31 July 2001

Senator Natasha Stott Despoja

ANZUS? ANZ who?

NATASHA STOTT DESPOJA AND ANDREW BARTLETT

What does ANZUS mean for the next generation? It is an alliance older than they are, and an acronym 16 years out of date. There has not been a great deal of public discussion of the treaty in the last decade and most young people probably do not know what ANZUS is, let alone have an opinion on it. Part of the explanation for this is offered in the following statement by the Prime Minister John Howard, in response to a journalist’s question, at the launch of the June 2000 public discussion paper on defence (that preceded the release of a Defence White Paper six months later) :

Journalist:

There seems to a certain amount of ambiguity in the green paper about the attitudes that might be adopted towards the United States. What’s your view on our alliance, our reliance on that alliance and self reliance?

Prime Minister:

Well I think I’ve always had the view that you need both. That the alliance with the United States is still the cornerstone of our defence position. But part of the alliance benefit assumes, on the part of the partners to that alliance that each will make its own contribution. And I don’t think there’s any ambiguity in that. I mean the ANZUS Treaty is still a cornerstone, a very fundamental document and we treat it seriously and I don’t think our interpretation of that has changed over the years…

Yes, Prime Minister. Looking at this answer it is hard to believe that John Howard is genuinely committed to a broad public debate on the US alliance and that he is not in fact just being boring on purpose.

Public debate about defence

The opening line of a recent and authoritative text on Australian defence issues, Australia’s Security in the 21st Century is: ‘Standard of public debate about defence matters in Australia has always been lamentable’ (Ball 1999). Despite the release of the media-lauded Defence White Paper 2000, doubts remain over the cohesion and management of Australia’s security policies. The respected defence analyst Desmond Ball, for example, argues that, ‘defence planning is in a state of utter confusion’ (Ball 2000).

A more transparent and participatory approach to defence issues and public consultation — including with young people—is vital. Given the changing nature of the international environment, security policy decisions should not be the exclusive domain of the Defence Department or the intellectual legacy of Second World War strategy. In a recent and wide-ranging assessment of the problem, Simon Dalby has observed that despite the principal rationale for the ANZUS alliance disappearing with the implosion of Soviet power, change is constrained by ‘the persistence of old patterns of thinking and practising “security”’(Dalby 1996).

It is worth examining the views of the younger generation on ANZUS, as these views will gain power in the future, while contemporary defence policy has been formed by the previous generation with different histories and experiences.

Self-evidently, the experiences and, therefore, the views of older Australians will be different from those of the next generation. However, perspectives will also be shared across generations and differ according to other factors such as education, gender or ethnicity. Simply put, both ‘peaceniks’ and ‘hawks’ come in all shapes and ages.

There are however generational differences. Twice as many 60-year olds as 21-year olds support more defence spending, so when the government committed itself to increase defence spending over the next decade by a total of $23 billion, they were not chasing the youth vote.

Who are these young people?

The definition of youth is flexible and relative. The editors of this issue have asked us to reflect the views of those under 40 years of age—a broad range with a diversity of opinions. We have tried to reflect on the experiences and how they inform different viewpoints from those of the older or ‘ANZUS generation’. While the perspectives of 15-year olds are probably very different from those of 35-year olds, we are forced to lump them together as the ‘next generation’.

The writers, 31 and 36 years of age are members of the Australian Federal Parliament where the median age is 50. Young Australian Democrats and most other youth wings of political parties are for those up to the age of 30. Where we talk about ‘young people’ and particularly research on young people’s views, we largely refer to those between the ages of 12 and 25, which represents about 18.5% of the Australian population.

