















SPEECH

SENATOR THE HON ROBERT HILL Minister for Defence Leader of the Government in the Senate

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FIRST IISS GULF DIALOGUE   BAHRAIN  SUNDAY, 5 DECEMBER 2004



WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION - COUNTER PROLIFERATION

Let me first express my appreciation to His Majesty King Hamad for agreeing to host  this important conference.  The personal support for the conference program by His  Majesty, and His Royal Highness Crown Prince Salman, is particularly appreciated.

Let  me  also  congratulate  the  International  Institute  of  Strategic  Studies  (IISS)  for   once again demonstrating its unique capacity.  It has brought together a wide group  of representatives from this important region, and from countries further afield who  have an interest in the Gulf.

As  Australia’s  Minister  for  Defence,  I  supported  the  extension  of  IISS  activities  to   the  Asia  Pacific  through  establishment  of  the  Shangri  La  Dialogue  in  Singapore,   which has now met over three consecutive years.  It has quickly earned its place as  an important regional security meeting and I hope the Gulf Dialogue does the same.

Australia  is  a  long  way  from  the  Gulf.   But  my  country  has  consistently   demonstrated  a  strong  interest  in  the  region.   Whether  it  is  through  people  ties,   trade and investment, cultural linkages, or security, Australia has a long history of  engagement  with  the  Middle  East.   Our  active  security  involvement  reflects   Australia’s  judgement  that  the  strategic  impact  of  events  here  have  a  world-wide   resonance.

Most recently, we participated, of course, in the military operation which removed  Saddam  Hussein,  and  still  have  nearly  a  thousand  military  and  civilian  Defence   personnel  deployed  in  this  area.   I  am  grateful  for  the  continuing  support  of  Gulf   countries for Australia’s deployments.

Proliferation  Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, is not a  problem unique to the Middle East.  We in the Asia-Pacific are particularly focused  on the nuclear program of North Korea, but each such program has the potential to  affect us all.

The  global  imperative  remains  to  discourage  any  further  spread  of  WMD.   Most   countries  have  given  support  for  this  objective  through  their  signature  of  the  key    treaties:  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Treaty,  the  Chemical  Weapons  Convention   and the Biological Weapons Convention.

We  assume,  I  think  properly,  that  the  fewer  states  armed  with  WMD,  the  less   likelihood  there  is  for  use  of  these  weapons.   And  the  less  need  there  will  be  for   other states to feel threatened by the weapons programs (or possible programs) of  their neighbours, with whatever strategic advantage this might be thought to entail.

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Now of course we also need to be concerned not only by the potential acquisition of  WMD  by  states,  but  also  the  interest  in  WMD  displayed  by  trans-national  terror   groups.  Recognising  this  possibility,  the  United  Nations  Security  Council  passed   Resolution  1540 earlier  this  year  requiring  all  states  to  take  effective  measures  to   prevent proliferation.

Without doubt, the existence of chronic security problems is a powerful motive for  some nations to pursue the development of WMD. Solutions to WMD proliferation  must address broad security issues, and persuade nations that their vital interests

can be preserved without resort to possession of weapons of mass destruction.

But  whatever  the  claimed  justification,  the  bottom  line  must  be  that  further   proliferation of WMD is unacceptable and will not be tolerated.

The record on counter-proliferation is a mixed one.  I thought that I would focus on  some of the achievements.

Iraq  Possibly  the  most  significant  positive  development  has  been  the  end  of  Saddam   Hussein’s regime in Iraq.  Iraq possessed WMD, and used them both internally and  against  other  countries.   Not  only  did Australia,  as  one  of  the  coalition  countries,   believe that Iraq had ongoing  WMD programs - I  think this conviction was nearly  universal - but we accepted the need to take more effective measures in response to  Iraq's  serial  evasion  of  the  inspection  and  reporting  requirements  to  verify  its   compliance with international demands.

With  the  benefit  of  the  Iraq  Survey  Group  reports,  following  on  the  reports  by   various UN inspection groups over the years, we now have a much clearer idea of  what Iraq had and didn’t have.

Through  the  work  of  the  Iraq  Survey  Group  we  have  a  unique  insight  into  the   activities and outlook of a regime that was committed to proliferation.  The Duelfer  report  on  the  work  of  the  Iraq  Survey  Group  has  found  that,  while  severe   international pressure in the form of sanctions was able to contain the development  and  proliferation  of  WMD,  Saddam  Hussein  retained  the  strong  intent  to  resume   weapons programs in his country as soon as sanctions were lifted.  To this end, he  maintained  core  capability  in  Iraq’s  WMD  research  whilst  winding  down  program   activity to be below the threshold of inspections.

After a decade of sanctions against Saddam’s regime, the sobering conclusion - and  Duelfer  is  quite  specific  about  this  -  is  that  Saddam’s  regime  maintained  the   strategic  intent  to  regenerate  its  weapons  programs  as  soon  as  international   pressure was lifted.

History shows that Saddam did not see WMD simply as a strategic deterrent - he  used them.

The world is safer now that this possibility has been permanently removed.



Iran   Another  positive  sign  is  the  recent  adoption  by  the  International  Atomic  Energy   Agency’s  (IAEA)  Board  of  a  resolution  confirming  Iran’s  agreement  with  the  EU  to

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suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. This action is the first  step towards restoring the global community’s confidence that Iran is committed to  non-proliferation.   It  is  vital,  however,  that  Iran  maintains  full  suspension  of   enrichment and reprocessing and cooperates fully with the IAEA on verification of  the suspension agreement with the EU.

