# Roadmap / not yet

Things ihasmail does not do, and why. An issue number here says where the entry
came from, not that it is tracked elsewhere — a report can be closed because the
bug in it was fixed while the larger thing it asked for stays on this page. What
is genuinely open lives in [the issue tracker](https://github.com/Coffey-Labs/ihasmail/issues);
the rest is here because the answer is "no", not "not yet".

See [KNOWN-ISSUES.md](KNOWN-ISSUES.md) for what is built but worth knowing about.

- **Sharing a mail folder.** Stalwart stores the share and never delivers it; see [KNOWN-ISSUES.md](KNOWN-ISSUES.md). Withdrawn until the server does something with it. Sharing files, calendars and address books is unaffected and works.
- **A scheduling view of its own**, for asking "when is everyone free next week?" without an event in hand. The grid itself is built and lives in the event editor — a row per participant, steppable, and clickable to place the event — which is where the question gets asked while you are arranging something. What is not built is the same thing as a destination you can visit with nothing in progress. Came out of [#172](https://github.com/Coffey-Labs/ihasmail/issues/172), which asked for a separate view and is closed by the panel: the reasoning for putting it in the editor is that a separate surface can only ever tell you a time you then retype, whereas one beside the event can set it. It stays here rather than in the tracker because nobody has yet said they want to ask the question on its own.
- **Per-message actions from the message list on a touchscreen.** Reply, Forward and compose-as-new are on the list row's context menu, which is a right-click — and holding a row on a phone starts selection instead, so none of them are reachable there. They are all available inside a thread, which is where the actions on a single message belong; what is missing is the shortcut from the list. Fixing it means deciding what a long press should do when it already means something, which is a bigger question than the actions themselves.
- Snooze (nothing in JMAP or Stalwart supports it, and ihasmail never stores a password, so nothing could act on a mailbox while you are away)
- **A translation anybody has checked.** The translations themselves shipped on 2026-08-31 and are no longer on this page: nine of them, alongside English, and the extraction that had always been the hard half is done — see [FEATURES.md](FEATURES.md#interface-language). What is *not* done is the other half, and it is the half that cannot be bought or automated. All nine were produced by AI against standard dictionaries and **not one has been read by anybody who speaks the language**, which is exactly where a bad translation does harm rather than merely looking untidy. They ship marked Beta, with that said in Settings and a link for reporting anything wrong, because shipping them quietly would ask people to trust text nobody has checked. A language loses the Beta mark when a speaker reads it and says so — a deliberate act by a person, not something a coverage percentage earns. If you speak one of them and are willing to read a few hundred strings, that is the single most useful thing anyone could contribute right now.
- **Right-to-left languages.** Arabic, Hebrew and Persian are held back deliberately, and not for want of translators. RTL is bidi and layout work throughout — mirrored panes, gesture directions, icon sides, the message list's own geometry — and a catalogue without it produces a page that is translated and unusable. Adding one is not another entry in the picker.
- **Two-factor sign-in.** Today an account with 2FA must use an app password (see [Quick start](README.md#quick-start-docker)), and Settings › Security offers no way to switch 2FA *on* — only off, for an account that already has it. Supporting a TOTP code directly means implementing OAuth: Stalwart offers the authorization-code and device flows and no password grant, so ihasmail would hand sign-in to Stalwart's own login and come back with a token. That is a better security posture than the sealed password it holds now — a refresh token rather than a credential — but it replaces ihasmail's own sign-in page for those users and may need an OAuth client registered. Came out of [#75](https://github.com/Coffey-Labs/ihasmail/issues/75), which is closed: what was reported there was a sign-in refused with nothing but "Invalid credentials", and that was fixed by saying what is actually happening and pointing at app passwords. The OAuth work it uncovered is tracked here rather than as an open issue, so there is no ticket to watch for it.
- **Signing and encrypting mail.** *Reading* a signature is built: S/MIME signed mail is checked as it is read, and the signer is remembered so a change is called out — see [Checking a signature](FEATURES.md#checking-a-signature). What is not built is anything that produces a signature or touches ciphertext, and the reason is not Stalwart. This is client work over the message body: JMAP hands over the MIME blob and the rest is ours.

