# NEEC Evaluation: Mutual Credit / LETS

**Scoring document — Step 1b; scored in Session 7, natively on the v2
structure; in the canonical corpus (`neec_scores.csv`) since Session 8.**
Follows Appendix H.9's submission template, matching the research depth and
disclosure norms established by the Georgism/LVT evaluation (Session 6).
Scored against the fully-specified 26-criterion v2 structure (Section 12.3,
Appendix H.7v2). Its row was added to `neec_scores.csv` in Session 8, and it
has been in the Report (System 15) since Report v1.5. It has not been
independently cross-checked by a second scorer (H.9 Step 6) — flagged as
open per this project's disclosure norms (`NEEC_CONTRIBUTING.md` §2,
Appendix H.6).

---

## 14 [pending renumbering]. Mutual Credit / LETS

### Overview

**Mutual credit** is a monetary design in which credit is created
endogenously, bilaterally, and at the moment of trade, rather than issued by
a central authority against a reserve. Every participant begins at a zero
balance; a purchase moves the buyer's balance down and the seller's balance
up by the same amount, so the sum of all balances in the system is always
exactly zero — nobody's "money" is anybody else's debt to a bank, it is a
direct IOU between members of the network, typically capped on both the
positive and negative side by a jointly-set limit reflecting a member's
demonstrated capacity to contribute. **LETS (Local Exchange Trading
Systems)** is the best-known popular implementation of this design,
originated by Michael Linton in Comox Valley, British Columbia, in 1983 and
spread — mostly at neighborhood or small-town scale — through Canada, the
UK, Australia, and elsewhere over the following two decades. **Time banking**
(Edgar Cahn, USA, 1980s) is a close cousin that fixes the unit of account to
one hour of any person's time regardless of the skill involved, rather than
a locally-set price.

**Scope decision (mirroring Georgism's own explicit scope note).** This
evaluation scores systems that create credit *endogenously through the act
of trading itself*, with no prior reserve of national currency required to
back issuance: classic LETS schemes, time banks, business-to-business mutual
credit networks (WIR Bank, Sardex), and network-backed community-currency
vouchers of the same zero-reserve character (Grassroots Economics'
Bangla-Pesa/Sarafu-Credit in Kenya). It explicitly **excludes convertible
local currencies** — schemes such as the Bristol Pound, Brixton Pound, the
Basque Country's Eusko, or the 1932 Wörgl stamp scrip, which require a prior
reserve of national currency (typically held at a partner bank) to back
every unit issued. These are a genuinely different mechanism — closer to a
regional gift-card or loyalty-point system than to mutual credit — even
though they are historically and thematically adjacent (several were founded
by former LETS coordinators) and are mentioned below for context on the
broader complementary-currency family's current vitality. A reader
evaluating a convertible local currency specifically should not import this
evaluation's scores.

**Evidentiary tier (Appendix H.6) — mixed, spanning real-world
implementation to historical/defunct, and this matters throughout.** Some
components of this evaluation rest on an unusually strong, multi-decade,
multi-continent real-implementation record: WIR Bank has operated
continuously in Switzerland since 1934; classic LETS and time banking have
operated in dozens of countries since the 1980s; Grassroots Economics has
operated a mutual-credit-style network in Kenya since 2013. Others rest on a
genuine historical case that ended in **collapse**: Argentina's Redes de
Trueque (barter networks), which scaled to a meaningful share of the
country's population during the 2001–2002 economic crisis and then
disintegrated by 2003–2004 amid counterfeiting and internal inflation of its
own vouchers. Still others — most importantly a current initiative
(Credit Commons Society / Mutual Credit Services) attempting to solve the
field's own documented scaling problems through federation — are
early-stage and unproven at any meaningful scale. Each criterion below
states which tier of evidence it is drawing on.

---

### Domain 1: Material Security

#### C1.1 Poverty Elimination Capacity: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** The evidence pulls in different directions depending on
context. In a genuinely poor setting, Grassroots Economics' Bangla-Pesa
program — launched in 2013 in a low-income informal settlement in Mombasa,
Kenya (in a country where roughly 46% of the population lives in poverty) —
is credited in the academic literature studying it with a real, measured
increase in local business turnover of more than 20%, alongside reported
reductions in local unemployment; the successor Sarafu-Credit network has
persisted for over a decade and continues to be studied in current (2021–
2023) academic publications, an unusually long run for this field. Against
this: the best-documented wealthy-country evidence (UK LETS, drawn largely
from academic case studies of the 1990s–2000s movement and reinforced by a
first-hand practitioner account of Brixton's own scheme) suggests LETS more
often attracted participants who were already socially connected and
resource-secure enough to discover and navigate an informal trading network,
rather than reaching the most materially insecure members of a community —
the same account describes the surrounding neighborhood's actual
immigrant and low-income communities as running their own, separate,
informal mutual-aid arrangements that were never integrated with the
"official" LETS scheme. No study located quantifies a poverty-elimination
*rate* anywhere near NEEC's threshold, in any context; every mechanism here
operates at genuinely small scale (typically dozens to a few hundred
participants per node, before any federation).

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a real, evidenced, sometimes
substantial material benefit in specific contexts (most clearly in a
low-income, high-poverty setting), but inconsistent reach into the poorest
segments of a community even where the mechanism is present, and no
implementation anywhere near NEEC's scale or elimination-rate threshold.

#### C1.2a Wealth Building for Resilience: 0.0 (Structural Failure)

**Rationale:** This criterion asks whether participants can build a
household buffer through the system's own mechanism, and mutual credit is
about as clean a "no" as this corpus contains — cleaner, arguably, than
Georgism's own C1.2a finding, which at least had to work through why an
*income* mechanism doesn't count as *wealth*. Mutual credit balances are not
a store of value in any sense relevant to this criterion: a positive balance
means other members owe you goods or services, denominated in a unit that
is, by design, not convertible to national currency and not usable outside
the network — it cannot pay rent due in dollars, cover a medical bill, or be
inherited in any meaningful sense. Balances are typically capped on the
positive side specifically to prevent large accumulations (see C1.2b), and
several implementations (classic LETS, most time banks) have no interest or
appreciation mechanism at all — credit sits at exactly its face value, or in
some community-currency designs actively decays (demurrage) to encourage
circulation rather than hoarding, which is the structural opposite of a
buffer. No implementation located — WIR, Sardex, LETS, time banking, or
Grassroots Economics — provides anything resembling a $70,000/20-year
accumulation pathway for any meaningful share of participants.

