1 00:00:00,030 --> 00:00:05,180 I always try to keep on top of the 2 00:00:05,180 --> 00:00:05,190 I always try to keep on top of the 3 00:00:05,190 --> 00:00:08,360 I always try to keep on top of the latest technology trends and threats are 4 00:00:08,360 --> 00:00:08,370 latest technology trends and threats are 5 00:00:08,370 --> 00:00:12,350 latest technology trends and threats are a really big part of tech because I need 6 00:00:12,350 --> 00:00:12,360 a really big part of tech because I need 7 00:00:12,360 --> 00:00:14,089 a really big part of tech because I need to protect myself I need to protect my 8 00:00:14,089 --> 00:00:14,099 to protect myself I need to protect my 9 00:00:14,099 --> 00:00:16,939 to protect myself I need to protect my customers and I need to be responsible 10 00:00:16,939 --> 00:00:16,949 customers and I need to be responsible 11 00:00:16,949 --> 00:00:20,450 customers and I need to be responsible to you my viewers and and help you to be 12 00:00:20,450 --> 00:00:20,460 to you my viewers and and help you to be 13 00:00:20,460 --> 00:00:22,700 to you my viewers and and help you to be ready and prepared for the threats that 14 00:00:22,700 --> 00:00:22,710 ready and prepared for the threats that 15 00:00:22,710 --> 00:00:26,509 ready and prepared for the threats that are coming over the horizon here as you 16 00:00:26,509 --> 00:00:26,519 are coming over the horizon here as you 17 00:00:26,519 --> 00:00:28,730 are coming over the horizon here as you know here the first month of January 18 00:00:28,730 --> 00:00:28,740 know here the first month of January 19 00:00:28,740 --> 00:00:31,550 know here the first month of January starts to wrap up the first month of 20 00:00:31,550 --> 00:00:31,560 starts to wrap up the first month of 21 00:00:31,560 --> 00:00:34,459 starts to wrap up the first month of 2020 I should say January being that my 22 00:00:34,459 --> 00:00:34,469 2020 I should say January being that my 23 00:00:34,469 --> 00:00:35,060 2020 I should say January being that my first month 24 00:00:35,060 --> 00:00:35,070 first month 25 00:00:35,070 --> 00:00:38,900 first month yes you're saying you knew what I meant 26 00:00:38,900 --> 00:00:38,910 yes you're saying you knew what I meant 27 00:00:38,910 --> 00:00:41,330 yes you're saying you knew what I meant January does feel very long though but 28 00:00:41,330 --> 00:00:41,340 January does feel very long though but 29 00:00:41,340 --> 00:00:43,670 January does feel very long though but we're really it does and when we're 30 00:00:43,670 --> 00:00:43,680 we're really it does and when we're 31 00:00:43,680 --> 00:00:45,799 we're really it does and when we're seeing an evolution in malware we're 32 00:00:45,799 --> 00:00:45,809 seeing an evolution in malware we're 33 00:00:45,809 --> 00:00:49,250 seeing an evolution in malware we're seeing things transition from viruses to 34 00:00:49,250 --> 00:00:49,260 seeing things transition from viruses to 35 00:00:49,260 --> 00:00:53,420 seeing things transition from viruses to malware to ransomware and now even file 36 00:00:53,420 --> 00:00:53,430 malware to ransomware and now even file 37 00:00:53,430 --> 00:00:55,970 malware to ransomware and now even file this attacks we're seeing Hardware 38 00:00:55,970 --> 00:00:55,980 this attacks we're seeing Hardware 39 00:00:55,980 --> 00:00:59,209 this attacks we're seeing Hardware attacks and firmware infiltrations and 40 00:00:59,209 --> 00:00:59,219 attacks and firmware infiltrations and 41 00:00:59,219 --> 00:01:01,400 attacks and firmware infiltrations and things that we've never ever even 42 00:01:01,400 --> 00:01:01,410 things that we've never ever even 43 00:01:01,410 --> 00:01:03,349 things that we've never ever even encountered before but those are very 44 00:01:03,349 --> 00:01:03,359 encountered before but those are very 45 00:01:03,359 --> 00:01:06,890 encountered before but those are very real threats here as we enter 2020 so 46 00:01:06,890 --> 00:01:06,900 real threats here as we enter 2020 so 47 00:01:06,900 --> 00:01:09,320 real threats here as we enter 2020 so the opportunity arose and I spent some 48 00:01:09,320 --> 00:01:09,330 the opportunity arose and I spent some 49 00:01:09,330 --> 00:01:11,149 the opportunity arose and I spent some time there I want to jump into an 50 00:01:11,149 --> 00:01:11,159 time there I want to jump into an 51 00:01:11,159 --> 00:01:15,679 time there I want to jump into an interview with Raph bovar at ESET 52 00:01:15,679 --> 00:01:15,689 interview with Raph bovar at ESET 53 00:01:15,689 --> 00:01:19,760 interview with Raph bovar at ESET headquarters in Toronto Ontario hey 54 00:01:19,760 --> 00:01:19,770 headquarters in Toronto Ontario hey 55 00:01:19,770 --> 00:01:20,240 headquarters in Toronto Ontario hey sorry man 56 00:01:20,240 --> 00:01:20,250 sorry man 57 00:01:20,250 --> 00:01:21,410 sorry man thanks for being here thanks for having 58 00:01:21,410 --> 00:01:21,420 thanks for being here thanks for having 59 00:01:21,420 --> 00:01:24,050 thanks for being here thanks for having a heavy well thanks can you tell the 60 00:01:24,050 --> 00:01:24,060 a heavy well thanks can you tell the 61 00:01:24,060 --> 00:01:25,340 a heavy well thanks can you tell the folks who are watching a little bit 62 00:01:25,340 --> 00:01:25,350 folks who are watching a little bit 63 00:01:25,350 --> 00:01:26,719 folks who are watching a little bit about what you do here at ESET 64 00:01:26,719 --> 00:01:26,729 about what you do here at ESET 65 00:01:26,729 --> 00:01:28,910 about what you do here at ESET headquarters so Robbie I am actually the 66 00:01:28,910 --> 00:01:28,920 headquarters so Robbie I am actually the 67 00:01:28,920 --> 00:01:31,910 headquarters so Robbie I am actually the sibling here I am the lead engineer for 68 00:01:31,910 --> 00:01:31,920 sibling here I am the lead engineer for 69 00:01:31,920 --> 00:01:34,670 sibling here I am the lead engineer for the for the attack team in Canada and I 70 00:01:34,670 --> 00:01:34,680 the for the attack team in Canada and I 71 00:01:34,680 --> 00:01:37,190 the for the attack team in Canada and I am mostly the tech guy that will support 72 00:01:37,190 --> 00:01:37,200 am mostly the tech guy that will support 73 00:01:37,200 --> 00:01:40,039 am mostly the tech guy that will support sales in general between the Canadian 74 00:01:40,039 --> 00:01:40,049 sales in general between the Canadian 75 00:01:40,049 --> 00:01:41,780 sales in general between the Canadian territory so a very technical mind 76 00:01:41,780 --> 00:01:41,790 territory so a very technical mind 77 00:01:41,790 --> 00:01:43,760 territory so a very technical mind you're very familiar with the inner 78 00:01:43,760 --> 00:01:43,770 you're very familiar with the inner 79 00:01:43,770 --> 00:01:45,770 you're very familiar with the inner workings of the products yep I'm doing 80 00:01:45,770 --> 00:01:45,780 workings of the products yep I'm doing 81 00:01:45,780 --> 00:01:47,990 workings of the products yep I'm doing that has all the geeky talk with the 82 00:01:47,990 --> 00:01:48,000 that has all the geeky talk with the 83 00:01:48,000 --> 00:01:50,539 that has all the geeky talk with the other text and other customers yeah and 84 00:01:50,539 --> 00:01:50,549 other text and other customers yeah and 85 00:01:50,549 --> 00:01:53,060 other text and other customers yeah and the main driver for that is to be able 86 00:01:53,060 --> 00:01:53,070 the main driver for that is to be able 87 00:01:53,070 --> 00:01:55,249 the main driver for that is to be able to technically position the products and 88 00:01:55,249 --> 00:01:55,259 to technically position the products and 89 00:01:55,259 --> 00:01:56,959 to technically position the products and see if we can address all the customer 90 00:01:56,959 --> 00:01:56,969 see if we can address all the customer 91 00:01:56,969 --> 00:01:57,469 see if we can address all the customer requirements 92 00:01:57,469 --> 00:01:57,479 requirements 93 00:01:57,479 --> 00:02:00,100 requirements sure so part of that comes from 94 00:02:00,100 --> 00:02:00,110 sure so part of that comes from 95 00:02:00,110 --> 00:02:03,950 sure so part of that comes from educating end-users to understand what 96 00:02:03,950 --> 00:02:03,960 educating end-users to understand what 97 00:02:03,960 --> 00:02:05,300 educating end-users to understand what the cyber security threat landscape 98 00:02:05,300 --> 00:02:05,310 the cyber security threat landscape 99 00:02:05,310 --> 00:02:07,280 the cyber security threat landscape looks like absolutely yeah and we've 100 00:02:07,280 --> 00:02:07,290 looks like absolutely yeah and we've 101 00:02:07,290 --> 00:02:08,960 looks like absolutely yeah and we've really really seen that change over the 102 00:02:08,960 --> 00:02:08,970 really really seen that change over the 103 00:02:08,970 --> 00:02:10,089 really really seen that change over the past couple of years I think especially 104 00:02:10,089 --> 00:02:10,099 past couple of years I think especially 105 00:02:10,099 --> 00:02:12,280 past couple of years I think especially was it 106 00:02:12,280 --> 00:02:12,290 was it 107 00:02:12,290 --> 00:02:15,470 was it 2017 when wanna cry dropped yes this is 108 00:02:15,470 --> 00:02:15,480 2017 when wanna cry dropped yes this is 109 00:02:15,480 --> 00:02:18,500 2017 when wanna cry dropped yes this is like the first ransomware that really 110 00:02:18,500 --> 00:02:18,510 like the first ransomware that really 111 00:02:18,510 --> 00:02:20,180 like the first ransomware that really made its way around the world and was 112 00:02:20,180 --> 00:02:20,190 made its way around the world and was 113 00:02:20,190 --> 00:02:23,630 made its way around the world and was really really huge how did that impact 114 00:02:23,630 --> 00:02:23,640 really really huge how did that impact 115 00:02:23,640 --> 00:02:25,610 really really huge how did that impact the direction of a kind like you said we 116 00:02:25,610 --> 00:02:25,620 the direction of a kind like you said we 117 00:02:25,620 --> 00:02:28,370 the direction of a kind like you said we should not see any any numbers going 118 00:02:28,370 --> 00:02:28,380 should not see any any numbers going 119 00:02:28,380 --> 00:02:30,140 should not see any any numbers going down whenever it comes to the ransomware 120 00:02:30,140 --> 00:02:30,150 down whenever it comes to the ransomware 121 00:02:30,150 --> 00:02:33,320 down whenever it comes to the ransomware it's still the the really prevalent and 122 00:02:33,320 --> 00:02:33,330 it's still the the really prevalent and 123 00:02:33,330 --> 00:02:35,690 it's still the the really prevalent and and