The Templeton Lecture 2002  University of Sydney





Science, Weapons, Politics:

the Ethics, the Hard Choices  Ambassador Mr. Richard Butler AM

I owe this university a great deal.  When I came here  for the first time, a little over 40 years ago, I wanted  to learn a lot and perhaps more importantly, I needed  to learn a lot.

In those first four years here I was given the tools and  the  skills  that  proved  to  be  amongst  the  most   important determinants of whatever I achieved in my  subsequent  career.  But,  vastly  more  important  than   those practical things, I was taught the importance of  thinking and of fundamental values.

The  university  was  also  a  place  of  culture  and  fun.    That  also  meant  a  lot.   I  studied  economics,  politics  and  psychology  but  of  course,  there  was  so  much   more.   Perhaps  the  most  important  of  my  extra   curricula ventures was the some three months I spent,  deep  in  the  stacks  of  the  Fisher  library,  reading  the   transcripts of the Nuremberg trials.

Earlier,  as  a  primary  school  student  at  Bondi  Beach   Public  School,  I  had  heard  stories  of  war  and   oppression from t he considerable number of students  there who were the children of refugees from Hitler’s  Europe.   When  I  have  been  asked,  all  these  years   later, why I pursued a career in international relations  and arms control, I have replied that it was because of  those stories I heard at Bondi Beach.  That is the true  answer.

My  decision  to  read  the  Nuremberg  transcripts  and   indeed  to choose  German  as  my  foreign  language  at   Randwick High School reflected the deep puzzlement  I had felt as a young man about those events, mainly  in  Europe,  during  the  Second  World  War.   In   particular I wanted to know how it could be that the  country  of  Beethoven  could  have  become  so   uncivilized.  Fine music was something to which my  older  brother, who  also  attended  this  university,  had   introduced me at an early  age,  an  action  for which  I   will be eternally grateful.

As  a  student  of  politics  I  had  also  wanted  to  know   how the structures of government, of bureaucracy, of  public  information  and  political  communication  had   functioned,  or  not,  in  Hitler’s  Germany.   Perhaps   above all I had wanted to know what had happened to  personal  responsibility  for  individual  action.   I

discovered, in the Nuremberg transcripts, that, at that  trial,  the  concept  of  a  crime  against  humanity  had   been  articulated  and  chief  amongst  the  findings  was   that  no  person  could  avoid  personal  responsibility,   blame others in higher authority, for their actions.

These  ideas  and  those  of  Hannah  Arendt,  among   others, have been important to me through the years.   It was easy to validate her concept of the “banality of  evil” while dealing with the dictators of Baghdad.

As  my  undergraduate  studies  at  the  university  drew   to  a  close  I  looked  for  a  job,  preferably  in  public   service,  because  this  accorded  with  my  personal   political  views.   I  saw  advertised,  in  the  Sydney   Morning  Herald,  a  job  that  struck  me  as  potentially   perfect—Graduate  Assistant  in  the  International   Relations  Section  of  the  Australian  Atomic  Energy   Commission  at  Coogee.   Possibly  the  only  thing   wrong  with  it  was  that  the  Commission  was  at   Coogee, not Bondi.

I  applied  and,  in  spite  of  an  embarrassingly

loquacious  application, they  gave  me  the  job.   I  had   no  idea  when  I started  work  at  the  Commission  that   what would happen there would shape the subsequent  four  decades  of  my  life.  I  could  give  so  very  many   examples of this but one will suffice to illustrate the  point—that  I  would  find  myself  in  Baghdad  thirty   five  years  later  negotiating  with  the  government  of   Saddam  Hussein  about  its  clandestine  nuclear   weapons  program  was  indivisible  from  my  starting   my  working  life  at  the  Australian  Atomic  Energy   Commission.

If I can be forgiven a domestic political aside, given  current  political  neglect  of  public  education  in   Australia,  I  would  point  out  that  all  of  mine  was   provided through the public system.  Some in politics  may, of course, take that as a reason for continuing to  starve the system.

Within  a  few  months,  at  the  atomic  energy

commission,  some  basic  concerns  and  facts  flooded   in upon me.

First,  the  fundamental  inquiry  into  the  nature  of   matter  that  had  taken  place  throughout  the  first  half   of  the  twentieth  century,  leading  to  modern  nuclear

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physics,  was  profoundly  exciting.   It  had  been  a   journey as momentous as that of Columbus.

Second, while it was not the intention of the men and  women who conducted that inquiry; they were armed  with  nothing  more  dangerous  than  pencil  and  paper,   blackboard  and  chalk;  their  work  opened  up  the   possibility  of  the  creation  of  nuclear  weapons,  the   weapons  which  continue  today  to  constitute  the   greatest  threat  to  the  survival  of  humanity,  and  its   planetary environment.

Third,  the  invention  of  the  bomb  had  been  pursued,   first,  by  Hitler.   Ironically  one  of  the  key  factors   which  had  slowed  down  his  program  was  his  anti-Semitism—he actually  viewed  theoretical  physics as   ‘Jewish  physics’  because  many  of  the  leading   scientists  were  Jewish.   He  therefore  discouraged  it   for  this  reason,  as  well  as  because  of  apprehensions   of the coming holocaust, many of those scientists left  Germany  and  went  to  England  and  America  where   they  subsequently  worked  in  the  Manhattan  Project,   the  project  to  design  the  allied  bomb.   I  might   mention  that  one  of  those  scientists,  the  1995  Noble  peace  prize  recipient,  Sir  Joseph  Rotblat,

subsequently  worked  as  a  member  of  the  Canberra   Commission  on  the  elimination  of  nuclear  weapons,   which I chaired.

Fourth, I discovered the existence of the International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  in  Vienna.   It  had  been   created  ten  years  earlier  in  an  attempt  to  limit  the   diversion  of  nuclear  science  to  military  purposes.   I   also  learned  that  a  negotiation  was  underway,   following  the Cuban  missile crisis  and pursuant to  a  proposal  made  by  Frank  Aiken,  then  Foreign   Minister  of  Ireland,  to  create  a  nuclear  non-proliferation treaty.

I  resolved  to  go  back  to  university  on  a  part  time   basis,  to  begin  a  Masters  degree,  and  to  make  my   research  topic—preventing  the  spread  of  nuclear   weapons.  It is a sign of the times that I decided upon  that  topic  because  of  the  paucity  of  research  and   written information on it.  I recall there were, in fact,  only four main authors. If any of you were to go to a  good library today or the great library of the Internet  and  look  up  the  subject, non-proliferation  of  nuclear  weapons, you would find that that four has become at  least four thousand.

