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NoÂ· M1 39 Date 21 August  1985

. OPENING ADDRESS BY BILL HAYDEN, MP

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

AT THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL

(Held by S trateg ic and Defence Studies Centre,  Research School o f P acific Studies)

H C Coombs B uilding, ANU

Wednesday, August 21, 1985

In arms control and disarmament, we have to deal with cruel*  contradictions. War, and defence against war, and the  methodology of defence are dangerous and complicated questions.  They are also emotional and frightening questions. The more

dangerous and complicated they appear, the greater becomes the  temptation to respond to them 1n emotional and frlg h tered  ways. The more emotional the response, the more d i f f i c u lt  1t becomes  to fin d  rationalÂ«answers to these questions; the more d if f ic u lt

1t becomes to s e ttle  on the quiet and careful and deliberate  steps by which peace can be established and protected.

Since th is  1s a conference to discuss the future o f arms c o n tro l, I propose to s ta rt with the cautionary ta le  o f Vannevar Bush, a  principal adviser to the United States Government 1n the period  Immediately a fte r  World War I I .  A great deal has been said, he  complained to a congressional committee 1n Washington, about the  p o s s ib ilitie s  o f a 3000 m ile , high-angle rocket. "In my opinion,*  he said, "such a thing Is  impossible and w ill be Impossible fo r  many years. The people who have been w ritin g  these things th at  annoy me have been talkin g  about a 3000 m ile high-angle rocket

shot from one continent to another, carrying an atomic bomb and  so directed as to be a precise weapon which would land on a  certain ta rg e t, such as th is  d t y .  I don't think anybody 1n the

world knows how to do such a thing and I feel confident 1t w ill  not be done fo r a very long period o f time to come." That was in  1945, only 15 years before the f i r s t  American IC8M.

My point is th a t peace is  the most crucial issue of our tim e, not  only fo r th is  Government and fo r Australians but also fo r a ll  human beings. I  am talkin g  about the prospect th at we have the  power to e ffe c t the almost instantaneous transformation of l i f e

In to  archeology. This Government therefore Intends to pursue its   policy fo r peace in the knowledge that success w ill be won through  small and careful steps and not m iracles, with dedication to taking  pains, with passionate concentration on what 1s possible — and an  abiding healthy scepticism about some o f the prognoses and

propositions being offered these days.

In carrying out th is  careful p o licy, A ustralia has made Its  voice  heard in a ll appropriate International forums, from the Conference  on Disarmament In Geneva, to the Commonwealth Heads of Government  Meeting 1n New D elh i. We discuss disarmament d ire c tly  with many

governments around the world almost every day through diplomatic  channels and 1n meetings with heads of government or foreign  m inisters. Our growing standing as an in terlo cu to r on disarmament  has been demonstrated By the v is its  to Canberra fo r this purpose,

th is year, o f special delegations led by senior o ffic ia ls  from  the Soviet Union, the United States and China. We have expanded  our diplomatic resources dedicated to disarmament and our national  technical c a p a b ilitie s  in such fie ld s  as the seismic monitoring

o f underground nuclear explosions and v e rific a tio n  o f allegations  of the use of chemical weapons.

2.

We have established a Peace Research Centre here a t the ANU. We  have arranged to celebrate 1986 as the In ternatio nal Year of Peace  on a tr u ly  national scale.

We have a c tiv e ly  pursued the goal o f a freeze on the testing and  deployment o f nuclear weapons th at would be mutual and v e rifia b le   and lead to deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. We have been a leader  1n in tern atio n al e ffo rts  to have the Conference on Disarmament-

resume work towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. We have  been prominent 1n measures to maintain respect fo r the 1925 proÂ­ h ib itio n  on the use o f chemical weapons and to conclude a new  convention fo r the destruction of existin g  stocks and fo r measures  against th e ir  manufacture or use in the fu tu re .

