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NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE

The following statement was delivered by the   Foreign Minister, Mr Bill Hayden, MP, to the NPT Review   Conference in Geneva on 28 August 1985.

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AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO THE THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE

OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

STATEMENT BY

MR BILL HAYDEN M.P.' Â· MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ;  28 AUGUST 1985

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Mr President,  the world changed on 29 March 1919.

At two opposing edges of this earth - Sobral in Brazil"

and Principe off West Africa - measurements'were taken -   of an eclipse of the sun. Their results proved that   Albert Einstein's theory of relativity was correct. Two hundred years of a perspective of physics and the *

cosmos ,  shaped by Newton and Euclid and Galileo, were   swept away. We learned from Einstein's simple equation

that all mass has energy.  The atomic age had begun.

Only twenty three‘years later in December 1942, Enrico Fermi produced the first self-sustaining nuclear chain Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ 'Â· Â·.

reaction in Chicago. As the message from Chicago r ep o r t e d , "The Italian navigator has just landed in the new w o r l d " .

Only two and a half years later, under the desperate   pressure of global conflict, the first nuclear explosion   was conducted at the Trinity test site in New M e x i c o ,   sending a ball of fire into the atmosphere and forming the   now familiar mushroom-shaped c l o u d . The yield of that

detonation was a mere 5,000 t o n s . Twenty days later the .   first nuclear weapon was detonated over Hiroshima, killing   78,000 people. A few days later, a second nuclear w e a p o n  r.   was detonated over Nagasaki, killing 100,000 people. Deaths

resulting from injury and radiation caused by those two

detonations continue to occur today. O n e 'scientist who

witnessed the Trinity test recalled a verse from a sacred

Hindu text -

"If the radiance of a thousand suns

Were to burst at once into the sky,

That would be like the splendour of the might one -   I am become death, the shatterer of worlds*.

Atomic energy has not been permitted to shatter our world.

It must never do so. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ' Ã¢ÂÂ   :

is a document - and a commitment - of irreducible importance,  one of the keymeans we have devised to contain the terrible

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.  power of atomic energy ana to maintain international peace,  _

’  security and stability in the nuclear age.

A few months after Hiroshima, the question how this new  science and technology could be controlled was already

actively being considered.  On 3 October 1945., President

Truman wrote to the Congress stating:  "Never in history " has society been confronted with a power so full of potential   danger and at the same time so full of promise for the   future of man and for the peace of the world. I think I

express the faith of the American people when I say that  we can use the knowledge we have won,  not for the devastation   of war, but for the future welfare of humanity".  The first

proposals for international control were presented by the   '  United States to the United Nations but were rejected in   1946 eind again in 1947 .  In 1949, the Soviet Union became   the second nuclear weapon state, following its detonation

of a weapon based on nuclear fission. In 1952, the United

States detonated the first thermo-nuclear bomb. It

*  was followed a year later by a similar detonation by the ( Soviet Union. The two original nuclear weapon states '  were joined by three others:  the United Kingdom in 1952,

*  Prance in 1960 and China in 1964. Nuclear proliferation had commenced because debate and negotiations about the -

control of atomic energy and nuclear weapons had failed. -

:  The central argument about this control is as relevant today: the question of denial versus control. There was a period in which serious thought was given to  absolute denial of atomic materials and technology by

those who possessed them.

Denial was in some ways the simple solution because it  '  was absolute. But it did not work, as the proliferation -  of nuclear weapons had demonstrated. The alternative was collective control, a more complex and difficult concept.

” Attempts to settle the argument between denial and control  foundered until President Eisenhower's "atoms for peace" -  speech.  That vision has since proved to settle the argument  ;  for most countries. - - - - -  _ v-

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It leapt across barriers of political dispute and

rising tension fuelled by competition in weapons of mass   destruction. President Eisenhower called upon the   United Nations to establish an International Atomic

Energy Agency would "devise measures by which this   fissionable material would be allocated to serve the "

peaceful pursuits of mankind".

Three years later, in October 1956, the statute of the   International Atomic Energy Agency was opened for signature.   It entered into force on 29 July 1957. The objective of   the Agency is to "seek to accelerate and enlarge the   contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity

through the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able,   that assistance provided by it or at its request or under   X t a  e u p e r v i e i o n  o r  c o n t r o l ,  i s  n o t  u s e d  i n  o u c h  a x a y  t o

further military purpose". The International Atomic Energy   Agency is dedicated to the exclusively peaceful uses of

nuclear energy. The work it has done, which itself has   explanded and developed during the almost thirty years~it   has existed, has made a major contribution to the   maintenance of international peace and security. Shortly   after the International Atomic Energy Agency was born,

negotiations commenced within the Agency on the

establishment of the Agency's nuclear safeguards system   designed to detect any diversion of peaceful nuclear   materials to any military purpose. It was recognised that   such a safeguards system would be essential if the Agency   was to fulfil its objective and if, in the face of inevitably

growing applications of nuclear energy, there was to be any

chance of restraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Those negotiations were difficult. For a number of years,

they were impeded by some members of the Agency because   they were, at that time, intent on continuing nuclear  weapons development. Nevertheless in 1961, the Agency's first

safeguards system was brought into existence. This was a. -  significant development but it was quickly recognised that  these arrangements were not, in themselves, sufficient

instruments to provide the world with assurances against ;

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'  the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  We remain indebted  to Ireland for its initiative in 1961 when it brought to  the UN General Assembly the resolution in which the need

for, and the elements of, a treaty on the non-proliferation  of nuclear weapons was outlined. In 1967, sa draft treaty  was introduced into the Disarmament Committee in Geneva by

both the United States and the Soviet Union on the nonÂ­ proliferation of nuclear weapons.  That treaty was opened  * for signature in July 1968. It entered into force in

March 1970.