Where have they been? Younger generations’ experiences of Australia in military conflicts

As intimated above, most Australian young people probably could not tell you what ANZUS is. They may not know what ANZAC is either but they are familiar with the legend. The generation whose first-hand experience of Gallipoli was the movie, is going in growing numbers on the 25th of April each year to spend sunrise in Turkey. Ten thousand mostly young people flocked to Gallipoli for the ANZAC Day 2000 dawn service and the War Memorial’s visitor numbers continue to rise (Brenchley 2001). The two world wars are viewed as sad but noble endeavours, characterised by mateship and bravery, and have positive emotional resonance for the younger generations.

The Vietnam War has had a strong influence on the Australian psyche even for those not born at the time. Division in the Australian population about whether Vietnam was a ‘just’ war, led people to question successive Australian governments’ propensity to follow unquestioningly so many aspects of American foreign policy. An unpopular war produced a lack of community support for the veterans. Vietnam has had a particularly heavy psychological hangover for those who fought, as well as their families. One of the findings of the recent Vietnam Veterans’ Health Study was that the children of Vietnam veterans have a higher incidence of conditions such as spina bifida, as well as a suicide rate three times that of their peers (Vietnam Veterans’ Health Study 1999).

The Gulf War was a short, cynical, hi-tech, resource war fought by a heavily oil-dependent superpower. Australia’s political support for US action was more important than military

support. Protestors shouted ‘No blood for oil’ but the war was over before the t-shirts were off the presses. While Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait broke international law, America could not sell this action as ‘fighting for democracy’ as Kuwait had little. Despite our side ‘winning’, refugees continue to escape Iraq, still economically crippled by sanctions that are causing a humanitarian tragedy and still ruled by the same murderous dictator, Saddam Hussein.

In 1992 interviews with Brisbane secondary students on the psychological impact of the Gulf War, six of the 27 respondents expressed extreme pessimism regarding the future of their world (Knoblauch 2001). Responses to the news of the war were shock, outrage, fear of conscription, concern over terrorism and worry for innocent victims. In a notable gender difference some males suggested further violence would end the war, comments female respondents found distressing. Surprisingly, since the Gulf War was largely a US exercise, nothing was reported specifically about views towards the US.

Peacekeeping in East Timor was the greatest Australian troop movement since Vietnam, with many fewer casualties. While Australia has been involved in many peacekeeping operations this was on a much greater scale. Australia led the multinational force under a United Nations peace enforcement mandate and contributed several thousand personnel (and none were spat on in the street when they returned).

Public opinion in Australia is highly sympathetic towards East Timor and peacekeeping made us feel good about ourselves and our regional role (Anon. 2000). There was a great deal of popular support among young people for the cause: an independence movement against an illegal occupation, self-determination, democracy, and ordinary East Timorese against an armed militia. It partly redressed the wrong that Australia had ever recognised the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, largely in the interests of our access to energy resources. The ANZUS generation are also sympathetic to the East Timorese who helped and protected World War Two servicemen against the Japanese.

There is very little research on young people’s views of conventional warfare (Knoblauch 1992). They are exposed to many images on the nightly news but also to movies such as Platoon, Full Metal Jacket, Born on the Fourth of July and Sylvester Stallone films. There are also video games where one can shoot Iraqi soldiers.

There is a consistency in findings that the nuclear arms buildup during the Cold War created feelings amongst young people of fear, alienation, powerlessness to affect the course of their futures or the future of the planet and a general lack of expectation or even desire to survive. These feelings clearly shape young people’s views of security. Perceptions of security decrease, and public debate about defence obviously increases, at times of conflict. The end of the Cold War saw perceptions of the security threat to Australia plummet to around 30% then rise again sharply over 50% with the Gulf War, tapering off to the 30% rate in 1999 (Makkai 2000).

National Service/ Reserves

During periods of conflict such as the Gulf War and East Timor peacekeeping, young people express concern that there will be a reintroduction of conscription. Older people are more likely to support a return to a form of national military peacetime service, than are those who would actually be serving. February this year was the 50th anniversary of the start of National Service in Australia and pretty much free of calls for its return, except by former National Servicemen (Black 2001).