There  is  a  simple  reason  for  this  and  it  is  shocking.    When  the  age  of  nuclear  weapons  began  there  were   three  of  them—the  weapon  tested  at  Alamogordo,   New Mexico, in July 1945 and then the two used by  the  United  States  over  Japan  a  month  later.   Forty   years  later,  at  the  height  of  the  cold  war  and  the   nuclear  arms  race,  that  number  had  become  80,000.    It  was  the  reason  why  one  of  bill  Hayden’s  first   actions  when  he  became  Foreign  Minister  of   Australia,  in  1983,  was  to  create  the  role  of

Australian  Ambassador  for  Disarmament.   He   thought  Australia  should  speak  up  against  the   madness  of  nuclear  weapons.   He  appointed  me  to   that job and his first action was to go to Moscow and

to  Washington  to  ask  both  of  them  to  stop  and   reverse the nuclear arms race.  I will not forget those  discussions.   Bill  Hayden’s  advocacy,  especially  in   the Kremlin, was outstanding.

Nuclear  weapons  are  not  the  only  weapons  of  mass   destruction.   That  category  now  also  includes,  at   least,  chemical  and  biological  weapons.   But  the   peculiar  history  of  nuclear  weapons  and  the hideous  shadow  they  have  cast  over  humanity  makes  their   development and the political and ethical issues they  have  raised,  the  paradigm  case  of  the  fundamental   issues I want to address in this lecture.  There are at  least four such issues.



The ethical connector  First  and  foremost,  the  question  of  the  relationship   between our ability to apply the products of research  practically and any given decision to do so.

It is often asserted that if something is possible then it  should be done or, at the very least, there is no reason  why  it  should  not.   I  want  to  state  that  I  robustly   disagree.   If  an  automatic  connection  is  drawn   between the potentiality revealed by a given piece of  research and it being then applied to the invention of  a process  or  an  object,  we  will  by  that  automaticity,   have  rendered  ethical  judgment  of  human  action   irrelevant.

This  ethical  connector  between  what  is  possible  and   what  it  is  decided  to  be  done  has  always  been  with   us, in medicine, in industry, and perhaps above all, in  the field of science under the umbrella of which this  lecture is being given—biology.

In  my  view  the  other  field  in  which  it  must  be   asserted  that  the  fact  that  something  can  be  done  is   not a sufficient reason to justify it being done, is that  of weaponry.

The originators of nuclear physics were aware of the  possibility  that  fission  could  be  deployed  to  make  a   massive  explosion.   As  is  vividly  shown  in  Michael   Frayn’s  superb  play  ‘Copenhagen’,  key  participants   in  the  journey  of  discovery  of  the  atom  and  its   behaviour, agonised about the military applications of  their work.  Albert Einstein was an apolitical person  yet  he  wrote  to  president  Roosevelt  warning  of  the   danger of fission.

Immediately  after  Hiroshima  and  Nagasaki  the   United  States  government  proposed  that  the  new   explosive  technology  be  placed  under  international   control,  essentially  to  ensure  that  it  was  not

developed or used further.  The Soviet Union rejected  this  and  embarked  on  its  own  nuclear  weapons   program.

Perhaps  even  more  important  than  the  astronomical   heights reached by the nuclear arms race, which then  ensued,  was  the  fact  that  repeatedly  during the  forty  years  of  that  desperate  competition  both  sides   indicated  that  they  recognised  that  the  quantity  of

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nuclear weapons in existence was enough.  Yet  they  couldn’t stop.

It was only when the burden of this arms race became  economically  crippling,  particularly  for  the  soviet   union,  and  recognition  that,  as  the  Canberra   Commission observed in 1995 that as long as nuclear  weapons existed it was inevitable that they would be  used, by accident or design, that steps were taken to  reduce the number of them in existence.  There have  been significant reductions so that, today, the number  of  deployed  nuclear  missile  systems  held  by  the   United  States  and  Russia  is  between  six  and  seven   thousand each.  This number, together with the some  twenty  thousand  held  by  each  in  storage,  still   constitutes  enough  explosive  capacity  to  destroy  the   earth  several  times  over.   Thankfully,  further   reductions are planned.

So  what  are  we  to  make  of  this  on  the  level  of   principles?

The  scientists  knew that  what  they  were researching  could  be  deployed  to  a  truly  destructive  purpose.    Some  of  them warned  against  it.  Clearly  others  did   not and indeed worked in the various atomic weapons  programs  and  continue  to  do  so  today.   This  has   always raised large questions of conscience and many  in the scientific community have sought to deal with  that uncomfortable problem by arguing that science is  morally neutral.  The individual scientist, it is said, is  only  responsible  for  the  scientific  integrity  of  his  or   her  work.   The  decision  on  what  to  do  with  it  lies   elsewhere,  with  politicians  or  indeed  with  ethicists.    But not them.

I  mentioned  earlier  my  friend,  Joseph  Rotblat.   His   case  is  interesting.   Joseph  is  of  Polish—Jewish   origin,  now  a  citizen  of  the  United  Kingdom.   At   eighteen  years  of  age,  a  brilliant  physicist,  having   escaped  the  Nazis,  he  joined  the  allied  bomb   program.  He  was  aware  of Hitler’s  program  and  he  believed  that  Hitler  was  a  truly  evil  man.   When   Hitler  was  defeated  he  believed  that  the  western   bomb program would then not proceed because in his  understanding it had been aimed at Hitler.  When he  learned  that  it  was  to  continue  and  be  used  on  the   Japanese  he  resigned  from  the  program.   He  then   spent  a  lifetime  in  conjunction  with  the  Pugwash  Movement  on  science  and  social  responsibility,   agitating for the abolition of nuclear weapons.  It was  for this work that he received the Nobel peace prize.

Another  Polish  ÃÂ©migrÃÂ©  scientist,  Jacob  Bronowski,   has  inspired  me,  always,  with  his  vibrant  history  of   science and human progress and his insistence on the  centrality of the notion of tolerance, both in scientific  measurement and in human relations.



Individual responsibility  The  history  of  the  development  of  nuclear  weapons   seems to me to support a second principle alongside  the one that I have called the ethical connector—just

because  something  can  be  done  does  not  mean  it   should be done.  An ethical judgment is essential.

This  second  principle  is  that  individual  scientists   should  be  expected  to  exercise  an  ethical  judgment   upon their own work.  To do otherwise, to accept the  notion  that  scientists  have  no  such  responsibility,   would  be  to  assert,  absurdly,  that  scientists  are   somehow a separate branch of the human race.  More  practically,  it  would  place  them  outside  the  concept   of  individual  responsibility  for  actions.   I  have  a   problem  with  that,  because  after  all,  I  have  read  the   transcripts from Nuremberg.



