Date THE HON. ANDREW PEACOCK M.P.

' 24 August 1978

NUtjhfcAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

The folldWing is the statement made by the  Minister for Foreign Affairs,  Mr Andrew Peacock, in  the House of Representatives on 24 August 1978,

Mr Speaker, .

.  I hereby present;

(a) the Agreement between the Government of Australia and .

j .  the Government of the Republic of Finland Concerning

:  the Transfer of Nuclear Material between Australia and

Finland signed on 20 July 1978, together with a letter

sent to the Leader of the Finnish Delegation which '

negotiated the Agreement;

(b) the Agreement between the Government Of Australia and

the Government of the Republic of the Philippines

Concerning Co-operation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear

Energy and the Transfer of Nuclear Material signed on

8 August, together with a letter sent to the Leader .

of the Philippines* Delegation which negotiated the Â· . Â·

Agreement;

(c) the Exchange of Letters constituting the Interim

Â· Â· . Ã¢ÂÂ   Agreement between the Government of Australia and the

Government of the United States of America on Peaceful

Nuclear Co-operation, of 8 August 1978.

I. seek leave to make a statement. Ã¢ÂÂ

The agreements which I have tabled represent

important steps in the establishment of a network of .

Fbilateral agreements between Australia and countries wishing

to import Australian uranium. The purpose of these agreements

is to ensure that when Australia supplies uranium for peaceful

purposes it will not be diverted to non-peaceful or explosive

Uses.  To this end the agreements incorporate stringent

safeguards'and controls on the use of uranium we supply to

other countries for peaceful purposes.

2

Agreement with Finland

The Agreement with Finland incorporates all the

Government's safeguards requirements as announced by the

Prime Minister on 24 May last year. These are;

(1) an undertaking that nuclear material supplied by

Australia will not be diverted to military or

explosive purposes;

(2) the application of International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) safeguards,  which provide an international

check against diversion of nuclear material;

(3) fallback arrangements to ensure continued safeguarding

of this nuclear material should IAEA safeguards for

any reason cease to apply;

(4) a requirement for Australia's prior consent to any

retransfers, to ensure that uranium supplied by

Australia cannot be re-exported unless we are

satisfied that the ultimate destination is acceptable

and that adequate controls would apply to the transferred

material;

(5) a requirement for Australia's prior consent for high

enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear material supplied

by Australia. This ensures that these operations can

only take place if Australia is fully satisfied about Ã¢ÂÂ

the arrangements and conditions. This effectively

reserves Australia's position on reprocessing, as

the Government has said it would, pending the outcome

of current international studies including the

International Fpel Cycle Evaluation Study (I.NFCE); 1

(6) provisions ensuring that adequate physical security

will"be maintained, to guard against theft or other

illegal use of nuclear material by groups or

individuals; and '  '  .  .

(7) provisions for consultations to ensure the effective

implementation of the agreement;

3

(8) all of these safeguards and controls are to cover

. Â· .  nuclear material derived from Australian uranium

1 so long as it remains in a form relevant from the

f point of view of safeguards; that is, until it has

been consumed or diluted to the point where there

is no practical possibility of it being useful for

the purpose of making a nuclear weapon.

1 The Agreement itself establishes the safeguards

:Â± .

obligations which Finland and Australia have accepted; the

accompanying letter concerns the practical implementation of

these obligations. It does not change or dilute the agreement

itself. Finland is dependent on other countries for processing

services such as enrichment and fuel fabrication and for

disposal of spent fuel after use.  It wished to have some

indication from Australia of how, in practice, we would see

the safeguards agreement affecting its plans. What Australia

is saying in the letter is basically that our concern is with

non-proliferation and it is not our wish to impose on Finland

practical problems unrelated to this.

Far from constituting any "watering down" of the

Government’s announced safeguards policy, the Agreement includes

provisions not explicitly foreshadowed in the policy statements

but which add to the effectiveness of the Agreement. These are:

- a right for Australia to have access to relevant

conclusions of the IAEA on its inspections in Finland;

- an article on sanctions which will apply if a recipient

breaches the agreement or does not comply with IAEA

safeguards;  and .

- an article providing for arbitral procedures to resolve any

disputes over implementation of the agreement.

Ã¢ÂÂ¢  We do not, of course,  start from the assumption

that countries with which we make nuclear safeguards agreements

will seek to breach them, or their obligations under the Nuclear'

Non-Proliferation Treaty, or their obligations under safeguards

agreements with the IAEA. On the contrary, we will only make

4

such agreements with countries whom we expect to faithfully abide

by their safeguards obligations. But the sanctions envisaged are

serious ones and their acceptance in the Agreement is an earnest

of th'e seriousness of the commitment which the Agreement

represents. The prospect of an interruption of supply is a very

serious deterrent and sanction for a country dependent on outside

supplies of fuel for its nuclear power industry and reliant on

nuclear power for an important portion of its electric power.

The Deputy Leader of the Opposition, when he learnt

the tdrms of the Agreement,  said that it would not be acceptable

to an ALP Government. In international affairs,  treaties are

binding undertakings between nations,  not trivial matters to be

upset at the whim of a government of the day. A government which

repudiated its international treaties would be regarded

internationally as irresponsible and untrustworthy.

The Deputy Leader of the Opposition has claimed that,

if there were a dispute over the Agreement, the arbitration provision

would take control out of Australia’s hands.  This is not so. Ã¢ÂÂ

Australia is not required to wait for an arbitrator’s decision

before taking action. The arbitration clause is a normal one in

international treaties and it provides an impartial mechanism

for dealing with any dispute that might arise in the implementation

of the Agreement.  The inclusion of the arbitration clause protects

Australia as well as Finland. It does not strengthen the hand of

one party against the other.

The ALP has hitherto had a policy of support for the

peaceful settlement of international disputes through arbitration

and judicial settlement. In the absence of an arbitration clause,

a dispute arising in relation to the Agreement would have been

subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court

of Justice - nsÂ· a result of action taken by Australia during the

term of office of the Labour Government. Arbitration was

preferred because it is likely to be more expeditious, simpler

and less costly, and involves procedures whereby parties to a

dispute agree on the terms in which it is to be submitted to the

tribunal.

1

’  The Deputy Leader of the Opposition has also

criticised the Agreement by saying that it contains no

prohibition on stockpiling "weapons usable" material by .

Finland. The Prime Minister’s statement on 24 May last year

did not say that there would be a prohibition on stockpiling

of weapons usable material. There was no need for such a

provision in our policy because the point is covered by other

provisions of the policy. The production of "weapons usable"

material requires, as a first step, high enrichment or

reprocessing. For this reason, the 24 May 1977 statement

required, and the Agreement provides, that Australian material

can only be enriched over 20 per cent or reprocessed if

Australia were satisfied at the appropriate time as to the

conditions and arrangements. We would, of course, not be

satisfied with arrangements which posed a proliferation risk;

this is explicit in the Agreement. We would not, of course,

agree to high enrichment or reprocessing for other than peaceful

purposes.

The Deputy Leader of the Opposition has been quoted

in the press as saying that in the Agreement "there is an explicit

endorsement of reprocessing to produce material for long term

storage, which material would be usable for weapons". There is

no such endorsement. Australia has reserved its position on

reprocessing while this is under study internationally, notably

in INFCE. The Agreement fully protects.this position. As the

Prime Minister said on 25 August last year, one of the points

on which we would need to be satisfied, before agreeing to

reprocessing would be: "that there is not excessive stock-piling

of plutonium in a way that could pose future proliferation

dangers". The Agreement itself specifies nuclear nonÂ­

proliferation considerations, as well as Finland’s energy

requirements and need for efficient and proper waste management,

as factors which would have to be taken into account by

Australia in considering any request for approval to reprocess.

6

I want to make it clear that the Government has

never said that it intends to prohibit the reprocessing of

"Australian uranium.  The Government has never portrayed its

policy as a "veto" policy. It should be understood that

Ã¢ÂÂ the Government,  in seeking consent or discretionary provisions

bn reprocessing in bilateral safeguards agreements, is

Reserving the right to decide the conditions under which the

reprocessing of Australian supplied material might take place.  ÃÂ  Obviously we would not permit reprocessing of Australian

Supplied material if the conditions and arrangements were

not fully satisfactory from the point of view of nuclear

non-proliferation.

May I add that, contrary to assertions by critics,

there is now widespread international acceptance that

suppliers have a legitimate interest in ensuring that reÂ­

processing only takes place under conditions which, are

considered to be satisfactory from a non-proliferation

point of view. This is inherent in the guidelines of

the Nuclear Suppliers Group which were published in

February 1978. All of Australia’s major potential

customers in Western-Europe, and Japan, have accepted these

guidelines.

Agreement with the Philippines

The Agreement with Finland is to be the first of '

many. The Agreement with the Philippines similarly incorporates

all the safeguards requirements announced in our policy -

statement of 24 May 1977. The texts of the two agreements are,

of course, not identical, as they reflect a different

negotiating history and different concerns on the part Of the

Philippines and Finland. Nevertheless,  Honourable Members

will see that both are equally effective in meeting the

requirements of Australia’s nuclear safeguards policy.

The letter accompanying the Philippines Agreement, which is

an integral part of the Agreement, covers different ground

from the letter accompanying the Agreement with Finland

7

because it responds to particular questions raised by the

Philippines. In terms of the Govdrnmfent1s riuclear

safeguards policy, the important point to note is that

the accompanying letter in no way detracts from the

obligations accepted by the Philippines towards Australia.

I might mention in particular the physical

Ã¢ÂÂ protection provisions i n .the Agreement with.the Philippines,

as I gather the Deputy Leader of the Opposition has raised

fra technical question about the standards they present.

