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M 146 23 A u g u s t  1990 E m b a r g o e d  m i d n i g h t

23 A u g u s t  1990

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE

Addressing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference  in Geneva today, Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Gareth Evans  said that the end of the Cold War left no ground for complacency  that nuclear holocaust was a horror we need no longer fear.

"The marked decline of tension in what was known as the central  balance has not carried over uniformly to a decline in regional  confrontations.  Events in the Middle East provide a sharp reminder  that deep enmities persist in many parts of our world, and that  naked aggression is still not a thing of the past. . . .

"And the capability of the number of nations to rapidly develop  nuclear weapons is all too unhappily evident, not only in the  Middle East, but in a number of other traditionally volatile  regions as well."

Senator Evans said that challenges to nuclear non-proliferation  remained.  A small number of states outside the NPT operated  nuclear facilities without international nuclear safeguards.  Also  some Treaty members had failed to comply with the obligation to  complete a fullscope safeguards agreement with the International  Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In this context, he drew particular attention to North Korea, which  has failed to conclude the safeguards agreement with the IAEA  required by the Treaty, while operating unsafeguarded facilities.  He urged North Korea to correct the situation.

In these circumstances, Senator Evans said, it was vital that the  success of the NPT not be taken for granted. The Treaty could only  play its role with the active support and full commitment of its  members.

"It would be a supreme irony and a tragedy if the progress in  nuclear arms control which is beginning to take place between the  superpowers were accompanied in the next few years by a

proliferation of other countries acquiring nuclear weapons",  he  said.

Senator Evans said Australia regretted that some nuclear exporting  countries had made deals over the past five years to supply major  nuclear items to non-NPT members,  without requiring them to enter  fullscope safeguards agreements with the IAEA. He urged the  Conference to accept the principle that full scope safeguards

should be made a condition of nuclear supply.

Fullscope safeguards involve a commitment by suppliers to require,  and by non-nuclear weapons states to accept, IAEA safeguards on all  existing afTd future nuclear activities, and on materials and  technology. IAEA safeguards, in turn, involve inspection and  verification arrangements to ensure effective surveillance,   containment and materials accountability.

(A copy of Senator Evans's speech to the NPT Review Conference is  attached)

* *  . *

Canberra

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION: THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE

Address by “the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and  Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, to the Fourth NPT Review  Conference, Geneva, 23 August 1990

The world has lived with nuclear weapons for 45 years.  The

unparalleled destructive power of nuclear arsenals, their  capacity to wipe out humanity, has weighed heavily upon the  world and put at risk the future of our children. The

enormity of the stake spurred our disarmament efforts, which  seemed at best able to hold the line.

Now we have witnessed historic global change over the last  year, producing an international political environment  fundamentally different from any time since the Second World  War. We stand at one of history's watersheds, and have in

front of us new opportunities for building a less mistrustful  and more secure world. The end of Cold War, and superpower  confrontation, and the understandings and agreements which

have resulted, offer new hope of lifting the oppressive threat  of global strategic nuclear war.

But there is absolutely no room for any complacent assumption

that nuclear holocaust is no longer a horror the world need  fear. The marked decline of tension in what was known as the  central balance has not carried over uniformly to a decline in  regional confrontations.  Events in the Middle East provide a  sharp reminder that deep enmities persist in many parts of  our world, that naked aggression is still not a thing of the  past. And the capacity of various nations to rapidly develop

nuclear weapons is all too unhappily apparent, not only in the  Middle East, but in a number of other traditionally volatile  regions of the world as well.

That persistence of conflict means that our joint effort at  building confidence and underpinning security is no less  urgent than it ever was - and indeed in some ways is even more  urgent.  And none of us here have any grounds for thinking

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that regional conflicts can be insulated, their effects  contained tb the immediate neighbourhood. We all feel the  repercussions of these conflicts - not least in our economies,  but certainly too in our national security. In an

interdependent world, we all have a shared interest in  ensuring that the great discoveries of the nuclear age are  employed peacefully and constructively for social and economic  development, and a shared interest in containing and  eventually eliminating the atom's destructive power.  Nuclear  disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons

proliferation must remain central objectives of the  international community.

The NPT - now 20 years old - was a product of a fearful world,  in the midst of the Cold War. It was a bold statement of

commitment to constructing a better future in which states

would put their faith in international arrangements and turn  their backs on the option of building their own nuclear  weapons.  It recognized the grave consequences for

international security of both the spread of nuclear weapons  beyond those states which already had them and the continued  growth of existing nuclear arsenals. It provided for the

first time for international on-site inspection and

verification of peaceful nuclear activities, to give states  the confidence they sought about the intentions of their  neighbours.

