1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:06,289 I started seeing the rounds of the 2 00:00:06,289 --> 00:00:06,299 I started seeing the rounds of the 3 00:00:06,299 --> 00:00:09,620 I started seeing the rounds of the exploits of the Canadian hacker as 4 00:00:09,620 --> 00:00:09,630 exploits of the Canadian hacker as 5 00:00:09,630 --> 00:00:12,140 exploits of the Canadian hacker as Twitter blew up with people saying I 6 00:00:12,140 --> 00:00:12,150 Twitter blew up with people saying I 7 00:00:12,150 --> 00:00:13,370 Twitter blew up with people saying I came into work today 8 00:00:13,370 --> 00:00:13,380 came into work today 9 00:00:13,380 --> 00:00:18,130 came into work today and on my printer was this printout and 10 00:00:18,130 --> 00:00:18,140 and on my printer was this printout and 11 00:00:18,140 --> 00:00:21,830 and on my printer was this printout and the printout was from the canadian 12 00:00:21,830 --> 00:00:21,840 the printout was from the canadian 13 00:00:21,840 --> 00:00:26,089 the printout was from the canadian hacker he is the Politis hacker that 14 00:00:26,089 --> 00:00:26,099 hacker he is the Politis hacker that 15 00:00:26,099 --> 00:00:27,519 hacker he is the Politis hacker that you'll ever meet 16 00:00:27,519 --> 00:00:27,529 you'll ever meet 17 00:00:27,529 --> 00:00:30,460 you'll ever meet he will hack your devices and then 18 00:00:30,460 --> 00:00:30,470 he will hack your devices and then 19 00:00:30,470 --> 00:00:36,350 he will hack your devices and then apologize yeah he is none other then the 20 00:00:36,350 --> 00:00:36,360 apologize yeah he is none other then the 21 00:00:36,360 --> 00:00:40,910 apologize yeah he is none other then the Canadian hacker the one fantastic how 22 00:00:40,910 --> 00:00:40,920 Canadian hacker the one fantastic how 23 00:00:40,920 --> 00:00:45,010 Canadian hacker the one fantastic how about yourself 24 00:00:45,010 --> 00:00:45,020 25 00:00:45,020 --> 00:00:47,450 listen you call yourself the Canadian 26 00:00:47,450 --> 00:00:47,460 listen you call yourself the Canadian 27 00:00:47,460 --> 00:00:49,430 listen you call yourself the Canadian hacker just to give us a sense of the 28 00:00:49,430 --> 00:00:49,440 hacker just to give us a sense of the 29 00:00:49,440 --> 00:00:52,520 hacker just to give us a sense of the scale of things how many how many 30 00:00:52,520 --> 00:00:52,530 scale of things how many how many 31 00:00:52,530 --> 00:00:54,110 scale of things how many how many devices have you seriously hacked I mean 32 00:00:54,110 --> 00:00:54,120 devices have you seriously hacked I mean 33 00:00:54,120 --> 00:00:56,150 devices have you seriously hacked I mean I've hacked about a hundred and fifty 34 00:00:56,150 --> 00:00:56,160 I've hacked about a hundred and fifty 35 00:00:56,160 --> 00:00:58,720 I've hacked about a hundred and fifty devices how many devices have you hacked 36 00:00:58,720 --> 00:00:58,730 devices how many devices have you hacked 37 00:00:58,730 --> 00:01:02,000 devices how many devices have you hacked well for the printers one hundred 38 00:01:02,000 --> 00:01:02,010 well for the printers one hundred 39 00:01:02,010 --> 00:01:05,960 well for the printers one hundred thousand of them a hundred thousand 40 00:01:05,960 --> 00:01:05,970 thousand of them a hundred thousand 41 00:01:05,970 --> 00:01:10,960 thousand of them a hundred thousand print heads why'd you hack printers well 42 00:01:10,960 --> 00:01:10,970 print heads why'd you hack printers well 43 00:01:10,970 --> 00:01:14,660 print heads why'd you hack printers well my main motivation for doing all this 44 00:01:14,660 --> 00:01:14,670 my main motivation for doing all this 45 00:01:14,670 --> 00:01:17,350 my main motivation for doing all this was to give myself more of a challenge 46 00:01:17,350 --> 00:01:17,360 was to give myself more of a challenge 47 00:01:17,360 --> 00:01:19,760 was to give myself more of a challenge without really affecting the people 48 00:01:19,760 --> 00:01:19,770 without really affecting the people 49 00:01:19,770 --> 00:01:23,570 without really affecting the people around me when you say that when you say 50 00:01:23,570 --> 00:01:23,580 around me when you say that when you say 51 00:01:23,580 --> 00:01:26,179 around me when you say that when you say without affecting are you talking about 52 00:01:26,179 --> 00:01:26,189 without affecting are you talking about 53 00:01:26,189 --> 00:01:28,969 without affecting are you talking about being benign in your attacks so that 54 00:01:28,969 --> 00:01:28,979 being benign in your attacks so that 55 00:01:28,979 --> 00:01:30,050 being benign in your attacks so that you're not actually creating damage 56 00:01:30,050 --> 00:01:30,060 you're not actually creating damage 57 00:01:30,060 --> 00:01:40,249 you're not actually creating damage you're walking would be something that I 58 00:01:40,249 --> 00:01:40,259 you're walking would be something that I 59 00:01:40,259 --> 00:01:42,590 you're walking would be something that I wanted to do and is what I did with the 60 00:01:42,590 --> 00:01:42,600 wanted to do and is what I did with the 61 00:01:42,600 --> 00:01:45,800 wanted to do and is what I did with the pictures I saw the pictures I was a very 62 00:01:45,800 --> 00:01:45,810 pictures I saw the pictures I was a very 63 00:01:45,810 --> 00:01:49,370 pictures I saw the pictures I was a very open target especially with how many 64 00:01:49,370 --> 00:01:49,380 open target especially with how many 65 00:01:49,380 --> 00:01:52,280 open target especially with how many like everybody know everybody's home has 66 00:01:52,280 --> 00:01:52,290 like everybody know everybody's home has 67 00:01:52,290 --> 00:01:55,069 like everybody know everybody's home has a picture rate every business has a 68 00:01:55,069 --> 00:01:55,079 a picture rate every business has a 69 00:01:55,079 --> 00:01:58,969 a picture rate every business has a picture and young people don't even care 70 00:01:58,969 --> 00:01:58,979 picture and young people don't even care 71 00:01:58,979 --> 00:02:01,609 picture and young people don't even care for something that you could exploit 72 00:02:01,609 --> 00:02:01,619 for something that you could exploit 73 00:02:01,619 --> 00:02:06,350 for something that you could exploit rage so you could pretty big 74 00:02:06,350 --> 00:02:06,360 rage so you could pretty big 75 00:02:06,360 --> 00:02:07,670 rage so you could pretty big vulnerability right there 76 00:02:07,670 --> 00:02:07,680 vulnerability right there 77 00:02:07,680 --> 00:02:11,229 vulnerability right there so my my whole law 78 00:02:11,229 --> 00:02:11,239 so my my whole law 79 00:02:11,239 --> 00:02:13,479 so my my whole law being was to create a challenge for 80 00:02:13,479 --> 00:02:13,489 being was to create a challenge for 81 00:02:13,489 --> 00:02:18,520 being was to create a challenge for myself while not affecting others and me 82 00:02:18,520 --> 00:02:18,530 myself while not affecting others and me 83 00:02:18,530 --> 00:02:20,920 myself while not affecting others and me I guess you could say yeah I got here 84 00:02:20,920 --> 00:02:20,930 I guess you could say yeah I got here 85 00:02:20,930 --> 00:02:22,869 I guess you could say yeah I got here good Anya good Anya how did you get 86 00:02:22,869 --> 00:02:22,879 good Anya good Anya how did you get 87 00:02:22,879 --> 00:02:26,589 good Anya good Anya how did you get started hacking well around seven years 88 00:02:26,589 --> 00:02:26,599 started hacking well around seven years 89 00:02:26,599 --> 00:02:30,670 started hacking well around seven years old I actually you know what that's 90 00:02:30,670 --> 00:02:30,680 old I actually you know what that's 91 00:02:30,680 --> 00:02:32,530 old I actually you know what that's actually really good question you're 92 00:02:32,530 --> 00:02:32,540 actually really good question you're 93 00:02:32,540 --> 00:02:34,660 actually really good question you're sorry I'm just um did you know my 94 00:02:34,660 --> 00:02:34,670 sorry I'm just um did you know my 95 00:02:34,670 --> 00:02:35,319 sorry I'm just um did you know my timeline 96 00:02:35,319 --> 00:02:35,329 timeline 97 00:02:35,329 --> 00:02:42,580 timeline yes I guess there's there's a point in 98 00:02:42,580 --> 00:02:42,590 yes I guess there's there's a point in 99 00:02:42,590 --> 00:02:45,610 yes I guess there's there's a point in in your like you're growing up in an era 100 00:02:45,610 --> 00:02:45,620 in your like you're growing up in an era 101 00:02:45,620 --> 00:02:49,659 in your like you're growing up in an era unlike I did so when I was when I was in 102 00:02:49,659 --> 00:02:49,669 unlike I did so when I was when I was in 103 00:02:49,669 --> 00:02:51,670 unlike I did so when I was when I was in high school is when I realized hey I can 104 00:02:51,670 --> 00:02:51,680 high school is when I realized hey I can 105 00:02:51,680 --> 00:02:54,069 high school is when I realized hey I can hack systems and I can make them do what 106 00:02:54,069 --> 00:02:54,079 hack systems and I can make them do what 107 00:02:54,079 --> 00:02:55,839 hack systems and I can make them do what I want them to do there must have been a 108 00:02:55,839 --> 00:02:55,849 I want them to do there must have been a 109 00:02:55,849 --> 00:02:58,720 I want them to do there must have been a point in your life where you said hey I 110 00:02:58,720 --> 00:02:58,730 point in your life where you said hey I 111 00:02:58,730 --> 00:03:01,119 point in your life where you said hey I can do more than what Windows allows me 112 00:03:01,119 --> 00:03:01,129 can do more than what Windows allows me 113 00:03:01,129 --> 00:03:04,390 can do more than what Windows allows me to do what Linux allows me to do what 114 00:03:04,390 --> 00:03:04,400 to do what Linux allows me to do what 115 00:03:04,400 --> 00:03:06,789 to do what Linux allows me to do what when was that point for you probably 116 00:03:06,789 --> 00:03:06,799 when was that point for you probably 117 00:03:06,799 --> 00:03:10,059 when was that point for you probably around ten or eleven I'd say when I 118 00:03:10,059 --> 00:03:10,069 around ten or eleven I'd say when I 119 00:03:10,069 --> 00:03:13,539 around ten or eleven I'd say when I started when a lot of people on the 120 00:03:13,539 --> 00:03:13,549 started when a lot of people on the 121 00:03:13,549 --> 00:03:15,719 started when a lot of people on the internet started coming out and trying 122 00:03:15,719 --> 00:03:15,729 internet started coming out and trying 123 00:03:15,729 --> 00:03:18,250 internet started coming out and trying to the public like what you can do with 124 00:03:18,250 --> 00:03:18,260 to the public like what you can do with 125 00:03:18,260 --> 00:03:20,680 to the public like what you can do with this and how everything can be explained 126 00:03:20,680 --> 00:03:20,690 this and how everything can be explained 127 00:03:20,690 --> 00:03:27,629 this and how everything can be explained I thought I wanted to learn that ability 128 00:03:27,629 --> 00:03:27,639 I thought I wanted to learn that ability 129 00:03:27,639 --> 00:03:34,599 I thought I wanted to learn that ability more so for good about okay so you know 130 00:03:34,599 --> 00:03:34,609 more so for good about okay so you know 131 00:03:34,609 --> 00:03:36,280 more so for good about okay so you know and these devices you mentioned printers 132 00:03:36,280 --> 00:03:36,290 and these devices you mentioned printers 133 00:03:36,290 --> 00:03:37,479 and these devices you mentioned printers and we're gonna talk more about that but 134 00:03:37,479 --> 00:03:37,489 and we're gonna talk more about that but 135 00:03:37,489 --> 00:03:41,469 and we're gonna talk more about that but these devices are benign considered safe 136 00:03:41,469 --> 00:03:41,479 these devices are benign considered safe 137 