In technical terms,  this provision derives from the

International Atomic Energy Agency1s. document INFCIRC/254,

which in turn generalises INFCIRC/225 JRev.,.1. In layman's

terms, and at the practical level of Â·implementation,  what

matters is that the standards of physical protection

required are in substance the same. Moreover.they are

the standards set out in the guidelines of the Nuclear

Suppliers Group. Â·  .  .  ,  .  ,

Agreement with the United States

The Interim Agreement with the United States

is a document of a different sort. r  It has two essential

purposes. :  .

In the first place it signifies the decision by

the two Governments to renegotiate their existing nuclear

co-operation agreement of 1956 with a view to bringing the

safeguards therein up to the standard required by their

current policies. In the case Of the United States, that

is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. In the case

of Australia, it is the Prime Minister,'s statement of 24 May

last year. .  Ã¢ÂÂ   . . .  ;  .  :  .

The second main purpose of the Interim Agreement

is to provide a means for the administration of the

discretionary clauses in the two countries'  present and future

safeguards agreements. The effect of this arrangement, in

essence,  is that,  should a third country importing Australian

uranium so desire,  the United States could act as its

agent in seeking

8

Australia's approval for a particular transaction or industrial

| operation. As Honourable Members will readily appreciate,  this

arrangement involves no surrender of Australian control,  nor any

|weakening of the obligations of importing countries towards

^Australia under our safeguards agreements. It is merely a matter

of their administrative convenience. Honourable Members may recall

that a similar interim agreement between Canada and the United

States in November last year opened the way for the successful

conclusion of Canada's negotiations with Japan on nuclear

safeguards.

,  The Interim Agreement also demonstrates conclusively

that suggestions that Australian policy is at odds with that of

the United States are groundless. In the agreement,  the

Uhited States spontaneously pays tribute to "Australia's

leadership role in preventing nuclear proliferation". It also

remains the case that the United States and others attach

importance to Australian uranium being available to the rest

of the world. This is because the availability of Australian

uranium will,  of itself,  make technologies based on reprocessing

.and the use of plutonium less attractive and help to avoid a

premature movement in this direction.

Further safeguards agreements will follow. A draft

agreement has been negotiated at the level of officials with

Iran and is to be considered shortly by the two Governments.

Negotiations are also well advanced with several other countries.

Each agreement will be made public as it is signed.

The Government's nuclear safeguards policy is not only

a highly responsible policy for the prevention of the proliferation

of nuclear weapons,  it is an eminently practical and

internationally workable policy - which is already demonstrating

that it is successful.

AGREEMENT ‘

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE GOVERNMENT

OF THE REPUBLIC OF FINLAND CONCERNING THE TRANSFER OF

NUCLEAR MATERIAL BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND FINLAND.

‘

The Government of Australia and the Government

of the Republic of Finland

Mindful that both Australia and Finland are nonÂ­

nuclear weapon States which are Parties to the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

Recognising that Australia and Finland have <

under that Treaty undertaken not to manufacture or otherwise

acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

and that both Governments have concluded agreements with

the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application

of safeguards in their respective countries in connexion

with the Treaty On the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

Affirming their support for the objectives of

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons .

and their desire to promote univeral adherence to that

Treaty; Ã¢ÂÂ   ’  \ .  ;  > . : ?  .  Ã¢ÂÂ   .  Ã¢ÂÂ

Pending international acceptance of new interÂ­

national arrangements and institutions to provide more

effective measures against the proliferation of nuclear

weapons;

Desiring to establish conditions under which ,

nuclear material can be transferred between their two '

countries for peaceful purposes, consistent with their

commitment to non-proliferation;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. This Agreement shall apply to:

(a) nuclear material transferred between the two Parties,

whether directly or through a third country, in

Ã¢ÂÂ¢accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article;

(b) quantities of derived nuclear material directly (

proportional to the transferred nuclear material

used for their production; and

(c) quantities of all subsequent generations of nuclear

material determined on the same proportional principle

referred to in sub paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 of this

Article.

2. Nuclear material shall be transferred between

the Parties only to a natural or legal person identified

by the appropriate governmental authority of the recipient

Party to the appropriate governmental authority of the

supplier Party as duly authorized to receive that material.

3. Prior to the transfer of nuclear material between

the Parties the appropriate governmental authorities of

both Parties shall agree in writing upon the point when

the material will become subject to the provisions of

this Agreement.

a r t i c l e  II'

Nuclear material referred to in Article I of

this Agreement shall remain subject to the provisions of

this Agreement until :

(a) it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity

relevant from the point of view of the safeguards

referred to in Article IV of this Agreement; that

is, until it shall be determined by the International

Atomic Energy Agency that the material is no longer

so usable as a result of its being

:  .  :  -Ã¢ÂÂ  .i

(i) practicably irrecoverable,

(ii) consumed, ' Â·  Ã¢ÂÂ

(iii) diluted, or

(iv) converted to non-nuclear use, such as the

production of alloys or ceramics;

Ob) it has been transferred beyond the jurisdiction

of the recipient Party in accordance with the

nrovisions of ArMr! A VTT of e ÃÂoraonwniÂ·.

(c) otherwise agreed between the Parties.

ARTICLE III

Nuclear material subject to this Agreement

shall not be diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear

explosive devices, to research on or development of nuclear

weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or used for

any military purpose.

ARTICLE IV

Nuclear material subject to this Agreement

shall be subject while within the territory or under

the jurisdiction or control of the recipient Party to <

safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy

Agency under a Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement,

or, if the International Atomic Energy Agency is not adminÂ­

istering a Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement

in the territory of that Party, under an agreement or

agreements to which that Party and the International Atomic

Energy Agency are parties which will provide safeguards

equivalent in scope and effect to those provided by a

Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards agreement.

ARTICLE V

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IV

of this Agreement, if nuclear material subject to this

Agreement is present.in the territory of a Party and the

International Atomic Energy Agency is not administering

safeguards in the territory of that Party pursuant to a

safeguards agreement or agreements referred to in Article IV

of this Agreement, the ether Party shall have the right to

administer in the territory of that Party safeguards based

on the procedures of the Agency's safeguards system for the

exclusive purpose of verifying that nuclear material subject

to this Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other

nuclear explosive devices or used for any military purpose.

The two Parties shall consult and assist each other to

establish and apply such safeguards.

ARTICLE VI

Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ   .  Ã¢ÂÂ  Ã¢ÂÂ  Ã¢ÂÂ  Â· Ã¢ÂÂ  . Ã¢ÂÂ  .  r

1. Each Party shall take such measures as are

necessary to ensure adequate physical protection of nuclear

material within its jurisdiction and to apply as a

minimum measures of physical protection which satisfy

the requirements of the recommendations of the InterÂ·?

national Atomic Energy Agency.

2. The Parties shall consult at the request of either

Party concerning matters relating to physical protection.

ARTICLE VII

1. Nuclear material subject to this Agreement shall

be .  Ã¢ÂÂ   '  - Ã¢ÂÂ   .  Ã¢ÂÂ . Ã¢ÂÂ

'  Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ   \ .  .  .

(a) transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the

recipient Party,

(b) enriched to more than 20 percent in the .  i,

isotope U235, or ^

'  Ã¢ÂÂ  -T P , v*Â·* '  '  Ã¢ÂÂ

(c) reprocessed,

only with the prior written consent of the supplier Party.

2. In considering a request for consent in relation

to the matters referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article,

the supplier Party will take into account non-proliferation

considerations, energy requirements and the needs of the

recipient Party for proper management of spent nuclear

fuel and for nuclear waste disposal. A Party shall not

withhold its consent to a matter referred to in paragraph

1 of this Article for the purpose of securing commercial

advantage.

3. If a Party considers that it is unable to grant

consent to a matter referred to in paragraph 1 of this

Article, that Party shall provide the other Party with

an immediate opportunity for full consultation on that

issue. '

Ã¢ÂÂ¢  ARTICLE VIII

1. The appropriate governmental authorities of

both Parties shall consult annually, or at any other time

at the request of either Party, to ensure the effective

implementation of this Agreement. Either Party may invite

the International Atomic Energy Agency to participate in

such consultations.

2. Each Party shall, upon request, inform the

other Party of the overall conclusions of the most .recent Ã¢ÂÂ   _ ,  Ã¢ÂÂ -s*

report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on its

verification activities in the territory of that Party,

relevant to the material subject to this Agreement.

3. The appropriate governmental authorities of

both Parties shall establish an administrative arrangement

to ensure the effective fulfilment of the obligations of

this Agreement. An administrative arrangement established

pursuant to this paragraph may be changed with the agreeÂ­

ment of the appropriate governmental authorities of both

Parties.

4. The cost of reports and records which either

Party is required to provide pursuant to the administrative

arrangement referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article

shall be borne by the Party which is required to provide

the reports or records *

5. The Parties shall take all appropriate precautions

to preserve the confidentiality of commercial and industrial

secrets and other confidential information received as a

result of the operation of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IX

1. A supplier Party shall have the right in the

event of

(a) detonation by the recipient Party of a

1'  nuclear explosive device, or

(b) determination in accordance with paragraph

C of Article XII of the Statute of the

International Atomic Energy Agency, that

there has been non-compliance with, or

repudiation of, a relevant safeguards

agreement concluded .with the International

Atomic Energy- Agency, by the recipient Party,

to suspend or cancel further transfers of nuclear material

and to require the return of nuclear material subject to

this Agreement, subject to payment therefor at prices then .  Ã¢ÂÂ   . ,  Ã¢ÂÂ   .  <

current.

2. In the event of material non-compliance by the

recipient Party with the provisions of Articles III to VII

inclusive of this Agreement, the supplier Party shall have

the right to suspend or cancel further transfers of nuclear

material and to require the recipient Party to take

corrective steps. If, following consultation between the

Parties, such corrective steps are not taken within a reasonÂ­

able time, the supplier Party shall thereupon have the right

to require the return of nuclear material subject to this

Agreement subject to payment therefor at prices then current.

