

















Moving Beyond Care and/or Trust:  An Ethic of Social Flesh

Associate Professor Carol Bacchi and  Dr. Chris Beasley

Politics Discipline  School of History and Politics  University of Adelaide

Refereed paper presented to the   Australasian Political Studies Association Conference  University of Adelaide University  Australia 29 September - 1 October 2004







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Moving Beyond Care and/or Trust  An Ethic of Social Flesh:

A  proliferation  of  theoretical  analyses  and  government  discourses  advocate  the

development  of  social  virtues,  either  ca re or trust, as ways past a perceived

contemporary  crisis  around  the  maintenance  of  social  connectedness.  There  are

references to a 'crisis in trust' (Hudson 2004: 76) or a 'crisis in civic engagement' (Szreter

2002: 589), as well as references to a 'crisis of care' (Daly and Lewis 2000: 288) or a crisis

due to a 'care gap' (Sevenhuijsen 2003: 189). While many of these accounts focus on the

internal  dynamics  of  nation-states,  others,  including  Zygmunt  Bauman  (2001)  and

Emmanuel  Levinas  (Bernasconi  and  Critchley  1991),  raise  the  significance  of  these

issues for an emerging global community. A shared concern is 'atomistic individualism',

identified  as  a  threat  to  stable,  effective  government  and/or  humane,  tolerant  human

relations.



The purpose of this paper is twofold. In the first instance, we intend to map the political

visions  associated  with  the  languages  of  care  and  trust,  identifying  problematic

premises.  Additionally, we offer 'social flesh' as an alternative ethico-political starting

place  for  thinking  critically  about  politics  and  community.  Our  engagement  in  these

debates  does  not  indicate  an  uncritical  acceptance  of  diagnoses  of  'crisis'.  In  fact  we

challenge the way in which 'crisis talk' tends to locate the 'problem' in the character of

citizens. Our target, by way of contrast, is the hegemonic social and political imaginary

that  constructs  citizens  as  independent,  self-reliant  and  solely  responsible  for  social

outcomes.  Social  flesh  is  put  forward  as  an  alternative  paradigm,  a  new  imaginary,

grounded  in  recognition  of  human  intersubjective  embodiment.  The  political  vision  it

inspires is democratic, emphasizing the need to create institutions where diverse bodily

experiences  are  given  voice  and  recognition.  The  paper  presumes  a  role  for  theory  in

political  praxis.  It  takes  its  inspiration  from  Clare  Colebrook's  (2000:  90-91)  argument

that  thought  and  theory  are  not  distanced  points  'of  observation  on  the  real',  but

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'activities  of  imaging  bodies'  and  'an  anticipation  of  the  future'  --  'the  real's  way  of

folding back upon itself through a multiplicity of becomings.'



In the first part of the paper we argue that early care ethicists and most trust theorists

focus their attention on the need to produce particular kinds of citizens, either caring or

trusting  people.  Important  distinctions  between  care  and  trust  perspectives  will  be

identified,  along  with  attention  to  significant  divisions  within  the  'trust'  camp.

Overriding these distinctions we identify a disturbing agreement among trust theorists

that  something  is  amiss  in  citizen  behaviour,  a  position  that,  in  our  view,  produces

citizens as responsible for the inadequacies of current political regimes and as the ones

needing  to  change.  There  appears  to  be  a  near  consensus  that  citizens  lack  trust  and

therefore need to be encouraged to become trusting. The major disagreements are over

the means to this end and over the kind of trust to be encouraged.



A more recent generation of care ethicists (Sevenhuijsen 1997, 1998, 2003; Tronto 1993,

2001; Kittay 1998; Folbre 2001) move past the focus on one-to-one caring and care as a

moral  disposition  to  insist  that  caring  be  considered  a  collective  responsibility.  These

theorists become the focus in the second part of the paper.  In their work, the nature of

institutional  supports  for  caring  practices,  rather  than  the  behaviour  of  citizens,

becomes the problem. We find the focus on the ubiquity of caring practices and the shift

from  moral  disposition  to  the  form  and  function  of  institutions  useful  but  remain

concerned about several aspects of care ethics. The ambiguity surrounding the meaning

of care, in our view, undermines its usefulness as a guiding ethic. Moreover, its highly

normative  character  leaves  it  open  to  political  manipulation.  In  particular,  the

asymmetrical relationship presumed between 'carers' and 'cared for' inscribes hierarchy

and hence the potential for paternalism at the core of these relationships.



In the third part of the paper, we offer an ethic of social flesh as a more equitable and

less normatively prescriptive starting place for re-imagining social and political life.

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Making Citizens Behave



It  is  useful  to  deal  in  this  initial  section  with  both  early  care  theorists  and  with  those

who privilege trust as the basis of ethical connectedness because, as we shall see, there

are important overlaps in the arguments. Indeed, the languages are not strictly separate,

which  in  itself  is  telling.  Many  who  proffer  trust  as  foundational  to  healthier

community talk at times about the ways in which trust will lead to sympathy for others

and a willingness to help others. According to Putnam (1993: 88-89), 'Virtuous citizens

are  helpful,  respectful,  and  trustful  toward  one  another,  even  when  they  differ  on

matters  of  substance'.  The  attributes  listed  as  accompanying  trust  commonly  include

sympathy,  reciprocity,  altruism  and  care  (Metlay  1999:  101-102).1   On  the  other  side

some  care  ethicists  retain  a  special  place  for  trust.  For  example,  Selma  Sevenhuijsen

(2003: 185), a contemporary leading proponent of care ethics, declares that 'an ethic of

care presupposes an ethic of trust.' In both cases we consider the focus on social virtues

as the key to healthy social relations inadequate and even retrograde.



