# NEEC Evaluation: Sovereign Wealth Fund Statism

**Scoring document — Step 1b; scored in Session 17, natively on the v2
structure; in the canonical corpus (`neec_scores.csv`) since Session 20.**
Follows Appendix H.9's submission template exactly. Scored directly against
the fully-specified 26-criterion v2 structure (Section 12.3, Appendix
H.7v2), consistent with how Georgism, Mutual Credit/LETS, Doughnut
Economics, and Universal Basic Services were each scored. Its row was added
to `neec_scores.csv` in Session 20; it is not yet a Part I entry of the
Report (the Step 5 revision adds it). It has not been independently
cross-checked by a second scorer (H.9 Step 6) — flagged as open per this
project's disclosure norms (`NEEC_CONTRIBUTING.md` §2, Appendix H.6).

---

## 18 [pending renumbering]. Sovereign Wealth Fund Statism

### Overview

Sovereign wealth fund (SWF) statism, as scored here, is the mechanism by
which a state channels a large, non-recurring revenue stream — classically
natural-resource royalties, though not exclusively (see below) — into a
professionally-managed, permanently-held investment fund, whose returns
then support the public either through general government spending under
a disciplined withdrawal rule (**Norway's model**) or through a direct,
universal per-capita cash dividend (**Alaska's model**). This evaluation
scores that mechanism as a general, generalizable design — not the whole
of any one country's economy — layered onto an otherwise-unmodified market
system, exactly as Georgism scores a Land Value Tax and Citizen's Dividend
rather than "Denmark" or "the ACT," and as Mutual Credit/LETS scores an
alternative-currency mechanism rather than "Switzerland."

**Two named exemplars, deliberately.** Norway's Government Pension Fund
Global (GPFG) — established 1990, first capital transfer 1996, now worth
over $2 trillion (NOK 21.3 trillion at end-2025, per Norges Bank Investment
Management's own reporting), more than four times Norway's mainland GDP —
represents the general-budget-support variant: a statutory rule permits
spending roughly 3% of the fund's value each year into the ordinary state
budget, with no direct per-capita payment at all. Alaska's Permanent Fund
and its Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) — established 1976/1982, now worth
roughly $83–86 billion — represents the direct-dividend variant, though
this evaluation's own research surfaced an important complication: since
2018 Alaska has drawn down the fund under a 5%-of-market-value rule that
funds *both* the PFD *and* general state operations (the fund now supplies
an estimated 50–60% of Alaska's state government spending in an ordinary
year, more than oil revenue itself, which supplies only about a third).
The two models have, in practice, converged partway toward each other
rather than remaining cleanly distinct; both are scored together below,
with dividend-dependent criteria (Domain 1 and 2's coercion/labor
criteria) flagged inline as resting specifically on Alaska's evidence.

**Scope boundary — deliberately excluding Gulf-state and Singaporean SWFs,
and why.** This project's own Paper (Section 8.1) separately queues three
state-capitalism sub-entries: China (party-state-directed SOE ownership),
Singapore (Temasek/GIC, government-linked-company developmental
capitalism), and Gulf sovereign-wealth-fund states (explicitly described
there as "rentier-distributive statism: citizen welfare funded primarily
by resource-rent flows into sovereign wealth funds *and direct state
employment*"). That description's own emphasis matters: the Gulf entry is
a *bundle* — an SWF mechanism combined with a distinct, non-democratic,
patronage-employment political economy — which the rentier-state
literature (Beblawi & Luciani, cited in that same section) already treats
as a structurally different wealth-flow mechanism from the fund-as-
standalone-savings-and-dividend-vehicle model this evaluation examines.
Singapore's Temasek/GIC are commercial holding companies operating within
a specific developmental-capitalist logic, reserved for that separate
sub-entry. Including any of these here would risk exactly the
unreproducible, average-of-different-things scoring this project's own
evidence standards (Appendix H.6) exist to prevent — the same reasoning
that split "state capitalism" into three sub-entries in the first place.
Norway and Alaska were chosen instead specifically because each isolates
the SWF mechanism from a distinct patronage-employment or rentier-monarchy
political economy, letting this evaluation test the mechanism on its own
terms. Two further real-world cases inform several criteria below without
serving as primary exemplars: **Timor-Leste's Petroleum Fund** (established
2005, explicitly modeled on Norway's with direct Norwegian technical
assistance, now roughly $18–19 billion) — a genuine lower-income, small,
post-conflict case: and **New Zealand's Superannuation Fund** (established
2001, roughly NZ$94 billion, funded from ordinary Crown budget
contributions rather than a resource windfall) — the clearest evidence
located that this mechanism does not *strictly* require a natural-resource
endowment, discussed under C5.2 and C5.5.

**This evaluation is this project's first opportunity to apply, rather
than merely cite, several facts already sitting in the corpus.** NEEC's
own founding Section 6 text names "Sovereign wealth funds: Alaska PFD
(40+ years), Norway (271% GDP)" as one of exactly four worked examples in
the *definition* of C5.1 (Proven Component Foundation) — written before
any system called "sovereign wealth fund statism" existed to claim that
evidence as its own. In the years since, Universal Basic Income, CCO-PTF-
CIP-SZH, and Georgism have each borrowed a piece of this same evidence for
their own C5.1 or C1.1 write-ups (Report, Systems 7, 8, 14); Nordic Social
Democracy's own C4.1 already credits "sovereign wealth funds (Norway's
$1.4T)" as positive intergenerational transfer; and the Report's own
Acknowledgments section thanks "the Alaska Permanent Fund administrators"
by name, alongside CLT networks and cooperative movements, as one of the
real-world innovators this whole project's comparative method depends on.
None of that prior borrowing is re-derived here — per the handoff's own
explicit caution, this evaluation does not re-litigate Nordic Social
Democracy's C4.1 or any other system's existing citation — but where this
system's own evidence updates a figure (Norway's fund has roughly
$0.6 trillion more than the $1.4T figure Nordic's write-up used), that
update is noted without touching Nordic's own already-published score,
consistent with this project's non-retroactive revision norm.

**Evidentiary tier (Appendix H.6).** This sits closer to the *real-world
implementation* tier than any other Step 1b system scored to date. Unlike
Georgism's untested "single tax" intensity or Mutual Credit's genuine-but-
narrow WIR/Sardex precedents, both core exemplars here have operated
continuously, at large scale, for 30–50 years, and the broader category —
tracked by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, the Peterson Institute's
Truman Scoreboard, and the IMF — comprises roughly 100 major funds
worldwide holding a combined $15+ trillion as of Global SWF's 2026 annual
report. The tier drops to *estimation* only for a handful of specific,
flagged claims (the generalized model's political-coalition durability
under fiscal stress; whether the mechanism scales to a state with no
comparable windfall at all).

