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    "comment": "Vote: YES\n\nThis Protocol Parameter Update (ab474223d40e2e3540555364be27e161a809c33651408f43d84acff10c0ba306), submitted by Intersect on August 3, 2026, makes two changes. It reduces minPoolCost from 170 ada to 75 ada, a 55.9% cut to the flat fee every stake pool deducts from block rewards before splitting with delegators. It also raises maxTxExecutionUnits[memory] from 16.5 million to 17.5 million units and maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] from 72 million to 77.5 million units, completing the second half of a 25% cumulative increase from the original 14 million and 62 million limits, the first part of which was enacted on February 18, 2026. No ADA is requested and no treasury funds are involved. The action expires September 1, 2026 and requires 67% of active DRep stake and 51% of active SPO stake.\n\nDracula DAO votes YES. The Plutus half of this action is uncontroversial foundational work: it completes a capacity increase the ecosystem already approved in principle and enacted half of six months ago, it has been validated on testnet, and the 6.1% and 7.6% steps are deliberately conservative. The minPoolCost half addresses a problem that is real, quantified, and getting worse. The 170 ada floor was calibrated against a reward environment that no longer exists; as reserve-funded emissions decline, a fixed fee consumes a steadily rising share of a small pool's rewards, and Intersect's figures put the resulting delegator penalty at roughly 52.8% today and on a path to 100% by February 2028. A parameter that trends toward making an entire class of operator unviable is not a neutral default. The precedent also weighs in favour: the 2023 reduction from 340 ada produced none of the predicted race to the bottom, with larger pools largely holding at the prior level while smaller operators used the headroom. Lowering a floor grants flexibility; it does not compel any pool to charge less.\n\nTwo objections deserve to be recorded rather than waved away. The first is bundling. Combining an economic parameter with an unrelated execution-unit change forces DReps into a single package vote on questions that merit separate deliberation, and several DReps have objected to this on procedural grounds. Dracula DAO shares that objection. Governance quality depends on votes being answerable to one question at a time, and this action is worse for having been assembled the way it was. The second is that this is a symptomatic fix. As GAIA and TriangleForces have argued, the underlying cause is declining reserve emissions and the calibration of k and a0, and adjusting minPoolCost leaves that structure untouched. That criticism is correct. Dracula DAO also notes the Sybil concern — a lower floor reduces the cost of fragmenting stake across multiple pools — and regards it as real but modest at this magnitude, given that the 2023 precedent did not produce it.\n\nDracula DAO's philosophy is to take an ultra long-term view, and that view resolves this in favour. The viability of small independent stake pools is not a tactical concern; it is the substrate of Cardano's decentralisation, which is the property the entire security argument for this chain rests on. Allowing that base to erode on a known trajectory while awaiting a more complete redesign of the incentive structure would be the short-sighted choice, not the patient one. A stopgap that preserves optionality is preferable to a principled abstention that lets the problem compound for another two years. Dracula DAO supports this action while stating plainly that it is not a substitute for the structural work on k, a0, and the reward equation, and we expect that work to continue rather than be considered discharged by this vote.\n\nDracula DAO discloses that Vampyre Fund, the stake pool operator affiliated with this DREP, operates the VAMP pool and would benefit from a lower minPoolCost. We judge the change on its merits for the ecosystem and record the interest so delegators can weigh this rationale accordingly. This action falls in the Network group and therefore requires SPO ratification at 51%; as of the most recent tallies available, SPO support stood at 5.1% and DRep support at 37.7% against a 67% threshold, with the action expiring September 1. The VAMP pool has voted YES in the SPO track. Dracula DAO opposes the bundling of unrelated parameters and will say so again if the practice recurs, but will not withhold support for a beneficial change on procedural grounds alone."
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