everybody in a way is kind of 124 00:02:35,690 --> 00:02:35,700 and everybody in a way is kind of 125 00:02:35,700 --> 00:02:38,990 and everybody in a way is kind of experiencing it we do have a pretty good 126 00:02:38,990 --> 00:02:39,000 experiencing it we do have a pretty good 127 00:02:39,000 --> 00:02:41,720 experiencing it we do have a pretty good protection against it so I I don't 128 00:02:41,720 --> 00:02:41,730 protection against it so I I don't 129 00:02:41,730 --> 00:02:44,180 protection against it so I I don't expect my existing customers that are 130 00:02:44,180 --> 00:02:44,190 expect my existing customers that are 131 00:02:44,190 --> 00:02:45,800 expect my existing customers that are running updated products and everything 132 00:02:45,800 --> 00:02:45,810 running updated products and everything 133 00:02:45,810 --> 00:02:49,610 running updated products and everything from being acted to those threats but 134 00:02:49,610 --> 00:02:49,620 from being acted to those threats but 135 00:02:49,620 --> 00:02:51,729 from being acted to those threats but it's something that's already very very 136 00:02:51,729 --> 00:02:51,739 it's something that's already very very 137 00:02:51,739 --> 00:02:54,830 it's something that's already very very live very very present in our day-to-day 138 00:02:54,830 --> 00:02:54,840 live very very present in our day-to-day 139 00:02:54,840 --> 00:02:57,890 live very very present in our day-to-day operations something else that right 140 00:02:57,890 --> 00:02:57,900 operations something else that right 141 00:02:57,900 --> 00:03:00,229 operations something else that right that I usually highlight on the on the 142 00:03:00,229 --> 00:03:00,239 that I usually highlight on the on the 143 00:03:00,239 --> 00:03:02,479 that I usually highlight on the on the threat landscape that we have recently 144 00:03:02,479 --> 00:03:02,489 threat landscape that we have recently 145 00:03:02,489 --> 00:03:06,770 threat landscape that we have recently is the upcoming releases of the file as 146 00:03:06,770 --> 00:03:06,780 is the upcoming releases of the file as 147 00:03:06,780 --> 00:03:10,310 is the upcoming releases of the file as malware so if you have for example an 148 00:03:10,310 --> 00:03:10,320 malware so if you have for example an 149 00:03:10,320 --> 00:03:12,979 malware so if you have for example an endpoint security product that's running 150 00:03:12,979 --> 00:03:12,989 endpoint security product that's running 151 00:03:12,989 --> 00:03:14,420 endpoint security product that's running on your computer either an AV 152 00:03:14,420 --> 00:03:14,430 on your computer either an AV 153 00:03:14,430 --> 00:03:16,850 on your computer either an AV anti-malware or whichever name you 154 00:03:16,850 --> 00:03:16,860 anti-malware or whichever name you 155 00:03:16,860 --> 00:03:21,770 anti-malware or whichever name you prefer to call it yeah I still have the 156 00:03:21,770 --> 00:03:21,780 prefer to call it yeah I still have the 157 00:03:21,780 --> 00:03:24,830 prefer to call it yeah I still have the need to scan files so however the idea 158 00:03:24,830 --> 00:03:24,840 need to scan files so however the idea 159 00:03:24,840 --> 00:03:27,410 need to scan files so however the idea of a file as malware is there's no files 160 00:03:27,410 --> 00:03:27,420 of a file as malware is there's no files 161 00:03:27,420 --> 00:03:30,320 of a file as malware is there's no files okay so how do you scan something if 162 00:03:30,320 --> 00:03:30,330 okay so how do you scan something if 163 00:03:30,330 --> 00:03:33,020 okay so how do you scan something if it's it's not available in a computer so 164 00:03:33,020 --> 00:03:33,030 it's it's not available in a computer so 165 00:03:33,030 --> 00:03:35,390 it's it's not available in a computer so those those malware's are in general 166 00:03:35,390 --> 00:03:35,400 those those malware's are in general 167 00:03:35,400 --> 00:03:38,449 those those malware's are in general being running by scripts on draw 168 00:03:38,449 --> 00:03:38,459 being running by scripts on draw 169 00:03:38,459 --> 00:03:41,319 being running by scripts on draw webpages malicious web pages right and 170 00:03:41,319 --> 00:03:41,329 webpages malicious web pages right and 171 00:03:41,329 --> 00:03:43,699 webpages malicious web pages right and the most common one today is probably 172 00:03:43,699 --> 00:03:43,709 the most common one today is probably 173 00:03:43,709 --> 00:03:46,250 the most common one today is probably the quaint miners so it's a script that 174 00:03:46,250 --> 00:03:46,260 the quaint miners so it's a script that 175 00:03:46,260 --> 00:03:48,710 the quaint miners so it's a script that we run on a given computer and that 176 00:03:48,710 --> 00:03:48,720 we run on a given computer and that 177 00:03:48,720 --> 00:03:51,560 we run on a given computer and that computer will start mining bitcoins for 178 00:03:51,560 --> 00:03:51,570 computer will start mining bitcoins for 179 00:03:51,570 --> 00:03:54,100 computer will start mining bitcoins for the for the motors so you call these 180 00:03:54,100 --> 00:03:54,110 the for the motors so you call these 181 00:03:54,110 --> 00:03:57,710 the for the motors so you call these file lists malware so does that mean 182 00:03:57,710 --> 00:03:57,720 file lists malware so does that mean 183 00:03:57,720 --> 00:04:00,110 file lists malware so does that mean that it just loads right into RAM from a 184 00:04:00,110 --> 00:04:00,120 that it just loads right into RAM from a 185 00:04:00,120 --> 00:04:02,509 that it just loads right into RAM from a website yes it will actually be it it 186 00:04:02,509 --> 00:04:02,519 website yes it will actually be it it 187 00:04:02,519 --> 00:04:04,310 website yes it will actually be it it will be a script that will be running in 188 00:04:04,310 --> 00:04:04,320 will be a script that will be running in 189 00:04:04,320 --> 00:04:06,500 will be a script that will be running in memory whenever you go to those websites 190 00:04:06,500 --> 00:04:06,510 memory whenever you go to those websites 191 00:04:06,510 --> 00:04:09,770 memory whenever you go to those websites and if your existing endpoint security 192 00:04:09,770 --> 00:04:09,780 and if your existing endpoint security 193 00:04:09,780 --> 00:04:12,410 and if your existing endpoint security product cannot scan or cannot protect 194 00:04:12,410 --> 00:04:12,420 product cannot scan or cannot protect 195 00:04:12,420 --> 00:04:15,259 product cannot scan or cannot protect your memory in real time you will be 196 00:04:15,259 --> 00:04:15,269 your memory in real time you will be 197 00:04:15,269 --> 00:04:17,390 your memory in real time you will be subset susceptible to that kind of 198 00:04:17,390 --> 00:04:17,400 subset susceptible to that kind of 199 00:04:17,400 --> 00:04:18,050 subset susceptible to that kind of threat 200 00:04:18,050 --> 00:04:18,060 threat 201 00:04:18,060 --> 00:04:19,580 threat in general so sounds to me like another 202 00:04:19,580 --> 00:04:19,590 in general so sounds to me like another 203 00:04:19,590 --> 00:04:20,310 in general so sounds to me like another like 204 00:04:20,310 --> 00:04:20,320 like 205 00:04:20,320 --> 00:04:22,140 like wanna cry as the first kind of example 206 00:04:22,140 --> 00:04:22,150 wanna cry as the first kind of example 207 00:04:22,150 --> 00:04:25,020 wanna cry as the first kind of example of ransomware another threat where basic 208 00:04:25,020 --> 00:04:25,030 of ransomware another threat where basic 209 00:04:25,030 --> 00:04:27,750 of ransomware another threat where basic like antivirus and use the absolutely 210 00:04:27,750 --> 00:04:27,760 like antivirus and use the absolutely 211 00:04:27,760 --> 00:04:30,420 like antivirus and use the absolutely virus because here anti-malware is a 212 00:04:30,420 --> 00:04:30,430 virus because here anti-malware is a 213 00:04:30,430 --> 00:04:32,460 virus because here anti-malware is a term that we in the industry use these 214 00:04:32,460 --> 00:04:32,470 term that we in the industry use these 215 00:04:32,470 --> 00:04:34,740 term that we in the industry use these days because really it's not just 216 00:04:34,740 --> 00:04:34,750 days because really it's not just 217 00:04:34,750 --> 00:04:36,450 days because really it's not just viruses that we are dealing with those 218 00:04:36,450 --> 00:04:36,460 viruses that we are dealing with those 219 00:04:36,460 --> 00:04:40,290 viruses that we are dealing with those threats anymore so so is antivirus is it 220 00:04:40,290 --> 00:04:40,300 threats anymore so so is antivirus is it 221 00:04:40,300 --> 00:04:43,560 threats anymore so so is antivirus is it sufficient anymore I don't I don't 222 00:04:43,560 --> 00:04:43,570 sufficient anymore I don't I don't 223 00:04:43,570 --> 00:04:45,540 sufficient anymore I don't I don't believe in C virus has been sufficient 224 00:04:45,540 --> 00:04:45,550 believe in C virus has been sufficient 225 00:04:45,550 --> 00:04:48,060 believe in C virus has been sufficient for a long time so not only we have the 226 00:04:48,060 --> 00:04:48,070 for a long time so not only we have the 227 00:04:48,070 --> 00:04:51,180 for a long time so not only we have the viruses out there we have those files as 228 00:04:51,180 --> 00:04:51,190 viruses out there we have those files as 229 00:04:51,190 --> 00:04:55,380 viruses out there we have those files as malware's we have the crypto actors in 230 00:04:55,380 --> 00:04:55,390 malware's we have the crypto actors in 231 00:04:55,390 --> 00:04:57,060 malware's we have the crypto actors in general the ransom layers we have 232 00:04:57,060 --> 00:04:57,070 general the ransom layers we have 233 00:04:57,070 --> 00:04:59,820 general the ransom layers we have Trojans we have back doors we have 234 00:04:59,820 --> 00:04:59,830 Trojans we have back doors we have 235 00:04:59,830 --> 00:05:02,850 Trojans we have back doors we have exploits so in general is antivirus 236 00:05:02,850 --> 00:05:02,860 exploits so in general is antivirus 237 00:05:02,860 --> 00:05:06,090 exploits so in general is antivirus enough you know is it better than not 238 00:05:06,090 --> 00:05:06,100 enough you know is it better than not 239 00:05:06,100 --> 00:05:08,430 enough you know is it better than not having anything yes sir but if you have 240 00:05:08,430 --> 00:05:08,440 having anything yes sir but if you have 241 00:05:08,440 --> 00:05:10,500 having anything yes sir but if you have the option and yes you do have the 242 00:05:10,500 --> 00:05:10,510 the option and yes you do have the 243 00:05:10,510 --> 00:05:11,940 the option and yes you do