Mr President, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons has more adherents than any treaty on arms control  or disarmament.  No member of the world community, whether Â·

.  a signatory of this treaty or not, has failed to benefit from it. It has contributed,  unqualifiedly, to the maintenance

Ã¢ÂÂ¢  of international peace and security. It must continue to do so'.

This Third Review Conference is the most important^ conference  ever held under the treaty. We face together a single and  compelling task.  Where we can, we must strengthen the  treaty, and we must redouble our efforts to bring into the

'  treaty those few remaining countries who, while they have .

i  benefitted from it, have nevertheless decided to remain v'' j  outside. Our work at this conference must also lay the v  - Â· foundation for the continuation of the treaty well beyond

1995. It is as unthinkable that we should allow the NPT v  to lapse as that we should withdraw our commitment to the  UN Charter since through the treaty the Charter is supplemented  and strengthened in a field which it was not conceived to cover

.  Before discussing some of the individual elements of the treaty to which the conference will devote detailed  attention,  I want to emphasise a point of over-riding  :  importance about the treaty as a whole. It may be true ** that not all hopes for some aspects of the treaty have

been fulfilled. But the fact remains that the treaty is the  single,  most effective, existing instrument against nuclear

proliferation.

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This treaty rests on the recognition that the use of  nuclear energy has spread throughout the world because  of its usefulness,  its economy and the expanding demand

for it.. Nuclear energy is one of a range of> possible

energy sources of interest to* Treaty Parties. Australia  contributes to multilateral mechanisms for providing  assistance to developing countries on energy questions,  including alternative energy sources. The IAEA itself

provides technology and know-how on energy issues generally,  as well as on the nuclear energy option. But the use of

nuclear energy cannot be permitted to bring with it what  would surely be the single most terrible and destabilising  of all conceivable developments: widespread proliferation

of nuclear weapons.

D u r i n g  fchtt l a c t  16 y o s r c ,  fchic t r e a t y  h a s  p r o v i d e d  t h e

framework within which the peaceful uses of nuclear energy   have been developed without our having to face this   development. It has made every person more secure"v*hether   his or her government has participated in it or not. Nobody   can say that he or she would have been better off without

this treaty. Nobody can say what this world would look like -   if indeed it still existed - if this treaty had not been forged.   Vie should not forget the sombre but confident preductions that   were made, only 20 years ago, that there would be 15 or 20

states possessing nuclear weapons today. And I want to make   this clear: Australia is one of the states which could have made a nuclear weapon.

Shortly after the Non-Proliferation Treaty was opened for   signature, the question whether or not Australia should   seek to make a nuclear weapon was debated in Australia.

Make no mistake: we possessed the technology and the skills.

Indeed, during the national election campaign in 1969 in   Australia, the main conservative political party pledged   that it would ''bring Australia into the atomic age'1   if it were elected. We stepped back from that decision, -   however, and signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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We decided to ignore whatever dark of anxious vision of   the future compels a state or a people to consider acquiring

nuclear weapons.  We decided instead to put our faith   in collective international action to control the

proliferation of nuclear weapons - to commit Australia .   unreservedly to this treaty and to the non-proliferation   objective.  Â·

We did not make this decision alone.  The idea has enormous

force throughout the world community. Along with more than   100 non-nuclear weapon states party to this treaty, we   have achieved collective self-defence through collective   self-denial for the common good.  ~

Mr ^President.  I now want to address briefly some of the ~   central issues of the operation of the treaty.  It is   common knowledge that, when the treaty was negotiated, .   it was envisaged as having a scope that would embrace

*  the prevention of both the-proliferation of nuclear ^   iweapons to countries which did nqt aliready possess them  f  .  .  - Â·  .

and the further proliferation of ‘ weapons by existing — nuclear weapon states. In Articles I and II of the

treaty, member states are divided, into two categories:   nuclear weapon states and non nuclear ~ weapon states, Each has specific obligations.  Australia has completely V   fulfilled its obligations as a non nuclear weapon state   under Article II of the treaty. We have no reason to believe

that any non nuclear weapon state party to this treaty

has violated or sought to violate its obligation under   than article.  The control of horizontal proliferation  provided for by this treaty has been effective with regard  to all non nuclear weapon states party to it. These are

facts of immense significance. In this respect the treaty

has worked.