Distributive justice  Science  and  technological  development  have,   perhaps  properly,  always  had  to  compete  for   resources.  The resource allocation aspect of nuclear  weapons  is  simply  astonishing.   It  is  probably   impossible to know exactly how much has been spent  on  nuclear  weapons  over  the  years,  especially  with   respect  to  expenditures  within  centrally  planned   economies.   The  best  estimate  of  United  States   expenditures  gives  us  a  guide.   Since  nuclear   weapons  were  first  developed  the  United  States  has   spent  $5.5  trillion  on  nuclear  weapons.   This  has   worked out to be more than $96 million a day.

Questions  of  values,  of  the  most  fundamental  and   pervasive  kind,  are  raised  by  these  expenditures.   It   beggars  the  imagination  to  think  of  the  opportunity   costs—of what could have been achieved and created  had  even  a  relatively  small  portion  of  this  money   been devoted elsewhere.

I  do  not  believe  that  I  am  a  naÃÂ¯ve  or  starry-eyed   person  when  it  comes  to  the  world’s  affairs.   But,  I   sometimes  feel  despair  at  the  value  system  that  can   permit  this  level  of  resource  allocation  to  persist   when poverty and other forms of dreadful distress so  abound  in  the  world  and  are  growing.   I  find  it   particularly  hard  to  accept  the  words  of  justification   for these expenditures that one sometimes hears from  people  who  style  themselves  as  both  the  champions   of  liberty  and  the  rights  of  individuals  and  the   inheritors of a Christian culture.

If there is a third principle to be derived, at this point,  it  is  surely  that  our  resource  allocation  decisions   should  reflect  as  far  as  possible  a  fundamental   judgment that each human life is valuable and that a  basic  human  right  is  justice,  including  distributive   justice.

John Rawl’s treatise on justice is deeply persuasive in  this  context  as  is  Ronald  Dworkins  on  the  thorny   problem of reconciling equality and liberty.



The axioms of proliferation  One of the key concepts that flows directly from the  notion  of  justice,  in  the  context  of  nuclear  weapons   and their peculiar history, is what I call the axiom of  proliferation.   This  asserts  that  as  long  as  any  state

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possesses nuclear weapons others will seek to acquire  them.  The basic reason for this is that justice, which  most human beings interpret essentially as fairness, is  demonstrably a concept of the deepest importance to  people all over the world.  Relating this to the axiom  of  proliferation,  it  is  manifestly  the  case  that  the   attempts  over  the  years  of  those  who  own  nuclear   weapons  to  assert  that  their  security  justifies  having   those  nuclear  weapons  while  the  security  of  others   does not, has been an abject failure.

I  have  worked  on  the  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation   Treaty all my adult life, that is, since its inception.  I  have  discussed  the  efforts  to  restrain  the  spread  of   nuclear  weapons  in  the  four  corners  of  this  globe— from Beijing to Bombay, from Moscow to Baghdad.   The problem of nuclear weapon have and have nots is  the  central,  perennial  one.   Amongst  my  toughest   moments  in  Baghdad  were  when  the  Iraqi’s   demanded that I explain why they should be hounded  for  their  weapons  of  mass  destruction  when,  just   down  the  road,  Israel  was  not,  even  though  it  was   known to possess some 200 nuclear weapons.

I  confess  too  that  I  flinch  when  I  hear  American,   British, and French, fulminations against weapons of  mass  destruction,  ignoring  the  fact  that  they  are  the   proud  owners  of  massive  quantities  of  those   weapons,  unapologetically  insisting  that  they  are   essential  for  their  national  security,  and  will  remain   so.

The  principle  I  would  derive  from  this  is  that   manifest unfairness, double standards, no matter what  power  would  appear  at  a  given  moment  to  support   them, produces a situation that is deeply, inherently,  unstable.   This  is  because  human  beings  will  not   swallow  such  unfairness.  This  principle  is  as  certain   as the basic laws of physics itself.

I will pause now, for a moment, to pull together what  I think we should know or have learnt from the half-century-old phenomenon of nuclear weapons and the  century old journey of modern nuclear science.

What  leaps  off  the  page,  first  and  foremost,  is  that   nuclear  weapons  are  at  least  history’s  greatest   accident  or  unintended  consequence  of  science  but,   more  likely,  history’s  greatest  failure—a  failure  of   understanding  of  the  values  that  are  inevitably  at   issue  in  any  scientific  research  and  its  potential   practical applications.

If we are to learn from the nuclear paradigm it is that  our values should be ever present in what we do and  should  shape  our  work.   All  are  responsible— scientists,  policy  makers  and  individuals.   If  such   responsibility  is  not  engaged  we  will  fantastically   misallocate  our  resources,  failing  to  attend  to  the   things that are truly the business of the human family,  and  finally,  all  of  this  will  come  to  naught,  because   we  will  have  created  an  inherently  unstable  system.    If  I  may  be  allowed  the  obvious  remark,  it  will   explode.

While  nuclear  weapons  have  occupied  the  first  rank   amongst  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  they  are  not   actually  the  original  type  of  such  weapons.   In  the   relatively  modern  period  that  dubious  distinction   goes to chemical weapons.

The  history  of  chemical  weapons  differs  somewhat   from that of nuclear weapons.  An attempt was made  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  to  outlaw  them   but  this  did  not  acquire  practical  significance  until   they were used with devastating consequences on the  battlefields during the First World War.

The world recoiled and the Geneva Protocol of 1925  was done, outlawing noxious and asphyxiating gases.   The  norm  it  established  was  substantially  observed   although  there  were  notable  exceptions:  the  use  of   gas by Italy in Abyssinia; the Nazi gas chambers; the  Vietnam war; the Iraq/Iran war and Saddam’s use of  chemical weapons against Kurdish Iraqis.  It is likely  that  there  are  other  instances  of  chemical  weapons   use.

The 1925  protocol  was  substantially  replaced  by  the  1972  Chemical  Weapons  Convention,  the

construction  of  which  was  greatly  shaped  by   Australia.   It  outlaws  chemical  weapons  in  all   aspects,  from  manufacture  to  use.   A  chemical   weapons  organisation  has  been  created  and  it  has   powers of inspection.

Biological  weapons  have  been  developed  and   deployed  by  a  number  of  countries  for  at  least  the   past half century.  It is not clear that they have been  used  in  anything  approximating  the  scale  in  which   chemical  weapons  have.   Biological  weapons  are   manifestly  a murky  and  unrespectable  application  of   science and, indeed, military tactics.

