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here's what's coming up in the category

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here's what's coming up in the category
 

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here's what's coming up in the category
five TV newsroom

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five TV newsroom
 

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five TV newsroom
a man hit the keys to it 59 million

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a man hit the keys to it 59 million
 

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a man hit the keys to it 59 million
dollars worth of Bitcoin with his

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dollars worth of Bitcoin with his
 

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dollars worth of Bitcoin with his
fishing gear which got thrown out and

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fishing gear which got thrown out and
 

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fishing gear which got thrown out and
incinerated while he was in jail firefox

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incinerated while he was in jail firefox
 

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incinerated while he was in jail firefox
has turned on encrypted DNS by default

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has turned on encrypted DNS by default
 

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has turned on encrypted DNS by default
to port snooping ISPs automatic pet

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to port snooping ISPs automatic pet
 

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to port snooping ISPs automatic pet
feeding systems could starve your pets

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feeding systems could starve your pets
 

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feeding systems could starve your pets
in the event of a failure musicians have

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in the event of a failure musicians have
 

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in the event of a failure musicians have
algorithmically generated every possible

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algorithmically generated every possible
 

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algorithmically generated every possible
melody and release them to the public

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melody and release them to the public
 

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melody and release them to the public
domain stick around the full details are

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domain stick around the full details are
 

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domain stick around the full details are
coming up later in the show this is the

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coming up later in the show this is the
 

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coming up later in the show this is the
category-five TV newsroom covering a

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category-five TV newsroom covering a
 

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category-five TV newsroom covering a
week's top texture with a slight linux

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week's top texture with a slight linux
 

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week's top texture with a slight linux
bias

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I'm Sasha Rickman joined this week by

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I'm Sasha Rickman joined this week by
 

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I'm Sasha Rickman joined this week by
Robbie Ferguson all right Sasha well

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Robbie Ferguson all right Sasha well
 

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Robbie Ferguson all right Sasha well
some quick honourable mentions this week

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some quick honourable mentions this week
 

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some quick honourable mentions this week
let's get into it

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let's get into it
 

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let's get into it
pioneering african-american nasa

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pioneering african-american nasa
 

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pioneering african-american nasa
mathematician Katherine Johnson has

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mathematician Katherine Johnson has
 

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mathematician Katherine Johnson has
passed away I want to get into a little

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passed away I want to get into a little
 

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passed away I want to get into a little
bit about her story and as Johnson

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bit about her story and as Johnson
 

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bit about her story and as Johnson
calculated she calculated the rocket

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calculated she calculated the rocket
 

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calculated she calculated the rocket
trajectories and earth orbits for NASA's

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trajectories and earth orbits for NASA's
 

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trajectories and earth orbits for NASA's
early space missions she was portrayed

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early space missions she was portrayed
 

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early space missions she was portrayed
in the 2016 Oscar nominated film hidden

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in the 2016 Oscar nominated film hidden
 

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in the 2016 Oscar nominated film hidden
figures and the film tells the story of

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figures and the film tells the story of
 

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figures and the film tells the story of
an african-american woman whose math

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an african-american woman whose math
 

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an african-american woman whose math
skills helped to put US astronauts John

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skills helped to put US astronauts John
 

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skills helped to put US astronauts John
Glenn into orbit around the earth in

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Glenn into orbit around the earth in
 

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Glenn into orbit around the earth in
1962

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1962
 

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1962
miss Johnston verified the calculations

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miss Johnston verified the calculations
 

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miss Johnston verified the calculations
made by new electronic computers before

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made by new electronic computers before
 

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made by new electronic computers before
his flight imagine that computers were

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his flight imagine that computers were
 

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his flight imagine that computers were
brand new at the time so we had to like

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brand new at the time so we had to like
 

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brand new at the time so we had to like
verify that data and there she was

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verify that data and there she was
 

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verify that data and there she was
verifying it making sure that the math

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verifying it making sure that the math
 

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verifying it making sure that the math
was correct from this new fandangled

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was correct from this new fandangled
 

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was correct from this new fandangled
device right miss Johnston

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device right miss Johnston
 

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device right miss Johnston
miss Johnson pardon me had previously

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miss Johnson pardon me had previously
 

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miss Johnson pardon me had previously
calculated the trajectories for the

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calculated the trajectories for the
 

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calculated the trajectories for the
space flight of Alan Shepard the first

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space flight of Alan Shepard the first
 

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space flight of Alan Shepard the first
American in space and such was her skill

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American in space and such was her skill
 

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American in space and such was her skill
and reputation that Glenn had asked her

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and reputation that Glenn had asked her
 

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and reputation that Glenn had asked her
specifically to be a part of his mission

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specifically to be a part of his mission
 

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specifically to be a part of his mission
and refused to fly unless she verified

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and refused to fly unless she verified
 

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and refused to fly unless she verified
the calculations she also helped to

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the calculations she also helped to
 

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the calculations she also helped to
calculate the trajectory from the 1969

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calculate the trajectory from the 1969
 

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calculate the trajectory from the 1969
Apollo 11 flight to the moon now NASA

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Apollo 11 flight to the moon now NASA
 

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Apollo 11 flight to the moon now NASA
Administrator Jim bridenstine describes

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Administrator Jim bridenstine describes
 

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Administrator Jim bridenstine describes
miss Johnson as a leader from NASA's

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miss Johnson as a leader from NASA's
 

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miss Johnson as a leader from NASA's
pioneering days he says miss Johnson

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pioneering days he says miss Johnson
 

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pioneering days he says miss Johnson
helped our helped our nation enlarge the

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helped our helped our nation enlarge the
 

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helped our helped our nation enlarge the
frontiers of space even as she made huge

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frontiers of space even as she made huge
 

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frontiers of space even as she made huge
strides that also opened doors for women

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strides that also opened doors for women
 

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strides that also opened doors for women
and people of color

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and people of color
 

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and people of color
in the universal human quest to explore

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in the universal human quest to explore
 

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in the universal human quest to explore
space her dedication and skill as a

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space her dedication and skill as a
 

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space her dedication and skill as a
mathematician helped put humans on the

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mathematician helped put humans on the
 

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mathematician helped put humans on the
moon and before that made it possible

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moon and before that made it possible
 

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moon and before that made it possible
for our astronauts to take the first

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for our astronauts to take the first
 

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for our astronauts to take the first
steps in space that we are now following

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steps in space that we are now following
 

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steps in space that we are now following
on a journey to Mars here in 2020 miss

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on a journey to Mars here in 2020 miss
 

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on a journey to Mars here in 2020 miss
Johnson was born in a small town in West

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Johnson was born in a small town in West
 

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Johnson was born in a small town in West
Virginia in 1918 she excelled

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Virginia in 1918 she excelled
 

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Virginia in 1918 she excelled
academically she graduated from high

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academically she graduated from high
 

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academically she graduated from high
school at just 14 years old and from

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school at just 14 years old and from
 

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school at just 14 years old and from
University at 18 NASA notes that her

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University at 18 NASA notes that her
 

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University at 18 NASA notes that her
academic achievements were partially

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academic achievements were partially
 

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academic achievements were partially
were particularly pardon me impressive

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were particularly pardon me impressive
 

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were particularly pardon me impressive
quote in an era when school for African

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quote in an era when school for African
 

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quote in an era when school for African
Americans normally stopped at 8th grade

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Americans normally stopped at 8th grade
 

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Americans normally stopped at 8th grade
for those who could indulge that luxury

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for those who could indulge that luxury
 

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for those who could indulge that luxury
to think of education as a luxury at

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to think of education as a luxury at
 

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to think of education as a luxury at
that time just an astonishing woman

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that time just an astonishing woman
 

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that time just an astonishing woman
after working as a teacher and being a

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after working as a teacher and being a
 

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after working as a teacher and being a
stay-at-home mom miss Johnson began

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stay-at-home mom miss Johnson began
 

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stay-at-home mom miss Johnson began
working for NASA's predecessor the

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working for NASA's predecessor the
 

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working for NASA's predecessor the
National Advisory Committee for

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National Advisory Committee for
 

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National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics pardon me they called it

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Aeronautics pardon me they called it
 

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Aeronautics pardon me they called it
NACA at the time in she started working

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NACA at the time in she started working
 

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NACA at the time in she started working
there in 1953 Johnson died at a

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there in 1953 Johnson died at a
 

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there in 1953 Johnson died at a
retirement home in Newport February 24th

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retirement home in Newport February 24th
 

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retirement home in Newport February 24th
at the age of 101 lived a long life

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at the age of 101 lived a long life
 

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at the age of 101 lived a long life
bridenstine described her as quote an

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bridenstine described her as quote an
 

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bridenstine described her as quote an
American hero and he stated that her

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American hero and he stated that her
 

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American hero and he stated that her
pioneering legacy will never be

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pioneering legacy will never be
 

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pioneering legacy will never be
forgotten since we're already on the

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forgotten since we're already on the
 

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forgotten since we're already on the
subject of mankind traveling to the

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subject of mankind traveling to the
 

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subject of mankind traveling to the
Stars the Los Angeles City Council has

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Stars the Los Angeles City Council has
 

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Stars the Los Angeles City Council has
approved a SpaceX permit to least 19

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approved a SpaceX permit to least 19
 

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approved a SpaceX permit to least 19
acres of land in the city's port for 20

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acres of land in the city's port for 20
 

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acres of land in the city's port for 20
years for a starship rocket facility

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years for a starship rocket facility
 

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years for a starship rocket facility
space X's new rocket Factory will be for

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space X's new rocket Factory will be for
 

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space X's new rocket Factory will be for
its mass

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its mass
 

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its mass
next generation rocket called starship

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next generation rocket called starship
 

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next generation rocket called starship
the rocket so far has been developed at

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the rocket so far has been developed at
 

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the rocket so far has been developed at
SpaceX's facilities in Texas and Florida

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SpaceX's facilities in Texas and Florida
 

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SpaceX's facilities in Texas and Florida
but the new location adds capacity for

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but the new location adds capacity for
 

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but the new location adds capacity for
SpaceX within driving distance to its

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SpaceX within driving distance to its
 

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SpaceX within driving distance to its
headquarters outside of Los Angeles

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headquarters outside of Los Angeles
 

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headquarters outside of Los Angeles
International Airport and that's where

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International Airport and that's where
 

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International Airport and that's where
the majority of their staff actually

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the majority of their staff actually
 

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the majority of their staff actually
work 6000 employees in an outline of

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work 6000 employees in an outline of
 

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work 6000 employees in an outline of
plans described by government officials

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plans described by government officials
 

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plans described by government officials
SpaceX's facility will include multiple

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SpaceX's facility will include multiple
 

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SpaceX's facility will include multiple
buildings for manufacturing such as

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buildings for manufacturing such as
 

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buildings for manufacturing such as
blacksmith shops and machining los

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blacksmith shops and machining los
 

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blacksmith shops and machining los
angeles officials say that SpaceX is

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angeles officials say that SpaceX is
 

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angeles officials say that SpaceX is
plan will actually refurbish dilapidated

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plan will actually refurbish dilapidated
 

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plan will actually refurbish dilapidated
facilities with a history of vacancy and

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facilities with a history of vacancy and
 

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facilities with a history of vacancy and
vandalism and quote has the potential to

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vandalism and quote has the potential to
 

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vandalism and quote has the potential to
create 130 aerospace jobs the facility

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create 130 aerospace jobs the facility
 

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create 130 aerospace jobs the facility
itself would be a large tent-like

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itself would be a large tent-like
 

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itself would be a large tent-like
structure similar to those that Tesla

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structure similar to those that Tesla
 

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structure similar to those that Tesla
was using to ramp up their production of

238
00:06:20,809 --> 00:06:20,819
was using to ramp up their production of
 

239
00:06:20,819 --> 00:06:23,330
was using to ramp up their production of
the cars in recent years the port

240
00:06:23,330 --> 00:06:23,340
the cars in recent years the port
 

241
00:06:23,340 --> 00:06:25,670
the cars in recent years the port
location provides SpaceX with immediate

242
00:06:25,670 --> 00:06:25,680
location provides SpaceX with immediate
 

243
00:06:25,680 --> 00:06:27,680
location provides SpaceX with immediate
access to water that's a key

244
00:06:27,680 --> 00:06:27,690
access to water that's a key
 

245
00:06:27,690 --> 00:06:31,189
access to water that's a key
transportation item for them for their

246
00:06:31,189 --> 00:06:31,199
transportation item for them for their
 

247
00:06:31,199 --> 00:06:34,820
transportation item for them for their
immense rocket because they need to get

248
00:06:34,820 --> 00:06:34,830
immense rocket because they need to get
 

249
00:06:34,830 --> 00:06:37,010
immense rocket because they need to get
that from a production facility to the

250
00:06:37,010 --> 00:06:37,020
that from a production facility to the
 

251
00:06:37,020 --> 00:06:38,600
that from a production facility to the
launch site in either texas or Florida

252
00:06:38,600 --> 00:06:38,610
launch site in either texas or Florida
 

253
00:06:38,610 --> 00:06:41,510
launch site in either texas or Florida
so SpaceX currently moves falcon 9

254
00:06:41,510 --> 00:06:41,520
so SpaceX currently moves falcon 9
 

255
00:06:41,520 --> 00:06:44,450
so SpaceX currently moves falcon 9
rocket s-- across the highway on super

256
00:06:44,450 --> 00:06:44,460
rocket s-- across the highway on super
 

257
00:06:44,460 --> 00:06:47,480
rocket s-- across the highway on super
long trucks but starship and it's super

258
00:06:47,480 --> 00:06:47,490
long trucks but starship and it's super
 

259
00:06:47,490 --> 00:06:50,600
long trucks but starship and it's super
heavy booster would be so large they

260
00:06:50,600 --> 00:06:50,610
heavy booster would be so large they
 

261
00:06:50,610 --> 00:06:52,850
heavy booster would be so large they
wouldn't be able to transplant transport

262
00:06:52,850 --> 00:06:52,860
wouldn't be able to transplant transport
 

263
00:06:52,860 --> 00:06:55,189
wouldn't be able to transplant transport
that by the road so the water is gonna

264
00:06:55,189 --> 00:06:55,199
that by the road so the water is gonna
 

265
00:06:55,199 --> 00:07:00,350
that by the road so the water is gonna
play a big part in that researchers have

266
00:07:00,350 --> 00:07:00,360
play a big part in that researchers have
 

267
00:07:00,360 --> 00:07:02,689
play a big part in that researchers have
developed an algorithm that could stop

268
00:07:02,689 --> 00:07:02,699
developed an algorithm that could stop
 

269
00:07:02,699 --> 00:07:04,519
developed an algorithm that could stop
self-driving vehicles from getting into

270
00:07:04,519 --> 00:07:04,529
self-driving vehicles from getting into
 

271
00:07:04,529 --> 00:07:08,029
self-driving vehicles from getting into
crashes and traffic jams the algorithm

272
00:07:08,029 --> 00:07:08,039
crashes and traffic jams the algorithm
 

273
00:07:08,039 --> 00:07:10,939
crashes and traffic jams the algorithm
divides the ground beneath the machines

274
00:07:10,939 --> 00:07:10,949
divides the ground beneath the machines
 

275
00:07:10,949 --> 00:07:13,909
divides the ground beneath the machines
into a grid the robots learn their

276
00:07:13,909 --> 00:07:13,919
into a grid the robots learn their
 

277
00:07:13,919 --> 00:07:16,070
into a grid the robots learn their
position through technology similar to

278
00:07:16,070 --> 00:07:16,080
position through technology similar to
 

279
00:07:16,080 --> 00:07:19,670
position through technology similar to
GPS and coordinate their own movements

280
00:07:19,670 --> 00:07:19,680
GPS and coordinate their own movements
 

281
00:07:19,680 --> 00:07:22,939
GPS and coordinate their own movements
together through sensors that assess

282
00:07:22,939 --> 00:07:22,949
together through sensors that assess
 

283
00:07:22,949 --> 00:07:25,540
together through sensors that assess
where there's free space

284
00:07:25,540 --> 00:07:25,550
where there's free space
 

285
00:07:25,550 --> 00:07:28,870
where there's free space
to move Northwestern engineers Michael

286
00:07:28,870 --> 00:07:28,880
to move Northwestern engineers Michael
 

287
00:07:28,880 --> 00:07:33,400
to move Northwestern engineers Michael
Rubinstein says the robots refused to

288
00:07:33,400 --> 00:07:33,410
Rubinstein says the robots refused to
 

289
00:07:33,410 --> 00:07:35,920
Rubinstein says the robots refused to
move to a spot until that spot is free

290
00:07:35,920 --> 00:07:35,930
move to a spot until that spot is free
 

291
00:07:35,930 --> 00:07:39,490
move to a spot until that spot is free
and until they know that no other robots

292
00:07:39,490 --> 00:07:39,500
and until they know that no other robots
 

293
00:07:39,500 --> 00:07:42,670
and until they know that no other robots
are moving to that same spot they are

294
00:07:42,670 --> 00:07:42,680
are moving to that same spot they are
 

295
00:07:42,680 --> 00:07:46,720
are moving to that same spot they are
careful and reserve a space ahead of

296
00:07:46,720 --> 00:07:46,730
careful and reserve a space ahead of
 

297
00:07:46,730 --> 00:07:51,070
careful and reserve a space ahead of
time Rubenstein's team tested their

298
00:07:51,070 --> 00:07:51,080
time Rubenstein's team tested their
 

299
00:07:51,080 --> 00:07:54,760
time Rubenstein's team tested their
algorithm on a swarm of 100 robots set

300
00:07:54,760 --> 00:07:54,770
algorithm on a swarm of 100 robots set
 

301
00:07:54,770 --> 00:07:57,250
algorithm on a swarm of 100 robots set
up in their lab to cut out any

302
00:07:57,250 --> 00:07:57,260
up in their lab to cut out any
 

303
00:07:57,260 --> 00:07:59,410
up in their lab to cut out any
distractions the robots were only

304
00:07:59,410 --> 00:07:59,420
distractions the robots were only
 

305
00:07:59,420 --> 00:08:02,380
distractions the robots were only
allowed to sense three or four of their

306
00:08:02,380 --> 00:08:02,390
allowed to sense three or four of their
 

307
00:08:02,390 --> 00:08:05,650
allowed to sense three or four of their
closest neighbors this restricted their

308
00:08:05,650 --> 00:08:05,660
closest neighbors this restricted their
 

309
00:08:05,660 --> 00:08:09,190
closest neighbors this restricted their
vision it and it made the system easier

310
00:08:09,190 --> 00:08:09,200
vision it and it made the system easier
 

311
00:08:09,200 --> 00:08:12,340
vision it and it made the system easier
to scale as the robots can interact

312
00:08:12,340 --> 00:08:12,350
to scale as the robots can interact
 

313
00:08:12,350 --> 00:08:15,460
to scale as the robots can interact
locally without needing global

314
00:08:15,460 --> 00:08:15,470
locally without needing global
 

315
00:08:15,470 --> 00:08:17,650
locally without needing global
information think about the impact of

316
00:08:17,650 --> 00:08:17,660
information think about the impact of
 

317
00:08:17,660 --> 00:08:20,770
information think about the impact of
that so the advantage of a swarm of

318
00:08:20,770 --> 00:08:20,780
that so the advantage of a swarm of
 

319
00:08:20,780 --> 00:08:23,500
that so the advantage of a swarm of
robots is that there is no centralized

