



Speech by





The Hon Alexander Downer MP

Minister for Foreign Affairs





To the Fifth General Conference of the

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific





Countering Proliferation: New Threats and Practical  Responses









Jakarta, 7 December 2005  (Check Against Delivery)



Introduction

I am very pleased to address you today on a subject I regard as posing one of the

greatest threats to international and regional security - the proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction.



No country can claim immunity from this menace.



There is little doubt that the perpetrators of attacks in Amman, Bali, Istanbul, London,

Madrid, New Delhi, New York and Riyadh - to name a few - would have used far

deadlier weapons had they had them.



Just as no corner of the world is safe from terrorists’ evil intentions, no region can

ignore threats from countries illicitly pursuing weapons of mass destruction and

missiles capable of delivering them well beyond their shores.



Clearly, all countries that value their security and prosperity must make an urgent and

practical commitment to prevent such weapons from falling into the wrong hands.



Meeting challenges in the Asia-Pacific region



The Asia-Pacific region faces some of the most significant challenges in providing

effective action against proliferation.



The region hosts some of the world’s busiest air and sea ports - some of which, we

know, have been used by proliferators in diverting WMD-related materials under the

guise of legitimate trade.



And we are, sadly, no stranger to the invidious threat of terrorism.



Encouragingly, awareness of the proliferation threat has increased considerably

among countries in our part of the world over recent years.



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The past three APEC Leaders Meetings have strongly endorsed counter-proliferation

measures in the interests of more secure trade and economic development; notably,

through work on export controls and securing radioactive sources.



I commend also the valuable work being done by the Council for Security

Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific in generating ideas on implementing aspects of the

ASEAN Regional Forum’s Ministerial Statement on Non-Proliferation…



… in particular, it’s Study Group on Countering Proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction in the Asia-Pacific and its work to design a regional export controls

template.



Australia strongly supports these and other regional efforts to advance cooperation on

addressing the threat from weapons of mass destruction.



Over the past two years, we have stepped up our efforts to engage Asia-Pacific

governments on practical implementation of export controls and other counter-proliferation measures, including the Proliferation Security Initiative.



It is vital that we learn from one another to ensure that our capacity for catching

proliferators is uniformly effective.



A measure of the Australian Government’s commitment to informing discussion on

contemporary proliferation threats and responses to them is found in its recent

publication, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Australia’s Role in Fighting Proliferation.



I commend the paper to you - it usefully supplements and expands on many of the

issues I will raise here.



New and emerging proliferation threats



A variety of dramatic changes in the global security environment over the past two

decades account for the spread of weapons of mass destruction - and the

commensurate rise in the risk of their use.

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While the risk of nuclear conflagration has receded since the end of the Cold War,

checks on proliferation have failed to keep pace with new global security realities.



These realities have in turn significantly diversified the proliferation threat.



I would like to outline some key trends in this regard.



First, while most countries eschew these weapons, a small number continue to flout

international non-proliferation norms by secretly developing them.



Their reasons for doing so are based on the misguided belief that these weapons bring

them the power and prestige that were once preserves of the superpowers.



Earlier this year, North Korea claimed that it had produced nuclear weapons.



More recently, Iran has been put on notice by the International Atomic Energy

Agency to dispel ambiguity over the direction of its nuclear program.



These countries’ willingness to avoid obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty has the potential to inspire others to do likewise.



Second, increased economic development and a freer world trading system have

opened up new opportunities for proliferators and terrorists.



For all the clear benefits it has brought, globalisation has increased the availability of

materials and technologies required to make biological, chemical and nuclear

weapons.



As a result, more countries have developed an indigenous capability to produce

weapons of mass destruction and missiles.



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Such capability has often been achieved through concealment within civilian

programs, given the inherently dual military-civilian applications of most relevant

technologies.



Third, a few of these countries, or individuals within them, have exported their deadly

expertise.



The nuclear procurement network operated by Abdul Qadeer Khan is the most

disturbing of the cases that have so far come to light.



This sort of horizontal, or secondary, proliferation has seen more countries in regions

of instability develop varying degrees of weapons of mass destruction and missile

capability.



The number of countries with ballistic missile capability, for example, has more than

trebled since 1975.



Fourth, and most ominously, the rise of transnational terrorism has significantly raised

the proliferation stakes.



Unlike states, terrorist groups cannot be constrained in their actions by threats of

retaliation.



Al Qaida has made no secret of its ambitions to acquire - and use - weapons of mass

destruction.



Terrorist groups in our own part of the world have similar ambitions.



Proliferation to terrorists is a very real possibility presenting unthinkable horrors.



It is only a matter of time before determined terrorist groups join forces with

unscrupulous proliferators whose only thought is to turn a profit.





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The need for a multidimensional approach



In light of these new and emerging threats, the overriding imperative today is to halt

and reverse the trend of more countries acquiring weapons of mass destruction.



