City of Mexico August 1822
Plan for the organization of Congress for the Empire of Mexico —
As a citizen of this Empire I should be wanting in my duty did
I not feel that anxiety for the common welfare of my Country which
ought to animate the bosom of every good man. I have therefoie
viewed with great interest the political agitations of the nation, and
particularly of this Capital for the last two months; and believing
that the evils which now embarrass the operations of Government
arise solely from a defect in the organization of the Legislative
department; I have taken the Liberty to offer my ideas on the subject,
hoping that my motives may excuse my presumption
Agreeably to the Basis which has governed since the glorious
declaration of independence in Iguala, the fundamental principles of
the Government are established—It is to be a Constitutional
Monarchy—This Basis has been recognised as the foundation on which
the superstructure of the Constitution is to be erected. The leading
features of the Government is therefore no longer a question, and
any remarks on that subject would be irrellevant and improper: the
on[l]y question to be considered is the details of a system the
foundation of which is already laid
The strength and beauty of architectural structures depend on the
symmetry, order and connection of their parts; so in the formation
of political institutions their capacity to sustain the shocks of
conflicting interests is of Primary import and must depend on the
harmony and dependent relations of the constituent parts—It would
seem that these circumstances have not been sufficiently attended to
in the organization of the Government, so far as it has progressed;
the consequences have resulted that the Congress on the one hand,
tenacious of its authority have been contending about forms, and
have wasted much time without a single salutory effect, being more
intent to extend its own Power than to promote the public good
The Executive on the other hand without a precise definition of
its powers have been obliged to wait the inefficient operations of the
Legislature—In this political [cataclysm(?)] the welfare of the State
is disregarded and discontents and distrusts are generated which
menace the most pernicious consequences—
What is the cause of this state of things?—The answer is
evident—It is that which has overthrown so many Governments in the
old world, and plunged whole nations into civil wars, anarchy and
desolation—that which like an overwhelming volcano burst upon
devoted France and after drenching her plains with the blood of
her choicest citizens only prepared her for the chains of a despot.
It is the want of a proper division, definition, and limitation, of the
powers of the several branches and departments of Government—
I lay it down as an axiom which history will support and prove,
that there is as much danger to be apprehended from the hasty
imprudence, intemperate decisions, and despotism of a single
representative body or Congress convened and united in one chamber as
there is from the despotism of a Single individual at the head of a
nation, and consequently that there is the same necessity for a check
to the Legislature, that there is for the Executive. This principle
is acknowledged even in the Government of the United States,
which is the most perfect republic that exists. The division of the
Legislative powers in that Government into two separate and
distinct branches, the House of Representatives, and the Senate, both
of which are to a limited extent controuled by the Executive, operates
as a check or balance in the exercise of them.
The first great and preparitory step therefore towards the firm and
final organization of this Government is to regulate the Legislative
department so that its deliberations may be free and independent,
and at the same time controuled so as to be incapable of exceeding its
authority, or clashing with that of another. To do this I propose the
following system for the organization of Congress
1—The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress, which
shall be composed of two chambers one to be called the Chamber of
the Commons, the other the Senate
2—The Commons shall be elected every 2d year by the People in
the following manner—There shall be one Deputy for every 70,000
inhabitants. The Provincial deputations of each Province shall,
immediately proceed to take an enumeration of the inhabitants of
their respective provinces and after this is completed they shall lay
them off into as many districts as the Province is entitled to Deputies
agreeably to the above ratio, which districts shall contain an equal
number of inhabitants so far as is practicable—Each of said districts
shall elect one Deputy to the Chamber of Commons, who shall be over
21 years of age, an inhabitant of the district for which he is elected,
and have been at least three years a Citizen of this Empire, and "tener
una renta anual proporcionada procedente de bienes propios—"
The Provincial deputations shall appoint Officers to preside at such