---

### Domain 1: Material Security

#### C1.1 Poverty Elimination Capacity: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** This is the one criterion where this system's own evidence
was already sitting in NEEC's founding text before this evaluation
existed: Section 6's own "Current Performance" line for C1.1 states
"Alaska Permanent Fund: 20% reduction (Berman & Reamy, 2021)" — a citation
already in this Paper's bibliography, now finally being applied to the
system it was always about rather than borrowed by UBI's own C1.1
write-up (Report, System 7). More recent peer-reviewed work (Berman,
*Poverty & Public Policy*, 2024) updates this to a 20–40% reduction in the
number of Alaskans below the US poverty threshold, with a disproportionate
effect on the state's most vulnerable populations: rural Indigenous
Alaskan poverty falls from 28% to under 22% with PFD income included, and
separate NBER-published research finds that an additional $1,000 in
early-childhood PFD payments reduces substantiated child-maltreatment
referrals by roughly 15%. Norway's general-budget-support model
contributes nothing distinctive of its own here — whatever poverty-
elimination effect flows from Norway's welfare state is already credited
to Nordic Social Democracy's own C1.1, not to the fund mechanism itself,
since Norway pays no comparable direct dividend.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a real, well-documented, and
(unusually for this corpus) *already-canonical* poverty-reduction effect,
disproportionately reaching a historically underserved population, but a
20–40% reduction is far short of the 90%+ Pass Threshold, and rests
entirely on the dividend variant of this mechanism.

#### C1.2a Wealth Building for Resilience: 0.5 (Partial) — flagged as the single most consequential contestable call in this evaluation

**Rationale:** This criterion asks whether participants can build a
$70,000+/20-year household buffer through the system's own mechanism.
Georgism's own C1.2a write-up (this corpus, Session 6) explicitly
distinguishes its own Citizen's Dividend — "a direct annual pass-through
of that year's land-rent surplus" — from "a growing, held corpus the way
**Alaska's actual Permanent Fund** (which invests its principal and
distributes only a portion of returns)... are," naming this exact system
as the stronger alternative it is not itself claiming to be. This
evaluation is the first opportunity to test that implied claim directly,
and Appendix H.7v2's own worked anchor for this exact band answers it
precisely: the 0.5 band is defined as "some accumulation mechanism exists
but is narrow, indirect, or **held collectively rather than individually**
— real, but not clearly clearing the household-buffer bar as stated,"
illustrated there by Degrowth's community land trusts and cooperatives.
A sovereign wealth fund fits this description at least as well as that
anchor case, and arguably more purely: Norway's fund is real, large
($2+ trillion), continuously growing, and professionally invested — not a
flow that is captured and immediately redistributed, the way Georgism's
dividend or a bare UBI payment are (both correctly scored 0.0 here on
exactly that reasoning) — but no citizen holds any individually titled,
transferable, or even notionally severable claim on it. Research located
for this evaluation states this distinction directly: each Norwegian's
roughly $360,000–400,000 notional per-capita share is described in
multiple 2026 sources as "a claim on a collective asset, not a bank
balance" that "nobody can withdraw." Alaska's dividend itself does not
independently support a higher score — it is consumed as ordinary income,
matching Georgism's and UBI's own reasoning — so the 0.5 here rests on the
fund itself, not the payout.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a genuine, real, growing,
professionally-managed corpus exists, categorically different from every
other Step 1b system's C1.2a finding to date (none of which involve any
held corpus at all), but it is purely collectively rather than
individually held, with zero individual attribution on any household's
own balance sheet. **Flagged as contestable:** a stricter reading of the
Measurement Protocol's own Survey-of-Consumer-Finances-methodology
language (net worth "including... system-specific wealth mechanisms," all
of its worked examples being individually titled) would score this 0.0,
since no citizen's own net worth statement reflects any share of the
fund. This evaluation lands at 0.5 because H.7v2's own anchor language
("held collectively rather than individually") appears written to cover
exactly this case. Consequence, checked directly rather than left
implicit: this call does **not** cross the Section 8.3 adequacy-tier
boundary in either direction (see Summary Scores) — unlike UBS's own
flagged C1.2b call, resolving this one does not change this system's
tier, only its percentage score by one full point (14.0 vs. 13.0 out of
26).

#### C1.2b Prevention of Exploitative Accumulation: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** The mechanism targets a specific, well-documented channel
of wealth concentration — state-owned subsoil resource rent — arguably
more completely than Georgism's LVT does for land value: under Norwegian
and Alaskan mineral-rights law, this revenue was never privately held to
begin with, so there is no equivalent of LVT's ongoing tax-collection
contest against an existing private-property interest. But it is narrow
in exactly the way Georgism's own C1.2b write-up already flags for its
own mechanism: it does nothing about wealth concentration through equity
ownership, business profits, or housing, and — a further, distinct point
worth naming since it doesn't apply to Georgism — the fund's own growth
strategy (roughly 71% global listed equities for GPFG) is not independent
of, but deeply reliant on, the same corporate-profit and capital-market
dynamics that drive concentration elsewhere in the economy. Norway itself
is the clearest illustration of the resulting limits: income inequality
there remains among the world's lowest, but wealth concentration at the
top is real and, per a March 2026 analysis, rising — just ten people in
Norway now own more wealth than the bottom 50% of the population
combined, entirely outside anything the fund itself touches, since the
fund is a public asset that leaves private equity and business ownership
untouched. Alaska's own measured effect on income distribution is small
and precisely estimated: a 0.02 reduction in the Gini coefficient
(Berman, 2024) — real, but modest.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a genuine, structurally-targeted
mechanism against one specific, real, historically significant channel
of wealth concentration, narrower in scope than total wealth inequality
and, on the clearest available evidence (Norway's own top-wealth
concentration trend), demonstrably not sufficient on its own to prevent
concentration through the many channels it does not touch.

#### C1.3 Housing Security: 0.0 (Structural Failure)

**Rationale:** No mechanism, and no evidence, connects either exemplar to
housing stability in any structural way. Norway's and Alaska's housing
markets are both ordinary, largely private, mortgage-based systems that
the fund does not touch; no housing-specific fund allocation, land trust,
or tenancy-protection mechanism was located for either. This matches
Mutual Credit/LETS's own precedent for this exact finding (Report, System
15: "no mechanism, and no evidence, was located connecting mutual credit
or LETS to housing stability in any structural way").

