CRIT] Clean `.bak_server_init` drop-ins on rollback # - [CRIT] All color output via printf '%b' (fixes dash literal-escape output) # - [CRIT] `--key-raw=` argv: apply printf %b for literal \n support # - [HIGH] restore.sh now verifies checksums.sha256 before applying # - [HIGH] Backup dir umask 077 + explicit chmod 700 (no more world-readable history) # - [HIGH] /tmp backup-dir fallback hardened (refuses pre-existing dir with wrong owner) # - [HIGH] fetch_keys: --max-filesize, --max-redirs, strict mode requires https # - [HIGH] validate_ssh_config uses sshd -T (Match-block aware) instead of grep|tail # - [HIGH] safe_configure_sudo checks wheel/sudo group membership # - [HIGH] Trap handler blocks re-entrant signals + explicit INT/TERM handlers # - [HIGH] update_motd preserves a real backup (.bak retained for one cycle) # - [MED] Stable sudoers.d filename per user (no more orphan files on re-run) # - [MED] Port lock cleanup on success # - [MED] `protect_sshd_service` runs even with --delay-restart # - [MED] chown verification post-deploy_keys (catches NFS root_squash silent failures) # - [MED] install_managed_block: mv guarded with die # - [MED] remove_managed_block tolerant of CRLF/whitespace markers # - [MED] Replace `echo "$user_input" | ...` with printf '%s\n' (bash/dash echo divergence) # - [MED] Health report uses if/then/else (no &&...|| precedence trap) # - [LOW] iptables.backup / backup.info / checksums.sha256 explicit chmod 600 # - [LOW] LC_ALL=C exported (deterministic sort/awk regex) # - [LOW] Optional external IP lookup gated by --no-ip-probe # ========================================================= set -u # [v4.7.0] Deterministic locale for sort/awk/sed/grep semantics LC_ALL=C LANGUAGE=C export LC_ALL LANGUAGE # [v4.7.8 FIX-HIGH] PATH hardening. The script invokes ~245 binaries; many # without `command -v` guards. If PATH is attacker-controlled (e.g. CI runner # env, sudo with env_keep+=PATH, a poisoned .bashrc sourced before sudo), an # attacker can plant fake `passwd`/`useradd`/`stat`/`whoami`/etc in $PATH # and the script will run them as root. Reset PATH to a known-safe default # BEFORE any external command runs. /usr/local/* first so legitimate local # installs (e.g. AlmaLinux's curl) still work. PATH=. is NEVER included. PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin export PATH print_usage() { cat </ (restore.sh per-run) EOF } # --help / --version should not require root and should not acquire locks. for __early_arg in "$@"; do case "$__early_arg" in --version|-V) echo "linux-ssh-init-sh v4.7.8 Enterprise Hardening" exit 0 ;; --help|-h) print_usage exit 0 ;; esac done unset __early_arg if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then __early_lang="zh" for __early_arg in "$@"; do case "$__early_arg" in --lang=en) __early_lang="en" ;; --lang=zh) __early_lang="zh" ;; esac done if [ "$__early_lang" = "en" ]; then echo "Must be run as root" else echo "必须以 root 权限运行此脚本" fi exit 1 fi unset __early_lang __early_arg SCRIPT_START_TIME=$(date +%s) # ---------------- Configuration ---------------- LANG_CUR="zh" LOG_FILE="/var/log/server-init.log" AUDIT_FILE="/var/log/server-init-audit.log" BACKUP_REPO="/var/backups/ssh-config" SSH_CONF="/etc/ssh/sshd_config" SSH_CONF_D="/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d" DEFAULT_USER="deploy" BLOCK_BEGIN="# BEGIN SERVER-INIT MANAGED BLOCK" BLOCK_END="# END SERVER-INIT MANAGED BLOCK" # [v4.7.3 FIX-H5] Persist the last-applied SSH port across script runs so # that on the next run with a DIFFERENT port we can clean the firewall rule # we previously installed. The file lives under /var/lib/server-init (root- # only, persists across reboots). LAST_APPLIED_FILE="/var/lib/server-init/last-applied" # ---------------- [SEC] Atomic Secure Temp Directory ---------------- old_umask=$(umask) umask 077 TMP_DIR="" if command -v mktemp >/dev/null 2>&1; then TMP_DIR=$(mktemp -d 2>/dev/null || mktemp -d -t ssh-init-XXXXXX 2>/dev/null || echo "") fi if [ -z "$TMP_DIR" ]; then rand_suffix="" if [ -r /dev/urandom ] && command -v od >/dev/null 2>&1; then rand_suffix=$(od -An -N4 -tx1 /dev/urandom 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' \n') fi [ -z "$rand_suffix" ] && rand_suffix="$$" TMP_DIR="/tmp/ssh-init.${$}.${rand_suffix}.$(date +%s 2>/dev/null || echo 0)" # [SEC-FIX] Use mkdir without -p to avoid reusing existing directories mkdir "$TMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null || { # Retry with different name TMP_DIR="/tmp/ssh-init.${rand_suffix}.$$" mkdir "$TMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null || { echo "FATAL: Cannot create temp directory: $TMP_DIR" >&2; exit 1; } } fi chmod 700 "$TMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true umask "$old_umask" # ---------------- [SEC] State & Lock Management ---------------- RUNTIME_DIR="" for try_dir in "/run/server-init" "/var/lib/server-init"; do if mkdir -p "$try_dir" 2>/dev/null; then RUNTIME_DIR="$try_dir" break fi done if [ -z "$RUNTIME_DIR" ]; then rand_rt="" if [ -r /dev/urandom ] && command -v od >/dev/null 2>&1; then rand_rt=$(od -An -N4 -tx1 /dev/urandom 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' \n') fi [ -z "$rand_rt" ] && rand_rt="$$" RUNTIME_DIR="/tmp/server-init.${rand_rt}.$(date +%s 2>/dev/null || echo 0)" # [SEC-FIX] Use mkdir without -p if ! mkdir "$RUNTIME_DIR" 2>/dev/null; then if command -v mktemp >/dev/null 2>&1; then RUNTIME_DIR=$(mktemp -d /tmp/server-init.XXXXXX 2>/dev/null || echo "") fi fi [ -n "$RUNTIME_DIR" ] && [ -d "$RUNTIME_DIR" ] || { echo "FATAL: Cannot create runtime directory" >&2; exit 1; } fi chmod 700 "$RUNTIME_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true STATE_FILE="$RUNTIME_DIR/state-$(id -u)" LOCK_DIR="$RUNTIME_DIR/locks-$(id -u)" # [v4.7.6 FIX-HIGH-N1] Script-level mutex. Two concurrent invocations of # this script can interleave-corrupt /etc/ssh/sshd_config (both rename # drop-ins, both install managed blocks, one's rollback wipes the other's # work). The lock is a directory (mkdir is atomic) holding the active PID. # Cleared by cleanup_locks() on normal exit. Stale entries (PID gone) are # auto-reclaimed by the next start. SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR="$RUNTIME_DIR/script.lock" [ -L "$STATE_FILE" ] && rm -f "$STATE_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true if [ -e "$LOCK_DIR" ] && [ ! -d "$LOCK_DIR" ]; then rm -f "$LOCK_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true fi # [v4.7.6] Acquire script-level mutex. We do this BEFORE any state mutation # (well before setup_rollback). If we fail to acquire, refuse to start. if mkdir "$SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR" 2>/dev/null; then echo "$$" > "$SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR/pid" 2>/dev/null || true else # Lock exists. Check if the holder is still alive. holder_pid="" if [ -r "$SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR/pid" ]; then holder_pid=$(head -1 "$SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR/pid" 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\n\r ') fi # [v4.7.7 FIX-MED] Liveness detection uses BOTH /proc/$pid AND kill -0. # The kill -0 fallback works in chroots without /proc (where the previous # form falsely declared "stale" → reclaim → two scripts both proceed → # sshd_config corruption). The unknown-result third branch refuses rather # than racing. holder_alive="unknown" if [ -n "$holder_pid" ]; then if [ -d "/proc/$holder_pid" ]; then holder_alive="yes" elif kill -0 "$holder_pid" 2>/dev/null; then holder_alive="yes" elif [ -d "/proc/1" ] || command -v kill >/dev/null 2>&1; then # /proc is available (or we have kill) AND neither method found the # PID → genuinely stale, safe to reclaim. holder_alive="no" fi fi case "$holder_alive" in yes) echo "FATAL: Another linux-ssh-init-sh run is in progress (PID $holder_pid)" >&2 echo " If you're sure it crashed, remove $SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR and retry." >&2 exit 1 ;; no) rm -rf "$SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true if ! mkdir "$SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR" 2>/dev/null; then echo "FATAL: Cannot acquire script lock at $SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR" >&2 exit 1 fi echo "$$" > "$SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR/pid" 2>/dev/null || true ;; unknown) # Cannot determine liveness (no /proc, no kill, or empty pid file). # Refuse rather than risk a concurrent-corruption race. echo "FATAL: Lock $SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR exists but liveness check is ambiguous" >&2 echo " (no /proc and/or empty PID file). Verify no other run is in" >&2 echo " progress, then remove $SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR manually and retry." >&2 exit 1 ;; esac fi # [v4.7.8 FIX] The script-level mutex is acquired before argv parsing so # concurrent invocations are blocked early. That also means every pre-rollback # exit path (--help/--version, bad flags, root/preflight/input failures) must # release it. Once setup_rollback() installs the real rollback trap, this # lightweight cleanup trap is replaced. early_cleanup_before_rollback() { [ -n "${STATE_FILE:-}" ] && rm -f "$STATE_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true [ -n "${ARTIFACT_MIRROR:-}" ] && rm -f "$ARTIFACT_MIRROR" 2>/dev/null || true [ -n "${LOCK_DIR:-}" ] && [ -d "$LOCK_DIR" ] && rm -rf "$LOCK_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true [ -n "${SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR:-}" ] && [ -d "$SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR" ] && rm -rf "$SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true [ -n "${TMP_DIR:-}" ] && [ -d "$TMP_DIR" ] && rm -rf "$TMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true case "${RUNTIME_DIR:-}" in /tmp/*) [ -d "$RUNTIME_DIR" ] && rm -rf "$RUNTIME_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true ;; esac } trap 'early_cleanup_before_rollback' EXIT # Colors RED='\033[0;31m' GREEN='\033[0;32m' YELLOW='\033[1;33m' BLUE='\033[0;34m' CYAN='\033[0;36m' NC='\033[0m' # ---------------- Initialize Variables ---------------- TARGET_USER="" SSH_PORT="22" KEY_OK="n" PORT_OPT="1" KEY_TYPE="" KEY_VAL="" DO_UPDATE="n" DO_BBR="n" # [v4.7.1] Track whether THIS script run created the target user. Used so that # finalize_user_password_policy does not wipe an existing admin's password. USER_WAS_CREATED="n" # [v4.7.2] Track whether sudo configuration succeeded for the (new) user. # Used so that finalize_user_password_policy does not clear the password on # a brand-new account that ALSO lacks sudo — that combo gives a key-only # account with no admin privileges, which is rarely what the operator wanted. SUDO_DEPLOYED="n" # [v4.7.2] Surfaces "the target account is locked and cannot SSH right now" # in print_final_summary + generate_health_report + audit_log. Otherwise the # operator sees the success banner with the ssh command line and only later # discovers the account is unusable. ACCOUNT_LOCKED_REASON="" # [v4.7.4] "Should record_last_applied persist SELINUX_PORT=N for this run?" # Set "y" by handle_selinux if NOOP/ADDED/MODIFIED (anything that means our # port is currently labeled ssh_port_t). SELINUX_LABEL_APPLIED="n" # [v4.7.5] "Did THIS run install or retype the label, i.e. may rollback # `semanage port -d` it without destroying pre-existing state?" "y" only on # ADDED or MODIFIED paths; "n" on NOOP (label pre-existed independently). SELINUX_LABEL_OWNED_BY_RUN="n" # Note: a previous v4.7.5 draft introduced SELINUX_LABEL_PREEXISTED here, but # the actual provenance signal that downstream code consumes is # SELINUX_LABEL_OWNED_BY_RUN above (which is the inverse). The PREEXISTED # flag is therefore intentionally NOT defined to avoid SC2034 unused-var. OPENSSH_VER_MAJOR=0 OPENSSH_VER_MINOR=0 KEX_LINE="" CIPHERS_LINE="" MACS_LINE="" CRYPTO_MODE="skip" IPV6_ENABLED="n" ROOT_KEY_PRESENT="n" SUPPORTS_KBD_INTERACTIVE="n" # ---------------- Automation Variables ---------------- ARG_USER="" ARG_PORT="" ARG_KEY_TYPE="" ARG_KEY_VAL="" ARG_UPDATE="" ARG_BBR="" AUTO_CONFIRM="n" STRICT_MODE="n" ARG_DELAY_RESTART="n" ARG_NO_IP_PROBE="n" # Parse Arguments # [v4.7.6 FIX-MED] Track first-set state so duplicate --user / --port / # --key-* don't silently last-win. Operators copy-pasting CI templates can # unintentionally specify both --key-gh and --key-raw; refuse instead. __seen_user=""; __seen_port=""; __seen_key="" for a in "$@"; do case "$a" in --lang=zh) LANG_CUR="zh" ;; --lang=en) LANG_CUR="en" ;; --strict) STRICT_MODE="y" ;; --yes) AUTO_CONFIRM="y" ;; --user=*) if [ -n "$__seen_user" ]; then printf '[FATAL] --user specified more than once\n' >&2; exit 1 fi __seen_user="y"; ARG_USER="${a#*=}" ;; --port=random) if [ -n "$__seen_port" ]; then printf '[FATAL] --port specified more than once\n' >&2; exit 1 fi __seen_port="y"; ARG_PORT="random" ;; --port=*) if [ -n "$__seen_port" ]; then printf '[FATAL] --port specified more than once\n' >&2; exit 1 fi __seen_port="y"; ARG_PORT="${a#*=}" ;; --key-gh=*) if [ -n "$__seen_key" ]; then printf '[FATAL] only one of --key-gh / --key-url / --key-raw may be given\n' >&2; exit 1 fi __seen_key="y"; ARG_KEY_TYPE="gh"; ARG_KEY_VAL="${a#*=}" ;; --key-url=*) if [ -n "$__seen_key" ]; then printf '[FATAL] only one of --key-gh / --key-url / --key-raw may be given\n' >&2; exit 1 fi __seen_key="y"; ARG_KEY_TYPE="url"; ARG_KEY_VAL="${a#*=}" ;; --key-raw=*) if [ -n "$__seen_key" ]; then printf '[FATAL] only one of --key-gh / --key-url / --key-raw may be given\n' >&2; exit 1 fi __seen_key="y" ARG_KEY_TYPE="raw" # [v4.7.0] Interpret literal \n / \t in argv so multi-line keys can be # passed as a single shell-quoted argument. # [v4.7.3 FIX-MED] Reject \c and \0 escapes BEFORE printf %b — `\c` # would silently truncate the rest of the key material. Real SSH keys # never contain these, so refusal is safe. # [v4.7.4 FIX-LOW] Cannot use die() here — argv parsing runs BEFORE # function definitions; an undefined die call would "command not found" # silently and proceed (bypassing the check). Use raw printf+exit. __raw_in="${a#*=}" case "$__raw_in" in *'\c'*|*'\0'*) printf '[FATAL] Refusing --key-raw containing \\c or \\0 escape (truncation hazard)\n' >&2 exit 1 ;; esac ARG_KEY_VAL="$(printf '%b' "$__raw_in")" unset __raw_in ;; --update) ARG_UPDATE="y" ;; --no-update) ARG_UPDATE="n" ;; --bbr) ARG_BBR="y" ;; --no-bbr) ARG_BBR="n" ;; --delay-restart) ARG_DELAY_RESTART="y" ;; --no-ip-probe) ARG_NO_IP_PROBE="y" ;; --version|-V) echo "linux-ssh-init-sh v4.7.8 Enterprise Hardening" # [v4.7.1] Clean up tmp/runtime dirs created at script entry so that # scripted `--version` invocations don't accumulate empty directories. [ -n "${TMP_DIR:-}" ] && [ -d "$TMP_DIR" ] && rm -rf "$TMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null [ -n "${RUNTIME_DIR:-}" ] && [ -d "$RUNTIME_DIR" ] && case "$RUNTIME_DIR" in /tmp/*) rm -rf "$RUNTIME_DIR" 2>/dev/null ;; esac exit 0 ;; --help|-h) cat </ (restore.sh per-run) EOF # [v4.7.1] Same tmp-dir cleanup as --version. [ -n "${TMP_DIR:-}" ] && [ -d "$TMP_DIR" ] && rm -rf "$TMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null [ -n "${RUNTIME_DIR:-}" ] && [ -d "$RUNTIME_DIR" ] && case "$RUNTIME_DIR" in /tmp/*) rm -rf "$RUNTIME_DIR" 2>/dev/null ;; esac exit 0 ;; esac done # [v4.7.6 FIX-LOW] Reject empty --port=, --key-* values explicitly. # Without this, `--port= --yes` falls through to interactive prompt → EOF → # default to port 22 → silent hardening downgrade. if [ "${__seen_port:-}" = "y" ] && [ -z "$ARG_PORT" ]; then printf '[FATAL] --port= requires a value (22, random, or 1024-65535)\n' >&2; exit 1 fi if [ -n "$ARG_KEY_TYPE" ] && [ -z "$ARG_KEY_VAL" ]; then printf '[FATAL] --key-%s= requires a value\n' "$ARG_KEY_TYPE" >&2; exit 1 fi unset __seen_user __seen_port __seen_key # ---------------- Internationalization ---------------- msg() { key="$1" if [ "$LANG_CUR" = "zh" ]; then case "$key" in MUST_ROOT) echo "必须以 root 权限运行此脚本" ;; BANNER) echo "服务器初始化 & SSH 安全加固 (v4.7.8 Enterprise Hardening)" ;; STRICT_ON) echo "STRICT 模式已开启：任何关键错误将直接退出" ;; ASK_USER) echo "SSH 登录用户 (默认 " ;; ERR_USER_INV) echo "❌ 用户名无效 (仅限小写字母/数字/下划线，且避开系统保留名)" ;; ASK_PORT_T) echo "SSH 端口配置：" ;; OPT_PORT_1) echo "1) 使用 22 (默认)" ;; OPT_PORT_2) echo "2) 随机高端口 (49152+, 自动避开 K8s)" ;; OPT_PORT_3) echo "3) 手动指定" ;; SELECT) echo "请选择 [1-3]: " ;; INPUT_PORT) echo "请输入端口号 (1024-65535): " ;; PORT_ERR) echo "❌ 端口输入无效 (非数字或超范围)" ;; PORT_RES) echo "❌ 端口被系统保留或不建议使用 (如 80, 443, 3306 等)" ;; PORT_K8S) echo "⚠️ 警告: 此端口位于 Kubernetes NodePort 常用范围 (30000-32767)，可能冲突" ;; ASK_KEY_T) echo "SSH 公钥来源：" ;; OPT_KEY_1) echo "1) GitHub 用户导入" ;; OPT_KEY_2) echo "2) URL 下载" ;; OPT_KEY_3) echo "3) 手动粘贴" ;; INPUT_GH) echo "请输入 GitHub 用户名: " ;; INPUT_URL) echo "请输入公钥 URL: " ;; INPUT_RAW) echo "请粘贴公钥内容 (空行结束输入): " ;; ASK_UPD) echo "是否更新系统软件包? [y/n] (默认 n): " ;; ASK_BBR) echo "是否开启 BBR 加速? [y/n] (默认 n): " ;; CONFIRM_T) echo "---------------- 执行确认 ----------------" ;; C_USER) echo "登录用户: " ;; C_PORT) echo "端口模式: " ;; C_KEY) echo "密钥来源: " ;; C_UPD) echo "系统更新: " ;; C_BBR) echo "开启 BBR: " ;; WARN_FW) echo "⚠ 注意：修改端口前，请确认云厂商防火墙/安全组已放行对应 TCP 端口" ;; ASK_SURE) echo "确认执行? [y/n]: " ;; CANCEL) echo "已取消操作" ;; I_INSTALL) echo "正在安装基础依赖..." ;; I_UPD) echo "正在更新系统..." ;; I_BBR) echo "正在配置 BBR..." ;; I_USER) echo "正在配置用户..." ;; I_SSH_INSTALL) echo "未检测到 OpenSSH，正在安装..." ;; I_KEY_OK) echo "公钥部署成功" ;; W_KEY_FAIL) echo "公钥部署失败，将启用安全回退策略以避免失联" ;; I_BACKUP) echo "已全量备份配置 (SSH/User/Firewall): " ;; E_SSHD_CHK) echo "sshd 配置校验失败，正在回滚..." ;; E_GREP_FAIL) echo "配置验证失败：关键参数未生效，正在回滚..." ;; E_RESTART) echo "SSH 服务重启失败，正在回滚..." ;; W_RESTART) echo "无法自动重启 SSH 服务，请手动重启" ;; W_LISTEN_FAIL) echo "SSHD 已重启但端口未监听，可能启动失败，正在回滚..." ;; DONE_T) echo "================ 完成 ================" ;; DONE_MSG1) echo "请【不要关闭】当前窗口。" ;; DONE_MSG2) echo "请新开一个终端窗口测试登录：" ;; DONE_FW) echo "⚠ 若无法连接，请再次检查防火墙设置" ;; AUTO_SKIP) echo "检测到参数输入，跳过询问: " ;; RB_START) echo "脚本执行出现关键错误，开始自动回滚..." ;; RB_DONE) echo "回滚完成。