It must also be said that, under Article I, the nuclear  weapon states party to the Treaty have carried out

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impeccably their obligations as possessors of nuclear

ir.ateria 1 s and technology. Thus must be recognised and .   appreciated as a significant source of strength to the   treaty. But it was also expected,  flowing from Article VI, .  V  that there would be real progress on measures of nuclear

disarmament,  to stop the vertical proliferation of -   nuclear weapons.  The nuclear weapon states also   reaffirmed the intention, contained previously in the ^ Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, to seek an end to   nuclear testing.  These expectations have not been fulfilled   adequately.  The nuclear weapon states have not wholly

fulfilled their side of the bargain.

This causes Australia very serious concern. VJe hold that Â·. *Â·

th a  world is not. made any safer by ever increasing   numbers and kinds of nuclear w e a p o n s , We hold that a   comprehensive test ban treaty is urgently required and

that it would greatly strengthen both this present treaty   and all actions designed to halt and reverse the nuclear   arms r a c e . - .

The world community has called for 25 years for a complete   end to all nuclear te st in g. This necessity* this d em a n d ,   has been expressed in agreements which form part of the body

of international law. The United States and the Soviet Union,   who conduct the overwhelming number of nuclear tests, are   parties to those agreements, including this present treaty.

The call by the international community, with which the

United States and the Soviet Union associated themselves,

has not been answered. It must be answered as a matter

of urgency. .  _

Arguments about the relevance of a test ban treaty to   nuclear disarmament and the proliferation of nuclear weapons   are unconvincing. It ia more important to look at   behaviour and facts than to hear a rg ument. The major testing

programs have had a direct functional relationship to vertical   proliferation. It is crystal clear t h a t , if testing was

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not militarily significant, it would not occur. Thus,

precisely because it is an integral part of nuclear

weapons development, it should end.  Arguments about the  verifiability of such a treaty command attention because  a treaty which was not adequately verifiable would constitute  a dangerous illusion.  Australia has no interest in illusory

arms control,

The Australian Government has given an extraordinary  amount of attention - more so than any previous government

in our country - to the issue of a comprehensive test  ban treaty: in other words, a measure to bring about truly effective arms control and disarmament.  As I told t h e  UN G e n e r a l  a e c o m b i  y  y e s r ’, w e  h a v e  b e e n  t r y  i n g

for some time as a matter of urgency to help overcome the   procedural obstacles which have been put in the way of   such an effective treaty. Our natural preference is for

a so-called full negotiating mandate. Since the consensus   for such a mandate does not yet exist, we have proposed

instead that the Ad Hoc Committee of the CD work on scope,   verification and compliance with a view to the negotiation   of such a treaty. We have proposed this consistently over   the past two years# at the CD and the General Assembly.

We believe these means of verification can be designed and

established. We have proposed the immediate establishment   of an international seismic monitoring network as one of   the means of ensuring compliance with a test ban treaty.   This can and should be done.  We have ourselves commenced

creating additional national seismic monitoring capacity.

Our approach has received overwhelming endorsement at the   General Assembly but has been blocked by only a handful :

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of states at the Conference on Disarmament.  There cannot

be any doubt that nuclear testing plays a significant   role in the proliferation of nuclear weapons, whether   horizontal or vertical. It is clear then that those

who are serious about stopping and reversing the nuclear   arms race and containing the spread of nuclear weapons m u e t  a g r e e  t o  a n u c l e a r  t e s t  b a n . U n i l a t e r a l ,  u n v o r i f i a b l e

moratoria are not the answer. What is required, and

required urgently, is a comprehensive nuclear test ban   treaty and the necessary global means of verification

of compliance with the treaty.