  The blocker is a security model, not code, and it is the same one it has always been. Signing and decrypting need a **private** key in a page served by the same host that would handle it, which runs straight into two things ihasmail says about itself: that it never stores a credential, and that it runs immutably with nowhere to keep one. Verifying needed none of that — the certificate travels inside the message — which is exactly why it could be built first and why it went first.

  **OpenPGP signatures are not checked, and this is a harder problem than it looks.** A PGP signature does not carry the key, so verifying one means having the sender's public key already. ihasmail has no source for it: `x:PublicKey` is the account's *own* registry, and fetching from a keyserver or WKD would tell a third party who you correspond with, which is precisely the leak the image proxy exists to close. A local store of correspondents' keys is possible and is not a small feature; nobody has asked for it yet.

  *Managing* keys — publishing your own to `x:PublicKey` — has been built twice ([PR #67](https://github.com/Coffey-Labs/ihasmail/pull/67), [PR #285](https://github.com/Coffey-Labs/ihasmail/pull/285)) and withdrawn twice, because a Settings page for keys nothing uses is furniture. That reasoning is now partly spent: something does use a key. But what signature checking uses is the certificate inside the message, not anything in the registry, so publishing your own key remains a feature waiting for a consumer.

  **Encryption at rest is refused rather than deferred.** Stalwart offers it as `encryptionAtRest`, a field on `x:AccountSettings` beside `description`, `locale` and `timeZone` — there is no `x:EncryptionAtRest` object whatever the docs suggest, and its value is a typed object (`{"@type": "Disabled"}`) rather than a bare string. It is self-service, needs no administrator, and would be easy to offer. It will not be: turning it *off does not decrypt what is already there*. Every message delivered while it was on stays encrypted on disk, readable only by a client holding the private key, so switching it on is a one-way door — and a toggle that reads as "make my mail safer" while quietly being irreversible is the wrong thing to hand an ordinary user.

  **Why S/MIME rather than OpenPGP, and why neither is urgent.** End-to-end encrypted mail never reached the mainstream and is not on its way there: as a share of the world's email, PGP-encrypted messages are a rounding error, and the most successful use of OpenPGP is signing packages rather than sending mail. The reasons are structural rather than a matter of better tooling. Everyone in a thread has to take part, so the network effect works against it from the first reply. Key discovery was never solved — keyservers were unauthenticated and got weaponised in the 2019 certificate-flooding attacks, which made specific people's keys unusable by any client that fetched them, and WKD is better without being universal. There is no forward secrecy, so one compromised key retroactively opens everything ever received. The metadata stays in the clear: subject lines are cleartext in classic PGP/MIME, and who corresponded with whom is often the sensitive part. Losing a key loses the mail permanently. And it breaks the client — no server-side search, degraded spam filtering, awkward on a phone — while EFAIL showed in 2018 that the clients themselves were exploitable through MIME and HTML handling. Meanwhile the actual privacy win arrived invisibly and without anyone participating, in STARTTLS, MTA-STS and DANE.

  So if one of the two gets built here it is S/MIME, because it is the one that is *more* deployed in the places that pay for software: native in Outlook and Apple Mail, and routine in defence, healthcare, finance and government, where a CA issues and revokes certificates that an IT department can actually administer. The web of trust never became something anybody could run at scale.

  Expect the asking to be far out of proportion to the using. A self-hosted webmail for Stalwart draws self-hosters, privacy-minded users and European SMEs, which is about the densest concentration of PGP users left alive — so this will be requested much more often than it would be used, and that is an argument for keeping it here, described honestly, rather than either building it on the strength of the requests or refusing it outright.