



MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  HON ALEXANDER DOWNER, MP

TRANSCRIPTION: (Check against delivery)

DATE:  8 November 2004, Sydney

TOPICS:   Press conference Asia Pacific Regional Conference on Nuclear Safeguards  and Security - Mr Downer and IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei

ALEXANDER DOWNER - FEDERAL MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS:  Ladies  and  gentlemen,  I’d  like  to  welcome  Dr  Mohamed  El  Baradei,  who’s  the  Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, here to Sydney today and say that we’re  delighted to have him participate in our Asia-Pacific conference on nuclear security.

This is a conference that we have organised, which brings together around 30 countries from  the  Asia-Pacific  region  where  we  can  focus  on  the  risks  of  nuclear  proliferation  and,  very   importantly, the risks of nuclear proliferation into the hands of terrorists.

This country … we’ve made this point quite often that if terrorists were to get hold of nuclear  weapons  or  nuclear  material,  as  we  know  some  terrorists  have  endeavoured  to  do  so  -  in   particular Al Qaeda has endeavoured to do so - the consequences could be devastating.

What  we  want  to  see  is  the  Asia-Pacific  region  at  the  very  least  and  more  importantly  the   whole  of  the  international  community,  apply  appropriately  high  standards  of  protection  of   nuclear  material,  to  continue  to  make  a  very  strong  regional  contribution  to  the  non-proliferation regime and to ensure that as a region we make a solid contribution to the non-proliferation treaty review conference which will be taking place in May next year.

Particularly pleased to have Mohamed El Baradei here as the guest speaker - as the keynote  speaker - at this regional meeting.  As I said, he’s the Director-General of the International  Atomic  Energy  Agency.   It’s  the  organisation  charged  with  the  simply  immense  task  of   enforcing the international norms on nuclear energy use and non-proliferation.  And he is, of  course, dealing with issues that are of great interest and concern to us; the issue of Iran that  we have been ourselves been contributing to trying to resolve, particularly earlier this year, at  the time of the visit by the Secretary-General of the Iranian National Security Committee, Mr  Rowhani.  And of course we wrestle in this part of the world too with the difficult issue of  North Korea.

So, I’ll ask Dr El Baradei if he’d like to say a few words, and then we’ll be, both of us, happy  to answer any questions.



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MOHAMED  EL  BARADEI  -  IAEA:   Can  I  first  say  that  how  much  I  appreciate  the   invitation to come to the conference here and to have an opportunity to meet with Mr Downer  who’s  a  good  friend  and  colleague.   We’ve  had  a  good  meeting  on  discussing  many  of  the   issues of current concern.

We have also committed ourselves to do all we can to work on this new phenomenon called  nuclear  terrorism  which  we’re  (indistinct)  up  to  9/11  when  we  realised  that  terrorists  have   become so sophisticated (indistinct) … and that they have also shown interest in nuclear and  radioactive  materials.   So  we  are  dealing  with  a  problem  that  is  current  and  that’s  real  and   that’s highly dangerous.

I’ve  always  said  that  we’re  having  a  race  against  time  because  this  is  something  which  we   were  not  prepared  for.   Many  of  the  radioactive  sources,  many  of  the  nuclear  facilities,  we   looked at it in the past from a (indistinct).  But we never thought that people would be ready,  to use it for malevolent activities and sacrifice their life in the process.

We,  the  IAEA,  have  a  large  program  to  deal  with  radioactive  sources,  nuclear  materials,  to   protect  them,  detect  them,  in  any  case  of  illicit  trafficking  of  this  material  or  theft.   And  of   course we do our work in cooperation with national governments and regional governments.   And I’m very happy that Australia took the initiative to organise the conference here.  I think  the Asia-Pacific is an area which has a lot of nuclear activity.  It has a lot of countries that rely

heavily on nuclear and radioactive sources for their economic and social development.  And  we need to do all we can to strike a balance while we make these technologies available to  countries and people, we have also to make sure that these activities will not be misused under  any form or shape.

