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covering the week's top tech stories

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covering the week's top tech stories
 

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covering the week's top tech stories
with a slight linux bias microsoft teams

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with a slight linux bias microsoft teams
 

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with a slight linux bias microsoft teams
users are under active attack in a fake

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users are under active attack in a fake
 

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users are under active attack in a fake
updates malware campaign

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updates malware campaign
 

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updates malware campaign
attackers are using ads for fake

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attackers are using ads for fake
 

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attackers are using ads for fake
microsoft teams updates to deploy back

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microsoft teams updates to deploy back
 

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microsoft teams updates to deploy back
doors

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doors
 

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doors
which use cobalt strike to infect

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which use cobalt strike to infect
 

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which use cobalt strike to infect
companies networks with malware

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companies networks with malware
 

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companies networks with malware
microsoft is warning the customers about

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microsoft is warning the customers about
 

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microsoft is warning the customers about
the so-called fake updates campaigns in

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the so-called fake updates campaigns in
 

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the so-called fake updates campaigns in
a non-public security advisory revealed

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a non-public security advisory revealed
 

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a non-public security advisory revealed
by bleeping computer

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by bleeping computer
 

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by bleeping computer
the campaign is targeting various types

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the campaign is targeting various types
 

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the campaign is targeting various types
of companies with recent targets in the

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of companies with recent targets in the
 

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of companies with recent targets in the
k-12 education sector

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k-12 education sector
 

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k-12 education sector
where organizations are currently

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where organizations are currently
 

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where organizations are currently
dependent on using apps like

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dependent on using apps like
 

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dependent on using apps like
teams for video conferencing due to

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teams for video conferencing due to
 

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teams for video conferencing due to
covet 19 restrictions cobalt strike is a

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covet 19 restrictions cobalt strike is a
 

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covet 19 restrictions cobalt strike is a
commodity attack simulation tool that's

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commodity attack simulation tool that's
 

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commodity attack simulation tool that's
used by attackers to spread malware

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used by attackers to spread malware
 

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used by attackers to spread malware
particularly ransomware recently threat

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particularly ransomware recently threat
 

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particularly ransomware recently threat
actors were seen using cobalt strike in

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actors were seen using cobalt strike in
 

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actors were seen using cobalt strike in
attacks exploiting zero logon

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attacks exploiting zero logon
 

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attacks exploiting zero logon
a privileged elevation flaw that allows

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a privileged elevation flaw that allows
 

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a privileged elevation flaw that allows
attackers to access a domain controller

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attackers to access a domain controller
 

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attackers to access a domain controller
and completely compromise all active

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and completely compromise all active
 

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and completely compromise all active
directory identitive

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directory identitive
 

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directory identitive
identity services in the advisory

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identity services in the advisory
 

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identity services in the advisory
microsoft said it's seen attackers in

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microsoft said it's seen attackers in
 

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microsoft said it's seen attackers in
the latest fake updates campaign using

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the latest fake updates campaign using
 

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the latest fake updates campaign using
search engine ads

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search engine ads
 

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search engine ads
to push top results for team software to

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to push top results for team software to
 

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to push top results for team software to
a domain controlled by the attackers

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a domain controlled by the attackers
 

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a domain controlled by the attackers
and used for nefarious activity if

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and used for nefarious activity if
 

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and used for nefarious activity if
victims click on the link it downloads a

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victims click on the link it downloads a
 

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victims click on the link it downloads a
payload that executes a power shell

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payload that executes a power shell
 

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payload that executes a power shell
script

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script
 

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script
which loads malicious content cobalt

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which loads malicious content cobalt
 

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which loads malicious content cobalt
strike beacons are among the payloads

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strike beacons are among the payloads
 

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strike beacons are among the payloads
also being distributed by the campaign

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also being distributed by the campaign
 

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also being distributed by the campaign
which give threat actors the capability

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which give threat actors the capability
 

