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    "comment": "Vote: YES\n\nThis is a Treasury Withdrawal (gov_action105mjyzm3spjppny2m776lwk5jnsuu07uva9tz0yg5u4nkf770rvsql5raht), proposed in epoch 649 and expiring epoch 656, requesting 103,000 ADA to reimburse the governance-action deposit lost by the submitter of the September 2024 Info action \"Cardanoの生きがい - Ikigai.\" The 100,000 ADA deposit was trapped by a Cardano node defect that permitted an unregistered stake key to be used in a governance action, defeating the standard refund path. The remaining 3,000 ADA compensates approximately two years of foregone staking rewards on the stranded principal at roughly 2% annually.\n\nDracula DAO has already supported this remedy once, on the 100,000 ADA action that closed in July 2026, and the reasoning has not changed. This is not discretionary spending; it is remediation of a protocol failure. Cardano's governance deposit is designed to be fully refundable, and that guarantee is what makes it a legitimate anti-spam bond rather than a fee. The submitter posted the required bond in good faith within weeks of the Chang hard fork and lost access to it solely through a node-level defect. When the protocol breaks a refund guarantee it made, making the affected party whole preserves the integrity of the deposit mechanism and the credibility of participating in governance at all. The amount is fixed and small, the cause and recipient are clearly identified, there is no ADA burning, and there is no open-ended commitment.\n\nThe one new element is the 3,000 ADA rewards component, and Dracula DAO judges it reasonable rather than opportunistic. Delegated ADA earns staking rewards; ADA frozen in a broken deposit does not. Two years at roughly 2% on 100,000 ADA would be closer to 4,000 ADA, so the request is conservatively stated rather than padded. That said, Dracula DAO treats opportunity-cost compensation as acceptable here only because the delay is attributable to the protocol and to the community's own failure to resolve the matter promptly across multiple attempts, including the Cardano in Oceania budget action that was not approved. This is not a precedent for interest accruing on ordinary treasury claims.\n\nPrecedent and scope remain the real concern. A treasury reimbursement of a governance deposit must be understood as bounded strictly to funds stranded by a documented protocol bug, not as a general policy of socializing normally-refundable deposits, which would gut the deposit's anti-spam function by removing the submitter's skin in the game. The cleaner long-term fix is at the ledger level, so that stranded deposits are recoverable directly rather than requiring a treasury draw; a treasury withdrawal is the practical remedy available today, not the ideal one. Dracula DAO will oppose any future attempt to generalise this into routine deposit reimbursement absent a genuine protocol failure.\n\nDracula DAO's treasury philosophy centres on funding delivered work rather than operating budgets, and this action sits outside that frame entirely: it is neither a grant nor a budget, but the correction of a bond wrongly withheld by the system. Judged on fairness, low risk, and the health of the governance process, it clears the bar. Dracula DAO votes YES."
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