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covering the week's top textbooks like

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covering the week's top textbooks like
 

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covering the week's top textbooks like
Linux bias the Department of Homeland

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Linux bias the Department of Homeland
 

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Linux bias the Department of Homeland
Security is said on Tuesday that a

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Security is said on Tuesday that a
 

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Security is said on Tuesday that a
us-based natural gas facility had to

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us-based natural gas facility had to
 

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us-based natural gas facility had to
shut down operations for two days after

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shut down operations for two days after
 

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shut down operations for two days after
sustaining a ransomware infection that

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sustaining a ransomware infection that
 

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sustaining a ransomware infection that
prevented personnel from receiving

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prevented personnel from receiving
 

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prevented personnel from receiving
crucial real-time operational data from

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crucial real-time operational data from
 

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crucial real-time operational data from
control and communication equipment the

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control and communication equipment the
 

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control and communication equipment the
advisory didn't identify the site except

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advisory didn't identify the site except
 

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advisory didn't identify the site except
to say that it was a natural gas a

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to say that it was a natural gas a
 

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to say that it was a natural gas a
natural gas compression facility such

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natural gas compression facility such
 

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natural gas compression facility such
sites typically use turbines motors and

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sites typically use turbines motors and
 

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sites typically use turbines motors and
engines to compress natural gas so that

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engines to compress natural gas so that
 

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engines to compress natural gas so that
it can be safely moved through pipelines

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it can be safely moved through pipelines
 

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it can be safely moved through pipelines
the attack started with a malicious link

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the attack started with a malicious link
 

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the attack started with a malicious link
in a phishing email that allowed

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in a phishing email that allowed
 

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in a phishing email that allowed
attackers to pivot from the facility's

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attackers to pivot from the facility's
 

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attackers to pivot from the facility's
IT network to the facilities ot network

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IT network to the facilities ot network
 

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IT network to the facilities ot network
which is the operational technology hub

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which is the operational technology hub
 

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which is the operational technology hub
of servers that control and monitor

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of servers that control and monitor
 

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of servers that control and monitor
physical processes of the facility with

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physical processes of the facility with
 

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physical processes of the facility with
that both the IT and ot networks were

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that both the IT and ot networks were
 

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that both the IT and ot networks were
infected with her and somewhere the

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infected with her and somewhere the
 

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infected with her and somewhere the
attack knocked out crucial control and

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attack knocked out crucial control and
 

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attack knocked out crucial control and
communications gear that on-site

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communications gear that on-site
 

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communications gear that on-site
employees depend on to monitor the

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employees depend on to monitor the
 

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employees depend on to monitor the
physical processes the infection didn't

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physical processes the infection didn't
 

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physical processes the infection didn't
spread to program a programmable logic

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spread to program a programmable logic
 

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spread to program a programmable logic
controllers which actually control

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controllers which actually control
 

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controllers which actually control
compression equipment and it didn't

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compression equipment and it didn't
 

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compression equipment and it didn't
cause the facility to lose control of

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cause the facility to lose control of
 

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cause the facility to lose control of
operations the adviser explicitly said

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operations the adviser explicitly said
 

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operations the adviser explicitly said
that quote at no time did the threat

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that quote at no time did the threat
 

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that quote at no time did the threat
actor obtain the ability to control or

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actor obtain the ability to control or
 

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actor obtain the ability to control or
manipulate operations end quote okay so

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manipulate operations end quote okay so
 

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manipulate operations end quote okay so
even though they weren't able to control

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even though they weren't able to control
 

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even though they weren't able to control
operations it's still really scary I I

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operations it's still really scary I I
 

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operations it's still really scary I I
have to kind of bite my tongue on that

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have to kind of bite my tongue on that
 

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have to kind of bite my tongue on that
statement because it kind of feels like

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statement because it kind of feels like
 

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statement because it kind of feels like
one of those where there oh well they

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one of those where there oh well they
 

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one of those where there oh well they
didn't they weren't actually able to

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didn't they weren't actually able to
 

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didn't they weren't actually able to
take control well they really were yeah

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take control well they really were yeah
 

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take control well they really were yeah
work yeah maybe they didn't take control

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work yeah maybe they didn't take control
 

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work yeah maybe they didn't take control
and blow something up sure but they had

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and blow something up sure but they had
 

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and blow something up sure but they had
control mm-hmm so it's kind of like I