系统状态已恢复。" ;; RB_FAIL) echo "致命错误：回滚失败！请立即手动检查 /etc/ssh/sshd_config" ;; SELINUX_DET) echo "检测到 SELinux Enforcing 模式，正在配置端口规则..." ;; SELINUX_OK) echo "SELinux 端口规则添加成功" ;; SELINUX_FAIL) echo "SELinux 规则添加失败，请手动执行: semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp PORT" ;; SELINUX_INS) echo "正在安装 SELinux 管理工具..." ;; CLEAN_D) echo "检测到冲突的配置片段，已备份并移除: " ;; TEST_CONN) echo "正在进行 SSH 连接测试 (IPv4/Local)..." ;; TEST_OK) echo "SSH 连接测试通过" ;; TEST_FAIL) echo "SSH 连接测试全部失败！新配置可能无法连接，正在回滚..." ;; IPV6_CFG) echo "检测到全局 IPv6 环境，已添加 :: 监听支持" ;; SYS_PROT) echo "正在添加 systemd 服务防误杀保护..." ;; MOTD_UPD) echo "正在更新登录提示信息 (MotD)..." ;; COMPAT_WARN) echo "检测到兼容性限制，已自动调整配置..." ;; AUDIT_START) echo "开始执行审计记录..." ;; BOX_TITLE) echo "初始化完成 - 安全配置已生效" ;; BOX_SSH) echo "SSH 连接信息:" ;; BOX_KEY_ON) echo "🔐 密钥认证: 已启用 (密码登录已禁用)" ;; BOX_KEY_OFF) echo "⚠️ 密钥认证: 未启用 (密码登录保持可用/回退策略已启用)" ;; BOX_PORT) echo "📍 端口变更: 22 → " ;; BOX_FW) echo "⚠️ 请确认防火墙已开放 TCP 端口" ;; BOX_WARN) echo "重要: 请在新窗口中测试连接，确认成功后再关闭此窗口！" ;; BOX_K8S_WARN) echo "⚠️ 注意: 使用了 Kubernetes NodePort 范围端口" ;; ERR_MISSING) echo "❌ 缺少必要命令，无法继续: " ;; ERR_MISSING_SSHD) echo "❌ 未找到 sshd 命令，请先安装 OpenSSH Server" ;; WARN_DISK) echo "⚠️ 磁盘空间不足: " ;; WARN_MEM) echo "⚠️ 可用内存不足: " ;; WARN_RESUME) echo "检测到未完成的初始化，可能上次执行异常终止" ;; ASK_RESUME) echo "检测到未完成的操作，是否继续? [y/N]: " ;; ERR_BACKUP_DIR) echo "❌ 无法创建备份目录:" ;; ERR_BACKUP_DIR_ALT) echo "❌ 无法创建备用备份目录" ;; ERR_BACKUP_SUBDIR) echo "❌ 无法创建备份子目录:" ;; INFO_BACKUP_CREATED) echo "✅ 备份已创建:" ;; INFO_CLEANING_BACKUPS) echo "🧹 正在清理" ;; INFO_OLD_BACKUPS) echo "个旧备份..." ;; ERR_LOCK_DIR) echo "❌ 无法创建锁目录:" ;; WARN_LOCK_DIR_PERM) echo "⚠️ 无法设置锁目录权限，继续尝试..." ;; WARN_CLEAN_LOCKS) echo "⚠️ 清理旧的锁文件..." ;; WARN_INVALID_KEY) echo "⚠️ 跳过无效的SSH密钥行" ;; WARN_SHORT_RSA_KEY) echo "⚠️ RSA密钥过短:" ;; WARN_SHORT_ED25519_KEY) echo "⚠️ Ed25519密钥过短:" ;; WARN_SHORT_DSA_KEY) echo "⚠️ DSA密钥过短:" ;; ERR_INVALID_KEY_FORMAT) echo "❌ SSH密钥格式无效" ;; ERR_MISSING_BASE64) echo "❌ SSH密钥缺少base64部分" ;; ERR_INVALID_BASE64) echo "❌ SSH密钥base64编码无效" ;; WARN_NO_BASE64_SKIPLEN) echo "⚠️ 未检测到 base64 命令：将跳过密钥长度校验，仅做格式校验" ;; WARN_USER_SHELL) echo "⚠️ 用户shell不允许登录:" ;; ASK_CHANGE_SHELL) echo "是否更改用户的shell为/bin/bash? [y/N]: " ;; WARN_CHANGE_SHELL_FAIL) echo "⚠️ 更改shell失败" ;; WARN_UNUSUAL_SHELL) echo "⚠️ 用户使用非常规shell:" ;; WARN_HOME_OWNER) echo "⚠️ 用户家目录所有者异常:" ;; WARN_HOME_NOT_WRITABLE) echo "⚠️ 用户家目录不可写" ;; ERR_USER_CREATE_FAIL) echo "❌ 创建用户失败" ;; ERR_USER_VERIFY_FAIL) echo "❌ 用户创建后验证失败" ;; WARN_NO_SUDOERS_DIR) echo "⚠️ 没有/etc/sudoers.d目录，跳过sudo配置" ;; INFO_SUDO_EXISTS) echo "ℹ️ 用户已配置sudo权限" ;; ERR_SUDOERS_SYNTAX) echo "❌ sudoers文件语法错误，已删除" ;; ERR_SUDOERS_PERM) echo "❌ 无法设置sudoers文件权限" ;; INFO_SUDO_CONFIGURED) echo "✅ 为用户配置了sudo权限" ;; WARN_SSH_PROTOCOL) echo "⚠️ SSH协议握手失败或超时" ;; INFO_SSH_PROTOCOL_OK) echo "✅ SSH协议握手成功" ;; WARN_PORT_OPEN_BUT_FAIL) echo "⚠️ 端口已打开，但SSH客户端连接失败(通常因无私钥或默认私钥不匹配)。此非错误，请务必人工测试连接！" ;; WARN_X11_FORWARDING) echo "⚠️ X11转发已启用，可能存在安全风险" ;; WARN_EMPTY_PASSWORDS) echo "⚠️ 允许空密码，存在安全风险" ;; WARN_INSECURE_OPTIONS) echo "⚠️ 检测到非关键的不安全选项 (仅提示，不影响安装)" ;; ERR_DEADLOCK) echo "❌ 致命错误：密码和密钥认证同时被禁用，将导致锁定！" ;; ERR_PASSWORD_NO_KEY) echo "❌ 致命错误：密码认证已禁用但未成功部署SSH密钥" ;; ERR_ROOT_NO_KEY) echo "❌ 致命错误：root密码登录已禁用但未部署SSH密钥" ;; WARN_PORT_MISMATCH) echo "⚠️ 配置中的端口与目标端口不匹配" ;; ERR_CANNOT_RESERVE_PORT) echo "❌ 无法预留端口，端口可能已被占用" ;; INFO_OLD_SSH_SKIP_ALGO) echo "ℹ️ OpenSSH较旧或无法检测支持列表：跳过现代加密算法强制配置" ;; INFO_SANITIZE_DUP) echo "ℹ️ 清理原配置文件中的重复指令..." ;; INFO_MATCH_INSERT) echo "ℹ️ 检测到 Match 块：托管配置将插入到首个 Match 之前，以避免语法/作用域问题" ;; ERR_NO_BANNER) echo "❌ 未能获取 SSH-2.0 协议 banner，服务可能未正常启动" ;; INFO_KEYS_DEPLOYED) echo "✅ 成功部署密钥数量:" ;; WARN_NO_VALID_KEYS) echo "⚠️ 没有有效的SSH密钥被部署" ;; ERR_HOME_SYMLINK) echo "❌ 拒绝：用户家目录是符号链接" ;; ERR_SSH_DIR_SYMLINK) echo "❌ 拒绝：.ssh 目录是符号链接" ;; ERR_AUTH_KEYS_SYMLINK) echo "❌ 拒绝：authorized_keys 是符号链接" ;; ERR_HOME_NOT_DIR) echo "❌ 拒绝：用户家目录不是目录" ;; ERR_SSH_DIR_NOT_DIR) echo "❌ 拒绝：.ssh 存在但不是目录" ;; ERR_AUTH_KEYS_NOT_FILE) echo "❌ 拒绝：authorized_keys 存在但不是普通文件" ;; DELAY_RESTART_MSG) echo "⚠️ 延迟重启模式：配置已写入，请手动重启 sshd 并测试连接" ;; *) echo "$key" ;; esac else case "$key" in MUST_ROOT) echo "Must be run as root" ;; BANNER) echo "Server Init & SSH Hardening (v4.7.8 Enterprise Hardening)" ;; STRICT_ON) echo "STRICT mode ON: Critical errors will abort" ;; ASK_USER) echo "SSH Login User (default " ;; ERR_USER_INV) echo "❌ Invalid username (lowercase/digits/underscore only, no reserved words)" ;; ASK_PORT_T) echo "SSH Port Configuration:" ;; OPT_PORT_1) echo "1) Use 22 (Default)" ;; OPT_PORT_2) echo "2) Random High Port (49152+, avoids K8s)" ;; OPT_PORT_3) echo "3) Manual Input" ;; SELECT) echo "Select [1-3]: " ;; INPUT_PORT) echo "Enter Port (1024-65535): " ;; PORT_ERR) echo "❌ Invalid port (not numeric or out of range)" ;; PORT_RES) echo "❌ Port is reserved (e.g. 80, 443, 3306)" ;; PORT_K8S) echo "⚠️ Warning: Port falls in Kubernetes NodePort range (30000-32767)" ;; ASK_KEY_T) echo "SSH Public Key Source:" ;; OPT_KEY_1) echo "1) GitHub User" ;; OPT_KEY_2) echo "2) URL Download" ;; OPT_KEY_3) echo "3) Manual Paste" ;; INPUT_GH) echo "Enter GitHub Username: " ;; INPUT_URL) echo "Enter Key URL: " ;; INPUT_RAW) echo "Paste Key (Empty line to finish): " ;; ASK_UPD) echo "Update system packages? [y/n] (default n): " ;; ASK_BBR) echo "Enable TCP BBR? [y/n] (default n): " ;; CONFIRM_T) echo "---------------- Confirmation ----------------" ;; C_USER) echo "User: " ;; C_PORT) echo "Port: " ;; C_KEY) echo "Key Source: " ;; C_UPD) echo "Update: " ;; C_BBR) echo "Enable BBR: " ;; WARN_FW) echo "⚠ WARNING: Ensure Cloud Firewall/Security Group allows the new TCP port" ;; ASK_SURE) echo "Proceed? [y/n]: " ;; CANCEL) echo "Cancelled." ;; I_INSTALL) echo "Installing dependencies..." ;; I_UPD) echo "Updating system..." ;; I_BBR) echo "Configuring BBR..." ;; I_USER) echo "Configuring user..." ;; I_SSH_INSTALL) echo "OpenSSH not found, installing..." ;; I_KEY_OK) echo "SSH Key deployed successfully" ;; W_KEY_FAIL) echo "Key deployment failed; enabling fallback policy to avoid lockout" ;; I_BACKUP) echo "Full backup created (SSH/User/Firewall): " ;; E_SSHD_CHK) echo "sshd config validation failed, rolling back..." ;; E_GREP_FAIL) echo "Config validation failed: Critical settings not active. Rolling back..." ;; E_RESTART) echo "SSH service restart failed, rolling back..." ;; W_RESTART) echo "Could not restart sshd automatically. Please restart manually." ;; W_LISTEN_FAIL) echo "SSHD restarted but port is not listening. Rolling back..." ;; DONE_T) echo "================ DONE ================" ;; DONE_MSG1) echo "Please DO NOT close this window yet." ;; DONE_MSG2) echo "Open a NEW terminal to test login:" ;; DONE_FW) echo "⚠ If connection fails, check your Firewall settings." ;; AUTO_SKIP) echo "Argument detected, skipping prompt: " ;; RB_START) echo "Critical error. Starting automatic rollback..." ;; RB_DONE) echo "Rollback complete. System state restored." ;; RB_FAIL) echo "FATAL: Rollback failed! Manually check /etc/ssh/sshd_config" ;; SELINUX_DET) echo "SELinux Enforcing detected. Configuring port rules..." ;; SELINUX_OK) echo "SELinux port rule added successfully." ;; SELINUX_FAIL) echo "SELinux rule failed. Manually run: semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp PORT" ;; SELINUX_INS) echo "Installing SELinux management tools..." ;; CLEAN_D) echo "Detected conflicting config fragment, backed up and removed: " ;; TEST_CONN) echo "Testing SSH connection (IPv4/Local)..." ;; TEST_OK) echo "SSH connection test passed." ;; TEST_FAIL) echo "SSH connection test FAILED! Rolling back..." ;; IPV6_CFG) echo "Global IPv6 detected. Added listen address :: support." ;; SYS_PROT) echo "Adding systemd service protection (anti-kill)..." ;; MOTD_UPD) echo "Updating Message of the Day (MotD)..." ;; COMPAT_WARN) echo "Compatibility limits detected; adjusted configuration automatically..." ;; AUDIT_START) echo "Starting audit logging..." ;; BOX_TITLE) echo "Init Complete - Security Applied" ;; BOX_SSH) echo "SSH Connection Info:" ;; BOX_KEY_ON) echo "🔐 Key Auth: ENABLED (Password Disabled)" ;; BOX_KEY_OFF) echo "⚠️ Key Auth: DISABLED (Password/Fallback Enabled)" ;; BOX_PORT) echo "📍 Port Change: 22 → " ;; BOX_FW) echo "⚠️ Verify Firewall Open for TCP Port" ;; BOX_WARN) echo "IMPORTANT: Test connection in NEW window before closing this one!" ;; BOX_K8S_WARN) echo "⚠️ NOTE: Using K8s NodePort range" ;; ERR_MISSING) echo "❌ Missing essential commands: " ;; ERR_MISSING_SSHD) echo "❌ sshd command not found, please install OpenSSH Server first" ;; WARN_DISK) echo "⚠️ Low disk space: " ;; WARN_MEM) echo "⚠️ Low memory: " ;; WARN_RESUME) echo "Detected incomplete initialization, last execution may have crashed" ;; ASK_RESUME) echo "Detected incomplete operation, continue? [y/N]: " ;; ERR_BACKUP_DIR) echo "❌ Cannot create backup directory:" ;; ERR_BACKUP_DIR_ALT) echo "❌ Cannot create alternative backup directory" ;; ERR_BACKUP_SUBDIR) echo "❌ Cannot create backup subdirectory:" ;; INFO_BACKUP_CREATED) echo "✅ Backup created:" ;; INFO_CLEANING_BACKUPS) echo "🧹 Cleaning" ;; INFO_OLD_BACKUPS) echo "old backups..." ;; ERR_LOCK_DIR) echo "❌ Cannot create lock directory:" ;; WARN_LOCK_DIR_PERM) echo "⚠️ Cannot set lock directory permissions, continuing..." ;; WARN_CLEAN_LOCKS) echo "⚠️ Cleaning old lock files..." ;; WARN_INVALID_KEY) echo "⚠️ Skipping invalid SSH key line" ;; WARN_SHORT_RSA_KEY) echo "⚠️ RSA key too short:" ;; WARN_SHORT_ED25519_KEY) echo "⚠️ Ed25519 key too short:" ;; WARN_SHORT_DSA_KEY) echo "⚠️ DSA key too short:" ;; ERR_INVALID_KEY_FORMAT) echo "❌ SSH key format invalid" ;; ERR_MISSING_BASE64) echo "❌ SSH key missing base64 part" ;; ERR_INVALID_BASE64) echo "❌ SSH key base64 encoding invalid" ;; WARN_NO_BASE64_SKIPLEN) echo "⚠️ base64 not found: skipping key length checks (format-only validation)" ;; WARN_USER_SHELL) echo "⚠️ User shell does not allow login:" ;; ASK_CHANGE_SHELL) echo "Change user's shell to /bin/bash? [y/N]: " ;; WARN_CHANGE_SHELL_FAIL) echo "⚠️ Failed to change shell" ;; WARN_UNUSUAL_SHELL) echo "⚠️ User uses unusual shell:" ;; WARN_HOME_OWNER) echo "⚠️ User home directory owner mismatch:" ;; WARN_HOME_NOT_WRITABLE) echo "⚠️ User home directory not writable" ;; ERR_USER_CREATE_FAIL) echo "❌ Failed to create user" ;; ERR_USER_VERIFY_FAIL) echo "❌ User verification failed after creation" ;; WARN_NO_SUDOERS_DIR) echo "⚠️ No /etc/sudoers.d directory, skipping sudo config" ;; INFO_SUDO_EXISTS) echo "ℹ️ User already has sudo permissions" ;; ERR_SUDOERS_SYNTAX) echo "❌ sudoers file syntax error, deleted" ;; ERR_SUDOERS_PERM) echo "❌ Cannot set sudoers file permissions" ;; INFO_SUDO_CONFIGURED) echo "✅ Configured sudo permissions for user" ;; WARN_SSH_PROTOCOL) echo "⚠️ SSH protocol handshake failed or timed out" ;; INFO_SSH_PROTOCOL_OK) echo "✅ SSH protocol handshake successful" ;; WARN_PORT_OPEN_BUT_FAIL) echo "⚠️ Port is open, but SSH connection failed (likely due to missing/mismatched private key). This is NOT an error. Please verify connection manually!" ;; WARN_X11_FORWARDING) echo "⚠️ X11 forwarding enabled, potential security risk" ;; WARN_EMPTY_PASSWORDS) echo "⚠️ Empty passwords allowed, security risk" ;; WARN_INSECURE_OPTIONS) echo "⚠️ Found non-critical insecure options (Info only, proceeding)" ;; ERR_DEADLOCK) echo "❌ FATAL: Both password and key authentication disabled, will cause lockout!" ;; ERR_PASSWORD_NO_KEY) echo "❌ FATAL: Password auth disabled but no SSH key deployed" ;; ERR_ROOT_NO_KEY) echo "❌ FATAL: Root password login disabled but no SSH key deployed" ;; WARN_PORT_MISMATCH) echo "⚠️ Port in config does not match target port" ;; ERR_CANNOT_RESERVE_PORT) echo "❌ Cannot reserve port, port may be occupied" ;; INFO_OLD_SSH_SKIP_ALGO) echo "ℹ️ Old OpenSSH or unable to detect supported lists: skipping forced crypto algorithms" ;; INFO_SANITIZE_DUP) echo "ℹ️ Sanitizing duplicate directives in original config..." ;; INFO_MATCH_INSERT) echo "ℹ️ Match blocks detected: inserting managed block before first Match to avoid scope issues" ;; ERR_NO_BANNER) echo "❌ Failed to get SSH-2.0 protocol banner, service may not be running properly" ;; INFO_KEYS_DEPLOYED) echo "✅ Number of keys deployed:" ;; WARN_NO_VALID_KEYS) echo "⚠️ No valid SSH keys were deployed" ;; ERR_HOME_SYMLINK) echo "❌ Refuse: user home is symlink" ;; ERR_SSH_DIR_SYMLINK) echo "❌ Refuse: .ssh is symlink" ;; ERR_AUTH_KEYS_SYMLINK) echo "❌ Refuse: authorized_keys is symlink" ;; ERR_HOME_NOT_DIR) echo "❌ Refuse: user home is not a directory" ;; ERR_SSH_DIR_NOT_DIR) echo "❌ Refuse: .ssh exists but is not a directory" ;; ERR_AUTH_KEYS_NOT_FILE) echo "❌ Refuse: authorized_keys exists but is not a regular file" ;; DELAY_RESTART_MSG) echo "⚠️ Delay restart mode: config written, please manually restart sshd and test" ;; *) echo "$key" ;; esac fi } # ---------------- Logging & Audit ---------------- init_log_files() { for logfile in "$LOG_FILE" "$AUDIT_FILE"; do # [v4.7.4 FIX-LOW] Reject pre-planted symlinks at log paths. A symlink # in /var/log (root-owned 755) requires prior root-equiv write, but as # defense-in-depth we remove it before touch follows it to e.g. # /etc/shadow. Helper unlink_if_symlink is defined later, so inline here. if [ -L "$logfile" ]; then rm -f "$logfile" 2>/dev/null || true fi if [ -f "$logfile" ]; then if [ ! -w "$logfile" ]; then logfile_new="${logfile}.$(date +%s)" if touch "$logfile_new" 2>/dev/null; then chmod 600 "$logfile_new" 2>/dev/null || true if [ "$logfile" = "$LOG_FILE" ]; then LOG_FILE="$logfile_new" else AUDIT_FILE="$logfile_new" fi fi fi else touch "$logfile" 2>/dev/null || true chmod 600 "$logfile" 2>/dev/null || true fi done } init_log_files log() { echo "$(date '+%F %T') $*" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true; } audit_log() { action="$1" details="$2" # [v4.7.6 FIX-HIGH-N3] Strip newlines from action/details before writing. # Without this, a $details value containing "\n---\nACTION: FAKE" could # inject forged audit entries. $details can transitively come from # untrusted sources (e.g. paths derived from /etc/passwd field 6 which # ends up in KEYS_DEPLOYED "auth=..." details). Replace LF/CR with space. action=$(printf '%s' "$action" | tr -d '\n\r') details=$(printf '%s' "$details" | tr '\n\r' ' ') { echo "=== $(date '+%F %T') ===" echo "ACTION: $action" echo "USER: $(whoami 2>/dev/null || echo root)" echo "DETAILS: $details" echo "---" } >> "$AUDIT_FILE" 2>/dev/null || { # [v4.7.7 FIX-LOW] Audit-log fallback to stderr when /var/log is full, # read-only, or otherwise unwritable. The ROLLBACK entry itself is the # most important forensic record — losing it silently would leave the # operator with no idea why the rollback fired. printf 'AUDIT-FALLBACK %s ACTION=%s DETAILS=%s\n' \ "$(date '+%F %T' 2>/dev/null || echo unknown)" "$action" "$details" >&2 } log "[AUDIT] $action - $details" } # [v4.7.0] Color via printf %b (dash-safe: '\033[...' is interpreted, not literal) # IMPORTANT: never put $COLOR into the format-string slot — keep it as %b argument. info() { printf '%b[INFO]%b %s\n' "$BLUE" "$NC" "$*"; log "[INFO] $*"; } warn() { printf '%b[WARN]%b %s\n' "$YELLOW" "$NC" "$*"; log "[WARN] $*"; } err() { printf '%b[ERR ]%b %s\n' "$RED" "$NC" "$*"; log "[ERR ] $*"; } ok() { printf '%b[ OK ]%b %s\n' "$GREEN" "$NC" "$*"; log "[OK] $*"; } die() { err "$*"; exit 1; } # [v4.7.4 FIX-LOW] Symlink-defense helper: if $1 is a symlink, remove it. # Prevents a planted symlink (planted by a previous root-equiv compromise) # from making `cat > FILE` or `echo >> FILE` write into the symlink target # (e.g. /etc/shadow). All write-targets in root-only directories use this. unlink_if_symlink() { [ -L "$1" ] || return 0 rm -f "$1" 2>/dev/null || true } # [v4.7.7 FIX-HIGH] Detect chroot-without-PID-namespace. Used by: # - direct-spawn sshd refusal (avoid `pkill -x sshd` killing host sshd) # - script-level mutex stale-PID detection (without /proc we can't tell # "stale lock" from "live peer", so refuse rather than reclaim) # Returns 0 if chroot/ambiguous, 1 if confirmed real root. in_chroot_or_unknown() { # If /proc is unavailable, we can't determine — treat as chroot for safety. [ -d /proc/1/root ] || return 0 # Compare root inode of the script's view vs PID 1's root. root_now=$(stat -c '%d:%i' / 2>/dev/null) root_init=$(stat -c '%d:%i' /proc/1/root/ 2>/dev/null) [ -z "$root_now" ] || [ -z "$root_init" ] && return 0 [ "$root_now" != "$root_init" ] } # ========================================================= # Core Logic Functions # ========================================================= preflight_checks() { essential_cmds="cat grep awk sed cp mv chmod chown mkdir rm id" extended_cmds="wc tr head cut touch find sleep date df uname tail" missing_cmds="" for cmd in $essential_cmds; do if ! command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null 2>&1; then missing_cmds="$missing_cmds $cmd" fi done if [ -n "$missing_cmds" ]; then die "$(msg ERR_MISSING)$missing_cmds" fi for cmd in $extended_cmds; do if ! command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null 2>&1; then warn "Optional command not found: $cmd (some features may be limited)" fi done available_kb=$(df -k / 2>/dev/null | awk 'NR==2 {print $4}' 2>/dev/null || echo "") if [ -n "$available_kb" ] && [ "$available_kb" -lt 5120 ] 2>/dev/null; then warn "$(msg WARN_DISK)${available_kb}KB" fi if [ -f /proc/meminfo ]; then mem_avail=$(grep MemAvailable /proc/meminfo 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $2}' 2>/dev/null || echo "") if [ -n "$mem_avail" ] && [ "$mem_avail" -lt 51200 ] 2>/dev/null; then warn "$(msg WARN_MEM)${mem_avail}KB" fi fi if ! command -v base64 >/dev/null 2>&1; then warn "$(msg WARN_NO_BASE64_SKIPLEN)" fi } # ---------------- Package Manager ---------------- detect_pm() { [ -f /etc/alpine-release ] && { echo apk; return; } [ -f /etc/debian_version ] && { echo apt; return; } [ -f /etc/redhat-release ] && { echo yum; return; } echo unknown } PM="$(detect_pm)" APT_UPDATED="n" APK_UPDATED="n" YUM_PREPARED="n" pm_prepare_once() { case "$PM" in apt) [ "$APT_UPDATED" != "y" ] && { apt-get