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EMBARGOED until 11am, Friday 15 July 1988

15 July, 1988  Melbourne  PR No 88/204

SANDERS; IAEA REPORT SHOWS SAFEGUARDS FAILURES INVOLVING AUSTRALIAN URANIUM

Senator Norm Sanders, Australian Democrats spokesperson on nuclear  issues,  today released a leaked copy of the International Atomic  Energy Agency's 1986 Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR), end  a detailed analysis of its contents done by his staff.

Senator Sanders said, "This report is the most damning evidence yet  that uranium safeguards exist only in the wishful thinking minds of  Bob Hawke and his get-rich-guick cronies."

The IAEA is the world's premier nuclear watchdog; it applies

safeguards world-wide, except in Western Europe, where its

functions are delegated to Euratom. The 1986 SIR —  the most

comprehensive overview of international safeguards there is -- was  leaked to European parliamentarians, who passed it to Senator  Sanders.

The SIR describes but does not name the countries -  in which

safeguards failed.  However, Senator Sanders'  analysis reveals that,  in 1986:

- the British Capenhurst enrichment plant, which enriched

Australian uranium in 1986, was inadequately safeguarded; - safeguards also failed in Italy, which can obtain Australian  uranium through Euratom flag swaps and retransfers; - IAEA safeguards in Canada, which converted Australian yellowcake  to uranium hexaflouride in 1986, were inadequate; and

- safeguards failed in two of three other countries -- West

Germany, Japan and Spain. This means they must have failed in Japan  and/or West Germany - —  both countries import Australian uranium.

The SIR also reveals that safeguards failed completely at 51 (17%)  of the 306 facilities which handled significant quantities of  nuclear material in 1986, and failed partially at a further 62  (20%). The IAEA can not guarantee that no diversion or theft of

nuclear material took place at those facilities.

Furthermore, safeguards failures were much more common in

facilities in countries with large inventories of nuclear material -  which are the most attractive targets for theft -- than in those  with Small inventories.

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In 17 nuclear facilities, IAEA measurement uncertainties were b o  large that the diversion or theft of several bomb's worth of

nuclear material would have gone undetected even where the

safeguards were properly applied.  .

Senator Sanders' analysis of the SIR also confirms that

unsafeguarded facilities which can be used for bomb production  exist in Argentina, Israel, India, Pakistan and South Africa.

" This information, from the horse's mouth, shows beyond doubt that  the safeguards which are supposed to keep our uranium out of bombs  are inadequate", Senator Sanders said.

" What's more, the problem is going to get worse, as more countries  separate plutonium from spent fuel by reprocessing.  Under current  plans, there will be 50 times more plutonium under 'safeguards' by  the year 2000 than there is now.

" This is what nuclear terrorists and renegade governments dream  of. They will be able to steal many bomb's worth of material

undetected by the so-called nuclear watchdog, the IAEA.

" The only road to a real non -pro li fere Lion regime ic an immediate  ban on reprocessing and the weapons-grade enrichment of uranium,  followed by a phase-out of the nuclear industry. Safeguards just  don't work, and Australian uranium exports are being justified by

lies", Senator Sanders concluded.

For further informations Senator Sanders Richard Bolt 03-614 3792  03-614 3792 w

03-429-6617 h