So  I  welcome  the  opportunity  to  be  here  today.   I  welcome  the  initiative  that  Australia  has   taken, and I would be happy with Alexander Downer to answer any of your questions.

REPORTER: (Inaudible question)

EL BARADEI: Well, I have been very supportive of the process of dialogue between Europe  and  Iran.   I  would  hope  that  this  would  lead  to  the  desired  outcome  which  is  for  Iran  to   suspend  all  its  enrichment  and  the  processing-related  activities  and  open  the  way  for   normalisation  of  Iran’s  relation  with  international  community,  starting  with  Europe  which   would  deal  with  providing  Iran  with  (indistinct)  technology,  conventional   technology, ….security assurance.  I’ve always believed that a policy of dialogue is the best  way to reach an enduring solution.

I’m  told  that  it’s  still  a  very  tentative  agreement,  it  has  not  yet  been  confirmed.   I’ve  been   talking to both parties and I would hope, however, in the next few days when they are going  to re-group that they will put a final seal of approval on that agreement.  I think it would be a  step in the right direction.

DOWNER:  Just  from  Australia’s  point  of  view  we  want  to,  for  the  record,  say  that  we’ve   been giving strong support to the EU3 and we’re pleased with what we’ve heard over the last  few days, but we’re still short of this matter being concluded.  But I can only say I’m a little  more optimistic about their efforts now than I was a couple of weeks ago.

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REPORTER:  Mr  El  Baradei,  how  (indistinct)  security  would  Iran  be  if  they  do  continue   (indistinct) program?

EL BARADEI: Well, I think, as I have been saying, that the issue of each country developing  an  independent  fuel  cycle  is  a  matter  that  we  need  to  revisit.   Under  the  Non-Proliferation   Treaty, each country has the right to have a complete fuel cycle which means the they have  the capability to develop highly enriched uranium or plutonium.

I think we have come to realise that that is not the kind of security margin we would like to  live  under  because  a  country  that  has  highly  enriched  uranium  or  plutonium  is  really   (indistinct), if you like, nuclear weapons. They can develop a weapon, should they decide for  security  reasons  to  do  that,  in  a  matter  of  months  or  maybe  a  year.   So  it  is  not  really   (indistinct)  specific  issue.  I  think  it’s  a  question  of  the  international  community  coming  to   realise that we need a better control of that sense of aspect of  the fuel cycle.  And what the  international community is saying, particularly in the case of Iran, because of the undeclared  nature of the Iranian program in the past, Iran needs to do its utmost to create confidence and  one of the confidence-building measures that Iran can take is to suspend enrichment-related  and reprocessing activities, in return, you know, for … as I said, a  beginning of a dialogue  that hopefully will assure Iran that sanctions will be lifted, that technology will be provided to  Iraq.  And so, it’s, in a way, how we can provide a country with all the economic and social  development  needs  while  not  necessarily  move  into  a  situation  when  there  is  a  concern,  a   reasonable international concern about a particular program, a nuclear program.

I’m addressing that.  As I said, it’s not just Iran-specific. I’ve been putting on the table ideas  that  we  need  to  have  better  control,  possible  multi-nationalising  that  part  of  the  fuel  cycle,   because we do not want to see ourselves in the next 10, 20 years with 40, 50 countries sitting  on  plutonium  or  highly  enriched  uranium.   I  think  the  security  margin  that  provides  is  too   close for comfort.

REPORTER: (Indistinct) between Iran and international terrorism (indistinct) think that the  IAEA has simply chosen Iran to make an example of them?

EL BARADEI:  I don’t think so. I can’t speak for all Member States.  I think our Member  States  are  not  really  saying  this  is  because,  you  know,  Iran  is  linked  to  terrorism  or  Iran  is   pursuing a certain policy.  I think the international community is saying that we have enough  (indistinct) capacity in the world, for example, that we are not yet sure about the nature of the  Iran  program,  because  we’re  still  going  through  (indistinct)  verification.   And  what   (indistinct)  is  asking  Iran,  at  least  for  now,  is  to  suspend  all  these  activities  as  confidence   building  measures  and  I  have  been  subscribing  to  that.   I’ve  been  telling  my  Iranian   colleagues  that  …  do  your  utmost  to  create  confidence,  adopt  a  policy  of  full  transparency,   because that’s a way you can then initiate across the (indistinct) which is very much needed  between Iran and the rest of the world.

