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welcome to category five technology TV

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welcome to category five technology TV
 

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welcome to category five technology TV
and this week we have a legit hacker who

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and this week we have a legit hacker who
 

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and this week we have a legit hacker who
has hacked a ton of devices gonna be

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has hacked a ton of devices gonna be
 

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has hacked a ton of devices gonna be
sharing with us about those exploits how

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sharing with us about those exploits how
 

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sharing with us about those exploits how
he's been able to do it why he's done it

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he's been able to do it why he's done it
 

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he's been able to do it why he's done it
and some of the concerns that it raises

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and some of the concerns that it raises
 

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and some of the concerns that it raises
stick around our live recordings are

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stick around our live recordings are
 

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stick around our live recordings are
trusted only two solid-state drives by

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trusted only two solid-state drives by
 

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trusted only two solid-state drives by
Kingston technology revive your computer

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Kingston technology revive your computer
 

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Kingston technology revive your computer
with improved performance and

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with improved performance and
 

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with improved performance and
reliability over traditional hard drives

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reliability over traditional hard drives
 

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reliability over traditional hard drives
with Kingston SSDs category 5 TV streams

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with Kingston SSDs category 5 TV streams
 

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with Kingston SSDs category 5 TV streams
live with Telestream Wirecast and nimble

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live with Telestream Wirecast and nimble
 

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live with Telestream Wirecast and nimble
streamer tune in every week on roku cody

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streamer tune in every week on roku cody
 

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streamer tune in every week on roku cody
and other HLS video players for local

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and other HLS video players for local
 

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and other HLS video players for local
show times visit category 5 TV welcome

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show times visit category 5 TV welcome
 

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show times visit category 5 TV welcome
to the show everybody this is category 5

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to the show everybody this is category 5
 

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to the show everybody this is category 5
technology TV episode number 6 44 and

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technology TV episode number 6 44 and
 

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technology TV episode number 6 44 and
I'm Robby Ferguson and I'm Sasha Rickman

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I'm Robby Ferguson and I'm Sasha Rickman
 

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I'm Robby Ferguson and I'm Sasha Rickman
hey Before we jump into a very exciting

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hey Before we jump into a very exciting
 

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hey Before we jump into a very exciting
show this week I want to remind you to

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show this week I want to remind you to
 

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show this week I want to remind you to
subscribe to us on YouTube and click

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subscribe to us on YouTube and click
 

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subscribe to us on YouTube and click
that Bell that's going to make sure that

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that Bell that's going to make sure that
 

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that Bell that's going to make sure that
you receive all the notifications

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you receive all the notifications
 

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you receive all the notifications
whenever we are live or when we post new

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whenever we are live or when we post new
 

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whenever we are live or when we post new
shiny videos what the cool people do I

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started seeing the rounds of the

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started seeing the rounds of the
 

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started seeing the rounds of the
exploits of the Canadian hacker as

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exploits of the Canadian hacker as
 

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exploits of the Canadian hacker as
Twitter blew up with people saying I

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Twitter blew up with people saying I
 

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Twitter blew up with people saying I
came into work today and on my printer

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came into work today and on my printer
 

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came into work today and on my printer
was this printout and the printout was

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was this printout and the printout was
 

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was this printout and the printout was
from the canadian hacker he is the

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from the canadian hacker he is the
 

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from the canadian hacker he is the
Politis hacker that you'll ever meet he

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Politis hacker that you'll ever meet he
 

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Politis hacker that you'll ever meet he
will hack your devices and then

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will hack your devices and then
 

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will hack your devices and then
apologize yeah he is none other then

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apologize yeah he is none other then
 

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apologize yeah he is none other then
the Canadian hacker the one fantastic

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the Canadian hacker the one fantastic
 

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the Canadian hacker the one fantastic
how about yourself

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listen you you call yourself the

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listen you you call yourself the
 

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listen you you call yourself the
Canadian hacker just to give us a sense

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Canadian hacker just to give us a sense
 

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Canadian hacker just to give us a sense
of the scale of things how many how many

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of the scale of things how many how many
 

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of the scale of things how many how many
devices have you seriously hacked I mean

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devices have you seriously hacked I mean
 

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devices have you seriously hacked I mean
I've hacked about a hundred and fifty

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I've hacked about a hundred and fifty
 

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I've hacked about a hundred and fifty
devices how many devices have you hacked

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devices how many devices have you hacked
 

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devices how many devices have you hacked
whoa for the printers 100 thousand a

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whoa for the printers 100 thousand a
 

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whoa for the printers 100 thousand a
hundred thousand printers why'd you hack

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hundred thousand printers why'd you hack
 

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hundred thousand printers why'd you hack
printers well my main motivation for

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printers well my main motivation for
 

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printers well my main motivation for
doing all this was to give myself more

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doing all this was to give myself more
 

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doing all this was to give myself more
of a challenge all without really

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of a challenge all without really
 

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of a challenge all without really
affecting the people around me when you

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affecting the people around me when you
 

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affecting the people around me when you
say that when you say without affecting

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say that when you say without affecting
 

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say that when you say without affecting
are you talking about being benign in

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are you talking about being benign in
 

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are you talking about being benign in
your attacks so that you're not actually

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your attacks so that you're not actually
 

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your attacks so that you're not actually
creating damage you're walking would be

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creating damage you're walking would be
 

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creating damage you're walking would be
something that I wanted doing is what I

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something that I wanted doing is what I
 

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something that I wanted doing is what I
did with the pictures I saw the pictures

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did with the pictures I saw the pictures
 

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did with the pictures I saw the pictures
I was a very open target uh especially

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I was a very open target uh especially
 

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I was a very open target uh especially
with how many like everybody you're on

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with how many like everybody you're on
 

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with how many like everybody you're on
everybody's home has a picture

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everybody's home has a picture
 

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everybody's home has a picture
every business has a picture uh and a

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every business has a picture uh and a
 

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every business has a picture uh and a
lot of people don't look at them for

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lot of people don't look at them for
 

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lot of people don't look at them for
something that you could exploit rage so

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something that you could exploit rage so
 

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something that you could exploit rage so
you could be big vulnerability right

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you could be big vulnerability right
 

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you could be big vulnerability right
there so my my whole thing was to create

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there so my my whole thing was to create
 

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there so my my whole thing was to create
a challenge for myself

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a challenge for myself
 

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a challenge for myself
well not affecting others and they'd say

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well not affecting others and they'd say
 

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well not affecting others and they'd say
yeah I got here good Anya good Anya how

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yeah I got here good Anya good Anya how
 

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yeah I got here good Anya good Anya how
did you get started hacking well around

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did you get started hacking well around
 

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did you get started hacking well around
seven years old I actually you know what

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seven years old I actually you know what
 

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seven years old I actually you know what
that's actually really good question

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that's actually really good question
 

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that's actually really good question
you're sorry

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you're sorry
 

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you're sorry
understood did you know my timeline yes

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understood did you know my timeline yes
 

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understood did you know my timeline yes
well yeah I'd say probably around six or

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well yeah I'd say probably around six or
 

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well yeah I'd say probably around six or
seven

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seven
 

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seven
I guess there's there's a point in in

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I guess there's there's a point in in
 

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I guess there's there's a point in in
your like you're growing up in an era

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your like you're growing up in an era
 

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your like you're growing up in an era
unlike I did so when I was when I was in

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unlike I did so when I was when I was in
 

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unlike I did so when I was when I was in
high school is when I realized hey I can

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high school is when I realized hey I can
 

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high school is when I realized hey I can
hack systems and I can make them do what

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hack systems and I can make them do what
 

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hack systems and I can make them do what
I want them to do there must have been a

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I want them to do there must have been a
 

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I want them to do there must have been a
point in your life where you said hey I

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point in your life where you said hey I
 

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point in your life where you said hey I
can do more than what Windows allows me

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can do more than what Windows allows me
 

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can do more than what Windows allows me
to do what Linux allows me to do what

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to do what Linux allows me to do what
 

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to do what Linux allows me to do what
when was that point for you probably

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when was that point for you probably
 

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when was that point for you probably
around 10 or 11 I'd say when I started

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around 10 or 11 I'd say when I started
 

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around 10 or 11 I'd say when I started
when a lot of people on the internet

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when a lot of people on the internet
 

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when a lot of people on the internet
started coming out and trying to the

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started coming out and trying to the
 

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started coming out and trying to the
public like what you can do with this

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public like what you can do with this
 

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public like what you can do with this
and how everything can be explained I

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and how everything can be explained I
 

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and how everything can be explained I
thought I wanted to learn that ability

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thought I wanted to learn that ability
 

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thought I wanted to learn that ability
more so for good about okay so you know

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more so for good about okay so you know
 

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more so for good about okay so you know
and these devices you mentioned printers

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and these devices you mentioned printers
 

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and these devices you mentioned printers
and we're gonna talk more about that but

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and we're gonna talk more about that but
 

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and we're gonna talk more about that but
these devices are benign considered safe

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these devices are benign considered safe
 

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these devices are benign considered safe
these are these are devices that people

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these are these are devices that people
 

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these are these are devices that people
trust to plug into their network I mean

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trust to plug into their network I mean
 

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trust to plug into their network I mean
you walk into any Super Center you buy a

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you walk into any Super Center you buy a
 

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you walk into any Super Center you buy a
printer and you install it and it just

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printer and you install it and it just
 

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printer and you install it and it just
works yeah what is it that drew you to

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works yeah what is it that drew you to
 

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works yeah what is it that drew you to
start attacking those devices a little

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start attacking those devices a little
 

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start attacking those devices a little
bit easier of an axis then a more

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bit easier of an axis then a more
 

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bit easier of an axis then a more
sophisticated system so it was easy

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sophisticated system so it was easy
 

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sophisticated system so it was easy
enough for each of you but just don't

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enough for each of you but just don't
 

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enough for each of you but just don't
have a challenge and a large amount to

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have a challenge and a large amount to
 

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have a challenge and a large amount to
bomb like a surplus of pictures on any

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bomb like a surplus of pictures on any
 

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bomb like a surplus of pictures on any
given network so you know you're I have

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given network so you know you're I have
 

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given network so you know you're I have
a lot of access to them and it made it a

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a lot of access to them and it made it a
 

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a lot of access to them and it made it a
little bit easier sorry I'm kind of

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little bit easier sorry I'm kind of
 

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little bit easier sorry I'm kind of
contractor no not at all not at all so

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contractor no not at all not at all so
 

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contractor no not at all not at all so
but it makes me think though and we're

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but it makes me think though and we're
 

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but it makes me think though and we're
speaking with the Canadian hacker here

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speaking with the Canadian hacker here
 

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speaking with the Canadian hacker here
the Canadian hacker we know you by no

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the Canadian hacker we know you by no
 

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the Canadian hacker we know you by no
other name when you're attacking

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other name when you're attacking
 

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other name when you're attacking
printers so so I

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printers so so I
 

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printers so so I
as a consoled me as a consumer our

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as a consoled me as a consumer our
 

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as a consoled me as a consumer our
viewers as consumers will purchase a

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viewers as consumers will purchase a
 

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viewers as consumers will purchase a
printer and just install it on their

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printer and just install it on their
 

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printer and just install it on their
network so what makes that device a

234
00:06:35,829 --> 00:06:35,839
network so what makes that device a
 

235
00:06:35,839 --> 00:06:38,209
network so what makes that device a
vulnerable device you just think it's a

236
00:06:38,209 --> 00:06:38,219
vulnerable device you just think it's a
 

237
00:06:38,219 --> 00:06:40,039
vulnerable device you just think it's a
benign device just sitting on your

238
00:06:40,039 --> 00:06:40,049
benign device just sitting on your
 

239
00:06:40,049 --> 00:06:44,689
benign device just sitting on your
network that you print - well how are we

240
00:06:44,689 --> 00:06:44,699
network that you print - well how are we
 

241
00:06:44,699 --> 00:06:46,879
network that you print - well how are we
able to attack that how what is what is

242
00:06:46,879 --> 00:06:46,889
able to attack that how what is what is
 

243
00:06:46,889 --> 00:06:49,549
able to attack that how what is what is
it that I should know as a consumer that

244
00:06:49,549 --> 00:06:49,559
it that I should know as a consumer that
 

245
00:06:49,559 --> 00:06:52,999
it that I should know as a consumer that
you can share with me as a hacker that I

246
00:06:52,999 --> 00:06:53,009
you can share with me as a hacker that I
 

247
00:06:53,009 --> 00:06:54,499
you can share with me as a hacker that I
should know about that printer being

248
00:06:54,499 --> 00:06:54,509
should know about that printer being
 

249
00:06:54,509 --> 00:06:59,540
should know about that printer being
connected to my network is how like

250
00:06:59,540 --> 00:06:59,550
connected to my network is how like
 

251
00:06:59,550 --> 00:07:01,719
connected to my network is how like
security fever I guess you can say um

252
00:07:01,719 --> 00:07:01,729
security fever I guess you can say um
 

253
00:07:01,729 --> 00:07:04,850
security fever I guess you can say um
you might think that they're safe when

254
00:07:04,850 --> 00:07:04,860
you might think that they're safe when
 

255
00:07:04,860 --> 00:07:06,829
you might think that they're safe when
they really truly not and for printers

256
00:07:06,829 --> 00:07:06,839
they really truly not and for printers
 

257
00:07:06,839 --> 00:07:09,799
they really truly not and for printers
in this case um there's a lot of it's on

258
00:07:09,799 --> 00:07:09,809
in this case um there's a lot of it's on
 

259
00:07:09,809 --> 00:07:12,290
in this case um there's a lot of it's on
your network that it can be accessed

260
00:07:12,290 --> 00:07:12,300
your network that it can be accessed
 

261
00:07:12,300 --> 00:07:14,749
your network that it can be accessed
with which I don't mean that you don't

262
00:07:14,749 --> 00:07:14,759
with which I don't mean that you don't
 

263
00:07:14,759 --> 00:07:16,669
with which I don't mean that you don't
you shouldn't connected to your network

264
00:07:16,669 --> 00:07:16,679
you shouldn't connected to your network
 

265
00:07:16,679 --> 00:07:19,219
you shouldn't connected to your network
I mean it makes it so much easier to

266
00:07:19,219 --> 00:07:19,229
I mean it makes it so much easier to
 

267
00:07:19,229 --> 00:07:21,079
I mean it makes it so much easier to
think anything else that you just have

268
00:07:21,079 --> 00:07:21,089
think anything else that you just have
 

269
00:07:21,089 --> 00:07:23,079
think anything else that you just have
to be really careful with what's exposed

270
00:07:23,079 --> 00:07:23,089
to be really careful with what's exposed
 

271
00:07:23,089 --> 00:07:27,259
to be really careful with what's exposed
because there's outputs ninety one

272
00:07:27,259 --> 00:07:27,269
because there's outputs ninety one
 

273
00:07:27,269 --> 00:07:29,449
because there's outputs ninety one
hundred five one five and six three one

274
00:07:29,449 --> 00:07:29,459
hundred five one five and six three one
 

275
00:07:29,459 --> 00:07:32,899
hundred five one five and six three one
which is the main three ports that then

276
00:07:32,899 --> 00:07:32,909
which is the main three ports that then
 

277
00:07:32,909 --> 00:07:35,389
which is the main three ports that then
it's mainly ninety one hundred six three

278
00:07:35,389 --> 00:07:35,399
it's mainly ninety one hundred six three
 

279
00:07:35,399 --> 00:07:41,059
it's mainly ninety one hundred six three
one isn't that cups yeah so you gotta be

280
00:07:41,059 --> 00:07:41,069
one isn't that cups yeah so you gotta be
 

281
00:07:41,069 --> 00:07:43,999
one isn't that cups yeah so you gotta be
really careful with them what you're

282
00:07:43,999 --> 00:07:44,009
really careful with them what you're
 

283
00:07:44,009 --> 00:07:47,540
really careful with them what you're
exposing um and you just always not be

284
00:07:47,540 --> 00:07:47,550
exposing um and you just always not be
 

285
00:07:47,550 --> 00:07:49,669
exposing um and you just always not be
watching out with what you're installing

286
00:07:49,669 --> 00:07:49,679
watching out with what you're installing
 

287
00:07:49,679 --> 00:07:51,109
watching out with what you're installing
to hear about what you're adding to

288
00:07:51,109 --> 00:07:51,119
to hear about what you're adding to
 

289
00:07:51,119 --> 00:07:54,290
to hear about what you're adding to
network because I guess I could get into

290
00:07:54,290 --> 00:07:54,300
network because I guess I could get into
 

291
00:07:54,300 --> 00:07:57,350
network because I guess I could get into
that picture and if I wanted you

292
00:07:57,350 --> 00:07:57,360
that picture and if I wanted you
 

293
00:07:57,360 --> 00:08:00,199
that picture and if I wanted you
attacked it for malicious reasons but

294
00:08:00,199 --> 00:08:00,209
attacked it for malicious reasons but
 

295
00:08:00,209 --> 00:08:02,779
attacked it for malicious reasons but
here a large business I could anything

296
00:08:02,779 --> 00:08:02,789
here a large business I could anything
 

297
00:08:02,789 --> 00:08:04,279
here a large business I could anything
you print off finance reports or

298
00:08:04,279 --> 00:08:04,289
you print off finance reports or
 

299
00:08:04,289 --> 00:08:07,699
you print off finance reports or
anything I would actually be able to use

300
00:08:07,699 --> 00:08:07,709
anything I would actually be able to use
 

301
00:08:07,709 --> 00:08:10,609
anything I would actually be able to use
a man-in-the-middle attack and she drops

302
00:08:10,609 --> 00:08:10,619
a man-in-the-middle attack and she drops
 

303
00:08:10,619 --> 00:08:14,589
a man-in-the-middle attack and she drops
so Lauren yeah she really have to be

304
00:08:14,589 --> 00:08:14,599
so Lauren yeah she really have to be
 

305
00:08:14,599 --> 00:08:16,999
so Lauren yeah she really have to be
careful with what you're putting or

306
00:08:16,999 --> 00:08:17,009
careful with what you're putting or
 

307
00:08:17,009 --> 00:08:19,189
careful with what you're putting or
connecting to your network and you

308
00:08:19,189 --> 00:08:19,199
connecting to your network and you
 

309
00:08:19,199 --> 00:08:20,839
connecting to your network and you
should always be checking on your

310
00:08:20,839 --> 00:08:20,849
should always be checking on your
 

311
00:08:20,849 --> 00:08:25,429
should always be checking on your
settings on your modem or I mean people

312
00:08:25,429 --> 00:08:25,439
settings on your modem or I mean people
 

313
00:08:25,439 --> 00:08:26,929
settings on your modem or I mean people
know this router but it's really all the

314
00:08:26,929 --> 00:08:26,939
know this router but it's really all the
 

315
00:08:26,939 --> 00:08:30,859
know this router but it's really all the
rage on to see what ports your long to

316
00:08:30,859 --> 00:08:30,869
rage on to see what ports your long to
 

317
00:08:30,869 --> 00:08:33,379
rage on to see what ports your long to
pass through choose the side of your

318
00:08:33,379 --> 00:08:33,389
pass through choose the side of your
 

319
00:08:33,389 --> 00:08:34,850
pass through choose the side of your
network and that makes me think now the

320
00:08:34,850 --> 00:08:34,860
network and that makes me think now the
 

321
00:08:34,860 --> 00:08:36,620
network and that makes me think now the
Canadian hacker you're dropping a bunch

322
00:08:36,620 --> 00:08:36,630
Canadian hacker you're dropping a bunch
 

323
00:08:36,630 --> 00:08:38,180
Canadian hacker you're dropping a bunch
of bombs here so I got to cut you off

324
00:08:38,180 --> 00:08:38,190
of bombs here so I got to cut you off
 

325
00:08:38,190 --> 00:08:39,529
of bombs here so I got to cut you off
because like okay we got to talk about

326
00:08:39,529 --> 00:08:39,539
because like okay we got to talk about
 

327
00:08:39,539 --> 00:08:41,870
because like okay we got to talk about
this UPnP is enabled on a lot of

328
00:08:41,870 --> 00:08:41,880
this UPnP is enabled on a lot of
 

329
00:08:41,880 --> 00:08:44,990
this UPnP is enabled on a lot of
router's you UPnP means as soon as you

330
00:08:44,990 --> 00:08:45,000
router's you UPnP means as soon as you
 

331
00:08:45,000 --> 00:08:47,240
router's you UPnP means as soon as you
plug that printer in it opens up the

332
00:08:47,240 --> 00:08:47,250
plug that printer in it opens up the
 

333
00:08:47,250 --> 00:08:49,520
plug that printer in it opens up the
ports it doesn't matter if you

334
00:08:49,520 --> 00:08:49,530
ports it doesn't matter if you
 

335
00:08:49,530 --> 00:08:51,950
ports it doesn't matter if you
specifically said open up those ports no

336
00:08:51,950 --> 00:08:51,960
specifically said open up those ports no
 

337
00:08:51,960 --> 00:08:54,320
specifically said open up those ports no
UPnP will automatically do that because

338
00:08:54,320 --> 00:08:54,330
UPnP will automatically do that because
 

339
00:08:54,330 --> 00:08:57,530
UPnP will automatically do that because
it detects the new printer and allows it

340
00:08:57,530 --> 00:08:57,540
it detects the new printer and allows it
 

341
00:08:57,540 --> 00:09:00,410
it detects the new printer and allows it
to open those ports automatically that's

342
00:09:00,410 --> 00:09:00,420
to open those ports automatically that's
 

343
00:09:00,420 --> 00:09:02,000
to open those ports automatically that's
dangerous that's what I'm learning here

344
00:09:02,000 --> 00:09:02,010
dangerous that's what I'm learning here
 

345
00:09:02,010 --> 00:09:04,250
dangerous that's what I'm learning here
but you're talking about okay not only

346
00:09:04,250 --> 00:09:04,260
but you're talking about okay not only
 

347
00:09:04,260 --> 00:09:08,480
but you're talking about okay not only
are you able to send print jobs to my

348
00:09:08,480 --> 00:09:08,490
are you able to send print jobs to my
 

349
00:09:08,490 --> 00:09:12,170
are you able to send print jobs to my
printer but you're able to intercept the

350
00:09:12,170 --> 00:09:12,180
printer but you're able to intercept the
 

351
00:09:12,180 --> 00:09:15,970
printer but you're able to intercept the
print jobs that I send to my printer

352
00:09:15,970 --> 00:09:15,980
print jobs that I send to my printer
 

353
00:09:15,980 --> 00:09:19,700
print jobs that I send to my printer
exactly yeah and you can see how injures

354
00:09:19,700 --> 00:09:19,710
exactly yeah and you can see how injures
 

355
00:09:19,710 --> 00:09:24,440
exactly yeah and you can see how injures
that is and a lot of the security

356
00:09:24,440 --> 00:09:24,450
that is and a lot of the security
 

357
00:09:24,450 --> 00:09:27,260
that is and a lot of the security
features on printers that say like only

358
00:09:27,260 --> 00:09:27,270
features on printers that say like only
 

359
00:09:27,270 --> 00:09:29,240
features on printers that say like only
our men will be saved on the system or

360
00:09:29,240 --> 00:09:29,250
our men will be saved on the system or
 

361
00:09:29,250 --> 00:09:33,830
our men will be saved on the system or
anything like that um because it's not

362
00:09:33,830 --> 00:09:33,840
anything like that um because it's not
 

363
00:09:33,840 --> 00:09:36,380
anything like that um because it's not
it's again a form of security feeder

364
00:09:36,380 --> 00:09:36,390
it's again a form of security feeder
 

365
00:09:36,390 --> 00:09:39,140
it's again a form of security feeder
you're really thinking it's more safe

366
00:09:39,140 --> 00:09:39,150
you're really thinking it's more safe
 

367
00:09:39,150 --> 00:09:43,190
you're really thinking it's more safe
than it truly is I can't help but think

368
00:09:43,190 --> 00:09:43,200
than it truly is I can't help but think
 

369
00:09:43,200 --> 00:09:46,070
than it truly is I can't help but think
about accounting firms lawyers offices

370
00:09:46,070 --> 00:09:46,080
about accounting firms lawyers offices
 

371
00:09:46,080 --> 00:09:51,380
about accounting firms lawyers offices
who just okay let's back up a second the

372
00:09:51,380 --> 00:09:51,390
who just okay let's back up a second the
 

373
00:09:51,390 --> 00:09:55,300
who just okay let's back up a second the
Canadian hacker has revealed themselves

374
00:09:55,300 --> 00:09:55,310
Canadian hacker has revealed themselves
 

375
00:09:55,310 --> 00:09:59,480
Canadian hacker has revealed themselves
to the world and said look your printers

376
00:09:59,480 --> 00:09:59,490
to the world and said look your printers
 

377
00:09:59,490 --> 00:10:02,720
to the world and said look your printers
are unsafe you need to secure these

378
00:10:02,720 --> 00:10:02,730
are unsafe you need to secure these
 

379
00:10:02,730 --> 00:10:07,250
are unsafe you need to secure these
things what if there are 10 other

380
00:10:07,250 --> 00:10:07,260
things what if there are 10 other
 

381
00:10:07,260 --> 00:10:10,490
things what if there are 10 other
hackers who have accessed that printer

382
00:10:10,490 --> 00:10:10,500
hackers who have accessed that printer
 

383
00:10:10,500 --> 00:10:13,190
hackers who have accessed that printer
and have never even unveiled the fact

384
00:10:13,190 --> 00:10:13,200
and have never even unveiled the fact
 

385
00:10:13,200 --> 00:10:16,190
and have never even unveiled the fact
that they have access to that printer is

386
00:10:16,190 --> 00:10:16,200
that they have access to that printer is
 

387
00:10:16,200 --> 00:10:19,820
that they have access to that printer is
there isn't it true the Canadian hacker

388
00:10:19,820 --> 00:10:19,830
there isn't it true the Canadian hacker
 

389
00:10:19,830 --> 00:10:23,690
there isn't it true the Canadian hacker
that they could compromise this printer

390
00:10:23,690 --> 00:10:23,700
that they could compromise this printer
 

391
00:10:23,700 --> 00:10:27,829
that they could compromise this printer
and be receiving every single print job

392
00:10:27,829 --> 00:10:27,839
and be receiving every single print job
 

393
00:10:27,839 --> 00:10:29,780
and be receiving every single print job
from this lawyer's office from this

394
00:10:29,780 --> 00:10:29,790
from this lawyer's office from this
 

395
00:10:29,790 --> 00:10:31,940
from this lawyer's office from this
accounting office from wherever this

396
00:10:31,940 --> 00:10:31,950
accounting office from wherever this
 

397
00:10:31,950 --> 00:10:35,780
accounting office from wherever this
office is and never you'd never be the

398
00:10:35,780 --> 00:10:35,790
office is and never you'd never be the
 

399
00:10:35,790 --> 00:10:37,970
office is and never you'd never be the
wiser you just be sending them this

400
00:10:37,970 --> 00:10:37,980
wiser you just be sending them this
 

401
00:10:37,980 --> 00:10:42,620
wiser you just be sending them this
information is that a valid point it's a

402
00:10:42,620 --> 00:10:42,630
information is that a valid point it's a
 

403
00:10:42,630 --> 00:10:44,810
information is that a valid point it's a
very valid point and that is very true

404
00:10:44,810 --> 00:10:44,820
very valid point and that is very true
 

405
00:10:44,820 --> 00:10:47,780
very valid point and that is very true
um of course I've never necessarily seen

406
00:10:47,780 --> 00:10:47,790
um of course I've never necessarily seen
 

407
00:10:47,790 --> 00:10:49,460
um of course I've never necessarily seen
that in action

408
00:10:49,460 --> 00:10:49,470
that in action
 

409
00:10:49,470 --> 00:10:51,870
that in action
is definitely in the realm of

410
00:10:51,870 --> 00:10:51,880
is definitely in the realm of
 

411
00:10:51,880 --> 00:10:57,840
is definitely in the realm of
possibilities yeah if you have anything

412
00:10:57,840 --> 00:10:57,850
possibilities yeah if you have anything
 

413
00:10:57,850 --> 00:11:00,090
possibilities yeah if you have anything
that's into their network open to your

414
00:11:00,090 --> 00:11:00,100
that's into their network open to your
 

415
00:11:00,100 --> 00:11:03,630
that's into their network open to your
network um there's IP crawlers that can

416
00:11:03,630 --> 00:11:03,640
network um there's IP crawlers that can
 

417
00:11:03,640 --> 00:11:06,540
network um there's IP crawlers that can
go through every single IP address in

418
00:11:06,540 --> 00:11:06,550
go through every single IP address in
 

419
00:11:06,550 --> 00:11:08,660
go through every single IP address in
the world and will tell you objectable

420
00:11:08,660 --> 00:11:08,670
the world and will tell you objectable
 

421
00:11:08,670 --> 00:11:13,460
the world and will tell you objectable
instrument for example things like that

422
00:11:13,460 --> 00:11:13,470
instrument for example things like that
 

423
00:11:13,470 --> 00:11:15,990
instrument for example things like that
who sells like they show them online and

424
00:11:15,990 --> 00:11:16,000
who sells like they show them online and
 

425
00:11:16,000 --> 00:11:18,270
who sells like they show them online and
then anybody with the malicious intent

426
00:11:18,270 --> 00:11:18,280
then anybody with the malicious intent
 

427
00:11:18,280 --> 00:11:20,280
then anybody with the malicious intent
like the people you said or that you

428
00:11:20,280 --> 00:11:20,290
like the people you said or that you
 

429
00:11:20,290 --> 00:11:25,350
like the people you said or that you
stated I can use that to create many

430
00:11:25,350 --> 00:11:25,360
stated I can use that to create many
 

431
00:11:25,360 --> 00:11:27,390
stated I can use that to create many
Millett acts or copy off any files

432
00:11:27,390 --> 00:11:27,400
Millett acts or copy off any files
 

433
00:11:27,400 --> 00:11:30,060
Millett acts or copy off any files
premiere be damage your venture just do

434
00:11:30,060 --> 00:11:30,070
premiere be damage your venture just do
 

435
00:11:30,070 --> 00:11:35,430
premiere be damage your venture just do
most anything unreal and speak now

436
00:11:35,430 --> 00:11:35,440
most anything unreal and speak now
 

437
00:11:35,440 --> 00:11:36,690
most anything unreal and speak now
getting away from printers are there

438
00:11:36,690 --> 00:11:36,700
getting away from printers are there
 

439
00:11:36,700 --> 00:11:39,120
getting away from printers are there
other devices that we as consumers may

440
00:11:39,120 --> 00:11:39,130
other devices that we as consumers may
 

441
00:11:39,130 --> 00:11:43,410
other devices that we as consumers may
pick up whether they be from a retailer

442
00:11:43,410 --> 00:11:43,420
pick up whether they be from a retailer
 

443
00:11:43,420 --> 00:11:45,660
pick up whether they be from a retailer
or from say our Internet service

444
00:11:45,660 --> 00:11:45,670
or from say our Internet service
 

445
00:11:45,670 --> 00:11:49,230
or from say our Internet service
provider that would allow us to be

446
00:11:49,230 --> 00:11:49,240
provider that would allow us to be
 

447
00:11:49,240 --> 00:11:51,120
provider that would allow us to be
compromised without us even thinking

448
00:11:51,120 --> 00:11:51,130
compromised without us even thinking
 

449
00:11:51,130 --> 00:11:53,760
compromised without us even thinking
about the security aspect of it Oh

450
00:11:53,760 --> 00:11:53,770
about the security aspect of it Oh
 

451
00:11:53,770 --> 00:11:58,230
about the security aspect of it Oh
there are times on a really big example

452
00:11:58,230 --> 00:11:58,240
there are times on a really big example
 

453
00:11:58,240 --> 00:12:01,890
there are times on a really big example
that I personally found him I was that I

454
00:12:01,890 --> 00:12:01,900
that I personally found him I was that I
 

455
00:12:01,900 --> 00:12:03,900
that I personally found him I was that I
actually experienced myself in my own

456
00:12:03,900 --> 00:12:03,910
actually experienced myself in my own
 

457
00:12:03,910 --> 00:12:08,310
actually experienced myself in my own
home what is on a certain ISP company

458
00:12:08,310 --> 00:12:08,320
home what is on a certain ISP company
 

459
00:12:08,320 --> 00:12:12,240
home what is on a certain ISP company
that are not the state are that I would

460
00:12:12,240 --> 00:12:12,250
that are not the state are that I would
 

461
00:12:12,250 --> 00:12:16,560
that are not the state are that I would
say a major ISP in Canada Oh what did

462
00:12:16,560 --> 00:12:16,570
say a major ISP in Canada Oh what did
 

463
00:12:16,570 --> 00:12:18,150
say a major ISP in Canada Oh what did
install them all down in my own home

464
00:12:18,150 --> 00:12:18,160
install them all down in my own home
 

465
00:12:18,160 --> 00:12:21,180
install them all down in my own home
that release her personal de are and it

466
00:12:21,180 --> 00:12:21,190
that release her personal de are and it
 

467
00:12:21,190 --> 00:12:24,240
that release her personal de are and it
actually opened up the web interface to

468
00:12:24,240 --> 00:12:24,250
actually opened up the web interface to
 

469
00:12:24,250 --> 00:12:28,470
actually opened up the web interface to
the public and these and it had a

470
00:12:28,470 --> 00:12:28,480
the public and these and it had a
 

471
00:12:28,480 --> 00:12:31,520
the public and these and it had a
standard like usually password like no