The Australian Government holds this view in the

strongest way possible and it sees the Non-Proliferation   Treaty as-a means of enabling and encouraging its translation   into concrete achievement.  Indeed, the Australian   Gwvemmeijt lb uuuoe^iietl LheL 1L will nut be Â«Lie L limited CTB negotiating mandate if it continues to be  ineffective or if it appears to the Australian people  to be getting nowhere. That is why this conference must seek to reconcile the  differences amongst parties in their approaches to this  urgent requirement. . 10 . c lircii.,Â· v-l !  i l ' v m F. 1Z 10.  M There is nothing which would more sharply strengthen  and support this reaty, from within, than a firm  undertaking to start now on the long and difficult path of negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. The negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty should   not be made hostage to the bilateral nuclear and space  negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.   -Both parties to those negotiations have stated that they   seek radical reductions leading towards ultimate elimination   in their nuclear weapons.  We applaud and support that goal   and we urge success in those negotiations. But we cannot  support any suggestion that a comprehensive test ban treaty   should become a bargaining chip in those negotiations. . Mr President,  it would be insensitive - it would do violence   to well known facts - if we did not recognise the wider  international political difficulties which have contributed   to nuclear weapon states inadequately implementing obligations   towards nuclear disarmament and an end to testing. I   also emphasise that it is Australia's view that whatever —  the findings of the conference on the implementation of this   treaty with regard to vertical proliferation, nuclear  disarmament2  and nuclear testing, this treaty remains of conÂ­ tinuing necessity.  But we do strongly appeal to the nuclear   weapon states to meet the expectations of the world community   because real measures of nuclear disarmament and an end to   nuclear testing are urgently required. Their failure to   do so risks damage to this treaty. In this context,  among the Australian Government’s deepest   concerns about maintaining the non proliferation regime in   the face of direct threats to it, is the action and policies   of a small number of non signatory statesi which have or are considering doing so, Here we face something of a /:< Â·  r. -  . Â· developed or may be developing a nuclear explosives device . . 11 . :  ÃÂ ÃÂ Ã¢ÂÂºÂ·-Â· i i  jj i i ’ .-Li ’ .L^ H F. 13 a  3 * Â» / i v paradox.  Virtually all of those states have repeated  that they support the non proliferation objective and  that they have no intention of developing a nuclear '   weapon. On the other hand, they give Â«11 kinds of " reasons why they will not join with us in the non proÂ­ liferation treaty regime.  What are we to make of this? Why not join a regime which provides common security,  including to those states? If their national nuclear  activities are beyond reproach,  why not let that be  seen by all by submitting those activities to the comÂ­ prehensive inspection procedures of this regime? Above  all, why not contribute directly to the overall climate .   of confidence,  which is so deeply necessary in the nuclear  ace,  by joining in this regime and thus enhancing its  ability to provide security to the whole world community? This Review Conference should send the clearest possible  message to those states. It should contain no element of  hostility or pedantry. Instead it should take the form —-of an appeal to those who remain outside this treaty -  especially those whose national nuclear activities create  legitimate concern - to join us in it. At the very least,  they should submit their national programs to the inspections  and controls that are vitally necessary to the maintenance v  of international confidence.  If what they say about their  national programs is correct,  such inspections would verify this and revatl nothing damaging to the non proliferation objective.  We should make it particularly clear that the  130 parties to the Treaty will not accept the threat to  the non proliferation regime and international nuclear  cooperation posed by any further instances, of the proÂ­ liferation of a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device. ‘  Â£ - With regard to other measures for nuclear arms control  and disarmament envisaged in the Treaty (for example,  under Article VII), I want to report particularly the . .  .12 12 . agreement reached on August 6 this year at Rarotonga  among the 14 sovereign and independent member states  of the South Pacific Forum. The forum states decided  to endorse a treaty which declares the South Pacific a ,   nuclear-free zone and to open the treaty for signature. Let me make just a few points about it. Forum member  states recognised the obligations of international law  with regard to rights of passage across the zone in the  air and on the high seas. They also recognised the  sovereign right of independent states concerning access  by ships and planes of other countries to their ports  and airfields. But the treaty does (among other things)  prohibit the development, manufacture, acquisition, storage,  testing and use of nuclear explosive devices in the South  Pacific. It opposes dumping of nuclear waste at sea in  the region. it provides that the export of nuclear material  from the region will be conducted under strict safeguards. The zone that is covered by this treaty is a significant  portion of the surface of this earth. The treaty is an  important contribution to disarmament, arms control and  the maintenance of peace and stability in this significant  region. Mr President, vital parts of the NPT are contained in  Articles III and IV. The former describes the safeguards  essential to an effective non proliferation regime and  the latter establishes principles and obligations with  regard to international cooperation in the peaceful uses  of nuclear energy, under the treaty. These provisions must  be fully implemented if we are toÃ¢ÂÂstrengthen the non proÂ­ liferation regime and, because the treaty has a whole or  overall significance, it is important to recognise the  integral relationship of these two articles. Simply,  taken together with Articles I and II, they provide the  basis for safe and constructive international cooperation  in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. ; Mr- O r e  e i i o n t  ,  t h e r e  W e e  b o o n  ÃÂ e u b o b a n h i a X  o o m n u n i t y  w i s e debate in Australia on the role Australia should or should 13. not play in the international nuclear fuel cycle.  I am  not suggesting that Australians are special or exotic _   in this. It is true, however, that nature has given  us a special interest in the issue because our country  possesses a substantial proportion of the world's reÂ­ coverable uranium resources. Responsible concern about  what, if anything,  we should do with our nuclear raw  materials, supported by wide community fears about the Hiadncss o f  a c o n t i n u i n g  n u c l e a r  a r m o  r a c e ,  h a v e  p l a c e d great demands on the Australian Government. The debate   in the Australian community has mirrored the debate   on denial versus control which took place 40 years ago.   Though a good number of Australians say they prefer denial   as far as the export of Australian uranium is concerned,   the ''uranium debate'1  in Australia has been resolved in   favour of control. It is to the credit of the Australian   people that they have demanded such a high degree of clarity   from their Government on the issues of non proliferation and   Australia's role in this treaty. For these reasons, in 1983 the Australian Government inÂ­ vitee the Australian Science and Technology Council - an   independent institution - to draw up a report to the   Government on Australia's role in the nuclear fuel cycle.   That report was tabled in the Australian parliament in   May 1984. Many of its recommendations, which the Government   accepted, had direct bearing on this treaty, including r Articles III and IV. I will outline briefly three major  decisions Australia has taken on the results of this  enquiry which are relevant to the work of the Conference. First, the Australian Government decided to promote  acceptance by all states of a commitment not to provide  nuclear items to non nuclear weapon states which are . n u L  HiemUe.ee u f  L h e  MPT, u i  ci t i e a L y  u l  e l i u l l e t i  v u v e x a y e ,  . / ? r. JD H .  