It  is  vital  also  that  Iran  cooperate  fully  with  the  IAEA  to  enable  resolution  of   outstanding concerns about Iran’s past undeclared nuclear program. This last week  has  been  a  good  start  to  addressing  Iran’s  nuclear  program  and  the international  community will continue to watch Iran’s progress closely.

Libya   A success story in cooperative counter-proliferation has been achieved in the case  of Libya.  It is now nearly a year since Libya announced that it would eliminate its  nuclear  and  chemical  weapons  programs,  abandon  its  long  range  missiles,  and   accept inspections and monitoring to verify all these actions.

It followed this announcement by permitting the removal or destruction of its WMD  materials and providing valuable information, particularly about foreign suppliers.   International inspections have gone ahead.

In return for such cooperation, the international community has progressively lifted  the sanctions previously applied to Libya and is stepping up cooperation with that  country.

While there are many reasons for this change in Libya’s policy, the strong approach  and  consistent  action  by  the  international  community  in  general  has  been   instrumental in helping to bring about this resolution.

It takes courage for a nation like Libya to take such a step, but the reward for such  courage  is  much  greater  than  removal  of  sanctions.   Libya  has  shown  WMD   programs can be given up peacefully, through open engagement, in ways that add  to a state’s future certainty and security.

Strengthening of National Controls  Proliferators operate globally so any weaknesses in national controls, including on  transhipments  and  transits,  risk  being  exploited.   This  is  especially  true  in  key   transportation hubs such as the Gulf.

Through a number of mechanisms states are giving greater attention to the problem  of  the  inadvertent  facilitation  of  the  spread  of  WMD.  For  example,  as  chair  of  the   Australia Group, the export control regime concerned with dual-use chemical and  biological materials, Australia would be ready to assist Governments in the region  to improve the management of their export controls.

We  need  also  to  further  engage  with  commerce  and  industry  to  ensure  that  dual-use materials and technologies do not fall into the wrong hands.

Proliferation Security Initiative  The Proliferation Security Initiative is a recent addition to the armoury of counter-proliferation  measures.   The  PSI  seeks  to  build  the  capability  to  identify  and   intercept  the  illegal  transfer  of  WMD  or  their  precursors.  Hopefully,  such  a   capability will act as a deterrent to those proposing to behave illegally.

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Australia is a founding member of PSI.  We strongly support this initiative because  we  see  the  need  for  new  tools  to  counter  proliferation.   PSI  is  a  framework  and   enabler  for  counter-proliferation  activity,  not  an  organisation.   It  operates  within   national and international laws, bringing together nations that  have committed to  act pragmatically and effectively in response to proliferation challenges.

PSI  is  not  aimed  at  any  particular  states,  but  at  proliferators  in  general.   Any   actions  undertaken  by  PSI  supporters  to  counter  proliferation  are  still  the   responsibility of national governments, acting in accord with their national interest  and international responsibilities.

Since it started only eighteen months ago, PSI has attracted growing international  support.  More than 60 countries have endorsed the PSI.  Numerous PSI exercises  have  been  held  to  improve  interoperability  amongst  nations  for  interdicting  the   illicit movement of WMD materials by sea and air.

Earlier  this week I  opened the  eighth  PSI  Operational  Experts  Meeting  in  Sydney.    The  meeting  welcomed  the  more  active  involvement  from  the  Asia  Pacific  region   through the addition of Thailand and New Zealand to PSI activities.

The  development  of  the  PSI  has  been  a  positive  development  and  can  continue  to   grow and strengthen.

Conclusion  With these positive developments to report, and others that I could have mentioned  (such  as  the  G8  Global  Partnership  Against  Weapons  and  Materials  of  Mass   Destruction), why are we still so concerned about proliferation?

An  underlying  problem  for  counter-proliferation  is  the  growing  capacity  for  countries to pursue WMD should they wish.  Inexorably, it seems, the path to WMD  is  becoming  a  less  difficult  one,  because  of  the  increasing  availability  of  relevant   knowledge, materials and dual use goods in the globalised world.

The threat is made greater by the existence of proliferation networks able to meet  the  demand  for  WMD  materials  and  technology.  The  most  spectacular  example  is   the A.Q. Khan network, which has been characterised as providing a ‘nuclear Wal-mart.’    It  is  significant  that  this  network  could  carry  out  its  blackmarket   endeavours  without  national  governments  and  the  international  community  being   able to detect and frustrate it at a much earlier stage.

Overall,  there  is  reason  to  be  encouraged  by  some  signs  of  progress  in  the  fight   against WMD proliferation.

At  the  same  time,  we  must  not  become  complacent.  Notwithstanding  the   achievements that I have noted, the threat of proliferation of WMD is very real and  the potential consequences dire.

Countering  the  threat  must  remain  one  of  the  highest  priorities  of  states.  As   members  of  the  international  community  we  must  show  our  determination  and   commitment  to  work  together  to  effectively  counter  this  major  threat  to  global   security.

MEDIA  NOTE:   Further  still  images  will  be  available  on  the  Defence  website  at:   www.defence.gov.au/media/download

