--- name: incident-response description: Security incident detection, analysis, containment, eradication, recovery, and lessons learned per NIST SP 800-61r2 and ISO 27035 license: Apache-2.0 --- # Incident Response Skill ## Purpose This skill establishes comprehensive procedures for detecting, analyzing, containing, eradicating, and recovering from security incidents affecting the CIA platform. It implements systematic incident management aligned with NIST SP 800-61r2, ISO 27035, and Hack23 ISMS Incident Response Plan with measurable response times and transparent communication. ## When to Use This Skill Apply this skill when: - ✅ Detecting security alerts or suspicious activity - ✅ Responding to security breaches or data exposure - ✅ Managing vulnerability exploitation incidents - ✅ Coordinating response to service disruptions - ✅ Handling supply chain security incidents - ✅ Meeting GDPR 72-hour breach notification requirements - ✅ Conducting post-incident analysis and lessons learned - ✅ Updating incident response playbooks Do NOT use for: - ❌ Routine maintenance or planned downtime - ❌ Non-security operational issues - ❌ Performance degradation without security implications ## Decision Tree ```mermaid %%{ init: { 'theme': 'base', 'themeVariables': { 'primaryColor': '#D32F2F', 'primaryTextColor': '#fff', 'lineColor': '#D32F2F', 'secondaryColor': '#FF9800', 'tertiaryColor': '#4CAF50' } } }%% flowchart TD DETECT["🔍 Incident Detected"] --> VALIDATE{"✅ Confirmed
Security Incident?"} VALIDATE -->|YES| CLASSIFY{"🏷️ Classify Severity"} VALIDATE -->|NO| FALSE["📋 False Positive
Document & Close"] CLASSIFY -->|🔴 Critical
€10K+ daily loss| S1["🔴 S1: Critical Response
RTO: 30 min
All Stakeholders"] CLASSIFY -->|🟠 High
€5-10K daily loss| S2["🟠 S2: High Response
RTO: 1 hour
Key Stakeholders"] CLASSIFY -->|🟡 Medium
€1-5K daily loss| S3["🟡 S3: Medium Response
RTO: 4 hours
Internal Only"] CLASSIFY -->|🟢 Low
<€1K daily loss| S4["🟢 S4: Low Response
RTO: 24 hours
Documentation"] S1 --> ACTIVATE["🚨 Activate Response Team
CEO + Specialists"] S2 --> ACTIVATE S3 --> ACTIVATE S4 --> ACTIVATE ACTIVATE --> CONTAIN["🛡️ Containment
Isolate & Preserve"] CONTAIN --> INVESTIGATE["🔬 Investigation
Root Cause Analysis"] INVESTIGATE --> REMEDIATE["🔧 Remediation
Fix & Restore"] REMEDIATE --> VALIDATE_FIX{"✅ Validated?"} VALIDATE_FIX -->|NO| REMEDIATE VALIDATE_FIX -->|YES| NOTIFY{"📢 External
Notification
Required?"} NOTIFY -->|YES - GDPR| GDPR["📢 GDPR Notification
72-hour deadline"] NOTIFY -->|YES - NIS2| NIS2["📢 NIS2 Notification
24-hour initial"] NOTIFY -->|YES - Customers| CUSTOMER["📢 Customer Notice
Per SLA"] NOTIFY -->|NO| DOCUMENT GDPR --> DOCUMENT["📝 Incident Report"] NIS2 --> DOCUMENT CUSTOMER --> DOCUMENT DOCUMENT --> LESSONS["📈 Lessons Learned
Process Improvement"] LESSONS --> CLOSE["✅ Close Incident
Archive Evidence"] CLOSE --> MONITOR["🔄 Continuous Monitoring"] style DETECT fill:#2196F3,color:#fff style S1 fill:#D32F2F,color:#fff style S2 fill:#FF9800,color:#fff style S3 fill:#FFC107,color:#000 style S4 fill:#4CAF50,color:#fff style CONTAIN fill:#7B1FA2,color:#fff style INVESTIGATE fill:#1565C0,color:#fff style REMEDIATE fill:#FF9800,color:#fff style CLOSE fill:#4CAF50,color:#fff ``` ## Incident Severity Classification ### Severity Matrix | **Severity** | **Financial Impact** | **Operational Impact** | **RTO** | **Escalation** | |--------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------|----------------| | **🔴 S1: Critical** | €10K+ daily loss | Complete outage | **30 minutes** | CEO + External Consultant | | **🟠 S2: High** | €5-10K daily loss | Major degradation | **1 hour** | CEO + Insurance Provider | | **🟡 S3: Medium** | €1-5K daily loss | Partial impact | **4 hours** | CEO Investigation | | **🟢 S4: Low** | <€1K daily loss | Minor inconvenience | **24 hours** | CEO Scheduled Review | ### Incident Classification Examples **🔴 S1: Critical Incidents** - Ransomware infection affecting production systems - Active data breach with PII exposure - Complete service outage affecting all users - Successful credential theft with admin access - Criminal liability (GDPR Article 83 violations) **🟠 S2: High Incidents** - Exploitation of critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.0+) - Partial data exposure (limited user data) - Major service degradation (>50% users affected) - Unauthorized access to sensitive systems - Regulatory investigation triggered **🟡 S3: Medium Incidents** - Attempted exploitation (blocked by controls) - Security misconfigurations discovered - Malware detected and quarantined - Moderate service impact (<50% users) - Minor compliance violations **🟢 S4: Low Incidents** - Failed login attempts (below threshold) - Security scan false positives - Minor policy violations - Suspicious activity with no impact - Documentation issues ## Incident Response Lifecycle ### Phase 1: Preparation **Pre-Incident Readiness:** ```yaml Incident_Response_Team: - CEO: James Pether Sörling (Incident Commander) - Security Lead: Primary responder - Development Lead: Technical remediation - External Consultant: On-call security expert - Legal Counsel: GDPR/regulatory compliance - Insurance Provider: Cyber insurance liaison Tools_and_Resources: - AWS Detective: Log analysis and investigation - AWS Security Hub: Centralized security findings - AWS GuardDuty: Threat detection - GitHub Security: Repository security monitoring - CloudWatch Logs Insights: Query and analysis - Incident Response Playbooks: Scenario-specific procedures Communication_Channels: - Primary: CEO email (james.sorling@hack23.com) - Secondary: GitHub Issues (private security issues) - Emergency: AWS Support (Enterprise plan) - External: External Stakeholder Registry contacts - Documentation: ISMS-PUBLIC repository updates Evidence_Preservation: - AWS CloudTrail: 90-day retention - Application Logs: CloudWatch 30-day retention - Database Audit Logs: 90-day retention - Network Flow Logs: VPC Flow Logs 7-day retention - Backup Snapshots: Automated daily backups ``` **Preparation Checklist:** - [ ] **Incident Response Plan:** Reviewed and updated quarterly - [ ] **Contact List:** Current and tested (External Stakeholder Registry) - [ ] **Playbooks:** Scenario-specific procedures documented - [ ] **Tools:** AWS security services enabled and monitored - [ ] **Training:** Annual tabletop exercises conducted - [ ] **Backups:** Verified and tested monthly - [ ] **Insurance:** Cyber insurance policy active and adequate - [ ] **Legal:** Retainer with legal counsel for GDPR compliance ### Phase 2: Detection and Analysis **Detection Sources:** ```mermaid flowchart LR subgraph "🔍 Automated Detection" GUARD[AWS GuardDuty
Threat Detection] SECHUB[AWS Security Hub
Findings Aggregation] CODEQL[CodeQL
Code Scanning] DEPEND[Dependabot
Vulnerability Alerts] end subgraph "👁️ Manual Detection" USER[User Report
Security Concern] AUDIT[Security Audit
Findings] RESEARCH[Security Researcher
Disclosure] MONITOR[System Monitoring
Anomalies] end subgraph "🎯 Incident Triage" VALIDATE[Validate Incident] CLASSIFY[Classify Severity] ASSIGN[Assign Response Team] end GUARD --> VALIDATE SECHUB --> VALIDATE CODEQL --> VALIDATE DEPEND --> VALIDATE USER --> VALIDATE AUDIT --> VALIDATE RESEARCH --> VALIDATE MONITOR --> VALIDATE VALIDATE --> CLASSIFY CLASSIFY --> ASSIGN style VALIDATE fill:#FF9800,color:#fff style CLASSIFY fill:#D32F2F,color:#fff style ASSIGN fill:#1565C0,color:#fff ``` **Initial Assessment Checklist:** - [ ] **Incident Confirmed:** Validate security incident vs. false positive - [ ] **Scope Identified:** Affected systems, data, and users documented - [ ] **Timeline Established:** Initial detection and estimated start time - [ ] **Severity Classified:** Using severity matrix (S1-S4) - [ ] **Evidence Preserved:** Logs, snapshots, and artifacts collected - [ ] **Team Notified:** Response team activated per severity level - [ ] **Stakeholders Informed:** CEO notified within RTO - [ ] **Communication Plan:** Notification requirements assessed **Analysis Activities:** ```bash # 1. Collect AWS CloudTrail logs aws cloudtrail lookup-events \ --lookup-attributes AttributeKey=EventName,AttributeValue=AssumeRole \ --start-time 2024-01-15T00:00:00Z \ --end-time 2024-01-16T00:00:00Z \ --max-results 100 \ > incident-cloudtrail-logs.json # 2. Query CloudWatch Logs aws logs filter-log-events \ --log-group-name /aws/lambda/cia-production \ --start-time $(date -d '24 hours ago' +%s)000 \ --filter-pattern "ERROR" \ > incident-application-logs.txt # 3. Check AWS GuardDuty findings aws guardduty list-findings \ --detector-id YOUR_DETECTOR_ID \ --finding-criteria '{"Criterion":{"severity":{"Gte":7}}}' \ --sort-criteria '{"AttributeName":"updatedAt","OrderBy":"DESC"}' \ > incident-guardduty-findings.json # 4. Review AWS Security Hub findings aws securityhub get-findings \ --filters '{"SeverityLabel":[{"Value":"CRITICAL","Comparison":"EQUALS"}]}' \ --max-results 100 \ > incident-securityhub-findings.json # 5. Analyze access patterns aws cloudtrail lookup-events \ --lookup-attributes AttributeKey=Username,AttributeValue=SUSPECTED_USER \ --start-time 2024-01-15T00:00:00Z \ > incident-user-activity.json # 6. Create evidence package tar -czf incident-evidence-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).tar.gz \ incident-*.json incident-*.txt ``` ### Phase 3: Containment **Short-Term Containment:** ```yaml Immediate_Actions: Network_Isolation: - Action: Isolate affected systems from network - Method: AWS Security Group rule changes - Command: | aws ec2 revoke-security-group-ingress \ --group-id sg-AFFECTED \ --protocol all \ --cidr 0.0.0.0/0 Access_Revocation: - Action: Disable compromised user accounts - Method: AWS IAM policy detachment - Command: | aws iam delete-login-profile \ --user-name COMPROMISED_USER aws iam list-access-keys \ --user-name COMPROMISED_USER | \ jq -r '.AccessKeyMetadata[].AccessKeyId' | \ xargs -I {} aws iam delete-access-key \ --user-name COMPROMISED_USER \ --access-key-id {} Session_Termination: - Action: Invalidate active sessions - Method: AWS IAM role trust policy update - Command: | aws iam update-assume-role-policy \ --role-name AFFECTED_ROLE \ --policy-document file://deny-all-policy.json Snapshot_Creation: - Action: Preserve current state for forensics - Method: EBS snapshot, RDS snapshot, S3 versioning - Command: | aws ec2 create-snapshot \ --volume-id vol-AFFECTED \ --description "Incident forensic snapshot $(date)" aws rds create-db-snapshot \ --db-snapshot-identifier incident-snapshot-$(date +%Y%m%d) \ --db-instance-identifier cia-production ``` **Long-Term Containment:** ```yaml Sustained_Protection: System_Patching: - Action: Apply security patches to affected systems - Priority: Critical vulnerabilities first - Validation: Test in staging before production Password_Rotation: - Action: Force password reset for all affected users - Method: AWS Cognito password reset enforcement - Scope: All users if credential exposure suspected Certificate_Revocation: - Action: Revoke and reissue compromised certificates - Method: AWS Certificate Manager - Timeline: Immediate for compromised, planned for rotation WAF_Rules: - Action: Deploy AWS WAF rules to block attack patterns - Patterns: IP blocking, SQL injection, XSS prevention - Review: Daily review during incident response Enhanced_Monitoring: - Action: Increase logging verbosity and alerting - Tools: CloudWatch alarms, GuardDuty sensitivity - Duration: Maintain until incident closed + 30 days ``` ### Phase 4: Eradication **Root Cause Elimination:** ```yaml Malware_Removal: - Identify all infected systems (AWS Systems Manager inventory) - Terminate compromised EC2 instances - Deploy clean AMI from known-good backup - Scan file systems with AWS Inspector - Verify integrity with AWS CloudWatch Logs Insights Vulnerability_Patching: - Apply security patches addressing root cause - Update dependencies (Dependabot PRs) - Fix configuration weaknesses (AWS Config remediation) - Implement compensating controls if patch unavailable Account_Cleanup: - Remove unauthorized user accounts (AWS IAM) - Delete rogue resources (EC2, Lambda, S3) - Audit and correct permission escalations - Review and revoke suspicious API keys Configuration_Hardening: - Enable AWS GuardDuty if disabled - Enforce MFA for all IAM users - Implement least privilege IAM policies - Enable encryption at rest (S3, EBS, RDS) - Enable VPC Flow Logs for network monitoring ``` **Eradication Checklist:** - [ ] **Root Cause Identified:** Technical analysis complete - [ ] **Vulnerability Fixed:** Patch