M152

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M I N I S T E R  FOR F O R E I G N  A F F A I R S

27 November 1980 Embargoed until

delivery_____

CONDITIONS FOR AUSTRALIAN CONSENT TO REPROCESSING

Following is the text of the statement by the Minister for  for Foreign Affairs, the Hon. Tony Street, M.P., to the  House of Representatives on 27 November 1980 on conditions  for Australian consent to the reprocessing of nuclear  material of Australian origin:

CONDITIONS FOR AUSTRALIAN CONSENT TO REPROCESSING

Mr Speaker, ’  '  ’

On 19 March,  in his statement on the outcome of the

International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, the former Minister

for Foreign Affairs informed the House that the Government would

be proceeding to advance its consideration of possible arrangeÂ­

ments for the exercise of Australia's prior consent rights on

the reprocessing of nuclear material of Australian origin. He

emphasised at that time that final decisions would only be taken

if the Government's non-proliferation objectives were fully

satisfied.

Honourable Members will be aware that reprocessing is

a chemical operation by which plutonium and unused uranium are

separated from the fission products in spent nuclear fuel.

International interest in reprocessing centres on the potential

energy content of the separated plutonium and unused uranium:

the sensitive non-proliferation issues involved: and the

relevance of reprocessing to the management of material from

spent fuel. .

The Government has now brought its consideration of

the reprocessing issue, which it has kept under review since

1977, to the point where it is now appropriate to make policy

decisions. Today, I would like to inform Honourable Members

of the decisions the Government has taken. I shall indicate

how the Government,  in accordance with its nuclear safeguards

agreements,  will exercise Australia's prior consent rights

over the reprocessing of Australian origin nuclear material.

........  .... / 2

2 .

Existing Policy

Honourable Members will recall that,  in announcing the

Government's nuclear safeguards policy on 24 May 1977 the Prime

Minister said that, pending the outcome of INFCF, and other

international studies,  Australia would reserve its position on

the reprocessing of spent fuel derived from Australian origin

uranium. He said that the Government would require a provision

in bilateral safeguards agreements that reprocessing of Australian

origin nuclear material could take place only with its prior

consent.

Later in 1977, on 25 August,  the Prime Minister said

that in relation to reprocessing the Government would need to

be satisfied,

- that there is a need to reprocess for legitimate energy

purposes;

- that international controls and safeguards are intensified

to ensure an adequate and effective defence against

diversion of plutonium to non-peaceful purposes;

- that there is not excessive stock-piling of plutonium

in a way that could pose future proliferation dangers.

On 24 August 1978, when the former Minister for Foreign

Affairs tabled the nuclear safeguards agreements concluded with

Finland and the Philippines, he noted that the Government's

attitude had never been one of rejecting out of hand the

reprocessing of Australian origin nuclear material. He said that

the prior consent clauses in safeguards agreements gave Australia

the right to decide the conditions under which reprocessing of

Australian supplied material might take place and emphasised that,

if reprocessing were permitted, the conditions and arrangements

would need to be fully satisfactory in terms of the Government's

non-proliferation objectives.

3.

International Developments

Mr Speaker,

Since 1977, the most important international examination

of the nuclear fuel cycle and non-proliferation has been the

International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, INFCE. The former

Minister for Foreign Affairs outlined in some detail the findings

of INFCE on reprocessing and plutonium in his statement to the

House on 19 March. I believe it would be useful for Honourable

Members however if I briefly went over the major statements that

INFCE made in this area:

- first, the use of plutonium obtained through the operation

of nuclear power plants is not the easiest or most efficient

route to acquire fissionable material for nuclear explosive

purposes.  Specially constructed facilities to produce highly

enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium have been and are

likely to continue to be preferred on technical and economic

grounds by any country contemplating production of an

explosive device;

- second, INFCE1s projections of the demand for nuclear

J  energy suggest that uranium supply might not be

sufficient to meet requirements after the year 2000,.