Interest in joining the military is not particularly high (research presented to an Australian Defence Force Academy seminar found 40% of 17 to 35 year olds agreed they would go to war to defend Australia, if called upon, with around 30% disagreeing) even in peacetime, although our peacekeeping efforts in East Timor have created renewed interest. It has been speculated that problems with recruiting young people are one of the reasons for a recent two-hour stand-down of the Australian forces for a lecture on harassment.

Another survey of over a thousand 15 to 35 year olds found interest in joining the defence forces declined with age. Of high school students, for example, 40% said they would definitely not consider joining, while 18% would, with 42% unsure. Among 26 to 35 year olds, 72% would definitely not consider joining the forces, while 7% would, with 21% unsure.

The accuracy of these figures would obviously vary enormously according to the type of conflict and the perceptions of threats to Australia. It can be argued that conscription in the Vietnam style will probably never happen again. In the event of our entering a large-scale, dangerous and infantry-based military conflict, the government would almost definitely try to draft the unemployed by default, by withdrawing benefits for those unwilling to make the ‘mutual obligation’, in a wartime version of Work for the Dole. A more desirable approach is to bolster the capabilities of the Reserves.

Perceptions of Threat and Alliance

People’s views on defence planning will be affected by their perceptions of threat as well as how they believe that threat should be answered.

While 60% of 60-year olds support more defence spending, only 30% of 21-year olds do (Makkai 2000). This is not because the 21-year olds feel more secure but because for them, more military does not necessarily equate with more security—the escalating arms race is not a security building measure. They might propose other ways of approaching defence such as constructive peacekeeping, a diplomatic approach in the region, supplying aid and promoting democracy. More specifically they might propose that Australia would be better off getting rid of the Pine Gap antennae and keeping the Radio Australia’s short wave transmitter, allowing Australia to transmit to the region. Or they might think Australia should have both. Clearly someone should actually ask them.

Together, with their high presence in the peace movement, young people are clearly interested in defence and peace issues. That so little is heard of their views reflects that those in power are not listening or they are ignoring what they hear. It is too often said young people are not interested in politics. It is more often true that politics is not interested in them.

The most relevant research on young people’s views on the US alliance was done not by the Defence Department, government or academics but was commissioned by community organisations, the Australian Peace Committee and the Anti-Bases Campaign. This 1998 survey on Australian’s views on nuclear weapons and the US alliance found 87% of all respondents agreed ‘all nuclear weapons should be destroyed’, while 80% agreed ‘Australia should keep its military alliance with the United States even though the United States is the biggest nuclear power in the world’. Despite a bit of push polling in the wording of the question, there is clearly a great deal of support for the alliance.

Agreement that all nuclear weapons should be destroyed was fairly consistent across all age groups between 15 years and over 50. Younger people, however showed a lower level of support

of 70% for the ANZUS alliance than those over 35, although this is still a considerable level of support.

Young people may not know what ANZUS is but if you ask them ‘Who is Australia’s main military ally?’ or ‘Whose side would we be on in a war?’ most would probably nominate the United States.

This probably reflects a pragmatic recognition that America is the biggest kid on the block. As satirist P. J. O’Rourke said, ‘America is not the world’s policeman. But you’ll notice when Kuwait got invaded nobody called Sweden’. Understandably, young Australians want the biggest military superpower on our side. At the same time young people largely support disarmament and condemn American gung-ho diplomacy and military expansionism. The problem is not so much America being the world’s policeman, but that it is also running the biggest gun shop.

Australia shares similar cultural properties with America, as new, multicultural, democratic nations with great resources. Young Australians, raised on MASH and other American television and movies have a good understanding of America’s cultural perspective of itself as the ‘global good guy’. Many young people might identify the fictional international hero James Bond, who used to fight communists and now takes on Middle East terrorists and drug dealers, as American, whereas the ANZUS generation might tell you he was British and some might even know he was Scottish.

