Pll/77

Deputy Leader of the Opposition

PRESS STATEMENT BY THE DEPUTY LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION,Â· MR TOM  UREN, MP - 3 MARCH 1977 .  .Â·

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Opposition to nuclear generation of electric power is

continuing to grow in Europe, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition

Tom Uren, MP, stated today. -

i i ' . .

Mr Uren said the Centre Party's popular opposition to nuclear

power had been a vital factor in the defeat of the Social  Democrats in Sweden in last years elections.  Norway had cancelled

their projected nuclear power program.rV ,

Mr Uren also pointed to recent setbacks to the nuclear  power industry in West Germany where opposition to nuclear  power generation is increasing because of radioactive waste and

plant security problems. The waste problem is regarded so .

seriously that on February 11th Chancellor Schmidt announced that  Ã¢ÂÂ¢ Ã¢ÂÂ  Â·' , .

West Germany would build no more nuclear power stations until radioactive disposal facilities are available.

In Denmark, Mr Uren noted, growing opposition to nuclear -   power has forced successive deferments of commitments to commence  building nuclear power stations. Public opinion polls in

Denmark indicate overwhelming opposition to a nuclear power . Â·   program. (See the attached statement from Organisationen til

Ophysning on Atomkraft.) '  ’

Recently opposition to nuclear power has gained momentum

in the Netherlands, Mr Uren said. He cited as evidence the recent  Congress of the Dutch Labor Party (Partis van de Arbeid) which

came out against the establishment of further enrichment facilities  or nuclear power plants in the Netherlands. Also Dutch Labor

movements generally have come out strongly against the further i   development of nuclear power generation. (A summary of their ' Â· “

attitude is also here appended.) ' Â· -

Parliament House. Canberra, A.C.T 2 6 0 0

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. . . The Organization f o r  Inform ation about Atomic Power(00A -  Organisationen . t i l  Oplysning om Atom kraft) was founded on the 31st o f January,  1974 w ith a  . demand fo r a moratorium on the use o f  atomic power in  Denmark. The day before  . the founding o f  00A the government had published. a l i s t  o f  ten s i t e s  f o r  atomic

power p la n ts in Denmark. These s i t e s  were located in Jutland and on the I s le  .

Ã¢ÂÂ   ..of Funen. Later, an a d d itio n a l fiv e -.s ite s  were proposed, fo r  eastern: Denmark.- -r

, . For more than 20 yea rs both the. Danish 'Atomic S c ie n tis ts  and~the E le c tr ic U t i li t y  Companies have proposed the use o f atomic power in  Denmark. However, -no concrete ste p s had been taken to  i n i t i a t e  any plans u n til 1971 when the .

' b  search began fo r p o s s ib le  atomic power p la n t s i t e s .  In May, 1972, the E le c tr ic

V '' Companies publish ed th e ir  f i r s t  ric h ly  colored prom otional brochures. At the  VÂ· same tim e, they arranged seminars fo r  jo u r n a lis ts ÃÂ±ÃÂÃÂ¬ p h ysics teach ers. . In  . th is  way, they had planned to  e sta b lish  the s o -c a lle d  "peacetim e" uses o f  atomic  ' energy w ithout too much discu ssio n  and debate o f  the pros and cons. .

. . Â· . During th e . Summer, and Autumn o f  1973 a handful o f  concerned c itiz e n s  formed  .. a working group. The members o f  th is  group regarded the use o f  atomic power  w ith g rea t scep ticism . T heir primary o b je c tiv e  was to  insure th a t no d ecision   . ' on the use o f  atomic poQer would be made before the Danish population had been  . informed o f  the problems and dangers th a t are connected w ith the use o f  atomic

. power and, a lso , th a t th ere e x is ts  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  a lte r n a tiv e  sources o f

. Â· energy. ' . Â· Ã¢ÂÂ   _ Â·. VV'VÂ·.Â· ; Ã¢ÂÂ   ÃÂ  b  . Ã¢ÂÂ  'Â· >  -Ã¢ÂÂ  ' b :-.b:;Â· ^ - ' V ' Â·.Â· /" 'V- ~Â·" V Â· 'y ' "