A  Biological  Weapons  Convention  came  into   existence  in  1962  under  which  all  parties  to  the   convention  eschew  biological  weapons.   The  norm   expressed in the convention is clear enough, but it is  a  weak  instrument  because  states  have  never  been   able  to  agree  on  a  mechanism  to  verify  compliance   with the convention.

While the exact facts of the current status of arsenals  of biological weapons cannot be ascertained, it seems  to  be  the  case  that  the  major  biological  weapons   states of the past have stopped making those weapons  and have set about destroying those stocks.  The state  with  the  largest  commitment  to  biological  weapons   was the Soviet Union and the details of the size and  scope of its past program are alarming to the point of  implying  a  pathological  interest  in  the  possibility  of   killing people with germs.

It should be pointed out that modern developments in  both  chemical  and  biological  science,  able  to  be   applied to weapons, has led many experts to hold that  in  some  instances,  a  significant  use  of  chemical   weapons  or  biological  warfare  could  cause  as  much   damage as the use of nuclear weapons.

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Chemical  and  biological  weapons  raise  virtually  the   same  issues  although  in  slightly  different  ways  to   those raised by nuclear weapons.  Clearly this is true  of  the  ethical,  personal  responsibility  and  resource   allocation issues.

The particular difficulties they raise in ways different  from or sharper than those raised by nuclear weapons  and  nuclear  science  derive  from  the  dual  use  aspect   of the science and technologies involved.  Simply, it  is  very  often  the  case  that  the  materials  and

technologies  employed  in  making  a  chemical  or   biological weapon are identical to those used to make  a range of benign products for medical, industrial or  agricultural use.  All that is different is the process.

We were acutely aware of this when conducting arms  inspections  in  Iraq.   It  was  clear  to  us,  for  example,  that  a  given  factory  could  be  manufacturing   insecticides while we visited it, in the morning hours,  but  could  readily  switch  to  the  production  of   chemical weapons agents in the afternoon.

The decision by the United Nations Security Council,  in  1991,  that  all  of  Iraq’s  weapons  of  mass

destruction  should  be  “destroyed,  removed,  or   rendered  harmless”  was  a  unique  and  far  reaching   decision.   There  had  been  attempts  in  the  past  to   disarm  defeated  countries,  most  recently  Germany   and Japan.  But there was little to compare with what  the  Security  Council  established  in  the  case  of  Iraq,   including  the  heaviest  possible  sanctions  until  Iraq   was  disarmed  and,  the  establishment  of  a  special   body, as a sub organ of the council itself, to carry out  the  disarmament  work.   This  body,  UNSCOM,  was   the one I came to head.

The working methodology established by the Council  had  four  parts:  declaration  by  Iraq  of  all  its  legal   weapons;  verification  by  UNSCOM  of  those   declarations;  destruction  by  UNSCOM  of  all  illegal   weapons  and  the  means  to  make  them;  the

establishment  of  a  monitoring  system  to  ensure  that   Iraq did not reconstitute the offending weapons in the  future.

This  work  of  removing  Iraq’s  weapons  of  mass   destruction was expected to take from a year to a year  and  a  half.   After  seven  years  it  was  not  completed   and Iraq shut UNSCOM down.

On three occasions during those seven years military  action  was  taken  against  Iraq  in  response  to  the   resistance  to  UNSCOM  and  its  work  mounted  by   Iraq.  During my term as head of UNSCOM I had to  evacuate  all  staff,  on  an  emergency  basis,  also  on   three  occasions,  for  reasons  of  breakdown  and   conflict but essentially for the safety of the staff.

If  anything  is  understood  about  this  experience with   Iraq, and indeed it continues today, it is that from the  beginning  Saddam Hussein  refused  to  hand over  the  weapons  and  withheld  cooperation  with  UNSCOM.    The  very  first  declaration  furnished  to  UNSCOM  in   1991  was  false.  Iraq  stated  for five years, including   at the United Nations, at the Security Council, that it

had no biological warfare program.  When UNSCOM  demonstrated  that  this  was  not  true  Iraq  then   furnished a declaration on its previously non-existent  program,  which  transparently  was  false.   It  had   moved from denial to deception.

A recitation of the means employed by Iraq to avoid  its  obligations  would  be  long,  very  tedious,  but   relieved  occasionally  by  the  thigh  slappingly  funny   explanations  it  sometimes  sought  to  give  for  the   disappearance  of  documents.   On  one  occasion  they   actually  tried  the  classic  teenage  explanation  for   homework not done—the dog ate the documents.

In  August  1998  when  Iraq  rejected  a  list  of  final   disarmament priorities I had handed it and shut down  our  work  in  Iraq,  it  did  so  because  that  final  list   included  items  that  Saddam  desperately  wanted  to   keep.   Those  items  continue to exist  today  and have   possibly been aggrandised by work undertaken in the  subsequent four years without inspection.

Iraq  was  able  to  take  that  step  because  it  knew  the   Security  Council  was  divided  and  knew  that  my   political  base  had  essentially  dissolved.   Very   specifically  Russia  and  France  wanted  UNSCOM’s   work  ended  while  the  United  States  and  the  United   Kingdom did not.  The resolve of the United States to  insist  to  its  colleagues  on  the  Security  Council  that   Iraq  had  to  be  brought  back  under  the  law  and  to   credibly  seek  to  enforce  that  law,  was  weakened  by   the  domestic  preoccupations  of  the  president  of  the   United States in 1998.

The unfinished business of Iraq and weapons of mass  destruction  is  not  only  posing  intrinsic  danger;   continuing to inflame the situation in the middle east  and relations between the united states and the Arab  world; but is challenging gravely the authority of the  Security  Council.   It  is  by  no  means  clear  that  the   Security  Council  will  survive  this  challenge,   especially  if  it  fails  to  enforce  its  own  laws  with   respect to Iraq and the current us administration then  decides to mount a unilateral attack upon Iraq with a  view to removing Saddam Hussein.

At the end of the second of the two world wars of the  twentieth  century,  which  together  killed  some  70   million  people,  the  United  Nations  was  created  in   order  to  “save  succeeding  generations  from  the   scourge  of  war”.   The  task  of  maintaining

international  peace  and  security  was  given  to  the   Security  Council.   It  was  given  the  power  to  both   make and enforce international law.

