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covering the week's top tech dorks like

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covering the week's top tech dorks like
 

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covering the week's top tech dorks like
Linux bias attackers behind one of the

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Linux bias attackers behind one of the
 

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Linux bias attackers behind one of the
world's most more destructive pieces of

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world's most more destructive pieces of
 

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world's most more destructive pieces of
ransomware

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ransomware
 

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ransomware
have found a new way to defeat defenses

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have found a new way to defeat defenses
 

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have found a new way to defeat defenses
that that might otherwise prevent the

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that that might otherwise prevent the
 

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that that might otherwise prevent the
attack from Incred encrypting data

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attack from Incred encrypting data
 

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attack from Incred encrypting data
installing a buggy driver first and then

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installing a buggy driver first and then
 

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installing a buggy driver first and then
hacking it to burrow deeper into the

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hacking it to burrow deeper into the
 

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hacking it to burrow deeper into the
targeted computer the ransomware in this

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targeted computer the ransomware in this
 

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targeted computer the ransomware in this
case is Robin Hood known for taking down

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case is Robin Hood known for taking down
 

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case is Robin Hood known for taking down
the city of Baltimore networks and

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the city of Baltimore networks and
 

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the city of Baltimore networks and
systems in Greenville North Carolina

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systems in Greenville North Carolina
 

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systems in Greenville North Carolina
Robin Hood can easily encrypt sensitive

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Robin Hood can easily encrypt sensitive
 

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Robin Hood can easily encrypt sensitive
files once a vulnerability has allowed

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files once a vulnerability has allowed
 

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files once a vulnerability has allowed
the malware to gain a toehold

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the malware to gain a toehold
 

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the malware to gain a toehold
for networks that are better fortified

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for networks that are better fortified
 

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for networks that are better fortified
the ransomware ax has a harder time

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the ransomware ax has a harder time
 

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the ransomware ax has a harder time
breaking in now Robin Hood has found a

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breaking in now Robin Hood has found a
 

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breaking in now Robin Hood has found a
way to defeat these defenses in two

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way to defeat these defenses in two
 

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way to defeat these defenses in two
recent attacks researchers from security

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recent attacks researchers from security
 

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recent attacks researchers from security
firm Sophos said the ransomware has used

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firm Sophos said the ransomware has used
 

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firm Sophos said the ransomware has used
its access to a targeted machine to

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its access to a targeted machine to
 

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its access to a targeted machine to
install a driver from taiwan-based

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install a driver from taiwan-based
 

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install a driver from taiwan-based
motherboard manufacturer gigabyte that

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motherboard manufacturer gigabyte that
 

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motherboard manufacturer gigabyte that
has a known vulnerability in it it's the

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has a known vulnerability in it it's the
 

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has a known vulnerability in it it's the
same vulnerability that led to gigabyte

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same vulnerability that led to gigabyte
 

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same vulnerability that led to gigabyte
officials discontinuing the use of the

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officials discontinuing the use of the
 

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officials discontinuing the use of the
driver but since it contains gigabytes

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driver but since it contains gigabytes
 

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driver but since it contains gigabytes
cryptographic signature the Windows

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cryptographic signature the Windows
 

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cryptographic signature the Windows
operating system trusts it and allows it

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operating system trusts it and allows it
 

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operating system trusts it and allows it
it allows it to run in the highly

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it allows it to run in the highly
 

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it allows it to run in the highly
sensitive Windows kernel region of the

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sensitive Windows kernel region of the
 

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sensitive Windows kernel region of the
OS without question whisks a benign but

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OS without question whisks a benign but
 

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OS without question whisks a benign but
buggy driver installed Robin Hood then

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buggy driver installed Robin Hood then
 

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buggy driver installed Robin Hood then
exploited the vulnerability to gain the

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exploited the vulnerability to gain the
 

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exploited the vulnerability to gain the
ability to read and write to virtually

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ability to read and write to virtually
 

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ability to read and write to virtually
any memory region chosen by the attacker

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any memory region chosen by the attacker
 

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any memory region chosen by the attacker
the Robin Hood exploit changed a single

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the Robin Hood exploit changed a single
 

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the Robin Hood exploit changed a single
byte to disable the windows requirement

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byte to disable the windows requirement
 

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byte to disable the windows requirement
that drivers be signed with that Robin

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that drivers be signed with that Robin
 

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that drivers be signed with that Robin
Hood installed its own unsigned driver

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Hood installed its own unsigned driver
 

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Hood installed its own unsigned driver
that used its highly privileged kernel

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that used its highly privileged kernel
 