In January, 1974, in  order to  gain more time to  inform and engage the p u b lic ,  the o rig in a l working group form ally e sta b lish e d  the ÃÂ0Ã‘. The newly formed 00A  , .. . ..'immediately demanded that, the decisio n  about atomic power be postponed f o r  a t  Ã¢ÂÂ¢yÂ·Â·-''Â·' le a s t three years. ÃÂ fu r th e r  demand w as:th at any d ecisio n  about atomic power Â·.Â·

' should be made by the Danish Parliament and not by any a d m in istra tiv e  o r . 'b y  governmental a u th o r itie s . Since then, 'the focus o f  00A's work has been in  the ,

;; follow in g areas: . Â· ... : ; V  :?'vb . v., -  Ã¢ÂÂ  . *>.Â·

1 .  "  A c r i t i c a l  eva lu a tio n  o f  a l l  o f  the problems and issu e s connected w ith

. wo ith e u s e  .o f atomic power. - ÃÂ» ...... .

2. . Increased research in  and renewed, evaluation o f  a lte r n a tiv e  sources o f Ã¢ÂÂ   :. .energy. . . . ..... ... . . Â·Â·.Â· . ..' Â· . Â·Â· Ã¢ÂÂ   Â·. . .......' Ã¢ÂÂ  Â·Â·'Â·. Â·'.

. 3. . Improvement o f  a long-term , energy p o lic y  th a t con siders s o c ia l and eco lo g ic a l f a c to r s . - Â·  Â· Â« .  .  Â· + Â· Â· Ã¢ÂÂ  .  <  ' - Â·  .  Â·  v.>  Â·  ' Ã¢ÂÂ  Â· i  .  - Â·  - Â· Â· . Â· Â»> >ÃÂÂ·.: Â· Â· . Â·  Â·  ..

During the p a st th ree yea rs the o rig in a l working group has grown and  strengthened in to  an org a n iza tio n  with 160 local groups, which, w ith u n ited   e f f o r t s , have crea te d  the s itu a tio n  where today i t  i s  an unanswered qu estion   whether or not atomic power p la n ts w i l l  ever be b u i l t  in  Denmark... In August, Ã¢ÂÂ   1976, a p u b lic  opinion p o l l  showed th a t i f  a referendum were to  be h eld , only

16% would vote in  fa v o r, w h ile 58% would vote against the use o f  atomic power in  jDenmark. The o th er 26% would be undecided. .Â·Ã¢ÂÂ -Â·Â· v

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Springy 1974, the Danish Parliament has been occupied w ith atomic  le g is la tio n . A new law concerning the establish m en t o f atomic paver p la n ts  was fin a lly  passed in A prily 1976. This law has made the atomic power qu estion   p o l i t i c a l  by requ irin g a separate parliam entary re so lu tio n  fo r  the establish m en t

o f  each new rea cto r. In Spring, 1976y the s o -c a lle d  "Coming In to  Force Law" was  proposed. This law would give the green lig h t f o r  the in trodu ction  o f  atomic  power in to  Denmark and r a t i f i e d  the Government's Energy Plan. In May, 1976, many

o f  the Members o f  Barliam&nt wanted some time to  study the Energy Plan p r io r  to   votin g on the "Corning In to  Force Law"* I t  was decided th at the Summer recess  would. be used as a stu dy time and the vote on the B i ll  was postponed u n til  September3 1976. During the Summer recess, the goverment decided to  withdraw

the B i ll  and s ta te d  th a t .th is action was necessary because o f, among o th er th in gs,  the U nsolved problems concerning ra d io a ctive w astes. The atomic power qu estion  Â·  w i l l  presumably be s e t t l e d  in the most ea rly Spring, 1978. . ; >' Ã¢ÂÂ   '

One.of the key fa c to r s  con tribu tin g to  OOA's growth and support has been the  a b i l i t y  to  keep c le a r o f  d l l  e x is tin g  p o l i t i c a l  id e o lo g ie s and p a rtie s .. OOA has

n ot c a te g o rica lly  r e je c te d  atomic power but has c o n siste n tly  p o in ted  out th a t .