There  was  logic  in  this.   The  twentieth  century  had   been bloody in the extreme.  The death toll had been  horrendous  war  had  become  such  a  frequently  used   instrument  that  a  major  effort  had  to  be  made  to   remove  it  from  human  life  and  relations  between   nations.  The Security Council’s performance of this  task  has  been  mixed  at  best  but  it  has  served

humanity  well  on  occasions,  of  which  the  Cuban   missile crisis was the leading example.

Richard Butler

2002 Templeton Lecture, University of Sydney 6

The  major  impediment  to  its  truly  effective   performance has been the veto power put in the hands  of  its  five  permanent  members  and  their  repeated   decisions to abuse that power.  In the case of both the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union  that  abuse  was   flagrant.   The  more  recent  veto  abuser  has  been   China.

If  war  has  been  the  legacy  of  the  first  half  of  the   twentieth  century,  the  Cold  War  which  followed  in   the  second  half  had  as  its  legacy  the  nuclear  arms   race  and  the  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass   destruction.

The  UN  was  brought  into  existence  at  the  charter   conference  in  San  Francisco  as  the  Second  World   War  drew  to  an  end.   It  is  now  a  dozen  years  since   the  cold  war  ended  but  there  has  been  no  such   conference  and  therefore  no  action  taken  on  its   legacy.

What is required is that a council, comparable to the  Security Council, be established to deal with the issue  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction.   This  council—the   Council on Weapons of Mass Destruction—would be  the  place  to  which  all  matters  pertaining  to  the   maintenance  of  the  non-proliferation  treaties— nuclear, chemical and biological—would be referred.   Infractions  by  states  such  as  Iraq  would  be

considered, discussed with that state and instructions  given.   Those  instructions  would  be  binding  in   international  law  and  the  council  would  have  the   ability  to  mount  inspections  as  required  and  enforce   the law as necessary.  This is not a council on which  any state should have the power of veto.

I  make  this  proposal  because  I  am  convinced  that   weapons  of  mass  destruction  are  different.   This   proposal involves making an exception from politics  as usual.  That exception is justifiable because of the  exceptional  character  of  weapons  of  mass

destruction. They are able to kill us all and poison the  earth.

It  is  for  this  reason  that  in  the  particular  case  of   biological  weapons  I  have  proposed  elsewhere,  that   their  manufacture  or  possession  should  be  declared,   intrinsically,  a  crime  against  humanity.    The  use  of   biological  materials  and  germs  to  cause  death,  as  a   weapon,  is  utterly  contrary  to  humanity.   Were   biological  weapons  to  be  the  subject  of  such  an   understanding under international law, action against  them could be taken more easily and more widely.

The normal test of the viability of a proposal such as  that  for  the  establishment  of  a  Council  on  Weapons   of Mass Destruction is will it be seen by nations to be  in their interest.  I believe most will although I do not  minimise the problem that will almost certainly arise  from  the  fundamental  unfairness  that  exists  today   between those who have, and those who do not have,  weapons  of  mass  destruction.   But,  a  deal  could  be   done,  if  every  state  could  come  to  believe  that  the   game  was  up  for  weapons  of  mass  destruction   everywhere and that no state would have them in the

future.   The  main  reason  for  this  deal  would  be   recognition that everyone would be safer.

Perhaps the most usual or tried generator of historical  change  is  catastrophe.   The  cost  of  creation  of  the   United  Nations  and  the  rule  of  law  in  international   relations was 70 million dead.

We should not have to await a catastrophe caused by  the use of weapons of mass destruction.  We know all  we  need  to  know  about  them.   We  can  address  the   threat  they  pose  now  and  refuse  to  wait  for  the   catastrophe.

For this to occur, we must keep our grip on and assert  underlying values: the need to incorporate the ethical  dimension of human life into the choices we make on  the  applications  of  science;  acceptance  of  individual   responsibility; and, resource allocation that is just.

These  choices  are  hard.   But,  if  something  is  right,   the fact that it is hard matters little.



Sydney, September 2002.











References  Arendt, Hannah (1973). The Origins of  Totalitarianism. Hardcourt Brace Jovanivich.

Arendt, Hannah. (1994). Eichmann in Jerusalem.  Penguin (revised edition).

Bronowski, Jacob. (1996). The Ascent of Man. Little  Brown

Butler, Richard (2000). The Greatest Threat: Iraq,  Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of  Global Security. New York: Public Affairs   (also released as: Saddam Defiant: The Threat of  Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of  Global Security. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.)

Butler, Richard (2001) Fatal Choice: Nuclear  Weapons and the Illusion of Missile Defense.  Westview Press.

Dworkin, Ronald (2000). Sovereign Virtue. Harvard  University Press.

Frayn, Michael (1998). Copenhagen. Methuen.

Power, Samantha (2002). A Problem from Hell:  America and the Age of Genocide.  A New Republic  Book.

Rawls, John (1999).  A Theory of Justice.  Harvard  University Press.

Roseman, Mark (2002) The Villa, the Lake, the  Meeting: Wannsee and the Final Solution.  Allen  Lane/The Penguin Press.



Q  &  A,  2002 Templeton Lecture, University of Sydney i

Transcript for the Question and Answer Session   following Richard Butler’s 2002 Templeton Lecture

Dr  Michael  Thomas:   Well  thank  you  very  much  indeed.   That  was  a  thought  provoking  and  challenging  and   magnificent presentation.  We have an opportunity now as Mr Butler has agreed to answer questions.



Question from Robert Hunter of CHAST: We are aware that with the collapse of the Soviet Union there is a huge  reservoir of nuclear weapons there which we understand they would like to get rid of and there was at one stage a  proposal that the US would assist that process by supplying the necessary money.  Given the amount of money that

is spent on nuclear weaponry is, as you say, $100m per day, it seems hard to understand why it is so hard to get that  finance to clear up the Russian mess. Does the UN have anything to do with that program?

Richard Butler’s reply: The answer to the last part of your question is No, it doesn’t (except in a marginal way).   The agency of the UN which is responsible for nuclear science and for ensuring that peaceful uses are not diverted  to military purposes is the one I referred to in my talk: the International Atomic Energy Agency.  It has an inspection  and verification role under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in nuclear weapons states and non-weapons  states alike and it looks at stock piles of relevant fissile materials BUT NOT WEAPONS (weapons are a military  matter) including those in Russia. There is no UN central program to deal with the arms control programs that you  referred to. One of the developments shortly after the Cold War was the Nunn-Lugar Act of the US Congress, which  sought to address the problem that you referred to. It set aside money to be made available to Russia for securing its  nuclear materials and weapons.