elections who shall make out certificates for the person or persons
elected, which certificate after being countersigned by the Captain
General of the Province shall be evidence of a right to a Seat in the
Commons—The Captain Generals or Political Chiefs of Provinces
shall give said signatures without delay when called on
3—The Senate shall be appointed in the following manner. The
Provincial Deputations shall elect two Senators for each Province
who shall hold their offices for 8 years and who shall be over thirty
years of age, an inhabitant of the Province for which they are elected
and have been at least five years a Citizen of this Empire. The
Emperor with the Consent of the Council shall appoint one Senator
for each Province to be selected from any part of the Empire he may
think proper, and without any restriction as to qualifications
4. The Senate at their first session shall divide themselves into
four classes, the seats of the first class shall be vacated the 2d year,
those of the 2d class the 4th year and so on, so that one-fourth should
be chosen every 2d year—
5 Each chamber shall judge of the qualifications of its members,
appoint its own President and other officers—determine the rules of
its proceedings and with the concurrence of two thirds expel a
Member—
6. The Chambers shall hold their sessions in separate and
distinct Halls, and each one shall keep a journal of its proceedings which
shall be published except such parts as may require secrecy—
7 Neither chamber shall adjourn during the session of Congress
without the Consent of the other, for more than four clays at a time,
nor to any other place—
8—The wages of the Deputies and Senators shall be fixed by law,
and untill that is done to continue the same as in the Spanish
Constitution—The Senators shall be paid out of the publick Treasury, and
the Deputies by the Provinces who send them—
9—The deputies to the Commons shall not receive any office from
the Emporer while they continue Members
10 All laws shall pass through both chambers and be approved
and promulgated by the Emperor as in the Spanish Constitution
11—The powers of Congress shall [be] the same that is given to
the Cortes by the Spanish Constitution except that the Senate alone
shall be consulted on all matters relating to foreign treaties, and
shall have the same power as to ratifying them that is given by the
Spanish Constitution to the Cortes—
12 The Emporer may convene the Senate whenever he thinks
proper to consult them as to foreign treaties or other subjects of
importance to the Nation
13—There shall be at least one session of Congress every two years
and as much oftener as the Emporer may think proper He may
convene them at any time by proclamation—
14—There shall be no permanent deputation of Congress as fixed
in the Spanish Constitution—and should it be necessary to convoke
Congress on the Death of the Emperor or any casualty happening
to him, it shall be done by the Council of State—
Agreeably to this plan the People would have a full and fair
representation in the Commons in proportion to their members-
The Senate would be a Territorial representation and being
composed of members elected by the Provincial Deputations and the
Emperor would combine the General interests of the Nation—This
Chamber would also be to the Throne what the House of Lords is
in England, one of its main pillars and supporters—for the
Captain Generals and Governors of Provinces are appointed by the
Emperor and their influence in the provincial Deputations would be
sufficient in Most instances to secure the election of Senators well
disposed to the Emperor—, this added to the power of appointing
one third of the senate and of distributing rewards and titles to the
Senators would make that chamber more dependent on the Throne
than the House of Lords is in England, for they are hereditary
Senators and do not depend on the Crown for their appointments—
The Government would then be composed of a Chamber of
Commons as.purely democratic as a representative body can be,—of a
Senate, independent of the other branch, and united by interest to
the Emperor, but whose legal existance at the same time would de-
pend on sustaining the Chamber of Commons in the event of any
attempt to distroy it by the Executive; for if one branch of the
Government was to be anihilated, the whole must fall, and a new
organization be made—This chamber then would serve as a barrier to
prevent the Mutual encroachment of the Executive and Commons
upon the authority of each other—
One great advantage in this plan is that many of its leading
features resembles the Government of the United States and would
therefore be calculated to please that part of the people who wish
to approximate towards a republic; but in fact the operation of the
system would be to strengthen the Emperor; for the Senate in effect
would be the Mere creature of the Throne although in appearance it
is an independent representation of the Nation; and thus public
opinion would probably unite in adopting the system, and prudent
management would soon confirm their confidence in it—