update -y >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true; APT_UPDATED="y"; } ;; apk) [ "$APK_UPDATED" != "y" ] && { apk update >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true; APK_UPDATED="y"; } ;; yum) [ "$YUM_PREPARED" != "y" ] && { if command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then dnf makecache -y >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true; else yum makecache -y >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true; fi YUM_PREPARED="y"; } ;; esac } install_pkg() { case "$PM" in apt) pm_prepare_once; DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y "$@" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 ;; yum) pm_prepare_once; if command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then dnf install -y "$@" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; else yum install -y "$@" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; fi ;; apk) pm_prepare_once; apk add --no-cache "$@" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 ;; *) return 1 ;; esac } install_pkg_try() { for p in "$@"; do if install_pkg "$p" >/dev/null 2>&1; then return 0; fi done return 1 } update_system() { # [v4.7.8 FIX-MED W1-1] Forensic record: a system-wide package upgrade is a # significant mutation that prior versions did not audit. Operators # investigating post-incident need to know whether the run touched # packages. audit_log "SYSTEM_UPDATE_START" "pm=$PM" case "$PM" in apt) pm_prepare_once; DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get upgrade -y >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 ;; yum) pm_prepare_once; if command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then dnf upgrade -y >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; else yum update -y >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; fi ;; apk) pm_prepare_once; apk upgrade >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 ;; esac audit_log "SYSTEM_UPDATE_DONE" "pm=$PM rc=$?" } # ---------------- SSHD Restart ---------------- # [v4.7.1] Args: # $1 (optional) — "force" bypasses the --delay-restart no-op (used by # rollback_handler, which must always relaunch sshd). restart_sshd() { force_mode="${1:-}" if [ "$ARG_DELAY_RESTART" = "y" ] && [ "$force_mode" != "force" ]; then warn "DELAY RESTART: Please manually restart sshd later." return 0 fi # [v4.7.8 FIX-HIGH-W4] Detect chroot BEFORE the systemctl path. With /run/dbus # bind-mounted into the chroot (common), `systemctl restart sshd` would # cross the chroot boundary via D-Bus and restart the HOST's sshd using the # CHROOT's modified config — silently breaking the host. Previously the # chroot guard only fired inside the direct-spawn fallback (after systemctl # had already run). Move the guard to the top of the function. if in_chroot_or_unknown; then err "Refusing to restart sshd: this process appears to be in a chroot" err " (or environment without /proc). Any restart path could reach the" err " HOST's sshd via D-Bus/PID-NS leakage and apply this chroot's config" err " to the host. Use --delay-restart and restart sshd manually outside" err " the chroot." audit_log "RESTART_REFUSED" "reason=chroot_or_no_proc" return 1 fi res=1 # ----- 1. systemd ----- if command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1; then systemctl stop ssh.socket >/dev/null 2>&1 || true systemctl disable ssh.socket >/dev/null 2>&1 || true if systemctl restart sshd >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || systemctl restart ssh >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; then return 0 fi res=$? fi # ----- 2. OpenRC ----- if command -v rc-service >/dev/null 2>&1; then rc-service sshd restart >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 && return 0 res=$? fi # ----- 3. SysV service ----- if command -v service >/dev/null 2>&1; then service sshd restart >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 && return 0 service ssh restart >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 && return 0 res=$? fi # ----- 4. init.d ----- if [ -x /etc/init.d/sshd ]; then /etc/init.d/sshd restart >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 && return 0 fi if [ -x /etc/init.d/ssh ]; then /etc/init.d/ssh restart >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 && return 0 fi # ----- 5. [v4.7.1 FIX-R4/H5] Direct-spawn fallback for minimal containers, # chroot environments, or any host where no init system is reachable # but the sshd binary is present. This is what makes the script # actually work inside e.g. a plain `docker run ubuntu:22.04` (which # has no PID 1 systemd) and inside test containers in CI. if command -v sshd >/dev/null 2>&1; then # [v4.7.3 FIX-MED] If the operator is running over SSH, the direct-spawn # fallback would kill the operator's own session. Detect via SSH_CONNECTION # env var (present in interactive ssh sessions) and refuse unconditionally # — there is no flag to override this. The correct workflow is: reconnect # via console/VNC, then re-run. if [ -n "${SSH_CONNECTION:-}" ]; then err "Direct-spawn fallback would kill sshd — but you appear to be running over SSH:" err " SSH_CONNECTION=$SSH_CONNECTION" err " Killing all sshd processes would drop your own session." err " Refusing. Reconnect via console/VNC, then re-run the script." audit_log "DIRECT_SPAWN_REFUSED" "SSH_CONNECTION=$SSH_CONNECTION" return 1 fi # [v4.7.7 FIX-HIGH] Even without SSH_CONNECTION, running in a chroot # WITHOUT a separate PID namespace means `pkill -x sshd` reaches the # HOST's sshd processes — including any SSH sessions terminating to the # host. This is exactly the "operator opened console, then chroot # /mnt/target, then ran script" scenario. Refuse. if in_chroot_or_unknown; then err "Direct-spawn fallback would run pkill -x sshd, but this process appears to be" err " in a chroot (or environment where /proc is missing). pkill would target the" err " HOST's sshd (different PID namespace not detected). Refusing to avoid mass" err " SSH disconnect on the host. Run from a proper container/VM or skip --delay-restart." audit_log "DIRECT_SPAWN_REFUSED" "reason=chroot_or_no_proc" return 1 fi info "No init system available — performing direct sshd spawn" audit_log "DIRECT_SPAWN" "config=$SSH_CONF" # Validate the file before killing the live instance — if syntax is bad # we'd otherwise lock ourselves out. if ! sshd -t -f "$SSH_CONF" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; then err "Direct-spawn: sshd -t failed against $SSH_CONF" return 1 fi # Try graceful first. pkill -TERM -x sshd >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true # Brief settle. sleep 1 # If sshd is still around, escalate. pkill -KILL -x sshd >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true # Re-launch (daemon mode by default). if sshd -f "$SSH_CONF" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; then return 0 fi res=$? fi return "$res" } # ---------------- Robust Rollback ---------------- ROLLBACK_DIR="$TMP_DIR/rollback" update_state() { phase="$1" details="${2:-}" { echo "PHASE=$phase" echo "TIMESTAMP=$(date +%s)" echo "USER=${TARGET_USER:-unknown}" echo "PORT=${SSH_PORT:-22}" echo "KEY_OK=${KEY_OK:-n}" echo "DETAILS=$details" } > "$STATE_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true chmod 600 "$STATE_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true } parse_state_value() { key="$1" file="$2" if [ -f "$file" ] && [ -r "$file" ]; then sed -n "s/^${key}=//p" "$file" 2>/dev/null | head -n 1 | tr -d '\r' fi } check_previous_state() { if [ -f "$STATE_FILE" ]; then state_owner="" if stat -c "%u" "$STATE_FILE" >/dev/null 2>&1; then state_owner=$(stat -c "%u" "$STATE_FILE" 2>/dev/null) else state_owner=$(ls -ln "$STATE_FILE" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $3}') fi current_uid=$(id -u) if [ "$state_owner" != "$current_uid" ] 2>/dev/null; then warn "State file owned by different user, ignoring" rm -f "$STATE_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true return 0 fi warn "$(msg WARN_RESUME)" # [v4.7.0] Surface previous phase in the warning instead of just discarding it prev_phase=$(parse_state_value "PHASE" "$STATE_FILE") prev_user=$(parse_state_value "USER" "$STATE_FILE") prev_port=$(parse_state_value "PORT" "$STATE_FILE") [ -n "$prev_phase" ] && warn " - previous phase: $prev_phase (user=$prev_user port=$prev_port)" # [v4.7.6 FIX-HIGH-N2] If a previous run crashed mid-way, its artifact # mirror in RUNTIME_DIR will be non-empty. Surface the artifacts so the # operator knows what mutations are stranded. prev_mirror="$RUNTIME_DIR/last-artifacts-$(id -u)" if [ -s "$prev_mirror" ]; then warn " ⚠ Previous run left STRANDED mutations the new run cannot roll back:" __stranded_count=0 while IFS= read -r __fact; do if [ -n "$__fact" ]; then warn " - $__fact" __stranded_count=$((__stranded_count + 1)) fi done < "$prev_mirror" warn " Manual cleanup may be required (delete users / sudoers / firewall rules)." # [v4.7.8 FIX-MED W8-1] Audit-log the stranded state so SIEM / scripted # cron `--yes` runs don't silently accumulate detected-but-ignored # mutations. The detailed list is in $LOG_FILE; the audit entry just # records the count so an alert can fire. audit_log "STRANDED_MUTATIONS_DETECTED" "count=$__stranded_count mirror=$prev_mirror" unset __stranded_count __fact fi if [ "$AUTO_CONFIRM" != "y" ]; then printf "%s" "$(msg ASK_RESUME)" read -r continue_resume if [ "${continue_resume:-n}" != "y" ]; then rm -f "$STATE_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true exit 1 fi fi [ -n "$prev_user" ] && [ -z "$ARG_USER" ] && TARGET_USER="$prev_user" [ -n "$prev_port" ] && [ -z "$ARG_PORT" ] && SSH_PORT="$prev_port" fi } cleanup_state() { rm -f "$STATE_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true # [v4.7.6 FIX-HIGH-N2] Clear the artifact mirror on success; the prev_mirror # detection above only fires when a previous run left a NON-EMPTY mirror. [ -n "${ARTIFACT_MIRROR:-}" ] && rm -f "$ARTIFACT_MIRROR" 2>/dev/null || true } cleanup_locks() { if [ -n "${LOCK_DIR:-}" ] && [ -d "$LOCK_DIR" ]; then rm -rf "$LOCK_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true fi # [v4.7.6 FIX-HIGH-N1] Release script-level mutex on every exit path. if [ -n "${SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR:-}" ] && [ -d "$SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR" ]; then rm -rf "$SCRIPT_LOCK_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true fi } # [v4.7.0 / v4.7.6] Artifact tracking. Each line in $ROLLBACK_DIR/artifacts # is a fact the rollback handler can undo. Append-only, line-oriented, # parsed in reverse. # [v4.7.6 FIX-HIGH-N2] Also mirror appends into $RUNTIME_DIR/last-artifacts-UID # so a script killed by SIGKILL / OOM / power loss can be recovered by the # next run (TMP_DIR is per-mktemp and lost on hard-kill; RUNTIME_DIR survives). ARTIFACT_FILE="" ARTIFACT_MIRROR="" artifact_track() { fact="$1" if [ -n "$ARTIFACT_FILE" ]; then printf '%s\n' "$fact" >> "$ARTIFACT_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true fi if [ -n "$ARTIFACT_MIRROR" ]; then printf '%s\n' "$fact" >> "$ARTIFACT_MIRROR" 2>/dev/null || true fi } # Reverse a file line-by-line in pure POSIX awk (no `tac` dependency). __reverse_lines() { awk '{ a[NR] = $0 } END { for (i = NR; i >= 1; i--) print a[i] }' "$1" 2>/dev/null } rollback_handler() { RET=$? # [v4.7.0] Disarm signals immediately so a SIGINT mid-rollback can't re-enter. trap '' INT TERM HUP trap - EXIT if [ "$RET" -ne 0 ]; then warn "" warn "$(msg RB_START)" # 1. Undo recorded artifacts in REVERSE chronological order. # [v4.7.1 FIX-M4] `|| [ -n "$fact" ]` ensures the loop also processes # the LAST line even if a torn write (disk full) left it without LF. if [ -n "$ARTIFACT_FILE" ] && [ -f "$ARTIFACT_FILE" ]; then __reverse_lines "$ARTIFACT_FILE" | while IFS= read -r fact || [ -n "$fact" ]; do case "$fact" in USER_CREATED=*) u="${fact#USER_CREATED=}" if id "$u" >/dev/null 2>&1; then warn " - removing user $u (and home dir)" # [v4.7.1 FIX-M5] Kill any processes owned by the user first, # otherwise userdel refuses to remove "user is currently used". if command -v pkill >/dev/null 2>&1; then pkill -KILL -u "$u" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true sleep 1 fi userdel_ok=0 if command -v userdel >/dev/null 2>&1; then userdel -r "$u" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 && userdel_ok=1 || userdel "$u" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 && userdel_ok=1 elif command -v deluser >/dev/null 2>&1; then deluser --remove-home "$u" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 && userdel_ok=1 || deluser "$u" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 && userdel_ok=1 fi if [ "$userdel_ok" != "1" ]; then audit_log "USER_REMOVE_FAILED" "Rollback could not remove user $u" err " - userdel failed for $u (check $LOG_FILE)" fi fi ;; SUDOERS_FILE=*) # [v4.7.6 FIX-MED-N5] Verify rm actually removed the file. On # read-only /etc the rm silently fails; a stale sudoers entry # plus a deleted user creates a "passwordless sudo for any # future re-created user with the same name" privilege primitive. f="${fact#SUDOERS_FILE=}" if [ -f "$f" ]; then warn " - removing $f" rm -f "$f" 2>/dev/null || true if [ -f "$f" ]; then err " - FAILED to remove $f (read-only /etc?)" audit_log "ROLLBACK_RM_FAILED" "$f" rollback_clean=0 fi fi ;; SYSTEMD_OVERRIDE=*) f="${fact#SYSTEMD_OVERRIDE=}" if [ -f "$f" ]; then warn " - removing $f" rm -f "$f" 2>/dev/null || true if [ -f "$f" ]; then err " - FAILED to remove $f" audit_log "ROLLBACK_RM_FAILED" "$f" rollback_clean=0 fi fi command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1 && systemctl daemon-reload >/dev/null 2>&1 || true ;; PROFILE_D_BANNER=*) f="${fact#PROFILE_D_BANNER=}" if [ -f "$f" ]; then warn " - removing $f" rm -f "$f" 2>/dev/null || true if [ -f "$f" ]; then err " - FAILED to remove $f" audit_log "ROLLBACK_RM_FAILED" "$f" rollback_clean=0 fi fi ;; FIREWALL_PORT=*) # [v4.7.1 FIX-H2] Format is "backend:port" (e.g. "ufw:2222"). # Backwards-compatible: if a pre-v4.7.1 artifact file has just the # port number, treat it as "iptables:port" (most likely). spec="${fact#FIREWALL_PORT=}" case "$spec" in *:*) fw_backend="${spec%%:*}"; fw_p="${spec#*:}" ;; *) fw_backend="iptables"; fw_p="$spec" ;; esac warn " - removing firewall rule (${fw_backend}) for tcp/$fw_p" case "$fw_backend" in ufw) command -v ufw >/dev/null 2>&1 && ufw delete allow "${fw_p}/tcp" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true ;; firewalld) if command -v firewall-cmd >/dev/null 2>&1; then firewall-cmd --permanent --remove-port="${fw_p}/tcp" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true firewall-cmd --reload >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true fi ;; iptables) command -v iptables >/dev/null 2>&1 && iptables -D INPUT -p tcp --dport "$fw_p" -j ACCEPT >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true ;; esac # IPv6 companion — try to remove if it exists; harmless if not. command -v ip6tables >/dev/null 2>&1 && ip6tables -D INPUT -p tcp --dport "$fw_p" -j ACCEPT >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true ;; SELINUX_PORT=*) # [v4.7.5] Safe to delete: artifact_track for SELINUX_PORT only # fires when handle_selinux ADDED or MODIFIED (i.e. this run owns # the label). The NOOP path no longer tracks, so rollback cannot # delete a sysadmin-installed label by accident. p="${fact#SELINUX_PORT=}" if command -v semanage >/dev/null 2>&1; then warn " - removing SELinux port label for $p" semanage port -d -t ssh_port_t -p tcp "$p" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true fi ;; BBR_SYSCTL=*) f="${fact#BBR_SYSCTL=}" [ -f "$f" ] || continue warn " - reverting BBR sysctl lines from $f" tmpf="${f}.rb.