In other work (Beasley and Bacchi 2000; Beasley and Bacchi, forthcoming 2004; Bacchi

and  Beasley,  forthcoming  2005)  we  have  highlighted  the  ways  in  which  early  care

ethicists  (Gilligan  1982;  Held  1987,  1993,  2001)  describe  the  ability  to  'care'  as  a  moral

attribute  and  have  discussed  the  problems  this  creates  for  their  argument.  There  is  a

tendency  among  these  early  care  ethicists  to  as sume that, if a person learns to care in

one-to-one  relationships,  this  will  translate  into  a  humane  concern  for  distant  others

and  into  humane  social  arrangements  generally  —  locally,  nationally  and  even

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internationally.  Mothering  is  put  forward  as  the  best  nursery  for  producing  caring

citizens  (Ruddick  1990).  The  mechanisms  by  which  an  ethic  derived  from  interactions

between  particular  others  may  be  transferred  to  the  public  and  international  domains

are taken for granted rather than explained. In addition the hierarchical nature of many

caring  relationships,  including  mothering,  goes  almost  unnoticed  (Shakespeare  2000).

Equally disturbing is the tendency to distance ethical theorizing from political practice.

Annette Baier (1987: 50 in Held 1993: 86), for example, sets at odds 'the male fixation on

the special skill of drafting legislation' and attention to relations of care and trust. The

implication  in  the  work  of  early  care  ethicists  is  that  care  ethics  has  its  own  domain,

separate  from  law  and  legalistic  interventions.  Such  an  approach  indicates  a  limited

engagement with or interest in political processes, not just in the strict traditional sense

of governance but in the sense most feminists employ -- that is, these writers display an

oddly restricted concern with power relations in society.



While those who position 'trust' as central to cooperative, collaborative relationships are

a  diverse  group,  the  work  of  the  most  prominent  and  best  known  theorists  (Putnam

1993, 2000; Fukuyama 1995) shares the limitations we observe in early care theory. Such

writings promote trust as a desirable moral quality, are ambiguous about the means of

transmission  from  'lower'  to  'higher'  levels  of  sociality,  and  neglect  the  relationship

between  power  and  trust.  Beyond  this  group,  trust  theorists  in  general  tend  to

recommend  the  generation  of  trust  as  a  desirable  goal,  implicitly  constituting  citizens

who  'lack'  trust  as  deficient.  Importantly,  the  turn  to  trust  loses  the  focus  on  bodily

interconnection  found  in  care  theory,  leaving  citizens  to  perform  trust  negotiations  in

oddly disembodied ways.



The  language  of  trust  has  a  long  heritage  in  Western  political  theory  but  has

experienced something of a renaissance in the last twenty years. The expressed concern



1  Many politicians in the West have begun to take on a language which links trust and care. For example,  Mark Latham (1998: 205), leader of the Australian Labor Party, advocates an increased 'preparedness of

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among those who want to privilege trust as a key element in successful collective life is

a perceived declining public interest in politics. Low voter turnout in the United States

sparked the trust revival. 'Why', trust theorists want to know, 'are citizens turning away

from civic participation and what can be done about it?' The key concern appears to be

with the kinds of people that will sustain a democratic political culture and institutions

(see  Sullivan  and  Transue  1999).  These  considerations  have  generated  a  plethora  of

studies around the concepts of trust, social capital and civil society.



Social  capital  theorists  embrace  a  variety  of  political  visions.  There  are  at  least  three

distinct positions:

Ã¢ÂÂ¢  the  Putnam-Fukuyama  camp  who  claim  that  'psychic  engagement'  (Szreter

2002:  582)  in  close-up  relationships  and  activities  produces  the  sentiments  required  to

facilitate  cooperation  and  economic  exchange  -  the  'social  glue'  necessary  for  national

cohesion;

Ã¢ÂÂ¢  those who prefer 'cool' to 'hot' trust, 'trust as social lubricant' rather than trust

as 'social glue';

Ã¢ÂÂ¢   those  who  insist  that  the  government  has  an  important  role  to  play  in

generating  social  capital  by  providing  services  which  reduce  inequalities  between

citizens.

Despite their differences, we suggest that all three positions, albeit to different degrees,

direct  attention  to  the  behaviours  of  citizens  as  the  key  to  viable  democratic  politics.

Each position will be discussed in turn, with a closer examination of the first, given its

prominence in popular and political discourse.



The Putnam-Fukuyama camp is most explicit in focussing on the desirability of certain

kinds of character traits among citizens. The  crucial issues motivating the  analysis are

'poor behaviour', evinced in crime rates and family breakdown, and 'excessive judicial

pleas  for  particular  rights'  (Helly  2003:  21),  behaviour  described  as  excessively



... citizens to trust in and care for each other'.

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individualistic and self-serving (Fukuyama 1995: 284).2  We are witnessing in this view

a 'downward spiral of contemporary societies into multiple communities and atomized

individuals'  (Helly  2003:  20).3   To  counter  this  trend  there  is  a  call  for  a

'retraditionalizing  of  civil  society'  (Cohen  1999:  232),  the  invocation  of  pre-modern

bonds of social solidarity.  Fukuyama (1995: 351) states that 'political liberalism ... needs

the support of aspects of traditional culture.'



There are different routes to this goal, however. Fukuyama, like James Coleman (1988),

an early progenitor of social capital theory, emphasizes the importance of socialization

in  close  family  structures.  Putnam  by  contrast  privileges  social  relationships  in

secondary associations. Participation in secondary groups, he argues, establishes social

bonds  and  teaches  civic  skills  such  as  'self-discipline,  moderation  and  appreciation  of

successful collaboration' (Misztal 1996: 14). From habits of cooperation and mutual trust

emerge  citizens  willing  to  shoulder  obligation,  loyal  citizens  (Pixley  1998;  Barbalet

2000),  deferential  citizens  (Janoski  1998),  and/or  compliant  citizens  (Costello  2003:  5).

