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here's what's coming up in the category

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here's what's coming up in the category
 

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here's what's coming up in the category
five TV newsroom IBM is laying off

4
00:00:05,390 --> 00:00:05,400
five TV newsroom IBM is laying off
 

5
00:00:05,400 --> 00:00:07,099
five TV newsroom IBM is laying off
thousands of employees and seeking

6
00:00:07,099 --> 00:00:07,109
thousands of employees and seeking
 

7
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thousands of employees and seeking
flexibility during The Cove at nineteen

8
00:00:08,990 --> 00:00:09,000
flexibility during The Cove at nineteen
 

9
00:00:09,000 --> 00:00:11,870
flexibility during The Cove at nineteen
crisis account stealing malware is

10
00:00:11,870 --> 00:00:11,880
crisis account stealing malware is
 

11
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crisis account stealing malware is
making his rounds on discord a pizzeria

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making his rounds on discord a pizzeria
 

13
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making his rounds on discord a pizzeria
owner in the US has discovered and

14
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owner in the US has discovered and
 

15
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owner in the US has discovered and
exploited a flaw in door Dash's

16
00:00:19,130 --> 00:00:19,140
exploited a flaw in door Dash's
 

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exploited a flaw in door Dash's
marketing scheme and makes money buying

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marketing scheme and makes money buying
 

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marketing scheme and makes money buying
his own pizzas Microsoft has fixed a

20
00:00:24,290 --> 00:00:24,300
his own pizzas Microsoft has fixed a
 

21
00:00:24,300 --> 00:00:26,029
his own pizzas Microsoft has fixed a
critical vulnerability affecting all

22
00:00:26,029 --> 00:00:26,039
critical vulnerability affecting all
 

23
00:00:26,039 --> 00:00:29,599
critical vulnerability affecting all
Windows versions since 1996 and unmanned

24
00:00:29,599 --> 00:00:29,609
Windows versions since 1996 and unmanned
 

25
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Windows versions since 1996 and unmanned
drones will slash NHS delivery times to

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drones will slash NHS delivery times to
 

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drones will slash NHS delivery times to
a remote Scottish Hospital stick around

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a remote Scottish Hospital stick around
 

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a remote Scottish Hospital stick around
the full details are coming up this is

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00:00:38,240 --> 00:00:38,250
the full details are coming up this is
 

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the full details are coming up this is
the category five dot TV newsroom

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the category five dot TV newsroom
 

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the category five dot TV newsroom
covering a week's top tech stories with

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covering a week's top tech stories with
 

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covering a week's top tech stories with
a slight linux bias from the newsroom

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a slight linux bias from the newsroom
 

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a slight linux bias from the newsroom
i'm becca ferguson both hewlett-packard

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i'm becca ferguson both hewlett-packard
 

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i'm becca ferguson both hewlett-packard
enterprise and IBM have announced

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enterprise and IBM have announced
 

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enterprise and IBM have announced
significant cost-cutting measures

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significant cost-cutting measures
 

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significant cost-cutting measures
including pay cuts and significant job

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including pay cuts and significant job
 

45
00:01:01,800 --> 00:01:04,609
including pay cuts and significant job
losses the kovat 19 crisis is hitting

46
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losses the kovat 19 crisis is hitting
 

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losses the kovat 19 crisis is hitting
almost every market sector hard and now

48
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almost every market sector hard and now
 

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almost every market sector hard and now
the dominoes are starting to fall as

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the dominoes are starting to fall as
 

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the dominoes are starting to fall as
other small medium and large businesses

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other small medium and large businesses
 

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other small medium and large businesses
reduce operations or shudder for good

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reduce operations or shudder for good
 

55
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reduce operations or shudder for good
the tech firms that rely on enterprise

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the tech firms that rely on enterprise
 

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the tech firms that rely on enterprise
clients are themselves taking heavy

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clients are themselves taking heavy
 

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clients are themselves taking heavy
losses and laying off personnel IBM

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losses and laying off personnel IBM
 

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losses and laying off personnel IBM
announced its layoffs late Thursday in a

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announced its layoffs late Thursday in a
 

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announced its layoffs late Thursday in a
statement the company said the highly

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statement the company said the highly
 

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statement the company said the highly
competitive marketplace requires

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competitive marketplace requires
 

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competitive marketplace requires
flexibility to constantly remix

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flexibility to constantly remix
 

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flexibility to constantly remix
high-value skills which in this case

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high-value skills which in this case
 

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high-value skills which in this case
means decide and you no longer place a

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means decide and you no longer place a
 

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means decide and you no longer place a
high value on the skills a significant

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high value on the skills a significant
 

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high value on the skills a significant
number of employees bring to the

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number of employees bring to the
 

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number of employees bring to the
socially distance table

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socially distance table
 

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socially distance table
IBM like many firms now facing cuts and

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IBM like many firms now facing cuts and
 

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IBM like many firms now facing cuts and
layoffs was not in the best of financial

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layoffs was not in the best of financial
 

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layoffs was not in the best of financial
situations before Cova 19 hit the

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situations before Cova 19 hit the
 

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situations before Cova 19 hit the
company's CEO Arvind Krishna has been

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company's CEO Arvind Krishna has been
 

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company's CEO Arvind Krishna has been
with the company for decades but only

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with the company for decades but only
 

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with the company for decades but only
stepped into the top seed in April

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stepped into the top seed in April
 

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stepped into the top seed in April
saying at the time he was focused on

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saying at the time he was focused on
 

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saying at the time he was focused on
building up the parts of the company

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building up the parts of the company
 

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building up the parts of the company
that support cloud computing and

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that support cloud computing and
 

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that support cloud computing and
artificial intelligence and was willing

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artificial intelligence and was willing
 

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artificial intelligence and was willing
to move away from the rest IVM did not

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to move away from the rest IVM did not
 

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to move away from the rest IVM did not
specify how many positions were being

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specify how many positions were being
 

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specify how many positions were being
cut but both The Wall Street Journal and

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cut but both The Wall Street Journal and
 

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cut but both The Wall Street Journal and
Bloomberg News report thousands of

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Bloomberg News report thousands of
 

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Bloomberg News report thousands of
employees were affected

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employees were affected
 

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employees were affected
in five states California New York North

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in five states California New York North
 

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in five states California New York North
Carolina Missouri and Pennsylvania IBM

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Carolina Missouri and Pennsylvania IBM
 

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Carolina Missouri and Pennsylvania IBM
said in a statement it would offer

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said in a statement it would offer
 

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said in a statement it would offer
subsidized medical coverage to affected

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subsidized medical coverage to affected
 

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subsidized medical coverage to affected
employees for the next 12 months Hewlett

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employees for the next 12 months Hewlett
 

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employees for the next 12 months Hewlett
Packard Enterprise also announced its