Despite the fact that a number of countries of proliferation  concern have not become members, the Treaty has had remarkable

success in its 20 years. It is the most widely adhered-to  arms control agreement in existence and its membership  continues to grow. It has acquired a position of irreducible  importance for the international community as the norm for  responsible international behaviour in the nuclear field. It  has become a pillar of the international and regional security

framework. It has become the foundation for most international  trade and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  Without the assurances offered by the NPT and the system of

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IAEA safeguards, distrust of nuclear intentions would feed  regional seCurity problems. Without the assurances offered by  the NPT, international nuclear trade and cooperation would  dwindle.

But as the world community starts to map out its future for  the twenty-first century, the NPT and its continued success  must not be taken for granted. The Treaty will only continue

to play the role we want it to play with the active support  and strong commitment of its members. That includes making  renewed efforts to achieve, through dialogue with non-parties,  universality of membership for the Treaty.

It would be a supreme irony and a tragedy if the progress in  nuclear arms control which is beginning to take place between

the superpowers were accompanied in the next few years by a

proliferation of other countries acquiring nuclear weapons.  The world must seize the opportunity provided by the reduction  in tensions between the superpowers to find solutions to  regional conflicts. The sources of insecurity in some regions  cannot be allowed to develop to the point where they lead to  the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Since the last Review Conference the wider security framework,  of which the NPT is a part, has grown from strength to

strength. Membership of the Treaty has grown to 141. There  has been significant progress in nuclear arms control between  the superpowers. .  The Conference on Disarmament has recently  agreed on a mandate for the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc  Committee to discuss the question of a Nuclear Test Ban. In  the South Pacific, the Treaty of Rarotonga has entered into

force.

Cooperation between NPT members in the peaceful uses of  nuclear energy has remained strong. Resources available to  the IAEA for its cooperation program have continued to grow  despite the need for financial constraints on international  organisations. Regional nuclear cooperation in the

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Asia/Pacific has developed strongly. There is now a regional  agreement wffLl-established in Latin America and we are pleased  to welcome at this Conference the recent establishment of a  regional agreement for Africa.

Since the last Review Conference in 1985 new factors have

gained prominence in discussion of the peaceful uses of  nuclear energy.  Chernobyl has given renewed emphasis to  international cooperation in nuclear safety. Two important  international conventions on early warning of nuclear

accidents and assistance in the event of an accident have been  negotiated and have entered into force. Australia has  ratified both conventions and would like to see the widest  possible adherence to them. Concerns about the quality of the  environment and the serious effects which global warming would  have on it have led to a reassessment of the place of nuclear  power.

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There have, however, also been some disturbing developments  since the last Review Conference - developments in the area of  nuclear supply and lack of progress in concluding safeguards  agreements with the IAEA

In 1985, the final document of the Review Conference called on  all nuclear suppliers in their nuclear cooperation and export

policies to work towards the objective of full scope

safeguards as the basic condition of supply. This recognised  the fact that supply to non-parties on a less stringent basis  than to Treaty members neither contributed to the objective of  the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons nor represented a

benefit in nuclear cooperation for Treaty members.

My Government warmly welcomes decisions by some major nuclear

suppliers since 1985 to adopt a policy of fullscope safeguards

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for nuclear supply. In this context, Australia warmly  welcomes the decision, announced yesterday by the

distinguished Foreign Minister of the FRG, that his Government  has decided to adopt a policy of fullscope safeguards as a  condition of nuclear supply. But we and many other countries

regret that over the last five years a small number of

suppliers have entered into agreements to supply major nuclear  items to non-parties without requiring fullscope safeguards.  It is a matter of special regret that among the suppliers  concerned are members of this Treaty.

At this turning point in history we have a great opportunity  to strengthen non-proliferation in a direct and practical way.  My government believes such a chance may not come again and  must be seized. We would therefore like to see this

Conference adopt a clear statement that henceforth supply of

nuclear items under new agreements should only take place on  the basis of fullscope safeguards. Australia in .company with  a number of other parties will be circulating a proposal to  this effect.

Another development of concern to Australia is that not all  states parties have exhibited by their actions and their words

the full support for the objective of nuclear nonÂ­

proliferation which Treaty membership requires.  It is crucial  that parties adhere to their commitments, and be seen to  adhere to those commitments, both through the verification  activities of the IAEA and through the actions and public  statements of states themselves.  Some actions and statements  of one or two parties have called into question their

intention to abide by their obligations in the future. This  is not acceptable behaviour for parties of this Treaty.

Furthermore, there has been disappointing progress in the  conclusion of safeguards agreements with the IAEA. More than

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fifty such agreements remain outstanding. There is a  particular eoncern when members of the Treaty actually operate  nuclear facilities without safeguards and do not quickly  comply with" their clear obligation to conclude a safeguards  agreement.  Australia urges a renewed effort by parties to the  Treaty and by the Director-General of the IAEA to encourage  the conclusion of these agreements.