ARTICLE X

Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or

application of this Agreement which is not settled by

'  .  Ã¢ÂÂ   : Ã¢ÂÂ  Â·  ml

negotiation shall, on request of either Party, be subÂ­

mitted to an arbitral tribunal which shall be composed

of three arbitrators. Each Party shall designate one

arbitrator and the two arbitrators so designated shall

elect a third, who shall be the Chairman. If within 30

days of the request for arbitration either Party has not

designated an arbitrator, either party to the dispute may

request the President of the International Court of Justice

to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply

if, within 30 days of the designation or appointment of

the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been

elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal

shall constitute a quorum and all decisions shall be made by  '  ,  V

majority vote of all the members of the arbitral tribunal.

The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The

decisions of the tribunal, including all rulings concerning

its constitution, procedure, jurisdiction and the division

of the expenses of arbitration between the Parties.shall

be binding on both Parties and shall be implemented by

them, in accordance with their respective constitutional

procedures. The remuneration of the arbitrators shall be

determined on the same basis as that for ad hoc Judges of

the International Court of Justice.

ARTICLE XI

For the purposes of this Agreement:

(a) "appropriate governmental authority" means,

in the case of Australia, the Australian

^Safeguards Office, and in the case of Finland,

the Ministry of Trade and Industry or its

designated representative;

(b) "nuclear material" means any "source material"

or "special fissionable material" as those terms

are defined in Article XX of the Statute of the

International Atomic Energy Agency. Any deter-

minatiori by the Board of Governors of the

International Atomic Energy Agency under Article

XX of the Agency's Statute which amends the list

of materials considered to be "source material"

or "special fissionable material" shall o nly<

have effect under this Agreement when both

Parties to this Agreement have informed each

other in writing that they accept that amendment;

(c) "Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement".

means an agreement concluded in accordance with

paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at

London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968;

(d) "the Agency's safeguards system" means the

safeguards system set out in International

Atomic Energy Agency document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2

as well as any subsequent amendments thereto

which are accepted by the Government of Finland

and by the Government of Australia.

ARTICLE XII

This Agreement shall enter into force 30 days

after the date the Parties by an exchange of diplomatic

notes have informed each other that they have complied with

all constitutional requirements for its entry into force,

and shall remain in force thereafter for a period of 30 yearsi

If neither Party has notified the other Party at least 180

days prior to the expiry of such period, the present Agreement

shall continue In"force thereafter until 180 days after notice

of termination has been given by either Party to the other

Party; provided, however, that termination of the Agreement

shall not release the Parties from obligations tinder the '

Agreement in respect of nuclear material referred to ih

Article I of the Agreement which remaihS; relevant from the

point of view of safeguards in aeci6i?diihih4''Vith Article II

of the Agreement.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly,

authorised by their respective Goyeramentd, have signed the

present Agreement.

Done at Helsinki on 20 July 1978 ‘

in the English and Finnish languages, both language versions

being equally authentic.

.  D.J. Anthony .  P* Paavela

For the Government of For the Government of the

Australia: Republic of Finland:

ÃÂ·

J i.  A U S T R A L IA ,,!!-

.  ; D E P A R T M E N T  O F F O R E I G N  A F F A I R S C A N B E R R A , A .C .T . 2 6 0 0 Dear Ambassador Gustafsson, In the negotiations between Finland and Australia  on an agreement concerning the transfer of nuclear material  between the two. countries,  the object of the two delegations  was to draw up an agreement to provide conditions,  consistent  with the commitment of the two countries to the non-proliferation  of nuclear weapons,  in which nuclear material may be transferred  between them for peaceful purposes. In this context the Finnish delegation sought Ã¢ÂÂ  clarification of Australian intentions as to how the agreement  would be implemented. It emphasized the importance which < Finland attached to the prior consent provisions of the  draft agreement being applied in such a way as to allow the  most practical possible operation of various fuel cycle  activities. It also pointed out that in the case of Finland  several of these activities might have to take place in  other countries.  It envisages that these countries would be  nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty on the NonÂ­ Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,  member states of EURATOM,  and/or Iceland, Norway or Sweden. ' The Australian authorities recognise the interest  of Finland in the practical and efficient operation of' its  nuclear facilities. It is the intention of the Australian  Government that the provisions of the agreement including  the prior consent requirements in Article VII should operate  to this effect and that they should be implemented so as to  avoid raising practical difficulties unrelated to nonÂ­ proliferation objectives. '  ' > ' .  Ã¢ÂÂ   Conversion ^enrichment and fuel fabrication Â· As to conversion, enrichment below 20%, and fuel  fabrication, these proposals present the Australian Government  with no difficulty. When the time comes to make arrangement  for the supply of uranium from Australia to Finland and for  its transfer to one or more of the countries mentioned, for  processing into fuel elements for use in Finnish powers  reactors:the Australian Government will, at the request of  the Government of Finland consider giving its consent in .../2 2. advance and for a period of years to the transfers involved. The only condition will be that the Australian Government  will need to be satisfied in terms of its non-proliferation  policy as to the applicable arrangements and controls. In  this connection it is relevant that 'he ^"n-Nuclear Weapon  states referred to are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation  Treaty. By that time the Australian Government expects  bilateral safeguards agreements to be in force covering  Australian origin nuclear material in most of the countries  mentioned and that these arrangements will fully satisfy the  Australian Government as to the safeguards and controls  applicable to the preparation there of fuel for use in  Finland. Tails,  reject pellets and other safeguardable  residues from these processes may be left in any of these  countries provided they will be covered there by a bilateral  safeguards agreement xtith Australia. In cases where such agreements are not by then in  force,  the Australian Government expects that it will,  nevertheless, be possible to make satisfactory arrangements.  These arrangements will have to include the return to Finland,  or to another of the countries mentioned with which Australia ’   has at that time a bilateral safeguards agreement, of  quantities of nuclear material equivalent to the supplied <  nuclear material. Reprocessing and/or final disposal of spent fuel The Finnish delegation also raised the question of  reprocessing and/or final disposal of spent fuel in the same  countries and the transfers for these purposes. Australian  policy does not preclude giving consent in advance subject  to specific arrangements and/or conditions. Reprocessing,  however, is a matter on which the Australian Government has -   reserved its position for the time being. The Australian  Government does not propose to decide on the detailed  arrangements and/or conditions under which it might agree to  reprocessing taking place until after the conclusion of  current international studies, notably INFCE. Ã¢ÂÂ¢  The Australian Government accordingly agrees to hold further consultations with the Government of Finland at  a mutually convenient time after the conclusion of the INFCE  study, on the detailed arrangements and/or conditions under  which it might agree to reprocessing and on the possibility  of giving its agreement in advance and for a period of time  under specific arrangements. As to transfers of nuclear material of Australian  origin to any of the countries mentioned f(|tr final disposal,   it is a requirement that Australian origin nuclear material . ../3 w C> 3 in that country be covered by a bilateral safeguards agreement  with Australia. The Australian Government would also w a n t .   an opportunity to consider such aspects as the quantities  involved. Yours sincerely, (R.R. Fernandez) . . . .  Â·  Leader of the Australian Delegation His Excellency Under Secretary of State  Paul Gustafsson, Leader of the Finnish Delegation,  Ministry for Foreign Affairs, HELSINKI AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND  THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES  CONCERNING COOPERATION IN PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR  ENERGY AND THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL The Government of Australia and the Government  of the Republic of the Philippines:  . Mindful that both Australia and the Philippines  are non-nuclear-weapon States which are Parties to the .   Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;  . Affirming their support for the various objectives  of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,  -   notably those stated in Articles III and IV,  and their <  desire to promote universal adherence to that Treaty; Recognizing that Australia and the Philippines  have under that Treaty undertaken not to manufacture or  otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear  explosive devices;  ' Recognizing also that Australia and the Philippines  have agreements in force with the International Atomic Energy  Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  of Nuclear Weapons for the application of safeguards to all  nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within  their territory, under their jurisdiction or carried out  under their control anywhere; 2 > Â» Affirming further that parties to the Treaty  in a position do so shall also cooperate in contributing  alone or together with other States or international  organizations to the further development of the applicÂ­ ations of nuclear energy for peac^-Tal purposes, especially  in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to  the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the  developing areas of the world; Confirming' further the desire of both countries  to cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as  exemplified by their participation in the Regional  Cooperation Agreement with other regional members of the  International Atomic Energy Agency; . Ã¢ÂÂ   < . Desiring to establish conditions consistent  with their commitment to non-proliferation under which  nuclear material can be transferred between their two  countries for peaceful purposes;  ' Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I . The Parties will cooperate in the peaceful uses  of nuclear energy, including research and training,  exchange of unclassified information and projects of mutual  Ã¢ÂÂ interest as may be agreed between them.  This cooperation  will be facilitated as may be necessary by specific  agreements. 3. a r t i c l e  II . 1. This Agreement shall apply to: . (a) all nuclear material transferred for peaceful  purposes between the two Parties, whether  directly or through third countries; (b) quantities of derived nuclear material proportional to the transferred nuclear material used for their Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂÂ·Â·Â·Â·Â·' -  .  production;  and (c) quantities of all subsequent generations of nuclear material determined on the same proportional .   principle. Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ  2. Nuclear material shall be transferred between the  Parties only to a natural or juridical person designated by  the appropriate governmental authority of the recipient Party to the appropriate governmental authority of the ‘  Â· Ã¢ÂÂ   -  .  .  i  supplier Party as duly authorised to receive that material.  " 3. Prior to the transfer of nuclear material between the Parties,  the appropriate governmental authorities of .   both Parties shall agree in writing upon the point when the .   material will become subject to the provisions of this  Agreement.  . ARTICLE III Nuclear material referred to in Article II of  this Agreement shall remain subject to the provisions of 4. this Agreement so long as it is usable for any nuclear  activity relevant from the point of view of the safeguards  referred to in Article V of this Agreement; that is, until  it shall be determined by the International Atomic Energy  Agency or be agreed between the Parries chat the material  is no longer so usable or that it has been transferred  beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient Party in accordance  with the provisions of Article VIII of this Agreement. '  "' ARTICLE IV Nuclear material subject to this Agreement shall  not be diverted to the development or the manufacture of  nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,  or be  used in such a way as to further any military purpose. ARTICLE V If nuclear material subject to this Agreement is  present in the territory of a Party and the International  Atomic Energy Agency is not administering safeguards in  the territory of that Party pursuant to a.Non-Proliferation  Treaty safeguards agreement,  that Party shall accept  safeguards under an agreement or agreements to which it  and the International Atomic Energy Agency are parties . and which will provide safeguards equivalent in scope  and effect to those provided by a Non-Proliferation Treaty  safeguards agreement. ARTICLE VI Notwithstanding the provisions of Article V of  this Agreement, if nuclear material subject to this Agreement  is present in the territory of a Party and, 5. (a) the International Atomic Energy Agency is not  administering safeguards in the territory of  that Party pursuant to a safeguards agreement  or agreements referred to in Article V of this  Agreement,  and (b) there is no safeguards agreement being  administered in the territory of that Party  which is satisfactory to both Parties, the other Party shall have the right to administer in the  territory of that Party,  in consultation with that Party  and with its assistance, safeguards based on the procedures  provided for in the Agency's safeguards system, with respect  to the nuclear material subject to this Agreement for (the  exclusive purpose of verifying compliance with Article IV  of this Agreement. ARTICLE VII ~ . 1. The Parties agree to take such measures as are  necessary to ensure adequate physical protection of nuclear  material within their jurisdiction and to apply, as a  minimum, physical protection measures which satisfy the  levels of physical protection set out in Annex A to this .   Agreement. 2. The Parties shall consult at the request of either  Party concerning matters relating to physical protection. ARTICLE VIII . Nuclear material subject.  to this Agreement shall be 1. 6.  i  .1 U  ÃÂ  Â· (a) transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the !  recipient Party, (b) enriched to more than 20 percent in the isotope  U-235, or (c) reprocessed, only with the prior written agreement of the supplier Party. 2. In considering proposals arising from matters  referred to in paragraph I of this Article, the supplier  Party will take into account non-proliferation considerations,  energy requirements and the needs of the recipient Party for  proper management of spent nuclear fuel and for nuclear  waste disposal. 3. If a Party considers that it. is unable to agree to  a proposal arising from a matter referred to in paragraph I of this Article, that Party shall providevthe other Party with  an immediate opportunity for full consultation on that issue. A Party shall not withhold its agreement to a matter referred  to in paragraph I of this Article for the purpose of securing  commercial advantage. ARTICLE IX - 1. The appropriate governmental authorities of both Parties shall consult annually, or at any other time at the  request of either Party, to ensure the effective implementatio- 7 of this Agreement. Either Party may invite the International  Atomic Energy Agency to participate in such consultations. 2. If nuclear material subject to this Agreement is  present in the territory of a Party, that Party shall, upon  request, inform the other Party in writing of the overall  conclusions of the most recent report by the international  Atomic Energy Agency on its verification activities in the  territory of the requested Party. 3. The appropriate governmental authorities of both  Parties shall establish an administrative arrangement to  ensure the effective fulfilment of the obligations under this Agreement. An administrative arrangement established .  - ,  ,  '  <  Â·  pursuant to this paragraph may be changed with the agreement of the appropriate governmental authorities of both Parties. 4. The administrative arrangement referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article shall also include the mechanism Ã¢ÂÂ   - , . , ,  for financing the cost of reports and records which either  Party shall be providing. 5. Each Party shall take all appropriate precautions  to preserve the confidentiality of commercial and industrial  secrets and other confidential information itt its possession  as a result of the operation of this Agreement. ARTICLE X . Â· 1. A supplier Party shall have the right in the event of, ; 8. a) detonation by the recipient Party of a nuclear .  Â· .  explosive device, or b) determination in accordance with paragraph C of .  .  .  Article XII of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency thau dierÃ¢ÂÂ has been non-complianc  ,  .  with, or abrogation of, a relevant safeguards agreemen ,  concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency by the recipient Party, to suspend or cancel further transfers of nuclear material  and to require the return of nuclear material subject to this  .  -Agreement, subject to payment therefore at prices then current. . .  2. .  .  In the event of material non-compliance by the Â· .  recipient Party with the provisions of Articles IV to VIII  Ã¢ÂÂ¢  .  '  Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ   -  /  '  ' t > ,  inclusive of this Agreement, the Parties shall forthwith consult .' at the request of either Party. The supplier Party shall have  the right to suspend further transfers of nuclear material and Â· .  to require the recipient Party to take corrective steps.  If  . . .  such corrective steps are not taken within a reasonable time,  -the supplier Party shall thereupon have the right to Cancel  further transfers of nuclear material and to require the  return of nuclear material subject to this Agreement,  subject  :  . . .  to payment therefore at prices then current. ...... ARTICLE XI . . . . . . . . .  ...  Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the present Agreement which is not settled by  negotiation shall, on the request of either Party, be  ,  .  submitted to an arbitral tribunal which shall be composed 9. of three arbitrators. Each Party shall designate one  arbitrator and the two arbitrators so designated shall  elect a third, who shall be the Chairman. If within  thirty days of the request for arbitration either Party  has not designated an arbitrator,  either Party to the  dispute may request the President of the International  Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator.  The same  procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of the  designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the  third arbitrator has"not been elected. A majority of the  members of the arbitral tribunal Shall constitute a quorum,   and all decisions shall be made by majority vote of all the  members of the arbitral tribunal. The arbitral procedure  shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the  tribunal, including all rulings concerning its constitution,  procedure, jurisdiction and the division of the expenses of  arbitration between the Parties shall be binding on both  Parties and shall be implemented by them, in accordance with  their respective constitutional procedures.  The remuneration  of the arbitrators shall be determined on the same basis as  that for ad hoc judges of the International Court of Justice. .  ARTICLE XII For the purposes of this Agreement; (a) "appropriate governmental authority" means,  in  the case of the Philippines, the Philippine  Atomic Energy Commission, and in the case of  Australia, the Australian Safeguards Office. 10. . (b) "nuclear material" means any "source material"  or "special fissionable material" as those terms  are defined in Article XX of the Statute of the  International Atomic Energy Agency. The term  "source material" shall .,vt b . . .  