{ "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": { "cveId": "CVE-2026-77776", "assignerOrgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "VulnCheck", "dateReserved": "2026-08-21T11:09:25.553Z", "datePublished": "2026-08-21T11:22:51.779Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T21:44:30.707Z" }, "containers": { "cna": { "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10", "shortName": "VulnCheck", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T11:22:51.779Z" }, "datePublic": "2026-08-20T00:00:00.000Z", "title": "Headroom Proxy Treats the Client-Supplied x-headroom-user-id Header as an Authenticated Identity", "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "Headroom's LLM proxy derives the memory owner from the x-headroom-user-id request header. The header is read directly at several points in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py, including the chat completion and websocket paths, and nothing binds the value to the caller. A client can therefore name another user's identifier and read or write that user's stored LLM memory. The fix introduces a single resolve_memory_identity seam in headroom/proxy/identity.py that honors the header only for loopback or allowlisted callers and otherwise binds the identity to the proxy-token fingerprint or the operating system user. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication." } ], "problemTypes": [ { "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "description": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key", "cweId": "CWE-639", "type": "CWE" } ] } ], "affected": [ { "vendor": "Headroom Labs", "product": "Headroom", "collectionURL": "https://pypi.org", "packageName": "headroom-ai", "packageURL": "pkg:pypi/headroom-ai", "repo": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "versions": [ { "version": "0", "lessThan": "0.36.1", "status": "affected", "versionType": "semver" }, { "version": "0.36.1", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver" } ], "programFiles": [ "headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py", "headroom/proxy/memory_handler.py", "headroom/memory/easy.py" ] } ], "metrics": [ { "format": "CVSS", "cvssV3_1": { "version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "availabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.1, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL" } }, { "format": "CVSS", "cvssV4_0": { "version": "4.0", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "NONE", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.3, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL" } } ], "references": [ { "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/pull/2207", "tags": [ "issue-tracking" ], "name": "Pull Request #2207 addressing the assessment findings" }, { "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.29.0/headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py", "tags": [ "technical-description" ], "name": "Header handling in the OpenAI proxy handler at v0.29.0" }, { "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom/blob/v0.36.1/headroom/proxy/identity.py", "tags": [ "technical-description" ], "name": "resolve_memory_identity seam introduced by the fix" }, { "url": "https://github.com/headroomlabs-ai/headroom", "tags": [ "product" ] }, { "name": "VulnCheck Advisory: Headroom Proxy Treats the Client-Supplied x-headroom-user-id Header as an Authenticated Identity", "tags": [ "third-party-advisory" ], "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/headroom-proxy-treats-the-client-supplied-x-headroom-user-id-header-as-an-authenticated-identity" } ], "credits": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "Gregory Tan (Grg0rry)", "type": "finder" } ] }, "adp": [ { "metrics": [ { "other": { "type": "ssvc", "content": { "timestamp": "2026-08-21T21:18:54.351966Z", "id": "CVE-2026-77776", "options": [ { "Exploitation": "none" }, { "Automatable": "yes" }, { "Technical Impact": "total" } ], "role": "CISA Coordinator", "version": "2.0.3" } } } ], "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment", "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0", "shortName": "CISA-ADP", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-21T21:44:30.707Z" } } ] } }