the b a sis fo r  a proper d ecisio n  has - not. y e t been found and i t  i s  th e re fo re .

irresp o n sib le  t o  mdke a d ecisio n  a t the p re se n t. time. E sp e c ia lly  when such a  decision may have such f a r  reaching and f a ta l consequences. r . . v* '  Â·

. ' In November, 1976, OOA, in  a j o in t  e f f o r t w ith the Organization fo r  ' . ’

Continuous Energy (an organ ization working fo r  the use o f  sun and wind power)  published an a lte r n a tiv e  Energy Plan fo r Denmark. In th is  plan, a number o f   s c ie n tis ts  have documented th a t the Danish energy needs, could be met w ith ou t the  bu ildin g o f  atomic power p la n ts. From an economic p o in t o f  -view, the plan w i l l

create and maintain more employment than the Government's Energy Plan which c a lls   fo r  the bu ildin g o f  f iv e  atomic power p la n ts by 1995. . Since most o f  the . :

equipment fo r  these p la n ts must be imported a t tremendous c o s t, the n e g a tive ..  e f f e c t  on Denmark's balance o f  payments w i l l  be considerably more under the .' Â· Government's Plan than w ith the A lte rn a tiv e  Energy Plan. : Â·Â·Â·;Â· -lÂ· -Â· .Â· ;

Ã¢ÂÂ   Â·  .  .  Â·  .  Ã¢ÂÂ   Ã¢ÂÂ   Â·  - Ã¢ÂÂ  Â· Â· Ã¢ÂÂ  -  '  '  -  :.Â·. ÃÂ : . J , ÃÂ³  'Ã¢ÂÂ   { : Ã¢ÂÂ ‘Ã¢ÂÂ 'Ã¢ÂÂ 'v Ã¢ÂÂ Ã¢ÂÂ  ' '

OOA's a c t i v i t i e s  inclu de amongst other th in gs, the p u b lica tio n  o f  inform ation,  application s to  Parliam ent, n atio n a l su b scrip tio n s o f  sig n a tu re s, l e c tu r e s ,' f a ir s   and the manufacture and sa le  o f  badges and s tic k e r s . - . ; .

During 1976,more than one m illio n  o f  our campaign symbols: the sm ilin g sun Ã¢ÂÂ    saying "Atonikraft -  Nej Tak" (Atomic Power -  No Thank You) have spread over the  whole country. This, i s  the symbol which the Danish Prime M inister,M r. Anker  Joergen sen,characterized a t an inform al occasion as " ir r ita tin g  good". Badges,

car bumper stick ers, and l e t t e r  s tic k e r s  d isp la yin g  the sm ilin g sun are now avcdlable in  English. Ã¢ÂÂ   .ÃÂ½'Â· Ã¢ÂÂ Â·Â·'"Â·' .  Â· _  Â·  ÃÂ* - Â· :  Â· ,  ' Â· . ;

" Â· < ' ' Ã¢ÂÂ  Â· .  .ÃÂ Â·

, The nuclear issu e  i s  one which transcends n ation al and lo c a l borders. I f  we

are ever to  work e f f e c t i v e l y  against the use o f  nuclear pow er,the n a tio n a l " .

boundaries must be elim in ated. I t  i s  our hope to  e s ta b lis h  con tact w ith  . .

Ã¢ÂÂ   organizations and groups in  oth er countries so th a t, e v e n tu a lly , we might share  our in  form ation,energy and e x p e rtise  so th a t c o lle c tiv e ly  our message o f  "Atomic  Power -  No Thankyou" w i l l  be heard a l l  over the world. . . . . .  ;; .