At the same time, we must anticipate attempts by terrorists to acquire such weapons -

and do everything possible to stop them from doing so.



Countering proliferation effectively demands as broad a range of tools and measures

as possible.



These include not only ongoing efforts to strengthen compliance with the multilateral

non-proliferation treaties, but also international cooperation to cut supply to troubling

weapons and missile programs.



Other measures are needed to protect vulnerable sources of WMD-related materials

against terrorist procurement, such as improved security of radioactive and other

hazardous materials.



The urgency and sheer diversity of proliferation threats compel us to implement such

measures - not as options, but as integral parts of a multidimensional strategy for

stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction.



Practical action to cut supply…



First and foremost, we cannot lose sight of the fact that proliferation is an actual threat,

not just a potential one.



Right now, proliferators and terrorists are actively exploiting gaps in global and

national non-proliferation measures.



To stop them from acquiring what they need to make biological, chemical, or nuclear

weapons, immediate practical action is needed.



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The Proliferation Security Initiative is the leading example of the type of new

thinking that has facilitated such action.



PSI is aimed at enhancing operational capacity within, and between, participating

countries to help them contribute to effective and timely actions to stop illicit

trafficking in these weapons.



Having no founding treaty, no headquarters and no secretariat, PSI’s strength is its

flexibility and responsiveness.



To date, participating countries have made substantial progress in integrating

operational capability, individually and collectively, through 18 exercises - held in

Asia, Europe and North America - and a series of expert-level meetings.



That decisive, practical action to disrupt proliferation brings results, has already been

demonstrated.



Libya’s decision to renounce its chemical and nuclear weapons programs came

following the PSI interdiction of the BBC China, destined for Libya with an illegal

cargo of centrifuge parts for uranium enrichment.



PSI is not an alternative to multilateral non-proliferation treaties.



Rather, it provides a vehicle for participating countries to consider the entire range of

existing legal provisions for taking action against specific WMD-related transfers.



PSI is expressly premised on such action being within domestic and international law

- nothing more and nothing less.



Growing support for the initiative, which now stands at some 70 countries, is creating

a highly effective deterrent.



The UN Secretary General has commended the important role PSI is playing in filling

a “gap in our defences.”

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The need for action to interdict illicit WMD-related trade can be significantly reduced

through effective supply-side barriers.



Export controls play a key role in this regard, as has been well recognised by the

international community.



UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and strong regional statements, including by

G8 and APEC leaders, have committed states to maintaining export controls on items

that can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction and missiles.



Much more, however, needs to be done to secure effective implementation and

enforcement of export controls, especially to capture wilful attempts by proliferators

to disguise their nefarious trade using tactics such as transhipment and re-export.



Australia, through our chairing of the Australia Group, has played an especially active

role in international cooperation on controls on chemical and biological materials and

technologies suitable for weapons development.



Encouragingly, an increasing number of countries are adhering to Australia Group

standards, and those of the other export control regimes, in a clear sign of their

growing acceptance as international benchmarks.



A few countries have nonetheless called for export controls to be subject to

consideration in a multilateral framework.



But we need to be clear on one thing: individual governments are responsible for what

comes out of their countries’ factories and ports - the onus is on each of us to adopt

and enforce legislation to stop proliferation at our borders.



To do anything less is to fall short of obligations set out in Resolution 1540.



This is not to say that the effectiveness of our individual efforts to prevent illicit trade

in WMD-related materials cannot be enhanced by common approaches.

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Among its other commitments, Resolution 1540 calls on all states “to take

cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological

weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials.”



As governments, we can all do better in our efforts to meet this obligation.



There is much to be gained from sharing our knowledge and experiences in

implementing and enforcing export controls within the region.



The recent ASEAN Regional Forum Licensing Experts Meeting held in Singapore

was valuable in this respect.



Far from restricting legitimate trade, an efficiently administered export control system

boosts exporter confidence and enhances trade security.



In our age of heightened security fears, it is in no exporter’s commercial interest to be

implicated in a weapons of mass destruction procurement network, or to fail to

cooperate with export licensing officials.



… while strengthening multilateral regimes



Practical efforts to cut supply to proliferators do not mean that we should lose sight of

our underlying objective to dissuade irresponsible states from pursuing biological,

chemical or nuclear weapons in the first place.



To this end, the multilateral arms control and non-proliferation treaties have served us

well over the years, helping to cap the number of nuclear-weapon states and

outlawing chemical and biological weapons.



But they have not always kept pace with new and emerging threats, especially

challenges posed by those willing to cheat on their obligations.



More needs to be done to strengthen compliance and verification.



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We simply cannot afford to waste - as we have done -opportunities like the NPT

Review Conference, if we hope to continue to regard multilateral processes as a viable

means for addressing contemporary security threats.



Universalisation of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol on

strengthened safeguards presents a tangible way forward for demonstrating collective

resolve on nuclear non-proliferation.



I welcome the recent signings of the Additional Protocol by Singapore, Thailand and

Malaysia.