It’s  been  successful  in  destroying  warheads  and  removing  special  fissionable  materials  for  either  storage  or   recycling in electricity generation. In other words taking them out of the weapons cycle.  But the amount of money  made available to it has not been adequate, although at $500m a year it is a sizeable amount of money.  The Clinton  Administration was seeking to increase it.  The initial reaction of the Bush Administration was to walk away from it,  and to say it didn’t matter. They are now reversing that.  They are now seeking to increase the amount of money  involved.  I  don’t  know  to  what  figure  but  I’m  not  sure  it  will  be  anything  like  it  should  be,  especially  given  the   $100m per day.

I  think  your  question  touches  on  precisely  an  area  where  much  more  needs  to  be  done.  Both  sides  have  very   significant stockpiles of useless nuclear weapons that are very dangerous as well as useless.  And the main threat  they  pose  derives  from  the  physical  security  that  is  or  isn’t  maintained  over  them.   And  I’ll  come  straight  to  the   point. There is a credible report that 12 small fully fabricated nuclear weapons have gone missing from Russia and it  is  feared  somewhere  towards the  Islamic world. That’s  not  a  verified  fact  but  there  are  serious  anxieties  about  it.  And  secondly,  under  the  command  economy  system  the  Russians  continually  made  excess  plutonium  which  they   didn’t need, but just because the way the system worked the factory managers were given production targets which  were reviewed each year and they kept making the stuff.  Plutonium is a transuranic element which doesn’t occur in  nature. It’s a first class material for the core of a nuclear weapon and the sorry fact is that I don’t think Russia knows  exactly how much of the stuff it’s got.

And  I  put  it  to  you,  as  a  now  defunct  Arms  Control  Inspector  that  its  pretty  hard  to  know  what  the  size  of  your   problem  is  if  you  don’t  have  an  accurate  baseline  figure.   That’s  a  pretty  glum  thing  to  say  to  you  but  I  would   endorse  the  implications  of  your  question  that  this  is  a  field  of  activity:  stock  pile  control,  getting  rid  of  excess   weapons, to which much more money and effort needs to be devoted.

Question  from  John  Hallam,  Anti-nuclear  weapons  campaigner  with  Friends  of  the  Earth:  I  want  to   congratulate  you  on  a  fantastic  speech  and  also  on  the  Canberra  Commission,  which  very  much  influenced  the   thinking of myself and a lot of NGOs around the world. Couple of things: Why is it that on the 29th August this year  when the United States conducted a subcritical nuclear test and a month or so earlier when it conducted a missile test  that  there  were  no  calls  for  regime  change  in  Washington  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  US  has  got  some  12000   warheads, of which 3000 are on launch-on-warning status. With similar numbers across in Russia, 400 with Britain  and  France  and  going  down  to  Israel,  do  you  see  any  movement  whatsoever  towards  removal  of  those  strategic   weapons on launch-on-warning status which was an absolutely key recommendation of the Canberra Commission  and on which I ran a global campaign on Y2K compliance?

Richard  Butler’s  reply:   Let  me  start  by  saying  that  I  think  that  people  should  be  grateful  to  organisations  like   yours for what you have tried to do.  One of the things I learned through being Ambassador for Disarmament and  being  involved  with  Australian  national  nuclear  policy  was  that  while  sometimes  the  discussion  between  non   Government organisations and the Government was less than courteous and seemed to be at loggerheads, the truth is  that if you look back at that period that I referred to when Bill Hayden went to Moscow and there was real stasis  between the US and the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons. This was the time when the film ‘The Day After’ was  made. And people were genuinely worried that nuclear catastrophe was not far away.



Q  &  A,  2002 Templeton Lecture, University of Sydney ii

If you look back at that period and then ten years further on to the period of the intermediate range nuclear force  treaty  and  then the Strategic Arms  Reduction  Treaties and  then  the latest  one that’s been  done between  Bush  and  Putin something has happened.  80000 has become something vastly less. You and I would agree it’s still far too  many. And I think what happened is not separable from the actions of non-Governmental groups.

I  think  of  key  instances  where  governments  were  reluctant  to  do  adequate  measures  of  nuclear  arms  control  and   community agitation for it changed that. So I think what you have done over the years has been very positive. That  doesn’t mean that I didn’t sometimes find myself in rather sterile arguments with guys like you but, on the whole, it  has been positive. The same is true with respect to racism, sexism and environmentalism.

This  whole  global  phenomenon  of  non-governmental  groups  participating  in  the  decisions  that  really  affect  the   human  family,  I  think  is  a  remarkable  one.  It  started  with  women  then  moved  on  to  arms  control,  then  the   environment and so on.

Now, the sub-critical test doesn’t contravene the nuclear test ban treaty, to which the US is not a party in any case.   (The US has, however, said that it intends to adhere to the provisions of the nuclear test ban treaty without signing  it.)  I  don’t  think  that  the  missile  test  is  surprising  given  the  policy  of  the  Bush  government  to  seek  to  dominate   space.  Now, is that Richard Butler speaking empathetically?  No.  Go to the website! This is what is hilarious about  today’s world.  If you go to the web and look at the US Space Authority website, they tell you that: ‘Our mission is  full spectrum dominance of space’! It is out there on the web. I’m not making it up!!

My real answer to your question is that the world of international relations is not fair and it never has been.  You  remember when I emphasized justice and fairness as a really fundamental human concept and Jacob Bronowski’s  ideas of tolerance.  These are the things that we have got to grow and make stronger within our world.  And those  states that have nuclear weapons and that conduct these tests and do not join in agreements that we are all generally  in,  but  spend  a  lot  of  time  bullying  and  criticising  others  who  want  to  emulate  them,  is  an  example  of  how   international politics and relationships are not fair. They never have been and one of our constant tasks is to make  them fairer if we can.

Finally, launch-on-warning (LOW) is the part of your question that worries me most deeply.  And that’s not to say  that  the  other  things  are  not  important.  But  I  guess  most  people  know  what  LOW  is.   It  is  a  status  of  alert  of  a   nuclear armed missile which will see it launched when a warning is received that the other side is about to launch.   This is hair trigger mutually assured destruction.  And the Canberra Commission pointed out that now that the Cold  War has ended (for that and for other reasons) LOW was a status that no longer needed to be maintained.  It was  deeply dangerous and it should be shut down.  And if both sides agreed to do it and verifiably did it, we would be in  a  much  safer  world.   But  I  don’t  see  any  inclination  on  the  part  of  either the  Bush  or the  Putin  administration  to  implement that and I think it’s a great pity.  Keep up the fight for it.  I think it’s very important.

Question:  Is  there  a  possibility  that  Iran  has  a  nuclear  weapon?   (Concerning  the  possibility  of  them  passing  on   weapons to Al Qaeda.)