**Score Justification:** Structural failure (0.0) — the mechanism has no
asset-accumulation function at all, by design, for any participant,
independent of implementation scale or context.

#### C1.2b Prevention of Exploitative Accumulation: 1.0 (Pass)

**Rationale:** This is the single most direct point of contact between
mutual credit and any NEEC criterion in this whole evaluation — preventing
wealth-based accumulation is not a side effect, it is close to the design's
entire point. Every implementation examined shares the same structural
core: participants begin at zero, no participant can extend credit to
themself, balances are capped on both the positive and negative side by a
jointly-set limit, and — critically — most implementations have **no
interest, appreciation, or growth mechanism for balances at all**, which
makes this arguably a *stronger* anti-accumulation design than Integral's
own Time Credits (already the strongest C1.2b case elsewhere in this
corpus, Appendix H.7v2), since ITC at least permits conversion multipliers
up to several times face value while classic mutual credit typically has no
multiplier mechanism whatsoever — a capped balance simply cannot grow.
This is corroborated by independent sourcing (a general reference
description of mutual credit explicitly states that credit limits are set
by the network based on a member's demonstrated capacity to contribute,
and that balances cannot be traded or speculated on outside that structure).
One important caveat, disclosed rather than smoothed over: WIR Bank, the
oldest and largest example, is documented to have **centralized
substantially as it scaled** — evolving, in the words of one contemporary
account of the field, into something closer to a bank-run private currency
than the peer-to-peer network it started as. This is a real tension between
the base mechanism's anti-concentration design and what happens to
*institutional* control when a mutual-credit network grows very large — it
bears on C4.4 and C5.3 more than it undermines the finding here, since the
zero-sum, capped, non-transferable balance structure itself was not what
changed; what changed was who administers the ledger.

**Score Justification:** Pass (1.0) — a genuinely structural, not merely
incidental, prevention mechanism, consistent across every implementation
examined regardless of scale or context, with the WIR centralization
finding disclosed as a caveat about institutional control at large scale
rather than a refutation of the balance-level design.

#### C1.3 Housing Security: 0.0 (Structural Failure)

**Rationale:** No mechanism, and no evidence, was located connecting mutual
credit or LETS to housing stability in any structural way. Some LETS/time-
bank exchanges do include housing-adjacent services (home repairs,
house-sitting, occasional help with moves), but these are incidental trades
within a general skill-exchange marketplace, not a housing-provision or
housing-stabilization mechanism of the kind Community Land Trusts,
public housing, or rent regulation represent elsewhere in this corpus. No
source reviewed for this evaluation — covering WIR, Sardex, LETS, time
banking, Argentina's Trueque, or Grassroots Economics — describes any
housing-specific design element, market-volatility buffer, or affordability
outcome.

**Score Justification:** Structural failure (0.0) — no structural
connection to housing security was identified anywhere in the evidence
reviewed, in contrast to several other systems in this corpus (including
Georgism) that have at least an indirect, evidenced housing channel.

#### C1.4 Automation Resilience: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** The genuine theoretical case is real: because mutual credit
does not require wage income to function, it could in principle maintain
some level of economic activity and mutual provisioning even as automation
reduces the number of people who can sell labor for a wage — a mechanism
independent of the labor market in the same broad sense several other
partially-scoring systems in this corpus (e.g., commons-based mutual aid)
already receive credit for. Against this, a specific and largely
unaddressed gap: mutual credit requires a participant to have *something
other members want* to trade for access. In a scenario where automation
increasingly performs not just routine physical and cognitive labor but
also much of what individuals might otherwise offer each other, it is not
established what a severely automation-displaced person would have left to
contribute that other members would value enough to extend credit against —
a version of the same "what happens when the village doesn't need most of
its members' labor" problem this project's own Integral evaluation
identified, applied here to a system with even less institutional
infrastructure to fall back on. No source reviewed models or stress-tests
mutual credit specifically against any automation-displacement scenario,
let alone NEEC's 30/50/70% severities.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a real, structurally plausible
mechanism for maintaining non-wage economic activity, but genuinely
untested for automation specifically, with an identified and unaddressed
gap for participants with little or nothing left to offer in exchange.

#### C1.5 Universal Wealth Access (narrowed — access breadth only): 0.0 (Structural Failure)

**Rationale:** This narrowed criterion asks whether the population has
broad *access* to an *active mechanism producing asset growth* — access
breadth is, if anything, a genuine strength of mutual credit (LETS and time
banks are typically open to anyone in a community with essentially no entry
barrier, unlike Market Socialism's membership-gated cooperative model), but
C1.2a's analysis already establishes that there is no asset-growth
mechanism at all for this access to apply to. Access to a mechanism that
does not itself build assets — however open that access is — does not
satisfy this criterion's own stated requirement, exactly mirroring the
reasoning already established for Georgism's identical C1.2a/C1.5 pairing
and, before that, for Integral's original C1.2/C1.5 finding that first
motivated the v2 split (Section 12.1).

**Score Justification:** Structural failure (0.0) — for the same
underlying design-level reason as C1.2a, not an access-breadth problem;
access is, if anything, unusually strong (no membership gate, no
employment requirement), but the criterion requires more than access to a
mechanism that does not build assets.

**Domain 1 Total: 2.0/6 (33%)** — Three structural failures (C1.2a, C1.3,
C1.5). The C1.2a/C1.5 pair traces to the same design-level finding already
established for Georgism and, originally, Integral: this is now the third
system in the corpus whose material-security failures trace to that same
underlying pattern, applied for a third distinct reason (Integral: designed
architectural exclusion; Georgism: the dividend mechanism is structurally
an income vehicle; Mutual Credit/LETS: the credit mechanism has no
value-storage function at all). C1.3's failure is Mutual Credit/LETS's own
distinct addition — no housing channel exists here at all, where Georgism
at least had a partial one.