00:03:41,479 --> 00:03:43,749 these devices are benign considered safe these are these are devices that people 138 00:03:43,749 --> 00:03:43,759 these are these are devices that people 139 00:03:43,759 --> 00:03:46,629 these are these are devices that people trust to plug into their network I mean 140 00:03:46,629 --> 00:03:46,639 trust to plug into their network I mean 141 00:03:46,639 --> 00:03:48,520 trust to plug into their network I mean you walk into any super Center you buy a 142 00:03:48,520 --> 00:03:48,530 you walk into any super Center you buy a 143 00:03:48,530 --> 00:03:50,140 you walk into any super Center you buy a printer and you install it and it just 144 00:03:50,140 --> 00:03:50,150 printer and you install it and it just 145 00:03:50,150 --> 00:03:50,589 printer and you install it and it just works 146 00:03:50,589 --> 00:03:50,599 works 147 00:03:50,599 --> 00:03:54,999 works yeah what is it that drew you to start 148 00:03:54,999 --> 00:03:55,009 yeah what is it that drew you to start 149 00:03:55,009 --> 00:04:04,479 yeah what is it that drew you to start attacking those devices a little bit 150 00:04:04,479 --> 00:04:04,489 attacking those devices a little bit 151 00:04:04,489 --> 00:04:07,330 attacking those devices a little bit easier of an access then a more 152 00:04:07,330 --> 00:04:07,340 easier of an access then a more 153 00:04:07,340 --> 00:04:10,659 easier of an access then a more sophisticated system so it was easy 154 00:04:10,659 --> 00:04:10,669 sophisticated system so it was easy 155 00:04:10,669 --> 00:04:14,229 sophisticated system so it was easy enough for each of you but just don't 156 00:04:14,229 --> 00:04:14,239 enough for each of you but just don't 157 00:04:14,239 --> 00:04:17,140 enough for each of you but just don't have a challenge and a large amount to 158 00:04:17,140 --> 00:04:17,150 have a challenge and a large amount to 159 00:04:17,150 --> 00:04:21,729 have a challenge and a large amount to bomb like a surplus of pincers on up and 160 00:04:21,729 --> 00:04:21,739 bomb like a surplus of pincers on up and 161 00:04:21,739 --> 00:04:22,090 bomb like a surplus of pincers on up and you 162 00:04:22,090 --> 00:04:22,100 you 163 00:04:22,100 --> 00:04:27,670 you then network so you know you're I have a 164 00:04:27,670 --> 00:04:27,680 then network so you know you're I have a 165 00:04:27,680 --> 00:04:32,170 then network so you know you're I have a lot of access to them and it made it a 166 00:04:32,170 --> 00:04:32,180 lot of access to them and it made it a 167 00:04:32,180 --> 00:04:34,180 lot of access to them and it made it a little bit easier sorry I'm kind of 168 00:04:34,180 --> 00:04:34,190 little bit easier sorry I'm kind of 169 00:04:34,190 --> 00:04:37,720 little bit easier sorry I'm kind of tracker no not at all not at all so but 170 00:04:37,720 --> 00:04:37,730 tracker no not at all not at all so but 171 00:04:37,730 --> 00:04:39,640 tracker no not at all not at all so but it makes me think though and we're 172 00:04:39,640 --> 00:04:39,650 it makes me think though and we're 173 00:04:39,650 --> 00:04:41,520 it makes me think though and we're speaking with the Canadian hacker here 174 00:04:41,520 --> 00:04:41,530 speaking with the Canadian hacker here 175 00:04:41,530 --> 00:04:44,650 speaking with the Canadian hacker here the Canadian hacker we know you by no 176 00:04:44,650 --> 00:04:44,660 the Canadian hacker we know you by no 177 00:04:44,660 --> 00:04:47,620 the Canadian hacker we know you by no other name when you're attacking 178 00:04:47,620 --> 00:04:47,630 other name when you're attacking 179 00:04:47,630 --> 00:04:51,910 other name when you're attacking printers so so I think as a consoled me 180 00:04:51,910 --> 00:04:51,920 printers so so I think as a consoled me 181 00:04:51,920 --> 00:04:54,400 printers so so I think as a consoled me as a consumer or our viewers as 182 00:04:54,400 --> 00:04:54,410 as a consumer or our viewers as 183 00:04:54,410 --> 00:04:57,430 as a consumer or our viewers as consumers will purchase a printer and 184 00:04:57,430 --> 00:04:57,440 consumers will purchase a printer and 185 00:04:57,440 --> 00:04:59,380 consumers will purchase a printer and just install it on their network so what 186 00:04:59,380 --> 00:04:59,390 just install it on their network so what 187 00:04:59,390 --> 00:05:02,860 just install it on their network so what makes that device a vulnerable device 188 00:05:02,860 --> 00:05:02,870 makes that device a vulnerable device 189 00:05:02,870 --> 00:05:05,230 makes that device a vulnerable device you just think it's a benign device just 190 00:05:05,230 --> 00:05:05,240 you just think it's a benign device just 191 00:05:05,240 --> 00:05:06,840 you just think it's a benign device just sitting on your network that you print - 192 00:05:06,840 --> 00:05:06,850 sitting on your network that you print - 193 00:05:06,850 --> 00:05:11,350 sitting on your network that you print - well how are we able to attack that how 194 00:05:11,350 --> 00:05:11,360 well how are we able to attack that how 195 00:05:11,360 --> 00:05:13,990 well how are we able to attack that how what is what is it that I should know as 196 00:05:13,990 --> 00:05:14,000 what is what is it that I should know as 197 00:05:14,000 --> 00:05:16,900 what is what is it that I should know as a consumer that you can share with me as 198 00:05:16,900 --> 00:05:16,910 a consumer that you can share with me as 199 00:05:16,910 --> 00:05:19,570 a consumer that you can share with me as a hacker that I should know about that 200 00:05:19,570 --> 00:05:19,580 a hacker that I should know about that 201 00:05:19,580 --> 00:05:24,240 a hacker that I should know about that printer being connected to my network 202 00:05:24,240 --> 00:05:24,250 203 00:05:24,250 --> 00:05:27,070 like security feeder I guess you can say 204 00:05:27,070 --> 00:05:27,080 like security feeder I guess you can say 205 00:05:27,080 --> 00:05:29,770 like security feeder I guess you can say um you might think that they're safe 206 00:05:29,770 --> 00:05:29,780 um you might think that they're safe 207 00:05:29,780 --> 00:05:32,140 um you might think that they're safe when they really truly not and for 208 00:05:32,140 --> 00:05:32,150 when they really truly not and for 209 00:05:32,150 --> 00:05:34,360 when they really truly not and for printers in this case um there's a lot 210 00:05:34,360 --> 00:05:34,370 printers in this case um there's a lot 211 00:05:34,370 --> 00:05:37,840 printers in this case um there's a lot of it's on your network that it can be 212 00:05:37,840 --> 00:05:37,850 of it's on your network that it can be 213 00:05:37,850 --> 00:05:39,850 of it's on your network that it can be accessed with which I don't mean that 214 00:05:39,850 --> 00:05:39,860 accessed with which I don't mean that 215 00:05:39,860 --> 00:05:42,160 accessed with which I don't mean that you don't you shouldn't connected to 216 00:05:42,160 --> 00:05:42,170 you don't you shouldn't connected to 217 00:05:42,170 --> 00:05:43,810 you don't you shouldn't connected to your network I mean it makes it so much 218 00:05:43,810 --> 00:05:43,820 your network I mean it makes it so much 219 00:05:43,820 --> 00:05:46,480 your network I mean it makes it so much easier to think anything else but you 220 00:05:46,480 --> 00:05:46,490 easier to think anything else but you 221 00:05:46,490 --> 00:05:47,890 easier to think anything else but you just have to be really careful with 222 00:05:47,890 --> 00:05:47,900 just have to be really careful with 223 00:05:47,900 --> 00:05:52,150 just have to be really careful with what's exposed because there's outputs 224 00:05:52,150 --> 00:05:52,160 what's exposed because there's outputs 225 00:05:52,160 --> 00:05:54,760 what's exposed because there's outputs ninety one hundred five one five and six 226 00:05:54,760 --> 00:05:54,770 ninety one hundred five one five and six 227 00:05:54,770 --> 00:05:56,980 ninety one hundred five one five and six three one which is the main three ports 228 00:05:56,980 --> 00:05:56,990 three one which is the main three ports 229 00:05:56,990 --> 00:05:59,760 three one which is the main three ports that then it's mainly ninety one hundred 230 00:05:59,760 --> 00:05:59,770 that then it's mainly ninety one hundred 231 00:05:59,770 --> 00:06:05,710 that then it's mainly ninety one hundred six three one isn't that cups yeah so 232 00:06:05,710 --> 00:06:05,720 six three one isn't that cups yeah so 233 00:06:05,720 --> 00:06:08,560 six three one isn't that cups yeah so you gotta be really careful with thumb 234 00:06:08,560 --> 00:06:08,570 you gotta be really careful with thumb 235 00:06:08,570 --> 00:06:12,460 you gotta be really careful with thumb what you're exposing um and you just 236 00:06:12,460 --> 00:06:12,470 what you're exposing um and you just 237 00:06:12,470 --> 00:06:14,890 what you're exposing um and you just always not be watching out with what 238 00:06:14,890 --> 00:06:14,900 always not be watching out with what 239 00:06:14,900 --> 00:06:16,150 always not be watching out with what you're installing to hear about what 240 00:06:16,150 --> 00:06:16,160 you're installing to hear about what 241 00:06:16,160 --> 00:06:18,220 you're installing to hear about what were you're adding to network cuz I 242 00:06:18,220 --> 00:06:18,230 were you're adding to network cuz I 243 00:06:18,230 --> 00:06:21,120 were you're adding to network cuz I guess I could get into that venture and 244 00:06:21,120 --> 00:06:21,130 guess I could get into that venture and 245 00:06:21,130 --> 00:06:24,250 guess I could get into that venture and if I wanted to attack it for malicious 246 00:06:24,250 --> 00:06:24,260 if I wanted to attack it for malicious 247 00:06:24,260 --> 00:06:27,220 if I wanted to attack it for malicious reasons on the theory large business I 248 00:06:27,220 --> 00:06:27,230 reasons on the theory large business I 249 00:06:27,230 --> 00:06:29,380 reasons on the theory large business I could anything you print off finance 250 00:06:29,380 --> 00:06:29,390 could anything you print off finance 251 00:06:29,390 --> 00:06:30,700 could anything you print off finance reports or anything 252 00:06:30,700 --> 00:06:30,710 reports or anything 253 00:06:30,710 --> 00:06:34,659 reports or anything I would actually be able to use a man 254 00:06:34,659 --> 00:06:34,669 I would actually be able to use a man 255 00:06:34,669 --> 00:06:39,790 I would actually be able to use a man and she drops solaar and she really have 256 00:06:39,790 --> 00:06:39,800 and she drops solaar and she really have 257 00:06:39,800 --> 00:06:42,339 and she drops solaar and she really have to be careful with what you're putting 258 00:06:42,339 --> 00:06:42,349 to be careful with what you're putting 259 00:06:42,349 --> 00:06:44,890 to be careful with what you're putting or connecting to your network and you 260 00:06:44,890 --> 00:06:44,900 or connecting to your network and you 261 00:06:44,900 --> 00:06:46,540 or connecting to your network and you should always be checking on your 262 00:06:46,540 --> 00:06:46,550 should always be checking on your 263 00:06:46,550 --> 00:06:51,129 should always be checking on your settings on your modem or I mean people 264 00:06:51,129 --> 00:06:51,139 settings on your modem or I mean people 265 00:06:51,139 --> 00:06:52,629 settings on your modem or I mean people know this router but it's really holding 266 00:06:52,629 --> 00:06:52,639 know this router but it's really holding 267 00:06:52,639 --> 00:06:56,559 know this router but it's really holding rate on to see what ports your long to 268 00:06:56,559 --> 00:06:56,569 rate on to see what ports your long to 269 00:06:56,569 --> 00:06:59,980 rate on to see what ports your long to pass through the network and that makes 270 00:06:59,980 --> 00:06:59,990 pass through