{ "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": { "cveId": "CVE-2026-80674", "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "Linux", "dateReserved": "2026-08-26T14:34:25.782Z", "datePublished": "2026-08-28T06:49:13.549Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:22:01.603Z" }, "containers": { "cna": { "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "shortName": "Linux", "dateUpdated": "2026-08-29T06:22:01.603Z" }, "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator\n\nA base inode's $ATTRIBUTE_LIST is sanity-checked by load_attribute_list()\nonly on the non-resident path; ntfs_read_locked_inode() copies a *resident*\nattribute list into ni->attr_list with a plain memcpy() and no validation\nat all. Every subsequent walk of ni->attr_list --\nntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents() and\nntfs_attrlist_need() -- then trusts the entries are well-formed and reads\nattr_list_entry fixed-header fields\n(lowest_vcn at offset 8, mft_reference at offset 16, and the name) with\nbounds that assume validation already happened. A crafted resident\nattribute list therefore reaches those walks unvalidated and can drive\nout-of-bounds reads of the attribute-list buffer.\n\nload_attribute_list() itself reads ale->name_offset (offset 7),\nale->mft_reference (offset 16) and the name length under only an\n\"al < al_start + size\" bound, so its own validation loop can over-read the\nfixed header of a truncated trailing entry by a few bytes.\n\nFactor the per-entry validation into ntfs_attr_list_entry_is_valid(),\nwhich requires each entry's fixed header (offsetof(struct\nattr_list_entry, name)) to be in range before any field is dereferenced,\nthat ale->length is a multiple of 8 covering the fixed header plus the\nname, and that the entry is in use and carries a live MFT reference.\nntfs_attr_list_is_valid() walks the buffer with it and checks the entries\ntile it exactly. Use the list validator in load_attribute_list()\n(replacing the open-coded loop, closing its own over-read) and on the\nresident path in ntfs_read_locked_inode() (which previously skipped\nvalidation entirely); patches 2/3 reuse the per-entry helper at the other\ntwo attribute-list walks." } ], "metrics": [ { "cvssV3_1": { "version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "baseScore": 9.8, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL" }, "scenarios": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "AV:N - NTFS registers ntfs_export_ops; remote nfsd/ksmbd VFS lookups on an exported crafted NTFS volume reach ntfs_iget→ntfs_read_locked_inode and subsequent ntfs_external_attr_find/ntfs_attrlist_need walks without local syscall access.\nAC:L - Attacker fully controls on-disk resident $ATTRIBUTE_LIST entry headers (length, name_offset, mft_reference) in a crafted image; triggering the slab OOB read is deterministic once the inode is accessed with no races.\nPR:N - Exploitation requires only read access to mounted NTFS content (e.g., NFS/SMB client on an exported share) or supplying removable media the host later mounts; the attribute-list walk paths need no init-namespace root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN.\nUI:N - Once a crafted NTFS volume is mounted and exported (or loop-mounted in a user namespace), normal remote lookups/opens or attribute operations reach the unvalidated resident attribute-list parsing without further victim interaction.\nS:U - The out-of-bounds read and potential kernel crash remain within the mounting host kernel security authority; this is standard filesystem metadata parsing, not a VM escape, IOMMU bypass, or sandbox scope change.\nC:H - ntfs_external_attr_find(), ntfs_inode_attach_all_extents(), and ntfs_attrlist_need() read attr_list_entry fixed-header fields (lowest_vcn, mft_reference, name) past the kmalloc attr_list buffer end, disclosing adjacent slab heap memory.\nI:H - Attacker-controlled attribute-list lengths and offsets drive kernel parsing of forged metadata and adjacent slab contents; per kernel CNA guidance this memory-corruption class can be leveraged for arbitrary kernel modification or control-flow hijack beyond the immediate read.\nA:H - Out-of-bounds reads from the attribute-list buffer can fault on invalid adjacent memory or otherwise oops/panic the kernel during inode attribute walks on lookup, extent attach, or attribute-list maintenance paths." } ] } ], "affected": [ { "product": "Linux", "vendor": "Linux", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", "programFiles": [ "fs/ntfs/attrib.c", "fs/ntfs/attrib.h", "fs/ntfs/inode.c" ], "versions": [ { "version": "1e9ea7e04472d4e5e12e58c881eaacfb3e49b669", "lessThan": "55e97648f7753c6097cb682d24d1abcfe878e812", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git" }, { "version": "1e9ea7e04472d4e5e12e58c881eaacfb3e49b669", "lessThan": "7d19e1ffee084c4f7d321a360c14ba43404f7cc8", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git" } ] }, { "product": "Linux", "vendor": "Linux", "defaultStatus": "affected", "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", "programFiles": [ "fs/ntfs/attrib.c", "fs/ntfs/attrib.h", "fs/ntfs/inode.c" ], "versions": [ { "version": "7.1", "status": "affected" }, { "version": "0", "lessThan": "7.1", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver" }, { "version": "7.1.5", "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver" }, { "version": "7.2", "lessThanOrEqual": "*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix" } ] } ], "cpeApplicability": [ { "nodes": [ { "operator": "OR", "negate": false, "cpeMatch": [ { "vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "7.1", "versionEndExcluding": "7.1.5" }, { "vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "7.1", "versionEndExcluding": "7.2" } ] } ] } ], "references": [ { "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55e97648f7753c6097cb682d24d1abcfe878e812" }, { "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d19e1ffee084c4f7d321a360c14ba43404f7cc8" } ], "title": "ntfs: validate resident attribute lists and harden the validator", "x_generator": { "engine": "bippy-1.2.0" } } } }