applied or workaround implemented - [ ] **Malware Removed:** All infected systems cleaned or replaced - [ ] **Accounts Secured:** Unauthorized access revoked - [ ] **Configuration Hardened:** Security controls strengthened - [ ] **Validation Testing:** Security scans confirm clean state - [ ] **Documentation Updated:** Changes recorded in change log ### Phase 5: Recovery **System Restoration:** ```yaml Restore_Services: Phase_1_Critical: - Restore database from pre-incident backup - Deploy application from verified clean build - Restore S3 data from backup or versioning - Verify data integrity (checksums, record counts) Phase_2_Validation: - Run security scans (CodeQL, OWASP Dependency Check) - Execute integration tests (Maven verify) - Perform manual security testing - Validate monitoring and alerting Phase_3_Gradual_Rollout: - Enable read-only mode initially - Monitor for anomalies (30-minute observation) - Enable write operations selectively - Full restoration with enhanced monitoring Monitoring_Enhancement: - CloudWatch alarm thresholds lowered - GuardDuty findings reviewed daily - Security Hub compliance checks enabled - Anomaly detection baseline recalculated ``` **Recovery Verification:** ```bash # 1. Verify application functionality curl -s https://www.hack23.com/cia/ | grep -q "Citizen Intelligence Agency" echo "Application accessible: $?" # 2. Check database connectivity psql -h DATABASE_HOST -U cia_user -d cia_db -c "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM politician;" # 3. Verify API endpoints curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" https://api.hack23.com/health # Expected: 200 # 4. Test authentication # Perform test login with known credentials # Verify MFA enforcement # 5. Scan for vulnerabilities mvn dependency-check:check # Expected: No critical vulnerabilities # 6. Monitor logs for errors aws logs tail /aws/lambda/cia-production --follow --filter-pattern "ERROR" ``` ### Phase 6: Post-Incident Activities **Lessons Learned Analysis:** ```markdown # Incident Post-Mortem Template ## Incident Summary - **Incident ID:** INC-2024-001 - **Date Detected:** 2024-01-15 09:30 UTC - **Date Resolved:** 2024-01-16 14:00 UTC - **Severity:** S2 (High) - **Duration:** 28.5 hours ## Incident Details - **Type:** Unauthorized access attempt - **Attack Vector:** Exposed API endpoint with weak authentication - **Affected Systems:** Production API server (EC2 instance i-0123456789abcdef) - **Data Impact:** No data exfiltration confirmed - **Business Impact:** €8K estimated revenue loss (service degradation) ## Timeline - **2024-01-15 09:30 UTC:** GuardDuty alert - suspicious API calls - **2024-01-15 09:45 UTC:** Incident validated, CEO notified - **2024-01-15 10:00 UTC:** Response team activated (S2 severity) - **2024-01-15 10:30 UTC:** Affected endpoint isolated (security group update) - **2024-01-15 11:00 UTC:** Root cause identified (missing authentication) - **2024-01-15 12:00 UTC:** Fix deployed to staging, testing complete - **2024-01-15 14:00 UTC:** Fix deployed to production - **2024-01-15 15:00 UTC:** Monitoring confirms normal operation - **2024-01-16 14:00 UTC:** Incident closed after 24-hour observation ## Root Cause Analysis **What Happened:** New API endpoint deployed without authentication middleware. Exposed endpoint allowed unauthenticated access to internal admin functions. **Why It Happened:** - Code review process did not catch missing @PreAuthorize annotation - Integration tests did not include security test cases - Deployment pipeline lacked security gate (CodeQL did not run) **Contributing Factors:** - Tight deadline pressure led to shortened review - Developer unfamiliar with Spring Security patterns - Security requirements not explicitly documented in user story ## What Went Well - ✅ Detection within 15 minutes (GuardDuty alert) - ✅ Incident validation within 15 minutes - ✅ Containment within 1 hour (met RTO) - ✅ Clear communication with CEO throughout - ✅ No data loss or exfiltration - ✅ Root cause identified quickly ## What Went Wrong - ❌ Vulnerability introduced during deployment - ❌ Code review did not catch security issue - ❌ Security tests inadequate - ❌ Deployment pipeline lacked security gate ## Action Items 1. **Immediate (Week 1):** - [ ] Add CodeQL to required CI/CD checks (blocker) - Owner: DevOps Lead - [ ] Create security test template for API endpoints - Owner: Security Lead - [ ] Update code review checklist with security items - Owner: Dev Lead 2. **Short-Term (Month 1):** - [ ] Conduct security training for development team - Owner: CEO - [ ] Implement Spring Security audit (all @RequestMapping) - Owner: Dev Team - [ ] Add AWS WAF rules for API protection - Owner: Security Lead 3. **Long-Term (Quarter 1):** - [ ] Establish security champion program - Owner: CEO - [ ] Implement automated security testing framework - Owner: QA Lead - [ ] Document secure coding standards - Owner: Security Lead ## Metrics - **MTTD (Mean Time to Detect):** 15 minutes (target: <30 min) ✅ - **MTTR (Mean Time to Respond):** 15 minutes (target: <1 hour) ✅ - **MTTC (Mean Time to Contain):** 1 hour (target: <1 hour) ✅ - **MTTR (Mean Time to Resolve):** 28.5 hours (target: <24 hours) ⚠️ - **Total Downtime:** 2 hours (partial degradation) ## Compliance Notifications - **GDPR Notification:** Not required (no personal data breach) - **NIS2 Notification:** Not required (not material incident) - **Customer Notification:** Sent via email (transparency commitment) - **Insurance Notification:** Submitted claim for revenue loss ## Approval - **Incident Commander:** James Pether Sörling, CEO - **Date:** 2024-01-16 - **Status:** Closed - **Archive Location:** ISMS-PUBLIC/incidents/INC-2024-001.md ``` ## Incident Response Playbooks ### Playbook 1: Ransomware Incident ```yaml Ransomware_Response: Detection: - Indicators: Mass file encryption, ransom notes, unusual process activity - Sources: AWS GuardDuty, CloudWatch anomaly detection, user reports Immediate_Actions: - Isolate affected systems (network segmentation) - Disable user accounts (prevent lateral movement) - Preserve evidence (EBS snapshots, memory dumps) - Notify CEO and cyber insurance provider Containment: - Terminate infected EC2 instances - Disable compromised IAM credentials - Block malicious IP addresses (Security Groups, WAF) - Scan all systems for indicators of compromise Eradication: - Identify ransomware variant (file extensions, ransom note) - Remove malware from all systems - Patch exploited vulnerabilities - Reset all credentials (passwords, API keys, certificates) Recovery: - Restore from backups (verified clean) - Rebuild systems from clean AMIs - Validate data integrity - Gradual service restoration with monitoring Notification: - GDPR notification if PII accessed (72-hour deadline) - Customer notification per SLA - Law enforcement (if required by jurisdiction) - Cyber insurance claim submission References: - NIST SP 800-61r2 Section 3.4 - CISA Ransomware Guide - AWS Incident Response Whitepaper ``` ### Playbook 2: Data Breach Incident ```yaml Data_Breach_Response: Detection: - Indicators: Unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, S3 bucket exposure - Sources: AWS CloudTrail, GuardDuty, Security Hub, public disclosure Immediate_Actions: - Assess scope of breach (what data, how many records) - Classify data per Data Classification Policy - Preserve evidence (CloudTrail logs, network logs) - Activate legal counsel for GDPR compliance Containment: - Block unauthorized access (S3 bucket policies, IAM) - Revoke compromised credentials - Enable S3 versioning to prevent further deletion - Monitor for continued unauthorized access Investigation: - Identify access method (stolen credentials, misconfiguration) - Determine timeline (when breach started, when detected) - Assess data sensitivity (PII, financial, health data) - Calculate affected individuals (GDPR Article 33) Notification: - GDPR notification to supervisory authority (72 hours) - Individual notification if high risk (GDPR Article 34) - NIS2 notification if material incident (24 hours) - Public disclosure if required by regulations Remediation: - Fix root cause (configuration, vulnerability, process) - Implement compensating controls - Enhance monitoring and alerting - Update incident response procedures Documentation: - Incident report with timeline - Evidence preservation for legal proceedings - Regulatory notification documentation - Lessons learned and action items ``` ### Playbook 3: DDoS Attack ```yaml DDoS_Response: Detection: - Indicators: Service degradation, high network traffic, AWS Shield alerts - Sources: CloudWatch metrics, AWS Shield, user reports Immediate_Actions: - Activate AWS Shield Advanced if not enabled - Enable AWS WAF rate limiting - Engage AWS DDoS Response Team (DRT) - Notify CEO and stakeholders Mitigation: - CloudFront distribution to absorb traffic - AWS Shield Advanced DDoS mitigation - WAF rules to block malicious patterns - Scale resources (Auto Scaling, RDS read replicas) Analysis: - Identify attack type (volumetric, protocol, application) - Determine attack source (IP addresses, geographic origin) - Assess business impact (users affected, revenue loss) - Estimate attack duration and intensity Communication: - Status page updates (transparency) - Customer notifications (service status) - Media response (if public attention) - Post-incident transparency report Recovery: - Gradual traffic restoration as attack subsides - Monitor for residual attack activity - Validate service functionality - Review capacity planning Post_Incident: - Analyze attack patterns for future prevention - Update WAF rules based on attack signatures - Review architecture for DDoS resilience - Consider AWS Shield Advanced if cost-justified ``` ## GDPR Breach Notification Requirements ### 72-Hour Notification Rule ```yaml GDPR_Compliance: Article_33_Requirements: - Notification to supervisory authority within 72 hours - Description of nature of breach - Name and contact details of DPO (if applicable) - Description of likely consequences - Measures taken or proposed to address breach Article_34_Requirements: - Direct notification to individuals if high risk - Clear and plain language description - Measures to mitigate adverse effects - Communication without undue delay Supervisory_Authority: - Sweden: Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten (IMY) - Contact: imy@imy.se - Phone: +46 (0)8 657 61 00 - Online: https://www.imy.se/ Breach_Assessment: High_Risk_Indicators: - Special categories of data (GDPR Article 9) - Large number of individuals affected (>1000) - Children or vulnerable individuals affected - Sensitive personal data (financial, health, criminal) - Data exfiltration or ransomware Low_Risk_Indicators: - Data already public or encrypted - Small number of individuals affected - Immediate containment successful - No realistic risk of harm to individuals ``` **GDPR Notification Template:** ```markdown # Data Breach Notification to Supervisory Authority **To:** Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten (IMY) **From:** Hack23 AB (Data Controller) **Date:** [Within 72 hours of breach awareness] **Reference:** GDPR Article 33 ## 1. Description of the Personal Data Breach **Nature of Breach:** [Describe what happened: unauthorized access, data loss, ransomware, etc.] **Date/Time of Breach:** - Breach Occurred: [Estimated start time] - Breach Detected: [Detection timestamp] - IMY Notified: [Current timestamp] **Categories of Personal Data:** - [X] Names and contact details - [ ] Financial information - [ ] Health data - [ ] Special categories (Article 9) - [X] Login credentials **Data Subjects Affected:** - Number: Approximately [X] individuals - Categories: [Users, customers, employees, etc.] ## 2. Contact Point **Data Protection Officer (if applicable):** - Name: [DPO Name] or CEO: James Pether Sörling - Email: james.sorling@hack23.com - Phone: [Contact number] ## 3. Likely Consequences **Assessment of Impact:** [Describe potential harm to individuals: identity theft, financial loss, discrimination, etc.] **Risk Level:** [High / Medium / Low] **Justification:** [Explain risk assessment considering data sensitivity, number affected, safeguards in place] ## 4. Measures Taken **Containment:** - [List immediate actions taken to stop breach] **Mitigation:** - [Actions to reduce harm to individuals] **Prevention:** - [Measures to prevent recurrence] ## 5. Additional Information **Evidence Preservation:** - Logs archived: [Yes/No] - Forensic