The Hon. Alexander Downer, MP  MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AUSTRALIA



Speech

09 July2003

Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Greatest Threat  to International Security



A speech at the Proliferation Security Initiative, Brisbane

(check against delivery)

Introduction

Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Brisbane.

It is a pleasure and an honour to host the second meeting of the Proliferation Security  Initiative (PSI), which was launched by President Bush in Poland on 31 May. Your  presence here tonight underlines the seriousness with which our respective nations  view the threat of WMD proliferation.

Last month, at the first PSI meeting, our Governments made a bold commitment to  work together to strengthen efforts to interdict and disrupt the proliferation of WMD  materials. I am confident that at this second meeting we will begin to turn our shared  commitment toward developing new and practical ideas to counter this most serious  threat.

Tonight, I want to give you an Australian perspective on weapons of mass  destruction, the states that are most responsible for their spread, and the efforts of  non-state actors - terrorists - to acquire them. I also want to share with you some  thoughts about what is being done - and what can further be done - to counter WMD  proliferation and the role of the Proliferation Security Initiative.

WMD proliferation

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the greatest security  challenges facing the international community. These weapons and ballistic missiles  are increasingly sought after by maverick states - those that have little regard for  norms of international behaviour, let alone the consensus against the spread of such  weapons established since World War II.

The ambitions of these states threaten international security. Their actions are  unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of nations. Of even greater concern is the

very real possibility that weapons of mass destruction could fall into the hands of  terrorist groups.

There can be no doubt about the desire of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda to wreak  mass destruction. Osama bin Laden has declared openly that he would use such  weapons if he had them. And we now know from laboratories and documents seized  in Afghanistan that he was considering developing chemical and biological weapons.  Reports also suggest that groups linked to al-Qaeda may have been looking to  construct a radiological dispersal device - a so called "dirty bomb".

So how hard is it for these groups to get their hands on WMD materials and  knowledge? The reality is that WMD-related materials, technologies and expertise are  more accessible today than ever. The free movement of goods, which we have  encouraged as a spur to economic growth, provides unwelcome opportunities for  proliferators to seek WMD materials.

We know, for instance, that they use transhipment to disguise end-users or suppliers.  The problem extends beyond materials and technology. Proliferators also seek to  advance their WMD programs in intangible ways, including through advanced studies  abroad in fields applicable to weapons development purposes. We have known of

these problems for years, and have put in place multilateral systems to constrain the  threat of wholesale WMD proliferation. Fortunately, the overwhelming majority of  nations behave responsibly - they have joined and adhered to the various multilateral  regimes.

But the handful of maverick states seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction  and the missiles needed to deliver them are a real and growing menace. There are also  deeply troubling indications of cooperation between states unwilling or unable to  implement effective export controls or domestic laws against WMD development.  Such states defy the non-proliferation disciplines most countries accept. Their  behaviour undermines international security and causes deep concern to the broader  international community. I don't have to tell anybody here that there is no room for  complacency. The consequences of a single WMD event such as a nuclear explosion  in a city would be the ultimate nightmare.

Countering the WMD threat

Clearly, we should be under no illusions about the threats posed by the proliferation  of WMD. Failure to act decisively to curtail the spread of weapons of mass  destruction and missiles could cost the international community dearly. We need to  ensure that we make full use of the existing tools at our disposal. The international

community must work together to reinforce adherence to non-proliferation norms -  and take firm action to counter proliferation whenever and wherever it occurs.

We need to send an unambiguous message to proliferators: acquiring and pursuing  weapons of mass destruction violates basic standards of responsible international  behaviour and will not be tolerated. We have a shared responsibility to hold cheats to  account.

Regrettably, the United Nations Security Council's record on defending non-proliferation standards is patchy at best.   The Security Council's inability over many years to deal resolutely with the threat  posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was a great disappointment to the many  nations who look to the Security Council to help maintain international peace and  security. The Security Council must step up to the mark. The Council should leave no  doubt that its actions will live up to the statement by its President on 31 January 1992  that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to  international peace and security.

The mainstay for stopping the spread of WMD remains the system of treaties, export  control regimes and other instruments built up over several decades. Aside from  significant security benefits, they provide legitimacy for the international  community's non-proliferation efforts. Treaty regimes must have the strongest  possible kit of legal and practical tools for verifying compliance. And parties to those  multilateral treaties must be resolute in dealing with cases of non-compliance.  Stronger disincentives are needed for those tempted to cheat on their treaty  obligations and clearer incentives for those who comply in a genuinely transparent  manner.We must isolate those cheats and expose them to the criticism of the  international community. All states must also be vigilant in ensuring they do not  supply or assist in the delivery of items that could advance proliferators' WMD and  missile programs - suppliers of sensitive items have a particular responsibility.

In the nuclear field, Australia considers that application of the International Atomic  Energy Agency's strengthened safeguards system - the Additional Protocol - in  recipient states should quickly come to be required by suppliers as an essential pre-requisite for nuclear supply. Governments must ensure that domestic regulatory  frameworks are effective. Customs, law enforcement and intelligence are particularly  important in detecting and responding to proliferators. For instance, we need adequate  screening arrangements to limit the risk of contributing to WMD and missile  proliferation through business and education exchanges.

The Proliferation Security Initiative

Making better use of these tools will help. But the fact is that some states continue to  cheat on their obligations or resist joining international regimes.History has shown  that there are few barriers - other than technical and financial - to those states  determined to develop weapons of mass destruction.There has to be room in our non-

proliferation agenda for a greater variety of measures and fresh thinking. For this  reason, Australia, while continuing to support and engage in non-proliferation forums,  has wholeheartedly joined the Proliferation Security Initiative as an important  opportunity to advance the non-proliferation agenda. We are willing to work quickly  toward developing new and practical ways to impede the trafficking of WMD-related  items and their delivery systems.

We will need to consider how best we can use existing domestic and international  laws to confront this threat. But we should also look at how domestic and  international laws could be strengthened to support our efforts to safeguard  international security. In a time of high demand and limited resources, a results-

oriented approach is what is needed to address this urgent security challenge. We are  a small core group of countries for now, but this will work in our favour.

It will give us the confidence to exchange sensitive information, and intervene quickly  and effectively to deal with the continuing WMD threat. As a focused group, we will  be better positioned to build a broad and effective partnership with other countries  prepared to play a part in impeding traffic in WMD and missiles. Australia is  confident that the many countries committed to non-proliferation will want to lend  their support to this important initiative.

Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen

The spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and their possible use by  maverick states or by international terrorist groups threatens the security of all states.  We should deal effectively and decisively with this threat. We should be open to new

methods and new thinking. The non- proliferation agenda is too important to be bound  by rigid dogma. Over the next decade, the battle to prevent the spread of WMD will  be about sharing information and disrupting and impeding supplies, as well as  applying the international non-proliferation framework. Together, during this  meeting, we must chart a path to make the trafficking of the world's most dangerous  weapons as near to impossible as we can. We must send a clear message to  proliferators that they can no longer compromise global security.

Thank you.