472
00:12:31,520 --> 00:12:31,530
standard like usually password like no
 

473
00:12:31,530 --> 00:12:37,520
standard like usually password like no
like it's a lot like admin password yeah

474
00:12:37,520 --> 00:12:37,530
like it's a lot like admin password yeah
 

475
00:12:37,530 --> 00:12:41,640
like it's a lot like admin password yeah
so and so many people don't understand

476
00:12:41,640 --> 00:12:41,650
so and so many people don't understand
 

477
00:12:41,650 --> 00:12:46,250
so and so many people don't understand
that this is such a huge issue and be

478
00:12:46,250 --> 00:12:46,260
that this is such a huge issue and be
 

479
00:12:46,260 --> 00:12:49,020
that this is such a huge issue and be
like I haven't contacted I'm on edge

480
00:12:49,020 --> 00:12:49,030
like I haven't contacted I'm on edge
 

481
00:12:49,030 --> 00:12:52,010
like I haven't contacted I'm on edge
um I probably should most like

482
00:12:52,010 --> 00:12:52,020
um I probably should most like
 

483
00:12:52,020 --> 00:12:54,860
um I probably should most like
in the future but you really have to be

484
00:12:54,860 --> 00:12:54,870
in the future but you really have to be
 

485
00:12:54,870 --> 00:12:56,960
in the future but you really have to be
careful with what you're installing onto

486
00:12:56,960 --> 00:12:56,970
careful with what you're installing onto
 

487
00:12:56,970 --> 00:12:59,750
careful with what you're installing onto
your network because especially with

488
00:12:59,750 --> 00:12:59,760
your network because especially with
 

489
00:12:59,760 --> 00:13:02,440
your network because especially with
that like that did send a bit of a shock

490
00:13:02,440 --> 00:13:02,450
that like that did send a bit of a shock
 

491
00:13:02,450 --> 00:13:05,750
that like that did send a bit of a shock
because looked at anybody could walk

492
00:13:05,750 --> 00:13:05,760
because looked at anybody could walk
 

493
00:13:05,760 --> 00:13:08,870
because looked at anybody could walk
into my mode on oh we need to do more

494
00:13:08,870 --> 00:13:08,880
into my mode on oh we need to do more
 

495
00:13:08,880 --> 00:13:11,180
into my mode on oh we need to do more
basic things like we said it or power it

496
00:13:11,180 --> 00:13:11,190
basic things like we said it or power it
 

497
00:13:11,190 --> 00:13:13,430
basic things like we said it or power it
off but then it also gives you more

498
00:13:13,430 --> 00:13:13,440
off but then it also gives you more
 

499
00:13:13,440 --> 00:13:15,860
off but then it also gives you more
access to your network then you should

500
00:13:15,860 --> 00:13:15,870
access to your network then you should
 

501
00:13:15,870 --> 00:13:21,079
access to your network then you should
ever have like a modem or a router would

502
00:13:21,079 --> 00:13:21,089
ever have like a modem or a router would
 

503
00:13:21,089 --> 00:13:25,519
ever have like a modem or a router would
allow me to open up say port 3389 the

504
00:13:25,519 --> 00:13:25,529
allow me to open up say port 3389 the
 

505
00:13:25,529 --> 00:13:28,130
allow me to open up say port 3389 the
network which would allow me as a hacker

506
00:13:28,130 --> 00:13:28,140
network which would allow me as a hacker
 

507
00:13:28,140 --> 00:13:31,940
network which would allow me as a hacker
to remotely access your computer desktop

508
00:13:31,940 --> 00:13:31,950
to remotely access your computer desktop
 

509
00:13:31,950 --> 00:13:36,440
to remotely access your computer desktop
and wreak all kinds of havoc what other

510
00:13:36,440 --> 00:13:36,450
and wreak all kinds of havoc what other
 

511
00:13:36,450 --> 00:13:38,480
and wreak all kinds of havoc what other
kinds of what other kinds of threats

512
00:13:38,480 --> 00:13:38,490
kinds of what other kinds of threats
 

513
00:13:38,490 --> 00:13:41,660
kinds of what other kinds of threats
does this introduce to our network I

514
00:13:41,660 --> 00:13:41,670
does this introduce to our network I
 

515
00:13:41,670 --> 00:13:43,820
does this introduce to our network I
mean these are devices that we trust so

516
00:13:43,820 --> 00:13:43,830
mean these are devices that we trust so
 

517
00:13:43,830 --> 00:13:45,110
mean these are devices that we trust so
the internet service provider says

518
00:13:45,110 --> 00:13:45,120
the internet service provider says
 

519
00:13:45,120 --> 00:13:46,760
the internet service provider says
here's your new modem it's gonna be

520
00:13:46,760 --> 00:13:46,770
here's your new modem it's gonna be
 

521
00:13:46,770 --> 00:13:49,250
here's your new modem it's gonna be
faster it's gonna be better and you

522
00:13:49,250 --> 00:13:49,260
faster it's gonna be better and you
 

523
00:13:49,260 --> 00:13:50,630
faster it's gonna be better and you
don't ever think twice about the

524
00:13:50,630 --> 00:13:50,640
don't ever think twice about the
 

525
00:13:50,640 --> 00:13:52,970
don't ever think twice about the
security of that device what what does

526
00:13:52,970 --> 00:13:52,980
security of that device what what does
 

527
00:13:52,980 --> 00:13:55,910
security of that device what what does
it open up to a hacker such as yourself

528
00:13:55,910 --> 00:13:55,920
it open up to a hacker such as yourself
 

529
00:13:55,920 --> 00:13:58,220
it open up to a hacker such as yourself
now I understand that you're taking the

530
00:13:58,220 --> 00:13:58,230
now I understand that you're taking the
 

531
00:13:58,230 --> 00:14:00,290
now I understand that you're taking the
you're taking the high road and saying

532
00:14:00,290 --> 00:14:00,300
you're taking the high road and saying
 

533
00:14:00,300 --> 00:14:04,460
you're taking the high road and saying
you know I'm gonna educate people but

534
00:14:04,460 --> 00:14:04,470
you know I'm gonna educate people but
 

535
00:14:04,470 --> 00:14:07,069
you know I'm gonna educate people but
what about those hackers that are saying

536
00:14:07,069 --> 00:14:07,079
what about those hackers that are saying
 

537
00:14:07,079 --> 00:14:14,360
what about those hackers that are saying
no I'm gonna exploit people that's a

538
00:14:14,360 --> 00:14:14,370
no I'm gonna exploit people that's a
 

539
00:14:14,370 --> 00:14:16,010
no I'm gonna exploit people that's a
very good question I'm just gonna

540
00:14:16,010 --> 00:14:16,020
very good question I'm just gonna
 

541
00:14:16,020 --> 00:14:17,380
very good question I'm just gonna
pretending of their own

542
00:14:17,380 --> 00:14:17,390
pretending of their own
 

543
00:14:17,390 --> 00:14:21,319
pretending of their own
it is truly astonishing what you can do

544
00:14:21,319 --> 00:14:21,329
it is truly astonishing what you can do
 

545
00:14:21,329 --> 00:14:24,160
it is truly astonishing what you can do
when you have access to these systems

546
00:14:24,160 --> 00:14:24,170
when you have access to these systems
 

547
00:14:24,170 --> 00:14:27,380
when you have access to these systems
what you said I mean I believe those are

548
00:14:27,380 --> 00:14:27,390
what you said I mean I believe those are
 

549
00:14:27,390 --> 00:14:30,920
what you said I mean I believe those are
you people correct yeah yeah so um

550
00:14:30,920 --> 00:14:30,930
you people correct yeah yeah so um
 

551
00:14:30,930 --> 00:14:33,319
you people correct yeah yeah so um
figure out without one you most likely

552
00:14:33,319 --> 00:14:33,329
figure out without one you most likely
 

553
00:14:33,329 --> 00:14:35,269
figure out without one you most likely
chap you need to have that one enabled

554
00:14:35,269 --> 00:14:35,279
chap you need to have that one enabled
 

555
00:14:35,279 --> 00:14:38,600
chap you need to have that one enabled
but there's so many exploits with this

556
00:14:38,600 --> 00:14:38,610
but there's so many exploits with this
 

557
00:14:38,610 --> 00:14:42,220
but there's so many exploits with this
and a modem you know you'll be able just

558
00:14:42,220 --> 00:14:42,230
and a modem you know you'll be able just
 

559
00:14:42,230 --> 00:14:45,470
and a modem you know you'll be able just
in most cases you can see what is

560
00:14:45,470 --> 00:14:45,480
in most cases you can see what is
 

561
00:14:45,480 --> 00:14:48,590
in most cases you can see what is
installed on the network uh and then

562
00:14:48,590 --> 00:14:48,600
installed on the network uh and then
 

563
00:14:48,600 --> 00:14:51,100
installed on the network uh and then
your shoulder specific IP address and

564
00:14:51,100 --> 00:14:51,110
your shoulder specific IP address and
 

565
00:14:51,110 --> 00:14:54,319
your shoulder specific IP address and
you can find vulnerabilities and like

566
00:14:54,319 --> 00:14:54,329
you can find vulnerabilities and like
 

567
00:14:54,329 --> 00:14:59,600
you can find vulnerabilities and like
CVD for but the CVD database and it can

568
00:14:59,600 --> 00:14:59,610
CVD for but the CVD database and it can
 

569
00:14:59,610 --> 00:15:01,890
CVD for but the CVD database and it can
say oh yeah

570
00:15:01,890 --> 00:15:01,900
say oh yeah
 

571
00:15:01,900 --> 00:15:04,770
say oh yeah
this threesome wish to see if their

572
00:15:04,770 --> 00:15:04,780
this threesome wish to see if their
 

573
00:15:04,780 --> 00:15:07,650
this threesome wish to see if their
missed out you know IOT thermostats this

574
00:15:07,650 --> 00:15:07,660
missed out you know IOT thermostats this
 

575
00:15:07,660 --> 00:15:10,320
missed out you know IOT thermostats this
thermostat has this vulnerability that

576
00:15:10,320 --> 00:15:10,330
thermostat has this vulnerability that
 

577
00:15:10,330 --> 00:15:12,960
thermostat has this vulnerability that
hasn't been patched yet and access

578
00:15:12,960 --> 00:15:12,970
hasn't been patched yet and access
 

579
00:15:12,970 --> 00:15:15,780
hasn't been patched yet and access
accusing this or this port and jacked up

580
00:15:15,780 --> 00:15:15,790
accusing this or this port and jacked up
 

581
00:15:15,790 --> 00:15:17,730
accusing this or this port and jacked up
to temperature or kill it or damage to

582
00:15:17,730 --> 00:15:17,740
to temperature or kill it or damage to
 

583
00:15:17,740 --> 00:15:21,390
to temperature or kill it or damage to
thermostat and then you can because you

584
00:15:21,390 --> 00:15:21,400
thermostat and then you can because you
 

585
00:15:21,400 --> 00:15:22,890
thermostat and then you can because you
have accessed the modem you can open

586
00:15:22,890 --> 00:15:22,900
have accessed the modem you can open
 

587
00:15:22,900 --> 00:15:25,110
have accessed the modem you can open
that porch so you can access it yourself

588
00:15:25,110 --> 00:15:25,120
that porch so you can access it yourself
 

589
00:15:25,120 --> 00:15:26,970
that porch so you can access it yourself
even if you weren't able to before

590
00:15:26,970 --> 00:15:26,980
even if you weren't able to before
 

591
00:15:26,980 --> 00:15:28,530
even if you weren't able to before
can I didn't put something out there

592
00:15:28,530 --> 00:15:28,540
can I didn't put something out there
 

593
00:15:28,540 --> 00:15:30,810
can I didn't put something out there
because you touched on thermostats here

594
00:15:30,810 --> 00:15:30,820
because you touched on thermostats here
 

595
00:15:30,820 --> 00:15:31,830
because you touched on thermostats here
the Canadian hacker

596
00:15:31,830 --> 00:15:31,840
the Canadian hacker
 

597
00:15:31,840 --> 00:15:35,550
the Canadian hacker
I could also as a hacker monitor that

598
00:15:35,550 --> 00:15:35,560
I could also as a hacker monitor that
 

599
00:15:35,560 --> 00:15:37,980
I could also as a hacker monitor that
thermostat and see when the people are

600
00:15:37,980 --> 00:15:37,990
thermostat and see when the people are
 

601
00:15:37,990 --> 00:15:39,900
thermostat and see when the people are
coming and going so then it brings it

602
00:15:39,900 --> 00:15:39,910
coming and going so then it brings it
 

603
00:15:39,910 --> 00:15:42,150
coming and going so then it brings it
into a physical realm of saying okay

604
00:15:42,150 --> 00:15:42,160
into a physical realm of saying okay
 

605
00:15:42,160 --> 00:15:45,090
into a physical realm of saying okay
well my nest thermostat tells whoever

606
00:15:45,090 --> 00:15:45,100
well my nest thermostat tells whoever
 

607
00:15:45,100 --> 00:15:47,040
well my nest thermostat tells whoever
has access to it whether I'm home or not

608
00:15:47,040 --> 00:15:47,050
has access to it whether I'm home or not
 

609
00:15:47,050 --> 00:15:52,040
has access to it whether I'm home or not
yeah so what if I was a physical robber

610
00:15:52,040 --> 00:15:52,050
yeah so what if I was a physical robber
 

611
00:15:52,050 --> 00:15:57,620
yeah so what if I was a physical robber
it's definitely a scary world all that

612
00:15:57,620 --> 00:15:57,630
it's definitely a scary world all that
 

613
00:15:57,630 --> 00:16:00,720
it's definitely a scary world all that
for a lot of people have smartphones

614
00:16:00,720 --> 00:16:00,730
for a lot of people have smartphones
 

615
00:16:00,730 --> 00:16:05,040
for a lot of people have smartphones
right and communicate you zippe for

616
00:16:05,040 --> 00:16:05,050
right and communicate you zippe for
 

617
00:16:05,050 --> 00:16:09,930
right and communicate you zippe for
example now you have a makers help us

618
00:16:09,930 --> 00:16:09,940
example now you have a makers help us
 

619
00:16:09,940 --> 00:16:12,420
example now you have a makers help us
into album that connects all of those

620
00:16:12,420 --> 00:16:12,430
into album that connects all of those
 

621
00:16:12,430 --> 00:16:14,850
into album that connects all of those
systems together and if you don't have

622
00:16:14,850 --> 00:16:14,860
systems together and if you don't have
 

623
00:16:14,860 --> 00:16:17,090
systems together and if you don't have
that set up properly or if they didn't

624
00:16:17,090 --> 00:16:17,100
that set up properly or if they didn't
 

625
00:16:17,100 --> 00:16:20,550
that set up properly or if they didn't
correct any security issues that they

626
00:16:20,550 --> 00:16:20,560
correct any security issues that they
 

627
00:16:20,560 --> 00:16:24,420
correct any security issues that they
saw present that would allow you access

628
00:16:24,420 --> 00:16:24,430
saw present that would allow you access
 

629
00:16:24,430 --> 00:16:27,860
saw present that would allow you access
to for example unlock the door are

630
00:16:27,860 --> 00:16:27,870
to for example unlock the door are
 

631
00:16:27,870 --> 00:16:31,470
to for example unlock the door are
trading off and it's really bad because

632
00:16:31,470 --> 00:16:31,480
trading off and it's really bad because
 

633
00:16:31,480 --> 00:16:34,320
trading off and it's really bad because
they a lot of systems don't use any

634
00:16:34,320 --> 00:16:34,330
they a lot of systems don't use any
 

635
00:16:34,330 --> 00:16:36,660
they a lot of systems don't use any
other education with that I mean there

636
00:16:36,660 --> 00:16:36,670
other education with that I mean there
 

637
00:16:36,670 --> 00:16:40,590
other education with that I mean there
are some that do but yeah with like one

638
00:16:40,590 --> 00:16:40,600
are some that do but yeah with like one
 

639
00:16:40,600 --> 00:16:42,330
are some that do but yeah with like one
of those smart phones you know it's just

640
00:16:42,330 --> 00:16:42,340
of those smart phones you know it's just
 

641
00:16:42,340 --> 00:16:44,100
of those smart phones you know it's just
like if you were helped everything out

642
00:16:44,100 --> 00:16:44,110
like if you were helped everything out
 

643
00:16:44,110 --> 00:16:45,720
like if you were helped everything out
you could press a button on your phone

644
00:16:45,720 --> 00:16:45,730
you could press a button on your phone
 

645
00:16:45,730 --> 00:16:48,120
you could press a button on your phone
maneuver lock the door a wall we can

646
00:16:48,120 --> 00:16:48,130
maneuver lock the door a wall we can
 

647
00:16:48,130 --> 00:16:49,860
maneuver lock the door a wall we can
somebody else that has access to your

648
00:16:49,860 --> 00:16:49,870
somebody else that has access to your
 

649
00:16:49,870 --> 00:16:54,990
somebody else that has access to your
modem do the same thing so we thought

650
00:16:54,990 --> 00:16:55,000
modem do the same thing so we thought
 

651
00:16:55,000 --> 00:16:57,450
modem do the same thing so we thought
yeah never even really thought that we

652
00:16:57,450 --> 00:16:57,460
yeah never even really thought that we
 

653
00:16:57,460 --> 00:16:59,580
yeah never even really thought that we
were always thinking in terms of you

654
00:16:59,580 --> 00:16:59,590
were always thinking in terms of you
 

655
00:16:59,590 --> 00:17:01,830
were always thinking in terms of you
know the the actual app well if I have

656
00:17:01,830 --> 00:17:01,840
know the the actual app well if I have
 

657
00:17:01,840 --> 00:17:06,329
know the the actual app well if I have
access to the modem I can access any of

658
00:17:06,329 --> 00:17:06,339
access to the modem I can access any of
 

659
00:17:06,339 --> 00:17:08,460
access to the modem I can access any of
the devices within the same network

660
00:17:08,460 --> 00:17:08,470
the devices within the same network
 

661
00:17:08,470 --> 00:17:10,199
the devices within the same network
that's scary stuff

662
00:17:10,199 --> 00:17:10,209
that's scary stuff
 

663
00:17:10,209 --> 00:17:12,570
that's scary stuff
well we're speaking with the Canadian

664
00:17:12,570 --> 00:17:12,580
well we're speaking with the Canadian
 

665
00:17:12,580 --> 00:17:15,720
well we're speaking with the Canadian
hacker and before we take a quick break

666
00:17:15,720 --> 00:17:15,730
hacker and before we take a quick break
 

667
00:17:15,730 --> 00:17:18,659
hacker and before we take a quick break
let's have a look at a video of how the

668
00:17:18,659 --> 00:17:18,669
let's have a look at a video of how the
 

669
00:17:18,669 --> 00:17:20,549
let's have a look at a video of how the
Canadian hacker was able to compromise

670
00:17:20,549 --> 00:17:20,559
Canadian hacker was able to compromise
 

671
00:17:20,559 --> 00:17:26,010
Canadian hacker was able to compromise
all those printers

672
00:17:26,010 --> 00:17:26,020

 

673
00:17:26,020 --> 00:17:36,790

[Music]

674
00:17:36,790 --> 00:17:36,800

 

675
00:17:36,800 --> 00:18:13,450

[Music]

676
00:18:13,450 --> 00:18:13,460

 

677
00:18:13,460 --> 00:18:31,100

[Music]

678
00:18:31,100 --> 00:18:31,110

 

679
00:18:31,110 --> 00:18:32,280

[Music]

680
00:18:32,280 --> 00:18:32,290
[Music]
 

681
00:18:32,290 --> 00:18:34,320
[Music]
please don't go anywhere when we come

682
00:18:34,320 --> 00:18:34,330
please don't go anywhere when we come
 

683
00:18:34,330 --> 00:18:36,180
please don't go anywhere when we come
back from the short break the Canadian

684
00:18:36,180 --> 00:18:36,190
back from the short break the Canadian
 

685
00:18:36,190 --> 00:18:37,500
back from the short break the Canadian
hacker is not only going to be sharing

686
00:18:37,500 --> 00:18:37,510
hacker is not only going to be sharing
 

687
00:18:37,510 --> 00:18:39,390
hacker is not only going to be sharing
with us about the response that he's

688
00:18:39,390 --> 00:18:39,400
with us about the response that he's
 

689
00:18:39,400 --> 00:18:41,700
with us about the response that he's
received to the printer Hanna but also

690
00:18:41,700 --> 00:18:41,710
received to the printer Hanna but also
 

691
00:18:41,710 --> 00:18:44,100
received to the printer Hanna but also
he's gonna share his concerns about how

692
00:18:44,100 --> 00:18:44,110
he's gonna share his concerns about how
 

693
00:18:44,110 --> 00:18:46,860
he's gonna share his concerns about how
young people could use similar hacks to

694
00:18:46,860 --> 00:18:46,870
young people could use similar hacks to
 

695
00:18:46,870 --> 00:18:49,410
young people could use similar hacks to
damage devices around the world and how

696
00:18:49,410 --> 00:18:49,420
damage devices around the world and how
 

697
00:18:49,420 --> 00:18:51,780
damage devices around the world and how
governments could use it for cyber

698
00:18:51,780 --> 00:18:51,790
governments could use it for cyber
 

699
00:18:51,790 --> 00:18:55,880
governments could use it for cyber
espionage don't go anywhere

700
00:18:55,880 --> 00:18:55,890
espionage don't go anywhere
 

701
00:18:55,890 --> 00:19:09,300
espionage don't go anywhere
[Music]

702
00:19:09,300 --> 00:19:09,310

 

703
00:19:09,310 --> 00:19:13,940

[Music]

704
00:19:13,940 --> 00:19:13,950

 

705
00:19:13,950 --> 00:19:16,320

jumping back to your own hack of

706
00:19:16,320 --> 00:19:16,330
jumping back to your own hack of
 

707
00:19:16,330 --> 00:19:19,320
jumping back to your own hack of
printers across Canada the US and even

708
00:19:19,320 --> 00:19:19,330
printers across Canada the US and even
 

709
00:19:19,330 --> 00:19:25,620
printers across Canada the US and even
overseas what is the response that

710
00:19:25,620 --> 00:19:25,630
overseas what is the response that
 

711
00:19:25,630 --> 00:19:28,970
overseas what is the response that
you've received like have you have you

712
00:19:28,970 --> 00:19:28,980
you've received like have you have you
 

713
00:19:28,980 --> 00:19:33,140
you've received like have you have you
gotten a lot of feedback from that hack

714
00:19:33,140 --> 00:19:33,150
gotten a lot of feedback from that hack
 

715
00:19:33,150 --> 00:19:42,260
gotten a lot of feedback from that hack
yes I have the attack my Twitter handle

716
00:19:42,260 --> 00:19:42,270
yes I have the attack my Twitter handle
 

717
00:19:42,270 --> 00:19:48,750
yes I have the attack my Twitter handle
as well as my email now the majority of

718
00:19:48,750 --> 00:19:48,760
as well as my email now the majority of
 

719
00:19:48,760 --> 00:19:51,750
as well as my email now the majority of
the feedback has been positive in a lot

720
00:19:51,750 --> 00:19:51,760
the feedback has been positive in a lot
 

721
00:19:51,760 --> 00:19:53,880
the feedback has been positive in a lot
of people actually font acted me to help

722
00:19:53,880 --> 00:19:53,890
of people actually font acted me to help
 

723
00:19:53,890 --> 00:19:57,780
of people actually font acted me to help
with the problem and a lot of the folks

724
00:19:57,780 --> 00:19:57,790
with the problem and a lot of the folks
 

725
00:19:57,790 --> 00:19:59,640
with the problem and a lot of the folks
tutor I don't know how to do this me

726
00:19:59,640 --> 00:19:59,650
tutor I don't know how to do this me
 

727
00:19:59,650 --> 00:20:02,790
tutor I don't know how to do this me
help me and you know you just buy stuff

728
00:20:02,790 --> 00:20:02,800
help me and you know you just buy stuff
 

729
00:20:02,800 --> 00:20:04,190
help me and you know you just buy stuff
with it

730
00:20:04,190 --> 00:20:04,200
with it
 

731
00:20:04,200 --> 00:20:07,500
with it
there's some other people which I mean

732
00:20:07,500 --> 00:20:07,510
there's some other people which I mean
 

733
00:20:07,510 --> 00:20:10,380
there's some other people which I mean
necessarily know your motives but I have

734
00:20:10,380 --> 00:20:10,390
necessarily know your motives but I have
 

735
00:20:10,390 --> 00:20:12,180
necessarily know your motives but I have
bought in actually a few death threats

736
00:20:12,180 --> 00:20:12,190
bought in actually a few death threats
 

737
00:20:12,190 --> 00:20:17,160
bought in actually a few death threats
from mom Russia which is why you can see

738
00:20:17,160 --> 00:20:17,170
from mom Russia which is why you can see
 

739
00:20:17,170 --> 00:20:20,730
from mom Russia which is why you can see
their master in this aw sure

740
00:20:20,730 --> 00:20:20,740
their master in this aw sure
 

741
00:20:20,740 --> 00:20:24,090
their master in this aw sure
is it possible the Canadian hacker and

742
00:20:24,090 --> 00:20:24,100
is it possible the Canadian hacker and
 

743
00:20:24,100 --> 00:20:25,830
is it possible the Canadian hacker and
we don't like to get into politics or

744
00:20:25,830 --> 00:20:25,840
we don't like to get into politics or
 

745
00:20:25,840 --> 00:20:27,780
we don't like to get into politics or
any of that kind of stuff here on

746
00:20:27,780 --> 00:20:27,790
any of that kind of stuff here on
 

747
00:20:27,790 --> 00:20:30,660
any of that kind of stuff here on
category 5 but is it possible that

748
00:20:30,660 --> 00:20:30,670
category 5 but is it possible that
 

749
00:20:30,670 --> 00:20:33,540
category 5 but is it possible that
they're utilizing these exploits and you

750
00:20:33,540 --> 00:20:33,550
they're utilizing these exploits and you
 

751
00:20:33,550 --> 00:20:36,870
they're utilizing these exploits and you
are educating the people to these

752
00:20:36,870 --> 00:20:36,880
are educating the people to these
 

753
00:20:36,880 --> 00:20:39,900
are educating the people to these
exploits you know what I've actually

754
00:20:39,900 --> 00:20:39,910
exploits you know what I've actually
 

755
00:20:39,910 --> 00:20:43,050
exploits you know what I've actually
never thought that and that is really

756
00:20:43,050 --> 00:20:43,060
never thought that and that is really
 

757
00:20:43,060 --> 00:20:44,170
never thought that and that is really
good

758
00:20:44,170 --> 00:20:44,180
good
 

759
00:20:44,180 --> 00:20:47,350
good
you are just so that is a possibility

760
00:20:47,350 --> 00:20:47,360
you are just so that is a possibility
 

761
00:20:47,360 --> 00:20:50,740
you are just so that is a possibility
that is very much so possibility yes and

762
00:20:50,740 --> 00:20:50,750
that is very much so possibility yes and
 

763
00:20:50,750 --> 00:20:53,230
that is very much so possibility yes and
I could be showing by doing this I could

764
00:20:53,230 --> 00:20:53,240
I could be showing by doing this I could
 

765
00:20:53,240 --> 00:20:55,330
I could be showing by doing this I could
be showing the public are things that

766
00:20:55,330 --> 00:20:55,340
be showing the public are things that
 

767
00:20:55,340 --> 00:20:57,580
be showing the public are things that
maybe those people who said those

768
00:20:57,580 --> 00:20:57,590
maybe those people who said those
 

769
00:20:57,590 --> 00:21:01,810
maybe those people who said those
threats they want to see oh yeah that's

770
00:21:01,810 --> 00:21:01,820
threats they want to see oh yeah that's
 

771
00:21:01,820 --> 00:21:04,060
threats they want to see oh yeah that's
a very good point how do you think the

772
00:21:04,060 --> 00:21:04,070
a very good point how do you think the
 

773
00:21:04,070 --> 00:21:08,950
a very good point how do you think the
CIA felt when eternal blue was revealed

774
00:21:08,950 --> 00:21:08,960
CIA felt when eternal blue was revealed
 

775
00:21:08,960 --> 00:21:12,610
CIA felt when eternal blue was revealed
publicly you know I don't know what

776
00:21:12,610 --> 00:21:12,620
publicly you know I don't know what
 

777
00:21:12,620 --> 00:21:15,580
publicly you know I don't know what
happened to those hackers we nobody

778
00:21:15,580 --> 00:21:15,590
happened to those hackers we nobody
 

779
00:21:15,590 --> 00:21:18,460
happened to those hackers we nobody
knows so looking at so this is the

780
00:21:18,460 --> 00:21:18,470
knows so looking at so this is the
 

781
00:21:18,470 --> 00:21:19,870
knows so looking at so this is the
Canadian hacker that we're speaking with

782
00:21:19,870 --> 00:21:19,880
Canadian hacker that we're speaking with
 

783
00:21:19,880 --> 00:21:22,510
Canadian hacker that we're speaking with
her and and we joke but the truth is is

784
00:21:22,510 --> 00:21:22,520
her and and we joke but the truth is is
 

785
00:21:22,520 --> 00:21:24,850
her and and we joke but the truth is is
that the Canadian hacker has taken a

786
00:21:24,850 --> 00:21:24,860
that the Canadian hacker has taken a
 

787
00:21:24,860 --> 00:21:28,510
that the Canadian hacker has taken a
very high road approach to these types

788
00:21:28,510 --> 00:21:28,520
very high road approach to these types
 

789
00:21:28,520 --> 00:21:30,880
very high road approach to these types
of exploits and in your actual printouts

790
00:21:30,880 --> 00:21:30,890
of exploits and in your actual printouts
 

791
00:21:30,890 --> 00:21:34,360
of exploits and in your actual printouts
so understand hundreds of thousands of

792
00:21:34,360 --> 00:21:34,370
so understand hundreds of thousands of
 

793
00:21:34,370 --> 00:21:35,800
so understand hundreds of thousands of
printers around the world suddenly

794
00:21:35,800 --> 00:21:35,810
printers around the world suddenly
 

795
00:21:35,810 --> 00:21:39,160
printers around the world suddenly
started printing out this printout from

796
00:21:39,160 --> 00:21:39,170
started printing out this printout from
 

797
00:21:39,170 --> 00:21:43,540
started printing out this printout from
this hacker and on this printout it says

798
00:21:43,540 --> 00:21:43,550
this hacker and on this printout it says
 

799
00:21:43,550 --> 00:21:46,660
this hacker and on this printout it says
if you are unable to find suitable

800
00:21:46,660 --> 00:21:46,670
if you are unable to find suitable
 

801
00:21:46,670 --> 00:21:49,150
if you are unable to find suitable
instructions you are welcome to contact

802
00:21:49,150 --> 00:21:49,160
instructions you are welcome to contact
 

803
00:21:49,160 --> 00:21:52,390
instructions you are welcome to contact
me via email or Twitter and I'll be glad

804
00:21:52,390 --> 00:21:52,400
me via email or Twitter and I'll be glad
 

805
00:21:52,400 --> 00:21:55,450
me via email or Twitter and I'll be glad
to help you out you mentioned some older

806
00:21:55,450 --> 00:21:55,460
to help you out you mentioned some older
 

807
00:21:55,460 --> 00:21:57,340
to help you out you mentioned some older
folks reaching out like have you really

808
00:21:57,340 --> 00:21:57,350
folks reaching out like have you really
 

809
00:21:57,350 --> 00:21:59,980
folks reaching out like have you really
received folks reaching out and saying I

810
00:21:59,980 --> 00:21:59,990
received folks reaching out and saying I
 

811
00:21:59,990 --> 00:22:04,690
received folks reaching out and saying I
need help with this yes I have the

812
00:22:04,690 --> 00:22:04,700
need help with this yes I have the
 

813
00:22:04,700 --> 00:22:06,550
need help with this yes I have the
majority of the emails I've received

814
00:22:06,550 --> 00:22:06,560
majority of the emails I've received
 

815
00:22:06,560 --> 00:22:10,080
majority of the emails I've received
where people thank you all which I

816
00:22:10,080 --> 00:22:10,090
where people thank you all which I
 

817
00:22:10,090 --> 00:22:12,760
where people thank you all which I
necessarily will pay for that through

818
00:22:12,760 --> 00:22:12,770
necessarily will pay for that through
 

819
00:22:12,770 --> 00:22:15,100
necessarily will pay for that through
the email or anything like that but is

820
00:22:15,100 --> 00:22:15,110
the email or anything like that but is
 

821
00:22:15,110 --> 00:22:18,760
the email or anything like that but is
more to provide a support system to help

822
00:22:18,760 --> 00:22:18,770
more to provide a support system to help
 

823
00:22:18,770 --> 00:22:21,270
more to provide a support system to help
people with that and yes I've received

824
00:22:21,270 --> 00:22:21,280
people with that and yes I've received
 

825
00:22:21,280 --> 00:22:25,150
people with that and yes I've received
multitudes of emails stating that they

826
00:22:25,150 --> 00:22:25,160
multitudes of emails stating that they
 

827
00:22:25,160 --> 00:22:29,890
multitudes of emails stating that they
required help and their company hasn't

828
00:22:29,890 --> 00:22:29,900
required help and their company hasn't
 

829
00:22:29,900 --> 00:22:31,530
required help and their company hasn't
told them or they don't know about you

830
00:22:31,530 --> 00:22:31,540
told them or they don't know about you
 

831
00:22:31,540 --> 00:22:33,760
told them or they don't know about you
things like that and I could provide a