investigation: [In progress / Complete] **Individual Notification:** - Required: [Yes/No] - Completed: [Yes/No / In progress] - Method: [Email / Letter / Website notice] **Supporting Documentation:** [Attached incident report, forensic analysis, etc.] --- **Declaration:** This notification is made in compliance with GDPR Article 33. Hack23 AB commits to cooperating fully with the supervisory authority and providing updates as investigation progresses. **Signature:** James Pether Sörling, CEO **Date:** [Submission date] ``` ## External Stakeholder Registry **Key Contacts for Incident Response:** ```yaml Regulatory_Authorities: Swedish_DPA: Name: Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten (IMY) Email: imy@imy.se Phone: +46 (0)8 657 61 00 Website: https://www.imy.se/ Purpose: GDPR breach notification Swedish_Cert: Name: CERT-SE (Swedish Computer Security Incident Response Team) Email: cert@cert.se Phone: +46 (0)8 632 88 00 Website: https://www.cert.se/ Purpose: Critical infrastructure incidents Legal_and_Insurance: Legal_Counsel: Contact: [Law firm details] Purpose: GDPR compliance, regulatory response Cyber_Insurance: Provider: [Insurance company] Policy: [Policy number] Emergency: [24/7 hotline] Purpose: Incident notification, claim submission Technical_Support: AWS_Support: Type: Enterprise Support Contact: AWS Console support center Purpose: Infrastructure incidents, DDoS mitigation External_Security_Consultant: Contact: [Consultant details] Purpose: Forensic analysis, incident response support Communication: Customers: Method: Email notification via mailing list Timeline: Within 24 hours of confirmed breach Media: Spokesperson: CEO James Pether Sörling Policy: Transparency and factual communication ``` ## Compliance Mapping ### ISO 27001:2022 - **A.5.24** - Information Security Incident Management Planning and Preparation - **A.5.25** - Assessment and Decision on Information Security Events - **A.5.26** - Response to Information Security Incidents - **A.5.27** - Learning from Information Security Incidents ### NIST CSF 2.0 - **DE.AE** - Anomalies and Events (Detection Process) - **RS.AN** - Analysis (Response Planning) - **RS.MI** - Mitigation (Response Activities) - **RS.IM** - Improvements (Post-Incident Activity) ### CIS Controls v8 - **Control 17** - Incident Response Management - **Control 17.1** - Designate Personnel to Manage Incident Handling - **Control 17.2** - Establish and Maintain Contact Information for Reporting Security Incidents - **Control 17.3** - Establish and Maintain an Enterprise Process for Reporting Incidents - **Control 17.4** - Establish and Maintain an Incident Response Process - **Control 17.5** - Assign Key Roles and Responsibilities ### NIST SP 800-61r2 - **Section 2.3** - Incident Response Team Structure - **Section 3.1** - Preparation - **Section 3.2** - Detection and Analysis - **Section 3.3** - Containment, Eradication, and Recovery - **Section 3.4** - Post-Incident Activity ## References - **Hack23 ISMS:** [Incident Response Plan](https://github.com/Hack23/ISMS-PUBLIC/blob/main/Incident_Response_Plan.md) - **NIST SP 800-61r2:** Computer Security Incident Handling Guide - **ISO 27035:** Information Security Incident Management - **GDPR Articles 33-34:** Personal Data Breach Notification - **AWS Incident Response:** https://docs.aws.amazon.com/whitepapers/latest/aws-security-incident-response-guide/ - **CISA Incident Response:** https://www.cisa.gov/incident-response ## Examples from CIA Platform ### Incident Example: API Endpoint Exposure **Incident Summary:** - **Type:** Unauthorized access (security misconfiguration) - **Severity:** S2 (High) - **Detection:** AWS GuardDuty alert - **Duration:** 28.5 hours (detection to closure) - **Impact:** No data breach, service degradation **Key Learnings:** - GuardDuty detected within 15 minutes (excellent MTTD) - Code review process improved (security checklist) - CodeQL added as required CI/CD gate - Security training scheduled for development team --- **Document Maintenance:** - **Review Frequency:** Quarterly - **Last Updated:** 2024-01-15 - **Next Review:** 2024-04-15 - **Owner:** Security Team / CIA Project Maintainers