Released in 1955 as printed book and adapted to TEI-XML based on scans provided by the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections Center
The following errors in the original edition have been corrected:
The following issues are known and can’t be fixed:
It has long been the custom of the United States Government to release to the
public, after a suitable lapse of time, a substantially complete documentary
record of our country’s diplomacy. This custom, established early in our
history, was crystallized by President Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic
Papers (then called Papers Relating to Foreign
Affairs).
The publication of the Foreign Relations volumes has
tended to fall increasingly far behind the period which they cover. During the
past two decades, this lag has reached nearly 18 years. This gap is now being
gradually reduced, thanks to the action of the Appropriations Committees of the
two Houses of Congress, and efforts will continue to reduce it, due
consideration being given to the necessity of avoiding any harm to our current
negotiations with other countries or to our national security interests.
This volume of documents on the conferences at Malta and Yalta is the first to
appear in a special series of Foreign Relations volumes
on World War II conferences attended by President Foreign Relations publication program prepared by the
Department of State, in response to expressions of interest by several Senators
and the Senate Committee on Appropriations in its report for fiscal year 1954.
This program also includes the preparation and release of a special series on
United States relations with China, 1942–1949, as well as the accelerated
publication of the regular volumes of the Foreign
Relations annual series already compiled through the year 1941.
In order to make this volume as complete and useful as possible, the Department of State has not only drawn upon its own files, but has also sought the cooperation of other agencies and individuals, to whom the Department is grateful for their assistance. The compiling and professional editing of this volume were done by a special staff in the Historical Division of the Department of State, under the direction of the Chief of the Division. The technical editing was done by the Division of Publishing Services.
(These photographic illustrations will be found in a group following page 546.)
Plate
MAPS
In February 1945 President Quincy from 12:25 to 3:56 p. m., with an interruption
for lunch at which the President was host to seven guests. (For description
of the Log, see post, p.
459.) Fleet Admiral I Was There, p.
327). The meeting is also mentioned by The Second World
War, vol. vi, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 397, and
by Sherwood in
Roosevelt and
Hopkins, p.
872. The only indications of the substance of the Bulletin, February 25,
1945, vol. xii, pp. 259–291) and in an address by
Parliamentary Debates, House of
Commons, 5th
The Malta Conference, which began on January 30 and lasted through February 2,
consisted of a series of discussions designed primarily to coordinate American
and British views on a number of important problems which were expected to come
up with the Russians at Yalta a few days later. Most of the Malta discussions
concerned military topics and centered around five meetings of the
Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. The first four of these meetings were
held at Montgomery House, in a suburb of Valletta, while the fifth, with
Quincy. There were also political discussions, one of
which took place aboard H. M. S. Sinus, between Secretary
of State
President Quincy with Prime Minister
Most of the American and British representatives who participated in the Malta Conference proceeded by plane on February 3 to the Crimea, where the tripartite conference with the Russians took place from February 4 to February 11. Although the officially approved name of this meeting was “The Crimea Conference”, the term “Yalta Conference” has become so widely accepted that it has been used throughout the present volume. As a matter of fact, the conference did not meet in the city of Yalta itself. The American delegation was housed in Livadia Palace about two miles southwest of Yalta on the coastal road, and it was here that a majority of the conference meetings were held. The Soviet delegation occupied the Yusupov Palace, located several miles farther west in the village of Koreiz, while the British delegation was accommodated in the Vorontsov Villa at Alupka, about two miles beyond Koreiz. Although the names “Koreiz” and “Alupka” have been retained on those few documents in this volume on which they appear, the editors have used only the word “Yalta” as the designation of the conference site wherever such indication needed to be supplied.
Scope of Coverage
The editors have presented in this volume as definitive and comprehensive a coverage of the Malta and Yalta conferences as could be made at the present time. To achieve this purpose it was necessary to obtain much documentation that was never in the files of the Department of State, notably presidential and military papers.
A few papers pertinent to the Malta and Yalta conferences had been obtained by
the Department of State from the White House, beginning as early as 1946. By
1950 all White House papers prepared by or for President
Since the files of the Department of State contained very few papers on the
military staff discussions at Malta and Yalta, the Department of State also
obtained the assistance of the Department of Defense in locating and releasing
documents from the military records of these conferences. This type of material
consists of papers documenting the official position or advice of the War and
Navy Departments on
This volume, therefore, includes the relevant papers on the Malta and Yalta
Conferences from the files of the Department of State, the Department of
Defense, and the
The editors have sought access to the private papers of individuals who attended
the conferences. Certain of these persons have contributed useful comments and
suggestions, and some have written memoirs which have been of great value in
compiling this official record. Some papers have not become available for
inclusion, among them the personal notes of Mr.
Organization of the Volume
The volume is divided into three major segments. Part I contains pre-conference background material; Part II presents the records of the conference at Malta; Part III consists of the records of the Yalta Conference.
The inclusion of the background material comprising Part I (Chapters 1–4) was
necessitated by the fact that the annual Foreign
Relations volumes for the years of World War II have not yet been
published. Accordingly, the editors felt obliged to include in this volume a
considerable quantity of pre-conference material in order to indicate at least
the general outlines of the historical setting in which the conferences at Malta
and Yalta took place. Chapter 1 of this pre-conference documentation shows how
the arrangements were made for holding the conferences. Chapter 2 contains
correspondence, memoranda, and Briefing Book papers showing the pre-conference
status of Foreign Relations volumes for the years
1941–1945. Chapter 3 comprises excerpts pertinent to those conference subjects
from the so-called Record (official diary) of Secretary of State
The records of the conferences themselves (Parts II and III) are organized as
follows: (1) At the beginning of each conference (Chapters 5 and 7) there are
presented those portions of President post, p. 459.
(2) Following the excerpts from the Log for each conference, there appear the minutes and related documents of Malta and Yalta respectively, arranged by meetings in chronological order (Chapters 6 and 8). The documents, regardless of their respective dates and subjects, have been placed after the minutes of the meeting to which they refer, or at which they were first discussed.
(3) For the Yalta Conference there are three additional chapters containing documents of a type not found for Malta. Chapter 9, entitled “Other Conference Documents”, contains papers which bear directly on Yalta discussions but are not closely enough related to any specific minutes to be included in Chapter 8. Chapter 10 presents literal prints of the English texts of the agreements signed at Yalta. Chapter 11 consists of such hitherto unpublished documents as could be found which were prepared by conference participants after the conference, describing factually certain of the proceedings at Yalta.
Categories of Conference Records
The records of the conferences themselves fall into three major categories: (1)
minutes of international discussions in which American representatives
participated with either the British or the Russians or both; (2) documents
which figured in the international negotiations at the conferences; (3)
intradelegation documentation relating to
(1) Minutes of International Meetings—Even with the
addition of documents from the White House, the Department of Defense, and the
“It would . . . have been better at Yalta to have had a stenographic record made of the discussions. The record then could have been distributed to and approved by each delegation and become the official record of the proceedings. There was, however, no single official record of the meetings, nor was there any stenotypist recording every word. Instead, each delegation kept its own minutes.
Bridges , for instance, took notes in shorthand for the British, whileBohlen had the double task of interpreting and note taking for the United States. In addition, some members of the American delegation, at least, kept their own personal notes. Every noon at the foreign ministers’ meetings to discuss problems assigned by the three leaders,Edward Page of the American Embassy in Moscow served both as interpreter and as note taker for the American delegation. …”“The military followed a different practice in keeping a record of their discussions. Although each of the three nations had its own representative taking notes, these three individuals cleared their versions with each other and with all the participants. In the case of the diplomatic discussions, this practice was unfortunately not followed. ...”
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. ,(New York, 1949), pp. 103–104.Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference
In view of this situation the editors decided to include in this volume all
available minutes or notes on the international political discussions at Yalta.
Thus for a majority of the political meetings at Yalta there will be found in
this volume two or more accounts, generally in the form of minutes prepared by
(2) Documents Considered at International Meetings—This
category comprises proposals, memoranda, and correspondence, of
(3) Intradelegation Documentation—This type of
documentation includes minutes or notes on discussions within the United States
Delegation bearing directly on the subjects under negotiation at the conferences
with either the British or the Russians or both. It also includes memoranda and
correspondence on such subjects within the United States Delegation or between
the Delegation and other officers of the United States Government. At Malta and
Yalta there were frequent meetings of top civilian advisers with the Secretary
of State or the President to discuss political subjects under negotiation at the
conferences, but apparently no minutes of these discussions were prepared. Such
notes as could be found on these discussions have been included, together with
all significant intradelegation memoranda dealing with international conference
subjects.
On the military side, minutes were regularly kept of the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Malta and Yalta. Those portions of these minutes which relate to subjects under international negotiation at the conferences are included in this volume, together with such related documents as are not adequately summarized in the minutes themselves.
Unpublished Sources
Only a small proportion of the total documentation published in this volume was
found in the indexed Central Files of the Department of State. Documents which
came from those files are indicated by a file number, in the usual style of Foreign Relations. The great majority of documents in
this volume came either from unindexed files (i. e., special collections) within
the Department of State or from documentary collections outside the Department.
These sources are indicated by brief headnotes above each document. The files
and collections so indicated are described in the following paragraphs.
a. inside the department of state
1.
Bohlen Collection—This
collection consists of the Yalta minutes and documents collected by
2.
Hiss Collection—This collection
consists of the notes and documents pertaining to Yalta which were collected by
3.
Matthews Files—The files
accumulated in the office of
4.
UNA Files—The files of the Bureau
(Office) of United Nations Affairs (now the Bureau of International Organization
Affairs). These files contain a voluminous collection of documents regarding the
establishment of the United Nations and related subjects.
5. Executive Secretariat Files—These files provided the
only copy that could be found in the Department of State of the Yalta Briefing
Book.
6. L/T Files—The files of the Assistant Legal Adviser for
Treaty Affairs.
7.
EE Files—The files of the Office
(Division) of Eastern European Affairs.
8.
EUR Files—The files of the Bureau
(Office) of European Affairs.
9. Moscow Embassy Files—Certain files of the American
Embassy at Moscow for the period 1936–1950 which are now in the Department of
State.
10.
EAC Files—The files of the United
States Delegation to the European Advisory Commission, now in the Department of
State.
11.
FEC Files—The files of the Far Eastern
Commission, now in the Department of State.
b. outside the department of state
1. White House Files—From these files there was obtained a
copy of the booklet containing the Log of the President’s trip to Malta and
Yalta.
2. J. C. S. Files—The files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
These files provided not only Joint Chiefs of Staff material but also Combined
Chiefs of Staff documentation. The approval of the British Chiefs of Staff,
along with that of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, was obtained for the
declassification of Combined Chiefs of Staff documentation.
3. Defense Files—The files of the Secretaries and
Assistant Secretaries of War and Navy and other relevant files.
4. Treasury Files—The files of the Department of the
Treasury. One pre-Yalta paper printed in this volume was obtained from these
files.
5.
Roosevelt Papers—The papers of
President
6. Hopkins Papers—The papers of
Published Sources
In addition to the Department of State Bulletin, the two
official publications listed below were found to be the most convenient sources
for citations to previously published documents referred to in this volume:
Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939—1945
- Department of State Publication 3580 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949). Hereafter cited as “
Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation”.
A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941–49
- Senate Document No. 123, 81st Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950). Hereafter cited as “
Decade”.
The most authoritative unofficial publications containing basic data on the
conferences at Malta and Yalta are the following books,
James F. Byrnes ,Speaking Frankly(New York: Harper and Bros., 1947). Hereafter referred to as “Byrnes ”.
Winston S. Churchill ,Triumph and Tragedy(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), volume VI of the seriesThe Second World War. Hereafter referred to as “Churchill ”.
John R. Deane ,The Strange Alliance: The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia(New York: The Viking Press, 1947). Hereafter referred to as “Deane ”.
Ernest J. King andWalter Muir Whitehill ,Fleet Admiral(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1952). Hereafter referred to as “King : A Naval RecordKing ”.
William D. Leahy ,I Was There: The Personal History of the Chief of Staff to Presidents(New York: Whittlesey House, 1950). Hereafter referred to as “Roosevelt andTruman , Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the TimeLeahy ”.
Robert E. Sherwood ,(New York: Harper and Bros., 1948). Hereafter referred to as “Sherwood”.Roosevelt andHopkins : An Intimate History
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. ,(New York: Doubleday and Co., 1949). Hereafter referred to as “Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta ConferenceStettinius ”.
While much information is contained in these books that is not in the official record, it would be neither feasible nor appropriate to reproduce such material in this volume. Citations have been made to these books, however, for statements of fact which are specifically supplementary to, or at variance with, the official record as presented herein. A few other unofficial but authoritative books which touch on aspects of the pre-conference negotiations have also been cited at appropriate points in this volume.