No task is  more d i f f i c u lt  than to forge re lia b le  international  agreements on such m atters. I t  is slow work and often fru s tra tin g .  Reverses are routine. Progress is usually incremental and unsung. The exception which proves the rule 1s the South P acific Nuclear

Free Zone Treaty which the South P a c ific  Forum opened fo r signature  on Hiroshima Day, only two years a fte r  we launched the in it ia t iv e . We and our Forum neighbours w ill now seek commitments from the

nuclear weapon powers to respect the Treaty.

The arms control road to security and disarmament often seems lik e   an endless journey but 1t has to be undertaken and we are fa r .

beyond the i n i t i a l  single step. We have, fo r instancy the NonÂ­ P ro life ra tio n  Treaty against the spread o f nuclear weapons, the  Treaty d e m ilita risin g  Antarctica and the Treaty to make Latin  America fre e  from nuclear weapons — although fo r its  fu ll  effectiveness th is  la s t measure s t i l l  awaits the p articip atio n  of  a ll regional countries. We have the tre a tie s  banning nuclear weapons

from the seabed and from outer space; the trea ty  prohibiting nuclear  tests in space, in the atmosphere and under water; and the tre a tie s   banning biological weapons fo r the m odification o f the environment  fo r m ilita r y  purposes — to mention only the more s a lie n t accords  which are by and large respected by the In ternational community.

There are also b ila te ra l agreements observed by the United States  and the Soviet Union: fo r example, the "Hot Line" agreement; the agreement fo r the prevention o f nuclear war; the Strategic Arms  Lim itatio n  agreements — SALT I and I I  — Including the c ru c ia lly

Important A nt1-B allist1c M issile Treaty; as well as the u n ratified   but observed Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions  T re a tie s .

These agreements and tre a tie s  — negotiated often with great d iffic u lty ,  often over many years - -  are a solid body o f e ffe c tiv e  measures which  put real constraints on the behaviour of governments. They are real  b a rrie rs  against a range of horrors which the world would face i f

these accords did not e x is t. Of course, the achievements to date of  arms control f a ll fa r short, not only of our ideals and objectives  but also of what is necessary 1f the world is to be spared the  catastrophe of global c o n flic t with modern weapons; Indeed, 1f the

world 1s to survive. But, however much our ambitions o u tstrip  these  achievements, they are the necessary building blocks to disarmament and  common security.

3.

In looking to the future of arms co n tro l, we must f i r s t  acknowledge  what has already been put 1n place and ensure th at 1t 1s available  as a so lid  basis on which to build fu rth e r. We must not allow i t   to be eroded or put In to  jeopardy.

The ABM Treaty o f 1972 between the United States and the Soviet  Union 1s the key to what might be termed the tra d itio n a l approach  to nuclear arms c o n tro l. That trea ty  prohibits; (nationwide defences  against b a llis t ic  m issiles. I t  1s undeniable th a t the lim itatio n s   o f the then a v a ila b le  technology were In flu e n tia l 1n bringing the  tre a ty  about. But there were also two other cardinal facto rs.

. F i r s t ,  two strongly antagonistic superpowers foreswore defences  against the most severe th reat they faced .in a tre a ty  of in d e fin ite   duration. Instead of deploying defensive weapons against nuclear  a tta c k , each chose to compel the cooperation o f the potential enemy  through the th re a t o f assured and devastating r e ta lia tio n . They  chose th is  even though 1t meant leaving themselves open to the same

th re a t. The ABM Treaty, a t least a t the s tra te g ic  le v e l, embodied  the Idea th a t nuclear weapons have only one ratio n al purpose: to  d eter. In other words, i t  aimed to prevent d ire c t c o n flic t between  nuclear armed powers, because such a war could re su lt in th e ir being

t o ta lly  destroyed - -  and probably the rest o f us with them. This is  a perspective on nuclear weapons th at must not be lo s t.

