Address by the Secretary  Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  Dr Ashton Calvert  to the Royal United Service Institute International

Seminar

“Global Security in the New Millennium”   Canberra, 9-10 October 2003



Introduction

Ladies and Gentlemen

It is a great pleasure to be here today and I welcome the  opportunity to address this seminar on “Global Security in  the New Millennium”.

The Royal United Services Institute has a long and  impressive record promoting the discussion of defence and  security issues.

This current seminar sits very comfortably within that  proud tradition.

I congratulate the organisers for bringing together this  valuable forum for exchanging views on the evolving  international security environment.

Let me also say that I appreciate the opportunity to address  an organisation with such a strong connection to our  defence and armed forces community.

The last few years - through the war on terror, the military  campaign in Iraq and more recently in the Solomons - have  seen the already strong cooperation between the foreign  policy and defence communities reach new levels of  effectiveness and mutual confidence.

In my remarks today I should like to do three things:

Outline some of the key characteristics of the current global  and regional strategic environments;

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Discuss three of the main challenges to international  security within that environment; and

Outline some of the ways Australia is seeking to tackle these  challenges, both on the global and regional levels.

Global and regional strategic environment

Quite reasonably and necessarily, a lot of the discussion at  this seminar is focusing on the twin threats of international  terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

I too want to talk about those subjects, and describe the  important place they occupy in Australia’s international  security policy.

Before doing that, however, I should like to highlight some  other basic features of our strategic environment which I  believe should not be lost sight of, and which I believe are  positive in their overall impact.

The first of these features is the economic and military pre-eminence of the United States in world affairs.

This, I suggest, should be taken as a key strategic reference  point for our times.

The United States accounts for around one-third of global  output; its defence budget exceeds that of the next nine  countries combined; and there is nothing to suggest that it  will lose its technological edge any time soon.

Given the prospect that the pre-eminent position of the  United States is likely to hold for a long while into the future,  it is not surprising that the outlook for strategic relations  between the United States and other major powers is  relatively stable and favourable.

In the foreseeable future, no other country or group of  countries will be able to challenge the United States in its  capacity to shape the global environment.

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There is still scope, of course, for serious diplomatic  disputes and tension between the United States and other  major powers.

We saw that earlier this year in the serious disagreement  between the United States and the United Kingdom, on the  one side, and France, Germany and Russia, on the other,  over the question of how to deal with the challenge posed by  Iraq.

But what distinguishes our times from the periods of  strategic confrontation that characterised the Cold War is a  relatively stable and favourable outlook for relations  between the United States and other major powers at the  basic strategic level.

And this situation offers scope - so long as the United  States and other major powers are in general agreement - of  finding effective ways of responding to the threats of  international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass  destruction.

Another key characteristic of our times that I should like to  flag is globalisation of the world economy.

The process continues apace and has a profound bearing on  the choices available to each country - developed and  developing alike.

Globalisation brings major benefits to those countries whose  open policies and sound institutions allow them to  participate successfully in the global economy.

And its disciplines of competition impose penalties and  disadvantages on those countries which do not have those  attributes.

Australia has undoubtedly benefited from this process.

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Since the early 1980s when Australia began seriously  internationalising its economy, we have seen significant  improvements in income, employment and living standards.

In 2001-02 Australians were around 55 per cent better off  than in 1979-80.

In that time real GDP per capita increased to A$36,000 from  around A$23,000 in 2001-02 dollars.

But globalisation has also helped to reduce the gap between  the developed and developing world.

World Bank research has found that over the past two  decades rapid growth and stable or improving income  distribution has combined to reduce poverty in developing  countries that lowered their barriers to trade.

By contrast, the World Bank has found poverty growing in  those developing countries that have remained relatively  closed to world trade and investment.

The strategic impact of globalisation is an interesting and  complex question which deserves perhaps more analysis  than it receives.

Let me offer one or two tentative observations.

Firstly, globalisation generates an increasing level of  economic interdependence and information connectedness  around the world.

While this process of itself will not spare us from future  military threats and the risk of major confrontation it does  increase the shared stake in international stability and  mutual engagement.

The overall effect of this process on the political dimension  of international relations is generally a positive and  stabilising one.