**Score Justification:** Structural failure (0.0) — no housing channel of
any kind was located for either exemplar.

#### C1.4 Automation Resilience: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** A genuinely distinctive point, not available to most other
systems in this corpus: this mechanism's revenue base (resource royalties
and investment returns) is structurally independent of labor income
entirely, meaning the fiscal capacity it provides does not erode as
automation shrinks the wage-tax base the way an ordinary income-tax-funded
welfare state's does. This is a real structural advantage, though an
underexplored one — no stress test against NEEC's own 30/50/70%
displacement scenarios was located for either exemplar. Whether that
structural advantage actually reaches households facing displacement is a
separate, policy-dependent question: Norway's general-budget model
provides no earmarked automation response at all, and Alaska's PFD is a
fixed, small, non-scaling annual payment that does not grow with
displacement severity, closer in kind to Georgism's own dividend-dependent
C1.4 reasoning than to UBI's full Pass here.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a real, structural revenue-side
advantage (labor-income independence) with no accompanying evidence that
either exemplar's actual payout scales with automation-driven
displacement.

#### C1.5 Universal Wealth Access (narrowed — access breadth only): 0.5 (Partial) — tracks C1.2a directly

**Rationale:** This evaluation follows the precedent Participatory
Economics' own C1.5 write-up already establishes for exactly this
situation (Report, System 11): "access to the underlying mechanism is
explicitly universal by design... but C1.2a's own finding that the
mechanism's asset-growth power is only partial keeps this at partial
credit rather than a full Pass, to avoid crediting universal access to a
mechanism that isn't itself fully load-bearing." Access here is, if
anything, more cleanly universal than that precedent's own case: Alaska's
PFD reaches essentially 100% of qualifying residents with no means test,
employment condition, or membership gate of any kind (more than 600,000
recipients in 2025 alone) — a broader, less-gated reach than even Nordic
Social Democracy's own ~70% pension/homeownership coverage. But since
C1.2a lands at 0.5 rather than 1.0, this criterion tracks it downward for
the same reason Participatory Economics' does.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — genuinely universal, non-gated
access to a mechanism whose own wealth-building power (C1.2a, above) is
only partial. **Tracks the same contestable call flagged above:** if
C1.2a resolves to 0.0, this criterion follows to 0.0 by the same logic
that makes it track 0.5 now (matching the pattern already established for
Georgism, UBS, and Doughnut Economics, whose own C1.5 scores each follow
their own C1.2a finding directly).

**Domain 1 = 0.5 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 0.0 + 0.5 + 0.5 = 2.5/6 (42%)**

---

### Domain 2: Human Autonomy

#### C2.1 Freedom from Coercion: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** Dividend-dependent, as with Georgism. Alaska's unconditional
annual payment (currently $1,200 for 2026: a $1,000 base dividend plus a
$200 energy-relief payment) reduces survival-based coercion at the margin
but falls well short of a threshold-clearing amount — the same order of
magnitude as the ~$90–100/month figure Georgism's own C2.1 write-up cites
for a comparable UK land-dividend model. Norway's general-budget model
contributes nothing distinctive here, since it makes no direct payment to
individuals at all.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a real, unconditional, unearned
cash transfer with a genuine but small coercion-reducing effect, resting
entirely on the dividend variant.

#### C2.2 Labor Non-Necessity: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** NEEC's own Section 6 text already supplies this criterion's
exact benchmark language for this system, again written before any
system existed to claim it: the "Current Performance" line for C2.2 reads
"Alaska PFD: Partial—universal but insufficient ($1,000–2,000 annually)."
This is, like C1.1's Berman & Reamy citation, evidence the framework
authors built in from the start, now finally scored under its native
system rather than left as an unclaimed benchmark.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — directly and explicitly anchored
by this project's own pre-existing benchmark text for this exact system
and criterion.

#### C2.3 Creative Development Opportunities: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** No direct mechanism was located; any effect runs through
the same generic, modest income-supplementation channel Georgism's own
C2.3 write-up describes for its dividend — some marginal reduction in
time-scarcity, unevidenced at the scale NEEC's Pass Threshold specifies
(50%+ regular creative engagement, 10+ hours weekly).

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — plausible but unevidenced
indirect effect, matching this corpus's standard treatment of dividend-
adjacent systems on this criterion.

#### C2.4 Democratic Participation: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** A real, if narrow, fund-specific deliberative layer exists
on top of whatever ordinary representative democracy the host country
already has: Norway's Storting sets the fiscal rule and investment mandate
by statute, and an independent Council on Ethics (established 2004)
translates parliamentary-set ethical criteria into specific exclusion
decisions — over 180 companies excluded as of 2025. Alaska's dividend size
is the subject of genuinely high-visibility, recurring annual legislative
debate (most recently a divided, 4–2 conference-committee vote in May
2026). This is real, evidenced, fund-specific public contestation — more
than Georgism's or Mutual Credit's own C2.4 findings can point to — but it
remains ordinary representative and technocratic governance (NBIM and the
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation are professionally managed, not citizen-
governed), not the distinctive participatory architecture Participatory
Economics or CCO-PTF's own C2.4 findings describe.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — genuine, evidenced, fund-specific
democratic oversight exceeding this corpus's typical "inherits whatever
the host jurisdiction already has" finding, but still ordinary
representative democracy applied to one public asset rather than a
distinctive economic-democracy mechanism.

#### C2.5 Exit Rights and Mobility: 1.0 (Pass)

**Rationale:** Purely additive; coexists with, rather than restricts, an
ordinary market economy and ordinary geographic mobility. Both dividend
eligibility (Alaska: full-calendar-year residency, intent to remain, no
concurrent claim on another state's residency) and general-budget benefit
(Norway: ordinary taxpayer/resident status) are territorial in the same
way any public benefit is — leaving forfeits future eligibility, exactly
as leaving Norway forfeits access to Norwegian public services generally,
with no additional penalty, lock-in, or exit cost imposed by the fund
mechanism itself.

**Score Justification:** Pass (1.0) — matches the established pattern for
the jurisdiction-layered mechanisms scored before it (Georgism, Mutual
Credit/LETS, Doughnut Economics and UBS all score 1.0 here for the same
structural reason); among the entries scored natively on the v2 structure,
Islamic finance and Ostrom-style commons governance score 1.0 here as well.