As noted above, therefore, most Australian young people probably could not tell you what ANZUS is. A similar percentage of American young people not only could not do this, but also would be uncertain of finding Australia on the map, despite our post-Olympic glow. Many more young Australians would know who George W. Bush is (if only because of the well-reported foibles of the US electoral system) than young Americans would know of Prime Minister John Howard.

Star Wars

The above suppositions are, of course, largely derived from informed guesswork, as there is so little research on young people’s views of defence and contemporary foreign affairs policy. There was, however, a glut of research in the 1980s about their fear of nuclear wars.

Indeed, young people’s feelings about nuclear war is one of the few research-rich areas related to the ‘Under-40 generation’. A 1984 survey of 1270 secondary students found war or nuclear war to be their major concern (Finlayson et al. 1987). A 1985 survey of hundreds of year 8 to 10 students in Melbourne found half said they thought about nuclear war often (Griffin and Prior 1988). A 1986 poll found more than half of 15 to 24 year olds thought a nuclear war was likely in their lifetime, while only a quarter of people over the age of 25 believed this . 1987 research found half the Sydney high school students interviewed ranked war as the issue of most concern to them, and those students most concerned tended to be more involved in peace activities (Griffin and Prior 1988). 1988 research shows a high feeling of threat from nuclear war amongst 10 to 12 year olds, with 77% expecting another world war. Fears of teenagers in other countries were also high, with 99% of nine to 17 year olds in the USSR worried about nuclear war (Griffin and Prior 1988).

The era of mutual assured destruction (MAD) produced plenty of fear, pessimism and even nihilism. Many young people could not foresee a future except a few survivors in a desolate, radioactive, post-holocaust existence after a ‘limited nuclear war’. It was a challenge to

educators to teach world politics without increasing the disempowerment of young people (Griffin and Prior 1988).

Young people’s fear of nuclear weapons and concern about their own safety is a very different experience, and subsequent attitude to nuclear weapons, to that of the ANZUS generation. For those alive in 1945 the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan was by and large seen as a positive endeavour by the Americans that brought about the end of World War Two.

This generation grew up with the fear of the end of the world—a nuclear holocaust that could come with no warning, possibly as a result of either a geriatric-related or technological mistake. They are wary of Star Wars. The Nintendo generation has a good understanding of technologies’ strengths, fallibilities and glitches. There has been, for example, a new proposal from the new US administration for a National Missile Defence (NMD) system which would utilise the US bases in Australia. Impressive technology does not rule out your backyard becoming susceptible to collateral damage in a system error.

Arguably, Australia should be saying ‘We think the NMD is a bad move’. Since the US facilities at Pine Gap are supposed to give this country some political leverage, this is surely the sort of issue on which it should be lifting the bar? The same logic can be applied to other international relations issues. Australia has been a world leader in the anti-land mines campaign, yet America has not signed, let alone ratified the Ottawa Treaty. Similarly, why is Australia’s ‘special friend’ refusing to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)? One can ask if Australia ever had a moderating influence on the USA on a major issue?

There seems to have been little success in persuading the US to consider our farmers’ interests and there is rising support in Australia for fair trade over free trade. The Bulletin recently argued the security treaty and Australia’s readiness to spend to its their defence commitment should also be an integral part of free trade negotiations (Brenchley 2000).

Indeed, some would see economics or the ‘trade wars’ as the new battlefield and discussions about defence thus cannot be isolated from other international negotiations. But Japan is certainly not viewed by the next generation as a military threat, reflecting 55 years of a self-contained Japanese military, although it might be viewed as an economic competitor.

Alliance against what?

Australia signed ANZUS in a climate of 1950s fears of communist expansionism in South East Asia and increasing security ties between the US and Japan. While the geo-strategic situation underpinning the 1951 ANZUS Treaty has shifted, today we have broadly similar security fears: instability in our region (South-East Asia and the Pacific); and that in the event of conflict, America would defend the interests of Japan, or its own, rather than Australia’s.