The  ultimate  goal  is  social  cohesion,  with  trust  providing  the  'social  glue'.  In  this

account trust is not, or at least not simply, an innate psychological disposition, a view

that would put severe limits on the usefulness of trying to shape character.4  Rather trust

emerges  as  a  characteristic  that  can  be  generated  through  association  with  those  who

share core values. Putnam (1993: 177) notes:

[t]rust itself is an emergent property of the social system as much as a personal

attribute. Individuals are able to be trusting (and not merely gullible) because of

the social norms and networks within which their actions are embedded.



2  A  recent article in the Melbourne Age on violence in the workplace (Robinson 2004) captured this  concern. It quoted from organisational psychologist, Dr. Peter Cotton, who suggested that people have  become more aggressive because they have a more acute awareness of their rights. This 'rights culture'  is set against 'collective or community behaviour': 'It's a lack of spirituality and the pursuit of individual  goals which seems to be motivating people — but that is also a route to unhappiness in the long term.'  3

The Australian Productivity Commission (2003: viii) Report on Social Capital mentions as a key point the  possible adverse effects of 'strong internal group cohesion', referring here to sub-groups within the polity.  4  A  number of studies have identified the psychological underpinnings of trust and tolerance. For  example, Marcus et al. (1995 in Sullivan and Transue 1999: 635) and Costa and McCrae (1992 in

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The learning  of  'trust'  requires  direct  participation  in  one-to-one  'trusting'  or  in

associational  life.  The  goal  is  to  create  the  conditions  which  will  produce  ‘trusting’

citizens.



The focus on family/associations as the source of beneficial learning environments for

'virtuous citizens' lies behind the declared concern that, if the government provides too

many  services,  trust-building  activities  will  be  'crowded  out'.  This  explains  the

popularity of volunteerism and devolution in much social capital theory (Costello 2003:

7). In Australia, for example, there are also direct links with the endorsement of 'mutual

obligation'  by  the  political  Right  and  'mutual  responsibility'  by  the  political  Left.  The

argument  here  is  that  direct  engagement  by  people  in  the  performance  of  labour  is

necessary  to  produce  responsible  citizens.  We  have  here  a  'nonstatist  form  of

communitarianism' (Fukuyama 1995: 279).



Care issues are relegated in this agenda to a responsibility of the domestic sphere. The

Australian Productivity Commission's Report (2003: ix) on Social Capital specifies that

home based care 'can be a more desirable and practical option than nursing home care'.

This  is  because  democratic  citizens  are  considered  to  need  particular  attributes  and

skills, and these are seen to be produced though engagement in close-up activities such

as  caring.  The  social  bonding  which  takes  place  in  these  activities  will,  it  is  argued,

produce  active  citizens,  countering  the  supposed  apathy  displayed  in  low  voter

turnout.5   There  is  an  assumption  here  that  close-up  relationships  produce

characteristics which transmit to the larger public sphere. A curious tension emerges in

the argument. Citizens will learn to trust government, but this  trust cannot  mean that



Sullivan and Transue 1999: 635) found that neuroticism, extroversion and openness to experiences all  predict levels of political tolerance fairly accurately.  5  We say 'supposed apathy' because we challenge the common view that low voter turn-out indicates the

kind of sluggish disinterest implied by the word 'apathy'. We prefer to characterise the growing aversion to  forms of political participation like voting as 'disaffection', capturing feelings of alienation and discontent.  This point is picked up later in the paper.

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they  will  want  the  government  to  provide  basic  services  because  citizens  need  to

provide these services themselves in order to develop 'trust' in government.



Social  capital  theory  of  this  ilk  marks  a  shift  within  liberalism  from  a  wariness

regarding trust to an endorsement of trust as an imperative. In Locke citizens could trust

government  if  government  proved  worthy  of  trust.  Now  citizens  are  told  that  they

should,  indeed,  must  trust  government,  or  be  found  wanting  in  their  performance  as

citizens (Hardin 1999: 23). Fukuyama (1995: 7) declares: 'a nation's well-being, as well as

its  ability  to  compete,  is  conditioned  by  a  single,  pervasive  cultural  characteristic,  the

level of trust inherent in a society'. This trust depends upon the expression of common

traditions and norms, imposing cultural coherence on diverse 'others'.



The  imperative 'to trust' produces trust as a form of governmentality (Mckay 2000: 2).

Nikolas  Rose  (1999:  Chapter  5)  traces  the  paradoxical  development  of  a  focus  on

community  in  a  period  dominated  by  visions  of  independent  economic  actors.  This

paradox  is  resolved,  he  argues,  in  the  decision  to  govern  through  community/ies.

Communities and their constituents are to be held responsible for their own fate and for

the  fate  of  the  nation.  It  follows  that  citizens  who  do  not  trust  are  characterized  as

deficient.  An  early  study  by  Eckstein  (1984  in  Damico  et  al.  2000:  378)  attributes  the

failure of the poor to participate in politics or the workplace to 'the authoritarian culture

of  the  poor'.  In  contrast,  Fukuyama  (1995:  10)  attributes  the  low  trust  evinced  among

Afro-Americans to their lack of strong community. In these analyses outgroups cannot

win. They are described either as having too much or too little community.



Numerous  authors  question  the  assumption  in  Fukuyama  and  Putnam  that  'virtues'

learned at home or in secondary associations translate into effective citizen participation

(Newton  2001:  173;  Damico  et  al.  2000:  377;  Misztal  1996:  199-200).  This  concern

regarding transmission parallels our challenge to early care ethicists who anticipated a

generalisation of caring sentiments from mothers to broad social arrangements.

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Going  further,  some  trust  theorists  argue  that  —  contra  the  claim  of  upward

transmission  —  close-up  relationships,  commonly  referred  to  as  generating  bonding

social  capital,  can  and  do  produce  conflict,  not  cooperation,  at  higher  political  levels

(Sennett  1974).  These  trust  theorists  prefer  a  less  intense,  more  'civil'  kind  of  trust,

though  there  are  sharp  disagreements  among  them  about  the  kind  of  political  order

'cool  trust'  involves.  On  the  one  side  are  those  who  praise  'cool'  trust  as  creating  just

sufficient  lubrication  for  free  and  rational  citizens  to  interact,  with  the  role  of

government limited to the provision of legal infrastructure (Silver 1985; Krygier 1996).