have the options sometimes we're talking about 244 00:05:11,940 --> 00:05:11,950 options sometimes we're talking about 245 00:05:11,950 --> 00:05:14,220 options sometimes we're talking about one dollar more expensive or something 246 00:05:14,220 --> 00:05:14,230 one dollar more expensive or something 247 00:05:14,230 --> 00:05:16,860 one dollar more expensive or something like that you can go to a full suite of 248 00:05:16,860 --> 00:05:16,870 like that you can go to a full suite of 249 00:05:16,870 --> 00:05:20,190 like that you can go to a full suite of an endpoint security product which will 250 00:05:20,190 --> 00:05:20,200 an endpoint security product which will 251 00:05:20,200 --> 00:05:23,610 an endpoint security product which will provide you a much better protection 252 00:05:23,610 --> 00:05:23,620 provide you a much better protection 253 00:05:23,620 --> 00:05:25,500 provide you a much better protection overall protection on your computer okay 254 00:05:25,500 --> 00:05:25,510 overall protection on your computer okay 255 00:05:25,510 --> 00:05:27,270 overall protection on your computer okay so I don't want to I don't want to give 256 00:05:27,270 --> 00:05:27,280 so I don't want to I don't want to give 257 00:05:27,280 --> 00:05:28,830 so I don't want to I don't want to give the impression that this is a sales 258 00:05:28,830 --> 00:05:28,840 the impression that this is a sales 259 00:05:28,840 --> 00:05:30,990 the impression that this is a sales pitch that we're trying to say you know 260 00:05:30,990 --> 00:05:31,000 pitch that we're trying to say you know 261 00:05:31,000 --> 00:05:33,450 pitch that we're trying to say you know choose ESET endpoint protection advanced 262 00:05:33,450 --> 00:05:33,460 choose ESET endpoint protection advanced 263 00:05:33,460 --> 00:05:35,700 choose ESET endpoint protection advanced because it's a sales pitch I want to 264 00:05:35,700 --> 00:05:35,710 because it's a sales pitch I want to 265 00:05:35,710 --> 00:05:39,810 because it's a sales pitch I want to instead kind of what what features of a 266 00:05:39,810 --> 00:05:39,820 instead kind of what what features of a 267 00:05:39,820 --> 00:05:40,830 instead kind of what what features of a product like endpoint protection 268 00:05:40,830 --> 00:05:40,840 product like endpoint protection 269 00:05:40,840 --> 00:05:44,160 product like endpoint protection advanced isn't it that are taking 270 00:05:44,160 --> 00:05:44,170 advanced isn't it that are taking 271 00:05:44,170 --> 00:05:45,990 advanced isn't it that are taking protection to the next level for those 272 00:05:45,990 --> 00:05:46,000 protection to the next level for those 273 00:05:46,000 --> 00:05:48,480 protection to the next level for those users so file this attacks yep 274 00:05:48,480 --> 00:05:48,490 users so file this attacks yep 275 00:05:48,490 --> 00:05:50,220 users so file this attacks yep ransomware attacks like these are 276 00:05:50,220 --> 00:05:50,230 ransomware attacks like these are 277 00:05:50,230 --> 00:05:52,800 ransomware attacks like these are threats that can take businesses and put 278 00:05:52,800 --> 00:05:52,810 threats that can take businesses and put 279 00:05:52,810 --> 00:05:54,630 threats that can take businesses and put them out of this gifts yep then and 280 00:05:54,630 --> 00:05:54,640 them out of this gifts yep then and 281 00:05:54,640 --> 00:05:56,490 them out of this gifts yep then and bankrupt their owners yeah absolutely 282 00:05:56,490 --> 00:05:56,500 bankrupt their owners yeah absolutely 283 00:05:56,500 --> 00:05:59,100 bankrupt their owners yeah absolutely that's the reason saying yeah so what 284 00:05:59,100 --> 00:05:59,110 that's the reason saying yeah so what 285 00:05:59,110 --> 00:06:01,560 that's the reason saying yeah so what what features so are those more advanced 286 00:06:01,560 --> 00:06:01,570 what features so are those more advanced 287 00:06:01,570 --> 00:06:03,270 what features so are those more advanced why do I need to pay more and yeah 288 00:06:03,270 --> 00:06:03,280 why do I need to pay more and yeah 289 00:06:03,280 --> 00:06:04,050 why do I need to pay more and yeah absolutely 290 00:06:04,050 --> 00:06:04,060 absolutely 291 00:06:04,060 --> 00:06:06,300 absolutely it specifically tree set the modules 292 00:06:06,300 --> 00:06:06,310 it specifically tree set the modules 293 00:06:06,310 --> 00:06:08,280 it specifically tree set the modules that we add those more advanced features 294 00:06:08,280 --> 00:06:08,290 that we add those more advanced features 295 00:06:08,290 --> 00:06:09,960 that we add those more advanced features is called hips which stands for host 296 00:06:09,960 --> 00:06:09,970 is called hips which stands for host 297 00:06:09,970 --> 00:06:12,060 is called hips which stands for host intrusion prevention system and that's 298 00:06:12,060 --> 00:06:12,070 intrusion prevention system and that's 299 00:06:12,070 --> 00:06:13,920 intrusion prevention system and that's where we have the advanced memory 300 00:06:13,920 --> 00:06:13,930 where we have the advanced memory 301 00:06:13,930 --> 00:06:15,780 where we have the advanced memory scanner which is basically protecting 302 00:06:15,780 --> 00:06:15,790 scanner which is basically protecting 303 00:06:15,790 --> 00:06:18,030 scanner which is basically protecting your memory in real time the final and 304 00:06:18,030 --> 00:06:18,040 your memory in real time the final and 305 00:06:18,040 --> 00:06:20,100 your memory in real time the final and that mostly associated to the file as 306 00:06:20,100 --> 00:06:20,110 that mostly associated to the file as 307 00:06:20,110 --> 00:06:23,670 that mostly associated to the file as malware we have the exploit blocker so 308 00:06:23,670 --> 00:06:23,680 malware we have the exploit blocker so 309 00:06:23,680 --> 00:06:25,980 malware we have the exploit blocker so let's say whenever a new company 310 00:06:25,980 --> 00:06:25,990 let's say whenever a new company 311 00:06:25,990 --> 00:06:28,500 let's say whenever a new company releases a publicly available exploit 312 00:06:28,500 --> 00:06:28,510 releases a publicly available exploit 313 00:06:28,510 --> 00:06:30,930 releases a publicly available exploit for a vulnerability let's say this week 314 00:06:30,930 --> 00:06:30,940 for a vulnerability let's say this week 315 00:06:30,940 --> 00:06:32,710 for a vulnerability let's say this week we actually had a pretty severe 316 00:06:32,710 --> 00:06:32,720 we actually had a pretty severe 317 00:06:32,720 --> 00:06:34,810 we actually had a pretty severe vulnerability with Microsoft and they 318 00:06:34,810 --> 00:06:34,820 vulnerability with Microsoft and they 319 00:06:34,820 --> 00:06:36,820 vulnerability with Microsoft and they actually release the patch the next day 320 00:06:36,820 --> 00:06:36,830 actually release the patch the next day 321 00:06:36,830 --> 00:06:38,140 actually release the patch the next day or something like that 322 00:06:38,140 --> 00:06:38,150 or something like that 323 00:06:38,150 --> 00:06:42,100 or something like that we will prevent that vulnerability from 324 00:06:42,100 --> 00:06:42,110 we will prevent that vulnerability from 325 00:06:42,110 --> 00:06:45,280 we will prevent that vulnerability from being exploited this is exactly what he 326 00:06:45,280 --> 00:06:45,290 being exploited this is exactly what he 327 00:06:45,290 --> 00:06:47,110 being exploited this is exactly what he said accomplished with wanna cry 328 00:06:47,110 --> 00:06:47,120 said accomplished with wanna cry 329 00:06:47,120 --> 00:06:50,170 said accomplished with wanna cry absolutely yes it was eternal it was yep 330 00:06:50,170 --> 00:06:50,180 absolutely yes it was eternal it was yep 331 00:06:50,180 --> 00:06:52,750 absolutely yes it was eternal it was yep it was the summer vulnerability and yes 332 00:06:52,750 --> 00:06:52,760 it was the summer vulnerability and yes 333 00:06:52,760 --> 00:06:54,580 it was the summer vulnerability and yes we were able to actually prevent that 334 00:06:54,580 --> 00:06:54,590 we were able to actually prevent that 335 00:06:54,590 --> 00:06:56,410 we were able to actually prevent that vulnerability from being exploited in 336 00:06:56,410 --> 00:06:56,420 vulnerability from being exploited in 337 00:06:56,420 --> 00:06:58,360 vulnerability from being exploited in the first place so even though wanna cry 338 00:06:58,360 --> 00:06:58,370 the first place so even though wanna cry 339 00:06:58,370 --> 00:07:00,430 the first place so even though wanna cry had never been discovered or ESET was 340 00:07:00,430 --> 00:07:00,440 had never been discovered or ESET was 341 00:07:00,440 --> 00:07:01,900 had never been discovered or ESET was already proactively protected absolutely 342 00:07:01,900 --> 00:07:01,910 already proactively protected absolutely 343 00:07:01,910 --> 00:07:04,810 already proactively protected absolutely and we were actually providing that kind 344 00:07:04,810 --> 00:07:04,820 and we were actually providing that kind 345 00:07:04,820 --> 00:07:07,480 and we were actually providing that kind of fix two weeks before when a crime 346 00:07:07,480 --> 00:07:07,490 of fix two weeks before when a crime 347 00:07:07,490 --> 00:07:09,790 of fix two weeks before when a crime actually existed fantastic we had that 348 00:07:09,790 --> 00:07:09,800 actually existed fantastic we had that 349 00:07:09,800 --> 00:07:12,250 actually existed fantastic we had that kind of preventive maintenance let's say 350 00:07:12,250 --> 00:07:12,260 kind of preventive maintenance let's say 351 00:07:12,260 --> 00:07:14,380 kind of preventive maintenance let's say and you want an anti-malware product 352 00:07:14,380 --> 00:07:14,390 and you want an anti-malware product 353 00:07:14,390 --> 00:07:16,240 and you want an anti-malware product that is going to be proactive instead of 354 00:07:16,240 --> 00:07:16,250 that is going to be proactive instead of 355 00:07:16,250 --> 00:07:18,550 that is going to be proactive instead of reactive absolutely yes because in the 356 00:07:18,550 --> 00:07:18,560 reactive absolutely yes because in the 357 00:07:18,560 --> 00:07:19,870 reactive absolutely yes because in the case of something like ransomware you 358 00:07:19,870 --> 00:07:19,880 case of something like ransomware you 359 00:07:19,880 --> 00:07:21,010 case of something like ransomware you can lose everything 360 00:07:21,010 --> 00:07:21,020 can lose everything 361 00:07:21,020 --> 00:07:23,860 can lose everything yep and so there is no reactive response 362 00:07:23,860 --> 00:07:23,870 yep and so there is no reactive response 363 00:07:23,870 --> 00:07:26,200 