**Domain 2 = 0.5 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 1.0 = 3.0/5 (60%)**

---

### Domain 3: System Resilience

#### C3.1 Crisis Response Capacity: 0.5 (Partial) — an unusually well-evidenced 0.5

**Rationale:** Norway's fiscal rule contains a genuine, statutory,
rule-based escape clause — not merely political improvisation —
explicitly permitting withdrawals above the standard ~3% "to counteract
economic setbacks." It was exercised at record scale during COVID-19: a
382-billion-kroner (~$37 billion) withdrawal announced in the government's
May 2020 Revised Budget, a 4.2% draw (later sustained near 3.7% into
2021), more than four times the previous 2016 record, and large enough to
force the fund's first-ever asset liquidation. This is a real,
demonstrated countercyclical response, structurally supported by the rule
itself rather than requiring fresh legislation from scratch each time —
more than Georgism's or Mutual Credit's own C3.1 findings can point to.
But it is not the Pass Threshold's 72-hour, 1:1-scaling, automatic
household-level trigger: the actual 2020 response took roughly two months
from the pandemic's onset to the Revised Budget's announcement, and scales
at the level of the national budget, not automatically at the household
level.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — real, rule-supported,
demonstrated-at-record-scale countercyclical capacity, but budget-cycle
rather than automatic-trigger in speed and mechanism, landing short of
the Pass Threshold's specific 72-hour/1:1/90%-coverage bar.

#### C3.2 Inflation Control Mechanisms: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** A specific, purpose-built, well-documented design feature
exists that most systems in this corpus cannot point to: GPFG invests
exclusively abroad, a deliberate sterilization of the resource windfall
from the domestic economy that is the textbook response to the Dutch-
disease/currency-appreciation risk a windfall of this size would otherwise
create. This is more distinctive than a generic "inherits whatever
monetary policy the host country has" 0.5, but it addresses one specific
inflation channel (resource-windfall sterilization) rather than the
sectoral-demand-isolation and velocity-control apparatus the Pass
Threshold specifies, and no evidence was located of either exemplar being
stress-tested against an 8%-external-inflation scenario.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a real, structural, purpose-built
anti-inflation design feature, narrower than the Pass Threshold's full
mechanism set and unevidenced at the specified stress-test level.

#### C3.3 Multi-Failure Resistance: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** GPFG's own diversification is extreme by any standard —
roughly 1.5% of all globally listed equity, spread across more than 7,000
companies and dozens of countries — providing real, if incidental,
insulation against any single-country or single-sector shock. But this is
a property of the investment portfolio's construction, not a designed
response to compound domestic shocks across economic, environmental, and
social domains simultaneously, and no evidence was located of either
exemplar being tested against NEEC's own four named compound scenarios.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — genuine, well-evidenced portfolio
diversification providing incidental multi-shock insulation, not a
designed compound-crisis response.

#### C3.4 Epistemic Adaptability: 1.0 (Pass)

**Rationale:** A live, sourced, real example of exactly this criterion's
own test: Norway's fiscal rule's assumed sustainable real return was
formally revised downward from 4% to 3% in 2017 in response to updated
long-run market-return expectations — a genuine, democratically-enacted
parameter change grounded in new evidence, not merely a theoretical
capacity to adapt. This matches the now-common Pass pattern this exact
criterion has produced across most Step 1b systems scored to date
(Georgism, Mutual Credit/LETS, Doughnut Economics, UBS all score 1.0
here).

**Score Justification:** Pass (1.0) — a specific, dated, sourced instance
of the system revising its own core parameter in response to evidence,
without collapse.

#### C3.5 Failure-Mode Transparency: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** A genuinely two-sided finding, and one where the gap
between this evaluation's own core exemplar and the generalized category
matters more than for any other criterion. Norway's fund is close to the
best-documented public investment vehicle in the world: a perfect 100/100
Truman Transparency Score, an independent Council on Ethics operating
since 2004, and over 180 disclosed exclusion decisions as of 2025. But the
broader category this evaluation nominally scores — "sovereign wealth
fund statism" as a general, adoptable model — spans an enormous,
independently tracked range: the Linaburg-Maduell and Truman indices exist
specifically because most of the roughly 100 major funds worldwide do not
look like Norway's. Cited scores for Russia's National Wealth Fund and
Iran's National Development Fund each sit around 5 out of 10 on the
Linaburg-Maduell scale — genuinely opaque by the index's own standard
(the Institute itself recommends 8 as the floor for "adequate"
transparency). Scoring the model rather than one country's
implementation of it, this is Partial: the mechanism *can* be built to
Norway's standard, and has been, but nothing about the mechanism itself
guarantees that outcome.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — an exceptionally well-evidenced
best case (Norway) sitting inside a category with independently
documented, wide, real transparency variance; scored for the generalized
mechanism, not the best exemplar alone.

**Domain 3 = 0.5 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 1.0 + 0.5 = 3.0/5 (60%)**

---

### Domain 4: Ethical Integrity

#### C4.1 Intergenerational Justice: 1.0 (Pass)

**Rationale:** This system's cleanest, most directly-founded Pass in the
whole evaluation. "Save a depleting, finite resource for future
generations rather than spend it all today" is not an incidental benefit
of either exemplar — it is each one's literal, explicit founding
rationale (Norway's own fund was created for exactly this purpose in
1990; Alaska's constitutional structure similarly protects fund principal
for future residents). This is precisely the mechanism Nordic Social
Democracy's own C4.1 write-up already gestures toward when it credits
"sovereign wealth funds (Norway's $1.4T)... positive intergenerational
transfer" — evidence this system now claims as native rather than
borrowed, updated to a current figure of just over $2 trillion (the fund
has grown by roughly $0.6 trillion since that citation was written; this
update does not touch Nordic's own already-published score, per this
project's non-retroactive revision norm).

**Score Justification:** Pass (1.0) — a real, large-scale, multi-decade,
explicitly-designed intergenerational wealth-transfer mechanism, the
strongest and most directly-evidenced case for this exact criterion this
corpus has produced to date.