832
00:22:33,760 --> 00:22:33,770
things like that and I could provide a
 

833
00:22:33,770 --> 00:22:35,920
things like that and I could provide a
step-by-step process and then there's

834
00:22:35,920 --> 00:22:35,930
step-by-step process and then there's
 

835
00:22:35,930 --> 00:22:38,440
step-by-step process and then there's
also some people some people that don't

836
00:22:38,440 --> 00:22:38,450
also some people some people that don't
 

837
00:22:38,450 --> 00:22:40,360
also some people some people that don't
necessarily know how I do the x-point

838
00:22:40,360 --> 00:22:40,370
necessarily know how I do the x-point
 

839
00:22:40,370 --> 00:22:42,640
necessarily know how I do the x-point
like you know how to fix the problem and

840
00:22:42,640 --> 00:22:42,650
like you know how to fix the problem and
 

841
00:22:42,650 --> 00:22:45,130
like you know how to fix the problem and
they've contacted me to test it again to

842
00:22:45,130 --> 00:22:45,140
they've contacted me to test it again to
 

843
00:22:45,140 --> 00:22:46,390
they've contacted me to test it again to
make sure that their printer isn't

844
00:22:46,390 --> 00:22:46,400
make sure that their printer isn't
 

845
00:22:46,400 --> 00:22:49,840
make sure that their printer isn't
accessible Oh fantastic okay so are you

846
00:22:49,840 --> 00:22:49,850
accessible Oh fantastic okay so are you
 

847
00:22:49,850 --> 00:22:51,910
accessible Oh fantastic okay so are you
gonna continue hacking printers in this

848
00:22:51,910 --> 00:22:51,920
gonna continue hacking printers in this
 

849
00:22:51,920 --> 00:22:54,160
gonna continue hacking printers in this
way Oh most definitely

850
00:22:54,160 --> 00:22:54,170
way Oh most definitely
 

851
00:22:54,170 --> 00:22:56,920
way Oh most definitely
um I am gonna be sending out another

852
00:22:56,920 --> 00:22:56,930
um I am gonna be sending out another
 

853
00:22:56,930 --> 00:23:01,090
um I am gonna be sending out another
wave item on there nothing I made inside

854
00:23:01,090 --> 00:23:01,100
wave item on there nothing I made inside
 

855
00:23:01,100 --> 00:23:03,730
wave item on there nothing I made inside
I don't know how many pictures I'll be

856
00:23:03,730 --> 00:23:03,740
I don't know how many pictures I'll be
 

857
00:23:03,740 --> 00:23:08,020
I don't know how many pictures I'll be
sending this Oh - oh maybe five hundred

858
00:23:08,020 --> 00:23:08,030
sending this Oh - oh maybe five hundred
 

859
00:23:08,030 --> 00:23:12,550
sending this Oh - oh maybe five hundred
thousand so that'll be much larger

860
00:23:12,550 --> 00:23:12,560
thousand so that'll be much larger
 

861
00:23:12,560 --> 00:23:14,920
thousand so that'll be much larger
amount of pictures that I sent it to

862
00:23:14,920 --> 00:23:14,930
amount of pictures that I sent it to
 

863
00:23:14,930 --> 00:23:22,810
amount of pictures that I sent it to
before but also sorry no no you're

864
00:23:22,810 --> 00:23:22,820
before but also sorry no no you're
 

865
00:23:22,820 --> 00:23:25,000
before but also sorry no no you're
fantastic and and we appreciate your

866
00:23:25,000 --> 00:23:25,010
fantastic and and we appreciate your
 

867
00:23:25,010 --> 00:23:28,450
fantastic and and we appreciate your
time so very much the Canadian hacker so

868
00:23:28,450 --> 00:23:28,460
time so very much the Canadian hacker so
 

869
00:23:28,460 --> 00:23:31,840
time so very much the Canadian hacker so
many hackers would utilize these types

870
00:23:31,840 --> 00:23:31,850
many hackers would utilize these types
 

871
00:23:31,850 --> 00:23:33,790
many hackers would utilize these types
of exploits for example I mean you're

872
00:23:33,790 --> 00:23:33,800
of exploits for example I mean you're
 

873
00:23:33,800 --> 00:23:35,500
of exploits for example I mean you're
talking about sending you've already

874
00:23:35,500 --> 00:23:35,510
talking about sending you've already
 

875
00:23:35,510 --> 00:23:37,300
talking about sending you've already
sent to over a hundred thousand printers

876
00:23:37,300 --> 00:23:37,310
sent to over a hundred thousand printers
 

877
00:23:37,310 --> 00:23:40,780
sent to over a hundred thousand printers
print out jobs okay and now we're

878
00:23:40,780 --> 00:23:40,790
print out jobs okay and now we're
 

879
00:23:40,790 --> 00:23:42,100
print out jobs okay and now we're
talking about the next wave being

880
00:23:42,100 --> 00:23:42,110
talking about the next wave being
 

881
00:23:42,110 --> 00:23:44,490
talking about the next wave being
another five hundred thousand printers

882
00:23:44,490 --> 00:23:44,500
another five hundred thousand printers
 

883
00:23:44,500 --> 00:23:47,830
another five hundred thousand printers
where a lot of hackers would just like

884
00:23:47,830 --> 00:23:47,840
where a lot of hackers would just like
 

885
00:23:47,840 --> 00:23:49,750
where a lot of hackers would just like
hey let's print out a mass amount of

886
00:23:49,750 --> 00:23:49,760
hey let's print out a mass amount of
 

887
00:23:49,760 --> 00:23:51,790
hey let's print out a mass amount of
porn on all these business printers

888
00:23:51,790 --> 00:23:51,800
porn on all these business printers
 

889
00:23:51,800 --> 00:23:54,820
porn on all these business printers
let's like print out some some horrible

890
00:23:54,820 --> 00:23:54,830
let's like print out some some horrible
 

891
00:23:54,830 --> 00:23:57,370
let's like print out some some horrible
things this is you know the approach of

892
00:23:57,370 --> 00:23:57,380
things this is you know the approach of
 

893
00:23:57,380 --> 00:24:00,280
things this is you know the approach of
the traditional hacker and this is how I

894
00:24:00,280 --> 00:24:00,290
the traditional hacker and this is how I
 

895
00:24:00,290 --> 00:24:04,840
the traditional hacker and this is how I
think media has painted the hacker so we

896
00:24:04,840 --> 00:24:04,850
think media has painted the hacker so we
 

897
00:24:04,850 --> 00:24:06,880
think media has painted the hacker so we
have this picture of what a hacker is

898
00:24:06,880 --> 00:24:06,890
have this picture of what a hacker is
 

899
00:24:06,890 --> 00:24:09,460
have this picture of what a hacker is
and that's what we expect of them what

900
00:24:09,460 --> 00:24:09,470
and that's what we expect of them what
 

901
00:24:09,470 --> 00:24:11,950
and that's what we expect of them what
has caused you to take a different

902
00:24:11,950 --> 00:24:11,960
has caused you to take a different
 

903
00:24:11,960 --> 00:24:16,090
has caused you to take a different
approach and instead send to 600,000

904
00:24:16,090 --> 00:24:16,100
approach and instead send to 600,000
 

905
00:24:16,100 --> 00:24:20,170
approach and instead send to 600,000
printers instructions and assistance

906
00:24:20,170 --> 00:24:20,180
printers instructions and assistance
 

907
00:24:20,180 --> 00:24:35,460
printers instructions and assistance
with helping to close these exploits

908
00:24:35,460 --> 00:24:35,470

 

909
00:24:35,470 --> 00:24:38,500

thought or not nuts - Siri thought

910
00:24:38,500 --> 00:24:38,510
thought or not nuts - Siri thought
 

911
00:24:38,510 --> 00:24:45,220
thought or not nuts - Siri thought
they'd never ever wanted to have any

912
00:24:45,220 --> 00:24:45,230
they'd never ever wanted to have any
 

913
00:24:45,230 --> 00:24:51,070
they'd never ever wanted to have any
devices for immoral purposes or to do

914
00:24:51,070 --> 00:24:51,080
devices for immoral purposes or to do
 

915
00:24:51,080 --> 00:24:54,910
devices for immoral purposes or to do
for reasons of my own Oh

916
00:24:54,910 --> 00:24:54,920
for reasons of my own Oh
 

917
00:24:54,920 --> 00:24:56,830
for reasons of my own Oh
first they wouldn't like necessarily a

918
00:24:56,830 --> 00:24:56,840
first they wouldn't like necessarily a
 

919
00:24:56,840 --> 00:24:59,770
first they wouldn't like necessarily a
dump so I see

920
00:24:59,770 --> 00:24:59,780
dump so I see
 

921
00:24:59,780 --> 00:25:04,810
dump so I see
it was just I wanted to be able to make

922
00:25:04,810 --> 00:25:04,820
it was just I wanted to be able to make
 

923
00:25:04,820 --> 00:25:07,440
it was just I wanted to be able to make
a difference in something without

924
00:25:07,440 --> 00:25:07,450
a difference in something without
 

925
00:25:07,450 --> 00:25:12,130
a difference in something without
necessarily hurting the persons involved

926
00:25:12,130 --> 00:25:12,140
necessarily hurting the persons involved
 

927
00:25:12,140 --> 00:25:16,540
necessarily hurting the persons involved
oh yeah that's pretty much home and

928
00:25:16,540 --> 00:25:16,550
oh yeah that's pretty much home and
 

929
00:25:16,550 --> 00:25:22,150
oh yeah that's pretty much home and
sorry are you you live up to the the the

930
00:25:22,150 --> 00:25:22,160
sorry are you you live up to the the the
 

931
00:25:22,160 --> 00:25:23,950
sorry are you you live up to the the the
handle of the Canadian hacker by

932
00:25:23,950 --> 00:25:23,960
handle of the Canadian hacker by
 

933
00:25:23,960 --> 00:25:26,380
handle of the Canadian hacker by
apologizing but what what you're

934
00:25:26,380 --> 00:25:26,390
apologizing but what what you're
 

935
00:25:26,390 --> 00:25:30,370
apologizing but what what you're
revealing to us I I just envisioned like

936
00:25:30,370 --> 00:25:30,380
revealing to us I I just envisioned like
 

937
00:25:30,380 --> 00:25:33,750
revealing to us I I just envisioned like
a new world of philanthropy in a way

938
00:25:33,750 --> 00:25:33,760
a new world of philanthropy in a way
 

939
00:25:33,760 --> 00:25:37,980
a new world of philanthropy in a way
like as a hacker you're choosing to help

940
00:25:37,980 --> 00:25:37,990
like as a hacker you're choosing to help
 

941
00:25:37,990 --> 00:25:42,070
like as a hacker you're choosing to help
others by exploiting the very things

942
00:25:42,070 --> 00:25:42,080
others by exploiting the very things
 

943
00:25:42,080 --> 00:25:43,810
others by exploiting the very things
that are exploitable within their

944
00:25:43,810 --> 00:25:43,820
that are exploitable within their
 

945
00:25:43,820 --> 00:25:44,500
that are exploitable within their
networks

946
00:25:44,500 --> 00:25:44,510
networks
 

947
00:25:44,510 --> 00:25:49,000
networks
so you're saying hey by the way your

948
00:25:49,000 --> 00:25:49,010
so you're saying hey by the way your
 

949
00:25:49,010 --> 00:25:50,950
so you're saying hey by the way your
printers could be used for these

950
00:25:50,950 --> 00:25:50,960
printers could be used for these
 

951
00:25:50,960 --> 00:25:52,930
printers could be used for these
malicious purposes but I want to help

952
00:25:52,930 --> 00:25:52,940
malicious purposes but I want to help
 

953
00:25:52,940 --> 00:25:56,290
malicious purposes but I want to help
you to lock those down exactly and of

954
00:25:56,290 --> 00:25:56,300
you to lock those down exactly and of
 

955
00:25:56,300 --> 00:25:58,990
you to lock those down exactly and of
course I didn't have to do that if I

956
00:25:58,990 --> 00:25:59,000
course I didn't have to do that if I
 

957
00:25:59,000 --> 00:26:02,170
course I didn't have to do that if I
wanted to I could go or completely

958
00:26:02,170 --> 00:26:02,180
wanted to I could go or completely
 

959
00:26:02,180 --> 00:26:05,050
wanted to I could go or completely
destroy those printers by deflating DEP

960
00:26:05,050 --> 00:26:05,060
destroy those printers by deflating DEP
 

961
00:26:05,060 --> 00:26:06,910
destroy those printers by deflating DEP
wrong over and over and over again

962
00:26:06,910 --> 00:26:06,920
wrong over and over and over again
 

963
00:26:06,920 --> 00:26:10,210
wrong over and over and over again
um takes about 24 hours and I'm

964
00:26:10,210 --> 00:26:10,220
um takes about 24 hours and I'm
 

965
00:26:10,220 --> 00:26:12,940
um takes about 24 hours and I'm
completely toilet printer I could do

966
00:26:12,940 --> 00:26:12,950
completely toilet printer I could do
 

967
00:26:12,950 --> 00:26:15,700
completely toilet printer I could do
that I could print off some images that

968
00:26:15,700 --> 00:26:15,710
that I could print off some images that
 

969
00:26:15,710 --> 00:26:17,590
that I could print off some images that
you wouldn't necessarily want to be

970
00:26:17,590 --> 00:26:17,600
you wouldn't necessarily want to be
 

971
00:26:17,600 --> 00:26:21,340
you wouldn't necessarily want to be
printed off all things like that I to it

972
00:26:21,340 --> 00:26:21,350
printed off all things like that I to it
 

973
00:26:21,350 --> 00:26:22,450
printed off all things like that I to it
I'll permanently

974
00:26:22,450 --> 00:26:22,460
I'll permanently
 

975
00:26:22,460 --> 00:26:28,060
I'll permanently
Ashe like a lot but not necessarily text

976
00:26:28,060 --> 00:26:28,070
Ashe like a lot but not necessarily text
 

977
00:26:28,070 --> 00:26:29,560
Ashe like a lot but not necessarily text
you could do anything you wanted any

978
00:26:29,560 --> 00:26:29,570
you could do anything you wanted any
 

979
00:26:29,570 --> 00:26:37,630
you could do anything you wanted any
image oh but yeah I've chosen to all the

980
00:26:37,630 --> 00:26:37,640
image oh but yeah I've chosen to all the
 

981
00:26:37,640 --> 00:26:39,970
image oh but yeah I've chosen to all the
things that you could do but you're

982
00:26:39,970 --> 00:26:39,980
things that you could do but you're
 

983
00:26:39,980 --> 00:26:43,150
things that you could do but you're
choosing the highroad did kudos and and

984
00:26:43,150 --> 00:26:43,160
choosing the highroad did kudos and and
 

985
00:26:43,160 --> 00:26:46,570
choosing the highroad did kudos and and
well done do you have plans you know

986
00:26:46,570 --> 00:26:46,580
well done do you have plans you know
 

987
00:26:46,580 --> 00:26:48,250
well done do you have plans you know
stepping away from the so the printer

988
00:26:48,250 --> 00:26:48,260
stepping away from the so the printer
 

989
00:26:48,260 --> 00:26:50,350
stepping away from the so the printer
hack has been a successful hack and and

990
00:26:50,350 --> 00:26:50,360
hack has been a successful hack and and
 

991
00:26:50,360 --> 00:26:52,240
hack has been a successful hack and and
you've been making a difference for

992
00:26:52,240 --> 00:26:52,250
you've been making a difference for
 

993
00:26:52,250 --> 00:26:54,130
you've been making a difference for
those who receive it and realize oh my

994
00:26:54,130 --> 00:26:54,140
those who receive it and realize oh my
 

995
00:26:54,140 --> 00:26:56,980
those who receive it and realize oh my
goodness my printer is exploitable but

996
00:26:56,980 --> 00:26:56,990
goodness my printer is exploitable but
 

997
00:26:56,990 --> 00:27:00,760
goodness my printer is exploitable but
this hacker has chosen to tell me about

998
00:27:00,760 --> 00:27:00,770
this hacker has chosen to tell me about
 

999
00:27:00,770 --> 00:27:04,210
this hacker has chosen to tell me about
it so that I'm no longer susceptible

1000
00:27:04,210 --> 00:27:04,220
it so that I'm no longer susceptible
 

1001
00:27:04,220 --> 00:27:06,820
it so that I'm no longer susceptible
what what do you have planned beyond

1002
00:27:06,820 --> 00:27:06,830
what what do you have planned beyond
 

1003
00:27:06,830 --> 00:27:08,980
what what do you have planned beyond
that so when this is exhausted itself

1004
00:27:08,980 --> 00:27:08,990
that so when this is exhausted itself
 

1005
00:27:08,990 --> 00:27:11,290
that so when this is exhausted itself
what's the next step for the canadian

1006
00:27:11,290 --> 00:27:11,300
what's the next step for the canadian
 

1007
00:27:11,300 --> 00:27:12,300
what's the next step for the canadian
hacker

1008
00:27:12,300 --> 00:27:12,310
hacker
 

1009
00:27:12,310 --> 00:27:15,390
hacker
well I've kind of cheap chicken'll

1010
00:27:15,390 --> 00:27:15,400
well I've kind of cheap chicken'll
 

1011
00:27:15,400 --> 00:27:19,860
well I've kind of cheap chicken'll
character to career paths I still always

1012
00:27:19,860 --> 00:27:19,870
character to career paths I still always
 

1013
00:27:19,870 --> 00:27:23,610
character to career paths I still always
want to do ethical hacking depending on

1014
00:27:23,610 --> 00:27:23,620
want to do ethical hacking depending on
 

1015
00:27:23,620 --> 00:27:25,940
want to do ethical hacking depending on
whatever career I choose and I

1016
00:27:25,940 --> 00:27:25,950
whatever career I choose and I
 

1017
00:27:25,950 --> 00:27:28,800
whatever career I choose and I
definitely wanted definitely don't want

1018
00:27:28,800 --> 00:27:28,810
definitely wanted definitely don't want
 

1019
00:27:28,810 --> 00:27:34,650
definitely wanted definitely don't want
to go on to the dark side of that either

1020
00:27:34,650 --> 00:27:34,660

 

1021
00:27:34,660 --> 00:27:38,940

so I've been looking at excite any sort

1022
00:27:38,940 --> 00:27:38,950
so I've been looking at excite any sort
 

1023
00:27:38,950 --> 00:27:41,730
so I've been looking at excite any sort
of cybersecurity jobs or anything like

1024
00:27:41,730 --> 00:27:41,740
of cybersecurity jobs or anything like
 

1025
00:27:41,740 --> 00:27:44,760
of cybersecurity jobs or anything like
that um seeing if I could get a degree

1026
00:27:44,760 --> 00:27:44,770
that um seeing if I could get a degree
 

1027
00:27:44,770 --> 00:27:48,420
that um seeing if I could get a degree
of some sort of that um or I've also

1028
00:27:48,420 --> 00:27:48,430
of some sort of that um or I've also
 

1029
00:27:48,430 --> 00:27:52,280
of some sort of that um or I've also
been look at engineering electrical or

1030
00:27:52,280 --> 00:27:52,290
been look at engineering electrical or
 

1031
00:27:52,290 --> 00:27:54,420
been look at engineering electrical or
so you're talking about you're talking

1032
00:27:54,420 --> 00:27:54,430
so you're talking about you're talking
 

1033
00:27:54,430 --> 00:27:58,410
so you're talking about you're talking
about career paths as future tense so am

1034
00:27:58,410 --> 00:27:58,420
about career paths as future tense so am
 

1035
00:27:58,420 --> 00:28:00,420
about career paths as future tense so am
I to understand that you are younger

1036
00:28:00,420 --> 00:28:00,430
I to understand that you are younger
 

1037
00:28:00,430 --> 00:28:08,670
I to understand that you are younger
than twenty ten so high school so I

1038
00:28:08,670 --> 00:28:08,680
than twenty ten so high school so I
 

1039
00:28:08,680 --> 00:28:12,600
than twenty ten so high school so I
still have a good bit of time but it

1040
00:28:12,600 --> 00:28:12,610
still have a good bit of time but it
 

1041
00:28:12,610 --> 00:28:15,750
still have a good bit of time but it
kind of just goes to show that if I'm

1042
00:28:15,750 --> 00:28:15,760
kind of just goes to show that if I'm
 

1043
00:28:15,760 --> 00:28:19,380
kind of just goes to show that if I'm
able to do this if they tends to didn't

1044
00:28:19,380 --> 00:28:19,390
able to do this if they tends to didn't
 

1045
00:28:19,390 --> 00:28:22,080
able to do this if they tends to didn't
lifter somebody with a lot more

1046
00:28:22,080 --> 00:28:22,090
lifter somebody with a lot more
 

1047
00:28:22,090 --> 00:28:24,060
lifter somebody with a lot more
knowledge who's actually done a degree

1048
00:28:24,060 --> 00:28:24,070
knowledge who's actually done a degree
 

1049
00:28:24,070 --> 00:28:28,470
knowledge who's actually done a degree
MS or can do it why don't you and the

1050
00:28:28,470 --> 00:28:28,480
MS or can do it why don't you and the
 

1051
00:28:28,480 --> 00:28:30,600
MS or can do it why don't you and the
Canadian hacker what this is what this

1052
00:28:30,600 --> 00:28:30,610
Canadian hacker what this is what this
 

1053
00:28:30,610 --> 00:28:33,420
Canadian hacker what this is what this
is revealing to me is that if you can do

1054
00:28:33,420 --> 00:28:33,430
is revealing to me is that if you can do
 

1055
00:28:33,430 --> 00:28:35,820
is revealing to me is that if you can do
this and you can choose the the moral

1056
00:28:35,820 --> 00:28:35,830
this and you can choose the the moral
 

1057
00:28:35,830 --> 00:28:39,870
this and you can choose the the moral
Road and help people to secure their

1058
00:28:39,870 --> 00:28:39,880
Road and help people to secure their
 

1059
00:28:39,880 --> 00:28:43,050
Road and help people to secure their
networks what about the next grade 10

1060
00:28:43,050 --> 00:28:43,060
networks what about the next grade 10
 

1061
00:28:43,060 --> 00:28:46,080
networks what about the next grade 10
student like folks I mean there's a lot

1062
00:28:46,080 --> 00:28:46,090
student like folks I mean there's a lot
 

1063
00:28:46,090 --> 00:28:48,120
student like folks I mean there's a lot
of people who just woke up and said oh

1064
00:28:48,120 --> 00:28:48,130
of people who just woke up and said oh
 

1065
00:28:48,130 --> 00:28:51,570
of people who just woke up and said oh
my goodness like and I apologize the

1066
00:28:51,570 --> 00:28:51,580
my goodness like and I apologize the
 

1067
00:28:51,580 --> 00:28:54,030
my goodness like and I apologize the
Canadian hacker but you some people are

1068
00:28:54,030 --> 00:28:54,040
Canadian hacker but you some people are
 

1069
00:28:54,040 --> 00:28:57,810
Canadian hacker but you some people are
saying this is a kid what we've learned

1070
00:28:57,810 --> 00:28:57,820
saying this is a kid what we've learned
 

1071
00:28:57,820 --> 00:28:59,330
saying this is a kid what we've learned
here is that you could have used this

1072
00:28:59,330 --> 00:28:59,340
here is that you could have used this
 

1073
00:28:59,340 --> 00:29:02,190
here is that you could have used this
exploit for for malicious purposes of

1074
00:29:02,190 --> 00:29:02,200
exploit for for malicious purposes of
 

1075
00:29:02,200 --> 00:29:05,670
exploit for for malicious purposes of
purposes and you haven't personally but

1076
00:29:05,670 --> 00:29:05,680
purposes and you haven't personally but
 

1077
00:29:05,680 --> 00:29:09,440
purposes and you haven't personally but
what about the next grade ten kid and

1078
00:29:09,440 --> 00:29:09,450
what about the next grade ten kid and
 

1079
00:29:09,450 --> 00:29:14,610
what about the next grade ten kid and
not not to necessarily put my own gender

1080
00:29:14,610 --> 00:29:14,620
not not to necessarily put my own gender
 

1081
00:29:14,620 --> 00:29:19,050
not not to necessarily put my own gender
this year but there are not three people

1082
00:29:19,050 --> 00:29:19,060
this year but there are not three people
 

1083
00:29:19,060 --> 00:29:21,750
this year but there are not three people
out there especially of my age group and

1084
00:29:21,750 --> 00:29:21,760
out there especially of my age group and
 

1085
00:29:21,760 --> 00:29:24,960
out there especially of my age group and
this big so desire to

1086
00:29:24,960 --> 00:29:24,970
this big so desire to
 

1087
00:29:24,970 --> 00:29:28,340
this big so desire to
- there's like you know the

1088
00:29:28,340 --> 00:29:28,350
- there's like you know the
 

1089
00:29:28,350 --> 00:29:31,279
- there's like you know the
possibilities are almost endless yeah

1090
00:29:31,279 --> 00:29:31,289
possibilities are almost endless yeah
 

1091
00:29:31,289 --> 00:29:34,940
possibilities are almost endless yeah
anything certain to be printers rage it

1092
00:29:34,940 --> 00:29:34,950
anything certain to be printers rage it
 

1093
00:29:34,950 --> 00:29:38,460
anything certain to be printers rage it
can be any sort of LG device or anything

1094
00:29:38,460 --> 00:29:38,470
can be any sort of LG device or anything
 

1095
00:29:38,470 --> 00:29:42,360
can be any sort of LG device or anything
connected to your network Wow well I

1096
00:29:42,360 --> 00:29:42,370
connected to your network Wow well I
 

1097
00:29:42,370 --> 00:29:44,310
connected to your network Wow well I
encourage you as we wrap up this

1098
00:29:44,310 --> 00:29:44,320
encourage you as we wrap up this
 

1099
00:29:44,320 --> 00:29:45,750
encourage you as we wrap up this
interview the Canadian hacker I

1100
00:29:45,750 --> 00:29:45,760
interview the Canadian hacker I
 

1101
00:29:45,760 --> 00:29:48,230
interview the Canadian hacker I
encourage you to continue pursuing that

1102
00:29:48,230 --> 00:29:48,240
encourage you to continue pursuing that
 

1103
00:29:48,240 --> 00:29:51,539
encourage you to continue pursuing that
positive path there are a lot of cyber

1104
00:29:51,539 --> 00:29:51,549
positive path there are a lot of cyber
 

1105
00:29:51,549 --> 00:29:53,370
positive path there are a lot of cyber
security companies out there that want

1106
00:29:53,370 --> 00:29:53,380
security companies out there that want
 

1107
00:29:53,380 --> 00:29:56,100
security companies out there that want
people like you that can exploit systems

1108
00:29:56,100 --> 00:29:56,110
people like you that can exploit systems
 

1109
00:29:56,110 --> 00:29:59,279
people like you that can exploit systems
for the good so that they can help patch

1110
00:29:59,279 --> 00:29:59,289
for the good so that they can help patch
 

1111
00:29:59,289 --> 00:30:02,580
for the good so that they can help patch
them and and I encourage you to pursue

1112
00:30:02,580 --> 00:30:02,590
them and and I encourage you to pursue
 

1113
00:30:02,590 --> 00:30:03,950
them and and I encourage you to pursue
that career path

1114
00:30:03,950 --> 00:30:03,960
that career path
 

1115
00:30:03,960 --> 00:30:06,000
that career path
absolutely and keep up the great work

1116
00:30:06,000 --> 00:30:06,010
absolutely and keep up the great work
 

1117
00:30:06,010 --> 00:30:07,500
absolutely and keep up the great work
and what you're doing and I and I hope

1118
00:30:07,500 --> 00:30:07,510
and what you're doing and I and I hope
 

1119
00:30:07,510 --> 00:30:09,029
and what you're doing and I and I hope
that everything goes very very well for

1120
00:30:09,029 --> 00:30:09,039
that everything goes very very well for
 

1121
00:30:09,039 --> 00:30:11,279
that everything goes very very well for
you thank you

1122
00:30:11,279 --> 00:30:11,289
you thank you
 

1123
00:30:11,289 --> 00:30:13,169
you thank you
the Canadian hacker do you have any

1124
00:30:13,169 --> 00:30:13,179
the Canadian hacker do you have any
 

1125
00:30:13,179 --> 00:30:15,510
the Canadian hacker do you have any
final words for us today as we close off

1126
00:30:15,510 --> 00:30:15,520
final words for us today as we close off
 

1127
00:30:15,520 --> 00:30:20,060
final words for us today as we close off
our interview well do preacher I'm sorry

1128
00:30:20,060 --> 00:30:20,070
our interview well do preacher I'm sorry
 

1129
00:30:20,070 --> 00:30:23,000
our interview well do preacher I'm sorry
all right thanks for being on the show

1130
00:30:23,000 --> 00:30:23,010
all right thanks for being on the show
 

1131
00:30:23,010 --> 00:30:25,320
all right thanks for being on the show
we've got a head over to the newsroom

1132
00:30:25,320 --> 00:30:25,330
we've got a head over to the newsroom
 

1133
00:30:25,330 --> 00:30:29,610
we've got a head over to the newsroom
Sasha if you are all set I am here's

1134
00:30:29,610 --> 00:30:29,620
Sasha if you are all set I am here's
 

1135
00:30:29,620 --> 00:30:31,740
Sasha if you are all set I am here's
what's coming up in the category five TV

1136
00:30:31,740 --> 00:30:31,750
what's coming up in the category five TV
 

1137
00:30:31,750 --> 00:30:34,919
what's coming up in the category five TV
newsroom a man hit the keys to it 59

1138
00:30:34,919 --> 00:30:34,929
newsroom a man hit the keys to it 59
 

1139
00:30:34,929 --> 00:30:37,110
newsroom a man hit the keys to it 59
million dollars worth of Bitcoin with

1140
00:30:37,110 --> 00:30:37,120
million dollars worth of Bitcoin with
 

1141
00:30:37,120 --> 00:30:39,539
million dollars worth of Bitcoin with
his fishing gear which got thrown out

1142
00:30:39,539 --> 00:30:39,549
his fishing gear which got thrown out
 

1143
00:30:39,549 --> 00:30:42,380
his fishing gear which got thrown out
and incinerated while he was in jail

1144
00:30:42,380 --> 00:30:42,390
and incinerated while he was in jail
 

1145
00:30:42,390 --> 00:30:45,419
and incinerated while he was in jail
firefox has turned on encrypted DNS by

1146
00:30:45,419 --> 00:30:45,429
firefox has turned on encrypted DNS by
 

1147
00:30:45,429 --> 00:30:49,440
firefox has turned on encrypted DNS by
default to court snooping ISPs automatic

1148
00:30:49,440 --> 00:30:49,450
default to court snooping ISPs automatic
 

1149
00:30:49,450 --> 00:30:51,810
default to court snooping ISPs automatic
pet feeding systems could serve your

1150
00:30:51,810 --> 00:30:51,820
pet feeding systems could serve your
 

1151
00:30:51,820 --> 00:30:55,649
pet feeding systems could serve your
pets in the event of a failure musicians

1152
00:30:55,649 --> 00:30:55,659
pets in the event of a failure musicians
 

1153
00:30:55,659 --> 00:30:58,289
pets in the event of a failure musicians
have algorithmically generated every

1154
00:30:58,289 --> 00:30:58,299
have algorithmically generated every
 

1155
00:30:58,299 --> 00:31:00,450
have algorithmically generated every
possible melody and release them to the

1156
00:31:00,450 --> 00:31:00,460
possible melody and release them to the
 

1157
00:31:00,460 --> 00:31:02,940
possible melody and release them to the
public domain stick around the full

1158
00:31:02,940 --> 00:31:02,950
public domain stick around the full
 

1159
00:31:02,950 --> 00:31:05,060
public domain stick around the full
details are coming up later in the show

1160
00:31:05,060 --> 00:31:05,070
details are coming up later in the show
 

1161
00:31:05,070 --> 00:31:07,350
details are coming up later in the show
this is the category

1162
00:31:07,350 --> 00:31:07,360
this is the category
 

1163
00:31:07,360 --> 00:31:10,380
this is the category
TV news covering the week's top tech

1164
00:31:10,380 --> 00:31:10,390
TV news covering the week's top tech
 

1165
00:31:10,390 --> 00:31:16,919
TV news covering the week's top tech
stories with a slight linux bias I'm

1166
00:31:16,919 --> 00:31:16,929
stories with a slight linux bias I'm
 

1167
00:31:16,929 --> 00:31:19,230
stories with a slight linux bias I'm
Sacha Rickman joined this week by Ravi

1168
00:31:19,230 --> 00:31:19,240
Sacha Rickman joined this week by Ravi
 

1169
00:31:19,240 --> 00:31:19,919
Sacha Rickman joined this week by Ravi
Ferguson

1170
00:31:19,919 --> 00:31:19,929
Ferguson
 

1171
00:31:19,929 --> 00:31:23,010
Ferguson
alright Sasha well some quick honourable

1172
00:31:23,010 --> 00:31:23,020
alright Sasha well some quick honourable
 

1173
00:31:23,020 --> 00:31:27,900
alright Sasha well some quick honourable
mentions this week let's get into it

1174
00:31:27,900 --> 00:31:27,910
mentions this week let's get into it
 

1175
00:31:27,910 --> 00:31:31,080
mentions this week let's get into it
pioneering african-american nasa