interpreted as  applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination  by the Board of Governors of the International Ã¢ÂÂ   -  .  . Atomic Energy Agency under Article XX of the Agency's  Statute which amends the list of materials considered  to be "soiirce material" or "special fissionable  material" shall only have effect under this Agreement  when both Parties to this Agreement have informed  each other in writing that they accept that amendment (c) '  Ã¢ÂÂ   .  '  '  Ã¢ÂÂ  Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ   < "Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement" means an agreement concluded in accordance with  Paragraph I of Article III of the Treaty on the  Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at London,  Moscow, and Washington on 1 July 1968;'  .  Â·  Ã¢ÂÂ   .  Ã¢ÂÂ   . ' i Ã¢ÂÂ   - * (d) "the Agency's safeguards system" means the safeguards  system set out.in International Atomic Energy Agency  document INFC.IRC/66/Rev. 2 as well as any subsequent  amendments thereto which are accepted by the  Government of Australia and by the Government of  the Republic of the Philippines. '  "  ... ARTICLE XIII 1. Either Party may at any time propose amendments to this Agreement. An amendment agreed between the Parties  shall come into force when confirmed by an Exchange of Notes. 11 2. After this Agreement has been in force for five years the Parties shall meet,  if either Party so requests,   to review the operation of the Agreement and to take into  account relevant developments,  including those ip the Ã¢ÂÂ   '' -'Â· I" m fields of Technology. Thereafter further reviews shall  take place,  at the request of either Party,  at intervals  of not less than five years from the date of the previous  review. ARTICLE XIV ; This Agreement shall enter into force on the date  the Parties, by an exchange of diplomatic notes,  have informed  each other that they have complied with all constitutional  requirements for its entry into force,  and shall remain in  force indefinitely unless it is otherwise agreed between  the Parties.  : In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly  authorized by their respective Governments,  have.signed this Ã¢ÂÂ   't  Agreement.  Â· .  Ã¢ÂÂ   - < DONE at Manila on 8 August 197,8 in the English and Filipino languages,  the English text to  prevail in case of ambiguity. D.J.Anthony :  G.Z.Velasco For the Government of For the Government of Australia .  the Republic of the Philippines ANNEX A Agreed Levels of Physical Protection The agreed levels of physical protection to  be ensured by the appropriate governmental authorities in  the use,  storage and transportation of the materials of  the attached table shall as a minimum include protection  characteristics as follows: - CATEGORY III . Use and Storage within an area to which access is controlled. Transportation under,special precautions including prior  arrangement between "sender, recipient and carrier,  and  prior agreement between States in case of international  transport specifying time, place and procedures for  transferring transport responsibility. CATEGORY II . Use and Storage within a protected area to which access is  controlled, i.e. an area under constant surveillance by  guards or electronic devices,  surrounded by a physical c  barrier with a limited number of points of entry under  appropriate control, or any area with an equivalent level  of physical protection. Transportation under special precautions including prior  arrangement between sender, recipient and carrier, and prior  agreement between States in case of international transport  specifying time, place and procedures for transferring  transport responsibility. CATEGORY I . Materials in this Category shall be protected with highly  reliable systems against unauthorised use as follows: Use and Storage within a highly protected area i.e. a  protected area as defined for Category II above,  to which,   in addition, access is restricted to persons whose  trustworthiness has been determined and which is under  surveillance by guards who are in close communication with  appropriate response forces. Specific measures taken in  this context should have as their objective the detection  and prevention of any assault, unauthorised access or  unauthorised removal of material. . Transportation under special precautions as identified above  for transportation of Category II and III materials and,  in addition, under constant surveillance of escorts and  under conditions which assure close communication with  appropriate response forces. CATEGORIZATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL MATERIAL .  FORM I . * Â·  CATEGORY II III ’ 1. Plutonium ^a ^ Unirradiated ^ ^ 2 kg or mor Less more than 2 kg but  than 500 g Ã¢ÂÂ   '  > 500 g or less ^ 2. Uranium-235 Unirradiated^^^ - uranium enriched to  20% U-235 or more 5 kg or more Less more than 5 kg but  than 1 kg 1 kg or less^C ^  Less than 10 kg^c ^ - uranium enriched to  10% U-235 but less  than 20% 10 kg or more - uranium enriched  above natural,  but  less than 10% U-235  > 10 kg or more 3. Uranium-233 Unirradiated 2 kg or more Less more than 2 kg but  than 500 g 500 g or less ^ 4. Irradiated fuel (e) (e) Depleted or natural  uranium, thorium or  low enriched fuel  (less than 10% ,  * fissile content) e (a) As identified in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (b) Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level  equal to or less than 100 rads/hour at one metre unshielded. (c) Less than a radiologically significant quantity should be exempted. ’ (d) Natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium and quantities of uranium enriched to less than 10%  not falling in Category III should be protected in accordance with prudent management practice. (e) Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material content is classified as Category I or II before irradiation may be reduced one category level when the radiation level from the fuel  exceeds 100 rads/hour at one metre unshielded. ^ 8 August 1978 Dear Ambassador Siazon, In the negotiations between the Philippines and  Australia on the Agreement concerning Co-operation in  Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Transfer of Nuclear  Material signed today,  the aim of the two delegations was  to draw up an agreement to provide conditions consistent  with the commitment of the two countries to the Ã¢ÂÂ  non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in which nuclear  material may be transferred between them for peaceful  "  purposes,  as well as foreshadowing the further development  of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context the Philippine delegation sought  clarification of Australian intentions as to how the  agreement would be implemented and, in the course of the  negotiations,  the following understandings,  which shall be an  integral part of the Agreement,  were reached. Uranium Supply Australia attaches fundamental importance to  being a secure and reliable supplier of uranium to other  countries for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. ,  Australia  shares the Philippines' interest in stable and timely  supplies of nuclear material under the agreement for the  orderly and efficient operation of the Philippines' nuclear  energy program. Australia will endeavour to take such  actions as may be practicable,  within the framework of its  law and policies,  to achieve these ends, Fallback.Safeguards . In relation to Article V of the Agreement,  the -  # Philippine delegation sought clarification of the requirement '   for an agreement or agreements which will provide safeguards  equivalent in scope and effect to those provided by a  Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement. The Australian  delegation noted that one way in which this requirement  could be satisfied would be the application of the Agency's  safeguards system under agreements which, taken together,  cover all nuclear material in peaceful use witbin the  jurisdiction of the country concerned and which provide  the same degree of reassurance that material is not diverted The Honourable Ambassador Domingo Siazon Jr.,   Chairman of Philippine Delegation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Padre Faura, MANILA ' to non-peaceful purposes,  including nuclear weapons or  other nuclear explosive devices. The Australian delegation acknowledges that an  Agreement providing for safeguards to be administered by  a third party could be a safeguards agreement which is  satisfactory to both parties for purposes of clause (b)  of Article VI of fhe Agreement. Non-Compliance Provisions In regard to paragraph 2 of Article X, it  ,is the intention of Australia that, in exercising its rights  as a supplier Party, it would take into account the  desirability of prior consultations and of allowing, where  appropriate, reasonable time for corrective steps. .Yours sincerely, .  <  (R.R. Fernandez) Leader of the Australian Delegation EMBASSY OF THE ;  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '  Ã¢ÂÂ  '  1  (  Â·  '  . ' Note No. 82 Â·  August 4, 1978 Excellency: _ I refer the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the  Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of  Atomic Energy between the Government of the United  States of America a n d ;the Government of Australia,  signed on June 22, 1956, as amended, hereinafter  referred  to as the 1956 Cooperation Agreement. . I wish to acknowledge Australia's leadership role  in the field of preventing nuclear proliferation. Both Australia and the United States are parties to  the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.  Both countries have committed themselves to ensure that  any source materials, special nuclear materials, or  equipment transferred pursuant to the 1956 Cooperation  Agreement, including such items subsequently retransÂ­ ferred pursuant to agreements for cooperation between  the United States and other nations, and any special  nuclear materials produced therefrom, shall not be used  for research on or development of any nuclear explosive His Excellency Andrew S. Peacock, 1  Minister for Foreign Affairs, Canberra device or for any other military purpose. They have  also committed themselves to accept the application  of IAEA safeguards to such materials and equipment. .   While such 'materials and equipment are within the  United States, the United States intends to implement  this commitment pursuant to an agreement with the  International Atomic Energy Agency for the application  of safeguards in the United StatesÃ¢ÂÂ Further, both  have committed themselves to ensure that physical  protection measures are applied to all such materials  or equipment, providing as a minimum protection  comparable to that set forth in INFCIRC/225 (Rev. 1).  These are enduring commitments. . The United States is prepared to begin renegotiation  of the 1956 Cooperation Agreement with Australia .  immedir  ately, with a view to prompt conclusion of a new AgreeÂ­ ment. Pending the entry into force of a renegotiated  Agreement for Cooperation, the United States proposes  the following understanding, in addition to the agreeÂ­ ments set forth in the 1956 Cooperation Agreement: The United States shall not exercise any rights  it has to approve the retransfer or enrichment  to twenty percent or greater in the isotope U-235  by another nation or group of nations of material  hereafter transferred pursuant to the 1956 . Cooperation Agreement or otherwise identified  as being of Australian origin, and shall not  exercise any rights it has to approve the reÂ­ transfer or reprocessing of irradiated fuel  elements containing special nuclear materials 3 produced through the use of such materials  unless Australian approval is obtained in  advance. This applies only where the country  requesting approval has notified the United  States that Australia has this right or its  equivalent. In the event that the United  States is not so notified, the United States  shall consult with Australia prior to granting such approval. /  In addition to theyforegoing, it is the underÂ­ '  |  standing of the United States that neither  i .  party shall enrich, any uranium after transfer  pursuant to the 1956 Cooperation Agreement to  twenty percent or greater in the isotope U-235 unless prior approval of the other party is Â·   obtained. I have the honor to propose that this Note and your  reply confirming the foregoing shall constitute an agreeÂ­ ment between our two Governments and shall enter into force on the date of your reply and shall remain in force  thereafter until a new Agreement for Cooperation ConcernÂ­ ing Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy enters into force. . Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my  highest consideration - ^ : ÃÂ ^  . M I N I S T E R  F O R  F O R E I G N  A F F A I R S , ’ *  C A N B E R R A  - - S i?  AUG 1978  Excellency, ' / '  ' I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of ' your Note of fourth Augur;t: 1973 concerning the proposed  Interim Agreement between the Government of Australia and  the Government of the United States of America on Peaceful  Nuclear Cooper at ÃÂ¯ÃÂ¿ÃÂÃÂ¯.ÃÂÃÂ¹ Ã¢ÂÂ   That Note ready as follows: "Excellency: i I refer the Minister for Foreign Affairs to  the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses  of Atomic Energy between the Government of the  United States of America and the Government of  Australia, signed on June 22, 1956, as amended,   hereinafter referred to as the 1956 Cooperation  Agreement. I wish to acknowledge Australia's leadership , jfÂ·-Â·  role in the field of preventing nuclear pro 1 if-  eration. Both Australia and the United States  are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation  of Nuclear Weapons. Both countries have committed  themselves to ensure that any source materials,   special nuclear materials, or equipment transferred  pursuant to the 1956 Cooperation Agreement,  including  such items subsequently retransferred pursuant to  agreements for cooperation between the United States  and other nations, and any special nuclear materials  produced therefrom, shall not be used for research  on or development of any nuclear explosive device  or for any other military purpose. They have also committed themselves to accept the application of  IAEA Safeguards to Gvch materials and equipment. While such materials and equipment are xvifchin the  United States,  the United States intends to implement  this commitment pursuant to an agreement with the  International Atomic Energy Agency for the appliÂ­ cation of safeguards in the United States. Further,  both have committed themselves to ensure that  physical protection measures arc applied to  all such materials or equipment, providing aa  a minimum protection comparable to that set  forth in'" INFCIRC/225 (Rev. 1). These are  enduring commitments. The United Staten is prepared to begin reneÂ­ gotiation. of the 1956 Cooperation Agreement . xvith Australia immediately, with a viex^ to  prompt conclusion of a new Agreement. Pending  the entry into force of a renegotiated Agreement  for Cooperation, the United States proposes the  following understanding, in addition to the  agreements set forth in the 1956 Cooperation  Agreement: . .  i Ã¢ÂÂ   '  Ã¢ÂÂ   . - 4 The United States shall not exercise any ' rights it has to approve the retransfer or  enrichment to. twenty percent or greater in the  isotope U-235 by another nation or group of  nations of material hereafter transferred .   pursuant to the 1956 Cooperation Agreement  or otherwise identified as being of Australian  origin, and shall not exercise any rights it  has to approve the retransfer or reprocessing  of irradiated fuel elements containing special  nuclear materials produced through the use of  such materials, unless Australian approval is  obtained in advance. Tills applies only xvhere  ;  the country requesting approval has notified - 2 - Â·  Ã¢ÂÂ   ~ 3 - Ã¢ÂÂ  the United States that Australia hag this  right or its equivalent. In the event that '   the United Staten la not g o notified, the United  States nhall consult with Australia prior to  Ã¢ÂÂ   granting ouch approval. In addition to the foregoing, it is the underÂ­ ot ending of the United States that neither party  shall enrich any uranium after transfer pursuant  to the 3 . 9 5 6  Cooperation Agreement to twenty Ã¢ÂÂ    percent or greater in the Isotope 235 unless  prior approval of the other party is obtained. I have.Che honour to propose that this Note  and your reply confirming the foregoing shall Â·   constitute an Agreement between our two GovernÂ­ ments and shall enter into force on the,date of  your reply and shall remain in force thereafter  until a new Agreement for Cooperation Concerning'  Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy enters into  Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my  highest consideration." I have the honour to confirm that the foregoing is  acceptable to the Government of Australia and that your Note y  and this reply shall together constitute an Agreement between  our tvo Governments, which shall enter into force on the date  of this reply. . Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my ' Â·   highest consideration. . (Andrew Peacock) Ã¢ÂÂ   .  !  '  Ã¢ÂÂ   His Excellency, Mr Philip Alston Snr., Ambassador of the United States  of America to Australia, CANBERRA, A.C.T. 2600