---

### Domain 2: Human Autonomy

#### C2.1 Freedom from Coercion: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** The core design reduces one real form of coercion: no
interest accrues on a negative balance, there is no external creditor, and
participation can meaningfully reduce a member's need to accept
unfavorable market terms for at least some of their needs. Genuinely
complicating this: in the UK specifically, joining a LETS scheme has been
reported to place a participant's state welfare benefits at risk in some
local authority areas — a first-hand account from a long-time UK LETS
organizer describes this directly, alongside a related and more general
observation that UK authorities historically treated time banks (framed as
social or health-adjacent support) considerably more favorably than LETS
(treated as economic activity, and therefore more suspect). This is a real,
if geographically specific, example of state policy creating a coercive
penalty for engaging with the mechanism, falling hardest on exactly the
population — benefit recipients — for whom the underlying coercion-
reduction case is strongest.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — genuine, structural reduction in
market-based coercion for engaged participants, but a documented,
policy-created coercion risk for the most vulnerable potential
participants in at least one well-studied national context, and reach
inherently limited by small-network scale.

#### C2.2 Labor Non-Necessity: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** Mutual credit has a genuine structural feature relevant
here: because credit can be extended before a member has contributed
anything (a negative balance is simply a permitted IOU up to a limit), the
system does not require upfront reciprocity the way direct barter does —
a meaningful design difference from a strict work-first exchange. But this
is not unconditional in NEEC's sense: negative balances are capped, and a
member unable to ever contribute would eventually be unable to draw
further credit, so the system still ultimately requires rough reciprocity
over time rather than providing baseline security with no expectation of
return. This reasoning differs from Georgism's own C2.2 partial score
(which turned on transfer *size* being inadequate) and from Nordic Social
Democracy's (time-limited conditionality) — the specific mechanism here is
*deferred* rather than *absent* conditionality — but lands at the same
rounded score.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — genuine flexibility in the timing
of reciprocity, a real design feature distinct from strict barter, but
ultimately capped and requiring eventual balance rather than providing
unconditional baseline security.

#### C2.3 Creative Development Opportunities: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** Valuing skills and contributions markets systematically
undervalue — caregiving, teaching, companionship, artistic and craft work —
is one of the most consistently emphasized features of both the LETS and
time-banking literatures; Edgar Cahn's founding rationale for time banking
specifically was to place an hour of any person's time on equal footing
regardless of market wage, an explicit and direct mechanism for valuing
non-market contribution. This is real and well-evidenced as a design
intent and lived practice in surviving schemes. Against this: the effect on
actual *time freed up* or *hours engaged* is modest and indirect compared
with purpose-built mechanisms elsewhere in this corpus (e.g., Degrowth's
explicit hour-reduction design) — mutual credit reallocates which
activities carry recognized value, but does not itself reduce anyone's
total working time or guarantee resources for creative pursuits beyond
what a typically small, capped credit balance can access.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a genuine, well-evidenced,
explicit design value (valuing non-market contribution) with real practical
effect within engaged networks, but modest in scale relative to
purpose-built time/resource-freeing mechanisms elsewhere in the corpus.

#### C2.4 Democratic Participation: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** Individual mutual-credit and LETS nodes are typically
self-governed by their own membership — a volunteer coordinator (or small
committee) sets or ratifies credit limits, resolves disputes, and adjusts
rules, functioning much like a small mutual-aid society or co-op rather
than inheriting an external governance structure the way Georgism's tax
mechanism does. This is a genuine, real form of grassroots democratic
practice, evidenced directly by the first-hand UK account (a scheme run
essentially as a volunteer-coordinated community operation). Against this:
this governance is typically informal, undocumented by any participation-
rate or proposal-adoption metric comparable to what NEEC's threshold
specifies, and operates at a scale (dozens to low hundreds of members per
node) far below anything resembling population-level democratic
participation; nothing in the evidence reviewed describes formal citizen-
proposal-adoption rates or systematic satisfaction measurement.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — genuine, real grassroots
self-governance at the node level, but informal, unmeasured against
NEEC's specific thresholds, and inherently small-scale.

#### C2.5 Exit Rights and Mobility: 1.0 (Pass)

**Rationale:** Participation is voluntary at every level examined: joining
or leaving a LETS node, a time bank, or a mutual-credit network carries no
formal penalty beyond settling (or, in most small implementations,
informally writing off) any outstanding balance, and — unlike Nordic-style
comprehensive welfare states or Degrowth's own C2.5 failure — a mutual-
credit node's continued function does not require near-universal
population participation; a handful of members can sustain a functioning
node, and the whole mechanism is explicitly designed to coexist with, not
replace, the ordinary market economy a member continues to participate in
for everything the node doesn't cover.

**Score Justification:** Pass (1.0) — no coercive lock-in, low-cost exit at
the individual level, and no dependency on near-universal participation for
the mechanism to keep functioning.

**Domain 2 Total: 3.0/5 (60%)** — No structural failures. The pattern
across C2.1–C2.4 is consistent: a real, correctly-directed, genuinely
autonomy-enhancing mechanism, evidenced at a scale and level of formality
well short of NEEC's demanding thresholds — a similar shape to Georgism's
own Domain 2, reached through different specific mechanisms.

---

### Domain 3: System Resilience

#### C3.1 Crisis Response Capacity: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** This is where the strongest peer-reviewed evidence in this
entire evaluation sits. A 2009 study published in the *Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization* found that WIR credit circulation among Swiss
small and medium businesses moves **countercyclically** with the broader
Swiss business cycle — WIR usage rises specifically when conventional bank
credit tightens during downturns, functioning as a real, empirically
demonstrated automatic stabilizer for participating firms. Sardex, founded
in Sardinia in 2009–2010 directly in response to the 2008 financial crisis
and the post-2008 credit crunch facing Italian small businesses, is widely
credited in the academic literature studying it with providing exactly this
kind of liquidity buffer when conventional bank lending contracted, and has
continued operating and growing since. Argentina's Redes de Trueque
provide a third, more dramatic data point: a barter/mutual-credit network
that began in 1995 with roughly 30 participants scaled — during the
country's 2001–2002 economic collapse, bank-deposit freeze, and mass
unemployment — to an estimated several million participants within a
short period, by some academic and press accounts covering a meaningful
share of the economically active population, demonstrating that this
mechanism *can* scale extremely rapidly under acute crisis conditions.
Against all of this: none of it meets NEEC's specific threshold of an
automatic, population-wide response within 72 hours reaching 90% coverage
— these are self-selected network effects (WIR, Sardex) or a crisis-driven
mass mobilization that, while large, was neither universal nor
centrally triggered (Argentina), and Argentina's own subsequent collapse
(see C3.2, C3.5) shows that rapid scaling under crisis conditions is not
the same as *resilient* crisis response.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — real, peer-reviewed, and in one
case (Argentina) dramatic evidence of crisis-responsive behavior and even
crisis-driven mass adoption, but neither automatic nor population-wide in
the sense NEEC's threshold requires, and the clearest rapid-scaling case
also ended in the collapse discussed below.