Second, the ABM Treaty was seen as a most helpful and perhaps  necessary backstop to agreements to control offensive forces. However  d i f f i c u l t  i t  may be (and has proved to be) to reach agreement between  the United States and the Soviet Union on what constitutes equality  or p a rity  between them,Â· the simple fa c t remains th at such calculations  are fa r  easier without defences than with them. The c ap ab ility of

such defences to th in  out an attacking force could never be subject  to  a fu lls c a le  te s t. And yet each side would have to make allowance  fo r th a t c a p a b ility  in calculating what is  needed to maintain the

to le ra b le  mutual balance on which any agreement in th is fie ld  is  necessarily predicated.

I  do not propose to rehearse the dismal histo ry of the la s t decade  1n which superpower relationships deteriorated and the nuclear arms  control process fa lte re d  and even, fo r a w h ile, stopped altogether. But I w ill say th a t I do not draw from th is  experience the conclusion  th a t the tra d itio n a l approach to arms control was wrongly conceived.  The shortest distance between two points 1s s t i l l  a s tra ig h t lin e . The most e ffe c tiv e  way to achieve nuclear disarmament 1s s t i l l  through  d ire c t, mutual, p a ra lle l reductions 1n nuclear forces.

But both the technological and doctrinal underpinnings of the ABM  Treaty are today being challenged. Defence against b a llis t ic  m issile  attack 1s now regarded as perhaps achievable, possibly in less than  20 years from now. There are even some who see the future of arms

control in It s  introduction, provided the rig h t conditions can be  created. The challenge comes from both sides of the arms control  argument. I t  causes some considerable concern around the world  community.

4.

That th is  challenge to the ABM Treaty has come about 1s not  r e a lly  surprisin g. The ABM Treaty 1s the high point to date  o f the doctrine of assured destruction, whose awful logic  rests uneasily with the natural In stin cts not only of moralists  but also o f s tra te g is ts . Both are concerned to prevent nuclear  war.

For the m o ra lis t, any system o f security and deterrence based  on a mutual and massive th reat to In te n tio n a lly  vulnerable  societies 1s repugnant. To the s tra te g is t, assured destruction  1s equally repugnant. The modem nuclear s tra te g is t's  objective

Is  to deter nuclear war by convincing a potential adversary th at  one 1s able and w illin g  to fig h t and prevail 1n a nuclear war.

Assured destruction on the contrary says th at nuclear weapons are  so d iffe re n t to a ll other weapons th at nuclear war can never be  won. The modern s tra te g is t is concerned to find ways to defend  h1s own m ilita ry  forces, Industry and population; assured  destruction on the contrary says th a t, the more vulnerable each

Is  to a tta c k , the b e tte r. Assured destruction is , therefore,  a n ti-s tra te g ic . Its  dictum that the security o f a ll is best

served by foreswearing defence against nuclear re ta lia tio n   goes against a ll th a t In s tin c tiv e ly  seems sensible, prudent  and p a tr io tic . That dictum 1s Just another paradox o f the

nuclear age.

The ABM Treaty which was. part of the SALT ÃÂª accords was therefore  the highwater mark to date o f the doctrine of assured destruction.  Since then, arms control negotiations have become more d if f ic u lt   and protracted. SALT I I  took longer to negotiate than SALT I and

In  the end was never r a tif ie d . The present negotiations seem  lik e ly  to be even more drawn out, when the time frame 1n which  agreement must be reached is probably very short.

The most common reason given fo r this 1s the breakdown of detente. But I  wonder i f  a more Important reason 1s not technological  developments 1n nuclear weaponry? These developments, especially  the quite extraordinary Increase 1n accuracy has made a t least

the ground-based forces o f each side more open to attack. Technology  seemed to take some of the in e v ita b ility  out of assured destruction  by giving greater c r e d ib ility  to theories o f deterrence Involving  lim itin g  nuclear exchanges.

But, 1n fa c t these technologies have also had another e ffe c t;  they have made the business o f calculating the state of the  s tra te g ic  balance between the superpowers much more complicated. That in turn has undermined the a b ilit y  o f arms control negotiators  to  conclude agreements which the superpowers can confidently accept  do not threaten th e ir security.

5.