We look forward to  hearing from you in  the fu tu re and would be p le a s e d  to   send you free inform ation and m aterial. Our address i s :

. . Â·  - i Ã¢ÂÂ¢ Ã¢ÂÂ ’ - ‘

OOA - Â· -  -Â· Â·Â·Â·Â· '

’ Ã¢ÂÂ   Â·Â·';.Â·Â·Ã¢ÂÂ Ã¢ÂÂ - Â· .Skindergade 26 Ã¢ÂÂ  Â·-_Ã¢ÂÂ  'Â· 1  Â· ‘ i:;' .Ã¢ÂÂ  Â·

; . 11S9 Copenhagen K : :

Ã¢ÂÂ   Â· Denmark Â· " Ã¢ÂÂ   ' Â·.

The Organization f o r  Continuous Energy has th is  address:  Ã¢ÂÂ¢  -  .  o v e  .  Â· "  vi. >. : Ã¢ÂÂ   "  . Â·

. * . . . Arendalsgade 3 kazlder " . .' Ã¢ÂÂ . Â· ' ./ '

. : .. 21oo Copenhagen,Denmark. -

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j ATTITUDES OF TRADE UNION FEDERATIONS OF THE  J  NETHERLANDS TOWARDS THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE.

Extracts from a fifteen section white paper on energy policy  i  ,  Ã¢ÂÂ

submitted by Overlegorgaan to the Chairman of the first and second;  Houses ,of the Parliament .of the Netherlands. The white

paper is entitled 'Definitive stand of Overlegorgaan Vackentrales.

on Energy Policy.1

(Overlegorgaan was a consultation and discussion body for the  three major Dutch Trade Union bodies:  Netherlands Union of Trade Unions ( N W j ,  Catholic Workers Union of the Netherlands  (NKV), and Christian National Workers Union (CNV).  This body,

the Federation of Trade Unions of the Netherlands (FNV).

Included below are the policy differences on nuclear energy  between FNV and CNV. FNV represents over 60% of Dutch Workers.)

The translation is by Odilia Boele of Vereniging Milieudefensie,   Amsterdam. -

6. Nuclear energy is propagated as a necessary development to

ensure sufficient energy in the future.  First of all*this -   type of energy means certain dangers and then there is the question  of whether this type of energy will actually be cheap, if you Â·:Â·   count all the social costs. '

Moreover there is uncertainty over the development of the :

uranium price over the future. At this moment it is still a .   buyers market but when nuclear energy has been introduced on a

grand scale it is to be expected that the development of the  uranium price will move with the price of other fuels. The ;

international political situation of the future will to a large  extent decide whether it will be coal, oil or uranium that will  be the cheapest energy source. One thing is certain, namely .

that control of nuclear energy even if only on a small scale r will create a new type of dependence for the user;  dependence ÃÂ»  on multinationals who possess the capital and the know-how for ;

building and operating nuclear reactors and dependance on the '

uranium producing countries. Another point of discussion at this

.  .  ./2

2

moment is the real amount of energy that nuclear reactors can

produce. The net energy production is negatively influenced by  the large quantity of energy that is needed for the development,

the building and the operation of the entire nuclear energy

system.

We have to ask the question, what is the meaning of the  gigantic investments that the oil companies are making for the  development of nuclear energy arid the winning of uranium,  investments that are really paid for by the society as a whole,  the consumers and the government.  Is this really the best way

to ensure safe-and cheap energy production in the future or  is it a means for the oil companies and industrial concerns to  maintain and extend their position of power at society's cost

against the rising influence of the oil producing countries who  will in the future increasingly refine their oil themselves?

As long as the society itself does not have a grip on these  investments it. is premature to start from the first assumption.

One can put a lot of question marks behind the advantages

of nuclear energy, but there are no doubts as to the potential  dangers of this form of energy even though different groups

estimate the extent of the risks differently. In trying to -  evaluate these dangers, comparison with-the risks of other  industrial activities is hardly relevant, because until now the  possible: consequences of industrial calamities were limited to  effects that are predictable. The possible consequences of a

v> Ã¢ÂÂ

nuclear energy calamity are of a totally different size, the  long half life of some radioactive elements adds yet another

dimension to this. ,

Probably one need not fear direct dangers within a short time, when one has just one or two nuclear reactors; extensive

studies on this point have taken away some existing uncertainties  *  Â· .  /

concerning reactor safety under, normal operating-circumstances,

although it is still impossible to give:the absolute guarantees that are necessary.