yep and so there is no reactive response to that then I hope your backups are 364 00:07:26,200 --> 00:07:26,210 to that then I hope your backups are 365 00:07:26,210 --> 00:07:28,600 to that then I hope your backups are good yes actually 366 00:07:28,600 --> 00:07:28,610 good yes actually 367 00:07:28,610 --> 00:07:30,580 good yes actually going back to that initial question 368 00:07:30,580 --> 00:07:30,590 going back to that initial question 369 00:07:30,590 --> 00:07:32,560 going back to that initial question about the current threat landscape you 370 00:07:32,560 --> 00:07:32,570 about the current threat landscape you 371 00:07:32,570 --> 00:07:34,120 about the current threat landscape you are seeing the still you're seeing a 372 00:07:34,120 --> 00:07:34,130 are seeing the still you're seeing a 373 00:07:34,130 --> 00:07:36,700 are seeing the still you're seeing a really prevalent presence of the res 374 00:07:36,700 --> 00:07:36,710 really prevalent presence of the res 375 00:07:36,710 --> 00:07:39,820 really prevalent presence of the res more however now the the crypto actors 376 00:07:39,820 --> 00:07:39,830 more however now the the crypto actors 377 00:07:39,830 --> 00:07:41,470 more however now the the crypto actors in just in this general they are not 378 00:07:41,470 --> 00:07:41,480 in just in this general they are not 379 00:07:41,480 --> 00:07:43,390 in just in this general they are not only encrypting your data and holding 380 00:07:43,390 --> 00:07:43,400 only encrypting your data and holding 381 00:07:43,400 --> 00:07:45,550 only encrypting your data and holding you for ransom but if you're not paying 382 00:07:45,550 --> 00:07:45,560 you for ransom but if you're not paying 383 00:07:45,560 --> 00:07:47,290 you for ransom but if you're not paying they are actually releasing the data and 384 00:07:47,290 --> 00:07:47,300 they are actually releasing the data and 385 00:07:47,300 --> 00:07:49,270 they are actually releasing the data and selling that data so it's going to be 386 00:07:49,270 --> 00:07:49,280 selling that data so it's going to be 387 00:07:49,280 --> 00:07:51,700 selling that data so it's going to be even more yes well that can be even 388 00:07:51,700 --> 00:07:51,710 even more yes well that can be even 389 00:07:51,710 --> 00:07:55,120 even more yes well that can be even worse yeah so Wow yeah that's scary 390 00:07:55,120 --> 00:07:55,130 worse yeah so Wow yeah that's scary 391 00:07:55,130 --> 00:07:55,770 worse yeah so Wow yeah that's scary stuff 392 00:07:55,770 --> 00:07:55,780 stuff 393 00:07:55,780 --> 00:07:58,570 stuff what else does does your product so 394 00:07:58,570 --> 00:07:58,580 what else does does your product so 395 00:07:58,580 --> 00:08:02,590 what else does does your product so again to just look at why I get the 396 00:08:02,590 --> 00:08:02,600 again to just look at why I get the 397 00:08:02,600 --> 00:08:04,270 again to just look at why I get the question all the time Ralph yep why 398 00:08:04,270 --> 00:08:04,280 question all the time Ralph yep why 399 00:08:04,280 --> 00:08:07,360 question all the time Ralph yep why should I buy the greater product when 400 00:08:07,360 --> 00:08:07,370 should I buy the greater product when 401 00:08:07,370 --> 00:08:09,130 should I buy the greater product when the antivirus has been working so well 402 00:08:09,130 --> 00:08:09,140 the antivirus has been working so well 403 00:08:09,140 --> 00:08:10,150 the antivirus has been working so well for me for so long 404 00:08:10,150 --> 00:08:10,160 for me for so long 405 00:08:10,160 --> 00:08:12,070 for me for so long so as you said it might be a couple 406 00:08:12,070 --> 00:08:12,080 so as you said it might be a couple 407 00:08:12,080 --> 00:08:15,430 so as you said it might be a couple bucks more don't learn so more per seat 408 00:08:15,430 --> 00:08:15,440 bucks more don't learn so more per seat 409 00:08:15,440 --> 00:08:17,830 bucks more don't learn so more per seat which can be a lot if you've got ten 410 00:08:17,830 --> 00:08:17,840 which can be a lot if you've got ten 411 00:08:17,840 --> 00:08:19,659 which can be a lot if you've got ten thousand computers but in a in a small 412 00:08:19,659 --> 00:08:19,669 thousand computers but in a in a small 413 00:08:19,669 --> 00:08:22,480 thousand computers but in a in a small medium business it's not that much why 414 00:08:22,480 --> 00:08:22,490 medium business it's not that much why 415 00:08:22,490 --> 00:08:26,020 medium business it's not that much why would I pay more the additional features 416 00:08:26,020 --> 00:08:26,030 would I pay more the additional features 417 00:08:26,030 --> 00:08:28,510 would I pay more the additional features that we have in the full endpoint 418 00:08:28,510 --> 00:08:28,520 that we have in the full endpoint 419 00:08:28,520 --> 00:08:31,570 that we have in the full endpoint security solution from a technical 420 00:08:31,570 --> 00:08:31,580 security solution from a technical 421 00:08:31,580 --> 00:08:33,100 security solution from a technical perspective and again I'm talking about 422 00:08:33,100 --> 00:08:33,110 perspective and again I'm talking about 423 00:08:33,110 --> 00:08:36,430 perspective and again I'm talking about $1 more is well worth it the value is 424 00:08:36,430 --> 00:08:36,440 $1 more is well worth it the value is 425 00:08:36,440 --> 00:08:39,159 $1 more is well worth it the value is actually there so I'm thinking of not 426 00:08:39,159 --> 00:08:39,169 actually there so I'm thinking of not 427 00:08:39,169 --> 00:08:41,290 actually there so I'm thinking of not only adding additional layers of 428 00:08:41,290 --> 00:08:41,300 only adding additional layers of 429 00:08:41,300 --> 00:08:43,300 only adding additional layers of protection to your computer either at 430 00:08:43,300 --> 00:08:43,310 protection to your computer either at 431 00:08:43,310 --> 00:08:44,420 protection to your computer either at home or or 432 00:08:44,420 --> 00:08:44,430 home or or 433 00:08:44,430 --> 00:08:46,880 home or or at your business but I'm also getting 434 00:08:46,880 --> 00:08:46,890 at your business but I'm also getting 435 00:08:46,890 --> 00:08:48,769 at your business but I'm also getting additional visibility on what's 436 00:08:48,769 --> 00:08:48,779 additional visibility on what's 437 00:08:48,779 --> 00:08:50,750 additional visibility on what's happening on your environment as well so 438 00:08:50,750 --> 00:08:50,760 happening on your environment as well so 439 00:08:50,760 --> 00:08:53,240 happening on your environment as well so let's say one of the features on that 440 00:08:53,240 --> 00:08:53,250 let's say one of the features on that 441 00:08:53,250 --> 00:08:56,300 let's say one of the features on that new on that bigger product let's say the 442 00:08:56,300 --> 00:08:56,310 new on that bigger product let's say the 443 00:08:56,310 --> 00:08:58,850 new on that bigger product let's say the endpoint security is a personal firewall 444 00:08:58,850 --> 00:08:58,860 endpoint security is a personal firewall 445 00:08:58,860 --> 00:09:00,949 endpoint security is a personal firewall which will potentially hit place your 446 00:09:00,949 --> 00:09:00,959 which will potentially hit place your 447 00:09:00,959 --> 00:09:03,350 which will potentially hit place your Windows Firewall in my computer and not 448 00:09:03,350 --> 00:09:03,360 Windows Firewall in my computer and not 449 00:09:03,360 --> 00:09:05,590 Windows Firewall in my computer and not only it will allow you to actually have 450 00:09:05,590 --> 00:09:05,600 only it will allow you to actually have 451 00:09:05,600 --> 00:09:08,030 only it will allow you to actually have visibility on the network layer so 452 00:09:08,030 --> 00:09:08,040 visibility on the network layer so 453 00:09:08,040 --> 00:09:10,550 visibility on the network layer so instead of only looking for viruses or 454 00:09:10,550 --> 00:09:10,560 instead of only looking for viruses or 455 00:09:10,560 --> 00:09:12,260 instead of only looking for viruses or Trojans or ransomware 456 00:09:12,260 --> 00:09:12,270 Trojans or ransomware 457 00:09:12,270 --> 00:09:14,150 Trojans or ransomware I'm also looking for duplicate IP 458 00:09:14,150 --> 00:09:14,160 I'm also looking for duplicate IP 459 00:09:14,160 --> 00:09:15,889 I'm also looking for duplicate IP address and looking for DNS poisoning 460 00:09:15,889 --> 00:09:15,899 address and looking for DNS poisoning 461 00:09:15,899 --> 00:09:19,190 address and looking for DNS poisoning that's interesting yeah yeah so now 462 00:09:19,190 --> 00:09:19,200 that's interesting yeah yeah so now 463 00:09:19,200 --> 00:09:22,610 that's interesting yeah yeah so now possibly network traffic problems or 464 00:09:22,610 --> 00:09:22,620 possibly network traffic problems or 465 00:09:22,620 --> 00:09:24,620 possibly network traffic problems or even social yes which are not 466 00:09:24,620 --> 00:09:24,630 even social yes which are not 467 00:09:24,630 --> 00:09:29,510 even social yes which are not necessarily security incidents but it 468 00:09:29,510 --> 00:09:29,520 necessarily security incidents but it 469 00:09:29,520 --> 00:09:32,030 necessarily security incidents but it can be a natural threat so for example 470 00:09:32,030 --> 00:09:32,040 can be a natural threat so for example 471 00:09:32,040 --> 00:09:33,889 can be a natural threat so for example one of the detection that we have is a 472 00:09:33,889 --> 00:09:33,899 one of the detection that we have is a 473 00:09:33,899 --> 00:09:37,100 one of the detection that we have is a port scanning so maybe your users is a 474 00:09:37,100 --> 00:09:37,110 port scanning so maybe your users is a 475 00:09:37,110 --> 00:09:39,710 port scanning so maybe your users is a given actor inside your network is 476 00:09:39,710 --> 00:09:39,720 given actor inside your network is 477 00:09:39,720 --> 00:09:42,410 given actor inside your network is scanning your servers for whatever 478 00:09:42,410 --> 00:09:42,420 scanning your servers for whatever 479 00:09:42,420 --> 00:09:45,079 scanning your servers for whatever reason where's they're not supposed to 480 00:09:45,079 --> 00:09:45,089 reason where's they're not supposed to 481 00:09:45,089 --> 00:09:47,420 reason where's they're not supposed to be doing that so yeah it gives you that 482 00:09:47,420 --> 00:09:47,430 be doing that so yeah it gives you that 483 00:09:47,430 --> 00:09:49,220 be doing that so yeah it gives you that visibility so you can actually go to the 484 00:09:49,220 --> 00:09:49,230 visibility so you can actually go to the 485 00:09:49,230 --> 00:09:50,540 visibility so you can actually go to the