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Packard Enterprise also announced its
 

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Packard Enterprise also announced its
cost-cutting plans on Thursday as part

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cost-cutting plans on Thursday as part
 

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cost-cutting plans on Thursday as part
of its more recent quarterly earnings

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of its more recent quarterly earnings
 

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of its more recent quarterly earnings
report the company will cut some

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report the company will cut some
 

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report the company will cut some
salaries through at least the end of

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salaries through at least the end of
 

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salaries through at least the end of
October with executives seeing pay cuts

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October with executives seeing pay cuts
 

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October with executives seeing pay cuts
of between 20 to 25 percent the company

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of between 20 to 25 percent the company
 

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of between 20 to 25 percent the company
like younger tech Brethren such as

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like younger tech Brethren such as
 

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like younger tech Brethren such as
Facebook and Twitter says it will

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Facebook and Twitter says it will
 

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Facebook and Twitter says it will
further save money by embracing remote

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further save money by embracing remote
 

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further save money by embracing remote
work in the longer term allowing it to

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00:02:51,020 --> 00:02:51,030
work in the longer term allowing it to
 

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00:02:51,030 --> 00:02:56,059
work in the longer term allowing it to
shutter some offices researchers have

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00:02:56,059 --> 00:02:56,069
shutter some offices researchers have
 

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00:02:56,069 --> 00:02:58,490
shutter some offices researchers have
found an updated version of Anarchy

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00:02:58,490 --> 00:02:58,500
found an updated version of Anarchy
 

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found an updated version of Anarchy
grabber that steals victims plaintext

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00:03:00,740 --> 00:03:00,750
grabber that steals victims plaintext
 

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00:03:00,750 --> 00:03:03,110
grabber that steals victims plaintext
passwords and infects victims friends on

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00:03:03,110 --> 00:03:03,120
passwords and infects victims friends on
 

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passwords and infects victims friends on
discord detected as Anarchy grabber 3

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00:03:06,860 --> 00:03:06,870
discord detected as Anarchy grabber 3
 

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discord detected as Anarchy grabber 3
the new trojan variant modifies the

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the new trojan variant modifies the
 

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the new trojan variant modifies the
discord clients javascriptcore upon

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00:03:12,319 --> 00:03:12,329
discord clients javascriptcore upon
 

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discord clients javascriptcore upon
successful installation and this

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00:03:14,210 --> 00:03:14,220
successful installation and this
 

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successful installation and this
modified version gives the malware the

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modified version gives the malware the
 

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00:03:16,230 --> 00:03:18,580
modified version gives the malware the
ability to load other JavaScript files

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ability to load other JavaScript files
 

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00:03:18,590 --> 00:03:21,680
ability to load other JavaScript files
when the infected disk or client is open

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00:03:21,680 --> 00:03:21,690
when the infected disk or client is open
 

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00:03:21,690 --> 00:03:25,270
when the infected disk or client is open
the threat loaded inject j/s from a new

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00:03:25,270 --> 00:03:25,280
the threat loaded inject j/s from a new
 

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the threat loaded inject j/s from a new
anarchy folder this file loaded another

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anarchy folder this file loaded another
 

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anarchy folder this file loaded another
script called discord magis and the two

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00:03:31,069 --> 00:03:31,079
script called discord magis and the two
 

169
00:03:31,079 --> 00:03:33,530
script called discord magis and the two
scripts together logs the user out at

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scripts together logs the user out at
 

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scripts together logs the user out at
which point they are prompted to log

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which point they are prompted to log
 

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which point they are prompted to log
back in the new Anarchy grabber variant

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back in the new Anarchy grabber variant
 

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back in the new Anarchy grabber variant
then attempts to disable two-factor

176
00:03:40,190 --> 00:03:40,200
then attempts to disable two-factor
 

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then attempts to disable two-factor
authentication on its victims account

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00:03:42,020 --> 00:03:42,030
authentication on its victims account
 

179
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authentication on its victims account
and steals information including their

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00:03:44,300 --> 00:03:44,310
and steals information including their
 

181
00:03:44,310 --> 00:03:46,640
and steals information including their
username plaintext password and user

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username plaintext password and user
 

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00:03:46,650 --> 00:03:49,159
username plaintext password and user
token which it sends to the attackers

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00:03:49,159 --> 00:03:49,169
token which it sends to the attackers
 

185
00:03:49,169 --> 00:03:52,339
token which it sends to the attackers
own discord server by a web hook the

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00:03:52,339 --> 00:03:52,349
own discord server by a web hook the
 

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00:03:52,349 --> 00:03:54,259
own discord server by a web hook the
malware also attempts to spread itself

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00:03:54,259 --> 00:03:54,269
malware also attempts to spread itself
 

189
00:03:54,269 --> 00:03:56,119
malware also attempts to spread itself
to other discord users by sending a

190
00:03:56,119 --> 00:03:56,129
to other discord users by sending a
 

191
00:03:56,129 --> 00:03:57,770
to other discord users by sending a
message that contains the malware to

192
00:03:57,770 --> 00:03:57,780
message that contains the malware to
 

193
00:03:57,780 --> 00:04:00,949
message that contains the malware to
everyone on the user's friend list after

194
00:04:00,949 --> 00:04:00,959
everyone on the user's friend list after
 

195
00:04:00,959 --> 00:04:03,110
everyone on the user's friend list after
modifying the discord client and our key

196
00:04:03,110 --> 00:04:03,120
modifying the discord client and our key
 

197
00:04:03,120 --> 00:04:05,270
modifying the discord client and our key
grabber doesn't run again which makes it

198
00:04:05,270 --> 00:04:05,280
grabber doesn't run again which makes it
 

199
00:04:05,280 --> 00:04:06,920
grabber doesn't run again which makes it
difficult for antivirus software to

200
00:04:06,920 --> 00:04:06,930
difficult for antivirus software to
 

201
00:04:06,930 --> 00:04:08,960
difficult for antivirus software to
detect the threat since there are no

202
00:04:08,960 --> 00:04:08,970
detect the threat since there are no
 

203
00:04:08,970 --> 00:04:11,960
detect the threat since there are no
malicious processes it also ensures that

204
00:04:11,960 --> 00:04:11,970
malicious processes it also ensures that
 

205
00:04:11,970 --> 00:04:13,670
malicious processes it also ensures that
a victim remains part of the botnet

206
00:04:13,670 --> 00:04:13,680
a victim remains part of the botnet
 

207
00:04:13,680 --> 00:04:15,559
a victim remains part of the botnet
whenever they interact with discord

208
00:04:15,559 --> 00:04:15,569
whenever they interact with discord
 

209
00:04:15,569 --> 00:04:18,620
whenever they interact with discord
using the app Robbie how can a user