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control mm-hmm so it's kind of like I
 

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control mm-hmm so it's kind of like I
don't know if I like that statement

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don't know if I like that statement
 

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don't know if I like that statement
and ransomware is we can be really

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and ransomware is we can be really
 

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and ransomware is we can be really
complacent and say it's just the

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complacent and say it's just the
 

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complacent and say it's just the
encryption of my files no they had to

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encryption of my files no they had to
 

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encryption of my files no they had to
get that in somehow and how did they get

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get that in somehow and how did they get
 

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get that in somehow and how did they get
that in in this case an email file right

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that in in this case an email file right
 

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that in in this case an email file right
so that email file contained ransomware

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so that email file contained ransomware
 

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so that email file contained ransomware
which encrypted our files okay what else

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which encrypted our files okay what else
 

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which encrypted our files okay what else
did it do what else could it have done

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did it do what else could it have done
 

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did it do what else could it have done
mm-hmm could it have installed a

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mm-hmm could it have installed a
 

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mm-hmm could it have installed a
gigabyte motherboard driver that is

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gigabyte motherboard driver that is
 

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gigabyte motherboard driver that is
exploitable right that has like a

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exploitable right that has like a
 

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exploitable right that has like a
backdoor in it that allows them into our

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backdoor in it that allows them into our
 

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backdoor in it that allows them into our
network and into our ot network and then

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network and into our ot network and then
 

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network and into our ot network and then
into our actual controllers you don't

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into our actual controllers you don't
 

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into our actual controllers you don't
really know like that's really

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really know like that's really
 

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really know like that's really
complacent to state unless you've got

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complacent to state unless you've got
 

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complacent to state unless you've got
data to back it unless you can

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data to back it unless you can
 

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data to back it unless you can
legitimately say this was strictly this

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legitimately say this was strictly this
 

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legitimately say this was strictly this
infection we found the infiltration

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infection we found the infiltration
 

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infection we found the infiltration
point we've locked it down we've blocked

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point we've locked it down we've blocked
 

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point we've locked it down we've blocked
every instance but I've had computers

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every instance but I've had computers
 

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every instance but I've had computers
come in for service where they say oh I

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come in for service where they say oh I
 

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come in for service where they say oh I
I accidentally fell for a phishing scam

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I accidentally fell for a phishing scam
 

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I accidentally fell for a phishing scam
and they install the they started

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and they install the they started
 

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and they install the they started
controlling my computer yep yeah and

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controlling my computer yep yeah and
 

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controlling my computer yep yeah and
then we found after is so okay they

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then we found after is so okay they
 

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then we found after is so okay they
thought they were safe but then we found

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thought they were safe but then we found
 

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thought they were safe but then we found
that there was like back-end software

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that there was like back-end software
 

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that there was like back-end software
that was running as as services in the

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that was running as as services in the
 

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that was running as as services in the
background there was no uninstaller for

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background there was no uninstaller for
 

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background there was no uninstaller for
it it was just a service running on the

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it it was just a service running on the
 

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it it was just a service running on the
computer that allowed them to remote in

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computer that allowed them to remote in
 

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computer that allowed them to remote in
at any time and take control of the

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at any time and take control of the
 

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at any time and take control of the
computer which they're only gonna do it

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computer which they're only gonna do it
 

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computer which they're only gonna do it
two o'clock in the morning while you're

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two o'clock in the morning while you're
 

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two o'clock in the morning while you're
sleeping sorry so you don't know what's

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sleeping sorry so you don't know what's
 

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sleeping sorry so you don't know what's
happening how many people would notice

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happening how many people would notice
 

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happening how many people would notice
now can you just as a precaution

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now can you just as a precaution
 

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now can you just as a precaution
I mean I'm not saying that this is the

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I mean I'm not saying that this is the
 

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I mean I'm not saying that this is the
answer just turn your computer off at

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answer just turn your computer off at
 

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answer just turn your computer off at
night would that be that in a in a home

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night would that be that in a in a home
 

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night would that be that in a in a home
environment oh but not environment when

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environment oh but not environment when
 

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environment oh but not environment when
it's controlling the flow of propane

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it's controlling the flow of propane
 

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it's controlling the flow of propane
yeah you'd probably want to leave it

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yeah you'd probably want to leave it
 

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yeah you'd probably want to leave it
running yeah yeah it's just sad that