Nothing in the last 40 years in Australia can compare to the vehemence of negative feeling generated by World War Two toward the Japanese. For some older Australians that feeling has diminished but not disappeared. While young people might be aware of Japanese atrocities largely through POW movies and perhaps family histories, this is a tangible generational difference.

Some young Australians might know that the Japanese bombed Darwin during World War Two (although many more would have heard of the bombing of Pearl Harbour weeks earlier). However, very few Japanese young people would know that Japan is the only country to have

ever militarily attacked Australian shores and that hundreds died. They would be unaware of the depth of antagonism held by sections of older Australia. It is often said that ‘the victors write history’ but in the case of Japanese history, for a long time theirs was a globally unique perspective on World War Two, particularly in comparison to the ongoing reflections of the next German population on the nation’s Nazi past.

Events prior to their lives inform young people’s views only indirectly via media such as education, books, movies and television and in some cases, family histories (although veterans are unlikely to discuss war experiences except with other veterans) as well as commemorative activities such as ANZAC Day and memorials. So experiences of the older generation—such as World War Two, the US entering the war, US troops being stationed in Australia, dropping nuclear bombs on Japan and the war ending—create particular views for older Australians that the next generation will not necessarily share.

Indeed confronting Australia’s traditional fears about others in our region may be a key to understanding the weaknesses of ANZUS. Australia’s fear of Asian threats has always impelled the Australian government to seek ‘great and powerful’ friends—England and later the US with whom we share cultural and ethnic links. Young Australians however have less perception of an ‘Asian threat’ and almost no fear of communism. The racial hatred and cold war antagonism that influenced Australian foreign policy after World War II is lessening in influence. The us-and-them syndrome of the ‘free world’ and ‘socialist world’ is collapsing.

The ANZUS generation lived through the shift of security alliance from England to the US as our great protector. Having lived in an era of closer British ties, older Australians are more likely to still view the English monarchy as our great constitutional protector, whereas youth support for an Australian Republic with an Australian head of state is very high. Young Australians may not approve of all aspects of the US electoral system, but they see the US example of a young, independent nation with their own president, elected by the people.

Some young Australians however would argue that the US alliance, like our attachment to the British monarchy, reflects a problem of lacking national self-confidence and that there are a number of approaches Australia could take to security outside of the US alliance.

Our Region

Young people are highly supportive of a non-nuclear stance and have also seen the example of New Zealand. In 1986 New Zealand was suspended from ANZUS when they decided not to allow American nuclear ships into their harbours, a suspension which endures to this day. New Zealand has always felt more secure than Australia from conventional military attack and therefore combined with a very active anti-nuclear movement , the presence of US nuclear submarines made them feel less secure in the alliance. To be in an alliance with a nuclear power is dangerous, even if it does not implicate you as directly as it does us now with permanent bases.

Australians have strong ties with New Zealand, one of our geographically closest neighbours, probably our culturally closest neighbour, and there is regular trans-Tasman travel. We have diverged in how we pursue our security interests. The governments’ relationship has deteriorated over welfare, and immigration issues as well as defence spending. When Australians call New Zealanders ‘dole bludgers’ we are talking about defence too. It is easy to make fun of the fact that the personnel from the New Zealand Army were extras in the film Lord of the Rings (Anon.

2001) but Australia and New Zealand have a long history of coalition in defence and security activities.

New Zealand has a lower budgetary commitment to defence than Australia, but has still managed to lead the region in dispute settling in Bougainville. Australia can learn from New Zealand both in utilising the diplomatic corps and in the reduced cost of extensive use of the reserve military. Particularly with the US expecting Australia to take the lead and carry most of the load in the region, Australia will need to work closely with New Zealand. Problems in the so-called northern ‘arc of crisis’ will include refugees, piracy, arms, drugs and people smuggling. These are problems that need to be confronted not just with security forces but with multilateral diplomatic efforts.