#### C4.2 Ecological Compliance: 0.0 (Structural Failure)

**Rationale:** A foundational and current contradiction, not a historical
footnote: both core exemplars' entire revenue base is fossil-fuel
extraction, and Norway continues, as of this evaluation, to expand it —
57 new oil and gas production licenses were awarded to 19 companies in
early 2026 under the APA 2025 round, including further Barents Sea Arctic
acreage. Norway's own Supreme Court upheld this policy 11–4 against a
constitutional climate challenge in 2020 ("the People vs. Arctic Oil"
case), and the matter remains before the European Court of Human Rights
as of this evaluation, with the Norwegian state's own defense there citing
the 2022 invasion of Ukraine as justification for continued extraction.
The fund's own ethics-based exclusions reach coal, tar sands, and the
highest-emitting upstream oil-sands producers specifically (Canadian
Natural Resources, Cenovus, Suncor, and Imperial Oil were all excluded on
these grounds as recently as May 2026) — but the Norwegian government has
explicitly and repeatedly declined to exclude oil and gas as a sector on
product grounds, and continues to hold large equity positions across the
sector generally. A mechanism whose own funding depends on continued
fossil-fuel extraction cannot pass a hard planetary-boundary constraint
regardless of how well it manages the resulting wealth — the same logic
this corpus already applies to Status Quo Capitalism, Libertarian
Minarchism, and Stakeholder Capitalism.

**Score Justification:** Structural failure (0.0) — the revenue source
itself is the constraint this criterion tests, and it is current, active,
and expanding, not merely historical.

#### C4.3 Racial and Gender Equity: 0.5 (Partial) — flagged as a genuinely mixed, evidence-rich finding

**Rationale:** This criterion has a substantially larger, more directly
on-point body of peer-reviewed research available for this system than
for most others in this corpus, and it points in two real directions at
once. In favor: Alaska's PFD produces a measurably *larger* proportional
poverty-reduction effect for rural Indigenous Alaskans than for the state
as a whole (28% to under 22%, a roughly 27% relative reduction, per
Berman's peer-reviewed research), and separate research finds reduced
early-childhood maltreatment referrals and reduced childhood obesity —
outcomes that plausibly matter disproportionately for historically
underserved communities. Against it: the underlying racial poverty *gap*
itself has not meaningfully closed over the PFD's 40-plus-year run
(official Alaska Native poverty rates remain roughly 2.5 times non-Native
rates, a gap the same research attributes mainly to non-Native poverty
rising rather than Native poverty falling) — and the same literature finds
a measurable rise in substance-abuse-related incidents following annual
dividend distribution, alongside a fall in property-crime incidents, a
real and uncomfortable finding this evaluation discloses rather than
omits. No comparable body of equity-specific research was located for
Norway's general-budget model, whose distributional effects run through
Norway's own separately-scored welfare state.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — a genuinely mixed record: real,
measured, disproportionate benefit for a historically underserved
population on several dimensions, alongside a persistent underlying gap
and at least one documented adverse correlate. **Flagged as contestable**
in the same spirit as Georgism's own C4.3 flag — a reader weighing the
child-welfare and poverty findings more heavily than the substance-use
finding, or vice versa, could reasonably land on a different score.

#### C4.4 Power Distribution: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** Genuinely mixed, and mixed for a reason distinctive to
this system among those scored so far. In Norway's specific case, real,
working checks exist — a parliamentary-set mandate, an independent ethics
council, and near-total public disclosure — that keep the fund from
becoming a vehicle of unaccountable elite control. But the *generalized*
model carries a real, independently documented risk in less-transparent
contexts, evidenced by the same Linaburg-Maduell/Truman variance already
discussed under C3.5 — a resource-funded pool this large, without
Norway's specific institutional safeguards, is a textbook concentration-
of-control risk, which is exactly why this project's own Section 8.1
treats Gulf-state rentier-distributive statism (the same mechanism paired
with non-democratic, patronage-employment governance) as a structurally
distinct case reserved for separate evaluation rather than folded in
here. Even in Norway's own well-governed case, the fund is not a lever
that shifts power over the rest of the economy — it changes who owns a
savings pool, not who controls firms, land, or labor relations, which is
the dynamic this criterion's own Pass Threshold and Current Performance
language (Gilens & Page's "near-zero" citizen policy influence) are most
concerned with.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — strong, evidenced safeguards in
the best-governed real case, alongside a genuine, independently
documented concentration-of-control risk in the generalized model that
this project's own scope decision (splitting out the Gulf sub-entry)
already implicitly acknowledges.

#### C4.5 Exploitation Elimination: 0.0 (Structural Failure)

**Rationale:** No structural connection to any of the three named
extraction channels — landlord-tenant, employer-employee, or creditor-
debtor — was located for either exemplar. The fund neither regulates nor
displaces ordinary market relations in housing, labor, or credit; its
effect on wealth concentration (C1.2b, above) runs through a wholly
separate channel (resource-rent capture) that this criterion does not
test.

**Score Justification:** Structural failure (0.0) — no evidence connects
this mechanism to any of the three named exploitation channels, matching
the precedent this exact finding has for several other systems in this
corpus (Doughnut Economics among them).

**Domain 4 = 1.0 + 0.0 + 0.5 + 0.5 + 0.0 = 2.0/5 (40%)**

---

### Domain 5: Implementation Viability

#### C5.1 Proven Component Foundation: 1.0 (Pass)

**Rationale:** Among the single best-evidenced criteria for any system
this corpus has scored. This is one of exactly four worked examples
already built into NEEC's own founding definition of this criterion
(Section 6: "Sovereign wealth funds: Alaska PFD (40+ years), Norway (271%
GDP)") — evidence UBI, CCO-PTF-CIP-SZH, and Georgism have each already
borrowed for their own C5.1 write-ups, now finally claimed by its native
system. Updated to current figures: Norway's fund has operated
continuously since 1990 (first transfer 1996) and now exceeds $2 trillion,
more than four times Norway's GDP; Alaska's since 1976/1982; Timor-Leste's
Petroleum Fund, built with direct Norwegian technical assistance, since
2005; and the wider global category collectively exceeds $15 trillion in
assets under management as of Global SWF's 2026 annual report. This
clears the ≥20-years/≥10,000-participants bar by an exceptionally wide
margin across multiple large, independent, long-duration implementations
— a broader and longer evidentiary base than several already-scored
systems' own C5.1 foundations.

**Score Justification:** Pass (1.0) — multiple, large-scale,
multi-decade, independently-documented implementations, exceeding the
Pass Threshold by a wide margin.