Testimony given in congressional hearings by participants in the Malta and Yalta conferences has also been studied for factual additions to the record, and citations to such statements have been made at appropriate points in the volume.
Editorial Treatment
In the documents presented in this volume the editors have corrected only obvious typographic errors. All permissible variations in spelling, punctuation, and capitalization have been retained as in the original text. The data appearing in the headings and subscriptions of the original documents (place, date, addressee, method of transmission, and classification) have been harmonized by the editors into a reasonably standard pattern in the headings as printed herein. Any substantive titles appearing on the original documents have been retained.
The classification of the document (top secret, secret, confidential, or
restricted) is included in the printed heading if such information appears on
the document itself. It should be noted, however, that in 1944 and 1945 many
documents were not given any formal classification,
Most of the minutes and notes presented in this volume contained lists of participants for each meeting reported on. In order to avoid the useless repetition of such lists and to harmonize differences in spelling, the editors have compiled a single list of the names of participants for each meeting of each conference. A complete list of persons mentioned in the volume will be found on pages xxv–xxxviii, with indications as to whether they were present at Malta, at Yalta, or at both places during the time of the conferences.
All telegraphic instructions of the Department of State are issued over the name of the Secretary or Acting Secretary, although in many cases the name of the Secretary or Acting Secretary is actually signed by an appropriate official of lower rank who subscribes his own initials. In the telegrams printed in this volume, such initials have been retained as a part of the signature, with a bracketed indication in each case of the identity of the signing officer. Similarly, in the case of those third-person communications which are customarily initialed rather than signed, the initials have been retained, together with a bracketed indication of the name of the initialing officer.
In accordance with the customary practice in the Foreign
Relations series, a limited number of omissions are made in order (1)
to avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals, (2) to
protect defense information in accordance with Executive Order 10501, and (3) to
condense the record, as, e. g. by eliminating items that are merely repetitious,
or not germane. All deletions have been indicated by marks of ellipsis (three or
seven dots) at the appropriate points in the documents as printed.
A consolidated list of abbreviations, symbols, and code names will be found immediately following this introduction. A list of papers will be found beginning on page xxxix.
(This list does not include: standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.)
(Identification of a person in this list is limited to circumstances under reference in this volume. Names of persons which appear only as the authors of books or other writings cited in the volume are not included. The symbols which precede certain names in the list provide, so far as it has been possible to ascertain, the following information: An asterisk (*) indicates presence at Yalta during the time of the conference there. A dagger (†) indicates presence at Malta during the time of the conference there.)
I. Pre-conference documents
1. Arrangements for the Conferences
2. Negotiations and Recommendations on
Principal Subjects
establishment of the united nations organization
liberated europe and spheres of influence
relief activities in eastern europe ( unrra)
germany
Agreements Prepared in the European Advisory Commission
Political and Economic Policies Toward Germany
The Bremen–Bremerhaven Enclave
poland: government and boundaries
the balkans
yugoslavia: the tito-šubasšić
agreement
the italian cabinet crisis
the role of france
proposed united states loan to the soviet union
post-war trade policy
the turkish straits
iran: oil concessions and soviet pressure
china
post-war status of korea
entry of the soviet union into the war against japan
war criminals
liberated prisoners of war and civilians
shipping
agenda for military discussions
subjects for the conference communiqué
3. The Stettinius “Record”, December 1, 1944–January 23, 1945
4. Survey Reports on Soviet Attitudes and
Policies
II. THE MALTA CONFERENCE
5. The President’s Log at Malta
6. Minutes and Related Documents
III. THE YALTA CONFERENCE
7. The President’s Log at Yalta
8. Minutes and Related Documents
9. Other Conference Documents
10. Signed Agreements
exchange of notes
trilateral documents
bilateral document
11. Post-Conference Documents
Number 27. Top Secret and Personal. From the President for Marshal
Things are moving so fast and so successfully that I feel there should be
a meeting between you and Mr. Your Army is doing so
magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than
the one taken by Molotov two
years ago.
Personal and Top Secret for the President from
I recommend that you consider omitting from your message to Marshal
Number 29. Personal and Top Secret. From the President for Ambassador
Replying to your message ... [of July 18], you are authorized to delete before delivery the following sentence:
“Your Army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter
to Scotland than the one taken by
Secret and Personal from Premier
I share your thought about the desirability of a meeting between you, Mr.
However, I must say, that now, when the Soviet Armies are involved in battles on such a wide front, it would be impossible for me to leave the country and depart for a certain period of time from the conducting of front matters. All my colleagues consider it absolutely impossible.
Number 32. Top Secret and Personal. For Marshal
I can fully understand the difficulty of your coming to a conference with the Prime Minister and me in view of the rapid military progress now being made but I hope you can keep such a conference very much in mind and that we can meet as early as possible. Such a meeting would help me domestically and we are approaching the time for further strategical decisions.
Personal and Top Secret for the eyes of the President only from
This evening I explained to Marshal
Number 76. Top Secret and Personal from the President to Ambassador
Your number . . . [telegram of October 3] received.
Will you please deliver the following message to Marshal
“While I had hoped that the next meeting could have been between you,
Churchill and myself, I appreciate that the Prime Minister wishes to have an early conference with you.You, naturally, understand that in this global war there is literally no question, political or military, in which the United States is not interested. I am firmly convinced that the three of us, and only the three of us, can find the solution to the still unresolved questions. In this sense, while appreciating the Prime Minister’s desire for the meeting, I prefer to regard your forthcoming talks with
Churchill as preliminary to a meeting of the three of us which, so far as I am concerned, can take place any time after the elections here.In the circumstances, I am suggesting, if you and Mr.
Churchill approve, that our Ambassador in Moscow be present at your coming conference as an observer for me.Sherwood (p. 833) indicates that Naturally, Mr.Hopkins stopped the transmission of a previous draft of this telegram which would in effect have “letChurchill speak for the United States as well as for Great Britain”.Harriman would not be in a position to commit this Government relative to the important matters which you and the Prime Minister will, very naturally, discuss.You will, by this time, have received from General
Deane , the statement of our Combined Chiefs of Staff position relative to the war against JapanThe President evidently was referring to the Joint Chiefs of Staff position alluded to and I want to reiterate to you how completely I accept the assurances which you have given us on this point. Our three countries are waging a successful war against Germany and we can surely join together with no less success in crushing a nation that I am sure in my heart is as great an enemy of Russia as she is of ours.”infra.
The above message will indicate to you that I wish you to participate as an observer.
I can tell you quite frankly, but for you only and not to be communicated
under any circumstances to the British or the Russians, that I would
have very much preferred to have the next conference between the three
of us for the very reasons that I have stated to the Marshal. I should
hope that this bilateral conference be nothing more than a preliminary
exploration by the British and the Russians
I will expect you to come home immediately when the discussions are over
and, naturally, you will keep Mr.
Number 626, 4 October 1944, Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.
I can well understand the reasons why you feel that an immediate meeting
between yourself and Uncle
I am only sorry that I cannot be with you myself but I am prepared for a
meeting of the three of us any time after the elections here, for which
your meeting with Uncle
Like you, I attach the greatest importance to the continued unity of our three countries. I am sorry that I cannot agree with you, however, that the voting question should be raised at this time. That is a matter which the three of us can I am sure work out together and I hope you will postpone discussion of it until our meeting. There is after all no immediate urgency about this question which is so directly related to public opinion in the United States and Great Britain and in all the United Nations.
I am asking our military people in Moscow to make available to you our
Joint Chiefs’ statement to post, p. 362, footnote
2.
You carry my best wishes with you and I will eagerly await word of how it goes.
From: Marshal
To: The President
Your message of October 5thante, p. 6.
It is unknown to me with what questions Mr.
M 21412.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secret and Personal from Premier
1. During the stay of Mr.
2. Ambassador
Prime Minister to President
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Para 8. I was delighted to hear from U. J. that you had suggested a triple meeting towards the end of November at a Black Sea port. I think this a very fine idea, and hope you will let me know about it in due course. I will come anywhere you two desire.
Number 632, Personal and Top Secret, from the President to the Prime Minister.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The selection of a Black Sea port for our next meeting seems to be dependent upon our ability to get through the Dardanelles safely as I wish to proceed by ship. Do you think it is possible to get U. J. to come to Athens or Cyprus?
Prime Minister to President
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Para 2. U. J.’s doctors do not like him flying and I suppose there would
be the same difficulties in Russian warships coming out of the Black Sea
as of American and British warships coming in. One way clxxiii, pp.
213–241.
Number 100, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for Marshal
I am delighted to learn from your message dated October 19Ante, p. 9.
We all must investigate the practicability of various places where our meeting in November can be held, such as accessibility, living accommodations, security, etc., and I would appreciate suggestions from you.
I have been thinking about the practicability of Malta, Athens, or Cyprus if my getting into the Black Sea on a ship should be impracticable or too difficult. I prefer travelling and living on a ship.
We know that the living conditions and security in Malta and Cyprus
I am looking forward with much pleasure to seeing you again.
Please let me have your suggestions and advice.
Secret and Personal from Premier
I have received your message of October 25.supra.
If the idea that was expressed earlier about the possibility of our meeting on the Soviet Black Sea coast appears to be acceptable for you I would consider it extremely desirable to realize this plan. The conditions for a meeting there are absolutely favorable. I hope that by that time it will be also possible to provide a safe entrance of your vessel into the Black Sea. Since the doctors do not recommend to undertake any big trips at the present time, I have to give consideration to that.
I shall be glad to see you as soon as you find it possible to undertake the trip.
Number 641, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.
Referring to my 635,ante, pp.
11–12.
His doctors to whose opinion he must give consideration do not wish him to make any “big trips.”
He gave me no information as to location of the meeting, accessibility, living conditions, etc., except to express a hope that it will be possible to provide a safe entrance for my ship into the Black Sea.
He will be glad to see me as soon as I find it possible to make the trip.
I do not wish to go to the Black Sea if it can be avoided, first because the Congress will be in session at that time which makes it imperative that I be at all times within rapid mail communication with Washington by Air Mail, and, second because of sanitary conditions.
Dr.
What do you think of the possibility of our inducing U. J. to meet with us in Piraeus, Salonica, or Constantinople. Any of these would not be a “big trip” for him.
Please give me your advice as to the best date for the meeting from your point of view, together with any information you may have in regard to a suitable place for the meeting, danger from enemy action, living conditions, etc. I will take a ship to wherever we may go.
I fear that Uncle
All advice and assistance that you can contribute to the solution of this problem will be appreciated.
Personal and Top Secret from the Prime Minister to President
1. Your number 641. I send you in my immediately following the report
which I called for from the First Sea Lord.
2. I am somewhat attracted by the suggestion of Jerusalem. Here there are first-class hotels, government houses, etc., and every means can be taken to ensure security. The warships could probably lie at Haifa unless the weather turned very rough, in which case they could go to Port Said or Alexandria.
3. Alexandria would probably be a feasible proposition.
4. U. J. could come by special train, with every form of protection, from Moscow to Jerusalem. I am having the timetables of the journeys studied and will telegraph to you about them.
5. I think we ought to put the proposition to U. J., and throw on him the onus of refusing. After all, we are respectable people too.
6. In the event of his not coming, I earnestly hope you will pay your
long-promised and deferred visit to Great Britain and then visit your
armies in France. The right thing would be to have the conference
between us in Britain. I have trenched so often on your hospitality. We
could no doubt get
7. Perhaps you would send me a draft of the telegram we should send to
Number 648. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.
The more I think it over the more I get convinced that a meeting of the three of us just now may be a little less valuable than it would be after I am inaugurated on the twentieth of January. The location of a meeting now is very difficult. All my people advise strongly against the Black Sea. I do not think there is a chance that U J would agree to Jerusalem, Egypt or Malta.
But there is a real chance that by the end of January or early February he could get rail transportation to head of the Adriatic. He might be willing to come to Rome or the Riviera. I would of course stop in England going or returning. I do not think he wants to fly or take a very difficult and long rail journey to Haifa.
Incidentally it would be far easier for me as I am undergoing the throes of the old session and preparing for the new session on January third.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
What do you think of postponement? It appeals to me greatly. My best to you on your Parisian trip. Don’t turn up in French clothes.
Prime Minister to President
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Your number 648.
I am very sorry that you are inclined to make no further effort to procure a triple meeting in December, and I will send you a separate telegram making some further suggestions about this.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Number 124, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for Marshal
All three of us are of one mind—that we should meet very soon, but problems chiefly geographical do not make this easy at this moment. I can, under difficulties, arrange to go somewhere now in order to get back here by Christmas but, quite frankly, it will be far more convenient if I could postpone it until after the Inauguration which is on January twentieth.
My Navy people recommend strongly against the Black Sea. They do not want
to risk a capital ship through the Aegean or the Dardanelles, as it
would involve a very large escort much needed elsewhere.