We should also have a more integrated effort with New Zealand in our foreign diplomatic efforts. Yet Australia’s Defence White Paper mentions New Zealand only briefly in its treatment of alliances, which is strange since we have many shared values and interests in the region.

As more young people from developing countries migrate to Australia, our ties and understanding of issues in their home countries will increase. This trend will reinforce an already apparent characteristic: young people are more supportive of independent movements in other countries, as they are less likely to support the status quo and can identify with political reform movements that take to the streets. Support for East Timor independence in Australia certainly grew after the 1991 massacres of hundreds of young East Timorese yet the Australian government was in denial about the independence movement in East Timor for a long time. Our American alliance partner actually demonstrated greater human rights sensitivity in this case by cutting back on US-Indonesian military ties.

Australia’s relationship with Indonesia will clearly be affected by any support for West Papua/Irian Jaya independence. At present Australian Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Downer is talking firm against any support for more independence movements in Indonesia. Young Australians (and a fair few older Australians) may feel differently if they see footage of young West Papuan independence protestors being fired on by Indonesian military units, particularly if these were trained by Australia.

People’s feelings about the US alliance will be influenced by unpredictable events in the Asia-Pacific region. Accidents and attacks in particular receive mainstream coverage and crash into people’s consciousness, such as a US nuclear submarine surfacing suddenly and sinking a Japanese fishing vessel, killing Japanese students. Isolated incidents can become a focus of broader campaigns as was the case of the Japanese girl raped by US servicemen in September 1995, an event that provided impetus to the campaign instituted by many Okinawans to remove US troops from their locale. Contrast growing tensions over US bases in Japan (and even in South Korea) with relatively more placid US-Australia security ties.

We are, of course, as the Prime Minister keeps pointing out, NOT America’s deputy sheriff in the region. We are, however, probably America’s most uncritical ally. Australia’s contribution to conflicts outside its region will probably continue to be militarily insignificant but diplomatically important to the US. We were the only country to publicly support the US against China during the 1996 Taiwan crisis. Yet it is not part of the Australian psyche to appease the powerful, even in an asymmetrical alliance relationship.

Consider the following examples of Australian young people’s views of the alliance.

Corey Watts, writes in a recent EnuFF (Everyone for a Nuclear Free Future) newsletter, ‘A considered weighing up of the “national interest” benefits of the ANZUS alliance (especially as it is now clear that the US either can’t or won’t aid us in regional security) against the horrendous costs should Australia be caught up in an accidental or angry nuclear war, clearly point to the need to a deep rethink of our position’. Michael Kingston recently asked in the Young Australian Democrats (YADs) national journal ‘Where’s the Threat?’, arguing that few countries (other than the US) have the military capability to invade Australia and that Australia’s stance is overly aggressive.

The recent Australian Defence White Paper Australia is illustrative. Australia is openly preparing for rapid deployment in the Asia-Pacific region with the White Paper committing an enormous amount of funds to defence for this type of mission. We are among the highest defence spenders in the region, a move Kingston describes as a recipe for fear and further political alienation’(Kingston 2001).

… this increase in the defense budget is not intended to secure the safety of Australia’s Territory, but rather to secure Australia’s position as a regional military super-power. This is not only a horrendous waste of taxpayer’s money; it will also do tremendous damage to the already fragile relationships between Australia and its Asian neighbours’ (Kingston 2001).

While young Australians may recognise an increasing need to deploy troops for peacekeeping, they question a budget increase to purchase and upgrade offensive military capabilities such as submarines and cruise missiles. As Kingston says ‘It is very hard to make peace by bombing and shelling’ (Kingston 2001).

Will more defence for Australia, in the long run thus lead to less regional and global security?

Defence planning, is still geared towards another Iraq (such as Taiwan or North Korea) rather than another East Timor (such as West Papua). What use are the big guns underscoring ANZUS in the face of non-traditional threats? For those young people and others who believe the threats facing Australia’s national security will not be traditional attack, the alliance seems useless. In this context the ANZUS treaty is like a device that protects against an elephant stampede. Critics point to the lack of elephants and supporters say that shows how well it works.