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which give threat actors the capability
to move laterally across a network

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to move laterally across a network
 

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to move laterally across a network
beyond the initial system of infection

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beyond the initial system of infection
 

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beyond the initial system of infection
the link also installs a valid copy of

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the link also installs a valid copy of
 

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the link also installs a valid copy of
microsoft teams on the system

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microsoft teams on the system
 

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microsoft teams on the system
to appear legitimate and avoid alerting

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to appear legitimate and avoid alerting
 

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to appear legitimate and avoid alerting
victims to the

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victims to the
 

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victims to the
to the attack malware being distributed

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to the attack malware being distributed
 

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to the attack malware being distributed
by the campaign include predator the

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by the campaign include predator the
 

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by the campaign include predator the
thief

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thief
 

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thief
infostealer which pilfers sensitive data

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infostealer which pilfers sensitive data
 

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infostealer which pilfers sensitive data
such as credentials

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such as credentials
 

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such as credentials
browser and payment data microsoft

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browser and payment data microsoft
 

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browser and payment data microsoft
also has seen a backdoor and zed loader

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also has seen a backdoor and zed loader
 

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also has seen a backdoor and zed loader
stealer being distributed by the latest

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stealer being distributed by the latest
 

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stealer being distributed by the latest
campaigns

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campaigns
 

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campaigns
microsoft is recommending that people

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microsoft is recommending that people
 

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microsoft is recommending that people
use web browsers that can filter and

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use web browsers that can filter and
 

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use web browsers that can filter and
block malicious websites

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block malicious websites
 

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block malicious websites
and ensure that local admin passwords

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and ensure that local admin passwords
 

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and ensure that local admin passwords
are strong and can't easily be guessed

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are strong and can't easily be guessed
 

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are strong and can't easily be guessed
admin privileges also should be limited

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admin privileges also should be limited
 

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admin privileges also should be limited
to essential users and avoid domain wine

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to essential users and avoid domain wine
 

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to essential users and avoid domain wine
service domain wide service accounts

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service domain wide service accounts
 

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service domain wide service accounts
that have the same permissions

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that have the same permissions
 

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that have the same permissions
as an administrator according to the

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as an administrator according to the
 

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as an administrator according to the
report

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report
 

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report
they advise organizations to limit their

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they advise organizations to limit their
 

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they advise organizations to limit their
attack surface to keep attackers at bay

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attack surface to keep attackers at bay
 

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attack surface to keep attackers at bay
by blocking executable files that do not

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by blocking executable files that do not
 

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by blocking executable files that do not
meet specific criteria

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meet specific criteria
 

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meet specific criteria
or blocking javascript and vbscript code

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or blocking javascript and vbscript code
 

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or blocking javascript and vbscript code
from downloading executable content

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from downloading executable content
 

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from downloading executable content
well microsoft teams it takes a team to

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well microsoft teams it takes a team to
 

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well microsoft teams it takes a team to
be hacked yeah it's uh

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be hacked yeah it's uh
 

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be hacked yeah it's uh
you can get independently hacked very

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you can get independently hacked very
 

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you can get independently hacked very
easily yeah well no it's it's it's a

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easily yeah well no it's it's it's a
 

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easily yeah well no it's it's it's a
scary thing really because without

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scary thing really because without
 

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scary thing really because without
being seen so much not just

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being seen so much not just
 

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being seen so much not just
organizations but if you're an educator

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organizations but if you're an educator
 

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organizations but if you're an educator
if you're a teacher

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if you're a teacher
 

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if you're a teacher
student etc um and it isn't

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student etc um and it isn't
 

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student etc um and it isn't
well think you're talking about teachers

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well think you're talking about teachers
 

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well think you're talking about teachers
and stuff i'm thinking about how

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and stuff i'm thinking about how
 

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and stuff i'm thinking about how
these folks have been thrown into having

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these folks have been thrown into having
 