#### C3.2 Inflation Control Mechanisms: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** The zero-sum-by-construction design is a genuine structural
anti-inflation property: because credit is created only at the moment of a
matched trade (no lending against a fractional reserve, no interest-driven
money creation), there is no mechanism internal to a well-run system for
the aggregate money supply to expand faster than real trading activity —
this is a real, structural, not merely asserted, difference from
conventional bank-money creation. Argentina's Redes de Trueque supply a
dramatic, well-documented counter-example: as the network scaled into the
millions, the internal "créditos" vouchers used by several of the larger
sub-networks were extensively counterfeited, and by some accounts issuing
organizations printed excess vouchers to keep pace with demand, producing
severe internal inflation of the barter currency itself — a collapse in
trust that press and academic accounts identify as a central cause of the
network's disintegration by 2003–2004. This shows that the zero-sum
property is a feature of a *well-governed*, well-verified system (WIR,
Sardex, and digitally-recorded LETS/time-bank ledgers, none of which have
reported anything resembling Argentina's inflation) rather than an
unconditional guarantee independent of implementation quality.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a real structural anti-inflation
design property, strongly evidenced in well-governed, verifiable-ledger
implementations, but with a documented, severe failure mode when
governance and verification break down under rapid, crisis-driven scaling.

#### C3.3 Multi-Failure Resistance: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** The field is structurally decentralized — many small,
independent nodes rather than one centralized system — which provides some
genuine resistance to any single point of failure, and a 2025 academic
study of the Sardex network's resilience properties (examining how
imitation dynamics and participant heterogeneity affect network
robustness) reflects active, current scholarly interest in exactly this
question. Argentina's case again supplies the clearest counter-evidence:
under the *compound* stress of simultaneous mass unemployment, a banking-
system freeze, and a currency crisis, the barter networks' own internal
controls were overwhelmed, contributing to the same collapse discussed
under C3.2. Individual nodes (WIR, Sardex, a typical LETS scheme) show no
evidence of comparable compound-stress vulnerability, but this may reflect
that none has been tested under stress remotely comparable to what
Argentina's networks faced during their rapid 2001–2002 scale-up.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — genuine structural
decentralization and active current research interest in network
resilience, but the one case tested under severe compound stress
(Argentina) shows real vulnerability, not clean resistance.

#### C3.4 Epistemic Adaptability: 1.0 (Pass)

**Rationale:** This is unusually well-evidenced for a criterion elsewhere
in this corpus that often rests on projection. WIR Bank's clearing and
settlement mechanisms have been adapted across nine decades of continuous
operation. More directly relevant: a **current, active initiative** —
Credit Commons Society / Mutual Credit Services, whose work is documented
through 2024–2025 — is explicitly engaged in redesigning mutual credit
specifically to address two failure modes this very evaluation has
independently identified through separate evidence: LETS's own scale/trust
ceiling (a long-time UK LETS organizer's own estimate, corroborated by the
general order-of-magnitude of stable-trust-network research in the social
sciences, places a single trust-based node's practical ceiling in the
low hundreds of members) and WIR's centralization-under-scale problem
(C1.2b above) — via a federated ("recursive") design intended to let
independent mutual-credit networks trade with each other without
requiring any one network to grow past its own trust ceiling or
centralize control. This is a genuine case of the field learning
directly from its own multi-decade documented failure modes and
iterating on the design in response, evidenced by real, current technical
and organizational work rather than aspiration alone.

**Score Justification:** Pass (1.0) — demonstrated multi-decade parameter
and mechanism adaptation (WIR), reinforced by a real, current,
well-documented redesign effort directly responsive to this field's own
identified historical failure modes.

#### C3.5 Failure-Mode Transparency: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** Small, well-run networks are genuinely transparent to their
own membership — balances are visible to participants in a shared ledger,
much like a cooperative's own books, and WIR/Sardex's continued multi-year
academic study suggests real, ongoing external visibility into their
performance. Argentina again supplies the clearest counter-case: the
internal counterfeiting and voucher-inflation that drove the Redes de
Trueque's collapse (C3.2) went undetected or unaddressed long enough to
cause systemic failure, indicating a real transparency and audit gap
specifically under rapid, crisis-driven scaling conditions where
verification infrastructure could not keep pace with growth.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — real internal transparency in
well-run, appropriately-scaled implementations, but a documented, severe
transparency and verification failure in the one case that scaled rapidly
under crisis conditions.

**Domain 3 Total: 3.0/5 (60%)** — One clean pass (C3.4, on the strength of
both WIR's demonstrated longevity and a current, evidenced redesign
effort), no failures, four partials. Argentina's Redes de Trueque supplies
the single most load-bearing piece of evidence across this domain,
providing simultaneously the strongest positive data point available for
this system-type (rapid crisis-scale adoption) and the clearest negative
one (governance collapse under that same scaling) — both are reported
honestly rather than the positive being emphasized at the negative's
expense.

---

### Domain 4: Ethical Integrity

#### C4.1 Intergenerational Justice: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** No specific intergenerational-transfer mechanism was located
in the evidence reviewed — no equivalent to a sovereign wealth fund, a
land trust, or a designed emissions-reduction trajectory. What exists is
the same generic "local circulation" reasoning that also supports C4.2
below: keeping trade local and outside debt-based money creation is
consistent with, but does not itself guarantee, reduced resource
throughput over time.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — no specific measurable
intergenerational commitment identified, but a plausible, non-zero
structural orientation shared with C4.2.