Furthermore, I have at this time a great hesitation in leaving here while my old Congress is in its final days, with the probability of its not adjourning finally until December fifteenth. Also, I have to be here, under the Constitution, to send the Annual Message to the new Congress which meets here in early January.
What I am suggesting is that we should all meet about the twenty-eighth
or thirtieth of January, and I should hope that by that time you will
have rail travel to some port on the Adriatic and that we
Almost any place in the Mediterranean is accessible to me so that I can be within easy air distance of Washington in order to carry out action on Legislation—a subject with which you are familiar. I must be able to get Bills or Resolutions sent from here and returned within ten days.
I hope that your January military operations will not prevent you from coming at that time, and I do not think that we should delay the meeting longer than the end of January or early February.
Of course, if in the meantime the Nazi Army or people should disintegrate quickly, we would have to meet earlier, though I should much prefer the meeting at the end of January.
A further suggestion as to a place would be one on the Riviera but this would be dependent on the withdrawal of German troops from northwestern Italy. I wish you would let me know your thoughts on this.
I hope to talk over many things with you. We understand each other’s problems and, as you know, I like to keep these discussions informal, and I have no reason for formal agenda.
My Ambassador in China, General
My warmest regards to you.
Number 649, Personal and Top Secret from the President for the Prime Minister.
Your 822.Ante, p. 15, and
post, pp.
284–286.supra.post, p. 286.
... I shall be glad to have your views about the time and place of our next meeting.
Prime Minister to President
1. Naturally I am very sorry to receive your numbers 649Supra.
2. Your message to U. J. will, of course, make it certain that he will not come anywhere before the end of January. Also you yourself give independently the important reasons which make it difficult for you to come earlier.
3. These reasons, I fear, destroy the hope which we had cherished that you would now pay your long-promised visit to Great Britain, and that we two could meet here in December and ask U. J. to send Molotov, who would be an adequate deputy. It is a great disappointment to me that this prospect should be indefinitely postponed.
4. There is, in my opinion, much doubt whether U. J. would be willing or able to come to an Adriatic port by January 30th, or that he would be willing to come on a non-Russian vessel through this extremely heavily-mined sea. However, if he accepts we shall, of course, be there. I note you do not wish the French to be present. I had thought they might come in towards the end in view of their vital interests in the arrangements made for policing Germany, as well as in all questions affecting the Rhine frontiers.
5. Even if a meeting can be arranged by the end of January, the two and a
half intervening months will be a serious hiatus. There are many
important matters awaiting settlement, for example, the treatment of
Germany and the future world organization, relations with France, the
position in the Balkans, as well as the Polish question, which ought not
to be left to moulder.post, pp. 286–287.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Personal and Secret from Premier
It is greatly regretted that your naval organs doubt the expedience of your initial supposition that the Soviet coast of the Black Sea should be chosen as the meeting place for the three of us. The suggested by you date of the meeting at the end of January or beginning of February has no objections on my part, but at the same time I have in mind that we shall succeed in choosing as a meeting place one of the Soviet port cities. I still have to take into consideration the advice of the doctors about the danger of long trips.
I still hope, however, that we shall succeed, if not right now, then somewhat later to agree finally upon an acceptable for all of us meeting place.
I am sending you my very best wishes.
Number 658. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.
Your 825.Ante, p.
17.ante,
p. 16, footnote 3.
He expresses regret that my Naval advisors doubt the expediency of meeting on the shore of the Black Sea. He does not object to a meeting at the end of January or the beginning of February, but he has in mind that we shall choose as a meeting place one of the Soviet port cities. He must consider the opinion of his doctors that a long trip would be a danger to him.
He hopes that we will now or soon finally agree upon a meeting place that will be acceptable to all of us.
I have a feeling that we will not succeed in getting U. J. to travel
beyond the Black Sea unless the Germans should have surrendered by that
time.post, p.
287.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Prime Minister to President
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Your 658. I agree with your conclusion that U. J. will not travel
beyond the Black Sea but I am sure the ports there will be unfit for us
until the winter has passed.post, pp. 287–288.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Number 672. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I think I can leave after Inauguration Day. I hoped that Uncle
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Personal and Top Secret for the President from
I talked with Marshal
Personal and Secret for the President from
Supplementing my . . . [telegram of December 14] sent last night
reporting on my talk with
He brought the subject of the meeting up himself and indicated that he was anxious to have it take place promptly after the inauguration.
Number 676, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.
I am today sending to
Please let me have your opinion as to the possibilities of this plan from your point of view.
“If
Stalin cannot manage to meet us in the Mediterranean I am prepared to go to the Crimea and have the meeting at Yalta which appears to be the best place available in the Black Sea having the best accommodations ashore and the most promising flying conditions.We would arrive by plane from some Mediterranean port and would send in advance a naval vessel to Sevastopol to provide necessary service and living accommodations if it should be necessary for me to live on board ship.
I would plan to leave America very soon after the inauguration on a naval vessel. You will be informed later of a date of arrival that will be satisfactory to
Churchill and to me. My party will be numerically equal to that which was present at Teheran, about 35 total.I still hope the military situation will permit Marshal
Stalin to meet us half way.”
Personal and Top Secret for the President from
In a talk with Supra.
To the President from
I told
Prime Minister to President
Your 676.Ante, p.
21.
Number 682. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.
Your 861Supra.
I will give you accurate dates as soon as details are worked out.
My thought now is to send a Naval ex-passenger ship to the Black Sea to provide services and living accommodations if necessary. This ship could berth in Sevastopol if necessary because of weather.
Information from
It is my intention to take with me about 35 persons, including Joint
Staff, personal staff, Secret Service, servants, etc.post, p.
462, and
I will give you more detailed information in the near future.
Prime Minister to President
Your 682:—
I will certainly meet you at Yalta. We are preparing to send a small
signal ship to Sebastopol, also a civil liner for accommodation if later
information indicates that this is necessary to supplement quarters on
shore. It will be necessary for me to take with me about the same
numbers as attended the last Quebec conference.Argonaut
Number 685, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.
Referring to your 861Ante, p.
23.
Admiral
Is there any reason why I should not transfer from ship to plane at Malta which might involve remaining overnight?
We are working on the details and hope to give you full information in the early future.
Number 153, Personal and Top Secret, from the President to Ambassador
Replying to your . . . [telegrams of December 26, 27, and 28],Ante, pp. 21–23, and p. 23,
first footnote.
My party for which suitable arrangements should be made will be as follows:
Fleet Admiral
My personal group will be Vice Admirals
I may be able to bring
The total number from here will be about seventy.
About a week before our arrival at Crimea it is my present intention to send a naval auxiliary not a combatant man of war to anchor off Yalta or in Sevastopol if necessary to provide services, etc. She will act as supply ship and communication center. She can provide some furniture from cabins to make up for any deficiencies and also certain standard food supplies.
We will arrive in four or five airplanes of the C–54 type. There should be a daily mail plane from Cairo of the Army C–54 or smaller type.
Prime Minister to President
We shall be delighted if you will come to Malta. I shall be waiting on the quay. You will also see the inscription of your noble message to Malta of a year ago. Everything can be arranged to your convenience. No more let us falter! From Malta to Yalta! Let nobody alter!
Number 688. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.
Your 871. We plan to arrive by ship at Malta early forenoon 1 February and hope to proceed at once by plane without faltering. It will be grand to meet you on the quay.
Number 690, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.
Your 868.Ante, p.
24.
I have also informed
Your suggestion of “Argonaut
In considering itinerary of visit to Black Sea, it has developed much to my regret that because of my extended absence from Washington it is necessary for me to postpone my projected visit to the United Kingdom until a later date.
I will make every effort to arrange to visit the U. K. in May or June.
Memorandum for Vice
Admiral Cooke:
Subject: Details of White House Arrangements for Argonaut
1. The Prime Minister and Ambassador
2. The State Department has been informed that the Catoctin will leave Naples on 22 January for Sevastopol and
that the passage of the Dardanelles will be made about 24–25 January.
She has been described as a naval auxiliary non-combatant vessel. The
State Department has been directed to inform the President of Turkey of
our intention and to arrange for the Catoctin’s
passage of the Dardanelles and of the Bosporus.
3. It is requested that appropriate instructions be issued to the Catoctin to carry out the above and that
appropriate instructions also
4. It might be well for her to transport some army jeeps for use of the mission.
Prime Minister to President Ante, p.
27.
In none of your telegrams about Argonaut
Would it not be possible for you to spend 2 or 3 nights at Malta and let
the staffs have a talk together unostentatiously? Also,
We are very sorry indeed you will not come to our shores on this journey.
We should feel it very much and a very dismal impression would be made
if you were to visit France before you come to Britain: In fact, it
would be regarded as a slight on your closest ally. I gather however
that you will only go the [to] the Mediterranean
and Black Sea, in which case it is merely a repetition of Teheran.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prime Minister to President
Argonaut
If you do not wish to spend more than one night at Malta, it could surely
be arranged that both our Chiefs of Staffs should arrive there say a
couple of days before us and have their preliminary discussions. We
would then all proceed by air to Argonaut
Number 692, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.
Your 874 and 875. I am informed by
Preparations are being made to take care of us and our Staff in undamaged houses in Yalta. I will send my ship to Sevastopol to arrive three or four days in advance of my arrival.
There is a chance that weather might permit of the ship’s anchoring off the place of meeting.
With favorable weather at sea I can arrive Malta February second, and it is necessary to proceed by air the same day in order to keep the date with U. J.
That is why I regret that in view of the time available to me for this
journey it will not be possible for us to meet your suggestion and have
a British-American Staff meeting at Malta before proceeding to ArgonautArgonaut
I am envious of your visits to the great battlefront which are denied to me by distance.
Number 159, Personal and Top Secret, from the President to Ambassador
Please inform
It is assumed that you will provide from Moscow the number of Russian speaking American officers necessary to handle at the conference details of our contacts with local Soviet officials.
Mr.
It appears probable that our party at Yalta from here will number eighty instead of seventy as previously stated.
Please inform us as soon as possible in regard to the housing arrangements for my party and also regarding the provision of a motor car for my personal use.
Personal and Top Secret for the President from
I have communicated to Marshal Supra.Argonaur’ for the projected meeting”
(Roosevelt Papers).Milepost
Planning Staff, General
Prime Minister to President
1. I am still thinking it of high importance that our military men should
get together for a few days before we arrive at Argonaut
2. Even further to this I would add that there would be great advantages
in a preliminary conference of about a week’s duration between the
foreign ministers. If these could be gathered at the Pyramids or
Alexandria, about which arrangements are very easy, and could join us at
Argonaut
3. What are your ideas of the length of our stay at Argonaut
No. 881. Prime Minister to President. Personal and Top Secret.
1. Please see paragraph one of my Nr. 880. In spite of your Ante, p.
29.Argonaut
2. We cannot tell what the flying will be from Malta onward and you may
easily have to wait an extra day in Malta. However if our staffs have
covered some of the ground, we can spend this day discussing with them.
Uncle
Number 696, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the Prime Minister.
Your 880 and 881. I have directed Marshall, King and
In regard to an advance conference between the foreign ministers and the
Secretary of State in view of my absence from Washington during the time
required to proceed by sea to Malta, it is impracticable for
He will join me at Malta and be with us in Argonaut
My idea of the length of stay at Argonaut
I am very desirous of keeping our date with U. J. if it can possibly be done.
Sent to the United States Naval Attaché, London, via Navy channels.
Prime Minister to President
Your Number 696.
1. Thank you very much about the Combined Chiefs of Staff’s preliminary meeting.
2.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Personal and Top Secret for the President from
ante, p. 30, footnote 3.
The following draft reply to
“Receipt is acknowledged of your . . . [five telegrams dated January 11].
One of the telegrams under reference is the message printed supra. Another has not been found. The other three dealt with identification cards for Americans going to Yalta living accommodations at Yalta, and the travel arrangements referred to inLeahy ’s drafts reply.I will be pleased to see you at Malta and learn from you of the latest developments in your area.
I expect to depart Malta for
February second. Argonaut
Stettinius will not visit Moscow prior to or immediately following. ArgonautIt is not considered advisable for you to urge
Stalin to bring his military staff with him. He will undoubtedly bring those that he wants without urging by us.”It is not known whether this proposed message was sent by Roosevelt toHarriman .
Number 699, Personal and Top Secret, from the President to the Prime Minister.
Your 884.Ante, p.
33.
It is my present intention to send
Prime Minister to President
1. Shall we not have to warn the Turks of the impending arrival of the two ships? We could indeed argue that they are “merchant vessels” for the purposes of the Montreux Convention, with purely defensive armament and not bound on any exclusively military mission. They could thus in theory arrive unannounced at the Straits; but the Turks could still insist on stopping and examining them, and in fact they would be obliged under Article Three to stop for sanitary inspection, which might lead to anything.
