---
name: incident-response
description: Security incident detection, analysis, containment, eradication, recovery, and lessons learned per NIST SP 800-61r2 and ISO 27035
license: Apache-2.0
---
# Incident Response Skill
## Purpose
This skill establishes comprehensive procedures for detecting, analyzing, containing, eradicating, and recovering from security incidents affecting the CIA platform. It implements systematic incident management aligned with NIST SP 800-61r2, ISO 27035, and Hack23 ISMS Incident Response Plan with measurable response times and transparent communication.
## When to Use This Skill
Apply this skill when:
- ✅ Detecting security alerts or suspicious activity
- ✅ Responding to security breaches or data exposure
- ✅ Managing vulnerability exploitation incidents
- ✅ Coordinating response to service disruptions
- ✅ Handling supply chain security incidents
- ✅ Meeting GDPR 72-hour breach notification requirements
- ✅ Conducting post-incident analysis and lessons learned
- ✅ Updating incident response playbooks
Do NOT use for:
- ❌ Routine maintenance or planned downtime
- ❌ Non-security operational issues
- ❌ Performance degradation without security implications
## Decision Tree
```mermaid
%%{
init: {
'theme': 'base',
'themeVariables': {
'primaryColor': '#D32F2F',
'primaryTextColor': '#fff',
'lineColor': '#D32F2F',
'secondaryColor': '#FF9800',
'tertiaryColor': '#4CAF50'
}
}
}%%
flowchart TD
DETECT["🔍 Incident Detected"] --> VALIDATE{"✅ Confirmed
Security Incident?"}
VALIDATE -->|YES| CLASSIFY{"🏷️ Classify Severity"}
VALIDATE -->|NO| FALSE["📋 False Positive
Document & Close"]
CLASSIFY -->|🔴 Critical
€10K+ daily loss| S1["🔴 S1: Critical Response
RTO: 30 min
All Stakeholders"]
CLASSIFY -->|🟠 High
€5-10K daily loss| S2["🟠 S2: High Response
RTO: 1 hour
Key Stakeholders"]
CLASSIFY -->|🟡 Medium
€1-5K daily loss| S3["🟡 S3: Medium Response
RTO: 4 hours
Internal Only"]
CLASSIFY -->|🟢 Low
<€1K daily loss| S4["🟢 S4: Low Response
RTO: 24 hours
Documentation"]
S1 --> ACTIVATE["🚨 Activate Response Team
CEO + Specialists"]
S2 --> ACTIVATE
S3 --> ACTIVATE
S4 --> ACTIVATE
ACTIVATE --> CONTAIN["🛡️ Containment
Isolate & Preserve"]
CONTAIN --> INVESTIGATE["🔬 Investigation
Root Cause Analysis"]
INVESTIGATE --> REMEDIATE["🔧 Remediation
Fix & Restore"]
REMEDIATE --> VALIDATE_FIX{"✅ Validated?"}
VALIDATE_FIX -->|NO| REMEDIATE
VALIDATE_FIX -->|YES| NOTIFY{"📢 External
Notification
Required?"}
NOTIFY -->|YES - GDPR| GDPR["📢 GDPR Notification
72-hour deadline"]
NOTIFY -->|YES - NIS2| NIS2["📢 NIS2 Notification
24-hour initial"]
NOTIFY -->|YES - Customers| CUSTOMER["📢 Customer Notice
Per SLA"]
NOTIFY -->|NO| DOCUMENT
GDPR --> DOCUMENT["📝 Incident Report"]
NIS2 --> DOCUMENT
CUSTOMER --> DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT --> LESSONS["📈 Lessons Learned
Process Improvement"]
LESSONS --> CLOSE["✅ Close Incident
Archive Evidence"]
CLOSE --> MONITOR["🔄 Continuous Monitoring"]
style DETECT fill:#2196F3,color:#fff
style S1 fill:#D32F2F,color:#fff
style S2 fill:#FF9800,color:#fff
style S3 fill:#FFC107,color:#000
style S4 fill:#4CAF50,color:#fff
style CONTAIN fill:#7B1FA2,color:#fff
style INVESTIGATE fill:#1565C0,color:#fff
style REMEDIATE fill:#FF9800,color:#fff
style CLOSE fill:#4CAF50,color:#fff
```
## Incident Severity Classification
### Severity Matrix
| **Severity** | **Financial Impact** | **Operational Impact** | **RTO** | **Escalation** |
|--------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------|----------------|