11 7k IIS' unless IAEA safeguards are applied to all the nuclear   activities in those states at all times.  Australia's   own supply policies require non nuclear weapon states   to be members of the KPT and to have safeguards applied   to all their nuclear activities at all timess v The"   irportonic ot ÃÂ¹ÃÂ»ÃÂÃÂ»  saicuuai in pi.uvJ.Qing l eassurance ' of the peaceful use of nuclear materials is fundamental   to the operation of the NPT. The Australian delegation   will be making a proposal to this Conference calling on all   -non parties to adhere to the treaty or accept IAEA fullscope   safeguards and seeking a commitment from all parties to   require the application of NPT or IAEA fullscope safeguards   to the supply of nuclear items to all non nuclear weapons   states. Such a commitmentÃ¢ÂÂ would significantly strengthen ,  the non proliferation regime. It would also remove ' * - 1   discrimination between safeguards conditions on supply accepted by non nuclear weapons state party to the NPT and those not party to the NPT. _ Second., the Australian Government decided to strengthen _! the operation of the Australian Safeguards Office in   line with the importance of the state systems of accounting   and control of nuclear material to"the effective operation   of IAEA safeguards. The Australian Government considers   that the important role of such state systems in controlling   the use of nuclear material and in providing the necessary   information and cooperation to the IAEA is a key factor in-   the effective application of IAEA safeguards. Accordingly, we are moving to underline the importance we   attach to such boQivÂ» by introducing specific legislation   setting out in detail the role and responsibility of the   Australian Safeguards Office and by providing assistance   to NPT parties within our region for the establishment and '   development of state systems of accounting and control. . . . 15 . i r '  i  i 15. Third, the Australian Government reiterated its support  for the establishment of an effective scheme for interÂ­ national plutonium storage. It recognises that plutonium  is a sensitive nuclear material which poses special proÂ­ liferation concerns. The need for such a scheme,  administered by the IAEA,  is becoming a matter of increasing priority. Australia hopes that this Conference will agree that  the establishment of an international plutonium storage  scheme merits the support of all NPT parties.  Australia  also supports the general objective of separation of civil  and military fuel cycles in the nuclear weapon states in  principle. If a solution c’ ould be found to this complex Â·   and demanding issue,  it could lay important groundwork for the implementation of future nuclear disarmament  agreements.  Â· ' Ã¢ÂÂ  . ' . Â· Â· I turn now to Article IV of the treaty - a provision of  great significance because this treaty as a whole re- Â· presents an agreement between virtually all members of the  world community, irrespective of their state of economic  development or military strength. An integral part of  this agreement was that, parallel with the non proliferation :  -  undertaking, all parties to the Treaty would be committed  to contribute to the further development of the applications  of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 11 especially in the  territories of non nuclear weapon states party to the treaty  with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas  of the world'', : Critics of this treaty principally charge that it discriminates  in favour of those who have nuclear technology and materials  against those who do not? control of the 1‘South' 1  by the  ''north'', to express the more cynical version of the criticism* —  I l i C O J W  v-u1  'L. ' >  H p .  ig 16. The Australian Government rejects this criticism, though it recognises the damage it causes.  However, our point is that those who choose to stand outside this treaty and nut enter into the non proliferation regime should  * Â»  not be seen to be rewarded in terms of cooperation in  comparison with those who have.  The consistent application  of fullscope safeguards as my delegation proposes would  put an end to any such rewards. Clearly, a principal subject of concern at this Conference  will be ways in Which we might strengthen international  nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes under Article IV  of the treaty.  In our view the past record of such  peaceful international nuclear cooperation has been a  creditable one.  For its part, Australia has contributed  to the IAEA’s Voluntary Technical Assistance Fund since the  last Review Conference. In the same period, Australia has  made available funds under the IAEA Regional Cooperative  Agreement for Asia and the Pacific and under bilateral  programs. Bilateral nuclear technical assistance programs are under way with Malaysia knd Indonesia. Discussions  on bilateral assistance to Thailand will begin in the near  future.  Since 1980 Australia has also enhanced the level of  predictability in the operation of its bilateral nuclear  cooperation agreements and provided customers of Australian  uranium with greater assurance of supply. The Australian delegation hopes that this Conference can avoid  the stereotyped North-South dialogue debate on Article IV. V?e believe it would' be much more productive to engage in a  genuine dialogue;  to examine in detail practical ways in  which international cooperation under Article IV of the  treaty can be improved. ,Demands, needs and expectations  are not static. We must recognise this fact and seek . .   together to design constructive responses. X . . . 17 . I-' J : . L  C - Nat-or.ai policies of preference for NPT parties to all forms _   of cooperation,  as is Australia's policyÂ» are one effective   mechanism. for benefitting KPT parties and improving cooperation.   Other questions which merit attention are: . improvements in the .  IAEA Footnote (A) mechanism   . the contribution that regional cooperation   agreements can make .  . cooperation in the development of commercially , viable small and medium power reactors to supply   small or isolated electrical grids. One of the abiding problems in this field is that of interÂ­ national or multilateral financing for nuclear cooperation   and development.  This is another important issue for disÂ­ cussion. These are a few of the possible channels through   which cooperation under Article IV may be developed. There are assuredly others. We want to identify and develop   such channels of cooperation,  because the Australian GovernÂ­ ment is committed to the principle that an integral-part of   a viable non proliferation regime is continuing cooperation   between member States in line with the objective of Article   IV of the treaty. ’ Mr PresidentÂ·Â» I h a v e  6oughL in tille statement to make clear -both what the Australian Government believes are the. critical   issues in this Review Conference and to describe Australia’s   policies and approaches towards those issues. This treaty   is - for the Government and the people of Australia - Ã¢ÂÂ  an international agreement of irreducible importance. This   is felt deeply in my country because of the nuclear source   materials we possess in great abundance and the depth of our   concern about nuclear weapons.  Vfe are directly involved Ã¢ÂÂ    because of the joint Australian-American facilities, which   the Australian Government holds to be an essential part of   the monitoring system in effective armc control.  We cue also   a people committed to an reliant upon international cooperation. Â·/ - - -*.>Â·Â·:’ 18 C ! 'Ã’5Â·  Or: 14 AUSIPAL1AH UlSrlOM C-DEVA 9 1  16 P.EO Australians are a long way from the traditional  flashpoints and cockpits and pressure areas of history. They understand that - just as much as those who live in  Europe or North America - they cannot escape the effects  of nuclear war, wherever it may break out.  So I bring a message  from Australians to this Conference.  The Treaty on the  Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be defended and  strengthened so that it can play its part in making sure " that this world can be handed on - whole and entire and  at peace - to the generations of the future. Â£ z v O / -  Â· . Â· Â· . .  'r ; *