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But alongside its overall economic and political benefits,  globalisation - in a perverse and ironic way - also increases  our vulnerability to terrorism.

Terrorists have found that they too can exploit the openness,  ease of transportation and greatly enhanced international  communications that are characteristics of this era of  globalisation.

A third characteristic of our times I should like to highlight  is China’s growing economic, political and strategic weight.

This has been rightly described as the single most important  strategic trend in the Asia-Pacific region.

And, again for Australia, this is clearly a positive  development.

China’s accession to the WTO, its support for the war on  terrorism and its key role in the North Korea six-party talks  are all positive signs that it takes seriously its international  responsibilities as a major power.

China also recognises that a constructive relationship and  economic engagement with the United States are vital to its  efforts to build its economy and international influence.

While China competes with the economies of South-East  Asia for foreign direct investment, it is also becoming an  increasingly important market for their exports.

At the same time, China is becoming increasingly important  as an export market for both Japan and South Korea.

On current trends, China will, in the new few years,  overtake Japan as the world’s third largest trading nation.

Certainly the current, relatively favourable outlook for US-China relations provides an optimum context for the  advancement of Australian interests in East Asia.

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Some commentators have suggested that the United States  and China are merely undergoing a pause in their strategic  competition.

Time will tell whether competition will resume in a serious  way, but for my part I have been impressed over the past  two years or so by the commitment of both Washington and  Beijing to manage their relationship responsibly and  constructively, including with regard to the difficult issue of  Taiwan.

Threats to international and regional security

Notwithstanding these underlying positive trends in the  current global strategic environment, that environment is  clearly far from benign.

Let me focus on three challenges which are central to the  Australian Government’s current concerns: terrorism; the  proliferation of WMD and the threats posed by weak and  unstable states.

September 11 gave the fight against terrorism an urgency  and prominence that it long deserved, but did not receive in  the past - to our great and common misfortune.

And the Bali terrorist attack in October last year removed  any residual complacency that we or our region might  somehow escape this threat.

There is now firmer international resolve to wage war on  terrorism.

One of the major achievements of the post September 11  environment has been the development of a broadly based  coalition against terrorism.

The resolve demonstrated by this alliance is seeing real  results.

Globally, Al-Qaeda has been disrupted and diminished, but  not yet defeated.

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It still has the capacity to finance, plan and launch attacks,  either on its own or in support of surrogates.

In two years, over 3000 Al-Qaeda suspects have been  detained in 90 countries, and in excess of USD140 million  in terrorist assets have been frozen.

In our own region cooperation with our neighbours has seen  terror attacks prevented, terror networks disrupted and  terrorists arrested - including many of those responsible for  the Bali bombings.

But even though we have achieved this important progress,  victory in the war against terrorism is going to require a  sustained effort over a number of years.

And notwithstanding our regional successes, there is no  doubt that a serious problem still exists in South-East Asia,  as the bombing of the Mariott hotel in Jakarta last August  illustrated.

Disrupting the activities of regional terrorist groups like  Jema’ah Islamiyyah will be a long and difficult process.

Efforts by terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction  have also given the cause of non-proliferation a new urgency.

The detonation of even a relatively crude chemical weapon  or a so-called dirty radiological bomb in a large city would  have disastrous consequences.

We know that terrorists have sought and are continuing to  seek such weapons.

And, despite the best efforts of non-proliferation and export  control regimes, there remains a real risk that these  weapons or associated materials might find their way into  terrorist hands.

Recently the Iraq Survey Group announced its discovery of  documents that appear to show a high-level dialogue

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between Iraq and North Korea over the transfer of  technology for a 1300km range missile system.

Fortunately the transfer does not appear to have gone ahead.

But this serves as yet another reminder that illicit trade and  cooperation between certain states - and indeed the  potential for that trade to extend to non-state actors - is a  serious challenge to international security.

Efforts by states like North Korea and Iran to acquire  weapons of mass destruction also remain a major concern  in and of itself.

The strategic implications of a nuclear-armed North Korea  for the stability of our region would be profound - illustrated  by the urgency with which all key regional players including,  importantly, China, are focused on achieving a nuclear  weapons-free Korean peninsula.