1176
00:31:31,080 --> 00:31:31,090
pioneering african-american nasa
 

1177
00:31:31,090 --> 00:31:34,020
pioneering african-american nasa
mathematician Katherine Johnson has

1178
00:31:34,020 --> 00:31:34,030
mathematician Katherine Johnson has
 

1179
00:31:34,030 --> 00:31:37,350
mathematician Katherine Johnson has
passed away I want to get into a little

1180
00:31:37,350 --> 00:31:37,360
passed away I want to get into a little
 

1181
00:31:37,360 --> 00:31:40,010
passed away I want to get into a little
bit about her story and as Johnson

1182
00:31:40,010 --> 00:31:40,020
bit about her story and as Johnson
 

1183
00:31:40,020 --> 00:31:42,540
bit about her story and as Johnson
calculated she calculated the rocket

1184
00:31:42,540 --> 00:31:42,550
calculated she calculated the rocket
 

1185
00:31:42,550 --> 00:31:45,900
calculated she calculated the rocket
trajectories and earth orbits for NASA's

1186
00:31:45,900 --> 00:31:45,910
trajectories and earth orbits for NASA's
 

1187
00:31:45,910 --> 00:31:49,290
trajectories and earth orbits for NASA's
early space missions she was portrayed

1188
00:31:49,290 --> 00:31:49,300
early space missions she was portrayed
 

1189
00:31:49,300 --> 00:31:53,070
early space missions she was portrayed
in the 2016 Oscar nominated film hidden

1190
00:31:53,070 --> 00:31:53,080
in the 2016 Oscar nominated film hidden
 

1191
00:31:53,080 --> 00:31:56,220
in the 2016 Oscar nominated film hidden
figures and the film tells the story of

1192
00:31:56,220 --> 00:31:56,230
figures and the film tells the story of
 

1193
00:31:56,230 --> 00:31:58,770
figures and the film tells the story of
an african-american woman whose math

1194
00:31:58,770 --> 00:31:58,780
an african-american woman whose math
 

1195
00:31:58,780 --> 00:32:02,340
an african-american woman whose math
skills helped to put US astronauts John

1196
00:32:02,340 --> 00:32:02,350
skills helped to put US astronauts John
 

1197
00:32:02,350 --> 00:32:05,720
skills helped to put US astronauts John
Glenn into orbit around the Earth in

1198
00:32:05,720 --> 00:32:05,730
Glenn into orbit around the Earth in
 

1199
00:32:05,730 --> 00:32:09,990
Glenn into orbit around the Earth in
1962 miss Johnston verified the

1200
00:32:09,990 --> 00:32:10,000
1962 miss Johnston verified the
 

1201
00:32:10,000 --> 00:32:12,840
1962 miss Johnston verified the
calculations made by new electronic

1202
00:32:12,840 --> 00:32:12,850
calculations made by new electronic
 

1203
00:32:12,850 --> 00:32:15,210
calculations made by new electronic
computers before his flight

1204
00:32:15,210 --> 00:32:15,220
computers before his flight
 

1205
00:32:15,220 --> 00:32:17,760
computers before his flight
imagine that computers were brand new at

1206
00:32:17,760 --> 00:32:17,770
imagine that computers were brand new at
 

1207
00:32:17,770 --> 00:32:21,930
imagine that computers were brand new at
the time so we had to like verify that

1208
00:32:21,930 --> 00:32:21,940
the time so we had to like verify that
 

1209
00:32:21,940 --> 00:32:23,430
the time so we had to like verify that
data and there she was

1210
00:32:23,430 --> 00:32:23,440
data and there she was
 

1211
00:32:23,440 --> 00:32:25,500
data and there she was
verifying it making sure that the math

1212
00:32:25,500 --> 00:32:25,510
verifying it making sure that the math
 

1213
00:32:25,510 --> 00:32:27,210
verifying it making sure that the math
was correct from this new fandangled

1214
00:32:27,210 --> 00:32:27,220
was correct from this new fandangled
 

1215
00:32:27,220 --> 00:32:30,090
was correct from this new fandangled
device right miss Johnston

1216
00:32:30,090 --> 00:32:30,100
device right miss Johnston
 

1217
00:32:30,100 --> 00:32:32,610
device right miss Johnston
miss Johnson pardon me had previously

1218
00:32:32,610 --> 00:32:32,620
miss Johnson pardon me had previously
 

1219
00:32:32,620 --> 00:32:34,620
miss Johnson pardon me had previously
calculated the trajectories for the

1220
00:32:34,620 --> 00:32:34,630
calculated the trajectories for the
 

1221
00:32:34,630 --> 00:32:36,990
calculated the trajectories for the
space flight of Alan Shepard the first

1222
00:32:36,990 --> 00:32:37,000
space flight of Alan Shepard the first
 

1223
00:32:37,000 --> 00:32:41,190
space flight of Alan Shepard the first
American in space and such was her skill

1224
00:32:41,190 --> 00:32:41,200
American in space and such was her skill
 

1225
00:32:41,200 --> 00:32:44,220
American in space and such was her skill
and reputation that Glenn had asked her

1226
00:32:44,220 --> 00:32:44,230
and reputation that Glenn had asked her
 

1227
00:32:44,230 --> 00:32:46,830
and reputation that Glenn had asked her
specifically to be a part of his mission

1228
00:32:46,830 --> 00:32:46,840
specifically to be a part of his mission
 

1229
00:32:46,840 --> 00:32:50,910
specifically to be a part of his mission
and refused to fly unless she verified

1230
00:32:50,910 --> 00:32:50,920
and refused to fly unless she verified
 

1231
00:32:50,920 --> 00:32:53,640
and refused to fly unless she verified
the calculations she also helped to

1232
00:32:53,640 --> 00:32:53,650
the calculations she also helped to
 

1233
00:32:53,650 --> 00:32:56,970
the calculations she also helped to
calculate the trajectory from the 1969

1234
00:32:56,970 --> 00:32:56,980
calculate the trajectory from the 1969
 

1235
00:32:56,980 --> 00:33:01,190
calculate the trajectory from the 1969
Apollo 11 flight to the moon now NASA

1236
00:33:01,190 --> 00:33:01,200
Apollo 11 flight to the moon now NASA
 

1237
00:33:01,200 --> 00:33:05,790
Apollo 11 flight to the moon now NASA
Administrator Jim bridenstine describes

1238
00:33:05,790 --> 00:33:05,800
Administrator Jim bridenstine describes
 

1239
00:33:05,800 --> 00:33:09,690
Administrator Jim bridenstine describes
miss Johnson as a leader from NASA's

1240
00:33:09,690 --> 00:33:09,700
miss Johnson as a leader from NASA's
 

1241
00:33:09,700 --> 00:33:13,440
miss Johnson as a leader from NASA's
pioneering days he says miss Johnson

1242
00:33:13,440 --> 00:33:13,450
pioneering days he says miss Johnson
 

1243
00:33:13,450 --> 00:33:18,390
pioneering days he says miss Johnson
helped our helped our nation enlarge the

1244
00:33:18,390 --> 00:33:18,400
helped our helped our nation enlarge the
 

1245
00:33:18,400 --> 00:33:22,560
helped our helped our nation enlarge the
frontiers of space even as she made huge

1246
00:33:22,560 --> 00:33:22,570
frontiers of space even as she made huge
 

1247
00:33:22,570 --> 00:33:25,530
frontiers of space even as she made huge
strides that also opened doors for women

1248
00:33:25,530 --> 00:33:25,540
strides that also opened doors for women
 

1249
00:33:25,540 --> 00:33:28,830
strides that also opened doors for women
and people of color in the universal

1250
00:33:28,830 --> 00:33:28,840
and people of color in the universal
 

1251
00:33:28,840 --> 00:33:32,610
and people of color in the universal
human quest to explore space her

1252
00:33:32,610 --> 00:33:32,620
human quest to explore space her
 

1253
00:33:32,620 --> 00:33:34,770
human quest to explore space her
dedication and skill as a mathematician

1254
00:33:34,770 --> 00:33:34,780
dedication and skill as a mathematician
 

1255
00:33:34,780 --> 00:33:38,160
dedication and skill as a mathematician
helped put humans on the moon and before

1256
00:33:38,160 --> 00:33:38,170
helped put humans on the moon and before
 

1257
00:33:38,170 --> 00:33:41,160
helped put humans on the moon and before
that made it possible for our ass

1258
00:33:41,160 --> 00:33:41,170
that made it possible for our ass
 

1259
00:33:41,170 --> 00:33:43,380
that made it possible for our ass
not to take the first steps in space

1260
00:33:43,380 --> 00:33:43,390
not to take the first steps in space
 

1261
00:33:43,390 --> 00:33:46,440
not to take the first steps in space
that we are now following on a journey

1262
00:33:46,440 --> 00:33:46,450
that we are now following on a journey
 

1263
00:33:46,450 --> 00:33:51,290
that we are now following on a journey
to Mars here in 2020

1264
00:33:51,290 --> 00:33:51,300
to Mars here in 2020
 

1265
00:33:51,300 --> 00:33:55,380
to Mars here in 2020
miss Johnson was born in a small town in

1266
00:33:55,380 --> 00:33:55,390
miss Johnson was born in a small town in
 

1267
00:33:55,390 --> 00:34:01,200
miss Johnson was born in a small town in
West Virginia in 1918 she excelled

1268
00:34:01,200 --> 00:34:01,210
West Virginia in 1918 she excelled
 

1269
00:34:01,210 --> 00:34:03,570
West Virginia in 1918 she excelled
academically she graduated from high

1270
00:34:03,570 --> 00:34:03,580
academically she graduated from high
 

1271
00:34:03,580 --> 00:34:06,420
academically she graduated from high
school at just 14 years old and from

1272
00:34:06,420 --> 00:34:06,430
school at just 14 years old and from
 

1273
00:34:06,430 --> 00:34:09,810
school at just 14 years old and from
University at 18 NASA notes that her

1274
00:34:09,810 --> 00:34:09,820
University at 18 NASA notes that her
 

1275
00:34:09,820 --> 00:34:12,409
University at 18 NASA notes that her
academic achievements were partially

1276
00:34:12,409 --> 00:34:12,419
academic achievements were partially
 

1277
00:34:12,419 --> 00:34:15,060
academic achievements were partially
were particularly pardon me

1278
00:34:15,060 --> 00:34:15,070
were particularly pardon me
 

1279
00:34:15,070 --> 00:34:18,840
were particularly pardon me
impressive quote in an era when school

1280
00:34:18,840 --> 00:34:18,850
impressive quote in an era when school
 

1281
00:34:18,850 --> 00:34:21,120
impressive quote in an era when school
for African Americans normally stopped

1282
00:34:21,120 --> 00:34:21,130
for African Americans normally stopped
 

1283
00:34:21,130 --> 00:34:25,020
for African Americans normally stopped
at 8th grade for those who could indulge

1284
00:34:25,020 --> 00:34:25,030
at 8th grade for those who could indulge
 

1285
00:34:25,030 --> 00:34:28,980
at 8th grade for those who could indulge
that luxury to think of education as a

1286
00:34:28,980 --> 00:34:28,990
that luxury to think of education as a
 

1287
00:34:28,990 --> 00:34:32,100
that luxury to think of education as a
luxury at that time just an astonishing

1288
00:34:32,100 --> 00:34:32,110
luxury at that time just an astonishing
 

1289
00:34:32,110 --> 00:34:35,580
luxury at that time just an astonishing
woman after working as a teacher and

1290
00:34:35,580 --> 00:34:35,590
woman after working as a teacher and
 

1291
00:34:35,590 --> 00:34:38,460
woman after working as a teacher and
being a stay-at-home mom miss Johnson

1292
00:34:38,460 --> 00:34:38,470
being a stay-at-home mom miss Johnson
 

1293
00:34:38,470 --> 00:34:41,790
being a stay-at-home mom miss Johnson
began working for NASA's predecessor the

1294
00:34:41,790 --> 00:34:41,800
began working for NASA's predecessor the
 

1295
00:34:41,800 --> 00:34:44,750
began working for NASA's predecessor the
National Advisory Committee for

1296
00:34:44,750 --> 00:34:44,760
National Advisory Committee for
 

1297
00:34:44,760 --> 00:34:47,970
National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics pardon me they called it

1298
00:34:47,970 --> 00:34:47,980
Aeronautics pardon me they called it
 

1299
00:34:47,980 --> 00:34:51,150
Aeronautics pardon me they called it
NACA at the time in she started working

1300
00:34:51,150 --> 00:34:51,160
NACA at the time in she started working
 

1301
00:34:51,160 --> 00:34:54,419
NACA at the time in she started working
there in 1953 Johnson died at a

1302
00:34:54,419 --> 00:34:54,429
there in 1953 Johnson died at a
 

1303
00:34:54,429 --> 00:34:58,380
there in 1953 Johnson died at a
retirement home in Newport February 24th

1304
00:34:58,380 --> 00:34:58,390
retirement home in Newport February 24th
 

1305
00:34:58,390 --> 00:35:05,210
retirement home in Newport February 24th
at the age of 101 lived a long life

1306
00:35:05,210 --> 00:35:05,220
at the age of 101 lived a long life
 

1307
00:35:05,220 --> 00:35:09,090
at the age of 101 lived a long life
bridenstine described her as quote an

1308
00:35:09,090 --> 00:35:09,100
bridenstine described her as quote an
 

1309
00:35:09,100 --> 00:35:12,690
bridenstine described her as quote an
American hero and he stated that her

1310
00:35:12,690 --> 00:35:12,700
American hero and he stated that her
 

1311
00:35:12,700 --> 00:35:15,690
American hero and he stated that her
pioneering legacy will never be

1312
00:35:15,690 --> 00:35:15,700
pioneering legacy will never be
 

1313
00:35:15,700 --> 00:35:19,290
pioneering legacy will never be
forgotten since we're already on the

1314
00:35:19,290 --> 00:35:19,300
forgotten since we're already on the
 

1315
00:35:19,300 --> 00:35:21,570
forgotten since we're already on the
subject of mankind traveling to the

1316
00:35:21,570 --> 00:35:21,580
subject of mankind traveling to the
 

1317
00:35:21,580 --> 00:35:24,510
subject of mankind traveling to the
stars the Los Angeles City Council has

1318
00:35:24,510 --> 00:35:24,520
stars the Los Angeles City Council has
 

1319
00:35:24,520 --> 00:35:28,890
stars the Los Angeles City Council has
approved a SpaceX permit to least 19

1320
00:35:28,890 --> 00:35:28,900
approved a SpaceX permit to least 19
 

1321
00:35:28,900 --> 00:35:32,700
approved a SpaceX permit to least 19
acres of land in the city's port for 20

1322
00:35:32,700 --> 00:35:32,710
acres of land in the city's port for 20
 

1323
00:35:32,710 --> 00:35:36,590
acres of land in the city's port for 20
years for a starship rocket facility

1324
00:35:36,590 --> 00:35:36,600
years for a starship rocket facility
 

1325
00:35:36,600 --> 00:35:41,100
years for a starship rocket facility
SpaceX's new rocket factory will be for

1326
00:35:41,100 --> 00:35:41,110
SpaceX's new rocket factory will be for
 

1327
00:35:41,110 --> 00:35:43,110
SpaceX's new rocket factory will be for
its massive next generation rocket

1328
00:35:43,110 --> 00:35:43,120
its massive next generation rocket
 

1329
00:35:43,120 --> 00:35:46,560
its massive next generation rocket
called starship the rocket so far has

1330
00:35:46,560 --> 00:35:46,570
called starship the rocket so far has
 

1331
00:35:46,570 --> 00:35:49,610
called starship the rocket so far has
been developed at SpaceX's facilities in

1332
00:35:49,610 --> 00:35:49,620
been developed at SpaceX's facilities in
 

1333
00:35:49,620 --> 00:35:53,640
been developed at SpaceX's facilities in
Texas and Florida but the new location

1334
00:35:53,640 --> 00:35:53,650
Texas and Florida but the new location
 

1335
00:35:53,650 --> 00:35:54,400
Texas and Florida but the new location
add

1336
00:35:54,400 --> 00:35:54,410
add
 

1337
00:35:54,410 --> 00:35:57,230
add
capacity for SpaceX within driving

1338
00:35:57,230 --> 00:35:57,240
capacity for SpaceX within driving
 

1339
00:35:57,240 --> 00:35:59,930
capacity for SpaceX within driving
distance to its headquarters outside of

1340
00:35:59,930 --> 00:35:59,940
distance to its headquarters outside of
 

1341
00:35:59,940 --> 00:36:02,630
distance to its headquarters outside of
Los Angeles International Airport and

1342
00:36:02,630 --> 00:36:02,640
Los Angeles International Airport and
 

1343
00:36:02,640 --> 00:36:04,790
Los Angeles International Airport and
that's where the majority of their staff

1344
00:36:04,790 --> 00:36:04,800
that's where the majority of their staff
 

1345
00:36:04,800 --> 00:36:11,060
that's where the majority of their staff
actually work 6000 employees in an

1346
00:36:11,060 --> 00:36:11,070
actually work 6000 employees in an
 

1347
00:36:11,070 --> 00:36:14,150
actually work 6000 employees in an
outline of plans described by government

1348
00:36:14,150 --> 00:36:14,160
outline of plans described by government
 

1349
00:36:14,160 --> 00:36:14,750
outline of plans described by government
officials

1350
00:36:14,750 --> 00:36:14,760
officials
 

1351
00:36:14,760 --> 00:36:17,150
officials
SpaceX's facility will include multiple

1352
00:36:17,150 --> 00:36:17,160
SpaceX's facility will include multiple
 

1353
00:36:17,160 --> 00:36:19,310
SpaceX's facility will include multiple
buildings for manufacturing such as

1354
00:36:19,310 --> 00:36:19,320
buildings for manufacturing such as
 

1355
00:36:19,320 --> 00:36:22,280
buildings for manufacturing such as
blacksmith shops and machining Los

1356
00:36:22,280 --> 00:36:22,290
blacksmith shops and machining Los
 

1357
00:36:22,290 --> 00:36:24,890
blacksmith shops and machining Los
Angeles officials say that SpaceX is

1358
00:36:24,890 --> 00:36:24,900
Angeles officials say that SpaceX is
 

1359
00:36:24,900 --> 00:36:27,770
Angeles officials say that SpaceX is
plan will actually refurbish dilapidated

1360
00:36:27,770 --> 00:36:27,780
plan will actually refurbish dilapidated
 

1361
00:36:27,780 --> 00:36:31,100
plan will actually refurbish dilapidated
facilities with a history of vacancy and

1362
00:36:31,100 --> 00:36:31,110
facilities with a history of vacancy and
 

1363
00:36:31,110 --> 00:36:34,490
facilities with a history of vacancy and
vandalism and quote has the potential to

1364
00:36:34,490 --> 00:36:34,500
vandalism and quote has the potential to
 

1365
00:36:34,500 --> 00:36:40,490
vandalism and quote has the potential to
create 130 aerospace jobs the facility

1366
00:36:40,490 --> 00:36:40,500
create 130 aerospace jobs the facility
 

1367
00:36:40,500 --> 00:36:43,910
create 130 aerospace jobs the facility
itself would be a large tent-like

1368
00:36:43,910 --> 00:36:43,920
itself would be a large tent-like
 

1369
00:36:43,920 --> 00:36:47,510
itself would be a large tent-like
structure similar to those that Tesla

1370
00:36:47,510 --> 00:36:47,520
structure similar to those that Tesla
 

1371
00:36:47,520 --> 00:36:49,430
structure similar to those that Tesla
was using to ramp up their production of

1372
00:36:49,430 --> 00:36:49,440
was using to ramp up their production of
 

1373
00:36:49,440 --> 00:36:51,980
was using to ramp up their production of
the cars in recent years the port

1374
00:36:51,980 --> 00:36:51,990
the cars in recent years the port
 

1375
00:36:51,990 --> 00:36:54,290
the cars in recent years the port
location provides SpaceX with immediate

1376
00:36:54,290 --> 00:36:54,300
location provides SpaceX with immediate
 

1377
00:36:54,300 --> 00:36:56,300
location provides SpaceX with immediate
access to water that's a key

1378
00:36:56,300 --> 00:36:56,310
access to water that's a key
 

1379
00:36:56,310 --> 00:36:59,810
access to water that's a key
transportation item for them for their

1380
00:36:59,810 --> 00:36:59,820
transportation item for them for their
 

1381
00:36:59,820 --> 00:37:03,440
transportation item for them for their
immense rocket because they need to get

1382
00:37:03,440 --> 00:37:03,450
immense rocket because they need to get
 

1383
00:37:03,450 --> 00:37:05,660
immense rocket because they need to get
that from a production facility to the

1384
00:37:05,660 --> 00:37:05,670
that from a production facility to the
 

1385
00:37:05,670 --> 00:37:07,250
that from a production facility to the
launch site in either texas or Florida

1386
00:37:07,250 --> 00:37:07,260
launch site in either texas or Florida
 

1387
00:37:07,260 --> 00:37:10,160
launch site in either texas or Florida
so SpaceX currently moves Falcon 9

1388
00:37:10,160 --> 00:37:10,170
so SpaceX currently moves Falcon 9
 

1389
00:37:10,170 --> 00:37:13,250
so SpaceX currently moves Falcon 9
rocket across the highway on super long

1390
00:37:13,250 --> 00:37:13,260
rocket across the highway on super long
 

1391
00:37:13,260 --> 00:37:16,310
rocket across the highway on super long
trucks but starship and it's super heavy

1392
00:37:16,310 --> 00:37:16,320
trucks but starship and it's super heavy
 

1393
00:37:16,320 --> 00:37:19,670
trucks but starship and it's super heavy
booster would be so large they wouldn't

1394
00:37:19,670 --> 00:37:19,680
booster would be so large they wouldn't
 

1395
00:37:19,680 --> 00:37:21,920
booster would be so large they wouldn't
be able to transplant transport that by

1396
00:37:21,920 --> 00:37:21,930
be able to transplant transport that by
 

1397
00:37:21,930 --> 00:37:24,140
be able to transplant transport that by
the road so the water is gonna play a

1398
00:37:24,140 --> 00:37:24,150
the road so the water is gonna play a
 

1399
00:37:24,150 --> 00:37:29,300
the road so the water is gonna play a
big part in that researchers have

1400
00:37:29,300 --> 00:37:29,310
big part in that researchers have
 

1401
00:37:29,310 --> 00:37:31,310
big part in that researchers have
developed an algorithm that could stop

1402
00:37:31,310 --> 00:37:31,320
developed an algorithm that could stop
 

1403
00:37:31,320 --> 00:37:33,170
developed an algorithm that could stop
self-driving vehicles from getting into

1404
00:37:33,170 --> 00:37:33,180
self-driving vehicles from getting into
 

1405
00:37:33,180 --> 00:37:36,680
self-driving vehicles from getting into
crashes and traffic jams the algorithm

1406
00:37:36,680 --> 00:37:36,690
crashes and traffic jams the algorithm
 

1407
00:37:36,690 --> 00:37:39,590
crashes and traffic jams the algorithm
divides the ground beneath the machines

1408
00:37:39,590 --> 00:37:39,600
divides the ground beneath the machines
 

1409
00:37:39,600 --> 00:37:42,560
divides the ground beneath the machines
into a grid the robots learn their

1410
00:37:42,560 --> 00:37:42,570
into a grid the robots learn their
 

1411
00:37:42,570 --> 00:37:44,720
into a grid the robots learn their
position through technology similar to

1412
00:37:44,720 --> 00:37:44,730
position through technology similar to
 

1413
00:37:44,730 --> 00:37:48,290
position through technology similar to
GPS and coordinate their own movements

1414
00:37:48,290 --> 00:37:48,300
GPS and coordinate their own movements
 

1415
00:37:48,300 --> 00:37:51,590
GPS and coordinate their own movements
together through sensors that assess

1416
00:37:51,590 --> 00:37:51,600
together through sensors that assess
 

1417
00:37:51,600 --> 00:37:55,150
together through sensors that assess
where there's free space to move

1418
00:37:55,150 --> 00:37:55,160
where there's free space to move
 

1419
00:37:55,160 --> 00:37:57,500
where there's free space to move
northwestern engineers Michael

1420
00:37:57,500 --> 00:37:57,510
northwestern engineers Michael
 

1421
00:37:57,510 --> 00:38:02,030
northwestern engineers Michael
Rubenstein says the robots refused to

1422
00:38:02,030 --> 00:38:02,040
Rubenstein says the robots refused to
 

1423
00:38:02,040 --> 00:38:04,550
Rubenstein says the robots refused to
move to a spot until that spot is free

1424
00:38:04,550 --> 00:38:04,560
move to a spot until that spot is free
 

1425
00:38:04,560 --> 00:38:08,190
move to a spot until that spot is free
and until they know that no other robot

1426
00:38:08,190 --> 00:38:08,200
and until they know that no other robot
 

1427
00:38:08,200 --> 00:38:11,280
and until they know that no other robot
are moving to that same spot they are

1428
00:38:11,280 --> 00:38:11,290
are moving to that same spot they are
 

1429
00:38:11,290 --> 00:38:15,359
are moving to that same spot they are
careful and reserve a space ahead of

1430
00:38:15,359 --> 00:38:15,369
careful and reserve a space ahead of
 

1431
00:38:15,369 --> 00:38:19,710
careful and reserve a space ahead of
time Rubenstein's team tested their

1432
00:38:19,710 --> 00:38:19,720
time Rubenstein's team tested their
 

1433
00:38:19,720 --> 00:38:23,400
time Rubenstein's team tested their
algorithm on a swarm of 100 robots set

1434
00:38:23,400 --> 00:38:23,410
algorithm on a swarm of 100 robots set
 

1435
00:38:23,410 --> 00:38:25,950
algorithm on a swarm of 100 robots set
up in their lab to cut out any

1436
00:38:25,950 --> 00:38:25,960
up in their lab to cut out any
 

1437
00:38:25,960 --> 00:38:28,020
up in their lab to cut out any
distractions the robots were only

1438
00:38:28,020 --> 00:38:28,030
distractions the robots were only
 

1439
00:38:28,030 --> 00:38:31,020
distractions the robots were only
allowed to sense three or four of their

1440
00:38:31,020 --> 00:38:31,030
allowed to sense three or four of their
 

1441
00:38:31,030 --> 00:38:34,290
allowed to sense three or four of their
closest neighbors this restricted their

1442
00:38:34,290 --> 00:38:34,300
closest neighbors this restricted their
 

1443
00:38:34,300 --> 00:38:38,069
closest neighbors this restricted their
vision it and it made the system easier

1444
00:38:38,069 --> 00:38:38,079
vision it and it made the system easier
 

1445
00:38:38,079 --> 00:38:40,980
vision it and it made the system easier
to scale as the robots can interact

1446
00:38:40,980 --> 00:38:40,990
to scale as the robots can interact
 

1447
00:38:40,990 --> 00:38:44,099
to scale as the robots can interact
locally without needing global

1448
00:38:44,099 --> 00:38:44,109
locally without needing global
 

1449
00:38:44,109 --> 00:38:46,290
locally without needing global
information think about the impact of

1450
00:38:46,290 --> 00:38:46,300
information think about the impact of
 

1451
00:38:46,300 --> 00:38:49,410
information think about the impact of
that so the advantage of a swarm of

1452
00:38:49,410 --> 00:38:49,420
that so the advantage of a swarm of
 

1453
00:38:49,420 --> 00:38:52,140
that so the advantage of a swarm of
robots is that there is no centralized

1454
00:38:52,140 --> 00:38:52,150
robots is that there is no centralized
 

1455
00:38:52,150 --> 00:38:55,020
robots is that there is no centralized
controller that can disrupt the whole

1456
00:38:55,020 --> 00:38:55,030
controller that can disrupt the whole
 

1457
00:38:55,030 --> 00:38:57,990
controller that can disrupt the whole
system this allows them to work together

1458
00:38:57,990 --> 00:38:58,000
system this allows them to work together
 

1459
00:38:58,000 --> 00:39:01,560
system this allows them to work together
to accomplish any task even if one of

1460
00:39:01,560 --> 00:39:01,570
to accomplish any task even if one of
 

1461
00:39:01,570 --> 00:39:03,710
to accomplish any task even if one of
them breaks down

1462
00:39:03,710 --> 00:39:03,720
them breaks down
 

1463
00:39:03,720 --> 00:39:06,120
them breaks down
this gives the system and obvious

1464
00:39:06,120 --> 00:39:06,130
this gives the system and obvious
 

1465
00:39:06,130 --> 00:39:08,040
this gives the system and obvious
application in warehouse robots but

1466
00:39:08,040 --> 00:39:08,050
application in warehouse robots but
 

1467
00:39:08,050 --> 00:39:10,319
application in warehouse robots but
Rubinstein believes it could actually

1468
00:39:10,319 --> 00:39:10,329
Rubinstein believes it could actually
 

1469
00:39:10,329 --> 00:39:14,069
Rubinstein believes it could actually
also cut traffic and collisions for

1470
00:39:14,069 --> 00:39:14,079
also cut traffic and collisions for
 

1471
00:39:14,079 --> 00:39:17,520
also cut traffic and collisions for
self-driving vehicles on the road he

1472
00:39:17,520 --> 00:39:17,530
self-driving vehicles on the road he
 

1473
00:39:17,530 --> 00:39:19,859
self-driving vehicles on the road he
said quote by understanding how to

1474
00:39:19,859 --> 00:39:19,869
said quote by understanding how to
 

1475
00:39:19,869 --> 00:39:23,579
said quote by understanding how to
control our swarm robots to form shapes

1476
00:39:23,579 --> 00:39:23,589
control our swarm robots to form shapes
 

1477
00:39:23,589 --> 00:39:26,460
control our swarm robots to form shapes
we can understand how to control fleets

1478
00:39:26,460 --> 00:39:26,470
we can understand how to control fleets
 

1479
00:39:26,470 --> 00:39:29,640
we can understand how to control fleets
of autonomous vehicles as they interact

1480
00:39:29,640 --> 00:39:29,650
of autonomous vehicles as they interact
 

1481
00:39:29,650 --> 00:39:31,609
of autonomous vehicles as they interact
with each other

1482
00:39:31,609 --> 00:39:31,619
with each other
 

1483
00:39:31,619 --> 00:39:34,819
with each other
finally cyber security researchers today

1484
00:39:34,819 --> 00:39:34,829
finally cyber security researchers today
 

1485
00:39:34,829 --> 00:39:40,589
finally cyber security researchers today
uncovered a new highly severe Hardware

1486
00:39:40,589 --> 00:39:40,599
uncovered a new highly severe Hardware
 

1487
00:39:40,599 --> 00:39:42,599
uncovered a new highly severe Hardware
vulnerability residing in the widely

1488
00:39:42,599 --> 00:39:42,609
vulnerability residing in the widely
 

1489
00:39:42,609 --> 00:39:44,720
vulnerability residing in the widely
used Wi-Fi chips manufactured by

1490
00:39:44,720 --> 00:39:44,730
used Wi-Fi chips manufactured by
 

1491
00:39:44,730 --> 00:39:47,510
used Wi-Fi chips manufactured by
Broadcom and Cypress

1492
00:39:47,510 --> 00:39:47,520
Broadcom and Cypress
 

1493
00:39:47,520 --> 00:39:50,700
Broadcom and Cypress
apparently they power over a billion

1494
00:39:50,700 --> 00:39:50,710
apparently they power over a billion
 

1495
00:39:50,710 --> 00:39:53,790
apparently they power over a billion
devices including smartphones tablets

1496
00:39:53,790 --> 00:39:53,800
devices including smartphones tablets
 

1497
00:39:53,800 --> 00:39:58,200
devices including smartphones tablets
laptops routers and IOT gadgets dubbed

1498
00:39:58,200 --> 00:39:58,210
laptops routers and IOT gadgets dubbed
 

1499
00:39:58,210 --> 00:40:03,630
laptops routers and IOT gadgets dubbed
crook K R 0 0 K the flock had let nearby

1500
00:40:03,630 --> 00:40:03,640
crook K R 0 0 K the flock had let nearby
 

1501
00:40:03,640 --> 00:40:06,750
crook K R 0 0 K the flock had let nearby
remote attackers intercept and decrypt

1502
00:40:06,750 --> 00:40:06,760
remote attackers intercept and decrypt
 

1503
00:40:06,760 --> 00:40:09,859
remote attackers intercept and decrypt
some wireless network packets

1504
00:40:09,859 --> 00:40:09,869
some wireless network packets
 

1505
00:40:09,869 --> 00:40:13,260
some wireless network packets
transmitted over the air by a vulnerable

1506
00:40:13,260 --> 00:40:13,270
transmitted over the air by a vulnerable
 

1507
00:40:13,270 --> 00:40:14,720
transmitted over the air by a vulnerable
device

1508
00:40:14,720 --> 00:40:14,730
device
 

1509
00:40:14,730 --> 00:40:17,540
device
the attacker doesn't need to be

1510
00:40:17,540 --> 00:40:17,550
the attacker doesn't need to be
 

1511
00:40:17,550 --> 00:40:19,370
the attacker doesn't need to be
connected to the victims wireless

1512
00:40:19,370 --> 00:40:19,380
connected to the victims wireless
 

1513
00:40:19,380 --> 00:40:22,579
connected to the victims wireless
network and the flaw works against

1514
00:40:22,579 --> 00:40:22,589
network and the flaw works against
 

1515
00:40:22,589 --> 00:40:26,030
network and the flaw works against
vulnerable devices using wpa2 personal

