Deputy Leader of the Opposition

PRESS statement by tom uren,  m .p .  deputy leader of the opposition  ON 2nd NOVEMBER 1977.

The attached document expressing the views of Mr.

Justice Fox shows that international safeguards against nuclear

weapons proliferation are inadequate.

Yet the Fraser Government is intent on beginning further

Australian uranium exports whilst these grave uncertainties  exist.

The ALP's policy is to withhold Australian uranium until

all of the unresolved problems'relating to the nuclear fuel cycle

have been overcome and to allow the Australian people enough  time to consider the issues.

The Fox document reveals that the Government does not  .want to understand the immense problems associated with the

question of proliferation safeguards.

One of the major difficulties is that nation States will  not accept international regulation that they feel infringes  their sovereignty.

An example is the widespread and effective resistance .

to President Carter's proliferation safeguards policies;

policies with which the Fraser Government has closely associated  itself.  .

For. example, Japan will not ratify their pact with the

International Atomic Energy Agency this year, even though there  is a legal obligation to do sip.

Will the Fraser Government as a .consequence cease supplying  Australian uranium to Japan?

.  The fact that India continues to receive nuclear .

materials from the United States, even after violating the nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treary, indicates that there are no effective  international sanctions against countries determined to ignore

international nuclear control mechnaisms.

The fact that Israel was able secretly to obtain uranium

from major Western powers indicates that there are no means even

for the IAEA to detect violations of such international agreements  as exist.

The views of Mr Justice Fox as expressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs deserve close study. P a rlia m e n t H o u s e , C a n b e rra , A C T .  2 6 0 0

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Record of Conversation with Mr Justice F O X  ' '

on 29 September 1977 .  Â·

Officers Present Mr J.C. Humphreys, FAS, Ec. Div. , Mr J. A. Benson,

Defence Policy Branch, Mr D.A. Hollway, Economic Policy ’  BranchÂ·. Officers of the Departments of the Prime

Minister and Cabinet, National Resources and Environment  MAIN SUBJECTS (S): Housing and Community Development were also present.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION _________'  .

;  Ã¢ÂÂ¦ Mr Justice Fox invited officials concerned with

uranium and non-proliferation matters to hear his impressions  of his recent overseas visit. In a meeting lasting nearly Ã¢ÂÂ¢  three hours,  Judge Fox made the following main points:

- The principal purpose of his visit had been to investigate  the proliferation problem.

- In the United States, he had found the Carter nonÂ­ proliferation policy to be ambiguous and uncertain. There  were widely divergent views within the Administration. ,  Moreover, the bills before Congress were more draconian

.  .  than Administration policy and represented a move towards .  "nuclear isolationism". -

- Internationally, there was recognition that the United  States' and Canadian nuclear policies had drawn attention -  ]  to ;the particularÂ·., dangers., associated with reprocessing' -gÂ­ !  and\breeder-.reactors !  There, wereyÂ· however,-^ strong: Â· : _ $

1  reservations, about" the' ’soundness of those policiesvÂ·-Â· -  Restraints on reprocessing and breeders were seen as

constituting interference with national energy programs  and as undermining the force of the NPT as a nonÂ­ proliferation instrument. U.S./Canadian policies were  deeply resented in Western Europe, Brazil and Japan and

there was general opposition elsewhere to the proposition  that there could be no reprocessing of American-supplied

.  /2.

C O N F ID E N T IA L

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material without United States' consent. Mr Justice Fox  had encountered this sentiment in discussions he.had held  in Vienna and New' York with representatives of developing  countries such as Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, India, Argentina,

and the Philippines. He considered that dictation and  discrimination- were a-t the coreÂ· of developing country  hostility. There was clearly a belief that Article IV  of the NPT had been compromised, suspicion about the

role of the Nuclear Suppliers’  Group and a tendency to  view the matter in the context of North/South issues. .   For these reasons,  the Judge doubted that the Carter  policy would work.

Canadian policy was still suffering from the trauma  caused by the Indian nuclear explosion, We should not  regard current policy as entrenched. Mr Justice Fox  considered that Canadian policy should move "in more

sound directions” .

The Japanese were pleased with the deal they had  negotiated with the United States -  on the operation of .  . their reprocessing plant. The Judge had been told,  including by the Foreign Minister, that Japan would be "  prepared to accept multinational management of the

reprocessing facility. "

Brazil's position had been misrepresented to some  extent. It faced a genuine problem in assuring its  energy requirements. Â·  It was prepared to accept strict  safeguards and to behave as if -  it were a party to the  Treaty of Tlatelolco (the Latin American nuclear free

zone). The idea of a nuclear war in South America was  ridiculous. The United States, had made a major error  by seeking to drive Brazil into, a c o m e r .  The Judge had been informed in West Germany that that country _ had refused to make any changes to the nuclear supply

arrangements it had negotiated with Brazil and. "^ould.  not dare” to do so. .  ,  '  .

Bilateral safeguards arrangements were becoming  inordinately complex, but were the best we had at the  moment. There was concern about the ability of the  IAEA to administer safeguards satisfactorily and

problems in regard to multilabelling and differing  terms of supply. There was a need for international  action to improve nuclear control arrangements. /3 .

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CONFIDENTIAL

- The principal requirement was to increase confidence . internationally against the diversion of nuclear  materials to military purposes. This was particularly so while countries like Israel; and South Africa were -

able to exploit their potential for nuclear weapons'  development or uncertainty about their intentions for  political ends. Multinational management of ‘   reprocessing centres would provide such confidence, both

to the participants and the rest of the world.

- Mr Justice Â£ q x  had floated On his own account the idea .

of multinational centres during his discussions overseas. He had found the proposal had been  enthusiastically received and had almost universal  .  approval. He had not refined his thinking on how the

idea might be implemented or under what aegis it might  be sponsored - IAEA, OECD, NSG or INFCE. He thought, - howeve r - ' , Â·  =- i t1 would Â·  be : *-be bt^ td1 ,  avo ided rawing' up an  international treaty and wondered whether it could be

achieved by the simple passage of a resolution through the IAEA. The proposal was less ambitious than the ,

IAEA study on regional fuel centres. He believed that  Australia had a responsibility to try to develop the  concept. We were "clean-skinned" and were now in a  position to exert influence. .  .

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