2. Should we not tell President Inonu about them at the latest possible
moment, for his own strictly personal information, and ask him to give
all the orders necessary to ensure that the ships shall pass
From: Admiral
To: The President (
I have sent the following message to Prime in reply to his 886 (
“Your 886. I have directed the State Department to take such action at an appropriate time through
Steinhardt with the Turkish Government as is necessary to insure passage to the Black Sea without delay or interference of the ‘Naval auxiliaryCatoctin, not a combatant vessel’ and also four smaller Naval vessels which are really mine sweepers and which the Navy wishes to send to the Black Sea.“We will have
Steinhardt give the Turks identical information regarding the passage of American airplanes to be used by my party and for daily mail trips. SignedRoosevelt .”The message quoted was sent as telegram “Number 700, Personal and Top Secret from the President for the Prime Minister”, dated January 13, 1945.
Pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of State, Ambassador
Steinhardt made the necessary arrangements with the Turkish Prime Minister (Roosevelt Papers,Stettinius toSteinhardt , Nos. 169 and 174, January 16 and 18, 1945, andSteinhardt toStettinius , January 19 and 20, 1945).
Prime Minister to President, personal and Top Secret nr 889.
1. Anthony is very pleased that Cricket if possible on the 31st instant. He will be there to
receive him.
2. I will meet you there on your arrival. I must point out however that
thereafter the weather will be our master. I have received from
Magneto on the 2nd. Ought
we not to make it clear that we are governed by weather? My air staff
are considering the possible alternatives for the onward flight and I
will telegraph their views as soon as possible, but it seems likely that
unless you can arrive at Cricket on the 1st we
shall not meet U. J. till the 3rd.
3. I am delighted that you will send
Number 168, Top Secret for Ambassador
In addition to myself and Argonaut
(Personal and Top Secret for the President from
I am sure that you will be well satisfied with the accommodations for
yourself and the principal members of your party. You will be in the
Livadia summer palace of the Czar where are two principal buildings one
of 21 rooms and one of 41 rooms and a third building formerly I
understand for the guards. I am not yet certain about accommodations for
the recent large increased number of the military group. I first told
Catoctin
can only be based at Sevastopol.
Number 167, Top Secret and Personal, for Ambassador
Referring to Supra.
I hope that you will be able to arrange, without offending the Russians,
for the setting up of my personal mess ashore and the use of my stewards
and cooks. I desire this in order to maintain my usual diet. Our
supplies will be obtained from the Catoctin.
(Personal and Top Secret for the President from
Reference cable ... [of January 16], White House number 167, in my first
talk with Ante, p.
36.
Day before yesterday at the White House at a meeting between Mr.
It was decided that if any press or other inquiries are made as to the whereabouts of any official whose movements are directly or indirectly connected with the meeting a reply should be simply “He is out of town”, and no further background information or explanation should be given. The Secretary has requested that this be followed throughout the Department in answering any inquries as to the whereabouts of any State Department officials.
cc to Mr.
Prime Minister to President
I suggest that the press should be entirely excluded from Argonaut
There will of course be the usual agreement communiqué, or communiqués.
I am sending a similar telegram to U. J.
Number 704, Personal and Top Secret, for the Prime Minister from the President.
I am in full agreement with the suggestion regarding press
representatives and photographers made in your 891.
Number 178, Top Secret and Personal, from the President to Marshal
I have decided to not have any press representatives at Argonaut
Prime Minister
Prime Minister to President
It would be a great pity if Cricket and if we do not have them with us at
Magneto.Magneto as well as Cricket and if they have to be absent from either, it should
be Cricket.
The above of course is subject to battle exigencies.
Nr 2064 to Map Room White House from
“Have had very satisfactory visit London. Leaving for Paris tomorrow.
Churchill well. He says that if we had spent ten years on research, we could not have found a worse place in the world thanMagnetobut that he feels that he can survive it by bringing an adequate supply of whisky. He claims it is good for typhus and deadly on lice which thrive in those parts. Sorry to hear thatWatson seasick as usual. Regards to all. SignedHarry .”
Number 706, Personal and Top Secret from the President to the Prime Minister.
Thank you for your 893
The approaches to Argonaut
I agree that we must notify U. J. as soon as we can fix our schedule in the light of present information.
In view of the fact that this volume is to be published prior to the
annual Foreign Relations volumes for the years
1944 and 1945 it was felt desirable to present in this chapter a
collection of documents designed to show in broad outline the
pre-conference status of the principal subjects which came up for
discussion at Malta or Yalta. In general, the pre-conference period as
defined for the purposes of this volume is the period, extending back
into the mid-autumn of 1944, during which the plans and policies for the
forthcoming tripartite conference were being developed. For all subjects
treated in this chapter, the editors have endeavored to find and include
primarily those key documents which highlight the nature of each problem
and show the policy position taken by the United States Government on
each major issue that subsequently came up for consideration at Malta
and Yalta. In view of the present limitations of time and space, a
fuller coverage of these subjects will have to await the appearance of
the annual Foreign Relations volumes for the
years of World War II.
Although the Combined Chiefs of Staff had an agenda for the military
discussions at Malta and Yalta (post, pp. 424–426)
there was no fixed agenda for the political discussions at either
conference. For several months preceding the conferences, however, a
number of subjects were considered in the diplomatic correspondence and
in correspondence within the United States Government as subjects which
should be taken up at the forthcoming conference or conferences of the
heads of government. All subjects of this type have been included in
this chapter, and particular effort has been made to include under these
topics all significant documents which were prepared in anticipation of
the forthcoming “Big Three” meeting. For some subjects, of course, there
were no significant, high-level negotiations in the several months
immediately preceding the conferences.
Also included are papers from the so-called Yalta Briefing Book which was
prepared for the use of Secretary
The great majority of Briefing Book papers are undated. A number of them
were completed as early as November 1944, as evidenced by the following
excerpt from a memorandum, dated November 10, 1944, from the Director of
the Office of European Affairs (post, pp. 47–48, 283–284.
“Preparation for Big Three Meeting
1. You now have the policy papers on U. S. policy and attitudes toward Eastern Europe, the Balkan area, and the Near East, which relate to possible clashes of interests between the Soviet and British Governments. These policy papers include the general position of the U. S. with respect to protection of the persons and property of its nationals in those areas and have specific recommendations with regard to the policy and attitudes we should pursue toward the Polish situation, the Yugoslav situation, Rumania, Hungary, Albania, and the countries of the Near and Middle East. I think these memoranda should be brought to the President’s attention, probably not long before his conference with the Prime Minister and
Stalin . On the trip to the conference would be the ideal time to bring them to his attention as there would then be an opportunity to discuss these situations and the positions we should adopt in order to protect American interests.”
On January 10, 1945 the Executive Secretary of the Secretary’s Staff
Committee (
“At the Secretary’s Staff Committee meeting of January 10, the Secretary asked that all memoranda for the President on topics to be discussed at the Meeting of the Big Three should be in the hands of Mr.
Alger Hiss not later than Monday, January 15. These memoranda should go to Mr.Hiss through Mr.Yost .”
Secretary
“Memorandum for the President
Subject: Political matters for discussion at the forthcoming meeting
For your convenience I am attaching hereto an extra copy of the
memorandum that I left with you in the black binder this morning
Secret
1. Soviet-British agreement to compromise on the voting procedure of the Security Council along the lines of the United States proposal.
2. Soviet-British agreement to the proposed establishment of an emergency European high commission composed of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France.
3. Soviet participation in working out a common allied political program for liberated Europe on the basis of which the emergency high commission would operate.
4. Soviet-British agreement to the short term and long term political and economic treatment of Germany as outlined in the United States proposals.
5. Soviet agreement to a solution of the Polish problem which would insure the emergence of a free, independent, and democratic Poland For this purpose pending elections in Poland the establishment of an interim government which would be broadly representative of the Polish people and acceptable to all the major allies.
6. Soviet agreement to permit
7. Soviet agreement to a clarification of the status and responsibilities of the United States representation on the Allied Control Commissions in former enemy countries which have surrendered to the Soviet Armies.
8. Soviet agreement, in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration
on Iran of December 1, 1943,Post, pp.
748–749.
9. Soviet-British agreement to the desirability and the common
interest of bringing about the maximum degree of unity in China and
for this purpose Soviet undertaking to use their influence with the
Chinese Communists to further an agreement between the national
Government and the Chinese Communists along the lines of General
10. A common policy between the three countries in regard to the question of the rearming of the Western European democracies in the postwar period.”
For background information on this subject, see Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation. The following excerpts
from this publication (pp. 374–375) summarize the situation at the
outset of the pre-Yalta negotiations:
“It will be recalled that when the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals
The Dumbarton Oaks conversations on the organization of international security took place in Washington between August 21 and October 7, 1944. For the text of the resulting Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, dated October 7, 1944, see Department of State were published, October 9, 1944, not only the voting question but several other questions bad been left ‘open’ and that a full United Nations Conference was contemplated as soon as agreement had been reached on certain of these questions among the governments that had taken part in the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. . . .Bulletin, October 8, 1944, vol.xi, pp. 368–374; orPostwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 611–619.. . . work on the six open questions began promptly after October 9, . . .
The superior committee [in the Department of State] was composed of Acting Secretary
Stettinius , presiding, and Messrs.Hackworth ,Dunn ,Pasvolsky , andWilson , with the executive assistance ofG. Hayden Raynor . . . Mr.Stettinius was able to report in the first meeting of this committee on November 1, 1944, that the President’s general plan was to cover all the open items requiring decision in a conference with Prime MinisterChurchill and MarshalStalin but that arrangements for such a conference were not completed. . . .”
The attached drafts of two memoranda to the President have been
prepared in response to directions given by Mr.
He has asked that both drafts be circulated at this time to you and
to Messrs.
Memorandum to the President
Subject: Questions Left Unsettled At Dumbarton Oaks.
For your convenience I am listing hereunder the questions which
still have to be settled in connection with the establishment of
a world security organization.
It would appear that some of these matters had best be settled by your own direct action in such manner as you yourself determine; others may lend themselves readily to settlement by more routine diplomatic action undertaken by the Department. I should appreciate an early opportunity to discuss with you the methods which you feel should be followed to accomplish settlement of the above open items.
I am attaching hereto a brief supplementary memorandum which sets
forth our recommendations as to the position this Government
should take at this time on the most difficult of the unsettled
items, namely the extent of the veto power to be accorded to
permanent
Supplementary Memorandum
Subject: Recommended Position On the Question of Veto Power of Permanent Members
1. Procedures of the
Council.
The Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security and to this end two main types of procedure are specified in some detail in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. First, the Council is authorized to facilitate the pacific settlement of disputes between nations. Secondly, the Council is authorized to take diplomatic, economic or military measures to maintain peace and security.
2. Preferred American
position.
It is recommended that from the point of view of American interests the most desirable rule as to the veto power of permanent members would be to eliminate, in the first category of procedures, the power of veto on the part of any such member involved in a dispute, but to provide that unanimity of the permanent members must prevail before any action can be taken by the Council in the second category of procedures. Under such a formula judicial and quasi-judicial procedures would be based on the traditional Anglo-American principle that a party to a dispute should not be able to prevent consideration of that dispute. At the same time this formula would insure, among other desirable objectives, express statement of the right of the United States to prevent any use of its armed forces without its specific consent.
3. Soviet and British
positions.
The Soviet Government can be expected to maintain strongly its position that the rule of unanimity of permanent members should prevail in both categories of procedures in the Council.
The British position at Dumbarton Oaks was that in both types of procedures a permanent member, if involved in a dispute, should be deprived of its power of veto. As you are aware, we have received, since the conclusion of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, information indicating that the British position now coincides with the Soviet position.
4. Recommended alternative
American position.
In the event that it should prove impossible to obtain the agreement of both the Soviet and the British Governments to our preferred position, it is recommended that we reluctantly accept the unqualified principle of unanimity of permanent members in both categories of procedures, provided this rule is explicitly adopted only as a provisional and temporary measure. The duration of such a measure might be (1) for a fixed number of years, or (2) subject to reconsideration by the Council after a fixed number of years, or (3) for such time as the present number and distribution of permanent seats on the Council continue. It is believed that such a frankly temporary and provisional arrangement would not be in violation of our principles and, if necessary to obtain establishment of the organization, would be acceptable to public opinion in this country and elsewhere.
Memorandumante, p. 42, and post, pp.
283–284.