1516
00:40:26,030 --> 00:40:26,040
vulnerable devices using wpa2 personal
 

1517
00:40:26,040 --> 00:40:32,859
vulnerable devices using wpa2 personal
or wpa2 Enterprise protocols with AES

1518
00:40:32,859 --> 00:40:32,869
or wpa2 Enterprise protocols with AES
 

1519
00:40:32,869 --> 00:40:37,339
or wpa2 Enterprise protocols with AES
ccmp encryption ESET researchers said

1520
00:40:37,339 --> 00:40:37,349
ccmp encryption ESET researchers said
 

1521
00:40:37,349 --> 00:40:40,550
ccmp encryption ESET researchers said
quote our tests confirmed some client

1522
00:40:40,550 --> 00:40:40,560
quote our tests confirmed some client
 

1523
00:40:40,560 --> 00:40:46,370
quote our tests confirmed some client
devices by Amazon echo Kindle Apple the

1524
00:40:46,370 --> 00:40:46,380
devices by Amazon echo Kindle Apple the
 

1525
00:40:46,380 --> 00:40:50,510
devices by Amazon echo Kindle Apple the
iPhone iPad MacBook Google's Nexus

1526
00:40:50,510 --> 00:40:50,520
iPhone iPad MacBook Google's Nexus
 

1527
00:40:50,520 --> 00:40:53,770
iPhone iPad MacBook Google's Nexus
device Samsung's Galaxy devices

1528
00:40:53,770 --> 00:40:53,780
device Samsung's Galaxy devices
 

1529
00:40:53,780 --> 00:40:59,060
device Samsung's Galaxy devices
raspberry PI's PI 3 and show meas redmi

1530
00:40:59,060 --> 00:40:59,070
raspberry PI's PI 3 and show meas redmi
 

1531
00:40:59,070 --> 00:41:02,630
raspberry PI's PI 3 and show meas redmi
as well as some access points by a soos

1532
00:41:02,630 --> 00:41:02,640
as well as some access points by a soos
 

1533
00:41:02,640 --> 00:41:07,130
as well as some access points by a soos
and Huawei were vulnerable to crook now

1534
00:41:07,130 --> 00:41:07,140
and Huawei were vulnerable to crook now
 

1535
00:41:07,140 --> 00:41:09,829
and Huawei were vulnerable to crook now
the attack relies on the fact that when

1536
00:41:09,829 --> 00:41:09,839
the attack relies on the fact that when
 

1537
00:41:09,839 --> 00:41:12,050
the attack relies on the fact that when
a device suddenly gets disconnected from

1538
00:41:12,050 --> 00:41:12,060
a device suddenly gets disconnected from
 

1539
00:41:12,060 --> 00:41:14,829
a device suddenly gets disconnected from
the wireless network the Wi-Fi chip

1540
00:41:14,829 --> 00:41:14,839
the wireless network the Wi-Fi chip
 

1541
00:41:14,839 --> 00:41:18,579
the wireless network the Wi-Fi chip
clears the session key in the memory and

1542
00:41:18,579 --> 00:41:18,589
clears the session key in the memory and
 

1543
00:41:18,589 --> 00:41:21,680
clears the session key in the memory and
it sets it to zero but see the chip

1544
00:41:21,680 --> 00:41:21,690
it sets it to zero but see the chip
 

1545
00:41:21,690 --> 00:41:24,920
it sets it to zero but see the chip
inadvertently transmits all data frames

1546
00:41:24,920 --> 00:41:24,930
inadvertently transmits all data frames
 

1547
00:41:24,930 --> 00:41:29,059
inadvertently transmits all data frames
left in the buffer with an all Z with an

1548
00:41:29,059 --> 00:41:29,069
left in the buffer with an all Z with an
 

1549
00:41:29,069 --> 00:41:32,569
left in the buffer with an all Z with an
all 0 encryption key even after the

1550
00:41:32,569 --> 00:41:32,579
all 0 encryption key even after the
 

1551
00:41:32,579 --> 00:41:35,660
all 0 encryption key even after the
disassociation so it's actually pushing

1552
00:41:35,660 --> 00:41:35,670
disassociation so it's actually pushing
 

1553
00:41:35,670 --> 00:41:41,270
disassociation so it's actually pushing
out that data without encryption so

1554
00:41:41,270 --> 00:41:41,280
out that data without encryption so
 

1555
00:41:41,280 --> 00:41:43,430
out that data without encryption so
therefore of course an attacker in a

1556
00:41:43,430 --> 00:41:43,440
therefore of course an attacker in a
 

1557
00:41:43,440 --> 00:41:46,160
therefore of course an attacker in a
near proximity to vulnerable devices can

1558
00:41:46,160 --> 00:41:46,170
near proximity to vulnerable devices can
 

1559
00:41:46,170 --> 00:41:49,309
near proximity to vulnerable devices can
use the flaw to repeat of repeatedly

1560
00:41:49,309 --> 00:41:49,319
use the flaw to repeat of repeatedly
 

1561
00:41:49,319 --> 00:41:52,569
use the flaw to repeat of repeatedly
trigger disassociation by sending D

1562
00:41:52,569 --> 00:41:52,579
trigger disassociation by sending D
 

1563
00:41:52,579 --> 00:41:55,880
trigger disassociation by sending D
authentication packets over-the-air to

1564
00:41:55,880 --> 00:41:55,890
authentication packets over-the-air to
 

1565
00:41:55,890 --> 00:41:58,010
authentication packets over-the-air to
capture more data frames quote

1566
00:41:58,010 --> 00:41:58,020
capture more data frames quote
 

1567
00:41:58,020 --> 00:42:00,490
capture more data frames quote
potentially containing sensitive data

1568
00:42:00,490 --> 00:42:00,500
potentially containing sensitive data
 

1569
00:42:00,500 --> 00:42:07,059
potentially containing sensitive data
including DNS ARP ICMP HTTP TCP and TLS

1570
00:42:07,059 --> 00:42:07,069
including DNS ARP ICMP HTTP TCP and TLS
 

1571
00:42:07,069 --> 00:42:09,650
including DNS ARP ICMP HTTP TCP and TLS
packets basically it's like a

1572
00:42:09,650 --> 00:42:09,660
packets basically it's like a
 

1573
00:42:09,660 --> 00:42:11,960
packets basically it's like a
man-in-the-middle without actually

1574
00:42:11,960 --> 00:42:11,970
man-in-the-middle without actually
 

1575
00:42:11,970 --> 00:42:14,650
man-in-the-middle without actually
having to be in the middle

1576
00:42:14,650 --> 00:42:14,660
having to be in the middle
 

1577
00:42:14,660 --> 00:42:17,990
having to be in the middle
besides this since the flaw also affects

1578
00:42:17,990 --> 00:42:18,000
besides this since the flaw also affects
 

1579
00:42:18,000 --> 00:42:21,980
besides this since the flaw also affects
chips embedded into wireless routers the

1580
00:42:21,980 --> 00:42:21,990
chips embedded into wireless routers the
 

1581
00:42:21,990 --> 00:42:23,780
chips embedded into wireless routers the
issue also makes it possible for

1582
00:42:23,780 --> 00:42:23,790
issue also makes it possible for
 

1583
00:42:23,790 --> 00:42:25,819
issue also makes it possible for
attackers to intercept and decrypt

1584
00:42:25,819 --> 00:42:25,829
attackers to intercept and decrypt
 

1585
00:42:25,829 --> 00:42:27,859
attackers to intercept and decrypt
network traffic transmitted from

1586
00:42:27,859 --> 00:42:27,869
network traffic transmitted from
 

1587
00:42:27,869 --> 00:42:28,470
network traffic transmitted from
connected

1588
00:42:28,470 --> 00:42:28,480
connected
 

1589
00:42:28,480 --> 00:42:30,960
connected
vices that are not vulnerable to crook

1590
00:42:30,960 --> 00:42:30,970
vices that are not vulnerable to crook
 

1591
00:42:30,970 --> 00:42:34,800
vices that are not vulnerable to crook
either attached or using different Wi-Fi

1592
00:42:34,800 --> 00:42:34,810
either attached or using different Wi-Fi
 

1593
00:42:34,810 --> 00:42:37,590
either attached or using different Wi-Fi
chips so consider that if you are

1594
00:42:37,590 --> 00:42:37,600
chips so consider that if you are
 

1595
00:42:37,600 --> 00:42:40,590
chips so consider that if you are
connecting to a Wi-Fi hotspot whose

1596
00:42:40,590 --> 00:42:40,600
connecting to a Wi-Fi hotspot whose
 

1597
00:42:40,600 --> 00:42:43,800
connecting to a Wi-Fi hotspot whose
hotspot is vulnerable you are

1598
00:42:43,800 --> 00:42:43,810
hotspot is vulnerable you are
 

1599
00:42:43,810 --> 00:42:47,970
hotspot is vulnerable you are
susceptible to crook Apple has already

1600
00:42:47,970 --> 00:42:47,980
susceptible to crook Apple has already
 

1601
00:42:47,980 --> 00:42:50,490
susceptible to crook Apple has already
released patches for its users some

1602
00:42:50,490 --> 00:42:50,500
released patches for its users some
 

1603
00:42:50,500 --> 00:42:52,250
released patches for its users some
should have issued advisories or

1604
00:42:52,250 --> 00:42:52,260
should have issued advisories or
 

1605
00:42:52,260 --> 00:42:55,440
should have issued advisories or
security patches at the time of the

1606
00:42:55,440 --> 00:42:55,450
security patches at the time of the
 

1607
00:42:55,450 --> 00:42:58,230
security patches at the time of the
publication and other vendors are still

1608
00:42:58,230 --> 00:42:58,240
publication and other vendors are still
 

1609
00:42:58,240 --> 00:43:00,300
publication and other vendors are still
testing the issue against their devices

1610
00:43:00,300 --> 00:43:00,310
testing the issue against their devices
 

1611
00:43:00,310 --> 00:43:04,470
testing the issue against their devices
watch for patch for patches to mitigate

1612
00:43:04,470 --> 00:43:04,480
watch for patch for patches to mitigate
 

1613
00:43:04,480 --> 00:43:07,460
watch for patch for patches to mitigate
this problem via software or firmware

1614
00:43:07,460 --> 00:43:07,470
this problem via software or firmware
 

1615
00:43:07,470 --> 00:43:12,050
this problem via software or firmware
updates for your device wow thank you

1616
00:43:12,050 --> 00:43:12,060
updates for your device wow thank you
 

1617
00:43:12,060 --> 00:43:14,460
updates for your device wow thank you
let's get into the top stories were

1618
00:43:14,460 --> 00:43:14,470
let's get into the top stories were
 

1619
00:43:14,470 --> 00:43:15,990
let's get into the top stories were
following this week

1620
00:43:15,990 --> 00:43:16,000
following this week
 

1621
00:43:16,000 --> 00:43:18,960
following this week
in a world where various mass breaches

1622
00:43:18,960 --> 00:43:18,970
in a world where various mass breaches
 

1623
00:43:18,970 --> 00:43:21,270
in a world where various mass breaches
dictate the use of strong randomized

1624
00:43:21,270 --> 00:43:21,280
dictate the use of strong randomized
 

1625
00:43:21,280 --> 00:43:23,700
dictate the use of strong randomized
passwords more than ever reliable and

1626
00:43:23,700 --> 00:43:23,710
passwords more than ever reliable and
 

1627
00:43:23,710 --> 00:43:25,290
passwords more than ever reliable and
secure credentials management is

1628
00:43:25,290 --> 00:43:25,300
secure credentials management is
 

1629
00:43:25,300 --> 00:43:28,920
secure credentials management is
paramount in 2021 Irish drug dealer has

1630
00:43:28,920 --> 00:43:28,930
paramount in 2021 Irish drug dealer has
 

1631
00:43:28,930 --> 00:43:31,400
paramount in 2021 Irish drug dealer has
evidently learnt the lesson the hard way

1632
00:43:31,400 --> 00:43:31,410
evidently learnt the lesson the hard way
 

1633
00:43:31,410 --> 00:43:34,230
evidently learnt the lesson the hard way
this week the Irish Times reported the

1634
00:43:34,230 --> 00:43:34,240
this week the Irish Times reported the
 

1635
00:43:34,240 --> 00:43:37,320
this week the Irish Times reported the
sad tale of Clifton Collins a 49 year

1636
00:43:37,320 --> 00:43:37,330
sad tale of Clifton Collins a 49 year
 

1637
00:43:37,330 --> 00:43:40,050
sad tale of Clifton Collins a 49 year
old cannabis grower from Dublin Collins

1638
00:43:40,050 --> 00:43:40,060
old cannabis grower from Dublin Collins
 

1639
00:43:40,060 --> 00:43:42,270
old cannabis grower from Dublin Collins
quietly grew and sold his product for 12

1640
00:43:42,270 --> 00:43:42,280
quietly grew and sold his product for 12
 

1641
00:43:42,280 --> 00:43:44,820
quietly grew and sold his product for 12
years and he amassed a small fortune by

1642
00:43:44,820 --> 00:43:44,830
years and he amassed a small fortune by
 

1643
00:43:44,830 --> 00:43:46,560
years and he amassed a small fortune by
using some of that revenue to buy

1644
00:43:46,560 --> 00:43:46,570
using some of that revenue to buy
 

1645
00:43:46,570 --> 00:43:50,340
using some of that revenue to buy
bitcoins around 20 2011 and 2012 before

1646
00:43:50,340 --> 00:43:50,350
bitcoins around 20 2011 and 2012 before
 

1647
00:43:50,350 --> 00:43:53,280
bitcoins around 20 2011 and 2012 before
the price of cryptocurrency soared but

1648
00:43:53,280 --> 00:43:53,290
the price of cryptocurrency soared but
 

1649
00:43:53,290 --> 00:43:56,040
the price of cryptocurrency soared but
in 2017 state authorities on a routine

1650
00:43:56,040 --> 00:43:56,050
in 2017 state authorities on a routine
 

1651
00:43:56,050 --> 00:43:58,080
in 2017 state authorities on a routine
overnight patrol spotted and then

1652
00:43:58,080 --> 00:43:58,090
overnight patrol spotted and then
 

1653
00:43:58,090 --> 00:44:01,349
overnight patrol spotted and then
arrested Collins with roughly $2,000 of

1654
00:44:01,349 --> 00:44:01,359
arrested Collins with roughly $2,000 of
 

1655
00:44:01,359 --> 00:44:03,990
arrested Collins with roughly $2,000 of
cannabis in his car the men quickly

1656
00:44:03,990 --> 00:44:04,000
cannabis in his car the men quickly
 

1657
00:44:04,000 --> 00:44:06,780
cannabis in his car the men quickly
earned himself a five-year jail sentence

1658
00:44:06,780 --> 00:44:06,790
earned himself a five-year jail sentence
 

1659
00:44:06,790 --> 00:44:09,900
earned himself a five-year jail sentence
as part of authorities investigation

1660
00:44:09,900 --> 00:44:09,910
as part of authorities investigation
 

1661
00:44:09,910 --> 00:44:11,609
as part of authorities investigation
Ireland's criminal assets Bureau

1662
00:44:11,609 --> 00:44:11,619
Ireland's criminal assets Bureau
 

1663
00:44:11,619 --> 00:44:13,830
Ireland's criminal assets Bureau
discovered and confiscated 12 Bitcoin

1664
00:44:13,830 --> 00:44:13,840
discovered and confiscated 12 Bitcoin
 

1665
00:44:13,840 --> 00:44:16,080
discovered and confiscated 12 Bitcoin
wallets belonging to Collins totaling

1666
00:44:16,080 --> 00:44:16,090
wallets belonging to Collins totaling
 

1667
00:44:16,090 --> 00:44:19,440
wallets belonging to Collins totaling
nearly 59 million dollars reportedly the

1668
00:44:19,440 --> 00:44:19,450
nearly 59 million dollars reportedly the
 

1669
00:44:19,450 --> 00:44:22,410
nearly 59 million dollars reportedly the
biggest financial case in CA B's 25 year

1670
00:44:22,410 --> 00:44:22,420
biggest financial case in CA B's 25 year
 

1671
00:44:22,420 --> 00:44:25,980
biggest financial case in CA B's 25 year
history there was only one problem CA B

1672
00:44:25,980 --> 00:44:25,990
history there was only one problem CA B
 

1673
00:44:25,990 --> 00:44:27,870
history there was only one problem CA B
couldn't access the accounts because

1674
00:44:27,870 --> 00:44:27,880
couldn't access the accounts because
 

1675
00:44:27,880 --> 00:44:32,310
couldn't access the accounts because
Collins had lost the keys nervous about

1676
00:44:32,310 --> 00:44:32,320
Collins had lost the keys nervous about
 

1677
00:44:32,320 --> 00:44:34,440
Collins had lost the keys nervous about
having a ton of money tied up in a

1678
00:44:34,440 --> 00:44:34,450
having a ton of money tied up in a
 

1679
00:44:34,450 --> 00:44:36,720
having a ton of money tied up in a
single wallet Collins diversified in

1680
00:44:36,720 --> 00:44:36,730
single wallet Collins diversified in
 

1681
00:44:36,730 --> 00:44:39,660
single wallet Collins diversified in
2016 by splitting his 6,000 bitcoins

1682
00:44:39,660 --> 00:44:39,670
2016 by splitting his 6,000 bitcoins
 

1683
00:44:39,670 --> 00:44:42,670
2016 by splitting his 6,000 bitcoins
across 12 newly created wallets

1684
00:44:42,670 --> 00:44:42,680
across 12 newly created wallets
 

1685
00:44:42,680 --> 00:44:44,770
across 12 newly created wallets
and to further secure this fortune

1686
00:44:44,770 --> 00:44:44,780
and to further secure this fortune
 

1687
00:44:44,780 --> 00:44:47,260
and to further secure this fortune
Collins hit a piece of paper containing

1688
00:44:47,260 --> 00:44:47,270
Collins hit a piece of paper containing
 

1689
00:44:47,270 --> 00:44:49,930
Collins hit a piece of paper containing
the access codes inside a fishing rod

1690
00:44:49,930 --> 00:44:49,940
the access codes inside a fishing rod
 

1691
00:44:49,940 --> 00:44:53,080
the access codes inside a fishing rod
case at his home unfortunately a

1692
00:44:53,080 --> 00:44:53,090
case at his home unfortunately a
 

1693
00:44:53,090 --> 00:44:55,660
case at his home unfortunately a
separate criminal broke into Collins

1694
00:44:55,660 --> 00:44:55,670
separate criminal broke into Collins
 

1695
00:44:55,670 --> 00:44:58,450
separate criminal broke into Collins
home in 2017 and cleared his belongings

1696
00:44:58,450 --> 00:44:58,460
home in 2017 and cleared his belongings
 

1697
00:44:58,460 --> 00:45:02,500
home in 2017 and cleared his belongings
and upon Collins arrest his former home

1698
00:45:02,500 --> 00:45:02,510
and upon Collins arrest his former home
 

1699
00:45:02,510 --> 00:45:05,110
and upon Collins arrest his former home
was cleared out by his landlord with

1700
00:45:05,110 --> 00:45:05,120
was cleared out by his landlord with
 

1701
00:45:05,120 --> 00:45:07,870
was cleared out by his landlord with
left-behind belongings taken to a dump

1702
00:45:07,870 --> 00:45:07,880
left-behind belongings taken to a dump
 

1703
00:45:07,880 --> 00:45:10,840
left-behind belongings taken to a dump
dump workers told State Police they

1704
00:45:10,840 --> 00:45:10,850
dump workers told State Police they
 

1705
00:45:10,850 --> 00:45:13,960
dump workers told State Police they
remember seeing fishing gear but waste

1706
00:45:13,960 --> 00:45:13,970
remember seeing fishing gear but waste
 

1707
00:45:13,970 --> 00:45:15,730
remember seeing fishing gear but waste
from this particular dump is set to

1708
00:45:15,730 --> 00:45:15,740
from this particular dump is set to
 

1709
00:45:15,740 --> 00:45:18,250
from this particular dump is set to
Germany and China and incinerated by

1710
00:45:18,250 --> 00:45:18,260
Germany and China and incinerated by
 

1711
00:45:18,260 --> 00:45:21,490
Germany and China and incinerated by
procedure the fishing rod case has been

1712
00:45:21,490 --> 00:45:21,500
procedure the fishing rod case has been
 

1713
00:45:21,500 --> 00:45:24,790
procedure the fishing rod case has been
missing ever since Collins told the

1714
00:45:24,790 --> 00:45:24,800
missing ever since Collins told the
 

1715
00:45:24,800 --> 00:45:26,770
missing ever since Collins told the
Irish police that he has had time to

1716
00:45:26,770 --> 00:45:26,780
Irish police that he has had time to
 

1717
00:45:26,780 --> 00:45:28,540
Irish police that he has had time to
come to terms with the loss of the money

1718
00:45:28,540 --> 00:45:28,550
come to terms with the loss of the money
 

1719
00:45:28,550 --> 00:45:31,150
come to terms with the loss of the money
and regarded it as punishment for his

1720
00:45:31,150 --> 00:45:31,160
and regarded it as punishment for his
 

1721
00:45:31,160 --> 00:45:36,670
and regarded it as punishment for his
own stupidity this makes me want to cry

1722
00:45:36,670 --> 00:45:36,680
own stupidity this makes me want to cry
 

1723
00:45:36,680 --> 00:45:38,710
own stupidity this makes me want to cry
right okay Wow

1724
00:45:38,710 --> 00:45:38,720
right okay Wow
 

1725
00:45:38,720 --> 00:45:44,770
right okay Wow
so that money would not have been his in

1726
00:45:44,770 --> 00:45:44,780
so that money would not have been his in
 

1727
00:45:44,780 --> 00:45:47,890
so that money would not have been his in
the end which is why he's kind of okay

1728
00:45:47,890 --> 00:45:47,900
the end which is why he's kind of okay
 

1729
00:45:47,900 --> 00:45:52,960
the end which is why he's kind of okay
with losing it because he's been caught

1730
00:45:52,960 --> 00:45:52,970
with losing it because he's been caught
 

1731
00:45:52,970 --> 00:45:55,000
with losing it because he's been caught
yep back up

1732
00:45:55,000 --> 00:45:55,010
yep back up
 

1733
00:45:55,010 --> 00:45:58,230
yep back up
where are your backups right I

1734
00:45:58,230 --> 00:45:58,240
where are your backups right I
 

1735
00:45:58,240 --> 00:46:00,790
where are your backups right I
understand that in the lure box the

1736
00:46:00,790 --> 00:46:00,800
understand that in the lure box the
 

1737
00:46:00,800 --> 00:46:02,410
understand that in the lure box the
tackle box is out they call it tackle

1738
00:46:02,410 --> 00:46:02,420
tackle box is out they call it tackle
 

1739
00:46:02,420 --> 00:46:04,690
tackle box is out they call it tackle
box of backups fishing rod for the main

1740
00:46:04,690 --> 00:46:04,700
box of backups fishing rod for the main
 

1741
00:46:04,700 --> 00:46:07,060
box of backups fishing rod for the main
believe me I understand the idea the

1742
00:46:07,060 --> 00:46:07,070
believe me I understand the idea the
 

1743
00:46:07,070 --> 00:46:10,060
believe me I understand the idea the
concept behind a paper wallet yeah but

1744
00:46:10,060 --> 00:46:10,070
concept behind a paper wallet yeah but
 

1745
00:46:10,070 --> 00:46:12,820
concept behind a paper wallet yeah but
paper wallet as a term doesn't

1746
00:46:12,820 --> 00:46:12,830
paper wallet as a term doesn't
 

1747
00:46:12,830 --> 00:46:14,950
paper wallet as a term doesn't
necessarily mean that you have to print

1748
00:46:14,950 --> 00:46:14,960
necessarily mean that you have to print
 

1749
00:46:14,960 --> 00:46:17,710
necessarily mean that you have to print
it on a piece of paper which is

1750
00:46:17,710 --> 00:46:17,720
it on a piece of paper which is
 

1751
00:46:17,720 --> 00:46:20,980
it on a piece of paper which is
susceptible to everything yeah a paper

1752
00:46:20,980 --> 00:46:20,990
susceptible to everything yeah a paper
 

1753
00:46:20,990 --> 00:46:23,050
susceptible to everything yeah a paper
wallet think about it this way an

1754
00:46:23,050 --> 00:46:23,060
wallet think about it this way an
 

1755
00:46:23,060 --> 00:46:27,100
wallet think about it this way an
offline wallet right like it could be an

1756
00:46:27,100 --> 00:46:27,110
offline wallet right like it could be an
 

1757
00:46:27,110 --> 00:46:30,190
offline wallet right like it could be an
encrypted GPG encrypted file on your

1758
00:46:30,190 --> 00:46:30,200
encrypted GPG encrypted file on your
 

1759
00:46:30,200 --> 00:46:32,740
encrypted GPG encrypted file on your
hard drive which is also Luke's

1760
00:46:32,740 --> 00:46:32,750
hard drive which is also Luke's
 

1761
00:46:32,750 --> 00:46:36,580
hard drive which is also Luke's
encrypted and that can be your

1762
00:46:36,580 --> 00:46:36,590
encrypted and that can be your
 

1763
00:46:36,590 --> 00:46:39,100
encrypted and that can be your
protection and and then back it up oh

1764
00:46:39,100 --> 00:46:39,110
protection and and then back it up oh
 

1765
00:46:39,110 --> 00:46:42,220
protection and and then back it up oh
you know what six I am slightly

1766
00:46:42,220 --> 00:46:42,230
you know what six I am slightly
 

1767
00:46:42,230 --> 00:46:44,920
you know what six I am slightly
suspicious actually of this story mr.

1768
00:46:44,920 --> 00:46:44,930
suspicious actually of this story mr.
 

1769
00:46:44,930 --> 00:46:47,800
suspicious actually of this story mr.
Collins why when you're released from

1770
00:46:47,800 --> 00:46:47,810
Collins why when you're released from
 

1771
00:46:47,810 --> 00:46:51,070
Collins why when you're released from
jail if all of a sudden you disappear

1772
00:46:51,070 --> 00:46:51,080
jail if all of a sudden you disappear
 

1773
00:46:51,080 --> 00:46:55,540
jail if all of a sudden you disappear
maybe you could excuse me I'm going

1774
00:46:55,540 --> 00:46:55,550
maybe you could excuse me I'm going
 

1775
00:46:55,550 --> 00:46:58,949
maybe you could excuse me I'm going
fishing

1776
00:46:58,949 --> 00:46:58,959

 

1777
00:46:58,959 --> 00:47:02,679

elsewhere oh boy okay so where do you

1778
00:47:02,679 --> 00:47:02,689
elsewhere oh boy okay so where do you
 

1779
00:47:02,689 --> 00:47:05,140
elsewhere oh boy okay so where do you
keep your crypto keys so think about

1780
00:47:05,140 --> 00:47:05,150
keep your crypto keys so think about
 

1781
00:47:05,150 --> 00:47:08,049
keep your crypto keys so think about
this Oh your wallets and your keys your

1782
00:47:08,049 --> 00:47:08,059
this Oh your wallets and your keys your
 

1783
00:47:08,059 --> 00:47:10,900
this Oh your wallets and your keys your
wallet is reasonably easy to recover as

1784
00:47:10,900 --> 00:47:10,910
wallet is reasonably easy to recover as
 

1785
00:47:10,910 --> 00:47:14,979
wallet is reasonably easy to recover as
long as you know your wallet address

1786
00:47:14,979 --> 00:47:14,989
long as you know your wallet address
 

1787
00:47:14,989 --> 00:47:17,739
long as you know your wallet address
it's that private key that you're not

1788
00:47:17,739 --> 00:47:17,749
it's that private key that you're not
 

1789
00:47:17,749 --> 00:47:18,999
it's that private key that you're not
going to be able to recover if you don't

1790
00:47:18,999 --> 00:47:19,009
going to be able to recover if you don't
 

1791
00:47:19,009 --> 00:47:24,579
going to be able to recover if you don't
have it so encryption I mean use like

1792
00:47:24,579 --> 00:47:24,589
have it so encryption I mean use like
 

1793
00:47:24,589 --> 00:47:26,890
have it so encryption I mean use like
can I skip off can I skip off the set

1794
00:47:26,890 --> 00:47:26,900
can I skip off can I skip off the set
 

1795
00:47:26,900 --> 00:47:29,380
can I skip off can I skip off the set
for a second here Sasha I'm jumping over

1796
00:47:29,380 --> 00:47:29,390
for a second here Sasha I'm jumping over
 

1797
00:47:29,390 --> 00:47:31,329
for a second here Sasha I'm jumping over
here and I know you guys can't see me

1798
00:47:31,329 --> 00:47:31,339
here and I know you guys can't see me
 

1799
00:47:31,339 --> 00:47:35,589
here and I know you guys can't see me
but I just want to grab a device right

1800
00:47:35,589 --> 00:47:35,599
but I just want to grab a device right
 

1801
00:47:35,599 --> 00:47:39,459
but I just want to grab a device right
from Kingston Tech okay so Kingston has

1802
00:47:39,459 --> 00:47:39,469
from Kingston Tech okay so Kingston has
 

1803
00:47:39,469 --> 00:47:41,799
from Kingston Tech okay so Kingston has
these guys would not stand up against

1804
00:47:41,799 --> 00:47:41,809
these guys would not stand up against
 

1805
00:47:41,809 --> 00:47:44,019
these guys would not stand up against
incinerator though wouldn't stand up

1806
00:47:44,019 --> 00:47:44,029
incinerator though wouldn't stand up
 

1807
00:47:44,029 --> 00:47:45,669
incinerator though wouldn't stand up
against an incinerator an incinerator

1808
00:47:45,669 --> 00:47:45,679
against an incinerator an incinerator
 

1809
00:47:45,679 --> 00:47:49,150
against an incinerator an incinerator
but perfect a data traveller mm has an

1810
00:47:49,150 --> 00:47:49,160
but perfect a data traveller mm has an
 

1811
00:47:49,160 --> 00:47:52,269
but perfect a data traveller mm has an
encryption key pad so save your GPG

1812
00:47:52,269 --> 00:47:52,279
encryption key pad so save your GPG
 

1813
00:47:52,279 --> 00:47:56,140
encryption key pad so save your GPG
encrypted keys yes on this encrypted

1814
00:47:56,140 --> 00:47:56,150
encrypted keys yes on this encrypted
 

1815
00:47:56,150 --> 00:47:59,679
encrypted keys yes on this encrypted
with the keypad and then back it up to

1816
00:47:59,679 --> 00:47:59,689
with the keypad and then back it up to
 

1817
00:47:59,689 --> 00:48:03,519
with the keypad and then back it up to
multiple devices yes like come up when

1818
00:48:03,519 --> 00:48:03,529
multiple devices yes like come up when
 

1819
00:48:03,529 --> 00:48:06,189
multiple devices yes like come up when
you've got millions and millions of

1820
00:48:06,189 --> 00:48:06,199
you've got millions and millions of
 

1821
00:48:06,199 --> 00:48:08,620
you've got millions and millions of
dollars in Bitcoin you can afford to buy

1822
00:48:08,620 --> 00:48:08,630
dollars in Bitcoin you can afford to buy
 

1823
00:48:08,630 --> 00:48:13,089
dollars in Bitcoin you can afford to buy
a dad a traveler mm don't be dumb daft

1824
00:48:13,089 --> 00:48:13,099
a dad a traveler mm don't be dumb daft
 

1825
00:48:13,099 --> 00:48:15,999
a dad a traveler mm don't be dumb daft
as they would say this is marish the

1826
00:48:15,999 --> 00:48:16,009
as they would say this is marish the
 

1827
00:48:16,009 --> 00:48:20,769
as they would say this is marish the
raft mister don't be a prat oh come on

1828
00:48:20,769 --> 00:48:20,779
raft mister don't be a prat oh come on
 

1829
00:48:20,779 --> 00:48:24,839
raft mister don't be a prat oh come on
now buy it like yeah right

1830
00:48:24,839 --> 00:48:24,849
now buy it like yeah right
 

1831
00:48:24,849 --> 00:48:27,909
now buy it like yeah right
that just breaks my heart in so many

1832
00:48:27,909 --> 00:48:27,919
that just breaks my heart in so many
 

1833
00:48:27,919 --> 00:48:29,649
that just breaks my heart in so many
ways but it's just like okay this guy

1834
00:48:29,649 --> 00:48:29,659
ways but it's just like okay this guy
 

1835
00:48:29,659 --> 00:48:31,179
ways but it's just like okay this guy
obviously knew his way around the

1836
00:48:31,179 --> 00:48:31,189
obviously knew his way around the
 

1837
00:48:31,189 --> 00:48:33,549
obviously knew his way around the
cryptocurrency I mean he but maybe he

1838
00:48:33,549 --> 00:48:33,559
cryptocurrency I mean he but maybe he
 

1839
00:48:33,559 --> 00:48:35,499
cryptocurrency I mean he but maybe he
was just lucky maybe he just bought it

1840
00:48:35,499 --> 00:48:35,509
was just lucky maybe he just bought it
 

1841
00:48:35,509 --> 00:48:39,309
was just lucky maybe he just bought it
right time boulders yeah hurts him some

1842
00:48:39,309 --> 00:48:39,319
right time boulders yeah hurts him some
 

1843
00:48:39,319 --> 00:48:42,159
right time boulders yeah hurts him some
chattering at the local pub evidently

