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The respective ratings of these persons was as follows:

Deck department.	59
Engine department.	130
Victualling department.	222
	411
Supernumerary engineers, Ex-R.M.S., <i>Empress of Asia</i>	4
Musicians.	5
	420

(b) The total number of passengers was 1,057, made up as follows:—

	Male.	Female.	Total.
1st Class.	49	38	87
2nd Class.	125	128	253
3rd Class.	500	217	717

Included in the above figures are:—

Four female children in first-class, 11 male and 21 female children in second class, and 54 male and 48 female children in third class; total children, 138.

Question 2.—On leaving Quebec on or about the 28th day of May last, did the SS. *Empress of Ireland* comply with the requirements of the M. S. Acts, 1894 to 1906, and the rules and regulations made thereunder, with regard to the safety and otherwise of 'passenger steamers' and 'emigrant ships'?

Answer.—Yes.

Question 3.—In the actual design and construction of the SS. *Empress of Ireland*, what special provisions, if any, were made for the safety of the vessel, and the lives of those on board, in the event of collisions and other casualties?

Answer.—This has been dealt with in Part I of our report.

Question 4.—Was the SS. *Empress of Ireland* sufficiently and efficiently officered and manned?

Answer.—Yes.

It was suggested to us, however, by counsel on behalf of the National Sailors' and Firemen's Union of Great Britain and Ireland, that more A.B.'s should have been carried on board the *Empress of Ireland*. He raised this point not with special reference to this casualty and this vessel, but as a means of placing before the court the general opinion of his clients, that for the purpose of launching and manning lifeboats all passenger ships should be required by law to carry A.B.'s to the number of two per boat. We do not, however, consider that such a requirement would have been of any avail in saving life on this occasion, and we, therefore, abstain from making any comment on the suggestion.

Question 5.—Were the arrangements for manning and launching the boats on board the S.S. *Empress of Ireland* in case of emergency, proper and sufficient? Had a boat drill and a bulkhead door drill been held on board, and if so, when? What was the carrying capacity of the respective boats? What number and description of life-buoys and life jackets were on board this vessel? Where were they carried? Were they in good condition, and adequate for the purpose intended?

Answer.—The answer to the first question is in the affirmative. Boat and bulkhead door drills were carried out at Quebec on the 23rd May last before the ship sailed. The rest of the information asked for is given in Part V of this report.

Question 6.—What installations for receiving and transmitting messages by wireless telegraphy were on board the S.S. *Empress of Ireland*? How many operators were employed in working such installations? Were the installations in good and effective working order? Were the number of operators sufficient to enable messages to be received and transmitted continuously by day and night?

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Answer.—The circumstances of the collision and the causes which brought it about are described in our report.

Question 13.—In what position in the River St. Lawrence and at what time on the morning of the 29th of May last did the collision occur between the S.S. *Empress of Ireland* and the S.S. *Storstad*? At what time did the S.S. *Empress of Ireland* founder, and how was it that she sank so quickly after the collision had occurred?

Answer.—These questions were dealt with in our report.

Question 14.—Was proper discipline maintained on board the S.S. *Empress of Ireland* after the casualty occurred?

Answer.—Yes.

Question 15.—What messages for assistance were sent by the S.S. *Empress of Ireland* after the casualty, and at what times respectively? Were the messages sent out received at the wireless station at Father Point? Were prompt measures taken by those on shore to render assistance? What assistance was rendered by the Government steamers *Eureka* and *Lady Evelyn*?

Answer.—A wireless message 'S.O.S.' was sent off by the Senior Marconi operator shortly after the collision had occurred, the message was received at the wireless station at Father Point, and no time was lost in sending the Government steamers *Lady Evelyn* and *Eureka* to the rescue. The vessels proceeded at once to the scene of the disaster and picked up many of the survivors, landing them at Rimouski.

Question 16.—Was the apparatus for lowering the boats on the S.S. *Empress of Ireland* at the time of the casualty in good working order? How many boats were got away before the vessel sank?

Did the boats, whether those under davits or otherwise, prove to be serviceable for the purpose of saving life? If not, why not? What steps were taken immediately on the happening of the casualty? How long after the casualty was its seriousness realized by those in charge of the vessel? What steps were then taken? Were all watertight doors in bulkheads immediately closed? What endeavours were made to save the lives of those on board, and to prevent the vessel from sinking?

Answer.—At the time of the casualty the apparatus for lowering the boats on board the *Empress of Ireland* was in good working order.

The second part of this question has already been answered in the body of the report.

Question 17.—Were any of the persons on board the S.S. *Empress of Ireland* who lost their lives, killed or injured by the collision?

What number of passengers and crew left the ship in the boats which got away?

How many persons were ultimately rescued, and by what means? What was the number of passengers, distinguishing between men and women, and adults and children, of the first, second and third classes respectively, who were saved? What was the number of the crew, discriminating their ratings and sex, who were saved?

Answer.—We have not before us sufficient evidence to enable us to answer the first question.

Of the total number of 1,417 persons on board the *Empress of Ireland* 465 were saved (1) in the vessel's own boats, (2) boats belonging to the S.S. *Storstad* and (3) the Government steamers *Eureka* and *Lady Evelyn*.

The number of passengers saved, distinguishing between men and women, and adults and children were as follows:—

	FIRST CLASS.	
	Total number.	Saved.
Adult, males.....	49	24
" females.....	34	11
Children, males.....		
" females.....	4	1
Total.....	87	36 were saved.

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SECOND CLASS.

	Total number.	Saved.
Adult, males.....	114	33
" females.....	107	13
Children, males.....	11	
" females.....	21	2
Total.....	253	of which number 48 were saved.

THIRD CLASS.

	Total number.	Saved.
Adult, males.....	446	115
" females.....	169	17
Children, males.....	54	1
" females.....	48	
Total.....	717	of which number 133 were saved.
Of the 609 adult male passengers	172	were saved.
" 310 " female "	41	"
" 65 male children "	1	"
" 73 female "	3	"
Total, 1,057	217	"

The total number of the crew saved was 248, as follows:—

	Total number.	Saved.
Deck Department.....	59	36
Engine Department.....	130	92
Sup. Engineers ex- <i>Empress of Asia</i>	4	3
Victualing Department.....	212	113
Matron and 9 stewardesses.....	10	1
Musicians.....	5	3
Total.....	420	crew. 248 saved.

Question 18.—Did the Master of the S.S. *Storstad* comply with Article 422 of the M.S.A. 1894?

Answer.— Yes.

Question 19.—Was a good and proper lookout kept on board of both vessels?

Answer.—A good and proper lookout was kept on board the *Empress of Ireland*. We are not prepared on the evidence before us to say whether the mistake made by those in charge of the *Storstad* in thinking that the *Empress of Ireland* was passing port to port was or was not due to an insufficient lookout being kept.

Question 20.—Was the loss of the S.S. *Empress of Ireland*, etc., or the loss of life caused by the wrongful act or default of the Master and First Officer of that vessel, and the Master, First, Second and Third Officers of the SS. *Storstad*, or any of them?

Answer.—This question has already been answered in our report.

PART VII.

SUGGESTIONS.

1. In order to prevent, if possible, disasters such as that into which we have been enquiring, we think that in foggy weather it would be desirable to close all watertight doors and port holes below the top of the watertight bulkheads, and to keep them closed until the fog has completely cleared. We think also that wherever practicable all watertight doors and port holes below the above level should be closed at sunset and kept closed until sunrise.