A Special friend

The US alliance is described, more often from the Australian side, as an ‘intimate’ relationship. Australia’s Foreign Minister, Downer has described the relationship as a ‘vital friendship’. It started as a threesome, but New Zealand was extricated over its anti-nuclear stance in 1986. Some critics argue that Australia is not getting what it wants out of the relationship and that the US really only wants that Asia-Pacific ally for its real estate. No matter how ‘special’ Australia might believe the American relationship is, the US is actually a strategic polygamist. Japan, Thailand, South Korea and the Philippines all have their own bilateral alliances with the US.

With a more international outlook, Australian young people might well recognise that the relationship is not so ‘special’ after all, that we may need some space, and to interact strategically with other countries, particularly if Australian / US security interests diverge on certain issues.

The key question for Australia is how its national security interests—and, above all that of war avoidance—are sustained by the alliance with the US.

Pine Gap—the line in the ANZUS sand?

Australia’s Foreign Minister is providing Washington with the most enthusiastic support for National Missile Defence (NMD), outside America. Downer argues that refusing to cooperate with the US on NMD would mean Australia was turning its back on the linchpin of the alliance: hosting joint facilities that among other things would help detect nuclear attack on the US (Garran and Stewart 2001).

Strong and enduring factors still sustain the US-Australian security relations. Australians generally support the Australia - United States defence alliance because the two countries are rooted in a similar cultural and ideological heritage. Bilateral relations also grows through technological and economic links.

These links are not necessarily damaged irreparably by strong Australian opposition to nuclear weaponry, particularly by younger Australians. The very small amount of research available indicates young people support the alliance, although they exhibit a higher opposition than their elders to nuclear weapons.

Opposition to nuclear weapons and support for ANZUS are viewpoints that collide 19km south west of Alice Springs at the Pine Gap research facility. Successive Australian governments have agreed to the establishment and maintenance of important US strategic communications, intelligence and early warning facilities in Australia since the 1960s. The presence of these facilities and the risk they pose to Australia being targeted by an American strategic adversary, could challenge Australian support for the US alliance (despite the fact that the 1951 ANZUS treaty does not mention the bases).

Pine Gap is probably the focus of opposition to Australia’s involvement in American defence systems. Along with Australian uranium mines, Pine Gap is also traditionally one of the targets of anti-nuclear campaigns. Political opposition to the bases may rise commensurately with future US military actions in the Gulf or other flashpoints, and in conjunction with new US weapons proposals.

A recent article in The Australian newspaper starts, ‘Pine Gap is the linchpin George Bush needs for his ambitious global missile defence scheme’ Garran and Stewart 2001). The headline ‘The Dome’ is reminiscent of the recent Australian movie The Dish, which painted an amiable picture of Australian and US cooperation to beam images of the first moon-walk to the world. The pictures that accompany the article are of a serviceman watching dials and displays, a nuclear explosion off a Pacific island, a picture of an aimed missile, and the Pine Gap ball-shaped antennae that we are told ‘can detect the heat of a ballistic missile fired on the other side of the world’. The smallest photo is of three young women with painted faces protesting against nuclear weapons.

This last image of young people protesting reflects one of the few ways their views are seen on defence and nuclear issues as well as a range of other issues—environmental and economic— that they care about. Young people have little access to the mainstream media, parliamentary politics or academia—the main channels through which the public debate is conducted. The views of young people who oppose Australia’s participation in American defence systems however can be found in other forums including youth specific media, student university newspapers, the youth wings of political parties, research on young people or peace newsletters.

Conclusion

The two major parties have long held similar defence policies. It is often claimed there is cross-party support for the US alliance but this ignores the views and concerns consistently expressed in the past by the Democrats, the Greens and the Nuclear Disarmament Party, who have all received a high degree of youth support.