320
00:08:23,500 --> 00:08:23,510
robots is that there is no centralized
 

321
00:08:23,510 --> 00:08:26,380
robots is that there is no centralized
controller that can disrupt the whole

322
00:08:26,380 --> 00:08:26,390
controller that can disrupt the whole
 

323
00:08:26,390 --> 00:08:29,350
controller that can disrupt the whole
system this allows them to work together

324
00:08:29,350 --> 00:08:29,360
system this allows them to work together
 

325
00:08:29,360 --> 00:08:32,920
system this allows them to work together
to accomplish any task even if one of

326
00:08:32,920 --> 00:08:32,930
to accomplish any task even if one of
 

327
00:08:32,930 --> 00:08:35,070
to accomplish any task even if one of
them breaks down

328
00:08:35,070 --> 00:08:35,080
them breaks down
 

329
00:08:35,080 --> 00:08:37,480
them breaks down
this gives the system and obvious

330
00:08:37,480 --> 00:08:37,490
this gives the system and obvious
 

331
00:08:37,490 --> 00:08:39,400
this gives the system and obvious
application in warehouse robots but

332
00:08:39,400 --> 00:08:39,410
application in warehouse robots but
 

333
00:08:39,410 --> 00:08:41,680
application in warehouse robots but
Rubinstein believes it could actually

334
00:08:41,680 --> 00:08:41,690
Rubinstein believes it could actually
 

335
00:08:41,690 --> 00:08:45,430
Rubinstein believes it could actually
also cut traffic and collisions for

336
00:08:45,430 --> 00:08:45,440
also cut traffic and collisions for
 

337
00:08:45,440 --> 00:08:48,880
also cut traffic and collisions for
self-driving vehicles on the road he

338
00:08:48,880 --> 00:08:48,890
self-driving vehicles on the road he
 

339
00:08:48,890 --> 00:08:51,250
self-driving vehicles on the road he
said quote by understanding how to

340
00:08:51,250 --> 00:08:51,260
said quote by understanding how to
 

341
00:08:51,260 --> 00:08:54,940
said quote by understanding how to
control our swarm robots to form shapes

342
00:08:54,940 --> 00:08:54,950
control our swarm robots to form shapes
 

343
00:08:54,950 --> 00:08:57,820
control our swarm robots to form shapes
we can understand how to control fleets

344
00:08:57,820 --> 00:08:57,830
we can understand how to control fleets
 

345
00:08:57,830 --> 00:09:01,000
we can understand how to control fleets
of autonomous vehicles as they interact

346
00:09:01,000 --> 00:09:01,010
of autonomous vehicles as they interact
 

347
00:09:01,010 --> 00:09:02,970
of autonomous vehicles as they interact
with each other

348
00:09:02,970 --> 00:09:02,980
with each other
 

349
00:09:02,980 --> 00:09:06,180
with each other
finally cyber security researchers today

350
00:09:06,180 --> 00:09:06,190
finally cyber security researchers today
 

351
00:09:06,190 --> 00:09:10,950
finally cyber security researchers today
uncovered on a new highly severe

352
00:09:10,950 --> 00:09:10,960
uncovered on a new highly severe
 

353
00:09:10,960 --> 00:09:13,540
uncovered on a new highly severe
Hardware vulnerability residing in the

354
00:09:13,540 --> 00:09:13,550
Hardware vulnerability residing in the
 

355
00:09:13,550 --> 00:09:16,080
Hardware vulnerability residing in the
widely used Wi-Fi chips manufactured by

356
00:09:16,080 --> 00:09:16,090
widely used Wi-Fi chips manufactured by
 

357
00:09:16,090 --> 00:09:20,320
widely used Wi-Fi chips manufactured by
Broadcom and Cypress apparently they

358
00:09:20,320 --> 00:09:20,330
Broadcom and Cypress apparently they
 

359
00:09:20,330 --> 00:09:24,010
Broadcom and Cypress apparently they
power over a billion devices including

360
00:09:24,010 --> 00:09:24,020
power over a billion devices including
 

361
00:09:24,020 --> 00:09:27,030
power over a billion devices including
smartphones tablets laptops routers and

362
00:09:27,030 --> 00:09:27,040
smartphones tablets laptops routers and
 

363
00:09:27,040 --> 00:09:33,850
smartphones tablets laptops routers and
IOT gadgets dubbed crook K R 0 0 K the

364
00:09:33,850 --> 00:09:33,860
IOT gadgets dubbed crook K R 0 0 K the
 

365
00:09:33,860 --> 00:09:35,980
IOT gadgets dubbed crook K R 0 0 K the
flaw could let nearby remote attackers

366
00:09:35,980 --> 00:09:35,990
flaw could let nearby remote attackers
 

367
00:09:35,990 --> 00:09:38,680
flaw could let nearby remote attackers
intercept and decrypt

368
00:09:38,680 --> 00:09:38,690
intercept and decrypt
 

369
00:09:38,690 --> 00:09:41,220
intercept and decrypt
some wireless network packets

370
00:09:41,220 --> 00:09:41,230
some wireless network packets
 

371
00:09:41,230 --> 00:09:44,620
some wireless network packets
transmitted over the air by a vulnerable

372
00:09:44,620 --> 00:09:44,630
transmitted over the air by a vulnerable
 

373
00:09:44,630 --> 00:09:48,910
transmitted over the air by a vulnerable
device the attacker doesn't need to be

374
00:09:48,910 --> 00:09:48,920
device the attacker doesn't need to be
 

375
00:09:48,920 --> 00:09:50,710
device the attacker doesn't need to be
connected to the victims wireless

376
00:09:50,710 --> 00:09:50,720
connected to the victims wireless
 

377
00:09:50,720 --> 00:09:53,950
connected to the victims wireless
network and the flaw works against

378
00:09:53,950 --> 00:09:53,960
network and the flaw works against
 

379
00:09:53,960 --> 00:09:57,400
network and the flaw works against
vulnerable devices using wpa2 personal

380
00:09:57,400 --> 00:09:57,410
vulnerable devices using wpa2 personal
 

381
00:09:57,410 --> 00:10:04,230
vulnerable devices using wpa2 personal
or wpa2 Enterprise protocols with AES

382
00:10:04,230 --> 00:10:04,240
or wpa2 Enterprise protocols with AES
 

383
00:10:04,240 --> 00:10:08,710
or wpa2 Enterprise protocols with AES
CCMP encryption ESET researchers said

384
00:10:08,710 --> 00:10:08,720
CCMP encryption ESET researchers said
 

385
00:10:08,720 --> 00:10:11,920
CCMP encryption ESET researchers said
quote our tests confirmed some client

386
00:10:11,920 --> 00:10:11,930
quote our tests confirmed some client
 

387
00:10:11,930 --> 00:10:17,740
quote our tests confirmed some client
devices by Amazon echo Kindle Apple the

388
00:10:17,740 --> 00:10:17,750
devices by Amazon echo Kindle Apple the
 

389
00:10:17,750 --> 00:10:21,880
devices by Amazon echo Kindle Apple the
iPhone iPad MacBook Google's Nexus

390
00:10:21,880 --> 00:10:21,890
iPhone iPad MacBook Google's Nexus
 

391
00:10:21,890 --> 00:10:25,140
iPhone iPad MacBook Google's Nexus
device Samsung's Galaxy devices

392
00:10:25,140 --> 00:10:25,150
device Samsung's Galaxy devices
 

393
00:10:25,150 --> 00:10:30,430
device Samsung's Galaxy devices
raspberry PI's PI 3 and show meas redmi

394
00:10:30,430 --> 00:10:30,440
raspberry PI's PI 3 and show meas redmi
 

395
00:10:30,440 --> 00:10:34,000
raspberry PI's PI 3 and show meas redmi
as well as some access points by a soos

396
00:10:34,000 --> 00:10:34,010
as well as some access points by a soos
 

397
00:10:34,010 --> 00:10:38,500
as well as some access points by a soos
and Huawei were vulnerable to crook now

398
00:10:38,500 --> 00:10:38,510
and Huawei were vulnerable to crook now
 

399
00:10:38,510 --> 00:10:41,200
and Huawei were vulnerable to crook now
the attack relies on the fact that when

400
00:10:41,200 --> 00:10:41,210
the attack relies on the fact that when
 

401
00:10:41,210 --> 00:10:43,420
the attack relies on the fact that when
a device suddenly gets disconnected from

402
00:10:43,420 --> 00:10:43,430
a device suddenly gets disconnected from
 

403
00:10:43,430 --> 00:10:46,200
a device suddenly gets disconnected from
the wireless network the Wi-Fi chip

404
00:10:46,200 --> 00:10:46,210
the wireless network the Wi-Fi chip
 

405
00:10:46,210 --> 00:10:49,950
the wireless network the Wi-Fi chip
clears the session key in the memory and

406
00:10:49,950 --> 00:10:49,960
clears the session key in the memory and
 

407
00:10:49,960 --> 00:10:53,050
clears the session key in the memory and
it sets it to zero but see the chip

408
00:10:53,050 --> 00:10:53,060
it sets it to zero but see the chip
 

409
00:10:53,060 --> 00:10:56,290
it sets it to zero but see the chip
inadvertently transmits all data frames

410
00:10:56,290 --> 00:10:56,300
inadvertently transmits all data frames
 

411
00:10:56,300 --> 00:11:00,430
inadvertently transmits all data frames
left in the buffer with an all Z with an

412
00:11:00,430 --> 00:11:00,440
left in the buffer with an all Z with an
 

413
00:11:00,440 --> 00:11:03,940
left in the buffer with an all Z with an
all 0 encryption key even after the

414
00:11:03,940 --> 00:11:03,950
all 0 encryption key even after the
 

415
00:11:03,950 --> 00:11:07,030
all 0 encryption key even after the
disassociation so it's actually pushing

416
00:11:07,030 --> 00:11:07,040
disassociation so it's actually pushing
 

417
00:11:07,040 --> 00:11:12,640
disassociation so it's actually pushing
out that data without encryption so

418
00:11:12,640 --> 00:11:12,650
out that data without encryption so
 

419
00:11:12,650 --> 00:11:14,800
out that data without encryption so
therefore of course an attacker in a

420
00:11:14,800 --> 00:11:14,810
therefore of course an attacker in a
 

421
00:11:14,810 --> 00:11:17,530
therefore of course an attacker in a
near proximity to vulnerable devices can

422
00:11:17,530 --> 00:11:17,540
near proximity to vulnerable devices can
 

423
00:11:17,540 --> 00:11:20,680
near proximity to vulnerable devices can
use the flaw to repeat of repeatedly

424
00:11:20,680 --> 00:11:20,690
use the flaw to repeat of repeatedly
 

425
00:11:20,690 --> 00:11:23,940
use the flaw to repeat of repeatedly
trigger disassociation by sending D

426
00:11:23,940 --> 00:11:23,950
trigger disassociation by sending D
 

427
00:11:23,950 --> 00:11:27,250
trigger disassociation by sending D
authentication packets over the air to

428
00:11:27,250 --> 00:11:27,260
authentication packets over the air to
 

429
00:11:27,260 --> 00:11:29,380
authentication packets over the air to
capture more data frames quote

430
00:11:29,380 --> 00:11:29,390
capture more data frames quote
 

431
00:11:29,390 --> 00:11:31,860
capture more data frames quote
potentially containing sensitive data

432
00:11:31,860 --> 00:11:31,870
potentially containing sensitive data
 

433
00:11:31,870 --> 00:11:38,430
potentially containing sensitive data
including DNS ARP ICMP HTTP TCP and TLS

434
00:11:38,430 --> 00:11:38,440
including DNS ARP ICMP HTTP TCP and TLS
 

435
00:11:38,440 --> 00:11:41,020
including DNS ARP ICMP HTTP TCP and TLS
packets basically it's like a

436
00:11:41,020 --> 00:11:41,030
packets basically it's like a
 

437
00:11:41,030 --> 00:11:43,329
packets basically it's like a
man-in-the-middle without actually

438
00:11:43,329 --> 00:11:43,339
man-in-the-middle without actually
 

439
00:11:43,339 --> 00:11:47,320
man-in-the-middle without actually
having to be in the middle besides this

440
00:11:47,320 --> 00:11:47,330
having to be in the middle besides this
 

441
00:11:47,330 --> 00:11:49,690
having to be in the middle besides this
since the flaw also affects chips

442
00:11:49,690 --> 00:11:49,700
since the flaw also affects chips
 

443
00:11:49,700 --> 00:11:52,670
since the flaw also affects chips
embedded into wireless routers

444
00:11:52,670 --> 00:11:52,680
embedded into wireless routers
 

445
00:11:52,680 --> 00:11:55,130
embedded into wireless routers
the issue also makes it possible for

446
00:11:55,130 --> 00:11:55,140
the issue also makes it possible for
 

447
00:11:55,140 --> 00:11:57,200
the issue also makes it possible for
attackers to intercept and decrypt

448
00:11:57,200 --> 00:11:57,210
attackers to intercept and decrypt
 

449
00:11:57,210 --> 00:11:59,240
attackers to intercept and decrypt
network traffic transmitted from

450
00:11:59,240 --> 00:11:59,250
network traffic transmitted from
 

451
00:11:59,250 --> 00:12:01,100
network traffic transmitted from
connected devices that are not

452
00:12:01,100 --> 00:12:01,110
connected devices that are not
 

453
00:12:01,110 --> 00:12:04,130
connected devices that are not
vulnerable to crook either attached or

454
00:12:04,130 --> 00:12:04,140
vulnerable to crook either attached or
 

455
00:12:04,140 --> 00:12:07,730
vulnerable to crook either attached or
using different Wi-Fi chips so consider

456
00:12:07,730 --> 00:12:07,740
using different Wi-Fi chips so consider
 

457
00:12:07,740 --> 00:12:10,400
using different Wi-Fi chips so consider
that if you are connecting to a Wi-Fi

458
00:12:10,400 --> 00:12:10,410
that if you are connecting to a Wi-Fi
 

459
00:12:10,410 --> 00:12:14,750
that if you are connecting to a Wi-Fi
hotspot whose hotspot is vulnerable you

460
00:12:14,750 --> 00:12:14,760
hotspot whose hotspot is vulnerable you
 

461
00:12:14,760 --> 00:12:19,040
hotspot whose hotspot is vulnerable you
are susceptible to crook Apple has

462
00:12:19,040 --> 00:12:19,050
are susceptible to crook Apple has
 

463
00:12:19,050 --> 00:12:20,900
are susceptible to crook Apple has
already released patches for its users

464
00:12:20,900 --> 00:12:20,910
already released patches for its users
 

465
00:12:20,910 --> 00:12:23,620
already released patches for its users
some should have issued advisories or

466
00:12:23,620 --> 00:12:23,630
some should have issued advisories or
 

467
00:12:23,630 --> 00:12:26,810
some should have issued advisories or
security patches at the time of the

468
00:12:26,810 --> 00:12:26,820
security patches at the time of the
 

469
00:12:26,820 --> 00:12:29,600
security patches at the time of the
publication and other vendors are still

470
00:12:29,600 --> 00:12:29,610
publication and other vendors are still
 

471
00:12:29,610 --> 00:12:31,670
publication and other vendors are still
testing the issue against their devices

472
00:12:31,670 --> 00:12:31,680
testing the issue against their devices
 

473
00:12:31,680 --> 00:12:35,840
testing the issue against their devices
watch for patch for patches to mitigate

474
00:12:35,840 --> 00:12:35,850
watch for patch for patches to mitigate
 

475
00:12:35,850 --> 00:12:38,830
watch for patch for patches to mitigate
this problem via software or firmware

476
00:12:38,830 --> 00:12:38,840
this problem via software or firmware
 

477
00:12:38,840 --> 00:12:43,420
this problem via software or firmware
updates for your device wow thank you

478
00:12:43,420 --> 00:12:43,430
updates for your device wow thank you
 

479
00:12:43,430 --> 00:12:45,830
updates for your device wow thank you
let's get into the top stories were

480
00:12:45,830 --> 00:12:45,840
let's get into the top stories were
 

481
00:12:45,840 --> 00:12:48,890
let's get into the top stories were
following this week in a world where

482
00:12:48,890 --> 00:12:48,900
following this week in a world where
 

483
00:12:48,900 --> 00:12:51,350
following this week in a world where
various mass breaches dictate the use of

484
00:12:51,350 --> 00:12:51,360
various mass breaches dictate the use of
 

485
00:12:51,360 --> 00:12:53,660
various mass breaches dictate the use of
strong randomized passwords more than

486
00:12:53,660 --> 00:12:53,670
strong randomized passwords more than
 

487
00:12:53,670 --> 00:12:55,970
strong randomized passwords more than
ever reliable and secure credentials

488
00:12:55,970 --> 00:12:55,980
ever reliable and secure credentials
 

489
00:12:55,980 --> 00:12:59,390
ever reliable and secure credentials
management is paramount in 2021 Irish

490
00:12:59,390 --> 00:12:59,400
management is paramount in 2021 Irish
 

491
00:12:59,400 --> 00:13:01,130
management is paramount in 2021 Irish
drug dealer has evidently learnt the

492
00:13:01,130 --> 00:13:01,140
drug dealer has evidently learnt the
 

493
00:13:01,140 --> 00:13:04,550
drug dealer has evidently learnt the
lesson the hard way this week the Irish

494
00:13:04,550 --> 00:13:04,560
lesson the hard way this week the Irish
 

495
00:13:04,560 --> 00:13:07,100
lesson the hard way this week the Irish
Times reported the sad tale of Clifton

496
00:13:07,100 --> 00:13:07,110
Times reported the sad tale of Clifton
 

497
00:13:07,110 --> 00:13:09,620
Times reported the sad tale of Clifton
Collins a 49 year old cannabis grower

498
00:13:09,620 --> 00:13:09,630
Collins a 49 year old cannabis grower
 

499
00:13:09,630 --> 00:13:12,350
Collins a 49 year old cannabis grower
from Dublin Collins quietly grew and

500
00:13:12,350 --> 00:13:12,360
from Dublin Collins quietly grew and
 

501
00:13:12,360 --> 00:13:14,540
from Dublin Collins quietly grew and
sold his product for 12 years and he

502
00:13:14,540 --> 00:13:14,550
sold his product for 12 years and he
 

503
00:13:14,550 --> 00:13:17,090
sold his product for 12 years and he
amassed a small fortune by using some of

504
00:13:17,090 --> 00:13:17,100
amassed a small fortune by using some of
 

505
00:13:17,100 --> 00:13:19,100
amassed a small fortune by using some of
that revenue to buy bitcoins around 20

506
00:13:19,100 --> 00:13:19,110
that revenue to buy bitcoins around 20
 

507
00:13:19,110 --> 00:13:22,640
that revenue to buy bitcoins around 20
2011 and 2012 before the price of

508
00:13:22,640 --> 00:13:22,650
2011 and 2012 before the price of
 

509
00:13:22,650 --> 00:13:26,090
2011 and 2012 before the price of
cryptocurrency soared but in 2017 state

510
00:13:26,090 --> 00:13:26,100
cryptocurrency soared but in 2017 state
 

511
00:13:26,100 --> 00:13:27,860
cryptocurrency soared but in 2017 state
authorities on a routine overnight

512
00:13:27,860 --> 00:13:27,870
authorities on a routine overnight
 

513
00:13:27,870 --> 00:13:30,560
authorities on a routine overnight
patrol spotted and then arrested Collins