D E P A R T M E N T  O F F O R E I G N  A F F A I R S

C A N B E R R A , A .C .T . 2 6 0 0

Dear Ambassador Gustafsson,

In the negotiations between Finland and Australia  on an agreement concerning the transfer of nuclear material  between the two. countries,  the object of the two delegations  was to draw up an agreement to provide conditions,  consistent  with the commitment of the two countries to the non-proliferation

of nuclear weapons,  in which nuclear material may be transferred  between them for peaceful purposes.

In this context the Finnish delegation sought Ã¢ÂÂ  clarification of Australian intentions as to how the agreement  would be implemented. It emphasized the importance which < Finland attached to the prior consent provisions of the

draft agreement being applied in such a way as to allow the  most practical possible operation of various fuel cycle  activities. It also pointed out that in the case of Finland  several of these activities might have to take place in

other countries.  It envisages that these countries would be  nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty on the NonÂ­ Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,  member states of EURATOM,

and/or Iceland, Norway or Sweden. '

The Australian authorities recognise the interest  of Finland in the practical and efficient operation of' its  nuclear facilities. It is the intention of the Australian  Government that the provisions of the agreement including

the prior consent requirements in Article VII should operate  to this effect and that they should be implemented so as to  avoid raising practical difficulties unrelated to nonÂ­ proliferation objectives. '  '

> ' .  Ã¢ÂÂ

Conversion ^enrichment and fuel fabrication Â·

As to conversion, enrichment below 20%, and fuel  fabrication, these proposals present the Australian Government  with no difficulty. When the time comes to make arrangement  for the supply of uranium from Australia to Finland and for

its transfer to one or more of the countries mentioned, for  processing into fuel elements for use in Finnish powers  reactors:the Australian Government will, at the request of  the Government of Finland consider giving its consent in

.../2

2.

advance and for a period of years to the transfers involved. The only condition will be that the Australian Government  will need to be satisfied in terms of its non-proliferation  policy as to the applicable arrangements and controls. In

this connection it is relevant that 'he ^"n-Nuclear Weapon  states referred to are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation  Treaty. By that time the Australian Government expects  bilateral safeguards agreements to be in force covering  Australian origin nuclear material in most of the countries  mentioned and that these arrangements will fully satisfy the  Australian Government as to the safeguards and controls

applicable to the preparation there of fuel for use in  Finland. Tails,  reject pellets and other safeguardable  residues from these processes may be left in any of these  countries provided they will be covered there by a bilateral

safeguards agreement xtith Australia.

In cases where such agreements are not by then in  force,  the Australian Government expects that it will,  nevertheless, be possible to make satisfactory arrangements.  These arrangements will have to include the return to Finland,

or to another of the countries mentioned with which Australia ’   has at that time a bilateral safeguards agreement, of  quantities of nuclear material equivalent to the supplied <  nuclear material.

Reprocessing and/or final disposal of spent fuel

The Finnish delegation also raised the question of  reprocessing and/or final disposal of spent fuel in the same  countries and the transfers for these purposes. Australian  policy does not preclude giving consent in advance subject

to specific arrangements and/or conditions. Reprocessing,  however, is a matter on which the Australian Government has -   reserved its position for the time being. The Australian  Government does not propose to decide on the detailed  arrangements and/or conditions under which it might agree to  reprocessing taking place until after the conclusion of

current international studies, notably INFCE.

Ã¢ÂÂ¢  The Australian Government accordingly agrees to hold further consultations with the Government of Finland at  a mutually convenient time after the conclusion of the INFCE  study, on the detailed arrangements and/or conditions under  which it might agree to reprocessing and on the possibility

of giving its agreement in advance and for a period of time  under specific arrangements.

As to transfers of nuclear material of Australian  origin to any of the countries mentioned f(|tr final disposal,   it is a requirement that Australian origin nuclear material

. ../3

w

C> 3

in that country be covered by a bilateral safeguards agreement  with Australia. The Australian Government would also w a n t .   an opportunity to consider such aspects as the quantities  involved.

Yours sincerely,

(R.R. Fernandez)

. . . .  Â·  Leader of the Australian Delegation

His Excellency Under Secretary of State  Paul Gustafsson, Leader of the Finnish Delegation,  Ministry for Foreign Affairs, HELSINKI

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

CONCERNING COOPERATION IN PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR

ENERGY AND THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

The Government of Australia and the Government

of the Republic of the Philippines:  .

Mindful that both Australia and the Philippines

are non-nuclear-weapon States which are Parties to the .

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;  .

Affirming their support for the various objectives

of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,  -

notably those stated in Articles III and IV,  and their <

desire to promote universal adherence to that Treaty;

Recognizing that Australia and the Philippines

have under that Treaty undertaken not to manufacture or

otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear

explosive devices;  '

Recognizing also that Australia and the Philippines

have agreements in force with the International Atomic Energy

Agency in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons for the application of safeguards to all

nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within

their territory, under their jurisdiction or carried out

under their control anywhere;

2

>

Â»

Affirming further that parties to the Treaty

in a position do so shall also cooperate in contributing

alone or together with other States or international

organizations to the further development of the applicÂ­

ations of nuclear energy for peac^-Tal purposes, especially

in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to

the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the

developing areas of the world;

Confirming' further the desire of both countries

to cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as

exemplified by their participation in the Regional

Cooperation Agreement with other regional members of the

International Atomic Energy Agency; . Ã¢ÂÂ   < .

Desiring to establish conditions consistent

with their commitment to non-proliferation under which

nuclear material can be transferred between their two

countries for peaceful purposes;  '

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I .

The Parties will cooperate in the peaceful uses

of nuclear energy, including research and training,

exchange of unclassified information and projects of mutual

Ã¢ÂÂ interest as may be agreed between them.  This cooperation

will be facilitated as may be necessary by specific

agreements.

3.

a r t i c l e  II .

1. This Agreement shall apply to: .

(a) all nuclear material transferred for peaceful

purposes between the two Parties, whether

directly or through third countries;

(b) quantities of derived nuclear material proportional

to the transferred nuclear material used for their Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂÂ·Â·Â·Â·Â·' -  .

production;  and

(c) quantities of all subsequent generations of nuclear

material determined on the same proportional .

principle. Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ

2. Nuclear material shall be transferred between the

Parties only to a natural or juridical person designated by

the appropriate governmental authority of the recipient

Party to the appropriate governmental authority of the ‘  Â· Ã¢ÂÂ   -  .  .  i

supplier Party as duly authorised to receive that material.  "

3. Prior to the transfer of nuclear material between

the Parties,  the appropriate governmental authorities of .

both Parties shall agree in writing upon the point when the .

material will become subject to the provisions of this

Agreement.  .

ARTICLE III

Nuclear material referred to in Article II of

this Agreement shall remain subject to the provisions of

4.

this Agreement so long as it is usable for any nuclear

activity relevant from the point of view of the safeguards

referred to in Article V of this Agreement; that is, until

it shall be determined by the International Atomic Energy

Agency or be agreed between the Parries chat the material

is no longer so usable or that it has been transferred

beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient Party in accordance

with the provisions of Article VIII of this Agreement.

'  "' ARTICLE IV

Nuclear material subject to this Agreement shall

not be diverted to the development or the manufacture of

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,  or be

used in such a way as to further any military purpose.

ARTICLE V

If nuclear material subject to this Agreement is

present in the territory of a Party and the International

Atomic Energy Agency is not administering safeguards in

the territory of that Party pursuant to a.Non-Proliferation

Treaty safeguards agreement,  that Party shall accept

safeguards under an agreement or agreements to which it

and the International Atomic Energy Agency are parties .

and which will provide safeguards equivalent in scope

and effect to those provided by a Non-Proliferation Treaty

safeguards agreement.

ARTICLE VI

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article V of

this Agreement, if nuclear material subject to this Agreement

is present in the territory of a Party and,

5.

(a) the International Atomic Energy Agency is not

administering safeguards in the territory of

that Party pursuant to a safeguards agreement

or agreements referred to in Article V of this

Agreement,  and

(b) there is no safeguards agreement being

administered in the territory of that Party

which is satisfactory to both Parties,

the other Party shall have the right to administer in the

territory of that Party,  in consultation with that Party

and with its assistance, safeguards based on the procedures

provided for in the Agency's safeguards system, with respect

to the nuclear material subject to this Agreement for (the

exclusive purpose of verifying compliance with Article IV

of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VII ~ .

1. The Parties agree to take such measures as are

necessary to ensure adequate physical protection of nuclear

material within their jurisdiction and to apply, as a

minimum, physical protection measures which satisfy the

levels of physical protection set out in Annex A to this .

Agreement.

2. The Parties shall consult at the request of either

Party concerning matters relating to physical protection.