DOWNER:  I mean we … just as a member of the board of governance, our perspective on  this is that we … I mean, it’s important to understand this debate.  We accept that originally,  under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, countries could participate in the full nuclear fuel cycle.   We  also  know  that  in  a  post  9/11  environment,  to  see  countries  enriching  uranium,  and  the

Inquiries:  (02) 6277 7500



number  of  countries  enriching  uranium  is  expanding  all  the  time,  is  a  matter  of  enormous   concern.   And  I’ve  made  it  clear  to  the  Iranians  myself  that,  no  matter  what  the  technical   arguments are in relation to the NPT, the truth is, that if they proceed with enrichment, that is  going to send a very, very negative message to the international community.

There’s  no  doubt  that  the  level  of  concern  in  the  international  community  though  about   nuclear  proliferation  has  been  substantially  heightened  because  of  the  implications  of  the   spread of terrorism.  There is no question of that.  That just cannot be repudiated.

EL BARADEI:  I should add to what Mr Downer has said.  There are two new developments  that have forced the international community to look at the whole question of proliferation in  different  lights.   One  is  the  illicit  network  of  supply  (indistinct)  and  the  awareness  that   technology  has  spread,  coupled  with  the  new  dangerous  phenomena  of  extremism  and   terrorism.  If you put these together, you come quickly to the conclusion that we need to do  things differently to protect ourselves.

REPORTER:  Mr El Baradei, how concerned (indistinct) Australia and (indistinct) as to how  concerned will you be of the spread of (indistinct) terrorism (indistinct)?

EL BARADEI:  Well, I think it’s a concern everywhere, not just in the Asia-Pacific.  I mean,  as I said, in the Asia-Pacific you have a lot of nuclear material… you have a lot of radioactive  sources.  This is a danger that can occur anywhere.  Again, I keep saying, you know, we still

have  a  lot  of  work  to  do.   We  are  racing  against  time.   We  have  to  cross  our  fingers  that   nothing will happen.

But what we are trying to do in this type of conference here is to raise awareness, you know,  that we need to take preventative measures before a nuclear or radiological emergency occurs.   We do not need to wait to see a kind of situation like 9/11 or Chernobyl for the international  community to act.

We  need  to  have  the  foresight  and  to  take  preventative  action.   But  the  danger  exists   everywhere.  The risk is real, as I said.  It’s current … it’s everywhere.   It’s  not  just  in  the   Asia-Pacific.

REPORTER: (Inaudible question)

EL BARADEI: Well, I think a lot of measures.  I think the conference here is discussing a lot  of  measures  for  better  physical  protection,  to  make  people  aware  of  the  danger  of  terrorists   getting  their  hands  on  nuclear  material,  radioactive  sources,  to  have  a  better  system  of   detection,  to  have  a  better  system  of  response  in  case  of  emergencies.   There’s  a  lot  of   measures.

We  have  been  working  the  last  few  years  both  as  an  organisation  and  with  national   governments, with regional institutions.  And a lot has been done but lots more still needs to  be done.

DOWNER: One of the key issues is the actual storage and management of nuclear materials  to  make  sure  …  not  to  say  that  no  country  should  ever  use  nuclear  materials  for  medical

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purposes  or  for  the  production  of  energy,  but  to  say  that  where  nuclear  material  is  used,  it   should be properly protected and effectively protected.  And there is an endeavour to try to get  international  standards  accepted  and  incorporated  around  the  Asia-Pacific  region  and,   obviously, well beyond that, around the world.

EL BARADEI:  We’re focusing on two things.  One is the theft of nuclear material and, of  course, two is the protection of nuclear facilities, if I give you the two major objectives we are  trying to achieve.