| **🔴 S1: Critical** | €10K+ daily loss | Complete outage | **30 minutes** | CEO + External Consultant |
| **🟠 S2: High** | €5-10K daily loss | Major degradation | **1 hour** | CEO + Insurance Provider |
| **🟡 S3: Medium** | €1-5K daily loss | Partial impact | **4 hours** | CEO Investigation |
| **🟢 S4: Low** | <€1K daily loss | Minor inconvenience | **24 hours** | CEO Scheduled Review |
### Incident Classification Examples
**🔴 S1: Critical Incidents**
- Ransomware infection affecting production systems
- Active data breach with PII exposure
- Complete service outage affecting all users
- Successful credential theft with admin access
- Criminal liability (GDPR Article 83 violations)
**🟠 S2: High Incidents**
- Exploitation of critical vulnerability (CVSS 9.0+)
- Partial data exposure (limited user data)
- Major service degradation (>50% users affected)
- Unauthorized access to sensitive systems
- Regulatory investigation triggered
**🟡 S3: Medium Incidents**
- Attempted exploitation (blocked by controls)
- Security misconfigurations discovered
- Malware detected and quarantined
- Moderate service impact (<50% users)
- Minor compliance violations
**🟢 S4: Low Incidents**
- Failed login attempts (below threshold)
- Security scan false positives
- Minor policy violations
- Suspicious activity with no impact
- Documentation issues
## Incident Response Lifecycle
### Phase 1: Preparation
**Pre-Incident Readiness:**
```yaml
Incident_Response_Team:
- CEO: James Pether Sörling (Incident Commander)
- Security Lead: Primary responder
- Development Lead: Technical remediation
- External Consultant: On-call security expert
- Legal Counsel: GDPR/regulatory compliance
- Insurance Provider: Cyber insurance liaison
Tools_and_Resources:
- AWS Detective: Log analysis and investigation
- AWS Security Hub: Centralized security findings
- AWS GuardDuty: Threat detection
- GitHub Security: Repository security monitoring
- CloudWatch Logs Insights: Query and analysis
- Incident Response Playbooks: Scenario-specific procedures
Communication_Channels:
- Primary: CEO email (james.sorling@hack23.com)
- Secondary: GitHub Issues (private security issues)
- Emergency: AWS Support (Enterprise plan)
- External: External Stakeholder Registry contacts
- Documentation: ISMS-PUBLIC repository updates
Evidence_Preservation:
- AWS CloudTrail: 90-day retention
- Application Logs: CloudWatch 30-day retention
- Database Audit Logs: 90-day retention
- Network Flow Logs: VPC Flow Logs 7-day retention
- Backup Snapshots: Automated daily backups
```
**Preparation Checklist:**
- [ ] **Incident Response Plan:** Reviewed and updated quarterly
- [ ] **Contact List:** Current and tested (External Stakeholder Registry)
- [ ] **Playbooks:** Scenario-specific procedures documented
- [ ] **Tools:** AWS security services enabled and monitored
- [ ] **Training:** Annual tabletop exercises conducted
- [ ] **Backups:** Verified and tested monthly
- [ ] **Insurance:** Cyber insurance policy active and adequate
- [ ] **Legal:** Retainer with legal counsel for GDPR compliance
### Phase 2: Detection and Analysis
**Detection Sources:**
```mermaid
flowchart LR
subgraph "🔍 Automated Detection"
GUARD[AWS GuardDuty
Threat Detection]
SECHUB[AWS Security Hub
Findings Aggregation]
CODEQL[CodeQL
Code Scanning]
DEPEND[Dependabot
Vulnerability Alerts]
end
subgraph "👁️ Manual Detection"
USER[User Report
Security Concern]
AUDIT[Security Audit
Findings]
RESEARCH[Security Researcher
Disclosure]