Australia has sought to advance this issue by urging major uranium suppliers to

follow its example in making adherence to the Additional Protocol a condition of

supply to non-nuclear-weapon states.



Strengthened political will in dealing with the threat from weapons of mass

destruction is essential if we are to preserve the benefits all states get from the

multilateral treaties.



The UN Security Council must be prepared to hold to account countries that cheat on

their non-proliferation obligations, making use of its powers under the UN Charter -

and the major non-proliferation treaties and IAEA Statute - to support action to re-establish compliance.



Ambiguity over Iran’s nuclear program has renewed attention on the potential for

countries of proliferation concern to misuse the NPT’s provisions on access to

peaceful nuclear energy to acquire the technical basis for rapid development of

nuclear weapons.



To close this potential loophole, a new framework is urgently needed to limit the

spread of sensitive nuclear technology while respecting NPT parties’ rights to

peaceful nuclear energy.



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Balancing peaceful use of nuclear technology with proliferation risks will be a

complex but necessary reality of life in the twenty-first century.



Further afield, we need to continue to pursue entry into force of the Comprehensive

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.



Dissuading countries from testing poses a very real obstacle to the development of a

nuclear weapon capability.



I had the honour in September to preside over the CTBT Entry into Force Conference

in New York, at which Australia assumed its role as coordinator for efforts in this area.



Our focus and determination in seeing this Treaty enter into force continue today.



The 44 countries specifically listed in the Treaty must sign and ratify the treaty to

trigger entry into force.



33 of those countries, including Australia, have done so.  But 11 countries, including

some in the Asia-Pacific, have not.



We have over the years heard many reasons as to why this is so.



As I said in New York, the time for excuses is past.



It is time for these countries to act.



Negotiation of a verifiable treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear

weapons use - a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty - also remains a priority.



An FMCT with an effective verification mechanism would reduce risks of leakage of

fissile material to proliferators or terrorists.



It would also advance disarmament objectives by imposing a cap on the amount of

fissile material produced for nuclear weapons use.

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Anticipating the terrorist threat



The risk of weapons of mass destruction being acquired by terrorists remains hard to

quantify.



Terrorists are not accountable to international arms control agreements.



Although they face considerable technical and financial hurdles in developing these

most dangerous of all weapons, their proliferation activities are much less visible than

those of states and therefore harder to monitor.



But we do know one thing that puts into clear perspective the imperative to keep these

weapons out of their evil hands: terrorist groups are actively seeking them for the sole

purpose of using them to kill as many innocent people as possible.



The success of strengthened multilateral treaties in preventing more countries

acquiring weapons will have an important, albeit indirect, role in curtailing the WMD

activities of terrorists.



Fewer countries with biological, chemical or nuclear weapons simply means fewer

opportunities for their leakage to terrorists.



The Proliferation Security Initiative and export controls will also continue to play an

important role in limiting terrorists’ options for WMD-related transfers across borders.



In 2004, I hosted the ministerial-level Asia-Pacific Nuclear Safeguards and Security

Conference, attended by the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Dr El

Baradei, to discuss ways to strengthen regional barriers against the threat of nuclear

and radiological terrorism.



One of the most important defences against this threat is the securing of potentially

dangerous materials, technology and knowledge against terrorist acquisition -

nowhere more so than in the countries where they intend to use them.

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Australia is working with South-East Asian and Pacific countries to secure

uncontrolled or vulnerable radioactive sources against unauthorised access or transfer.



A related threat we are working to address is that of terrorist attacks on civilian

aircraft using shoulder-fired missiles.



The Asia-Pacific region has thankfully been spared any such attacks to date - but we

cannot afford to be complacent.



From 2006, Australia will substantially step up its efforts in a range of international

forums to secure existing stocks of shoulder-fired missiles and to stamp out the illicit

trade in these dangerous weapons.



As our law enforcement and intelligence agencies develop greater insights into the

operational methods of terrorists and the networks they draw on, we also need to

remain open to opportunities to better marry our counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation activities.



Conclusion



In closing, let me reiterate that no one tool or measure is adequate for arresting the

proliferation of the most dangerous of all weapons.



The diversity of the threats we face means that we need to be comprehensive, flexible

and innovative in our responses.



It is also clear that the global counter-proliferation net can only be as effective as it is

wide.



The full commitment of all countries is required to deny proliferators the opportunity

to exploit weaknesses in our collective defences.



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We should be under no illusion as to the difficulty of the challenges we face - and of

the urgent need for practical action.



We would do well to heed the words of John F Kennedy in this respect: “There are

risks and costs to a program of action.  But they are far less than the long-range risks

and costs of comfortable inaction.”



As we in the Asia-Pacific region work to integrate our economies more closely, we

have a clear responsibility to coming generations to ensure that our future prosperity

and security is not held hostage to such threats.



I commend this forum as a useful vehicle for working towards this goal.