Preparation for Big Three Meeting
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. The questions having to do with the International Organization I
shall leave to Leo,
4. We would not lose anything by dropping Section A out of the document as the principle and purpose and the whole spirit of the document call repeatedly for the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and prohibit the use of force or the threat of force in such disputes. We would still have the World Court and the assembly could debate or discuss any situation which they thought might, if continued, give rise to a threat to the peace. So if we eliminate Section A, we would eliminate all the discussion about the voting procedure in connection with the discussion of disputes, while at the same time the discussion could be held in the assembly under the proposals, as now drafted, and we would concentrate the question of voting on the really crucial point of the whole International Organization, which is enforcement action of any kind whatsoever in connection with a threat to, or a breach of, the peace. If you will sit down and read over again the two sections of Chapter 8, Section A and Section B, you will find there is no action provided for in Section A—merely recommendations—so that by eliminating Section A you would merely leave the authority to make recommendations in the assembly, where it now is, up to the time the Council might wish to take a matter over. As you recall, all the enforcement action is in Section B, so, therefore, if Section A were eliminated, as I said before, we could very well accept the Russian position as to Section B, as it is already half of our compromise proposal.
5. Summary. Try to have the compromise
proposal adopted. If the Russians hold firmly to their position and
will not accede to the compromise, then consider eliminating Section
A completely from the document, leaving Section B and accept the
Russian position as to Section B.
Matters To Discuss With the President
World Security Organization
1. The Next Step
2. Open Items
a. Voting in Security Council
1. We recommend acceptance of formula giving each member one vote;
procedural matters decided by affirmative vote of 7 members;
b. Initial Membership
1. Try to get “Associated Nations” in Latin America to join United Nations—This means declarations of war.
2. Failing that, stick to our guns that Associated Nations be invited.
3. In any event, oppose X.
c. Location
1. We recommend for headquarters an internationalized district
comprising a strip of Swiss territory on which League and
d. International Trusteeships
1. We be authorized to study further with military and naval authorities and if you approve, to exchange proposals with U. K., U. S. S. R., and China prior to the general conference.
e. Drafting of Court Statute
1. We tentatively agreed at Dumbarton Oaks to have experts meet several weeks prior to general conference to draft statute.
f. Termination of League
1. British and Chinese studying. They have promised to give us their conclusions.
3. Congressional Groups—May I have discussions
with them[?]—Especially on voting procedure.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Questions Left Unsettled at Dumbarton Oaks
There are six principal questions which need to be settled in
connection with the establishment of the United Nations
organization. They are as follows:
There are attached hereto recommendations as regards the first four of these questions.
As regards the Court statute, it was tentatively agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that a group of legal experts would meet two or three weeks prior to the opening of the Conference to draft the document.
As regards procedure for the termination of the League of Nations, the British and the Chinese governments have appointed committees to work on this subject and have promised to communicate their conclusions to us.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Voting Procedure in the Security Council
Background
There are three issues involved in this connection, as follows:
The Russians took the position that the Council should make decisions by a simple majority vote; that unanimity of the permanent members should be required, except on procedural questions; and that the unanimity rule should prevail even when one of the permanent members is a party to a dispute.
The British took the position that the Council’s decisions should be by a two-thirds majority vote, except that procedural questions might be settled by a simple majority vote; that unanimity of the permanent members should be required on all substantive matters; and that parties to a dispute should not vote.
The Chinese position was similar to the British.
In accordance with your instructions, our delegation took a position similar to the British, except that we expressed our willingness to accept either a simple majority or a two-thirds majority.
In the course of the Dumbarton discussions, in order to meet the
conflicting views, proposals were tentatively made that decisions
should require the affirmative votes of seven members, rather than
of six members, as would be the case under a simple majority rule,
or of eight members, as would be the case under a two-thirds rule;
Recommendation
It is recommended that
This government accept the formula embodied in
the attached draft of a proposal on this subject and seek to
obtain the acceptance of that formula by Soviet Russia and the
United Kingdom.
The proposed formula is essentially along the lines of the compromise solution discussed at Dumbarton Oaks. It provides that parties to a dispute should abstain from voting in those decisions of the Council which relate to the investigation of disputes, to appeals by the Council for peaceful settlement of disputes, and to recommendations by the Council as to methods and procedures of settlement. It retains the unanimity rule for decisions relating to the determination of the existence of threats to the peace or breaches of the peace and to the suppression of such threats or breaches.
This proposal should be acceptable to this country, since no party to a dispute would sit as a judge in its own case so long as judicial or quasi-judicial procedures are involved, but would participate fully in procedures involving political rather than judicial determination. It should be acceptable to Soviet Russia because it meets her desire that no action be taken against her without her consent.
Proposal for Section C of the Chapter on
the Security Council
C. Voting
1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Section VIII A and under paragraph 1 of Section VIII C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Invitations to the Conference and Initial Membership
Background
There are two issues involved in this connection, as follows:
The Soviet delegation took the position that only the signatories of the United Nations Declaration be invited to the Conference. They raised no objection to the inclusion by the Conference of other nations in the list of initial members, but placed themselves on record as insisting on the inclusion of the initial membership of the sixteen Soviet Republics.
In accordance with your instructions, we took the position that invitations should be sent to the forty-four nations which had been invited to the previous conferences (list attached) and that we could not accede to the Soviet demand for the inclusion of the sixteen republics as members of the organization.
The British and Chinese delegations supported our position fully in both respects.
Recommendation
It is recommended that
1. We take steps to induce the six American
Republics now listed as “associated” nations (Chile, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) to qualify as United
Nations by declaring war on Japan or Germany, or both; and
2. Failing this, we continue to maintain the
position taken at Dumbarton Oaks.
List of Nations Which Participated in Hot
Springs, and Bretton Woods Conferences
United Nations
States or Authorities Associated with the
United Nations in the War
Observers
Danish Minister at Washington, attending in a personal capacity
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Location of The United Nations Organization
Background
This question was not formally discussed at Dumbarton Oaks, although there were some exchanges of views. The Soviet delegation objected to Geneva. One of the Soviet delegates very informally suggested Prague. The British and the Chinese raised no objection to Geneva, but had no positive suggestions.
We had a group of our own working on the question. It is recommended
that, while the Assembly, the Council, and the various conferences
Recommendation
It is recommended that:
This government urge the proposal that the
headquarters of the Organization be in an internationalized
Swiss-French District as suggested above.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Arrangements for International Trusteeship
Background
This question was not discussed at Dumbarton Oaks because of the desire of our Joint Chiefs of Staff that it not be discussed. The Soviet, British, and Chinese delegations expressed a desire that it be taken up at a later date, and we undertook to give consideration to the question of whether the matter should be postponed until the Conference or a preliminary exchange of papers take place before the Conference.
The Department of State has already prepared tentative proposals on this subject.
Recommendation
It is recommended that
1. The Department of State proceed, in
consultation with the military and naval authorities, to a
further examination of the tentative proposals; and
2. It be authorized, if you approve the
proposals, to transmit them to the British, Soviet, and Chinese
Governments prior to the convocation of the Conference.
Memorandum to the President
Subject: Further Steps with Respect to Items Left Open at the Dumbarton Oaks Meeting
There are two items left open at the Dumbarton Oaks meeting on which
agreement is necessary between the Governments of the United States,
the Soviet Union and Great Britain before a Conference of the United
Nations can be called to draft a Charter of The United Nations
Organization. The Government of China will undoubtedly go along with
any agreement thus reached. The two items are:
The following alternative steps for seeking agreement on these items
appear to be open to us:
Subject: Questions Left Unsettled at Dumbarton Oaks
Mr.
Voting Procedure
The President thereupon examined the memorandum entitled “Voting
Procedure in the Security Council”Ante, pp.
50–51.
Invitations to the Conference
The President then read the memorandum entitled “Invitations to the
Conference and Initial Membership.”Ante, pp.
52–53.Bulletin,
January 3, 1942, vol. vi, pp. 3–4; or
Decade, pp. 2–3.
In reply to the Under Secretary’s question as to whether or not he
remembered ever authorizing or instructing the Department to tell
the American Republics that it was not necessary for them to declare
Location
On the question of the location of the United Nations
Organization,Ante, p.
53–54.
International Trusteeship
With respect to arrangements for international trusteeship,Ante, p.
54.
He approved the recommendation that the Department of State proceed, in consultation with the military and naval authorities, to a further examination of tentative proposals on the subject of trusteeship. After the studies have been completed, he wants to take up again the question of our transmitting the papers to the British, Soviet and Chinese Governments.
Further Steps
The President also read the memorandum entitled “Further Steps with
Respect to Items Left Open at Dumbarton Oaks Meeting.”Supra.
2784. For the Urgent and Personal Attention of the Ambassador.
1. Please arrange to call in person on Marshal
“In view of the fact that prospects for an early meeting between us are still unsettled and because of my conviction, with which I am sure you agree, that we must move forward as quickly as possible in the convening of a general conference of the United Nations on the subject of international organization, I am asking Ambassador
Harriman to deliver this message to you and to discuss with you on my behalf the important subject of voting procedure in the Security Council. This and other questions will, of course, have to be agreed between us before the general conference will be possible. I am also taking up this matter with Mr.Churchill .After giving this whole subject further consideration, I now feel that the substance of the following draft provision should be eminently satisfactory to everybody concerned:
proposal for section c of the chapter on the security councilC.
Voting1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A, and under paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.
You will note that this calls for the unanimity of the permanent members in all decisions of the Council which relate to a determination of a threat to the peace and to action for the removal of such a threat or for the suppression of aggression or other breaches of the peace. I can see, as a practical matter, that this is necessary if action of this kind is to be feasible, and I am, therefore, prepared to accept in this respect the view expressed by your Government in its memorandum on an international security organization presented at the Dumbarton Oaks meeting. This means, of course, that in decisions of this character each permanent member would always have a vote.
At the same time, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals also provide in Chapter VIII, Section A, for judicial or other procedures of a recommendatory character which the Security Council may employ in promoting voluntary peaceful settlement of disputes. Here, too, I am satisfied that recommendations of the Security Council will carry far greater weight if they are concurred in by the permanent members.
But I am also convinced that such procedures will be effective only if the Great Powers exercise moral leadership by demonstrating their fidelity to the principles of justice, and, therefore, by accepting a provision under which, with regard to such procedures, all parties to a dispute should abstain from voting. I firmly believe that willingness on the part of the permanent members not to claim for themselves a special position in this respect would greatly enhance their moral prestige and would strengthen their own position as the principal guardians of the future peace, without in any way jeopardizing their vital interests or impairing the essential principle that in all decisions of the Council which affect such interests the Great Powers must act unanimously. It would certainly make the whole plan, which must necessarily assign a special position to the Great Powers in the enforcement of peace, far more acceptable to all nations. Neither the Soviet nor the American memoranda presented at Dumbarton Oaks contained specific provisions for voting procedure on questions of this nature. Our representatives there were not, of course, in a position to reach a definite agreement on the subject. You and I must now find a way of completing the work which they have so well carried forward on our behalf.
If you should be inclined to give favorable consideration to some such approach to the problem of voting in the Council as I now suggest, would you be willing that there be held as soon as possible a meeting of representatives designated by you, by me, and by Mr.
Churchill to work out a complete provision on this question and to discuss the arrangements necessary for a prompt convening of a general United Nations conference?”
2. We assume that you will wish to have a careful Russian translation
made of the foregoing message so that you can hand to Marshal
3. The contemplated meeting referred to in the last paragraph of the President’s message would be an informal one in which only two or three representatives of each of the three countries would participate. In other words, we do not have in mind anything in the nature of a reconvening of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. We have no fixed idea at the present time as to just who these representatives would be or as to where they should meet, although perhaps London might prove to be appropriate and convenient.
4. You may wish to present orally, and perhaps in a separate
memorandum, additional observations in support of the President’s
views which necessarily are stated in restricted compass in the
message itself. Among the additional considerations which impress us
and some or all of which you should feel free to use as you see fit
as representing the views of your Government are the following:
Unanimity of thought and action on the part of the great powers in
all decisions affecting the maintenance of international peace and
security is of the greatest importance. With the great powers
unanimous in thought and in action and equally and instantly ready
to employ measures of enforcement in behalf of peace and security
when and as necessary,
5. We have great confidence in your ability to convince Marshal
4905. The Foreign Office is evidently trying to puzzle out and
understand the meaning and implications of the proposals made in the
President’s cable to Marshal
2855. Secret for the Ambassador
1. Your interpretation of the reasons for the inclusion of the reference to paragraph one of Section C of Chapter VIII is correct (Reference your 4905 of December 19, 11 a. m.) but covers only one part of the situation. The paragraph under reference envisages the settlement of local disputes by peaceful means under regional arrangements or agencies. It also envisages scrutiny by the Security Council of such arrangements or agencies and their activites for the purpose of determining whether or not they are consistent with the purposes and principles of the organization. Finally, it envisages specific utilization of such arrangements or agencies by the Security Council, in its discretion, for purposes of peaceful settlement. Accordingly, we regard the Security Council’s activities under this paragraph as part of the Security Council’s general responsibilities for encouraging peaceful settlement specified in detail in Section A of Chapter VIII. It is not of course practicable to foresee at this time the precise procedures which the Security Council will adopt in the discharge of its functions pursuant to the paragraph under reference. We do however anticipate that such functions will in all probability lead in some instances to formal decisions by the Council which will call for a vote of the Council. In view of the fact that these particular functions are basically similar in nature to the functions specified in Section A of Chapter VIII, it seemed to us logical to provide for a similar voting procedure in the two categories of functions.