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these folks have been thrown into having
to use microsoft teams with no

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to use microsoft teams with no
 

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to use microsoft teams with no
experience this is

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experience this is
 

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experience this is
something totally new and then all of a

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something totally new and then all of a
 

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something totally new and then all of a
sudden you get a little

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sudden you get a little
 

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sudden you get a little
little window that says hey you need to

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little window that says hey you need to
 

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little window that says hey you need to
update it's okay

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update it's okay
 

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update it's okay
right and you think oh this this is what

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right and you think oh this this is what
 

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right and you think oh this this is what
i'm using for my classroom so i better

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i'm using for my classroom so i better
 

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i'm using for my classroom so i better
get that update

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get that update
 

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get that update
oh no it's like children make sure you

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oh no it's like children make sure you
 

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oh no it's like children make sure you
install this update

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install this update
 

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install this update
well like we're just talking before the

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well like we're just talking before the
 

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well like we're just talking before the
show it really is a form of social

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show it really is a form of social
 

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show it really is a form of social
engineering

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engineering
 

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engineering
absolutely because it's it's so easy to

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absolutely because it's it's so easy to
 

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absolutely because it's it's so easy to
fall into the trap this is where

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fall into the trap this is where
 

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fall into the trap this is where
phishing scams

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phishing scams
 

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phishing scams
have like we think oh well i would never

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have like we think oh well i would never
 

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have like we think oh well i would never
fall for a phishing scam because you

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fall for a phishing scam because you
 

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fall for a phishing scam because you
know i don't use that service or this

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know i don't use that service or this
 

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know i don't use that service or this
service or whatever but

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service or whatever but
 

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service or whatever but
it's a it's a like a if i throw enough

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it's a it's a like a if i throw enough
 

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it's a it's a like a if i throw enough
phishing scams out there that pretend to

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phishing scams out there that pretend to
 

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phishing scams out there that pretend to
be

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be
 

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be
the royal bank of canada yeah i will

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the royal bank of canada yeah i will
 

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the royal bank of canada yeah i will
inevitably land in the inbox of

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inevitably land in the inbox of
 

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inevitably land in the inbox of
some people who bank at the royal bank

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some people who bank at the royal bank
 

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some people who bank at the royal bank
of canada so

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of canada so
 

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of canada so
if i buy ads that are pretending to be

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if i buy ads that are pretending to be
 

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if i buy ads that are pretending to be
updates for

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updates for
 

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updates for
microsoft teams even though i personally

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microsoft teams even though i personally
 

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microsoft teams even though i personally
robbie ferguson don't use teams

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robbie ferguson don't use teams
 

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robbie ferguson don't use teams
somebody out there you might yeah

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somebody out there you might yeah
 

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somebody out there you might yeah
somebody else might and and social

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somebody else might and and social
 

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somebody else might and and social
engineering they

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engineering they
 

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engineering they
they trick those folks into installing

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they trick those folks into installing
 

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they trick those folks into installing
this malware and we're talking

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this malware and we're talking
 

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this malware and we're talking
ransomware

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00:04:18,629 --> 00:04:18,639
ransomware
 

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00:04:18,639 --> 00:04:21,430
ransomware
so ransomware is the one that encrypts

252
00:04:21,430 --> 00:04:21,440
so ransomware is the one that encrypts
 

253
00:04:21,440 --> 00:04:22,069
so ransomware is the one that encrypts
your

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00:04:22,069 --> 00:04:22,079
your
 

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00:04:22,079 --> 00:04:24,469
your
files and goes out on the network that

256
00:04:24,469 --> 00:04:24,479
files and goes out on the network that
 

257
00:04:24,479 --> 00:04:25,749
files and goes out on the network that
you're connected to

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00:04:25,749 --> 00:04:25,759
you're connected to
 

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00:04:25,759 --> 00:04:27,430
you're connected to
and encrypts all the files that it can

