{ "work_urn": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110", "edition_urn": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.ai-claude", "source_edition": "tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1", "language": "eng", "translator": "Claude (AI-generated)", "model": "claude-opus-5-5", "made": "2026-11-08", "updated": "2026-11-08", "whole_work": true, "header": { "title": "Ad Justinum Manichaeum Contra Duo Principia Manichaeorum: AI translation (Claude)", "author": "Victorinus Afrus", "publisher": "Classica Codex AI translations", "date": "2026", "source": "Translated by Claude (claude-opus-5-5, Anthropic) from the library's tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1, from Open Greek and Latin's Patrologia Latina (CC BY-SA 4.0), one English line for each line of the original. The whole work is translated. It was chosen because no English translation of it could be found.", "statement": "An AI-generated translation of the whole work, checked against the original by a second AI only in samples. No specialist has reviewed it.", "availability": "CC BY-SA 4.0, as its source requires: credit Open Greek and Latin's Patrologia Latina and this AI translation, and share adaptations under the same licence." }, "notes": { "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.head": "Section I: 'ut is Andreas actibus eloquitur' is obscure and perhaps corrupt; rendered as 'what that Andreas declares in the Acts' (possibly a reference to the apocryphal Acts of Andrew); 'Thesauro' is taken as Mani's Treasure. 'quam abditis' is read as 'quam abdicatis' ('which you disown'), which suits the contrast with the plants the Manichaeans revere; the sentence beginning 'Namque homo uterque victurus' is syntactically loose and the rendering is tentative. Section III: 'veritatis et Ideis' rendered 'of truth and of the Ideas'; it may be a corruption of 'veritatis et Dei' ('of truth and of God'). 'virginem singularem' (also 'casta virginitas' in II) may allude to the Manichaean Virgin of Light or to the moon; left literal. Section IV: the forest simile is obscure and probably corrupt in places ('ac penes discreta confusio'). Section V: 'ut laisse soles' is taken as 'as you are wont to say' (perhaps for 'ut aisse' or 'ut dicere'); 'respuo vel abutor' is rendered loosely as 'reject and refuse'; 'nequii' read as 'nequit', 'beilum' as 'bellum', 'ci' as 'ei'.", "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.6": "The Latin of this tract is often obscure and the text appears corrupt in places; renderings are tentative throughout. VI: 'Cura dementi fando vicium' read as 'Cave, demens, fando victum'. 'Habendo quod aeternum est superari' is unclear. VII: 'ludus' perhaps for 'Indus'; 'ni separantur' may be for 'ut separantur'; 'enumeris' read as 'innumeris'; 'Zoradis' taken as Zoroaster; 'lotum' read as 'totum'. VIII: 'haec tenuisse sub eventus est' is unclear, perhaps 'sub eventu'; 'fratres' perhaps for 'frater'; 'periret' perhaps for 'pereat'. IX: 'emeat' (perhaps 'meat'), 'admiratus' (perhaps 'admirans') and 'acris' (read as 'aeris') are uncertain. 'allero' is read as 'altero'. The final clause of IX is compressed, and the subject of 'scindit' is supplied.", "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.10": "Scanning errors read as: getum = gelum, liis = his, lotum = totum, ven rationis sua? = vi rationis suae, el = et, esi = est, aede = an de, sil = sit, ci = ei, cum = eum. X: 'ejus ipsius di in glaciem quod gelascit' seems corrupt (perhaps 'id'); sense approximate. XI: 'totius omnes' unclear (perhaps 'omnis'); 'alocale' rendered 'without place', uncertain; 'falso originem praestat' taken as 'furnishes an origin to the false'. XIII: 'et actu casu principia accedentibus crescunt minuta utique quando addita fecerunt' is obscure, probably corrupt; rendering tentative. XIV: 'jam sole est' unclear, rendered as if 'solutus est' (undone); the sentence 'Jam non eadem est, si ubicumque speratur' is obscure.", "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.15": "XV: 'Est disciplina' is read as referring to the opponent's teaching; the sense is uncertain. 'ex umbra inferi partus' is obscure and may be corrupt. The Greek is garbled in the scan (ΑΓΑΘΟΣ δαιμον, κΑκοςδαι- MQN, χαχός); read as agathos daimon, kakos daimon, kakos. XVI: 'Ne sane conteris' may be corrupt (perhaps for 'contendas' or 'credas'). The sentence beginning 'Deinde duarum substantiarum' lacks a main verb and is construed as the opponent's claim. 'Armenorium' is read as 'Armeniorum'. 'Mani' is rendered Mani here; elsewhere 'Manis Babylon' is rendered 'Manes of Babylon'." }, "nodes": [ { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.head", "text": "THE BOOK OF MARIUS VICTORINUS TO JUSTINUS THE MANICHAEAN AGAINST" }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.1", "text": "THE TWO PRINCIPLES OF THE MANICHAEANS, AND ON THE TRUE FLESH OF CHRIST." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.1a", "text": "I. To speak to one who long ago, by much reading and the unwearied vigils of continuous labour, has settled what he ought to confess about the faith of the law, is the act of one who errs, Justinus, but also of one who loves. So I preferred to show how highly I regard you, and I gladly accepted that I had laboured with you so far that you understood beforehand that you still had to inquire into what Manichaeus [says], and what that Andreas declares in the Acts, and what he revealed in the Treasure. Approached on this, I am inquiring attentively whether you said these things truly or not. Since I have to discuss, as you wished, whether things diverse and contrary to us come from one principle, I did not refuse to answer on this point. But I want you, brother, to make this labour worth the effort. Reread often the little book meant for you, and by turning over for yourself what is said, penetrate or search it out in the privacy of deeper inquiry. For the inner sight surpasses words, and the hiddenness of the immeasurable outreaches and blinds even the conjectures of the mind itself; yet when it is sought by them piously and reverently, it is found to delight rather than to terrify. For man will live in both his parts when the intention of a holy mind asks after the one principle, and this flesh of ours, which you disown, along with the herbs and grasses which you love, venerates one and the same author of itself and of the whole world, as is proper for it to do. I myself wonder and am astonished at your stubborn view, that you hate flesh and venerate grasses, and I do not yet know whether you profess these to be from one [source] or from different ones. If you say from one, you see what you fall into; if from another, it is unwise to praise the maker of the other on account of other things, while one accuses and rebukes one's own [maker] on account of what is in oneself. But lest in saying these things I should rebuke rather than answer, they will be said later, if they move you: now receive what you asked." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.2", "text": "II. To claim that we have the power and the right to inquire about things beyond ourselves and the world, when we are almost unknown to ourselves, is mad and insane; and it is truly dangerous to doubt whence and how, or from whom, you exist, when you do not dare to doubt that you exist and are held in flesh, and you see plainly that you live in the world, and that by the help of your maker, provided you obey him, you are set free; and you hold it as confessed that there is one Saviour, yet are afraid to confess that you are from one maker, dividing off one as maker of the flesh and another as founder of the soul. So, picturing these things, we say that both rule the world and guard their handiwork in man, each equally pressing that what he made from his own realms should not perish. The bright sun rejects this, and chaste virginity and the glorious choir of the stars; and the whole fabric of the entire world refutes and casts off the idea that its origin comes to it from two different [principles], two unbegotten ones. For the mind is violated by profane clouds if so great a splendour of immeasurable brightness should consist of older darkness and a part of it. For thus it would follow that the sun is from them, if the whole world received its being from two principles. Plainly, since it is not for us to hold our understanding on these things and to rest in this wandering of the mind, we flee and shudder at confessing that he over whom we ourselves are victors is from himself. Finally, I want you to grasp what it means to say that flesh exists without him from whom all things took their beginning, and that it dwells in the higher realms, where that renowned virginity, the glory, the proclaimed light are: [flesh] which, since it came down from there into Christ, cannot be thought not to be there. For Christ has his flesh from there, since your veneration does not allow you to say [it came] from Mary. Shall we say, then, that what God took up is from another? What was there for him who was to take it up to do, if not that he who is the founder should fashion it? And if he composed it, is it then worthy to deserve [such honour]?" }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.3", "text": "III. Here, as I see it, the inventor and founder is praised, if eternity deigned to dwell in it. But if that flesh which was in Christ is another, and yet not older, then God the maker too is found to be later. If older, why is it not in the world, and why is it in heaven, where no one is fleshly? And if that which was in Christ is not in the world, from where did a creature come into alien realms from foreign shores? Or from where is it joined here to the soul? Or why is it able so often to take souls captive, that it appears almost more powerful in realms not its own? And why does the author of the inner [man] labour to free this inner [man] from the flesh? Or why did he allow him to be shut up