the network and that makes 271 00:06:59,990 --> 00:07:01,749 pass through the network and that makes me think now the Canadian hacker you're 272 00:07:01,749 --> 00:07:01,759 me think now the Canadian hacker you're 273 00:07:01,759 --> 00:07:03,279 me think now the Canadian hacker you're dropping a bunch of bombs here so I got 274 00:07:03,279 --> 00:07:03,289 dropping a bunch of bombs here so I got 275 00:07:03,289 --> 00:07:04,779 dropping a bunch of bombs here so I got to cut you off because like okay and we 276 00:07:04,779 --> 00:07:04,789 to cut you off because like okay and we 277 00:07:04,789 --> 00:07:07,119 to cut you off because like okay and we got to talk about this UPnP is enabled 278 00:07:07,119 --> 00:07:07,129 got to talk about this UPnP is enabled 279 00:07:07,129 --> 00:07:10,240 got to talk about this UPnP is enabled on a lot of routers you UPnP means as 280 00:07:10,240 --> 00:07:10,250 on a lot of routers you UPnP means as 281 00:07:10,250 --> 00:07:12,339 on a lot of routers you UPnP means as soon as you plug that printer in it 282 00:07:12,339 --> 00:07:12,349 soon as you plug that printer in it 283 00:07:12,349 --> 00:07:14,409 soon as you plug that printer in it opens up the ports it doesn't matter if 284 00:07:14,409 --> 00:07:14,419 opens up the ports it doesn't matter if 285 00:07:14,419 --> 00:07:17,140 opens up the ports it doesn't matter if you specifically said open up those 286 00:07:17,140 --> 00:07:17,150 you specifically said open up those 287 00:07:17,150 --> 00:07:19,719 you specifically said open up those ports no UPnP will automatically do that 288 00:07:19,719 --> 00:07:19,729 ports no UPnP will automatically do that 289 00:07:19,729 --> 00:07:22,300 ports no UPnP will automatically do that because it detects the new printer and 290 00:07:22,300 --> 00:07:22,310 because it detects the new printer and 291 00:07:22,310 --> 00:07:24,850 because it detects the new printer and allows it to open those ports 292 00:07:24,850 --> 00:07:24,860 allows it to open those ports 293 00:07:24,860 --> 00:07:26,860 allows it to open those ports automatically that's dangerous that's 294 00:07:26,860 --> 00:07:26,870 automatically that's dangerous that's 295 00:07:26,870 --> 00:07:28,390 automatically that's dangerous that's what I'm learning here but you're 296 00:07:28,390 --> 00:07:28,400 what I'm learning here but you're 297 00:07:28,400 --> 00:07:30,399 what I'm learning here but you're talking about okay not only are you able 298 00:07:30,399 --> 00:07:30,409 talking about okay not only are you able 299 00:07:30,409 --> 00:07:35,320 talking about okay not only are you able to send print jobs to my printer but 300 00:07:35,320 --> 00:07:35,330 to send print jobs to my printer but 301 00:07:35,330 --> 00:07:38,589 to send print jobs to my printer but you're able to intercept the print jobs 302 00:07:38,589 --> 00:07:38,599 you're able to intercept the print jobs 303 00:07:38,599 --> 00:07:42,879 you're able to intercept the print jobs that I send to my printer exactly yeah 304 00:07:42,879 --> 00:07:42,889 that I send to my printer exactly yeah 305 00:07:42,889 --> 00:07:49,209 that I send to my printer exactly yeah and you can see how interest is and a 306 00:07:49,209 --> 00:07:49,219 and you can see how interest is and a 307 00:07:49,219 --> 00:07:51,519 and you can see how interest is and a lot of the security features on printers 308 00:07:51,519 --> 00:07:51,529 lot of the security features on printers 309 00:07:51,529 --> 00:07:54,249 lot of the security features on printers that say like only our men will be saved 310 00:07:54,249 --> 00:07:54,259 that say like only our men will be saved 311 00:07:54,259 --> 00:07:56,770 that say like only our men will be saved on the system or anything like that um 312 00:07:56,770 --> 00:07:56,780 on the system or anything like that um 313 00:07:56,780 --> 00:07:58,050 on the system or anything like that um [Music] 314 00:07:58,050 --> 00:07:58,060 [Music] 315 00:07:58,060 --> 00:08:01,480 [Music] because it's not it's again a form of 316 00:08:01,480 --> 00:08:01,490 because it's not it's again a form of 317 00:08:01,490 --> 00:08:03,550 because it's not it's again a form of security feeder you're really thinking 318 00:08:03,550 --> 00:08:03,560 security feeder you're really thinking 319 00:08:03,560 --> 00:08:07,990 security feeder you're really thinking it's more safe than it truly is I can't 320 00:08:07,990 --> 00:08:08,000 it's more safe than it truly is I can't 321 00:08:08,000 --> 00:08:10,119 it's more safe than it truly is I can't help but think about accounting firms 322 00:08:10,119 --> 00:08:10,129 help but think about accounting firms 323 00:08:10,129 --> 00:08:16,269 help but think about accounting firms lawyers offices who just okay let's back 324 00:08:16,269 --> 00:08:16,279 lawyers offices who just okay let's back 325 00:08:16,279 --> 00:08:18,459 lawyers offices who just okay let's back up a second the Canadian hacker has 326 00:08:18,459 --> 00:08:18,469 up a second the Canadian hacker has 327 00:08:18,469 --> 00:08:23,379 up a second the Canadian hacker has revealed themselves to the world and 328 00:08:23,379 --> 00:08:23,389 revealed themselves to the world and 329 00:08:23,389 --> 00:08:26,670 revealed themselves to the world and said look your printers are unsafe you 330 00:08:26,670 --> 00:08:26,680 said look your printers are unsafe you 331 00:08:26,680 --> 00:08:30,899 said look your printers are unsafe you need to secure these things 332 00:08:30,899 --> 00:08:30,909 333 00:08:30,909 --> 00:08:32,319 what if there 334 00:08:32,319 --> 00:08:32,329 what if there 335 00:08:32,329 --> 00:08:35,679 what if there r10 other hackers who have accessed that 336 00:08:35,679 --> 00:08:35,689 r10 other hackers who have accessed that 337 00:08:35,689 --> 00:08:38,619 r10 other hackers who have accessed that printer and have never even unveiled the 338 00:08:38,619 --> 00:08:38,629 printer and have never even unveiled the 339 00:08:38,629 --> 00:08:40,899 printer and have never even unveiled the fact that they have access to that 340 00:08:40,899 --> 00:08:40,909 fact that they have access to that 341 00:08:40,909 --> 00:08:44,919 fact that they have access to that printer is there isn't it true the 342 00:08:44,919 --> 00:08:44,929 printer is there isn't it true the 343 00:08:44,929 --> 00:08:47,949 printer is there isn't it true the Canadian hacker that they could 344 00:08:47,949 --> 00:08:47,959 Canadian hacker that they could 345 00:08:47,959 --> 00:08:51,759 Canadian hacker that they could compromise this printer and be receiving 346 00:08:51,759 --> 00:08:51,769 compromise this printer and be receiving 347 00:08:51,769 --> 00:08:54,039 compromise this printer and be receiving every single print job from this 348 00:08:54,039 --> 00:08:54,049 every single print job from this 349 00:08:54,049 --> 00:08:56,049 every single print job from this lawyer's office from this accounting 350 00:08:56,049 --> 00:08:56,059 lawyer's office from this accounting 351 00:08:56,059 --> 00:08:58,889 lawyer's office from this accounting office from wherever this office is and 352 00:08:58,889 --> 00:08:58,899 office from wherever this office is and 353 00:08:58,899 --> 00:09:02,499 office from wherever this office is and never you'd never be the wiser you just 354 00:09:02,499 --> 00:09:02,509 never you'd never be the wiser you just 355 00:09:02,509 --> 00:09:06,579 never you'd never be the wiser you just be sending them this information is that 356 00:09:06,579 --> 00:09:06,589 be sending them this information is that 357 00:09:06,589 --> 00:09:09,100 be sending them this information is that a valid point it's a very valid point 358 00:09:09,100 --> 00:09:09,110 a valid point it's a very valid point 359 00:09:09,110 --> 00:09:12,100 a valid point it's a very valid point and that is very true of course I've 360 00:09:12,100 --> 00:09:12,110 and that is very true of course I've 361 00:09:12,110 --> 00:09:14,379 and that is very true of course I've never necessarily seen that in action 362 00:09:14,379 --> 00:09:14,389 never necessarily seen that in action 363 00:09:14,389 --> 00:09:17,590 never necessarily seen that in action but it is definitely in the realm of 364 00:09:17,590 --> 00:09:17,600 but it is definitely in the realm of 365 00:09:17,600 --> 00:09:23,410 but it is definitely in the realm of possibilities yeah if you have anything 366 00:09:23,410 --> 00:09:23,420 possibilities yeah if you have anything 367 00:09:23,420 --> 00:09:25,809 possibilities yeah if you have anything that's open to the network open to your 368 00:09:25,809 --> 00:09:25,819 that's open to the network open to your 369 00:09:25,819 --> 00:09:29,319 that's open to the network open to your network um there's IP crawlers that can 370 00:09:29,319 --> 00:09:29,329 network um there's IP crawlers that can 371 00:09:29,329 --> 00:09:32,229 network um there's IP crawlers that can go through every single IP address in 372 00:09:32,229 --> 00:09:32,239 go through every single IP address in 373 00:09:32,239 --> 00:09:34,269 go through every single IP address in the world and will tell you objectable 374 00:09:34,269 --> 00:09:34,279 the world and will tell you objectable 375 00:09:34,279 --> 00:09:37,090 the world and will tell you objectable puts their alignment for example things 376 00:09:37,090 --> 00:09:37,100 puts their alignment for example things 377 00:09:37,100 --> 00:09:41,109 puts their alignment for example things like shoe soles like they show them 378 00:09:41,109 --> 00:09:41,119 like shoe soles like they show them 379 00:09:41,119 --> 00:09:43,119 like shoe soles like they show them online and then anybody with the 380 00:09:43,119 --> 00:09:43,129 online and then anybody with the 381 00:09:43,129 --> 00:09:44,739 online and then anybody with the malicious intent like the people you 382 00:09:44,739 --> 00:09:44,749 malicious intent like the people you 383 00:09:44,749 --> 00:09:47,949 malicious intent like the people you said or that you stated ah can use Dodge 384 00:09:47,949 --> 00:09:47,959 said or that you stated ah can use Dodge 385 00:09:47,959 --> 00:09:52,299 said or that you stated ah can use Dodge Chu um they men and millet ATS or puppy 386 00:09:52,299 --> 00:09:52,309 Chu um they men and millet ATS or puppy 387 00:09:52,309 --> 00:09:54,280 Chu um they men and millet ATS or puppy off any files from your be damaged 388 00:09:54,280 --> 00:09:54,290 off any files from your be damaged 389 00:09:54,290 --> 00:09:58,679 off any files from your be damaged adventurer you do most anything 390 00:09:58,679 --> 00:09:58,689 adventurer you do most anything 391 00:09:58,689 --> 00:10:01,539 adventurer you do most anything unreal and to speak now getting away 392 00:10:01,539 --> 00:10:01,549 unreal and to speak now getting away 393 00:10:01,549 --> 00:10:03,039 unreal and to speak now getting away from printers are there other devices 394 00:10:03,039 --> 00:10:03,049 from printers are there other devices 395 00:10:03,049 --> 00:10:06,579 from printers are there other devices that we as consumers may pick up whether 396 00:10:06,579 --> 00:10:06,589 that we as consumers may pick up whether 397 00:10:06,589 --> 00:10:10,539 that we as consumers may pick up whether they be from a retailer or from say our 398 00:10:10,539 --> 00:10:10,549 they be from a retailer or from say our 399 00:10:10,549 --> 00:10:13,600 they be from a retailer or from say our Internet service provider that would 400 00:10:13,600 --> 00:10:13,610 Internet service provider that would 401 00:10:13,610 --> 00:10:16,059 Internet service provider that would allow us to be compromised without us 402 00:10:16,059 --> 00:10:16,069 allow us to be compromised without us 403 00:10:16,069 --> 00:10:18,249 allow us to be compromised without us even thinking about the security