The even newer exotic technologies which have prompted renewed  atten tio n  to s trateg ic defence seems to be operating 1n the same  way. On the one hand, they have offered hope to both the  s tra te g is ts  and the m oralists that we can fin a lly  escape from  assured destruction to assured defence. For the m o ra lis t, 1t

Is  much more comfortable to liv e  with a system 1n which defence  1s a t the fo re fro n t. For the s tra te g is t, o f course, to defend

against attack and preserve one's population, Industry and armed  forces 1s a much more natural way to approach problems of war and  peace." On the other hand, these new technologies are Immensely

complicating the task of the negotiator. He now has to take Into  account 1n h1s calculations not only the d iffic u ltie s  of balancing  re ta lia to r y  forces; not only the more recent d if fic u lt y  o f more  accurate nuclear weapons with counter force c a p a b ility ; but NOW  also has to fa c to r In to  h1s already complex equations the  un certainties o f h1s own and his potential adversary's strateg ic  defence c a p a b ility .

The Soviet challenge 1s undeclared but the evidence 1s undeniable  th a t 1 t 1s quite re a l. The USSR has Invested massively. 1n

s tra te g ic  a ir  defences. I t  deployed the world's f i r s t  operational  ABM system and has continued to upgrade this system w ithin the  lim its  o f the ABM Treaty. I t  is building a large phased array  radar a t Krasnoyarsk in S ib eria, a controversial location from the  ABM Treaty standpoint. We also know th a t the USSR 1s conducting

research on a massive scale Into lasers, p a rtic le  beams and other  fu tu r is tic  technologies applicable to a "Star Wars"-style defence  against b a llis t ic  m issile attack.

The US has also been Interested 1n strateg ic defence, although  th a t in te re s t has waxed and wined. Its  early models were phased  out by 1974 but here, as 1n the USSR and (again) as permitted by  the ABM Treaty, research Into ABM technologies has continued. In  his speech on the subject in March 1983, President Reagan called  fo r  an expanded and focussed research e ffo r t — now called the S trateg ic  Defence In it ia t iv e  — Into technologies p o te n tia lly  applicable to a  defence against b a llis t ic  m issiles. The SDI also Involves a c r it ic a l

re-examination o f the strategic concept which underlines the ABM  Treaty and of the general approach to deterrence. I f  I can put 1t  in  other terms, i t  involves rethinking the question o f how to avoid  war 1n the nuclear age.

The US Administration has made 1t clear th a t, before considering  deployment, I t  would have to be s a tis fie d  on important technological  c r it e r ia  relevant to maintaining strateg ic s ta b ility . The defences  themselves should not be tempting targets fo r pre-emptive attack.  They should provide no Incentive fo r the USSR to seek to overwhelm

them through p ro life ra tin g  offensive forces and penetration aids. The US Administration has also developed a strategic concept fo r  gradual movement towards a new deterrent relationship with the

Soviet Union. This has two broad phases:

6.

. fo r  the next 15 years or so, to continue to re ly  on the

e x istin g  offensive deterrent and to negotiate ra d ic a l,  s ta b ilis in g  reductions 1n the offensive forces. The  US emphasises — and I agree — 1t would also be  v i t a l l y  Important in th is  context th at both sides

demonstrated th e ir continued commitment to the ABM  Treaty and Indeed reverse the erosion nibbling a t that  regime; '

. 1n the second phase, 1 f research proves the fe a s ib ility   o f e ffe c tiv e  defences, to negotiate with the USSR on  the Introduction o f these systems 1n a gradual,  co-operative manner. The US Administration hopes th a t,

th e re a fte r, offensive nuclear forces could 1n turn be  phased out on both sides.

. Many people have found much to admire 1n President Reagan’ s  decision In e ffe c t to give one o f his successors the opportunity  of moving away from the threat o f nuclear devastation. C ertain ly,  one must respect the technical Imagination on which the scheme rests.