$$" grep -vE '^(net\.core\.default_qdisc=fq|net\.ipv4\.tcp_congestion_control=bbr)$' "$f" > "$tmpf" 2>/dev/null && mv "$tmpf" "$f" 2>/dev/null || rm -f "$tmpf" 2>/dev/null ;; MOTD_BAK=*) # [v4.7.1 FIX-R3 / v4.7.6 FIX-MED-N6] Restore /etc/motd from .bak. # If .bak is missing (rare, e.g. it was manually removed), motd # stays in its modified state — surface this as a non-clean # rollback so the operator knows to manually clean up. f="${fact#MOTD_BAK=}" if [ -f "${f}.bak" ]; then warn " - restoring $f from ${f}.bak" if ! mv "${f}.bak" "$f" 2>/dev/null; then err " failed to restore motd from ${f}.bak" audit_log "ROLLBACK_MOTD_FAILED" "$f" rollback_clean=0 fi else err " - MOTD .bak missing; $f stays in modified state" audit_log "ROLLBACK_MOTD_BAK_MISSING" "$f" rollback_clean=0 fi ;; esac done fi # 2. [v4.7.1 FIX-R2] Rename `.bak_server_init` files BACK to their originals. # Previously these were rm -f'd, which permanently lost user data when # the snapshot directory was empty or partial. The original drop-in # content lives in this renamed file — restore it by renaming back. if [ -d "$SSH_CONF_D" ]; then for f in "$SSH_CONF_D"/*.bak_server_init; do [ -f "$f" ] || continue orig="${f%.bak_server_init}" warn " - restoring renamed drop-in: $f → $orig" # If the snapshot has a fresher copy, prefer it; otherwise this rename # is the only source of truth. if [ -f "$ROLLBACK_DIR/sshd_config.d/$(basename "$orig")" ]; then rm -f "$f" 2>/dev/null || true else mv "$f" "$orig" 2>/dev/null || warn " failed to rename" fi done fi # 3. Restore /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/* — drop any files we ADDED during the # run (not present in snapshot), then re-populate from snapshot. if [ -d "$ROLLBACK_DIR/sshd_config.d" ] && [ -d "$SSH_CONF_D" ]; then for f in "$SSH_CONF_D"/*; do [ -f "$f" ] || continue base=$(basename "$f") case "$base" in *.bak_server_init) continue ;; # already handled in stage 2 esac # Only delete if NOT present in the snapshot. if [ ! -f "$ROLLBACK_DIR/sshd_config.d/$base" ]; then rm -f "$f" 2>/dev/null || true fi done for f in "$ROLLBACK_DIR/sshd_config.d"/*; do [ -f "$f" ] || continue cp -p "$f" "$SSH_CONF_D"/ 2>/dev/null || warn " - failed to restore $f" done fi # 4. Restore the main sshd_config from snapshot. if [ -f "$ROLLBACK_DIR/sshd_config" ]; then if ! cp -p "$ROLLBACK_DIR/sshd_config" "$SSH_CONF" 2>/dev/null; then err " - FAILED to restore $SSH_CONF from snapshot" fi chmod 600 "$SSH_CONF" 2>/dev/null || true fi # 5. Restore iptables (now actually used — v4.6.x had captured but never applied). if [ -f "$ROLLBACK_DIR/iptables.backup" ] && command -v iptables-restore >/dev/null 2>&1; then # [v4.7.1 FIX-M6] iptables-restore replaces the entire ruleset with the # snapshot. Rules added by OTHER services since setup_rollback (e.g. # fail2ban triggers) will be wiped. Warn loudly. warn " - iptables-restore: replacing live ruleset with snapshot taken at script start" warn " (rules added by other services since then will be lost)" iptables-restore < "$ROLLBACK_DIR/iptables.backup" 2>>"$LOG_FILE" || warn " - iptables-restore failed" fi # 6. Validate restored config & relaunch sshd. If either fails we MUST shout. # [v4.7.2 FIX] Only relaunch sshd when the restored config passes # `sshd -t`. Previously we restarted regardless, which could push a # broken config to the live daemon (worst-case: sshd crashes and the # machine is unreachable). When validation fails, we skip the restart # so the LIVE sshd keeps running its current (pre-rollback) in-memory # config — buying the operator time to reach VNC/console. rollback_clean=1 config_ok=1 if command -v sshd >/dev/null 2>&1; then if ! sshd -t -f "$SSH_CONF" 2>>"$LOG_FILE"; then rollback_clean=0 config_ok=0 err " - restored sshd_config failed sshd -t — NOT restarting sshd to avoid pushing a broken config" fi fi if [ "$config_ok" = "1" ]; then # [v4.7.1 FIX-H4] Force-restart so --delay-restart runs still relaunch # the daemon during rollback. if ! restart_sshd force >/dev/null 2>&1; then rollback_clean=0 err " - restart_sshd failed during rollback" fi fi if [ "$rollback_clean" = "1" ]; then ok "$(msg RB_DONE)" else err "================================================================" err " ⚠ ROLLBACK COULD NOT FULLY RESTORE THE SYSTEM." err " ⚠ Open a VNC/console session and manually verify:" err " - $SSH_CONF syntax (sshd -t)" err " - sshd is listening on port 22" err " - $LOG_FILE for the failure trail" err "================================================================" fi # [v4.7.3 FIX-H5] After a rollback, the LAST_APPLIED_FILE may point at a # firewall rule that no longer exists (we just removed it). Clear it so # the next run starts from a clean state. rm -f "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true audit_log "ROLLBACK" "rc=$RET clean=$rollback_clean" else rm -rf "$TMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true fi cleanup_locks exit "$RET" } setup_rollback() { mkdir -p "$ROLLBACK_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true chmod 700 "$ROLLBACK_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true ARTIFACT_FILE="$ROLLBACK_DIR/artifacts" : > "$ARTIFACT_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true chmod 600 "$ARTIFACT_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true # [v4.7.6 FIX-HIGH-N2] Also persist the artifact file path AND mirror its # content into RUNTIME_DIR (which survives across script invocations, # unlike TMP_DIR which is per-mktemp). If this run is killed by SIGKILL / # OOM / power loss, the next script invocation can find the mirrored # artifact list and offer recovery. The mirror is updated by artifact_track # on every append. # [v4.7.6 FIX-followup] Order matters: assign the path FIRST, then let # check_previous_state read any orphaned content from a prior crashed run, # THEN truncate for our run. The earlier v4.7.6 draft truncated BEFORE # check_previous_state, making the orphan-surface logic dead code. ARTIFACT_MIRROR="$RUNTIME_DIR/last-artifacts-$(id -u)" check_previous_state : > "$ARTIFACT_MIRROR" 2>/dev/null || true chmod 600 "$ARTIFACT_MIRROR" 2>/dev/null || true update_state "setup" "Init" # [v4.7.7 FIX-MED] Verify the snapshot cp actually produced a non-empty # file. Previously a silent cp failure (ENOSPC, NFS hiccup, ENOTDIR) would # leave a 0-byte snapshot; later rollback would cp it back over the live # /etc/ssh/sshd_config, blanking it. sshd refuses to start with an empty # config → operator locked out. Refuse to proceed when the snapshot is # missing or empty. if [ -f "$SSH_CONF" ]; then if ! cp -p "$SSH_CONF" "$ROLLBACK_DIR/sshd_config" 2>>"$LOG_FILE"; then die "setup_rollback: cp $SSH_CONF → $ROLLBACK_DIR/sshd_config FAILED (disk full?). Refusing to proceed without a rollback snapshot." fi if [ ! -s "$ROLLBACK_DIR/sshd_config" ]; then die "setup_rollback: snapshot of $SSH_CONF is empty after cp (likely ENOSPC mid-write). Refusing to proceed." fi fi chmod 600 "$ROLLBACK_DIR/sshd_config" 2>/dev/null || true if [ -d "$SSH_CONF_D" ]; then mkdir -p "$ROLLBACK_DIR/sshd_config.d" 2>/dev/null || true chmod 700 "$ROLLBACK_DIR/sshd_config.d" 2>/dev/null || true for f in "$SSH_CONF_D"/*; do [ -f "$f" ] || continue # [v4.7.3 FIX-H6] Skip .bak_server_init files when snapshotting — # they're already-renamed originals from a prior crashed run and # capturing them would let stage-3 of rollback restore stale content. case "$f" in *.bak_server_init|*.bak_server_init.[0-9]*) continue ;; esac cp -p "$f" "$ROLLBACK_DIR/sshd_config.d/" 2>/dev/null || true done fi if command -v iptables-save >/dev/null 2>&1; then iptables-save > "$ROLLBACK_DIR/iptables.backup" 2>/dev/null || true chmod 600 "$ROLLBACK_DIR/iptables.backup" 2>/dev/null || true fi # [v4.7.0] Explicit per-signal handling. EXIT trap fires unconditionally; the # signal traps just `exit` with the standard 128+N code so EXIT sees a real # non-zero $? (dash sets $? = 0 after a bare signal otherwise). trap 'rollback_handler' EXIT trap 'exit 130' INT trap 'exit 143' TERM trap 'exit 129' HUP } # ---------------- Persistent Backup ---------------- # [SEC-FIX] Fixed cleanup_old_backups awk logic bug cleanup_old_backups() { keep_count=10 if [ -d "$BACKUP_REPO" ]; then backup_list=$(ls -dt "$BACKUP_REPO"/*/ 2>/dev/null) || return 0 # [v4.7.3 FIX-MED] Use printf+wc instead of `grep -c . || echo 0`. # Previous form produced "0\n0" on empty input (grep -c outputs 0 AND # exits 1 → trailing `|| echo 0` appended a second 0), breaking the # numeric `-gt` compare. if [ -z "$backup_list" ]; then count=0 else count=$(printf '%s\n' "$backup_list" | grep -c . 2>/dev/null) [ -z "$count" ] && count=0 fi if [ "$count" -gt "$keep_count" ] 2>/dev/null; then to_rm=$((count - keep_count)) info "$(msg INFO_CLEANING_BACKUPS) $to_rm $(msg INFO_OLD_BACKUPS)" # [SEC-FIX] Use tail -n to get oldest backups (last in sorted list) echo "$backup_list" | tail -n "$to_rm" | while IFS= read -r d; do [ -n "$d" ] && [ -d "$d" ] && rm -rf "$d" 2>/dev/null || true done fi fi } backup_config_persistent() { # [v4.7.0] All file creation inside this function happens with umask 077 so # backup.info / restore.sh / checksums.sha256 are 0600/0700 instead of 0644. __saved_umask=$(umask) umask 077 timestamp=$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S) if command -v date >/dev/null 2>&1 && date --version 2>&1 | grep -q GNU; then timestamp=$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S%N 2>/dev/null || echo "$timestamp") fi backup_dir="$BACKUP_REPO/$timestamp" if ! mkdir -p "$BACKUP_REPO" 2>/dev/null; then warn "$(msg ERR_BACKUP_DIR) $BACKUP_REPO" # [v4.7.0 / HIGH] /tmp fallback only succeeds if the path doesn't already # exist with the wrong owner (defeats predictable-path squatting). alt="/tmp/server-init-backups" if [ -e "$alt" ] && [ ! -d "$alt" ]; then warn "$(msg ERR_BACKUP_DIR_ALT) ($alt exists and is not a directory)" umask "$__saved_umask" return 1 fi if [ -d "$alt" ]; then owner=$(stat -c "%u" "$alt" 2>/dev/null || ls -ld "$alt" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $3}') if [ -n "$owner" ] && [ "$owner" != "0" ] && [ "$owner" != "root" ]; then warn "$(msg ERR_BACKUP_DIR_ALT) (refusing to use $alt — owned by $owner)" umask "$__saved_umask" return 1 fi fi BACKUP_REPO="$alt" backup_dir="$BACKUP_REPO/$timestamp" if ! mkdir -p "$BACKUP_REPO" 2>/dev/null; then warn "$(msg ERR_BACKUP_DIR_ALT)" umask "$__saved_umask" return 1 fi fi chmod 700 "$BACKUP_REPO" 2>/dev/null || true if ! mkdir -p "$backup_dir" 2>/dev/null; then warn "$(msg ERR_BACKUP_SUBDIR) $backup_dir" umask "$__saved_umask" return 1 fi chmod 700 "$backup_dir" 2>/dev/null || true if [ -f "$SSH_CONF" ]; then # [v4.7.7 FIX-MED] Don't silently swallow cp failure — the persistent # backup is what `restore.sh` uses, so an incomplete cp would mean # operator's manual recovery gets a 0-byte sshd_config and bricks # the box harder. Failing the backup here just skips this persistent # snapshot (script continues — backup is opportunistic, not load-bearing). if ! cp -p "$SSH_CONF" "$backup_dir/sshd_config" 2>>"$LOG_FILE"; then warn "Persistent backup cp failed (disk full?); restore.sh from this backup will NOT work" rm -f "$backup_dir/sshd_config" 2>/dev/null || true elif [ ! -s "$backup_dir/sshd_config" ]; then warn "Persistent backup snapshot is empty (truncated mid-write); removing" rm -f "$backup_dir/sshd_config" 2>/dev/null || true else chmod 600 "$backup_dir/sshd_config" 2>/dev/null || true fi fi if [ -d "$SSH_CONF_D" ]; then mkdir -p "$backup_dir/sshd_config.d" 2>/dev/null && chmod 700 "$backup_dir/sshd_config.d" 2>/dev/null || true for f in "$SSH_CONF_D"/*; do [ -f "$f" ] || continue cp -p "$f" "$backup_dir/sshd_config.d/" 2>/dev/null || true done fi { echo "=== Server Init Backup ===" echo "Time: $(date)" echo "Version: 4.7.8" echo "User: ${TARGET_USER:-unknown}" echo "Port: ${SSH_PORT:-unknown}" echo "OpenSSH: ${OPENSSH_VER_MAJOR}.${OPENSSH_VER_MINOR}" echo "--- System ---" uname -a 2>/dev/null || true echo "" echo "Note: restore.sh restores ONLY $SSH_CONF and sshd_config.d/." echo "User accounts, sudoers files, systemd overrides, firewall rules," echo "SELinux port labels and BBR sysctl entries created by the run are" echo "NOT undone by restore.sh — use runtime auto-rollback instead." } > "$backup_dir/backup.info" 2>/dev/null || true chmod 600 "$backup_dir/backup.info" 2>/dev/null || true # [v4.7.0 / HIGH] restore.sh now verifies checksums before applying. cat > "$backup_dir/restore.sh" <<'EOF' #!/bin/sh # Auto-generated by linux-ssh-init-sh v4.7.8 # Restores /etc/ssh/sshd_config (and sshd_config.d/) from this backup directory # after verifying that the files match checksums.sha256. set -eu BACKUP_DIR=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd) SSH_CONFIG="/etc/ssh/sshd_config" SSH_CONFIG_D="/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d" if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then echo "Must be run as root" >&2 exit 1 fi echo "[restore] Verifying integrity..." # [v4.7.3 FIX-MED] Default to STRICT (refuse missing checksum). An attacker # who can write to the backup dir could otherwise delete checksums.sha256 to # neutralize verification. Set FORCE=1 in the environment to override (e.g. # when restoring a backup created by an older version that lacked sha256s). if [ ! -f "$BACKUP_DIR/checksums.sha256" ]; then if [ "${FORCE:-0}" != "1" ]; then echo "[restore] REFUSING: checksums.sha256 missing. Re-run with FORCE=1 to bypass." >&2 exit 5 fi echo "[restore] WARNING: FORCE=1 — proceeding without checksum verification." >&2 elif ! command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then if [ "${FORCE:-0}" != "1" ]; then echo "[restore] REFUSING: sha256sum not available. Re-run with FORCE=1 to bypass." >&2 exit 6 fi echo "[restore] WARNING: FORCE=1 — sha256sum unavailable, skipping verification." >&2 else ( cd "$BACKUP_DIR" && sha256sum -c checksums.sha256 ) || { echo "[restore] CHECKSUM MISMATCH — refusing to restore tampered backup." >&2 exit 2 } fi if [ ! -f "$BACKUP_DIR/sshd_config" ]; then echo "[restore] No sshd_config snapshot found." >&2 exit 3 fi ts=$(date +%s) cp -p "$SSH_CONFIG" "$SSH_CONFIG.bak-$ts" 2>/dev/null || true cp -p "$BACKUP_DIR/sshd_config" "$SSH_CONFIG" chmod 600 "$SSH_CONFIG" 2>/dev/null || true if [ -d "$BACKUP_DIR/sshd_config.d" ] && [ -d "$SSH_CONFIG_D" ]; then for f in "$BACKUP_DIR/sshd_config.d"/*; do [ -f "$f" ] || continue cp -p "$f" "$SSH_CONFIG_D/" 2>/dev/null || true done fi echo "[restore] Validating restored config..." if command -v sshd >/dev/null 2>&1; then sshd -t || { echo "[restore] sshd -t failed against restored config!" >&2; exit 4; } fi echo "[restore] Restarting sshd..." systemctl restart sshd 2>/dev/null || service sshd restart 2>/dev/null || /etc/init.d/sshd restart 2>/dev/null || true echo "[restore] Done. Test connectivity in a NEW terminal before closing this one." EOF chmod 700 "$backup_dir/restore.sh" 2>/dev/null || true # Generate checksums LAST so they cover every other file in the dir. ( cd "$backup_dir" || exit 0 # exclude any pre-existing checksums file from being self-referential rm -f checksums.sha256 2>/dev/null # [v4.7.1] xargs -r is GNU-only; BusyBox xargs lacks it. The input is # never empty in practice (backup.info + restore.sh always exist) so we # can drop the flag for portability. find . -maxdepth 2 -type f ! -name 'checksums.sha256' -print 2>/dev/null \ | sed 's|^\./||' \ | sort \ | xargs sha256sum 2>/dev/null > checksums.sha256 chmod 600 checksums.sha256 2>/dev/null || true ) || true umask "$__saved_umask" cleanup_old_backups info "$(msg INFO_BACKUP_CREATED) $backup_dir" return 0 } # ---------------- BBR ---------------- enable_bbr() { command -v sysctl >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0 if ! sysctl -n net.ipv4.tcp_available_congestion_control 2>/dev/null | grep -q bbr; then warn "Kernel does not support BBR, skipping." return 0 fi sysctl_conf="/etc/sysctl.conf" # [v4.7.4 FIX-LOW] Defense-in-depth: if /etc/sysctl.conf is a symlink, the # >> redirect would follow it. Refuse to append in that case (don't blindly # remove — sysctl.conf is sometimes legitimately a symlink to a packaged file). if [ -L "$sysctl_conf" ]; then warn "$sysctl_conf is a symlink — skipping BBR sysctl write (manual configuration required)" return 0 fi added_any=0 if ! grep -q '^net.core.default_qdisc=fq$' "$sysctl_conf" 2>/dev/null; then echo 'net.core.default_qdisc=fq' >> "$sysctl_conf" added_any=1 fi if ! grep -q '^net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=bbr$' "$sysctl_conf" 2>/dev/null; then echo 'net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control=bbr' >> "$sysctl_conf" added_any=1 fi if [ "$added_any" = "1" ]; then artifact_track "BBR_SYSCTL=$sysctl_conf" audit_log "BBR_ENABLED" "appended to $sysctl_conf" fi sysctl -p >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true } # ---------------- SSHD Helpers ---------------- ensure_ssh_server() { if [ -f "$SSH_CONF" ] && command -v sshd >/dev/null 2>&1; then return 0 fi info "$(msg I_SSH_INSTALL)" case "$PM" in apk) install_pkg openssh openssh-server ;; *) install_pkg openssh-server ;; esac if ! command -v sshd >/dev/null 2>&1; then die "$(msg ERR_MISSING_SSHD)" fi [ -f "$SSH_CONF" ] || die "OpenSSH Install Failed" } protect_sshd_service() { command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0 info "$(msg SYS_PROT)" systemctl enable ssh sshd 2>/dev/null || true systemctl unmask ssh sshd 2>/dev/null || true override_dir="/etc/systemd/system/sshd.service.d" override_file="$override_dir/override.conf" # [v4.7.0 / MED] Refuse to follow a symlinked override dir (package compromise vector) if [ -L "$override_dir" ]; then warn "$override_dir is a symlink — skipping systemd override" return 0 fi mkdir -p "$override_dir" 2>/dev/null || true chmod 755 "$override_dir" 2>/dev/null || true # [v4.7.4 FIX-LOW] Symlink defense (override_file path). unlink_if_symlink "$override_file" # Only write (and track) if file is new or content differs. desired_content='[Service] Restart=on-failure RestartSec=5s OOMScoreAdjust=-500' if [ ! -f "$override_file" ] || ! printf '%s' "$desired_content" | cmp -s - "$override_file" 2>/dev/null; then printf '%s\n' "$desired_content" > "$override_file" 2>/dev/null || warn "failed to write $override_file" chmod 644 "$override_file" 2>/dev/null || true chown root:root "$override_file" 2>/dev/null || true artifact_track "SYSTEMD_OVERRIDE=$override_file" audit_log "SYSTEMD_OVERRIDE_WRITTEN" "$override_file" fi systemctl daemon-reload >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true } detect_openssh_version() { OPENSSH_VER_MAJOR=0 OPENSSH_VER_MINOR=0 ver_str="" if command -v sshd >/dev/null 2>&1; then ver_str=$(sshd -V 2>&1 | sed -n 's/.*OpenSSH_\([0-9]*\)\.\([0-9]*\).*/\1.\2/p' | head -1) fi if [ -z "$ver_str" ] && command -v ssh >/dev/null 2>&1; then ver_str=$(ssh -V 2>&1 | sed -n 's/.*OpenSSH_\([0-9]*\)\.\([0-9]*\).*/\1.