MINISTER FOR S' Ã¢ÂÂ  FOREIGN AFFAIRS

No. Date

Ml16 28 October 1981

NEWS RELEASE THE HON. TONY STREET, M.P.

EURATOM NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT

Following is the text of a statement by the   Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Hon Tony Street MP,   to the. House of Representatives on 28 October 1981 on   the nuclear safeguards agreement between Australia and   Euratom:

STATEMENT TO PARLIAMENT BY THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  ON A NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH EURATOM

Mr Speaker,

I hereby present the Agreement between the Government  of Australia and the European Atomic Energy Community concerning  Transfers of Nuclear Material from Australia to the European  Atomic Energy Community, signed in Brussels on 21 September 1981.

,  I seek leave to make a statement.

In presenting this Agreement I am fulfilling a  commitment by the Government to ensure that the -texts of all  Australia's nuclear safeguards agreements will be presented in  the Parliament as soon as practicable after signature with a

full explanation of their provisions.

The conclusion of a nuclear safeguards agreement with  the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) has been a major  objective of the Government in the nuclear safeguards area.  Upon entry into force it will open the way to exports of  Australian uranium to all Member States of the European  Community under new contracts.  The Agreement is a significant

step in the establishment of a network of bilateral nuclear  safeguards agreements between Australia and our potential  uranium customers,  in accordance with Australia's nuclear  safeguards policy announced to Parliament by the Prime Minister  on 24 May 1977.

The Agreement has been negotiated with Euratom as a  single entity in recognition of the competence and responsibilities  vested in Euratom by the Member States under the Euratom Treaty.  Australia had already accorded this recognition in the safeÂ­

guards Agreements negotiated with the United Kingdom and France. The present Agreement gives full effect to our recognition of  Euratom as an entity for transfers of nuclear material from  Australia to all Member States of the Community.  Assertions .

have been made from time to time that this is not in accordance  with Australian policy. These assertions are not correct. From the time of the announcement of Australia's nuclear safeÂ­ guards policy, the Government made clear .that it had recognised  Euratom as a single entity and would deal with this reality. The Government is gratified that we have been successful in  doing so. Ã¢ÂÂ

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The primary purpose of this Agreement is to  provide that when Australia supplies uranium to any of the  10 member countries of Euratom for peaceful purposes,  this  uranium will not be diverted to non-peaceful or explosive  purposes.  To this end, and in accordance with our nuclear  safeguards policy, all of Australia's bilateral nuclear  safeguards agreements incorporate stringent safeguards and  controls on the use of the uranium we may supply to other  countries for peaceful purposes.  This Agreement, as with

the other bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements concluded  by Australia since the introduction of our comprehensive  nuclear safeguards policy, incorporates all the requirements  of that policy. It provides for the prohibition of

explosive or military use, the application of International  Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,  "fall-back" safeguards in  the event that IAEA safeguards cease to apply,  the application  of internationally recognised levels of physical protection

and prior consent rights over retransfers to third countries  outside the Community. The Agreement provides for  administrative arrangements to implement the provisions of

the Agreement and to track Australian supplied material  throughout the fuel cycle of customer countries members of  the European Community.  These detailed procedures enable us  to establish that there is no diversion of Australian supplied  material to non-peaceful or explosive purposes.

Mr Speaker, I would now like to comment on some  particular features of the Agreement I have tabled. Like the  French and Swedish Agreements which I tabled in Parliament in   March of this year, this Agreement includes provisions covering

reprocessing of spent fuel containing material supplied by  Australia.  These provisions accord with the Government's  policy of maintaining Australia's prior consent rights over  reprocessing of Australian origin nuclear material, while

establishing conditions in our bilateral agreements under which  this consent may be exercised.  I announced the Government's  policy on these conditions in Parliament on 27 November 1980. The detailed procedures for implementation of the conditions in

the Agreement relating to reprocessing are contained in a   separate document.  That document,  being of less-than-treaty  status, is not being tabled, but will be made available to  Members or Senators on request through my office.