514
00:13:30,560 --> 00:13:30,570
patrol spotted and then arrested Collins
 

515
00:13:30,570 --> 00:13:33,410
patrol spotted and then arrested Collins
with roughly 2000 dollars of cannabis in

516
00:13:33,410 --> 00:13:33,420
with roughly 2000 dollars of cannabis in
 

517
00:13:33,420 --> 00:13:36,710
with roughly 2000 dollars of cannabis in
his car the man quickly earned himself a

518
00:13:36,710 --> 00:13:36,720
his car the man quickly earned himself a
 

519
00:13:36,720 --> 00:13:39,680
his car the man quickly earned himself a
five-year jail sentence as part of

520
00:13:39,680 --> 00:13:39,690
five-year jail sentence as part of
 

521
00:13:39,690 --> 00:13:41,780
five-year jail sentence as part of
authorities investigation Ireland

522
00:13:41,780 --> 00:13:41,790
authorities investigation Ireland
 

523
00:13:41,790 --> 00:13:43,790
authorities investigation Ireland
criminal assets Bureau discovered and

524
00:13:43,790 --> 00:13:43,800
criminal assets Bureau discovered and
 

525
00:13:43,800 --> 00:13:45,980
criminal assets Bureau discovered and
confiscated 12 Bitcoin wallets belonging

526
00:13:45,980 --> 00:13:45,990
confiscated 12 Bitcoin wallets belonging
 

527
00:13:45,990 --> 00:13:49,130
confiscated 12 Bitcoin wallets belonging
to Collins totaling nearly 59 million

528
00:13:49,130 --> 00:13:49,140
to Collins totaling nearly 59 million
 

529
00:13:49,140 --> 00:13:49,940
to Collins totaling nearly 59 million
dollars

530
00:13:49,940 --> 00:13:49,950
dollars
 

531
00:13:49,950 --> 00:13:52,160
dollars
reportedly the biggest financial case in

532
00:13:52,160 --> 00:13:52,170
reportedly the biggest financial case in
 

533
00:13:52,170 --> 00:13:55,610
reportedly the biggest financial case in
CA B's 25 year history there was only

534
00:13:55,610 --> 00:13:55,620
CA B's 25 year history there was only
 

535
00:13:55,620 --> 00:13:58,490
CA B's 25 year history there was only
one problem CA B couldn't access the

536
00:13:58,490 --> 00:13:58,500
one problem CA B couldn't access the
 

537
00:13:58,500 --> 00:14:01,130
one problem CA B couldn't access the
accounts because Collins had lost the

538
00:14:01,130 --> 00:14:01,140
accounts because Collins had lost the
 

539
00:14:01,140 --> 00:14:05,030
accounts because Collins had lost the
keys nervous about having a ton of money

540
00:14:05,030 --> 00:14:05,040
keys nervous about having a ton of money
 

541
00:14:05,040 --> 00:14:06,350
keys nervous about having a ton of money
tied up in a single

542
00:14:06,350 --> 00:14:06,360
tied up in a single
 

543
00:14:06,360 --> 00:14:09,650
tied up in a single
Collins diversified in 2016 by splitting

544
00:14:09,650 --> 00:14:09,660
Collins diversified in 2016 by splitting
 

545
00:14:09,660 --> 00:14:12,619
Collins diversified in 2016 by splitting
his 6,000 bitcoins across 12 newly

546
00:14:12,619 --> 00:14:12,629
his 6,000 bitcoins across 12 newly
 

547
00:14:12,629 --> 00:14:15,139
his 6,000 bitcoins across 12 newly
created wallets and to further secure

548
00:14:15,139 --> 00:14:15,149
created wallets and to further secure
 

549
00:14:15,149 --> 00:14:17,689
created wallets and to further secure
this fortune Collins hid a piece of

550
00:14:17,689 --> 00:14:17,699
this fortune Collins hid a piece of
 

551
00:14:17,699 --> 00:14:20,329
this fortune Collins hid a piece of
paper containing the access codes inside

552
00:14:20,329 --> 00:14:20,339
paper containing the access codes inside
 

553
00:14:20,339 --> 00:14:22,460
paper containing the access codes inside
a fishing rod case at his home

554
00:14:22,460 --> 00:14:22,470
a fishing rod case at his home
 

555
00:14:22,470 --> 00:14:25,999
a fishing rod case at his home
unfortunately a separate criminal broke

556
00:14:25,999 --> 00:14:26,009
unfortunately a separate criminal broke
 

557
00:14:26,009 --> 00:14:29,419
unfortunately a separate criminal broke
into Collins home in 2017 and cleared

558
00:14:29,419 --> 00:14:29,429
into Collins home in 2017 and cleared
 

559
00:14:29,429 --> 00:14:31,970
into Collins home in 2017 and cleared
his belongings and upon Collins arrest

560
00:14:31,970 --> 00:14:31,980
his belongings and upon Collins arrest
 

561
00:14:31,980 --> 00:14:35,299
his belongings and upon Collins arrest
his former home was cleared out by his

562
00:14:35,299 --> 00:14:35,309
his former home was cleared out by his
 

563
00:14:35,309 --> 00:14:37,939
his former home was cleared out by his
landlord with left-behind belongings

564
00:14:37,939 --> 00:14:37,949
landlord with left-behind belongings
 

565
00:14:37,949 --> 00:14:41,660
landlord with left-behind belongings
taken to a dump dump workers told State

566
00:14:41,660 --> 00:14:41,670
taken to a dump dump workers told State
 

567
00:14:41,670 --> 00:14:44,179
taken to a dump dump workers told State
Police they remember seeing fishing gear

568
00:14:44,179 --> 00:14:44,189
Police they remember seeing fishing gear
 

569
00:14:44,189 --> 00:14:46,759
Police they remember seeing fishing gear
but waste from this particular dump is

570
00:14:46,759 --> 00:14:46,769
but waste from this particular dump is
 

571
00:14:46,769 --> 00:14:49,460
but waste from this particular dump is
set to Germany and China and incinerated

572
00:14:49,460 --> 00:14:49,470
set to Germany and China and incinerated
 

573
00:14:49,470 --> 00:14:52,669
set to Germany and China and incinerated
by procedure the fishing rod case has

574
00:14:52,669 --> 00:14:52,679
by procedure the fishing rod case has
 

575
00:14:52,679 --> 00:14:56,150
by procedure the fishing rod case has
been missing ever since Collins told the

576
00:14:56,150 --> 00:14:56,160
been missing ever since Collins told the
 

577
00:14:56,160 --> 00:14:58,129
been missing ever since Collins told the
Irish police that he has had time to

578
00:14:58,129 --> 00:14:58,139
Irish police that he has had time to
 

579
00:14:58,139 --> 00:14:59,840
Irish police that he has had time to
come to terms with the loss of the money

580
00:14:59,840 --> 00:14:59,850
come to terms with the loss of the money
 

581
00:14:59,850 --> 00:15:02,509
come to terms with the loss of the money
and regarded it as punishment for his

582
00:15:02,509 --> 00:15:02,519
and regarded it as punishment for his
 

583
00:15:02,519 --> 00:15:07,999
and regarded it as punishment for his
own stupidity this makes me want to cry

584
00:15:07,999 --> 00:15:08,009
own stupidity this makes me want to cry
 

585
00:15:08,009 --> 00:15:15,109
own stupidity this makes me want to cry
right okay Wow so that money would not

586
00:15:15,109 --> 00:15:15,119
right okay Wow so that money would not
 

587
00:15:15,119 --> 00:15:18,259
right okay Wow so that money would not
have been his in the end which is why

588
00:15:18,259 --> 00:15:18,269
have been his in the end which is why
 

589
00:15:18,269 --> 00:15:23,629
have been his in the end which is why
he's kind of okay with losing it because

590
00:15:23,629 --> 00:15:23,639
he's kind of okay with losing it because
 

591
00:15:23,639 --> 00:15:27,590
he's kind of okay with losing it because
he's been caught yep back up where are

592
00:15:27,590 --> 00:15:27,600
he's been caught yep back up where are
 

593
00:15:27,600 --> 00:15:30,919
he's been caught yep back up where are
your backups right I understand that in

594
00:15:30,919 --> 00:15:30,929
your backups right I understand that in
 

595
00:15:30,929 --> 00:15:33,109
your backups right I understand that in
the lure box the tackle box is out they

596
00:15:33,109 --> 00:15:33,119
the lure box the tackle box is out they
 

597
00:15:33,119 --> 00:15:35,210
the lure box the tackle box is out they
call it tackle box with backups fishing

598
00:15:35,210 --> 00:15:35,220
call it tackle box with backups fishing
 

599
00:15:35,220 --> 00:15:37,189
call it tackle box with backups fishing
rod for the main believe me I understand

600
00:15:37,189 --> 00:15:37,199
rod for the main believe me I understand
 

601
00:15:37,199 --> 00:15:39,769
rod for the main believe me I understand
the idea the concept behind a paper

602
00:15:39,769 --> 00:15:39,779
the idea the concept behind a paper
 

603
00:15:39,779 --> 00:15:43,189
the idea the concept behind a paper
wallet yeah but paper wallet as a term

604
00:15:43,189 --> 00:15:43,199
wallet yeah but paper wallet as a term
 

605
00:15:43,199 --> 00:15:45,739
wallet yeah but paper wallet as a term
doesn't necessarily mean that you have

606
00:15:45,739 --> 00:15:45,749
doesn't necessarily mean that you have
 

607
00:15:45,749 --> 00:15:49,069
doesn't necessarily mean that you have
to print it on a piece of paper which is

608
00:15:49,069 --> 00:15:49,079
to print it on a piece of paper which is
 

609
00:15:49,079 --> 00:15:52,340
to print it on a piece of paper which is
susceptible to everything yeah a paper

610
00:15:52,340 --> 00:15:52,350
susceptible to everything yeah a paper
 

611
00:15:52,350 --> 00:15:54,439
susceptible to everything yeah a paper
wallet think about it this way an

612
00:15:54,439 --> 00:15:54,449
wallet think about it this way an
 

613
00:15:54,449 --> 00:15:58,460
wallet think about it this way an
offline wallet right like it could be an

614
00:15:58,460 --> 00:15:58,470
offline wallet right like it could be an
 

615
00:15:58,470 --> 00:16:01,549
offline wallet right like it could be an
encrypted GPG encrypted file on your

616
00:16:01,549 --> 00:16:01,559
encrypted GPG encrypted file on your
 

617
00:16:01,559 --> 00:16:04,129
encrypted GPG encrypted file on your
hard drive which is also Luke's

618
00:16:04,129 --> 00:16:04,139
hard drive which is also Luke's
 

619
00:16:04,139 --> 00:16:07,909
hard drive which is also Luke's
encrypted and that can be your

620
00:16:07,909 --> 00:16:07,919
encrypted and that can be your
 

621
00:16:07,919 --> 00:16:10,789
encrypted and that can be your
protection and and then back it up all

622
00:16:10,789 --> 00:16:10,799
protection and and then back it up all
 

623
00:16:10,799 --> 00:16:13,579
protection and and then back it up all
right you know what six I am slightly

624
00:16:13,579 --> 00:16:13,589
right you know what six I am slightly
 

625
00:16:13,589 --> 00:16:16,309
right you know what six I am slightly
suspicious actually of this story mr.

626
00:16:16,309 --> 00:16:16,319
suspicious actually of this story mr.
 

627
00:16:16,319 --> 00:16:19,159
suspicious actually of this story mr.
Collins why when you're released from

628
00:16:19,159 --> 00:16:19,169
Collins why when you're released from
 

629
00:16:19,169 --> 00:16:20,180
Collins why when you're released from
jail

630
00:16:20,180 --> 00:16:20,190
jail
 

631
00:16:20,190 --> 00:16:23,329
jail
if all of a sudden you disappear maybe

632
00:16:23,329 --> 00:16:23,339
if all of a sudden you disappear maybe
 

633
00:16:23,339 --> 00:16:30,340
if all of a sudden you disappear maybe
you hard excuse me I'm going fishing

634
00:16:30,340 --> 00:16:30,350

 

635
00:16:30,350 --> 00:16:31,639

elsewhere

636
00:16:31,639 --> 00:16:31,649
elsewhere
 

637
00:16:31,649 --> 00:16:34,309
elsewhere
oh boy okay so where do you keep your

638
00:16:34,309 --> 00:16:34,319
oh boy okay so where do you keep your
 

639
00:16:34,319 --> 00:16:37,009
oh boy okay so where do you keep your
crypto keys so think about it so your

640
00:16:37,009 --> 00:16:37,019
crypto keys so think about it so your
 

641
00:16:37,019 --> 00:16:40,360
crypto keys so think about it so your
wallets and your keys your wallet is

642
00:16:40,360 --> 00:16:40,370
wallets and your keys your wallet is
 

643
00:16:40,370 --> 00:16:42,590
wallets and your keys your wallet is
reasonably easy to recover as long as

644
00:16:42,590 --> 00:16:42,600
reasonably easy to recover as long as
 

645
00:16:42,600 --> 00:16:46,369
reasonably easy to recover as long as
you know your wallet address

646
00:16:46,369 --> 00:16:46,379
you know your wallet address
 

647
00:16:46,379 --> 00:16:49,100
you know your wallet address
it's that private key that you're not

648
00:16:49,100 --> 00:16:49,110
it's that private key that you're not
 

649
00:16:49,110 --> 00:16:50,360
it's that private key that you're not
going to be able to recover if you don't

650
00:16:50,360 --> 00:16:50,370
going to be able to recover if you don't
 

651
00:16:50,370 --> 00:16:55,970
going to be able to recover if you don't
have it so encryption I mean use like

652
00:16:55,970 --> 00:16:55,980
have it so encryption I mean use like
 

653
00:16:55,980 --> 00:16:58,249
have it so encryption I mean use like
can I skip off can I skip off the set

654
00:16:58,249 --> 00:16:58,259
can I skip off can I skip off the set
 

655
00:16:58,259 --> 00:17:00,740
can I skip off can I skip off the set
for a second here Sasha I'm jumping over

656
00:17:00,740 --> 00:17:00,750
for a second here Sasha I'm jumping over
 

657
00:17:00,750 --> 00:17:02,689
for a second here Sasha I'm jumping over
here and I know you guys can't see me

658
00:17:02,689 --> 00:17:02,699
here and I know you guys can't see me
 

659
00:17:02,699 --> 00:17:06,949
here and I know you guys can't see me
but I just want to grab a device right

660
00:17:06,949 --> 00:17:06,959
but I just want to grab a device right
 

661
00:17:06,959 --> 00:17:10,850
but I just want to grab a device right
from Kingston Tech okay so Kingston has

662
00:17:10,850 --> 00:17:10,860
from Kingston Tech okay so Kingston has
 

663
00:17:10,860 --> 00:17:13,189
from Kingston Tech okay so Kingston has
these guys would not stand up against

664
00:17:13,189 --> 00:17:13,199
these guys would not stand up against
 

665
00:17:13,199 --> 00:17:15,380
these guys would not stand up against
incinerator though wouldn't stand up

666
00:17:15,380 --> 00:17:15,390
incinerator though wouldn't stand up
 

667
00:17:15,390 --> 00:17:17,029
incinerator though wouldn't stand up
against an incinerator an incinerator

668
00:17:17,029 --> 00:17:17,039
against an incinerator an incinerator
 

669
00:17:17,039 --> 00:17:20,539
against an incinerator an incinerator
but perfect a dad a traveler mm has an

670
00:17:20,539 --> 00:17:20,549
but perfect a dad a traveler mm has an
 

671
00:17:20,549 --> 00:17:23,659
but perfect a dad a traveler mm has an
encryption key pad so save your GPG

672
00:17:23,659 --> 00:17:23,669
encryption key pad so save your GPG
 

673
00:17:23,669 --> 00:17:27,500
encryption key pad so save your GPG
encrypted keys yes on this encrypted

674
00:17:27,500 --> 00:17:27,510
encrypted keys yes on this encrypted
 

675
00:17:27,510 --> 00:17:31,039
encrypted keys yes on this encrypted
with the keypad and then back it up to

676
00:17:31,039 --> 00:17:31,049
with the keypad and then back it up to
 

677
00:17:31,049 --> 00:17:34,880
with the keypad and then back it up to
multiple devices yes like come up when

678
00:17:34,880 --> 00:17:34,890
multiple devices yes like come up when
 

679
00:17:34,890 --> 00:17:37,549
multiple devices yes like come up when
you've got millions and millions of

680
00:17:37,549 --> 00:17:37,559
you've got millions and millions of
 

681
00:17:37,559 --> 00:17:39,980
you've got millions and millions of
dollars in Bitcoin you can afford to buy

682
00:17:39,980 --> 00:17:39,990
dollars in Bitcoin you can afford to buy
 

683
00:17:39,990 --> 00:17:44,480
dollars in Bitcoin you can afford to buy
a data traveller mm don't be dumb daft

684
00:17:44,480 --> 00:17:44,490
a data traveller mm don't be dumb daft
 

685
00:17:44,490 --> 00:17:47,360
a data traveller mm don't be dumb daft
as they would say this is marish the

686
00:17:47,360 --> 00:17:47,370
as they would say this is marish the
 

687
00:17:47,370 --> 00:17:52,130
as they would say this is marish the
raft mister don't be a prat oh come on

688
00:17:52,130 --> 00:17:52,140
raft mister don't be a prat oh come on
 

689
00:17:52,140 --> 00:17:58,100
raft mister don't be a prat oh come on
now but like yeah right that just breaks

690
00:17:58,100 --> 00:17:58,110
now but like yeah right that just breaks
 

691
00:17:58,110 --> 00:18:00,169
now but like yeah right that just breaks
my heart in so many ways but it's just

692
00:18:00,169 --> 00:18:00,179
my heart in so many ways but it's just
 

693
00:18:00,179 --> 00:18:01,970
my heart in so many ways but it's just
like okay this guy obviously knew his

694
00:18:01,970 --> 00:18:01,980
like okay this guy obviously knew his
 

695
00:18:01,980 --> 00:18:03,919
like okay this guy obviously knew his
way around the cryptocurrency I mean he

696
00:18:03,919 --> 00:18:03,929
way around the cryptocurrency I mean he
 

697
00:18:03,929 --> 00:18:06,500
way around the cryptocurrency I mean he
but maybe he was just lucky maybe just

698
00:18:06,500 --> 00:18:06,510
but maybe he was just lucky maybe just
 

699
00:18:06,510 --> 00:18:09,669
but maybe he was just lucky maybe just
blob right time Boulder yeah hurts him

700
00:18:09,669 --> 00:18:09,679
blob right time Boulder yeah hurts him
 

701
00:18:09,679 --> 00:18:12,520
blob right time Boulder yeah hurts him
some chattering at the local pub

702
00:18:12,520 --> 00:18:12,530
some chattering at the local pub
 

703
00:18:12,530 --> 00:18:14,690
some chattering at the local pub
evidently I'm painting a picture of who

704
00:18:14,690 --> 00:18:14,700
evidently I'm painting a picture of who
 

705
00:18:14,700 --> 00:18:17,120
evidently I'm painting a picture of who
this guy is he's sitting there except in

706
00:18:17,120 --> 00:18:17,130
this guy is he's sitting there except in
 

707
00:18:17,130 --> 00:18:20,720
this guy is he's sitting there except in
a pine Guinness listening kisum so I

708
00:18:20,720 --> 00:18:20,730
a pine Guinness listening kisum so I
 

709
00:18:20,730 --> 00:18:24,860
a pine Guinness listening kisum so I
bought a thousand Bitcoin last week no

