COMMONWEALTH  PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY  M iC A H

PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER   ON THE JOINT DEFENCE FACILITIES  22 NOVEMBER 1988

I wish to inform the House that the Australian and US   Governments have agreed to a number of important changes to   the arrangements under which we cooperate in running our   joint defence facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar.

The changes we are making reflect the commitment of both   Governments to maintaining and strengthening our   long-standing partnership in these joint facilities. They   ensure that the facilities continue to operate in ways that

best serve the interests of ourselves and our partners.

These changes also reflect the commitment of this Government   to informing the public as fully as possible about the   facilities. On 6 June 1984 in this place I made the first   detailed public statement about the roles of the facilities.

In making that statement I was convinced that better public   understanding of the roles of the joint facilities could   only increase public support for them. My remarks today,   which will in some respects go beyond that earlier

statement, are made with the same conviction.

Since the joint facilities were established in the 1960s,   the alliance between Australia and the US has evolved and   matured, the technologies involved at Pine Gap and Nurrungar   have developed, and Australians have learned more of the

skills involved in running the facilities.

The new arrangements at Pine Gap and Nurrungar accommodate   these important changes.

At Pine Gap, the number of Australians engaged in the   central operational activity is being steadily increased.   Some of these personnel, who are drawn from scientific and   intelligence areas of the Department of Defence, are taking   over functions previously carried out by US employees.

Whereas only a handful of Australian Government personnel   was directly involved in the central work of the facility in   the 1970s and early 1980s - contributing less than   10 per cent of the staff there - the proportion is scheduled

to rise to about 30% over the next two or three years.

But Australians are not only doing more of the operational   work at the facilities. Under the new arrangements we have   agreed, Australians will carry out more of the senior   management functions at both Pine Gap and Nurrungar.

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At Pine Gap, a senior Australian Defence official will be   appointed to a newly created position as Deputy Chief of the   Facility. He will advise and support the US Chief of   Facility in managing the facility and its activities, and he   will share responsibility with him for that w o r k . He will

also continue to be the officer in charge of the prohibited   a r e a , with ultimate responsibility for the physical security   of the facility. Other senior management positions will   also be filled by Australians.

Parallel changes have been agreed to the staffing at   Nurrungar. Australians constitute some 40 per cent of the   staff in the key operational areas, and will now take a role   in management with the appointment of the senior Australian

officer there as Deputy Commander. Like his counterpart at   Pine Gap, he will share responsibility with the Commander   for the management of the station and its physical security.

The integration of Australian personnel in both the  operation and the management of the joint facilities at Pine  Gap and Nurrungar is such that the Australian Government can  be assured of having full knowledge of all aspects of the

operations at the facilities, and reinforces our confidence  that our interests and sovereignty are respected at all  times.

At the same time,  Australia will be able to take more direct  advantage of the facilities' capabilities for our own  purposes than has been practicable in the past.

Hitherto, by agreement between ourselves and our partners,  we have spoken in public of the capabilities of the two  facilities only in conjunction. Under the new arrangements,  and in pursuit of better understanding and stronger support

for the facilities we have now agreed to specify the  separate roles of Pine Gap and Nurrungar.

Nurrungar is a ground station used for controlling  satellites in the US Defence Support Program (DSP). The DSP  satellites provide ballistic missile early warning and other  information related to missile launches,  surveillance and  the detonation of nuclear weapons.

Few if any elements of the strategic systems of either  superpower make such a decisive and unambiguous contribution  to keeping the peace as the Defense Support Program. As an  essential link in the DSP, Nurrungar plays a quite

fundamental role in preventing nuclear war.

The DSP,  through Nurrungar,  would give the earliest warning  of an ICBM attack on the US or its allies.

Because the DSP gives longer warning of an attack than other  systems, it reduces the chances that US forces could be  destroyed in a surprise attack,  and that makes it extremely  unlikely that anyone would ever try such an attack.

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Together with other elements of the US early warning system,  the DSP provides highly reliable warning of attack. It thus  plays a vital role in helping to prevent nuclear war by  accident.

Australians can be glad that we help to operate this vital  facility, and that every day, around the clock,  Australian  personnel are playing this part in helping to prevent  nuclear war.

I turn now to Pine Gap. Pine Gap is a satellite ground  station, whose function is to collect intelligence data  which supports the national security of both Australia and  the US.

Intelligence collected at Pine Gap contributes importantly  to the verification of arms control and disarmament  agreements.  The value of that data has become more and more  evident over the last year or two, as disarmament has moved

from being an aspiration to become an emerging reality.

Today, for the first time since the invention of the atom  bomb,  nuclear weapons systems are,  under the INF Treaty,  being destroyed by their owners. The next step is already  underway. In the START talks the superpowers are seriously  negotiating to make major cuts in their strategic arsenals.

Verification is vital to this arms control process.  Verification was the key issue in reaching that INF  agreement last year,  and verification will be the key to any  START agreement in the future. If the START process were to

fail,  despite the efforts of both sides, it would be largely  because of the difficulties with verification.

In April this year,  nuclear risk reduction centres were  created in Washington and Moscow. This new confidence  building channel is being used to notify the two sides of  missile launches required by arms control accords and will

also serve to reduce the possibility of nuclear conflict.

Without Australia's involvement in arms control  verification, the risk of nuclear war would have been  directly and significantly increased.

I think it is important for those who have urged us over the  years to close Pine Gap and Nurrungar to reflect on the  undoubted fact that, had we done as they urged, the INF  Treaty could not have been signed and the START process  would not have got underway.

With the information now on the public record about the  roles played by these facilities in preventing nuclear war, I think it is clear that nobody seriously committed to peace  could argue for their closure.

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There are of course limitations on what it would be sensible   for me to reveal publicly about details of the operations   that are conducted at either of these joint defence   facilities, or details of the organisation and manning   arrangements which apply there. It has been the practice of

successive Australian Governments not to comment on   intelligence matters, and this Government will continue that   policy. Details of our capabilities in the sensitive and   important area of intelligence collection, or in relation to

systems providing attack warning, are not in our national   interests to divulge and this Government will not do so.

The Government takes the view that the irreplaceable   contribution made by these facilities gives us a special   responsibility to ensure that they can continue to function   in an atmosphere of stability and commitment.

At present both facilities operate under agreements which   are terminable at.one year's notice by either side. We do   not regard this as satisfactory, both because of the   continuing importance of their effective operation to global   peace, and because of the specific benefits to Australia of

long-term access to their capabilities.

To this end the US and Australia have, as part of the new   arrangements for the operation of the facilities, agreed to   extend the arrangements under which the two facilities   operate for a further ten years in each case. We have

further agreed that three years' notice shall be required to   terminate the agreement.

Last week the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Evans, and the US Ambassador Mr Bill Lane, signed   exchanges of notes to formalise this agreement. For the   information of Honourable Members I now table those

exchanges of notes. Members will note that this exchange   also defines clearly the functions of the two facilities.

These agreements confirm my Government's conviction that the   joint defence facilities will continue to serve Australia's   national interests; that they will continue to reflect the   depth and substance of our bilateral strategic relationship   with the United States under ANZUS; and that they will

continue to play a vital role in preventing nuclear war. The Government intends that Honourable Members will have an   opportunity to debate this statement.