REPORTER: (Indistinct), Iran, how would you describe your (indistinct) Iran (indistinct)?

EL BARADEI: My report is not going to be different whether there is an agreement or not,  except  it  would  …  if  I  have  been  asked  to  verify  that  suspension,  so  if  there  were  to  be  a   suspension by Iran of its (indistinct) and (indistinct) activity obviously the report will be more  positive because then I’d be able to say to the IAEA board that Iran has responded positively  to its request for suspension.

But with regard to the other part, which is verifying that compliance, this is a legal obligation  that will continue to be the same whether they have suspended their activities as a confidence  building measure or not.

So the report will deal with the issues.  One is legal compliance with IAEA obligations; the  second is the confidence-building measure.  The first part is not going to change; the second  part obviously will change depending on Iran’s response.  And I hope that this report of an  initial agreement will be confirmed the next couple of …

DOWNER:  I  think,  an  agreement  between  Iran  and  the  EU3  is  going  to  have  a  very  big   impact on the sorts of approaches the board of governors themselves will take.  That’s going  to be the key, for sure.

EL  BARADEI:  I  think  the  board  …  many  board  members  have  made  it  clear  that  their   approach  will  be  different  if  Iran  were  to  show  the  kind  of  confidence-building  measures   requested  by  the  Member  States,  and  that  includes  suspending  any  enrichment-related  or   reprocessing activities.

I’m  very  hopeful  that  this  will  be  the  case.   I  think  both  of  us  are  somewhat  cautiously   optimistic that we are moving into that direction.

REPORTER: Dr El Baradei, is there any way of (indistinct)?

EL BARADEI:  It’s  very  difficult  to  speculate.   I  mean, I hate to speculate on any of these  issues but, as I said, I hope we will continue to do as much as we can to make that as difficult  as possible.

DOWNER:  Without  singling  out  countries,  I  would  say  that  it  comes  back  to  something  I   said  earlier.   I  don’t  think  that  the  level  of  security  surrounding  nuclear  facilities  is   everywhere  in  the  region  of  good  as  it  could  be.   And  I  think  the  Director-General  would

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agree with that.  But we need to invest resources, substantial resources, in helping countries  around the region improve significantly the security of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities.

Now,  I  know  the  Americans  are  investing  fairly  heavily  in  providing  that  sort  of  assistance   but the international community has to focus on it too.

This is in the context not of proliferation per se but in the context of, for example, a terrorist  group being able to get some sort of nuclear material.  Realistically, I think there’s a bit of a  consensus about this.  The most likely risk is that they could make some kind of a radiological  bomb  using  nuclear  material  and  explosives  and  spread  radiation  that  way;  cause  panic,   concern,  not  necessarily  kill  many  people  in  the  one-off  explosion  but  certainly  cause   widespread concern.

That is a little more likely than them either building a nuclear weapon or stealing a nuclear  weapon.  I mean, after all, in our  immediate region the only country that is a nuclear weapon  state is China.  We could take India, I suppose, but in East Asia, only China.

But the issue of them getting hold of some nuclear material and being able to use that as part  of terrorist activities is a real concern and therefore that nuclear material needs to be secured  to a much better extent than is currently the case.

REPORTER: (Indistinct) South East Asia (indistinct).

DOWNER:  Well  China  of  course  is  a  nuclear  weapon  state  but  there  are  countries  in  the   region  that  have  nuclear  power  use  for  peaceful  purposes,  for  power  generation.   Some   countries just have nuclear research reactors and in some cases, of course, nuclear medicine is  used as well.

REPORTER: [Inaudible question]

DOWNER:  Well,  I  wasn’t  going  to  nominate  any  particular  countries;  just  talk  in  general   about what we need to do as a region.