210
00:04:18,620 --> 00:04:18,630
using the app Robbie how can a user
 

211
00:04:18,630 --> 00:04:20,210
using the app Robbie how can a user
determine if they're infected

212
00:04:20,210 --> 00:04:20,220
determine if they're infected
 

213
00:04:20,220 --> 00:04:22,940
determine if they're infected
if antivirus can't detect it well Becca

214
00:04:22,940 --> 00:04:22,950
if antivirus can't detect it well Becca
 

215
00:04:22,950 --> 00:04:26,060
if antivirus can't detect it well Becca
tech savvy users can open the index CAS

216
00:04:26,060 --> 00:04:26,070
tech savvy users can open the index CAS
 

217
00:04:26,070 --> 00:04:27,140
tech savvy users can open the index CAS
file

218
00:04:27,140 --> 00:04:27,150
file
 

219
00:04:27,150 --> 00:04:28,939
file
and then they can check the contents so

220
00:04:28,939 --> 00:04:28,949
and then they can check the contents so
 

221
00:04:28,949 --> 00:04:31,670
and then they can check the contents so
on Windows you're gonna find that in its

222
00:04:31,670 --> 00:04:31,680
on Windows you're gonna find that in its
 

223
00:04:31,680 --> 00:04:34,640
on Windows you're gonna find that in its
app data just wrap that in percent signs

224
00:04:34,640 --> 00:04:34,650
app data just wrap that in percent signs
 

225
00:04:34,650 --> 00:04:36,529
app data just wrap that in percent signs
to get there really quickly and then

226
00:04:36,529 --> 00:04:36,539
to get there really quickly and then
 

227
00:04:36,539 --> 00:04:38,360
to get there really quickly and then
you'll enter the discord folder Linux

228
00:04:38,360 --> 00:04:38,370
you'll enter the discord folder Linux
 

229
00:04:38,370 --> 00:04:40,850
you'll enter the discord folder Linux
and Mac users go to the dot config

230
00:04:40,850 --> 00:04:40,860
and Mac users go to the dot config
 

231
00:04:40,860 --> 00:04:42,650
and Mac users go to the dot config
hidden folder in your home folder and

232
00:04:42,650 --> 00:04:42,660
hidden folder in your home folder and
 

233
00:04:42,660 --> 00:04:44,570
hidden folder in your home folder and
within that you'll find the discord

234
00:04:44,570 --> 00:04:44,580
within that you'll find the discord
 

235
00:04:44,580 --> 00:04:47,270
within that you'll find the discord
folder holding all the files now on any

236
00:04:47,270 --> 00:04:47,280
folder holding all the files now on any
 

237
00:04:47,280 --> 00:04:50,689
folder holding all the files now on any
architecture the files in from there are

238
00:04:50,689 --> 00:04:50,699
architecture the files in from there are
 

239
00:04:50,699 --> 00:04:52,219
architecture the files in from there are
going to be the same so whether you're

240
00:04:52,219 --> 00:04:52,229
going to be the same so whether you're
 

241
00:04:52,229 --> 00:04:54,310
going to be the same so whether you're
on Windows Mac or Linux you'll note that

242
00:04:54,310 --> 00:04:54,320
on Windows Mac or Linux you'll note that
 

243
00:04:54,320 --> 00:04:57,290
on Windows Mac or Linux you'll note that
that there are many many files called

244
00:04:57,290 --> 00:04:57,300
that there are many many files called
 

245
00:04:57,300 --> 00:05:00,610
that there are many many files called
index J s in the tree from that folder

246
00:05:00,610 --> 00:05:00,620
index J s in the tree from that folder
 

247
00:05:00,620 --> 00:05:04,090
index J s in the tree from that folder
so the one that you're looking for is in

248
00:05:04,090 --> 00:05:04,100
so the one that you're looking for is in
 

249
00:05:04,100 --> 00:05:07,370
so the one that you're looking for is in
discord underscore desktop underscore

250
00:05:07,370 --> 00:05:07,380
discord underscore desktop underscore
 

251
00:05:07,380 --> 00:05:10,909
discord underscore desktop underscore
core and the directory format is your

252
00:05:10,909 --> 00:05:10,919
core and the directory format is your
 

253
00:05:10,919 --> 00:05:13,189
core and the directory format is your
discord version now in my case here on

254
00:05:13,189 --> 00:05:13,199
discord version now in my case here on
 

255
00:05:13,199 --> 00:05:15,560
discord version now in my case here on
Windows if that's zero point zero point

256
00:05:15,560 --> 00:05:15,570
Windows if that's zero point zero point
 

257
00:05:15,570 --> 00:05:18,890
Windows if that's zero point zero point
306 so I enter that folder then modules

258
00:05:18,890 --> 00:05:18,900
306 so I enter that folder then modules
 

259
00:05:18,900 --> 00:05:21,290
306 so I enter that folder then modules
then discord underscore desktop

260
00:05:21,290 --> 00:05:21,300
then discord underscore desktop
 

261
00:05:21,300 --> 00:05:23,330
then discord underscore desktop
underscore core and I can check the

262
00:05:23,330 --> 00:05:23,340
underscore core and I can check the
 

263
00:05:23,340 --> 00:05:25,999
underscore core and I can check the
contents of the index J ass file and if

264
00:05:25,999 --> 00:05:26,009
contents of the index J ass file and if
 

265
00:05:26,009 --> 00:05:28,129
contents of the index J ass file and if
it contains anything other than a

266
00:05:28,129 --> 00:05:28,139
it contains anything other than a
 

267
00:05:28,139 --> 00:05:30,650
it contains anything other than a
command to require core dot s R it's

268
00:05:30,650 --> 00:05:30,660
command to require core dot s R it's
 

269
00:05:30,660 --> 00:05:33,770
command to require core dot s R it's
probably infected thanks Robbie

270
00:05:33,770 --> 00:05:33,780
probably infected thanks Robbie
 

271
00:05:33,780 --> 00:05:36,589
probably infected thanks Robbie
if you suspect infection uninstall the

272
00:05:36,589 --> 00:05:36,599
if you suspect infection uninstall the
 

273
00:05:36,599 --> 00:05:39,080
if you suspect infection uninstall the
discord app and reinstall change your

274
00:05:39,080 --> 00:05:39,090
discord app and reinstall change your
 

275
00:05:39,090 --> 00:05:41,870
discord app and reinstall change your
password and ensure two FA is reenable

276
00:05:41,870 --> 00:05:41,880
password and ensure two FA is reenable
 

277
00:05:41,880 --> 00:05:43,850
password and ensure two FA is reenable
diff it's been turned off whether

278
00:05:43,850 --> 00:05:43,860
diff it's been turned off whether
 

279
00:05:43,860 --> 00:05:46,189
diff it's been turned off whether
discord email Facebook or otherwise be