On  the  other  side  there  are  those  who  endorse  forms  of  bridging  and  linking  social

capital,  based  on  cooperation  among  unequals,  with  a  central  role  for  the  equalizing

policies of government (Szreter 2002; Fattore et al. 2003).



Martin Krygier (1996) typifies the first 'cool trust' camp. He argues that multi-member

polities  need  just  enough  trust  to  facilitate  'routine  social  relations'  among  'non-intimates'.   This  'cool'  trust  is  to  be  distinguished  from  more  organic  forms  of  trust

based on love or 'deep connection', trust which he sees as 'inimical to civil society'. Cool

trust,  according  to  Krygier,  produces  a  'moderately  inclusive'  civility.  This  restrained

civility is preferable because it involves

multitudes of independent actors, going about their individual or freely chosen

affairs … able  to  choose  to  associate  and  participate  (or  not)  in an independent

public  realm,  with  an  economy  of  dispersed  economic  actors  and  markets,

undergirded by a socially embedded legal order which grants and enforces legal

rights. (Krygier 1996:8).

The role of government is limited to upholding this legal order. Cool trust, it is argued,

relies  on  common  traditions  and  norms  and  produces  tolerance  of  'weakly  expressed

communal identities'.



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In this account trust is compatible with economic rationalism. Indeed, the subject of this

model of social relations is the rational, disembodied self-interested actor of the current

hegemonic  economic  paradigm.  While  there  is  some  suggestion  of  a  tempering  of

atomistic  individualism,  it  is  no  more  than  this.  In  addition  Krygier’s  approach

indicates  an  antagonism  to  interconnection.  He  asserts  that  cool  distancing  from

particularities  produces  tolerance,  and  hence  he  endorses  broad  commonalities  and

weakly  identified  communal  identities.  This  implies  that  sub-national  identities  are

considered to be problematic and should therefore be discouraged.



The second challenge to 'hot' associational trust offers a dramatically different vision of

social  relations  and  the  role  of  the  state.  In  this  version  of  social  capital,  Bourdieu-inspired theorists identify close-up or bonding social capital as a resource employed in

the reproduction of social class.  Newton (1999: 185), for example, makes the point that

'generalized  interpersonal  trust'  is  most  strongly  expressed  'not  by  members  of

voluntary  organizations  ...  but  by  the  winners  in  society,  insofar  as  it  correlates  most

strongly  with  education,  satisfaction  with  life,  income,  class  and  race'.  Because  of  a

commitment  to  a  more  egalitarian  social  vision,  these  theorists  describe  an  important

role  for  the  state  in  generating  bridging  and  linking  social  capital  by  breaking  down

boundaries  between  unequals.  There  is  still  a  commitment  to  make  the  poor  'more

trusting', but the problem is no longer represented to be their lack of community or their

excess of community (see above), but their exclusion from full social participation. The

government is allocated a key role in evening out the social disparities which alienate

the  poor  and  in  creating  a  'socially  inclusive'  society.   In  this  scenario  state  and  civil

society  are  interdependent.  Trust  flows  downward  from  integrative  social  structures.

Fattore  et  al.  (2003:  171)  offer  evidence  that  people  who  have  confidence  in  social

institutions are more trusting generally.



Significantly,  Szreter  (2002),  a  keen  supporter  of  state-generated  social  capital,  insists

that  social  relations  must  be  'respectful'  before  they  can  generate  trust.  Respect  as  a

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virtue marks his commitment to egalitarian values and a democratic polity. We see this

as a significant step forward in conceptualizing ethical social relations. Richard Sennett

(2004)  pursues  the  importance  of  respect  as  a  starting  place  for  egalitarian  politics.

However,  in  our  view,  the  emphasis  in  Sennett  on  cultivating  this  'virtue'  in  relations

between  'weak'  and  'strong'  citizens  underplays  human  interdependence  and

interconnection  across  the  board,  leaving  in  place  an  inegalitarian  ethic  of

protectionism.6  As we argue later, assumptions that the 'strong' must 'take care' of the

'weak' provide limited starting places for imagining truly ethical community.



The dangers inherent in this model of social relations are clear in Szreter. Disturbingly,

in  his  view  'social  capital  can  only  flourish  where  a  society  sufficiently  embraces  the

values  of  egalitarianism  combined  with  order  and  hierarchy'  (Szreter  2002:  595.

Emphasis added.). More disturbing still are the different roles marked out for the rich

and  poor  in  the  social  drama  Szreter  describes.  The  rich,  according  to  Szreter,  must

learn to recognize the plight of the poor and to react sensitively. If they do not do this,

they  bear  responsibility  for  the  alienation  of  those  less  well-off.  ‘At  least  some  among

the elite must have their imagination enthused' and

if none among the wealthy and powerful in society will countenance this ... they

cannot be surprised if the poor draw their own defensive conclusions about the

nature of respect, reciprocity, and trust in their society. (Szreter 2002: 587, 613)

Szreter's heroes are turn-of-the-century Progressives, in particular reformers involved in

social  experiments  like  Hull  House.  The  paternalistic  nature  of  relations  between



6  There are links here with Iris Marion Young's (2003) critique of protectionist social relations that  constitute some groups as needing protection and other groups as able to deliver it.