While an average 25-year old may not know what ANZUS is, s/he may well know the song lyrics, ‘US Forces get the nod. It’s a setback for our country’ sung by Peter Garrett of the band Midnight Oil. Garrett’s brief stint with party politics for the Nuclear Disarmament Party highlighted the resonance of his message. Given the even stronger vote for the also pro-disarmament Democrat candidate who was successfully elected, the message clearly had some support from the public.

Finding political support for Australia’s practical support of Bush’s bombs is indeed, as The Australian newspaper has recently described it, ‘a serious strategic dilemma’ (Garran and Stewart 2001). It will be a growing dilemma for the Australian Government as the next generation, the ‘new world order’ generation (as the current US President’s father would put it), increasingly questions military solutions to emerging global problems.

Young people may not have many answers on defence issues but they have a number of questions worth contemplating:

. Is the greater threat to Australia and its Pacific neighbours an armed attack from overseas, or global warming causing the seas to rise?

. Why is Australia spending so little on overseas aid and so much on defence?

. Does ‘interoperability’ just mean Australia spending an even greater proportion of its defence budget on high technology equipment, labelled ‘Made in the USA’?

. And, why are there are antennae at Pine Gap that can detect the heat of a ballistic missile fired on the other side of the world, but Australia no longer has an operable short-wave radio transmitter near Darwin that can broadcast Australian views and programs to Indonesia?

Young people deserve better answers than the government is giving them to these questions. If stronger explanations are not forthcoming the younger generation has every right to begin questioning the continuing value of the alliance itself.

References

Anon. 2000. ‘Timor’s Troubled Waters’ The Economist, 2 December, p.34. Anon., 2001. ‘It’s no fairy story—NZ troops play Hobbits’ The Australian, 2 February, p.1. Ball, Desmond, 1999. ‘Foreword’ in Mohan Malik (ed.) Australia’s Security inthe 21st Century (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin). — . 2000. ‘Australian defence planning: problems and prospects’ Pacific Review Vol. 12, no.3, October. Black, Rob, 2001. ‘Bring back nashos!’ Sunday Mail, 11 February, p.36. Brenchley, Fred, 2000. ‘Great White Hope’ The Bulletin, 19 December, p.28. — . 2001. ‘Theatre of War’ The Bulletin, 23 January, p.35.

Dalby, Simon, 1996. ‘Security Discourse, the ANZUS Alliance and Australian Identity’ in Graeme Cheeseman and Robert Bruce (eds) Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with the Department of International Rel;ations and the Peace Research Centre, RSPAS, Australian National University). Defence, Department of, 2000. Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force White Paper. (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia). Finlayson, P., I. Reynolds, M. Rob and C. Muir, 1987. Adolescents—their views, problems and needs. A survey of High School students (Hornsby: The Hornsby, Kuring-gai Area Health Service). Garran, Robert and Cameron Stewart, 2001. ‘The Dome’ The Weekend Australian, 10-11 February, p. 20. Griffin, M. and M. Prior, 1988. ‘Young People and the Nuclear Threat’ The Bulletin of the National Clearinghouse for Youth Studies, Vol.7, no. 2, May, pp. 40-43. Kingston, Michael, 2001. ‘Where’s the Threat?’ Young Australian Democrats National Journal, February, p.4. Knoblauch, Cobie, 1992. ‘Perceptions of the Future’ Youth Studies Australia Vol. 11, no.1, Autumn, pp. 40-46. Makkai, Tony, 2000. ‘Trends in public opinion towards defence and foreign affairs in Australia’, Australian Election Study surveys presented in, ADSC seminar, 8 August, Canberra. Vietnam Veterans’ Health Study 1999. ‘4.5 Conclusions’ in Morbidity of Vietnam Veterans: A study of the health of Australia’s Vietnam veteran community: Validation, Vol. 3, December.