Richard Butler’s reply: Yes. Iran is working on acquiring nuclear weapons and missile capability too. My main  comment on that as I said in my talk is (and I believe this passionately) there is an axiom of proliferation which says  that as long as any state has these weapons systems other states will seek to acquire them.  And I’ll tell you quite  specifically,  that  the  day  that  India  detonated  its  nuclear  explosive  device  three  years  ago  and  I  was  asked  to   comment about this in New York I included the comment that no one should be surprised.  They had been saying for  25  years  that  they  weren’t  prepared  to  live  this  way  any  longer  in  such  an  unfair  world.  But  the  day  that  that   happened one of my first thoughts was well, of course Pakistan will follow. That’s an adversarial pair arrangement  so that’s bound to happen. (With a bit of Chinese assistance I might say).

My first though was, well Iran’s next.  Absolutely! That’s the axiom of proliferation. How in the name of God, if  you look at that part of the world: the proximity of these states to one another, the problems they are dealing with,  add history, culture and pride and all that stuff, how can you insist to Iran, that somehow it’s OK for India to have  nuclear weapons, as well as China, but Iran may not?

The  only  way  to  deal  with  this  problem  is  for  the  promise  that  all  have  made  in  the  NPT  to  be  kept.  And  it’s  a   promise on both sides: that those who do not have these weapons must never acquire them but those who have them  must  progressively  get  rid  of  them.   And  it’s  the  slowness  and  failure  to  do  the  latter  that  keeps  the  axiom  of   proliferation alive.

Will they give them to Al Qaeda?   Absolutely not!  No, No!  One of the things we know about the possessors of  nuclear weapons is that they feel very, very attached to them. And they don’t go around giving them to anyone else.



Q  &  A,  2002 Templeton Lecture, University of Sydney iii

Question from Peter Pockley: When did you first start working for the Australian Atomic Energy Commission?

Richard Butler’s reply: Next you’ll be asking me my age! I think it was 1963-64.  Round there.

Question  from  Peter  Pockley:  Were  you  or  other  officers  of  the  same  kind  as  yourself  in  the  Atomic  Energy   Commission aware at the time of the development of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Australia?

Richard  Butler’s  reply:  I  became  aware  of  it  but  a  bit  later.  Actually,  I  wrote  an  article  that  I  submitted  to  the   Bulletin magazine in 1968 or 69. You remember John Gorton had an election in 1968 or 69 where he promised he’d  take Australia into the nuclear age. I wrote an article which compared Sir Philip Baxter to Dr Strangelove, because  he was Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (as well as being Vice Chancellor of that other place.) And he

was driving this.  I took a risk as I sought to expose some of this. I was really angry that the Gorton government  wouldn’t sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and I got away with it for some reason.  (In the by-line it said this  man is a government official but this is written in his personal capacity.)

Actually did you see the documentary film recently?  In that film you saw Baxter saying what he was doing. They  were thinking of building a plutonium-generating reactor at Jervis Bay that would make it possible for Australia to  make nuclear weapons.

Question from Peter Pockley: I can add a rider to that. The document which Peter Buckley(?) did not have access  to  at  the  time  he  finished  the  film  shows  that  Baxter  presented  his  proposal  to  Gorton  in  February  1968.  The   document was a fully costed plan to produce 30 nuclear bombs a year as a result of that reactor.

Richard Butler’s reply: That’s a hell of a lot of plutonium.

Question from  Peter  Pockley:  Yes,  it  is.  The  follow up  question  is:  Once  that  was  purged  from the  Australian   system Australia became a bit more innocent as a negotiator.  Had that material become readily available publicly at  the  time  you  were  working  in  the  Canberra  Commission  would  Australia’s  political,  social,  ethical  position  have   been almost as pure as you were able to present?

Richard Butler’ reply: Well I must say I found the selection of William MacMahon as Prime Minister of Australia  one of the curiosities of my life but what he did do was sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.  I don’t know if  anyone in this room can think of anything else he did, but he did sign the NPT. Although with slight reservations.   (Australians  accession  to  NPT  has,  if  you  look  in  the  treaty  documents  you’ll  find,  it  has  a  slight  reservation   attached to it).  That put an end to what was Gorton’s clear interest in Australia becoming a nuclear weapons state.   And of course it also put an end to the clearly misleading activities of Sir Philip Baxter with respect to this matter.

Now,  thereafter,  Australia  developed  on  a  bi-partisan  basis  an  extraordinary  record  in  then  pursuing  nuclear arms   control: both sides of politics.  Andrew Peacock was very, very dedicated to this.  It wasn’t just  Bill  Hayden and  those people on that side.  And by the time the Conference on Disarmament was established we became an original  member.  We played a leading role in the continuing development of the NPT. We have always been a permanent  member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency and we helped generate and improve  the safeguard system of that agency for the protection of nuclear materials.

We established I think a reputation proportionately far higher than a population of this size (and being a non nuclear  weapons state) would suggest.  I’ve never quite found why we Australians did that, why we were so attached to the  business of nuclear safety.  We then had the uranium debate of the 80s, which was very serious and very vigorous  and  I  got  embroiled  in  that  in  all  sorts  of  ways.   It  caused  Peter  Garrett  and  me  to  become  friends,  which  was   interesting.  People  around  the  world  asked  me:  Where  does  this  come?   What  is  happening  in  Australia  that  you   have this extraordinarily vigorous debate about whether or not to make a buck out of selling uranium?  It was really  an extraordinary phenomenon. But we solved that problem (not to everyone’s satisfaction) by limiting our uranium  exports and tying them at all stages to a nuclear non- proliferation treaty.

Now  I  don’t  honestly  know  where  that  comes  from  but  by  the  time  Paul  Keating  decided  that  we  should  have   another  shot  at trying  to  get  sensible  procedures underway  for  the  ultimate  elimination  of  nuclear weapons  in  the  Canberra  Commission,  people  around  the  world  gave  ready  assent  to  Australia  in  that  role.  I  received  many   messages from people saying ‘You are exactly the kind of country that can credibly do this’.  Do you know where  that  comes  from?   I mean  you’re saying  that  if  Gorton’s  policy  had  become  exposed  would  we  have  been  there?   Maybe not. Maybe we would have had to do a bit of explaining I think.  But from that time—remember NPT was  1968—Gorton  won  the  election  in  69  but  MacMahon  followed  shortly  thereafter.  The  Canberra  Commission  was   1995. So there was about a thirty-year period of bipartisan popular commitment in Australia to nuclear arms control  that gave Australia a very credible reputation globally in that field.