MONITOR[System Monitoring
Anomalies]
end
subgraph "🎯 Incident Triage"
VALIDATE[Validate Incident]
CLASSIFY[Classify Severity]
ASSIGN[Assign Response Team]
end
GUARD --> VALIDATE
SECHUB --> VALIDATE
CODEQL --> VALIDATE
DEPEND --> VALIDATE
USER --> VALIDATE
AUDIT --> VALIDATE
RESEARCH --> VALIDATE
MONITOR --> VALIDATE
VALIDATE --> CLASSIFY
CLASSIFY --> ASSIGN
style VALIDATE fill:#FF9800,color:#fff
style CLASSIFY fill:#D32F2F,color:#fff
style ASSIGN fill:#1565C0,color:#fff
```
**Initial Assessment Checklist:**
- [ ] **Incident Confirmed:** Validate security incident vs. false positive
- [ ] **Scope Identified:** Affected systems, data, and users documented
- [ ] **Timeline Established:** Initial detection and estimated start time
- [ ] **Severity Classified:** Using severity matrix (S1-S4)
- [ ] **Evidence Preserved:** Logs, snapshots, and artifacts collected
- [ ] **Team Notified:** Response team activated per severity level
- [ ] **Stakeholders Informed:** CEO notified within RTO
- [ ] **Communication Plan:** Notification requirements assessed
**Analysis Activities:**
```bash
# 1. Collect AWS CloudTrail logs
aws cloudtrail lookup-events \
--lookup-attributes AttributeKey=EventName,AttributeValue=AssumeRole \
--start-time 2024-01-15T00:00:00Z \
--end-time 2024-01-16T00:00:00Z \
--max-results 100 \
> incident-cloudtrail-logs.json
# 2. Query CloudWatch Logs
aws logs filter-log-events \
--log-group-name /aws/lambda/cia-production \
--start-time $(date -d '24 hours ago' +%s)000 \
--filter-pattern "ERROR" \
> incident-application-logs.txt
# 3. Check AWS GuardDuty findings
aws guardduty list-findings \
--detector-id YOUR_DETECTOR_ID \
--finding-criteria '{"Criterion":{"severity":{"Gte":7}}}' \
--sort-criteria '{"AttributeName":"updatedAt","OrderBy":"DESC"}' \
> incident-guardduty-findings.json
# 4. Review AWS Security Hub findings
aws securityhub get-findings \
--filters '{"SeverityLabel":[{"Value":"CRITICAL","Comparison":"EQUALS"}]}' \
--max-results 100 \
> incident-securityhub-findings.json
# 5. Analyze access patterns
aws cloudtrail lookup-events \
--lookup-attributes AttributeKey=Username,AttributeValue=SUSPECTED_USER \
--start-time 2024-01-15T00:00:00Z \
> incident-user-activity.json
# 6. Create evidence package
tar -czf incident-evidence-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S).tar.gz \
incident-*.json incident-*.txt
```
### Phase 3: Containment
**Short-Term Containment:**
```yaml
Immediate_Actions:
Network_Isolation:
- Action: Isolate affected systems from network
- Method: AWS Security Group rule changes
- Command: |
aws ec2 revoke-security-group-ingress \
--group-id sg-AFFECTED \
--protocol all \
--cidr 0.0.0.0/0
Access_Revocation:
- Action: Disable compromised user accounts
- Method: AWS IAM policy detachment
- Command: |
aws iam delete-login-profile \
--user-name COMPROMISED_USER
aws iam list-access-keys \
--user-name COMPROMISED_USER | \
jq -r '.AccessKeyMetadata[].AccessKeyId' | \
xargs -I {} aws iam delete-access-key \
--user-name COMPROMISED_USER \
--access-key-id {}
Session_Termination:
- Action: Invalidate active sessions
- Method: AWS IAM role trust policy update
- Command: |
aws iam update-assume-role-policy \
--role-name AFFECTED_ROLE \
--policy-document file://deny-all-policy.json
Snapshot_Creation:
- Action: Preserve current state for forensics
- Method: EBS snapshot, RDS snapshot, S3 versioning
- Command: |
aws ec2 create-snapshot \
--volume-id vol-AFFECTED \
--description "Incident forensic snapshot $(date)"