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00:04:27,430 --> 00:04:27,440
and encrypts all the files that it can
 

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00:04:27,440 --> 00:04:29,749
and encrypts all the files that it can
gain access to and as we know

262
00:04:29,749 --> 00:04:29,759
gain access to and as we know
 

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00:04:29,759 --> 00:04:32,790
gain access to and as we know
from xero logon that is every

264
00:04:32,790 --> 00:04:32,800
from xero logon that is every
 

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00:04:32,800 --> 00:04:35,510
from xero logon that is every
file on the entire network if you're

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00:04:35,510 --> 00:04:35,520
file on the entire network if you're
 

267
00:04:35,520 --> 00:04:35,830
file on the entire network if you're
like

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00:04:35,830 --> 00:04:35,840
like
 

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00:04:35,840 --> 00:04:37,110
like
like a school network you think oh well

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00:04:37,110 --> 00:04:37,120
like a school network you think oh well
 

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00:04:37,120 --> 00:04:40,070
like a school network you think oh well
we're locked down it's safe

272
00:04:40,070 --> 00:04:40,080
we're locked down it's safe
 

273
00:04:40,080 --> 00:04:43,189
we're locked down it's safe
no zero login zero logon allows

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00:04:43,189 --> 00:04:43,199
no zero login zero logon allows
 

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00:04:43,199 --> 00:04:44,870
no zero login zero logon allows
them to have administrator credentials

276
00:04:44,870 --> 00:04:44,880
them to have administrator credentials
 

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00:04:44,880 --> 00:04:47,110
them to have administrator credentials
just like just like your i.t admin

278
00:04:47,110 --> 00:04:47,120
just like just like your i.t admin
 

279
00:04:47,120 --> 00:04:50,230
just like just like your i.t admin
so like these are serious exploits

280
00:04:50,230 --> 00:04:50,240
so like these are serious exploits
 

281
00:04:50,240 --> 00:04:51,830
so like these are serious exploits
and social engineering they're using

282
00:04:51,830 --> 00:04:51,840
and social engineering they're using
 

283
00:04:51,840 --> 00:04:53,990
and social engineering they're using
that to get into these systems that

284
00:04:53,990 --> 00:04:54,000
that to get into these systems that
 

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00:04:54,000 --> 00:04:55,749
that to get into these systems that
could be a back door into the network

286
00:04:55,749 --> 00:04:55,759
could be a back door into the network
 

287
00:04:55,759 --> 00:04:56,710
could be a back door into the network
well exactly

288
00:04:56,710 --> 00:04:56,720
well exactly
 

289
00:04:56,720 --> 00:04:58,550
well exactly
i'm also scared for small businesses

290
00:04:58,550 --> 00:04:58,560
i'm also scared for small businesses
 

291
00:04:58,560 --> 00:05:00,469
i'm also scared for small businesses
right yeah so again

292
00:05:00,469 --> 00:05:00,479
right yeah so again
 

293
00:05:00,479 --> 00:05:02,150
right yeah so again
everyone's working from home now so

294
00:05:02,150 --> 00:05:02,160
everyone's working from home now so
 

295
00:05:02,160 --> 00:05:04,390
everyone's working from home now so
again if you have employees who aren't

296
00:05:04,390 --> 00:05:04,400
again if you have employees who aren't
 

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00:05:04,400 --> 00:05:05,909
again if you have employees who aren't
aztec literate or

298
00:05:05,909 --> 00:05:05,919
aztec literate or
 

299
00:05:05,919 --> 00:05:09,029
aztec literate or
but henry who would target me

300
00:05:09,029 --> 00:05:09,039
but henry who would target me
 

301
00:05:09,039 --> 00:05:11,670
but henry who would target me
i'm just uh i'm just a work from home

302
00:05:11,670 --> 00:05:11,680
i'm just uh i'm just a work from home
 

303
00:05:11,680 --> 00:05:12,710
i'm just uh i'm just a work from home
you know person who