1844
00:48:42,159 --> 00:48:42,169
chattering at the local pub evidently
 

1845
00:48:42,169 --> 00:48:43,659
chattering at the local pub evidently
I'm painting a picture of who this guy

1846
00:48:43,659 --> 00:48:43,669
I'm painting a picture of who this guy
 

1847
00:48:43,669 --> 00:48:45,849
I'm painting a picture of who this guy
is he's sitting there except in a pine

1848
00:48:45,849 --> 00:48:45,859
is he's sitting there except in a pine
 

1849
00:48:45,859 --> 00:48:49,839
is he's sitting there except in a pine
tea Guiness listening kisum so I bought

1850
00:48:49,839 --> 00:48:49,849
tea Guiness listening kisum so I bought
 

1851
00:48:49,849 --> 00:48:54,009
tea Guiness listening kisum so I bought
a thousand Bitcoin last week no that'll

1852
00:48:54,009 --> 00:48:54,019
a thousand Bitcoin last week no that'll
 

1853
00:48:54,019 --> 00:48:58,509
a thousand Bitcoin last week no that'll
never be worth anything they said he

1854
00:48:58,509 --> 00:48:58,519
never be worth anything they said he
 

1855
00:48:58,519 --> 00:49:00,399
never be worth anything they said he
wrote it down on a napkin they were

1856
00:49:00,399 --> 00:49:00,409
wrote it down on a napkin they were
 

1857
00:49:00,409 --> 00:49:04,809
wrote it down on a napkin they were
there are only 20 cents each like oh my

1858
00:49:04,809 --> 00:49:04,819
there are only 20 cents each like oh my
 

1859
00:49:04,819 --> 00:49:07,390
there are only 20 cents each like oh my
goodness not to be again s I'm going

1860
00:49:07,390 --> 00:49:07,400
goodness not to be again s I'm going
 

1861
00:49:07,400 --> 00:49:09,459
goodness not to be again s I'm going
fishing boys yeah

1862
00:49:09,459 --> 00:49:09,469
fishing boys yeah
 

1863
00:49:09,469 --> 00:49:11,620
fishing boys yeah
so the question becomes okay so think

1864
00:49:11,620 --> 00:49:11,630
so the question becomes okay so think
 

1865
00:49:11,630 --> 00:49:13,749
so the question becomes okay so think
about it where are your keys okay so if

1866
00:49:13,749 --> 00:49:13,759
about it where are your keys okay so if
 

1867
00:49:13,759 --> 00:49:15,370
about it where are your keys okay so if
you collect cryptocurrency where are

1868
00:49:15,370 --> 00:49:15,380
you collect cryptocurrency where are
 

1869
00:49:15,380 --> 00:49:18,039
you collect cryptocurrency where are
your keys how are they safe do you have

1870
00:49:18,039 --> 00:49:18,049
your keys how are they safe do you have
 

1871
00:49:18,049 --> 00:49:21,069
your keys how are they safe do you have
a device like a data traveler 2000 from

1872
00:49:21,069 --> 00:49:21,079
a device like a data traveler 2000 from
 

1873
00:49:21,079 --> 00:49:25,120
a device like a data traveler 2000 from
Kingston I have one and if not get one

1874
00:49:25,120 --> 00:49:25,130
Kingston I have one and if not get one
 

1875
00:49:25,130 --> 00:49:26,440
Kingston I have one and if not get one
okay because this is a great device

1876
00:49:26,440 --> 00:49:26,450
okay because this is a great device
 

1877
00:49:26,450 --> 00:49:28,630
okay because this is a great device
two-storey keys on but I wouldn't just I

1878
00:49:28,630 --> 00:49:28,640
two-storey keys on but I wouldn't just I
 

1879
00:49:28,640 --> 00:49:31,539
two-storey keys on but I wouldn't just I
wouldn't just put my files on here I

1880
00:49:31,539 --> 00:49:31,549
wouldn't just put my files on here I
 

1881
00:49:31,549 --> 00:49:33,489
wouldn't just put my files on here I
would also encrypt those files with GPG

1882
00:49:33,489 --> 00:49:33,499
would also encrypt those files with GPG
 

1883
00:49:33,499 --> 00:49:36,039
would also encrypt those files with GPG
right so you've got multiple layers of

1884
00:49:36,039 --> 00:49:36,049
right so you've got multiple layers of
 

1885
00:49:36,049 --> 00:49:38,559
right so you've got multiple layers of
encryption and heck if you want to Luc's

1886
00:49:38,559 --> 00:49:38,569
encryption and heck if you want to Luc's
 

1887
00:49:38,569 --> 00:49:39,969
encryption and heck if you want to Luc's
encrypt this as well

1888
00:49:39,969 --> 00:49:39,979
encrypt this as well
 

1889
00:49:39,979 --> 00:49:42,700
encrypt this as well
triple layer encryption that's fine and

1890
00:49:42,700 --> 00:49:42,710
triple layer encryption that's fine and
 

1891
00:49:42,710 --> 00:49:44,410
triple layer encryption that's fine and
then you can back that up to multiple

1892
00:49:44,410 --> 00:49:44,420
then you can back that up to multiple
 

1893
00:49:44,420 --> 00:49:48,190
then you can back that up to multiple
devices create a DD image I don't care

1894
00:49:48,190 --> 00:49:48,200
devices create a DD image I don't care
 

1895
00:49:48,200 --> 00:49:49,809
devices create a DD image I don't care
what you do but you need to have a

1896
00:49:49,809 --> 00:49:49,819
what you do but you need to have a
 

1897
00:49:49,819 --> 00:49:52,539
what you do but you need to have a
backup of your keys yes and an offline

1898
00:49:52,539 --> 00:49:52,549
backup of your keys yes and an offline
 

1899
00:49:52,549 --> 00:49:55,089
backup of your keys yes and an offline
key does not necessarily mean that

1900
00:49:55,089 --> 00:49:55,099
key does not necessarily mean that
 

1901
00:49:55,099 --> 00:49:57,160
key does not necessarily mean that
there's only one copy no you can still

1902
00:49:57,160 --> 00:49:57,170
there's only one copy no you can still
 

1903
00:49:57,170 --> 00:50:00,729
there's only one copy no you can still
have backups but I think that is safer

1904
00:50:00,729 --> 00:50:00,739
have backups but I think that is safer
 

1905
00:50:00,739 --> 00:50:03,729
have backups but I think that is safer
than the paper key because the paper key

1906
00:50:03,729 --> 00:50:03,739
than the paper key because the paper key
 

1907
00:50:03,739 --> 00:50:05,200
than the paper key because the paper key
can be picked up by anyone so that

1908
00:50:05,200 --> 00:50:05,210
can be picked up by anyone so that
 

1909
00:50:05,210 --> 00:50:07,509
can be picked up by anyone so that
robber if he recognized it and he also

1910
00:50:07,509 --> 00:50:07,519
robber if he recognized it and he also
 

1911
00:50:07,519 --> 00:50:10,839
robber if he recognized it and he also
had the wallets I'm saying he I'm just

1912
00:50:10,839 --> 00:50:10,849
had the wallets I'm saying he I'm just
 

1913
00:50:10,849 --> 00:50:15,039
had the wallets I'm saying he I'm just
assuming it was probably a woman but if

1914
00:50:15,039 --> 00:50:15,049
assuming it was probably a woman but if
 

1915
00:50:15,049 --> 00:50:18,729
assuming it was probably a woman but if
the robber was to get a hold of the keys

1916
00:50:18,729 --> 00:50:18,739
the robber was to get a hold of the keys
 

1917
00:50:18,739 --> 00:50:22,959
the robber was to get a hold of the keys
the private keys on paper as well as the

1918
00:50:22,959 --> 00:50:22,969
the private keys on paper as well as the
 

1919
00:50:22,969 --> 00:50:24,759
the private keys on paper as well as the
wallets well they've got all your 69

1920
00:50:24,759 --> 00:50:24,769
wallets well they've got all your 69
 

1921
00:50:24,769 --> 00:50:27,519
wallets well they've got all your 69
billion dollars whatever it is a lot of

1922
00:50:27,519 --> 00:50:27,529
billion dollars whatever it is a lot of
 

1923
00:50:27,529 --> 00:50:30,549
billion dollars whatever it is a lot of
money a lot of money right right so at

1924
00:50:30,549 --> 00:50:30,559
money a lot of money right right so at
 

1925
00:50:30,559 --> 00:50:32,109
money a lot of money right right so at
least with encryption you can have

1926
00:50:32,109 --> 00:50:32,119
least with encryption you can have
 

1927
00:50:32,119 --> 00:50:35,219
least with encryption you can have
multiple copies of your file backed up

1928
00:50:35,219 --> 00:50:35,229
multiple copies of your file backed up
 

1929
00:50:35,229 --> 00:50:38,469
multiple copies of your file backed up
that has your keys but don't just pray

1930
00:50:38,469 --> 00:50:38,479
that has your keys but don't just pray
 

1931
00:50:38,479 --> 00:50:40,989
that has your keys but don't just pray
hail it would be for him when he gets

1932
00:50:40,989 --> 00:50:40,999
hail it would be for him when he gets
 

1933
00:50:40,999 --> 00:50:43,329
hail it would be for him when he gets
out after I don't know if his sentences

1934
00:50:43,329 --> 00:50:43,339
out after I don't know if his sentences
 

1935
00:50:43,339 --> 00:50:45,700
out after I don't know if his sentences
up yet but when he gets out and he's

1936
00:50:45,700 --> 00:50:45,710
up yet but when he gets out and he's
 

1937
00:50:45,710 --> 00:50:47,620
up yet but when he gets out and he's
just talking to somebody who's never met

1938
00:50:47,620 --> 00:50:47,630
just talking to somebody who's never met
 

1939
00:50:47,630 --> 00:50:50,079
just talking to somebody who's never met
him before and he tells them the tale he

1940
00:50:50,079 --> 00:50:50,089
him before and he tells them the tale he
 

1941
00:50:50,089 --> 00:50:52,870
him before and he tells them the tale he
lost so much money they'll think that he

1942
00:50:52,870 --> 00:50:52,880
lost so much money they'll think that he
 

1943
00:50:52,880 --> 00:50:57,150
lost so much money they'll think that he
is lying yeah all right

1944
00:50:57,150 --> 00:50:57,160
is lying yeah all right
 

1945
00:50:57,160 --> 00:50:59,620
is lying yeah all right
Firefox has begun the process of

1946
00:50:59,620 --> 00:50:59,630
Firefox has begun the process of
 

1947
00:50:59,630 --> 00:51:01,839
Firefox has begun the process of
switching browser users to cloud flairs

1948
00:51:01,839 --> 00:51:01,849
switching browser users to cloud flairs
 

1949
00:51:01,849 --> 00:51:05,019
switching browser users to cloud flairs
encrypted DNS service this week the

1950
00:51:05,019 --> 00:51:05,029
encrypted DNS service this week the
 

1951
00:51:05,029 --> 00:51:06,759
encrypted DNS service this week the
change rolls out across the United

1952
00:51:06,759 --> 00:51:06,769
change rolls out across the United
 

1953
00:51:06,769 --> 00:51:09,029
change rolls out across the United
States in the coming weeks

1954
00:51:09,029 --> 00:51:09,039
States in the coming weeks
 

1955
00:51:09,039 --> 00:51:14,499
States in the coming weeks
DNS over HTTPS helps keep eavesdroppers

1956
00:51:14,499 --> 00:51:14,509
DNS over HTTPS helps keep eavesdroppers
 

1957
00:51:14,509 --> 00:51:16,809
DNS over HTTPS helps keep eavesdroppers
from seeing what DNS lookups your

1958
00:51:16,809 --> 00:51:16,819
from seeing what DNS lookups your
 

1959
00:51:16,819 --> 00:51:19,420
from seeing what DNS lookups your
browser's making potentially making it

1960
00:51:19,420 --> 00:51:19,430
browser's making potentially making it
 

1961
00:51:19,430 --> 00:51:20,859
browser's making potentially making it
more difficult for Internet service

1962
00:51:20,859 --> 00:51:20,869
more difficult for Internet service
 

1963
00:51:20,869 --> 00:51:22,210
more difficult for Internet service
providers or

1964
00:51:22,210 --> 00:51:22,220
providers or
 

1965
00:51:22,220 --> 00:51:24,520
providers or
other third parties to monitor what

1966
00:51:24,520 --> 00:51:24,530
other third parties to monitor what
 

1967
00:51:24,530 --> 00:51:27,550
other third parties to monitor what
websites you visit mozilla

1968
00:51:27,550 --> 00:51:27,560
websites you visit mozilla
 

1969
00:51:27,560 --> 00:51:31,720
websites you visit mozilla
embrace of dns over HTTP is fueled in

1970
00:51:31,720 --> 00:51:31,730
embrace of dns over HTTP is fueled in
 

1971
00:51:31,730 --> 00:51:34,480
embrace of dns over HTTP is fueled in
part by concerns about ISPs monitoring

1972
00:51:34,480 --> 00:51:34,490
part by concerns about ISPs monitoring
 

1973
00:51:34,490 --> 00:51:37,510
part by concerns about ISPs monitoring
customers web usage mobile broadband

1974
00:51:37,510 --> 00:51:37,520
customers web usage mobile broadband
 

1975
00:51:37,520 --> 00:51:39,730
customers web usage mobile broadband
providers were caught selling their

1976
00:51:39,730 --> 00:51:39,740
providers were caught selling their
 

1977
00:51:39,740 --> 00:51:42,099
providers were caught selling their
customers real-time location data to

1978
00:51:42,099 --> 00:51:42,109
customers real-time location data to
 

1979
00:51:42,109 --> 00:51:44,260
customers real-time location data to
third parties and internet providers can

1980
00:51:44,260 --> 00:51:44,270
third parties and internet providers can
 

1981
00:51:44,270 --> 00:51:46,300
third parties and internet providers can
use browsing history to deliver targeted

1982
00:51:46,300 --> 00:51:46,310
use browsing history to deliver targeted
 

1983
00:51:46,310 --> 00:51:49,480
use browsing history to deliver targeted
ads wireless and wired internet

1984
00:51:49,480 --> 00:51:49,490
ads wireless and wired internet
 

1985
00:51:49,490 --> 00:51:51,550
ads wireless and wired internet
providers are suing the state of maine

1986
00:51:51,550 --> 00:51:51,560
providers are suing the state of maine
 

1987
00:51:51,560 --> 00:51:54,580
providers are suing the state of maine
to stop a web browsing privacy law that

1988
00:51:54,580 --> 00:51:54,590
to stop a web browsing privacy law that
 

1989
00:51:54,590 --> 00:51:57,010
to stop a web browsing privacy law that
would require ISPs to get customers

1990
00:51:57,010 --> 00:51:57,020
would require ISPs to get customers
 

1991
00:51:57,020 --> 00:51:59,560
would require ISPs to get customers
opt-in consent before using or sharing

1992
00:51:59,560 --> 00:51:59,570
opt-in consent before using or sharing
 

1993
00:51:59,570 --> 00:52:01,540
opt-in consent before using or sharing
browsing history and other sensitive

1994
00:52:01,540 --> 00:52:01,550
browsing history and other sensitive
 

1995
00:52:01,550 --> 00:52:04,470
browsing history and other sensitive
data the telecom companies already

1996
00:52:04,470 --> 00:52:04,480
data the telecom companies already
 

1997
00:52:04,480 --> 00:52:06,849
data the telecom companies already
convinced Congress to eliminate a

1998
00:52:06,849 --> 00:52:06,859
convinced Congress to eliminate a
 

1999
00:52:06,859 --> 00:52:10,780
convinced Congress to eliminate a
similar federal law in 2017 with web

2000
00:52:10,780 --> 00:52:10,790
similar federal law in 2017 with web
 

2001
00:52:10,790 --> 00:52:12,760
similar federal law in 2017 with web
users already being tracked heavily by

2002
00:52:12,760 --> 00:52:12,770
users already being tracked heavily by
 

2003
00:52:12,770 --> 00:52:14,560
users already being tracked heavily by
companies like Google and Facebook

2004
00:52:14,560 --> 00:52:14,570
companies like Google and Facebook
 

2005
00:52:14,570 --> 00:52:17,410
companies like Google and Facebook
Mozilla had said it is embracing DNS

2006
00:52:17,410 --> 00:52:17,420
Mozilla had said it is embracing DNS
 

2007
00:52:17,420 --> 00:52:20,920
Mozilla had said it is embracing DNS
over HTTPS because quote we don't want

2008
00:52:20,920 --> 00:52:20,930
over HTTPS because quote we don't want
 

2009
00:52:20,930 --> 00:52:23,170
over HTTPS because quote we don't want
to see that business model duplicated in

2010
00:52:23,170 --> 00:52:23,180
to see that business model duplicated in
 

2011
00:52:23,180 --> 00:52:25,720
to see that business model duplicated in
the middle of a network and it's just a

2012
00:52:25,720 --> 00:52:25,730
the middle of a network and it's just a
 

2013
00:52:25,730 --> 00:52:28,359
the middle of a network and it's just a
mistake to use DNS for those purposes

2014
00:52:28,359 --> 00:52:28,369
mistake to use DNS for those purposes
 

2015
00:52:28,369 --> 00:52:29,550
mistake to use DNS for those purposes
end quote

2016
00:52:29,550 --> 00:52:29,560
end quote
 

2017
00:52:29,560 --> 00:52:32,109
end quote
Mozilla said in an announcement Tuesday

2018
00:52:32,109 --> 00:52:32,119
Mozilla said in an announcement Tuesday
 

2019
00:52:32,119 --> 00:52:35,470
Mozilla said in an announcement Tuesday
quote today we know that unencrypted DNS

2020
00:52:35,470 --> 00:52:35,480
quote today we know that unencrypted DNS
 

2021
00:52:35,480 --> 00:52:38,200
quote today we know that unencrypted DNS
is not only vulnerable to spying but is

2022
00:52:38,200 --> 00:52:38,210
is not only vulnerable to spying but is
 

2023
00:52:38,210 --> 00:52:40,480
is not only vulnerable to spying but is
being exploited and so we are helping

2024
00:52:40,480 --> 00:52:40,490
being exploited and so we are helping
 

2025
00:52:40,490 --> 00:52:42,700
being exploited and so we are helping
the Internet to make the shift to more

2026
00:52:42,700 --> 00:52:42,710
the Internet to make the shift to more
 

2027
00:52:42,710 --> 00:52:46,359
the Internet to make the shift to more
secure alternatives we do we do this by

2028
00:52:46,359 --> 00:52:46,369
secure alternatives we do we do this by
 

2029
00:52:46,369 --> 00:52:49,560
secure alternatives we do we do this by
performing DNS lookups in encrypted

2030
00:52:49,560 --> 00:52:49,570
performing DNS lookups in encrypted
 

2031
00:52:49,570 --> 00:52:53,230
performing DNS lookups in encrypted
HTTPS connection this helps hide your

2032
00:52:53,230 --> 00:52:53,240
HTTPS connection this helps hide your
 

2033
00:52:53,240 --> 00:52:55,120
HTTPS connection this helps hide your
browsing history from attackers on the

2034
00:52:55,120 --> 00:52:55,130
browsing history from attackers on the
 

2035
00:52:55,130 --> 00:52:57,099
browsing history from attackers on the
network and helps prevent data

2036
00:52:57,099 --> 00:52:57,109
network and helps prevent data
 

2037
00:52:57,109 --> 00:52:59,589
network and helps prevent data
collection by third parties on the

2038
00:52:59,589 --> 00:52:59,599
collection by third parties on the
 

2039
00:52:59,599 --> 00:53:01,599
collection by third parties on the
network that ties your computer to

2040
00:53:01,599 --> 00:53:01,609
network that ties your computer to
 

2041
00:53:01,609 --> 00:53:03,870
network that ties your computer to
websites you visit end quote

2042
00:53:03,870 --> 00:53:03,880
websites you visit end quote
 

2043
00:53:03,880 --> 00:53:07,359
websites you visit end quote
while Firefox is encrypted DNS uses

2044
00:53:07,359 --> 00:53:07,369
while Firefox is encrypted DNS uses
 

2045
00:53:07,369 --> 00:53:09,940
while Firefox is encrypted DNS uses
CloudFlare by default users can change

2046
00:53:09,940 --> 00:53:09,950
CloudFlare by default users can change
 

2047
00:53:09,950 --> 00:53:13,540
CloudFlare by default users can change
that to next DNS in the Firefox setting

2048
00:53:13,540 --> 00:53:13,550
that to next DNS in the Firefox setting
 

2049
00:53:13,550 --> 00:53:15,490
that to next DNS in the Firefox setting
or manually enter the address of another

2050
00:53:15,490 --> 00:53:15,500
or manually enter the address of another
 

2051
00:53:15,500 --> 00:53:19,210
or manually enter the address of another
encrypted DNS service Firefox users can

2052
00:53:19,210 --> 00:53:19,220
encrypted DNS service Firefox users can
 

2053
00:53:19,220 --> 00:53:21,700
encrypted DNS service Firefox users can
also disable the new default setting if

2054
00:53:21,700 --> 00:53:21,710
also disable the new default setting if
 

2055
00:53:21,710 --> 00:53:23,290
also disable the new default setting if
they don't want to use any of the

2056
00:53:23,290 --> 00:53:23,300
they don't want to use any of the
 

2057
00:53:23,300 --> 00:53:27,430
they don't want to use any of the
encrypted DNS options google's plan for

2058
00:53:27,430 --> 00:53:27,440
encrypted DNS options google's plan for
 

2059
00:53:27,440 --> 00:53:30,910
encrypted DNS options google's plan for
encrypted dns in chrome which is still

2060
00:53:30,910 --> 00:53:30,920
encrypted dns in chrome which is still
 

2061
00:53:30,920 --> 00:53:32,650
encrypted dns in chrome which is still
in the experimental phase and hasn't

2062
00:53:32,650 --> 00:53:32,660
in the experimental phase and hasn't
 

2063
00:53:32,660 --> 00:53:35,290
in the experimental phase and hasn't
been deployed to everyone is

2064
00:53:35,290 --> 00:53:35,300
been deployed to everyone is
 

2065
00:53:35,300 --> 00:53:38,200
been deployed to everyone is
little different from mozilla x' instead

2066
00:53:38,200 --> 00:53:38,210
little different from mozilla x' instead
 

2067
00:53:38,210 --> 00:53:40,180
little different from mozilla x' instead
of automatically switching users to a

2068
00:53:40,180 --> 00:53:40,190
of automatically switching users to a
 

2069
00:53:40,190 --> 00:53:42,850
of automatically switching users to a
DNS provider chosen by google chrome

2070
00:53:42,850 --> 00:53:42,860
DNS provider chosen by google chrome
 

2071
00:53:42,860 --> 00:53:45,700
DNS provider chosen by google chrome
sticks with whichever DNS provider the

2072
00:53:45,700 --> 00:53:45,710
sticks with whichever DNS provider the
 

2073
00:53:45,710 --> 00:53:48,520
sticks with whichever DNS provider the
user has selected if the user selected

2074
00:53:48,520 --> 00:53:48,530
user has selected if the user selected
 

2075
00:53:48,530 --> 00:53:51,100
user has selected if the user selected
DNS provider offers encrypted lookups

2076
00:53:51,100 --> 00:53:51,110
DNS provider offers encrypted lookups
 

2077
00:53:51,110 --> 00:53:54,160
DNS provider offers encrypted lookups
and is in the list of providers chrome

2078
00:53:54,160 --> 00:53:54,170
and is in the list of providers chrome
 

2079
00:53:54,170 --> 00:53:56,230
and is in the list of providers chrome
automatically upgrades the user to that

2080
00:53:56,230 --> 00:53:56,240
automatically upgrades the user to that
 

2081
00:53:56,240 --> 00:53:59,140
automatically upgrades the user to that
DNS providers encrypted service if the

2082
00:53:59,140 --> 00:53:59,150
DNS providers encrypted service if the
 

2083
00:53:59,150 --> 00:54:01,720
DNS providers encrypted service if the
user selected DNS provider isn't in the

2084
00:54:01,720 --> 00:54:01,730
user selected DNS provider isn't in the
 

2085
00:54:01,730 --> 00:54:04,720
user selected DNS provider isn't in the
list chrome makes no changes see that

2086
00:54:04,720 --> 00:54:04,730
list chrome makes no changes see that
 

2087
00:54:04,730 --> 00:54:07,030
list chrome makes no changes see that
makes more sense to me yeah don't touch

2088
00:54:07,030 --> 00:54:07,040
makes more sense to me yeah don't touch
 

2089
00:54:07,040 --> 00:54:11,110
makes more sense to me yeah don't touch
my DNS settings browser ha ha ha Swiss

2090
00:54:11,110 --> 00:54:11,120
my DNS settings browser ha ha ha Swiss
 

2091
00:54:11,120 --> 00:54:15,070
my DNS settings browser ha ha ha Swiss
aghhh no I mean we're gonna we're gonna

2092
00:54:15,070 --> 00:54:15,080
aghhh no I mean we're gonna we're gonna
 

2093
00:54:15,080 --> 00:54:19,030
aghhh no I mean we're gonna we're gonna
divide the community right now my belief

2094
00:54:19,030 --> 00:54:19,040
divide the community right now my belief
 

2095
00:54:19,040 --> 00:54:23,190
divide the community right now my belief
is that my web browser should not touch

2096
00:54:23,190 --> 00:54:23,200
is that my web browser should not touch
 

2097
00:54:23,200 --> 00:54:28,420
is that my web browser should not touch
my DNS it shouldn't touch my IP address

2098
00:54:28,420 --> 00:54:28,430
my DNS it shouldn't touch my IP address
 

2099
00:54:28,430 --> 00:54:32,580
my DNS it shouldn't touch my IP address
it shouldn't touch my default gateway

2100
00:54:32,580 --> 00:54:32,590
it shouldn't touch my default gateway
 

2101
00:54:32,590 --> 00:54:35,590
it shouldn't touch my default gateway
right you're all agreeing with that so

2102
00:54:35,590 --> 00:54:35,600
right you're all agreeing with that so
 

2103
00:54:35,600 --> 00:54:37,960
right you're all agreeing with that so
why is it touching my DNS my browser

2104
00:54:37,960 --> 00:54:37,970
why is it touching my DNS my browser
 

2105
00:54:37,970 --> 00:54:39,760
why is it touching my DNS my browser
should be subject to my operating

2106
00:54:39,760 --> 00:54:39,770
should be subject to my operating
 

2107
00:54:39,770 --> 00:54:42,580
should be subject to my operating
systems DNS settings my operating system

2108
00:54:42,580 --> 00:54:42,590
systems DNS settings my operating system
 

2109
00:54:42,590 --> 00:54:44,500
systems DNS settings my operating system
should be making these decisions

2110
00:54:44,500 --> 00:54:44,510
should be making these decisions
 

2111
00:54:44,510 --> 00:54:47,230
should be making these decisions
Lubuntu should be saying hey we're gonna

2112
00:54:47,230 --> 00:54:47,240
Lubuntu should be saying hey we're gonna
 

2113
00:54:47,240 --> 00:54:50,110
Lubuntu should be saying hey we're gonna
try to encourage our users to use HTTPS

2114
00:54:50,110 --> 00:54:50,120
try to encourage our users to use HTTPS
 

2115
00:54:50,120 --> 00:54:53,320
try to encourage our users to use HTTPS
for DNS queries my browser should never

2116
00:54:53,320 --> 00:54:53,330
for DNS queries my browser should never
 

2117
00:54:53,330 --> 00:54:57,340
for DNS queries my browser should never
be allowed to override my DNS right I

2118
00:54:57,340 --> 00:54:57,350
be allowed to override my DNS right I
 

2119
00:54:57,350 --> 00:54:59,650
be allowed to override my DNS right I
see what you're saying that's my opinion

2120
00:54:59,650 --> 00:54:59,660
see what you're saying that's my opinion
 

2121
00:54:59,660 --> 00:55:03,120
see what you're saying that's my opinion
my browser is to be able to surf the web

2122
00:55:03,120 --> 00:55:03,130
my browser is to be able to surf the web
 

2123
00:55:03,130 --> 00:55:05,530
my browser is to be able to surf the web
based on the settings which I have set

2124
00:55:05,530 --> 00:55:05,540
based on the settings which I have set
 

2125
00:55:05,540 --> 00:55:08,620
based on the settings which I have set
in my operating system for TC I for my

2126
00:55:08,620 --> 00:55:08,630
in my operating system for TC I for my
 

2127
00:55:08,630 --> 00:55:09,280
in my operating system for TC I for my
tcpip

2128
00:55:09,280 --> 00:55:09,290
tcpip
 

2129
00:55:09,290 --> 00:55:13,590
tcpip
stack for my DNS stack for my Gateway

2130
00:55:13,590 --> 00:55:13,600
stack for my DNS stack for my Gateway
 

2131
00:55:13,600 --> 00:55:15,130
stack for my DNS stack for my Gateway
now

2132
00:55:15,130 --> 00:55:15,140
now
 

2133
00:55:15,140 --> 00:55:18,010
now
what about a consumer or a user who

2134
00:55:18,010 --> 00:55:18,020
what about a consumer or a user who
 

2135
00:55:18,020 --> 00:55:20,350
what about a consumer or a user who
isn't as knowledgeable as you with the

2136
00:55:20,350 --> 00:55:20,360
isn't as knowledgeable as you with the
 

2137
00:55:20,360 --> 00:55:23,850
isn't as knowledgeable as you with the
suit them I think that is the exception

2138
00:55:23,850 --> 00:55:23,860
suit them I think that is the exception
 

2139
00:55:23,860 --> 00:55:27,310
suit them I think that is the exception
to where I think this works yeah I think

2140
00:55:27,310 --> 00:55:27,320
to where I think this works yeah I think
 

2141
00:55:27,320 --> 00:55:31,030
to where I think this works yeah I think
this works for the average Windows user

2142
00:55:31,030 --> 00:55:31,040
this works for the average Windows user
 

2143
00:55:31,040 --> 00:55:33,670
this works for the average Windows user
we'll say like the average home user who

2144
00:55:33,670 --> 00:55:33,680
we'll say like the average home user who
 

2145
00:55:33,680 --> 00:55:35,470
we'll say like the average home user who
just bought a laptop from the future

2146
00:55:35,470 --> 00:55:35,480
just bought a laptop from the future
 

2147
00:55:35,480 --> 00:55:40,060
just bought a laptop from the future
shop yes from Walmart and fires it up

2148
00:55:40,060 --> 00:55:40,070
shop yes from Walmart and fires it up
 

2149
00:55:40,070 --> 00:55:42,190
shop yes from Walmart and fires it up
and installs Firefox hopefully because

2150
00:55:42,190 --> 00:55:42,200
and installs Firefox hopefully because
 

2151
00:55:42,200 --> 00:55:43,390
and installs Firefox hopefully because
they're not going to use edge because

2152
00:55:43,390 --> 00:55:43,400
they're not going to use edge because
 

2153
00:55:43,400 --> 00:55:45,130
they're not going to use edge because
they're smarter than that at least yes

2154
00:55:45,130 --> 00:55:45,140
they're smarter than that at least yes
 

2155
00:55:45,140 --> 00:55:47,609
they're smarter than that at least yes
right

2156
00:55:47,609 --> 00:55:47,619
right
 

2157
00:55:47,619 --> 00:55:50,410
right
but you trust your browser and and so

2158
00:55:50,410 --> 00:55:50,420
but you trust your browser and and so
 

2159
00:55:50,420 --> 00:55:53,349
but you trust your browser and and so
that user sure I mean use HTTPS but

2160
00:55:53,349 --> 00:55:53,359
that user sure I mean use HTTPS but
 

2161
00:55:53,359 --> 00:55:55,959
that user sure I mean use HTTPS but
here's my problem is that I set I have a

2162
00:55:55,959 --> 00:55:55,969
here's my problem is that I set I have a
 

2163
00:55:55,969 --> 00:56:00,579
here's my problem is that I set I have a
pie hole that's right you do oh I have a

2164
00:56:00,579 --> 00:56:00,589
pie hole that's right you do oh I have a
 

2165
00:56:00,589 --> 00:56:03,339
pie hole that's right you do oh I have a
DNS server on my network that is on a

2166
00:56:03,339 --> 00:56:03,349
DNS server on my network that is on a
 

2167
00:56:03,349 --> 00:56:07,479
DNS server on my network that is on a
Odroid xu4 in a cloud shell - that pie

2168
00:56:07,479 --> 00:56:07,489
Odroid xu4 in a cloud shell - that pie
 

2169
00:56:07,489 --> 00:56:10,150
Odroid xu4 in a cloud shell - that pie
hole powered device so pie hole is the

2170
00:56:10,150 --> 00:56:10,160
hole powered device so pie hole is the
 

2171
00:56:10,160 --> 00:56:12,370
hole powered device so pie hole is the
operating system it's a DNS server uses

2172
00:56:12,370 --> 00:56:12,380
operating system it's a DNS server uses
 

2173
00:56:12,380 --> 00:56:15,939
operating system it's a DNS server uses
by nine and it controls the flow of DNS

2174
00:56:15,939 --> 00:56:15,949
by nine and it controls the flow of DNS
 

2175
00:56:15,949 --> 00:56:18,880
by nine and it controls the flow of DNS
through my network so if my kids go to

2176
00:56:18,880 --> 00:56:18,890
through my network so if my kids go to
 

2177
00:56:18,890 --> 00:56:20,349
through my network so if my kids go to
something that Daddy says is