aws rds create-db-snapshot \
--db-snapshot-identifier incident-snapshot-$(date +%Y%m%d) \
--db-instance-identifier cia-production
```
**Long-Term Containment:**
```yaml
Sustained_Protection:
System_Patching:
- Action: Apply security patches to affected systems
- Priority: Critical vulnerabilities first
- Validation: Test in staging before production
Password_Rotation:
- Action: Force password reset for all affected users
- Method: AWS Cognito password reset enforcement
- Scope: All users if credential exposure suspected
Certificate_Revocation:
- Action: Revoke and reissue compromised certificates
- Method: AWS Certificate Manager
- Timeline: Immediate for compromised, planned for rotation
WAF_Rules:
- Action: Deploy AWS WAF rules to block attack patterns
- Patterns: IP blocking, SQL injection, XSS prevention
- Review: Daily review during incident response
Enhanced_Monitoring:
- Action: Increase logging verbosity and alerting
- Tools: CloudWatch alarms, GuardDuty sensitivity
- Duration: Maintain until incident closed + 30 days
```
### Phase 4: Eradication
**Root Cause Elimination:**
```yaml
Malware_Removal:
- Identify all infected systems (AWS Systems Manager inventory)
- Terminate compromised EC2 instances
- Deploy clean AMI from known-good backup
- Scan file systems with AWS Inspector
- Verify integrity with AWS CloudWatch Logs Insights
Vulnerability_Patching:
- Apply security patches addressing root cause
- Update dependencies (Dependabot PRs)
- Fix configuration weaknesses (AWS Config remediation)
- Implement compensating controls if patch unavailable
Account_Cleanup:
- Remove unauthorized user accounts (AWS IAM)
- Delete rogue resources (EC2, Lambda, S3)
- Audit and correct permission escalations
- Review and revoke suspicious API keys
Configuration_Hardening:
- Enable AWS GuardDuty if disabled
- Enforce MFA for all IAM users
- Implement least privilege IAM policies
- Enable encryption at rest (S3, EBS, RDS)
- Enable VPC Flow Logs for network monitoring
```
**Eradication Checklist:**
- [ ] **Root Cause Identified:** Technical analysis complete
- [ ] **Vulnerability Fixed:** Patch applied or workaround implemented
- [ ] **Malware Removed:** All infected systems cleaned or replaced
- [ ] **Accounts Secured:** Unauthorized access revoked
- [ ] **Configuration Hardened:** Security controls strengthened
- [ ] **Validation Testing:** Security scans confirm clean state
- [ ] **Documentation Updated:** Changes recorded in change log
### Phase 5: Recovery
**System Restoration:**
```yaml
Restore_Services:
Phase_1_Critical:
- Restore database from pre-incident backup
- Deploy application from verified clean build
- Restore S3 data from backup or versioning
- Verify data integrity (checksums, record counts)
Phase_2_Validation:
- Run security scans (CodeQL, OWASP Dependency Check)
- Execute integration tests (Maven verify)
- Perform manual security testing
- Validate monitoring and alerting
Phase_3_Gradual_Rollout:
- Enable read-only mode initially
- Monitor for anomalies (30-minute observation)
- Enable write operations selectively
- Full restoration with enhanced monitoring
Monitoring_Enhancement:
- CloudWatch alarm thresholds lowered
- GuardDuty findings reviewed daily
- Security Hub compliance checks enabled
- Anomaly detection baseline recalculated
```
**Recovery Verification:**
```bash
# 1. Verify application functionality
curl -s https://www.hack23.com/cia/ | grep -q "Citizen Intelligence Agency"
echo "Application accessible: $?"