\2/p' | head -1) fi if [ -n "$ver_str" ]; then OPENSSH_VER_MAJOR=$(echo "$ver_str" | cut -d. -f1 2>/dev/null || echo 0) OPENSSH_VER_MINOR=$(echo "$ver_str" | cut -d. -f2 2>/dev/null || echo 0) fi case "$OPENSSH_VER_MAJOR" in ''|*[!0-9]*) OPENSSH_VER_MAJOR=7 ;; esac case "$OPENSSH_VER_MINOR" in ''|*[!0-9]*) OPENSSH_VER_MINOR=0 ;; esac [ "$OPENSSH_VER_MAJOR" -eq 0 ] 2>/dev/null && OPENSSH_VER_MAJOR=7 } openssh_version_ge() { req_major="$1" req_minor="${2:-0}" [ "$OPENSSH_VER_MAJOR" -gt "$req_major" ] && return 0 [ "$OPENSSH_VER_MAJOR" -eq "$req_major" ] && [ "$OPENSSH_VER_MINOR" -ge "$req_minor" ] && return 0 return 1 } # [SEC-FIX] Detect if sshd supports KbdInteractiveAuthentication detect_kbd_interactive_support() { SUPPORTS_KBD_INTERACTIVE="n" if command -v sshd >/dev/null 2>&1; then if sshd -T 2>/dev/null | grep -qi '^kbdinteractiveauthentication'; then SUPPORTS_KBD_INTERACTIVE="y" fi fi } # ---------------- Firewall / SELinux ---------------- # [v4.7.3 FIX-H5 / v4.7.4 extended] Read last-applied state from disk and, if # it records a DIFFERENT port than the one we're about to install, remove # stale firewall AND SELinux state so a chain of `--port=X then --port=Y` # runs doesn't leave cruft on every prior X. remove_stale_firewall_port() { new_port="$1" [ -f "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" ] || return 0 # ---- Firewall stale-rule cleanup ---- old_spec=$(awk -F= '$1=="FIREWALL"{print $2; exit}' "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" 2>/dev/null) if [ -n "$old_spec" ]; then case "$old_spec" in *:*) old_backend="${old_spec%%:*}"; old_port="${old_spec#*:}" ;; *) old_backend="iptables"; old_port="$old_spec" ;; esac case "$old_port" in ''|*[!0-9]*) old_port="" ;; esac if [ -n "$old_port" ] && [ "$old_port" != "$new_port" ] && [ "$old_port" != "22" ]; then warn "Cleaning stale firewall rule from previous run: tcp/$old_port (backend: $old_backend)" case "$old_backend" in ufw) command -v ufw >/dev/null 2>&1 && ufw delete allow "${old_port}/tcp" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true ;; firewalld) if command -v firewall-cmd >/dev/null 2>&1; then firewall-cmd --permanent --remove-port="${old_port}/tcp" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true firewall-cmd --reload >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true fi ;; iptables) command -v iptables >/dev/null 2>&1 && iptables -D INPUT -p tcp --dport "$old_port" -j ACCEPT >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true ;; esac command -v ip6tables >/dev/null 2>&1 && ip6tables -D INPUT -p tcp --dport "$old_port" -j ACCEPT >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true audit_log "STALE_FIREWALL_REMOVED" "backend=$old_backend port=$old_port" fi fi # ---- [v4.7.4 / v4.7.5 FIX-MED-1] SELinux stale-label cleanup ---- # Only delete a label that THIS script previously INSTALLED (SELINUX_OWNED=y). # A label recorded as NOOP (SELINUX_OWNED=n) belongs to the operator or # was set up out-of-band — deleting it would silently destroy unrelated # system state. old_se=$(awk -F= '$1=="SELINUX_PORT"{print $2; exit}' "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" 2>/dev/null) old_owned=$(awk -F= '$1=="SELINUX_OWNED"{print $2; exit}' "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" 2>/dev/null) case "$old_se" in ''|*[!0-9]*) old_se="" ;; esac if [ -n "$old_se" ] && [ "$old_se" != "$new_port" ] && [ "$old_se" != "22" ]; then if [ "$old_owned" = "y" ]; then if command -v semanage >/dev/null 2>&1; then warn "Removing stale SELinux ssh_port_t label from previous run: tcp/$old_se" if semanage port -d -t ssh_port_t -p tcp "$old_se" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; then audit_log "STALE_SELINUX_REMOVED" "port=$old_se" # [v4.7.5 FIX-MED-2 / v4.7.6 FIX-MED] Strip SELINUX_PORT= and # SELINUX_OWNED= lines from the persisted file. If the script # crashes between here and the next record_last_applied call, the # file won't claim we still own a label that no longer exists. # # v4.7.6 fix: previous form `grep -v ... > tmp && mv || rm tmp` # broke when the file contained ONLY SELINUX_* lines — grep -v # produced no output, exited 1, the mv never fired, the rm cleaned # tmp, and the original file kept the stale lines. Use `|| true` # to mask grep's no-match exit code, then mv unconditionally. if [ -f "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" ]; then __tmp_la="${LAST_APPLIED_FILE}.tmp.$$" grep -vE '^(SELINUX_PORT|SELINUX_OWNED)=' "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" 2>/dev/null > "$__tmp_la" || true if mv "$__tmp_la" "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" 2>/dev/null; then chmod 600 "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true else rm -f "$__tmp_la" 2>/dev/null || true fi unset __tmp_la fi else audit_log "STALE_SELINUX_REMOVE_FAILED" "port=$old_se" fi else audit_log "STALE_SELINUX_SKIP" "port=$old_se reason=no_semanage" warn "Cannot remove stale SELinux label (semanage not installed): tcp/$old_se" fi else # Pre-existing label (SELINUX_OWNED=n). Don't delete; just note. audit_log "STALE_SELINUX_KEPT" "port=$old_se reason=not_owned_by_script" fi fi } # [v4.7.3 FIX-H5 / v4.7.4 / v4.7.5] Write the current state to # LAST_APPLIED_FILE so the NEXT run can pick up where this one left off. # Args: # $1 = port (validated digits) # $2 = firewall backend ("" if none) # $3 = "y" if THIS run's port is labeled ssh_port_t (NOOP or ADDED/MODIFIED) # $4 = "y" if THIS run actually INSTALLED/RETYPED the label (i.e. cleanup # on next run is allowed to `semanage port -d` it); "n" means the # label pre-existed independently (sysadmin-installed) and must be # preserved across port changes / rollbacks. record_last_applied() { port="$1"; backend="$2"; selinux="${3:-n}"; owned="${4:-n}" mkdir -p "$(dirname "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE")" 2>/dev/null || return 0 chmod 700 "$(dirname "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE")" 2>/dev/null || true # [v4.7.4 FIX-LOW] Symlink defense before writing. unlink_if_symlink "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" # Preserve existing SELINUX_PORT/SELINUX_OWNED if caller didn't pass them. preserved_se="" preserved_owned="" if [ "$selinux" != "y" ] && [ -f "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" ]; then preserved_se=$(awk -F= '$1=="SELINUX_PORT"{print $2; exit}' "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" 2>/dev/null) preserved_owned=$(awk -F= '$1=="SELINUX_OWNED"{print $2; exit}' "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" 2>/dev/null) fi # [v4.7.7 FIX-MED] Atomic write: previously a direct `> "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE"` # truncate-then-write left the file partial/empty on signal or ENOSPC mid- # write — the next run misinterpreted the orphaned state and either left a # stale firewall rule untouched or tried to `semanage port -d` a non-existent # label. Write to .tmp, then atomically mv. __la_tmp="${LAST_APPLIED_FILE}.tmp.$$" { [ -n "$backend" ] && printf 'FIREWALL=%s:%s\n' "$backend" "$port" printf 'PORT=%s\n' "$port" if [ "$selinux" = "y" ]; then printf 'SELINUX_PORT=%s\n' "$port" printf 'SELINUX_OWNED=%s\n' "$owned" elif [ -n "$preserved_se" ]; then printf 'SELINUX_PORT=%s\n' "$preserved_se" [ -n "$preserved_owned" ] && printf 'SELINUX_OWNED=%s\n' "$preserved_owned" fi } > "$__la_tmp" 2>/dev/null if [ -s "$__la_tmp" ]; then mv "$__la_tmp" "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" 2>/dev/null || rm -f "$__la_tmp" 2>/dev/null chmod 600 "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true else rm -f "$__la_tmp" 2>/dev/null || true fi unset __la_tmp } # [v4.7.1 FIX-H2] Tag the artifact with WHICH backend added the rule, so the # rollback path only undoes that backend (instead of blindly trying all three # and potentially deleting an unrelated rule that another tool installed). allow_firewall_port() { p="$1" backend="" # [v4.7.8 FIX-MED W2-2] Differentiate "rule actually added" from "rule # already there" so idempotent re-runs don't pollute the audit log with # phantom FIREWALL_OPENED entries. rule_was_new="n" if command -v ufw >/dev/null 2>&1; then # ufw allow returns the same exit code whether new or pre-existing — # check via `ufw status` BEFORE adding. if ufw status 2>/dev/null | grep -Eq "^${p}/tcp[[:space:]]+ALLOW"; then backend="ufw" # pre-existing — track for rollback symmetry but don't claim "OPENED" else ufw allow "${p}/tcp" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 && { backend="ufw"; rule_was_new="y"; } || true fi elif command -v firewall-cmd >/dev/null 2>&1; then if firewall-cmd --query-port="${p}/tcp" >/dev/null 2>&1; then backend="firewalld" # pre-existing elif firewall-cmd --permanent --add-port="${p}/tcp" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; then firewall-cmd --reload >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true backend="firewalld"; rule_was_new="y" fi elif command -v iptables >/dev/null 2>&1; then if iptables -C INPUT -p tcp --dport "$p" -j ACCEPT 2>/dev/null; then backend="iptables" # pre-existing elif iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport "$p" -j ACCEPT 2>>"$LOG_FILE"; then backend="iptables"; rule_was_new="y" fi fi # IPv6 — not tracked separately. We treat it as a best-effort companion. if command -v ip6tables >/dev/null 2>&1; then if ip6tables -C INPUT -p tcp --dport "$p" -j ACCEPT 2>/dev/null; then : else ip6tables -I INPUT -p tcp --dport "$p" -j ACCEPT 2>>"$LOG_FILE" || true fi fi # [v4.7.8 FIX-MED W2-2] Only emit FIREWALL_OPENED audit + artifact_track # when we actually INSTALLED the rule. Pre-existing rules don't need # rollback (we didn't create them) and shouldn't show in the audit trail # as "opened by this run". if [ -n "$backend" ] && [ "$rule_was_new" = "y" ]; then artifact_track "FIREWALL_PORT=${backend}:${p}" audit_log "FIREWALL_OPENED" "backend=$backend port=$p" # [v4.7.3 FIX-H5] Persist so the next run can remove this rule if the # port changes. Only after success; rollback removes the artifact AND # rewrites/discards the persisted state via cleanup of the in-flight run. # [v4.7.5] At this point handle_selinux hasn't run yet, so the SELinux # state is whatever a previous run persisted (preserved automatically). # The second record_last_applied call below (after handle_selinux) is the # one that knows OWNED vs NOOP and persists the final state. record_last_applied "$p" "$backend" "n" "n" elif [ -n "$backend" ]; then audit_log "FIREWALL_NOOP" "backend=$backend port=$p reason=already_allowed" # Still update LAST_APPLIED_FILE so next run knows what backend we'd use # to clean it if the port changes. record_last_applied "$p" "$backend" "n" "n" fi if [ "$STRICT_MODE" = "y" ] && [ -z "$backend" ]; then case "$p" in 22) ;; *) warn "STRICT: could not confirm firewall rule for tcp/$p" ;; esac fi } handle_selinux() { port="$1" # [v4.7.6 FIX-CRIT] Initialize __selinux_done — without this, the # "all 3 semanage attempts failed" path (else-branch) doesn't set it, # then the `[ "$__selinux_done" = "y" ]` check below errors under # `set -u`, crashing the script and triggering rollback. This defeats # the non-strict graceful-degrade design (should warn + continue). __selinux_done="n" command -v getenforce >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 0 getenforce 2>/dev/null | grep -qi "Enforcing" || return 0 info "$(msg SELINUX_DET)" if ! command -v semanage >/dev/null 2>&1; then info "$(msg SELINUX_INS)" case "$PM" in yum) install_pkg_try policycoreutils-python-utils policycoreutils-python ;; apt) install_pkg_try policycoreutils python3-policycoreutils ;; esac fi if command -v semanage >/dev/null 2>&1; then # [v4.7.4 FIX] Check FIRST whether this port is ALREADY labeled as # ssh_port_t. If so, both `-a` (duplicate) and `-m` (no-op) succeed but # the previous code falsely warned "previous SELinux type was # overwritten" — there was nothing to overwrite. Now we no-op cleanly. if semanage port -l 2>/dev/null | awk -v p="$port" ' $1=="ssh_port_t" { for (i=3; i<=NF; i++) { gsub(/,/, "", $i) if ($i == p) { found=1; exit } } } END { exit !found } '; then info "SELinux port $port already labeled ssh_port_t — no-op" audit_log "SELINUX_PORT_NOOP" "port=$port already_labeled" # [v4.7.5 FIX-MED-1] DO NOT artifact_track here. The label pre-existed # before this run (sysadmin-installed or set by a prior script run that # already persisted state). Tracking it would let rollback `semanage # port -d` a label we didn't create. The OWNERSHIP record lives in # LAST_APPLIED_FILE if a previous run actually installed it. __selinux_done="y" elif semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp "$port" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; then artifact_track "SELINUX_PORT=$port" audit_log "SELINUX_PORT_ADDED" "port=$port type=ssh_port_t" ok "$(msg SELINUX_OK)" SELINUX_LABEL_OWNED_BY_RUN="y" __selinux_done="y" elif semanage port -m -t ssh_port_t -p tcp "$port" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; then # [v4.7.3 FIX-H7] `-m` modifies an EXISTING label that wasn't already # ssh_port_t (caught above) — some other service had this port (e.g. # http_port_t). Can't cleanly restore the original label on rollback. warn "SELinux port $port was MODIFIED (not added) — previous SELinux type was overwritten" warn " If another service used this port label, restore it manually:" warn " semanage port -d -t ssh_port_t -p tcp $port && semanage port -a -t -p tcp $port" audit_log "SELINUX_PORT_MODIFIED" "port=$port (previous label overwritten, no rollback)" [ "$STRICT_MODE" = "y" ] && die "STRICT: refusing to overwrite SELinux port label that already exists" ok "$(msg SELINUX_OK)" # [v4.7.5] -m path: WE retyped the label, so we own it. Rollback can # safely `semanage port -d` (though it won't restore the original type). SELINUX_LABEL_OWNED_BY_RUN="y" __selinux_done="y" else warn "$(msg SELINUX_FAIL)" audit_log "SELINUX_PORT_FAIL" "port=$port" [ "$STRICT_MODE" = "y" ] && die "STRICT: SELinux port label add failed" fi # [v4.7.4 / v4.7.5] Export to caller so allow_firewall_port's # record_last_applied can persist SELinux state. # SELINUX_LABEL_APPLIED is the "should we record this port in # LAST_APPLIED_FILE" signal (true if NOOP, ADDED, or MODIFIED — anything # that means "this run's port is labeled ssh_port_t"). # SELINUX_LABEL_OWNED_BY_RUN is the "may rollback delete it" signal — # only true when WE installed or retyped the label. [ "$__selinux_done" = "y" ] && SELINUX_LABEL_APPLIED="y" else warn "$(msg SELINUX_FAIL)" fi } # ---------------- Port Logic ---------------- is_hard_reserved() { case "$1" in 53|80|443|3306) return 0 ;; esac return 1 } is_k8s_nodeport() { [ "$1" -ge 30000 ] && [ "$1" -le 32767 ]; } rand_u16() { if [ -r /dev/urandom ] && command -v od >/dev/null 2>&1; then od -An -N2 -tu2 /dev/urandom 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ' elif command -v shuf >/dev/null 2>&1; then shuf -i 1024-65535 -n 1 else echo $(( ( $(date +%s 2>/dev/null || echo 12345) + $$ ) % 65536 )) fi } ensure_port_tools() { # === [新增] 强制安装 nc (netcat) === if ! command -v nc >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo "Installing missing dependency: netcat..." case "$PM" in # [v4.7.3 FIX-MED] Try multiple `nc` package names — varies by distro # (netcat-openbsd on Debian/Ubuntu/Alpine, nmap-ncat or nc on RHEL). apt) install_pkg_try netcat-openbsd netcat ncat ;; yum) install_pkg_try nmap-ncat nc netcat ;; apk) install_pkg_try netcat-openbsd ncat ;; esac fi # ============================== # 原有的 ss/netstat 检查保持不变 command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0 command -v netstat >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0 case "$PM" in apt) install_pkg_try iproute2 >/dev/null 2>&1 || true ;; yum) install_pkg_try iproute >/dev/null 2>&1 || true ;; apk) install_pkg_try iproute2 iproute2-ss >/dev/null 2>&1 || true ;; esac install_pkg_try net-tools >/dev/null 2>&1 || true } is_port_free() { p="$1" if command -v ss >/dev/null 2>&1; then if ss -lnt 2>/dev/null | awk -v port="$p" ' BEGIN { found = 0 } NR > 1 { n = split($4, parts, ":") if (parts[n] == port) { found = 1; exit } } END { exit !found } '; then return 1 fi return 0 fi if command -v netstat >/dev/null 2>&1; then if netstat -lnt 2>/dev/null | awk -v port="$p" ' BEGIN { found = 0 } NR > 2 { n = split($4, parts, ":") if (parts[n] == port) { found = 1; exit } } END { exit !found } '; then return 1 fi return 0 fi return 1 } pick_random_port() { ensure_port_tools i=0 if ! mkdir -p "$LOCK_DIR" 2>/dev/null; then warn "$(msg ERR_LOCK_DIR) $LOCK_DIR" return 1 fi chmod 700 "$LOCK_DIR" 2>/dev/null || warn "$(msg WARN_LOCK_DIR_PERM)" find "$LOCK_DIR" -name "port-*.lock" -mmin +5 -delete 2>/dev/null || true while [ "$i" -lt 100 ]; do r="$(rand_u16)" p=$(( 49152 + (r % (65535 - 49152)) )) lockfile="$LOCK_DIR/port-$p.lock" if mkdir "$lockfile" 2>/dev/null; then if is_port_free "$p"; then echo "$p" return 0 else rmdir "$lockfile" 2>/dev/null || true fi fi i=$((i+1)) done warn "$(msg ERR_CANNOT_RESERVE_PORT)" return 1 } validate_port() { port="$1" case "$port" in ''|*[!0-9]*) return 1 ;; esac # [v4.7.6 FIX-MED] Reject leading zeros. Otherwise `--port=03306` passes # digit + range checks (decimal-parsed to 3306), bypasses # is_hard_reserved (which is a STRING `case` matching only "3306"), # and the script writes `Port 03306` to sshd_config — which OpenSSH # parses as decimal 3306, silently shadowing MySQL. Similar issue # for `--port=0022` (script string-compares to "22" elsewhere and # treats it as non-standard, racing firewall/SELinux state vs sshd's # actual listening port). case "$port" in 0?