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reformers and the poor in these experiments goes unremarked.7  If this is the best social

capital egalitarians can deliver, it is sadly inadequate.8



Other  Bourdieu-inspired  social  capital  theorists  recognize  with  Szreter  that  more

powerful  groups  are  usually  in  command  of  more  social  capital,  and  that  trust  as  a

public  good  is  unevenly  distributed  (Evers  2003;  Fattore  et  al.  2003).  Hence,  unlike

Putnam,  Fukuyama  and  Costello,  who  warn  about  the  'crowding  out'  effects  of

government  intervention,  they  see  a  role  for  government  in  'social  capital  building'

(Evers 2003: 18). In different accounts this role is described as 'giving citizens a say and

a co-responsibility in designing future welfare states' and 'opinion building' (Evers 2003:

18),  or  providing  more  social  resources,  'opportunities,  income  and  welfare  —  that

make  people  willing  and  able  to  participate  in  their  communities'  (Fattore  et  al.  2003:

174).  These  versions  of  social  capital  provide  a  necessary  corrective  to  'civil  society

determinism'  (Evers  2003:  17),  the  impression  that  all  else  follows  from  associational

participation with no explanation of the mechanisms for transmission. However, these

accounts  remain  part  of  a  project  geared  to  producing  'trusting  citizens'  as  the  key  to

social order and social cohesion, a project we consider misguided and even dangerous.



We  do  not  wish  to  downplay  the  significance  of  the  distinctive  social  visions  among

social capital theorists. Analyses like Szreter's (and we could add the work of Eva Cox

2000)  show  that  it  is  much  too  simple  to  claim  that  social  capital  theory  is  necessarily

anti-state. Indeed, Szreter (2002) makes it easier to identify those social capital theorists



7  Hull House was established by Jane Addams in Chicago in 1889. It formed part of what was called the  'settlement movement', a movement prompted by the desire to teach middle-class values to slum  dwellers. The settlement movement formed part of a wider reform approach commonly called  'progressivism', in which reformers saw themselves as members of a competent ruling elite who could  create a cradle-to-grave blueprint for a new, better-ordered society (Bacchi 1983: 11).  8

Social inclusion analyses commonly display the problems just identified in Szreter. They tend to assume  that the 'poor' are a distinct group (the lower 30%) who need to be assisted by the benevolent to integrate  (Levitas 1996: 17; 1998). Denise Helly (2003: 21) describes the image of society in social inclusion  analyses as  'a society made up of a central locus of individuals and a margin of failures'. A social  inclusion response is to define 'populations at risk, those considered unfit of (sic) an economic and social  performance without social assistance', and convince them to 'change their behavior and become more  qualified.'

Carol Bacchi & Chris Beasley: Moving Beyond Care and/or Trust

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who are anti-state. It follows that people who believe that the state has an important role

to play in providing collective services may well find the kind of analyses offered here a

convincing defense of social capital and trust (or respect) as useful ways to talk about

collective social relationships.



However, there are disturbing commonalities in social capital theory that we think need

to be highlighted. In particular there is a shared belief that 'trust' is a good thing, that

citizens lack  trust,  and  that  ways  must  be  found  to  encourage  citizens  to  trust  one

another  and  the  government.  Despite  important  disagreements  about  the  conditions

needed to produce 'trust' and about the best kind of 'trust' to encourage, the conviction

is that the fate of liberal democracy is bound up, at the last, with the 'quality of citizens'

(Berkowitz 1999: Preface in Wallach 2000: 169).



Social capital theorists of whatever ilk thus appear to accept that there is a crisis in civic

engagement, a 'problem' of citizen 'apathy', and this belief drives their commitment to

find  ways  to  'motivate'  'trust'.   This  grounding  assumption  is  readily  challenged.  As

Dennis Altman (2001) has indicated in his comments on Putnam’s thesis concerning the

decline of American social and communal ties, mobilization around AIDS at least raises

doubts  about  the  scope  of  Putnam’s  claims.  Moreover,  it  is  possible  to  argue,  as  does

Ronald  Inglehart  (1999:  236),  that  elite-forms  of  participation  like  voting  are  declining

while other forms of citizen activism are flourishing.9  There is also evidence that people

can  declare  their  distrust  of  government  all  the  while  expressing  a  desire  for

government to play a significant role in the provision of collective services (Fattore et al.

2003).  Distrust  of  government  most  often  correlates  with  distrust  of  specific  political

regimes,  not  of  government  in  general  (Damico  et  al.  2000).  Given  this,  in  some

circumstances,  distrust  would  have  to  be  considered  a  sign  of  a  healthy,  not  a

languishing, polity.



9  Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995 in Brewer 2003: 7) found evidence that decreased voting is not  accompanied by a general decrease in citizen activism or campaign related activities.

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In  our  view,  the  language  of  crisis  around  trust  and  'civic  engagement'  creates  the

conditions for sheeting home responsibility for these 'problems' to citizens themselves.

Sociality  is  seen  to  depend  upon  the  inculcation of  desired  character  traits,  as in  early

care  theory,  or  of  desirable  citizen  behaviours.  An  ethical  sociality  depends  in  these

accounts  on  creating  ‘caring  citizens’  or  'trusting  citizens'  or  'respecting  citizens'.  The

assumption here is that people are not caring or trusting, and need to be encouraged to

become  so.  This  ignores  the  practices  that  maintain  people  in  their  embodied  social

relations  on  a  daily  basis.   Recognizing  that  caring  is  an  on-going  human  practice

directs attention away from the feared 'limitations' of citizen character/behaviour to the

shape  and  form  of  those  practices.  This  agenda,  pursued  by  second  generation  care

ethicists, marks a significant shift in perspective in the pursuit of ethical community.



Care as a Collective Responsibility



Political theorists Joan Tronto (1993, 2001) and Selma Sevenhuijsen (1997, 1998a, 1998b)

have attempted to deal directly with the limitations of a moral philosophy version of an

ethic  of  care.  They  insist  that  feminists  need  to  stop  thinking  about  care  as  a  moral

disposition. Rather care ought to be seen as an important social practice which should be

considered  in  political  deliberations  about  institutional  responses  to  need.  This  move

shifts  the  discussion  from  one-to-one  caring  relationships  to  institutional  caring

arrangements  (see  also  Engster  2004).  It  draws  attention  to  the  already  existing  caring

practices of citizens, rather than presuming, as trust theorists tend to, that citizens need

to learn to trust and to care.