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running yeah yeah it's just sad that
 

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running yeah yeah it's just sad that
this is still becoming a regular story

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this is still becoming a regular story
 

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this is still becoming a regular story
every single week oh that's like come on

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every single week oh that's like come on
 

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every single week oh that's like come on
how many times do we have to hear this

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how many times do we have to hear this
 

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how many times do we have to hear this
before we go hey the world finally got

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before we go hey the world finally got
 

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before we go hey the world finally got
it and it always seems to be the big

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it and it always seems to be the big
 

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it and it always seems to be the big
companies or the government's that are

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companies or the government's that are
 

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companies or the government's that are
getting hit by it it's like then

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getting hit by it it's like then
 

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getting hit by it it's like then
directed those are the ones that make

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directed those are the ones that make
 

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directed those are the ones that make
the news true but still

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the news true but still
 

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the news true but still
like here a bigger target and I think

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like here a bigger target and I think
 

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like here a bigger target and I think
Jeff and maybe we can you know maybe

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Jeff and maybe we can you know maybe
 

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Jeff and maybe we can you know maybe
this is a discussion to be had in the

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this is a discussion to be had in the
 

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this is a discussion to be had in the
comments below

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comments below
 

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comments below
but I think that these big targets and

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but I think that these big targets and
 

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but I think that these big targets and
forgive me if you're in the IT

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forgive me if you're in the IT
 

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forgive me if you're in the IT
departments in these companies forgive

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departments in these companies forgive
 

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departments in these companies forgive
me I don't mean this as a jab but it's a

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me I don't mean this as a jab but it's a
 

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me I don't mean this as a jab but it's a
it's a truth it's a sad truth that we

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it's a truth it's a sad truth that we
 

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it's a truth it's a sad truth that we
were educated 10 15 20 years ago ok and

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were educated 10 15 20 years ago ok and
 

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were educated 10 15 20 years ago ok and
we've been in the industry for that long

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we've been in the industry for that long
 

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we've been in the industry for that long
and and some of us in the IT department

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and and some of us in the IT department
 

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and and some of us in the IT department
not myself of course but some of us are

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not myself of course but some of us are
 

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not myself of course but some of us are
on the verge of retirement and that's

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on the verge of retirement and that's
 

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on the verge of retirement and that's
again not a jab I entirely respect what

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again not a jab I entirely respect what
 

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again not a jab I entirely respect what
you do however malware has evolved right

234
00:05:16,230 --> 00:05:16,240
you do however malware has evolved right
 

235
00:05:16,240 --> 00:05:20,110
you do however malware has evolved right
significantly significantly what we're

236
00:05:20,110 --> 00:05:20,120
significantly significantly what we're
 

237
00:05:20,120 --> 00:05:23,140
significantly significantly what we're
encountering now is not natus we're not

238
00:05:23,140 --> 00:05:23,150
encountering now is not natus we're not
 

239
00:05:23,150 --> 00:05:25,629
encountering now is not natus we're not
dealing with PSVs we're not dealing when

240
00:05:25,629 --> 00:05:25,639
dealing with PSVs we're not dealing when
 

241
00:05:25,639 --> 00:05:27,519
dealing with PSVs we're not dealing when
was the last time you ever saw a bsv and

242
00:05:27,519 --> 00:05:27,529
was the last time you ever saw a bsv and
 

243
00:05:27,529 --> 00:05:29,439
was the last time you ever saw a bsv and
if you know what a bsv is then you're

244
00:05:29,439 --> 00:05:29,449
if you know what a bsv is then you're
 

245
00:05:29,449 --> 00:05:33,579
if you know what a bsv is then you're
you're this I'm speaking to you it's not

246
00:05:33,579 --> 00:05:33,589
you're this I'm speaking to you it's not
 

247
00:05:33,589 --> 00:05:34,929
you're this I'm speaking to you it's not
about those anymore

248
00:05:34,929 --> 00:05:34,939
about those anymore
 

249
00:05:34,939 --> 00:05:38,140
about those anymore
no now it's the evolution back in 2017

250
00:05:38,140 --> 00:05:38,150
no now it's the evolution back in 2017
 

251
00:05:38,150 --> 00:05:40,149
no now it's the evolution back in 2017
when wanna cry dropped and we started