user and have a conversation to see 486 00:09:50,540 --> 00:09:50,550 user and have a conversation to see 487 00:09:50,550 --> 00:09:52,190 user and have a conversation to see what's what's going on yeah I've never 488 00:09:52,190 --> 00:09:52,200 what's what's going on yeah I've never 489 00:09:52,200 --> 00:09:53,810 what's what's going on yeah I've never really thought about that as a threat 490 00:09:53,810 --> 00:09:53,820 really thought about that as a threat 491 00:09:53,820 --> 00:09:56,810 really thought about that as a threat yeah because like a duplicate IP address 492 00:09:56,810 --> 00:09:56,820 yeah because like a duplicate IP address 493 00:09:56,820 --> 00:09:58,190 yeah because like a duplicate IP address you just think oh well I accidentally 494 00:09:58,190 --> 00:09:58,200 you just think oh well I accidentally 495 00:09:58,200 --> 00:10:00,110 you just think oh well I accidentally assign same IP to a printer or something 496 00:10:00,110 --> 00:10:00,120 assign same IP to a printer or something 497 00:10:00,120 --> 00:10:01,940 assign same IP to a printer or something but what if it's a thread actor exactly 498 00:10:01,940 --> 00:10:01,950 but what if it's a thread actor exactly 499 00:10:01,950 --> 00:10:04,460 but what if it's a thread actor exactly yeah maybe someone is doing that IP 500 00:10:04,460 --> 00:10:04,470 yeah maybe someone is doing that IP 501 00:10:04,470 --> 00:10:07,460 yeah maybe someone is doing that IP address yeah mm-hmm interesting and you 502 00:10:07,460 --> 00:10:07,470 address yeah mm-hmm interesting and you 503 00:10:07,470 --> 00:10:09,710 address yeah mm-hmm interesting and you mentioned about the firewall how and I 504 00:10:09,710 --> 00:10:09,720 mentioned about the firewall how and I 505 00:10:09,720 --> 00:10:11,090 mentioned about the firewall how and I don't want to put you too much on the 506 00:10:11,090 --> 00:10:11,100 don't want to put you too much on the 507 00:10:11,100 --> 00:10:12,230 don't want to put you too much on the spot but yeah absolutely I mean 508 00:10:12,230 --> 00:10:12,240 spot but yeah absolutely I mean 509 00:10:12,240 --> 00:10:14,090 spot but yeah absolutely I mean Microsoft Windows 10 comes with a 510 00:10:14,090 --> 00:10:14,100 Microsoft Windows 10 comes with a 511 00:10:14,100 --> 00:10:16,269 Microsoft Windows 10 comes with a firewall yep so do I really need to 512 00:10:16,269 --> 00:10:16,279 firewall yep so do I really need to 513 00:10:16,279 --> 00:10:19,070 firewall yep so do I really need to supplement my anti-malware with a 514 00:10:19,070 --> 00:10:19,080 supplement my anti-malware with a 515 00:10:19,080 --> 00:10:21,769 supplement my anti-malware with a firewall for Mesa we do see a two main 516 00:10:21,769 --> 00:10:21,779 firewall for Mesa we do see a two main 517 00:10:21,779 --> 00:10:24,620 firewall for Mesa we do see a two main approaches for that hit placement let's 518 00:10:24,620 --> 00:10:24,630 approaches for that hit placement let's 519 00:10:24,630 --> 00:10:26,900 approaches for that hit placement let's say so the first one is ease of use so 520 00:10:26,900 --> 00:10:26,910 say so the first one is ease of use so 521 00:10:26,910 --> 00:10:28,910 say so the first one is ease of use so we do provide a management console that 522 00:10:28,910 --> 00:10:28,920 we do provide a management console that 523 00:10:28,920 --> 00:10:32,150 we do provide a management console that will allow you to have much more 524 00:10:32,150 --> 00:10:32,160 will allow you to have much more 525 00:10:32,160 --> 00:10:34,100 will allow you to have much more user-friendly configuration and 526 00:10:34,100 --> 00:10:34,110 user-friendly configuration and 527 00:10:34,110 --> 00:10:35,720 user-friendly configuration and deployment of that that's specific and 528 00:10:35,720 --> 00:10:35,730 deployment of that that's specific and 529 00:10:35,730 --> 00:10:37,010 deployment of that that's specific and we're talking centralized management 530 00:10:37,010 --> 00:10:37,020 we're talking centralized management 531 00:10:37,020 --> 00:10:39,769 we're talking centralized management slowly okay so all 10,000 of my 532 00:10:39,769 --> 00:10:39,779 slowly okay so all 10,000 of my 533 00:10:39,779 --> 00:10:41,690 slowly okay so all 10,000 of my computer's yes absolutely four or five 534 00:10:41,690 --> 00:10:41,700 computer's yes absolutely four or five 535 00:10:41,700 --> 00:10:43,340 computer's yes absolutely four or five of my computer's just create the 536 00:10:43,340 --> 00:10:43,350 of my computer's just create the 537 00:10:43,350 --> 00:10:45,110 of my computer's just create the policies and you push it out to your 538 00:10:45,110 --> 00:10:45,120 policies and you push it out to your 539 00:10:45,120 --> 00:10:46,970 policies and you push it out to your computers yes again it's fully automated 540 00:10:46,970 --> 00:10:46,980 computers yes again it's fully automated 541 00:10:46,980 --> 00:10:49,180 computers yes again it's fully automated so it's it's pretty convenient to use 542 00:10:49,180 --> 00:10:49,190 so it's it's pretty convenient to use 543 00:10:49,190 --> 00:10:51,650 so it's it's pretty convenient to use and the second main reason is the 544 00:10:51,650 --> 00:10:51,660 and the second main reason is the 545 00:10:51,660 --> 00:10:53,870 and the second main reason is the visibility so you do have access to a 546 00:10:53,870 --> 00:10:53,880 visibility so you do have access to a 547 00:10:53,880 --> 00:10:56,020 visibility so you do have access to a lot of reporting that's actually coming 548 00:10:56,020 --> 00:10:56,030 lot of reporting that's actually coming 549 00:10:56,030 --> 00:10:59,350 lot of reporting that's actually coming on the natural fire rope component let's 550 00:10:59,350 --> 00:10:59,360 on the natural fire rope component let's 551 00:10:59,360 --> 00:11:02,020 on the natural fire rope component let's say you can get a list of all the users 552 00:11:02,020 --> 00:11:02,030 say you can get a list of all the users 553 00:11:02,030 --> 00:11:04,810 say you can get a list of all the users on your network that's had a port 554 00:11:04,810 --> 00:11:04,820 on your network that's had a port 555 00:11:04,820 --> 00:11:06,760 on your network that's had a port scanner on your environment on a given 556 00:11:06,760 --> 00:11:06,770 scanner on your environment on a given 557 00:11:06,770 --> 00:11:08,980 scanner on your environment on a given time frame so that's the kind of 558 00:11:08,980 --> 00:11:08,990 time frame so that's the kind of 559 00:11:08,990 --> 00:11:10,740 time frame so that's the kind of awareness that kind of visibility that 560 00:11:10,740 --> 00:11:10,750 awareness that kind of visibility that 561 00:11:10,750 --> 00:11:13,810 awareness that kind of visibility that some other vendors will not allow you to 562 00:11:13,810 --> 00:11:13,820 some other vendors will not allow you to 563 00:11:13,820 --> 00:11:17,350 some other vendors will not allow you to have great so looking at now here we are 564 00:11:17,350 --> 00:11:17,360 have great so looking at now here we are 565 00:11:17,360 --> 00:11:18,280 have great so looking at now here we are it's 2020 566 00:11:18,280 --> 00:11:18,290 it's 2020 567 00:11:18,290 --> 00:11:22,000 it's 2020 yep q1 2020 being that we're here at 568 00:11:22,000 --> 00:11:22,010 yep q1 2020 being that we're here at 569 00:11:22,010 --> 00:11:24,040 yep q1 2020 being that we're here at ESET headquarters what kind of threats 570 00:11:24,040 --> 00:11:24,050 ESET headquarters what kind of threats 571 00:11:24,050 --> 00:11:28,870 ESET headquarters what kind of threats are we preparing for in this new year is 572 00:11:28,870 --> 00:11:28,880 are we preparing for in this new year is 573 00:11:28,880 --> 00:11:32,800 are we preparing for in this new year is is there an evolution like in 2017 we 574 00:11:32,800 --> 00:11:32,810 is there an evolution like in 2017 we 575 00:11:32,810 --> 00:11:34,950 is there an evolution like in 2017 we really saw an evolution from viruses 576 00:11:34,950 --> 00:11:34,960 really saw an evolution from viruses 577 00:11:34,960 --> 00:11:37,810 really saw an evolution from viruses ransomware and things are continuing to 578 00:11:37,810 --> 00:11:37,820 ransomware and things are continuing to 579 00:11:37,820 --> 00:11:39,580 ransomware and things are continuing to progress the imagine file list attacks 580 00:11:39,580 --> 00:11:39,590 progress the imagine file list attacks 581 00:11:39,590 --> 00:11:42,190 progress the imagine file list attacks what else our thank you for for actually 582 00:11:42,190 --> 00:11:42,200 what else our thank you for for actually 583 00:11:42,200 --> 00:11:44,560 what else our thank you for for actually a touching based on that one and I will 584 00:11:44,560 --> 00:11:44,570 a touching based on that one and I will 585 00:11:44,570 --> 00:11:47,590 a touching based on that one and I will actually look at the cameras a everybody 586 00:11:47,590 --> 00:11:47,600 actually look at the cameras a everybody 587 00:11:47,600 --> 00:11:51,370 actually look at the cameras a everybody we have the depth malware's of the the 588 00:11:51,370 --> 00:11:51,380 we have the depth malware's of the the 589 00:11:51,380 --> 00:11:54,660 we have the depth malware's of the the the actual evil players in the industry 590 00:11:54,660 --> 00:11:54,670 the actual evil players in the industry 591 00:11:54,670 --> 00:11:58,000 the actual evil players in the industry every single day they are going better 592 00:11:58,000 --> 00:11:58,010 every single day they are going better 593 00:11:58,010 --> 00:11:59,950 every single day they are going better and better and better so it's not only 594 00:11:59,950 --> 00:11:59,960 and better and better so it's not only 595 00:11:59,960 --> 00:12:02,200 and better and better so it's not only important to hit new your license it's 596 00:12:02,200 --> 00:12:02,210 important to hit new your license it's 597 00:12:02,210 --> 00:12:04,210 important to hit new your license it's imperative that you guys actually keep 598 00:12:04,210 --> 00:12:04,220 imperative that you guys actually keep 599 00:12:04,220 --> 00:12:06,910 imperative that you guys actually keep your ESET product or any other product 600 00:12:06,910 --> 00:12:06,920 your ESET product or any other product 601 00:12:06,920 --> 00:12:09,220 your ESET product or any other product that you might have today as updated as 602 00:12:09,220 --> 00:12:09,230 that you might have today as updated as 603 00:12:09,230 --> 00:12:11,830 that you might have today as updated as possible so you have the evolution of 604 00:12:11,830 --> 00:12:11,840 