710
00:18:24,860 --> 00:18:24,870
bought a thousand Bitcoin last week no
 

711
00:18:24,870 --> 00:18:26,630
bought a thousand Bitcoin last week no
that'll never be worth anything they

712
00:18:26,630 --> 00:18:26,640
that'll never be worth anything they
 

713
00:18:26,640 --> 00:18:31,240
that'll never be worth anything they
said he wrote it down on a now

714
00:18:31,240 --> 00:18:31,250
said he wrote it down on a now
 

715
00:18:31,250 --> 00:18:33,370
said he wrote it down on a now
they were taught there are only 20 cents

716
00:18:33,370 --> 00:18:33,380
they were taught there are only 20 cents
 

717
00:18:33,380 --> 00:18:37,630
they were taught there are only 20 cents
each like oh my goodness not to be again

718
00:18:37,630 --> 00:18:37,640
each like oh my goodness not to be again
 

719
00:18:37,640 --> 00:18:41,680
each like oh my goodness not to be again
s I'm going fishing boys yeah so the

720
00:18:41,680 --> 00:18:41,690
s I'm going fishing boys yeah so the
 

721
00:18:41,690 --> 00:18:43,330
s I'm going fishing boys yeah so the
question becomes okay so think about it

722
00:18:43,330 --> 00:18:43,340
question becomes okay so think about it
 

723
00:18:43,340 --> 00:18:45,190
question becomes okay so think about it
where are your keys okay so if you

724
00:18:45,190 --> 00:18:45,200
where are your keys okay so if you
 

725
00:18:45,200 --> 00:18:46,899
where are your keys okay so if you
collect cryptocurrency where are your

726
00:18:46,899 --> 00:18:46,909
collect cryptocurrency where are your
 

727
00:18:46,909 --> 00:18:47,350
collect cryptocurrency where are your
keys

728
00:18:47,350 --> 00:18:47,360
keys
 

729
00:18:47,360 --> 00:18:49,840
keys
how are they safe do you have a device

730
00:18:49,840 --> 00:18:49,850
how are they safe do you have a device
 

731
00:18:49,850 --> 00:18:52,930
how are they safe do you have a device
like a data traveler 2000 from Kingston

732
00:18:52,930 --> 00:18:52,940
like a data traveler 2000 from Kingston
 

733
00:18:52,940 --> 00:18:56,890
like a data traveler 2000 from Kingston
I have one and if not get one okay

734
00:18:56,890 --> 00:18:56,900
I have one and if not get one okay
 

735
00:18:56,900 --> 00:18:57,820
I have one and if not get one okay
because this is a great device

736
00:18:57,820 --> 00:18:57,830
because this is a great device
 

737
00:18:57,830 --> 00:18:59,980
because this is a great device
two-storey keys on but I wouldn't just I

738
00:18:59,980 --> 00:18:59,990
two-storey keys on but I wouldn't just I
 

739
00:18:59,990 --> 00:19:02,890
two-storey keys on but I wouldn't just I
wouldn't just put my files on here I

740
00:19:02,890 --> 00:19:02,900
wouldn't just put my files on here I
 

741
00:19:02,900 --> 00:19:04,840
wouldn't just put my files on here I
would also encrypt those files with GPG

742
00:19:04,840 --> 00:19:04,850
would also encrypt those files with GPG
 

743
00:19:04,850 --> 00:19:07,510
would also encrypt those files with GPG
right so you've got multiple layers of

744
00:19:07,510 --> 00:19:07,520
right so you've got multiple layers of
 

745
00:19:07,520 --> 00:19:09,909
right so you've got multiple layers of
encryption and heck if you want to Luc's

746
00:19:09,909 --> 00:19:09,919
encryption and heck if you want to Luc's
 

747
00:19:09,919 --> 00:19:12,520
encryption and heck if you want to Luc's
encrypt this as well triple layer

748
00:19:12,520 --> 00:19:12,530
encrypt this as well triple layer
 

749
00:19:12,530 --> 00:19:14,529
encrypt this as well triple layer
encryption that's fine and then you can

750
00:19:14,529 --> 00:19:14,539
encryption that's fine and then you can
 

751
00:19:14,539 --> 00:19:17,500
encryption that's fine and then you can
back that up to multiple devices create

752
00:19:17,500 --> 00:19:17,510
back that up to multiple devices create
 

753
00:19:17,510 --> 00:19:20,470
back that up to multiple devices create
a DD image I don't care what you do but

754
00:19:20,470 --> 00:19:20,480
a DD image I don't care what you do but
 

755
00:19:20,480 --> 00:19:22,210
a DD image I don't care what you do but
you need to have a backup of your keys

756
00:19:22,210 --> 00:19:22,220
you need to have a backup of your keys
 

757
00:19:22,220 --> 00:19:25,570
you need to have a backup of your keys
yes and an offline key does not

758
00:19:25,570 --> 00:19:25,580
yes and an offline key does not
 

759
00:19:25,580 --> 00:19:27,070
yes and an offline key does not
necessarily mean that there's only one

760
00:19:27,070 --> 00:19:27,080
necessarily mean that there's only one
 

761
00:19:27,080 --> 00:19:30,580
necessarily mean that there's only one
copy no you can still have backups but I

762
00:19:30,580 --> 00:19:30,590
copy no you can still have backups but I
 

763
00:19:30,590 --> 00:19:33,419
copy no you can still have backups but I
think that is safer than the paper key

764
00:19:33,419 --> 00:19:33,429
think that is safer than the paper key
 

765
00:19:33,429 --> 00:19:35,770
think that is safer than the paper key
because the paper key can be picked up

766
00:19:35,770 --> 00:19:35,780
because the paper key can be picked up
 

767
00:19:35,780 --> 00:19:37,600
because the paper key can be picked up
by anyone so that robber if he

768
00:19:37,600 --> 00:19:37,610
by anyone so that robber if he
 

769
00:19:37,610 --> 00:19:39,310
by anyone so that robber if he
recognized it and he also had the

770
00:19:39,310 --> 00:19:39,320
recognized it and he also had the
 

771
00:19:39,320 --> 00:19:42,430
recognized it and he also had the
wallets I'm saying he I'm just assuming

772
00:19:42,430 --> 00:19:42,440
wallets I'm saying he I'm just assuming
 

773
00:19:42,440 --> 00:19:46,870
wallets I'm saying he I'm just assuming
it was probably a woman but if the

774
00:19:46,870 --> 00:19:46,880
it was probably a woman but if the
 

775
00:19:46,880 --> 00:19:50,500
it was probably a woman but if the
robber was to get a hold of the keys the

776
00:19:50,500 --> 00:19:50,510
robber was to get a hold of the keys the
 

777
00:19:50,510 --> 00:19:54,430
robber was to get a hold of the keys the
private keys on paper as well as the

778
00:19:54,430 --> 00:19:54,440
private keys on paper as well as the
 

779
00:19:54,440 --> 00:19:56,140
private keys on paper as well as the
wallets well they've got all your 69

780
00:19:56,140 --> 00:19:56,150
wallets well they've got all your 69
 

781
00:19:56,150 --> 00:19:58,899
wallets well they've got all your 69
billion dollars whatever it is a lot of

782
00:19:58,899 --> 00:19:58,909
billion dollars whatever it is a lot of
 

783
00:19:58,909 --> 00:20:01,930
billion dollars whatever it is a lot of
money a lot of money right right so at

784
00:20:01,930 --> 00:20:01,940
money a lot of money right right so at
 

785
00:20:01,940 --> 00:20:03,490
money a lot of money right right so at
least with encryption you can have

786
00:20:03,490 --> 00:20:03,500
least with encryption you can have
 

787
00:20:03,500 --> 00:20:06,430
least with encryption you can have
multiple copies of your file backed up

788
00:20:06,430 --> 00:20:06,440
multiple copies of your file backed up
 

789
00:20:06,440 --> 00:20:08,740
multiple copies of your file backed up
that has your keys

790
00:20:08,740 --> 00:20:08,750
that has your keys
 

791
00:20:08,750 --> 00:20:12,220
that has your keys
but don't just print B for him when he

792
00:20:12,220 --> 00:20:12,230
but don't just print B for him when he
 

793
00:20:12,230 --> 00:20:13,990
but don't just print B for him when he
gets out after I don't know if his

794
00:20:13,990 --> 00:20:14,000
gets out after I don't know if his
 

795
00:20:14,000 --> 00:20:16,750
gets out after I don't know if his
sentence is up yet but when he gets out

796
00:20:16,750 --> 00:20:16,760
sentence is up yet but when he gets out
 

797
00:20:16,760 --> 00:20:18,520
sentence is up yet but when he gets out
and he's just talking to somebody who's

798
00:20:18,520 --> 00:20:18,530
and he's just talking to somebody who's
 

799
00:20:18,530 --> 00:20:20,260
and he's just talking to somebody who's
never met him before and he tells them

800
00:20:20,260 --> 00:20:20,270
never met him before and he tells them
 

801
00:20:20,270 --> 00:20:23,590
never met him before and he tells them
the tale he lost so much money they'll

802
00:20:23,590 --> 00:20:23,600
the tale he lost so much money they'll
 

803
00:20:23,600 --> 00:20:27,430
the tale he lost so much money they'll
think that he is lying yeah

804
00:20:27,430 --> 00:20:27,440
think that he is lying yeah
 

805
00:20:27,440 --> 00:20:30,549
think that he is lying yeah
all right Firefox has begun the process

806
00:20:30,549 --> 00:20:30,559
all right Firefox has begun the process
 

807
00:20:30,559 --> 00:20:32,770
all right Firefox has begun the process
of switching browser users to cloud

808
00:20:32,770 --> 00:20:32,780
of switching browser users to cloud
 

809
00:20:32,780 --> 00:20:35,529
of switching browser users to cloud
flairs encrypted DNS service this week

810
00:20:35,529 --> 00:20:35,539
flairs encrypted DNS service this week
 

811
00:20:35,539 --> 00:20:38,140
flairs encrypted DNS service this week
the change rolls out across the United

812
00:20:38,140 --> 00:20:38,150
the change rolls out across the United
 

813
00:20:38,150 --> 00:20:40,620
the change rolls out across the United
States in the coming weeks

814
00:20:40,620 --> 00:20:40,630
States in the coming weeks
 

815
00:20:40,630 --> 00:20:44,330
States in the coming weeks
DNS over HTTP

816
00:20:44,330 --> 00:20:44,340
DNS over HTTP
 

817
00:20:44,340 --> 00:20:46,640
DNS over HTTP
helps keep eavesdroppers from seeing

818
00:20:46,640 --> 00:20:46,650
helps keep eavesdroppers from seeing
 

819
00:20:46,650 --> 00:20:49,269
helps keep eavesdroppers from seeing
what DNS lookups your browser is making

820
00:20:49,269 --> 00:20:49,279
what DNS lookups your browser is making
 

821
00:20:49,279 --> 00:20:51,500
what DNS lookups your browser is making
potentially making it more difficult for

822
00:20:51,500 --> 00:20:51,510
potentially making it more difficult for
 

823
00:20:51,510 --> 00:20:53,600
potentially making it more difficult for
Internet service providers or other

824
00:20:53,600 --> 00:20:53,610
Internet service providers or other
 

825
00:20:53,610 --> 00:20:56,360
Internet service providers or other
third parties to monitor what websites

826
00:20:56,360 --> 00:20:56,370
third parties to monitor what websites
 

827
00:20:56,370 --> 00:20:58,909
third parties to monitor what websites
you visit mozilla

828
00:20:58,909 --> 00:20:58,919
you visit mozilla
 

829
00:20:58,919 --> 00:21:03,080
you visit mozilla
embrace of dns over HTTP is fueled in

830
00:21:03,080 --> 00:21:03,090
embrace of dns over HTTP is fueled in
 

831
00:21:03,090 --> 00:21:05,840
embrace of dns over HTTP is fueled in
part by concerns about ISPs monitoring

832
00:21:05,840 --> 00:21:05,850
part by concerns about ISPs monitoring
 

833
00:21:05,850 --> 00:21:08,899
part by concerns about ISPs monitoring
customers web usage mobile broadband

834
00:21:08,899 --> 00:21:08,909
customers web usage mobile broadband
 

835
00:21:08,909 --> 00:21:11,120
customers web usage mobile broadband
providers were caught selling their

836
00:21:11,120 --> 00:21:11,130
providers were caught selling their
 

837
00:21:11,130 --> 00:21:13,460
providers were caught selling their
customers real-time location data to

838
00:21:13,460 --> 00:21:13,470
customers real-time location data to
 

839
00:21:13,470 --> 00:21:15,620
customers real-time location data to
third parties and internet providers can

840
00:21:15,620 --> 00:21:15,630
third parties and internet providers can
 

841
00:21:15,630 --> 00:21:17,930
third parties and internet providers can
use browsing history to deliver targeted

842
00:21:17,930 --> 00:21:17,940
use browsing history to deliver targeted
 

843
00:21:17,940 --> 00:21:20,840
use browsing history to deliver targeted
ads wireless and wired internet

844
00:21:20,840 --> 00:21:20,850
ads wireless and wired internet
 

845
00:21:20,850 --> 00:21:22,909
ads wireless and wired internet
providers are suing the state of maine

846
00:21:22,909 --> 00:21:22,919
providers are suing the state of maine
 

847
00:21:22,919 --> 00:21:25,940
providers are suing the state of maine
to stop a web browsing privacy law that

848
00:21:25,940 --> 00:21:25,950
to stop a web browsing privacy law that
 

849
00:21:25,950 --> 00:21:28,370
to stop a web browsing privacy law that
would require ISPs to get customers

850
00:21:28,370 --> 00:21:28,380
would require ISPs to get customers
 

851
00:21:28,380 --> 00:21:30,919
would require ISPs to get customers
opt-in consent before using or sharing

852
00:21:30,919 --> 00:21:30,929
opt-in consent before using or sharing
 

853
00:21:30,929 --> 00:21:32,930
opt-in consent before using or sharing
browsing history and other sensitive

854
00:21:32,930 --> 00:21:32,940
browsing history and other sensitive
 

855
00:21:32,940 --> 00:21:35,860
browsing history and other sensitive
data the telecom companies already

856
00:21:35,860 --> 00:21:35,870
data the telecom companies already
 

857
00:21:35,870 --> 00:21:38,210
data the telecom companies already
convinced Congress to eliminate a

858
00:21:38,210 --> 00:21:38,220
convinced Congress to eliminate a
 

859
00:21:38,220 --> 00:21:42,139
convinced Congress to eliminate a
similar federal law in 2017 with web

860
00:21:42,139 --> 00:21:42,149
similar federal law in 2017 with web
 

861
00:21:42,149 --> 00:21:44,120
similar federal law in 2017 with web
users already being tracked heavily by

862
00:21:44,120 --> 00:21:44,130
users already being tracked heavily by
 

863
00:21:44,130 --> 00:21:45,740
users already being tracked heavily by
companies like Google and Facebook

864
00:21:45,740 --> 00:21:45,750
companies like Google and Facebook
 

865
00:21:45,750 --> 00:21:48,799
companies like Google and Facebook
Mozilla had said it is embracing DNS

866
00:21:48,799 --> 00:21:48,809
Mozilla had said it is embracing DNS
 

867
00:21:48,809 --> 00:21:52,279
Mozilla had said it is embracing DNS
over HTTPS because quote we don't want

868
00:21:52,279 --> 00:21:52,289
over HTTPS because quote we don't want
 

869
00:21:52,289 --> 00:21:54,529
over HTTPS because quote we don't want
to see that business model duplicated in

870
00:21:54,529 --> 00:21:54,539
to see that business model duplicated in
 

871
00:21:54,539 --> 00:21:57,080
to see that business model duplicated in
the middle of a network and it's just a

872
00:21:57,080 --> 00:21:57,090
the middle of a network and it's just a
 

873
00:21:57,090 --> 00:21:59,750
the middle of a network and it's just a
mistake to use DNS for those purposes

874
00:21:59,750 --> 00:21:59,760
mistake to use DNS for those purposes
 

875
00:21:59,760 --> 00:22:02,720
mistake to use DNS for those purposes
end quote Mozilla said in an

876
00:22:02,720 --> 00:22:02,730
end quote Mozilla said in an
 

877
00:22:02,730 --> 00:22:05,389
end quote Mozilla said in an
announcement Tuesday quote today we know

878
00:22:05,389 --> 00:22:05,399
announcement Tuesday quote today we know
 

879
00:22:05,399 --> 00:22:07,820
announcement Tuesday quote today we know
that unencrypted DNS is not only

880
00:22:07,820 --> 00:22:07,830
that unencrypted DNS is not only
 

881
00:22:07,830 --> 00:22:09,830
that unencrypted DNS is not only
vulnerable to spying but is being

882
00:22:09,830 --> 00:22:09,840
vulnerable to spying but is being
 

883
00:22:09,840 --> 00:22:12,200
vulnerable to spying but is being
exploited and so we are helping the

884
00:22:12,200 --> 00:22:12,210
exploited and so we are helping the
 

885
00:22:12,210 --> 00:22:14,120
exploited and so we are helping the
Internet to make the shift to more

886
00:22:14,120 --> 00:22:14,130
Internet to make the shift to more
 

887
00:22:14,130 --> 00:22:17,720
Internet to make the shift to more
secure alternatives we do we do this by

888
00:22:17,720 --> 00:22:17,730
secure alternatives we do we do this by
 

889
00:22:17,730 --> 00:22:21,919
secure alternatives we do we do this by
performing DNS lookups in encrypted HTTP

890
00:22:21,919 --> 00:22:21,929
performing DNS lookups in encrypted HTTP
 

891
00:22:21,929 --> 00:22:24,860
performing DNS lookups in encrypted HTTP
connection this helps hide your browsing

892
00:22:24,860 --> 00:22:24,870
connection this helps hide your browsing
 

893
00:22:24,870 --> 00:22:26,840
connection this helps hide your browsing
history from attackers on the network

894
00:22:26,840 --> 00:22:26,850
history from attackers on the network
 

895
00:22:26,850 --> 00:22:29,210
history from attackers on the network
and helps prevent data collection by

896
00:22:29,210 --> 00:22:29,220
and helps prevent data collection by
 

897
00:22:29,220 --> 00:22:32,090
and helps prevent data collection by
third parties on the network that ties

898
00:22:32,090 --> 00:22:32,100
third parties on the network that ties
 

899
00:22:32,100 --> 00:22:34,399
third parties on the network that ties
your computer to websites you visit end

900
00:22:34,399 --> 00:22:34,409
your computer to websites you visit end
 

901
00:22:34,409 --> 00:22:35,230
your computer to websites you visit end
quote

902
00:22:35,230 --> 00:22:35,240
quote
 

903
00:22:35,240 --> 00:22:38,899
quote
while Firefox is encrypted DNS uses

904
00:22:38,899 --> 00:22:38,909
while Firefox is encrypted DNS uses
 

905
00:22:38,909 --> 00:22:41,330
while Firefox is encrypted DNS uses
CloudFlare by default users can change

906
00:22:41,330 --> 00:22:41,340
CloudFlare by default users can change
 

907
00:22:41,340 --> 00:22:44,899
CloudFlare by default users can change
that to next DNS in the Firefox setting

908
00:22:44,899 --> 00:22:44,909
that to next DNS in the Firefox setting
 

909
00:22:44,909 --> 00:22:46,850
that to next DNS in the Firefox setting
or manually enter the address of another

