No. Date THE HON. ANDREW PEACOCK M.P.

M47. 22 July 1977

NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Andrew Peacock,  said today that Mr Whitlam's speech to the National Press  Club on 20 July reflected a number of confusions in relation  to nuclear safeguards and the proposed International  Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation.

Mr Whitlam criticised safeguards implementation  in Europe and Japan and said that it did not meet nonÂ­ proliferation requirements. Mr Peacock said that this  presented a distorted picture of the situation.

The Safeguards Agreement between Belgium, Denmark,   the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,  Ireland, Luxembourg, the European Atomic Energy Community  (EURATOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)  provides for the safeguards obligations assumed by these

countries when they ratified the Non-proliferation Treaty  (NPT); that is to verify that there is no diversion from  peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive  devices.

Mr Whitlam misleadingly described this Agreement,  which is a detailed document running to almost 100 articles,   as "nothing but a framework". He neglected to mention, for  example, that the Agreement provides for IAEA inspection of

European nuclear facilities without awaiting the conclusion  of subsidiary arrangements. In the interim, the Agreement  empowers the IAEA to make ad hoc inspections. Such  inspections are already taking place in addition to the

continuation of EURATOM1s own safeguarding activity.

The purpose of the subsidiary arrangements is to  define more permanent technical arrangements for the IAEA  to implement its safeguards. This is standard procedure  following the entry into force of a new agreement to

implement safeguards under the NPT. Since the Agreement  entered into force there have been discussions between,  the European authorities and the IAEA on the terms of these  arrangements. It should be borne in mind that a number of  the European countries have large nuclear industries  and there was already in existence an independent safeguards  system of long standing, the EURATOM system, which has now  to be co-ordinated with the IAEA system of safeguards.

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At the most recent meeting of the IAEA Board of  Governors in June 1977: the Australian Delegation welcomed  the commitment made by the representatives of the EURAT0M  States to reaching early resolution of the subsidiary

arrangements. This remains the Governmeiit1  s view, which . . Â·  '   reflects the importance it attaches to the application of  effective IAEA Safeguards. This was a major theme of the  Prime Minister's statement on safeguards of 24 May 1977.

The IAEA has been applying its safeguards in  Japan for many years pursuant to bilateral agreements. This is, for example, already a requirement under the 1972  bilateral agreement between Australia and Japan. In

fiscal year 1976, IAEA inspectors spent 416 man-days in  Japan.

Mr Peacock said the main purpose of the International  Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) was not to work out  stronger international safeguards for the nuclear industry,  as claimed by Mr Whitlam, but to study how nuclear power

could'help to meet:.the world's energy needs without  compromising non-proliferation objectives. INFCE will be  a technical study which it is proposed will cover:

. work on uranium and enrichment availability; .

. institutional arrangements related to possible  nuclear fuel supply assurances:

. spent fuel storage and waste disposal;

. methods to increase once-through uranium  utilisation in light-water reactors;

. various, types of reprocessing;

. breeder reactors (including non-plutonium breeders);

.Â· advanced reactors.

Mr Whitlam has thus mistaken the purpose of this  evaluation at a basic level. From that follows his equally  basic mistake about the consequences of export of uranium  in the period. Indeed, if Australia did: decideÂ·.  to permit

further exports of uranium under the stringent safeguards  recently announced by the Prime Minister, Australia would  be in a better position to exert influence in INFCE and  help shape the direction of future nuclear development with  non-proliferation objectives in mind. Further, to postpone  any decision on uranium export while INFCE is underway, as  Mr Whitlam proposed, would only add to uncertainties about  the availability- of uranium, a major topic that will be

studied in INFCE. Continuing uncertainty about availability  of uranium could further encourage the use of plutonium even  before the results of the INFCE study are known.

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Mr Peacock said that in contrast to the Opposition  the Government-had taken the initiative in strengthening the  international non-proliferation regime. Unlike the Opposition,  which is content simply to criticise present multilateral

safeguards arrangements, the Government has formulated and  announced a tough and comprehensive safeguards policy which  contains stringent bilateral conditions,  over and above  existing multilateral arrangfemerits

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