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that used its highly privileged kernel
access to kill processes and files

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access to kill processes and files
 

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access to kill processes and files
belonging to endpoint security products

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belonging to endpoint security products
 

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belonging to endpoint security products
the advanced status of the driver gave

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the advanced status of the driver gave
 

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the advanced status of the driver gave
it greater ability than other techniques

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it greater ability than other techniques
 

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it greater ability than other techniques
to ensure that the targeted processes

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to ensure that the targeted processes
 

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to ensure that the targeted processes
are permanently stopped

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are permanently stopped
 

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are permanently stopped
there are other windows trusted drivers

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there are other windows trusted drivers
 

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there are other windows trusted drivers
with known vulnerabilities that could be

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with known vulnerabilities that could be
 

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with known vulnerabilities that could be
used in the same way of gigabytes

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used in the same way of gigabytes
 

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used in the same way of gigabytes
drivers these include sign drivers from

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drivers these include sign drivers from
 

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drivers these include sign drivers from
VirtualBox novel cpu-z and asus and

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VirtualBox novel cpu-z and asus and
 

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VirtualBox novel cpu-z and asus and
while the gigabyte driver may be the

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while the gigabyte driver may be the
 

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while the gigabyte driver may be the
first known instance of this type of

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first known instance of this type of
 

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first known instance of this type of
hack it is it very well may not be the

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hack it is it very well may not be the
 

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hack it is it very well may not be the
last

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last
 

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last
and points to a need for Microsoft to

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and points to a need for Microsoft to
 

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and points to a need for Microsoft to
reassess the way their certificate

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reassess the way their certificate
 

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reassess the way their certificate
revocation procedures hmm that's tough

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revocation procedures hmm that's tough
 

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revocation procedures hmm that's tough
mm-hmm because the the part of me wants

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mm-hmm because the the part of me wants
 

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mm-hmm because the the part of me wants
to say Oh we'll just revoke the

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to say Oh we'll just revoke the
 

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to say Oh we'll just revoke the
certificate anytime there's an exploit

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certificate anytime there's an exploit
 

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certificate anytime there's an exploit
but remember that then that would

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but remember that then that would
 

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but remember that then that would
nullify everybody's drivers right so

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nullify everybody's drivers right so
 

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nullify everybody's drivers right so
this is all mole I mean as I'm hearing

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this is all mole I mean as I'm hearing
 

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this is all mole I mean as I'm hearing
it this is like a new wave of Trojan

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it this is like a new wave of Trojan
 

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it this is like a new wave of Trojan
attacks so to speak yeah that's what it

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attacks so to speak yeah that's what it
 

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attacks so to speak yeah that's what it
feels like like you're coming in through

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feels like like you're coming in through
 

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feels like like you're coming in through
yeah trusted source to get access is

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yeah trusted source to get access is
 

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yeah trusted source to get access is
that not the basic principle of behind

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that not the basic principle of behind
 

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that not the basic principle of behind
it or is it a whole different way of

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it or is it a whole different way of
 

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it or is it a whole different way of
just feels like so they're using it as

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just feels like so they're using it as
 

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just feels like so they're using it as
an elevated privilege tactic so they're

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an elevated privilege tactic so they're
 

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an elevated privilege tactic so they're
using a driver that windows trusts

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using a driver that windows trusts
 

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using a driver that windows trusts
because of the signature being valid so

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because of the signature being valid so
 

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because of the signature being valid so
it's not a fake driver it's not like a

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it's not a fake driver it's not like a
 

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it's not a fake driver it's not like a
malware it is a legitimate driver but it

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malware it is a legitimate driver but it
 

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malware it is a legitimate driver but it
has a bug in it mm-hmm that caused it to

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has a bug in it mm-hmm that caused it to
 

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has a bug in it mm-hmm that caused it to
be recalled basically but the Windows

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be recalled basically but the Windows
 

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be recalled basically but the Windows
operating system no matter what version

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operating system no matter what version
 

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operating system no matter what version
you're running still trusts the

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you're running still trusts the
 

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you're running still trusts the
Installer for that driver because of the

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Installer for that driver because of the
 

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Installer for that driver because of the
certificate that is applied to it and so

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certificate that is applied to it and so
 

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certificate that is applied to it and so
the hackers are using that to then be

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the hackers are using that to then be
 

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the hackers are using that to then be
able to elevate their privileges and do

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able to elevate their privileges and do
 

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able to elevate their privileges and do
whatever the heck they want and that's

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whatever the heck they want and that's
 

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whatever the heck they want and that's
the scary thing because how do you stop

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the scary thing because how do you stop
 