2. Section C of Chapter VIII was among the last provisions of the proposals to be drafted at Dumbarton Oaks. It had not been drafted at the time the voting procedure of the Council received intensive consideration and there was in fact no discussion at Dumbarton Oaks of the procedures which the Council might follow in acting under that Section. Consequently we assume that the Soviet officials who are familiar with the Dumbarton Oaks conversations may not have heretofore considered this question and so may have experienced some surprise at noting the President’s specific proposal in this respect.
3. For the reasons given in paragraph one above we consider that paragraph one of Section C is so closely related to Section A that the same voting procedure should naturally be followed with respect to cases arising under both sets of provisions. However the clearcut and important issue at this time is the one of principle, namely, that a distinction should be drawn between the peaceful settlement functions of the Council on the one hand and its enforcement functions on the other hand. It seems to us evident that if this issue is resolved in the way in which the President has proposed it will follow as a matter of course that the President’s specific proposal as to paragraph 1 of Section C of Chapter VIII will also in due course be adopted. Consequently you should, if you consider it would be helpful, feel free to state to the Soviet officials that in view of the fact that the President’s suggestion as to paragraph 1 of Section C is a novel matter from their point of view and relates only to a subsidiary aspect of the voting question, we should be glad to have consideration on that part of the President’s suggestion left for future determination if they so desire.
4. The President and I are most anxious for this matter to be settled as rapidly as possible for reasons of which you are of course, aware. We have not yet heard from the British but are urging them to come to a decision as soon as possible. We are confident that you will make every effort which you consider appropriate to bring this to a successful conclusion.
Subject: Voting in the Security Council
I reported orally to the President on the latest developments on this
matter and indicated to him that we were doing what we could
He indicated some displeasure at the fact that things were moving so slowly in this field.
cc: Mr.
Mr.
For the President from Ante, pp.
58–59. On December 26
In this connection the first and second points of your proposal meet with no objections and can be accepted, bearing in mind that point two deals with procedure questions mentioned in Chapter 6 Subdivision D.
As regards point three of your proposal I have, to my regret, to inform you that with the proposed by you wording of this point I see no possibility of agreeing. As you yourself admit the principle of unanimity of permanent members is necessary in all decisions of the Council in regard to determination of a threat to peace as well as in respect to measures of elimination of such a threat or for suppression of aggression or other violations of peace. Undoubtedly, that when decisions on questions of such a nature are made there must be full agreement of powers which are permanent members of the Council bearing upon themselves the main responsibility for maintenance of peace and security.
It goes without saying that the attempt to prevent, on a certain stage, one or several permanent members of the Council from participating in voting on said questions, and theoretically it is possible to assume also a case when the majority of permanent members will find themselves prevented from participation in making decisions on a question, can have fatal consequences for the cause of preservation of international security. Such a situation is in contradiction with the principle of agreement and unanimity of decisions of the four leading powers and can lead to a situation when some great powers are put in opposition to other great powers and this may undermine the cause of universal security. In prevention of this small countries are interested not less than great powers since a split among great powers, united for tasks of maintenance of peace and security for all peace loving countries is pregnant with the most dangerous consequences for all these nations.
Therefore I have to insist on our former position on the question of voting in the Security Council. This position, as it seems to me, will provide the new international organization with the unanimity of four powers, contributing to avoiding of attempts to put certain powers in opposition to other great powers which (unanimity) is necessary for their joint fight against aggression in the future. Naturally, such a situation would secure the interests of small nations in the cause of preservation of their security and would correspond to the interests of universal peace.
I hope that you will estimate the importance of the above stated views in favor of the principle of unanimity of decisions of the four leading powers and that we shall find an agreed upon decision of this question as well as certain other questions which remain still unsolved. On the basis of such an agreed upon decision our representatives could work out a full draft on this question and discuss the measures necessary for an early convocation of a general conference of the United Nations.
5043. With the thought that it might be of some use in connection
with future discussions with the Russians on the voting procedure of
the international security organization, I will give below my
present impressions of why the Soviets are insisting on their right
to veto consideration by the council of all matters, even peaceful
procedures. (
One. On analyzing reactions of the Soviets, one must bear in mind that since the revolution the nations of the world have been hostile to or suspicious of them and their objectives. Although the Russians realize that they are now accepted as a powerful world power, they are still suspicious of the underlying attitude of most of the nations toward them.
Thus they lack confidence that the members of the council would be impartial in dealing with disputes in which the Soviet Government might be involved.
Two. The Soviets have definite objectives in their future foreign policy, all of which we do not as yet fully understand. For example, while they have recognized the right of the states bordering the Soviet Union to have their independence, they insist upon “friendly” governments. From Soviet actions so far, the terms “friendly” and “independent” appear to mean something quite different from our interpretation. It is interesting to note that in Iran they appear to justify their recent actions by explaining that they know better what the Iranian people want than the Iranian Government, which does not represent the majority of Iranian opinion. Any political figure, in Iran and elsewhere, who disagrees with Soviet policies is conveniently branded as a “Fascist”. The same sort of thing can be said about the Polish situation. It would seem probable that the Russians are as conscious as we are of the difference of interpretation of terms and of concepts. They thus probably come to the conclusion that if their actions are subjected to scrutiny by the representatives of nations with different concepts, their actions and objectives will in all probability be condemned and they will therefore be subjected to public criticism supported by the world’s highest authority.
Three. It would appear that they look upon the international security organization as a method by which the Soviet Union can be protected against aggressor nations, but it seems doubtful whether they believe that it can be useful to them in settling disputes between them and other countries through mediatory or judicial processes. The court, they believe, is packed against them. They appear, therefore, to be insisting upon the right of unilateral action in settling disputes of this character.
Four. I fear that we are faced with a very fundamental question of what the effect on the international security organization will be with most of the nations looking to it to develop mediatory or judicial procedures in the advancement of international relations, whereas the Soviet Union appears to view it from a much narrower perspective.
Thus, I believe, the Soviets have made up their minds in regard to
their position on voting procedure and the only possibility of
getting them to change their position would be if we and the British
were prepared to take a firm and definite stand, supported by
widespread
Subject: Voting Formula for Security Council
Copies to:
At the meeting today in the White House, the Secretary emphasized to
the President the urgent need for reaching agreement on the voting
formula at the forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister
The President said that he was determined to go forward vigorously
and to press for a decision. He said that he was clear in his mind
as to how he would handle the matter of initial membership for the
Soviet Republics, but that he was puzzled as to how to approach the
matter of voting procedure. He said that he was still worried as to
what the situation would be if a controversy arose between, say, the
United States and Mexico, and the matter was taken up by the
Security Council without the United States having a vote in whatever
decisions might be taken. He inquired whether, in view of the fact
that Marshal
In a reply to the President’s question, Mr.
Our discussions with Congressional leaders, with many individuals and groups thoughout the country and with representatives of the American Republics and of other United Nations have convinced us that the unanimity rule needs to be modified at least to this extent. Otherwise, we run the risk at home of alienating some of our supporters and of providing powerful ammunition for the opponents of international organization, as well as of getting into trouble with the Latin American countries and the other United Nations.
As regards the possibility of a dispute between us and Mexico coming before the Council, we would abstain from casting our vote only in such decisions as might be involved in the investigation of the dispute, in calling upon the parties to settle it peacefully, and in making recommendations as regards methods and procedures of settlement. No decision for action could be made without our affirmative vote.
The President inquired as to what would happen if there developed a
dispute between us and Mexico over oil. Mr.
Reverting to Soviet Russia’s position, Mr.
We are, therefore, not really asking much of Soviet Russia, from the
point of view of her interests and desires, when we propose that the
permanent members abstain from voting in the Council’s decisions
The President then said that he was satisfied that something like our
formula was necessary, and that he would make every effort to
convince the Russians that it was essential from the point of view
of our position. He said that he thought he knew
Mr.
He also agreed that our proposed formula should take care not only of our position, but of the Soviet position as well, since, as was recalled to him, the original Soviet document called for the unanimity rule only on the kind of questions for which that rule is now proposed in our formula.
The President directed that there be prepared for him a memorandum embodying the main ideas brought out in the discussion, and that some emphasis be put on the reasons why the Latin American countries are objecting to the straight unanimity rule.
Memorandum of Conversation
Subject: Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on the Dumbarton Oaks Document
Copies to:
Today I had a long talk with the Ambassador which grew out of a conversation we had on New Year’s Day at Blair House. The discussion centered primarily around the question of voting procedure in the Council.
The Ambassador said that, as he saw it, the President’s proposal to
Marshal
I said that from our point of view the President’s formula represents
a substantial modification of the position which we took at
Dumbarton Oaks. While it is true that the President’s formula is
very similar to the formula which was tentatively worked out at
Dumbarton Oaks, the latter formula did not represent an accepted
position on our part. The whole idea of differentiating between
various categories of voting procedure as regards unanimity of the
great powers did not become our accepted position until the
President put his proposal before Marshal
I said that we have now accepted the proposition that, as a practical matter, it is necessary that the unanimity of the great powers in voting be maintained whenever the Council deals with matters of action. But it is clear to us that the whole organization would be much stronger if the great powers agreed to put themselves on exactly the same footing as all other member states as regards decisions involved in peaceful settlement of disputes. This, I pointed out, relates only to the Council’s decisions to investigate a situation or dispute and to determine whether or not its continuation is likely to lead to a threat to the peace, whether or not to call upon the parties to a dispute to settle their differences by peaceful means of their own choice, and whether or not to make a recommendation to the parties. The rule of unanimity, I made clear, would be maintained as regards decisions relating to admission, suspension and expulsion of members; restoration of privileges of suspended members; determination of a threat to the peace or breaches of the peace; the taking of measures to maintain or restore the peace; approval of special agreements for the provision of armed forces and all matters relating to regulation of armaments.
I summarized for the Ambassador the results of our discussions with numerous individuals and groups in this country and with representatives of other United Nations. I said that in all of these discussions the question of voting inevitably came up. As a result we have become even more convinced than we were at the time of the Dumbarton Oaks discussions that in order to obtain whole-hearted support for the projected organization, both in our country and in the smaller United Nations, it is necessary for the great powers to accept at least this much of a modification in the otherwise general unanimity rule.
The Ambassador repeated the arguments which he has so often given us: that what the small countries are primarily interested in is peace; that peace is unobtainable unless unity prevails among the great powers; and that unity among great powers will inevitably be impaired if the unanimity rule is not maintained throughout in the voting procedures of the Security Council. He said that the difference between our two positions, as he saw it, lay in the fact that we are trying to draw a line between the various functions of the Council for the purpose of applying different voting procedures, whereas their position is that no distinction whatever should be made between the functions. After all, he said, the very first decision to be made by the Council—i. e. whether a particular situation or dispute is of such a nature that its continuation may result in a threat to the peace—is of such great importance that, if there is a cleavage of opinion on that question between the great powers, the whole condition of unity among them will be impaired. He thought that we were emphasizing too much moral, juridical, and organizational issues, and paying too little attention to the political side of the question.
I replied that we were, of course, immensely interested in the moral
and juridical aspects of the problem, but that we, no less than
they, were fully conscious of the political side of the question. We
want the organization to succeed. It is clear to us that the
organization will succeed only if the great powers have confidence
in each other and act in unity. But it is equally clear that it is
also essential to the success of the organization that the smaller
powers have confidence in the great powers. These are basic
political issues, and the real question is whether confidence will
be better promoted by: (a) insistence on the
part of the great powers that they must retain a veto privilege
throughout in any disputes in which they themselves might be
involved; or (b) a system under which they
would be willing to place themselves, at least as regards judicial
or quasi-judicial procedures, on an equal footing with the others. I
said that it is difficult for us to see how the appearance of unity
would help its substance, or how even the appearance of unity could
be guaranteed. After all, even if we adopt the unanimity rule
throughout, that would merely mean that no decision would be valid
without the concurring votes of all of the permanent members. But
there is no device by which the fact of voting or the fact of
disagreement in voting could be prevented. We may, therefore, easily
run into a situation in which there would be a series of votes on
which the great powers would be divided. Obviously, when a question
is raised before the Council, a discussion needs to take place and
even if the discussion does not result in a vote, the
representatives of the great powers might easily take opposite
views. And then when some nation asks for a vote, there would have
to be a decision as to whether or not to take a vote. Perhaps the
only way in which all this
From the point of view of maintaining the unity of the great powers, what is really important is that they should take every care not to bring to a vote any questions on which they are really divided, but to try to adjust and harmonize their differences by discussion both inside and outside the Council.
