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A Speech by



The Minister for Foreign Affairs

The Hon Alexander Downer MP



To the



Asia-Pacific conference on nuclear safeguards

and security



‘Protecting against nuclear and radiological terrorism:

a comprehensive approach’





Sydney, 8 November 2004

(check against delivery)

UNDER EMBARGO UNTIL 8pm, 8 NOVEMBER 2004



Introduction



Thank you [MC]



Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen



It is a great pleasure to be here at this regional conference on

nuclear safeguards and security.



Today has seen a stimulating discussion of key security issues,

in particular the threat of nuclear terrorism.



The world received a wake-up call earlier this year when the

AQ Khan’s proliferation network was laid bare.



Khan’s network was peddling the know-how and materials to

make some of the most destructive weapons known.



That some of his clients were states of proliferation concern was

deeply troubling.



But of particular concern is the prospect that such networks

could be exploited by terrorists and others to acquire the means

of mass destruction.

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The revelations of the Khan network are a reminder that in the

post September 11 world, there is no room for complacency.



We must act decisively against the threat of nuclear proliferation.



I am pleased to say that Australia has been at the forefront of

these efforts - through our commitment to the Proliferation

Security Initiative…



…our participation in the coalition efforts to bring Saddam

Hussein into compliance with no fewer than 17 UN Security

Council resolutions…



…and as a committed and active member of the multilateral

arms control and disarmament treaties established over decades.



These treaties remain the international community’s first line of

defence against the misuse of sensitive materials and technology.



In the nuclear realm the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

is central.



A strong and effective NPT is essential to preventing the spread

of nuclear weapons, progress towards nuclear disarmament, and

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a climate of confidence necessary for cooperation on peaceful

uses of nuclear energy.



Aside from North Korea, which purportedly has withdrawn

from the NPT, all of us in the Asia-Pacific are NPT parties…



…a testament to the Treaty’s place in the region’s security

architecture.



Regrettably, the NPT is under serious challenge.



Libya’s clandestine nuclear program, developed while an NPT

party and subject to IAEA safeguards, confirmed that existing

measures are insufficient to stop determined proliferators.



That Libya has abandoned its ambitions in this area is a most

welcome development.



But we all fear that NPT parties could misuse the Treaty’s

nuclear energy provisions to acquire the technical basis for a

rapid breakout to nuclear weapons.



After two years of investigations concerns about Iran’s NPT

compliance and future nuclear intentions remain unresolved.



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Iran must do more to satisfy the legitimate expectations of the

international community, notwithstanding having taken some

steps to improve transparency and cooperation with the IAEA.



But the Iran issue is not one of safeguards compliance alone.



If Iran is to restore confidence it must suspend fully all uranium

enrichment activities, including operation of the uranium

conversion facility, as requested by the IAEA Board.



Of concurrent concern - particularly to our region - is North

Korea’s non-compliance with its NPT obligations, its announced

withdrawal from the NPT and claims it has a nuclear deterrent.



I reiterated Australia’s strong concern about North Korea’s

nuclear weapons ambitions when I visited Pyongyang in August

this year.



North Korea must declare and dismantle its nuclear weapons

programs if it is to grasp the opportunities on offer through the

six-party talks and re-engage with the international community.



We should be clear about what is at stake from these threats.



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The NPT-based non-proliferation regime provides vital security

benefits.



But more than this, preventing nuclear proliferation is

fundamental to the goal of nuclear disarmament.



It is impossible to conceive of a world free of nuclear weapons

without complete and permanent assurances of non-proliferation.



For this reason, it is absolutely essential that the IAEA - and its

members - stays the course and enforces its own rules.



Anything less would give comfort to would-be proliferators.



This evening, I want to focus your attention on the threat from

nuclear terrorism and to share some thoughts about what is and

must be done to combat this threat.



The Problem



The threat of nuclear terrorism is not new, but it deserves greater

attention now than it has received in the past.



The form of terrorism the world now faces makes it more

dangerous than ever before.

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The extremism driving this new terrorism is absolute.



Wherever possible the aim of the terrorists is to inflict mass

casualties and disruption.



Attacks are indiscriminate and do not concentrate on military

assets or even on symbolic or political figures - civilians are

often the target.



These terrorists have international reach, are well organised and

able to plan and carry out sophisticated operations.



And many of their known leaders and operatives are highly

educated, well funded, and well versed in technology.



Against this background, it comes as no surprise that

transnational terrorists are interested in weapons of mass

destruction.



We know terrorists have already tried to develop chemical,

biological and radiological capability.



We should have no doubt they would use these weapons - or

even nuclear weapons - if they had them.

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Dr Potter and others have described the forms nuclear and

radiological terrorism might take and the potential consequences.



We can all visualise the terrible human costs if terrorists were to

explode a nuclear weapon in a major city.



Fortunately, this most frightening of scenarios is also the least

probable.



But terrorists could more readily obtain radioactive material -

such as the radioactive sources commonly used in medicine,

science and industry - to produce a “dirty bomb” which could

disperse radioactive contamination over a wide area.



Nor can we dismiss the possibility of a terrorist attack on a

nuclear facility.



We know Khaled Sheikh Mohammed and Mohamed Atta

considered including nuclear power plants on their target lists

for the 9-11 attacks.



Notwithstanding such threats, modern, well-designed and

appropriately sited facilities incorporate a ‘defence-in-depth’

philosophy…

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…for example, modern facilities are designed to withstand

earthquakes and external impacts more destructive than any

form of terrorist attack.



Unfortunately, we cannot safely assume that terrorist groups do

not have - or could not acquire - the necessary materials to

carry out an act of nuclear or radiological terrorism.



To date the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database has recorded,

since 1993, approximately 630 confirmed incidents involving

illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.