limited CTB negotiating mandate if it continues to be

ineffective or if it appears to the Australian people  to be getting nowhere.

That is why this conference must seek to reconcile the

differences amongst parties in their approaches to this

urgent requirement.

. 10 .

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10.

M

There is nothing which would more sharply strengthen  and support this reaty, from within, than a firm  undertaking to start now on the long and difficult path of negotiating a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

The negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty should   not be made hostage to the bilateral nuclear and space  negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.   -Both parties to those negotiations have stated that they

seek radical reductions leading towards ultimate elimination

in their nuclear weapons.  We applaud and support that goal

and we urge success in those negotiations. But we cannot  support any suggestion that a comprehensive test ban treaty   should become a bargaining chip in those negotiations. .

Mr President,  it would be insensitive - it would do violence   to well known facts - if we did not recognise the wider  international political difficulties which have contributed

to nuclear weapon states inadequately implementing obligations   towards nuclear disarmament and an end to testing. I   also emphasise that it is Australia's view that whatever —  the findings of the conference on the implementation of this   treaty with regard to vertical proliferation, nuclear

disarmament2  and nuclear testing, this treaty remains of conÂ­ tinuing necessity.  But we do strongly appeal to the nuclear   weapon states to meet the expectations of the world community   because real measures of nuclear disarmament and an end to

nuclear testing are urgently required. Their failure to   do so risks damage to this treaty.

In this context,  among the Australian Government’s deepest   concerns about maintaining the non proliferation regime in   the face of direct threats to it, is the action and policies   of a small number of non signatory statesi which have

or are considering doing so, Here we face something of a

/:< Â·  r. -  . Â· developed or may be developing a nuclear explosives device

. . 11 .

:  ÃÂ ÃÂ Ã¢ÂÂºÂ·-Â· i i  jj i i ’ .-Li ’ .L^ H F. 13

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paradox.  Virtually all of those states have repeated  that they support the non proliferation objective and  that they have no intention of developing a nuclear '   weapon. On the other hand, they give Â«11 kinds of "

reasons why they will not join with us in the non proÂ­ liferation treaty regime.  What are we to make of this?

Why not join a regime which provides common security,

including to those states? If their national nuclear  activities are beyond reproach,  why not let that be  seen by all by submitting those activities to the comÂ­

prehensive inspection procedures of this regime? Above  all, why not contribute directly to the overall climate .   of confidence,  which is so deeply necessary in the nuclear  ace,  by joining in this regime and thus enhancing its

ability to provide security to the whole world community?

This Review Conference should send the clearest possible

message to those states. It should contain no element of  hostility or pedantry. Instead it should take the form —-of an appeal to those who remain outside this treaty -  especially those whose national nuclear activities create

legitimate concern - to join us in it. At the very least,  they should submit their national programs to the inspections  and controls that are vitally necessary to the maintenance v  of international confidence.  If what they say about their

national programs is correct,  such inspections would verify this and revatl nothing damaging to the non proliferation objective.  We should make it particularly clear that the  130 parties to the Treaty will not accept the threat to

the non proliferation regime and international nuclear  cooperation posed by any further instances, of the proÂ­ liferation of a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device.