280
00:05:46,189 --> 00:05:46,199
discord email Facebook or otherwise be
 

281
00:05:46,199 --> 00:05:48,920
discord email Facebook or otherwise be
diligent and ensure you only click links

282
00:05:48,920 --> 00:05:48,930
diligent and ensure you only click links
 

283
00:05:48,930 --> 00:05:51,170
diligent and ensure you only click links
you know you can trust since malware

284
00:05:51,170 --> 00:05:51,180
you know you can trust since malware
 

285
00:05:51,180 --> 00:05:52,939
you know you can trust since malware
like this spreads to friend lists it's

286
00:05:52,939 --> 00:05:52,949
like this spreads to friend lists it's
 

287
00:05:52,949 --> 00:05:54,409
like this spreads to friend lists it's
also important to remember that just

288
00:05:54,409 --> 00:05:54,419
also important to remember that just
 

289
00:05:54,419 --> 00:05:56,360
also important to remember that just
because it's one of your trusted friends

290
00:05:56,360 --> 00:05:56,370
because it's one of your trusted friends
 

291
00:05:56,370 --> 00:05:58,219
because it's one of your trusted friends
sending it doesn't mean you can

292
00:05:58,219 --> 00:05:58,229
sending it doesn't mean you can
 

293
00:05:58,229 --> 00:06:00,560
sending it doesn't mean you can
automatically trust the links a simple

294
00:06:00,560 --> 00:06:00,570
automatically trust the links a simple
 

295
00:06:00,570 --> 00:06:02,450
automatically trust the links a simple
did you send this question could be all

296
00:06:02,450 --> 00:06:02,460
did you send this question could be all
 

297
00:06:02,460 --> 00:06:04,670
did you send this question could be all
it takes to protect you your account and

298
00:06:04,670 --> 00:06:04,680
it takes to protect you your account and
 

299
00:06:04,680 --> 00:06:10,250
it takes to protect you your account and
your privacy the owner of a pizza

300
00:06:10,250 --> 00:06:10,260
your privacy the owner of a pizza
 

301
00:06:10,260 --> 00:06:12,379
your privacy the owner of a pizza
restaurant in the US has discovered the

302
00:06:12,379 --> 00:06:12,389
restaurant in the US has discovered the
 

303
00:06:12,389 --> 00:06:15,050
restaurant in the US has discovered the
the door - delivery app has been selling

304
00:06:15,050 --> 00:06:15,060
the door - delivery app has been selling
 

305
00:06:15,060 --> 00:06:17,240
the door - delivery app has been selling
his food cheaper than he does while

306
00:06:17,240 --> 00:06:17,250
his food cheaper than he does while
 

307
00:06:17,250 --> 00:06:19,510
his food cheaper than he does while
still paying him full price for orders a

308
00:06:19,510 --> 00:06:19,520
still paying him full price for orders a
 

309
00:06:19,520 --> 00:06:22,670
still paying him full price for orders a
pizza for vici charged $24 was being

310
00:06:22,670 --> 00:06:22,680
pizza for vici charged $24 was being
 

311
00:06:22,680 --> 00:06:25,580
pizza for vici charged $24 was being
advertised for 16 on door - and when he

312
00:06:25,580 --> 00:06:25,590
advertised for 16 on door - and when he
 

313
00:06:25,590 --> 00:06:27,560
advertised for 16 on door - and when he
secretly ordered it himself the app paid

314
00:06:27,560 --> 00:06:27,570
secretly ordered it himself the app paid
 

315
00:06:27,570 --> 00:06:29,779
secretly ordered it himself the app paid
his restaurant the full 24 dollars while

316
00:06:29,779 --> 00:06:29,789
his restaurant the full 24 dollars while
 

317
00:06:29,789 --> 00:06:32,960
his restaurant the full 24 dollars while
charging him 16 so he ordered ten pizzas

318
00:06:32,960 --> 00:06:32,970
charging him 16 so he ordered ten pizzas
 

319
00:06:32,970 --> 00:06:35,659
charging him 16 so he ordered ten pizzas
pay at $160 and had them delivered to a

320
00:06:35,659 --> 00:06:35,669
pay at $160 and had them delivered to a
 

321
00:06:35,669 --> 00:06:37,850
pay at $160 and had them delivered to a
friend's house the restaurant was then

322
00:06:37,850 --> 00:06:37,860
friend's house the restaurant was then
 

323
00:06:37,860 --> 00:06:40,980
friend's house the restaurant was then
paid $240 for the order by door -

324
00:06:40,980 --> 00:06:40,990
paid $240 for the order by door -
 

325
00:06:40,990 --> 00:06:43,140
paid $240 for the order by door -
in further tests the restaurant prepared

326
00:06:43,140 --> 00:06:43,150
in further tests the restaurant prepared
 

327
00:06:43,150 --> 00:06:45,059
in further tests the restaurant prepared
his friends order by boxing up the pizza

328
00:06:45,059 --> 00:06:45,069
his friends order by boxing up the pizza
 

329
00:06:45,069 --> 00:06:47,700
his friends order by boxing up the pizza
base without any toppings maximizing the

330
00:06:47,700 --> 00:06:47,710
base without any toppings maximizing the
 

331
00:06:47,710 --> 00:06:50,370
base without any toppings maximizing the
profit from the mismatched prices and it

332
00:06:50,370 --> 00:06:50,380
profit from the mismatched prices and it
 

333
00:06:50,380 --> 00:06:50,999
profit from the mismatched prices and it
worked

334
00:06:50,999 --> 00:06:51,009
worked
 

335
00:06:51,009 --> 00:06:53,610
worked
content strategist Rand John Roy who is

336
00:06:53,610 --> 00:06:53,620
content strategist Rand John Roy who is
 

337
00:06:53,620 --> 00:06:55,320
content strategist Rand John Roy who is
a friend of the pizzeria owner blogged

338
00:06:55,320 --> 00:06:55,330
a friend of the pizzeria owner blogged
 

339
00:06:55,330 --> 00:06:58,110
a friend of the pizzeria owner blogged
about it he said I was genuinely curious

340
00:06:58,110 --> 00:06:58,120
about it he said I was genuinely curious
 

341
00:06:58,120 --> 00:07:00,600
about it he said I was genuinely curious
if doordash would catch on but they

342
00:07:00,600 --> 00:07:00,610
if doordash would catch on but they
 

343
00:07:00,610 --> 00:07:01,140
if doordash would catch on but they
didn't

344
00:07:01,140 --> 00:07:01,150
didn't
 

345
00:07:01,150 --> 00:07:03,540
didn't
the curiosity stemmed from the fact that

346
00:07:03,540 --> 00:07:03,550
the curiosity stemmed from the fact that
 

347
00:07:03,550 --> 00:07:05,100
the curiosity stemmed from the fact that
they had not asked to be put on the app