2178
00:56:20,349 --> 00:56:20,359
something that Daddy says is
 

2179
00:56:20,359 --> 00:56:22,989
something that Daddy says is
objectionable it will block it so what

2180
00:56:22,989 --> 00:56:22,999
objectionable it will block it so what
 

2181
00:56:22,999 --> 00:56:25,930
objectionable it will block it so what
Firefox is saying is I don't care what

2182
00:56:25,930 --> 00:56:25,940
Firefox is saying is I don't care what
 

2183
00:56:25,940 --> 00:56:27,549
Firefox is saying is I don't care what
daddy says I'm going to go around what

2184
00:56:27,549 --> 00:56:27,559
daddy says I'm going to go around what
 

2185
00:56:27,559 --> 00:56:29,140
daddy says I'm going to go around what
daddy says and I'm gonna go directly to

2186
00:56:29,140 --> 00:56:29,150
daddy says and I'm gonna go directly to
 

2187
00:56:29,150 --> 00:56:32,680
daddy says and I'm gonna go directly to
CloudFlare and whatever the kids type in

2188
00:56:32,680 --> 00:56:32,690
CloudFlare and whatever the kids type in
 

2189
00:56:32,690 --> 00:56:36,279
CloudFlare and whatever the kids type in
I don't care cuz I'm Firefox I know

2190
00:56:36,279 --> 00:56:36,289
I don't care cuz I'm Firefox I know
 

2191
00:56:36,289 --> 00:56:38,949
I don't care cuz I'm Firefox I know
what's what yeah so I'm gonna go I'm

2192
00:56:38,949 --> 00:56:38,959
what's what yeah so I'm gonna go I'm
 

2193
00:56:38,959 --> 00:56:42,939
what's what yeah so I'm gonna go I'm
gonna circumvent your piehole hi every

2194
00:56:42,939 --> 00:56:42,949
gonna circumvent your piehole hi every
 

2195
00:56:42,949 --> 00:56:44,410
gonna circumvent your piehole hi every
time I say it I laugh

2196
00:56:44,410 --> 00:56:44,420
time I say it I laugh
 

2197
00:56:44,420 --> 00:56:47,469
time I say it I laugh
it's called piehole okay it's a DNS

2198
00:56:47,469 --> 00:56:47,479
it's called piehole okay it's a DNS
 

2199
00:56:47,479 --> 00:56:52,109
it's called piehole okay it's a DNS
server yeah so I block things like

2200
00:56:52,109 --> 00:56:52,119
server yeah so I block things like
 

2201
00:56:52,119 --> 00:56:57,999
server yeah so I block things like
advertisements pornography things like

2202
00:56:57,999 --> 00:56:58,009
advertisements pornography things like
 

2203
00:56:58,009 --> 00:57:01,239
advertisements pornography things like
gambling sites and stuff that I'm that

2204
00:57:01,239 --> 00:57:01,249
gambling sites and stuff that I'm that
 

2205
00:57:01,249 --> 00:57:04,900
gambling sites and stuff that I'm that
you know yeah even stuff that I just

2206
00:57:04,900 --> 00:57:04,910
you know yeah even stuff that I just
 

2207
00:57:04,910 --> 00:57:06,099
you know yeah even stuff that I just
think that the kids should maybe

2208
00:57:06,099 --> 00:57:06,109
think that the kids should maybe
 

2209
00:57:06,109 --> 00:57:08,589
think that the kids should maybe
approach me about if they need access to

2210
00:57:08,589 --> 00:57:08,599
approach me about if they need access to
 

2211
00:57:08,599 --> 00:57:11,769
approach me about if they need access to
it just so that I can explain why they

2212
00:57:11,769 --> 00:57:11,779
it just so that I can explain why they
 

2213
00:57:11,779 --> 00:57:13,449
it just so that I can explain why they
might want to be careful on those sites

2214
00:57:13,449 --> 00:57:13,459
might want to be careful on those sites
 

2215
00:57:13,459 --> 00:57:17,229
might want to be careful on those sites
yeah so so I try to control those things

2216
00:57:17,229 --> 00:57:17,239
yeah so so I try to control those things
 

2217
00:57:17,239 --> 00:57:19,569
yeah so so I try to control those things
not from a control freak perspective but

2218
00:57:19,569 --> 00:57:19,579
not from a control freak perspective but
 

2219
00:57:19,579 --> 00:57:22,259
not from a control freak perspective but
from a I want to be a parent who

2220
00:57:22,259 --> 00:57:22,269
from a I want to be a parent who
 

2221
00:57:22,269 --> 00:57:24,819
from a I want to be a parent who
protects my children and in this

2222
00:57:24,819 --> 00:57:24,829
protects my children and in this
 

2223
00:57:24,829 --> 00:57:28,089
protects my children and in this
connected world and Firefox is saying

2224
00:57:28,089 --> 00:57:28,099
connected world and Firefox is saying
 

2225
00:57:28,099 --> 00:57:32,680
connected world and Firefox is saying
you know what yeah and I hate that so if

2226
00:57:32,680 --> 00:57:32,690
you know what yeah and I hate that so if
 

2227
00:57:32,690 --> 00:57:36,249
you know what yeah and I hate that so if
my kids are using Firefox they are

2228
00:57:36,249 --> 00:57:36,259
my kids are using Firefox they are
 

2229
00:57:36,259 --> 00:57:38,259
my kids are using Firefox they are
circumventing the settings that Daddy

2230
00:57:38,259 --> 00:57:38,269
circumventing the settings that Daddy
 

2231
00:57:38,269 --> 00:57:40,890
circumventing the settings that Daddy
set up to protect my kids

2232
00:57:40,890 --> 00:57:40,900
set up to protect my kids
 

2233
00:57:40,900 --> 00:57:43,989
set up to protect my kids
that I don't like so I but I do

2234
00:57:43,989 --> 00:57:43,999
that I don't like so I but I do
 

2235
00:57:43,999 --> 00:57:46,209
that I don't like so I but I do
understand for the average person who

2236
00:57:46,209 --> 00:57:46,219
understand for the average person who
 

2237
00:57:46,219 --> 00:57:48,699
understand for the average person who
goes into Walmart and buys a laptop and

2238
00:57:48,699 --> 00:57:48,709
goes into Walmart and buys a laptop and
 

2239
00:57:48,709 --> 00:57:51,609
goes into Walmart and buys a laptop and
installs Firefox this is safer right

2240
00:57:51,609 --> 00:57:51,619
installs Firefox this is safer right
 

2241
00:57:51,619 --> 00:57:55,089
installs Firefox this is safer right
because nobody needs to know what URLs

2242
00:57:55,089 --> 00:57:55,099
because nobody needs to know what URLs
 

2243
00:57:55,099 --> 00:57:58,730
because nobody needs to know what URLs
you are going to write and Mike

2244
00:57:58,730 --> 00:57:58,740
you are going to write and Mike
 

2245
00:57:58,740 --> 00:58:01,130
you are going to write and Mike
Sasha from 2009 I don't even know when I

2246
00:58:01,130 --> 00:58:01,140
Sasha from 2009 I don't even know when I
 

2247
00:58:01,140 --> 00:58:04,359
Sasha from 2009 I don't even know when I
started the show mm see Sasha from 2011

2248
00:58:04,359 --> 00:58:04,369
started the show mm see Sasha from 2011
 

2249
00:58:04,369 --> 00:58:08,109
started the show mm see Sasha from 2011
wouldn't have known anything about

2250
00:58:08,109 --> 00:58:08,119
wouldn't have known anything about
 

2251
00:58:08,119 --> 00:58:10,280
wouldn't have known anything about
technology like I wouldn't have known I

2252
00:58:10,280 --> 00:58:10,290
technology like I wouldn't have known I
 

2253
00:58:10,290 --> 00:58:12,230
technology like I wouldn't have known I
would have just loved to Dada walked

2254
00:58:12,230 --> 00:58:12,240
would have just loved to Dada walked
 

2255
00:58:12,240 --> 00:58:13,730
would have just loved to Dada walked
into a store picked up a computer

2256
00:58:13,730 --> 00:58:13,740
into a store picked up a computer
 

2257
00:58:13,740 --> 00:58:15,410
into a store picked up a computer
brought at home plugged it in and

2258
00:58:15,410 --> 00:58:15,420
brought at home plugged it in and
 

2259
00:58:15,420 --> 00:58:17,600
brought at home plugged it in and
probably would have believed any pop-up

2260
00:58:17,600 --> 00:58:17,610
probably would have believed any pop-up
 

2261
00:58:17,610 --> 00:58:20,180
probably would have believed any pop-up
that showed up on my computer right and

2262
00:58:20,180 --> 00:58:20,190
that showed up on my computer right and
 

2263
00:58:20,190 --> 00:58:23,870
that showed up on my computer right and
so those are the people that needs oh

2264
00:58:23,870 --> 00:58:23,880
so those are the people that needs oh
 

2265
00:58:23,880 --> 00:58:26,990
so those are the people that needs oh
right no absolutely and but like the

2266
00:58:26,990 --> 00:58:27,000
right no absolutely and but like the
 

2267
00:58:27,000 --> 00:58:30,890
right no absolutely and but like the
adults sure but for fur I mean there are

2268
00:58:30,890 --> 00:58:30,900
adults sure but for fur I mean there are
 

2269
00:58:30,900 --> 00:58:34,130
adults sure but for fur I mean there are
so many great uses for being able and I

2270
00:58:34,130 --> 00:58:34,140
so many great uses for being able and I
 

2271
00:58:34,140 --> 00:58:36,980
so many great uses for being able and I
understand that the the approach or the

2272
00:58:36,980 --> 00:58:36,990
understand that the the approach or the
 

2273
00:58:36,990 --> 00:58:39,440
understand that the the approach or the
promotional end of it so I mean we'll

2274
00:58:39,440 --> 00:58:39,450
promotional end of it so I mean we'll
 

2275
00:58:39,450 --> 00:58:40,940
promotional end of it so I mean we'll
say the marketing perspective that

2276
00:58:40,940 --> 00:58:40,950
say the marketing perspective that
 

2277
00:58:40,950 --> 00:58:42,770
say the marketing perspective that
Firefox is using is that this protects

2278
00:58:42,770 --> 00:58:42,780
Firefox is using is that this protects
 

2279
00:58:42,780 --> 00:58:45,770
Firefox is using is that this protects
you because now your internet service

2280
00:58:45,770 --> 00:58:45,780
you because now your internet service
 

2281
00:58:45,780 --> 00:58:49,580
you because now your internet service
provider can't see what domain you go to

2282
00:58:49,580 --> 00:58:49,590
provider can't see what domain you go to
 

2283
00:58:49,590 --> 00:58:51,650
provider can't see what domain you go to
so if you punch in a pornographic

2284
00:58:51,650 --> 00:58:51,660
so if you punch in a pornographic
 

2285
00:58:51,660 --> 00:58:55,490
so if you punch in a pornographic
website into your url bar your ISP knows

2286
00:58:55,490 --> 00:58:55,500
website into your url bar your ISP knows
 

2287
00:58:55,500 --> 00:58:59,750
website into your url bar your ISP knows
that right but so does daddy and so

2288
00:58:59,750 --> 00:58:59,760
that right but so does daddy and so
 

2289
00:58:59,760 --> 00:59:02,660
that right but so does daddy and so
Daddy can say I don't want my kids to

2290
00:59:02,660 --> 00:59:02,670
Daddy can say I don't want my kids to
 

2291
00:59:02,670 --> 00:59:06,349
Daddy can say I don't want my kids to
see that yes I want to protect them from

2292
00:59:06,349 --> 00:59:06,359
see that yes I want to protect them from
 

2293
00:59:06,359 --> 00:59:11,480
see that yes I want to protect them from
that so please Firefox don't turn that

2294
00:59:11,480 --> 00:59:11,490
that so please Firefox don't turn that
 

2295
00:59:11,490 --> 00:59:15,020
that so please Firefox don't turn that
off yes I have to be able to see those

2296
00:59:15,020 --> 00:59:15,030
off yes I have to be able to see those
 

2297
00:59:15,030 --> 00:59:18,859
off yes I have to be able to see those
domains so that's why I have a problem

2298
00:59:18,859 --> 00:59:18,869
domains so that's why I have a problem
 

2299
00:59:18,869 --> 00:59:22,580
domains so that's why I have a problem
with it I agree that HTTPS is important

2300
00:59:22,580 --> 00:59:22,590
with it I agree that HTTPS is important
 

2301
00:59:22,590 --> 00:59:27,560
with it I agree that HTTPS is important
but there are times when maybe Google's

2302
00:59:27,560 --> 00:59:27,570
but there are times when maybe Google's
 

2303
00:59:27,570 --> 00:59:29,960
but there are times when maybe Google's
approach is better right because Google

2304
00:59:29,960 --> 00:59:29,970
approach is better right because Google
 

2305
00:59:29,970 --> 00:59:31,790
approach is better right because Google
is saying if you already have something

2306
00:59:31,790 --> 00:59:31,800
is saying if you already have something
 

2307
00:59:31,800 --> 00:59:35,960
is saying if you already have something
set in chrome in your browser in your

2308
00:59:35,960 --> 00:59:35,970
set in chrome in your browser in your
 

2309
00:59:35,970 --> 00:59:38,180
set in chrome in your browser in your
operating system we will honor that but

2310
00:59:38,180 --> 00:59:38,190
operating system we will honor that but
 

2311
00:59:38,190 --> 00:59:40,760
operating system we will honor that but
we'll try to switch to HTTPS so Google

2312
00:59:40,760 --> 00:59:40,770
we'll try to switch to HTTPS so Google
 

2313
00:59:40,770 --> 00:59:45,080
we'll try to switch to HTTPS so Google
is saying if you have a piehole I'll

2314
00:59:45,080 --> 00:59:45,090
is saying if you have a piehole I'll
 

2315
00:59:45,090 --> 00:59:47,240
is saying if you have a piehole I'll
still go through your piehole but then

2316
00:59:47,240 --> 00:59:47,250
still go through your piehole but then
 

2317
00:59:47,250 --> 00:59:51,590
still go through your piehole but then
daddy can set the pie holes DNS server

2318
00:59:51,590 --> 00:59:51,600
daddy can set the pie holes DNS server
 

2319
00:59:51,600 --> 00:59:55,430
daddy can set the pie holes DNS server
to an HTTP server so the ISP cannot see

2320
00:59:55,430 --> 00:59:55,440
to an HTTP server so the ISP cannot see
 

2321
00:59:55,440 --> 00:59:59,570
to an HTTP server so the ISP cannot see
what my family is putting in so daddy

2322
00:59:59,570 --> 00:59:59,580
what my family is putting in so daddy
 

2323
00:59:59,580 --> 01:00:01,520
what my family is putting in so daddy
can still see it because the browser no

2324
01:00:01,520 --> 01:00:01,530
can still see it because the browser no
 

2325
01:00:01,530 --> 01:00:05,000
can still see it because the browser no
longer has the power to override but the

2326
01:00:05,000 --> 01:00:05,010
longer has the power to override but the
 

2327
01:00:05,010 --> 01:00:07,609
longer has the power to override but the
ISP cannot because my pie hole which is

2328
01:00:07,609 --> 01:00:07,619
ISP cannot because my pie hole which is
 

2329
01:00:07,619 --> 01:00:11,240
ISP cannot because my pie hole which is
the override of my systems see that is

2330
01:00:11,240 --> 01:00:11,250
the override of my systems see that is
 

2331
01:00:11,250 --> 01:00:12,600
the override of my systems see that is
is able to direct

2332
01:00:12,600 --> 01:00:12,610
is able to direct
 

2333
01:00:12,610 --> 01:00:15,600
is able to direct
okay so I can make that decision because

2334
01:00:15,600 --> 01:00:15,610
okay so I can make that decision because
 

2335
01:00:15,610 --> 01:00:17,550
okay so I can make that decision because
I'm smart enough yeah you're smart

2336
01:00:17,550 --> 01:00:17,560
I'm smart enough yeah you're smart
 

2337
01:00:17,560 --> 01:00:20,100
I'm smart enough yeah you're smart
enough to make that decision so there

2338
01:00:20,100 --> 01:00:20,110
enough to make that decision so there
 

2339
01:00:20,110 --> 01:00:24,930
enough to make that decision so there
should be a process that Firefox has for

2340
01:00:24,930 --> 01:00:24,940
should be a process that Firefox has for
 

2341
01:00:24,940 --> 01:00:27,420
should be a process that Firefox has for
some reason forgotten to put into place

2342
01:00:27,420 --> 01:00:27,430
some reason forgotten to put into place
 

2343
01:00:27,430 --> 01:00:31,080
some reason forgotten to put into place
there should be a process of qualifying

2344
01:00:31,080 --> 01:00:31,090
there should be a process of qualifying
 

2345
01:00:31,090 --> 01:00:34,350
there should be a process of qualifying
is this user capable of making these

2346
01:00:34,350 --> 01:00:34,360
is this user capable of making these
 

2347
01:00:34,360 --> 01:00:38,160
is this user capable of making these
decisions for themselves yes or do we

2348
01:00:38,160 --> 01:00:38,170
decisions for themselves yes or do we
 

2349
01:00:38,170 --> 01:00:42,080
decisions for themselves yes or do we
actually need to override for them right

2350
01:00:42,080 --> 01:00:42,090
actually need to override for them right
 

2351
01:00:42,090 --> 01:00:45,930
actually need to override for them right
okay that's my perspective please

2352
01:00:45,930 --> 01:00:45,940
okay that's my perspective please
 

2353
01:00:45,940 --> 01:00:47,970
okay that's my perspective please
comment below I know we're probably

2354
01:00:47,970 --> 01:00:47,980
comment below I know we're probably
 

2355
01:00:47,980 --> 01:00:50,130
comment below I know we're probably
gonna have some mixed perspectives here

2356
01:00:50,130 --> 01:00:50,140
gonna have some mixed perspectives here
 

2357
01:00:50,140 --> 01:00:54,240
gonna have some mixed perspectives here
on this topic but my perspective is from

2358
01:00:54,240 --> 01:00:54,250
on this topic but my perspective is from
 

2359
01:00:54,250 --> 01:00:55,920
on this topic but my perspective is from
the father who just wants to protect his

2360
01:00:55,920 --> 01:00:55,930
the father who just wants to protect his
 

2361
01:00:55,930 --> 01:00:58,940
the father who just wants to protect his
kids I like it thank you

2362
01:00:58,940 --> 01:00:58,950
kids I like it thank you
 

2363
01:00:58,950 --> 01:01:02,340
kids I like it thank you
comment below we have to take a quick

2364
01:01:02,340 --> 01:01:02,350
comment below we have to take a quick
 

2365
01:01:02,350 --> 01:01:04,440
comment below we have to take a quick
break more of this week's top tech

2366
01:01:04,440 --> 01:01:04,450
break more of this week's top tech
 

2367
01:01:04,450 --> 01:01:05,830
break more of this week's top tech
stories are coming up

2368
01:01:05,830 --> 01:01:05,840
stories are coming up
 

2369
01:01:05,840 --> 01:01:19,780
stories are coming up
[Music]

2370
01:01:19,780 --> 01:01:19,790

 

2371
01:01:19,790 --> 01:01:22,540

owners of the device designed to release

2372
01:01:22,540 --> 01:01:22,550
owners of the device designed to release
 

2373
01:01:22,550 --> 01:01:25,180
owners of the device designed to release
food for pets say their animals are left

2374
01:01:25,180 --> 01:01:25,190
food for pets say their animals are left
 

2375
01:01:25,190 --> 01:01:27,720
food for pets say their animals are left
hungry during a week-long

2376
01:01:27,720 --> 01:01:27,730
hungry during a week-long
 

2377
01:01:27,730 --> 01:01:31,670
hungry during a week-long
[Music]

2378
01:01:31,670 --> 01:01:31,680
[Music]
 

2379
01:01:31,680 --> 01:01:34,530
[Music]
however such devices are being trusted

2380
01:01:34,530 --> 01:01:34,540
however such devices are being trusted
 

2381
01:01:34,540 --> 01:01:38,010
however such devices are being trusted
by pet owners pet net allows owners to

2382
01:01:38,010 --> 01:01:38,020
by pet owners pet net allows owners to
 

2383
01:01:38,020 --> 01:01:39,870
by pet owners pet net allows owners to
schedule and control feeding via

2384
01:01:39,870 --> 01:01:39,880
schedule and control feeding via
 

2385
01:01:39,880 --> 01:01:43,740
schedule and control feeding via
smartphone app one pet owner tweeted my

2386
01:01:43,740 --> 01:01:43,750
smartphone app one pet owner tweeted my
 

2387
01:01:43,750 --> 01:01:46,410
smartphone app one pet owner tweeted my
cat starved for over a week while others

2388
01:01:46,410 --> 01:01:46,420
cat starved for over a week while others
 

2389
01:01:46,420 --> 01:01:48,320
cat starved for over a week while others
complained about other hardware issues

2390
01:01:48,320 --> 01:01:48,330
complained about other hardware issues
 

2391
01:01:48,330 --> 01:01:52,109
complained about other hardware issues
quote my three Gen 2 feeders constantly

2392
01:01:52,109 --> 01:01:52,119
quote my three Gen 2 feeders constantly
 

2393
01:01:52,119 --> 01:01:54,390
quote my three Gen 2 feeders constantly
Jam and won't dispense food wrote

2394
01:01:54,390 --> 01:01:54,400
Jam and won't dispense food wrote
 

2395
01:01:54,400 --> 01:01:57,870
Jam and won't dispense food wrote
another some expressed relief that the

2396
01:01:57,870 --> 01:01:57,880
another some expressed relief that the
 

2397
01:01:57,880 --> 01:02:01,109
another some expressed relief that the
feeders were now back online pet net has

2398
01:02:01,109 --> 01:02:01,119
feeders were now back online pet net has
 

2399
01:02:01,119 --> 01:02:03,450
feeders were now back online pet net has
two Twitter accounts the official one

2400
01:02:03,450 --> 01:02:03,460
two Twitter accounts the official one
 

2401
01:02:03,460 --> 01:02:05,670
two Twitter accounts the official one
has not tweeted since August 2019

2402
01:02:05,670 --> 01:02:05,680
has not tweeted since August 2019
 

2403
01:02:05,680 --> 01:02:08,580
has not tweeted since August 2019
but the support account issued for

2404
01:02:08,580 --> 01:02:08,590
but the support account issued for
 

2405
01:02:08,590 --> 01:02:10,530
but the support account issued for
tweets between last week and now about

2406
01:02:10,530 --> 01:02:10,540
tweets between last week and now about
 

2407
01:02:10,540 --> 01:02:13,560
tweets between last week and now about
the problems experienced in its first

2408
01:02:13,560 --> 01:02:13,570
the problems experienced in its first
 

2409
01:02:13,570 --> 01:02:16,830
the problems experienced in its first
tweet it said a system outage was

2410
01:02:16,830 --> 01:02:16,840
tweet it said a system outage was
 

2411
01:02:16,840 --> 01:02:19,080
tweet it said a system outage was
affecting second generation devices and

2412
01:02:19,080 --> 01:02:19,090
affecting second generation devices and
 

2413
01:02:19,090 --> 01:02:21,210
affecting second generation devices and
asked customers not to switch off their

2414
01:02:21,210 --> 01:02:21,220
asked customers not to switch off their
 

2415
01:02:21,220 --> 01:02:23,430
asked customers not to switch off their
feeder even if it appeared to be offline

2416
01:02:23,430 --> 01:02:23,440
feeder even if it appeared to be offline
 

2417
01:02:23,440 --> 01:02:26,580
feeder even if it appeared to be offline
it said automatic feeds would quote

2418
01:02:26,580 --> 01:02:26,590
it said automatic feeds would quote
 

2419
01:02:26,590 --> 01:02:30,420
it said automatic feeds would quote
still dispense four days later it

2420
01:02:30,420 --> 01:02:30,430
still dispense four days later it
 

2421
01:02:30,430 --> 01:02:32,370
still dispense four days later it
tweeted again to say that it hoped to

2422
01:02:32,370 --> 01:02:32,380
tweeted again to say that it hoped to
 

2423
01:02:32,380 --> 01:02:36,450
tweeted again to say that it hoped to
release more information soon on Friday

2424
01:02:36,450 --> 01:02:36,460
release more information soon on Friday
 

2425
01:02:36,460 --> 01:02:39,240
release more information soon on Friday
it said it's smart feeders were quote

2426
01:02:39,240 --> 01:02:39,250
it said it's smart feeders were quote
 

2427
01:02:39,250 --> 01:02:42,510
it said it's smart feeders were quote
returning online and a system reset was

2428
01:02:42,510 --> 01:02:42,520
returning online and a system reset was
 

2429
01:02:42,520 --> 01:02:45,870
returning online and a system reset was
in progress stuart miles founder of the

2430
01:02:45,870 --> 01:02:45,880
in progress stuart miles founder of the
 

2431
01:02:45,880 --> 01:02:48,960
in progress stuart miles founder of the
tech site pocket-lint says quote as we

2432
01:02:48,960 --> 01:02:48,970
tech site pocket-lint says quote as we
 

2433
01:02:48,970 --> 01:02:51,270
tech site pocket-lint says quote as we
go towards a more automated home you

2434
01:02:51,270 --> 01:02:51,280
go towards a more automated home you
 

2435
01:02:51,280 --> 01:02:53,760
go towards a more automated home you
have to acknowledge that somewhere along

2436
01:02:53,760 --> 01:02:53,770
have to acknowledge that somewhere along
 

2437
01:02:53,770 --> 01:02:56,760
have to acknowledge that somewhere along
the line things will fall over robots

2438
01:02:56,760 --> 01:02:56,770
the line things will fall over robots
 

2439
01:02:56,770 --> 01:02:59,010
the line things will fall over robots
and automated systems have hiccups along

2440
01:02:59,010 --> 01:02:59,020
and automated systems have hiccups along
 

2441
01:02:59,020 --> 01:03:01,050
and automated systems have hiccups along
the way it's something we need to get

2442
01:03:01,050 --> 01:03:01,060
the way it's something we need to get
 

2443
01:03:01,060 --> 01:03:02,780
the way it's something we need to get
used to end quote

2444
01:03:02,780 --> 01:03:02,790
used to end quote
 

2445
01:03:02,790 --> 01:03:06,089
used to end quote
this particular outage though points to

2446
01:03:06,089 --> 01:03:06,099
this particular outage though points to
 

2447
01:03:06,099 --> 01:03:07,829
this particular outage though points to
a need for pet owners to have a back-up

2448
01:03:07,829 --> 01:03:07,839
a need for pet owners to have a back-up
 

2449
01:03:07,839 --> 01:03:10,170
a need for pet owners to have a back-up
plan a friend or family member to check

2450
01:03:10,170 --> 01:03:10,180
plan a friend or family member to check
 

2451
01:03:10,180 --> 01:03:12,630
plan a friend or family member to check
in on the Pats every couple of days may

2452
01:03:12,630 --> 01:03:12,640
in on the Pats every couple of days may
 

2453
01:03:12,640 --> 01:03:14,579
in on the Pats every couple of days may
be all it takes to ensure that if tech

2454
01:03:14,579 --> 01:03:14,589
be all it takes to ensure that if tech
 

2455
01:03:14,589 --> 01:03:17,099
be all it takes to ensure that if tech
fails a human is there to ensure things

2456
01:03:17,099 --> 01:03:17,109
fails a human is there to ensure things
 

2457
01:03:17,109 --> 01:03:20,130
fails a human is there to ensure things
are safe and careful for that makes

2458
01:03:20,130 --> 01:03:20,140
are safe and careful for that makes
 

2459
01:03:20,140 --> 01:03:24,270
are safe and careful for that makes
sense here it really reminds me of the

2460
01:03:24,270 --> 01:03:24,280
sense here it really reminds me of the
 

2461
01:03:24,280 --> 01:03:28,650
sense here it really reminds me of the
Tesla automated autonomous vehicles yes

2462
01:03:28,650 --> 01:03:28,660
Tesla automated autonomous vehicles yes
 

2463
01:03:28,660 --> 01:03:30,900
Tesla automated autonomous vehicles yes
and how there have been some crashes and

2464
01:03:30,900 --> 01:03:30,910
and how there have been some crashes and
 

2465
01:03:30,910 --> 01:03:34,250
and how there have been some crashes and
it's while they're watching a movie or

2466
01:03:34,250 --> 01:03:34,260
it's while they're watching a movie or
 

2467
01:03:34,260 --> 01:03:38,520
it's while they're watching a movie or
talking on the phone or like this is

2468
01:03:38,520 --> 01:03:38,530
talking on the phone or like this is
 

2469
01:03:38,530 --> 01:03:41,910
talking on the phone or like this is
what okay so this is why I don't think

2470
01:03:41,910 --> 01:03:41,920
what okay so this is why I don't think
 

2471
01:03:41,920 --> 01:03:42,690
what okay so this is why I don't think
robots are

2472
01:03:42,690 --> 01:03:42,700
robots are
 

2473
01:03:42,700 --> 01:03:44,849
robots are
gonna take over the world and all the

2474
01:03:44,849 --> 01:03:44,859
gonna take over the world and all the
 

2475
01:03:44,859 --> 01:03:47,579
gonna take over the world and all the
humans are gonna totally are well they

2476
01:03:47,579 --> 01:03:47,589
humans are gonna totally are well they
 

2477
01:03:47,589 --> 01:03:50,310
humans are gonna totally are well they
need us robots need people as yeah

2478
01:03:50,310 --> 01:03:50,320
need us robots need people as yeah
 

2479
01:03:50,320 --> 01:03:52,050
need us robots need people as yeah
people need robot we got to keep them in

2480
01:03:52,050 --> 01:03:52,060
people need robot we got to keep them in
 

2481
01:03:52,060 --> 01:03:55,980
people need robot we got to keep them in
check who can have animated cat feeder

2482
01:03:55,980 --> 01:03:55,990
check who can have animated cat feeder
 

2483
01:03:55,990 --> 01:03:58,050
check who can have animated cat feeder
like I think of people I know in my

2484
01:03:58,050 --> 01:03:58,060
like I think of people I know in my
 

2485
01:03:58,060 --> 01:04:00,750
like I think of people I know in my
daily life that really could use an

2486
01:04:00,750 --> 01:04:00,760
daily life that really could use an
 

2487
01:04:00,760 --> 01:04:03,690
daily life that really could use an
automated cat feeder to help assist them

2488
01:04:03,690 --> 01:04:03,700
automated cat feeder to help assist them
 

2489
01:04:03,700 --> 01:04:06,480
automated cat feeder to help assist them
in feeding their cat but they're not

2490
01:04:06,480 --> 01:04:06,490
in feeding their cat but they're not
 

2491
01:04:06,490 --> 01:04:09,060
in feeding their cat but they're not
gonna hightail it out for two weeks and

2492
01:04:09,060 --> 01:04:09,070
gonna hightail it out for two weeks and
 

2493
01:04:09,070 --> 01:04:10,950
gonna hightail it out for two weeks and
assume that the cat's gonna be fine with

2494
01:04:10,950 --> 01:04:10,960
assume that the cat's gonna be fine with
 

2495
01:04:10,960 --> 01:04:13,230
assume that the cat's gonna be fine with
their automated kitty litter cleaner and

2496
01:04:13,230 --> 01:04:13,240
their automated kitty litter cleaner and
 

2497
01:04:13,240 --> 01:04:15,569
their automated kitty litter cleaner and
their automated hat feeder like they

2498
01:04:15,569 --> 01:04:15,579
their automated hat feeder like they
 

2499
01:04:15,579 --> 01:04:18,560
their automated hat feeder like they
they're gonna stay there you can't just

2500
01:04:18,560 --> 01:04:18,570
they're gonna stay there you can't just
 

2501
01:04:18,570 --> 01:04:22,670
they're gonna stay there you can't just
trust your cat's life to technology

2502
01:04:22,670 --> 01:04:22,680
trust your cat's life to technology
 

2503
01:04:22,680 --> 01:04:27,180
trust your cat's life to technology
kinda ever yeah I like I trust

2504
01:04:27,180 --> 01:04:27,190
kinda ever yeah I like I trust
 

2505
01:04:27,190 --> 01:04:30,150
kinda ever yeah I like I trust
technology yes but when it comes to life

2506
01:04:30,150 --> 01:04:30,160
technology yes but when it comes to life
 

2507
01:04:30,160 --> 01:04:34,380
technology yes but when it comes to life
and death health wellness I think it's

2508
01:04:34,380 --> 01:04:34,390
and death health wellness I think it's
 

2509
01:04:34,390 --> 01:04:37,950
and death health wellness I think it's
important for us to still be the human

2510
01:04:37,950 --> 01:04:37,960
important for us to still be the human
 

2511
01:04:37,960 --> 01:04:39,089
important for us to still be the human
right

2512
01:04:39,089 --> 01:04:39,099
right
 

2513
01:04:39,099 --> 01:04:41,250
right
like autonomous vehicles still have a

2514
01:04:41,250 --> 01:04:41,260
like autonomous vehicles still have a
 

2515
01:04:41,260 --> 01:04:43,290
like autonomous vehicles still have a
steering wheel for a reason yes

2516
01:04:43,290 --> 01:04:43,300
steering wheel for a reason yes
 

2517
01:04:43,300 --> 01:04:46,650
steering wheel for a reason yes
you're meant to observe what's going on

2518
01:04:46,650 --> 01:04:46,660
you're meant to observe what's going on
 

2519
01:04:46,660 --> 01:04:50,010
you're meant to observe what's going on
around you yeah but sit there and relax