252
00:05:40,149 --> 00:05:40,159
when wanna cry dropped and we started
 

253
00:05:40,159 --> 00:05:42,790
when wanna cry dropped and we started
seeing ransomware infiltrating networks

254
00:05:42,790 --> 00:05:42,800
seeing ransomware infiltrating networks
 

255
00:05:42,800 --> 00:05:44,829
seeing ransomware infiltrating networks
and we started seeing RDP attacks and

256
00:05:44,829 --> 00:05:44,839
and we started seeing RDP attacks and
 

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00:05:44,839 --> 00:05:48,249
and we started seeing RDP attacks and
and eternal blue being exploited and and

258
00:05:48,249 --> 00:05:48,259
and eternal blue being exploited and and
 

259
00:05:48,259 --> 00:05:51,329
and eternal blue being exploited and and
all of these kinds of things that's when

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00:05:51,329 --> 00:05:51,339
all of these kinds of things that's when
 

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all of these kinds of things that's when
the cybersecurity industry woke up and

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00:05:53,920 --> 00:05:53,930
the cybersecurity industry woke up and
 

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the cybersecurity industry woke up and
said okay we need to re-educate

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00:05:55,209 --> 00:05:55,219
said okay we need to re-educate
 

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00:05:55,219 --> 00:05:57,790
said okay we need to re-educate
ourselves and if we haven't since then

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00:05:57,790 --> 00:05:57,800
ourselves and if we haven't since then
 

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00:05:57,800 --> 00:05:59,350
ourselves and if we haven't since then
and if we're still thinking in that old

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and if we're still thinking in that old
 

269
00:05:59,360 --> 00:06:02,219
and if we're still thinking in that old
mindset where viruses as is our threat

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00:06:02,219 --> 00:06:02,229
mindset where viruses as is our threat
 

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mindset where viruses as is our threat
I'm sorry to say that viruses are not

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00:06:04,929 --> 00:06:04,939
I'm sorry to say that viruses are not
 

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I'm sorry to say that viruses are not
our threat when was the last time we

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our threat when was the last time we
 

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00:06:07,069 --> 00:06:09,700
our threat when was the last time we
ever heard of a virus infiltration it

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00:06:09,700 --> 00:06:09,710
ever heard of a virus infiltration it
 

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00:06:09,710 --> 00:06:11,469
ever heard of a virus infiltration it
truly has been a long time but they'll

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truly has been a long time but they'll
 

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00:06:11,479 --> 00:06:13,809
truly has been a long time but they'll
still go I don't want viruses it's like

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00:06:13,809 --> 00:06:13,819
still go I don't want viruses it's like
 

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00:06:13,819 --> 00:06:15,249
still go I don't want viruses it's like
yeah if that's your biggest concern

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00:06:15,249 --> 00:06:15,259
yeah if that's your biggest concern
 

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00:06:15,259 --> 00:06:16,209
yeah if that's your biggest concern
antivirus

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antivirus
 

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00:06:16,219 --> 00:06:18,879
antivirus
I'm safe yeah when was the last time you

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00:06:18,879 --> 00:06:18,889
I'm safe yeah when was the last time you
 

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00:06:18,889 --> 00:06:21,790
I'm safe yeah when was the last time you
heard of a fire I haven't got a virus

288
00:06:21,790 --> 00:06:21,800
heard of a fire I haven't got a virus
 

289
00:06:21,800 --> 00:06:23,649
heard of a fire I haven't got a virus
infection because I have antivirus no

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00:06:23,649 --> 00:06:23,659
infection because I have antivirus no
 

291
00:06:23,659 --> 00:06:25,689
infection because I have antivirus no
I'm just saying that's that's an

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00:06:25,689 --> 00:06:25,699
I'm just saying that's that's an
 

293
00:06:25,699 --> 00:06:27,730
I'm just saying that's that's an
old-school way of thinking and it's a

294
00:06:27,730 --> 00:06:27,740
old-school way of thinking and it's a
 

295
00:06:27,740 --> 00:06:30,189
old-school way of thinking and it's a
dangerous way of thinking because that's

296
00:06:30,189 --> 00:06:30,199
dangerous way of thinking because that's
 

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00:06:30,199 --> 00:06:33,279
dangerous way of thinking because that's
that's how these big industries are

298
00:06:33,279 --> 00:06:33,289
that's how these big industries are
 

299
00:06:33,289 --> 00:06:35,350
that's how these big industries are
getting hit because we've got that