304
00:05:12,710 --> 00:05:12,720
you know person who
 

305
00:05:12,720 --> 00:05:14,870
you know person who
no nobody would always target me see

306
00:05:14,870 --> 00:05:14,880
no nobody would always target me see
 

307
00:05:14,880 --> 00:05:16,469
no nobody would always target me see
yeah false insecure

308
00:05:16,469 --> 00:05:16,479
yeah false insecure
 

309
00:05:16,479 --> 00:05:18,870
yeah false insecure
security right yeah we become complacent

310
00:05:18,870 --> 00:05:18,880
security right yeah we become complacent
 

311
00:05:18,880 --> 00:05:19,590
security right yeah we become complacent
absolutely

312
00:05:19,590 --> 00:05:19,600
absolutely
 

313
00:05:19,600 --> 00:05:21,469
absolutely
the fact is is that these are

314
00:05:21,469 --> 00:05:21,479
the fact is is that these are
 

315
00:05:21,479 --> 00:05:23,590
the fact is is that these are
non-targeted attacks

316
00:05:23,590 --> 00:05:23,600
non-targeted attacks
 

317
00:05:23,600 --> 00:05:27,270
non-targeted attacks
these tools are built to find

318
00:05:27,270 --> 00:05:27,280
these tools are built to find
 

319
00:05:27,280 --> 00:05:29,990
these tools are built to find
susceptible systems and attack them yeah

320
00:05:29,990 --> 00:05:30,000
susceptible systems and attack them yeah
 

321
00:05:30,000 --> 00:05:31,590
susceptible systems and attack them yeah
just a wide net that's all it takes

322
00:05:31,590 --> 00:05:31,600
just a wide net that's all it takes
 

323
00:05:31,600 --> 00:05:34,469
just a wide net that's all it takes
like you said one email spam it out yeah

324
00:05:34,469 --> 00:05:34,479
like you said one email spam it out yeah
 

325
00:05:34,479 --> 00:05:35,189
like you said one email spam it out yeah
so

326
00:05:35,189 --> 00:05:35,199
so
 

327
00:05:35,199 --> 00:05:37,830
so
maybe a pie hole which is an ad blocking

328
00:05:37,830 --> 00:05:37,840
maybe a pie hole which is an ad blocking
 

329
00:05:37,840 --> 00:05:39,189
maybe a pie hole which is an ad blocking
dns server

330
00:05:39,189 --> 00:05:39,199
dns server
 

331
00:05:39,199 --> 00:05:41,110
dns server
suddenly becomes not just something to

332
00:05:41,110 --> 00:05:41,120
suddenly becomes not just something to
 

333
00:05:41,120 --> 00:05:42,790
suddenly becomes not just something to
block your advertising but also

334
00:05:42,790 --> 00:05:42,800
block your advertising but also
 

335
00:05:42,800 --> 00:05:44,550
block your advertising but also
something to like your ad blocker

336
00:05:44,550 --> 00:05:44,560
something to like your ad blocker
 

337
00:05:44,560 --> 00:05:45,189
something to like your ad blocker
becomes

338
00:05:45,189 --> 00:05:45,199
becomes
 

339
00:05:45,199 --> 00:05:47,029
becomes
something that's going to prevent

340
00:05:47,029 --> 00:05:47,039
something that's going to prevent
 

341
00:05:47,039 --> 00:05:48,790
something that's going to prevent
malware yeah

342
00:05:48,790 --> 00:05:48,800
malware yeah
 

343
00:05:48,800 --> 00:05:51,990
malware yeah
they bought ads on google i mean

344
00:05:51,990 --> 00:05:52,000
they bought ads on google i mean
 

345
00:05:52,000 --> 00:05:54,310
they bought ads on google i mean
like come on i've seen it happen on