# 2. Check database connectivity
psql -h DATABASE_HOST -U cia_user -d cia_db -c "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM politician;"
# 3. Verify API endpoints
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" https://api.hack23.com/health
# Expected: 200
# 4. Test authentication
# Perform test login with known credentials
# Verify MFA enforcement
# 5. Scan for vulnerabilities
mvn dependency-check:check
# Expected: No critical vulnerabilities
# 6. Monitor logs for errors
aws logs tail /aws/lambda/cia-production --follow --filter-pattern "ERROR"
```
### Phase 6: Post-Incident Activities
**Lessons Learned Analysis:**
```markdown
# Incident Post-Mortem Template
## Incident Summary
- **Incident ID:** INC-2024-001
- **Date Detected:** 2024-01-15 09:30 UTC
- **Date Resolved:** 2024-01-16 14:00 UTC
- **Severity:** S2 (High)
- **Duration:** 28.5 hours
## Incident Details
- **Type:** Unauthorized access attempt
- **Attack Vector:** Exposed API endpoint with weak authentication
- **Affected Systems:** Production API server (EC2 instance i-0123456789abcdef)
- **Data Impact:** No data exfiltration confirmed
- **Business Impact:** €8K estimated revenue loss (service degradation)
## Timeline
- **2024-01-15 09:30 UTC:** GuardDuty alert - suspicious API calls
- **2024-01-15 09:45 UTC:** Incident validated, CEO notified
- **2024-01-15 10:00 UTC:** Response team activated (S2 severity)
- **2024-01-15 10:30 UTC:** Affected endpoint isolated (security group update)
- **2024-01-15 11:00 UTC:** Root cause identified (missing authentication)
- **2024-01-15 12:00 UTC:** Fix deployed to staging, testing complete
- **2024-01-15 14:00 UTC:** Fix deployed to production
- **2024-01-15 15:00 UTC:** Monitoring confirms normal operation
- **2024-01-16 14:00 UTC:** Incident closed after 24-hour observation
## Root Cause Analysis
**What Happened:**
New API endpoint deployed without authentication middleware. Exposed endpoint allowed unauthenticated access to internal admin functions.
**Why It Happened:**
- Code review process did not catch missing @PreAuthorize annotation
- Integration tests did not include security test cases
- Deployment pipeline lacked security gate (CodeQL did not run)
**Contributing Factors:**
- Tight deadline pressure led to shortened review
- Developer unfamiliar with Spring Security patterns
- Security requirements not explicitly documented in user story
## What Went Well
- ✅ Detection within 15 minutes (GuardDuty alert)
- ✅ Incident validation within 15 minutes
- ✅ Containment within 1 hour (met RTO)
- ✅ Clear communication with CEO throughout
- ✅ No data loss or exfiltration
- ✅ Root cause identified quickly
## What Went Wrong
- ❌ Vulnerability introduced during deployment
- ❌ Code review did not catch security issue
- ❌ Security tests inadequate
- ❌ Deployment pipeline lacked security gate
## Action Items
1. **Immediate (Week 1):**
- [ ] Add CodeQL to required CI/CD checks (blocker) - Owner: DevOps Lead
- [ ] Create security test template for API endpoints - Owner: Security Lead
- [ ] Update code review checklist with security items - Owner: Dev Lead
2. **Short-Term (Month 1):**
- [ ] Conduct security training for development team - Owner: CEO
- [ ] Implement Spring Security audit (all @RequestMapping) - Owner: Dev Team
- [ ] Add AWS WAF rules for API protection - Owner: Security Lead
3. **Long-Term (Quarter 1):**
- [ ] Establish security champion program - Owner: CEO
- [ ] Implement automated security testing framework - Owner: QA Lead
- [ ] Document secure coding standards - Owner: Security Lead
## Metrics
- **MTTD (Mean Time to Detect):** 15 minutes (target: <30 min) ✅
- **MTTR (Mean Time to Respond):** 15 minutes (target: <1 hour) ✅
- **MTTC (Mean Time to Contain):** 1 hour (target: <1 hour) ✅
- **MTTR (Mean Time to Resolve):** 28.5 hours (target: <24 hours) ⚠️
- **Total Downtime:** 2 hours (partial degradation)