348
00:07:05,100 --> 00:07:05,110
they had not asked to be put on the app
 

349
00:07:05,110 --> 00:07:07,290
they had not asked to be put on the app
so it didn't make sense that the company

350
00:07:07,290 --> 00:07:07,300
so it didn't make sense that the company
 

351
00:07:07,300 --> 00:07:08,879
so it didn't make sense that the company
would be selling their pizza at a loss

352
00:07:08,879 --> 00:07:08,889
would be selling their pizza at a loss
 

353
00:07:08,889 --> 00:07:10,980
would be selling their pizza at a loss
they later found out it was part of a

354
00:07:10,980 --> 00:07:10,990
they later found out it was part of a
 

355
00:07:10,990 --> 00:07:12,809
they later found out it was part of a
cunning strategy to build customer

356
00:07:12,809 --> 00:07:12,819
cunning strategy to build customer
 

357
00:07:12,819 --> 00:07:15,060
cunning strategy to build customer
demand and then use that demand to get

358
00:07:15,060 --> 00:07:15,070
demand and then use that demand to get
 

359
00:07:15,070 --> 00:07:19,110
demand and then use that demand to get
the restaurant to sign up mr. Roy says

360
00:07:19,110 --> 00:07:19,120
the restaurant to sign up mr. Roy says
 

361
00:07:19,120 --> 00:07:21,180
the restaurant to sign up mr. Roy says
they have a test period where they

362
00:07:21,180 --> 00:07:21,190
they have a test period where they
 

363
00:07:21,190 --> 00:07:23,159
they have a test period where they
scrape the restaurants website and don't

364
00:07:23,159 --> 00:07:23,169
scrape the restaurants website and don't
 

365
00:07:23,169 --> 00:07:25,379
scrape the restaurants website and don't
charge any fees to anyone so they can

366
00:07:25,379 --> 00:07:25,389
charge any fees to anyone so they can
 

367
00:07:25,389 --> 00:07:26,850
charge any fees to anyone so they can
ideally go to the restaurant with a

368
00:07:26,850 --> 00:07:26,860
ideally go to the restaurant with a
 

369
00:07:26,860 --> 00:07:28,860
ideally go to the restaurant with a
positive order data to then get the

370
00:07:28,860 --> 00:07:28,870
positive order data to then get the
 

371
00:07:28,870 --> 00:07:31,980
positive order data to then get the
restaurant signed on to the platform mr.

372
00:07:31,980 --> 00:07:31,990
restaurant signed on to the platform mr.
 

373
00:07:31,990 --> 00:07:33,749
restaurant signed on to the platform mr.
Roy is of the opinion that it's bad

374
00:07:33,749 --> 00:07:33,759
Roy is of the opinion that it's bad
 

375
00:07:33,759 --> 00:07:36,629
Roy is of the opinion that it's bad
business he says you have insanely large

376
00:07:36,629 --> 00:07:36,639
business he says you have insanely large
 

377
00:07:36,639 --> 00:07:38,850
business he says you have insanely large
pools of capital creating an incredibly

378
00:07:38,850 --> 00:07:38,860
pools of capital creating an incredibly
 

379
00:07:38,860 --> 00:07:41,360
pools of capital creating an incredibly
inefficient money losing business model

380
00:07:41,360 --> 00:07:41,370
inefficient money losing business model
 

381
00:07:41,370 --> 00:07:44,100
inefficient money losing business model
doordash is backed by investment giants

382
00:07:44,100 --> 00:07:44,110
doordash is backed by investment giants
 

383
00:07:44,110 --> 00:07:46,260
doordash is backed by investment giants
Softbank which last week posted a

384
00:07:46,260 --> 00:07:46,270
Softbank which last week posted a
 

385
00:07:46,270 --> 00:07:49,020
Softbank which last week posted a
record-breaking loss of nearly 13

386
00:07:49,020 --> 00:07:49,030
record-breaking loss of nearly 13
 

387
00:07:49,030 --> 00:07:51,870
record-breaking loss of nearly 13
billion thanks beca we do have to take a

388
00:07:51,870 --> 00:07:51,880
billion thanks beca we do have to take a
 

389
00:07:51,880 --> 00:07:53,640
billion thanks beca we do have to take a
really quick break but when we come back

390
00:07:53,640 --> 00:07:53,650
really quick break but when we come back
 

391
00:07:53,650 --> 00:07:55,560
really quick break but when we come back
beck has got more of your top tech news

392
00:07:55,560 --> 00:07:55,570
beck has got more of your top tech news
 

393
00:07:55,570 --> 00:07:56,339
beck has got more of your top tech news
for the week

394
00:07:56,339 --> 00:07:56,349
for the week
 

395
00:07:56,349 --> 00:07:59,240
for the week
so stick around

396
00:07:59,240 --> 00:07:59,250

 

397
00:07:59,250 --> 00:08:12,640

[Music]

398
00:08:12,640 --> 00:08:12,650

 

399
00:08:12,650 --> 00:08:18,650

[Music]

400
00:08:18,650 --> 00:08:18,660

 

401
00:08:18,660 --> 00:08:20,420

researchers have shown that a

402
00:08:20,420 --> 00:08:20,430
researchers have shown that a
 

403
00:08:20,430 --> 00:08:23,010
researchers have shown that a
vulnerability in a decades-old Microsoft

404
00:08:23,010 --> 00:08:23,020
vulnerability in a decades-old Microsoft
 

405
00:08:23,020 --> 00:08:25,200
vulnerability in a decades-old Microsoft
Windows component that controls printing

406
00:08:25,200 --> 00:08:25,210
Windows component that controls printing
 

407
00:08:25,210 --> 00:08:27,930
Windows component that controls printing
could be abused by malicious actors to

408
00:08:27,930 --> 00:08:27,940
could be abused by malicious actors to
 

409
00:08:27,940 --> 00:08:30,300
could be abused by malicious actors to
gain elevated privileges on the targeted

410
00:08:30,300 --> 00:08:30,310
gain elevated privileges on the targeted
 

411
00:08:30,310 --> 00:08:33,300
gain elevated privileges on the targeted
system the flaw which they dubbed print

412
00:08:33,300 --> 00:08:33,310
system the flaw which they dubbed print
 

413
00:08:33,310 --> 00:08:35,610
system the flaw which they dubbed print
demon resides in the print spooler and

414
00:08:35,610 --> 00:08:35,620
demon resides in the print spooler and
 

415
00:08:35,620 --> 00:08:36,390
demon resides in the print spooler and
get this

416
00:08:36,390 --> 00:08:36,400
get this
 

417
00:08:36,400 --> 00:08:39,090
get this
it affects all Windows versions since NT