in that from which he was to be freed? Certainly the whole of what the world is here is the realm of truth and of the Ideas, and he who is its maker rules [it]. If in all this realm, his very own, there is one thing belonging to another, which is called flesh, and this alone is so strong and powerful that the soul, driven by it, is tossed about wavering and grows faint and weary, we can see how great in his own realms the maker of flesh may be. For if we take this realm, which is the whole world, to be his whose servant we believe the flesh to be, we shall be saying that the sun, and that choir, and the unique virgin shone forth from a source of darkness. For my part I willingly embrace, and with uplifted joy rejoice to profess, one founder of all these things, and to venerate him, whom it is right to hold to be light and truth and the whole, as he is known in the privacy of pious inquiry by searching care. To hold this, the remembrance of an exultant soul lifts the mind, and a better origin consoles all the cares of a wavering spirit with the festive grounds of reason. Whatever things are called ages, or are counted as realms, or are held to be worlds, whatever came before all antiquity, [I hold] to be one, to exist as a single [being], and to be gathered to be immeasurable from this, that it is the whole, yet is called one." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.4", "text": "IV. One thing, Justinus, is what he himself is, another the things that are from him. What he himself is, is one, and whatever he is, is whole; but what is from him is countless. And these are the things with which everything is filled that is enclosed and encompassed by the one whole. But since the things that are from him who is from himself and is one are varied, it befits him to rule varied things. And so that he may appear almighty, he himself had to be found the origin even of contraries. And this plainly now belongs to that forest which divided all the wood of its material into species, unequal and unlike in their kinds of trees; and yet the whole forest, a confusion distinct within itself, is seen and perceived to be wood in its material across countless thousands of thousands, and yet is not distinguished in nature. Looking with me, you too recall that these things belong to likenesses which have been ordained, and which came to exist because they came forth from another. But that, that immeasurable and self-derived [being]: no one will doubt that it lacks likeness, is bereft of comparison, falls short of any example. By this the approach of our intention is compelled to confess, and is pressed and constrained, to penetrate to those hidden things of the height that run on with unwearied bounds, to the more secret of the secrets of venerable reality; to approach, touch or attempt them, alone indeed, yet as far as nature is able, as far as speech suffices to utter. And so I now ask what will be like the immeasurable." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.5", "text": "V. Tell me, if you can, you who give your faith to comparisons and believe you have attained the truth through the shadows of images. But, as I see it, it is not so much you, Justinus, who fail the matter as the matter that fails you. And if, as you are wont to say and now say, [there is] another realm, is this other realm, whatever it is, also immeasurable? But I do not see how it can fitly be called immeasurable if being is not denied to the other as well: for where being begins for the one, there the other reaches its limit, and neither is infinite. And if it is so that it is finite, I reject and refuse [our] being from either of them. Yet since we are from another, and the world is not from itself, and however great it may be is yet finite, if not to others, certainly to its maker, it is therefore a sacred duty to confess its maker infinite. Therefore all things that are in the world, each of the things that make up the world itself, I perceive and recognise to be from that principle which is one and alone, from itself, in itself, for itself, and which, immeasurable and whole, extends infinitely, and reaches so far that it would cease and fail to be only where being or existence belongs to another; nor can anything else be held to exist that is external or divided from it, and becomes a rival or stands as an enemy, which, set and abiding in its own [realm], could admit being conquered, and afterwards be taken captive and be present, dragged within the victor's realms, and, carried over there, cease to be, and stop [being] where it had its being before the war. Certainly, if it is still in that [realm], it has not yet been overcome; and if it exists, perhaps it may be restored. How many times will this happen? How many ages will this battle last? When will it cease? If it has been extinguished, or already conquered, it is not in its own [realm]: and is it anywhere at all? Nay rather, its being now fails and ceases. So too all the things that were its own perished with their source and were taken away. If they perished, none of them are ever its own; and the flesh, which exists, is not its own, but rather his who conquered." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.6", "text": "VI. Perhaps you would prefer [to say] that this victor carried off to his own realms as a trophy some of the things which the one who was conquered possessed. Granted that these may exist, yet the spoils which the victor led away are not hostile. Yet you confess that the flesh is in truth hostile to God even today. O the sloth of the one who triumphs! O the idleness of the one who was beaten! O the torpor of the one who was injured! O the sluggish strength of the one who was provoked! O the authority of a lord at rest! You are wearied by your captives in your own realm; and you who were able to conquer by waging war grow used to being overcome by sparing. Let the first things be held in such an order, and this supposition gathers errors from long back, before the world existed. Certainly you say that each of the two, whom you record as having clashed in war, is from itself: equal is the power of those in whom origin from self and one eternity are found. Were I to dare here to call one of them the better, and to suspect that there is more in one: do I not fall and run into [guilt], and am I not made a defendant and condemned before the eternal itself, which is always one? Should I not fear to profess that what is eternal is overcome while possessing [eternity], and that what is one from itself is not; and, while we confess it almighty, should I assert that someone at some time has dominion [over it]? A blind thing, darker than anything dark, is laid open here, [the thing] of sacrilegious error. Beware, madman, of saying that what is from itself is conquered, so that fear of the captive also harasses the victor who is from himself, and that the unbegotten lies in subjection. So the almighty victor enlarged himself from the crushed realms, and what you inquire about as unbegotten you declare to be abolished or taken away. Nay, it will even follow that he who is from himself will not continue to be, when, yielding to the victor's power, he will either perish or be led away [captive]." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.7", "text": "VII. Next, whom shall we say was not content with its own, so that the battle you record arose? The light or the darkness? If the light, it lacked the darkness and took delight in what is foul. Where then is what is held to be almighty, what is understood as the whole, if there was something not in it, which was outside, and was held in other realms, and was truth to itself, being indeed what it was, something that the dominion of the almighty did not yet possess? But now let us suppose that the darkness started the war, and let us lay down that the shadow, existing [apart] from the unbegotten brightness, conspired with its own solid [parts]. If that light is fire, the darkness will have come together for burning, so that its solid [part], which belonged to it, coming into the conflict from outside, would be burned up. But if they are empty, and so do not make use [of solidity], where, I ask, is there any clash of the solid with the empty? To think these things, and by roaming thought to have come to such inward matters, is plainly bold and insane. To imagine a conflict of the empty with the solid, the deep with the high, the finite with the infinite, darkness with light, the false with the true, and the so very little with the whole? I do not allow, brother, that these discordant things, arisen in equal manner, should be set side by side, and recorded with eternity and so placed that being belongs to both of them; rather I assign being to that one alone which is from itself, and I would wish to assert that the other does not have it. For if you reject this, teach me what substance belongs to the empty, what is outside the infinite, what is older than the eternal, what is as great as the whole: so that I may grasp that this exists and is held in reality, and I will not deny two origins to things. If some school says these things, or a Persian records them, let him teach them to his own nation, let him grow old in his own quarter. For there it is [the custom] to think otherwise of divine things, among those whose practice of law is otherwise. Although they are men by nature, yet unless they are separated by speech, let them be distinguished also by reason; nor let one think otherwise about such people, whose body is fed otherwise, whose dress is fitted otherwise, whose appearance is groomed otherwise in the manner of taking it up and otherwise kept, many of whom are even born with another form, and, as I say, let them be peoples beyond count. Have you not now seen, then, how many Manes, Zoroasters or Buddhas have deceived by teaching these things? Let us be called back to what is to be sought." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.8", "text": "VIII. What we are, Justinus, we are from him who is almighty, and who is seen to have stood existing from himself; for whom not to be is [possible] only in what he is not. So there did not even come to be one who could stir up a battle. But that two kinds are held, and these contrary or diverse, of good and evil, solid and empty, high and deep, true and false, light and darkness, eternal and temporal, life and death, and of the contraries of all things: the order of things teaches and reveals that they are not from two principles. For if one were to look at two eternal [beings], and to think that they came as enemies, [one would have to hold] that they held these things subject to outcome. To set up the principles themselves, and to hand over unbegotten [beings] to the anxious fear of trembling dread, while sad care troubled realms about to fight, may perhaps have been allowed to the Parthians, who told tales of what the outcome of the combatants was: what conditions and agreements were reached, what end checked the war, which of the two a more secure chance made lord. But since whichever is treated, danger falls, as I see, upon the unbegotten and the victor, then, brothers, what is from itself is conquered, and what is without beginning will be ended and will not be, or has already been ended. I have escaped, I breathe again: there is no other who may be called my maker; or if he were still perishing and remains, he dwells in his own realms, and he himself will not be my maker in this world; and he is my founder who is also the craftsman of the world, by whom the chaste virginity, the glorious choir of the stars, the shining sun were established in heaven, or set in the heights in ships, as you are accustomed [to say]. And so let us exult in triumph; rejoice, flesh, that will no longer perish. For you are from your Christ the saviour, whether when you are in Adam and Mary, or when, taken up into the higher vessels, you have been found worthy to be of the eternal. No longer, forsaken of the hope of the promise, thrust into the depths, do you waste away growing old: now, restored by the price of the cross, you will be clothed with the glory of immortality." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.9", "text": "IX. And this is worthy of [you], since you have entered and taken hold of the things which pass out through the whole that is eternity and the immeasurable. Here indeed it is now a pleasure to brand the magi of Babylon and the chanters of Ctesiphon with the mysteries of their secrets: whose power it is by a spell now to raise spirits, now to summon them. But it is better, and plainly divine, that the flesh of our Saviour, buried in the tomb, was raised. For no one doubts that what could be buried was dead; and if death clung, wounded, to the flesh that came from above, in Christ our flesh rose again. Yet what reason was there to take flesh, if it itself was not lifted up? But if it is that other [flesh], it is certainly mortal, since it admits being killed. This is immeasurable and beyond estimation: to have dwelt in the members of a man. Unless he were from eternity, he would not be almighty: recognise that in this same eternal [one] are the things called contraries. To die belonged to the same one for whom an unbegotten Father, and age, and eternity are found; and so that he may truly be known as almighty, it is not denied that he was born of a virgin. What is it, then, that is almighty, eternal, infinite and whole; what is immeasurable and higher than every summit and height, from which all that exists in things abides and comes? I take note of it, admonished by the saviour of all, who, teaching that he is the Son, deigned to show that he has a Father; whom Jesus, revealing him as God, and marvelling that he is all things, revealed as far as the measure of the world deserved. Therefore God is the one and only principle, and God alone is truth; and truth itself is light, and light always eternal; and all that is true is solid, and always is, and continues and remains clear. But what is true from itself is never conquered, what is solid has nothing empty, what is light does not admit darkness and does not know it; and if it admits it, and [the darkness] comes into it, it ceases to be for itself. Still more, things that have ceased to be for themselves do not exist for others. But if they are still in their own [realm], they are outside this world, and the conflict with them still goes on, and it is uncertain whether they are being overcome, or will truly perish at some time. But if this is still in doubt, then the world, or the flesh, did not receive in that [realm] being as from another; rather it came to it from him by whom the shining sun too was appointed as servant to the world. For imagining darkness to be what is called evil, you will grasp and understand it: not indeed taking it that being is given to darkness as it is held to belong to light and brightness, but in the sense that it is produced or appears from the action of another which truly is. For in things both above and in the air, and in these of ours, there is that which has come to be from the action of another: as heat from the ray of the sun; as from the blowing of the wind the cold that binds rivers, [while the sun] splits the earth with heat. So the earth is opened by the sun's blaze, and the flowing rivers are bound by frost." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.10", "text": "X. These things, then, are to be observed in this way: that one thing is produced by the action of another, so that among the things that exist one may see that what is not present in them by quality finds its origin arising from the action of another. But it is otherwise with what is given to come about from the reality of the eternal, which is, which is wholly of another. For darkness does not stand, is not solid, does not penetrate: it is something empty which perishes before light, and has no being of its own when that [light] shines out. For it has befallen it not to be through the action of light; because it is not itself a substance, it suffers perishing by the substance of light. If, then, darkness perishes by light, from the same [light] comes its appearing, in the way that the deep comes about from the high, and nothing from the whole. For although the whole is eternal, yet there is also nothing, which is no substance anywhere. For there is the high, but there is its deep: for if there were no high, the deep could not appear. If you do not know the solid, you do not discern the empty. There are, then, things that are substance, and there are things that exist without enjoying a substance of their own: because those are which are substance, from these it comes about that those appear which are not substance, such as hoarfrost, such as ice. These appear, but because they do not enjoy a substance of their own, being has come to them from the action of cold; they melt, and, dissolved, they perish. And yet ice comes from water, but is bound together by the stiffness of the air. So I see two [states] belonging to water, liquid and frost. What is substance, then, is liquid; but what comes to it by action is that very thing of it which freezes into ice. But because ice itself is no substance, it perishes and is taken away, and yet the liquid of the water, remaining substance, endures." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.11", "text": "XI. And these indeed are worldly things, which are either from the creator or from nature. But those higher things, last, and first without beginning, which lack any likeness, which fall short of comparison, which are not formed after the pattern of images, to which nothing is equal, nothing prior, beyond which nothing can be reckoned, which are grasped only in this, that they are known to be ungraspable, do not have their action by the cause or form of the things that have been mentioned, which this composite world contains. But as power belongs to those things which are unmade, unbegotten, infinite, which are the whole, so observe or consider being in them: that there is one and only one thing which is almighty, which is held to be of the whole, which is perceived as infinite; this is and stands firm, and standing out in its own invisible solidity it rules and reigns, its wonderful substance using the force of its reason by that divine action of its own by which it is either moved or unmoved. Yet that very thing which truly is furnishes an origin to the false, as the whole: for since the almighty is the whole, it comes about through him that nothing also appears. For the almighty will not be such as to be the whole, if besides himself there were not anything [that is] nothing. So there is what is called nothing, but it has no substance; and there is what is called the whole, and it has substance. But to the one belongs being, to the other not being. God, then, is the truth, who is the whole, and stands infinite. Since nothing can be outside the whole, rightly, Justinus, that which is understood as without place and is held to be beyond the bounds is called false: if indeed any reason can allow you to conceive a limit anywhere to him whom you perceive to be the whole, and to search it out. For if the whole is occupied by the eternal, nothing has no place where it may be; and if the almighty is all things, being will belong to nothing only in the sense that it is what is outside the whole, not that it is held to be something. Finally, if you so measure the almighty that you also have another who is not almighty, a place will be called greater than God, and larger than both, if unbegotten, differing principles enjoy their own realms and stand as rivals." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.12", "text": "XII. To understand or hold this, that something is greater than the eternal Almighty, is the barbarous notion of a heedless confusion; and that what wars is coeternal, and to suppose that one of the eternal beings is conquered, belongs to one who would say that light itself will cease to be in some age; yet if you heed this very thing, you will understand that the sun too will cease to be. And since to have begun belongs to it, if danger of perishing comes even to what exists from itself, then the unbegotten wars, and what is overcome by the unbegotten is unbegotten. Do you dare to reckon which of the unbegotten began first? Or do you perhaps pretend [a difference] in order alone, and tell the tale that they began together? Can you judge greater and lesser among eternal unbegotten beings? If you put darkness first, you will give it every principle, and to it will belong being greater. If you profess light to be older, you confess that all things are from it. If you perceive each as equally coeval, either neither will be conquered, or what one has taken will remain to the other. And where here will the almighty or eternal be? Will he be victor in one of them, and in an equal existence will the cause be made unequal, and will outcome govern the war of the unbegotten, or chance take it up? Far be it from the soul's understanding to turn to this error, and let human hope cast off confessing so mad a notion. One unbegotten stands forth; from one lord all things have come. But because diverse things have the same cause, the almighty is found [to be] by all creatures, and before beginnings and ends." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.13", "text": "XIII. So, then, from the true which is, even the false comes to be, as shadows from solid things. For if there were no solid, neither would there be shadow. And this is the true mystery of the true. For from the things that are true appear also those that are not, so that it has [being] for itself from itself, and grounds others from itself that they may be, not by its own toil, not by labour, not by matter, not by nature, nor by substance. For if it belongs to the almighty to be the whole, what is outside is his. But if anything comes about without him, neither is almighty, and by action and chance the principles grow by additions, being diminished indeed when they have made the additions. Finally, what matter, what nature belongs to a shadow, which does not appear without another, and is not had in darkness? But because this is not its own substance, nor is from itself, it vanishes and perishes, and yet the solid, from which at times there is a shadow, standing firm, endures by its own strength. Marvel, Manes of Babylon, at these mysteries and these riches of the almighty: confess that there is nothing which is not his whom you would revere as eternal, whom you would profess as lord, to whom nothing is prior. And how is it fitting that anything should not be his or from him, before whom you conceive nothing else? But because you are troubled, wavering, anxious with the care of a wandering error, or rather confounded by the labour of a vain pursuit, deceived by a dull sense, you have wounded the first steps of a beginning soul by the madness of a greater inquiry. Call your untamed cares back to their first tracks, and cease to believe that one eternity has taken on two realms, and these, as you say, assailing each other." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.14", "text": "XIV. If one of two eternal beings is to be conquered, eternity will remain cut short. So light and darkness have equal [standing], and are diverse in themselves, or rather contrary: one power is agreed, but in the other it will at some time cease. It is no longer the same, if it is hoped for anywhere; if one of them will fail first, it will follow, Justinus, that you confess there is one principle, if one of the two is victor. Certainly, as I understand, in the higher heights, and at the extreme of all height, nothing dwells that may be called evil, [there] where the fearful veneration of human devotion looks up beyond the Angels and Archangels. It is a sacrilegious saying that evil dwells among such things; or if it has its seat there, and is itself taken for the creator, the devil rules over every creature and over the sun itself. For if he is coeternal, he is there; or if he is not there, he is in some realm of his own, I know not what. I believe the other has no sun, no heaven, no world, no light, no truth. And if he has a realm elsewhere, nothing of his is common to us; or if he is in this world, he is already conquered, already undone, already has no strength. And if you admit this, you yourself understand that this cannot be called a principle, which you perceive taken captive by the one who rules. Is it fitting for things that there be two highest, two lowest, two infinite? Two cannot be called infinite, because where one begins is the end of the other; and the highest is so if there is nothing beyond it, and likewise the lowest if there is nothing within it; and the whole is held to be so when nothing else is held. If, then, God is one and alone, highest, infinite, and the whole, and almighty, and all-holding, he himself is one and only principle." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.15", "text": "XV. Do not be disturbed, do not, anxious and terrified by wonder at so venerable a truth, be stunned and blinded, on the ground that evil cannot arise from a good author. Rightly do I inquire into these things among creatures, since things that are created do not send forth from themselves anything other than what they themselves are, as bitter from sweet, water from fire, offspring of the underworld from shadow, a man from wood, flesh from what is not flesh, and every other such thing the whole world enumerates. But these things cannot be ascribed to the almighty. It is [your] teaching that there is a law for him as to what can come from him, what cannot, what [is] from him, what through him. You rightly gather and bind these things together, if you do not at all confess him almighty. But if his power and eternity are spread through the whole, and it did not fall to him from another that he should be, then surely all things either come about or are created either from him or out of him or through him. Therefore, then, evil too received from him that it should be. Yet the evil is this which is called a daemon; for the rest, if there are any things you would call evil, have no substance or nature. But a daemon, now good, now bad, exists as an angelic creature, as the expression of the Attic tongue teaches, which says: AGATHOS DAIMON [good daemon], and KAKOS DAIMON [bad daemon]. And that this very one who is called kakos is good, we shall say later. But all the other things you call evil, if the vices of errors come to rest, will have no origin of birth." }, { "ref": "urn:cts:latinLit:tmp110.tmp110.opp-lat1.16", "text": "XVI. Do not, surely, waste yourself [in thinking] that it is by the impulse of evil, as of the substance of something existing, or arisen or made, that there is one who hurls [us] headlong into vices. It is the soul which, set in freedom, has violated through the licence of free choice the dominion granted to it. It is deceived by curious desire and concupiscence rather than by proud [desire]. Then, [you say] that the lord ruling over us is lord of two substances, or that human realms of a twofold, or rather manifold, nature rule over innumerable nations. For you so delight in examples that you love to discern things eternal and perpetual through things mortal and perishable. You deny flesh in Christ, and confess a man; you will not have him born, and do not deny that he lived; you cry out that he was killed by the Jews, and you reckon that what was wounded did not exist. So you assert that the members of the condemned, crucified on the right and the left, were dead, as the death of Christ himself was fulfilled; and you will not have him a true man in flesh, where you find a true burial. See, Justinus, what truly is you try to assert never was, and what is not and was not you strive to prove abides. But, taught by you yourself as instructor, I speak out steadfastly: Was it possible for the eternal to die, and not possible to have flesh? Was it possible for him also to establish what did not exist, and not possible to grant the world two natures, of light and of darkness? Would the lord not be by his power the origin of contraries, he who is from himself, so that he is? Cease, Justinus, cease to grasp with diligent care at the barbarism of this vanity, and strive, a Roman man, to remove yourself from the Persian or Armenian sacrilege. For it is in no way fitting that, with darkness or the devil as authors, Mani should dwell in the glory of eternal life in the realms of true light. And in vain until now have you wasted by continual fasting the members of the flesh which, as you say, is hostile, judging that the juices of a well-fed body hinder the merits and nature of the soul, through the onslaughts of distended fat, and that it is weighed down by the very bulk of the belly, if after this labour of fasts you return to your creator, whom you call either the devil or the outer darkness. I judge it better, and plainly declare it, that you should confess almighty God to be your founder, so that you may truly be the temple of God, as the apostle Paul speaks, saying: You are the temple of God, and the spirit of God dwells in you (1 Cor. 3:16). But if you are bereft of this honour, so that you are neither the temple of God nor does his spirit dwell in you, Christ came not as Saviour of man but as one who drives [him] away; which divine law forbids us to say, and the eternity of his majesty does not admit. For if we are not his temple, and his spirit is not in us, what is there between him and us? For if we are his, we are his in both, in soul and body, and that true and catholic [word] uttered by a holy mouth holds: God all in all (1 Cor. 15:28); who alone and only is the principle, almighty without beginning, and the whole of the universe, infinite through all things. To whom be honour and glory." } ] }