{ "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.1", "cveMetadata": { "cveId": "CVE-2025-62495", "assignerOrgId": "14ed7db2-1595-443d-9d34-6215bf890778", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "Google", "dateReserved": "2025-10-15T08:47:41.878Z", "datePublished": "2025-10-16T15:51:58.953Z", "dateUpdated": "2025-10-16T17:42:15.865Z" }, "containers": { "cna": { "affected": [ { "collectionURL": "https://bellard.org/quickjs/", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "packageName": "libregexp", "product": "QuickJS", "vendor": "QuickJS", "versions": [ { "lessThan": "2025-09-13", "status": "affected", "version": "2025-04-26", "versionType": "date" } ] } ], "credits": [ { "lang": "en", "type": "finder", "value": "Google Big Sleep" } ], "datePublic": "2025-07-24T22:00:00.000Z", "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [ { "base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "
An integer overflow vulnerability exists in the QuickJS regular expression engine (libregexp) due to an inconsistent representation of the bytecode buffer size.
The regular expression bytecode is stored in a DynBuf structure, which correctly uses a $\\text{size}\\_\\text{t}$ (an unsigned type, typically 64-bit) for its size member.
However, several functions, such as re_emit_op_u32 and other internal parsing routines, incorrectly cast or store this DynBuf $\\text{size}\\_\\text{t}$ value into a signed int (typically 32-bit).
When a large or complex regular expression (such as those generated by a recursive pattern in a Proof-of-Concept) causes the bytecode size to exceed $2^{31}$ bytes (the maximum positive value for a signed 32-bit integer), the size value wraps around, resulting in a negative integer when stored in the int variable (Integer Overflow).
This negative value is subsequently used in offset calculations. For example, within functions like re_parse_disjunction, the negative size is used to compute an offset (pos) for patching a jump instruction.
This negative offset is then incorrectly added to the buffer pointer (s->byte\\_code.buf + pos), leading to an out-of-bounds write on the first line of the snippet below:
put_u32(s->byte_code.buf + pos, len);