910
00:22:46,850 --> 00:22:46,860
or manually enter the address of another
 

911
00:22:46,860 --> 00:22:50,570
or manually enter the address of another
encrypted DNS service Firefox users can

912
00:22:50,570 --> 00:22:50,580
encrypted DNS service Firefox users can
 

913
00:22:50,580 --> 00:22:53,090
encrypted DNS service Firefox users can
also disable the new default setting if

914
00:22:53,090 --> 00:22:53,100
also disable the new default setting if
 

915
00:22:53,100 --> 00:22:54,649
also disable the new default setting if
they don't want to use any of the

916
00:22:54,649 --> 00:22:54,659
they don't want to use any of the
 

917
00:22:54,659 --> 00:22:57,860
they don't want to use any of the
encrypted DNS options

918
00:22:57,860 --> 00:22:57,870
encrypted DNS options
 

919
00:22:57,870 --> 00:23:00,200
encrypted DNS options
Google's plan for encrypted DNS in

920
00:23:00,200 --> 00:23:00,210
Google's plan for encrypted DNS in
 

921
00:23:00,210 --> 00:23:02,480
Google's plan for encrypted DNS in
Chrome which is still in the

922
00:23:02,480 --> 00:23:02,490
Chrome which is still in the
 

923
00:23:02,490 --> 00:23:04,280
Chrome which is still in the
experimental phase and hasn't been

924
00:23:04,280 --> 00:23:04,290
experimental phase and hasn't been
 

925
00:23:04,290 --> 00:23:07,010
experimental phase and hasn't been
deployed to everyone is a little

926
00:23:07,010 --> 00:23:07,020
deployed to everyone is a little
 

927
00:23:07,020 --> 00:23:08,560
deployed to everyone is a little
different from Mozilla

928
00:23:08,560 --> 00:23:08,570
different from Mozilla
 

929
00:23:08,570 --> 00:23:11,270
different from Mozilla
instead of automatically switching users

930
00:23:11,270 --> 00:23:11,280
instead of automatically switching users
 

931
00:23:11,280 --> 00:23:13,700
instead of automatically switching users
to a DNS provider chosen by Google

932
00:23:13,700 --> 00:23:13,710
to a DNS provider chosen by Google
 

933
00:23:13,710 --> 00:23:16,400
to a DNS provider chosen by Google
Chrome sticks with whichever DNS

934
00:23:16,400 --> 00:23:16,410
Chrome sticks with whichever DNS
 

935
00:23:16,410 --> 00:23:19,160
Chrome sticks with whichever DNS
provider the user has selected if the

936
00:23:19,160 --> 00:23:19,170
provider the user has selected if the
 

937
00:23:19,170 --> 00:23:21,200
provider the user has selected if the
user selected DNS provider offers

938
00:23:21,200 --> 00:23:21,210
user selected DNS provider offers
 

939
00:23:21,210 --> 00:23:24,110
user selected DNS provider offers
encrypted lookups and is in the list of

940
00:23:24,110 --> 00:23:24,120
encrypted lookups and is in the list of
 

941
00:23:24,120 --> 00:23:26,870
encrypted lookups and is in the list of
providers chrome automatically upgrades

942
00:23:26,870 --> 00:23:26,880
providers chrome automatically upgrades
 

943
00:23:26,880 --> 00:23:29,240
providers chrome automatically upgrades
the user to that DNS providers encrypted

944
00:23:29,240 --> 00:23:29,250
the user to that DNS providers encrypted
 

945
00:23:29,250 --> 00:23:31,730
the user to that DNS providers encrypted
service if the user selected DNS

946
00:23:31,730 --> 00:23:31,740
service if the user selected DNS
 

947
00:23:31,740 --> 00:23:33,950
service if the user selected DNS
provider isn't in the list chrome makes

948
00:23:33,950 --> 00:23:33,960
provider isn't in the list chrome makes
 

949
00:23:33,960 --> 00:23:36,830
provider isn't in the list chrome makes
no changes see that makes more sense to

950
00:23:36,830 --> 00:23:36,840
no changes see that makes more sense to
 

951
00:23:36,840 --> 00:23:39,440
no changes see that makes more sense to
me yeah don't touch my DNS settings

952
00:23:39,440 --> 00:23:39,450
me yeah don't touch my DNS settings
 

953
00:23:39,450 --> 00:23:45,290
me yeah don't touch my DNS settings
browser ha ha ha Swiss aghhh no I mean

954
00:23:45,290 --> 00:23:45,300
browser ha ha ha Swiss aghhh no I mean
 

955
00:23:45,300 --> 00:23:47,030
browser ha ha ha Swiss aghhh no I mean
we're gonna we're gonna divide the

956
00:23:47,030 --> 00:23:47,040
we're gonna we're gonna divide the
 

957
00:23:47,040 --> 00:23:51,380
we're gonna we're gonna divide the
community right now my belief is that my

958
00:23:51,380 --> 00:23:51,390
community right now my belief is that my
 

959
00:23:51,390 --> 00:23:58,280
community right now my belief is that my
web browser should not touch my DNS it

960
00:23:58,280 --> 00:23:58,290
web browser should not touch my DNS it
 

961
00:23:58,290 --> 00:24:00,620
web browser should not touch my DNS it
shouldn't touch my IP address it

962
00:24:00,620 --> 00:24:00,630
shouldn't touch my IP address it
 

963
00:24:00,630 --> 00:24:04,910
shouldn't touch my IP address it
shouldn't touch my default gateway right

964
00:24:04,910 --> 00:24:04,920
shouldn't touch my default gateway right
 

965
00:24:04,920 --> 00:24:07,220
shouldn't touch my default gateway right
you're all agreeing with that so why is

966
00:24:07,220 --> 00:24:07,230
you're all agreeing with that so why is
 

967
00:24:07,230 --> 00:24:09,890
you're all agreeing with that so why is
it touching my DNS my browser should be

968
00:24:09,890 --> 00:24:09,900
it touching my DNS my browser should be
 

969
00:24:09,900 --> 00:24:11,960
it touching my DNS my browser should be
subject to my operating systems DNS

970
00:24:11,960 --> 00:24:11,970
subject to my operating systems DNS
 

971
00:24:11,970 --> 00:24:14,510
subject to my operating systems DNS
settings my operating system should be

972
00:24:14,510 --> 00:24:14,520
settings my operating system should be
 

973
00:24:14,520 --> 00:24:15,740
settings my operating system should be
making these decisions

974
00:24:15,740 --> 00:24:15,750
making these decisions
 

975
00:24:15,750 --> 00:24:18,590
making these decisions
Ubuntu should be saying hey we're gonna

976
00:24:18,590 --> 00:24:18,600
Ubuntu should be saying hey we're gonna
 

977
00:24:18,600 --> 00:24:21,470
Ubuntu should be saying hey we're gonna
try to encourage our users to use HTTPS

978
00:24:21,470 --> 00:24:21,480
try to encourage our users to use HTTPS
 

979
00:24:21,480 --> 00:24:24,680
try to encourage our users to use HTTPS
for DNS queries my browser should never

980
00:24:24,680 --> 00:24:24,690
for DNS queries my browser should never
 

981
00:24:24,690 --> 00:24:28,700
for DNS queries my browser should never
be allowed to override my DNS rights I

982
00:24:28,700 --> 00:24:28,710
be allowed to override my DNS rights I
 

983
00:24:28,710 --> 00:24:31,220
be allowed to override my DNS rights I
see what you're saying that's my opinion

984
00:24:31,220 --> 00:24:31,230
see what you're saying that's my opinion
 

985
00:24:31,230 --> 00:24:34,480
see what you're saying that's my opinion
my browser is to be able to surf the web

986
00:24:34,480 --> 00:24:34,490
my browser is to be able to surf the web
 

987
00:24:34,490 --> 00:24:36,890
my browser is to be able to surf the web
based on the settings which I have said

988
00:24:36,890 --> 00:24:36,900
based on the settings which I have said
 

989
00:24:36,900 --> 00:24:39,350
based on the settings which I have said
in my operating system for TCI

990
00:24:39,350 --> 00:24:39,360
in my operating system for TCI
 

991
00:24:39,360 --> 00:24:43,730
in my operating system for TCI
for my tcpip stack for my DNS stack for

992
00:24:43,730 --> 00:24:43,740
for my tcpip stack for my DNS stack for
 

993
00:24:43,740 --> 00:24:48,200
for my tcpip stack for my DNS stack for
my gateway now what about a consumer or

994
00:24:48,200 --> 00:24:48,210
my gateway now what about a consumer or
 

995
00:24:48,210 --> 00:24:51,260
my gateway now what about a consumer or
a user who isn't as knowledgeable as you

996
00:24:51,260 --> 00:24:51,270
a user who isn't as knowledgeable as you
 

997
00:24:51,270 --> 00:24:54,320
a user who isn't as knowledgeable as you
with the suit them I think that is the

998
00:24:54,320 --> 00:24:54,330
with the suit them I think that is the
 

999
00:24:54,330 --> 00:24:57,530
with the suit them I think that is the
exception to where I think this works

1000
00:24:57,530 --> 00:24:57,540
exception to where I think this works
 

1001
00:24:57,540 --> 00:25:01,120
exception to where I think this works
yeah I think this works for the average

1002
00:25:01,120 --> 00:25:01,130
yeah I think this works for the average
 

1003
00:25:01,130 --> 00:25:04,190
yeah I think this works for the average
Windows user we'll say like the average

1004
00:25:04,190 --> 00:25:04,200
Windows user we'll say like the average
 

1005
00:25:04,200 --> 00:25:06,350
Windows user we'll say like the average
home user who just bought a laptop from

1006
00:25:06,350 --> 00:25:06,360
home user who just bought a laptop from
 

1007
00:25:06,360 --> 00:25:09,830
home user who just bought a laptop from
the future shop yes from Walmart

1008
00:25:09,830 --> 00:25:09,840
the future shop yes from Walmart
 

1009
00:25:09,840 --> 00:25:12,830
the future shop yes from Walmart
and fires it up and installs firefox

1010
00:25:12,830 --> 00:25:12,840
and fires it up and installs firefox
 

1011
00:25:12,840 --> 00:25:14,060
and fires it up and installs firefox
hopefully because they're not going to

1012
00:25:14,060 --> 00:25:14,070
hopefully because they're not going to
 

1013
00:25:14,070 --> 00:25:15,350
hopefully because they're not going to
use edge because they're smarter than

1014
00:25:15,350 --> 00:25:15,360
use edge because they're smarter than
 

1015
00:25:15,360 --> 00:25:20,390
use edge because they're smarter than
that at least yes right but you trust

1016
00:25:20,390 --> 00:25:20,400
that at least yes right but you trust
 

1017
00:25:20,400 --> 00:25:23,419
that at least yes right but you trust
your browser and and so that user sure I

1018
00:25:23,419 --> 00:25:23,429
your browser and and so that user sure I
 

1019
00:25:23,429 --> 00:25:25,789
your browser and and so that user sure I
mean use HTTP but here's my problem is

1020
00:25:25,789 --> 00:25:25,799
mean use HTTP but here's my problem is
 

1021
00:25:25,799 --> 00:25:30,470
mean use HTTP but here's my problem is
that I set I have a pie hole right you

1022
00:25:30,470 --> 00:25:30,480
that I set I have a pie hole right you
 

1023
00:25:30,480 --> 00:25:33,470
that I set I have a pie hole right you
do oh I have a DNS server on my network

1024
00:25:33,470 --> 00:25:33,480
do oh I have a DNS server on my network
 

1025
00:25:33,480 --> 00:25:36,919
do oh I have a DNS server on my network
that is on a Odroid xu4 in a cloud shell

1026
00:25:36,919 --> 00:25:36,929
that is on a Odroid xu4 in a cloud shell
 

1027
00:25:36,929 --> 00:25:41,029
that is on a Odroid xu4 in a cloud shell
to that pie hole powered device so pie

1028
00:25:41,029 --> 00:25:41,039
to that pie hole powered device so pie
 

1029
00:25:41,039 --> 00:25:42,740
to that pie hole powered device so pie
hole is the operating system it's a DNS

1030
00:25:42,740 --> 00:25:42,750
hole is the operating system it's a DNS
 

1031
00:25:42,750 --> 00:25:46,549
hole is the operating system it's a DNS
server uses bi9 and it controls the flow

1032
00:25:46,549 --> 00:25:46,559
server uses bi9 and it controls the flow
 

1033
00:25:46,559 --> 00:25:49,909
server uses bi9 and it controls the flow
of DNS through my network so if my kids

1034
00:25:49,909 --> 00:25:49,919
of DNS through my network so if my kids
 

1035
00:25:49,919 --> 00:25:51,710
of DNS through my network so if my kids
go to something that Daddy says is

1036
00:25:51,710 --> 00:25:51,720
go to something that Daddy says is
 

1037
00:25:51,720 --> 00:25:54,350
go to something that Daddy says is
objectionable it will block it so what

1038
00:25:54,350 --> 00:25:54,360
objectionable it will block it so what
 

1039
00:25:54,360 --> 00:25:57,289
objectionable it will block it so what
Firefox is saying is I don't care what

1040
00:25:57,289 --> 00:25:57,299
Firefox is saying is I don't care what
 

1041
00:25:57,299 --> 00:25:58,909
Firefox is saying is I don't care what
daddy says I'm gonna go around what

1042
00:25:58,909 --> 00:25:58,919
daddy says I'm gonna go around what
 

1043
00:25:58,919 --> 00:26:00,529
daddy says I'm gonna go around what
daddy says and I'm gonna go directly to

1044
00:26:00,529 --> 00:26:00,539
daddy says and I'm gonna go directly to
 

1045
00:26:00,539 --> 00:26:04,039
daddy says and I'm gonna go directly to
CloudFlare and whatever the kids type in

1046
00:26:04,039 --> 00:26:04,049
CloudFlare and whatever the kids type in
 

1047
00:26:04,049 --> 00:26:07,639
CloudFlare and whatever the kids type in
I don't care cuz I'm Firefox I know

1048
00:26:07,639 --> 00:26:07,649
I don't care cuz I'm Firefox I know
 

1049
00:26:07,649 --> 00:26:10,310
I don't care cuz I'm Firefox I know
what's what yeah so I'm gonna go I'm

1050
00:26:10,310 --> 00:26:10,320
what's what yeah so I'm gonna go I'm
 

1051
00:26:10,320 --> 00:26:14,299
what's what yeah so I'm gonna go I'm
gonna circumvent your piehole hi every

1052
00:26:14,299 --> 00:26:14,309
gonna circumvent your piehole hi every
 

1053
00:26:14,309 --> 00:26:17,029
gonna circumvent your piehole hi every
time I say it I laugh it's called

1054
00:26:17,029 --> 00:26:17,039
time I say it I laugh it's called
 

1055
00:26:17,039 --> 00:26:22,159
time I say it I laugh it's called
piehole okay it's a DNS server yeah so I

1056
00:26:22,159 --> 00:26:22,169
piehole okay it's a DNS server yeah so I
 

1057
00:26:22,169 --> 00:26:25,690
piehole okay it's a DNS server yeah so I
block things like advertisements

1058
00:26:25,690 --> 00:26:25,700
block things like advertisements
 

1059
00:26:25,700 --> 00:26:30,350
block things like advertisements
pornography things like gambling sites

1060
00:26:30,350 --> 00:26:30,360
pornography things like gambling sites
 

1061
00:26:30,360 --> 00:26:35,029
pornography things like gambling sites
and stuff that I'm that you know yeah

1062
00:26:35,029 --> 00:26:35,039
and stuff that I'm that you know yeah
 

1063
00:26:35,039 --> 00:26:36,740
and stuff that I'm that you know yeah
even stuff that I just think that the

1064
00:26:36,740 --> 00:26:36,750
even stuff that I just think that the
 

1065
00:26:36,750 --> 00:26:38,720
even stuff that I just think that the
kids should maybe approach me about if

1066
00:26:38,720 --> 00:26:38,730
kids should maybe approach me about if
 

1067
00:26:38,730 --> 00:26:41,120
kids should maybe approach me about if
they need access to it just so that I

1068
00:26:41,120 --> 00:26:41,130
they need access to it just so that I
 

1069
00:26:41,130 --> 00:26:43,760
they need access to it just so that I
can explain why they might want to be

1070
00:26:43,760 --> 00:26:43,770
can explain why they might want to be
 

1071
00:26:43,770 --> 00:26:47,600
can explain why they might want to be
careful on those sites yeah so so I try

1072
00:26:47,600 --> 00:26:47,610
careful on those sites yeah so so I try
 

1073
00:26:47,610 --> 00:26:49,310
careful on those sites yeah so so I try
to control those things not from a

1074
00:26:49,310 --> 00:26:49,320
to control those things not from a
 

1075
00:26:49,320 --> 00:26:51,590
to control those things not from a
control freak perspective but from a I

1076
00:26:51,590 --> 00:26:51,600
control freak perspective but from a I
 

1077
00:26:51,600 --> 00:26:54,799
control freak perspective but from a I
want to be a parent who protects my

1078
00:26:54,799 --> 00:26:54,809
want to be a parent who protects my
 

1079
00:26:54,809 --> 00:26:58,000
want to be a parent who protects my
children and in this connected world and

1080
00:26:58,000 --> 00:26:58,010
children and in this connected world and
 

1081
00:26:58,010 --> 00:27:01,789
children and in this connected world and
Firefox is saying you know what yeah and

1082
00:27:01,789 --> 00:27:01,799
Firefox is saying you know what yeah and
 

1083
00:27:01,799 --> 00:27:04,730
Firefox is saying you know what yeah and
I hate that so if my kids are using

1084
00:27:04,730 --> 00:27:04,740
I hate that so if my kids are using
 

1085
00:27:04,740 --> 00:27:08,690
I hate that so if my kids are using
Firefox they are circumventing the

1086
00:27:08,690 --> 00:27:08,700
Firefox they are circumventing the
 

1087
00:27:08,700 --> 00:27:11,120
Firefox they are circumventing the
settings that Daddy set up to protect my

1088
00:27:11,120 --> 00:27:11,130
settings that Daddy set up to protect my
 

1089
00:27:11,130 --> 00:27:15,350
settings that Daddy set up to protect my
kids that I don't like so I but I do

1090
00:27:15,350 --> 00:27:15,360
kids that I don't like so I but I do
 

1091
00:27:15,360 --> 00:27:17,630
kids that I don't like so I but I do
understand for the average person who

1092
00:27:17,630 --> 00:27:17,640
understand for the average person who
 

1093
00:27:17,640 --> 00:27:20,060
understand for the average person who
goes into Walmart and buys a laptop and

1094
00:27:20,060 --> 00:27:20,070
goes into Walmart and buys a laptop and
 

1095
00:27:20,070 --> 00:27:23,299
goes into Walmart and buys a laptop and
installs Firefox this is safer right

1096
00:27:23,299 --> 00:27:23,309
installs Firefox this is safer right
 

1097
00:27:23,309 --> 00:27:26,450
installs Firefox this is safer right
because nobody needs to know what URLs

1098
00:27:26,450 --> 00:27:26,460
because nobody needs to know what URLs
 

1099
00:27:26,460 --> 00:27:30,440
because nobody needs to know what URLs
you are going to write and like Sasha

1100
00:27:30,440 --> 00:27:30,450
you are going to write and like Sasha
 

1101
00:27:30,450 --> 00:27:32,539
you are going to write and like Sasha
from 2009 I don't even know when I