*) return 1 ;; esac [ "$port" -ge 1 ] 2>/dev/null && [ "$port" -le 65535 ] 2>/dev/null || return 1 if [ "$port" -lt 1024 ] && [ "$port" != "22" ]; then return 1 fi return 0 } # ---------------- User & Sudo ---------------- validate_username() { raw="$1" # [v4.7.0 / MED] printf '%s\n' instead of echo to handle inputs starting # with -e / -n safely on shells where /bin/sh resolves to bash. u=$(printf '%s' "$raw" | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//;s/[[:space:]]*$//') # 必须将清洗后的变量回写给全局变量，否则后续 useradd 还是会用带空格的 TARGET_USER="$u" [ "$u" = "root" ] && return 0 len=${#u} [ "$len" -ge 2 ] && [ "$len" -le 32 ] || return 1 # [v4.7.6 FIX-LOW] Reject embedded newlines BEFORE grep — POSIX grep is # per-line-anchored, so a value like "admin\nbadguy" passes since each # line individually matches. A simple case-match on the whole value # rejects ANY character outside the allowed set including LF/CR. case "$u" in *[!a-z0-9_-]*) return 1 ;; esac printf '%s\n' "$u" | grep -Eq '^[a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*$' || return 1 case "$u" in bin|daemon|adm|lp|sync|shutdown|halt|mail|operator|games|ftp|nobody) return 1 ;; esac return 0 } # [v4.7.0 / HIGH] Wheel/sudo group membership check + stable filename. safe_configure_sudo() { user="$1" if [ ! -d /etc/sudoers.d ]; then warn "$(msg WARN_NO_SUDOERS_DIR)"; return 0; fi # 1. Is user already explicitly named in /etc/sudoers* with a whitespace boundary? if grep -Eq "^[[:space:]]*${user}[[:space:]]" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* 2>/dev/null; then info "$(msg INFO_SUDO_EXISTS)" return 0 fi # 2. Is user already in a group that grants sudo? Check both explicit # membership (id -nG) and the %group rules present in sudoers files. user_groups=$(id -nG "$user" 2>/dev/null | tr ' ' '\n') if [ -n "$user_groups" ]; then for g in wheel sudo admin; do if printf '%s\n' "$user_groups" | grep -qx "$g"; then # User is in the group AND that group is granted sudo in some config file? if grep -Eq "^[[:space:]]*%${g}[[:space:]]" /etc/sudoers /etc/sudoers.d/* 2>/dev/null; then info "$(msg INFO_SUDO_EXISTS) (via group %$g)" return 0 fi fi done fi # 3. New sudoers file — stable name per user (idempotent across re-runs). # [v4.7.2 FIX] Write & validate the NEW file BEFORE touching any legacy # files. Previously we removed legacy variants first, which on visudo # failure left the operator with NO sudo at all (lockout). sudoers_file="/etc/sudoers.d/server-init-$user" # [v4.7.4 FIX-LOW] Symlink defense before write. /etc/sudoers.d is normally # 750 root:root but defense-in-depth: a pre-planted symlink would let `cat` # overwrite an arbitrary file (e.g. /etc/passwd) with sudoers content. unlink_if_symlink "$sudoers_file" # [v4.7.2 FIX] umask 337 so the file is born at 0440 (sudoers requires # group/world-NON-writable; some sudo builds also warn on world-readable). # Default umask (022) would create at 0644 with a brief window before our # explicit chmod 440, during which a parallel sudo invocation could warn. __sudoers_old_umask=$(umask) umask 337 cat > "$sudoers_file" </dev/null 2>&1; then if ! visudo -c -f "$sudoers_file" >/dev/null 2>&1; then rm -f "$sudoers_file" err "$(msg ERR_SUDOERS_SYNTAX)" return 1 fi fi if ! chmod 440 "$sudoers_file" 2>/dev/null; then rm -f "$sudoers_file" err "$(msg ERR_SUDOERS_PERM)" return 1 fi chown root:root "$sudoers_file" 2>/dev/null || true artifact_track "SUDOERS_FILE=$sudoers_file" audit_log "SUDOERS_WRITTEN" "$sudoers_file" # 4. [v4.7.2 FIX] Now that the new file is in place, clean up pre-v4.7.0 # timestamped variants. Strict pattern: server-init-- # so we cannot accidentally match another user whose name shares this # user's name as a prefix (e.g. cleaning "admin" must NOT remove # "server-init-admin-bot"). Operator-created files like # "server-init--special-policy" are also preserved. for legacy in /etc/sudoers.d/server-init-"$user"-*; do [ -f "$legacy" ] || continue suffix="${legacy##*/server-init-"$user"-}" # Only purely numeric suffixes (the v4.6.x timestamp format) qualify. case "$suffix" in ''|*[!0-9]*) continue ;; esac # [v4.7.2 FIX] rm FIRST, then audit_log only on success. The previous # ordering wrote the audit-log entry unconditionally — if rm silently # failed (read-only fs, immutable bit), the audit trail would falsely # claim a removal that never happened. if rm -f "$legacy" 2>/dev/null; then audit_log "LEGACY_SUDOERS_REMOVED" "$legacy" info "Removed pre-v4.7.0 timestamped sudoers: $legacy" else warn "Failed to remove legacy sudoers file: $legacy" fi done info "$(msg INFO_SUDO_CONFIGURED)" return 0 } get_user_home() { user="$1" home="" if command -v getent >/dev/null 2>&1; then home=$(getent passwd "$user" 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f6) fi if [ -z "$home" ] && [ -r /etc/passwd ]; then home=$(awk -F: -v u="$user" '$1==u {print $6}' /etc/passwd 2>/dev/null) fi if [ -z "$home" ]; then if [ "$user" = "root" ]; then home="/root" else home="/home/$user" fi fi echo "$home" } get_user_shell() { user="$1" shell="" if command -v getent >/dev/null 2>&1; then shell=$(getent passwd "$user" 2>/dev/null | cut -d: -f7) fi if [ -z "$shell" ] && [ -r /etc/passwd ]; then shell=$(awk -F: -v u="$user" '$1==u {print $7}' /etc/passwd 2>/dev/null) fi echo "$shell" } safe_ensure_user() { user="$1" [ "$user" = "root" ] && return 0 if id "$user" >/dev/null 2>&1; then shell=$(get_user_shell "$user") home_dir=$(get_user_home "$user") case "$shell" in /bin/bash|/bin/sh|/usr/bin/bash|/usr/bin/sh|/bin/dash|/bin/ash) ;; /sbin/nologin|/bin/false|/usr/sbin/nologin) warn "$(msg WARN_USER_SHELL) $shell" if [ "$AUTO_CONFIRM" != "y" ]; then printf "%s" "$(msg ASK_CHANGE_SHELL)" read -r change_shell if [ "${change_shell:-n}" = "y" ]; then new_shell="/bin/sh" for try_shell in /bin/bash /bin/ash /bin/sh; do [ -x "$try_shell" ] && { new_shell="$try_shell"; break; } done if command -v chsh >/dev/null 2>&1; then chsh -s "$new_shell" "$user" 2>>"$LOG_FILE" || warn "$(msg WARN_CHANGE_SHELL_FAIL)" elif command -v usermod >/dev/null 2>&1; then usermod -s "$new_shell" "$user" 2>>"$LOG_FILE" || warn "$(msg WARN_CHANGE_SHELL_FAIL)" else warn "$(msg WARN_CHANGE_SHELL_FAIL)" fi fi fi ;; "") ;; *) warn "$(msg WARN_UNUSUAL_SHELL) $shell" ;; esac if [ -n "$home_dir" ] && [ -d "$home_dir" ]; then dir_owner="" if stat -c "%U" "$home_dir" >/dev/null 2>&1; then dir_owner=$(stat -c "%U" "$home_dir" 2>/dev/null) else dir_owner=$(ls -ld "$home_dir" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $3}') fi [ -n "$dir_owner" ] && [ "$dir_owner" != "$user" ] && warn "$(msg WARN_HOME_OWNER) $dir_owner" [ ! -w "$home_dir" ] && warn "$(msg WARN_HOME_NOT_WRITABLE)" fi return 0 fi info "$(msg I_USER) $user" shell="/bin/sh" for test_shell in /bin/bash /usr/bin/bash /bin/ash /bin/sh /usr/bin/sh /bin/dash; do if [ -x "$test_shell" ]; then shell="$test_shell"; break; fi done user_created=0 if command -v useradd >/dev/null 2>&1; then useradd -m -s "$shell" "$user" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 && user_created=1 elif command -v adduser >/dev/null 2>&1; then adduser -D -s "$shell" "$user" >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 && user_created=1 fi [ "$user_created" -eq 1 ] || { err "$(msg ERR_USER_CREATE_FAIL)"; return 1; } id "$user" >/dev/null 2>&1 || { err "$(msg ERR_USER_VERIFY_FAIL)"; return 1; } # [v4.7.0] Mark this user as script-created for rollback tracking. artifact_track "USER_CREATED=$user" # [v4.7.1] Mark for finalize_user_password_policy: this is a NEW account, safe to passwd -d. USER_WAS_CREATED="y" # [v4.7.4 FIX-MED] Audit trail for user creation (forensic completeness). audit_log "USER_CREATED" "user=$user shell=$shell" # [v4.7.0 / CRIT] Do NOT clear password here. Previously this was unconditional, # which (combined with the fallback "key-failed → keep password auth" policy) # could leave a NEW account with no password AND password auth enabled. # Password-clear is now deferred to finalize_user_password_policy, which only # runs after deploy_keys succeeds. # [v4.7.1 FIX-H1 / v4.7.2] Sudoers failure must not be silent. if safe_configure_sudo "$user"; then SUDO_DEPLOYED="y" else SUDO_DEPLOYED="n" audit_log "SUDO_FAIL" "Could not write sudoers entry for $user" if [ "$STRICT_MODE" = "y" ]; then err "STRICT: sudoers configuration failed for $user" return 1 fi warn "Account $user was created WITHOUT sudo. See $AUDIT_FILE." fi return 0 } # [v4.7.0 / v4.7.1] Account password policy applied AFTER key deploy outcome is known. # # New account (USER_WAS_CREATED=y): # KEY_OK=y → passwd -d (unlock, key-only auth) # KEY_OK=n → leave locked (no password set by useradd anyway). Fallback # password-auth must NEVER mean "anyone who knows the username # can SSH in passwordlessly". # # Pre-existing account (USER_WAS_CREATED=n) [v4.7.1 fix]: # We MUST NOT touch the password. The admin-managed password stays. # Key deployment merely ADDS a key; the existing password remains valid # for any service that uses it (su, sudo with password, console, etc.). # finalize_user_password_policy() { user="$1" key_ok="$2" was_created="$3" sudo_ok="${4:-y}" # default y for backwards compat [ "$user" = "root" ] && return 0 if [ "$was_created" != "y" ]; then # [v4.7.1] Pre-existing account: do not clobber its password. info "Account $user pre-existed — leaving password state untouched" return 0 fi if [ "$key_ok" != "y" ]; then warn "Account $user remains locked because key deployment failed" ACCOUNT_LOCKED_REASON="key deployment failed" audit_log "ACCOUNT_KEPT_LOCKED" "user=$user reason=key_deploy_failed" return 0 fi # [v4.7.2 FIX] Be conservative when sudo deployment ALSO failed. A new # passwordless+no-sudo account is rarely the operator's intent and means # nobody can elevate from it. Keep the account locked so the operator # actively notices and fixes it (rather than discovering it later). if [ "$sudo_ok" != "y" ]; then warn "Account $user kept locked: sudo deployment failed (avoid passwordless+no-sudo)" ACCOUNT_LOCKED_REASON="sudo deployment failed" audit_log "ACCOUNT_KEPT_LOCKED" "user=$user reason=sudo_deploy_failed" return 0 fi if passwd -d "$user" >/dev/null 2>&1; then info "Account $user: password cleared (key-only auth)" audit_log "PASSWORD_CLEARED" "user=$user method=passwd_-d" elif command -v usermod >/dev/null 2>&1 && usermod -p "" "$user" >/dev/null 2>&1; then # Some minimal RHEL-family images ship shadow-utils (useradd/usermod) but # not the separate passwd(1) package. `usermod -U` refuses to unlock an # account when that would leave an empty password, while `passwd -d` would # intentionally create exactly that key-only state. Use usermod -p "" as # the equivalent fallback after key deployment and sudo setup succeeded. info "Account $user: password cleared via usermod -p (key-only auth)" audit_log "PASSWORD_CLEARED" "user=$user method=usermod_-p_empty" elif usermod -U "$user" >/dev/null 2>&1; then info "Account $user: unlocked via usermod" audit_log "PASSWORD_CLEARED" "user=$user method=usermod_-U" else # [v4.7.3 FIX-H2] Both `passwd -d` and `usermod -U` failed — previously # silent. Now surface the locked state so the operator sees the warning # in print_final_summary instead of an apparent-success banner with a # broken account. warn "Account $user: passwd -d AND usermod -U both failed — account remains locked" ACCOUNT_LOCKED_REASON="passwd-d and usermod-U both failed" audit_log "ACCOUNT_KEPT_LOCKED" "user=$user reason=passwd_usermod_both_failed" fi } # ---------------- Keys ---------------- # [v4.7.0] Hardening: max-filesize, max-redirs, strict-mode requires HTTPS. # Response is also piped through `head -c` as a belt-and-suspenders DoS guard # for wget (which lacks --max-filesize). 64 KiB is plenty for a key list. KEY_MAX_BYTES=65536 KEY_MAX_REDIRS=3 fetch_keys() { mode="$1" val="$2" url="" case "$mode" in gh) # [v4.7.1 FIX-M2] GitHub usernames: 1-39 chars, alphanumeric + hyphen, # cannot start or end with hyphen. Anything else → don't substitute it # into a URL (avoids path-traversal-style URLs reaching github.com). # [v4.7.6 FIX-LOW] Reject embedded newlines / weird bytes BEFORE grep # (POSIX grep is per-line-anchored — multi-line strings would each # match individually). case "$val" in *[!A-Za-z0-9-]*) warn "Invalid GitHub username (illegal character): $val"; return 1 ;; esac if ! printf '%s' "$val" | grep -Eq '^[A-Za-z0-9](-?[A-Za-z0-9]){0,38}$'; then warn "Invalid GitHub username (must match ^[A-Za-z0-9](-?[A-Za-z0-9]){0,38}$): $val" return 1 fi url="https://github.com/$val.keys" ;; url) url="$val" ;; raw) printf '%s\n' "$val"; return 0 ;; *) return 1 ;; esac if [ "$mode" = "url" ]; then case "$url" in https://*) : ;; http://*) if [ "$STRICT_MODE" = "y" ]; then warn "STRICT: refusing plaintext http:// key URL" return 1 fi warn "Plaintext http:// URL — keys are public but a MITM could substitute. Prefer https://" # [v4.7.5 FIX-LOW] Forensic audit: post-incident analysis needs to # know if a key URL was fetched over plaintext. URL itself stays in # /var/log/server-init.log debug but is omitted here for redaction. audit_log "INSECURE_KEY_URL" "scheme=http non_strict_mode" ;; *) warn "Invalid URL scheme (must be https://, or http:// in non-strict mode)" return 1 ;; esac fi # [v4.7.1 FIX-M3] Download to a TEMP FILE first, then size-check, then emit. # The previous design piped curl | head -c which masks curl's max-filesize # exit code (63) via SIGPIPE and lets a 1GB-of-junk URL silently succeed # with 64KB of attacker-controlled content. tmpf="" if command -v mktemp >/dev/null 2>&1; then tmpf=$(mktemp "$TMP_DIR/fetched_keys.XXXXXX" 2>/dev/null || echo "$TMP_DIR/fetched_keys.$$") else tmpf="$TMP_DIR/fetched_keys.$$" fi : > "$tmpf" chmod 600 "$tmpf" 2>/dev/null || true retries=0 max_retries=3 rc=1 while [ "$retries" -lt "$max_retries" ]; do : > "$tmpf" if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then curl -fsSL \ --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 30 \ --max-filesize "$KEY_MAX_BYTES" \ --max-redirs "$KEY_MAX_REDIRS" \ --proto '=https,http' \ "$url" >"$tmpf" 2>>"$LOG_FILE" rc=$? elif command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1; then # [v4.7.3 FIX-MED] wget has no --max-filesize; instead we set # --quota=BYTES which aborts the transfer once exceeded. That bounds # the on-disk damage. The post-fetch wc -c size check still applies. wget -qO "$tmpf" --timeout=30 \ --max-redirect="$KEY_MAX_REDIRS" \ --quota="$KEY_MAX_BYTES" \ "$url" 2>>"$LOG_FILE" rc=$? else warn "Need curl or wget to fetch keys" rm -f "$tmpf" 2>/dev/null return 1 fi if [ "$rc" -eq 0 ] && [ -s "$tmpf" ]; then # Enforce size cap (paranoid: covers wget which has no max-filesize). sz=$(wc -c < "$tmpf" 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ') if [ -n "$sz" ] && [ "$sz" -gt "$KEY_MAX_BYTES" ] 2>/dev/null; then warn "Fetched response exceeded $KEY_MAX_BYTES bytes — refusing" rm -f "$tmpf" 2>/dev/null return 1 fi cat "$tmpf" rm -f "$tmpf" 2>/dev/null return 0 fi retries=$((retries+1)) [ "$retries" -lt "$max_retries" ] && sleep 2 done rm -f "$tmpf" 2>/dev/null warn "Failed to fetch keys after $max_retries attempts (last rc=$rc)" # [v4.7.8 FIX-MED W6-1] Forensic audit: previously, a fetch failure was # only `warn`'d. SIEM operators investigating a ROLLBACK had no breadcrumb # explaining why the script aborted (the rolled-back artifacts plus a # ROLLBACK entry, but no KEY_FETCH_FAILED → no clear cause). audit_log "KEY_FETCH_FAILED" "mode=$mode rc=$rc retries=$max_retries" return 1 } # [SEC-FIX] Removed rsa-sha2-256/512 from key type regex (they are signature algorithms, not key types) validate_ssh_key_line() { line="$1" line=$(printf '%s' "$line" | tr -d '\000-\037\177' | sed 's/[[:space:]]*#.*$//') [ -z "$line" ] && return 1 # [SEC-FIX] Tightened regex: removed rsa-sha2-256/512, restricted ecdsa to known curves if ! printf '%s' "$line" | grep -Eq '^(ssh-(rsa|dss|ed25519)|ecdsa-sha2-nistp(256|384|521)|sk-(ssh-ed25519|ecdsa-sha2-nistp256)@openssh\.com|ssh-(rsa|dss|ed25519)-cert-v01@openssh\.com|ecdsa-sha2-nistp(256|384|521)-cert-v01@openssh\.com)[[:space:]]+[A-Za-z0-9+/]+=*([[:space:]]+.*)?$'; then return 1 fi key_part=$(printf '%s' "$line" | awk '{print $2}') [ -n "$key_part" ] || return 1 if command -v base64 >/dev/null 2>&1; then if ! printf '%s' "$key_part" | base64 -d >/dev/null 2>&1; then return 1 fi key_type=$(printf '%s' "$line" | awk '{print $1}') key_bytes=$(printf '%s' "$key_part" | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | wc -c | tr -d ' ') case "$key_type" in ssh-rsa) [ -n "$key_bytes" ] && [ "$key_bytes" -ge 256 ] 2>/dev/null || return 1 ;; ssh-ed25519|sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com) [ -n "$key_bytes" ] && [ "$key_bytes" -ge 32 ] 2>/dev/null || return 1 ;; ssh-dss) [ -n "$key_bytes" ] && [ "$key_bytes" -ge 40 ] 2>/dev/null || return 1 ;; esac fi # [v4.7.0] Use mktemp so concurrent validations in a `while read` loop # cannot collide on the same filename inside TMP_DIR. if command -v ssh-keygen >/dev/null 2>&1; then if command -v mktemp >/dev/null 2>&1; then tmpk=$(mktemp "$TMP_DIR/keycheck.XXXXXX" 2>/dev/null || echo "$TMP_DIR/keycheck.$$") else tmpk="$TMP_DIR/keycheck.$$" fi printf '%s\n' "$line" > "$tmpk" if ! ssh-keygen -l -f "$tmpk" >/dev/null 2>&1; then rm -f "$tmpk" 2>/dev/null || true return 1 fi rm -f "$tmpk" 2>/dev/null || true fi printf "%s\n" "$line" return 0 } # [SEC-FIX] Completely rewritten deploy_keys with symlink protection deploy_keys() { user="$1" keys="$2" home=$(get_user_home "$user") dir="$home/.ssh" auth="$dir/authorized_keys" # [v4.7.3 FIX-H3] Defensive home-path validation. /etc/passwd is the source # of truth, but if it has been tampered with (e.g. someone set a # non-root user's home to /root or /etc), deploy_keys would happily mkdir # .ssh inside it and chown to the unprivileged user — instant escalation. # Whitelist the realistic home-dir prefixes. case "$home" in /home/*|/Users/*|/var/lib/*) : ;; # standard user homes /root) # Only allowed when the target user IS root. if [ "$user" != "root" ]; then err "Refusing to deploy keys for non-root user '$user' into /root" return 1 fi ;; /*) : # Other absolute paths permitted only if the directory is already owned # by the target user (operator's existing custom layout). Reject if # owned by someone else (defends against the tampered-/etc/passwd case). ;; *) err "Refusing: home dir '$home' is not an absolute path" return 1 ;; esac # [SEC-FIX] Refuse symlink home directory (local privilege escalation prevention) [ -z "$home" ] && { err "$(msg ERR_HOME_NOT_DIR)"; return 1; } if [ -L "$home" ]; then err "$(msg ERR_HOME_SYMLINK): $home" return 1 fi if [ ! -d "$home" ]; then err "$(msg ERR_HOME_NOT_DIR): $home" return 1 fi # [v4.7.3 FIX-H3] Refuse to deploy keys into a directory that isn't owned # by the target user (or by root, for root). Catches tampered /etc/passwd # pointing a user's home at /root, /etc, etc. home_owner="" if stat -c "%U" "$home" >/dev/null 2>&1; then home_owner=$(stat -c "%U" "$home" 2>/dev/null) else home_owner=$(ls -ld "$home" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $3}') fi if [ -n "$home_owner" ]; then case "$user:$home_owner" in root:root) : ;; # root → /root, fine *:"$user") : ;; # user → user-owned dir, fine *) err "Refusing: $home is owned by '$home_owner', not '$user'. /etc/passwd may be tampered." return 1 ;; esac fi # [SEC-FIX] Refuse symlink .ssh directory if [ -L "$dir" ]; then err "$(msg ERR_SSH_DIR_SYMLINK): $dir" return 1 fi if [ -e "$dir" ] && [ ! -d "$dir" ]; then err "$(msg ERR_SSH_DIR_NOT_DIR): $dir" return 1 fi mkdir -p "$dir" 2>/dev/null || return 1 chmod 700 "$dir" 2>/dev/null || true # [SEC-FIX] Refuse symlink authorized_keys if [ -L "$auth" ]; then err "$(msg ERR_AUTH_KEYS_SYMLINK): $auth" return 1 fi if [ -e "$auth" ] && [ ! -f "$auth" ]; then err "$(msg ERR_AUTH_KEYS_NOT_FILE): $auth" return 1 fi touch "$auth" 2>/dev/null || return 1 chmod 600 "$auth" 2>/dev/null || true # [SEC-FIX] Only chown specific paths, no -R (symlink traversal risk) chown "${user}:" "$dir" "$auth" 2>/dev/null || chown "$user" "$dir" "$auth" 2>/dev/null || true # [v4.7.0 / MED] Verify ownership stuck. On NFS root_squash or restrictive # filesystems chown can silently fail and leave files owned by root, which # sshd then refuses to read ("bad ownership"). Catch this BEFORE we disable # password auth on the strength of "KEY_OK=y". actual_owner=$(stat -c "%U" "$auth" 2>/dev/null || ls -l "$auth" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $3}') if [ -n "$actual_owner" ] && [ "$actual_owner" != "$user" ]; then err "deploy_keys: $auth owned by '$actual_owner' (expected '$user') — sshd will reject. Aborting." return 1 fi valid_keys_file="$TMP_DIR/valid_keys.