{ "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": { "cveId": "CVE-2026-48168", "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M", "dateReserved": "2026-05-20T23:12:43.032Z", "datePublished": "2026-08-05T18:29:38.632Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T19:24:05.128Z" }, "containers": { "cna": { "title": "PraisonAI: GitHub Actions Claude workflow command injection via unquoted PR branch name", "problemTypes": [ { "descriptions": [ { "cweId": "CWE-862", "lang": "en", "description": "CWE-862: Missing Authorization", "type": "CWE" } ] } ], "metrics": [ { "cvssV3_1": { "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "CHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1" } } ], "references": [ { "name": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-xp85-6wwf-r67c", "tags": [ "x_refsource_CONFIRM" ], "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-xp85-6wwf-r67c" }, { "name": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/179cab02dbec0c1e9b601507a659", "tags": [ "x_refsource_MISC" ], "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/179cab02dbec0c1e9b601507a659" } ], "affected": [ { "vendor": "MervinPraison", "product": "PraisonAI", "versions": [ { "version": "< 4.6.40", "status": "affected" } ] } ], "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa", "shortName": "GitHub_M", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T18:29:38.632Z" }, "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 4.6.40, the bundled Claude GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection because it embeds an attacker-controlled pull request branch name into a Bash run: block without quoting or validation. Additionally, the workflow allows any @claude comment to trigger the job regardless of whether the commenter is a trusted collaborator. An outside contributor can open a pull request from a fork whose branch name contains shell metacharacters and comment @claude, causing Bash to execute arbitrary shell code in the GitHub Actions runner. Because these commands run in a job holding a GitHub App token with write permissions, OIDC access, and gh/git access, the injection can be chained through $GITHUB_PATH to compromise later privileged steps, enabling repository writes, pull request and issue manipulation, or OIDC-token abuse. This issue has been fixed in version 4.6.40." } ], "source": { "advisory": "GHSA-xp85-6wwf-r67c", "discovery": "UNKNOWN" } }, "adp": [ { "references": [ { "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-xp85-6wwf-r67c", "tags": [ "exploit" ] } ], "metrics": [ { "other": { "type": "ssvc", "content": { "timestamp": "2026-08-05T19:23:57.492283Z", "id": "CVE-2026-48168", "options": [ { "Exploitation": "poc" }, { "Automatable": "yes" }, { "Technical Impact": "total" } ], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3" } } } ], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-05T19:24:05.128Z" } } ] } }