Finally, since September 11 2001 the world has come to  understand a lot better the impact that failed and failing  states have on global security.

Afghanistan illustrated the central role that such states play  in providing shelter and support for terrorist networks.

But terrorists are not the only groups that find a home in  failed or failing states.

The smuggling of people, the laundering of money, the  trafficking of drugs and weapons - including in some cases  WMD materials - are all made easier in states whose legal  and political systems have ceased to operate.

And even in cases where states are not on the verge of  failure, weak governance and institutions have an impact on  global security.

In a world where security is increasingly indivisible, the  international community is strengthened by all its members

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having, for example, a robust capacity to detect and disrupt  terrorists or trans-national criminals.

Australia’s role

Australia has, and will, continue to seek effective responses  to these global and regional security challenges.

Sometimes this will involve using the existing international  security architecture, including the United Nations and  other traditional mechanisms of multilateral diplomacy.

Sometimes it will mean using other mechanisms, such as  coalitions of the willing, or regional arrangements.

This in part reflects the Government’s belief that the UN  must do more to adapt to an evolving international security  environment - a belief it shares with many in the UN system,  including the Secretary General.

But in greater part it reflects a Government approach  focused on delivering outcomes; of using those means which  are best suited and most effective for tackling particular  security challenges we face.

In a world of increasingly unconventional threats we need to  be creative and flexible in how we chose to respond to them.

Thus the major global disarmament and non-proliferation  treaties, such as the NPT, the CWC and the BWC remain  critical to setting international norms.

But they need to be reinforced by effective action to counter  proliferation wherever it occurs.

Australia is a strong supporter of all these norms.

We also play a pivotal part in international efforts to prevent  the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons through  our chairmanship of the Australia Group, which aims to  minimise the risk of proliferation by strengthening national  export controls.

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As a part of these efforts, Australia is participating in the  Proliferation Security Initiative, intended as a practical  means of impeding the trafficking of WMD, their delivery  systems and related materials.

The PSI both recognises and reinforces the existing  framework of national laws, export controls, multilateral  treaties and other tools.

States must work together, within the parameters of  international law, to uphold these non-proliferation norms.

We must respond effectively to the threat to international  peace and security posed by the proliferation of WMD and  the transfer of WMD-related materials outside of  internationally agreed frameworks.

It is against this background that Australia joined the  coalition to disarm Iraq.

Notwithstanding the inevitably difficult process of  stabilisation and nation-building, that campaign has  already made a significant contribution to global non-proliferation.

The Iraq Survey Group is only beginning to understand the  extent and nature of Iraq’s WMD programs.

A focus on “smoking guns” should not distract us from the  fact that the ISG has found further significant evidence that  the former Iraqi regime had neither abandoned its WMD  programs nor its thorough-going efforts at concealment.

This is, of course, entirely consistent with a pattern of Iraqi  behaviour firmly established by UN weapons inspectors and  in breach of UN Security Council Resolutions for over twelve  years.

Beyond the issue of Iraq, international efforts to stop the  spread of these weapons will continue and will take various  forms.

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With respect to North Korea and Iran, the international  community will need to find effective and perhaps creative  means for resolving these problems - from the use of  existing multilateral institutions and organisations such as  the International Atomic Energy Agency to regional  mechanisms such as the six-party talks.

Australia will play an appropriate role in support of these  efforts.

We have reinforced to North Korea - including through  direct discussions - that the six-party process is an  important opportunity for it to eliminate its nuclear  weapons program and to re-engage constructively with the  international community.

With respect to Iran, we have urged them to resolve  outstanding safeguards issues, sign a safeguards-strengthening Additional Protocol without delay or  preconditions, and halt development of sensitive nuclear  technology.

As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, we played a  leading role in the adoption of a strong resolution calling on  Iran to cooperate fully and transparently in resolving  concerns about its nuclear program.

Australia will continue to contribute to these and other  efforts to strengthen global security where we believe we can  make a difference.

But, at the same time, we will continue to focus most of our  efforts on building security in our own region in cooperation  with regional partners - something which in itself  contributes to global security.