$$" deployed_count=0 : > "$valid_keys_file" printf "%s\n" "$keys" | while IFS= read -r line; do [ -z "$line" ] && continue clean_line=$(validate_ssh_key_line "$line") if [ -n "$clean_line" ]; then printf "%s\n" "$clean_line" >> "$valid_keys_file" fi done if [ ! -s "$valid_keys_file" ]; then warn "$(msg WARN_NO_VALID_KEYS)" rm -f "$valid_keys_file" 2>/dev/null || true return 1 fi while IFS= read -r key; do [ -z "$key" ] && continue if ! grep -qxF "$key" "$auth" 2>/dev/null; then printf "%s\n" "$key" >> "$auth" fi if grep -qxF "$key" "$auth" 2>/dev/null; then deployed_count=$((deployed_count + 1)) fi done < "$valid_keys_file" rm -f "$valid_keys_file" 2>/dev/null || true if [ "$deployed_count" -gt 0 ]; then info "$(msg INFO_KEYS_DEPLOYED) $deployed_count" audit_log "KEYS_DEPLOYED" "user=$user count=$deployed_count auth=$auth" return 0 else warn "$(msg WARN_NO_VALID_KEYS)" return 1 fi } # ---------------- sshd_config management ---------------- # [SEC-FIX] Case-insensitive directive matching cleanup_sshd_config_d() { if [ -d "$SSH_CONF_D" ]; then for conf in "$SSH_CONF_D"/*.conf; do [ -f "$conf" ] || continue # [SEC-FIX] Case-insensitive matching if awk ' BEGIN { found = 0 } { line = tolower($0) if (line ~ /^[[:space:]]*(port|permitrootlogin|passwordauthentication|pubkeyauthentication|challengeresponseauthentication|kbdinteractiveauthentication|kexalgorithms|ciphers|macs|addressfamily|listenaddress)[[:space:]]/) { found = 1 exit } } END { exit !found } ' "$conf" 2>/dev/null; then # [v4.7.3 FIX-H4] If a stale .bak_server_init from a prior crashed # run already exists, do NOT overwrite it (we'd lose the original # snapshot). Pick a timestamped name so both are preserved. # Append $$ as well so two runs in the same second never collide. target="${conf}.bak_server_init" if [ -e "$target" ]; then target="${conf}.bak_server_init.$(date +%s 2>/dev/null || echo 0).$$" warn "Pre-existing $conf.bak_server_init kept; using $target" fi mv "$conf" "$target" 2>/dev/null || true audit_log "DROPIN_RENAMED" "$conf -> $target" warn "$(msg CLEAN_D) $conf" fi done fi } remove_managed_block() { tmp_in="$TMP_DIR/sshd_config.in" tmp_out="$TMP_DIR/sshd_config.out" cp -p "$SSH_CONF" "$tmp_in" 2>/dev/null || true # [v4.7.0 / MED] Tolerate CRLF endings, leading whitespace and trailing # whitespace on the marker lines so a hand-edited file still gets cleaned. awk -v b="$BLOCK_BEGIN" -v e="$BLOCK_END" ' function norm(s) { sub(/\r$/, "", s) sub(/^[[:space:]]+/, "", s) sub(/[[:space:]]+$/, "", s) return s } { n = norm($0) if (n == b) { skip = 1; next } if (n == e) { skip = 0; next } if (skip != 1) print } ' "$tmp_in" >"$tmp_out" if [ -s "$tmp_out" ]; then cat "$tmp_out" > "$SSH_CONF" fi } # [SEC-FIX] Case-insensitive sanitization sanitize_sshd_config() { info "$(msg INFO_SANITIZE_DUP)" tmp_san="$TMP_DIR/sshd_config.sanitized" # [SEC-FIX] Case-insensitive matching with tolower() # [v4.7.3 FIX-MED] Stop sanitizing once a `Match` block is seen. Directives # inside Match blocks are scope-restricted by design and our managed-block # comment-out would silently disable operator-intended overrides. awk ' { low = tolower($0) } # Once we hit a Match directive, just pass everything through unchanged. in_match { print; next } low ~ /^[[:space:]]*match[[:space:]]/ { in_match = 1; print; next } low ~ /^[[:space:]]*port[[:space:]]/ { print "# [server-init disabled] " $0; next } low ~ /^[[:space:]]*permitrootlogin[[:space:]]/ { print "# [server-init disabled] " $0; next } low ~ /^[[:space:]]*passwordauthentication[[:space:]]/ { print "# [server-init disabled] " $0; next } low ~ /^[[:space:]]*pubkeyauthentication[[:space:]]/ { print "# [server-init disabled] " $0; next } low ~ /^[[:space:]]*challengeresponseauthentication[[:space:]]/ { print "# [server-init disabled] " $0; next } low ~ /^[[:space:]]*kbdinteractiveauthentication[[:space:]]/ { print "# [server-init disabled] " $0; next } low ~ /^[[:space:]]*kexalgorithms[[:space:]]/ { print "# [server-init disabled] " $0; next } low ~ /^[[:space:]]*ciphers[[:space:]]/ { print "# [server-init disabled] " $0; next } low ~ /^[[:space:]]*macs[[:space:]]/ { print "# [server-init disabled] " $0; next } low ~ /^[[:space:]]*addressfamily[[:space:]]/ { print "# [server-init disabled] " $0; next } low ~ /^[[:space:]]*listenaddress[[:space:]]/ { print "# [server-init disabled] " $0; next } { print } ' "$SSH_CONF" > "$tmp_san" if [ -s "$tmp_san" ]; then cat "$tmp_san" > "$SSH_CONF" fi } has_global_ipv6() { if command -v ip >/dev/null 2>&1; then ip -6 addr show scope global 2>/dev/null | grep -q inet6 && return 0 fi if [ -f /proc/net/if_inet6 ]; then awk '$4 == "00" && $6 != "lo" { found=1; exit } END { exit !found }' /proc/net/if_inet6 2>/dev/null && return 0 fi if command -v ifconfig >/dev/null 2>&1; then ifconfig 2>/dev/null | grep -i 'inet6.*global' >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0 fi return 1 } # ----- Crypto selection ----- csv_contains() { csv="$1" item="$2" case ",$csv," in *,"$item",*) return 0 ;; *) return 1 ;; esac } csv_intersect_ordered() { pref="$1" supp="$2" result="" result=$( IFS=, for a in $pref; do if [ -n "$a" ] && csv_contains "$supp" "$a"; then printf "%s\n" "$a" fi done ) echo "$result" | tr '\n' ',' | sed 's/,$//' } get_sshd_T_value() { key="$1" v="" if openssh_version_ge 6 8; then v=$(sshd -T -C user=root,host=localhost,addr=127.0.0.1 -f "$SSH_CONF" 2>/dev/null | awk -v k="$key" 'tolower($1)==k {print $2; exit}') fi if [ -z "$v" ]; then v=$(sshd -T -f "$SSH_CONF" 2>/dev/null | awk -v k="$key" 'tolower($1)==k {print $2; exit}') fi echo "$v" } compute_crypto_lines() { KEX_LINE="" CIPHERS_LINE="" MACS_LINE="" CRYPTO_MODE="skip" if ! command -v sshd >/dev/null 2>&1; then CRYPTO_MODE="skip" return 0 fi supp_kex=$(get_sshd_T_value "kexalgorithms") supp_ciphers=$(get_sshd_T_value "ciphers") supp_macs=$(get_sshd_T_value "macs") pref_kex="curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,curve25519-sha256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group16-sha512" pref_ciphers="chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr" pref_macs="hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,umac-128@openssh.com" if [ -n "$supp_kex" ] || [ -n "$supp_ciphers" ] || [ -n "$supp_macs" ]; then sel_kex=$(csv_intersect_ordered "$pref_kex" "$supp_kex") sel_ciphers=$(csv_intersect_ordered "$pref_ciphers" "$supp_ciphers") sel_macs=$(csv_intersect_ordered "$pref_macs" "$supp_macs") [ -n "$sel_kex" ] && KEX_LINE="KexAlgorithms $sel_kex" [ -n "$sel_ciphers" ] && CIPHERS_LINE="Ciphers $sel_ciphers" [ -n "$sel_macs" ] && MACS_LINE="MACs $sel_macs" if [ -n "$KEX_LINE" ] || [ -n "$CIPHERS_LINE" ] || [ -n "$MACS_LINE" ]; then CRYPTO_MODE="filtered" else CRYPTO_MODE="skip" fi return 0 fi if openssh_version_ge 6 5; then KEX_LINE="KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" CIPHERS_LINE="Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr" MACS_LINE="MACs hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256" CRYPTO_MODE="fallback" else CRYPTO_MODE="skip" fi } build_block() { file="$1" { echo "$BLOCK_BEGIN" echo "# Managed by server-init v4.7.8" echo "# Generated: $(date)" echo "# OpenSSH: ${OPENSSH_VER_MAJOR}.${OPENSSH_VER_MINOR}" echo "# Do NOT edit inside this block. Changes will be overwritten." echo "" echo "Port $SSH_PORT" [ -n "$KEX_LINE" ] && echo "$KEX_LINE" [ -n "$CIPHERS_LINE" ] && echo "$CIPHERS_LINE" [ -n "$MACS_LINE" ] && echo "$MACS_LINE" if [ "$IPV6_ENABLED" = "y" ]; then echo "AddressFamily any" # [FIX-AWS] Debian 12 Socket Activation 冲突修复: 不显式指定监听地址 # echo "ListenAddress ::" # echo "ListenAddress 0.0.0.0" else echo "AddressFamily inet" # echo "ListenAddress 0.0.0.0" fi if [ "$KEY_OK" = "y" ]; then echo "PasswordAuthentication no" echo "PermitEmptyPasswords no" echo "ChallengeResponseAuthentication no" echo "PubkeyAuthentication yes" # [SEC-FIX] Add KbdInteractiveAuthentication no for true key-only auth if [ "$SUPPORTS_KBD_INTERACTIVE" = "y" ]; then echo "KbdInteractiveAuthentication no" fi else echo "PasswordAuthentication yes" echo "PubkeyAuthentication yes" fi if [ "$TARGET_USER" = "root" ]; then if [ "$KEY_OK" = "y" ]; then if openssh_version_ge 7 0; then echo "PermitRootLogin prohibit-password" else echo "PermitRootLogin without-password" fi else echo "PermitRootLogin yes" fi else if [ "$KEY_OK" = "y" ]; then echo "PermitRootLogin no" else if [ "$ROOT_KEY_PRESENT" = "y" ]; then if openssh_version_ge 7 0; then echo "PermitRootLogin prohibit-password" else echo "PermitRootLogin without-password" fi else echo "PermitRootLogin yes" fi fi fi echo "" echo "$BLOCK_END" } >"$file" } install_managed_block() { block="$1" tmp="$TMP_DIR/sshd_config.merge" match_line=$(awk '/^[[:space:]]*#/ {next} /^[[:space:]]*Match[[:space:]]/ {print NR; exit}' "$SSH_CONF" 2>/dev/null) if [ -z "$match_line" ]; then cat "$block" "$SSH_CONF" > "$tmp" else info "$(msg INFO_MATCH_INSERT)" cat "$block" "$SSH_CONF" > "$tmp" fi chmod 600 "$tmp" 2>/dev/null || true # [v4.7.0 / MED] Fail loudly if rename fails (e.g. cross-device) so we don't # silently continue with the old config being "validated" by later steps. mv "$tmp" "$SSH_CONF" || die "install_managed_block: failed to mv $tmp → $SSH_CONF" audit_log "MANAGED_BLOCK_INSTALLED" "config=$SSH_CONF port=$SSH_PORT" } verify_sshd_listening() { port="$1" timeout_s=30 # [FIX] 延长至 30 秒，适应 Vultr 等慢速机器 elapsed=0 ensure_port_tools while [ "$elapsed" -lt "$timeout_s" ]; do if ! is_port_free "$port"; then return 0 fi if command -v nc >/dev/null 2>&1; then # [SEC-FIX] Use 127.0.0.1 instead of localhost # [兼容性优化] # 1. 尝试 IPv4 本地回环 (大多数系统的标准情况) # 2>/dev/null 屏蔽了不支持 IPv4 时的报错 nc -z -w 1 127.0.0.1 "$port" 2>/dev/null && return 0 # 2. 尝试 IPv6 本地回环 (针对 Debian 12 默认开启 bindv6only 的情况) # 如果系统不支持 IPv6，这行命令会静默失败，不会中断脚本 nc -z -w 1 ::1 "$port" >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0 fi sleep 1 elapsed=$((elapsed + 1)) done return 1 } # [SEC-FIX] Use 127.0.0.1 instead of localhost to avoid IPv6 mismatch enhanced_ssh_test() { port="$1" user="$2" info "$(msg TEST_CONN)" if ! verify_sshd_listening "$port"; then err "SSHD not listening on port $port" return 1 fi banner_ok=0 if command -v nc >/dev/null 2>&1; then proto="" # [SEC-FIX] Use 127.0.0.1 instead of localhost if command -v timeout >/dev/null 2>&1; then proto=$(printf "SSH-2.0-TEST\r\n" | timeout 3 nc 127.0.0.1 "$port" 2>/dev/null || true) else proto=$(printf "SSH-2.0-TEST\r\n" | nc -w 3 127.0.0.1 "$port" 2>/dev/null || true) fi if echo "$proto" | grep -q "SSH-2.0"; then ok "$(msg INFO_SSH_PROTOCOL_OK)" banner_ok=1 else err "$(msg ERR_NO_BANNER)" fi else warn "nc not available, skipping banner check" banner_ok=1 fi if [ "$banner_ok" -ne 1 ]; then return 1 fi attempts=1 max_attempts=3 success=0 while [ "$attempts" -le "$max_attempts" ]; do if command -v ssh >/dev/null 2>&1; then # [SEC-FIX] Use -4 flag and 127.0.0.1 if ssh -4 -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=3 -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \ -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o GlobalKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \ -p "$port" "$user@127.0.0.1" "exit 0" >/dev/null 2>&1; then success=1 break fi # 尝试 1: IPv4 回环 (主流情况) if ssh -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=3 -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \ -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o GlobalKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \ -p "$port" "$user@127.0.0.1" "exit 0" >/dev/null 2>&1; then success=1 break fi # 尝试 2: IPv6 回环 (针对纯 IPv6 环境的备选) if ssh -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=3 -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no \ -o UserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null -o GlobalKnownHostsFile=/dev/null \ -p "$port" "$user@::1" "exit 0" >/dev/null 2>&1; then success=1 break fi fi attempts=$((attempts + 1)) [ "$attempts" -le "$max_attempts" ] && sleep 1 done if [ "$success" -eq 1 ]; then ok "$(msg TEST_OK)" audit_log "LOGIN_TEST_PASSED" "user=$user port=$port" else # [v4.7.3 NOTE] An ssh-client login test launched from root with no # client-side private key for $user cannot succeed; this is EXPECTED in # the vast majority of runs. We've already validated server health via # `sshd -t`, `verify_sshd_listening`, and an SSH-2.0 banner exchange. # So this branch is informational, not a server-side failure signal. warn "$(msg WARN_PORT_OPEN_BUT_FAIL)" audit_log "LOGIN_TEST_INCONCLUSIVE" "user=$user port=$port (expected when root lacks client key)" fi return 0 } update_motd() { info "$(msg MOTD_UPD)" # --------------------------------------------------------- # 1. 清理 /etc/motd 中的历史 server-init 遗留行，并保留一份真实 .bak # [v4.7.1 FIX-R3] motd mutation is now tracked as an artifact so that # rollback can restore the original from .bak. # --------------------------------------------------------- motd="/etc/motd" if [ -f "$motd" ]; then motd_changed=0 # First time only — preserve real .bak; subsequent runs keep that bak. if [ ! -f "${motd}.bak" ]; then cp -p "$motd" "${motd}.bak" 2>/dev/null && motd_changed=1 fi # [v4.7.3 FIX-MED] Anchor patterns to start-of-line so the operator's own # MOTD lines that happen to contain "Login User:" or similar text are not # accidentally stripped. Older versions used unanchored grep which could # eat user content. if grep -qE "^[[:space:]]*(Server Init|Login User:|SSH Port:|Auth Type:|Firewall:)|^={10,}" "$motd" 2>/dev/null; then grep -vE "^[[:space:]]*(Server Init|Login User:|SSH Port:|Auth Type:|Firewall:)|^={10,}" "$motd" > "${motd}.clean" 2>/dev/null if [ -f "${motd}.clean" ]; then mv "${motd}.clean" "$motd" 2>/dev/null || rm -f "${motd}.clean" 2>/dev/null motd_changed=1 fi fi if [ "$motd_changed" = "1" ] && [ -f "${motd}.bak" ]; then artifact_track "MOTD_BAK=$motd" fi fi # --------------------------------------------------------- # 2. 写出动态登录横幅（POSIX 兼容；颜色用 printf %b 避免 dash 字面输出） # --------------------------------------------------------- mkdir -p /etc/profile.d 2>/dev/null || true banner_file="/etc/profile.d/z99-ssh-init-banner.sh" # [v4.7.4 FIX-LOW] Symlink defense. unlink_if_symlink "$banner_file" # [v4.7.0 / HIGH] Values are validated upstream ($SSH_PORT digits-only, # $FINAL_AUTH from a fixed set) — write the final form directly in one # heredoc instead of a heredoc + post-sed pass (no race window). if [ "$KEY_OK" = "y" ]; then final_auth="Key Only (Secure)" else final_auth="Password/Key" fi cat > "$banner_file" </dev/null || echo "unknown") # Refresh from live config if readable (root sessions). if [ -r "\$SSH_CONF" ]; then CONF_PORT=\$(awk '/^[[:space:]]*Port[[:space:]]+[0-9]+/{print \$2}' "\$SSH_CONF" | tail -n 1) [ -n "\$CONF_PORT" ] && REAL_PORT="\$CONF_PORT" if grep -Ei '^[[:space:]]*PasswordAuthentication[[:space:]]+yes' "\$SSH_CONF" >/dev/null 2>&1; then AUTH_TYPE="Password/Key" else AUTH_TYPE="Key Only (Secure)" fi fi printf '\n' printf '%b===============================================================================%b\n' "\033[0;36m" "\033[0m" printf '%b Server Init Managed - SSH Hardened%b\n' "\033[0;36m" "\033[0m" printf '%b===============================================================================%b\n' "\033[0;36m" "\033[0m" printf ' Login User: %b%s%b\n' "\033[1;32m" "\$REAL_USER" "\033[0m" printf ' SSH Port: %b%s%b (Dynamic Check)\n' "\033[1;32m" "\$REAL_PORT" "\033[0m" printf ' Auth Type: %s\n' "\$AUTH_TYPE" printf ' Firewall: Please ensure TCP/%b%s%b is allowed.\n' "\033[1;33m" "\$REAL_PORT" "\033[0m" printf '%b===============================================================================%b\n' "\033[0;36m" "\033[0m" printf '\n' EOF chown root:root "$banner_file" 2>/dev/null || true chmod 0644 "$banner_file" 2>/dev/null || true artifact_track "PROFILE_D_BANNER=$banner_file" audit_log "MOTD_BANNER_WRITTEN" "$banner_file" } generate_health_report() { report_file="/var/log/server-init-health.log" end_time=$(date +%s) duration=$((end_time - SCRIPT_START_TIME)) sys_uptime=$(uptime -p 2>/dev/null || uptime 2>/dev/null | awk -F, '{print $1}') # [v4.7.0] Pre-compute fields with if/then/else (avoids &&...|| precedence trap) if [ "$KEY_OK" = "y" ]; then key_auth_label="YES"; else key_auth_label="NO"; fi if [ "$IPV6_ENABLED" = "y" ]; then ipv6_label="Enabled"; else ipv6_label="Disabled"; fi if is_port_free "$SSH_PORT"; then port_label="NOT LISTENING (Error)"; else port_label="LISTENING (OK)"; fi { echo "=== Server Init Health Report ===" echo "Generated: $(date)" echo "Version: v4.7.8 Enterprise Hardening" echo "Execution Time: ${duration}s" echo "" echo "--- System ---" echo "Uptime: $sys_uptime" echo "OpenSSH: ${OPENSSH_VER_MAJOR}.