#### C4.2 Ecological Compliance: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** Keeping exchange local and favoring locally-available goods
and services over long-distance trade is a genuinely consistent, explicit
value across the complementary-currency literature broadly — descriptions
of the field's own motivating goals repeatedly cite environmental and social
sustainability alongside economic resilience as core aims, and a
locally-circulating credit unit structurally cannot fund the kind of
long-distance shipping or extraction-heavy supply chain that national
currency routinely does. Against this: no source reviewed for this
evaluation quantifies an emissions or resource-throughput effect
specifically attributable to mutual credit or LETS, and nothing in the
mechanism itself imposes a hard ecological ceiling the way Degrowth's or
CCO-PTF's explicit carbon-tax-funding designs do.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a real, consistently-stated
structural orientation toward reduced-throughput local exchange, but no
quantified evidence and no hard ecological constraint built into the
mechanism itself.

#### C4.3 Racial and Gender Equity: 0.5 (Partial) — flagged as a genuinely contestable score

**Rationale:** As with Georgism's own C4.3, this sits on real evidence
pulling in different directions, and is flagged explicitly as a case where
a different reasoner could defensibly land elsewhere. In one direction:
time banking's founding design (an hour is an hour, regardless of market
wage) is explicitly built to elevate care and domestic work that markets
and conventional wages systematically undervalue and that is
disproportionately performed by women — a structural, not incidental,
equity feature; and Grassroots Economics' Bangla-Pesa/Sarafu work operates
in, and reports real benefit to, a low-income, non-white, Global South
community that most of the rest of this evaluation's evidence base does
not reach at all. In the other direction: a first-hand, detailed account
from a long-running UK LETS scheme (operating in one of London's most
linguistically and ethnically diverse neighborhoods, described by its own
organizer as home to residents speaking 56 different first languages)
reports that the scheme's membership was overwhelmingly white, and that
the area's actual immigrant and minority communities ran their own,
separate, informal mutual-aid and rotating-savings arrangements that were
never integrated with or drawn into the "official" LETS scheme — a
concrete, honestly-self-reported participation gap in a specific,
well-documented case, not a hypothetical concern. No source reviewed
studies this tension directly or systematically (i.e., no paper was
located specifically measuring racial or ethnic participation gaps across
multiple LETS/mutual-credit implementations); both directions above rest
on evidence about specific, individual cases rather than a general survey.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a real, structurally-grounded
equity benefit (time banking's valuation of undervalued, often gendered
labor; Grassroots Economics' Global South reach) weighed against a real,
specific, honestly-reported racial participation gap in a well-documented
wealthy-country case; presented as a close call rather than a
confidently-resolved one, consistent with how Georgism's own C4.3 was
handled.

#### C4.4 Power Distribution: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** At the level of individual balances, the same
zero-sum/capped/no-interest design already credited under C1.2b is a real
anti-concentration mechanism — no participant can accumulate outsized
economic power through the mechanism itself. But the WIR centralization
finding (C1.2b) is directly relevant here too: as the largest and
longest-running example scaled, institutional control concentrated in the
bank administering the network, a real, documented tension between the
balance-level design (which stayed anti-concentration) and
institutional-level control (which did not, at scale). Smaller, more
recent examples (Sardex, current LETS nodes, Grassroots Economics) have
not been documented undergoing the same institutional concentration, but
none has yet operated at WIR's scale or duration, so this may simply
reflect that the tension hasn't had time or scale to manifest rather than
that it has been solved — precisely the problem the current Credit
Commons federation effort (C3.4) is trying to design around before it
recurs.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a genuine, real anti-concentration
mechanism at the level of individual balances, weighed against a
documented case of institutional re-concentration in the field's own
longest-running, largest-scale example.

#### C4.5 Exploitation Elimination: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** Within transactions routed through the mechanism, mutual
credit structurally eliminates interest-based extraction and creditor-
debtor subordination — there is no external lender profiting from a
member's negative balance, unlike a conventional loan or credit card.
This is real and direct. But — as with Georgism's own C4.5 finding — this
addresses only one of NEEC's three named extraction channels
(landlord-tenant, employer-employee, creditor-debtor), and only the
portion of a member's economic life that is actually routed through the
network; a mutual-credit participant can still be an exploited renter or
an exploited employee in every part of their economic life the mechanism
doesn't touch, which for most participants in most implementations
examined is the large majority of their total economic activity.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — direct, structural elimination of
one of the three named extraction channels (creditor-debtor), entirely
silent on the other two, and reaching only the fraction of a participant's
economic life actually conducted through the network.

**Domain 4 Total: 2.5/5 (50%)** — Uniform partials across all five
criteria, the same shape Georgism's own Domain 4 took (though through
different specific mechanisms). This domain most clearly shows mutual
credit's character as a well-targeted intervention on one specific
transaction type (peer-to-peer, credit-based exchange) layered onto an
otherwise-unmodified economy and society — genuinely strong wherever the
evaluation touches the credit relationship itself (C1.2b), flat 0.5
everywhere the underlying social or economic structure is untouched.

---

### Domain 5: Implementation Viability

#### C5.1 Proven Component Foundation: 1.0 (Pass)

**Rationale:** This is arguably the strongest-evidenced criterion in
Domain 5. WIR Bank has operated continuously since 1934 (90+ years),
serving tens of thousands of Swiss small and medium businesses with
turnover in the billions of Swiss francs — already an established "proven
component" precedent elsewhere in this very corpus (cited in this paper's
own Section 6/Appendix H under C5.1 discussions of alternative
currencies generally). Sardex has operated since 2009–2010, currently
serving several thousand businesses with tens of millions of euros in
annual trade, and is the subject of an active, ongoing academic literature
(including a 2025 network-resilience study). Grassroots Economics has
operated a mutual-credit-style network in Kenya continuously since 2013,
persisting more than a decade in a genuinely resource-constrained context.
Classic LETS and time banking have operated across dozens of countries
since the 1980s. This is a genuinely broader, longer, and more diverse
multi-jurisdiction component record than several already-scored systems in
this corpus.

**Score Justification:** Pass (1.0) — an unusually strong, multi-decade,
multi-continent, multi-income-level component record, anchored by an
already-established 90-year precedent (WIR) this paper's own corpus
already treats as proven.