418
00:08:39,090 --> 00:08:39,100
it affects all Windows versions since NT
 

419
00:08:39,100 --> 00:08:41,580
it affects all Windows versions since NT
4.0 the component has remained largely

420
00:08:41,580 --> 00:08:41,590
4.0 the component has remained largely
 

421
00:08:41,590 --> 00:08:43,830
4.0 the component has remained largely
unchanged since even though another

422
00:08:43,830 --> 00:08:43,840
unchanged since even though another
 

423
00:08:43,840 --> 00:08:45,960
unchanged since even though another
vulnerability affecting it was abused by

424
00:08:45,960 --> 00:08:45,970
vulnerability affecting it was abused by
 

425
00:08:45,970 --> 00:08:48,200
vulnerability affecting it was abused by
the infamous Stuxnet a decade ago

426
00:08:48,200 --> 00:08:48,210
the infamous Stuxnet a decade ago
 

427
00:08:48,210 --> 00:08:51,270
the infamous Stuxnet a decade ago
Microsoft said of the fix an elevation

428
00:08:51,270 --> 00:08:51,280
Microsoft said of the fix an elevation
 

429
00:08:51,280 --> 00:08:53,400
Microsoft said of the fix an elevation
of privileged vulnerability exists when

430
00:08:53,400 --> 00:08:53,410
of privileged vulnerability exists when
 

431
00:08:53,410 --> 00:08:54,780
of privileged vulnerability exists when
the Windows print spooler service

432
00:08:54,780 --> 00:08:54,790
the Windows print spooler service
 

433
00:08:54,790 --> 00:08:57,270
the Windows print spooler service
improperly allows arbitrary writing to

434
00:08:57,270 --> 00:08:57,280
improperly allows arbitrary writing to
 

435
00:08:57,280 --> 00:08:59,670
improperly allows arbitrary writing to
the file system an attacker who

436
00:08:59,670 --> 00:08:59,680
the file system an attacker who
 

437
00:08:59,680 --> 00:09:00,930
the file system an attacker who
successfully exploited this

438
00:09:00,930 --> 00:09:00,940
successfully exploited this
 

439
00:09:00,940 --> 00:09:03,060
successfully exploited this
vulnerability could run arbitrary code

440
00:09:03,060 --> 00:09:03,070
vulnerability could run arbitrary code
 

441
00:09:03,070 --> 00:09:04,980
vulnerability could run arbitrary code
with elevated system privileges an

442
00:09:04,980 --> 00:09:04,990
with elevated system privileges an
 

443
00:09:04,990 --> 00:09:07,950
with elevated system privileges an
attacker could then install programs

444
00:09:07,950 --> 00:09:07,960
attacker could then install programs
 

445
00:09:07,960 --> 00:09:10,950
attacker could then install programs
view change or delete data or create new

446
00:09:10,950 --> 00:09:10,960
view change or delete data or create new
 

447
00:09:10,960 --> 00:09:14,250
view change or delete data or create new
accounts with full user rights microsoft

448
00:09:14,250 --> 00:09:14,260
accounts with full user rights microsoft
 

449
00:09:14,260 --> 00:09:16,260
accounts with full user rights microsoft
laid down the likelihood of exploitation

450
00:09:16,260 --> 00:09:16,270
laid down the likelihood of exploitation
 

451
00:09:16,270 --> 00:09:18,210
laid down the likelihood of exploitation
saying that an attacker would need to

452
00:09:18,210 --> 00:09:18,220
saying that an attacker would need to
 

453
00:09:18,220 --> 00:09:20,610
saying that an attacker would need to
log on to an affected system and use a

454
00:09:20,610 --> 00:09:20,620
log on to an affected system and use a
 

455
00:09:20,620 --> 00:09:22,560
log on to an affected system and use a
specially written script or application

456
00:09:22,560 --> 00:09:22,570
specially written script or application
 

457
00:09:22,570 --> 00:09:25,290
specially written script or application
but as we know RDP exploits are

458
00:09:25,290 --> 00:09:25,300
but as we know RDP exploits are
 

459
00:09:25,300 --> 00:09:27,240
but as we know RDP exploits are
occurring in the wild with malware such

460
00:09:27,240 --> 00:09:27,250
occurring in the wild with malware such
 

461
00:09:27,250 --> 00:09:30,000
occurring in the wild with malware such
as SAR whant opening a remote access to

462
00:09:30,000 --> 00:09:30,010
as SAR whant opening a remote access to
 

463
00:09:30,010 --> 00:09:32,880
as SAR whant opening a remote access to
Windows systems so in today's connected

464
00:09:32,880 --> 00:09:32,890
Windows systems so in today's connected
 

465
00:09:32,890 --> 00:09:34,650
Windows systems so in today's connected
world saying a hacker needs to have

466
00:09:34,650 --> 00:09:34,660
world saying a hacker needs to have
 

467
00:09:34,660 --> 00:09:36,750
world saying a hacker needs to have
access to a system in order to exploit

468
00:09:36,750 --> 00:09:36,760
access to a system in order to exploit
 

469
00:09:36,760 --> 00:09:39,210
access to a system in order to exploit
it is an irresponsible point to make

470
00:09:39,210 --> 00:09:39,220
it is an irresponsible point to make
 

471
00:09:39,220 --> 00:09:41,400
it is an irresponsible point to make
which could mislead inexperienced IT

472
00:09:41,400 --> 00:09:41,410
which could mislead inexperienced IT
 

473
00:09:41,410 --> 00:09:45,270
which could mislead inexperienced IT
departments into complacency the

474
00:09:45,270 --> 00:09:45,280
departments into complacency the
 

475
00:09:45,280 --> 00:09:47,190
departments into complacency the
vulnerability can be abused to elevate

476
00:09:47,190 --> 00:09:47,200
vulnerability can be abused to elevate
 

477
00:09:47,200 --> 00:09:49,680
vulnerability can be abused to elevate
privileges bypass endpoint detection and

478
00:09:49,680 --> 00:09:49,690
privileges bypass endpoint detection and
 

479
00:09:49,690 --> 00:09:52,740
privileges bypass endpoint detection and
response rules and game persistence as

480
00:09:52,740 --> 00:09:52,750
response rules and game persistence as
 

481
00:09:52,750 --> 00:09:54,660
response rules and game persistence as
part of this month's Patch Tuesday which

482
00:09:54,660 --> 00:09:54,670
part of this month's Patch Tuesday which
 

483
00:09:54,670 --> 00:09:57,260
part of this month's Patch Tuesday which
plugged a total of 111 security holes

484
00:09:57,260 --> 00:09:57,270
plugged a total of 111 security holes
 

485
00:09:57,270 --> 00:09:59,940
plugged a total of 111 security holes
Microsoft changed how the windows print

