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    "comment": "Vote: NO\n\nThis is a non-binding Info Action, \"Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713)\" (gov_action15atytcy8ru7mkcs8m7r8mx7k5x36t0h6grtgmak6v5wmf4nq07lsqhakceq), submitted July 2, 2026 with voting closing August 2, 2026. It proposes replacing the existing 350,000,000 ADA Net Change Limit for Epochs 613-713 (February 13, 2026 through July 3, 2027) with a 500,000,000 ADA limit — a 43% increase in the ceiling on treasury withdrawals for a period already more than a third elapsed. The NCL caps total lovelace removed from the treasury by enacted Treasury Withdrawals; treasury inflows are not netted against it.\n\nThe proposal is correct on one point of framing: an NCL is a ceiling, not a mandate, and DReps retain full discretion to reject every individual withdrawal beneath it. It is also legitimate to revisit a limit mid-period if the limit is demonstrably binding — that is, if worthy, well-structured proposals are being turned away for want of headroom rather than for want of merit. Dracula DAO would consider that case seriously if it were made.\n\nThat case has not been made. Roughly 68M ADA has actually been withdrawn against the existing 350M ceiling; the current limit is not the constraint on ecosystem funding, and there is no evidence that a single qualifying proposal has failed because the cap was reached. The 2026 cycle's approximately 331.6M ADA of requests failed on their merits and on DRep judgment, not on headroom. Raising a ceiling that has been utilized at under 20% does not unlock funding — it removes a discipline, and it does so at a moment when the treasury's purchasing power is depressed and every ADA spent today is sold into weakness. Dracula DAO's position has been consistent since the 2025 NCL votes: ADA not spent today is ADA available tomorrow, when priorities and conditions have clarified. A lower NCL is the better long-term posture, and 350M is already generous relative to demonstrated, accountable demand. The stake-weighted signal so far reflects this — SPOs have voted against by a margin exceeding forty to one, and DReps remain net negative.\n\nDracula DAO votes NO. The problem the 2026 cycle exposed is not an insufficient spending ceiling; it is the absence of a credible allocation mechanism beneath it. Treasury funds should be awarded as grants paid on completion of well-defined features — the ecosystem specifies what it wants built and pays once it exists and has been verified. It should not fund team operating budgets, roadmaps, or projected work, however that funding is scheduled or subdivided. A ceiling governs how much can leave the treasury; it says nothing about whether anything of value comes back. Until the community is paying for delivered features rather than financing intentions, a larger ceiling raises the cost of governance failure without improving the quality of what gets funded. Fix what the treasury buys before raising what it may spend; Dracula DAO will revisit the limit when there is evidence the limit — and not the process — is what binds."
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