possible so you have the evolution of 605 00:12:11,840 --> 00:12:12,970 possible so you have the evolution of the restaurant where you have the 606 00:12:12,970 --> 00:12:12,980 the restaurant where you have the 607 00:12:12,980 --> 00:12:15,160 the restaurant where you have the evolution of the file as a malware if 608 00:12:15,160 --> 00:12:15,170 evolution of the file as a malware if 609 00:12:15,170 --> 00:12:17,170 evolution of the file as a malware if you are running your antivirus or your 610 00:12:17,170 --> 00:12:17,180 you are running your antivirus or your 611 00:12:17,180 --> 00:12:18,970 you are running your antivirus or your anti-malware product from three years 612 00:12:18,970 --> 00:12:18,980 anti-malware product from three years 613 00:12:18,980 --> 00:12:21,610 anti-malware product from three years ago you might be losing some advant 614 00:12:21,610 --> 00:12:21,620 ago you might be losing some advant 615 00:12:21,620 --> 00:12:23,850 ago you might be losing some advant advantage in there so you might be 616 00:12:23,850 --> 00:12:23,860 advantage in there so you might be 617 00:12:23,860 --> 00:12:26,500 advantage in there so you might be actually lagging behind and sometime 618 00:12:26,500 --> 00:12:26,510 actually lagging behind and sometime 619 00:12:26,510 --> 00:12:28,540 actually lagging behind and sometime they will eventually win over your 620 00:12:28,540 --> 00:12:28,550 they will eventually win over your 621 00:12:28,550 --> 00:12:30,280 they will eventually win over your computer and you might experience some 622 00:12:30,280 --> 00:12:30,290 computer and you might experience some 623 00:12:30,290 --> 00:12:32,410 computer and you might experience some some loss or some incidents in general 624 00:12:32,410 --> 00:12:32,420 some loss or some incidents in general 625 00:12:32,420 --> 00:12:34,800 some loss or some incidents in general so it's really important as a vendor 626 00:12:34,800 --> 00:12:34,810 so it's really important as a vendor 627 00:12:34,810 --> 00:12:37,210 so it's really important as a vendor should be as updated as possible 628 00:12:37,210 --> 00:12:37,220 should be as updated as possible 629 00:12:37,220 --> 00:12:38,800 should be as updated as possible whenever really is a new a new feature a 630 00:12:38,800 --> 00:12:38,810 whenever really is a new a new feature a 631 00:12:38,810 --> 00:12:40,660 whenever really is a new a new feature a new feature a new version of the product 632 00:12:40,660 --> 00:12:40,670 new feature a new version of the product 633 00:12:40,670 --> 00:12:42,910 new feature a new version of the product it's important that you actually try to 634 00:12:42,910 --> 00:12:42,920 it's important that you actually try to 635 00:12:42,920 --> 00:12:45,730 it's important that you actually try to be as updated as possible work with your 636 00:12:45,730 --> 00:12:45,740 be as updated as possible work with your 637 00:12:45,740 --> 00:12:47,590 be as updated as possible work with your vendor work with your partner and work 638 00:12:47,590 --> 00:12:47,600 vendor work with your partner and work 639 00:12:47,600 --> 00:12:49,960 vendor work with your partner and work with your IT departments so so you you 640 00:12:49,960 --> 00:12:49,970 with your IT departments so so you you 641 00:12:49,970 --> 00:12:55,180 with your IT departments so so you you are well protected we are seeing coming 642 00:12:55,180 --> 00:12:55,190 are well protected we are seeing coming 643 00:12:55,190 --> 00:12:56,830 are well protected we are seeing coming back to your question we are seeing a 644 00:12:56,830 --> 00:12:56,840 back to your question we are seeing a 645 00:12:56,840 --> 00:12:59,710 back to your question we are seeing a lot of the 646 00:12:59,710 --> 00:12:59,720 lot of the 647 00:12:59,720 --> 00:13:02,650 lot of the the movements in general whenever we are 648 00:13:02,650 --> 00:13:02,660 the movements in general whenever we are 649 00:13:02,660 --> 00:13:05,410 the movements in general whenever we are looking at the data so we are seeing a 650 00:13:05,410 --> 00:13:05,420 looking at the data so we are seeing a 651 00:13:05,420 --> 00:13:07,840 looking at the data so we are seeing a lot of the new threats coming from two 652 00:13:07,840 --> 00:13:07,850 lot of the new threats coming from two 653 00:13:07,850 --> 00:13:11,680 lot of the new threats coming from two main avenues let's say so the first one 654 00:13:11,680 --> 00:13:11,690 main avenues let's say so the first one 655 00:13:11,690 --> 00:13:12,670 main avenues let's say so the first one is hardware 656 00:13:12,670 --> 00:13:12,680 is hardware 657 00:13:12,680 --> 00:13:15,610 is hardware so whenever thinking of FEMA for example 658 00:13:15,610 --> 00:13:15,620 so whenever thinking of FEMA for example 659 00:13:15,620 --> 00:13:17,740 so whenever thinking of FEMA for example you have a BIOS update you have a new 660 00:13:17,740 --> 00:13:17,750 you have a BIOS update you have a new 661 00:13:17,750 --> 00:13:20,170 you have a BIOS update you have a new chipset on your computer yes it's 662 00:13:20,170 --> 00:13:20,180 chipset on your computer yes it's 663 00:13:20,180 --> 00:13:24,490 chipset on your computer yes it's actually possible to in fact or true - 664 00:13:24,490 --> 00:13:24,500 actually possible to in fact or true - 665 00:13:24,500 --> 00:13:26,560 actually possible to in fact or true - in fact that given a component on your 666 00:13:26,560 --> 00:13:26,570 in fact that given a component on your 667 00:13:26,570 --> 00:13:31,420 in fact that given a component on your computer another point that we have and 668 00:13:31,420 --> 00:13:31,430 computer another point that we have and 669 00:13:31,430 --> 00:13:33,100 computer another point that we have and we actually have a lot of research going 670 00:13:33,100 --> 00:13:33,110 we actually have a lot of research going 671 00:13:33,110 --> 00:13:36,280 we actually have a lot of research going on on that specific one is the user 672 00:13:36,280 --> 00:13:36,290 on on that specific one is the user 673 00:13:36,290 --> 00:13:39,430 on on that specific one is the user behavior so let's say that usually when 674 00:13:39,430 --> 00:13:39,440 behavior so let's say that usually when 675 00:13:39,440 --> 00:13:40,930 behavior so let's say that usually when you think user behavior probably the 676 00:13:40,930 --> 00:13:40,940 you think user behavior probably the 677 00:13:40,940 --> 00:13:43,660 you think user behavior probably the biggest example is credit card company 678 00:13:43,660 --> 00:13:43,670 biggest example is credit card company 679 00:13:43,670 --> 00:13:45,820 biggest example is credit card company so you have your credit card in Canada 680 00:13:45,820 --> 00:13:45,830 so you have your credit card in Canada 681 00:13:45,830 --> 00:13:47,650 so you have your credit card in Canada that credit card has been used in 682 00:13:47,650 --> 00:13:47,660 that credit card has been used in 683 00:13:47,660 --> 00:13:51,880 that credit card has been used in somewhere in Asia and hey even though 684 00:13:51,880 --> 00:13:51,890 somewhere in Asia and hey even though 685 00:13:51,890 --> 00:13:54,610 somewhere in Asia and hey even though online shopping is available everywhere 686 00:13:54,610 --> 00:13:54,620 online shopping is available everywhere 687 00:13:54,620 --> 00:13:56,620 online shopping is available everywhere it might create a trigger hey it's 688 00:13:56,620 --> 00:13:56,630 it might create a trigger hey it's 689 00:13:56,630 --> 00:13:58,150 it might create a trigger hey it's something that card is not supposed to 690 00:13:58,150 --> 00:13:58,160 something that card is not supposed to 691 00:13:58,160 --> 00:14:00,820 something that card is not supposed to be used in Asia for example in Europe or 692 00:14:00,820 --> 00:14:00,830 be used in Asia for example in Europe or 693 00:14:00,830 --> 00:14:05,020 be used in Asia for example in Europe or anywhere else and we are started to see 694 00:14:05,020 --> 00:14:05,030 anywhere else and we are started to see 695 00:14:05,030 --> 00:14:08,530 anywhere else and we are started to see some some some efforts from different 696 00:14:08,530 --> 00:14:08,540 some some some efforts from different 697 00:14:08,540 --> 00:14:11,140 some some some efforts from different vendors actually to try to correlate all 698 00:14:11,140 --> 00:14:11,150 vendors actually to try to correlate all 699 00:14:11,150 --> 00:14:14,830 vendors actually to try to correlate all the incidents or all the the incidents 700 00:14:14,830 --> 00:14:14,840 the incidents or all the the incidents 701 00:14:14,840 --> 00:14:16,180 the incidents or all the the incidents in general the security state that we 702 00:14:16,180 --> 00:14:16,190 in general the security state that we 703 00:14:16,190 --> 00:14:18,850 in general the security state that we flag and we also try to map that to the 704 00:14:18,850 --> 00:14:18,860 flag and we also try to map that to the 705 00:14:18,860 --> 00:14:21,250 flag and we also try to map that to the actual user behavior so hey that user 706 00:14:21,250 --> 00:14:21,260 actual user behavior so hey that user 707 00:14:21,260 --> 00:14:24,280 actual user behavior so hey that user has just had his email access in Canada 708 00:14:24,280 --> 00:14:24,290 has just had his email access in Canada 709 00:14:24,290 --> 00:14:27,520 has just had his email access in Canada being accessed in Europe name that's a 710 00:14:27,520 --> 00:14:27,530 being accessed in Europe name that's a 711 00:14:27,530 --> 00:14:28,930 being accessed in Europe name that's a user that's always traveling so yeah 712 00:14:28,930 --> 00:14:28,940 user that's always traveling so yeah 713 00:14:28,940 --> 00:14:31,090 user that's always traveling so yeah it's kind of expected maybe not that 714 00:14:31,090 --> 00:14:31,100 it's kind of expected maybe not that 715 00:14:31,100 --> 00:14:33,130 it's kind of expected maybe not that user is an internal user he has no 716 00:14:33,130 --> 00:14:33,140 user is an internal user he has no 717 00:14:33,140 --> 00:14:35,500 user is an internal user he has no reason to have that kind of exposure in 718 00:14:35,500 --> 00:14:35,510 reason to have that kind of exposure in 719 00:14:35,510 --> 00:14:37,360 reason to have that kind of exposure in there so we can actually create a ticket 720 00:14:37,360 --> 00:14:37,370 there so we can actually create a ticket 721 00:14:37,370 --> 00:14:39,960 there so we can actually create a ticket and we can flag that as a potential 722 00:14:39,960 --> 00:14:39,970 and we can flag that as a potential 723 00:14:39,970 --> 00:14:42,970 and we can flag that