## Compliance Notifications
- **GDPR Notification:** Not required (no personal data breach)
- **NIS2 Notification:** Not required (not material incident)
- **Customer Notification:** Sent via email (transparency commitment)
- **Insurance Notification:** Submitted claim for revenue loss
## Approval
- **Incident Commander:** James Pether Sörling, CEO
- **Date:** 2024-01-16
- **Status:** Closed
- **Archive Location:** ISMS-PUBLIC/incidents/INC-2024-001.md
```
## Incident Response Playbooks
### Playbook 1: Ransomware Incident
```yaml
Ransomware_Response:
Detection:
- Indicators: Mass file encryption, ransom notes, unusual process activity
- Sources: AWS GuardDuty, CloudWatch anomaly detection, user reports
Immediate_Actions:
- Isolate affected systems (network segmentation)
- Disable user accounts (prevent lateral movement)
- Preserve evidence (EBS snapshots, memory dumps)
- Notify CEO and cyber insurance provider
Containment:
- Terminate infected EC2 instances
- Disable compromised IAM credentials
- Block malicious IP addresses (Security Groups, WAF)
- Scan all systems for indicators of compromise
Eradication:
- Identify ransomware variant (file extensions, ransom note)
- Remove malware from all systems
- Patch exploited vulnerabilities
- Reset all credentials (passwords, API keys, certificates)
Recovery:
- Restore from backups (verified clean)
- Rebuild systems from clean AMIs
- Validate data integrity
- Gradual service restoration with monitoring
Notification:
- GDPR notification if PII accessed (72-hour deadline)
- Customer notification per SLA
- Law enforcement (if required by jurisdiction)
- Cyber insurance claim submission
References:
- NIST SP 800-61r2 Section 3.4
- CISA Ransomware Guide
- AWS Incident Response Whitepaper
```
### Playbook 2: Data Breach Incident
```yaml
Data_Breach_Response:
Detection:
- Indicators: Unauthorized data access, data exfiltration, S3 bucket exposure
- Sources: AWS CloudTrail, GuardDuty, Security Hub, public disclosure
Immediate_Actions:
- Assess scope of breach (what data, how many records)
- Classify data per Data Classification Policy
- Preserve evidence (CloudTrail logs, network logs)
- Activate legal counsel for GDPR compliance
Containment:
- Block unauthorized access (S3 bucket policies, IAM)
- Revoke compromised credentials
- Enable S3 versioning to prevent further deletion
- Monitor for continued unauthorized access
Investigation:
- Identify access method (stolen credentials, misconfiguration)
- Determine timeline (when breach started, when detected)
- Assess data sensitivity (PII, financial, health data)
- Calculate affected individuals (GDPR Article 33)
Notification:
- GDPR notification to supervisory authority (72 hours)
- Individual notification if high risk (GDPR Article 34)
- NIS2 notification if material incident (24 hours)
- Public disclosure if required by regulations
Remediation:
- Fix root cause (configuration, vulnerability, process)
- Implement compensating controls
- Enhance monitoring and alerting
- Update incident response procedures
Documentation:
- Incident report with timeline
- Evidence preservation for legal proceedings
- Regulatory notification documentation
- Lessons learned and action items
```
### Playbook 3: DDoS Attack
```yaml
DDoS_Response:
Detection:
- Indicators: Service degradation, high network traffic, AWS Shield alerts
- Sources: CloudWatch metrics, AWS Shield, user reports
Immediate_Actions:
- Activate AWS Shield Advanced if not enabled
- Enable AWS WAF rate limiting
- Engage AWS DDoS Response Team (DRT)
- Notify CEO and stakeholders
Mitigation:
- CloudFront distribution to absorb traffic
- AWS Shield Advanced DDoS mitigation
- WAF rules to block malicious patterns
- Scale resources (Auto Scaling, RDS read replicas)
Analysis:
- Identify attack type (volumetric, protocol, application)
- Determine attack source (IP addresses, geographic origin)