- r- Ã¢ÂÂ -Ã¢ÂÂ¢ 'Ã¢ÂÂ¢‘. ‘A

.  .  ./3

However it is premature to use this as a basis for a decision

to build a new nuclear reactor.  Such a decision is the first

step on the road to a nuclear energy industry in Holland, a

development that will be difficult to undo at a later stage. The  money that is used for the nuclear sector cannot anymore be  used for alternatives; the structure of demand and supply will  to a large extent be decided by whether we use nuclear energy

or not.

Even though this might not be true of one nuclear reactor,

the dangers of a growing nuclear industry which embraces the entire  nuclear fuel cycle and the storing of radioactive waste are very . ;   real. Because of the strong international network of the nuclear'  industry all countries that have anything to do with nuclear

energy at all are involved in this problem. ;

It has to be demonstrated whether it is possible to develop ,~

international structures of control which can give the necessary guarantees against accidents,  misuse of radioactive materials and the cumulative effects of inevitable losses and emissions ; of radioactive material that may occur during normal operating. Ã¢ÂÂ  Ã¢ÂÂ

Safety levels developed nationally can only concern part of the  .  Â»  Â·  .  y

nuclear energy activities and are therefore inadequate.

AÂ·

In the present situation the private producers of nuclear

reactors have large influence in determining the safety levels.

The public and; the politicians are mostly confronted by fait  accomplis. The?development of safety levels and control mechanisms  particularly the international ones seem to be way behind the  actual development of nuclear technology. " It is as yet by no

- 4  Â·

means certain that there exists the political willingness to

strive for responsible use of nuclear energy. The transfer of nuclear technology to countries that are in an early "stage of

economic development,  which is taking place at the moment/  gives rise to serious- concern. Not only because it is impossible to tie nuclear energy into a model of economic development by which the poorest groups will benefit, but even more because of the proliferation aspects. It is impossible to make a distinction

* .  Â· . . Ã¢ÂÂ  ; ?  ‘  Ã¢ÂÂ

between the peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy. This

fact should play a large role in any national decision to intensify

__ /4

4

the role played in international nuclear developments,

The present views on the safety of nuclear energy are based

on studies which only to a small extent consider failures and

irrational and intentionally malevolent behaviour by human  beings. The views on safety are further based on experience with  a number of reactor years which is a fraction of what is planned

for the future.

Â·' ;>>Â· &

We will need time to study whether it is possible to use

nuclear technology on a larger scale in the future,  in the long -Ã¢ÂÂ 1

run and in realistic circumstances, in a responsible manner. This

is not just a technical problem, there has to be real hope for the  realization of“the necessary political consensus concerning interÂ­ national structures of control. If there are no. real grounds for  expecting this then there exists a real danger that national  decisions to further extend nuclear energy will strengthen the .

influence of nuclear technology producers and will put the

government and the people in a powerless position. Ã¢ÂÂ ÃÂ¯ .

7. In the decision-making concerning a subject which is so

vitally important as nuclear energy the entire population

has to be given a chance to join in the decision-making. In  the preparation of the decision-making:' the commercial interests

should not be allowed to play a decisive role.

The decision-making about nuclear power in Holland which, as  > Â·  :

promised by the Minister, of Economic Affairs during the debate

on the budget, will take place according to the procedure for  essential planning decisions, should not be limited to the form  in which this essential decision might be executed; it will also  have to emphatically include the question whether we will further

develop nuclear energy at all.

Here the public will have to get ample opportunity to inform

itself from as many angles as possible".f It seems only just that

the government gives money to those groups which want to produce  and distribute information for these discussions and do not have  the necessary means themselves. .  ..