The Ambassador said that he agreed, of course, that no such powers as I described could or should be put in the hands of the President of the Council. On the other hand, he cannot escape the fear that, if we are all to acquiesce in what he considers as “unrealistic” demands of the small powers (i. e. the great powers should abstain from voting in matters which concern them) that would be tantamount to admission that no trust can be put in the declarations and intentions of the great powers. This would merely emphasize suspicions and might discredit the whole idea on which the proposed organization rests.
I replied by saying that we have to consider seriously whether more suspicions will be created by that procedure or by one under which the great powers insist on putting themselves in a position in which none of their acts could be questioned and in which each of them, when involved in a dispute, could put a stop to any public discussion of the matter, thus giving the impression that it was really afraid to face the bar of public opinion. I said that as far as we are concerned, we are impressed not only by the position taken by the smaller countries but also by the fact that in our own country there are large groups of people who find a cause for apprehension in the possibility of the acceptance of a straight unanimity rule. For these reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the strength and effectiveness of the organization, from the point of view of the great powers themselves, would be enhanced rather than diminished by our type of formula.
The Ambassador then said that an idea occurred to him as a result of our discussion which he would like to express personally rather than in any official capacity. That idea was that perhaps a distinction could be drawn between discussions in the Council and formal action involved in voting, and that, perhaps, the situation could be taken care of by some provision under which any matter, whether or not it involves the great powers, could be freely discussed in the Council, while still providing that no decisions of the Council would be valid without the unanimous vote of the great powers.
I said that this was an extremely interesting idea, but that if we go as far as that, why not go one step further and combine it with the kind of voting rule that we proposed. I again emphasized the point that there is no way to prevent, even under their formula, the registering of a disagreement among the great powers, whereas our formula would have a great psychological and, therefore, political importance and would certainly make for better relations and greater confidence. He said that, while he still thought that we are exaggerating this point, the point itself had not occurred to him before and he would like to give it further consideration.
As I had promised him at our earlier meeting, I gave the Ambassador a
copy of our translation of excerpts from the Mexican memorandum and
a summary of the principal points which had emerged in our
discussions with the other American Republics. He was greatly
interested in the two documentsPostwar Foreign Policy Preparation,
pp. 399–401. The second document is a two-page memorandum dated
January 5, 1945, and entitled “Summary of Principal Comments and
Suggestions So Far Made by the Latin American Governments with
Respect to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposais” (copy in
He then went on to suggest that it would be a very useful thing for us to exchange such comments as might come our way in order to keep each other better prepared for the eventual conference. We are doing that sort of thing in connection with peace feelers, and this is a comparable case. I said that I was sure that it would be a useful procedure and we ought to talk about it at greater length on another occasion. I said we might also think about the advisability of setting up some informal machinery for that purpose. Such machinery might well be in the form of some sort of preliminary preparatory group for the conference. He was very much interested in the idea, and we agreed that the question might be taken up again after the meeting of the Big Three and after we know more definitely as to when the conference will take place.
He asked me whether we have given any further thought to the question
of the representation of the sixteen Soviet Republics. Most of them,
he said, are much more important than, say, Liberia or Guatemala.
They have their own constitutions and deal independently with their
own foreign affairs. I asked him whether he really thought that they
are independent countries as we commonly understand the term. He
said that, of course, they are, even though they are also very
intimately connected as members of a federation. I said that that
was obviously a question which would have to be discussed
He then went back to the question of voting, which was apparently
very much on his mind. He asked whether we had heard from the
British and recalled that at Dumbarton Oaks
The conversation was in Russian throughout and was extremely friendly. As we were saying good-bye, he remarked that he was very grateful, because, although, in large measure, we went over old ground, there were many new aspects brought out which were extremely suggestive. He asked whether I would be willing to have another talk, if any new thoughts occurred to him. I said I should, of course, be delighted.
Memorandum of Conversation
Subject: Second Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on the Dumbarton Oaks Documents
Copies to:
At the Ambassador’s request, we met again today to continue the
conversation which took place on January 11.supra.
The Ambassador opened the conversation by saying that he had given a great deal of thought to the points brought out in our previous discussion and had re-read the President’s proposal. He was puzzled by the reference to Chapter VIII, Section C, paragraph 1, and proceeded to read that paragraph from the Russian text of the Dumbarton Oaks documents which he had in his hands. I told him that what we had in mind was the question of whether or not the Council should encourage a regional group or agency to undertake peaceful settlement of a local or regional dispute. He thought that was logical in terms of our general formula.
He said that he was anxious to have another talk because, in view of his imminent departure for Moscow, it had occurred to him that this would be a good opportunity to clarify his mind on a number of points.
There ensued another long discussion of the voting formula, which did not, however, bring out any new points. His evident purpose was to fix clearly in his mind our arguments in favor of the formula.
He then asked me if I would be willing to go over with him the other
open items, and proceeded to enumerate them as they occurred to him:
With regard to the Court, he said that he considered the matter settled in substance and that agreement on details should not be difficult to reach. The whole subject is being studied in Moscow on the basis of our documents which were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks.
The discussion of the dependent areas matter was rather lengthy. He
said that he had been very much interested in the few informal
conversations we had on this subject at Dumbarton Oaks, but had
never had the opportunity to make a more systematic examination of
the subject. He mentioned the memorandum which Secretary Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 470–472. See
also The Memoirs of Cordell Hull
(New York, 1948), vol. ii, pp.
1304–1305.
I summarized for him the various alternative approaches to such
problems as the distinction between trust and colonial areas; the
possible declaration of general principles applicable to both; the
machinery of international trusteeship for detached areas; the
possibilities and structure of regional commissions for colonial
areas; the question of international accountability; and the
relation between the international organization and the possible
regional commissions. I said that our basic thought runs generally
in terms of the ideas expressed in Secretary
In reply to his question as to whether all of these problems would have to be discussed at the United Nations Conference, I said that only questions relating to international trusteeship properly belong on the agenda of the conference. Colonial problems as such might be touched upon, but probably ought to be taken up in earnest at some special conference or by some other means.
He inquired whether such a discussion of colonial problems would involve only the colonial powers or also the other important powers. Might it not even be appropriate, he asked, that such a discussion be arranged by the future international organization, since the problems raised might well come within the scope of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council? I said that any one of these procedures was possible.
He then said that he was certain that some trusteeship arrangements for detached areas must be provided for in the Charter, and that the matter really ought to be of direct concern to his Government. After all, he pointed out, as a country at war with Italy, the Soviet Union will have to assume responsibilities with regard to Italian colonies, and it may well have to assume responsibilities with regard to territories detached from Japan.
His next question related to the position of Great Britain and of
other countries on this subject. I said that we have a tentative
arrangement with the British to exchange documents relating to this
question, and it is our intention to make our documents available to
the Russians. I said I was sure that the British intended to proceed
similarly. I recalled the fact that there are very interesting
passages on this subject in the Chinese memorandum.
We readily agreed that the initiative on the question of the liquidation of the League of Nations should be taken by the members of the League.
On the subject of initial membership, he repeated that the Soviet Government still wishes the Soviet Republics to be included while it wishes the associated nations, as well as the neutrals, to be excluded. I made no attempt to argue the point, saying merely that we have had no new thoughts on either the Soviet Republics or the associated nations.
He then raised the question of the seat of the organization. We
talked briefly about the Pays de Gex idea, which he had heard about
and found quite interesting, except that a part of the territory
would be Swiss. He characterized Switzerland rather contemptuously
as
After that he turned to the summary of views expressed by certain
Latin American governmentsante, p.
72, footnote 1.
He said, however, that he was somewhat perturbed by the various suggestions for strengthening the Assembly and the Court at the expense of the Council, since such changes would completely alter the character of our proposals. I agreed. I also agreed that it would be impracticable to make the decisions of the Court enforceable by the Council because the Council would, for one thing, deal only with peace and security, whereas the Court might render decisions on a large variety of subjects. In answer to his inquiry, I explained to him the meaning of compulsory jurisdiction, which he had misunderstood completely.
When he came to the statement that the Latin American countries are against voting by the permanent members on disputes in which they are involved, he again plunged into the subject of how “unrealistic” the smaller countries are in making that demand. I said that we must expect all of the countries at the Conference to urge many ideas of the kind that have emerged in our discussions with the Latin American countries, but that it seems to us that the advocacy of most of them would be greatly weakened by the acceptance of our voting formula. He said he would like to think about that possibility, and then asked if it would be possible for me to give him our analysis of the functions of the Council from the point of view of the voting procedure proposed in the President’s formula. I said that I would be glad to put down on paper the points in this respect which I brought out in the discussion.
In conclusion, he again said that our two conversations had been both interesting and useful to him and would certainly be helpful in making his report to his Government. I responded in kind, and we parted on a very friendly note.
Dear Leo: In confirmation of my telephone message of
yesterday, I am writing, on the Ambassador’s instructions, to inform
you that His Majesty’s Government are prepared to accept the
President’s proposed compromise on voting on the Security Council of
the World Organization.
His Majesty’s Government are still not entirely clear as to the precise effect of the application to paragraph 1 Chapter 8, Section C of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals of the rule that parties to a dispute should not vote, but they do not anticipate any difficulty on this score.
The Foreign Office ask us to recall to you that the question of voting is not the only one that remains to be settled before a United Nations Conference could be called, and that all difficulties will not probably have been got out of the way before the next Three Power meeting. This must unfortunately militate against going ahead too precipitately. The Foreign Office also recall that the idea was that the invitation to the Conference should be sent out in the names of the Three (or Four) Powers. Consultation between us would consequently be required before the invitation actually issues.
Yours sincerely,
Memorandum for the President
Subject: International Security Organization
Ambassador ante, pp. 68–76.
As many of the statements made by the Ambassador were entirely personal ones, we cannot, of course, refer to this discussion in other conversations as to do so might injure the Ambassador but it is most interesting to know that at least the Ambassador, personally, seems to have a very great interest in the subject. For instance, the Ambassador indicated that personally the idea had occurred to him that perhaps a distinction can be drawn between discussions in the Council and formal actions involving voting. This, obviously, is not enough but it is a move in the right direction.
The Ambassador again evidenced keen interest in the subject of international trusteeships. He also reiterated the importance which his Government attaches to the admission as initial members of their republics and the exclusion of the Associated nations and the neutrals.
cc to
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
Here is the list of points I tried to make at our meeting yesterday:
First
1. The Moscow Conference of November 1, 1943,
Bulletin,
November 6, 1943, vol. ix, pp.
308–309; or Decade, pp.
11–12.
2. This recognized the self-evident fact that these large powers who have won the war for law and justice will be obliged to maintain the security of the world which they have saved during the time necessary to establish a permanent organization of the whole world, and for that purpose they will have to consult and decide on many questions necessary to the security of the world and primarily their own safety in establishing that security. I have always thought that this interim organization should be formal, subject to rules of consultation similar to Article XI of the old League, and actively at work until the world had gotten stabilized enough to establish and turn loose the large world organization which includes the small nations.
3. The job of the four big nations is principally to establish a guarantee of peace in the atmosphere of which the world organization can be set going.
This will necessarily include the settlement of all territorial acquisitions in the shape of defense posts which each of these four powers may deem to be necessary for their own safety in carrying out such a guarantee of world peace.
4. For substantially this purpose, at the end of the last war
President
5. I think we are in danger of making a similar mistake by attempting
to formulate the Dumbarton organization before we have discussed and
ironed out the realities which may exist to enable the four powers
to carry out their mission, and I was much interested to read
Senator
6. Any attempt to finally organize a Dumbarton organization will necessarily take place in an atmosphere of unreality until these preliminary foundations are established. The attitude of the numerous minor nations who have no real responsibility but plenty of vocal power and logical arguments will necessarily be different from that of the large powers who have to furnish the real security.
Second
1. An example of one of these difficulties has already appeared in the problem of the mandated islands. You are proposing to include them under your future principles of “trusteeship” or “mandates”. They do not really belong in such a classification. Acquisition of them by the United States does not represent an attempt at colonization or exploitation. Instead it is merely the acquisition by the United States of the necessary bases for the defense of the security of the Pacific for the future world. To serve such a purpose they must belong to the United States with absolute power to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies; they are outposts, and their acquisition is appropriate under the general doctrine of self-defense by the power which guarantees the safety of that area of the world.
2. For that reason you will get into needless mazes if you try to set up a form of trusteeship which will include them before the necessity of their acquisition by the United States is established and recognized.
3. They are of an entirely different nature from the German colonies in various parts of the world, quite unessential to the defense of any protecting power, to which was applied the doctrine of mandates under the League of Nations formula.