300
00:06:35,350 --> 00:06:35,360
getting hit because we've got that
 

301
00:06:35,360 --> 00:06:37,159
getting hit because we've got that
old-school thinking and we're

302
00:06:37,159 --> 00:06:37,169
old-school thinking and we're
 

303
00:06:37,169 --> 00:06:38,930
old-school thinking and we're
adequately educating and protecting

304
00:06:38,930 --> 00:06:38,940
adequately educating and protecting
 

305
00:06:38,940 --> 00:06:40,850
adequately educating and protecting
ourselves and it comes down you know it

306
00:06:40,850 --> 00:06:40,860
ourselves and it comes down you know it
 

307
00:06:40,860 --> 00:06:42,520
ourselves and it comes down you know it
comes down to the c-suite as well

308
00:06:42,520 --> 00:06:42,530
comes down to the c-suite as well
 

309
00:06:42,530 --> 00:06:45,200
comes down to the c-suite as well
educating our staff and making sure that

310
00:06:45,200 --> 00:06:45,210
educating our staff and making sure that
 

311
00:06:45,210 --> 00:06:46,520
educating our staff and making sure that
there are cybersecurity professionals

312
00:06:46,520 --> 00:06:46,530
there are cybersecurity professionals
 

313
00:06:46,530 --> 00:06:49,360
there are cybersecurity professionals
that are brought in as consultants and

314
00:06:49,360 --> 00:06:49,370
that are brought in as consultants and
 

315
00:06:49,370 --> 00:06:52,370
that are brought in as consultants and
DLP's put in place to be able to protect

316
00:06:52,370 --> 00:06:52,380
DLP's put in place to be able to protect
 

317
00:06:52,380 --> 00:06:54,830
DLP's put in place to be able to protect
our networks from today's threats not

318
00:06:54,830 --> 00:06:54,840
our networks from today's threats not
 

319
00:06:54,840 --> 00:06:57,320
our networks from today's threats not
yes not yesterday is not 1999 threats

320
00:06:57,320 --> 00:06:57,330
yes not yesterday is not 1999 threats
 

321
00:06:57,330 --> 00:06:59,629
yes not yesterday is not 1999 threats
now I know we have to get to the next

322
00:06:59,629 --> 00:06:59,639
now I know we have to get to the next
 

323
00:06:59,639 --> 00:07:02,870
now I know we have to get to the next
story but as part of this a budgetary

324
00:07:02,870 --> 00:07:02,880
story but as part of this a budgetary
 

325
00:07:02,880 --> 00:07:04,850
story but as part of this a budgetary
component sure like they're looking at

326
00:07:04,850 --> 00:07:04,860
component sure like they're looking at
 

327
00:07:04,860 --> 00:07:06,439
component sure like they're looking at
it go ahead we can only put in one

328
00:07:06,439 --> 00:07:06,449
it go ahead we can only put in one
 

329
00:07:06,449 --> 00:07:07,939
it go ahead we can only put in one
percent total budget for cybersecurity

330
00:07:07,939 --> 00:07:07,949
percent total budget for cybersecurity
 

331
00:07:07,949 --> 00:07:10,040
percent total budget for cybersecurity
when really they should be looking at 10

332
00:07:10,040 --> 00:07:10,050
when really they should be looking at 10
 

333
00:07:10,050 --> 00:07:12,469
when really they should be looking at 10
percent like not that there's a defined

334
00:07:12,469 --> 00:07:12,479
percent like not that there's a defined
 

335
00:07:12,479 --> 00:07:14,870
percent like not that there's a defined
number but like the way that things grow

336
00:07:14,870 --> 00:07:14,880
number but like the way that things grow
 

337
00:07:14,880 --> 00:07:16,580
number but like the way that things grow
it's like you have to grow with the

338
00:07:16,580 --> 00:07:16,590
it's like you have to grow with the
 

339
00:07:16,590 --> 00:07:18,650
it's like you have to grow with the
threats and if that means allocating

340
00:07:18,650 --> 00:07:18,660
threats and if that means allocating
 

341
00:07:18,660 --> 00:07:19,879
threats and if that means allocating
more of your budget to more

342
00:07:19,879 --> 00:07:19,889
more of your budget to more
 

343
00:07:19,889 --> 00:07:21,379
more of your budget to more
cybersecurity to protect your