__ /5

-f-.O.Â·-,  8. In view of all the abovementioned the NNV and NKV come to jthe following conclusions concerning nuclear energy (for ' the moment leaving aside the question of the most desirable ,  |  '  1 decision making procedure).  On the basis of what is known at  this moment about the dangers of nuclear energy they consider it  is unacceptable to extend this industry further in the short  term. Decisions about extending nuclear energy will have to be  postponed until at least 1980. Until that time research,  particularly in the European- context, about fundamental safety  aspects of nuclear energy will have to be stimulated; not just  research on the technical aspects but also research on the organÂ­ isational and political possibilities of guarantees for responsible  international control of all the stages of the nuclear fuel  cycle. If after the abovementioned date no real breakthroughs  have been achieved on both these counts then the stand concerning  further extension of nuclear energy will have to remain negative. Because we will have to take into account seriously the  possibility that even in the future in.the Netherlands no further  use will be made of nuclear energy ,  the Dutch efforts on energy  will have to ' be reoriented. In'energy and industrial policy we  have to strive towards eliminating the necessity to use nuclear  energy.  An active policy of the government will have to ensure  that changes in the pattern of activity will not adversely'affect  those who are now working in the inuclear sector. In the coming  five years there should not be any decisions taken' (and this is  particularly true of the electricity sector) which presuppose .the  possibility of using nuclear energy in the future. The same objections exist against the fast breeder reactor.;  but to even a larger extent than for conventional reactors. Chances  of accidents and the effects thereof are greater. Any net  contribution to energy production is so uncertain and will in any  case only happen after such a long time,  that there seems to be  no argument in favour of putting so much effort into it, effort  that can probably be used better in other energy sectors. .  .  ./6 The Netherlands will therefore have to withdraw from the  Kalkar project. As a consequence of its position the Over-  legorgaan feels it necessary to press the government to do  its upmost to convince the partner countries in this project to  also stop the building of the prototype.reactor.  Another . reason is the fact that the consequences of a possible accident  with the prototype reactor will because of its siting also have  catastrophic consequences for the Netherlands. 9. We hope that from the above.it has become clear that we do not underwrite the present government plans for the building of three new reactors.  In the Energienota (government white  paper on energy); in which these plans are presented the dangers  of nuclear energy are insufficiently taken into account and the  advantages thereof are presented in a rather one sided manner  without acknowledging the doubts about this that are heard  in many circles. According to N W  and NKV it is unacceptable  that a decision of principle about a question which is of such  vital importance to society is taken without a careful,  broadly  based decision-making process. . 10. After weighing all the facts the CNV draws a different . conclusion. It is of the opinion that postponing important decisions for five years has the following consequences: 1) That the Dutch concerns involved in the building of _   nuclear reactors will get into^difficulties which might  mean unemployment. 2) That the Netherlands will get even more behind than at  present in nuclear technology .  < Â· 3) That the Netherlands would then isolate itself from other  European countries who are strongly promoting nuclear  energy, with the result that the Netherlands would get no benefits and only the disadvantages. 4) That the Dutch employers would, be in a position of uncertainty for a long time, concerning energy supply in  the future, which would have negative influence on their  investment decisions. . These points as well as the view that with the following we  would remain within acceptable limits,  bring the CNV to' their  opinion that they are not against a very limited further developÂ­ ment of nuclear energy, provided certain strict conditions are  fulfilled. . The government should only be allowed to give the green  light for the building of the three new conventional reactors,  that she wishes to build, if all safety guarantees.and environÂ­ mental guidelines that she will make are fulfilled and if we can  find a site for these reactors, which entails no danger to the ’ ’   population. Moreover the entire nuclear fuel cycle has to be  '  / . I  guarded by a government organisation which will carry full \;~  responsibility including the transport, the processing and the  storing of radioactive waste. The CNV is of the opinion that  by building the three reactors the nuclear energy potential will  for the time being have reached the maximum for our country.   Concerning the non-conventional fast breeder reactor in Kalkar the  CNV shares the opinion of N W  and NKV. Ã¢ÂÂ  - . Ã¢ÂÂ  ÃÂ:  Ã¢ÂÂ  :>