346
00:05:54,310 --> 00:05:54,320
like come on i've seen it happen on
 

347
00:05:54,320 --> 00:05:56,150
like come on i've seen it happen on
facebook i've been on facebook yeah and

348
00:05:56,150 --> 00:05:56,160
facebook i've been on facebook yeah and
 

349
00:05:56,160 --> 00:05:57,189
facebook i've been on facebook yeah and
a java

350
00:05:57,189 --> 00:05:57,199
a java
 

351
00:05:57,199 --> 00:05:59,029
a java
i think it was a flash virus at the time

352
00:05:59,029 --> 00:05:59,039
i think it was a flash virus at the time
 

353
00:05:59,039 --> 00:06:00,870
i think it was a flash virus at the time
tried to install through an ad

354
00:06:00,870 --> 00:06:00,880
tried to install through an ad
 

355
00:06:00,880 --> 00:06:03,110
tried to install through an ad
well they have like a hundred dollar

356
00:06:03,110 --> 00:06:03,120
well they have like a hundred dollar
 

357
00:06:03,120 --> 00:06:04,950
well they have like a hundred dollar
free like ad credit thing if you sign up

358
00:06:04,950 --> 00:06:04,960
free like ad credit thing if you sign up
 

359
00:06:04,960 --> 00:06:06,230
free like ad credit thing if you sign up
for google ads now so

360
00:06:06,230 --> 00:06:06,240
for google ads now so
 

361
00:06:06,240 --> 00:06:07,830
for google ads now so
they got a real good deal i'm not just

362
00:06:07,830 --> 00:06:07,840
they got a real good deal i'm not just
 

363
00:06:07,840 --> 00:06:09,270
they got a real good deal i'm not just
kidding that's not sponsored

364
00:06:09,270 --> 00:06:09,280
kidding that's not sponsored
 

365
00:06:09,280 --> 00:06:11,430
kidding that's not sponsored
so be really careful when you click on

366
00:06:11,430 --> 00:06:11,440
so be really careful when you click on
 

367
00:06:11,440 --> 00:06:12,390
so be really careful when you click on
folks

368
00:06:12,390 --> 00:06:12,400
folks
 

369
00:06:12,400 --> 00:06:14,469
folks
be very very careful and almost to the

370
00:06:14,469 --> 00:06:14,479
be very very careful and almost to the
 

371
00:06:14,479 --> 00:06:16,629
be very very careful and almost to the
point of skeptical

372
00:06:16,629 --> 00:06:16,639
point of skeptical
 

373
00:06:16,639 --> 00:06:19,830
point of skeptical
all right it really does show how the

374
00:06:19,830 --> 00:06:19,840
all right it really does show how the
 

375
00:06:19,840 --> 00:06:21,909
all right it really does show how the
world is developing away from ads though

376
00:06:21,909 --> 00:06:21,919
world is developing away from ads though
 

377
00:06:21,919 --> 00:06:23,110
world is developing away from ads though
like i know this is going to be kind of

378
00:06:23,110 --> 00:06:23,120
like i know this is going to be kind of
 

379
00:06:23,120 --> 00:06:25,510
like i know this is going to be kind of
a little bit off topic now but it just

380
00:06:25,510 --> 00:06:25,520
a little bit off topic now but it just
 

381
00:06:25,520 --> 00:06:28,150
a little bit off topic now but it just
add ads being so intrusive hence why you

382
00:06:28,150 --> 00:06:28,160
add ads being so intrusive hence why you
 

383
00:06:28,160 --> 00:06:30,070
add ads being so intrusive hence why you
have other platforms like patreon and

384
00:06:30,070 --> 00:06:30,080
have other platforms like patreon and
 

385
00:06:30,080 --> 00:06:31,909
have other platforms like patreon and
stuff that you can support sure yes and

386
00:06:31,909 --> 00:06:31,919
stuff that you can support sure yes and
 

387
00:06:31,919 --> 00:06:34,150
stuff that you can support sure yes and
things like that right because