#### C5.2 Staged Transition Pathways: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** Real, if not NEEC-formatted, staged-adoption evidence
exists: Norway's own fund grew from its first modest 1996 transfer to its
current scale over three decades of deliberate, incremental accumulation,
and Timor-Leste's 2005 Petroleum Fund Law is a documented, genuine case of
a state adopting this model from scratch with direct outside technical
assistance modeled explicitly on Norway's own template — real policy
transfer, not merely theoretical portability. But no system-specific,
phase-by-phase national implementation plan comparable to CCO-PTF's own
modeling was located, and this system carries a limitation distinctive
among those scored so far: its clearest historical pathway depends on the
state having, or discovering, an appropriately large, non-recurring
revenue source to seed the fund in the first place. New Zealand's own
Superannuation Fund — funded from ordinary Crown budget contributions
rather than a resource windfall — is the clearest evidence located that
this isn't a strict requirement, but that pathway has its own documented
fragility (discussed under C5.5).

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — genuine historical precedent for
gradual, deliberate accumulation and at least one documented case of
direct cross-border policy transfer, short of a comprehensive, NEEC-
formatted phase plan.

#### C5.3 Partial and Parallel Deployability: 1.0 (Pass)

**Rationale:** Definitionally and empirically clean. Every implementing
jurisdiction operates independently of every other, and every one
coexists with, rather than displaces, an ordinary market economy — this
is simply the observed pattern across every exemplar located (Norway,
Alaska, Timor-Leste, New Zealand, and dozens of others tracked by the
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute), not a projection requiring modeling.

**Score Justification:** Pass (1.0) — observed fact across every located
implementation, not projection.

#### C5.4 Political Coalition Potential: 0.5 (Partial) — a genuinely close call

**Rationale:** Alaska's PFD is this project's own pre-existing, named
anchor case for a full Pass on this exact criterion (Section 6's own
Cross-Ideological Appeal Examples: "Alaska PFD: 80%+ approval across
political spectrum for 40+ years") — evidence this system can now claim
natively. Norway's own fiscal-rule framework similarly enjoys deep,
sustained, cross-party support, functioning as something close to a
political "third rail." But this evaluation's own research into the
mechanism's *lived* political history complicates that headline figure:
Alaska's dividend size, specifically, has been the subject of genuinely
severe, recurring, high-conflict legislative fights since the mid-2010s
fiscal downturn — the 2025 dividend ($1,000) was the smallest in state
history in inflation-adjusted terms against a statutory formula exceeding
$3,800, and the 2026 compromise ($1,200, combining a base dividend with a
separate energy-relief payment) was reached only after a divided,
4–2 conference-committee vote. The coalition holds firmly around the
*mechanism's existence* — no serious proposal to abolish the PFD was
located — while fracturing repeatedly, and on predictable lines, over its
*size*. That is a genuinely different, more contested picture than the
framework's own anchor citation, read alone, suggests.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — durable, multi-decade,
cross-ideological support for the mechanism's existence, but real,
recurring, documented political conflict over its parameters that this
evaluation judges as falling short of the Pass Threshold's ≥65%-
opposition-to-repeal-and-≥80%-survival-probability bar as a description
of the system's actual, lived political stability. **Flagged explicitly**
since this project's own pre-existing anchor text, read in isolation,
would point toward 1.0.

#### C5.5 Cultural Adaptability: 0.5 (Partial)

**Rationale:** Real, if narrower-than-typical, diversity of successful
contexts was located: a wealthy Nordic democracy (Norway), a US state
with its own distinct politics (Alaska), a small, high-income, non-
resource-funded Pacific democracy (New Zealand), and a genuinely
low-income, small, post-conflict Southeast Asian state (Timor-Leste) have
each built a working version of this mechanism. But nearly every
large-scale, long-running success case shares one structural precondition
this evaluation could not find a clean workaround for: a large, lumpy,
non-recurring revenue source — a resource windfall in most cases, or a
sustained, politically-durable general budget contribution in New
Zealand's rarer case — to seed and sustain the fund. Even that rarer,
non-resource case shows real fragility: New Zealand's own government
contributions were suspended for roughly a decade (contributions
resuming only from 2020/21 after a multi-year pause) as they competed
against other budget priorities, and at least one 2026 critical analysis
argues the fund now returns more to the Crown in tax than the Crown
contributes to it annually — a specific, sourced critique this evaluation
treats as one contested viewpoint rather than settled fact, but one
pointing at a real structural tension: a windfall-funded model doesn't
compete with existing spending commitments the way a contribution funded
from ordinary revenue does.

**Score Justification:** Partial (0.5) — real, if resource-windfall-
concentrated, cross-context success, with the clearest non-windfall
counterexample itself showing documented fragility; a more structural,
harder-to-parameter-adjust adaptability constraint than the income-level
parameter tables most other systems' C5.5 discussions turn on.

**Domain 5 = 1.0 + 0.5 + 1.0 + 0.5 + 0.5 = 3.5/5 (70%)**

---

## Summary Scores

**Domain Totals:**
- Material Security: 2.5/6 (42%)
- Human Autonomy: 3.0/5 (60%)
- System Resilience: 3.0/5 (60%)
- Ethical Integrity: 2.0/5 (40%)
- Implementation Viability: 3.5/5 (70%)

**Overall Score: 14.0/26 (54%)**

*Explicit sum, per Appendix H.4: 2.5 + 3.0 + 3.0 + 2.0 + 3.5 = 14.0.*

*Score distribution: 5 criteria at 1.0 (C2.5, C3.4, C4.1, C5.1, C5.3), 18
criteria at 0.5, 3 criteria at 0.0 (C1.3, C4.2, C4.5). Check:
5(1.0) + 18(0.5) + 3(0.0) = 5 + 9 + 0 = 14.0 — matches the domain sum
exactly.*

**Structural Failures: 3** (C1.3 Housing Security, C4.2 Ecological
Compliance, C4.5 Exploitation Elimination).

**Adequacy Classification: Partially Adequate** (3–5 structural failures,
Section 8.3) — the same tier Mutual Credit/LETS and Universal Basic
Services already occupy, but for a genuinely different reason: this is
the **first** Step 1b "narrow single-mechanism" system whose three
failures are **not** concentrated in the wealth-accumulation cluster
(C1.2a/C1.2b/C1.5). This system is the first of the four newly-scored
systems to clear a Partial (not a failing) score on all three wealth-
cluster criteria simultaneously — Mutual Credit/LETS fails C1.2a and
C1.5; Universal Basic Services fails C1.2a, C1.2b, *and* C1.5; Doughnut
Economics fails all three plus more. This system's own failure set
(C1.3, C4.2, C4.5) overlaps Mutual Credit/LETS's on only one criterion
(C1.3) and does not overlap Universal Basic Services's at all.