‘  Â£ -

With regard to other measures for nuclear arms control  and disarmament envisaged in the Treaty (for example,  under Article VII), I want to report particularly the

. .  .12

12 .

agreement reached on August 6 this year at Rarotonga  among the 14 sovereign and independent member states  of the South Pacific Forum. The forum states decided  to endorse a treaty which declares the South Pacific a ,   nuclear-free zone and to open the treaty for signature.

Let me make just a few points about it. Forum member  states recognised the obligations of international law  with regard to rights of passage across the zone in the  air and on the high seas. They also recognised the

sovereign right of independent states concerning access  by ships and planes of other countries to their ports  and airfields. But the treaty does (among other things)

prohibit the development, manufacture, acquisition, storage,  testing and use of nuclear explosive devices in the South  Pacific. It opposes dumping of nuclear waste at sea in  the region. it provides that the export of nuclear material

from the region will be conducted under strict safeguards.

The zone that is covered by this treaty is a significant  portion of the surface of this earth. The treaty is an  important contribution to disarmament, arms control and  the maintenance of peace and stability in this significant

region.

Mr President, vital parts of the NPT are contained in  Articles III and IV. The former describes the safeguards  essential to an effective non proliferation regime and  the latter establishes principles and obligations with

regard to international cooperation in the peaceful uses  of nuclear energy, under the treaty. These provisions must  be fully implemented if we are toÃ¢ÂÂstrengthen the non proÂ­

liferation regime and, because the treaty has a whole or  overall significance, it is important to recognise the  integral relationship of these two articles. Simply,  taken together with Articles I and II, they provide the  basis for safe and constructive international cooperation

in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. ;

Mr- O r e  e i i o n t  ,  t h e r e  W e e  b o o n  ÃÂ e u b o b a n h i a X  o o m n u n i t y  w i s e

debate in Australia on the role Australia should or should

13.

not play in the international nuclear fuel cycle.  I am  not suggesting that Australians are special or exotic _   in this. It is true, however, that nature has given  us a special interest in the issue because our country  possesses a substantial proportion of the world's reÂ­ coverable uranium resources. Responsible concern about  what, if anything,  we should do with our nuclear raw

materials, supported by wide community fears about the Hiadncss o f  a c o n t i n u i n g  n u c l e a r  a r m o  r a c e ,  h a v e  p l a c e d

great demands on the Australian Government. The debate

in the Australian community has mirrored the debate   on denial versus control which took place 40 years ago.

Though a good number of Australians say they prefer denial   as far as the export of Australian uranium is concerned,   the ''uranium debate'1  in Australia has been resolved in

favour of control. It is to the credit of the Australian

people that they have demanded such a high degree of clarity   from their Government on the issues of non proliferation and   Australia's role in this treaty.

For these reasons, in 1983 the Australian Government inÂ­ vitee the Australian Science and Technology Council - an

independent institution - to draw up a report to the

Government on Australia's role in the nuclear fuel cycle.   That report was tabled in the Australian parliament in   May 1984. Many of its recommendations, which the Government   accepted, had direct bearing on this treaty, including r Articles III and IV. I will outline briefly three major

decisions Australia has taken on the results of this  enquiry which are relevant to the work of the Conference.

First, the Australian Government decided to promote

acceptance by all states of a commitment not to provide

nuclear items to non nuclear weapon states which are .

n u L  HiemUe.ee u f  L h e  MPT, u i  ci t i e a L y  u l  e l i u l l e t i  v u v e x a y e ,  .

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H .  11 7k IIS'

unless IAEA safeguards are applied to all the nuclear

activities in those states at all times.  Australia's   own supply policies require non nuclear weapon states   to be members of the KPT and to have safeguards applied   to all their nuclear activities at all timess v The"   irportonic ot ÃÂ¹ÃÂ»ÃÂÃÂ»  saicuuai in pi.uvJ.Qing l eassurance '

of the peaceful use of nuclear materials is fundamental   to the operation of the NPT. The Australian delegation   will be making a proposal to this Conference calling on all   -non parties to adhere to the treaty or accept IAEA fullscope

safeguards and seeking a commitment from all parties to   require the application of NPT or IAEA fullscope safeguards   to the supply of nuclear items to all non nuclear weapons   states. Such a commitmentÃ¢ÂÂ would significantly strengthen ,  the non proliferation regime. It would also remove '

* - 1

discrimination between safeguards conditions on supply accepted by non nuclear weapons state party to the NPT and those not party to the NPT. _

Second., the Australian Government decided to strengthen _!

the operation of the Australian Safeguards Office in   line with the importance of the state systems of accounting   and control of nuclear material to"the effective operation

of IAEA safeguards. The Australian Government considers   that the important role of such state systems in controlling   the use of nuclear material and in providing the necessary   information and cooperation to the IAEA is a key factor in-

the effective application of IAEA safeguards.

Accordingly, we are moving to underline the importance we   attach to such boQivÂ» by introducing specific legislation   setting out in detail the role and responsibility of the   Australian Safeguards Office and by providing assistance

to NPT parties within our region for the establishment and '   development of state systems of accounting and control.

. . . 15 .

i r '  i  i

15.

