{ "dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": { "cveId": "CVE-2026-98070", "assignerOrgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "Linux", "dateReserved": "2026-09-25T10:19:56.074Z", "datePublished": "2026-09-25T10:24:11.481Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-25T14:42:01.245Z" }, "containers": { "cna": { "providerMetadata": { "orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67", "shortName": "Linux", "dateUpdated": "2026-09-25T14:42:01.245Z" }, "descriptions": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks()\n\nrds_tcp_reset_callbacks() quiesces the transmit path by setting the\npath state to RDS_CONN_RESETTING and then waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT to\nbe sampled clear before swapping the underlying socket and calling\nrds_send_path_reset().\n\nSampling the bit clear is not the same as owning it: rds_send_xmit()\ncan re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT right after the wait_event() returns. Its\nstate recheck after taking the lock is a store-buffering pattern (the\nresetter writes the state and reads the bit, the sender writes the\nbit and reads the state) and acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire\noperation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss\neach other's write and the transmit path then runs concurrently with\nrds_send_path_reset() rewriting cp_xmit_* state - which is exactly\nwhat the comment above rds_send_path_reset() tells its callers to\nprevent.\n\nTake the lock instead, hold it across the socket swap and\nrds_send_path_reset(), and release it with a wake-up at the end. The\nlock-ordering constraint documented above the wait still holds: the\nlock is acquired before lock_sock(), so a sender inside tcp_sendmsg()\ncan never be waited on while we hold the socket lock.\n\nTwo details of the old code go away with the same change:\n\n - t_sock is now read only after the lock is acquired. The old code\n cached it before waiting; the teardown in rds_conn_shutdown()\n releases that socket and clears t_sock, so a pointer cached before\n the wait can be stale by the time the accept path resumes. Reading\n it under RDS_IN_XMIT is what makes the exclusion complete once the\n teardown owns the same lock, which the next patch arranges; until\n then the teardown still only samples the bit, and the two paths\n remain as exposed to each other as they are today.\n\n - The old !osock early path called rds_send_path_reset() with no\n serialization at all. It now runs under the lock like the normal\n path. The conditional RDS_CONN_RESETTING transition of the\n previous patch happens before the socket check either way: a path\n found without a socket is either still connecting (its reconnect\n worker blocked on t_conn_path_lock) and legitimately goes\n RESETTING -> UP on the new socket, or it has been torn down\n meanwhile and is dropped.\n\nThe in-function comment describing the old wait-based quiesce is\nrewritten to describe the lock-based one, and the stale block comment\nabove the function (which still described a return value and an\nincomplete list of t_sock writers) is refreshed to name all four\nwriters - the connect, accept, teardown and swap paths - and what\nserializes each of them." } ], "metrics": [ { "cvssV3_1": { "version": "3.1", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "baseScore": 8.1, "baseSeverity": "HIGH" }, "scenarios": [ { "lang": "en", "value": "AV:N - rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() runs when a remote peer's TCP SYN to the RDS/TCP listener is accepted by rds_tcp_accept_one() while the local path already has t_sock set (the duelling-SYN case). The peer's routable TCP connection is what sets off the unsynchronized socket swap and rds_send_path_reset().\nAC:H - The attacker must win a narrow store-buffering race between the resetter's test_bit(RDS_IN_XMIT) and rds_send_xmit()'s acquire_in_xmit()/state recheck, which only fails on weakly ordered CPUs. It also needs a duelling SYN that arrives while the local path is still CONNECTING, which the attacker cannot fully control.\nPR:N - The RDS/TCP listener accepts incoming connections with no authentication. The accept path through rds_tcp_accept_one() into rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() needs only a reachable IP address and TCP port.\nUI:N - No local user action is needed. The reset path runs from the listen socket's data_ready callback and accept worker, and rds_send_xmit() is driven by the send worker or by pongs to peer pings.\nS:U - The corruption stays inside kernel memory under a single security authority. Crossing no VM or hardware isolation boundary.\nC:H - rds_send_path_reset() puts cp_xmit_rm and zeroes the cp_xmit_* offsets while a concurrent rds_send_xmit() still dereferences that rds_message. This is a use-after-free, and a stale osock cached before the wait can be released twice. Reclaiming the freed object could leak kernel memory.\nI:H - The use-after-free of the rds_message and of the stale socket, plus the torn cp_xmit_* transmit state, corrupt kernel heap objects that could be reclaimed and used for controlled writes.\nA:H - A sender using a freed cp_xmit_rm, or a double sock_release() of the stale osock, will oops or panic the kernel." } ] } ], "affected": [ { "product": "Linux", "vendor": "Linux", "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", "programFiles": [ "net/rds/tcp.c" ], "versions": [ { "version": "335b48d980f631fbc5b233cbb3625ac0c86d67cb", "lessThan": "d625112564c3e980e02504270222b49b82690cee", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git" }, { "version": "335b48d980f631fbc5b233cbb3625ac0c86d67cb", "lessThan": "8e4c3b7844c906c7097b4cfedd9dd1f48c9a6a92", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git" }, { "version": "335b48d980f631fbc5b233cbb3625ac0c86d67cb", "lessThan": "062d9e008c67289e8e1b221ecdd8f9d60566d012", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git" }, { "version": "335b48d980f631fbc5b233cbb3625ac0c86d67cb", "lessThan": "02c5f9dc2efd823e061954d564ce00bacd1bebeb", "status": "affected", "versionType": "git" } ] }, { "product": "Linux", "vendor": "Linux", "defaultStatus": "affected", "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git", "programFiles": [ "net/rds/tcp.c" ], "versions": [ { "version": "4.7", "status": "affected" }, { "version": "0", "lessThan": "4.7", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver" }, { "version": "6.12.111", "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver" }, { "version": "6.18.53", "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver" }, { "version": "7.2.7", "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "semver" }, { "version": "7.3-rc2", "lessThanOrEqual": "*", "status": "unaffected", "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix" } ] } ], "cpeApplicability": [ { "nodes": [ { "operator": "OR", "negate": false, "cpeMatch": [ { "vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "4.7", "versionEndExcluding": "6.12.111" }, { "vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "4.7", "versionEndExcluding": "6.18.53" }, { "vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "4.7", "versionEndExcluding": "7.2.7" }, { "vulnerable": true, "criteria": "cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionStartIncluding": "4.7", "versionEndExcluding": "7.3-rc2" } ] } ] } ], "references": [ { "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d625112564c3e980e02504270222b49b82690cee" }, { "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e4c3b7844c906c7097b4cfedd9dd1f48c9a6a92" }, { "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/062d9e008c67289e8e1b221ecdd8f9d60566d012" }, { "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02c5f9dc2efd823e061954d564ce00bacd1bebeb" } ], "title": "net/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks()", "x_generator": { "engine": "bippy-1.2.0" } } } }