1102
00:27:32,539 --> 00:27:32,549
from 2009 I don't even know when I
 

1103
00:27:32,549 --> 00:27:35,739
from 2009 I don't even know when I
started the show mm see Sasha from 2011

1104
00:27:35,739 --> 00:27:35,749
started the show mm see Sasha from 2011
 

1105
00:27:35,749 --> 00:27:39,460
started the show mm see Sasha from 2011
wouldn't have known anything about

1106
00:27:39,460 --> 00:27:39,470
wouldn't have known anything about
 

1107
00:27:39,470 --> 00:27:41,629
wouldn't have known anything about
technology like I wouldn't have known I

1108
00:27:41,629 --> 00:27:41,639
technology like I wouldn't have known I
 

1109
00:27:41,639 --> 00:27:43,249
technology like I wouldn't have known I
would have just loved to Dada

1110
00:27:43,249 --> 00:27:43,259
would have just loved to Dada
 

1111
00:27:43,259 --> 00:27:45,110
would have just loved to Dada
walked into a store picked up a computer

1112
00:27:45,110 --> 00:27:45,120
walked into a store picked up a computer
 

1113
00:27:45,120 --> 00:27:46,820
walked into a store picked up a computer
brought it home plugged it in and

1114
00:27:46,820 --> 00:27:46,830
brought it home plugged it in and
 

1115
00:27:46,830 --> 00:27:48,950
brought it home plugged it in and
probably would have believed any pop-up

1116
00:27:48,950 --> 00:27:48,960
probably would have believed any pop-up
 

1117
00:27:48,960 --> 00:27:51,560
probably would have believed any pop-up
that showed up on my computer right and

1118
00:27:51,560 --> 00:27:51,570
that showed up on my computer right and
 

1119
00:27:51,570 --> 00:27:55,249
that showed up on my computer right and
so those are the people that needs oh

1120
00:27:55,249 --> 00:27:55,259
so those are the people that needs oh
 

1121
00:27:55,259 --> 00:27:58,369
so those are the people that needs oh
right no absolutely and but like the

1122
00:27:58,369 --> 00:27:58,379
right no absolutely and but like the
 

1123
00:27:58,379 --> 00:28:02,180
right no absolutely and but like the
adults sure but for her I mean there are

1124
00:28:02,180 --> 00:28:02,190
adults sure but for her I mean there are
 

1125
00:28:02,190 --> 00:28:05,480
adults sure but for her I mean there are
so many great uses for being able and I

1126
00:28:05,480 --> 00:28:05,490
so many great uses for being able and I
 

1127
00:28:05,490 --> 00:28:08,330
so many great uses for being able and I
understand that the the approach or the

1128
00:28:08,330 --> 00:28:08,340
understand that the the approach or the
 

1129
00:28:08,340 --> 00:28:10,820
understand that the the approach or the
promotional end of it so I mean we'll

1130
00:28:10,820 --> 00:28:10,830
promotional end of it so I mean we'll
 

1131
00:28:10,830 --> 00:28:12,320
promotional end of it so I mean we'll
say the marketing perspective that

1132
00:28:12,320 --> 00:28:12,330
say the marketing perspective that
 

1133
00:28:12,330 --> 00:28:14,119
say the marketing perspective that
Firefox is using is that this protects

1134
00:28:14,119 --> 00:28:14,129
Firefox is using is that this protects
 

1135
00:28:14,129 --> 00:28:17,149
Firefox is using is that this protects
you because now your internet service

1136
00:28:17,149 --> 00:28:17,159
you because now your internet service
 

1137
00:28:17,159 --> 00:28:20,960
you because now your internet service
provider can't see what domain you go to

1138
00:28:20,960 --> 00:28:20,970
provider can't see what domain you go to
 

1139
00:28:20,970 --> 00:28:22,999
provider can't see what domain you go to
so if you punch in a pornographic

1140
00:28:22,999 --> 00:28:23,009
so if you punch in a pornographic
 

1141
00:28:23,009 --> 00:28:26,869
so if you punch in a pornographic
website into your url bar your ISP knows

1142
00:28:26,869 --> 00:28:26,879
website into your url bar your ISP knows
 

1143
00:28:26,879 --> 00:28:31,129
website into your url bar your ISP knows
that right but so does daddy and so

1144
00:28:31,129 --> 00:28:31,139
that right but so does daddy and so
 

1145
00:28:31,139 --> 00:28:34,039
that right but so does daddy and so
Daddy can say I don't want my kids to

1146
00:28:34,039 --> 00:28:34,049
Daddy can say I don't want my kids to
 

1147
00:28:34,049 --> 00:28:37,789
Daddy can say I don't want my kids to
see that yes I want to protect them from

1148
00:28:37,789 --> 00:28:37,799
see that yes I want to protect them from
 

1149
00:28:37,799 --> 00:28:39,669
see that yes I want to protect them from
that

1150
00:28:39,669 --> 00:28:39,679
that
 

1151
00:28:39,679 --> 00:28:43,369
that
so please Firefox don't turn that off

1152
00:28:43,369 --> 00:28:43,379
so please Firefox don't turn that off
 

1153
00:28:43,379 --> 00:28:46,369
so please Firefox don't turn that off
yes I have to be able to see those

1154
00:28:46,369 --> 00:28:46,379
yes I have to be able to see those
 

1155
00:28:46,379 --> 00:28:50,239
yes I have to be able to see those
domains so that's why I have a problem

1156
00:28:50,239 --> 00:28:50,249
domains so that's why I have a problem
 

1157
00:28:50,249 --> 00:28:53,960
domains so that's why I have a problem
with it I agree that HTTPS is important

1158
00:28:53,960 --> 00:28:53,970
with it I agree that HTTPS is important
 

1159
00:28:53,970 --> 00:28:58,940
with it I agree that HTTPS is important
but there are times when maybe Google's

1160
00:28:58,940 --> 00:28:58,950
but there are times when maybe Google's
 

1161
00:28:58,950 --> 00:29:01,430
but there are times when maybe Google's
approach is better because Google is

1162
00:29:01,430 --> 00:29:01,440
approach is better because Google is
 

1163
00:29:01,440 --> 00:29:03,619
approach is better because Google is
saying if you already have something set

1164
00:29:03,619 --> 00:29:03,629
saying if you already have something set
 

1165
00:29:03,629 --> 00:29:07,340
saying if you already have something set
in chrome in your browser in your

1166
00:29:07,340 --> 00:29:07,350
in chrome in your browser in your
 

1167
00:29:07,350 --> 00:29:09,560
in chrome in your browser in your
operating system we will honor that but

1168
00:29:09,560 --> 00:29:09,570
operating system we will honor that but
 

1169
00:29:09,570 --> 00:29:12,139
operating system we will honor that but
we'll try to switch to HTTPS so Google

1170
00:29:12,139 --> 00:29:12,149
we'll try to switch to HTTPS so Google
 

1171
00:29:12,149 --> 00:29:16,519
we'll try to switch to HTTPS so Google
is saying if you have a piehole I'll

1172
00:29:16,519 --> 00:29:16,529
is saying if you have a piehole I'll
 

1173
00:29:16,529 --> 00:29:18,619
is saying if you have a piehole I'll
still go through your piehole but then

1174
00:29:18,619 --> 00:29:18,629
still go through your piehole but then
 

1175
00:29:18,629 --> 00:29:22,970
still go through your piehole but then
Daddy can set the pie holes DNS server

1176
00:29:22,970 --> 00:29:22,980
Daddy can set the pie holes DNS server
 

1177
00:29:22,980 --> 00:29:26,810
Daddy can set the pie holes DNS server
to an HTTP server so the ISP cannot see

1178
00:29:26,810 --> 00:29:26,820
to an HTTP server so the ISP cannot see
 

1179
00:29:26,820 --> 00:29:30,950
to an HTTP server so the ISP cannot see
what my family is putting in so daddy

1180
00:29:30,950 --> 00:29:30,960
what my family is putting in so daddy
 

1181
00:29:30,960 --> 00:29:32,899
what my family is putting in so daddy
can still see it because the browser no

1182
00:29:32,899 --> 00:29:32,909
can still see it because the browser no
 

1183
00:29:32,909 --> 00:29:35,530
can still see it because the browser no
longer has the power to override

1184
00:29:35,530 --> 00:29:35,540
longer has the power to override
 

1185
00:29:35,540 --> 00:29:38,110
longer has the power to override
but the ISP cannot because my piehole

1186
00:29:38,110 --> 00:29:38,120
but the ISP cannot because my piehole
 

1187
00:29:38,120 --> 00:29:42,040
but the ISP cannot because my piehole
which is the override of my systems see

1188
00:29:42,040 --> 00:29:42,050
which is the override of my systems see
 

1189
00:29:42,050 --> 00:29:45,850
which is the override of my systems see
that is is able to direct okay so I can

1190
00:29:45,850 --> 00:29:45,860
that is is able to direct okay so I can
 

1191
00:29:45,860 --> 00:29:47,620
that is is able to direct okay so I can
make that decision cuz I'm smart enough

1192
00:29:47,620 --> 00:29:47,630
make that decision cuz I'm smart enough
 

1193
00:29:47,630 --> 00:29:49,840
make that decision cuz I'm smart enough
yeah you're smart enough to make that

1194
00:29:49,840 --> 00:29:49,850
yeah you're smart enough to make that
 

1195
00:29:49,850 --> 00:29:53,220
yeah you're smart enough to make that
decision so there should be a process

1196
00:29:53,220 --> 00:29:53,230
decision so there should be a process
 

1197
00:29:53,230 --> 00:29:56,500
decision so there should be a process
that Firefox has for some reason

1198
00:29:56,500 --> 00:29:56,510
that Firefox has for some reason
 

1199
00:29:56,510 --> 00:29:59,590
that Firefox has for some reason
forgotten to put into place there should

1200
00:29:59,590 --> 00:29:59,600
forgotten to put into place there should
 

1201
00:29:59,600 --> 00:30:04,360
forgotten to put into place there should
be a process of qualifying is this user

1202
00:30:04,360 --> 00:30:04,370
be a process of qualifying is this user
 

1203
00:30:04,370 --> 00:30:06,340
be a process of qualifying is this user
capable of making these decisions for

1204
00:30:06,340 --> 00:30:06,350
capable of making these decisions for
 

1205
00:30:06,350 --> 00:30:10,300
capable of making these decisions for
themselves yes or do we actually need to

1206
00:30:10,300 --> 00:30:10,310
themselves yes or do we actually need to
 

1207
00:30:10,310 --> 00:30:15,760
themselves yes or do we actually need to
override for them right okay that's my

1208
00:30:15,760 --> 00:30:15,770
override for them right okay that's my
 

1209
00:30:15,770 --> 00:30:18,310
override for them right okay that's my
perspective please comment below I know

1210
00:30:18,310 --> 00:30:18,320
perspective please comment below I know
 

1211
00:30:18,320 --> 00:30:20,470
perspective please comment below I know
we're probably gonna have some mixed

1212
00:30:20,470 --> 00:30:20,480
we're probably gonna have some mixed
 

1213
00:30:20,480 --> 00:30:24,610
we're probably gonna have some mixed
perspectives here on this topic but my

1214
00:30:24,610 --> 00:30:24,620
perspectives here on this topic but my
 

1215
00:30:24,620 --> 00:30:26,500
perspectives here on this topic but my
perspective is from the father who just

1216
00:30:26,500 --> 00:30:26,510
perspective is from the father who just
 

1217
00:30:26,510 --> 00:30:29,530
perspective is from the father who just
wants to protect his kids I like it

1218
00:30:29,530 --> 00:30:29,540
wants to protect his kids I like it
 

1219
00:30:29,540 --> 00:30:30,300
wants to protect his kids I like it
thank you

1220
00:30:30,300 --> 00:30:30,310
thank you
 

1221
00:30:30,310 --> 00:30:33,760
thank you
comment below we have to take a quick

1222
00:30:33,760 --> 00:30:33,770
comment below we have to take a quick
 

1223
00:30:33,770 --> 00:30:35,800
comment below we have to take a quick
break more of this week's top tech

1224
00:30:35,800 --> 00:30:35,810
break more of this week's top tech
 

1225
00:30:35,810 --> 00:30:37,200
break more of this week's top tech
stories are coming up

1226
00:30:37,200 --> 00:30:37,210
stories are coming up
 

1227
00:30:37,210 --> 00:30:50,960
stories are coming up
[Music]

1228
00:30:50,960 --> 00:30:50,970

 

1229
00:30:50,970 --> 00:30:53,910

owners of the device designed to release

1230
00:30:53,910 --> 00:30:53,920
owners of the device designed to release
 

1231
00:30:53,920 --> 00:30:56,550
owners of the device designed to release
food for pets say their animals are left

1232
00:30:56,550 --> 00:30:56,560
food for pets say their animals are left
 

1233
00:30:56,560 --> 00:30:59,090
food for pets say their animals are left
hungry during a week-long

1234
00:30:59,090 --> 00:30:59,100
hungry during a week-long
 

1235
00:30:59,100 --> 00:31:03,049
hungry during a week-long
[Music]

1236
00:31:03,049 --> 00:31:03,059
[Music]
 

1237
00:31:03,059 --> 00:31:05,909
[Music]
however such devices are being trusted

1238
00:31:05,909 --> 00:31:05,919
however such devices are being trusted
 

1239
00:31:05,919 --> 00:31:09,360
however such devices are being trusted
by pet owners pet net allows owners to

1240
00:31:09,360 --> 00:31:09,370
by pet owners pet net allows owners to
 

1241
00:31:09,370 --> 00:31:11,250
by pet owners pet net allows owners to
schedule and control feeding via

1242
00:31:11,250 --> 00:31:11,260
schedule and control feeding via
 

1243
00:31:11,260 --> 00:31:15,090
schedule and control feeding via
smartphone app one pet owner tweeted my

1244
00:31:15,090 --> 00:31:15,100
smartphone app one pet owner tweeted my
 

1245
00:31:15,100 --> 00:31:17,789
smartphone app one pet owner tweeted my
cat starved for over a week while others

1246
00:31:17,789 --> 00:31:17,799
cat starved for over a week while others
 

1247
00:31:17,799 --> 00:31:19,700
cat starved for over a week while others
complained about other hardware issues

1248
00:31:19,700 --> 00:31:19,710
complained about other hardware issues
 

1249
00:31:19,710 --> 00:31:23,490
complained about other hardware issues
quote my three Gen 2 feeders constantly

1250
00:31:23,490 --> 00:31:23,500
quote my three Gen 2 feeders constantly
 

1251
00:31:23,500 --> 00:31:25,770
quote my three Gen 2 feeders constantly
Jam and won't dispense food wrote

1252
00:31:25,770 --> 00:31:25,780
Jam and won't dispense food wrote
 

1253
00:31:25,780 --> 00:31:29,250
Jam and won't dispense food wrote
another some expressed relief that the

1254
00:31:29,250 --> 00:31:29,260
another some expressed relief that the
 

1255
00:31:29,260 --> 00:31:32,490
another some expressed relief that the
feeders were now back online pet net has

1256
00:31:32,490 --> 00:31:32,500
feeders were now back online pet net has
 

1257
00:31:32,500 --> 00:31:34,830
feeders were now back online pet net has
two twitter accounts the official one

1258
00:31:34,830 --> 00:31:34,840
two twitter accounts the official one
 

1259
00:31:34,840 --> 00:31:37,440
two twitter accounts the official one
has not tweeted since August 2019 but

1260
00:31:37,440 --> 00:31:37,450
has not tweeted since August 2019 but
 

1261
00:31:37,450 --> 00:31:40,320
has not tweeted since August 2019 but
the support account issued for tweets

1262
00:31:40,320 --> 00:31:40,330
the support account issued for tweets
 

1263
00:31:40,330 --> 00:31:42,090
the support account issued for tweets
between last week and now about the

1264
00:31:42,090 --> 00:31:42,100
between last week and now about the
 

1265
00:31:42,100 --> 00:31:45,270
between last week and now about the
problems experienced in its first tweet

1266
00:31:45,270 --> 00:31:45,280
problems experienced in its first tweet
 

1267
00:31:45,280 --> 00:31:48,810
problems experienced in its first tweet
it said a system outage was affecting

1268
00:31:48,810 --> 00:31:48,820
it said a system outage was affecting
 

1269
00:31:48,820 --> 00:31:50,580
it said a system outage was affecting
second generation devices and asked

1270
00:31:50,580 --> 00:31:50,590
second generation devices and asked
 

1271
00:31:50,590 --> 00:31:52,860
second generation devices and asked
customers not to switch off their feeder

1272
00:31:52,860 --> 00:31:52,870
customers not to switch off their feeder
 

1273
00:31:52,870 --> 00:31:55,169
customers not to switch off their feeder
even if it appeared to be offline it

1274
00:31:55,169 --> 00:31:55,179
even if it appeared to be offline it
 

1275
00:31:55,179 --> 00:31:58,560
even if it appeared to be offline it
said automatic feeds would quote still

1276
00:31:58,560 --> 00:31:58,570
said automatic feeds would quote still
 

1277
00:31:58,570 --> 00:32:02,220
said automatic feeds would quote still
dispense four days later it tweeted

1278
00:32:02,220 --> 00:32:02,230
dispense four days later it tweeted
 

1279
00:32:02,230 --> 00:32:04,289
dispense four days later it tweeted
again to say that it hoped to release

1280
00:32:04,289 --> 00:32:04,299
again to say that it hoped to release
 

1281
00:32:04,299 --> 00:32:08,430
again to say that it hoped to release
more information soon on Friday it said

1282
00:32:08,430 --> 00:32:08,440
more information soon on Friday it said
 

1283
00:32:08,440 --> 00:32:11,370
more information soon on Friday it said
it's smart feeders were quote returning

1284
00:32:11,370 --> 00:32:11,380
it's smart feeders were quote returning
 

1285
00:32:11,380 --> 00:32:14,039
it's smart feeders were quote returning
online and a system reset was in

1286
00:32:14,039 --> 00:32:14,049
online and a system reset was in
 

1287
00:32:14,049 --> 00:32:17,250
online and a system reset was in
progress stuart miles founder of the

1288
00:32:17,250 --> 00:32:17,260
progress stuart miles founder of the
 

1289
00:32:17,260 --> 00:32:20,310
progress stuart miles founder of the
tech site pocket-lint says quote as we

1290
00:32:20,310 --> 00:32:20,320
tech site pocket-lint says quote as we
 

1291
00:32:20,320 --> 00:32:22,620
tech site pocket-lint says quote as we
go towards a more automated home you

1292
00:32:22,620 --> 00:32:22,630
go towards a more automated home you
 

1293
00:32:22,630 --> 00:32:25,140
go towards a more automated home you
have to acknowledge that somewhere along

1294
00:32:25,140 --> 00:32:25,150
have to acknowledge that somewhere along
 

1295
00:32:25,150 --> 00:32:28,140
have to acknowledge that somewhere along
the line things will fall over robots

1296
00:32:28,140 --> 00:32:28,150
the line things will fall over robots
 

1297
00:32:28,150 --> 00:32:30,390
the line things will fall over robots
and automated systems have hiccups along

1298
00:32:30,390 --> 00:32:30,400
and automated systems have hiccups along
 

1299
00:32:30,400 --> 00:32:32,430
and automated systems have hiccups along
the way it's something we need to get