${OPENSSH_VER_MINOR}" echo "" echo "--- SSH Config ---" echo "Port: $SSH_PORT" echo "User: $TARGET_USER" echo "KeyAuth: $key_auth_label" # [v4.7.2] Surface locked-account state if applicable. if [ -n "$ACCOUNT_LOCKED_REASON" ]; then echo "AccountLocked: YES ($ACCOUNT_LOCKED_REASON)" else echo "AccountLocked: NO" fi echo "" echo "--- Network ---" echo "IPv6: $ipv6_label" echo "Port Status: $port_label" echo "Crypto Mode: $CRYPTO_MODE" } > "$report_file" 2>/dev/null || true chmod 600 "$report_file" 2>/dev/null || true info "Health report saved to: $report_file" } print_final_summary() { public_ip="" # [v4.7.0] Gate external lookup behind a flag for offline / air-gapped use. # [v4.7.1 FIX-M8] Apply the same protocol/redirect hardening as fetch_keys. if [ "$ARG_NO_IP_PROBE" != "y" ] && command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then public_ip=$(curl -4fsSL --max-time 2 \ --max-redirs 2 \ --proto '=https' \ https://api.ipify.org 2>/dev/null || echo "") # [v4.7.6 FIX-LOW] Sanitize: a hostile (or MITM'd) ipify response could # contain ANSI CSI sequences that the operator's terminal renders. # Strip everything except IPv4 chars + length cap. public_ip=$(printf '%s' "$public_ip" | tr -cd '0-9.' | cut -c1-15) fi local_ip="" if command -v hostname >/dev/null 2>&1; then local_ip=$(hostname -I 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}') fi if [ -z "$local_ip" ] && command -v ip >/dev/null 2>&1; then local_ip=$(ip -4 addr show 2>/dev/null | awk ' /inet / { ip=$2 sub(/\/.*/, "", ip) if (ip !~ /^127\./) { print ip; exit } } ') fi end_time=$(date +%s) duration=$((end_time - SCRIPT_START_TIME)) # [v4.7.0] Use %b for ANSI sequences so dash interprets them correctly echo "" printf '%b╔════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗%b\n' "$CYAN" "$NC" printf '%b║ %-66s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" "$(msg BOX_TITLE)" "$NC" printf '%b╠════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣%b\n' "$CYAN" "$NC" printf '%b║ %-66s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" " $(msg BOX_SSH)" "$NC" # [v4.7.3 FIX-LOW] If the account is locked, do NOT print the ssh command — # it won't work and operators have copy-pasted such hints to their grief. # Show a placeholder instead, the explicit warning block below explains. if [ -n "$ACCOUNT_LOCKED_REASON" ]; then printf '%b║ (ssh command suppressed: account is locked, see below) %-3s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" "" "$NC" else if [ -n "$public_ip" ]; then printf '%b║ Public: ssh -p %-5s %s@%s %-16s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" "$SSH_PORT" "$TARGET_USER" "$public_ip" "" "$NC" fi if [ -n "$local_ip" ]; then printf '%b║ Local: ssh -p %-5s %s@%s %-16s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" "$SSH_PORT" "$TARGET_USER" "$local_ip" "" "$NC" fi fi printf '%b║ ║%b\n' "$CYAN" "$NC" if [ "$KEY_OK" = "y" ]; then printf '%b║ %-66s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" " $(msg BOX_KEY_ON)" "$NC" else printf '%b║ %-66s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" " $(msg BOX_KEY_OFF)" "$NC" fi if [ "$SSH_PORT" != "22" ]; then printf '%b║ %-66s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" " $(msg BOX_PORT)$SSH_PORT" "$NC" printf '%b║ %-66s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" " $(msg BOX_FW)" "$NC" if is_k8s_nodeport "$SSH_PORT"; then printf '%b║ %-66s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" " $(msg BOX_K8S_WARN)" "$NC" fi fi # [v4.7.2] Show explicit locked-account warning if applicable, so the # operator doesn't blindly try the SSH command above. # Truncate the username at 20 chars for box-width safety (printf %-66s pads # but never truncates; a 32-char name would push the right border past col 66). if [ -n "$ACCOUNT_LOCKED_REASON" ]; then short_user=$(printf '%.20s' "$TARGET_USER") short_reason=$(printf '%.50s' "$ACCOUNT_LOCKED_REASON") printf '%b║ ║%b\n' "$CYAN" "$NC" printf '%b║ %-66s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" " ! ACCOUNT LOCKED: $short_user cannot SSH yet" "$NC" printf '%b║ %-66s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" " Reason: $short_reason" "$NC" printf '%b║ %-66s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" " Fix: passwd -d $short_user (then test SSH)" "$NC" fi printf '%b║ ║%b\n' "$CYAN" "$NC" printf '%b║ %-66s ║%b\n' "$CYAN" " $(msg BOX_WARN)" "$NC" printf '%b╚════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝%b\n' "$CYAN" "$NC" echo "" echo "Log: $LOG_FILE" echo "Audit: $AUDIT_FILE" echo "Health: /var/log/server-init-health.log" echo "Time: ${duration}s" } validate_ssh_config_comprehensive() { config_file="$1" user="$2" key_ok="$3" if ! sshd -t -f "$config_file" 2>>"$LOG_FILE"; then err "SSH Config Syntax Error" return 1 fi # [v4.7.0 / HIGH] Use sshd -T (effective config) instead of grep|tail|$NF. # The previous approach picked the LAST matching line which may live inside # a `Match` block, giving the wrong effective value at the global scope. # sshd -T resolves Match blocks against the simulated identity below. sshd_T_out="" if openssh_version_ge 6 8; then sshd_T_out=$(sshd -T -C "user=$user,host=localhost,addr=127.0.0.1" -f "$config_file" 2>>"$LOG_FILE" || true) fi if [ -z "$sshd_T_out" ]; then sshd_T_out=$(sshd -T -f "$config_file" 2>>"$LOG_FILE" || true) fi if [ -n "$sshd_T_out" ]; then password_auth=$(printf '%s\n' "$sshd_T_out" | awk 'tolower($1)=="passwordauthentication" {print tolower($2); exit}') pubkey_auth=$(printf '%s\n' "$sshd_T_out" | awk 'tolower($1)=="pubkeyauthentication" {print tolower($2); exit}') port_setting=$(printf '%s\n' "$sshd_T_out" | awk 'tolower($1)=="port" {print $2; exit}') else # [v4.7.1 FIX-H3] sshd -T failed in BOTH variants — usually means a Match # block prevents `-T` without proper `-C`, or sshd is too old. The grep # fallback is approximate and can be wrong inside Match blocks. STRICT # mode refuses to proceed on approximate validation. err "sshd -T produced no output (Match block + old sshd?). Validation will be approximate." if [ "$STRICT_MODE" = "y" ]; then die "STRICT: refusing to apply config without authoritative sshd -T validation" fi warn "Continuing with grep-based fallback — values inside Match blocks may give wrong answers" password_auth=$(grep -Ei '^[[:space:]]*PasswordAuthentication[[:space:]]' "$config_file" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $NF}' | tr -d '\r' | tail -1 | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]') pubkey_auth=$(grep -Ei '^[[:space:]]*PubkeyAuthentication[[:space:]]' "$config_file" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $NF}' | tr -d '\r' | tail -1 | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]') port_setting=$(grep -Ei '^[[:space:]]*Port[[:space:]]' "$config_file" 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $NF}' | tr -d '\r' | tail -1) fi [ -n "$password_auth" ] || password_auth="yes" [ -n "$pubkey_auth" ] || pubkey_auth="yes" [ -n "$port_setting" ] || port_setting="22" if [ "$password_auth" = "no" ] && [ "$pubkey_auth" = "no" ]; then die "$(msg ERR_DEADLOCK)" fi if [ "$password_auth" = "no" ] && [ "$key_ok" != "y" ]; then die "$(msg ERR_PASSWORD_NO_KEY)" fi if [ "$user" = "root" ] && [ "$password_auth" = "no" ] && [ "$key_ok" != "y" ]; then die "$(msg ERR_ROOT_NO_KEY)" fi if [ "$port_setting" != "$SSH_PORT" ]; then warn "$(msg WARN_PORT_MISMATCH) ($port_setting vs $SSH_PORT)" fi insecure_options=0 if printf '%s\n' "$sshd_T_out" | awk 'BEGIN { found = 0 } tolower($1)=="x11forwarding" && tolower($2)=="yes" { found = 1; exit } END { exit !found }' 2>/dev/null; then warn "$(msg WARN_X11_FORWARDING)" insecure_options=$((insecure_options + 1)) fi if printf '%s\n' "$sshd_T_out" | awk 'BEGIN { found = 0 } tolower($1)=="permitemptypasswords" && tolower($2)=="yes" { found = 1; exit } END { exit !found }' 2>/dev/null; then warn "$(msg WARN_EMPTY_PASSWORDS)" insecure_options=$((insecure_options + 1)) fi [ "$insecure_options" -gt 0 ] && warn "$(msg WARN_INSECURE_OPTIONS) $insecure_options" return 0 } # ========================================================= # Entry # ========================================================= [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ] || { msg MUST_ROOT; exit 1; } # [v4.7.0] Redact sensitive argv (URLs may carry tokens; raw keys are large) before audit. sanitized_args="" for _a in "$@"; do case "$_a" in --key-raw=*) sanitized_args="$sanitized_args --key-raw=" ;; --key-url=*) sanitized_args="$sanitized_args --key-url=" ;; --key-gh=*) sanitized_args="$sanitized_args --key-gh=" ;; *) sanitized_args="$sanitized_args $_a" ;; esac done audit_log "START" "Script started with args:$sanitized_args" unset sanitized_args _a if command -v clear >/dev/null 2>&1; then clear; fi echo "=================================================" msg BANNER echo "=================================================" [ "$STRICT_MODE" = "y" ] && msg STRICT_ON preflight_checks # Phase 1: Input if [ -n "$ARG_USER" ]; then TARGET_USER="$ARG_USER" validate_username "$TARGET_USER" || die "$(msg ERR_USER_INV): $TARGET_USER" printf "%s%s\n" "$(msg AUTO_SKIP)" "$TARGET_USER" else while :; do printf "%s%s): " "$(msg ASK_USER)" "$DEFAULT_USER" read -r TARGET_USER [ -z "$TARGET_USER" ] && TARGET_USER="$DEFAULT_USER" validate_username "$TARGET_USER" && break msg ERR_USER_INV done fi if [ -n "$ARG_PORT" ]; then case "$ARG_PORT" in 22) PORT_OPT="1"; SSH_PORT="22" ;; random) PORT_OPT="2"; SSH_PORT="22" ;; *) if ! validate_port "$ARG_PORT"; then die "$(msg PORT_ERR): $ARG_PORT" fi if is_hard_reserved "$ARG_PORT"; then die "$(msg PORT_RES): $ARG_PORT" fi if is_k8s_nodeport "$ARG_PORT"; then warn "$(msg PORT_K8S)" fi PORT_OPT="3"; SSH_PORT="$ARG_PORT" ;; esac printf "%s%s\n" "$(msg AUTO_SKIP)" "$ARG_PORT (Mode $PORT_OPT)" else echo "" msg ASK_PORT_T; msg OPT_PORT_1; msg OPT_PORT_2; msg OPT_PORT_3 printf "%s" "$(msg SELECT)"; read -r PORT_OPT [ -z "$PORT_OPT" ] && PORT_OPT="1" SSH_PORT="22" if [ "$PORT_OPT" = "3" ]; then while :; do printf "%s" "$(msg INPUT_PORT)" read -r MANUAL_PORT printf '%s\n' "$MANUAL_PORT" | grep -Eq '^[0-9]+$' || { msg PORT_ERR; continue; } [ "$MANUAL_PORT" -ge 1024 ] 2>/dev/null && [ "$MANUAL_PORT" -le 65535 ] 2>/dev/null || { msg PORT_ERR; continue; } if is_hard_reserved "$MANUAL_PORT"; then msg PORT_RES continue elif is_k8s_nodeport "$MANUAL_PORT"; then msg PORT_K8S printf "%s" "$(msg ASK_SURE)" read -r force_port [ "${force_port:-n}" = "y" ] || continue fi SSH_PORT="$MANUAL_PORT" break done fi fi if [ -n "$ARG_KEY_TYPE" ]; then KEY_OPT="auto"; KEY_TYPE="$ARG_KEY_TYPE"; KEY_VAL="$ARG_KEY_VAL" # [v4.7.1 FIX-M1] Don't echo raw key material or URLs (may contain tokens) # to stdout — the audit log is already sanitized but stdout/scrollback # captures (tee, screen, tmux) bypass that. case "$KEY_TYPE" in raw) printf "%s%s\n" "$(msg AUTO_SKIP)" "$KEY_TYPE ()" ;; url) printf "%s%s\n" "$(msg AUTO_SKIP)" "$KEY_TYPE ()" ;; *) printf "%s%s\n" "$(msg AUTO_SKIP)" "$KEY_TYPE ($KEY_VAL)" ;; esac else echo "" msg ASK_KEY_T; msg OPT_KEY_1; msg OPT_KEY_2; msg OPT_KEY_3 printf "%s" "$(msg SELECT)"; read -r KEY_OPT case "$KEY_OPT" in 1) KEY_TYPE="gh"; printf "%s" "$(msg INPUT_GH)"; read -r KEY_VAL ;; 2) KEY_TYPE="url"; printf "%s" "$(msg INPUT_URL)"; read -r KEY_VAL ;; 3) # [v4.7.3 FIX-MED] Build $raw with a REAL newline, not literal '\n' that # later needs printf %b — which would interpret any \c the user typed # and silently truncate the result. KEY_TYPE="raw" msg INPUT_RAW raw="" __nl=' ' while IFS= read -r l; do [ -z "$l" ] && break raw="${raw}${l}${__nl}" done KEY_VAL="$raw" unset raw l __nl ;; *) die "Invalid Option" ;; esac fi if [ -n "$ARG_UPDATE" ]; then DO_UPDATE="$ARG_UPDATE"; printf "%s%s\n" "$(msg AUTO_SKIP)" "Update=$DO_UPDATE"; else printf "%s" "$(msg ASK_UPD)"; read -r DO_UPDATE; [ -z "$DO_UPDATE" ] && DO_UPDATE="n"; fi if [ -n "$ARG_BBR" ]; then DO_BBR="$ARG_BBR"; printf "%s%s\n" "$(msg AUTO_SKIP)" "BBR=$DO_BBR"; else printf "%s" "$(msg ASK_BBR)"; read -r DO_BBR; [ -z "$DO_BBR" ] && DO_BBR="n"; fi # Phase 2: Confirm if [ "$AUTO_CONFIRM" = "y" ]; then echo ""; info "Auto-Confirm: Skipping interactive confirmation." else echo "" msg CONFIRM_T echo "$(msg C_USER)$TARGET_USER" echo "$(msg C_PORT)$SSH_PORT (Mode: $PORT_OPT)" echo "$(msg C_KEY)$KEY_TYPE" echo "$(msg C_UPD)$DO_UPDATE" echo "$(msg C_BBR)$DO_BBR" [ "$PORT_OPT" != "1" ] && msg WARN_FW printf "%s" "$(msg ASK_SURE)" read -r CONFIRM [ "${CONFIRM:-n}" = "y" ] || die "$(msg CANCEL)" fi # Phase 3: Execute msg AUDIT_START setup_rollback backup_config_persistent || true info "$(msg I_INSTALL)" ensure_ssh_server detect_openssh_version detect_kbd_interactive_support info "OpenSSH Version: ${OPENSSH_VER_MAJOR}.${OPENSSH_VER_MINOR}" install_pkg_try curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || true install_pkg_try wget >/dev/null 2>&1 || true # === [新增] 补充常用管理工具 === if ! command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then info "Installing missing dependency: sudo..." install_pkg sudo >/dev/null 2>&1 || true fi if ! command -v hostname >/dev/null 2>&1; then # Debian/Ubuntu 下 hostname 命令通常在 hostname 包或 net-tools 中 install_pkg hostname >/dev/null 2>&1 || true fi if [ "$DO_UPDATE" = "y" ]; then info "$(msg I_UPD)"; update_system; fi if [ "$DO_BBR" = "y" ]; then info "$(msg I_BBR)"; enable_bbr; fi if [ "$PORT_OPT" = "2" ]; then p="$(pick_random_port 2>/dev/null || true)" if [ -n "$p" ]; then SSH_PORT="$p" info "Random Port: $SSH_PORT" else [ "$STRICT_MODE" = "y" ] && die "STRICT: Random port failed" warn "Random port failed, fallback to 22" SSH_PORT="22" fi fi # [v4.7.3 FIX-H5] Always run stale-rule cleanup — including when this run # REVERTS to port 22. Otherwise a sequence of `--port=2222` then later # `--port=22` would leak the 2222 rule. remove_stale_firewall_port "$SSH_PORT" if [ "$SSH_PORT" != "22" ]; then allow_firewall_port "$SSH_PORT" handle_selinux "$SSH_PORT" # [v4.7.4] Re-record state AFTER handle_selinux so the persisted file # also reflects SELinux ownership. allow_firewall_port already called # record_last_applied with the firewall backend; this overwrites with the # complete picture including SELINUX_PORT. if [ "$SELINUX_LABEL_APPLIED" = "y" ]; then # Re-read the firewall backend just persisted (or fall back to empty). if [ -f "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" ]; then __recorded_fw=$(awk -F= '$1=="FIREWALL"{print $2; exit}' "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" 2>/dev/null) case "$__recorded_fw" in *:*) __recorded_be="${__recorded_fw%%:*}" ;; *) __recorded_be="" ;; esac # [v4.7.5] Pass SELINUX_LABEL_OWNED_BY_RUN as 4th arg so the persisted # file distinguishes "we own this and may delete on next run" from # "label pre-existed independently, don't touch on next run". record_last_applied "$SSH_PORT" "$__recorded_be" "y" "$SELINUX_LABEL_OWNED_BY_RUN" unset __recorded_fw __recorded_be else record_last_applied "$SSH_PORT" "" "y" "$SELINUX_LABEL_OWNED_BY_RUN" fi fi else # [v4.7.3 + v4.7.4] When the operator reverts to port 22, clear the # last-applied state. The stale-cleanup above already removed the prior # firewall + SELinux state for the OLD port. Nothing to remember. if [ -f "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" ]; then rm -f "$LAST_APPLIED_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true audit_log "LAST_APPLIED_CLEARED" "reverting to port 22" fi fi safe_ensure_user "$TARGET_USER" || die "User setup failed" root_home=$(get_user_home root) [ -s "$root_home/.ssh/authorized_keys" ] && ROOT_KEY_PRESENT="y" || ROOT_KEY_PRESENT="n" KEY_OK="n" KEY_DATA="$(fetch_keys "$KEY_TYPE" "$KEY_VAL" 2>/dev/null || true)" if [ -n "$KEY_DATA" ] && deploy_keys "$TARGET_USER" "$KEY_DATA"; then KEY_OK="y" info "$(msg I_KEY_OK)" else [ "$STRICT_MODE" = "y" ] && die "STRICT: Key deploy failed" warn "$(msg W_KEY_FAIL)" fi # [v4.7.0 / CRIT] Apply password policy now that KEY_OK is known. # [v4.7.1] Pass USER_WAS_CREATED so pre-existing admin passwords are preserved. # [v4.7.2] Pass SUDO_DEPLOYED so new accounts that lack sudo stay locked # (prevents passwordless+no-sudo combo). finalize_user_password_policy "$TARGET_USER" "$KEY_OK" "$USER_WAS_CREATED" "$SUDO_DEPLOYED" if has_global_ipv6; then IPV6_ENABLED="y" info "$(msg IPV6_CFG)" else IPV6_ENABLED="n" fi compute_crypto_lines if [ "$CRYPTO_MODE" = "skip" ]; then info "$(msg INFO_OLD_SSH_SKIP_ALGO)" elif [ "$CRYPTO_MODE" = "fallback" ]; then warn "$(msg COMPAT_WARN)" fi info "$(msg I_BACKUP)$SSH_CONF" cleanup_sshd_config_d remove_managed_block sanitize_sshd_config tmp="$TMP_DIR/sshd_block_final" build_block "$tmp" install_managed_block "$tmp" # [v4.7.0 / MED] protect_sshd_service is a safety feature — it must run # regardless of whether we'll restart sshd in this invocation. The flag was # only ever supposed to skip the live restart + connection tests. protect_sshd_service if ! sshd -t -f "$SSH_CONF" 2>>"$LOG_FILE"; then die "$(msg E_SSHD_CHK)"; fi validate_ssh_config_comprehensive "$SSH_CONF" "$TARGET_USER" "$KEY_OK" # [SEC-FIX] Handle --delay-restart properly: skip restart and tests if [ "$ARG_DELAY_RESTART" = "y" ]; then warn "$(msg DELAY_RESTART_MSG)" # [v4.7.3 FIX-MED] Surface the systemd override status — we wrote it but # didn't restart, so the operator should know the protection (Restart=, # OOMScoreAdjust=) only takes effect on next sshd start. if command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1 && [ -f /etc/systemd/system/sshd.service.d/override.conf ]; then info "systemd override written at /etc/systemd/system/sshd.service.d/override.conf — applies on next sshd restart" fi update_motd generate_health_report trap - INT TERM EXIT HUP cleanup_state cleanup_locks rm -rf "$TMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true print_final_summary audit_log "DONE" "Completed (delay-restart). user=$TARGET_USER port=$SSH_PORT key_ok=$KEY_OK" exit 0 fi if ! restart_sshd; then die "$(msg E_RESTART)" fi grep -Eq "^[[:space:]]*Port[[:space:]]+$SSH_PORT([[:space:]]|\$)" "$SSH_CONF" 2>/dev/null || die "$(msg E_GREP_FAIL)" verify_sshd_listening "$SSH_PORT" || die "$(msg W_LISTEN_FAIL)" enhanced_ssh_test "$SSH_PORT" "$TARGET_USER" || die "$(msg TEST_FAIL)" update_motd generate_health_report trap - INT TERM EXIT HUP cleanup_state cleanup_locks rm -rf "$TMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null || true print_final_summary audit_log "DONE" "Completed successfully. user=$TARGET_USER port=$SSH_PORT key_ok=$KEY_OK" exit 0