ARTICLE VIII .

Nuclear material subject.  to this Agreement shall be 1.

6.

i  .1 U  ÃÂ  Â·

(a) transferred beyond the jurisdiction of the

!  recipient Party,

(b) enriched to more than 20 percent in the isotope

U-235, or

(c) reprocessed,

only with the prior written agreement of the supplier Party.

2. In considering proposals arising from matters

referred to in paragraph I of this Article, the supplier

Party will take into account non-proliferation considerations,

energy requirements and the needs of the recipient Party for

proper management of spent nuclear fuel and for nuclear

waste disposal.

3. If a Party considers that it. is unable to agree to

a proposal arising from a matter referred to in paragraph I

of this Article, that Party shall providevthe other Party with

an immediate opportunity for full consultation on that issue.

A Party shall not withhold its agreement to a matter referred

to in paragraph I of this Article for the purpose of securing

commercial advantage.

ARTICLE IX -

1. The appropriate governmental authorities of both

Parties shall consult annually, or at any other time at the

request of either Party, to ensure the effective implementatio-

7

of this Agreement. Either Party may invite the International

Atomic Energy Agency to participate in such consultations.

2. If nuclear material subject to this Agreement is

present in the territory of a Party, that Party shall, upon

request, inform the other Party in writing of the overall

conclusions of the most recent report by the international

Atomic Energy Agency on its verification activities in the

territory of the requested Party.

3. The appropriate governmental authorities of both

Parties shall establish an administrative arrangement to

ensure the effective fulfilment of the obligations under

this Agreement. An administrative arrangement established .  - ,  ,  '  <  Â·

pursuant to this paragraph may be changed with the agreement

of the appropriate governmental authorities of both Parties.

4. The administrative arrangement referred to in

paragraph 3 of this Article shall also include the mechanism Ã¢ÂÂ   - , . , ,

for financing the cost of reports and records which either

Party shall be providing.

5. Each Party shall take all appropriate precautions

to preserve the confidentiality of commercial and industrial

secrets and other confidential information itt its possession

as a result of the operation of this Agreement.

ARTICLE X . Â·

1. A supplier Party shall have the right in the

event of, ;

8.

a) detonation by the recipient Party of a nuclear .  Â·

.  explosive device, or

b) determination in accordance with paragraph C of

.  .  .  Article XII of the Statute of the International

Atomic Energy Agency thau dierÃ¢ÂÂ has been non-complianc

,  .  with, or abrogation of, a relevant safeguards agreemen

,  concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency

by the recipient Party,

to suspend or cancel further transfers of nuclear material

and to require the return of nuclear material subject to this

.  -Agreement, subject to payment therefore at prices then current.

. .  2. .  .  In the event of material non-compliance by the

Â· .  recipient Party with the provisions of Articles IV to VIII  Ã¢ÂÂ¢  .  '  Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ   -  /  '  ' t

> ,  inclusive of this Agreement, the Parties shall forthwith consult

.' at the request of either Party. The supplier Party shall have

the right to suspend further transfers of nuclear material and Â·

.  to require the recipient Party to take corrective steps.  If

. . .  such corrective steps are not taken within a reasonable time,

-the supplier Party shall thereupon have the right to Cancel

further transfers of nuclear material and to require the

return of nuclear material subject to this Agreement,  subject

:  . . .  to payment therefore at prices then current.

...... ARTICLE XI

. . . . . . . . .  ...  Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or

application of the present Agreement which is not settled by

negotiation shall, on the request of either Party, be

,  .  submitted to an arbitral tribunal which shall be composed

9.

of three arbitrators. Each Party shall designate one

arbitrator and the two arbitrators so designated shall

elect a third, who shall be the Chairman. If within

thirty days of the request for arbitration either Party

has not designated an arbitrator,  either Party to the

dispute may request the President of the International

Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator.  The same

procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of the

designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the

third arbitrator has"not been elected. A majority of the

members of the arbitral tribunal Shall constitute a quorum,

and all decisions shall be made by majority vote of all the

members of the arbitral tribunal. The arbitral procedure

shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the

tribunal, including all rulings concerning its constitution,

procedure, jurisdiction and the division of the expenses of

arbitration between the Parties shall be binding on both

Parties and shall be implemented by them, in accordance with

their respective constitutional procedures.  The remuneration

of the arbitrators shall be determined on the same basis as

that for ad hoc judges of the International Court of Justice.

.  ARTICLE XII

For the purposes of this Agreement;

(a) "appropriate governmental authority" means,  in

the case of the Philippines, the Philippine

Atomic Energy Commission, and in the case of

Australia, the Australian Safeguards Office.

10. .

(b) "nuclear material" means any "source material"

or "special fissionable material" as those terms

are defined in Article XX of the Statute of the

International Atomic Energy Agency. The term

"source material" shall .,vt b . . .  interpreted as

applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination

by the Board of Governors of the International

Ã¢ÂÂ   -  .  .

Atomic Energy Agency under Article XX of the Agency's

Statute which amends the list of materials considered

to be "soiirce material" or "special fissionable

material" shall only have effect under this Agreement

when both Parties to this Agreement have informed

each other in writing that they accept that amendment

(c)

'  Ã¢ÂÂ   .  '  '  Ã¢ÂÂ  Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ   <

"Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement"

means an agreement concluded in accordance with

Paragraph I of Article III of the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at London,

Moscow, and Washington on 1 July 1968;'  .  Â·  Ã¢ÂÂ   .  Ã¢ÂÂ   . ' i

Ã¢ÂÂ   - *

(d) "the Agency's safeguards system" means the safeguards

system set out.in International Atomic Energy Agency

document INFC.IRC/66/Rev. 2 as well as any subsequent

amendments thereto which are accepted by the

Government of Australia and by the Government of

the Republic of the Philippines.

'  "  ...

ARTICLE XIII

1. Either Party may at any time propose amendments to

this Agreement. An amendment agreed between the Parties

shall come into force when confirmed by an Exchange of Notes.

11

2. After this Agreement has been in force for five

years the Parties shall meet,  if either Party so requests,

to review the operation of the Agreement and to take into

account relevant developments,  including those ip the Ã¢ÂÂ   '' -'Â· I" m

fields of Technology. Thereafter further reviews shall

take place,  at the request of either Party,  at intervals

of not less than five years from the date of the previous

review.

ARTICLE XIV ;

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date

the Parties, by an exchange of diplomatic notes,  have informed

each other that they have complied with all constitutional

requirements for its entry into force,  and shall remain in

force indefinitely unless it is otherwise agreed between

the Parties.  :

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly

authorized by their respective Governments,  have.signed this

Ã¢ÂÂ   't

Agreement.  Â· .  Ã¢ÂÂ   - <

DONE at Manila on 8 August 197,8

in the English and Filipino languages,  the English text to

prevail in case of ambiguity.

D.J.Anthony :  G.Z.Velasco

For the Government of For the Government of

Australia .  the Republic of the

Philippines

ANNEX A

Agreed Levels of Physical Protection

The agreed levels of physical protection to  be ensured by the appropriate governmental authorities in  the use,  storage and transportation of the materials of  the attached table shall as a minimum include protection

characteristics as follows: -

CATEGORY III .

Use and Storage within an area to which access is controlled.

Transportation under,special precautions including prior  arrangement between "sender, recipient and carrier,  and  prior agreement between States in case of international  transport specifying time, place and procedures for

transferring transport responsibility.

CATEGORY II .

Use and Storage within a protected area to which access is  controlled, i.e. an area under constant surveillance by  guards or electronic devices,  surrounded by a physical c  barrier with a limited number of points of entry under  appropriate control, or any area with an equivalent level  of physical protection.

Transportation under special precautions including prior  arrangement between sender, recipient and carrier, and prior  agreement between States in case of international transport  specifying time, place and procedures for transferring  transport responsibility.

CATEGORY I .

Materials in this Category shall be protected with highly  reliable systems against unauthorised use as follows:

Use and Storage within a highly protected area i.e. a  protected area as defined for Category II above,  to which,   in addition, access is restricted to persons whose  trustworthiness has been determined and which is under

surveillance by guards who are in close communication with  appropriate response forces. Specific measures taken in  this context should have as their objective the detection  and prevention of any assault, unauthorised access or  unauthorised removal of material. .

Transportation under special precautions as identified above  for transportation of Category II and III materials and,  in addition, under constant surveillance of escorts and  under conditions which assure close communication with  appropriate response forces.

CATEGORIZATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

MATERIAL .  FORM

I . * Â·

CATEGORY II III ’

1. Plutonium ^a ^ Unirradiated ^ ^ 2 kg or mor Less

more than 2 kg but

than 500 g

Ã¢ÂÂ   '  >

500 g or less ^

2. Uranium-235 Unirradiated^^^

- uranium enriched to  20% U-235 or more 5 kg or more Less

more than 5 kg but

than 1 kg

1 kg or less^C ^

Less than 10 kg^c ^ - uranium enriched to  10% U-235 but less  than 20%

10 kg or more

- uranium enriched  above natural,  but  less than 10% U-235

>

10 kg or more

3. Uranium-233 Unirradiated 2 kg or more Less

more than 2 kg but

than 500 g

500 g or less ^

4. Irradiated fuel (e) (e) Depleted or natural

uranium, thorium or  low enriched fuel  (less than 10% ,  *

fissile content) e

(a) As identified in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

(b) Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level  equal to or less than 100 rads/hour at one metre unshielded.

(c) Less than a radiologically significant quantity should be exempted. ’

(d) Natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium and quantities of uranium enriched to less than 10%  not falling in Category III should be protected in accordance with prudent management practice.