1300
00:32:32,430 --> 00:32:32,440
the way it's something we need to get
 

1301
00:32:32,440 --> 00:32:34,159
the way it's something we need to get
used to end quote

1302
00:32:34,159 --> 00:32:34,169
used to end quote
 

1303
00:32:34,169 --> 00:32:37,470
used to end quote
this particular outage though points to

1304
00:32:37,470 --> 00:32:37,480
this particular outage though points to
 

1305
00:32:37,480 --> 00:32:39,180
this particular outage though points to
a need for pet owners to have a back-up

1306
00:32:39,180 --> 00:32:39,190
a need for pet owners to have a back-up
 

1307
00:32:39,190 --> 00:32:41,760
a need for pet owners to have a back-up
plan a friend or family member to check

1308
00:32:41,760 --> 00:32:41,770
plan a friend or family member to check
 

1309
00:32:41,770 --> 00:32:43,980
plan a friend or family member to check
in on the pets every couple of days may

1310
00:32:43,980 --> 00:32:43,990
in on the pets every couple of days may
 

1311
00:32:43,990 --> 00:32:45,930
in on the pets every couple of days may
be all it takes to ensure that if tech

1312
00:32:45,930 --> 00:32:45,940
be all it takes to ensure that if tech
 

1313
00:32:45,940 --> 00:32:48,480
be all it takes to ensure that if tech
fails a human is there to ensure things

1314
00:32:48,480 --> 00:32:48,490
fails a human is there to ensure things
 

1315
00:32:48,490 --> 00:32:51,899
fails a human is there to ensure things
are safe and care for that makes sense

1316
00:32:51,899 --> 00:32:51,909
are safe and care for that makes sense
 

1317
00:32:51,909 --> 00:32:56,640
are safe and care for that makes sense
it really reminds me of the Tesla

1318
00:32:56,640 --> 00:32:56,650
it really reminds me of the Tesla
 

1319
00:32:56,650 --> 00:33:00,450
it really reminds me of the Tesla
automated autonomous vehicles yes and

1320
00:33:00,450 --> 00:33:00,460
automated autonomous vehicles yes and
 

1321
00:33:00,460 --> 00:33:02,279
automated autonomous vehicles yes and
how there have been some crashes and

1322
00:33:02,279 --> 00:33:02,289
how there have been some crashes and
 

1323
00:33:02,289 --> 00:33:05,810
how there have been some crashes and
it's while they're watching a movie or

1324
00:33:05,810 --> 00:33:05,820
it's while they're watching a movie or
 

1325
00:33:05,820 --> 00:33:09,870
it's while they're watching a movie or
talking on the phone or like this is

1326
00:33:09,870 --> 00:33:09,880
talking on the phone or like this is
 

1327
00:33:09,880 --> 00:33:13,039
talking on the phone or like this is
what okay so this is why I

1328
00:33:13,039 --> 00:33:13,049
what okay so this is why I
 

1329
00:33:13,049 --> 00:33:14,899
what okay so this is why I
think robots are gonna take over the

1330
00:33:14,899 --> 00:33:14,909
think robots are gonna take over the
 

1331
00:33:14,909 --> 00:33:17,060
think robots are gonna take over the
world and all the humans are gonna

1332
00:33:17,060 --> 00:33:17,070
world and all the humans are gonna
 

1333
00:33:17,070 --> 00:33:20,479
world and all the humans are gonna
totally are well they need us robots

1334
00:33:20,479 --> 00:33:20,489
totally are well they need us robots
 

1335
00:33:20,489 --> 00:33:22,940
totally are well they need us robots
need people as people need robots we got

1336
00:33:22,940 --> 00:33:22,950
need people as people need robots we got
 

1337
00:33:22,950 --> 00:33:24,710
need people as people need robots we got
to keep them in check you can have an

1338
00:33:24,710 --> 00:33:24,720
to keep them in check you can have an
 

1339
00:33:24,720 --> 00:33:28,399
to keep them in check you can have an
automated cat feeder like I think of

1340
00:33:28,399 --> 00:33:28,409
automated cat feeder like I think of
 

1341
00:33:28,409 --> 00:33:30,499
automated cat feeder like I think of
people I know in my daily life that

1342
00:33:30,499 --> 00:33:30,509
people I know in my daily life that
 

1343
00:33:30,509 --> 00:33:33,229
people I know in my daily life that
really could use an automated cat feeder

1344
00:33:33,229 --> 00:33:33,239
really could use an automated cat feeder
 

1345
00:33:33,239 --> 00:33:36,799
really could use an automated cat feeder
to help assist them in feeding their cat

1346
00:33:36,799 --> 00:33:36,809
to help assist them in feeding their cat
 

1347
00:33:36,809 --> 00:33:39,320
to help assist them in feeding their cat
but they're not gonna hightail it out

1348
00:33:39,320 --> 00:33:39,330
but they're not gonna hightail it out
 

1349
00:33:39,330 --> 00:33:41,389
but they're not gonna hightail it out
for two weeks and assume that the cat's

1350
00:33:41,389 --> 00:33:41,399
for two weeks and assume that the cat's
 

1351
00:33:41,399 --> 00:33:43,639
for two weeks and assume that the cat's
gonna be fine with their automated kitty

1352
00:33:43,639 --> 00:33:43,649
gonna be fine with their automated kitty
 

1353
00:33:43,649 --> 00:33:46,159
gonna be fine with their automated kitty
litter cleaner and their automated hat

1354
00:33:46,159 --> 00:33:46,169
litter cleaner and their automated hat
 

1355
00:33:46,169 --> 00:33:48,529
litter cleaner and their automated hat
feeder like they they're gonna stay

1356
00:33:48,529 --> 00:33:48,539
feeder like they they're gonna stay
 

1357
00:33:48,539 --> 00:33:51,950
feeder like they they're gonna stay
there you can't just trust your cat's

1358
00:33:51,950 --> 00:33:51,960
there you can't just trust your cat's
 

1359
00:33:51,960 --> 00:33:56,979
there you can't just trust your cat's
life to technology trying to ever yeah I

1360
00:33:56,979 --> 00:33:56,989
life to technology trying to ever yeah I
 

1361
00:33:56,989 --> 00:34:00,710
life to technology trying to ever yeah I
like I trust technology yes but when it

1362
00:34:00,710 --> 00:34:00,720
like I trust technology yes but when it
 

1363
00:34:00,720 --> 00:34:04,099
like I trust technology yes but when it
comes to life and death health wellness

1364
00:34:04,099 --> 00:34:04,109
comes to life and death health wellness
 

1365
00:34:04,109 --> 00:34:08,450
comes to life and death health wellness
I think it's important for us to still

1366
00:34:08,450 --> 00:34:08,460
I think it's important for us to still
 

1367
00:34:08,460 --> 00:34:11,659
I think it's important for us to still
be the human right like autonomous

1368
00:34:11,659 --> 00:34:11,669
be the human right like autonomous
 

1369
00:34:11,669 --> 00:34:13,460
be the human right like autonomous
vehicles still have a steering wheel for

1370
00:34:13,460 --> 00:34:13,470
vehicles still have a steering wheel for
 

1371
00:34:13,470 --> 00:34:14,659
vehicles still have a steering wheel for
a reason yes

1372
00:34:14,659 --> 00:34:14,669
a reason yes
 

1373
00:34:14,669 --> 00:34:18,020
a reason yes
you're meant to observe what's going on

1374
00:34:18,020 --> 00:34:18,030
you're meant to observe what's going on
 

1375
00:34:18,030 --> 00:34:21,169
you're meant to observe what's going on
around you yeah but sit there and relax

1376
00:34:21,169 --> 00:34:21,179
around you yeah but sit there and relax
 

1377
00:34:21,179 --> 00:34:24,440
around you yeah but sit there and relax
enjoy the music and just kind of look

1378
00:34:24,440 --> 00:34:24,450
enjoy the music and just kind of look
 

1379
00:34:24,450 --> 00:34:26,720
enjoy the music and just kind of look
around and enjoy nature for once be a

1380
00:34:26,720 --> 00:34:26,730
around and enjoy nature for once be a
 

1381
00:34:26,730 --> 00:34:28,849
around and enjoy nature for once be a
passenger but as soon as you start

1382
00:34:28,849 --> 00:34:28,859
passenger but as soon as you start
 

1383
00:34:28,859 --> 00:34:31,520
passenger but as soon as you start
swerving toward the guardrail be like

1384
00:34:31,520 --> 00:34:31,530
swerving toward the guardrail be like
 

1385
00:34:31,530 --> 00:34:33,559
swerving toward the guardrail be like
grab a hold of the damn steering wheel

1386
00:34:33,559 --> 00:34:33,569
grab a hold of the damn steering wheel
 

1387
00:34:33,569 --> 00:34:37,819
grab a hold of the damn steering wheel
and take control right I honestly don't

1388
00:34:37,819 --> 00:34:37,829
and take control right I honestly don't
 

1389
00:34:37,829 --> 00:34:40,430
and take control right I honestly don't
think that the pet feeder company is at

1390
00:34:40,430 --> 00:34:40,440
think that the pet feeder company is at
 

1391
00:34:40,440 --> 00:34:43,549
think that the pet feeder company is at
fault in this systems goal they are they

1392
00:34:43,549 --> 00:34:43,559
fault in this systems goal they are they
 

1393
00:34:43,559 --> 00:34:45,889
fault in this systems goal they are they
totally are but our complacency in

1394
00:34:45,889 --> 00:34:45,899
totally are but our complacency in
 

1395
00:34:45,899 --> 00:34:49,430
totally are but our complacency in
trusting a digitally connected device to

1396
00:34:49,430 --> 00:34:49,440
trusting a digitally connected device to
 

1397
00:34:49,440 --> 00:34:52,369
trusting a digitally connected device to
provide life-giving food right to our

1398
00:34:52,369 --> 00:34:52,379
provide life-giving food right to our
 

1399
00:34:52,379 --> 00:34:52,819
provide life-giving food right to our
past

1400
00:34:52,819 --> 00:34:52,829
past
 

1401
00:34:52,829 --> 00:34:55,280
past
yes is a problem right they didn't say

1402
00:34:55,280 --> 00:34:55,290
yes is a problem right they didn't say
 

1403
00:34:55,290 --> 00:34:58,940
yes is a problem right they didn't say
hey leave your cat alone we know well

1404
00:34:58,940 --> 00:34:58,950
hey leave your cat alone we know well
 

1405
00:34:58,950 --> 00:35:00,710
hey leave your cat alone we know well
maybe they did I didn't see getting

1406
00:35:00,710 --> 00:35:00,720
maybe they did I didn't see getting
 

1407
00:35:00,720 --> 00:35:03,319
maybe they did I didn't see getting
material but understand this is a

1408
00:35:03,319 --> 00:35:03,329
material but understand this is a
 

1409
00:35:03,329 --> 00:35:05,359
material but understand this is a
connected device that if Wi-Fi goes down

1410
00:35:05,359 --> 00:35:05,369
connected device that if Wi-Fi goes down
 

1411
00:35:05,369 --> 00:35:07,280
connected device that if Wi-Fi goes down
if internet goes down if their servers

1412
00:35:07,280 --> 00:35:07,290
if internet goes down if their servers
 

1413
00:35:07,290 --> 00:35:10,490
if internet goes down if their servers
go down which is what happened here your

1414
00:35:10,490 --> 00:35:10,500
go down which is what happened here your
 

1415
00:35:10,500 --> 00:35:13,609
go down which is what happened here your
pets will not get fed right think about

1416
00:35:13,609 --> 00:35:13,619
pets will not get fed right think about
 

1417
00:35:13,619 --> 00:35:16,849
pets will not get fed right think about
that for a second so we need to still

1418
00:35:16,849 --> 00:35:16,859
that for a second so we need to still
 

1419
00:35:16,859 --> 00:35:21,579
that for a second so we need to still
make sure like I I set an automatic

1420
00:35:21,579 --> 00:35:21,589
make sure like I I set an automatic
 

1421
00:35:21,589 --> 00:35:25,130
make sure like I I set an automatic
plant feeder yeah when I go away from my

1422
00:35:25,130 --> 00:35:25,140
plant feeder yeah when I go away from my
 

1423
00:35:25,140 --> 00:35:26,850
plant feeder yeah when I go away from my
annual vacation

1424
00:35:26,850 --> 00:35:26,860
annual vacation
 

1425
00:35:26,860 --> 00:35:29,400
annual vacation
okay and it feeds my cucumbers and it

1426
00:35:29,400 --> 00:35:29,410
okay and it feeds my cucumbers and it
 

1427
00:35:29,410 --> 00:35:32,190
okay and it feeds my cucumbers and it
keeps my garden fed but my sister-in-law

1428
00:35:32,190 --> 00:35:32,200
keeps my garden fed but my sister-in-law
 

1429
00:35:32,200 --> 00:35:34,890
keeps my garden fed but my sister-in-law
still checks in for us right every

1430
00:35:34,890 --> 00:35:34,900
still checks in for us right every
 

1431
00:35:34,900 --> 00:35:37,200
still checks in for us right every
couple days she goes in and waters the

1432
00:35:37,200 --> 00:35:37,210
couple days she goes in and waters the
 

1433
00:35:37,210 --> 00:35:38,640
couple days she goes in and waters the
plants and does it make sure

1434
00:35:38,640 --> 00:35:38,650
plants and does it make sure
 

1435
00:35:38,650 --> 00:35:40,950
plants and does it make sure
everything's working right cuz I don't

1436
00:35:40,950 --> 00:35:40,960
everything's working right cuz I don't
 

1437
00:35:40,960 --> 00:35:42,150
everything's working right cuz I don't
want to come back to a bunch of dead

1438
00:35:42,150 --> 00:35:42,160
want to come back to a bunch of dead
 

1439
00:35:42,160 --> 00:35:44,670
want to come back to a bunch of dead
cucumbers just in case something happens

1440
00:35:44,670 --> 00:35:44,680
cucumbers just in case something happens
 

1441
00:35:44,680 --> 00:35:47,880
cucumbers just in case something happens
don't just write willy-nilly trust the

1442
00:35:47,880 --> 00:35:47,890
don't just write willy-nilly trust the
 

1443
00:35:47,890 --> 00:35:53,340
don't just write willy-nilly trust the
tacit we can as a convenience but please

1444
00:35:53,340 --> 00:35:53,350
tacit we can as a convenience but please
 

1445
00:35:53,350 --> 00:35:55,620
tacit we can as a convenience but please
don't trust it to give life I would

1446
00:35:55,620 --> 00:35:55,630
don't trust it to give life I would
 

1447
00:35:55,630 --> 00:35:58,410
don't trust it to give life I would
never trust a robot to keep me alive

1448
00:35:58,410 --> 00:35:58,420
never trust a robot to keep me alive
 

1449
00:35:58,420 --> 00:36:01,290
never trust a robot to keep me alive
without human intervention let you say

1450
00:36:01,290 --> 00:36:01,300
without human intervention let you say
 

1451
00:36:01,300 --> 00:36:04,740
without human intervention let you say
that now but wait till you're 95 no

1452
00:36:04,740 --> 00:36:04,750
that now but wait till you're 95 no
 

1453
00:36:04,750 --> 00:36:06,180
that now but wait till you're 95 no
there will be people there there will be

1454
00:36:06,180 --> 00:36:06,190
there will be people there there will be
 

1455
00:36:06,190 --> 00:36:08,880
there will be people there there will be
nurses there will be people there make

1456
00:36:08,880 --> 00:36:08,890
nurses there will be people there make
 

1457
00:36:08,890 --> 00:36:10,650
nurses there will be people there make
sure the robots are doing the right

1458
00:36:10,650 --> 00:36:10,660
sure the robots are doing the right
 

1459
00:36:10,660 --> 00:36:11,700
sure the robots are doing the right
thing or pepper

1460
00:36:11,700 --> 00:36:11,710
thing or pepper
 

1461
00:36:11,710 --> 00:36:14,700
thing or pepper
it could be pepper Oh pepper she's so

1462
00:36:14,700 --> 00:36:14,710
it could be pepper Oh pepper she's so
 

1463
00:36:14,710 --> 00:36:20,340
it could be pepper Oh pepper she's so
cute pepper can be my nurse okay -

1464
00:36:20,340 --> 00:36:20,350
cute pepper can be my nurse okay -
 

1465
00:36:20,350 --> 00:36:22,860
cute pepper can be my nurse okay -
programmer musicians wrote every

1466
00:36:22,860 --> 00:36:22,870
programmer musicians wrote every
 

1467
00:36:22,870 --> 00:36:25,140
programmer musicians wrote every
possible melody in existence - a hard

1468
00:36:25,140 --> 00:36:25,150
possible melody in existence - a hard
 

1469
00:36:25,150 --> 00:36:28,080
possible melody in existence - a hard
drive in MIDI format copyrighted the

1470
00:36:28,080 --> 00:36:28,090
drive in MIDI format copyrighted the
 

1471
00:36:28,090 --> 00:36:30,720
drive in MIDI format copyrighted the
whole thing and then released it all to

1472
00:36:30,720 --> 00:36:30,730
whole thing and then released it all to
 

1473
00:36:30,730 --> 00:36:32,850
whole thing and then released it all to
the public domain in an attempt to stop

1474
00:36:32,850 --> 00:36:32,860
the public domain in an attempt to stop
 

1475
00:36:32,860 --> 00:36:36,210
the public domain in an attempt to stop
musicians from getting sued programmer

1476
00:36:36,210 --> 00:36:36,220
musicians from getting sued programmer
 

1477
00:36:36,220 --> 00:36:38,370
musicians from getting sued programmer
musician and copyright attorney

1478
00:36:38,370 --> 00:36:38,380
musician and copyright attorney
 

1479
00:36:38,380 --> 00:36:41,610
musician and copyright attorney
Damian reel along with musician

1480
00:36:41,610 --> 00:36:41,620
Damian reel along with musician
 

1481
00:36:41,620 --> 00:36:45,540
Damian reel along with musician
programmer Noah Rubin sought to stop

1482
00:36:45,540 --> 00:36:45,550
programmer Noah Rubin sought to stop
 

1483
00:36:45,550 --> 00:36:48,120
programmer Noah Rubin sought to stop
copyright lawsuits that they believe

1484
00:36:48,120 --> 00:36:48,130
copyright lawsuits that they believe
 

1485
00:36:48,130 --> 00:36:50,960
copyright lawsuits that they believe
stifle the creative freedom of artists

1486
00:36:50,960 --> 00:36:50,970
stifle the creative freedom of artists
 

1487
00:36:50,970 --> 00:36:53,460
stifle the creative freedom of artists
often in copyright cases for song

1488
00:36:53,460 --> 00:36:53,470
often in copyright cases for song
 

1489
00:36:53,470 --> 00:36:55,710
often in copyright cases for song
melodies if the artist being sued for

1490
00:36:55,710 --> 00:36:55,720
melodies if the artist being sued for
 

1491
00:36:55,720 --> 00:36:58,260
melodies if the artist being sued for
infringement could have possibly had

1492
00:36:58,260 --> 00:36:58,270
infringement could have possibly had
 

1493
00:36:58,270 --> 00:37:00,420
infringement could have possibly had
access to the music they're accused of

1494
00:37:00,420 --> 00:37:00,430
access to the music they're accused of
 

1495
00:37:00,430 --> 00:37:02,670
access to the music they're accused of
copying even if it was something they

1496
00:37:02,670 --> 00:37:02,680
copying even if it was something they
 

1497
00:37:02,680 --> 00:37:05,370
copying even if it was something they
listened to just once they can be