388
00:06:34,150 --> 00:06:34,160
things like that right because
 

389
00:06:34,160 --> 00:06:35,749
things like that right because
whenever i'm on youtube i'm like yeah i

390
00:06:35,749 --> 00:06:35,759
whenever i'm on youtube i'm like yeah i
 

391
00:06:35,759 --> 00:06:37,270
whenever i'm on youtube i'm like yeah i
have an ad locker i i

392
00:06:37,270 --> 00:06:37,280
have an ad locker i i
 

393
00:06:37,280 --> 00:06:39,749
have an ad locker i i
rely on ad revenue in order to survive

394
00:06:39,749 --> 00:06:39,759
rely on ad revenue in order to survive
 

395
00:06:39,759 --> 00:06:41,909
rely on ad revenue in order to survive
as a as a broadcaster on youtube exactly

396
00:06:41,909 --> 00:06:41,919
as a as a broadcaster on youtube exactly
 

397
00:06:41,919 --> 00:06:43,670
as a as a broadcaster on youtube exactly
but it's just like it's a balance now

398
00:06:43,670 --> 00:06:43,680
but it's just like it's a balance now
 

399
00:06:43,680 --> 00:06:44,950
but it's just like it's a balance now
right because it's like

400
00:06:44,950 --> 00:06:44,960
right because it's like
 

401
00:06:44,960 --> 00:06:47,749
right because it's like
is this ad gonna try to sell me or try

402
00:06:47,749 --> 00:06:47,759
is this ad gonna try to sell me or try
 

403
00:06:47,759 --> 00:06:49,189
is this ad gonna try to sell me or try
to affect me try to trick you into

404
00:06:49,189 --> 00:06:49,199
to affect me try to trick you into
 

405
00:06:49,199 --> 00:06:50,950
to affect me try to trick you into
getting an infection of ransomware

406
00:06:50,950 --> 00:06:50,960
getting an infection of ransomware
 

407
00:06:50,960 --> 00:06:52,710
getting an infection of ransomware
yeah so just like i want to support

408
00:06:52,710 --> 00:06:52,720
yeah so just like i want to support
 

409
00:06:52,720 --> 00:06:54,469
yeah so just like i want to support
small businesses and channels and stuff

410
00:06:54,469 --> 00:06:54,479
small businesses and channels and stuff
 

411
00:06:54,479 --> 00:06:56,150
small businesses and channels and stuff
but how do i balance that with safety

412
00:06:56,150 --> 00:06:56,160
but how do i balance that with safety
 

413
00:06:56,160 --> 00:06:56,550
but how do i balance that with safety
now

414
00:06:56,550 --> 00:06:56,560
now
 

415
00:06:56,560 --> 00:06:58,309
now
it's it's such a hard thing to talk

416
00:06:58,309 --> 00:06:58,319
it's it's such a hard thing to talk
 

417
00:06:58,319 --> 00:06:59,909
it's it's such a hard thing to talk
about it's a very good question i don't

418
00:06:59,909 --> 00:06:59,919
about it's a very good question i don't
 

419
00:06:59,919 --> 00:07:00,629
about it's a very good question i don't
know that there's an

420
00:07:00,629 --> 00:07:00,639
know that there's an
 

421
00:07:00,639 --> 00:07:02,710
know that there's an
answer immediately sitting there ready

422
00:07:02,710 --> 00:07:02,720
answer immediately sitting there ready
 

423
00:07:02,720 --> 00:07:04,150
answer immediately sitting there ready
to be given

424
00:07:04,150 --> 00:07:04,160
to be given
 

425
00:07:04,160 --> 00:07:06,309
to be given
so it's really just down to be very

426
00:07:06,309 --> 00:07:06,319
so it's really just down to be very
 

427
00:07:06,319 --> 00:07:07,350
so it's really just down to be very
cautious be