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the scary thing because how do you stop
that how can you possibly stop that I

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that how can you possibly stop that I
 

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that how can you possibly stop that I
think it comes down to where's your

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think it comes down to where's your
 

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think it comes down to where's your
first line of defense I think the only

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first line of defense I think the only
 

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first line of defense I think the only
thing you have to do that you can look

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thing you have to do that you can look
 

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thing you have to do that you can look
at is how did they get in in the first

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at is how did they get in in the first
 

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at is how did they get in in the first
place was it a phishing scam was it

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place was it a phishing scam was it
 

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place was it a phishing scam was it
somebody clicked on an email that had

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somebody clicked on an email that had
 

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somebody clicked on an email that had
some file this malware that allowed

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some file this malware that allowed
 

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some file this malware that allowed
somebody to run some

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somebody to run some
 

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somebody to run some
resident in their computer is it that

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resident in their computer is it that
 

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resident in their computer is it that
you have remote desktop turned on on one

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you have remote desktop turned on on one
 

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you have remote desktop turned on on one
of your computers on your network and

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of your computers on your network and
 

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of your computers on your network and
that's really easy to hack now I don't

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that's really easy to hack now I don't
 

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that's really easy to hack now I don't
know how certificates work just because

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know how certificates work just because
 

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know how certificates work just because
I haven't delved into that but does each

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I haven't delved into that but does each
 

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I haven't delved into that but does each
certificate in each driver have its own

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certificate in each driver have its own
 

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certificate in each driver have its own
like a certificate identifier no the

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like a certificate identifier no the
 

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like a certificate identifier no the
driver doesn't have its own certificate

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driver doesn't have its own certificate
 

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driver doesn't have its own certificate
but the company that manufactures the

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but the company that manufactures the
 

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but the company that manufactures the
driver does so that certificate says yes

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driver does so that certificate says yes
 

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driver does so that certificate says yes
to Microsoft this is a gigabyte driver

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to Microsoft this is a gigabyte driver
 

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to Microsoft this is a gigabyte driver
provided by gigabyte because it contains

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provided by gigabyte because it contains
 

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provided by gigabyte because it contains
the certificate that proves that this is

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the certificate that proves that this is
 

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the certificate that proves that this is
a legitimate driver from gigabyte so

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a legitimate driver from gigabyte so
 

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a legitimate driver from gigabyte so
what if the certificate system changed

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what if the certificate system changed
 

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what if the certificate system changed
in such a way that you have your your

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in such a way that you have your your
 

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in such a way that you have your your
main certificate safer gigabyte but then

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main certificate safer gigabyte but then
 

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main certificate safer gigabyte but then
you have your sub certificates for each

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you have your sub certificates for each
 

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you have your sub certificates for each
driver roll out so that it identifies

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driver roll out so that it identifies
 

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driver roll out so that it identifies
this driver is this subset yeah a

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this driver is this subset yeah a
 

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this driver is this subset yeah a
developer I feel like that's your you're

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developer I feel like that's your you're
 

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developer I feel like that's your you're
giving me nightmares right now Jeff like

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giving me nightmares right now Jeff like
 

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giving me nightmares right now Jeff like
where you're going but it just sounds

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where you're going but it just sounds
 

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where you're going but it just sounds
like a logistical nightmare as far as

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like a logistical nightmare as far as
 

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like a logistical nightmare as far as
managing those certificates like it

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managing those certificates like it
 

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managing those certificates like it
could just be a nightmare I think maybe

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could just be a nightmare I think maybe
 

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could just be a nightmare I think maybe
some kind of an aristocrat is able to

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some kind of an aristocrat is able to
 

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some kind of an aristocrat is able to
identify maybe it's a checksum that

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identify maybe it's a checksum that
 

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identify maybe it's a checksum that
identifies known faulty drivers or

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identifies known faulty drivers or
 

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identifies known faulty drivers or
deprecated drivers so that Windows could

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deprecated drivers so that Windows could
 

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deprecated drivers so that Windows could
say yes this is a valid certificate

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say yes this is a valid certificate
 

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say yes this is a valid certificate
however gigabyte has marked this

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however gigabyte has marked this
 

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however gigabyte has marked this
certificate there this installer as bad

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certificate there this installer as bad
 

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certificate there this installer as bad
it's got to be some kind of an

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it's got to be some kind of an
 

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it's got to be some kind of an
identifier yeah it's good it'll be

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identifier yeah it's good it'll be
 

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identifier yeah it's good it'll be
interesting

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interesting
 

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interesting
yeah dude oh yeah that's the answer