#### C5.2 Staged Transition Pathways: 0.5 (Partial) — a closer call than most scores in this evaluation

**Rationale:** No historical example supplies a genuine NEEC-style staged
plan. Classic LETS, WIR, Sardex, and Grassroots Economics all simply
"started small" without a documented multi-phase design comparable to even
Market Socialism's own partial-credit "niche to dominant" cooperative-
economics discussion; Argentina's rapid scale-up was crisis-driven and
chaotic rather than planned, and is this evaluation's clearest illustration
of a rapid, undesigned deployment that ended badly rather than a template
for one that worked (paralleling Britain's 1910 Land Value Duty in the
Georgism evaluation as this domain's clearest failure case). What earns
this a Partial rather than a flat 0.0, disclosed honestly as a genuinely
close call: the Credit Commons Society/Mutual Credit Services federation
effort (C3.4) is a real, current, technically-substantive attempt to design
a staged, scalable pathway specifically responding to this field's own
documented failure modes — but it remains early-stage, has not yet been
demonstrated at meaningful scale, and is better characterized as active
research and development than as an executing transition plan (unlike, for
comparison, Georgism's own C5.2 partial credit, which rested partly on the
Australian Capital Territory's *already-underway*, government-implemented
20-year transition — a materially stronger form of evidence than a
community-led design initiative not yet running at scale).

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — no historically-realized staged
pathway and one dramatic historical failure case (Argentina), credited
only on the strength of a genuine, current, but still early-stage and
unproven-at-scale design effort; flagged as more contestable toward 0.0
than most other scores in this evaluation, since the design effort has not
yet been tested against the failure modes it is meant to solve.

#### C5.3 Partial and Parallel Deployability: 1.0 (Pass)

**Rationale:** By definition, every implementation examined operates
alongside conventional currency, requires no government approval, and can
begin with as few as a handful of participants — no case of adoption
requiring or even attempting simultaneous multi-jurisdiction coordination
was located anywhere in the evidence reviewed. This is demonstrated, not
projected, in every single example: a single Swiss cooperative-turned-bank
(WIR), a single Sardinian business network (Sardex), a single Kenyan
informal settlement (Grassroots Economics), or a single neighborhood LETS
scheme (Brixton and hundreds of others) can each function completely
independently of what any other jurisdiction or network is doing.

**Score Justification:** Pass (1.0) — demonstrated, not merely claimed,
across every real case in the evidence base; likely the single most
strongly and consistently evidenced criterion in this entire evaluation.

#### C5.4 Political Coalition Potential: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** The theoretical cross-ideological case is real: mutual
credit appeals to libertarian-leaning self-organization and
mutual-aid values on one side and to left communitarian and degrowth-
adjacent values on the other, and WIR Bank has operated for 90 years in
Switzerland without evident political controversy, a genuine sustained-
success case. Against this, a real, repeated, cross-context pattern of
friction with state authority: UK local-authority treatment of LETS
participation as a threat to welfare-benefit eligibility (C2.1); Kenyan
authorities briefly detaining Grassroots Economics organizers in 2013 over
concerns the Bangla-Pesa vouchers undermined the national currency, before
charges were dropped; and Argentina's own network founders facing arrest
during the Trueque system's later troubles. This is not merely a set of
isolated anecdotes — legal and economics literature on complementary
currencies more broadly documents a genuine, structural tension between
these mechanisms and states' legal monopoly on currency issuance (including
specific court rulings on the question in at least one European
jurisdiction), meaning the friction reflects a real, recurring legal
category problem rather than three unrelated local incidents. Separately,
and independently of state hostility: the best-documented wealthy-country
case (UK LETS, which peaked at several hundred registered schemes in the
mid-1990s) underwent a well-documented, sustained decline by the 2000s–
2010s, with a first-hand account attributing much of this to the
widespread availability of cheap conventional credit reducing the
perceived need for an alternative — suggesting the field's own political
and social momentum is difficult to sustain once the acute scarcity
conditions that motivate adoption ease, a pattern also visible in
Argentina's post-crisis decline once the peso stabilized.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — genuine cross-ideological
appeal and at least one long-sustained, uncontroversial success case
(WIR), weighed against a real, repeated, legally-grounded pattern of state
friction across multiple contexts and a documented historical difficulty
sustaining broad momentum once acute economic distress eases.

#### C5.5 Cultural Adaptability: 1.0 (Pass)

**Rationale:** The geographic, cultural, and — importantly — economic-
development breadth of real implementation reviewed for this evaluation is
unusually wide: high-income contexts (Switzerland/WIR, Italy/Sardex, the
UK/Canada/Australia/USA's classic LETS and time-banking movement),
middle-income context (Argentina's Trueque), and low-income context
(Kenya's Grassroots Economics/Bangla-Pesa/Sarafu-Credit, operating in a
country where roughly 46% of the population lives in poverty). This
low-income-context evidence is a genuine point of distinction from
Georgism's own C5.5 finding, whose evidence base — while broad — remained
concentrated in middle- and high-income jurisdictions. Taken together, this
plausibly clears NEEC's own threshold language (viable across at least
three economic contexts, at least five cultural contexts) more clearly
than most systems scored in this corpus.

**Score Justification:** Pass (1.0) — a genuinely broad implementation
record spanning high-, middle-, and low-income contexts specifically
(unlike several already-scored systems whose evidence clusters in
wealthier jurisdictions), clearing NEEC's stated economic- and cultural-
context breadth requirements with room to spare.

**Domain 5 Total: 4.0/5 (80%)** — Three clean passes (C5.1, C5.3, C5.5), no
failures, two partials — this domain's overall shape is notably stronger
than Georgism's own Domain 5 (3.0/5, 60%), driven mainly by the additional
low-income-context evidence (Kenya) and the currently-active Credit
Commons redesign effort, which together give Mutual Credit/LETS a broader
and more currently-active implementation-viability case than most other
systems scored so far in this corpus.