(e) Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile material content is classified as Category I or II before irradiation may be reduced one category level when the radiation level from the fuel  exceeds 100 rads/hour at one metre unshielded. ^

8 August 1978

Dear Ambassador Siazon,

In the negotiations between the Philippines and  Australia on the Agreement concerning Co-operation in  Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Transfer of Nuclear  Material signed today,  the aim of the two delegations was

to draw up an agreement to provide conditions consistent  with the commitment of the two countries to the Ã¢ÂÂ

non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in which nuclear  material may be transferred between them for peaceful  "  purposes,  as well as foreshadowing the further development  of co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In this context the Philippine delegation sought  clarification of Australian intentions as to how the  agreement would be implemented and, in the course of the  negotiations,  the following understandings,  which shall be an

integral part of the Agreement,  were reached.

Uranium Supply

Australia attaches fundamental importance to  being a secure and reliable supplier of uranium to other  countries for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. ,  Australia  shares the Philippines' interest in stable and timely

supplies of nuclear material under the agreement for the  orderly and efficient operation of the Philippines' nuclear  energy program. Australia will endeavour to take such  actions as may be practicable,  within the framework of its  law and policies,  to achieve these ends,

Fallback.Safeguards .

In relation to Article V of the Agreement,  the -  # Philippine delegation sought clarification of the requirement '   for an agreement or agreements which will provide safeguards  equivalent in scope and effect to those provided by a  Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement. The Australian  delegation noted that one way in which this requirement  could be satisfied would be the application of the Agency's

safeguards system under agreements which, taken together,  cover all nuclear material in peaceful use witbin the  jurisdiction of the country concerned and which provide  the same degree of reassurance that material is not diverted

The Honourable Ambassador Domingo Siazon Jr.,   Chairman of Philippine Delegation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Padre Faura, MANILA '

to non-peaceful purposes,  including nuclear weapons or  other nuclear explosive devices.

The Australian delegation acknowledges that an  Agreement providing for safeguards to be administered by  a third party could be a safeguards agreement which is  satisfactory to both parties for purposes of clause (b)

of Article VI of fhe Agreement.

Non-Compliance Provisions

In regard to paragraph 2 of Article X, it  ,is the intention of Australia that, in exercising its rights  as a supplier Party, it would take into account the  desirability of prior consultations and of allowing, where

appropriate, reasonable time for corrective steps.

.Yours sincerely,

.  <

(R.R. Fernandez)

Leader of the Australian Delegation

EMBASSY OF THE

;  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

'  Ã¢ÂÂ  '  1  (  Â·  '  . '

Note No. 82 Â·  August 4, 1978

Excellency: _

I refer the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the

Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of

Atomic Energy between the Government of the United

States of America a n d ;the Government of Australia,

signed on June 22, 1956, as amended, hereinafter

referred  to as the 1956 Cooperation Agreement. .

I wish to acknowledge Australia's leadership role

in the field of preventing nuclear proliferation.

Both Australia and the United States are parties to

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Both countries have committed themselves to ensure that

any source materials, special nuclear materials, or

equipment transferred pursuant to the 1956 Cooperation

Agreement, including such items subsequently retransÂ­

ferred pursuant to agreements for cooperation between

the United States and other nations, and any special

nuclear materials produced therefrom, shall not be used

for research on or development of any nuclear explosive

His Excellency

Andrew S. Peacock,

1  Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Canberra

device or for any other military purpose. They have

also committed themselves to accept the application

of IAEA safeguards to such materials and equipment. .

While such 'materials and equipment are within the

United States, the United States intends to implement

this commitment pursuant to an agreement with the

International Atomic Energy Agency for the application

of safeguards in the United StatesÃ¢ÂÂ Further, both

have committed themselves to ensure that physical

protection measures are applied to all such materials

or equipment, providing as a minimum protection

comparable to that set forth in INFCIRC/225 (Rev. 1).

These are enduring commitments. .

The United States is prepared to begin renegotiation

of the 1956 Cooperation Agreement with Australia .  immedir

ately, with a view to prompt conclusion of a new AgreeÂ­

ment. Pending the entry into force of a renegotiated

Agreement for Cooperation, the United States proposes

the following understanding, in addition to the agreeÂ­

ments set forth in the 1956 Cooperation Agreement:

The United States shall not exercise any rights

it has to approve the retransfer or enrichment

to twenty percent or greater in the isotope U-235

by another nation or group of nations of material

hereafter transferred pursuant to the 1956 .

Cooperation Agreement or otherwise identified

as being of Australian origin, and shall not

exercise any rights it has to approve the reÂ­

transfer or reprocessing of irradiated fuel

elements containing special nuclear materials

3

produced through the use of such materials

unless Australian approval is obtained in

advance. This applies only where the country

requesting approval has notified the United

States that Australia has this right or its

equivalent. In the event that the United

States is not so notified, the United States

shall consult with Australia prior to

granting such approval.

/

In addition to theyforegoing, it is the underÂ­ '  |

standing of the United States that neither  i .

party shall enrich, any uranium after transfer

pursuant to the 1956 Cooperation Agreement to

twenty percent or greater in the isotope U-235

unless prior approval of the other party is Â·

obtained.

I have the honor to propose that this Note and your

reply confirming the foregoing shall constitute an agreeÂ­

ment between our two Governments and shall enter into

force on the date of your reply and shall remain in force

thereafter until a new Agreement for Cooperation ConcernÂ­

ing Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy enters into force. .

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my

highest consideration

- ^ : ÃÂ ^  .

M I N I S T E R  F O R  F O R E I G N  A F F A I R S

, ’ *  C A N B E R R A  -

- S i?  AUG 1978

Excellency, '

/ '  '

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of '

your Note of fourth Augur;t: 1973 concerning the proposed

Interim Agreement between the Government of Australia and

the Government of the United States of America on Peaceful

Nuclear Cooper at ÃÂ¯ÃÂ¿ÃÂÃÂ¯.ÃÂÃÂ¹ Ã¢ÂÂ   That Note ready as follows:

"Excellency:

i

I refer the Minister for Foreign Affairs to

the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses

of Atomic Energy between the Government of the

United States of America and the Government of

Australia, signed on June 22, 1956, as amended,

hereinafter referred to as the 1956 Cooperation

Agreement.

I wish to acknowledge Australia's leadership , jfÂ·-Â·

role in the field of preventing nuclear pro 1 if-

eration. Both Australia and the United States

are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons. Both countries have committed

themselves to ensure that any source materials,

special nuclear materials, or equipment transferred

pursuant to the 1956 Cooperation Agreement,  including

such items subsequently retransferred pursuant to

agreements for cooperation between the United States

and other nations, and any special nuclear materials

produced therefrom, shall not be used for research

on or development of any nuclear explosive device

or for any other military purpose. They have also

committed themselves to accept the application of

IAEA Safeguards to Gvch materials and equipment.

While such materials and equipment are xvifchin the

United States,  the United States intends to implement

this commitment pursuant to an agreement with the

International Atomic Energy Agency for the appliÂ­

cation of safeguards in the United States. Further,

both have committed themselves to ensure that

physical protection measures arc applied to

all such materials or equipment, providing aa

a minimum protection comparable to that set

forth in'" INFCIRC/225 (Rev. 1). These are

enduring commitments.

The United Staten is prepared to begin reneÂ­

gotiation. of the 1956 Cooperation Agreement .

xvith Australia immediately, with a viex^ to

prompt conclusion of a new Agreement. Pending

the entry into force of a renegotiated Agreement

for Cooperation, the United States proposes the

following understanding, in addition to the

agreements set forth in the 1956 Cooperation

Agreement: .

.  i

Ã¢ÂÂ   '  Ã¢ÂÂ   . - 4

The United States shall not exercise any '

rights it has to approve the retransfer or

enrichment to. twenty percent or greater in the

isotope U-235 by another nation or group of

nations of material hereafter transferred .

pursuant to the 1956 Cooperation Agreement

or otherwise identified as being of Australian

origin, and shall not exercise any rights it

has to approve the retransfer or reprocessing

of irradiated fuel elements containing special

nuclear materials produced through the use of

such materials, unless Australian approval is

obtained in advance. Tills applies only xvhere

;  the country requesting approval has notified

- 2 -

Â·  Ã¢ÂÂ   ~ 3 - Ã¢ÂÂ

the United States that Australia hag this

right or its equivalent. In the event that '

the United Staten la not g o notified, the United

States nhall consult with Australia prior to

Ã¢ÂÂ   granting ouch approval.

In addition to the foregoing, it is the underÂ­

ot ending of the United States that neither party

shall enrich any uranium after transfer pursuant

to the 3 . 9 5 6  Cooperation Agreement to twenty Ã¢ÂÂ

percent or greater in the Isotope 235 unless

prior approval of the other party is obtained.

I have.Che honour to propose that this Note

and your reply confirming the foregoing shall Â·

constitute an Agreement between our two GovernÂ­

ments and shall enter into force on the,date of

your reply and shall remain in force thereafter

until a new Agreement for Cooperation Concerning'

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy enters into  Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my  highest consideration." I have the honour to confirm that the foregoing is  acceptable to the Government of Australia and that your Note y  and this reply shall together constitute an Agreement between  our tvo Governments, which shall enter into force on the date  of this reply. . Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my ' Â·   highest consideration. . (Andrew Peacock) Ã¢ÂÂ   .  !  '  Ã¢ÂÂ   His Excellency, Mr Philip Alston Snr., Ambassador of the United States  of America to Australia, CANBERRA, A.C.T. 2600

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my

highest consideration."

I have the honour to confirm that the foregoing is

acceptable to the Government of Australia and that your Note y

and this reply shall together constitute an Agreement between

our tvo Governments, which shall enter into force on the date

of this reply. .

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my ' Â·

highest consideration. .

(Andrew Peacock)

Ã¢ÂÂ   .  !  '  Ã¢ÂÂ

His Excellency,

Mr Philip Alston Snr.,

Ambassador of the United States

of America to Australia,

CANBERRA, A.C.T. 2600