8. In view of all the abovementioned the NNV and NKV come to jthe following conclusions concerning nuclear energy (for ' the moment leaving aside the question of the most desirable ,  |  '  1 decision making procedure).  On the basis of what is known at  this moment about the dangers of nuclear energy they consider it

is unacceptable to extend this industry further in the short

term. Decisions about extending nuclear energy will have to be

postponed until at least 1980. Until that time research,  particularly in the European- context, about fundamental safety  aspects of nuclear energy will have to be stimulated; not just  research on the technical aspects but also research on the organÂ­

isational and political possibilities of guarantees for responsible

international control of all the stages of the nuclear fuel  cycle. If after the abovementioned date no real breakthroughs  have been achieved on both these counts then the stand concerning  further extension of nuclear energy will have to remain negative.

Because we will have to take into account seriously the  possibility that even in the future in.the Netherlands no further  use will be made of nuclear energy ,  the Dutch efforts on energy

will have to ' be reoriented. In'energy and industrial policy we

have to strive towards eliminating the necessity to use nuclear  energy.  An active policy of the government will have to ensure  that changes in the pattern of activity will not adversely'affect  those who are now working in the inuclear sector. In the coming

five years there should not be any decisions taken' (and this is  particularly true of the electricity sector) which presuppose .the  possibility of using nuclear energy in the future.

The same objections exist against the fast breeder reactor.;  but to even a larger extent than for conventional reactors. Chances

of accidents and the effects thereof are greater. Any net  contribution to energy production is so uncertain and will in any

case only happen after such a long time,  that there seems to be

no argument in favour of putting so much effort into it, effort  that can probably be used better in other energy sectors.

.  .  ./6

The Netherlands will therefore have to withdraw from the

Kalkar project. As a consequence of its position the Over-

legorgaan feels it necessary to press the government to do

its upmost to convince the partner countries in this project to  also stop the building of the prototype.reactor.  Another .

reason is the fact that the consequences of a possible accident  with the prototype reactor will because of its siting also have

catastrophic consequences for the Netherlands.

9. We hope that from the above.it has become clear that we do not underwrite the present government plans for the building of three new reactors.  In the Energienota (government white

paper on energy); in which these plans are presented the dangers  of nuclear energy are insufficiently taken into account and the  advantages thereof are presented in a rather one sided manner  without acknowledging the doubts about this that are heard

in many circles. According to N W  and NKV it is unacceptable  that a decision of principle about a question which is of such

vital importance to society is taken without a careful,  broadly

based decision-making process. .

10. After weighing all the facts the CNV draws a different .

conclusion. It is of the opinion that postponing important decisions for five years has the following consequences:

1) That the Dutch concerns involved in the building of _   nuclear reactors will get into^difficulties which might

mean unemployment.

2) That the Netherlands will get even more behind than at

present in nuclear technology .  < Â· 3) That the Netherlands would then isolate itself from other  European countries who are strongly promoting nuclear

energy, with the result that the Netherlands would get no benefits and only the disadvantages.

4) That the Dutch employers would, be in a position of uncertainty for a long time, concerning energy supply in  the future, which would have negative influence on their

investment decisions. .

These points as well as the view that with the following we

would remain within acceptable limits,  bring the CNV to' their  opinion that they are not against a very limited further developÂ­ ment of nuclear energy, provided certain strict conditions are

fulfilled. .

The government should only be allowed to give the green  light for the building of the three new conventional reactors,  that she wishes to build, if all safety guarantees.and environÂ­

mental guidelines that she will make are fulfilled and if we can  find a site for these reactors, which entails no danger to the ’ ’

population. Moreover the entire nuclear fuel cycle has to be  '  / . I

guarded by a government organisation which will carry full \;~  responsibility including the transport, the processing and the  storing of radioactive waste. The CNV is of the opinion that  by building the three reactors the nuclear energy potential will

for the time being have reached the maximum for our country.   Concerning the non-conventional fast breeder reactor in Kalkar the

CNV shares the opinion of N W  and NKV.

Ã¢ÂÂ  - . Ã¢ÂÂ  ÃÂ:  Ã¢ÂÂ

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