Q  &  A,  2002 Templeton Lecture, University of Sydney iv

Question: Should Iraq be given a second chance with weapons inspectors? And what will the inspectors face when  they get in there?

Richard Butler’s reply:  I think the numbers wrong. It should be the fourth or fifth chance. But anyway should they  be  given  a  further  chance.  Well,  this  is  today’s  question  in  a  way  because  of  the  passage  of  events  since  last   Thursday, a week ago, when George 43 (I love that—the other one was George 41) went to the UN.  His showing up  at the UN was the first truly remarkable phenomenon that we saw in the last week because he did that against his  own personal inclinations and against the strong advice of some of the heavy hitters in his government that this was  a waste of time. That the job ahead was getting rid of Saddam and just go straight to it.  But a lot of people around  the world said that this was the wrong approach and the President of the US went to the UN to say:

1. Iraq is in violation of the law in several areas.

2. It’s your law, your UN law, and you should enforce it and

3. We’re prepared to work with you in doing that but

4. If you don’t we’ll do it alone.

And amazingly, within 48 hours a great number of countries said: ‘Good. We can work with this’. A great number,  including the Arab world. Because this restores an approach through the system of international law and avoids US  unilateralism that most states had come to think was deeply dangerous.

Now the Iraqis sat down with the Secretary-General of the UN and the Secretary-General of the Arab League over  the weekend and tried to figure out what they should do about this. And a letter emerged in which the Iraqis said:  ‘We’re prepared to have weapons inspectors come back to Iraq without conditions’.

Now  I  said  that  George  43's  visit  to  the  UN  was  fairly  remarkable.  I  put  it  to  you  that  the  second  most  truly   remarkable  thing  in  this  period  of  a  week  was  the  failure  of  the  Iraqis  to  include  in  that  letter  a  commitment  to   unfettered, unhindered inspection. This is a terrible failure.  If you look hard at that letter you can see that is says  ‘You can come back here’ but it doesn’t actually give the one central undertaking that everyone required, that the  inspections  would  be  able  to  be  done  without  the  sort  of  blockage  that  we  encountered  in  the  past.  And  I  can’t   fathom what they think that will achieve because, within a few hours, I think inevitably, the Secretary of State of the  US, who is the most committed internationalist in the Bush government, (he’s the one who had Bush there over the  opinions of Rumsfeld and the others) he had to say I’m sorry. This letter doesn’t cut it. This letter is not what we  expect.

There was an attitude in the letter in which Iraq was picking and choosing which of its legal obligations it would like  to see fulfilled for it. It was not in a position to do that.  The sensible approach would have been to say: ‘Come back  in.  You  can  go  wherever  you  want,  look  for  whatever  you  want  because  we  don’t  have  weapons  of  mass   destruction’. And Powell had to say: ‘This won’t wash’. But Iraq’s letter did have the effect of breaking down that  unity that emerged in the Security Council over the first few days following the President’s appearance at the UN.  I  think that’s a very serious problem.  Secretary of State Powell in the course of the coming week is going to try to get  this back  on  track  with  the  Security  Council  adopting  a new resolution  that takes  account  of  the  Iraqi  letter. That   says ‘Thanks, that’s nice but we need this real stuff, otherwise we’ll have to come in and enforce the law’.

The key question now is whether the Russians will close ranks with the US and agree to such a resolution. I actually  think it comes to this.  The most important point  of decision in the next few days is actually in President Putin’s  office.  He has to decide whether he is going to avoid a US unilateral strike upon Iraq, which they say they don’t  want, by joining with the US in trying to do it through the UN. Or prefers to keep their bilateral relationship with  Iraq  intact. It’s Putin’s  call. I think  this is a deeply serious moment.  I think  that if  there is failure at the Security  Council two things will occur.  The Council’s credibility as an institution will be basically trashed. (I don’t know  that it will recover from it.)

And  secondly  it  will  then  become  inevitable  that  the  US  will  go  to  war  unilaterally  with  Iraq  within  a  matter  of   weeks.  It  will  do  that  because  those  in  the  US  administration  who  don’t  like  the  UN  and  don’t  believe  in   international law (and I’m not fictionalising them.  I’ve met them and I know them. They say quite plainly It doesn’t  apply to us. We are the exceptional country.) Those people will say ‘We told you so’. ‘It was a waste of time going  to the UN. Look what happened’. ‘We’ve just got to fix this ourselves’. And then the combination of the rejection of  the authority of the Security Council and the exercise of this profound unilateral power in the world—I think that  will  open  up  a world  that  will  be very  dangerous.  And  one  that  at  almost  any  cost  we should  do  what  we can  to   avoid.

Now, what will the inspectors face?  They will face great difficulty if they get in there. Because of Saddam’s choice.  Saddam has a choice.  He has weapons of mass destruction. He says he doesn’t but don’t you believe him.  He has.  If he lets the inspectors go anywhere any time they’ll find them and he’ll be exposed as having lied to the world.   The consequences of that are not easy to work out. But he is probably toast. If he does the opposite and refuses to  allow them to go anywhere any time because he doesn’t want them to find the weapons and expose him, then that



Q  &  A,  2002 Templeton Lecture, University of Sydney v

will be taken as a sign that he is hiding serious stuff and then he’ll probably be toast.  So he’s got a very serious  problem.

Dr Michael Thomas: Time is up and I must draw proceedings to a close.  I’d like to call on Professor Stuart Rees  of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies to offer a vote of thanks.

Professor Stuart Rees: Thank you Michael. First of all I must congratulate you and your colleagues in CHAST for  producing what I regard as a great University occasion.  Not only for your wisdom in choosing Ambassador Butler  as your speaker, but for facilitating a dialogue across discipline boundaries.  The spirit of the University exists as an  interdisciplinary phenomenon.  Not, despite the claims of managerialism, to protect departments and faculties. So  thank you for facilitating this (aspect of the University.)

May I also express the gratitude of all of us to Ambassador Butler first of all for continuing to stress throughout your  lecture the principle that no decision about the allocation of resources should be made without considering the value  of every human life. It was almost inevitable, I think, that you moved on from that to create this proposal about the  Council on Weapons of Mass Destruction over which no state would have the power of veto. You are correct to say  that would require a very new brand of politics or rather, no politics at all as you pointed out. At the very least it  would require each country to resuscitate …(inaudible)... So thank you for the rich content of your lecture.  Thank  you for delivering technical knowledge with great clarity.   Most of all thank you for insisting that every decision  about science and weapons of mass destruction should be made with humanitarian considerations paramount.



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