2520
01:04:50,010 --> 01:04:50,020
around you yeah but sit there and relax
 

2521
01:04:50,020 --> 01:04:53,099
around you yeah but sit there and relax
enjoy the music and just kind of look

2522
01:04:53,099 --> 01:04:53,109
enjoy the music and just kind of look
 

2523
01:04:53,109 --> 01:04:55,349
enjoy the music and just kind of look
around and enjoy nature for once be a

2524
01:04:55,349 --> 01:04:55,359
around and enjoy nature for once be a
 

2525
01:04:55,359 --> 01:04:57,480
around and enjoy nature for once be a
passenger but as soon as you start

2526
01:04:57,480 --> 01:04:57,490
passenger but as soon as you start
 

2527
01:04:57,490 --> 01:05:00,150
passenger but as soon as you start
swerving toward the guardrail be like

2528
01:05:00,150 --> 01:05:00,160
swerving toward the guardrail be like
 

2529
01:05:00,160 --> 01:05:02,190
swerving toward the guardrail be like
grab a hold of the damn steering wheel

2530
01:05:02,190 --> 01:05:02,200
grab a hold of the damn steering wheel
 

2531
01:05:02,200 --> 01:05:06,450
grab a hold of the damn steering wheel
and take control right I honestly don't

2532
01:05:06,450 --> 01:05:06,460
and take control right I honestly don't
 

2533
01:05:06,460 --> 01:05:09,059
and take control right I honestly don't
think that the pet feeder company is at

2534
01:05:09,059 --> 01:05:09,069
think that the pet feeder company is at
 

2535
01:05:09,069 --> 01:05:12,180
think that the pet feeder company is at
fault in this systems goal they are they

2536
01:05:12,180 --> 01:05:12,190
fault in this systems goal they are they
 

2537
01:05:12,190 --> 01:05:12,839
fault in this systems goal they are they
totally are

2538
01:05:12,839 --> 01:05:12,849
totally are
 

2539
01:05:12,849 --> 01:05:15,680
totally are
but our complacency in trusting a

2540
01:05:15,680 --> 01:05:15,690
but our complacency in trusting a
 

2541
01:05:15,690 --> 01:05:18,720
but our complacency in trusting a
digitally connected device to provide

2542
01:05:18,720 --> 01:05:18,730
digitally connected device to provide
 

2543
01:05:18,730 --> 01:05:21,630
digitally connected device to provide
life-giving food right to our past yes

2544
01:05:21,630 --> 01:05:21,640
life-giving food right to our past yes
 

2545
01:05:21,640 --> 01:05:23,910
life-giving food right to our past yes
there's a problem right they didn't say

2546
01:05:23,910 --> 01:05:23,920
there's a problem right they didn't say
 

2547
01:05:23,920 --> 01:05:27,569
there's a problem right they didn't say
hey leave your cat alone we know well

2548
01:05:27,569 --> 01:05:27,579
hey leave your cat alone we know well
 

2549
01:05:27,579 --> 01:05:29,430
hey leave your cat alone we know well
maybe they did I didn't see our getting

2550
01:05:29,430 --> 01:05:29,440
maybe they did I didn't see our getting
 

2551
01:05:29,440 --> 01:05:31,950
maybe they did I didn't see our getting
material but understand this is a

2552
01:05:31,950 --> 01:05:31,960
material but understand this is a
 

2553
01:05:31,960 --> 01:05:33,990
material but understand this is a
connected device that if Wi-Fi goes down

2554
01:05:33,990 --> 01:05:34,000
connected device that if Wi-Fi goes down
 

2555
01:05:34,000 --> 01:05:35,910
connected device that if Wi-Fi goes down
if internet goes down if their servers

2556
01:05:35,910 --> 01:05:35,920
if internet goes down if their servers
 

2557
01:05:35,920 --> 01:05:39,089
if internet goes down if their servers
go down which is what happened here your

2558
01:05:39,089 --> 01:05:39,099
go down which is what happened here your
 

2559
01:05:39,099 --> 01:05:42,240
go down which is what happened here your
pets will not get fed right think about

2560
01:05:42,240 --> 01:05:42,250
pets will not get fed right think about
 

2561
01:05:42,250 --> 01:05:45,480
pets will not get fed right think about
that for a second so we need to still

2562
01:05:45,480 --> 01:05:45,490
that for a second so we need to still
 

2563
01:05:45,490 --> 01:05:50,210
that for a second so we need to still
make sure like I I set an automatic

2564
01:05:50,210 --> 01:05:50,220
make sure like I I set an automatic
 

2565
01:05:50,220 --> 01:05:53,760
make sure like I I set an automatic
plant feeder yeah when I go away from my

2566
01:05:53,760 --> 01:05:53,770
plant feeder yeah when I go away from my
 

2567
01:05:53,770 --> 01:05:55,620
plant feeder yeah when I go away from my
annual vacation

2568
01:05:55,620 --> 01:05:55,630
annual vacation
 

2569
01:05:55,630 --> 01:05:58,050
annual vacation
okay and it feeds my cucumbers and it

2570
01:05:58,050 --> 01:05:58,060
okay and it feeds my cucumbers and it
 

2571
01:05:58,060 --> 01:06:00,810
okay and it feeds my cucumbers and it
keeps my garden fed but my sister-in-law

2572
01:06:00,810 --> 01:06:00,820
keeps my garden fed but my sister-in-law
 

2573
01:06:00,820 --> 01:06:03,510
keeps my garden fed but my sister-in-law
still checks in for us right every

2574
01:06:03,510 --> 01:06:03,520
still checks in for us right every
 

2575
01:06:03,520 --> 01:06:05,820
still checks in for us right every
couple days she goes in and waters the

2576
01:06:05,820 --> 01:06:05,830
couple days she goes in and waters the
 

2577
01:06:05,830 --> 01:06:07,410
couple days she goes in and waters the
plants and does it make sure

2578
01:06:07,410 --> 01:06:07,420
plants and does it make sure
 

2579
01:06:07,420 --> 01:06:09,390
plants and does it make sure
everything's working right because I

2580
01:06:09,390 --> 01:06:09,400
everything's working right because I
 

2581
01:06:09,400 --> 01:06:10,620
everything's working right because I
don't want to come back to a bunch of

2582
01:06:10,620 --> 01:06:10,630
don't want to come back to a bunch of
 

2583
01:06:10,630 --> 01:06:12,810
don't want to come back to a bunch of
dead cucumbers just in case something

2584
01:06:12,810 --> 01:06:12,820
dead cucumbers just in case something
 

2585
01:06:12,820 --> 01:06:15,540
dead cucumbers just in case something
happens don't just write willy-nilly

2586
01:06:15,540 --> 01:06:15,550
happens don't just write willy-nilly
 

2587
01:06:15,550 --> 01:06:20,540
happens don't just write willy-nilly
trust the tech we can as a convenience

2588
01:06:20,540 --> 01:06:20,550
trust the tech we can as a convenience
 

2589
01:06:20,550 --> 01:06:23,760
trust the tech we can as a convenience
but please don't trust it to give life I

2590
01:06:23,760 --> 01:06:23,770
but please don't trust it to give life I
 

2591
01:06:23,770 --> 01:06:26,790
but please don't trust it to give life I
would never trust a robot to keep me

2592
01:06:26,790 --> 01:06:26,800
would never trust a robot to keep me
 

2593
01:06:26,800 --> 01:06:29,700
would never trust a robot to keep me
alive without human intervention let you

2594
01:06:29,700 --> 01:06:29,710
alive without human intervention let you
 

2595
01:06:29,710 --> 01:06:33,390
alive without human intervention let you
say that now but wait till you're 95 no

2596
01:06:33,390 --> 01:06:33,400
say that now but wait till you're 95 no
 

2597
01:06:33,400 --> 01:06:34,800
say that now but wait till you're 95 no
there will be people there there will be

2598
01:06:34,800 --> 01:06:34,810
there will be people there there will be
 

2599
01:06:34,810 --> 01:06:37,500
there will be people there there will be
nurses there will be people there make

2600
01:06:37,500 --> 01:06:37,510
nurses there will be people there make
 

2601
01:06:37,510 --> 01:06:39,300
nurses there will be people there make
sure the robots are doing the right

2602
01:06:39,300 --> 01:06:39,310
sure the robots are doing the right
 

2603
01:06:39,310 --> 01:06:40,470
sure the robots are doing the right
thing more pepper

2604
01:06:40,470 --> 01:06:40,480
thing more pepper
 

2605
01:06:40,480 --> 01:06:43,350
thing more pepper
it could be pepper Oh pepper she's so

2606
01:06:43,350 --> 01:06:43,360
it could be pepper Oh pepper she's so
 

2607
01:06:43,360 --> 01:06:43,890
it could be pepper Oh pepper she's so
cute

2608
01:06:43,890 --> 01:06:43,900
cute
 

2609
01:06:43,900 --> 01:06:49,860
cute
pepper can be my nurse okay - programmer

2610
01:06:49,860 --> 01:06:49,870
pepper can be my nurse okay - programmer
 

2611
01:06:49,870 --> 01:06:52,650
pepper can be my nurse okay - programmer
musicians wrote every possible melody in

2612
01:06:52,650 --> 01:06:52,660
musicians wrote every possible melody in
 

2613
01:06:52,660 --> 01:06:55,610
musicians wrote every possible melody in
existence - a hard drive in MIDI format

2614
01:06:55,610 --> 01:06:55,620
existence - a hard drive in MIDI format
 

2615
01:06:55,620 --> 01:06:57,930
existence - a hard drive in MIDI format
copyrighted the whole thing and then

2616
01:06:57,930 --> 01:06:57,940
copyrighted the whole thing and then
 

2617
01:06:57,940 --> 01:07:00,360
copyrighted the whole thing and then
released it all to the public domain in

2618
01:07:00,360 --> 01:07:00,370
released it all to the public domain in
 

2619
01:07:00,370 --> 01:07:02,430
released it all to the public domain in
an attempt to stop musicians from

2620
01:07:02,430 --> 01:07:02,440
an attempt to stop musicians from
 

2621
01:07:02,440 --> 01:07:05,880
an attempt to stop musicians from
getting sued programmer musician and

2622
01:07:05,880 --> 01:07:05,890
getting sued programmer musician and
 

2623
01:07:05,890 --> 01:07:08,970
getting sued programmer musician and
copyright attorney a Damian reel along

2624
01:07:08,970 --> 01:07:08,980
copyright attorney a Damian reel along
 

2625
01:07:08,980 --> 01:07:12,170
copyright attorney a Damian reel along
with musician programmer Noah Rubin

2626
01:07:12,170 --> 01:07:12,180
with musician programmer Noah Rubin
 

2627
01:07:12,180 --> 01:07:15,870
with musician programmer Noah Rubin
sought to stop copyright lawsuits that

2628
01:07:15,870 --> 01:07:15,880
sought to stop copyright lawsuits that
 

2629
01:07:15,880 --> 01:07:18,180
sought to stop copyright lawsuits that
they believe stifle the creative freedom

2630
01:07:18,180 --> 01:07:18,190
they believe stifle the creative freedom
 

2631
01:07:18,190 --> 01:07:21,900
they believe stifle the creative freedom
of artists often in copyright cases for

2632
01:07:21,900 --> 01:07:21,910
of artists often in copyright cases for
 

2633
01:07:21,910 --> 01:07:24,300
of artists often in copyright cases for
song melodies if the artist being sued

2634
01:07:24,300 --> 01:07:24,310
song melodies if the artist being sued
 

2635
01:07:24,310 --> 01:07:26,880
song melodies if the artist being sued
for infringement could have possibly had

2636
01:07:26,880 --> 01:07:26,890
for infringement could have possibly had
 

2637
01:07:26,890 --> 01:07:29,100
for infringement could have possibly had
access to the music they're accused of

2638
01:07:29,100 --> 01:07:29,110
access to the music they're accused of
 

2639
01:07:29,110 --> 01:07:31,290
access to the music they're accused of
copying even if it was something they

2640
01:07:31,290 --> 01:07:31,300
copying even if it was something they
 

2641
01:07:31,300 --> 01:07:34,020
copying even if it was something they
listened to just once they can be

2642
01:07:34,020 --> 01:07:34,030
listened to just once they can be
 

2643
01:07:34,030 --> 01:07:36,230
listened to just once they can be
accused of subconsciously

2644
01:07:36,230 --> 01:07:36,240
accused of subconsciously
 

2645
01:07:36,240 --> 01:07:39,660
accused of subconsciously
infringing on the original content one

2646
01:07:39,660 --> 01:07:39,670
infringing on the original content one
 

2647
01:07:39,670 --> 01:07:41,460
infringing on the original content one
of the most notorious examples of this

2648
01:07:41,460 --> 01:07:41,470
of the most notorious examples of this
 

2649
01:07:41,470 --> 01:07:43,830
of the most notorious examples of this
is Tom Petty's claim that Sam Smith's

2650
01:07:43,830 --> 01:07:43,840
is Tom Petty's claim that Sam Smith's
 

2651
01:07:43,840 --> 01:07:46,380
is Tom Petty's claim that Sam Smith's
stay with me sounded too close to

2652
01:07:46,380 --> 01:07:46,390
stay with me sounded too close to
 

2653
01:07:46,390 --> 01:07:48,870
stay with me sounded too close to
Petty's I won't back down Smith

2654
01:07:48,870 --> 01:07:48,880
Petty's I won't back down Smith
 

2655
01:07:48,880 --> 01:07:51,120
Petty's I won't back down Smith
eventually had to give Petty co-writing

2656
01:07:51,120 --> 01:07:51,130
eventually had to give Petty co-writing
 

2657
01:07:51,130 --> 01:07:54,510
eventually had to give Petty co-writing
credits on his own chart-topping song

2658
01:07:54,510 --> 01:07:54,520
credits on his own chart-topping song
 

2659
01:07:54,520 --> 01:07:58,250
credits on his own chart-topping song
which entitled petty to royalties

2660
01:07:58,250 --> 01:07:58,260
which entitled petty to royalties
 

2661
01:07:58,260 --> 01:08:00,720
which entitled petty to royalties
defending a case like that in court can

2662
01:08:00,720 --> 01:08:00,730
defending a case like that in court can
 

2663
01:08:00,730 --> 01:08:02,580
defending a case like that in court can
cost millions of dollars in legal fees

2664
01:08:02,580 --> 01:08:02,590
cost millions of dollars in legal fees
 

2665
01:08:02,590 --> 01:08:05,670
cost millions of dollars in legal fees
and the outcome is in never assured real

2666
01:08:05,670 --> 01:08:05,680
and the outcome is in never assured real
 

2667
01:08:05,680 --> 01:08:07,980
and the outcome is in never assured real
and Ruben hoped that by releasing the

2668
01:08:07,980 --> 01:08:07,990
and Ruben hoped that by releasing the
 

2669
01:08:07,990 --> 01:08:09,210
and Ruben hoped that by releasing the
melodies publicly

2670
01:08:09,210 --> 01:08:09,220
melodies publicly
 

2671
01:08:09,220 --> 01:08:10,980
melodies publicly
they'll prevent a lot of these cases

2672
01:08:10,980 --> 01:08:10,990
they'll prevent a lot of these cases
 

2673
01:08:10,990 --> 01:08:14,069
they'll prevent a lot of these cases
from standing a chance in court in a

2674
01:08:14,069 --> 01:08:14,079
from standing a chance in court in a
 

2675
01:08:14,079 --> 01:08:16,439
from standing a chance in court in a
recent talk about the project real

2676
01:08:16,439 --> 01:08:16,449
recent talk about the project real
 

2677
01:08:16,449 --> 01:08:18,720
recent talk about the project real
explained that to get there melody

2678
01:08:18,720 --> 01:08:18,730
explained that to get there melody
 

2679
01:08:18,730 --> 01:08:21,809
explained that to get there melody
database they algorithmically determined

2680
01:08:21,809 --> 01:08:21,819
database they algorithmically determined
 

2681
01:08:21,819 --> 01:08:24,260
database they algorithmically determined
every melody contained within a single

2682
01:08:24,260 --> 01:08:24,270
every melody contained within a single
 

2683
01:08:24,270 --> 01:08:28,800
every melody contained within a single
octave to determine the finite nature of

2684
01:08:28,800 --> 01:08:28,810
octave to determine the finite nature of
 

2685
01:08:28,810 --> 01:08:31,170
octave to determine the finite nature of
melodies real and Rubin developed an

2686
01:08:31,170 --> 01:08:31,180
melodies real and Rubin developed an
 

2687
01:08:31,180 --> 01:08:33,930
melodies real and Rubin developed an
algorithm that recorded every possible

2688
01:08:33,930 --> 01:08:33,940
algorithm that recorded every possible
 

2689
01:08:33,940 --> 01:08:36,360
algorithm that recorded every possible
eighth note twelve beat melody combo

2690
01:08:36,360 --> 01:08:36,370
eighth note twelve beat melody combo
 

2691
01:08:36,370 --> 01:08:38,789
eighth note twelve beat melody combo
this used the same basic tactic that

2692
01:08:38,789 --> 01:08:38,799
this used the same basic tactic that
 

2693
01:08:38,799 --> 01:08:41,189
this used the same basic tactic that
hackers used to guess passwords churning

2694
01:08:41,189 --> 01:08:41,199
hackers used to guess passwords churning
 

2695
01:08:41,199 --> 01:08:42,990
hackers used to guess passwords churning
through every possible combination of

2696
01:08:42,990 --> 01:08:43,000
through every possible combination of
 

2697
01:08:43,000 --> 01:08:46,559
through every possible combination of
notes until none remained real says this

2698
01:08:46,559 --> 01:08:46,569
notes until none remained real says this
 

2699
01:08:46,569 --> 01:08:49,860
notes until none remained real says this
algorithm works at a rate of 300,000

2700
01:08:49,860 --> 01:08:49,870
algorithm works at a rate of 300,000
 

2701
01:08:49,870 --> 01:08:53,610
algorithm works at a rate of 300,000
melodies per second oh I know once a

2702
01:08:53,610 --> 01:08:53,620
melodies per second oh I know once a
 

2703
01:08:53,620 --> 01:08:55,890
melodies per second oh I know once a
work is committed to a tangible format

2704
01:08:55,890 --> 01:08:55,900
work is committed to a tangible format
 

2705
01:08:55,900 --> 01:08:58,229
work is committed to a tangible format
it's considered copyrighted and in MIDI

2706
01:08:58,229 --> 01:08:58,239
it's considered copyrighted and in MIDI
 

2707
01:08:58,239 --> 01:09:01,860
it's considered copyrighted and in MIDI
format notes are just numbers all of the

2708
01:09:01,860 --> 01:09:01,870
format notes are just numbers all of the
 

2709
01:09:01,870 --> 01:09:04,110
format notes are just numbers all of the
melodies they've generated as well as

2710
01:09:04,110 --> 01:09:04,120
melodies they've generated as well as
 

2711
01:09:04,120 --> 01:09:05,519
melodies they've generated as well as
the codes for the algorithm that

2712
01:09:05,519 --> 01:09:05,529
the codes for the algorithm that
 

2713
01:09:05,529 --> 01:09:07,740
the codes for the algorithm that
generated them are available as open

2714
01:09:07,740 --> 01:09:07,750
generated them are available as open
 

2715
01:09:07,750 --> 01:09:10,800
generated them are available as open
source materials on github and the

2716
01:09:10,800 --> 01:09:10,810
source materials on github and the
 

2717
01:09:10,810 --> 01:09:13,760
source materials on github and the
datasets are on the Internet Archive

2718
01:09:13,760 --> 01:09:13,770
datasets are on the Internet Archive
 

2719
01:09:13,770 --> 01:09:16,650
datasets are on the Internet Archive
fantastic thank you guys that is so oh

2720
01:09:16,650 --> 01:09:16,660
fantastic thank you guys that is so oh
 

2721
01:09:16,660 --> 01:09:20,789
fantastic thank you guys that is so oh
my goodness and this is like this should

2722
01:09:20,789 --> 01:09:20,799
my goodness and this is like this should
 

2723
01:09:20,799 --> 01:09:22,890
my goodness and this is like this should
go into the files of why didn't we think

2724
01:09:22,890 --> 01:09:22,900
go into the files of why didn't we think
 

2725
01:09:22,900 --> 01:09:23,640
go into the files of why didn't we think
of this before

2726
01:09:23,640 --> 01:09:23,650
of this before
 

2727
01:09:23,650 --> 01:09:26,579
of this before
these guys should get a super award like

2728
01:09:26,579 --> 01:09:26,589
these guys should get a super award like
 

2729
01:09:26,589 --> 01:09:28,650
these guys should get a super award like
they should actually get a small royalty

2730
01:09:28,650 --> 01:09:28,660
they should actually get a small royalty
 

2731
01:09:28,660 --> 01:09:31,499
they should actually get a small royalty
from all of the royalties that these

2732
01:09:31,499 --> 01:09:31,509
from all of the royalties that these
 

2733
01:09:31,509 --> 01:09:33,470
from all of the royalties that these
other big bully

2734
01:09:33,470 --> 01:09:33,480
other big bully
 

2735
01:09:33,480 --> 01:09:36,510
other big bully
musicians yeah so now I want to download

2736
01:09:36,510 --> 01:09:36,520
musicians yeah so now I want to download
 

2737
01:09:36,520 --> 01:09:40,470
musicians yeah so now I want to download
the entire MIDI set like a tribute

2738
01:09:40,470 --> 01:09:40,480
the entire MIDI set like a tribute
 

2739
01:09:40,480 --> 01:09:44,640
the entire MIDI set like a tribute
edirol orchestral to all the mini notes

2740
01:09:44,640 --> 01:09:44,650
edirol orchestral to all the mini notes
 

2741
01:09:44,650 --> 01:09:47,880
edirol orchestral to all the mini notes
and re sequence everything add some drum

2742
01:09:47,880 --> 01:09:47,890
and re sequence everything add some drum
 

2743
01:09:47,890 --> 01:09:50,430
and re sequence everything add some drum
loops and let's see what we come up with

2744
01:09:50,430 --> 01:09:50,440
loops and let's see what we come up with
 

2745
01:09:50,440 --> 01:09:55,290
loops and let's see what we come up with
I think this is great I think it's it's

2746
01:09:55,290 --> 01:09:55,300
I think this is great I think it's it's
 

2747
01:09:55,300 --> 01:09:57,030
I think this is great I think it's it's
obviously novel but it's also a

2748
01:09:57,030 --> 01:09:57,040
obviously novel but it's also a
 

2749
01:09:57,040 --> 01:10:01,380
obviously novel but it's also a
brilliant way to thwart like this is the

2750
01:10:01,380 --> 01:10:01,390
brilliant way to thwart like this is the
 

2751
01:10:01,390 --> 01:10:03,660
brilliant way to thwart like this is the
equivalent copyright trolls are the

2752
01:10:03,660 --> 01:10:03,670
equivalent copyright trolls are the
 

2753
01:10:03,670 --> 01:10:05,760
equivalent copyright trolls are the
equivalent of patent trolls in many many

2754
01:10:05,760 --> 01:10:05,770
equivalent of patent trolls in many many
 

2755
01:10:05,770 --> 01:10:08,459
equivalent of patent trolls in many many
ways so oh yeah that sounds I mean

2756
01:10:08,459 --> 01:10:08,469
ways so oh yeah that sounds I mean
 

2757
01:10:08,469 --> 01:10:10,229
ways so oh yeah that sounds I mean
there's only so many chords we can use

2758
01:10:10,229 --> 01:10:10,239
there's only so many chords we can use
 

2759
01:10:10,239 --> 01:10:15,450
there's only so many chords we can use
in in our you know 4/4 and 3/4 time yeah

2760
01:10:15,450 --> 01:10:15,460
in in our you know 4/4 and 3/4 time yeah
 

2761
01:10:15,460 --> 01:10:17,430
in in our you know 4/4 and 3/4 time yeah
and and they do start like I mean

2762
01:10:17,430 --> 01:10:17,440
and and they do start like I mean
 

2763
01:10:17,440 --> 01:10:18,360
and and they do start like I mean
barenaked ladies

2764
01:10:18,360 --> 01:10:18,370
barenaked ladies
 

2765
01:10:18,370 --> 01:10:22,560
barenaked ladies
you know GD c GD c GD c mi

2766
01:10:22,560 --> 01:10:22,570
you know GD c GD c GD c mi
 

2767
01:10:22,570 --> 01:10:26,549
you know GD c GD c GD c mi
like how many songs are gonna fall into

2768
01:10:26,549 --> 01:10:26,559
like how many songs are gonna fall into
 

2769
01:10:26,559 --> 01:10:30,750
like how many songs are gonna fall into
that and and you can creatively have a

2770
01:10:30,750 --> 01:10:30,760
that and and you can creatively have a
 

2771
01:10:30,760 --> 01:10:32,819
that and and you can creatively have a
thought that is similar to somebody

2772
01:10:32,819 --> 01:10:32,829
thought that is similar to somebody
 

2773
01:10:32,829 --> 01:10:35,729
thought that is similar to somebody
else's very creative unique thought turn

2774
01:10:35,729 --> 01:10:35,739
else's very creative unique thought turn
 

2775
01:10:35,739 --> 01:10:40,680
else's very creative unique thought turn
but you didn't hear it even like it you

2776
01:10:40,680 --> 01:10:40,690
but you didn't hear it even like it you
 

2777
01:10:40,690 --> 01:10:42,930
but you didn't hear it even like it you
can people have said things that I've

2778
01:10:42,930 --> 01:10:42,940
can people have said things that I've
 

2779
01:10:42,940 --> 01:10:46,890
can people have said things that I've
said I'm sure without hearing me say

2780
01:10:46,890 --> 01:10:46,900
said I'm sure without hearing me say
 

2781
01:10:46,900 --> 01:10:49,970
said I'm sure without hearing me say
them they're not stealing my thoughts I

2782
01:10:49,970 --> 01:10:49,980
them they're not stealing my thoughts I
 

2783
01:10:49,980 --> 01:10:53,790
them they're not stealing my thoughts I
just feel like in this particular case

2784
01:10:53,790 --> 01:10:53,800
just feel like in this particular case
 

2785
01:10:53,800 --> 01:10:55,709
just feel like in this particular case
especially the example Tom Petty was

2786
01:10:55,709 --> 01:10:55,719
especially the example Tom Petty was
 

2787
01:10:55,719 --> 01:11:02,790
especially the example Tom Petty was
being very petty I think that since the

2788
01:11:02,790 --> 01:11:02,800
being very petty I think that since the
 

2789
01:11:02,800 --> 01:11:05,069
being very petty I think that since the
only person who is able to create unique

2790
01:11:05,069 --> 01:11:05,079
only person who is able to create unique
 

2791
01:11:05,079 --> 01:11:09,060
only person who is able to create unique
melodies Asiya these days it just comes

2792
01:11:09,060 --> 01:11:09,070
melodies Asiya these days it just comes
 

2793
01:11:09,070 --> 01:11:10,830
melodies Asiya these days it just comes
down to it like seriously there's only

2794
01:11:10,830 --> 01:11:10,840
down to it like seriously there's only
 

2795
01:11:10,840 --> 01:11:13,649
down to it like seriously there's only
so many melodies that can be made and

2796
01:11:13,649 --> 01:11:13,659
so many melodies that can be made and
 

2797
01:11:13,659 --> 01:11:16,049
so many melodies that can be made and
we're coming up on a time where in

2798
01:11:16,049 --> 01:11:16,059
we're coming up on a time where in
 

2799
01:11:16,059 --> 01:11:18,810
we're coming up on a time where in
recorded history there have been so many

2800
01:11:18,810 --> 01:11:18,820
recorded history there have been so many
 

2801
01:11:18,820 --> 01:11:20,310
recorded history there have been so many
recordings made that we're going to

2802
01:11:20,310 --> 01:11:20,320
recordings made that we're going to
 

2803
01:11:20,320 --> 01:11:22,649
recordings made that we're going to
start to see overlap and we have seen

2804
01:11:22,649 --> 01:11:22,659
start to see overlap and we have seen
 

2805
01:11:22,659 --> 01:11:25,979
start to see overlap and we have seen
that this is a cool way for them to say

2806
01:11:25,979 --> 01:11:25,989
that this is a cool way for them to say
 

2807
01:11:25,989 --> 01:11:29,910
that this is a cool way for them to say
haha we we own them all we've released

2808
01:11:29,910 --> 01:11:29,920
haha we we own them all we've released
 

2809
01:11:29,920 --> 01:11:32,220
haha we we own them all we've released
them to the public domain well done

2810
01:11:32,220 --> 01:11:32,230
them to the public domain well done
 

2811
01:11:32,230 --> 01:11:35,549
them to the public domain well done
thank you so much

2812
01:11:35,549 --> 01:11:35,559
thank you so much
 

2813
01:11:35,559 --> 01:11:38,189
thank you so much
links below yes go download the MIDI

2814
01:11:38,189 --> 01:11:38,199
links below yes go download the MIDI
 

2815
01:11:38,199 --> 01:11:41,160
links below yes go download the MIDI
files sequence them use them yeah we ate

2816
01:11:41,160 --> 01:11:41,170
files sequence them use them yeah we ate
 

2817
01:11:41,170 --> 01:11:41,790
files sequence them use them yeah we ate
your tracks

2818
01:11:41,790 --> 01:11:41,800
your tracks
 

2819
01:11:41,800 --> 01:11:46,799
your tracks
be creative yeah big thanks to Roy W

2820
01:11:46,799 --> 01:11:46,809
be creative yeah big thanks to Roy W
 

2821
01:11:46,809 --> 01:11:48,629
be creative yeah big thanks to Roy W
Nash and our community of viewers for

2822
01:11:48,629 --> 01:11:48,639
Nash and our community of viewers for
 

2823
01:11:48,639 --> 01:11:50,450
Nash and our community of viewers for
submitting stories to us this week

2824
01:11:50,450 --> 01:11:50,460
submitting stories to us this week
 

2825
01:11:50,460 --> 01:11:53,459
submitting stories to us this week
thanks for watching the category-five TV

2826
01:11:53,459 --> 01:11:53,469
thanks for watching the category-five TV
 

2827
01:11:53,469 --> 01:11:55,470
thanks for watching the category-five TV
newsroom don't forget to Like and

2828
01:11:55,470 --> 01:11:55,480
newsroom don't forget to Like and
 

2829
01:11:55,480 --> 01:11:57,180
newsroom don't forget to Like and
subscribe for all your tech news with a

2830
01:11:57,180 --> 01:11:57,190
subscribe for all your tech news with a
 

2831
01:11:57,190 --> 01:11:59,609
subscribe for all your tech news with a
slight Linux bias and if you appreciate

2832
01:11:59,609 --> 01:11:59,619
slight Linux bias and if you appreciate
 

2833
01:11:59,619 --> 01:12:01,229
slight Linux bias and if you appreciate
what we do become a patron at

2834
01:12:01,229 --> 01:12:01,239
what we do become a patron at
 

2835
01:12:01,239 --> 01:12:04,379
what we do become a patron at
patreon.com slash newsroom from the

2836
01:12:04,379 --> 01:12:04,389
patreon.com slash newsroom from the
 

2837
01:12:04,389 --> 01:12:07,229
patreon.com slash newsroom from the
category-five TV newsroom i'm sasha

2838
01:12:07,229 --> 01:12:07,239
category-five TV newsroom i'm sasha
 

2839
01:12:07,239 --> 01:12:10,379
category-five TV newsroom i'm sasha
Rickman and i'm robi ferguson well

2840
01:12:10,379 --> 01:12:10,389
Rickman and i'm robi ferguson well
 

2841
01:12:10,389 --> 01:12:12,479
Rickman and i'm robi ferguson well
thanks for being with us this week it's

2842
01:12:12,479 --> 01:12:12,489
thanks for being with us this week it's
 

2843
01:12:12,489 --> 01:12:15,209
thanks for being with us this week it's
been great having the Canadian hacker on

2844
01:12:15,209 --> 01:12:15,219
been great having the Canadian hacker on
 

2845
01:12:15,219 --> 01:12:18,899
been great having the Canadian hacker on
the show to share with us and I hope

2846
01:12:18,899 --> 01:12:18,909
the show to share with us and I hope
 

2847
01:12:18,909 --> 01:12:20,010
the show to share with us and I hope
that you've enjoyed the show please

2848
01:12:20,010 --> 01:12:20,020
that you've enjoyed the show please
 

2849
01:12:20,020 --> 01:12:22,500
that you've enjoyed the show please
comment below give us a like a big

2850
01:12:22,500 --> 01:12:22,510
comment below give us a like a big
 

2851
01:12:22,510 --> 01:12:25,229
comment below give us a like a big
subscribe and thumbs up and we look

2852
01:12:25,229 --> 01:12:25,239
subscribe and thumbs up and we look
 

2853
01:12:25,239 --> 01:12:26,700
subscribe and thumbs up and we look
forward to having you as a part of our

2854
01:12:26,700 --> 01:12:26,710
forward to having you as a part of our
 

2855
01:12:26,710 --> 01:12:28,709
forward to having you as a part of our
community we'll see you again next week

2856
01:12:28,709 --> 01:12:28,719
community we'll see you again next week
 

2857
01:12:28,719 --> 01:12:37,980
community we'll see you again next week
everyone take care

2858
01:12:37,980 --> 01:12:37,990

 

2859
01:12:37,990 --> 01:12:41,090

[Music]