Australia is particularly concerned that the DPRK, having

joined the Treaty almost five years ago, continues to operate  an unsafeguarded nuclear facility. We and many other members  of the IAEA Board of Governors have expressed these concerns  on many occasions. Frankly, we see the DPRK's continued

failure to conclude its safeguards agreement as most  inappropriate behaviour by a member of this Treaty, as an  unhelpful element of uncertainty in the security situation in  Asia and the Pacific, and as one of the obstacles to improved  bilateral relations with other states. We hope the North  Korean delegation will report to its Government the depth of  concern there is in this conference about the continuation of

the current situation.

The existence of unsafeguarded facilities in non-nuclear  weapon states inevitably raises questions about their use,  increases suspicions, and undermines regional and global

security. Australia calls on all states outside the Treaty to  adhere to the Treaty as soon as possible, to place all their  nuclear activities under fullscope safeguards and to work  together within the NPT for a more secure world.

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Looking ahead to 1995, I believe we have reason for optimism.  I sense a renewed recognition by members of the Treaty of the

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importance of the confidence it inspires for regional security  and for nucJtear trade and cooperation.

Between now and 1995 there is the prospect of a further  significant increase in membership. My Government looks  forward to the day - now not very far distant , we hope - when  consequent on changes beginning to take place in South Africa,  the whole of southern Africa will together be part of this  Treaty. I warmly welcome the presence at this conference of  representatives of China and France and hope that their  reexamination of their attitude to the Treaty will result in  early membership.

There is also reason for optimism in the state of relations  between the superpowers and the demonstrated commitment of  both countries to work towards further disarmament agreements.  We have much to applaud, since 1985, with the INF Agreement  eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons; with the

START Agreement,  bringing about significant cuts in strategic

arsenals; very close to finalisation; and with an emerging  commitment to START as an ongoing process, not merely an end  in itself. .

But for all the change in atmosphere,  and for all the

disarmament progress that has already been made, there are  still in existence some 50,000 nuclear warheads with a  destructive capacity of nearly 16,000 megatons - equivalent to  3.3 tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on earth, or,  to put it another way, 800,000 times the force of the bomb  which destroyed Hiroshima.

The commitment to work not only towards the cessation of the

nuclear arms race, but towards genuine nuclear disarmament is  a central obligation of the NPT. For Australia a

comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and a chemical weapons  convention remain key priorities. Both agreements would play  a major role in the disarmament process and in preventing

further proliferation. But the NPT is central to preventing

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nuclear proliferation and in the process of pursuing a CTB, we  should not jeopardize the NPT. We should also recognize that  there is no substitute for hard work in the Conference on  Disarmament if we are to produce a properly verified treaty.

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There are also challenges ahead for the NPT - challenges  which, if ignored, can undermine the credibility and

effectiveness of the Treaty to the detriment of all of us.

I have mentioned a number of them already. There is the  challenge of maintaining momentum in nuclear arms control; of  resolving regional disputes which could lead to further  proliferation; of encouraging all parties to comply in word

and deed with the obligations of the Treaty; and of finding  the necessary resources for the IAEA to carry out its

responsibilities at a time when there are significant new  developments in the nuclear fuel cycle.

I would like to say just a few more words about this last  challenge. The 1990s will see a number of developments in the  nuclear fuel cycle relevant to the IAEA's safeguards  responsibilities. A steady increase is forecast for the  construction of power reactors. There will be an increase in  commercial reprocessing, including in at least one non-nuclear  weapon state. The rate of plutonium separation and the use of  the separated material will be higher. The quantity of spent

fuel stored will increase with some stored away from reactors.

These developments will place additional pressures on the  IAEA. The safeguarding of fuel cycle processing facilities is  already absorbing a significant proportion of the Agency's

safeguards resources. Safeguards arrangements, possibly more

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demanding of resources, will need to be developed for large  scale commercial reprocessing facilities and for the  manufacture and use of mixed oxide fuels. The question of  whether and at what point safeguards on disposed waste can be  terminated will need to be resolved.

It is of central importance to the continued effectiveness of  the NPT that the IAEA has the resources, both human and  financial, to carry out its international legal

responsibilities in the application of safeguards. Maintaining  the credibility and effectiveness of IAEA safeguards needs to  be a clear objective of every member of this Treaty.

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We all have cause for optimism about the continued strength of  the NPT and the contribution it will make to international and  regional security in the 1990s. The Treaty is no less

important now , as the world maps out the future for the 21st  Century, than it was when it was founded 20 years ago.

Indeed, the momentous changes to the international order of  the last two years have given us a better chance to make the  world safer from the threat of nuclear proliferation than at

any time in the Treaty's life.

We need to recognise, however,  that there are challenges in  the path ahead and the Treaty will not remain effective if its  members take it for granted. The NPT will continue to play  the vital role we see for it only if its members provide

active support and strong commitment. Australia will play  its part and exert its efforts to ensure that the objectives  of the Treaty are achieved.  We see the NPT as a permanent

feature of the international security framework and are  committed to its continuation in force indefinitely after  1995.