Feminists have a contested relationship to care, however. Carol Thomas (1993) notes a

divide between those who direct attention to the care that women provide in domestic

arrangements  and  who  demand  that  this  care  be  socially  recognized,  as  against  those

who insist that it is no longer adequate to call upon women to meet society's caring

Carol Bacchi & Chris Beasley: Moving Beyond Care and/or Trust

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needs. Increasingly this tension is being resolved in the direction of the latter position as

a response to what is commonly identified as a growing 'care gap'. This deficit in care is

attributed in large part to the increased participation of women in paid labour and their

consequent  inability  to  provide  as  much  personal  care  as  they  provided  previously

(Sevenhuijsen  2003:  181).  The  focus  increasingly  in  feminist  analyses  is  upon  finding

ways to meet this 'care deficit' (Misra 2003).



Despite this shared goal it is possible to identify serious disagreements about how this

need should be met. Sevenhuijsen, for example, in keeping with early care ethicists, is

concerned to delineate carefully a restricted role for the state. She refers disparagingly

to  'cockpit  notions  of  government',  echoing  British  PM  Tony  Blair  when  he  rejects  a

view  of  government  as  actively  ‘rowing’  in  favour  of  one  which  merely  'steers'  (Blair

and Schroeder 1999). Despite expressed concerns about a 'de-caring of the welfare state',

her focus is explicitly on the importance of civil society. In this vision the role of public

policy  is  to  create  'social  spaces  in  which  people  can  practice  care,  responsibility  and

trust'  (Sevenhuijsen  2003:  187).  Sevenhuijsen's  commitment  to  active  citizenship  and

'trust  as  social  practice'  (Severhuijsen  1998b)  reiterates  aspects  of  social  capital  theory,

specifically  the  insistance  that  'citizen  activities'  provide  the  basis  of  social  ties  and

commitment.  Like  the  early  care  ethicists  Sevenhuijsen  seems  more  than  a  little

uncertain  about  possible  links  between  an  ethic  of  care  and  state  policy  making.  In

contrast,  Nel  Noddings  (2002  in  Engster  2004:  119)  and  Eva  Feder  Kittay  (1999  in

Engster 2004: 120) use care ethics to ground a defense of a stronger welfare state.10



The  fact  that  care  ethics  can  produce  such  contrasting  political  visions  indicates  that,

with  'care'  as  our  yardstick  of  ethical  practice,  we  remain  very  much  in  the  realm  of

interpretation.  Sevenhuijsen  is  well  aware  of  this  but  contends  that  it  is  useful,

nonetheless,  to  try  and  create  'rhetorical  and  discursive  space  for  moral  narratives  of



10  A good deal of recent feminist policy analysis (see Misra 2003) wishes to establish 'carework' as a  public responsibility.

Carol Bacchi & Chris Beasley: Moving Beyond Care and/or Trust

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care,  which  are  marginalized  in  dominant  discourses'  (Sevenhuijsen  1998:  60).  We

accept  the  importance  of  expanding  the  universe  of  political  discourse  as  a  means  to

invigorating  ethico-political  debate  and  indeed  wish  to  make  a  contribution  to  this

project, but we have serious reservations about 'care' as an ideal.11  In our view, care is

both too ambiguous and too normative, leaving it open to abuse.



In other work (Beasley and Bacchi, forthcoming 2004; Bacchi and Beasley, forthcoming

2005)  we  note  the  alignment  of  endorsements  of  an  ethic  of  care  with  traditional

conceptions of heterosexual family and sexuality, signalling a limit to the claim that an

ethic of care fosters sensitivity to difference and context. In addition, despite expressed

desires to avoid paternalism, an asymmetrical relationship is constructed between those

needing  care  and  those  delivering  care,  undermining  the  egalitarian  potential  of  the

analysis.  Sevenhuijsen  (1998b:  7),  for  example,  follows  in  the  footsteps  of  early  care

ethicists  with  her  detailed  exploration  of  one-to-one  caring  arrangements  which

presuppose relations of dependence and vulnerability.12  Even in accounts like Szreter’s

(2002)  that  insist  on  institutional  provision  of  care,  however,  'recipients'  of  care  are

positioned as other than  'donors', as 'in need' in ways that 'donors' are presumed not to

be.



This  kind  of  distinction  appears  also  in  some  postmodern  attempts  to  ground  a  new

ethical  sociality.  Levinas'  reflections  on  ethical  responsibility,  for  example,  assume  a

'radical asymmetry' in the 'apprehension of the Other', where the 'suffering of the one

before  me'  calls  me  'out  of  my  own  insular  subjectivity'  (Dunphy  2004:  3).  Relatedly,

Margrit  Shildrick  (2001:  238)  notes  how  Iris  Marion  Young  draws  upon  Levinas  to

'theorize  her  reflections  on  public  address  and  political  inclusion.'  Once  again,  the



11  Important feminist theorists like Iris Marion Young (1997: 82-3 in Sybylla 2001: 75) would like to see the  ethics of care extended to 'serve as a general ethical theory to ground a normative conception of politics  and policy.'  12

Roe Sybylla (2001: 72) identifies the ways in which caring can create weakness and dependence,  patronizing or diminishing the recipient. In her view, to counter this tendency, respect must come first and  there must be a refusal to speak for others.

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emphasis is on the ways in which the 'bodily need and possibility for suffering' of the

other  'makes  an  unavoidable  claim  on  me'  (Young  1999:  107  in  Shildrick  2001:  238).