428
00:07:07,350 --> 00:07:07,360
cautious be
 

429
00:07:07,360 --> 00:07:09,350
cautious be
skeptical when you're clicking on stuff

430
00:07:09,350 --> 00:07:09,360
skeptical when you're clicking on stuff
 

431
00:07:09,360 --> 00:07:11,589
skeptical when you're clicking on stuff
online and know that even in

432
00:07:11,589 --> 00:07:11,599
online and know that even in
 

433
00:07:11,599 --> 00:07:13,909
online and know that even in
somewhere like google maybe the ads

434
00:07:13,909 --> 00:07:13,919
somewhere like google maybe the ads
 

435
00:07:13,919 --> 00:07:15,029
somewhere like google maybe the ads
contain malware

436
00:07:15,029 --> 00:07:15,039
contain malware
 

437
00:07:15,039 --> 00:07:17,749
contain malware
so watch out and be careful big thanks

438
00:07:17,749 --> 00:07:17,759
so watch out and be careful big thanks
 

439
00:07:17,759 --> 00:07:19,670
so watch out and be careful big thanks
to roy w nash and our community of

440
00:07:19,670 --> 00:07:19,680
to roy w nash and our community of
 

441
00:07:19,680 --> 00:07:21,670
to roy w nash and our community of
viewers for submitting stories to us

442
00:07:21,670 --> 00:07:21,680
viewers for submitting stories to us
 

443
00:07:21,680 --> 00:07:23,670
viewers for submitting stories to us
this week thanks for watching the

444
00:07:23,670 --> 00:07:23,680
this week thanks for watching the
 

445
00:07:23,680 --> 00:07:24,710
this week thanks for watching the
category 5

446
00:07:24,710 --> 00:07:24,720
category 5
 

447
00:07:24,720 --> 00:07:27,350
category 5
tv newsroom don't forget to like and

448
00:07:27,350 --> 00:07:27,360
tv newsroom don't forget to like and
 

449
00:07:27,360 --> 00:07:29,270
tv newsroom don't forget to like and
subscribe for all your tech news with a

450
00:07:29,270 --> 00:07:29,280
subscribe for all your tech news with a
 

451
00:07:29,280 --> 00:07:29,990
subscribe for all your tech news with a
slight linux

452
00:07:29,990 --> 00:07:30,000
slight linux
 

453
00:07:30,000 --> 00:07:32,390
slight linux
bias and if you appreciate what we do

454
00:07:32,390 --> 00:07:32,400
bias and if you appreciate what we do
 

455
00:07:32,400 --> 00:07:33,350
bias and if you appreciate what we do
become a patron

456
00:07:33,350 --> 00:07:33,360
become a patron
 

457
00:07:33,360 --> 00:07:36,710
become a patron
at patreon.com category 5.

458
00:07:36,710 --> 00:07:36,720
at patreon.com category 5.
 

459
00:07:36,720 --> 00:07:39,270
at patreon.com category 5.
from the category 5 tv newsroom i'm

460
00:07:39,270 --> 00:07:39,280
from the category 5 tv newsroom i'm
 

461
00:07:39,280 --> 00:07:44,950
from the category 5 tv newsroom i'm
becca ferguson

462
00:07:44,950 --> 00:07:44,960
becca ferguson
 

463
00:07:44,960 --> 00:07:52,310
becca ferguson
[Music]

464
00:07:52,310 --> 00:07:52,320
[Music]
 

465
00:07:52,320 --> 00:07:54,780
[Music]
[Applause]

466
00:07:54,780 --> 00:07:54,790
[Applause]
 

467
00:07:54,790 --> 00:08:06,950
[Applause]
[Music]

468
00:08:06,950 --> 00:08:06,960

 

469
00:08:06,960 --> 00:08:11,830

[Music]

470
00:08:11,830 --> 00:08:11,840

 

471
00:08:11,840 --> 00:08:13,919

you