FOR PRESS A 5 SEPTEMBER 1977

MR WHITEAM’S NATIONAL BROADCAST ON

'  '  URANIUM '  ......

The Leader of the Opposition last night made a

National Broadcast about Australia’s decision on uranium which

was dishonest and deceptiveÃ¢ÂÂ  It misleads the Australian public

and provokes division within the community. It contains .

selective quotation and misrepresentation. Ã¢ÂÂ

Mr Whitlam said that the Government’s decision '

commits Australia to the export of uranium regardless of the

lack of international, .controls to prevent the spread of

nuclear weapons and to reduce.  the risks of nuclear war.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

;  The Government’s policy on nuclear safeguards,

announced by me on 24 May and described in detail in the

material explaining the Government’q decisions of 25 August,

will ensure the application of the most stringent nuclear

safeguards to Australian uranium. That policy goes beyond the

recommendations of the Ranger Inquiry in:

. The requirement for International Atomic Energy Agency

safeguards on any nuclear material supplied by Australia

to existing nuclear weapon states.

.  The requirements for prior Australian consent to

- high enrichment

- reprocessing .

of nuclear materials supplied by Australia

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The requirement for assurances of adequate physical

security ’

The requirement for a clause in contracts noting that '

transactions are subject to Australia's safeguard

requirements.

But the Government is not complacent; it will be going further.

As I have already announced, the Government will investigate

areas in which Australia could assist the International Atomic

Energy Agency. The Government will act with other suppliers to

ensure that nuclear safeguards are effective and are kept under

-  review and improvement. Ã¢ÂÂ   .

Mr Whitlam claims that the Australian Government has

committed itself to supplying uranium before any of the

customer countries have committed themselves to safeguards.

This is a gross misrepresentation. The Government has decided

that the mining of Australian uranium should proceed but with

exports permitted only to countries that accept safeguards of our

standard. Non-nuclear weapon states who wish to import our

'  uranium must be parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, involving

International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.  Existing'nuclear

weapon states must agree that Australian uranium will not be used H

for military or explosive purposes and will be covered by

International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

Mr Whitlam again misrepresents the facts when he says

it does not make sense to play the game before the other side has

agreed to stick to the rules. The Government's position is

precisely that we will not authorise the sale of uranium unless

customers fully accept our safeguards requirements.

.  .  ,/3

3 .

SS

They will be required to enter into a binding bilateral

agreement on those requirements before any Australian uranium

is exported to them.

The Ranger Inquiry says "the dangers of proliferation  *

are very serious.  They affect the whole world and exist whether

or not Australia makes its uranium available to other countries"

It is quite clear that Australia's place in advancing the cause of

non-proliferation, in furthering development of stringent safeguards,

and in contributing to studies aimed at reducing the risks of

proliferation - such as the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluatio

will be very much less if Australia decides to wait for ten or twenty

years before making a decision on the export of uranium.

Again, when Mr Whitlam says that the export of

Australian uranium would increase the amount of man-made nuclear

waste,  he is misleading. Countries requiring uranium for. peaceful

purposes-to heat homes and to provide jobs - will acquire that

uranium from other sources.  Those other sources may be less

concerned than Australia is about the risks of proliferation

and may not require the stringent safeguards that Australia does.

Mr Whitlam’s proposal that we delay ca decision about uranium

would do nothing about the amount of nuclear waste in the-world,

could increase the costs of power generation in energy-poor countries

and,indeed, could increase risks of nuclear proliferation.

Mr Whitlam causes further confusion when he refers

to the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards

in the Euratom countries. The plain fact is that, under its

nuclear safeguards policy, the Government will not agree to the

supply of Australian uranium unless it is covered by International

Atomic Energy Agency safeguards from the time it leaves Australian

ownership.  Pending the completion of subsidiary arrangements with

Ã¢ÂÂ¢ Â·  /4

4

V % Euratom countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency is  empowered to make ad hoc inspections, and is already doing so.

Ã¢ÂÂ   Mr Whitlam misleads again when he says that the '  '

United States cannot account for some 8000 pounds of nuclear '  P .

material. The United States' Nuclear Regulatory Commission has

stated that there has never been an unresolved case of enough

"Material Unaccounted For" to make a bomb.  "Material Unaccounted For"

is not necessarily a result of diversion but is usually the result

of the limits of precision of analysis and of operating losses

such as deposits on pipes and filters.

Mr Whitlam misuses statements by the Ranger Inquiry,by 0

me and by the Minister for Environment, Housing and Community

Development when he talks about the disposal of nuclear waste. Let

me be clear. The technology for handling high-level radioactive

liquid wastes exists and is proven.  ,The technology for the

solidification and vitrification of those wastes into a form suitable

for ultimate disposal exists and is being developed on a commercial

scale.  .  .  "

.  Â·  .  Mr Whitlam makes a spurious and dishonest comparison -  ^

between the safe storage of nuclear waste and the atmospheric testing

of nuclear weapons. There are no proposals by other countries tha^

we should store their nuclear waste. Mr Whitlam is ignoring the

concern of other Governments - in Japan, in Europe,  in the .

developing countries - for the welfareof their people and the well-bein

of their environments.  Mr Whitlam, having made a show of examining

his own conscience, is now trying to act as the conscience of the w brlc

The price he would pay would be to reduce Australia’s effectiveness

in international forums concerned with nuclear proliferation and

waste disposal.