While postcolonial theorist Ghassan Hage (2003a, 2003b) enunciates an account of care

that  is  clearly  about  political  caring  based  upon  a  notion  of  interconnection  as  social

practice,  he  conceives  of  the  nurturing  welfare  state  generating  caring  in  individual

citizens, such that they will be able to care for ‘others’, especially those in need. In other

words the caring 'exchange' is still viewed as a form of reciprocated altruism.



The point we wish to make here is that  those  who  want  to  promote  institutional

responsibility for caring practices fail to identity the way in which their accounts retain

a hierarchical relationship between 'givers' and 'receivers'. Sennett's (2004) insistence on

the  need  for  a  respectful  character  to  the  interchange  between  'weak'  and  'strong'

provides a useful corrective here (see also Szreter 2002). However, so long as our ethical

starting  place  is  benevolence,  or  compassion,  or  gift  giving,  or  altruism,  we  reinstate

aspects  of  hierarchy  which  undermine  egalitarian  social  relations  (see  Minow  1990;

Bacchi 2001; 2004). Iris Marion Young is acutely sensitive to the problematic aspects of

dependency  relationships.  She  notes  (2003:  16)  that  'rights  and  dignity  of  individuals

should  not  be  diminished  just  because  they  need  help  and  support'.  To  this  end  she

points out the importance of challenging the assumption that 'a need for support or care

is more exceptional than normal'. Along similar lines Margrit Shildrick (2002) suggests

'a new  mode of ethics that holds at its centre  the vulnerability of being' (Clough 2003:

111).  These  insights  are  crucial  for  our  argument  and  we  pursue  them  below  in  our

reflections on embodied interconnection.



Social Flesh: a new political ethic



Second  generation  care  ethicists  mark  a  significant  advance  on  earlier  care  theory  by

shifting  the  focus  from  moral  disposition  to  caring  practices.  Recognizing  that  caring

practices already take place highlights the limitations of theory that starts from a premise

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that  citizens  have  to  be  motivated  to  'trust'  or  'care'  in  order  to  generate  integrative

sociality. However, caring practices are only one part of the complex and interweaving

layers  of  interconnection  that  characterise  contemporary  social  relations.  Our

necessarily embodied  intersubjective  existence  involves  caring  but  goes  beyond  caring

relationships  to  include  shared  occupation  of  geographical  space,  shared  usage  of

infrastructure  and  ongoing  social  interdependence  within  and  across  borders.

Recognition of these relationships, we suggest, marks a new point of departure for re-imagining social and political life.



This  line  of  thought  involves  conceptualizing  citizens  as  embodied.  As  mentioned

earlier,  the  subject  of  trust  theory  is  decidedly  disembodied,  marking  a  serious

limitation  in  its  scope  and  usefulness.  Notably  second  generation  care  ethicists  put

embodiment  on  the  political  agenda  but  they  deal  only  with  quite  specific  aspects  of

embodiment — those to do with bodily maintenance and nurturance, such as elder care

and child care (Beasley and Bacchi, forthcoming 2004; Bacchi and Beasley, forthcoming

2005). This limited focus emphasizes the dichotomy between those who care and those

cared  for,  highlighting  the  asymmetry  we  find  so  disturbing.  Visions  of  ethical

community require, in our view, a broader conception of embodied intersubjectivity.



On this subject feminist body theory offers important advances on conventional views

about the 'relationship between' body and self. However, much of this theory remains

thinly  physical,  abstract  and  representational  (Beasley  and  Bacchi  2000:  347).  A  key

limitation is the lack of attention to a critical aspect of bodily materiality — that is, its

formation  and  location  within  a  political  sociality  as  a  body  among  bodies.  There  is  a

neglect  of  the  social  space  within  which  embodied  subjects  operate  and  a  neglect  of

inter-subject relations. On this point it is disappointing that Young's (2002) work on the

lived  body  pays  insufficient  attention  to  the  necessarily  social  nature  of  bodily

interactions. This explains, we would suggest, the ease with which Young separates the

formation of identity from social structural factors: 'The person ... is an actor; she has an

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ontological  freedom  to  construct  herself  in  relation  to  this  facticity'  (Young  2002:  415).

Young's  insight  in  other  work  (2003)  that  we  all  need  care  and  support  seems  to

disappear from her analysis of identity formation.13



Some  postmodern  reflections  on  dominant  Western  conceptions  of  embodiment  are

useful  here.  Lara  Merlin  (2003:165)  points  out  that  the  'Western  body  is  constituted

through  a  fear  of  lack  and  of  loss'.  This  subject  attempts  to  'defend  itself  against  their

dual threats by folding in on itself, thereby precluding any relation with the other'. The

prominent  place  of  acquisitive  individualism  in  contemporary  social  theory  confirms

this  account,  as  do  public  policies  predicated  on  rationalist  decision-making  or

cognition. Levinas (Wyschogrod 2003: 62) offers a different starting place for reflecting

on  embodied  subjectivity.  He  interprets  sensation  as  'depending  on  two  distinct

functions  of  bodily  existence:  first,  vulnerability  and  susceptibility,  sensation's  passive

side,  and  second,  aesthetic  ...  articulation  in  its  active  dimension.'  This  leads  to  the

observation  that  corporeality  is  susceptible  to  pain  and  wounding,  to  sickness  and

ageing:  'Pain  penetrates  to  the  heart  of  the  active  cognitive  self  and  calls  it  to  order.

Thus  the  ethical  body  in  its  susceptibility  to  wounding,  to  outrage  and  hurt  ...

challenges the structure of the self as an egology' (Wyschogrod 2003: 63).14



Despite the value of these insights, as noted earlier, this analysis retains a focus on 'the

fragility  of  the  other'  and  the  'radical  generosity  of  altruistic  existence'  (Wyschogrod

2003:  63),  reinstating  asymmetry  at  the  core  of  the  relationship.  We  suggest  that

recognition  of  our  common  intersubjective  embodiment  marks  a  different  ethical

moment.  It  shifts  the  focus  from  those  constituted  as  dependent  to  human

interconnection. As Damico et al. (2000: 379) point out: '[M]any social interactions take



13  Roe Sybylla (2001: 73) notes perceptively that, while Young (1997: 83) speaks against paternalism,  she comes 'dangerously close to it herself when she writes in reference to pregnant drug users, "The  privileged and the powerful have a duty  to ... protect the vulnerable from the consequences of their  compromised situation".' There are echoes here of Szreter's desire to 'enthuse' the imaginations of the  'elite'.