In these circumstances reprocessing and recycling of

plutonium would be essential for some countries;

- third,  INFCE found that materials accountancy,

supplemented by containment and surveillance measures

for existing operating reprocessing plants,  was generally

capable of providing effective international safeguards.

It was foreseen that the establishment of future

large commercial reprocessing plants would require

/4

4 .

improved safeguarding techniques,  but that there was

sufficient time to develop these given that the

commercial use of plutonium was still a decade or

so away;

- fourth, INFCE found that no single judgement about

the risk of diversion from the different fuel cycles

could be made which was valid both now and for the

future. It was found that valid assessments of risks

could not be made without regard to the particular

circumstances and environment of the various fuel cycle

activities in each case; and .

- fifth, it was generally accepted that more uniform,

consistent and predictable application of export and

import controls by supplier and consumer countries,

in accordance with more concrete criteria, would be

desirable.

INFCE concluded that, in the event that industrial

scale reprocessing develops, it would be necessary to adopt

the best technical, safeguards and institutional measures

to increase the protection of material against diversion to

non-peaceful uses.

.../5

5 .

Mr Speaker,

The Government participated actively in INFCE, and has

also consulted a number of countries, including potential

customer countries, on the subject of reprocessing.

The discussion in INFCE and these bilateral discussions have

shown that a number of important industrial countries are

committed to reprocessing as part of their nuclear energy

programs.

I believe that as a result of international discussions

over the past three years, particularly in INFCE, differences

over reprocessing have been considerably narrowed.  It is

generally agreed that prior consent rights over reprocessing

should be applied in a predictable manner. This can contribute

to greater certainty and stability in international nuclear

trade and cooperation. In turn, this greater stability can

strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Countries are less

likely to launch prematurely into the acquisition of sensitive

technologies if their concerns about energy security can be

allayed.

It has also become accepted internationally that decisions

on the adoption of various nuclear fuel cycle options will

necessarily take into account a range of factors which will v;i rv

from country to country in accordance with the specific social,

political and economic circumstances involved.

Program Approach to Reprocessing

Taking this emerging international consensus into account,

the Government has developed an approach to reprocessing which

- fully satisfies the Government's non-proliferation concerns;

- encompasses all existing nuclear safeguards requirements;

- accommodates the need of consumer countries for the

predictable application of non-proliferation conditions;  and

.... / 6

6 . j

" addresses in detail the specific nuclear fuel cycle programs

in which Australian origin nuclear material might be

reprocessed and the separated plutonium used.

Mr Speaker,

I shall now outline in more detail the procedures the

Government will adopt in making decisions about whether or not

it should give its prior consent, in particular circumstances,

to the reprocessing of Australian origin nuclear material for

the nuclear fuel cycle programs of countries with which Australia

has nuclear safeguards agreements.

The first step will be the provision by an interested

customer country of detailed information. The purpose of

this will be to establish the country's need, within its

overall energy strategy, for Australian origin nuclear material

to be reprocessed. '  Â·

I should like to emphasise thatÂ· this initial information

gathering stage in no way seeks to intrude into the decisionÂ­

making process of negotiating partners and that information

received would remain confidential between the parties to

respect commercial confidences. I am able to inform Honourable

Members that this process of seeking comprehensive information

about nuclear programs and the applicable controls and safeguards

has been initiated with a number of interested negotiating

partners.

If the need to reprocess Australian origin nuclear material

is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Government and the

controls and safeguards applied to programs involving

. . .  /7

7.

reprocessing meet all the Government's existing requirements,

the Government will be prepared to consider granting its consent

to the reprocessing of Australian origin nuclear material in

specifically defined nuclear fuel cycle programs on the

following bases:

- agreement in advance to reprocessing for the purpose of

energy u s e ;

- agreement in advance to reprocessing for the purpose of

the management of materials (plutonium, fission products

and unused uranium) contained in spent nuclear fuel;

- case by case consideration of requests for consent to

reprocessing for other peaceful non-explosive purposes

including research; and

- storage and use of plutonium of Australian origin separated

from spent fuel to be in ways that do not cause proliferation

dangers;

- provision for consultation and review of the operation of

the agreed conditions; and

- commitment by customer countries to support the development

of more effective international control measures relevant

to reprocessing, including an international plutonium

storage scheme.