1498
00:37:05,370 --> 00:37:05,380
listened to just once they can be
 

1499
00:37:05,380 --> 00:37:08,760
listened to just once they can be
accused of subconsciously infringing on

1500
00:37:08,760 --> 00:37:08,770
accused of subconsciously infringing on
 

1501
00:37:08,770 --> 00:37:11,400
accused of subconsciously infringing on
the original content one of the most

1502
00:37:11,400 --> 00:37:11,410
the original content one of the most
 

1503
00:37:11,410 --> 00:37:13,260
the original content one of the most
notorious examples of this is Tom

1504
00:37:13,260 --> 00:37:13,270
notorious examples of this is Tom
 

1505
00:37:13,270 --> 00:37:16,140
notorious examples of this is Tom
Petty's claim that Sam Smith's stay with

1506
00:37:16,140 --> 00:37:16,150
Petty's claim that Sam Smith's stay with
 

1507
00:37:16,150 --> 00:37:18,810
Petty's claim that Sam Smith's stay with
me sounded too close to Petty's I won't

1508
00:37:18,810 --> 00:37:18,820
me sounded too close to Petty's I won't
 

1509
00:37:18,820 --> 00:37:21,390
me sounded too close to Petty's I won't
back down Smith eventually had to give

1510
00:37:21,390 --> 00:37:21,400
back down Smith eventually had to give
 

1511
00:37:21,400 --> 00:37:24,470
back down Smith eventually had to give
Petty co-writing credits on his own

1512
00:37:24,470 --> 00:37:24,480
Petty co-writing credits on his own
 

1513
00:37:24,480 --> 00:37:27,840
Petty co-writing credits on his own
chart-topping songs which entitled petty

1514
00:37:27,840 --> 00:37:27,850
chart-topping songs which entitled petty
 

1515
00:37:27,850 --> 00:37:31,170
chart-topping songs which entitled petty
to royalties defending a case like that

1516
00:37:31,170 --> 00:37:31,180
to royalties defending a case like that
 

1517
00:37:31,180 --> 00:37:33,600
to royalties defending a case like that
in court can cost millions of dollars in

1518
00:37:33,600 --> 00:37:33,610
in court can cost millions of dollars in
 

1519
00:37:33,610 --> 00:37:35,760
in court can cost millions of dollars in
legal fees and the outcome is an ever

1520
00:37:35,760 --> 00:37:35,770
legal fees and the outcome is an ever
 

1521
00:37:35,770 --> 00:37:38,520
legal fees and the outcome is an ever
assured real and Rueben hoped that by

1522
00:37:38,520 --> 00:37:38,530
assured real and Rueben hoped that by
 

1523
00:37:38,530 --> 00:37:40,530
assured real and Rueben hoped that by
releasing the melodies publicly

1524
00:37:40,530 --> 00:37:40,540
releasing the melodies publicly
 

1525
00:37:40,540 --> 00:37:42,600
releasing the melodies publicly
they'll prevent a lot of these cases

1526
00:37:42,600 --> 00:37:42,610
they'll prevent a lot of these cases
 

1527
00:37:42,610 --> 00:37:45,450
they'll prevent a lot of these cases
from standing a chance in court in a

1528
00:37:45,450 --> 00:37:45,460
from standing a chance in court in a
 

1529
00:37:45,460 --> 00:37:47,790
from standing a chance in court in a
recent talk about the project real

1530
00:37:47,790 --> 00:37:47,800
recent talk about the project real
 

1531
00:37:47,800 --> 00:37:50,100
recent talk about the project real
explained that to get there melody

1532
00:37:50,100 --> 00:37:50,110
explained that to get there melody
 

1533
00:37:50,110 --> 00:37:53,160
explained that to get there melody
database they algorithmically determined

1534
00:37:53,160 --> 00:37:53,170
database they algorithmically determined
 

1535
00:37:53,170 --> 00:37:55,640
database they algorithmically determined
every melody contained within a single

1536
00:37:55,640 --> 00:37:55,650
every melody contained within a single
 

1537
00:37:55,650 --> 00:38:00,150
every melody contained within a single
octave to determine the finite nature of

1538
00:38:00,150 --> 00:38:00,160
octave to determine the finite nature of
 

1539
00:38:00,160 --> 00:38:02,550
octave to determine the finite nature of
melodies real and Rubin developed an

1540
00:38:02,550 --> 00:38:02,560
melodies real and Rubin developed an
 

1541
00:38:02,560 --> 00:38:05,280
melodies real and Rubin developed an
algorithm that recorded every possible

1542
00:38:05,280 --> 00:38:05,290
algorithm that recorded every possible
 

1543
00:38:05,290 --> 00:38:07,710
algorithm that recorded every possible
eighth note twelve beat melody combo

1544
00:38:07,710 --> 00:38:07,720
eighth note twelve beat melody combo
 

1545
00:38:07,720 --> 00:38:10,140
eighth note twelve beat melody combo
this used the same basic tactic that

1546
00:38:10,140 --> 00:38:10,150
this used the same basic tactic that
 

1547
00:38:10,150 --> 00:38:12,570
this used the same basic tactic that
hackers used to guess passwords churning

1548
00:38:12,570 --> 00:38:12,580
hackers used to guess passwords churning
 

1549
00:38:12,580 --> 00:38:14,370
hackers used to guess passwords churning
through every possible combination of

1550
00:38:14,370 --> 00:38:14,380
through every possible combination of
 

1551
00:38:14,380 --> 00:38:17,940
through every possible combination of
notes until none remained real says this

1552
00:38:17,940 --> 00:38:17,950
notes until none remained real says this
 

1553
00:38:17,950 --> 00:38:21,210
notes until none remained real says this
algorithm works at a rate of 300,000

1554
00:38:21,210 --> 00:38:21,220
algorithm works at a rate of 300,000
 

1555
00:38:21,220 --> 00:38:24,990
algorithm works at a rate of 300,000
melodies per second oh I know once a

1556
00:38:24,990 --> 00:38:25,000
melodies per second oh I know once a
 

1557
00:38:25,000 --> 00:38:27,270
melodies per second oh I know once a
work is committed to a tangible format

1558
00:38:27,270 --> 00:38:27,280
work is committed to a tangible format
 

1559
00:38:27,280 --> 00:38:29,610
work is committed to a tangible format
it's considered copyrighted and in MIDI

1560
00:38:29,610 --> 00:38:29,620
it's considered copyrighted and in MIDI
 

1561
00:38:29,620 --> 00:38:33,360
it's considered copyrighted and in MIDI
format notes are just numbers all of the

1562
00:38:33,360 --> 00:38:33,370
format notes are just numbers all of the
 

1563
00:38:33,370 --> 00:38:35,460
format notes are just numbers all of the
melodies they've generated as well as

1564
00:38:35,460 --> 00:38:35,470
melodies they've generated as well as
 

1565
00:38:35,470 --> 00:38:36,900
melodies they've generated as well as
the codes for the algorithm that

1566
00:38:36,900 --> 00:38:36,910
the codes for the algorithm that
 

1567
00:38:36,910 --> 00:38:39,120
the codes for the algorithm that
generated them are available as open

1568
00:38:39,120 --> 00:38:39,130
generated them are available as open
 

1569
00:38:39,130 --> 00:38:42,180
generated them are available as open
source materials on github and the

1570
00:38:42,180 --> 00:38:42,190
source materials on github and the
 

1571
00:38:42,190 --> 00:38:45,110
source materials on github and the
datasets are on the Internet Archive

1572
00:38:45,110 --> 00:38:45,120
datasets are on the Internet Archive
 

1573
00:38:45,120 --> 00:38:48,000
datasets are on the Internet Archive
fantastic thank you guys that is so oh

1574
00:38:48,000 --> 00:38:48,010
fantastic thank you guys that is so oh
 

1575
00:38:48,010 --> 00:38:52,380
fantastic thank you guys that is so oh
my goodness this is like this should go

1576
00:38:52,380 --> 00:38:52,390
my goodness this is like this should go
 

1577
00:38:52,390 --> 00:38:54,390
my goodness this is like this should go
into the files of why didn't we think of

1578
00:38:54,390 --> 00:38:54,400
into the files of why didn't we think of
 

1579
00:38:54,400 --> 00:38:55,200
into the files of why didn't we think of
this before

1580
00:38:55,200 --> 00:38:55,210
this before
 

1581
00:38:55,210 --> 00:38:57,960
this before
these guys should get a super award like

1582
00:38:57,960 --> 00:38:57,970
these guys should get a super award like
 

1583
00:38:57,970 --> 00:39:00,330
these guys should get a super award like
they should actually get a small royalty

1584
00:39:00,330 --> 00:39:00,340
they should actually get a small royalty
 

1585
00:39:00,340 --> 00:39:02,850
they should actually get a small royalty
from all of the royalties that these

1586
00:39:02,850 --> 00:39:02,860
from all of the royalties that these
 

1587
00:39:02,860 --> 00:39:04,850
from all of the royalties that these
other big bully

1588
00:39:04,850 --> 00:39:04,860
other big bully
 

1589
00:39:04,860 --> 00:39:08,070
other big bully
musicians yeah so now I want to download

1590
00:39:08,070 --> 00:39:08,080
musicians yeah so now I want to download
 

1591
00:39:08,080 --> 00:39:11,700
musicians yeah so now I want to download
the entire MIDI set yeah like a tribute

1592
00:39:11,700 --> 00:39:11,710
the entire MIDI set yeah like a tribute
 

1593
00:39:11,710 --> 00:39:15,990
the entire MIDI set yeah like a tribute
edirol orchestral to all the MIDI notes

1594
00:39:15,990 --> 00:39:16,000
edirol orchestral to all the MIDI notes
 

1595
00:39:16,000 --> 00:39:19,230
edirol orchestral to all the MIDI notes
and resequenced everything add some drum

1596
00:39:19,230 --> 00:39:19,240
and resequenced everything add some drum
 

1597
00:39:19,240 --> 00:39:21,660
and resequenced everything add some drum
loops and let's see what we come up with

1598
00:39:21,660 --> 00:39:21,670
loops and let's see what we come up with
 

1599
00:39:21,670 --> 00:39:26,640
loops and let's see what we come up with
I think this is great I think it's it's

1600
00:39:26,640 --> 00:39:26,650
I think this is great I think it's it's
 

1601
00:39:26,650 --> 00:39:28,410
I think this is great I think it's it's
obviously novel but it's also a

1602
00:39:28,410 --> 00:39:28,420
obviously novel but it's also a
 

1603
00:39:28,420 --> 00:39:32,730
obviously novel but it's also a
brilliant way to thwart like this is the

1604
00:39:32,730 --> 00:39:32,740
brilliant way to thwart like this is the
 

1605
00:39:32,740 --> 00:39:35,040
brilliant way to thwart like this is the
equivalent copyright trolls are the

1606
00:39:35,040 --> 00:39:35,050
equivalent copyright trolls are the
 

1607
00:39:35,050 --> 00:39:37,110
equivalent copyright trolls are the
equivalent of patent trolls in many many

1608
00:39:37,110 --> 00:39:37,120
equivalent of patent trolls in many many
 

1609
00:39:37,120 --> 00:39:39,810
equivalent of patent trolls in many many
ways so oh yeah that sounds I mean

1610
00:39:39,810 --> 00:39:39,820
ways so oh yeah that sounds I mean
 

1611
00:39:39,820 --> 00:39:41,580
ways so oh yeah that sounds I mean
there's only so many chords we can use

1612
00:39:41,580 --> 00:39:41,590
there's only so many chords we can use
 

1613
00:39:41,590 --> 00:39:46,830
there's only so many chords we can use
in in our you know 4/4 and 3/4 time yeah

1614
00:39:46,830 --> 00:39:46,840
in in our you know 4/4 and 3/4 time yeah
 

1615
00:39:46,840 --> 00:39:48,810
in in our you know 4/4 and 3/4 time yeah
and and they do start like I mean

1616
00:39:48,810 --> 00:39:48,820
and and they do start like I mean
 

1617
00:39:48,820 --> 00:39:53,010
and and they do start like I mean
barenaked ladies you know GD c GD c GD c

1618
00:39:53,010 --> 00:39:53,020
barenaked ladies you know GD c GD c GD c
 

1619
00:39:53,020 --> 00:39:53,970
barenaked ladies you know GD c GD c GD c
mi

1620
00:39:53,970 --> 00:39:53,980
mi
 

1621
00:39:53,980 --> 00:39:57,900
mi
like how many songs are gonna fall into

1622
00:39:57,900 --> 00:39:57,910
like how many songs are gonna fall into
 

1623
00:39:57,910 --> 00:40:02,099
like how many songs are gonna fall into
that and and you can creatively have a

1624
00:40:02,099 --> 00:40:02,109
that and and you can creatively have a
 

1625
00:40:02,109 --> 00:40:04,200
that and and you can creatively have a
thought that is similar to somebody

1626
00:40:04,200 --> 00:40:04,210
thought that is similar to somebody
 

1627
00:40:04,210 --> 00:40:07,079
thought that is similar to somebody
else's very creative unique thought sure

1628
00:40:07,079 --> 00:40:07,089
else's very creative unique thought sure
 

1629
00:40:07,089 --> 00:40:12,059
else's very creative unique thought sure
but you didn't hear it even like it you

1630
00:40:12,059 --> 00:40:12,069
but you didn't hear it even like it you
 

1631
00:40:12,069 --> 00:40:14,280
but you didn't hear it even like it you
can people have said things that I've

1632
00:40:14,280 --> 00:40:14,290
can people have said things that I've
 

1633
00:40:14,290 --> 00:40:18,240
can people have said things that I've
said I'm sure without hearing me say

1634
00:40:18,240 --> 00:40:18,250
said I'm sure without hearing me say
 

1635
00:40:18,250 --> 00:40:21,000
said I'm sure without hearing me say
them they're not stealing my thoughts

1636
00:40:21,000 --> 00:40:21,010
them they're not stealing my thoughts
 

1637
00:40:21,010 --> 00:40:25,170
them they're not stealing my thoughts
I just feel like in this particular case

1638
00:40:25,170 --> 00:40:25,180
I just feel like in this particular case
 

1639
00:40:25,180 --> 00:40:27,089
I just feel like in this particular case
especially the example Tom Petty was

1640
00:40:27,089 --> 00:40:27,099
especially the example Tom Petty was
 

1641
00:40:27,099 --> 00:40:34,170
especially the example Tom Petty was
being very Petty I think that since the

1642
00:40:34,170 --> 00:40:34,180
being very Petty I think that since the
 

1643
00:40:34,180 --> 00:40:36,420
being very Petty I think that since the
only person who is able to create unique

1644
00:40:36,420 --> 00:40:36,430
only person who is able to create unique
 

1645
00:40:36,430 --> 00:40:40,410
only person who is able to create unique
melodies is SIA these days it just comes

1646
00:40:40,410 --> 00:40:40,420
melodies is SIA these days it just comes
 

1647
00:40:40,420 --> 00:40:42,599
melodies is SIA these days it just comes
down to like seriously there's only so

1648
00:40:42,599 --> 00:40:42,609
down to like seriously there's only so
 

1649
00:40:42,609 --> 00:40:45,510
down to like seriously there's only so
many melodies that can be made and we're

1650
00:40:45,510 --> 00:40:45,520
many melodies that can be made and we're
 

1651
00:40:45,520 --> 00:40:47,940
many melodies that can be made and we're
coming up on a time where in recorded

1652
00:40:47,940 --> 00:40:47,950
coming up on a time where in recorded
 

1653
00:40:47,950 --> 00:40:50,069
coming up on a time where in recorded
history there have been so many

1654
00:40:50,069 --> 00:40:50,079
history there have been so many
 

1655
00:40:50,079 --> 00:40:51,690
history there have been so many
recordings made that we're going to

1656
00:40:51,690 --> 00:40:51,700
recordings made that we're going to
 

1657
00:40:51,700 --> 00:40:54,030
recordings made that we're going to
start to see overlap and we have seen

1658
00:40:54,030 --> 00:40:54,040
start to see overlap and we have seen
 

1659
00:40:54,040 --> 00:40:57,359
start to see overlap and we have seen
that this is a cool way for them to say

1660
00:40:57,359 --> 00:40:57,369
that this is a cool way for them to say
 

1661
00:40:57,369 --> 00:41:01,260
that this is a cool way for them to say
haha we we own them all we've released

1662
00:41:01,260 --> 00:41:01,270
haha we we own them all we've released
 

1663
00:41:01,270 --> 00:41:03,569
haha we we own them all we've released
them to the public domain well done

1664
00:41:03,569 --> 00:41:03,579
them to the public domain well done
 

1665
00:41:03,579 --> 00:41:08,849
them to the public domain well done
thank you so much links below yes go

1666
00:41:08,849 --> 00:41:08,859
thank you so much links below yes go
 

1667
00:41:08,859 --> 00:41:10,980
thank you so much links below yes go
download the MIDI files sequence them

1668
00:41:10,980 --> 00:41:10,990
download the MIDI files sequence them
 

1669
00:41:10,990 --> 00:41:13,140
download the MIDI files sequence them
use them yeah we ate your tracks

1670
00:41:13,140 --> 00:41:13,150
use them yeah we ate your tracks
 

1671
00:41:13,150 --> 00:41:18,180
use them yeah we ate your tracks
be creative yeah big thanks to Roy W

1672
00:41:18,180 --> 00:41:18,190
be creative yeah big thanks to Roy W
 

1673
00:41:18,190 --> 00:41:20,010
be creative yeah big thanks to Roy W
Nash and our community of viewers for

1674
00:41:20,010 --> 00:41:20,020
Nash and our community of viewers for
 

1675
00:41:20,020 --> 00:41:21,799
Nash and our community of viewers for
submitting stories to us this week

1676
00:41:21,799 --> 00:41:21,809
submitting stories to us this week
 

1677
00:41:21,809 --> 00:41:24,839
submitting stories to us this week
thanks for watching the category-five TV

1678
00:41:24,839 --> 00:41:24,849
thanks for watching the category-five TV
 

1679
00:41:24,849 --> 00:41:26,849
thanks for watching the category-five TV
newsroom don't forget to Like and

1680
00:41:26,849 --> 00:41:26,859
newsroom don't forget to Like and
 

1681
00:41:26,859 --> 00:41:28,559
newsroom don't forget to Like and
subscribe for all your tech news with a

1682
00:41:28,559 --> 00:41:28,569
subscribe for all your tech news with a
 

1683
00:41:28,569 --> 00:41:30,960
subscribe for all your tech news with a
slight Linux bias and if you appreciate

1684
00:41:30,960 --> 00:41:30,970
slight Linux bias and if you appreciate
 

1685
00:41:30,970 --> 00:41:32,609
slight Linux bias and if you appreciate
what we do become a patron at

1686
00:41:32,609 --> 00:41:32,619
what we do become a patron at
 

1687
00:41:32,619 --> 00:41:35,730
what we do become a patron at
patreon.com slash newsroom from the

1688
00:41:35,730 --> 00:41:35,740
patreon.com slash newsroom from the
 

1689
00:41:35,740 --> 00:41:38,700
patreon.com slash newsroom from the
category-five dot TV newsroom i'm sasha

1690
00:41:38,700 --> 00:41:38,710
category-five dot TV newsroom i'm sasha
 

1691
00:41:38,710 --> 00:41:42,450
category-five dot TV newsroom i'm sasha
Rickman and i'm robi ferguson