---

## Summary Scores

**Domain Totals:**
- Material Security: 2.0/6 (33%)
- Human Autonomy: 3.0/5 (60%)
- System Resilience: 3.0/5 (60%)
- Ethical Integrity: 2.5/5 (50%)
- Implementation Viability: 4.0/5 (80%)

**Overall Score: 14.5/26 (56%)**

*Explicit sum, per Appendix H.4: 2.0 + 3.0 + 3.0 + 2.5 + 4.0 = 14.5.
Independently re-verified by a standalone Python script (see this session's
verification pass) that re-sums every one of the 26 individual criterion
scores from a hand-transcribed list separate from the number written into
this document's prose while drafting — matched exactly.*

*Score distribution: 6 criteria at 1.0 (C1.2b, C2.5, C3.4, C5.1, C5.3,
C5.5), 17 criteria at 0.5, 3 criteria at 0.0 (C1.2a, C1.3, C1.5).*

**Structural Failures: 3** (C1.2a Wealth Building for Resilience, C1.3
Housing Security, C1.5 Universal Wealth Access). C1.2a and C1.5 trace to the
same finding already established for Georgism and, before that, Integral:
the mechanism has no asset-accumulation function, for a third distinct
underlying reason (no value-storage function of any kind, by design). C1.3
is this system's own distinct addition to that pattern — no housing channel
was identified at all.

**Adequacy Classification: Partially Adequate** (3 to 5 structural failures,
per Section 8.3) — the second system in this corpus's history to occupy this
tier, after Integral (the first, 3 failures); Georgism, scored the session
before, landed instead in Potentially Adequate with only 2. The tier now has
eight members: MMT + Job Guarantee, Integral, Mutual Credit / LETS,
Universal Basic Services, Sovereign Wealth Fund Statism, State Capitalism /
Singapore, Islamic finance and Ostrom-style commons governance. See the
framework note below for why this is a substantively interesting three-way
comparison, not just a number.

**On the canonical CSV.** This evaluation was added as a row of
`neec_scores.csv` in Session 8. The CSV's schema had been updated in Session
7 (`criteria_count`, `domain1_max` columns added, per the session 5/6
handoffs' Step 1c preparation) so that a v2-structure row like this one
could be added correctly; the row itself was left until after review,
consistent with this project's scratch-before-insert discipline.

---

## Final Assessment

**Key Strengths:**
- C1.2b (Prevention of Exploitative Accumulation) is arguably the single
  cleanest, most structurally-grounded Pass in this entire evaluation —
  the zero-sum, capped, no-interest design is close to the mechanism's
  entire reason for existing, and plausibly a *stronger* anti-accumulation
  design than Integral's own ITC (this corpus's previous strongest case),
  since typical mutual credit has no conversion-multiplier mechanism at
  all.
- Domain 5 (Implementation Viability, 4.0/5, 80%) is genuinely strong,
  anchored by an already-corpus-established 90-year precedent (WIR),
  demonstrated deployability in every single example reviewed, and — a
  real point of distinction from Georgism — implementation evidence
  reaching a genuine low-income, Global South context (Kenya) rather than
  clustering in wealthy or middle-income jurisdictions.
- C3.4 (Epistemic Adaptability) benefits from unusually concrete, current
  evidence: a real, technically-substantive, ongoing redesign effort
  (Credit Commons Society/Mutual Credit Services) directly responding to
  this field's own documented historical failure modes, not merely a
  claim of adaptive capacity.

**Key Deficiencies:**
- Both C1.2a and C1.5 trace to one root cause: mutual credit has no
  value-storage function at all, by design, which is both this design's
  greatest anti-concentration strength (C1.2b) and its clearest material-
  security weakness — the same structural choice produces both outcomes
  simultaneously, a genuinely tight coupling worth naming explicitly
  rather than treating as two unrelated findings.
- C1.3's flat failure (no housing channel at all) is this evaluation's
  own distinct contribution to the corpus's C1.2a/C1.5 pattern — a gap
  Georgism at least partially addressed through its indirect
  housing-density evidence.
- Argentina's Redes de Trueque supplies this evaluation's single most
  load-bearing piece of evidence, and it cuts both ways by design of the
  historical record itself, not by editorial choice: the clearest positive
  data point available anywhere in this evaluation for crisis-driven,
  rapid, large-scale adoption (C3.1, C5.2) is also the clearest cautionary
  tale about what happens when that same rapid scaling outpaces a mutual-
  credit system's governance and verification capacity (C3.2, C3.5).
- C5.4's real, repeated, legally-grounded pattern of state friction across
  three separate national contexts (UK, Kenya, Argentina), combined with
  UK LETS's own well-documented decline once cheap conventional credit
  became widely available, is a genuine, evidenced obstacle to sustained
  political coalition-building — not merely a hypothetical concern about
  an unfamiliar framework, but a repeatedly-observed historical pattern.

**A note on the adequacy-tier result, for the NEEC framework itself.**
Mutual Credit/LETS lands in the **Partially Adequate** tier (3 failures)
with a **higher** raw percentage score (56%) than Georgism's own 52% — which
landed in the **better** tier (Potentially Adequate, 2 failures). This is a
second, and in some ways sharper, real illustration of the
tier-versus-percentage tension Georgism's own write-up already flagged for
the framework's attention (itself following on Section 10.3's discussion of
why NEEC prefers dominance/failure-count analysis over scalar totals): a
system can score *numerically higher* than a peer while landing in a *worse*
adequacy classification, purely because failure-count classification and
percentage score are measuring genuinely different things by design. Unlike
Georgism's own version of this finding (a single system with an unusually
low percentage inside the *better* tier), this is now a **direct, one-on-one
crossover** between two systems scored under the identical v2 structure in
the same research pass — a cleaner, more directly comparable data point for
anyone weighing whether the adequacy-tier thresholds need a supplementary
percentage-based check alongside the failure count. Three systems in the
Partially Adequate tier's near neighborhood are worth considering together,
all on the v2 structure since the Step 1c retrofit: Integral (19.5/26, 75%,
3 failures, Partially Adequate), Georgism (13.5/26, 52%, 2 failures,
Potentially Adequate), and Mutual Credit/LETS (14.5/26, 56%, 3 failures,
Partially Adequate).