Working closely with our neighbours, we are helping to  defeat terrorism in South-East Asia.

We have put in place a network of bilateral counter-terrorism arrangements that have strengthened practical

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cooperation with our key regional partners including  Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia,  India and Fiji.

A key component of our effort to fight terror in the region  has been to strengthen the counter-terrorism capacity of  regional security and law enforcement agencies.



We currently have a 4-year, $10 million assistance package  with Indonesia and a 3-year, $5 million package with the  Philippines.



We are also helping improve the ability of regional  governments to conduct a multi-faceted campaign against  terrorism.

We have co-hosted a number of workshops and meetings to  strengthen defences against terrorism and improve  responses to terrorist attacks.

We have, for example, helped Indonesia to draft anti-terrorist financing legislation and to establish a financial  investigation unit to track money used to fund terrorist  activities and trans-national crime.

This cooperation with Indonesia continues the tradition that  has been established of working closely together to address  emerging regional threats.

The latest example of this is the recent announcement that  Indonesia and Australia will co-host a major regional  conference on counter-terrorism in Bali next February.

We have also, of course, played a leading role in efforts to  address the prospect of state-failure and institutional  weakness in our region.

The most prominent example of this has been our leading  role in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon  Islands (RAMSI).

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The Mission has already made excellent progress in  restoring stability and law and order to the Solomon Islands.

Over 3500 weapons have been handed in or otherwise  secured.

And a total of 166 arrests on 234 charges have been made  through RAMSI police operations and RAMSI/RSIP joint  operations since 24 July.

In Honiara, work is underway to strengthen the Finance  Ministry, police, judiciary, prison service and other key  institutions.

This early progress is welcome, though we do not  underestimate the difficulty of the task ahead.

RAMSI is a large-scale and costly undertaking for Australia.

But it is a job that needed to be done, and we are prepared  to make the long-term commitment that it involves.

RAMSI - together with our new approach to PNG - marks a  significant shift in Australia’s dealings with the South  Pacific.

We are now prepared to get more directly involved, in cases  where we believe this will have a positive impact.

The Way Ahead

I trust these remarks have conveyed a sense of the various  ways in which Australia is helping respond to the various  global and regional security challenges that now confront us.

In conclusion, let me draw together five or six areas which I  am confident will continue as priority areas of action in  Australia’s international security policy.

Firstly, continued engagement and cooperation with the  United States will remain a key priority.

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We benefit greatly from our close alliance with the United  States, and in the period ahead the Government will be  working to strengthen the effectiveness of the alliance and  increase its value to both parties.

In parallel with this process, we are also working to build a  closer economic and business relationship with the United  States through the negotiation of a free trade agreement.

Secondly, as a continuation of the longstanding priority  given to non-proliferation in Australia’s international  security policy, we aim to make an active contribution  towards stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction  at both the global and regional levels.

Thirdly, Australian efforts to foster and contribute to  effective international collaboration against terrorism -  especially in our immediate region - will remain a major  priority.

We have a number of powerful reasons to engage closely  with Indonesia and other neighbours in South-East Asia.

The shared interest in working together to defeat the  scourge of terrorism in our region is a new and compelling  incentive for engagement.

It was entirely fitting that RUSI was able to welcome  Indonesia’s Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security  Affairs, Lt.Gen Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, as a key-note  speaker this morning.

Fourthly, in North Asia, it is likely that the strategic and  security dimensions of our relationships with Japan and  China - though different in details - will become more  important in the period ahead.

We welcome the responsible and more active contribution  Japan is making to international security, especially in East  Timor and in the war on terrorism and prospectively in Iraq.

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With China, there is scope for a more developed strategic  dialogue and defence cooperation.

As indicated earlier, we welcome warmly the constructive  role China has been playing this year in contributing to a  resolution of the DPRK nuclear issue.

Finally, in the South-West Pacific, the Government’s recent  decision to lead the Regional Assistant Mission to the  Solomon Islands demonstrates our willingness to intervene  decisively - when asked to do so - to strengthen governance  and institutions when they are seen to falter.

The stake that Australia has in the stability and economic  viability of our near neighbours in Melanesia is self-evident.

Thank you for this opportunity to address your important  conference.



