{ "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": { "cveId": "CVE-2026-72186", "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "Linux", "dateReserved": "2026-08-09T03:40:39.911Z", "datePublished": "2026-08-15T05:53:48.127Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:41:16.318Z" }, "containers": { "cna": { "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "shortName": "Linux", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-17T05:41:16.318Z" }, "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: make system files immutable to prevent corruption\n\nWhen a system file such as $Bitmap is exposed via show_sys_files and\nwritten from userspace, the volume is corrupted and, because the cluster\nallocator scans $Bitmap through the same inode's page cache, a write to\n$Bitmap also deadlocks writeback against the folio it already holds locked.\n\nThese files are maintained by the driver itself and have no valid reason\nto be written through the file interface. Mark base metadata files\n(mft_no < FILE_first_user) as immutable during inode read so the VFS\nrejects write, mmap, truncate and unlink with -EPERM. Directories are\nskipped so the root and $Extend remain usable. Internal metadata updates\ndo not go through the VFS write path and are unaffected." } ], "metrics": [ { "cvssV3_1": { "version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H", "baseScore": 9.1, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL" }, "scenarios": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "AV:N - fs/ntfs registers ntfs_export_ops; remote nfsd/ksmbd write RPCs reach ntfs_file_write_iter on $Bitmap, and dual-boot/shared NTFS volumes are commonly rw-mounted and network-exported on NAS/hybrid servers.\nAC:L - Without S_IMMUTABLE, opening $Bitmap by name and writing is deterministic; expanding $Bitmap triggers ntfs_attr_map_cluster while lcnalloc holds the same folio locked, deadlocking writeback as documented in the fix commit.\nPR:N - Exploitation needs only permission to write on a mounted NTFS volume (default i_mode 0777 with fmask=0, uid/gid mount options, authenticated SMB/NFS client, or guest write); no CAP_SYS_ADMIN or init-namespace root is required at trigger time.\nUI:N - Once an administrator has rw-mounted and optionally exported the NTFS volume, the attacker issues normal write/mmap/truncate/unlink to $Bitmap or other mft_no