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place  with  people  at  a  great  distance  from  us.  This  distance  does  not  lessen  our

dependence on them: Indeed, our interdependence increases.' In this vein Kittay (1998:

133)  remarks  that  there  are  no  self-reliant  workers  and  that  'self-sufficiency  is  a

conceptual  chimera in a capitalist economy'. The challenge theoretically is to maintain

this insight and not lapse into versions of sociality that construct some groups as needy

and others as beneficent.



We offer the concept of social flesh as a way forward in rethinking the complex nature

of  the  interaction  between  subjectivity,  embodiment,  intimacy,  social  institutions  and

social interconnection.  Social flesh generalizes the  insight that caring practices already

take  place on an ongoing basis to recognition of the  broad, complex sustenance of life

that characterizes embodied intersubjective existence. There is no sense here of 'givers'

and 'receivers'; rather we are all recognized as receivers of socially generated goods and

services. Social flesh necessarily inhabits a specific geographical space, emphasizing the

importance of environmentalist efforts to preserve that space (Macken 2004: 25). Social

flesh also marks our diversity, challenging those who would privilege some bodies over

others.   We  would  also  suggest  that  social  flesh  is  less  normatively  prescriptive  than

care. It is not a directive to behave in any particular way. Rather it provides a new basis

for  thinking  about  the  sorts  of  institutional  arrangements  necessary  to  acknowledge

social  fleshly  existence.  The  effect  is  to  'open  up  the  scope  of  what  counts  as  relevant'

(Shildrick  2001:  238).  For  example,  it  allows  a  challenge  to  current  conceptualizations

which  construct  attention  to  the  'private  sphere'  as  compensatory  rather  than  as

necessary (Beasley and Bacchi 2000: 350).



We  believe  that  this  intervention,  demanding  a  rethinking  of  the  nature  of  embodied

interconnection,  is  particularly  important  as  current  government  policies  already

presume  particular  conceptions  of  bodies,  often  with  undemocratic  consequences.  In



14   G. Thomas Couser  (1997 in Major 2002: 41) agrees that 'body dysfunction is perhaps the most  common threat to the appealing belief that one controls one's destiny.'

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other  work  (Bacchi  and  Beasley  2002)  we  identify  a  dichotomy  operating  in  public

policy  between  conceptions  of  bodies  as  controlled  by  citizens,  and  conceptions  of

citizens as controlled by their bodies. On the one side we find that the presumption of

bodies  controlled  by  citizens  underpins  policies  which  do  not  'infringe'  on  rational

body-controlling citizens, leaving in place structures that disenfranchise many. On the

other  side  the  assumption  that  some  citizens  cannot  control  their  bodies  provides  the

rationale for forms of often coercive regulation. Social flesh challenges the 'control over

body'/'controlled by body' distinction, and hence provides a different starting place for

institutional design.





Conclusion



In  times  like  these,  a  new  ethico-political  ideal  is  required  to  contest  the  adequacy  of

dominant  understandings  of  social  interaction  as  matters  of  choice  and  rational

decision-making.15 Along with some trust and some care theorists, we wish to displace

the  current  hegemonic  status  of  atomistic  individualism.  Contra  much  of  this  theory,

however, we consider the problem to lodge, not in the character deficiencies of citizens,

but  at  the  level  of  social  imaginaries.  Theory  that describes citizens as uncaring or as

lacking in trust leaves unchallenged the presumption that individuals shape their own

futures.  In  some  versions  (Fukuyama  1995;  Costello  2003),  in  fact,  it  reasserts  exactly

this  belief.  In  our  view,  even  those  like  Szreter  and  Hage  who  insist  that  political

institutions  ought  to  provide  basic  social  supports  and  to  take  the  lead  in  generating

viable  social  relations,  continue  to  insist  that  the  outcome  will  be  the  production  of

'trusting' or 'caring' citizens.





15   Mitchell Dean (1997 in Larner 2002: 19) notes that neo-liberalism is 'more an ethos or an ethical ideal,  than a set of completed or established institutions'. This highlights the need to offer contesting ethical  ideals that allow us to imagine political alternatives. Here we offer the bare bones of an ethical ideal we  call ‘social flesh’, an ideal that clearly requires elaboration in future work.

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Our starting place, by way of contrast, is the insight offered by care ethics, that caring

practices are already ongoing. We broaden this insight to include the full range of social

practices that sustain social fleshly existence. This broadening removes the asymmetrical

power  relations  lodged  in  descriptions  of  relations  between  'carers'  and  'cared  for',

between  'givers'  and  'receivers'.  It  shifts  the  discussion  from  the  need  for  compassion

and  open-hearted  generosity  to  recognition  of  embodied  interconnection.  The  focus

becomes mutual, instead of self-, reliance.



As an ethico-political ideal, social flesh demands a political response. In this context, we

do not consider characterizations of the political as 'always manipulation'16 or as a 'male

fixation' (Baier 1987: 50 in Held 1993: 86) to be adequate. Indeed, the ideal of social flesh

is precisely about political sociality. However, this ideal does not presume that forms of

social recognition that flow from it are predictable or laudable. Rather it creates a point

of  departure  for  imagining  and  debating  appropriate  forms  of  responsive

interconnection. This requires democratic institutional spaces with a broad constituency

empowered to share stories about social fleshly experience.



16  Levinas asserts a 'hiatus' between ethics and politics due to the assumption that politics is always  manipulation (Bell 2001).

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