aspect 404 00:10:18,249 --> 00:10:18,259 even thinking about the security aspect 405 00:10:18,259 --> 00:10:19,539 even thinking about the security aspect of it Oh 406 00:10:19,539 --> 00:10:19,549 of it Oh 407 00:10:19,549 --> 00:10:23,919 of it Oh there are times on a really big example 408 00:10:23,919 --> 00:10:23,929 there are times on a really big example 409 00:10:23,929 --> 00:10:27,400 there are times on a really big example that I personally found him I was that I 410 00:10:27,400 --> 00:10:27,410 that I personally found him I was that I 411 00:10:27,410 --> 00:10:29,739 that I personally found him I was that I actually experienced myself in my own 412 00:10:29,739 --> 00:10:29,749 actually experienced myself in my own 413 00:10:29,749 --> 00:10:33,999 actually experienced myself in my own home what is on a certain ISP company 414 00:10:33,999 --> 00:10:34,009 home what is on a certain ISP company 415 00:10:34,009 --> 00:10:37,929 home what is on a certain ISP company that are not the stage ah that I would 416 00:10:37,929 --> 00:10:37,939 that are not the stage ah that I would 417 00:10:37,939 --> 00:10:42,249 that are not the stage ah that I would say a major is PE in Canada Oh what did 418 00:10:42,249 --> 00:10:42,259 say a major is PE in Canada Oh what did 419 00:10:42,259 --> 00:10:42,840 say a major is PE in Canada Oh what did Islam 420 00:10:42,840 --> 00:10:42,850 Islam 421 00:10:42,850 --> 00:10:48,540 Islam in my own personal and actually opened 422 00:10:48,540 --> 00:10:48,550 in my own personal and actually opened 423 00:10:48,550 --> 00:10:52,519 in my own personal and actually opened up the web interface to the public and 424 00:10:52,519 --> 00:10:52,529 up the web interface to the public and 425 00:10:52,529 --> 00:10:56,069 up the web interface to the public and it had a standard like usually password 426 00:10:56,069 --> 00:10:56,079 it had a standard like usually password 427 00:10:56,079 --> 00:10:59,720 it had a standard like usually password like you know like it's not like admin 428 00:10:59,720 --> 00:10:59,730 like you know like it's not like admin 429 00:10:59,730 --> 00:11:06,720 like you know like it's not like admin password so so many people don't 430 00:11:06,720 --> 00:11:06,730 password so so many people don't 431 00:11:06,730 --> 00:11:08,819 password so so many people don't understand that this is such a huge 432 00:11:08,819 --> 00:11:08,829 understand that this is such a huge 433 00:11:08,829 --> 00:11:13,710 understand that this is such a huge issue and be like I haven't contacted 434 00:11:13,710 --> 00:11:13,720 issue and be like I haven't contacted 435 00:11:13,720 --> 00:11:17,400 issue and be like I haven't contacted them up avenge um I probably should most 436 00:11:17,400 --> 00:11:17,410 them up avenge um I probably should most 437 00:11:17,410 --> 00:11:20,189 them up avenge um I probably should most like people in the future but you really 438 00:11:20,189 --> 00:11:20,199 like people in the future but you really 439 00:11:20,199 --> 00:11:21,780 like people in the future but you really have to be careful with what you're 440 00:11:21,780 --> 00:11:21,790 have to be careful with what you're 441 00:11:21,790 --> 00:11:24,240 have to be careful with what you're installing onto your network because uh 442 00:11:24,240 --> 00:11:24,250 installing onto your network because uh 443 00:11:24,250 --> 00:11:26,759 installing onto your network because uh especially with that like that did send 444 00:11:26,759 --> 00:11:26,769 especially with that like that did send 445 00:11:26,769 --> 00:11:29,879 especially with that like that did send a bit of a shock because with that 446 00:11:29,879 --> 00:11:29,889 a bit of a shock because with that 447 00:11:29,889 --> 00:11:33,150 a bit of a shock because with that anybody could walk into my mode on um 448 00:11:33,150 --> 00:11:33,160 anybody could walk into my mode on um 449 00:11:33,160 --> 00:11:35,280 anybody could walk into my mode on um and we need to do more basic things like 450 00:11:35,280 --> 00:11:35,290 and we need to do more basic things like 451 00:11:35,290 --> 00:11:38,280 and we need to do more basic things like we said it or power it off but then it 452 00:11:38,280 --> 00:11:38,290 we said it or power it off but then it 453 00:11:38,290 --> 00:11:40,199 we said it or power it off but then it also gives you more access to your 454 00:11:40,199 --> 00:11:40,209 also gives you more access to your 455 00:11:40,209 --> 00:11:43,530 also gives you more access to your network then you should ever have like 456 00:11:43,530 --> 00:11:43,540 network then you should ever have like 457 00:11:43,540 --> 00:11:47,100 network then you should ever have like me but a modem or a router would allow 458 00:11:47,100 --> 00:11:47,110 me but a modem or a router would allow 459 00:11:47,110 --> 00:11:51,210 me but a modem or a router would allow me to open up say port 3389 yeah the 460 00:11:51,210 --> 00:11:51,220 me to open up say port 3389 yeah the 461 00:11:51,220 --> 00:11:53,819 me to open up say port 3389 yeah the network which would allow me as a hacker 462 00:11:53,819 --> 00:11:53,829 network which would allow me as a hacker 463 00:11:53,829 --> 00:11:57,629 network which would allow me as a hacker to remotely access your computer desktop 464 00:11:57,629 --> 00:11:57,639 to remotely access your computer desktop 465 00:11:57,639 --> 00:12:02,129 to remotely access your computer desktop and wreak all kinds of havoc what other 466 00:12:02,129 --> 00:12:02,139 and wreak all kinds of havoc what other 467 00:12:02,139 --> 00:12:04,170 and wreak all kinds of havoc what other kinds of what are the kinds of threats 468 00:12:04,170 --> 00:12:04,180 kinds of what are the kinds of threats 469 00:12:04,180 --> 00:12:07,350 kinds of what are the kinds of threats does this introduce to our network I 470 00:12:07,350 --> 00:12:07,360 does this introduce to our network I 471 00:12:07,360 --> 00:12:09,509 does this introduce to our network I mean these are devices that we trust so 472 00:12:09,509 --> 00:12:09,519 mean these are devices that we trust so 473 00:12:09,519 --> 00:12:10,829 mean these are devices that we trust so the Internet service provider says 474 00:12:10,829 --> 00:12:10,839 the Internet service provider says 475 00:12:10,839 --> 00:12:12,449 the Internet service provider says here's your new modem it's gonna be 476 00:12:12,449 --> 00:12:12,459 here's your new modem it's gonna be 477 00:12:12,459 --> 00:12:14,460 here's your new modem it's gonna be faster it's gonna be better and you 478 00:12:14,460 --> 00:12:14,470 faster it's gonna be better and you 479 00:12:14,470 --> 00:12:16,319 faster it's gonna be better and you don't ever think twice about the 480 00:12:16,319 --> 00:12:16,329 don't ever think twice about the 481 00:12:16,329 --> 00:12:18,660 don't ever think twice about the security of that device what what does 482 00:12:18,660 --> 00:12:18,670 security of that device what what does 483 00:12:18,670 --> 00:12:21,629 security of that device what what does it open up to a hacker such as yourself 484 00:12:21,629 --> 00:12:21,639 it open up to a hacker such as yourself 485 00:12:21,639 --> 00:12:23,939 it open up to a hacker such as yourself now I understand that you're taking the 486 00:12:23,939 --> 00:12:23,949 now I understand that you're taking the 487 00:12:23,949 --> 00:12:25,379 now I understand that you're taking the you're taking the high road 488 00:12:25,379 --> 00:12:25,389 you're taking the high road 489 00:12:25,389 --> 00:12:28,379 you're taking the high road and saying you know I'm gonna educate 490 00:12:28,379 --> 00:12:28,389 and saying you know I'm gonna educate 491 00:12:28,389 --> 00:12:31,980 and saying you know I'm gonna educate people but what about those hackers that 492 00:12:31,980 --> 00:12:31,990 people but what about those hackers that 493 00:12:31,990 --> 00:12:38,990 people but what about those hackers that are saying no I'm gonna exploit people 494 00:12:38,990 --> 00:12:39,000 495 00:12:39,000 --> 00:12:41,699 that's very good question I'm just gonna 496 00:12:41,699 --> 00:12:41,709 that's very good question I'm just gonna 497 00:12:41,709 --> 00:12:43,640 that's very good question I'm just gonna put that on their own 498 00:12:43,640 --> 00:12:43,650 put that on their own 499 00:12:43,650 --> 00:12:47,000 put that on their own it is truly astonishing what you can do 500 00:12:47,000 --> 00:12:47,010 it is truly astonishing what you can do 501 00:12:47,010 --> 00:12:49,870 it is truly astonishing what you can do when you have access to these systems 502 00:12:49,870 --> 00:12:49,880 when you have access to these systems 503 00:12:49,880 --> 00:12:52,850 when you have access to these systems like you said I mean I believe that's 504 00:12:52,850 --> 00:12:52,860 like you said I mean I believe that's 505 00:12:52,860 --> 00:12:57,560 like you said I mean I believe that's our DP current yeah yeah so figure out 506 00:12:57,560 --> 00:12:57,570 our DP current yeah yeah so figure out 507 00:12:57,570 --> 00:12:59,840 our DP current yeah yeah so figure out that one you most likely chap you need 508 00:12:59,840 --> 00:12:59,850 that one you most likely chap you need 509 00:12:59,850 --> 00:13:02,540 that one you most likely chap you need to have that one enabled but there's so 510 00:13:02,540 --> 00:13:02,550 to have that one enabled but there's so 511 00:13:02,550 --> 00:13:07,100 to have that one enabled but there's so many exploits with this and a modem you 512 00:13:07,100 --> 00:13:07,110 many exploits with this and a modem you 513 00:13:07,110 --> 00:13:09,380 many exploits with this and a modem you know you'll be able just in most cases 514 00:13:09,380 --> 00:13:09,390 know you'll be able just in most cases 515 00:13:09,390 --> 00:13:11,960 know you'll be able just in most cases you can see what is installed on the 516 00:13:11,960 --> 00:13:11,970 you can see what is installed on the 517 00:13:11,970 --> 00:13:15,829 you can see what is installed on the network and then your shoulder specific 518 00:13:15,829 --> 00:13:15,839 network and then your shoulder specific 519 00:13:15,839 --> 00:13:18,530 network and then your shoulder specific IP address and you can find 520 00:13:18,530 --> 00:13:18,540 IP address and you can find 521 00:13:18,540 --> 00:13:23,180 IP address and you can find vulnerabilities in like tv-48 CDE 522 00:13:23,180 --> 00:13:23,190 vulnerabilities in like tv-48 CDE 523 00:13:23,190 --> 00:13:26,829 vulnerabilities in like tv-48 CDE database and they can say oh yeah on 524 00:13:26,829 --> 00:13:26,839 database and they can say oh yeah on 525 00:13:26,839 --> 00:13:30,860 database and they can say oh yeah on this thermostat which is a thermostat 526 00:13:30,860 --> 00:13:30,870 this thermostat which is a thermostat 527 00:13:30,870 --> 00:13:33,800 this thermostat which is a thermostat you know IOT thermostats this thermostat 528 00:13:33,800 --> 00:13:33,810 you know IOT thermostats this thermostat 529 00:13:33,810 --> 00:13:36,380 you know IOT thermostats this thermostat has this vulnerability that hasn't been 530 00:13:36,380 --> 00:13:36,390 has this vulnerability that hasn't been 531 00:13:36,390 --> 00:13:39,620 has this vulnerability that hasn't been patched yet and access it using this or 532 00:13:39,620 --> 00:13:39,630 patched yet and access it using this or 533 00:13:39,630 --> 00:13:42,110 patched yet and access it using this or this point and jacked up to temperature 534 00:13:42,110 --> 00:13:42,120 this point and jacked up to temperature 535 00:13:42,120 --> 00:13:44,510 this point and jacked up to temperature or kill it or damage the thermostat and 536 00:13:44,510 --> 00:13:44,520 or kill it or damage the thermostat and 537 00:13:44,520 --> 00:13:47,570 or kill it or damage the thermostat and then you can because