- Assess business impact (users affected, revenue loss)
- Estimate attack duration and intensity
Communication:
- Status page updates (transparency)
- Customer notifications (service status)
- Media response (if public attention)
- Post-incident transparency report
Recovery:
- Gradual traffic restoration as attack subsides
- Monitor for residual attack activity
- Validate service functionality
- Review capacity planning
Post_Incident:
- Analyze attack patterns for future prevention
- Update WAF rules based on attack signatures
- Review architecture for DDoS resilience
- Consider AWS Shield Advanced if cost-justified
```
## GDPR Breach Notification Requirements
### 72-Hour Notification Rule
```yaml
GDPR_Compliance:
Article_33_Requirements:
- Notification to supervisory authority within 72 hours
- Description of nature of breach
- Name and contact details of DPO (if applicable)
- Description of likely consequences
- Measures taken or proposed to address breach
Article_34_Requirements:
- Direct notification to individuals if high risk
- Clear and plain language description
- Measures to mitigate adverse effects
- Communication without undue delay
Supervisory_Authority:
- Sweden: Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten (IMY)
- Contact: imy@imy.se
- Phone: +46 (0)8 657 61 00
- Online: https://www.imy.se/
Breach_Assessment:
High_Risk_Indicators:
- Special categories of data (GDPR Article 9)
- Large number of individuals affected (>1000)
- Children or vulnerable individuals affected
- Sensitive personal data (financial, health, criminal)
- Data exfiltration or ransomware
Low_Risk_Indicators:
- Data already public or encrypted
- Small number of individuals affected
- Immediate containment successful
- No realistic risk of harm to individuals
```
**GDPR Notification Template:**
```markdown
# Data Breach Notification to Supervisory Authority
**To:** Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten (IMY)
**From:** Hack23 AB (Data Controller)
**Date:** [Within 72 hours of breach awareness]
**Reference:** GDPR Article 33
## 1. Description of the Personal Data Breach
**Nature of Breach:**
[Describe what happened: unauthorized access, data loss, ransomware, etc.]
**Date/Time of Breach:**
- Breach Occurred: [Estimated start time]
- Breach Detected: [Detection timestamp]
- IMY Notified: [Current timestamp]
**Categories of Personal Data:**
- [X] Names and contact details
- [ ] Financial information
- [ ] Health data
- [ ] Special categories (Article 9)
- [X] Login credentials
**Data Subjects Affected:**
- Number: Approximately [X] individuals
- Categories: [Users, customers, employees, etc.]
## 2. Contact Point
**Data Protection Officer (if applicable):**
- Name: [DPO Name] or CEO: James Pether Sörling
- Email: james.sorling@hack23.com
- Phone: [Contact number]
## 3. Likely Consequences
**Assessment of Impact:**
[Describe potential harm to individuals: identity theft, financial loss, discrimination, etc.]
**Risk Level:** [High / Medium / Low]
**Justification:**
[Explain risk assessment considering data sensitivity, number affected, safeguards in place]
## 4. Measures Taken
**Containment:**
- [List immediate actions taken to stop breach]
**Mitigation:**
- [Actions to reduce harm to individuals]
**Prevention:**
- [Measures to prevent recurrence]
## 5. Additional Information
**Evidence Preservation:**
- Logs archived: [Yes/No]
- Forensic investigation: [In progress / Complete]
**Individual Notification:**
- Required: [Yes/No]
- Completed: [Yes/No / In progress]
- Method: [Email / Letter / Website notice]
**Supporting Documentation:**
[Attached incident report, forensic analysis, etc.]
---
**Declaration:**
This notification is made in compliance with GDPR Article 33. Hack23 AB commits to cooperating fully with the supervisory authority and providing updates as investigation progresses.