Weapons-usable nuclear material made up a small proportion of

the incidents.



In most cases, quantities involved were only a few percent of

what would be needed for a nuclear weapon.



But during the first half of the 1990s, quantities of a kilogram or

more of stolen highly enriched uranium were also intercepted.



Obviously these figures are of concern.



But of even greater concern is what we might not be seeing.

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It is very difficult to determine how much trafficking in nuclear

materials and sources is going undetected.



Certainly, we received an alarming insight into the extent of the

nuclear black-market with exposure of the A Q Khan nuclear

proliferation network.



Khan was able to supply everything from the technology needed

to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons…..



….. to nuclear weapon design information.



The lessons from the Khan network go well beyond state-level

proliferation.



The existence of a sophisticated nuclear black-market, coupled

with terrorist interest in weapons of mass destruction was a stark

reminder…



…that unless we act firmly and in unity, terrorists could obtain a

nuclear or radiological weapon with disastrous consequences.



In our region we have a particular interest in ensuring the

highest standards of nuclear security.

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Of 26 nuclear power reactors currently under construction

around the world 15 are located in India, Japan, the Republic of

Korea, and China (including Taiwan).



But we should guard against any inclination to think of nuclear

terrorism as an issue for some states and not for others.



Nuclear technology is present today in almost all countries and

it is our collective responsibility to ensure it is not misused.



The Current Situation



Australia is committed to promoting the highest international

standards of nuclear security.



Australia strongly supports universal application of the IAEA’s

strengthened nuclear safeguards system - the Additional

Protocol.



This would substantially raise the barriers to misuse of sensitive

materials and technology by both state and non-state actors.



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In our view, next year’s NPT Review Conference should

confirm the strengthened safeguards system as the current

standard under the NPT.



Protection of nuclear facilities has generally been strong - but

constant vigilance and effort is needed to ensure wide

application of the highest standards against sabotage or theft.



Work to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of

Nuclear Material (CPPNM) should be finalised quickly.



Those yet to adhere to this Convention, and other instruments

which help protect against nuclear terrorism, should do so.



Controlling radioactive sources is already an important public

health and environmental priority.



As an illustration, just one ‘orphan source’ in Brazil required

significant decontamination of buildings and cost some

US$20 million in clean up costs.



The risk of radiological terrorism heightens the urgency of

securing vulnerable radioactive sources.



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The international standard for safe and secure use of sources

was established in 2003 when the IAEA Code of Conduct on the

Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources was adopted.



Australia is implementing all the requirements of the Code.



Our task now is to ensure the Code is universally applied.



The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation is

working with regional countries to improve and strengthen

regulatory controls and physical security on sources.



Australia has set aside $4.4 million over three years to

implement this program in South-East Asia and the Pacific.

We welcome the assistance that the IAEA and the US

International Radiological Threat Reduction Program are

providing in rendering sealed radioactive sources safe and

secure, and in securing orphaned radioactive sources.



The Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency

is working with our States and Territories to improve physical

security and safe use of radioactive sources.



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Multilaterally, Australia welcomed adoption of UN Security

Council Resolution 1540 as a timely and appropriate response to

the threat of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction.



Australia is ready and willing to work with your countries, and

to provide what assistance we can, to promote implementation

of UNSCR 1540 in the Asia-Pacific region.



Early and full implementation will ensure the international

community derives full benefit from this historic resolution.



As with other forms of terrorism, we need to work together to

combat the risk of nuclear and radiological terrorism.



We need to strengthen international cooperation - including

through enhanced information-sharing and technical cooperation.



Australia values the IAEA’s strong contribution in this field…



…and was one of the first countries to contribute to the IAEA’s

Nuclear Security Fund established to support international

efforts to address the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism.



We remain committed to that program.



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The G8 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of

Mass Destruction is another group playing a major role in

improving the security on fissile material in their case

concentrating on Russia and other former Soviet Republics.



Australia has contributed $10 million to the Global Partnership

- specifically the Japan-Russia project for the dismantlement of

decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines.



We chose this project because of its direct relevance to our

region.



The Outlook



There will be no easy solution or quick fix in tackling the threat

of nuclear and radiological terrorism.



Our approach must be sustained, comprehensive and

cooperative.



We must make full use of existing tools and develop new

measures to close the gaps in nuclear counter-terrorism efforts.



In our region we should strive to exemplify best practice in the

application of global standards…

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…to implement and enforce strong national regulations

including export controls…



…and collaborate at the regional and international levels to

counter this threat.



The rapid development of the Proliferation Security Initiative

has demonstrated the opportunities for new thinking on

combating illicit trafficking in WMD-and missile-related items.



The PSI Operational Experts Meeting will be held in Sydney

later this year.



We hope to engage increasing numbers of Asia-Pacific countries

in this endeavour, building on broad international support.



Asia-Pacific countries may wish to consider whether there are

ways to improve the sharing of experience on nuclear security

and safeguards issues.



One option could be to establish some form of regular regional

consultations, perhaps initially on an informal basis, to facilitate

best practice safeguards and security culture.



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Conclusion



It is clear that national governments cannot deal with the threat

of nuclear and radiological terrorism in isolation.



Cooperation, including making full use of the advice and

assistance available from the IAEA, is essential.



For the present, nuclear and radiological terrorism remains less

probable than conventional attacks.



But it would be foolhardy in the extreme to assume terrorists are

not seeking to develop or acquire unconventional weapons.



The reality is that potential consequences are so high that we

must take this threat seriously…



…for failure to act in a decisive and unified manner…



…leaves open the possibility of an international disaster, on an

unprecedented scale.



Australia stands ready to work with countries in this region to

enhance regional efforts to combat nuclear and radiological

terrorism and to share resources towards this end.

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I encourage all countries to be committed to these goals.



Thank you.