as a potential incident so your admins can can take a 724 00:14:42,970 --> 00:14:42,980 incident so your admins can can take a 725 00:14:42,980 --> 00:14:45,310 incident so your admins can can take a look at it interesting and we can do 726 00:14:45,310 --> 00:14:45,320 look at it interesting and we can do 727 00:14:45,320 --> 00:14:45,760 look at it interesting and we can do that 728 00:14:45,760 --> 00:14:45,770 that 729 00:14:45,770 --> 00:14:48,010 that so this is not as a third-party service 730 00:14:48,010 --> 00:14:48,020 so this is not as a third-party service 731 00:14:48,020 --> 00:14:51,430 so this is not as a third-party service but as an internal absolutely our yeah 732 00:14:51,430 --> 00:14:51,440 but as an internal absolutely our yeah 733 00:14:51,440 --> 00:14:54,340 but as an internal absolutely our yeah in mastering and again the amount of 734 00:14:54,340 --> 00:14:54,350 in mastering and again the amount of 735 00:14:54,350 --> 00:14:56,380 in mastering and again the amount of data that's coming out of those surfaces 736 00:14:56,380 --> 00:14:56,390 data that's coming out of those surfaces 737 00:14:56,390 --> 00:14:59,500 data that's coming out of those surfaces is so big that automation is it's 738 00:14:59,500 --> 00:14:59,510 is so big that automation is it's 739 00:14:59,510 --> 00:15:01,480 is so big that automation is it's critical for that and so we do have a 740 00:15:01,480 --> 00:15:01,490 critical for that and so we do have a 741 00:15:01,490 --> 00:15:03,370 critical for that and so we do have a lot of automation capabilities in our 742 00:15:03,370 --> 00:15:03,380 lot of automation capabilities in our 743 00:15:03,380 --> 00:15:05,220 lot of automation capabilities in our products yeah 744 00:15:05,220 --> 00:15:05,230 products yeah 745 00:15:05,230 --> 00:15:07,260 products yeah and again it's everything to make your 746 00:15:07,260 --> 00:15:07,270 and again it's everything to make your 747 00:15:07,270 --> 00:15:08,880 and again it's everything to make your life easier and I've never really 748 00:15:08,880 --> 00:15:08,890 life easier and I've never really 749 00:15:08,890 --> 00:15:10,320 life easier and I've never really thought of it outside the context of the 750 00:15:10,320 --> 00:15:10,330 thought of it outside the context of the 751 00:15:10,330 --> 00:15:12,660 thought of it outside the context of the credit card like a perfect example if I 752 00:15:12,660 --> 00:15:12,670 credit card like a perfect example if I 753 00:15:12,670 --> 00:15:14,970 credit card like a perfect example if I view it and you see it sometimes where 754 00:15:14,970 --> 00:15:14,980 view it and you see it sometimes where 755 00:15:14,980 --> 00:15:17,580 view it and you see it sometimes where is it's an inconvenience but if your 756 00:15:17,580 --> 00:15:17,590 is it's an inconvenience but if your 757 00:15:17,590 --> 00:15:19,260 is it's an inconvenience but if your credit card ever was stolen and used 758 00:15:19,260 --> 00:15:19,270 credit card ever was stolen and used 759 00:15:19,270 --> 00:15:21,090 credit card ever was stolen and used maliciously then you want to know about 760 00:15:21,090 --> 00:15:21,100 maliciously then you want to know about 761 00:15:21,100 --> 00:15:22,650 maliciously then you want to know about it and here's a service that you're 762 00:15:22,650 --> 00:15:22,660 it and here's a service that you're 763 00:15:22,660 --> 00:15:26,330 it and here's a service that you're offering and evolving in 2020 that is 764 00:15:26,330 --> 00:15:26,340 offering and evolving in 2020 that is 765 00:15:26,340 --> 00:15:29,280 offering and evolving in 2020 that is in-house so absolutely I have control 766 00:15:29,280 --> 00:15:29,290 in-house so absolutely I have control 767 00:15:29,290 --> 00:15:30,870 in-house so absolutely I have control over that so you're thinking of your 768 00:15:30,870 --> 00:15:30,880 over that so you're thinking of your 769 00:15:30,880 --> 00:15:32,550 over that so you're thinking of your credit card what if it's your email 770 00:15:32,550 --> 00:15:32,560 credit card what if it's your email 771 00:15:32,560 --> 00:15:35,880 credit card what if it's your email access or maybe your scene number public 772 00:15:35,880 --> 00:15:35,890 access or maybe your scene number public 773 00:15:35,890 --> 00:15:38,310 access or maybe your scene number public data basically it's private it should be 774 00:15:38,310 --> 00:15:38,320 data basically it's private it should be 775 00:15:38,320 --> 00:15:40,500 data basically it's private it should be private and we are trying to make it 776 00:15:40,500 --> 00:15:40,510 private and we are trying to make it 777 00:15:40,510 --> 00:15:43,020 private and we are trying to make it remain private so is that the evolution 778 00:15:43,020 --> 00:15:43,030 remain private so is that the evolution 779 00:15:43,030 --> 00:15:45,810 remain private so is that the evolution of malware do you think is targeting 780 00:15:45,810 --> 00:15:45,820 of malware do you think is targeting 781 00:15:45,820 --> 00:15:50,490 of malware do you think is targeting data yeah I would say so I don't see 782 00:15:50,490 --> 00:15:50,500 data yeah I would say so I don't see 783 00:15:50,500 --> 00:15:54,840 data yeah I would say so I don't see specific data to confirm that that 784 00:15:54,840 --> 00:15:54,850 specific data to confirm that that 785 00:15:54,850 --> 00:15:56,700 specific data to confirm that that application but I do believe that's 786 00:15:56,700 --> 00:15:56,710 application but I do believe that's 787 00:15:56,710 --> 00:15:58,170 application but I do believe that's that's something that is going to happen 788 00:15:58,170 --> 00:15:58,180 that's something that is going to happen 789 00:15:58,180 --> 00:16:02,070 that's something that is going to happen we are having we are three SS citizens 790 00:16:02,070 --> 00:16:02,080 we are having we are three SS citizens 791 00:16:02,080 --> 00:16:05,160 we are having we are three SS citizens we are actually producing more data 792 00:16:05,160 --> 00:16:05,170 we are actually producing more data 793 00:16:05,170 --> 00:16:07,050 we are actually producing more data every single day the amount of data that 794 00:16:07,050 --> 00:16:07,060 every single day the amount of data that 795 00:16:07,060 --> 00:16:11,190 every single day the amount of data that we have associated to our profiles is 796 00:16:11,190 --> 00:16:11,200 we have associated to our profiles is 797 00:16:11,200 --> 00:16:14,400 we have associated to our profiles is massive either from financial data 798 00:16:14,400 --> 00:16:14,410 massive either from financial data 799 00:16:14,410 --> 00:16:17,490 massive either from financial data healthcare data social networking data 800 00:16:17,490 --> 00:16:17,500 healthcare data social networking data 801 00:16:17,500 --> 00:16:21,060 healthcare data social networking data work data basically so we should see 802 00:16:21,060 --> 00:16:21,070 work data basically so we should see 803 00:16:21,070 --> 00:16:25,500 work data basically so we should see more custom attacks targeting specific 804 00:16:25,500 --> 00:16:25,510 more custom attacks targeting specific 805 00:16:25,510 --> 00:16:27,650 more custom attacks targeting specific users don't specifically organizations 806 00:16:27,650 --> 00:16:27,660 users don't specifically organizations 807 00:16:27,660 --> 00:16:32,130 users don't specifically organizations interesting so well RAF it's been a 808 00:16:32,130 --> 00:16:32,140 interesting so well RAF it's been a 809 00:16:32,140 --> 00:16:33,750 interesting so well RAF it's been a pleasure having you here we've learned 810 00:16:33,750 --> 00:16:33,760 pleasure having you here we've learned 811 00:16:33,760 --> 00:16:35,700 pleasure having you here we've learned sorry I don't want to overwhelm the 812 00:16:35,700 --> 00:16:35,710 sorry I don't want to overwhelm the 813 00:16:35,710 --> 00:16:39,360 sorry I don't want to overwhelm the viewers grand scheme of things 814 00:16:39,360 --> 00:16:39,370 viewers grand scheme of things 815 00:16:39,370 --> 00:16:40,950 viewers grand scheme of things I mean 2020 is gonna be an interesting 816 00:16:40,950 --> 00:16:40,960 I mean 2020 is gonna be an interesting 817 00:16:40,960 --> 00:16:43,290 I mean 2020 is gonna be an interesting year I think from the cybersecurity land 818 00:16:43,290 --> 00:16:43,300 year I think from the cybersecurity land 819 00:16:43,300 --> 00:16:45,690 year I think from the cybersecurity land absolutely are we still seeing attacks 820 00:16:45,690 --> 00:16:45,700 absolutely are we still seeing attacks 821 00:16:45,700 --> 00:16:47,310 absolutely are we still seeing attacks in the ransomware end of things are we 822 00:16:47,310 --> 00:16:47,320 in the ransomware end of things are we 823 00:16:47,320 --> 00:16:49,470 in the ransomware end of things are we still yes we said customers are 824 00:16:49,470 --> 00:16:49,480 still yes we said customers are 825 00:16:49,480 --> 00:16:51,780 still yes we said customers are generally protected against them yes 826 00:16:51,780 --> 00:16:51,790 generally protected against them yes 827 00:16:51,790 --> 00:16:53,790 generally protected against them yes there's to a lot of Renison we're going 828 00:16:53,790 --> 00:16:53,800 there's to a lot of Renison we're going 829 00:16:53,800 --> 00:16:57,930 there's to a lot of Renison we're going on I don't see that going down not not 830 00:16:57,930 --> 00:16:57,940 on I don't see that going down not not 831 00:16:57,940 --> 00:17:01,200 on I don't see that going down not not not not in the near future at least it's 832 00:17:01,200 --> 00:17:01,210 not not in the near future at least it's 833 00:17:01,210 --> 00:17:05,840 not not in the near future at least it's still evolving and the the the actual 834 00:17:05,840 --> 00:17:05,850 still evolving and the the the actual 835 00:17:05,850 --> 00:17:07,380 still evolving and the the the actual organizations that are actually 836 00:17:07,380 --> 00:17:07,390 organizations that are actually 837 00:17:07,390 --> 00:17:09,240 organizations that are actually organization on the back end that are 838 00:17:09,240 --> 00:17:09,250 organization on the back end that are 839 00:17:09,250 --> 00:17:11,160 organization on the back end that are running with those rare somewhere they 840 00:17:11,160 --> 00:17:11,170 running with those rare somewhere they 841 00:17:11,170 --> 00:17:12,630 running with those rare somewhere they are still making a profit 842 00:17:12,630 --> 00:17:12,640 are still making a profit 843 00:17:12,640 --> 00:17:13,580 are still making a profit that's the same 844 00:17:13,580 --> 00:17:13,590 that's the same 845 00:17:13,590 --> 00:17:15,650 that's the same so yeah the question for years when it 846 00:17:15,650 --> 00:17:15,660 so yeah the question for years when it 847 00:17:15,660 --> 00:17:17,660 so yeah the question for years when it was just viruses on the landscape the 848 00:17:17,660 --> 00:17:17,670 was just viruses on the landscape the 849 00:17:17,670 --> 00:17:18,860 was just viruses on the landscape the question was always what's the 850 00:17:18,860 --> 00:17:18,870 question was always what's the 851 00:17:18,870 --> 00:17:20,990 question was always what's the motivation of a hacker yep to do this 852 00:17:20,990 --> 00:17:21,000 motivation of a hacker yep to do this 853 00:17:21,000 --> 00:17:23,000 motivation of a hacker yep to do this yep and you say well money yep because 854 00:17:23,000 --> 00:17:23,010 yep and you say well money yep because 855 00:17:23,010 --> 00:17:24,770 yep and you say well money yep because makes money ransomware is a perfect 856 00:17:24,770 --> 00:17:24,780 makes money ransomware is a perfect 857 00:17:24,780 --> 00:17:26,750 makes money ransomware is a perfect example or it's like will there bring in 858 00:17:26,750 --> 00:17:26,760 example or it's like will there bring in 859 00:17:26,760 --> 00:17:28,850 example or it's like will there bring in a ton of money in order to create 860 00:17:28,850 --> 00:17:28,860 a ton of money in order to create 861 00:17:28,860 --> 00:17:32,270 a ton of money in order to create malware yep which you know if that's a 862 00:17:32,270 --> 00:17:32,280 malware yep which you know if that's a 863 00:17:32,280 --> 00:17:34,580 malware yep which you know if that's a scary thing so thank you for working to 864 00:17:34,580 --> 00:17:34,590 scary thing so thank you for working to 865 00:17:34,590 --> 00:17:36,860 scary thing so thank you for working to combat that thanks man now of course you 866 00:17:36,860 --> 00:17:36,870 combat that thanks man now of course you 867 00:17:36,870 --> 00:17:38,420 combat that thanks man now of course you can find out more about the particular 868 00:17:38,420 --> 00:17:38,430 can find out more about the particular 869 00:17:38,430 --> 00:17:39,770 can find out more about the particular protections that we were discussing 870 00:17:39,770 --> 00:17:39,780 protections that we were discussing 871 00:17:39,780 --> 00:17:42,830 protections that we were discussing there by visiting the website endpoint 872 00:17:42,830 --> 00:17:42,840 there by visiting the website endpoint 873 00:17:42,840 --> 00:17:46,130 there by visiting the website endpoint security dot CA and incidentally we've 874 00:17:46,130 --> 00:17:46,140 security dot CA and incidentally we've 875 00:17:46,140 --> 00:17:50,420 security dot CA and incidentally we've got some more video help and and some 876 00:17:50,420 --> 00:17:50,430 got some more video help and and some 877 00:17:50,430 --> 00:17:52,580 got some more video help and and some great educational content there that is 878 00:17:52,580 --> 00:17:52,590 great educational content there that is 879 00:17:52,590 --> 00:17:56,300 great educational content there that is really geared toward businesses so that 880 00:17:56,300 --> 00:17:56,310 really geared toward businesses so that 881 00:17:56,310 --> 00:17:58,850 really geared toward businesses so that information is there as a resource for 882 00:17:58,850 --> 00:17:58,860 information is there as a resource for 883 00:17:58,860 --> 00:18:01,730 information is there as a resource for you to be able to to just watch videos 884 00:18:01,730 --> 00:18:01,740 you to be able to to just watch videos 885 00:18:01,740 --> 00:18:03,950 you to be able to to just watch videos that help you to understand the threat 886 00:18:03,950 --> 00:18:03,960 that help you to understand the threat 887 00:18:03,960 --> 00:18:07,520 that help you to understand the threat landscape and and with that at endpoint 888 00:18:07,520 --> 00:18:07,530 landscape and and with that at endpoint 889 00:18:07,530 --> 00:18:09,440 landscape and and with that at endpoint security dot CA you're able to arm 890 00:18:09,440 --> 00:18:09,450 security dot CA you're able to arm 891 00:18:09,450 --> 00:18:11,600 security dot CA you're able to arm yourself with more information and as I 892 00:18:11,600 --> 00:18:11,610 yourself with more information and as I 893 00:18:11,610 --> 00:18:13,220 yourself with more information and as I kind of mentioned it and alluded to in 894 00:18:13,220 --> 00:18:13,230 kind of mentioned it and alluded to in 895 00:18:13,230 --> 00:18:15,170 kind of mentioned it and alluded to in the interview it's not a sales pitch for 896 00:18:15,170 --> 00:18:15,180 the interview it's not a sales pitch for 897 00:18:15,180 --> 00:18:17,480 the interview it's not a sales pitch for a particular product or brand but it is 898 00:18:17,480 --> 00:18:17,490 a particular product or brand but it is 899 00:18:17,490 --> 00:18:19,280 a particular product or brand but it is an educational piece that helps you to 900 00:18:19,280 --> 00:18:19,290 an educational piece that helps you to 901 00:18:19,290 --> 00:18:21,710 an educational piece that helps you to understand what you need to know because 902 00:18:21,710 --> 00:18:21,720 understand what you need to know because 903 00:18:21,720 --> 00:18:23,750 understand what you need to know because things are really evolving ESET has 904 00:18:23,750 --> 00:18:23,760 things are really evolving ESET has 905 00:18:23,760 --> 00:18:27,410 things are really evolving ESET has proven themselves to be as we talked 906 00:18:27,410 --> 00:18:27,420 proven themselves to be as we talked 907 00:18:27,420 --> 00:18:30,380 proven themselves to be as we talked about with wanna cry very very proactive 908 00:18:30,380 --> 00:18:30,390 about with wanna cry very very proactive 909 00:18:30,390 --> 00:18:32,690 about with wanna cry very very proactive being able to block a threat before it 910 00:18:32,690 --> 00:18:32,700 being able to block a threat before it 911 00:18:32,700 --> 00:18:36,320 being able to block a threat before it was even known yeah it wasn't having a 912 00:18:36,320 --> 00:18:36,330 was even known yeah it wasn't having a 913 00:18:36,330 --> 00:18:38,900 was even known yeah it wasn't having a thing they actually blocked the exploit 914 00:18:38,900 --> 00:18:38,910 thing they actually blocked the exploit 915 00:18:38,910 --> 00:18:41,660 thing they actually blocked the exploit that allowed the thing to exist right so 916 00:18:41,660 --> 00:18:41,670 that allowed the thing to exist right so 917 00:18:41,670 --> 00:18:44,660 that allowed the thing to exist right so that when the thing existed the exploit 918 00:18:44,660 --> 00:18:44,670 that when the thing existed the exploit 919 00:18:44,670 --> 00:18:46,910 that when the thing existed the exploit was already blocked by ESET so so that 920 00:18:46,910 --> 00:18:46,920 was already blocked by ESET so so that 921 00:18:46,920 --> 00:18:49,400 was already blocked by ESET so so that proactive nature of the protection to me 922 00:18:49,400 --> 00:18:49,410 proactive nature of the protection to me 923 00:18:49,410 --> 00:18:51,890 proactive nature of the protection to me is like that's where it's at that's what 924 00:18:51,890 --> 00:18:51,900 is like that's where it's at that's what 925 00:18:51,900 --> 00:18:55,010 is like that's where it's at that's what I want um they do have Linux services 926 00:18:55,010 --> 00:18:55,020 I want um they do have Linux services 927 00:18:55,020 --> 00:18:56,690 I want um they do have Linux services available as well 928 00:18:56,690 --> 00:18:56,700 available as well 929 00:18:56,700 --> 00:18:58,910 available as well incidentally they're centralized 930 00:18:58,910 --> 00:18:58,920 incidentally they're centralized 931 00:18:58,920 --> 00:19:01,070 incidentally they're centralized management console that we discussed is 932 00:19:01,070 --> 00:19:01,080 management console that we discussed is 933 00:19:01,080 --> 00:19:03,770 management console that we discussed is based on a Linux environment so the one 934 00:19:03,770 --> 00:19:03,780 based on a Linux environment so the one 935 00:19:03,780 --> 00:19:06,560 based on a Linux environment so the one that they provide is sent OS I have a 936 00:19:06,560 --> 00:19:06,570 that they provide is sent OS I have a 937 00:19:06,570 --> 00:19:08,600 that they provide is sent OS I have a github repository that allows you to 938 00:19:08,600 --> 00:19:08,610 github repository that allows you to 939 00:19:08,610 --> 00:19:11,000 github repository that allows you to install it on Debian buster 940 00:19:11,000 --> 00:19:11,010 install it on Debian buster 941 00:19:11,010 --> 00:19:15,710 install it on Debian buster that is github.com slash cat 5 TV slash 942 00:19:15,710 --> 00:19:15,720 that is github.com slash cat 5 TV slash 943 00:19:15,720 --> 00:19:18,470 that is github.com slash cat 5 TV slash ESET you'll see the installers there if 944 00:19:18,470 --> 00:19:18,480 ESET you'll see the installers there if 945 00:19:18,480 --> 00:19:20,150 ESET you'll see the installers there if you're interested so there's a whole lot 946 00:19:20,150 --> 00:19:20,160 you're interested so there's a whole lot 947 00:19:20,160 --> 00:19:22,520 you're interested so there's a whole lot of support there and endpoint security 948 00:19:22,520 --> 00:19:22,530 of support there and endpoint security 949 00:19:22,530 --> 00:19:24,590 of support there and endpoint security dot CA is a great place that it all 950 00:19:24,590 --> 00:19:24,600 dot CA is a great place that it all 951 00:19:24,600 --> 00:19:26,740 dot CA is a great place that it all comes together with blogs 952 00:19:26,740 --> 00:19:26,750 comes together with blogs 953 00:19:26,750 --> 00:19:29,950 comes together with blogs videos podcasts of course the products 954 00:19:29,950 --> 00:19:29,960 videos podcasts of course the products 955 00:19:29,960 --> 00:19:32,020 videos podcasts of course the products themselves recommendations for what 956 00:19:32,020 --> 00:19:32,030 themselves recommendations for what 957 00:19:32,030 --> 00:19:34,150 themselves recommendations for what would work in your environment so if 958 00:19:34,150 --> 00:19:34,160 would work in your environment so if 959 00:19:34,160 --> 00:19:35,410 would work in your environment so if you're in business that's where you want 960 00:19:35,410 --> 00:19:35,420 you're in business that's where you want 961 00:19:35,420 --> 00:19:51,230 you're in business that's where you want to go endpoint security dot CA 962 00:19:51,230 --> 00:19:51,240 963 00:19:51,240 --> 00:19:54,279 [Music]