**On the flagged contestable call's consequence, checked directly:** if
C1.2a and C1.5 both resolve to 0.0 instead of 0.5 (see both entries above),
the failure count rises to 5 (C1.2a, C1.5, C1.3, C4.2, C4.5) and the total
falls to 13.0/26 (50%) — but 5 failures remains inside the 3–5 Partially
Adequate band (Section 8.3), so **this call does not move this system's
adequacy tier either way**, unlike UBS's own flagged C1.2b call (which would
move UBS into a different tier). This is disclosed explicitly rather than
left for a reader to work out, per this project's own contestable-call
practice. Under protocol 6.1 (decision D16), this entry carries four flagged
criteria in three independent calls: C1.2a with C1.5, which tracks it; C4.3
(0.5, encoded with both alternatives, 0.0 and 1.0); and C5.4 (0.5,
alternative 1.0). The tier-neutrality shown above holds for the C1.2a/C1.5
call alone. The joint readings are not tier-neutral: the joint downward
reading (C1.2a, C1.5 and C4.3 at 0.0) gives 12.5/26 with 6 structural
failures, Structurally Inadequate; the joint upward reading (C4.3 and C5.4
at 1.0) gives 15.0/26 with 3, Partially Adequate as scored.

**On the canonical CSV.** Consistent with this project's
scratch-before-insert discipline, this evaluation was added as a row of
`neec_scores.csv` in a dedicated insertion pass, Session 20, together with
State Capitalism / China and State Capitalism / Singapore.

---

## Final Assessment

**Key Strengths:**
- **C5.1 (Proven Component Foundation)** and **C4.1 (Intergenerational
  Justice)** are both among the best-evidenced Pass scores this corpus
  has produced for any criterion: multiple large-scale, multi-decade,
  independently-documented real-world implementations, for a mechanism
  whose founding purpose is *literally* NEEC's own C4.1 test
  ("preserve resources and opportunities for future generations").
- The first Step 1b "narrow single-mechanism" system to clear Partial
  credit on **all three** wealth-cluster criteria (C1.2a, C1.2b, C1.5)
  rather than failing at least one outright — a direct consequence of
  being the first such system whose mechanism is an actual accumulating,
  invested *stock* rather than a recurring *flow* (Georgism's dividend,
  Mutual Credit's ledger balances) or a service-in-kind (UBS). This is
  also this evaluation's single most consequential contestable call
  (C1.2a/C1.5), disclosed above with its exact, checked consequence.
- **C3.1 and C3.2** rest on real, current, well-documented, rule-
  supported evidence (Norway's 2020 COVID-19 fiscal-rule drawdown; the
  fund's deliberate all-foreign investment mandate) rather than
  theoretical projection — an unusually strong evidentiary footing for
  two Partial scores.
- Domain 5 (Implementation Viability, 3.5/5, 70%) ties Universal Basic
  Services for the highest Domain 5 score among all Step 1b systems
  scored to date, on the strength of the same C5.1/C5.3 pairing.

**Key Deficiencies:**
- **C4.2 (Ecological Compliance)** is a clean, current, well-evidenced
  structural failure with no comparable escape route available to this
  system: unlike a system whose ecological weakness is a matter of
  degree, this mechanism's funding source is fossil-fuel extraction, and
  Norway's own government is, as of this evaluation, actively expanding
  that extraction in the Arctic against ongoing constitutional and
  European human-rights litigation.
- **C1.3 and C4.5** are flat, no-mechanism failures with no located
  evidence in either direction — this system simply does not engage
  housing or the three named exploitation channels at all.
- Both remaining Domain 4 scores (C4.3, C4.4) rest on genuinely mixed
  evidence rather than clean support in either direction, and C4.3 in
  particular surfaces a documented adverse correlate (a rise in
  substance-abuse-related incidents following dividend distribution)
  that this evaluation discloses rather than omits, alongside real,
  disproportionate benefits to the same population on other measures.
- **C5.4**, this project's own pre-existing anchor citation for a clean
  Pass, is revised downward here once this evaluation's own research
  into the mechanism's lived political history (Alaska's recurring,
  severe dividend-size fights) is taken into account — a case where
  deeper research complicates rather than confirms an existing
  benchmark.

**A structural-archetype finding, as the prior handoff specifically
flagged for checking at this point.** This system fits this project's
first named archetype — "narrow single-mechanism systems," alongside
Georgism and Mutual Credit/LETS — cleanly: it is one mechanism (a fund
plus its withdrawal rule) layered onto an otherwise-unmodified market
economy, not a comprehensive vision (Doughnut Economics' shape) or a
federation of separately-proven, sector-specific mechanisms (UBS's
shape). Within that archetype, though, it is a genuinely new sub-case:
the first whose core mechanism is an accumulating **stock** rather than a
recurring **flow**. That distinction is not cosmetic — it is the direct
cause of this system's own C1.2a/C1.2b findings, both without precedent
among this archetype's other two members, and the reason this system's
wealth-cluster profile looks nothing like either of theirs (see Adequacy
Classification, above).

**Comparison to other systems in the corpus.** On the canonical corpus,
Sovereign Wealth Fund Statism is strictly dominated by one system,
CCO-PTF-CIP-SZH, and dominates none. At 14.0/26 (54%), this system scores
higher than Georgism and UBS's own exact 13.5/26 tie, and just half a point
below Mutual Credit/LETS's 14.5/26 — tied third and fourth, with State
Capitalism / Singapore, among the ten entries scored natively on the v2
structure, behind Mutual Credit/LETS and Ostrom-style commons governance. It
shares Mutual Credit/LETS's and UBS's adequacy tier (Partially Adequate, 3
failures) but, as discussed above, essentially none of their specific
failure pattern. Qualitatively, its profile — one clean, exceptionally
strong ethical/implementation pairing (C4.1, C5.1) resting on genuine
multi-decade real-world operation, a uniformly Partial middle (Domains 1–3),
and one clean, current, well- evidenced ecological failure — most resembles
Nordic Social Democracy's own shape in miniature (a real, working,
well-governed mechanism with one sharp, named weakness) more than it
resembles Georgism's "one strength, otherwise-Partial" shape, even though it
does not approach Nordic's own score or tier.