.  .  .  / 5

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Mr Whitlam's course is a gesture to protesters at home,

The Government's course is constructive and internationally

responsible.

Mr Whitlam dismisses the economic significance of .  . P  .  '

exporting uranium. He says -  the export income, royalties, jobs will

not begin for five or even ten years and so, he says, the

decision is irrelevant to Australia's current economic problems.

This illustrates the myopic and blinkered attitude of the

Opposition. Mr Whitlam ignores the benefits - the jobs - that

will result from the construction works at the mines;  these

are not five to ten years hence. However, most seriously of all,

he ignores the fact that in five years time Australia will be

facing economic problems if it does not have additional export

income, not least to pay for additional imports of oil.

Mr Whitlam would not only have us deny other countries the energy

they need, he would -have us, too, out of work and shivering in the

cold as energy costs mount.  That is only to be expected from

the leader of a Party which, in Government, brought exploration

for oil in Australia to a halt. Mr Whitlam ignores the totality of

our energy needs.  The Government does not.

Mr Whitlam says the Ranger Inquiry favoured a delay of

several years in the decision about supplying Australia's uranium.

This is untrue.  The Ranger Inquiry said on page 5 of its Second

Report that "a decision on the options (to delay or not to delay)

depended largely on what was deemed to be the best strategy in

relation to the matter of proliferation". The Government took its

decision with full regard for advancing the cause of

non-proliferation. President Carter's initiatives, the Internationa]

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, and recent deepening in international

concerns about proliferation make this the most propitious time

for Australia to make its decision.

.../6

6 .

It is significant that throughout his broadcast

X  X.

speech, Mr Whitlam referred to the Ranger Inquiry as the \

"Fox Commission". Mr Whitlam ignores the fact, that Mr Justice Fox

for whom the Government has the highest esteem - was one of

three Commissioners;  the other two were Mr G.G. Kelleher and

Professor C.B. Kerr. The Ranger Inquiry's recommendations

were unanimous. The Government gave careful and lengthy

consideration to those recommendations.  It arrived at its .

decisions on them after consideration of other relevant factors,

including international developments in non-proliferation.

The Government explained its decisions fully and honestly to

the Australian people. Unlike the Opposition,it has explained

its decisions consistently.

Finally, I reiterate what I placed on public record

on 25 August:

"The Government's decision was taken on the basis of the

Inquiry's principal findings and recommendations.

"On uranium mining, the Inquiry concluded:

'The hazards of mining and milling uranium, if those

activities are properly regulated and controlled, are not

such as to justify a decision not to develop Australian

uranium mines.’

The Government is now satisfied that the environmental

control and industrial health measures proposed by the Inquiry

and accepted by the Government,  will provide proper regulation

and control.

"On nuclear power reactors,  the Inquiry concluded:

'The hazards involved in the ordinary operations of nuclear

power reactors, if those operations are properly regulated and

controlled, are not such as to justify a decision not to mine

and sell Australian uranium.'

.  .  / 7

This is in accordance with the Government's 'own view.

"On waste disposal from nuclear power stations, the Inquiry

concluded:

'While we do not think that the waste situation is at present

such as to justify Australia wholly refusing to export uranium,

it is plain that the situation demands careful watching, and

depending on developments, regular and frequent reassessment.r

The Government is satisfied that the technology exists for the

safe management and ultimate disposal of highly radioactive waste.

International developments will continue to be closely reviewed and

Australia will continue to participate in international studies

directed to improve standards for waste disposal.

"On the possibility of nuclear terrorism, the Inquiry concluded:

'In our view, the possibility of nuclear terrorism merits

energetic consideration and action at the international level.

We do not believe that this risk alone constitutes a sufficient

reason for Australia declining to supply uranium. It does, however,

provide a further reason why the export of our uranium, including

what is proposed to be done with it, and where,  are matters which

the Government should keep underÂ· constant scutiny and control.1

The Government is satisfied that the specification of standards of

physical security by the International Atomic Energy Agency

constitutes the basis upon which national governments can provide

strong protection against nuclear terrorism.

"On Australia's international obligations, the Inquiry concluded:

ÃÂ  total refusal to supply would place Australia in clear

breach of Article IV of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and

could adversely affect its relation to countries which are parties

to the N .P.T.. 1

Article IV of theTreaty obliges Australia to co-operate in the

Sr*

Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ   Â·  Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ   .  ' ÃÂ

production and usage of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The export by Australia of uranium under stringent safeguards

would give effect to our obligations under Articles III and IV

of the Treaty" *

S

CANBERRA

5 September 1977