you have access to 538 00:13:47,570 --> 00:13:47,580 then you can because you have access to 539 00:13:47,580 --> 00:13:49,820 then you can because you have access to the modem you can open that porch so you 540 00:13:49,820 --> 00:13:49,830 the modem you can open that porch so you 541 00:13:49,830 --> 00:13:51,740 the modem you can open that porch so you can access it yourself even if you 542 00:13:51,740 --> 00:13:51,750 can access it yourself even if you 543 00:13:51,750 --> 00:13:53,750 can access it yourself even if you weren't able to before can I didn't put 544 00:13:53,750 --> 00:13:53,760 weren't able to before can I didn't put 545 00:13:53,760 --> 00:13:55,370 weren't able to before can I didn't put something out there because you touched 546 00:13:55,370 --> 00:13:55,380 something out there because you touched 547 00:13:55,380 --> 00:13:57,530 something out there because you touched on thermostats here the Canadian hacker 548 00:13:57,530 --> 00:13:57,540 on thermostats here the Canadian hacker 549 00:13:57,540 --> 00:14:01,280 on thermostats here the Canadian hacker I could also as a hacker monitor that 550 00:14:01,280 --> 00:14:01,290 I could also as a hacker monitor that 551 00:14:01,290 --> 00:14:03,680 I could also as a hacker monitor that thermostat and see when the people are 552 00:14:03,680 --> 00:14:03,690 thermostat and see when the people are 553 00:14:03,690 --> 00:14:05,600 thermostat and see when the people are coming and going so then it brings it 554 00:14:05,600 --> 00:14:05,610 coming and going so then it brings it 555 00:14:05,610 --> 00:14:07,850 coming and going so then it brings it into a physical realm of saying okay 556 00:14:07,850 --> 00:14:07,860 into a physical realm of saying okay 557 00:14:07,860 --> 00:14:10,790 into a physical realm of saying okay well my nest thermostat tells whoever 558 00:14:10,790 --> 00:14:10,800 well my nest thermostat tells whoever 559 00:14:10,800 --> 00:14:12,710 well my nest thermostat tells whoever has access to it whether I'm home or not 560 00:14:12,710 --> 00:14:12,720 has access to it whether I'm home or not 561 00:14:12,720 --> 00:14:17,740 has access to it whether I'm home or not yeah so what if I was a physical robber 562 00:14:17,740 --> 00:14:17,750 yeah so what if I was a physical robber 563 00:14:17,750 --> 00:14:25,640 yeah so what if I was a physical robber it's definitely a scary world for a lot 564 00:14:25,640 --> 00:14:25,650 it's definitely a scary world for a lot 565 00:14:25,650 --> 00:14:28,780 it's definitely a scary world for a lot of people have smartphones right and 566 00:14:28,780 --> 00:14:28,790 of people have smartphones right and 567 00:14:28,790 --> 00:14:32,000 of people have smartphones right and communicate you zippe for example now 568 00:14:32,000 --> 00:14:32,010 communicate you zippe for example now 569 00:14:32,010 --> 00:14:36,949 communicate you zippe for example now you have a lake as a bus into album that 570 00:14:36,949 --> 00:14:36,959 you have a lake as a bus into album that 571 00:14:36,959 --> 00:14:38,810 you have a lake as a bus into album that connects all of those systems together 572 00:14:38,810 --> 00:14:38,820 connects all of those systems together 573 00:14:38,820 --> 00:14:41,210 connects all of those systems together and if you don't have that set up 574 00:14:41,210 --> 00:14:41,220 and if you don't have that set up 575 00:14:41,220 --> 00:14:44,540 and if you don't have that set up properly or if they didn't track any 576 00:14:44,540 --> 00:14:44,550 properly or if they didn't track any 577 00:14:44,550 --> 00:14:47,860 properly or if they didn't track any security issues that they saw present ah 578 00:14:47,860 --> 00:14:47,870 security issues that they saw present ah 579 00:14:47,870 --> 00:14:51,590 security issues that they saw present ah that would allow you access to for 580 00:14:51,590 --> 00:14:51,600 that would allow you access to for 581 00:14:51,600 --> 00:14:53,240 that would allow you access to for example unlock the door 582 00:14:53,240 --> 00:14:53,250 example unlock the door 583 00:14:53,250 --> 00:14:57,170 example unlock the door or training and it's really bad because 584 00:14:57,170 --> 00:14:57,180 or training and it's really bad because 585 00:14:57,180 --> 00:15:00,020 or training and it's really bad because there are a lot of systems don't use any 586 00:15:00,020 --> 00:15:00,030 there are a lot of systems don't use any 587 00:15:00,030 --> 00:15:02,360 there are a lot of systems don't use any other education with that I mean there 588 00:15:02,360 --> 00:15:02,370 other education with that I mean there 589 00:15:02,370 --> 00:15:05,870 other education with that I mean there are some that do uh but yeah with like 590 00:15:05,870 --> 00:15:05,880 are some that do uh but yeah with like 591 00:15:05,880 --> 00:15:07,880 are some that do uh but yeah with like one of those smart phones you know it's 592 00:15:07,880 --> 00:15:07,890 one of those smart phones you know it's 593 00:15:07,890 --> 00:15:09,620 one of those smart phones you know it's just like if you were hacked everything 594 00:15:09,620 --> 00:15:09,630 just like if you were hacked everything 595 00:15:09,630 --> 00:15:11,360 just like if you were hacked everything out you could press a button on your 596 00:15:11,360 --> 00:15:11,370 out you could press a button on your 597 00:15:11,370 --> 00:15:13,670 out you could press a button on your phone maneuver lock the door a wall we 598 00:15:13,670 --> 00:15:13,680 phone maneuver lock the door a wall we 599 00:15:13,680 --> 00:15:15,350 phone maneuver lock the door a wall we can somebody else that has access to 600 00:15:15,350 --> 00:15:15,360 can somebody else that has access to 601 00:15:15,360 --> 00:15:20,510 can somebody else that has access to your modem do the same thing so think 602 00:15:20,510 --> 00:15:20,520 your modem do the same thing so think 603 00:15:20,520 --> 00:15:22,550 your modem do the same thing so think thought yeah never even really thought 604 00:15:22,550 --> 00:15:22,560 thought yeah never even really thought 605 00:15:22,560 --> 00:15:24,470 thought yeah never even really thought that we were always thinking in terms of 606 00:15:24,470 --> 00:15:24,480 that we were always thinking in terms of 607 00:15:24,480 --> 00:15:27,350 that we were always thinking in terms of you know the the actual app well if I 608 00:15:27,350 --> 00:15:27,360 you know the the actual app well if I 609 00:15:27,360 --> 00:15:31,670 you know the the actual app well if I have access to the modem I can access 610 00:15:31,670 --> 00:15:31,680 have access to the modem I can access 611 00:15:31,680 --> 00:15:33,860 have access to the modem I can access any of the devices within the same 612 00:15:33,860 --> 00:15:33,870 any of the devices within the same 613 00:15:33,870 --> 00:15:35,900 any of the devices within the same network that's scary stuff 614 00:15:35,900 --> 00:15:35,910 network that's scary stuff 615 00:15:35,910 --> 00:15:38,270 network that's scary stuff well we're speaking with the Canadian 616 00:15:38,270 --> 00:15:38,280 well we're speaking with the Canadian 617 00:15:38,280 --> 00:15:40,400 well we're speaking with the Canadian hacker and before we take a quick break 618 00:15:40,400 --> 00:15:40,410 hacker and before we take a quick break 619 00:15:40,410 --> 00:15:44,360 hacker and before we take a quick break let's have a look at a video of how the 620 00:15:44,360 --> 00:15:44,370 let's have a look at a video of how the 621 00:15:44,370 --> 00:15:46,130 let's have a look at a video of how the Canadian hacker was able to compromise 622 00:15:46,130 --> 00:15:46,140 Canadian hacker was able to compromise 623 00:15:46,140 --> 00:15:51,710 Canadian hacker was able to compromise all those printers 624 00:15:51,710 --> 00:15:51,720 625 00:15:51,720 --> 00:16:02,490 [Music] 626 00:16:02,490 --> 00:16:02,500 627 00:16:02,500 --> 00:16:39,140 [Music] 628 00:16:39,140 --> 00:16:39,150 629 00:16:39,150 --> 00:16:56,800 [Music] 630 00:16:56,800 --> 00:16:56,810 631 00:16:56,810 --> 00:16:57,890 [Music] 632 00:16:57,890 --> 00:16:57,900 [Music] 633 00:16:57,900 --> 00:17:00,020 [Music] please don't go anywhere when we come 634 00:17:00,020 --> 00:17:00,030 please don't go anywhere when we come 635 00:17:00,030 --> 00:17:01,880 please don't go anywhere when we come back from this short break the Canadian 636 00:17:01,880 --> 00:17:01,890 back from this short break the Canadian 637 00:17:01,890 --> 00:17:03,200 back from this short break the Canadian hacker is not only going to be sharing 638 00:17:03,200 --> 00:17:03,210 hacker is not only going to be sharing 639 00:17:03,210 --> 00:17:05,090 hacker is not only going to be sharing with us about the response that he's 640 00:17:05,090 --> 00:17:05,100 with us about the response that he's 641 00:17:05,100 --> 00:17:07,400 with us about the response that he's received to the printer Hanna but also 642 00:17:07,400 --> 00:17:07,410 received to the printer Hanna but also 643 00:17:07,410 --> 00:17:09,500 received to the printer Hanna but also he's going to share his concerns about 644 00:17:09,500 --> 00:17:09,510 he's going to share his concerns about 645 00:17:09,510 --> 00:17:12,140 he's going to share his concerns about how young people could use similar hacks 646 00:17:12,140 --> 00:17:12,150 how young people could use similar hacks 647 00:17:12,150 --> 00:17:14,510 how young people could use similar hacks to damage devices around the world and 648 00:17:14,510 --> 00:17:14,520 to damage devices around the world and 649 00:17:14,520 --> 00:17:17,480 to damage devices around the world and how governments could use it for cyber 650 00:17:17,480 --> 00:17:17,490 how governments could use it for cyber 651 00:17:17,490 --> 00:17:21,579 how governments could use it for cyber espionage don't go anywhere 652 00:17:21,579 --> 00:17:21,589 espionage don't go anywhere 653 00:17:21,589 --> 00:17:34,990 espionage don't go anywhere [Music] 654 00:17:34,990 --> 00:17:35,000 655 00:17:35,000 --> 00:17:39,640 [Music] 656 00:17:39,640 --> 00:17:39,650 657 00:17:39,650 --> 00:17:42,020 jumping back to your own hack of 658 00:17:42,020 --> 00:17:42,030 jumping back to your own hack of 659 00:17:42,030 --> 00:17:45,020 jumping back to your own hack of printers across Canada the US and even 660 00:17:45,020 --> 00:17:45,030 printers across Canada the US and even 661 00:17:45,030 --> 00:17:51,500 printers across Canada the US and even overseas what is the response that 662 00:17:51,500 --> 00:17:51,510 overseas what is the response that 663 00:17:51,510 --> 00:17:54,670 overseas what is the response that you've received like have you have you 664 00:17:54,670 --> 00:17:54,680 you've received like have you have you 665 00:17:54,680 --> 00:17:58,840 you've received like have you have you gotten a lot of feedback from that hack 666 00:17:58,840 --> 00:17:58,850 gotten a lot of feedback from that hack 667 00:17:58,850 --> 00:18:03,380 gotten a lot of feedback from that hack yes I have so the attack 668 00:18:03,380 --> 00:18:03,390 yes I have so the attack 669 00:18:03,390 --> 00:18:10,640 yes I have so the attack I added my Twitter handle as well as my 670 00:18:10,640 --> 00:18:10,650 I added my Twitter handle as well as my 671 00:18:10,650 --> 00:18:15,410 I added my Twitter handle as well as my email now the majority of the feedback 672 00:18:15,410 --> 00:18:15,420 email now the majority of the feedback 673 00:18:15,420 --> 00:18:17,870 email now the majority of the feedback has been positive and a lot of people 674 00:18:17,870 --> 00:18:17,880 has been positive and a lot of people 675 00:18:17,880 --> 00:18:20,450 has been positive and a lot of people action font acted me to help with the 676 00:18:20,450 --> 00:18:20,460 action font acted me to help with the 677 00:18:20,460 --> 