No. M 3 3  Date 22 May 1979 THE HON. ANDREW PEACOCK M.P.

AUSTRALIA/ROK NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT

The following is the text of a statement by  the Minister for Foreign Affairs,  Mr Andrew Peacock,  to  the House of Representatives on 22 May 1979:

Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Mr Andrew Peacock, on 22 May 1979 on

tabling the Australian/Republic of Korea

Nuclear Safeguards Agreement

Mr Speaker, .

I hereby present the Agreement between the Government of

Australia and the Government of the Republic of Korea Concerning

Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the

Transfer of Nuclear Material together with a letter sent to the

leader of the Republic of Korea delegation which negotiated

the Agreement;

I seek leave to make a statement.

The Agreement was signed in Canberra on 2 May 1979 by

the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Resources,

Mr Anthony,  and the Ambassador of the Republic of Korea His

Excellency Mr Han Lim Lee. The Agreement entered into force

on s ignature .  Ã¢ÂÂ  '  Â·

Consistent with the practice that I adopted regarding

previous nuclear safeguards agreements, namely with Finland and

the Philippines,  I have sought to present the Agreement to

Parliament as soon as possible after signature.

The Agreement is a further step in the establishment of

a network of bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements between

Australia and other countries.  The purpose of these agreements is

to ensure that when Australia supplies uranium for peaceful

purposes it will not be diverted to non-peaceful or explosive

uses. To this end the Agreement incorporates stringent safeguards

and controls on the use of the uranium we supply to the Republic

of Korea for peaceful purposes.

The Agreement incorporates all the Government's nuclear

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safeguards requirements as announced by the Prime Minister on

24 May 1977Â· These are: .

- ah undertaking that nuclear material supplied by

Australia will not be diverted to military or;

explosive purposes; ,

- the application of International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) safeguards, which provide an international check

against diversion of material;

- fallback arrangements to ensure continued safeguarding

of nuclear material should IAEA safeguards for any reason

cease to apply;

- a requirement for Australia's prior consent to any

retransfers, to ensure that uranium supplied by

Australia cannot be re-exported unless we are satisfied

as to the ultimate destination and as to the controls

that would apply;

- a requirement for Australia's prior consent for high

enrichment 'dr reprocessing of material supplied by Australia

This ensures that these operations can only take place

if Australia is fully satisfied about the arrangements '  ' &  . .

and conditions. This effectively reserves our position

on reprocessing, as We have said we wish to, pending the

outcome of international studies, including INFCE (the

International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation);

- provisions ensuring that adequate physical security will

be maintained, to guard against theft or other illegal

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use of nuclear material by groups or individuals; :

- provisions for consultations to ensure the"effective .

implementation of the Agreement; and -

- all these safeguards and controls to cover nuclear

material derived from Australian uranium so long as it

remains in a form relevant from the point of view of

safeguards. '  1  -  Ã¢ÂÂ  "  Â·  Ã¢ÂÂ   .

The Agreement also contains:-

- a sanctions Article acknowledging Australia's right to

suspend supplies and to require return of material in

the event of detonation of a nuclear device, failure

to comply with IAEA safeguards or breach of the-agreement;

and

- arbitration procedures for the settlement of disputes.

The Agreement itself establishes safeguards obligations

which the Republic of Korea and Australia have accepted; the

accompanying letter concerns the practical application and

implementation of these obligations. It does not change or

dilute the Agreement itself. The purpose of the letter is

to provide a degree of reassurance to the Republic of Korea

of the manner in which Australia intends to exercise its

prior consent rights and to handle administrative problems

that might arise from "multiple labelling",  i.e. the attachment

pf different national nuclear safeguards conditions to material

as it is transferred internationally for processing purposes on

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its way to the end-user. The letter also deals with the

implementation of the non-compliance and "fall-back safeguards"

provisions, and the intended scope of.the administrative

arrangements. The letter states Australia's intention of

being a reliable supplier and^its attitude towards a

possible international convention on the physical protection

of nuclear material. 'Ã¢ÂÂ Ã¢ÂÂ Â·Â·Ã¢ÂÂ   ,

The Republic of Korea's nuclear program is a

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large one, and envisages over 40 reactors by the year 2000,

at which time nuclear power would account for 60% of

electricity generation and 20% of the Republic of Korea's

total energy requirements.  One reactor is already operating,

two are under construction and two are on order. Under present

plans, work on two new reactors, will start each year. The

Republic of Korea estimates that its cumulative.requirements

for yellowcake between now and the year 2000 will be of the

order of 80,000 tonnes, a very substantial quantity. The

conclusion of this nuclear cooperation and safeguards agreement

with the Republic of Korea provides a basis for shipments of

Australian uranium to that country under commercial contracts.

It therefore opens the way to an important new link between

the two countries. ,  .

Further nucleat safeguards agreements with other

countries will follow. I assure the House that each agreement

will be made public as it is signed. .  ,  . . .

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The Government's nuclear safeguards policy is

a comprehensive, stringent and highly responsible policy aimed

at contributing to the prevention of the proliferation of

nuclear weapons. It is also an eminently practical and

internationally workable policy. The willingness of potential

customer- countries to accept Australia's nuclear safeguards

1  requirements,  thorough and stringent as they are, is

evidence of this.

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