---

## Reviewer disclosure (per NEEC_CONTRIBUTING.md §2 / Appendix H.6)

This is a first-pass scoring by a single AI reasoner (Claude), based on
web research conducted in this session rather than a systematic
literature review, and has not yet been independently cross-checked by a
second scorer per H.9 Step 6. Sources were drawn from a mix of: primary
fund-administrator reporting (Norges Bank Investment Management,
Norwegianpetroleum.no, the Alaska Department of Revenue's Permanent Fund
Dividend Division, the IFSWF's own member profiles for Timor-Leste and
New Zealand); peer-reviewed academic research (Berman's 2024 *Poverty &
Public Policy* article and her earlier ScienceDirect piece on Indigenous
Alaskans, the NBER working paper on PFD payments and child maltreatment,
a 2026 MDPI paper on SWF transparency scoring, an Oxford Academic chapter
on GPFG's ethics framework); international-institution material (IMF
country reporting on Norway's fiscal framework, the Sovereign Wealth Fund
Institute's own Linaburg-Maduell methodology); current news coverage
through 2026 (Norway's COVID-19-era withdrawals, the 2026 Arctic
licensing round and its pending European Court of Human Rights case,
Alaska's 2025–2026 dividend-size legislative fights); and at least one
openly critical, non-peer-reviewed source (a 2026 opinion piece critical
of New Zealand's own Superannuation Fund contribution record), flagged
inline as a contested viewpoint rather than treated as settled fact. This
is an attempt at genuine balance across a mechanism with an unusually
large and disparate evidence base, not a substitute for a formal
literature review. The clearest candidates for independent disagreement
are flagged inline: C1.2a and C1.5 together (explicitly marked as this
evaluation's single most consequential contestable call, with its exact
tier-boundary consequence checked and disclosed), C4.3 (genuinely mixed
evidence, marked contestable), and C5.4 (a case where this evaluation
revises a pre-existing framework anchor downward based on its own
further research, marked as a close call). A reader who would weight
Norway's own exemplary governance and transparency more heavily relative
to the generalized category's documented variance would likely score
C3.5 and C4.4 higher than this evaluation does; a reader who would treat
the Gulf-state and Singaporean cases as within scope rather than reserved
for their own separate sub-entries would need to re-derive several
criteria (especially C4.4 and C5.5) from a different evidence base than
this evaluation used.

---

## Summary block

The machine-readable summary of this entry (protocol section 9; schema
`neec-summary-block/1.0`, `summary_block_schema.json`). It is generated from
the canonical corpus and the Session 28 staging (`summary_blocks_s28.json`),
not typed, and validated by `neec_entry.py`.

<!-- NEEC-SUMMARY-BLOCK -->
```json
{
  "schema": "neec-summary-block/1.0",
  "key": "Sovereign Wealth Fund Statism",
  "code": "SWF",
  "display_name": "Sovereign Wealth Fund Statism",
  "record": {"documents": ["NEEC_SovereignWealthFundStatism_scoring_scratch.md"], "scored": "Session 17, natively on the v2 structure", "structure": "native-v2"},
  "scope": {"class": "mechanism", "basis": "stated", "source": {"file": "NEEC_Ostrom_Commons_scoring_scratch.md", "locator": "document", "phrase": "Commons governance joins archetype 1, narrow single-mechanism systems, as its fifth member after Georgism, Mutual Credit / LETS, Sovereign Wealth Fund Statism and Islamic finance."}},
  "vector": {
    "C1.1": 0.5, "C1.2a": 0.5, "C1.2b": 0.5, "C1.3": 0.0, "C1.4": 0.5, "C1.5": 0.5,
    "C2.1": 0.5, "C2.2": 0.5, "C2.3": 0.5, "C2.4": 0.5, "C2.5": 1.0,
    "C3.1": 0.5, "C3.2": 0.5, "C3.3": 0.5, "C3.4": 1.0, "C3.5": 0.5,
    "C4.1": 1.0, "C4.2": 0.0, "C4.3": 0.5, "C4.4": 0.5, "C4.5": 0.0,
    "C5.1": 1.0, "C5.2": 0.5, "C5.3": 1.0, "C5.4": 0.5, "C5.5": 0.5
  },
  "summary": {"D1": 2.5, "D2": 3.0, "D3": 3.0, "D4": 2.0, "D5": 3.5, "total": 14.0, "failures": 3, "tier": "Partially Adequate"},
  "flags": [
    {"criterion": "C1.2a", "scored": 0.5, "alternatives": [0.0], "basis": "stated", "reading": "only individually titled net worth counts", "tracks": null, "source": {"file": "NEEC_SovereignWealthFundStatism_scoring_scratch.md", "locator": "C1.2a", "phrase": "would score this 0.0"}},
    {"criterion": "C1.5", "scored": 0.5, "alternatives": [0.0], "basis": "stated", "reading": "follows C1.2a", "tracks": "C1.2a", "source": {"file": "NEEC_SovereignWealthFundStatism_scoring_scratch.md", "locator": "C1.5", "phrase": "if C1.2a resolves to 0.0, this criterion follows to 0.0"}},
    {"criterion": "C4.3", "scored": 0.5, "alternatives": [0.0, 1.0], "basis": "both-directions", "reading": null, "tracks": null, "source": {"file": "NEEC_SovereignWealthFundStatism_scoring_scratch.md", "locator": "C4.3", "phrase": "could reasonably land on a different score"}},
    {"criterion": "C5.4", "scored": 0.5, "alternatives": [1.0], "basis": "stated", "reading": "the pre-existing anchor text read in isolation", "tracks": null, "source": {"file": "NEEC_SovereignWealthFundStatism_scoring_scratch.md", "locator": "C5.4", "phrase": "would point toward 1.0"}}
  ],
  "joint_readings": [
    {"id": "scored", "label": "as scored", "basis": "scored", "resolve": {}, "result": {"total": 14.0, "failures": 3, "tier": "Partially Adequate"}},
    {"id": "up", "label": "every flagged call resolved upward", "basis": "extremes", "resolve": {"C4.3": 1.0, "C5.4": 1.0}, "result": {"total": 15.0, "failures": 3, "tier": "Partially Adequate"}},
    {"id": "down", "label": "every flagged call resolved downward", "basis": "extremes", "resolve": {"C1.2a": 0.0, "C1.5": 0.0, "C4.3": 0.0}, "result": {"total": 12.5, "failures": 6, "tier": "Structurally Inadequate"}}
  ],
  "scenarios": []
}
```
<!-- /NEEC-SUMMARY-BLOCK -->