**Signature:** James Pether Sörling, CEO
**Date:** [Submission date]
```
## External Stakeholder Registry
**Key Contacts for Incident Response:**
```yaml
Regulatory_Authorities:
Swedish_DPA:
Name: Integritetsskyddsmyndigheten (IMY)
Email: imy@imy.se
Phone: +46 (0)8 657 61 00
Website: https://www.imy.se/
Purpose: GDPR breach notification
Swedish_Cert:
Name: CERT-SE (Swedish Computer Security Incident Response Team)
Email: cert@cert.se
Phone: +46 (0)8 632 88 00
Website: https://www.cert.se/
Purpose: Critical infrastructure incidents
Legal_and_Insurance:
Legal_Counsel:
Contact: [Law firm details]
Purpose: GDPR compliance, regulatory response
Cyber_Insurance:
Provider: [Insurance company]
Policy: [Policy number]
Emergency: [24/7 hotline]
Purpose: Incident notification, claim submission
Technical_Support:
AWS_Support:
Type: Enterprise Support
Contact: AWS Console support center
Purpose: Infrastructure incidents, DDoS mitigation
External_Security_Consultant:
Contact: [Consultant details]
Purpose: Forensic analysis, incident response support
Communication:
Customers:
Method: Email notification via mailing list
Timeline: Within 24 hours of confirmed breach
Media:
Spokesperson: CEO James Pether Sörling
Policy: Transparency and factual communication
```
## Compliance Mapping
### ISO 27001:2022
- **A.5.24** - Information Security Incident Management Planning and Preparation
- **A.5.25** - Assessment and Decision on Information Security Events
- **A.5.26** - Response to Information Security Incidents
- **A.5.27** - Learning from Information Security Incidents
### NIST CSF 2.0
- **DE.AE** - Anomalies and Events (Detection Process)
- **RS.AN** - Analysis (Response Planning)
- **RS.MI** - Mitigation (Response Activities)
- **RS.IM** - Improvements (Post-Incident Activity)
### CIS Controls v8
- **Control 17** - Incident Response Management
- **Control 17.1** - Designate Personnel to Manage Incident Handling
- **Control 17.2** - Establish and Maintain Contact Information for Reporting Security Incidents
- **Control 17.3** - Establish and Maintain an Enterprise Process for Reporting Incidents
- **Control 17.4** - Establish and Maintain an Incident Response Process
- **Control 17.5** - Assign Key Roles and Responsibilities
### NIST SP 800-61r2
- **Section 2.3** - Incident Response Team Structure
- **Section 3.1** - Preparation
- **Section 3.2** - Detection and Analysis
- **Section 3.3** - Containment, Eradication, and Recovery
- **Section 3.4** - Post-Incident Activity
## References
- **Hack23 ISMS:** [Incident Response Plan](https://github.com/Hack23/ISMS-PUBLIC/blob/main/Incident_Response_Plan.md)
- **NIST SP 800-61r2:** Computer Security Incident Handling Guide
- **ISO 27035:** Information Security Incident Management
- **GDPR Articles 33-34:** Personal Data Breach Notification
- **AWS Incident Response:** https://docs.aws.amazon.com/whitepapers/latest/aws-security-incident-response-guide/
- **CISA Incident Response:** https://www.cisa.gov/incident-response
## Examples from CIA Platform
### Incident Example: API Endpoint Exposure
**Incident Summary:**
- **Type:** Unauthorized access (security misconfiguration)
- **Severity:** S2 (High)
- **Detection:** AWS GuardDuty alert
- **Duration:** 28.5 hours (detection to closure)
- **Impact:** No data breach, service degradation
**Key Learnings:**
- GuardDuty detected within 15 minutes (excellent MTTD)
- Code review process improved (security checklist)
- CodeQL added as required CI/CD gate
- Security training scheduled for development team
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**Document Maintenance:**
- **Review Frequency:** Quarterly
- **Last Updated:** 2024-01-15
- **Next Review:** 2024-04-15
- **Owner:** Security Team / CIA Project Maintainers