I must confess to a more pessimistic view o f the lik e ly  fru its   o f technology. I share some o f the concerns about strategic  defence raised ( fo r  Instance) 1n the report of the P on tifical  Academy o f Sciences of the Vatican and other Interested s c ie n tific

and academic quarters. I  am not convinced th at the research and  fe a s ib ilit y  studies w ill point to a s ta b ilis in g  way forward or even  a possible u n ila te ra l withdrawal from competition 1n offensive  weapons, rath er than another round o f action and reaction. I am

concerned th a t we are looking a t a new dimension to the arms race  which we are a ll trying to escape. Chekhov once said th at the gun  on the w all 1n the f i r s t  act o f a play would be used by the th ird '

a c t. I t  is  a point which applies 1n the present case. The

determ inist e ffe c t o f weaponry and technology must be considered:  th at weapons once developed w ill be deployed and th a t the more  expensive the development the heavier the temptation to proceed  towards deployment. The Government is considering a ll these matters  a t the moment.

In the meantime, the In te re s t which both superpowers show 1n  fu tu r is tic  defence e n title s  us to put questions to them. Because  they share great power, the superpowers also share great re sp o n sib ility.  Because the re sp o n s ib ility  affects us a l l ,  they share great accountÂ­ a b ilit y  to us a l l .  I would therefore put the same questions to both  o f them:

Can a system of defence o ffe r in v u ln e ra b ility  to nuclear weapons?  How w ill you ensure th at your Intensive and dedicated research on  defensive systems does not lead your riv a l to In s is t on keeping  open a ll h1s offensive options, thereby In h ib itin g  a ll attempts to

cut the numbers of existing weapons? Does s trateg ic defence

7.

place a premium on building as many new nuclear weapons as  possible to swamp that defence? How w ill you in s t il in your  riv a l the necessary tru s t, confidence and s e lf-d is c ip lin e  so  th a t both o f you move in unison; in an o rd erly, s t a b ilit y Â­ preserving manner? How do you flea! with the fa c t th a t mutual  deployment of imperfect defence would create additional incentives

to s trik e  f i r s t  in a c r is is , and hope th at those Imperfect defences  would cope with a ragged re ta lia to ry  strike?

How can the benefits be preserved in the ABM Treaty, which both  o f you r ig h tly  regard as v i t a l ,  a t le a s t fo r the current phase,

i f  research proceeds on technologies th at cannot be translated  in to  deployed weapons without overturning the Treaty? How can  you ensure th at research into defensive systems w ill not break  out in to  competition to develop and deploy? Is i t  lik e ly

th at testing and deployment w ill go ahead Inexorably i f  there  is massive investment in the research preceding i t ,  despite the  present intentions o f policy makers?

How can you ensure th at we w ill not have an arms race 1n space  to add to those on land, a t sea and 1n the a ir?  There 1s e s s e n tia lly   no dissent from the view th a t, with such an outcome, the strateg ic  nuclear balance would become even more complex, vastly more costly

to maintain and characterised by higher levels of uncertainty and  ris k . I f  there are p a rtic u la r circumstances in which defensive  weapons could be Integrated with offensive weapons to y ie ld  (on  the contrary) a mutually more stable and secure balance, how do you

propose to get from where we. are today to th at happy state of  a ffa irs ?  What guarantees do you o ffe r not to stumble on the way,  making us a ll f a ll into a worse situation? .

These are d if f ic u lt  questions: I am conscious o f th a t. Having posed them, i t  is only f a i r  and reasonable th at I should suggest  some a t le a s t p a rtia l answers.

In the f i r s t  place, i t  is self-evid en t th at the best way to get

rid  of nuclear weapons is to go the d ire c t route. .

Agreement on deep cuts in intercontinental b a llis t ic   m issiles and in th e ir intermediate range counterparts would be the  most e ffe c tiv e  means of reducing the incentive to choose strateg ic  defence. I f  the arms reduction process were put back

on the r a ils  and deep cuts agreed, a ll the forces o f lo g ic and  p o litic s  would point towards a return to the basics, a re-dedication  to the philosophy enshrined 1n the ABM Treaty.