00:18:24,410 action font acted me to help with the problem a lot of the folks - I don't 678 00:18:24,410 --> 00:18:24,420 problem a lot of the folks - I don't 679 00:18:24,420 --> 00:18:27,650 problem a lot of the folks - I don't know how to do this me help me and you 680 00:18:27,650 --> 00:18:27,660 know how to do this me help me and you 681 00:18:27,660 --> 00:18:31,310 know how to do this me help me and you know you this stuff there's some other 682 00:18:31,310 --> 00:18:31,320 know you this stuff there's some other 683 00:18:31,320 --> 00:18:34,040 know you this stuff there's some other people which I mean necessarily know 684 00:18:34,040 --> 00:18:34,050 people which I mean necessarily know 685 00:18:34,050 --> 00:18:36,560 people which I mean necessarily know your motives but I have bought in 686 00:18:36,560 --> 00:18:36,570 your motives but I have bought in 687 00:18:36,570 --> 00:18:39,190 your motives but I have bought in actually a few death threats from Nam 688 00:18:39,190 --> 00:18:39,200 actually a few death threats from Nam 689 00:18:39,200 --> 00:18:43,040 actually a few death threats from Nam Russia which is why you can see their 690 00:18:43,040 --> 00:18:43,050 Russia which is why you can see their 691 00:18:43,050 --> 00:18:47,960 Russia which is why you can see their master in this aw sure is it possible 692 00:18:47,960 --> 00:18:47,970 master in this aw sure is it possible 693 00:18:47,970 --> 00:18:50,420 master in this aw sure is it possible the Canadian hacker and we don't like to 694 00:18:50,420 --> 00:18:50,430 the Canadian hacker and we don't like to 695 00:18:50,430 --> 00:18:52,940 the Canadian hacker and we don't like to get into politics or any of that kind of 696 00:18:52,940 --> 00:18:52,950 get into politics or any of that kind of 697 00:18:52,950 --> 00:18:55,940 get into politics or any of that kind of stuff here on category 5 but is it 698 00:18:55,940 --> 00:18:55,950 stuff here on category 5 but is it 699 00:18:55,950 --> 00:18:58,220 stuff here on category 5 but is it possible that they're utilizing these 700 00:18:58,220 --> 00:18:58,230 possible that they're utilizing these 701 00:18:58,230 --> 00:19:01,580 possible that they're utilizing these exploits and you are educating the 702 00:19:01,580 --> 00:19:01,590 exploits and you are educating the 703 00:19:01,590 --> 00:19:05,090 exploits and you are educating the people to these exploits you know what 704 00:19:05,090 --> 00:19:05,100 people to these exploits you know what 705 00:19:05,100 --> 00:19:12,250 people to these exploits you know what I've never thought and that is very good 706 00:19:12,250 --> 00:19:12,260 707 00:19:12,260 --> 00:19:14,900 possibility that is very much so 708 00:19:14,900 --> 00:19:14,910 possibility that is very much so 709 00:19:14,910 --> 00:19:17,720 possibility that is very much so possibility yes and I could be showing 710 00:19:17,720 --> 00:19:17,730 possibility yes and I could be showing 711 00:19:17,730 --> 00:19:19,400 possibility yes and I could be showing by doing this I could be showing the 712 00:19:19,400 --> 00:19:19,410 by doing this I could be showing the 713 00:19:19,410 --> 00:19:21,770 by doing this I could be showing the public are things that maybe those 714 00:19:21,770 --> 00:19:21,780 public are things that maybe those 715 00:19:21,780 --> 00:19:25,100 public are things that maybe those people who said those threats they want 716 00:19:25,100 --> 00:19:25,110 people who said those threats they want 717 00:19:25,110 --> 00:19:28,760 people who said those threats they want to see oh yeah that's a very good point 718 00:19:28,760 --> 00:19:28,770 to see oh yeah that's a very good point 719 00:19:28,770 --> 00:19:31,550 to see oh yeah that's a very good point how do you think the CIA felt when 720 00:19:31,550 --> 00:19:31,560 how do you think the CIA felt when 721 00:19:31,560 --> 00:19:35,830 how do you think the CIA felt when eternal blue was revealed publicly 722 00:19:35,830 --> 00:19:35,840 eternal blue was revealed publicly 723 00:19:35,840 --> 00:19:38,800 eternal blue was revealed publicly you know I don't know what happened to 724 00:19:38,800 --> 00:19:38,810 you know I don't know what happened to 725 00:19:38,810 --> 00:19:43,000 you know I don't know what happened to those hackers we nobody knows so looking 726 00:19:43,000 --> 00:19:43,010 those hackers we nobody knows so looking 727 00:19:43,010 --> 00:19:44,860 those hackers we nobody knows so looking at so this is the Canadian hacker that 728 00:19:44,860 --> 00:19:44,870 at so this is the Canadian hacker that 729 00:19:44,870 --> 00:19:46,630 at so this is the Canadian hacker that we're speaking with her and and we joke 730 00:19:46,630 --> 00:19:46,640 we're speaking with her and and we joke 731 00:19:46,640 --> 00:19:49,660 we're speaking with her and and we joke but the truth is is that the Canadian 732 00:19:49,660 --> 00:19:49,670 but the truth is is that the Canadian 733 00:19:49,670 --> 00:19:52,210 but the truth is is that the Canadian hacker has taken a very high road 734 00:19:52,210 --> 00:19:52,220 hacker has taken a very high road 735 00:19:52,220 --> 00:19:55,030 hacker has taken a very high road approach to these types of exploits and 736 00:19:55,030 --> 00:19:55,040 approach to these types of exploits and 737 00:19:55,040 --> 00:19:57,780 approach to these types of exploits and in your actual printout so understand 738 00:19:57,780 --> 00:19:57,790 in your actual printout so understand 739 00:19:57,790 --> 00:20:00,850 in your actual printout so understand hundreds of thousands of printers around 740 00:20:00,850 --> 00:20:00,860 hundreds of thousands of printers around 741 00:20:00,860 --> 00:20:02,230 hundreds of thousands of printers around the world suddenly started printing out 742 00:20:02,230 --> 00:20:02,240 the world suddenly started printing out 743 00:20:02,240 --> 00:20:06,940 the world suddenly started printing out this printout from this hacker and on 744 00:20:06,940 --> 00:20:06,950 this printout from this hacker and on 745 00:20:06,950 --> 00:20:11,260 this printout from this hacker and on this printout it says if you are unable 746 00:20:11,260 --> 00:20:11,270 this printout it says if you are unable 747 00:20:11,270 --> 00:20:13,540 this printout it says if you are unable to find suitable instructions you are 748 00:20:13,540 --> 00:20:13,550 to find suitable instructions you are 749 00:20:13,550 --> 00:20:16,450 to find suitable instructions you are welcome to contact me via email or 750 00:20:16,450 --> 00:20:16,460 welcome to contact me via email or 751 00:20:16,460 --> 00:20:19,320 welcome to contact me via email or Twitter and I'll be glad to help you out 752 00:20:19,320 --> 00:20:19,330 Twitter and I'll be glad to help you out 753 00:20:19,330 --> 00:20:21,940 Twitter and I'll be glad to help you out you mentioned some older folks reaching 754 00:20:21,940 --> 00:20:21,950 you mentioned some older folks reaching 755 00:20:21,950 --> 00:20:24,370 you mentioned some older folks reaching out like have you really received folks 756 00:20:24,370 --> 00:20:24,380 out like have you really received folks 757 00:20:24,380 --> 00:20:26,890 out like have you really received folks reaching out and saying I need help with 758 00:20:26,890 --> 00:20:26,900 reaching out and saying I need help with 759 00:20:26,900 --> 00:20:31,150 reaching out and saying I need help with this yes I have um the majority of the 760 00:20:31,150 --> 00:20:31,160 this yes I have um the majority of the 761 00:20:31,160 --> 00:20:32,860 this yes I have um the majority of the emails I've received where people 762 00:20:32,860 --> 00:20:32,870 emails I've received where people 763 00:20:32,870 --> 00:20:36,940 emails I've received where people thanking me all which I necessarily will 764 00:20:36,940 --> 00:20:36,950 thanking me all which I necessarily will 765 00:20:36,950 --> 00:20:37,540 thanking me all which I necessarily will pay for that 766 00:20:37,540 --> 00:20:37,550 pay for that 767 00:20:37,550 --> 00:20:39,580 pay for that through the email or anything like that 768 00:20:39,580 --> 00:20:39,590 through the email or anything like that 769 00:20:39,590 --> 00:20:43,000 through the email or anything like that but uh is more to provide a support 770 00:20:43,000 --> 00:20:43,010 but uh is more to provide a support 771 00:20:43,010 --> 00:20:46,090 but uh is more to provide a support system to help people with that and yes 772 00:20:46,090 --> 00:20:46,100 system to help people with that and yes 773 00:20:46,100 --> 00:20:49,350 system to help people with that and yes I could receive multitudes of emails 774 00:20:49,350 --> 00:20:49,360 I could receive multitudes of emails 775 00:20:49,360 --> 00:20:53,140 I could receive multitudes of emails stating that they required help and 776 00:20:53,140 --> 00:20:53,150 stating that they required help and 777 00:20:53,150 --> 00:20:56,230 stating that they required help and their company hasn't told them where 778 00:20:56,230 --> 00:20:56,240 their company hasn't told them where 779 00:20:56,240 --> 00:20:58,390 their company hasn't told them where they don't know how to of things like 780 00:20:58,390 --> 00:20:58,400 they don't know how to of things like 781 00:20:58,400 --> 00:20:59,740 they don't know how to of things like that and I could provide a step-by-step 782 00:20:59,740 --> 00:20:59,750 that and I could provide a step-by-step 783 00:20:59,750 --> 00:21:01,990 that and I could provide a step-by-step process and then there's also some 784 00:21:01,990 --> 00:21:02,000 process and then there's also some 785 00:21:02,000 --> 00:21:04,210 process and then there's also some people some people that don't 786 00:21:04,210 --> 00:21:04,220 people some people that don't 787 00:21:04,220 --> 00:21:06,010 people some people that don't necessarily know how I did the exploit 788 00:21:06,010 --> 00:21:06,020 necessarily know how I did the exploit 789 00:21:06,020 --> 00:21:08,350 necessarily know how I did the exploit but you know how fix the problem and 790 00:21:08,350 --> 00:21:08,360 but you know how fix the problem and 791 00:21:08,360 --> 00:21:10,810 but you know how fix the problem and they've contacted me to test it again to 792 00:21:10,810 --> 00:21:10,820 they've contacted me to test it again to 793 00:21:10,820 --> 00:21:11,980 they've contacted me to test it again to make sure that the printer isn't 794 00:21:11,980 --> 00:21:11,990 make sure that the printer isn't 795 00:21:11,990 --> 00:21:12,670 make sure that the printer isn't accessible 796 00:21:12,670 --> 00:21:12,680 accessible 797 00:21:12,680 --> 00:21:15,730 accessible Oh fantastic okay so are you gonna 798 00:21:15,730 --> 00:21:15,740 Oh fantastic okay so are you gonna 799 00:21:15,740 --> 00:21:18,150 Oh fantastic okay so are you gonna continue hacking printers in this way 800 00:21:18,150 --> 00:21:18,160 continue hacking printers in this way 801 00:21:18,160 --> 00:21:21,610 continue hacking printers in this way almost definitely um I am gonna be 802 00:21:21,610 --> 00:21:21,620 almost definitely um I am gonna be 803 00:21:21,620 --> 00:21:24,940 almost definitely um I am gonna be sending out another wave I'm a good 804 00:21:24,940 --> 00:21:24,950 sending out another wave I'm a good 805 00:21:24,950 --> 00:21:26,530 sending out another wave I'm a good defender mom they're not gonna make them 806 00:21:26,530 --> 00:21:26,540 defender mom they're not gonna make them 807 00:21:26,540 --> 00:21:28,720 defender mom they're not gonna make them fight but I don't know how many pictures 808 00:21:28,720 --> 00:21:28,730 fight but I don't know how many pictures 809 00:21:28,730 --> 00:21:30,940 fight but I don't know how many pictures I'll be sending this Oh - OH 810 00:21:30,940 --> 00:21:30,950 I'll be sending this Oh - OH 811 00:21:30,950 --> 00:21:34,980 I'll