486
00:09:59,940 --> 00:09:59,950
Microsoft changed how the windows print
 

487
00:09:59,950 --> 00:10:01,860
Microsoft changed how the windows print
spooler component writes data to the

488
00:10:01,860 --> 00:10:01,870
spooler component writes data to the
 

489
00:10:01,870 --> 00:10:04,680
spooler component writes data to the
file system and it advised to download

490
00:10:04,680 --> 00:10:04,690
file system and it advised to download
 

491
00:10:04,690 --> 00:10:07,560
file system and it advised to download
and apply the update this exploit goes

492
00:10:07,560 --> 00:10:07,570
and apply the update this exploit goes
 

493
00:10:07,570 --> 00:10:09,570
and apply the update this exploit goes
to show why running a version of one of

494
00:10:09,570 --> 00:10:09,580
to show why running a version of one of
 

495
00:10:09,580 --> 00:10:11,610
to show why running a version of one of
Windows that is passed end-of-life is

496
00:10:11,610 --> 00:10:11,620
Windows that is passed end-of-life is
 

497
00:10:11,620 --> 00:10:14,220
Windows that is passed end-of-life is
unwise the fix for this exploit will not

498
00:10:14,220 --> 00:10:14,230
unwise the fix for this exploit will not
 

499
00:10:14,230 --> 00:10:16,380
unwise the fix for this exploit will not
be released to eol operating systems

500
00:10:16,380 --> 00:10:16,390
be released to eol operating systems
 

501
00:10:16,390 --> 00:10:18,900
be released to eol operating systems
such as Windows XP or even Windows 7

502
00:10:18,900 --> 00:10:18,910
such as Windows XP or even Windows 7
 

503
00:10:18,910 --> 00:10:20,940
such as Windows XP or even Windows 7
which will remain vulnerable to this

504
00:10:20,940 --> 00:10:20,950
which will remain vulnerable to this
 

505
00:10:20,950 --> 00:10:23,790
which will remain vulnerable to this
critical flaw perhaps this is also

506
00:10:23,790 --> 00:10:23,800
critical flaw perhaps this is also
 

507
00:10:23,800 --> 00:10:25,650
critical flaw perhaps this is also
another example of why it's heightened

508
00:10:25,650 --> 00:10:25,660
another example of why it's heightened
 

509
00:10:25,660 --> 00:10:32,520
another example of why it's heightened
to consider switching to Linux remote

510
00:10:32,520 --> 00:10:32,530
to consider switching to Linux remote
 

511
00:10:32,530 --> 00:10:34,500
to consider switching to Linux remote
control drones will be used to deliver

512
00:10:34,500 --> 00:10:34,510
control drones will be used to deliver
 

513
00:10:34,510 --> 00:10:36,870
control drones will be used to deliver
coronavirus testing kits to a remote

514
00:10:36,870 --> 00:10:36,880
coronavirus testing kits to a remote
 

515
00:10:36,880 --> 00:10:39,240
coronavirus testing kits to a remote
Scottish hospital and they're being

516
00:10:39,240 --> 00:10:39,250
Scottish hospital and they're being
 

517
00:10:39,250 --> 00:10:41,370
Scottish hospital and they're being
flown outside of the operators direct

518
00:10:41,370 --> 00:10:41,380
flown outside of the operators direct
 

519
00:10:41,380 --> 00:10:44,390
flown outside of the operators direct
line-of-sight backed by the local NHS

520
00:10:44,390 --> 00:10:44,400
line-of-sight backed by the local NHS
 

521
00:10:44,400 --> 00:10:47,550
line-of-sight backed by the local NHS
trust drone firm Sky ports will fly

522
00:10:47,550 --> 00:10:47,560
trust drone firm Sky ports will fly
 

523
00:10:47,560 --> 00:10:49,440
trust drone firm Sky ports will fly
drones between the Isle of Mull and Oban

524
00:10:49,440 --> 00:10:49,450
drones between the Isle of Mull and Oban
 

525
00:10:49,450 --> 00:10:51,420
drones between the Isle of Mull and Oban
the closest town on the Scottish

526
00:10:51,420 --> 00:10:51,430
the closest town on the Scottish
 

527
00:10:51,430 --> 00:10:54,150
the closest town on the Scottish
mainland we've reported on similar in

528
00:10:54,150 --> 00:10:54,160
mainland we've reported on similar in
 

529
00:10:54,160 --> 00:10:56,430
mainland we've reported on similar in
recent trial programs and it seems it's

530
00:10:56,430 --> 00:10:56,440
recent trial programs and it seems it's
 

531
00:10:56,440 --> 00:10:58,530
recent trial programs and it seems it's
working as more communities begin

532
00:10:58,530 --> 00:10:58,540
working as more communities begin
 

533
00:10:58,540 --> 00:11:00,030
working as more communities begin
tapping into the unmatched capabilities

534
00:11:00,030 --> 00:11:00,040
tapping into the unmatched capabilities
 

535
00:11:00,040 --> 00:11:05,160
tapping into the unmatched capabilities
of UAVs Sky ports chief exec Duncan

536
00:11:05,160 --> 00:11:05,170
of UAVs Sky ports chief exec Duncan
 

537
00:11:05,170 --> 00:11:07,080
of UAVs Sky ports chief exec Duncan
Walker speaks about their recent trial

538
00:11:07,080 --> 00:11:07,090
Walker speaks about their recent trial
 

539
00:11:07,090 --> 00:11:09,260
Walker speaks about their recent trial
in the Scottish area of Argyll and Bute

540
00:11:09,260 --> 00:11:09,270
in the Scottish area of Argyll and Bute
 

541
00:11:09,270 --> 00:11:11,760
in the Scottish area of Argyll and Bute
saying it provides an important

542
00:11:11,760 --> 00:11:11,770
saying it provides an important
 

543
00:11:11,770 --> 00:11:13,260
saying it provides an important
short-term response to the current

544
00:11:13,260 --> 00:11:13,270
short-term response to the current
 

545
00:11:13,270 --> 00:11:15,510
short-term response to the current
pandemic and lays the foundations from

546
00:11:15,510 --> 00:11:15,520
pandemic and lays the foundations from
 

547
00:11:15,520 --> 00:11:17,520
pandemic and lays the foundations from
which to grow a permanent drone delivery

548
00:11:17,520 --> 00:11:17,530
which to grow a permanent drone delivery
 

549
00:11:17,530 --> 00:11:20,310
which to grow a permanent drone delivery
operation across a network of healthcare

550
00:11:20,310 --> 00:11:20,320
operation across a network of healthcare
 

551
00:11:20,320 --> 00:11:23,640
operation across a network of healthcare
facilities around the country his

552
00:11:23,640 --> 00:11:23,650
facilities around the country his
 

553
00:11:23,650 --> 00:11:25,650
facilities around the country his
company will fly unmanned delivery