Unlike our Agreements with France and the United  Kingdom, the scope of the Agreement with Euratom is limited to   nuclear material only as defined in the Agreement and is not  reciprocal in that it covers only transfers of nuclear material

from Australia to Euratom. This reflects the specific  competence of Euratom in the nuclear field. Written assurances  have been provided by the Member States of Euratom which do not

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have bilateral agreements with Australia of their willingness  to negotiate additional arrangements with Australia to  cover forms of nuclear transfers other than those covered in  this Agreement if and when appropriate, as well as an  assurance from the Community that it will not impede such  arrangements between a Member State and Australia provided  these are consistent with the Euratom Treaty. ..

Consistent with the division of competence between  '  Euratom and the Member States, the latter will apply the  necessary measures of physical protection. In this regard,  Member States not having bilateral agreements with Australia

have provided written undertakings that they will fulfil  within their own areas of competence the physical protection  obligations of the Agreement. All these assurances are  incorporated in the Agreement. The Euratom Agreement, like  our Agreements with two Euratom Member States, the United

Kingdom and France, provides that the provisions in the  Agreement will be complementary to, and where appropriate  .  supersede, the provisions of the. bilateral Agreements with  the United Kingdom and France.

A side-letter to the Agreement sets out arrangements  for the exercise of prior consent in relation to transfers,  to countries outside the Community, of Australian origin  nuclear material for the purposes of conversion, low enrichment  and fuel fabrication. These arrangements accord with  Australia's nuclear safeguards policy. The letter notes that

in circumstances where Member States of the Community use, for  these fuel cycle services, the facilities of countries with  which Australia does not have a nuclear safeguards agreement,  they may do so on an "all-in, all-out" basis. This principle

is already being applied pursuant to our Agreements with  Finland and Sweden. The side-letter also provides that  transfers outside the Community for reprocessing of Australian  origin spent fuel may be made to countries with which Australia

has a nuclear safeguards agreement in force.

Of the ten Member States of Euratom, France and the  United Kingdom are nuclear weapon states which under the Treaty  on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are not obliged to  renounce nuclear weapons or accept international safeguards.  Under the Government's stringent nuclear safeguards policy,

nuclear weapon states which wish to import Australian uranium  must provide assurances that nuclear material supplied for  peaceful purposes is not diverted to military.or. explosive  purposes and must agree that the uranium we supply be covered

by IAEA safeguards. The French and British Governments have  made these commitments in their separate bilateral nuclear  safeguards Agreements with Australia as well as through the

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Australia/Euratom Agreement.  They have themselves  concluded separate agreements with the IAEA and Euratom  to make their civil facilities subject to IAEA safeguards. Under Australia's Agreement with Euratom,  the non-nuclear  weapon states member countries of the Community commit

themselves to placing nuclear material subject to the  Agreement under IAEA safeguards applied pursuant to their  NPT-based safeguards agreements with the IAEA, which provide  for all nuclear material in their nuclear industries to be

subject to such safeguards.

The tabling of this Agreement makes a total of  nine nuclear safeguards agreements covering sixteen countries  concluded by the Government since the announcement of its  nuclear safeguards policy by the Prime Minister on 24 May 1977.  The Government is proud it its achievements in negotiating

these agreements.  We believe they provide a convincing  demonstration of the international acceptability of Australian  policy. They show that, while applying stringent nonÂ­ proliferation safeguards to our uranium exports,  we are  prepared to make Australian uranium available to customer  countries for legitimate peaceful energy purposes. The  agreements show that Australia,  by facilitating peaceful  nuclear trade under stringent predictable conditions, is doing

so in a manner which supports international efforts aimed at  preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Government welcomes the conclusion of this  Agreement with Euratom,  representing an important step forward  in Australia's relations with the European Community and its  Member States.