The second point which seems Inescapable 1s th at the questions I  have  raised today — as to the impact of present and po tential strateg ic  defence systems on s ta b ility  and the chances of war — must be the  subject o f serious and detailed exploration between the two superÂ­

powers. In p a rtic u la r, the key role o f research and how 1t is to be  accomodated 1n a stable fashion must be discussed and agreed between  them. The ABM Treaty permits research. But where 1s the borderline  between (a ) research which helps s ta b ility  by providing a hedge and

8.

a deterrent against a u n ila te ra l breakout by a superpower and  (b) research which unleashes a competitive race a t le a s t in  research and possibly in development and deployment? To refuse  to discuss such matters or to place preconditions on negotiations

is  to turn one's back on the only possible road to safety fo r both  superpowers and fo r the whole planet. For e ith e r side to delay,  hoping th at the evolution o f p o litic a l events w ill favour its   own in te re s ts , is to squander our most precious asset; th at is ,

tim e. I t  is d i f f i c u l t  to say how long the superpowers have got  before irre v e rs ib le  steps are taken and a strateg ic defence  competition takes ro o t, but I have a fe e lin g  that i t  is not very

long a t a l l .

Above and before the necessary accords on deep cuts to existing  arsenals and measures to prevent arms racing 1n new d irectio n s,  the crucial prerequisite fo r b etter relations and greater safety  fo r a ll is a much higher level o f mutual p r e d ic ta b ility . I t  is

impossible in th is  context to ignore the contrast between the  debate in the US about the possible ro le fo r , and circumstances  which would favour, the introduction o f "Star W ars"-style weapons  and the silence in  the USSR about its  intentions fo r its  research

program and existin g  deployments. I contest the view th a t Soviet  secrecy is an unchanging and in s ig n ific a n t fa c t o f international  l i f e .  Such secrecy fuels the arms race and compounds the d iffic u lty   o f e ffo rts  towards arms control. Far from enhancing Soviet security

i t  Increases the danger to us a l l .

The subleties and complexities in the strateg ic defence issue —  the almost undetectable eddies in the course of debate between the  protagonists — bring me to my concluding point. We are discussing  today the future o f arms co n tro l. I am saying th at th is  future lie s

in our maintaining the doctrine of the past - -  the fin a l nuclear  paradox.

Like the Palme Commission, the Australian Government 1s committed  to complete nuclear disarmament, which can only come about by  agreement between those nations which possess nuclear weapons. The  Palme Commission points out th a t, in the meantime and as a step

towards complete disarmament, deterrence 1s the only option that  is  viable and acceptable. This is also the Australian Government's  view. While we are working towards the ultim ate goal, we must deal  with the objective s itu atio n  in which we liv e . We cannot evade the

awful logic of assured destruction, the doctrine which understands  th a t nuclear weapons are no longer a simple case o f a bigger bang  fo r the buck.

Like every other country on earth , A ustralia cannot escape the  ram ificatio n s, e ith e r of developments 1n the nuclear age or of the  consequences i f  these developments go wrong. But more than most  countries, A ustralia is a c tu a lly  and in extricab ly involved in these

developments, through such mechanisms as the jo in t f a c i l i t i e s ,  and  we have been so involved fo r more than 15 years. We have b etter

9.

reason than most to appreciate th a t, in arms c o n tro l, there are  no quick technical fix e s  or whizz bang solu tion s. There are no  short cuts to use or Gordian knots to be cu t. Instead, we are  f a l l i b l e  people who must tr y  to grapple with in f in ite

conscientiousness and patience with the most complex and te rrify in g   and explosive problem the world has ever faced.

The forthcoming meeting between President Reagan and General  Secretary Gorbachev w ill be of unprecedented Importance. At the  conceptual le v e l, the superpowers are back where they were in 1969

when the nuclear arms control process took hold. Now, though, the  temptation is  being offered — .and the awesome prospect - -  of  S tar Wars. May the two leaders, who bear the t e r r ib le  resp o n s ib ility   which t e r r ib le  power confers, remember the stakes. They are, as I

reminded Mr Gromyko in May la s t year, th at the choice in the nuclear  age is not between peace and war any more but between peace and  e xtin ctio n  fo r a ll o f us.

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