be sending this Oh - OH I'm thinking maybe five hundred thousand 812 00:21:34,980 --> 00:21:34,990 I'm thinking maybe five hundred thousand 813 00:21:34,990 --> 00:21:38,620 I'm thinking maybe five hundred thousand so that'll be much larger amount of 814 00:21:38,620 --> 00:21:38,630 so that'll be much larger amount of 815 00:21:38,630 --> 00:21:41,260 so that'll be much larger amount of pictures that I sent it to before but 816 00:21:41,260 --> 00:21:41,270 pictures that I sent it to before but 817 00:21:41,270 --> 00:21:43,909 pictures that I sent it to before but also 818 00:21:43,909 --> 00:21:43,919 819 00:21:43,919 --> 00:21:50,100 sorry no no you're fantastic and we 820 00:21:50,100 --> 00:21:50,110 sorry no no you're fantastic and we 821 00:21:50,110 --> 00:21:51,870 sorry no no you're fantastic and we appreciate your time so very much 822 00:21:51,870 --> 00:21:51,880 appreciate your time so very much 823 00:21:51,880 --> 00:21:55,620 appreciate your time so very much the Canadian hacker so many hackers 824 00:21:55,620 --> 00:21:55,630 the Canadian hacker so many hackers 825 00:21:55,630 --> 00:21:58,169 the Canadian hacker so many hackers would utilize these types of exploits 826 00:21:58,169 --> 00:21:58,179 would utilize these types of exploits 827 00:21:58,179 --> 00:21:59,940 would utilize these types of exploits for example I mean you're talking about 828 00:21:59,940 --> 00:21:59,950 for example I mean you're talking about 829 00:21:59,950 --> 00:22:01,919 for example I mean you're talking about sending you've already sent to over a 830 00:22:01,919 --> 00:22:01,929 sending you've already sent to over a 831 00:22:01,929 --> 00:22:04,379 sending you've already sent to over a hundred thousand printers print out jobs 832 00:22:04,379 --> 00:22:04,389 hundred thousand printers print out jobs 833 00:22:04,389 --> 00:22:07,110 hundred thousand printers print out jobs okay and now we're talking about the 834 00:22:07,110 --> 00:22:07,120 okay and now we're talking about the 835 00:22:07,120 --> 00:22:08,820 okay and now we're talking about the next wave being another five hundred 836 00:22:08,820 --> 00:22:08,830 next wave being another five hundred 837 00:22:08,830 --> 00:22:12,450 next wave being another five hundred thousand printers where a lot of hackers 838 00:22:12,450 --> 00:22:12,460 thousand printers where a lot of hackers 839 00:22:12,460 --> 00:22:14,610 thousand printers where a lot of hackers would just like hey let's print out a 840 00:22:14,610 --> 00:22:14,620 would just like hey let's print out a 841 00:22:14,620 --> 00:22:16,680 would just like hey let's print out a mass amount of porn on all these 842 00:22:16,680 --> 00:22:16,690 mass amount of porn on all these 843 00:22:16,690 --> 00:22:18,749 mass amount of porn on all these business printers let's like print out 844 00:22:18,749 --> 00:22:18,759 business printers let's like print out 845 00:22:18,759 --> 00:22:22,409 business printers let's like print out some some horrible things this is you 846 00:22:22,409 --> 00:22:22,419 some some horrible things this is you 847 00:22:22,419 --> 00:22:24,029 some some horrible things this is you know the approach of the traditional 848 00:22:24,029 --> 00:22:24,039 know the approach of the traditional 849 00:22:24,039 --> 00:22:27,960 know the approach of the traditional hacker and this is how I think media has 850 00:22:27,960 --> 00:22:27,970 hacker and this is how I think media has 851 00:22:27,970 --> 00:22:30,899 hacker and this is how I think media has painted the hacker so we have this 852 00:22:30,899 --> 00:22:30,909 painted the hacker so we have this 853 00:22:30,909 --> 00:22:33,570 painted the hacker so we have this picture of what a hacker is and that's 854 00:22:33,570 --> 00:22:33,580 picture of what a hacker is and that's 855 00:22:33,580 --> 00:22:36,029 picture of what a hacker is and that's what we expect of them what has caused 856 00:22:36,029 --> 00:22:36,039 what we expect of them what has caused 857 00:22:36,039 --> 00:22:38,730 what we expect of them what has caused you to take a different approach and 858 00:22:38,730 --> 00:22:38,740 you to take a different approach and 859 00:22:38,740 --> 00:22:43,100 you to take a different approach and instead send to 600,000 printers 860 00:22:43,100 --> 00:22:43,110 instead send to 600,000 printers 861 00:22:43,110 --> 00:22:46,950 instead send to 600,000 printers instructions and assistance with helping 862 00:22:46,950 --> 00:22:46,960 instructions and assistance with helping 863 00:22:46,960 --> 00:23:02,789 instructions and assistance with helping to close these exploits I thought or not 864 00:23:02,789 --> 00:23:02,799 to close these exploits I thought or not 865 00:23:02,799 --> 00:23:06,899 to close these exploits I thought or not nuts to Sarah thought they'd never ever 866 00:23:06,899 --> 00:23:06,909 nuts to Sarah thought they'd never ever 867 00:23:06,909 --> 00:23:13,950 nuts to Sarah thought they'd never ever wanted to have any devices for immoral 868 00:23:13,950 --> 00:23:13,960 wanted to have any devices for immoral 869 00:23:13,960 --> 00:23:19,080 wanted to have any devices for immoral purposes or to do for reasons of my own 870 00:23:19,080 --> 00:23:19,090 purposes or to do for reasons of my own 871 00:23:19,090 --> 00:23:21,720 purposes or to do for reasons of my own oh that first they wouldn't like 872 00:23:21,720 --> 00:23:21,730 oh that first they wouldn't like 873 00:23:21,730 --> 00:23:25,799 oh that first they wouldn't like necessarily a dump so I think it was 874 00:23:25,799 --> 00:23:25,809 necessarily a dump so I think it was 875 00:23:25,809 --> 00:23:30,539 necessarily a dump so I think it was just I wanted to be able to make a 876 00:23:30,539 --> 00:23:30,549 just I wanted to be able to make a 877 00:23:30,549 --> 00:23:33,139 just I wanted to be able to make a difference in something without 878 00:23:33,139 --> 00:23:33,149 difference in something without 879 00:23:33,149 --> 00:23:37,830 difference in something without necessarily hurting the persons involved 880 00:23:37,830 --> 00:23:37,840 necessarily hurting the persons involved 881 00:23:37,840 --> 00:23:42,240 necessarily hurting the persons involved oh yeah that's pretty much home and 882 00:23:42,240 --> 00:23:42,250 oh yeah that's pretty much home and 883 00:23:42,250 --> 00:23:43,009 oh yeah that's pretty much home and sorry 884 00:23:43,009 --> 00:23:43,019 sorry 885 00:23:43,019 --> 00:23:48,450 sorry are you you live up to the the handle of 886 00:23:48,450 --> 00:23:48,460 are you you live up to the the handle of 887 00:23:48,460 --> 00:23:50,669 are you you live up to the the handle of the Canadian hacker by apologizing but 888 00:23:50,669 --> 00:23:50,679 the Canadian hacker by apologizing but 889 00:23:50,679 --> 00:23:54,300 the Canadian hacker by apologizing but what what you're revealing to us 890 00:23:54,300 --> 00:23:54,310 what what you're revealing to us 891 00:23:54,310 --> 00:23:57,600 what what you're revealing to us I I just envision like a new world of 892 00:23:57,600 --> 00:23:57,610 I I just envision like a new world of 893 00:23:57,610 --> 00:24:01,950 I I just envision like a new world of philanthropy in a way like as a hacker 894 00:24:01,950 --> 00:24:01,960 philanthropy in a way like as a hacker 895 00:24:01,960 --> 00:24:05,520 philanthropy in a way like as a hacker you're choosing to help others by 896 00:24:05,520 --> 00:24:05,530 you're choosing to help others by 897 00:24:05,530 --> 00:24:08,250 you're choosing to help others by exploiting the very things that are 898 00:24:08,250 --> 00:24:08,260 exploiting the very things that are 899 00:24:08,260 --> 00:24:10,200 exploiting the very things that are exploitable within their networks 900 00:24:10,200 --> 00:24:10,210 exploitable within their networks 901 00:24:10,210 --> 00:24:14,700 exploitable within their networks so you're saying hey by the way your 902 00:24:14,700 --> 00:24:14,710 so you're saying hey by the way your 903 00:24:14,710 --> 00:24:16,650 so you're saying hey by the way your printers could be used for these 904 00:24:16,650 --> 00:24:16,660 printers could be used for these 905 00:24:16,660 --> 00:24:18,600 printers could be used for these malicious purposes but I want to help 906 00:24:18,600 --> 00:24:18,610 malicious purposes but I want to help 907 00:24:18,610 --> 00:24:21,990 malicious purposes but I want to help you to lock those down exactly and of 908 00:24:21,990 --> 00:24:22,000 you to lock those down exactly and of 909 00:24:22,000 --> 00:24:24,690 you to lock those down exactly and of course I didn't have to do that if I 910 00:24:24,690 --> 00:24:24,700 course I didn't have to do that if I 911 00:24:24,700 --> 00:24:27,870 course I didn't have to do that if I wanted to I could dumb or completely 912 00:24:27,870 --> 00:24:27,880 wanted to I could dumb or completely 913 00:24:27,880 --> 00:24:30,750 wanted to I could dumb or completely destroy those printers by deflating DEP 914 00:24:30,750 --> 00:24:30,760 destroy those printers by deflating DEP 915 00:24:30,760 --> 00:24:32,640 destroy those printers by deflating DEP wrong over and over and over again 916 00:24:32,640 --> 00:24:32,650 wrong over and over and over again 917 00:24:32,650 --> 00:24:35,910 wrong over and over and over again um takes about 24 hours and I'm 918 00:24:35,910 --> 00:24:35,920 um takes about 24 hours and I'm 919 00:24:35,920 --> 00:24:38,640 um takes about 24 hours and I'm completely toilet printer oh I could do 920 00:24:38,640 --> 00:24:38,650 completely toilet printer oh I could do 921 00:24:38,650 --> 00:24:41,400 completely toilet printer oh I could do that I could print off some images that 922 00:24:41,400 --> 00:24:41,410 that I could print off some images that 923 00:24:41,410 --> 00:24:43,290 that I could print off some images that you wouldn't necessarily want to be 924 00:24:43,290 --> 00:24:43,300 you wouldn't necessarily want to be 925 00:24:43,300 --> 00:24:45,120 you wouldn't necessarily want to be printed off Oh 926 00:24:45,120 --> 00:24:45,130 printed off Oh 927 00:24:45,130 --> 00:24:47,610 printed off Oh things like that I could out permanently 928 00:24:47,610 --> 00:24:47,620 things like that I could out permanently 929 00:24:47,620 --> 00:24:53,760 things like that I could out permanently ash like a lot but not necessarily text 930 00:24:53,760 --> 00:24:53,770 ash like a lot but not necessarily text 931 00:24:53,770 --> 00:24:55,260 ash like a lot but not necessarily text you could do anything you wanted any 932 00:24:55,260 --> 00:24:55,270 you could do anything you wanted any 933 00:24:55,270 --> 00:25:02,610 you could do anything you wanted any image Oh but yeah I've chosen June all 934 00:25:02,610 --> 00:25:02,620 image Oh but yeah I've chosen June all 935 00:25:02,620 --> 00:25:05,640 image Oh but yeah I've chosen June all the things that you could do but you're 936 00:25:05,640 --> 00:25:05,650 the things that you could do but you're 937 00:25:05,650 --> 00:25:08,880 the things that you could do but you're choosing the highroad did kudos and and 938 00:25:08,880 --> 00:25:08,890 choosing the highroad did kudos and and 939 00:25:08,890 --> 00:25:12,270 choosing the highroad did kudos and and and well done do you have plans you know 940 00:25:12,270 --> 00:25:12,280 and well done do you have plans you know 941 00:25:12,280 --> 00:25:13,950 and well done do you have plans you know stepping away from the so the printer 942 00:25:13,950 --> 00:25:13,960 stepping away from the so the printer 943 00:25:13,960 --> 00:25:16,050 stepping away from the so the printer hack has been a successful hack and and 944 00:25:16,050 --> 00:25:16,060 hack has been a successful hack and and 945 00:25:16,060 --> 00:25:17,940 hack has been a successful hack and and you've been making a difference for 946 00:25:17,940 --> 00:25:17,950 you've been making a difference for 947 00:25:17,950 --> 00:25:19,830 you've been making a difference for those who receive it and realize oh my 948 00:25:19,830 --> 00:25:19,840 those who receive it and realize oh my 949 00:25:19,840 --> 00:25:22,680 those who receive it and realize oh my goodness my printer is exploitable but 950 00:25:22,680 --> 00:25:22,690 goodness my printer is exploitable but 951 00:25:22,690 --> 00:25:26,460 goodness my printer is exploitable but this hacker has chosen to tell me about 952 00:25:26,460 --> 00:25:26,470 this hacker has chosen to tell me about 953 00:25:26,470 --> 00:25:29,910 this hacker has chosen to tell me about it so that I'm no longer susceptible 954 00:25:29,910 --> 00:25:29,920 it so that I'm no longer susceptible 955 00:25:29,920 --> 00:25:32,520 it so that I'm no longer susceptible what what do you have planned beyond 956 00:25:32,520 --> 00:25:32,530 what what do you have planned beyond 957 00:25:32,530 --> 00:25:34,680 what what do you have planned beyond that so when this is exhausted itself 958 00:25:34,680 --> 00:25:34,690 that so when this is exhausted itself 959 00:25:34,690 --> 00:25:36,990 that so when this is exhausted itself what's the next step for the Canadian 960 00:25:36,990 --> 00:25:37,000 what's the next step for the Canadian 961 00:25:37,000 --> 00:25:45,540 what's the next step for the Canadian hacker to career paths I still always 962 00:25:45,540 --> 00:25:45,550 hacker to career paths I still always 963 00:25:45,550 --> 00:25:49,320 hacker to career paths I still always want you to go Hawking depending on 964 00:25:49,320 --> 00:25:49,330 want you to go Hawking depending on 965 00:25:49,330 --> 00:25:52,080 want you to go Hawking depending on whatever career I choose and I 966 00:25:52,080 --> 00:25:52,090 whatever career I choose and I 967 00:25:52,090 --> 00:25:54,900 whatever career I choose and I definitely wanted definitely one go on 968 00:25:54,900 --> 00:25:54,910 definitely wanted definitely one go on 969 00:25:54,910 --> 00:26:01,410 definitely wanted definitely one go on to the dark side of that either so I've 970 00:26:01,410 --> 00:26:01,420 to the dark side of that either so I've 971 00:26:01,420 --> 00:26:04,740 to the dark side of that either so I've been looking at excite any sort of 972 00:26:04,740 --> 00:26:04,750 been looking at excite any sort of 973 00:26:04,750 --> 00:26:06,860 been looking at excite any sort of cybersecurity 974 00:26:06,860 --> 00:26:06,870 cybersecurity 975 00:26:06,870 --> 00:26:09,770 cybersecurity so anything like that um seeing if I can 976 00:26:09,770 --> 00:26:09,780 so anything like that um seeing if I can 977 00:26:09,780 --> 00:26:12,430 so anything like that um seeing if I can get a degree of some sort with that um 978 00:26:12,430 --> 00:26:12,440 get a degree of some sort with that um 979 00:26:12,440 --> 00:26:15,290 get a degree of some sort with that um or I've also didn't care of engineering 980 00:26:15,290 --> 00:26:15,300 or I've also didn't care of engineering 981 00:26:15,300 --> 00:26:19,640 or I've also didn't care of engineering electrical so you're talking about 982 00:26:19,640 --> 00:26:19,650 electrical so you're talking about 983 00:26:19,650 --> 00:26:21,880 electrical so you're talking about you're talking about career paths as 984 00:26:21,880 --> 00:26:21,890 you're talking about career paths as 985 00:26:21,890 --> 00:26:25,040 you're talking about career paths as future tense so am I to understand that 986 00:26:25,040 --> 00:26:25,050 future tense so am I to understand that 987 00:26:25,050 --> 00:26:31,430 future tense so am I to understand that you are younger than twenty ten so high 988 00:26:31,430 --> 00:26:31,440 you are younger than twenty ten so high 989 00:26:31,440 --> 00:26:33,010 you are younger than twenty ten so high school 990 00:26:33,010 --> 00:26:33,020 school 991 00:26:33,020 --> 00:26:37,300 school so I still have a good bit of time but 992 00:26:37,300 --> 00:26:37,310 so I still have a good bit of time but 993 00:26:37,310 --> 00:26:41,450 so I still have a good bit of time but it kind of just goes to show that if I'm 994 00:26:41,450 --> 00:26:41,460 it kind of just goes to show that if I'm 995 00:26:41,460 --> 00:26:45,080 it kind of just goes to show that if I'm able to do this as a pretense to didn't 996 00:26:45,080 --> 00:26:45,090 able to do this as a pretense to didn't 997 00:26:45,090 --> 00:26:47,780 able to do this as a pretense to didn't lift is somebody with a lot more 998 00:26:47,780 --> 00:26:47,790 lift is somebody with a lot more 999 00:26:47,790 --> 00:26:50,090 lift is somebody with a lot more knowledge who's actually got a degree MS 1000 00:26:50,090 --> 00:26:50,100 knowledge who's actually got a degree MS 1001 00:26:50,100 --> 00:26:54,290 knowledge who's actually got a degree MS or can do it why don't you and the 1002 00:26:54,290 --> 00:26:54,300 or can do it why don't you and the 1003 00:26:54,300 --> 00:26:56,390 or can do it why don't you and the Canadian hacker what this is what this 1004 00:26:56,390 --> 00:26:56,400 Canadian hacker what this is what this 1005 00:26:56,400 --> 00:26:59,120 Canadian hacker what this is what this is revealing to me is that if you can do 1006 00:26:59,120 --> 00:26:59,130 is revealing to me is that if you can do 1007 00:26:59,130 --> 00:27:01,670 is revealing to me is that if you can do this and you can choose the the moral 1008 00:27:01,670 --> 00:27:01,680 this and you can choose the the moral 1009 00:27:01,680 --> 00:27:05,570 this and you can choose the the moral Road and help people to secure their 1010 00:27:05,570 --> 00:27:05,580 Road and help people to secure their 1011 00:27:05,580 --> 00:27:08,750 Road and help people to secure their networks what about the next grade 10 1012 00:27:08,750 --> 00:27:08,760 networks what about the next grade 10 1013 00:27:08,760 --> 00:27:11,780 networks what about the next grade 10 student like folks I mean there's a lot 1014 00:27:11,780 --> 00:27:11,790 student like folks I mean there's a lot 1015 00:27:11,790 --> 00:27:13,790 student like folks I mean there's a lot of people who just woke up and said oh 1016 00:27:13,790 --> 00:27:13,800 of people who just woke up and said oh 1017 00:27:13,800 --> 00:27:17,270 of people who just woke up and said oh my goodness like and I apologize the 1018 00:27:17,270 --> 00:27:17,280 my goodness like and I apologize the 1019 00:27:17,280 --> 00:27:19,730 my goodness like and I apologize the Canadian hacker but you some people are 1020 00:27:19,730 --> 00:27:19,740 Canadian hacker but you some people are 1021 00:27:19,740 --> 00:27:23,510 Canadian hacker but you some people are saying this is a kid what we've learned 1022 00:27:23,510 --> 00:27:23,520 saying this is a kid what we've learned 1023 00:27:23,520 --> 00:27:25,040 saying this is a kid what we've learned here is that you could have used this 1024 00:27:25,040 --> 00:27:25,050 here is that you could have used this 1025 00:27:25,050 --> 00:27:27,890 here is that you could have used this exploit for for malicious purposes of 1026 00:27:27,890 --> 00:27:27,900 exploit for for malicious purposes of 1027 00:27:27,900 --> 00:27:31,400 exploit for for malicious purposes of purposes and you haven't personally but 1028 00:27:31,400 --> 00:27:31,410 purposes and you haven't personally but 1029 00:27:31,410 --> 00:27:35,110 purposes and you haven't personally but what about the next grade ten kid and 1030 00:27:35,110 --> 00:27:35,120 what about the next grade ten kid and 1031 00:27:35,120 --> 00:27:40,310 what about the next grade ten kid and not not to necessarily put my own gender 1032 00:27:40,310 --> 00:27:40,320 not not to necessarily put my own gender 1033 00:27:40,320 --> 00:27:45,290 not not to necessarily put my own gender here but there are not three people out 1034 00:27:45,290 --> 00:27:45,300 here but there are not three people out 1035 00:27:45,300 --> 00:27:48,530 here but there are not three people out there especially of my group and if they 1036 00:27:48,530 --> 00:27:48,540 there especially of my group and if they 1037 00:27:48,540 --> 00:27:54,040 there especially of my group and if they so desire to do this like you know the 1038 00:27:54,040 --> 00:27:54,050 so desire to do this like you know the 1039 00:27:54,050 --> 00:27:56,680 so desire to do this like you know the possibilities are almost endless yeah 1040 00:27:56,680 --> 00:27:56,690 possibilities are almost endless yeah 1041 00:27:56,690 --> 00:27:59,840 possibilities are almost endless yeah and it is necessary to be printers rage 1042 00:27:59,840 --> 00:27:59,850 and it is necessary to be printers rage 1043 00:27:59,850 --> 00:28:03,980 and it is necessary to be printers rage it can be any sort of ing device or 1044 00:28:03,980 --> 00:28:03,990 it can be any sort of ing device or 1045 00:28:03,990 --> 00:28:07,670 it can be any sort of ing device or anything connected to your network Wow 1046 00:28:07,670 --> 00:28:07,680 anything connected to your network Wow 1047 00:28:07,680 --> 00:28:10,010 anything connected to your network Wow well I encourage you as we wrap up this 1048 00:28:10,010 --> 00:28:10,020 well I encourage you as we wrap up this 1049 00:28:10,020 --> 00:28:11,420 well I encourage you as we wrap up this interview the Canadian hacker I 1050 00:28:11,420 --> 00:28:11,430 interview the Canadian hacker I 1051 00:28:11,430 --> 00:28:13,930 interview the Canadian hacker I encourage you to continue pursuing that 1052 00:28:13,930 --> 00:28:13,940 encourage you to continue pursuing that 1053 00:28:13,940 --> 00:28:17,240 encourage you to continue pursuing that positive path there are a lot of cyber 1054 00:28:17,240 --> 00:28:17,250 positive path there are a lot of cyber 1055 00:28:17,250 --> 00:28:19,070 positive path there are a lot of cyber security companies out there that want 1056 00:28:19,070 --> 00:28:19,080 security companies out there that want 1057 00:28:19,080 --> 00:28:20,570 security companies out there that want people like you that 1058 00:28:20,570 --> 00:28:20,580 people like you that 1059 00:28:20,580 --> 00:28:24,019 people like you that can exploit systems for the good so that 1060 00:28:24,019 --> 00:28:24,029 can exploit systems for the good so that 1061 00:28:24,029 --> 00:28:27,409 can exploit systems for the good so that they can help patch them and and I 1062 00:28:27,409 --> 00:28:27,419 they can help patch them and and I 1063 00:28:27,419 --> 00:28:29,649 they can help patch them and and I encourage you to pursue that career path 1064 00:28:29,649 --> 00:28:29,659 encourage you to pursue that career path 1065 00:28:29,659 --> 00:28:31,700 encourage you to pursue that career path absolutely and keep up the great work 1066 00:28:31,700 --> 00:28:31,710 absolutely and keep up the great work 1067 00:28:31,710 --> 00:28:33,169 absolutely and keep up the great work and what you're doing and I and I hope 1068 00:28:33,169 --> 00:28:33,179 and what you're doing and I and I hope 1069 00:28:33,179 --> 00:28:34,519 and what you're doing and I and I hope that everything goes very very well for 1070 00:28:34,519 --> 00:28:34,529 that everything goes very very well for 1071 00:28:34,529 --> 00:28:38,570 that everything goes very very well for you thank you the Canadian hacker do you 1072 00:28:38,570 --> 00:28:38,580 you thank you the Canadian hacker do you 1073 00:28:38,580 --> 00:28:40,820 you thank you the Canadian hacker do you have any final words for us today as we 1074 00:28:40,820 --> 00:28:40,830 have any final words for us today as we 1075 00:28:40,830 --> 00:28:44,480 have any final words for us today as we close off our interview well the future 1076 00:28:44,480 --> 00:28:44,490 close off our interview well the future 1077 00:28:44,490 --> 00:28:47,539 close off our interview well the future I'm sorry