**Comparison to other systems in the corpus.** On the canonical corpus,
Mutual Credit / LETS is strictly dominated by no entry and dominates none;
its total, 14.5/26, ties those of Universal Basic Income and Ostrom-style
commons governance. Qualitatively: Mutual Credit/LETS's profile — a sharp,
structurally clean strength in exactly one place (C1.2b, wealth-
concentration prevention), strong implementation-breadth evidence (Domain
5), and otherwise consistent partial scores reflecting real but small-scale,
unevenly-reaching mechanisms — most closely resembles Georgism's own shape
among the systems scored so far, more than it resembles any comprehensive,
multi-domain-strong system like CCO-PTF or Participatory Economics. Both new
v2-era systems, in other words, look like well-evidenced *partial*
interventions on a specific mechanism (land rent capture; peer-to-peer
credit) layered onto an otherwise unmodified surrounding economy, rather
than comprehensive alternative systems in their own right — a pattern worth
watching as more Step 1b systems are scored, since it may say something
about which kinds of economic reform proposals tend to reach NEEC
evaluators' attention versus which kinds tend to be comprehensive from the
start.

---

## Reviewer disclosure (per NEEC_CONTRIBUTING.md §2 / Appendix H.6)

This is a first-pass scoring by a single AI reasoner (Claude), based on
web research conducted in this session (more than a dozen searches plus one
in-depth fetch of a first-hand practitioner account) rather than a
systematic literature review, and has not yet been independently
cross-checked by a second scorer per H.9 Step 6. Sources drawn on include:
peer-reviewed academic literature (Stodder's 2009 *Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization* study of WIR's countercyclical behavior; academic
literature on Sardex, including a 2025 network-resilience study; academic
and policy literature on Grassroots Economics/Bangla-Pesa/Sarafu-Credit);
a detailed first-hand practitioner interview (a long-time UK LETS organizer,
now working on the Credit Commons/Mutual Credit Services federation effort)
that supplied several of this evaluation's most specific, concrete findings
(the racial-participation gap, the benefits-eligibility risk, the
100–200-person practical trust ceiling, the cheap-credit-driven decline
explanation); press and academic coverage of Argentina's Redes de Trueque
from multiple outlets and time periods (contemporary 2001 reporting through
later retrospective academic and journalistic accounts); general reference
and legal/economics literature on complementary currencies' regulatory
status; and general reference material on mutual credit's own technical
design. This is an attempt at genuine, honest balance — actively seeking
out both the field's strongest successes (WIR, Sardex, Grassroots
Economics) and its most serious documented failure (Argentina) and
participation gaps (Brixton) — rather than a one-sided case, but it is not
a substitute for a formal literature review. The clearest candidates for
independent disagreement are flagged inline: C4.3 (explicitly marked
contestable), C5.2 (explicitly marked as a closer call than most other
scores in this write-up, given how early-stage the Credit Commons evidence
is), and the overall scope decision (mutual credit specifically, excluding
convertible local currencies like Eusko or the Bristol/Brixton Pound) —
a scorer evaluating the broader "complementary currency" category inclusive
of convertible local currencies should not import this evaluation's scores
wholesale, since several (especially C1.2a/b, C3.2, and C5.1) would likely
score differently for a reserve-backed mechanism.

---

## Summary block

The machine-readable summary of this entry (protocol section 9; schema
`neec-summary-block/1.0`, `summary_block_schema.json`). It is generated from
the canonical corpus and the Session 28 staging (`summary_blocks_s28.json`),
not typed, and validated by `neec_entry.py`.

<!-- NEEC-SUMMARY-BLOCK -->
```json
{
  "schema": "neec-summary-block/1.0",
  "key": "Mutual Credit / LETS",
  "code": "MC",
  "display_name": "Mutual Credit / LETS",
  "record": {"documents": ["NEEC_MutualCredit_LETS_scoring_scratch.md"], "scored": "Session 7, natively on the v2 structure", "structure": "native-v2"},
  "scope": {"class": "mechanism", "basis": "stated", "source": {"file": "NEEC_Ostrom_Commons_scoring_scratch.md", "locator": "document", "phrase": "Commons governance joins archetype 1, narrow single-mechanism systems, as its fifth member after Georgism, Mutual Credit / LETS, Sovereign Wealth Fund Statism and Islamic finance."}},
  "vector": {
    "C1.1": 0.5, "C1.2a": 0.0, "C1.2b": 1.0, "C1.3": 0.0, "C1.4": 0.5, "C1.5": 0.0,
    "C2.1": 0.5, "C2.2": 0.5, "C2.3": 0.5, "C2.4": 0.5, "C2.5": 1.0,
    "C3.1": 0.5, "C3.2": 0.5, "C3.3": 0.5, "C3.4": 1.0, "C3.5": 0.5,
    "C4.1": 0.5, "C4.2": 0.5, "C4.3": 0.5, "C4.4": 0.5, "C4.5": 0.5,
    "C5.1": 1.0, "C5.2": 0.5, "C5.3": 1.0, "C5.4": 0.5, "C5.5": 1.0
  },
  "summary": {"D1": 2.0, "D2": 3.0, "D3": 3.0, "D4": 2.5, "D5": 4.0, "total": 14.5, "failures": 3, "tier": "Partially Adequate"},
  "flags": [
    {"criterion": "C4.3", "scored": 0.5, "alternatives": [0.0, 1.0], "basis": "both-directions", "reading": null, "tracks": null, "source": {"file": "NEEC_MutualCredit_LETS_scoring_scratch.md", "locator": "C4.3", "phrase": "a different reasoner could defensibly land elsewhere"}},
    {"criterion": "C5.2", "scored": 0.5, "alternatives": [0.0], "basis": "direction-stated", "reading": "the staged design effort is untested at scale", "tracks": null, "source": {"file": "NEEC_MutualCredit_LETS_scoring_scratch.md", "locator": "C5.2", "phrase": "flagged as more contestable toward 0.0"}}
  ],
  "joint_readings": [
    {"id": "scored", "label": "as scored", "basis": "scored", "resolve": {}, "result": {"total": 14.5, "failures": 3, "tier": "Partially Adequate"}},
    {"id": "up", "label": "every flagged call resolved upward", "basis": "extremes", "resolve": {"C4.3": 1.0}, "result": {"total": 15.0, "failures": 3, "tier": "Partially Adequate"}},
    {"id": "down", "label": "every flagged call resolved downward", "basis": "extremes", "resolve": {"C4.3": 0.0, "C5.2": 0.0}, "result": {"total": 13.5, "failures": 5, "tier": "Partially Adequate"}}
  ],
  "scenarios": []
}
```
<!-- /NEEC-SUMMARY-BLOCK -->