REPORTER: (Inaudible question)

DOWNER: Well … you’ll have to ask the Science Minister who’s the minister responsible,  but I think I should tell you that to the best of my knowledge, security is very good at Lucas  Heights  and  in  relation  to  other  nuclear  materials that exist in Australia.  But as you know,  we’ve had a very full debate in this country about the whole idea of having a nuclear waste  dump,  low-level  nuclear  waste  dump  and  a  medium-level  nuclear  waste  dump  and  that  is  a   work in progress.  As a South Australian member of the Federal Parliament just coming out of  an election, the waste dump’s not going to be in South Australia.

REPORTER: (Inaudible question)

DOWNER: Well, Australia is … as I think you all know, Australia is an eternally activist and  ultimately  optimistic  country  that  believes  that  if  we  can  make  an  active  and  responsible   contribution  to  enhancing  the  security  of  the  region  that  can  make  a  real  difference.   And  I

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think  this  conference  is  a  great  opportunity  for  us  as  Australia  to  bring  together  other   countries in the region and help them focus their minds on the issues at hand.

I made this point to the conference earlier today, that if there were to be a terrorist incident  involving nuclear material, there would be a sense of global pandemonium.  Yet how much  focus is there now, when that hasn’t happened, on the risks involved.  And you understand my  point:  we  as  a  region  have  to  make  sure  that  we  do  everything  that  is  humanly  possible  to   make sure that the type of incidents I describe never occurs.

REPORTER: Dr El Baradei, given the explosives report that was released in the last week of  the  US  election  campaign,  how  would  you  describe  your  relationship  with  the  Bush   Administration?

EL  BARADEI:  I  think  we  have  a  good  working  relationship.   I  think  that  report,  I  mean,   if  …  that  report  had  nothing  to  do,  obviously,  with  the  American  election.   I  think  it’s   disgraceful that some people tried to make some political hype out of the timing of the report.   I mean, we … as I’ve said a number of times in … last week in New York, there is a world  out  there  that  continues  to  function  whether  you  have  an  American  election  or  not.   And  I   have  an  obligation  to  report  to  the  UN  Security  Council,  which  I  did.   And  in  fact  I  had  a   discussion  on  the  issue  with  Secretary  Powell  after  we  reported  the  matter,  where  we  both   agreed that the important thing is to try to locate these explosives.

These  are  very  powerful  explosives.   I  am  very  concerned,  not  about  who  knew  what  and   what  happened,  you  know,  but  how  to  …is  there  a  possibility  to  make  sure  that  these   explosives will be redeemed.  And I did, as you probably know, the first thing when I got that  letter is go to the American government before I wrote to the Security Council to give them an  opportunity to locate this material.

It’s still a mystery to me what happened to this material, and would be very … I am still very  concerned about it, obviously, because it’s powerful explosives, and I hope, you know, every  effort will be made to … at least to know the whereabouts of this material.

REPORTER: Did Secretary Powell express any concerns about the timing of the release of  the report?

EL BARADEI: No, he did not.  I think he obviously was aware that this was becoming an  election issue, but I think he was fully aware of the timing and developments surrounding that  report.

REPORTER:(Inaudiblequestion)

DOWNER: We have no plans at the moment to change the nature of our troop deployments  in  Iraq.   As  I  said  yesterday,   there  are  small  numbers  of  people  in  a  number  of  different   functions,  but  the  two  key  functions  of  our  troops  are  to  provide  security  for  our  diplomats   and officials.  That’s the so-called SECDET, the security detachment, and secondly we have a  considerable number of Australian troops providing training for the new Iraqi army.  They’ve  provided some support for the Navy as well.

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Inquiries:  (02) 6277 7500

That  is  of  course  very  much  a  work  in  progress.   It  will  take  some  time  to  build  up  the   security  forces  in  Iraq  to  a  level  where  the  Iraqis  themselves  can  take  …  or  at  least   predominantly take responsibility for their own security.  So, we offer no timeline on when

that task will be complete, to put that into some perspective.

Prime  Minister  Allawi  says  there  are  around  one  hundred  thousand  members  of  the  Iraqi   security forces at the moment, that includes police.  But this time next year or the end of next  year there’ll be - he hopes - around two hundred thousand.  We’ll have to wait and see.

ENDS