554
00:11:25,650 --> 00:11:25,660
company will fly unmanned delivery
 

555
00:11:25,660 --> 00:11:27,720
company will fly unmanned delivery
drones made by German company

556
00:11:27,720 --> 00:11:27,730
drones made by German company
 

557
00:11:27,730 --> 00:11:30,720
drones made by German company
wing copter the craft will fly the 17

558
00:11:30,720 --> 00:11:30,730
wing copter the craft will fly the 17
 

559
00:11:30,730 --> 00:11:32,520
wing copter the craft will fly the 17
kilometres between Lauren and Isles

560
00:11:32,520 --> 00:11:32,530
kilometres between Lauren and Isles
 

561
00:11:32,530 --> 00:11:35,250
kilometres between Lauren and Isles
hospital in Oban and I own a community

562
00:11:35,250 --> 00:11:35,260
hospital in Oban and I own a community
 

563
00:11:35,260 --> 00:11:38,400
hospital in Oban and I own a community
hospital in Craig nur while 17

564
00:11:38,400 --> 00:11:38,410
hospital in Craig nur while 17
 

565
00:11:38,410 --> 00:11:39,810
hospital in Craig nur while 17
kilometres doesn't sound like a long

566
00:11:39,810 --> 00:11:39,820
kilometres doesn't sound like a long
 

567
00:11:39,820 --> 00:11:41,760
kilometres doesn't sound like a long
distance as the crow flies it's a

568
00:11:41,760 --> 00:11:41,770
distance as the crow flies it's a
 

569
00:11:41,770 --> 00:11:43,980
distance as the crow flies it's a
lengthy arduous journey by Road and

570
00:11:43,980 --> 00:11:43,990
lengthy arduous journey by Road and
 

571
00:11:43,990 --> 00:11:44,610
lengthy arduous journey by Road and
ferry

572
00:11:44,610 --> 00:11:44,620
ferry
 

573
00:11:44,620 --> 00:11:47,250
ferry
by contrast sky port says it will take

574
00:11:47,250 --> 00:11:47,260
by contrast sky port says it will take
 

575
00:11:47,260 --> 00:11:50,730
by contrast sky port says it will take
just 15 minutes by drone the trial will

576
00:11:50,730 --> 00:11:50,740
just 15 minutes by drone the trial will
 

577
00:11:50,740 --> 00:11:52,530
just 15 minutes by drone the trial will
take place using beyond visual line of

578
00:11:52,530 --> 00:11:52,540
take place using beyond visual line of
 

579
00:11:52,540 --> 00:11:54,690
take place using beyond visual line of
sight rules requiring special permission

580
00:11:54,690 --> 00:11:54,700
sight rules requiring special permission
 

581
00:11:54,700 --> 00:11:57,180
sight rules requiring special permission
from the Civil Aviation Authority drone

582
00:11:57,180 --> 00:11:57,190
from the Civil Aviation Authority drone
 

583
00:11:57,190 --> 00:11:59,190
from the Civil Aviation Authority drone
flights that go beyond the operators

584
00:11:59,190 --> 00:11:59,200
flights that go beyond the operators
 

585
00:11:59,200 --> 00:12:00,900
flights that go beyond the operators
line-of-sight are normally prohibited

586
00:12:00,900 --> 00:12:00,910
line-of-sight are normally prohibited
 

587
00:12:00,910 --> 00:12:03,120
line-of-sight are normally prohibited
however the main perceived benefit of

588
00:12:03,120 --> 00:12:03,130
however the main perceived benefit of
 

589
00:12:03,130 --> 00:12:05,250
however the main perceived benefit of
aviation drones cannot be realized until

590
00:12:05,250 --> 00:12:05,260
aviation drones cannot be realized until
 

591
00:12:05,260 --> 00:12:07,770
aviation drones cannot be realized until
the tech is proven safe enough to be

592
00:12:07,770 --> 00:12:07,780
the tech is proven safe enough to be
 

593
00:12:07,780 --> 00:12:09,780
the tech is proven safe enough to be
thought to be flown without a watchful

594
00:12:09,780 --> 00:12:09,790
thought to be flown without a watchful
 

595
00:12:09,790 --> 00:12:12,720
thought to be flown without a watchful
human nearby in case of collisions the

596
00:12:12,720 --> 00:12:12,730
human nearby in case of collisions the
 

597
00:12:12,730 --> 00:12:14,550
human nearby in case of collisions the
trial will take place over the next two

598
00:12:14,550 --> 00:12:14,560
trial will take place over the next two
 

599
00:12:14,560 --> 00:12:16,590
trial will take place over the next two
weeks completing in the first week of

600
00:12:16,590 --> 00:12:16,600
weeks completing in the first week of
 

601
00:12:16,600 --> 00:12:20,550
weeks completing in the first week of
June big thanks to Roy W Nash and our

602
00:12:20,550 --> 00:12:20,560
June big thanks to Roy W Nash and our
 

603
00:12:20,560 --> 00:12:22,140
June big thanks to Roy W Nash and our
community of yours for submitting

604
00:12:22,140 --> 00:12:22,150
community of yours for submitting
 

605
00:12:22,150 --> 00:12:24,390
community of yours for submitting
stories to us this week thanks for

606
00:12:24,390 --> 00:12:24,400
stories to us this week thanks for
 

607
00:12:24,400 --> 00:12:26,610
stories to us this week thanks for
watching the category-five TV newsroom

608
00:12:26,610 --> 00:12:26,620
watching the category-five TV newsroom
 

609
00:12:26,620 --> 00:12:29,190
watching the category-five TV newsroom
don't forget to Like and subscribe for

610
00:12:29,190 --> 00:12:29,200
don't forget to Like and subscribe for
 

611
00:12:29,200 --> 00:12:30,960
don't forget to Like and subscribe for
all your tech news with a slight Linux

612
00:12:30,960 --> 00:12:30,970
all your tech news with a slight Linux
 

613
00:12:30,970 --> 00:12:31,430
all your tech news with a slight Linux
bias

614
00:12:31,430 --> 00:12:31,440
bias
 

615
00:12:31,440 --> 00:12:33,860
bias
and if you appreciate what we do become

616
00:12:33,860 --> 00:12:33,870
and if you appreciate what we do become
 

617
00:12:33,870 --> 00:12:36,619
and if you appreciate what we do become
a patron at patreon.com slash category

618
00:12:36,619 --> 00:12:36,629
a patron at patreon.com slash category
 

619
00:12:36,629 --> 00:12:39,769
a patron at patreon.com slash category
five from the category five TV newsroom

620
00:12:39,769 --> 00:12:39,779
five from the category five TV newsroom
 

621
00:12:39,779 --> 00:12:43,100
five from the category five TV newsroom
I'm Becca Ferguson