Third, the Australian Government reiterated its support  for the establishment of an effective scheme for interÂ­

national plutonium storage. It recognises that plutonium  is a sensitive nuclear material which poses special proÂ­

liferation concerns.

The need for such a scheme,  administered by the IAEA,

is becoming a matter of increasing priority.

Australia hopes that this Conference will agree that  the establishment of an international plutonium storage  scheme merits the support of all NPT parties.  Australia  also supports the general objective of separation of civil  and military fuel cycles in the nuclear weapon states in  principle. If a solution c’ ould be found to this complex Â·

and demanding issue,  it could lay important groundwork for the implementation of future nuclear disarmament  agreements.  Â· ' Ã¢ÂÂ  . ' . Â· Â·

I turn now to Article IV of the treaty - a provision of

great significance because this treaty as a whole re- Â·

presents an agreement between virtually all members of the  world community, irrespective of their state of economic  development or military strength. An integral part of  this agreement was that, parallel with the non proliferation :  -

undertaking, all parties to the Treaty would be committed

to contribute to the further development of the applications  of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 11 especially in the  territories of non nuclear weapon states party to the treaty  with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas

of the world'', :

Critics of this treaty principally charge that it discriminates  in favour of those who have nuclear technology and materials  against those who do not? control of the 1‘South' 1  by the  ''north'', to express the more cynical version of the criticism*

—  I l i C O J W  v-u1  'L. ' >  H p .  ig

16.

The Australian Government rejects this criticism, though it recognises the damage it causes.  However, our point is that those who choose to stand outside this treaty and nut enter into the non proliferation regime should

* Â»

not be seen to be rewarded in terms of cooperation in

comparison with those who have.  The consistent application  of fullscope safeguards as my delegation proposes would  put an end to any such rewards.

Clearly, a principal subject of concern at this Conference  will be ways in Which we might strengthen international  nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes under Article IV  of the treaty.  In our view the past record of such  peaceful international nuclear cooperation has been a

creditable one.  For its part, Australia has contributed  to the IAEA’s Voluntary Technical Assistance Fund since the  last Review Conference. In the same period, Australia has

made available funds under the IAEA Regional Cooperative  Agreement for Asia and the Pacific and under bilateral  programs. Bilateral nuclear technical assistance programs are under way with Malaysia knd Indonesia. Discussions

on bilateral assistance to Thailand will begin in the near

future.  Since 1980 Australia has also enhanced the level of  predictability in the operation of its bilateral nuclear  cooperation agreements and provided customers of Australian  uranium with greater assurance of supply.

The Australian delegation hopes that this Conference can avoid  the stereotyped North-South dialogue debate on Article IV.

V?e believe it would' be much more productive to engage in a  genuine dialogue;  to examine in detail practical ways in  which international cooperation under Article IV of the

treaty can be improved. ,Demands, needs and expectations  are not static. We must recognise this fact and seek . .   together to design constructive responses.

X

. . . 17 .

I-' J : . L  C -

Nat-or.ai policies of preference for NPT parties to all forms _

of cooperation,  as is Australia's policyÂ» are one effective   mechanism. for benefitting KPT parties and improving cooperation.

Other questions which merit attention are:

. improvements in the .  IAEA Footnote (A) mechanism

. the contribution that regional cooperation

agreements can make .  . cooperation in the development of commercially ,

viable small and medium power reactors to supply

small or isolated electrical grids.

One of the abiding problems in this field is that of interÂ­ national or multilateral financing for nuclear cooperation   and development.  This is another important issue for disÂ­ cussion. These are a few of the possible channels through   which cooperation under Article IV may be developed.

There are assuredly others. We want to identify and develop

such channels of cooperation,  because the Australian GovernÂ­ ment is committed to the principle that an integral-part of   a viable non proliferation regime is continuing cooperation   between member States in line with the objective of Article

IV of the treaty. ’

Mr PresidentÂ·Â» I h a v e  6oughL in tille statement to make clear -both what the Australian Government believes are the. critical   issues in this Review Conference and to describe Australia’s   policies and approaches towards those issues. This treaty

is - for the Government and the people of Australia - Ã¢ÂÂ

an international agreement of irreducible importance. This

is felt deeply in my country because of the nuclear source   materials we possess in great abundance and the depth of our   concern about nuclear weapons.  Vfe are directly involved Ã¢ÂÂ    because of the joint Australian-American facilities, which

the Australian Government holds to be an essential part of   the monitoring system in effective armc control.  We cue also   a people committed to an reliant upon international cooperation.

Â·/ - - -*.>Â·Â·:’

18

C ! 'Ã’5Â·  Or: 14 AUSIPAL1AH UlSrlOM C-DEVA 9

1

16

P.EO

Australians are a long way from the traditional  flashpoints and cockpits and pressure areas of history.

They understand that - just as much as those who live in  Europe or North America - they cannot escape the effects  of nuclear war, wherever it may break out.  So I bring a message

from Australians to this Conference.  The Treaty on the  Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be defended and  strengthened so that it can play its part in making sure " that this world can be handed on - whole and entire and  at peace - to the generations of the future.

Â£ z v O /

-  Â· . Â· Â· . .  'r ; *