344
00:07:21,379 --> 00:07:21,389
cybersecurity to protect your
 

345
00:07:21,389 --> 00:07:26,420
cybersecurity to protect your
investments and your industry whatever

346
00:07:26,420 --> 00:07:26,430
investments and your industry whatever
 

347
00:07:26,430 --> 00:07:30,290
investments and your industry whatever
you're doing you gotta just the budget

348
00:07:30,290 --> 00:07:30,300
you're doing you gotta just the budget
 

349
00:07:30,300 --> 00:07:31,610
you're doing you gotta just the budget
accordingly you can't just stick in that

350
00:07:31,610 --> 00:07:31,620
accordingly you can't just stick in that
 

351
00:07:31,620 --> 00:07:32,870
accordingly you can't just stick in that
same number be like well we've got our

352
00:07:32,870 --> 00:07:32,880
same number be like well we've got our
 

353
00:07:32,880 --> 00:07:34,580
same number be like well we've got our
subscriptions we updated that and oh

354
00:07:34,580 --> 00:07:34,590
subscriptions we updated that and oh
 

355
00:07:34,590 --> 00:07:36,350
subscriptions we updated that and oh
we've got an old computer we got to

356
00:07:36,350 --> 00:07:36,360
we've got an old computer we got to
 

357
00:07:36,360 --> 00:07:37,610
we've got an old computer we got to
replace so that's our budget it's like

358
00:07:37,610 --> 00:07:37,620
replace so that's our budget it's like
 

359
00:07:37,620 --> 00:07:39,920
replace so that's our budget it's like
yes I think it's exactly the same

360
00:07:39,920 --> 00:07:39,930
yes I think it's exactly the same
 

361
00:07:39,930 --> 00:07:41,839
yes I think it's exactly the same
mindset though Jeff it's yes that word I

362
00:07:41,839 --> 00:07:41,849
mindset though Jeff it's yes that word I
 

363
00:07:41,849 --> 00:07:44,300
mindset though Jeff it's yes that word I
use complacent we've become complacent

364
00:07:44,300 --> 00:07:44,310
use complacent we've become complacent
 

365
00:07:44,310 --> 00:07:46,990
use complacent we've become complacent
because we're so used to the old way

366
00:07:46,990 --> 00:07:47,000
because we're so used to the old way
 

367
00:07:47,000 --> 00:07:49,400
because we're so used to the old way
when things change we have to change

368
00:07:49,400 --> 00:07:49,410
when things change we have to change
 

369
00:07:49,410 --> 00:07:49,850
when things change we have to change
with it

370
00:07:49,850 --> 00:07:49,860
with it
 

371
00:07:49,860 --> 00:07:53,210
with it
plain and simple otherwise you're gonna

372
00:07:53,210 --> 00:07:53,220
plain and simple otherwise you're gonna
 

373
00:07:53,220 --> 00:07:56,930
plain and simple otherwise you're gonna
be we're all under attack sorry we are

374
00:07:56,930 --> 00:07:56,940
be we're all under attack sorry we are
 

375
00:07:56,940 --> 00:07:58,879
be we're all under attack sorry we are
all under attack are you going to be

376
00:07:58,879 --> 00:07:58,889
all under attack are you going to be
 

377
00:07:58,889 --> 00:08:01,040
all under attack are you going to be
susceptible to the attack right are you

378
00:08:01,040 --> 00:08:01,050
susceptible to the attack right are you
 

379
00:08:01,050 --> 00:08:03,649
susceptible to the attack right are you
gonna fall victim or are you gonna be a

380
00:08:03,649 --> 00:08:03,659
gonna fall victim or are you gonna be a
 

381
00:08:03,659 --> 00:08:05,500
gonna fall victim or are you gonna be a
brick wall that they can't penetrate

382
00:08:05,500 --> 00:08:05,510
brick wall that they can't penetrate
 

383
00:08:05,510 --> 00:08:09,409
brick wall that they can't penetrate
we're all under attack this is 2020 do

384
00:08:09,409 --> 00:08:09,419
we're all under attack this is 2020 do
 

385
00:08:09,419 --> 00:08:11,230
we're all under attack this is 2020 do
you remember the books when we were kids

386
00:08:11,230 --> 00:08:11,240
you remember the books when we were kids
 

387
00:08:11,240 --> 00:08:15,650
you remember the books when we were kids
2020 is the future hello