I should emphasise that the Government's decisions on

reprocessing will take account, in accordance with the

Government's nuclear safeguards policy, of wider foreign

and non-proliferation policy considerations.

The Government believes that advance consent to

reprocessing of Australian origin nuclear material within

specific programs designed for energy use and management of

materials contained in spent nuclear fuel is a legitimate

procedure which can be achieved consistently with nonÂ­

proliferation objectives.

.. ./8

8 .

-  Customer countries have an understandable interest in*-wishing

to know, when they purchase Australian uranium, for. what

purposes they may use it. The predictability and stability

introduced by advance consent for certain specified uses,

combined with commitments to stringent safeguards and controls,

represents a positive contribution to non-proliferation objectives

and stable international trade in the nuclear field. J SsÂ»-

Mr Speaker, .

I will now summarise the position for Honourable Members.

The approach the Government has adopted fully satisfies its

stringent non-proliferation requirements. It takes into account

the needs of an energy-deficient world. It addresses itself

thoroughly to specific nuclear fuel cycle programs and the

precise circumstances under which they operate. It is a step

which will contribute to the development of an enhanced interÂ­

national consensus on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Continuing Support for Non-Proliferation Consensus

-  This last point is one to which the Government attaches

continuing importance. The Government's interest in reprocessing

and plutonium does not end with the announcement today of this

policy decision. It is a decision which has been taken in the

context of the Government's support, expressed by the Prime

Minister in 1977, for the widest possible consensus amongst both

nuclear supplier countries and nuclear importing countries on

the controls to apply to the world nuclear industry.

.. / 9 .

9. Ã¢ÂÂº  '  ,

I

The Government is currently supporting efforts on a

broad front to develop such a consensus, Australia participated

actively in the recently concluded Second Review Conference

of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The leader of the

Australian Delegation was elected as Chairman of the Committee

on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.,  The Government's strong

support for nuclear arms control measures such as SALT and a

Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is well known to Honourable

Members.

The Government is also supporting in a substantial way

the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I can

inform the House that the Government has recently approved

a three year program of assistance to the Agency's safeguards

development efforts. This will amount to $541,000 over the

period of the program.

Of particular relevance to reprocessing are two current

IAEA Expert Studies - one an international plutonium storage

scheme and another on international spent fuel management.

If effectively developed, both initiatives could make an important

contribution to the development of a wider international consensus

Australia is participating actively in both studies and in 1980/81

the Australian assistance program to the Agency will include a

$15,000 contribution to the cost of the plutonium storage study.

Another post-INFCE initiative is the recently established

,IAEA Committee on Assurance of Supply. The work of this

Committee could be said to hold one of the essential keys to

the achievement of consensus. The announcement of the

Government's policy on reprocessing, with its combination of

stringent controls and predictability, appropriately coincides

with the early meetings of this Committee and will help to

foster a constructive atmosphere for the Committee's deliberations

.../10

Ã¢ÂÂ¢ V  \

10 .

Conclusion

Mr Speaker,  .

The Government has maintained a consistent, measured

and responsible approach to the question of reprocessing. The

Government reserved its position for three years.  It has taken

into account two years of international study of the issues

involved in reprocessing. It has also taken into account INFCE's

projections which suggest that uranium supply might not be

sufficient to meet energy requirements after the year two thousand

and that reprocessing will be essential for some countries.

The decision which I have announced today has been

the result of exhaustive analysis and examination as well as

detailed consultation with negotiating partners and others.

It demonstrates that non-proliferation concerns will remain

uppermost and that the Government is maintaining this approach.

In the Government's view its decision is a constructive

contribution to the development of an international consensus

on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