Third
1. You will find the same clash of fundamental ideas and interests with Russia in regard to certain more difficult problems. She will claim that, in the light of her bitter experience with Germany, her own self-defense as a guarantor of the peace of the world will depend on relations with buffer countries like Poland, Bulgaria, and Rumania, which will be quite different from complete independence on the part of those countries.
2. It is my suggestion that such fundamental problems should be at least discussed and if possible an understanding reached between the big guarantor nations before you endeavor to set up principles in a world organization which may clash with realities.
For all these reasons I think we should not put the cart before the horse. We should by thorough discussion between the three or four great powers endeavor to settle, so far as we can, an accord upon the general area of these fundamental problems. We should endeavor to secure a covenant of guarantee of peace or at least an understanding of the conditions upon which such a general undertaking of mutual guarantee could be based.
If there is a general understanding reached among the larger powers I do not fear any lack of enthusiasm on the part of the lesser fry to follow through with the world organization whenever a general meeting may be called.
The foregoing constitutes a consideration which I believe to be fundamental yet it is no more than the common prudence one would exercise in preparing for the success of any general assembly or meeting in business or political life.
There is another point, however, which relates to the advisability of
raising any territorial questions at all during the course of the
war or, at least, until after the Russians have clearly committed
themselves to their participation in the Pacific war. Any
discussions of territorial matters, whether they be in the nature of
security acquisitions, trusteeships or outright territorial
adjustments, are almost certain to induce controversies which put at
risk a united and vigorous prosecution of the war itself. The
introduction of these subjects into any general meeting would be
most inadvisable, almost certainly provoke a welter of opinion and
great jockeying for position. In my judgment it is fanciful to
suppose that the subject of “trusteeships” could be introduced with
a limitation of the discussion to the mere form of the trust
organization. No such discussion could usefully proceed without a
consideration of the nature of the specific areas to
I feel that for us to raise the subject, on the proviso that no areas in the Pacific in which we are interested could be discussed is even more unwise. This would immediately provoke a sense of distrust and discrimination among the other parties to the discussion which would both call marked attention to our aims and poison the general atmosphere of the discussion.
It is my conclusion, therefore, that we should not bring up the subject of territorial adjustments, including “trusteeships” for discussion in any form, at least until the war is much further along and Russian participation in the Pacific war is accomplished. We should also make a determined effort to avoid a discussion of the subject. I realize that some discussion of territorial matters may be inevitable but we should not bring it up and we should avoid it if we can. The subject of “trusteeships” could certainly be avoided until a more suitable time, on the very sound ground that no satisfactory discussion can possibly take place without full knowledge of the types and character of the territories to be dealt with.
Memorandum for the Secretary
Subject: Recommended Action on Points Which Must Be Decided at The Three-Power Meeting
1. Text of the voting provisions: Adoption of
the President’s formula with slight modification as to Chapter VIII,
Section C. (Text attached)post, pp. 89–90, and the undated United States
Delegation memorandum printed post, pp. 648–686. It comprises that portion of the text of the
United States Delegation memorandum beginning with the heading
and ending with the words “Under the above formula”; and it
continues from that point with the text of the Briefing Book
paper after the opening phrase of that paper, “Under the voting
formula proposed by the President”. A penciled endorsement on
the attachment, in the handwriting of
2. International Trusteeships: Decision that
provisions for the establishment of trusteeship machinery within the
framework of the proposed organization will be included in the
Charter and that the sponsoring Governments will consult with each
other before the Conference as to detailed proposals on this
subject. (Memorandum attached)Infra.
3. Position of France: Decision that France
should become the fifth sponsoring power.
4. Nations to be Invited: Decision that
invitations be issued to the same 44 nations which had been invited
to the Hot Springs, Atlantic City and Bretton Woods Conferences.
(List attached)post, pp.
747–748.
5. Time and Place of Conference: Decision that
the Conference be held in the United States (exact location to be
left for future determination). Tentative decision as to time,
subject to later consultation with China and France and possibly
other countries.
6. Form of Invitation: Decision that
invitations be issued by the United States on behalf of the five
sponsoring Powers in the form of the attached draft.post,
p. 818, without the
modifications and insertions introduced therein by
7. Consultation with China and France:
Authorization for the United States to consult with China and France
on behalf of Britain and the Soviet Union to obtain Chinese and
French agreement to the above points.
8. Public Announcements: Statement at the
meeting along the lines of the attached draft.Infra.
I
background
1. A chapter on trusteeship should be included in the Charter of
the International Organization for the following reasons:
It was the understanding at Dumbarton Oaks that the question of trusteeship, although not taken up at that time, was a proper subject for discussion among the governments represented there, and that in due course the sponsoring governments would consult with each other and perhaps exchange papers on the subject in order to save time at the Conference itself. Other governments have subsequently suggested the inclusion of arrangements for dependent territories.
2. The view was expressed informally to us by Colonel
3. Our desire that only general principles and procedures
relating to international trusteeship be discussed at present is
based upon the view that territorial dispositions should be left
for consideration until the end of hostilities. We consider it
of the utmost importance, nevertheless, to get an agreement on
the principle of trusteeship, in order that our basic
distinction between trust territories and all other dependencies
may be maintained. Colonel
4. We have long felt that, as indispensable parts of an over-all
program, a complete system for dependencies would provide for:
5. The British probably will propose regional advisory commissions as the sole device for expressing international responsibility with respect to dependent territories. Regional commissions, in their view, could be employed to discharge, through consultation, a limited international accountability for the administration of dependent territories. In our view, regional commissions are desirable, but only as one part of an over-all international system.
II
recommendations
We recommend that at the forthcoming talks decisions be reached
that:
These proposals should deal only with the principles and the mechanism which should govern these trusteeship arrangements. They should not be concerned at this stage with specific territories to be placed under trusteeship or with the disposition or allocation of particular territories.
A general Declaration of Standards and Regional Advisory Commissions should be regarded as additions to and not substitutions for the Trusteeship Arrangement. These, however, may also need to be discussed at the Conference and decisions taken as to how they might be related to each other, and perhaps to the General Organization.
Communiqué To Be Issued Jointly and Signed
by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin
The proposals for the general international organization resulting from the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks have been considered, and agreed proposals have been worked out on the major points left open at those conversations. Our views are being transmitted to the Government of China and to the Provisional Government of the French Republic for their consideration. When these consultations have been completed, invitations to a United Nations Conference will be issued at which time the full text of the proposals to be laid before the Conference as a basis of discussion will be made public.
Problem of Voting in the Security Council
Summary
1. President’s formula calls for
unanimity in most cases.
Unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council, under the
voting formula proposed by the President on December 5, 1944,Ante, pp.
58–59.
2. Soviet proposal would increase
domestic United States opposition.
The proposed formula, or its basic principle, seems more clearly
essential to us now than heretofore. Our talks with members of
Congress, and groups and individuals throughout the country,
indicate that its abandonment would gravely alienate many sincere
supporters of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, and would provide
perfectionists and isolationists with a powerful weapon against
American participation in the Organization. It is furthermore
disturbing that acceptance by us of the straight unanimity rule
would be
3. Soviet proposal is opposed by
small nations.
At the same time, our discussions with representatives of other American republics and United Nations have disclosed the strongest official opposition to the straight unanimity rule. It may be difficult, if not impossible, for their governments to secure popular support for entrance into an international organization which, with such a rule, would bear every earmark of a great-power alliance. It appears that all of them would be bitterly disillusioned, that some may stay out, and that under such a rule various smaller nations after joining the organization may feel obliged to align themselves with great powers, which would render the organization undependable and unstable.
The Problem of Voting in the Security
Council
I
To bring the problem into its proper perspective, the question of
voting procedure in the Security Council must be considered in
relation to the functions and powers to be assigned to the Council
and, therefore, to the type of substantive decisions which the
Council might be called upon to make. The various types of decisions
are listed in the attached memorandum,Infra.
Under the voting formula proposed by the President, unanimity of the permanent members would always be required for all categories of decisions except one: in those decisions involving promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, a permanent member of the Council would not cast a vote if it is a party to the dispute in question.
This exception is based upon the principle that the procedures involved under the excepted category would be quasi-judicial in character, and in such procedures no nation should be placed above the law in an organization based fundamentally on the principle of equality under the law. The rule of unanimity should always prevail under the other six categories of decisions because the procedures involved are of a political character and may require the use of force. In such procedures there is every justification for placing the permanent members in a special position since they must bear the principal responsibility for action in the maintenance of peace and security.
While it is clear that, in general, the rule of unanimity of the permanent members is necessary, the proposed voting formula—or, at least, its basic principle—is essential from our point of view. It amply safeguards our basic national interests. Its abandonment would weaken rather than strengthen our position, both at home and abroad, and would cause us no end of trouble.
Our talks with members of Congress and with many individuals and groups throughout the country clearly indicate that failure to provide for at least this much of a modification of the unanimity rule would be profoundly deplored by many sincere supporters of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. There is strong evidence that it would become a powerful weapon in the hands of both the perfectionists and the isolationists. Moreover, acceptance by us of a straight unanimity rule would inevitably be interpreted as surrender to Russia. These factors might well jeopardize our chances for adequate public and Congressional support in this country.
At the same time, our discussions with representatives of the American Republics and of other United Nations have already disclosed their strong opposition to the straight unanimity rule. All of them have indicated that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for their governments to secure whole-hearted support on the part of their peoples for an international organization which would thus, in popular estimation, have every earmark of a great-power alliance. Without at least some such provision as is contained in the proposed voting formula, all of them will be bitterly disillusioned, and some of them may even decide to stay out. Furthermore, under these conditions, the smaller nations, even after joining the organization, might well seek to align themselves with the various great powers and thus render the whole system precarious and unstable.
Taken in conjunction with the fact that we may have to acquiesce in some unsatisfactory peace settlements, all this would inevitably impair both our moral prestige and our political leadership in the world and might come perilously close to defeating the great cause in which we are now exercising so vigorous a leadership.
Soviet Russia’s case against the proposed formula is extremely weak.
Under the proposal, she—as well as we and each of the other three
permanent members—would have veto power in the following decisions:
So long as this is so, Soviet Russia has more to gain than to lose,
just as have we—in stature, in prestige, in leadership, and in
prospects for a successful and effective world order—by agreeing to
place herself on an equal footing with all other countries before
the bar of world opinion as regards efforts on the part of the new
organization
II
The manner in which the proposed voting formula would safeguard our
basic national interests may be seen from the following concrete
example. If the United States were to become involved in a dispute
with Mexico, and if Mexico or some other country were to bring the
situation to the attention of the Security Council on the plea that
its continuation is likely to threaten the peace, the United States
would accept the Council’s decisions made without its participation,
by a vote of the other permanent members and at least two
non-permanent members, only on the following questions:
Once the situation gets beyond the field of conciliation and of efforts at peaceful settlement, and the Security Council is confronted with the question as to whether or not the dispute between the United States and Mexico constitutes a threat to the peace, the United States would resume the right to cast its vote in the Council’s decisions. The right of the United States to cast its vote under the unanimity rule in all other substantive decisions of the Council would, of course, remain unimpaired throughout.
Principal Substantive Decisions on Which the
Security Council Would Have To Vote
Under the voting formula proposed by the President, all of the decisions listed below would require the affirmative votes of 7 members of the Security Council, including the votes of the permanent members. The only exception would be that, in the event that a permanent member is a party to a dispute or a situation before the Council, that member would not cast its vote in decisions listed under “Promotion of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes” (Category III below).
I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on
II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.
III. Promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, including the
following questions:
IV. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of
the peace, including the following questions:
V. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.
VI. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.
VII. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.
Composition of the Security Council
Present Proposal
The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals provide that the Security Council should be composed of eleven members, of which the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China and, in due course, France, would have permanent seats. Six other states would be elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, which states would not be immediately eligible for reelection.
Changed Status of France
The condition attached to French tenure of a permanent seat has been met by virtue of recognition of the French Provisional Government, of that Government’s having become a full member of the European Advisory Commission, and of its having signed the United Nations Declaration. The other permanent members should, accordingly, reach prompt agreement that hereafter they will treat France as one of the powers sponsoring the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals if France so desires.
Possibility of Other Governments Proposing
Changes
It is not believed that the Soviet Union will raise questions about the present Proposals for the composition of the Security Council.
It is considered more likely that Great Britain may advance recommended changes in the present Proposals which would recognize the right of the medium-sized powers to something akin to semi-permanent seats, based on their greater ability to assist in the maintenance of international peace and security through military action. It is believed that any such proposal should be resisted.
Nations To Be Invited to the United Nations
Conference
During the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations it was assumed that the nations to be invited to the United Nations Conference for the drafting of the Charter of the General International Organization would be the initial or founding members of the Organization, but the question of which nations should be invited was left open.
We took the position that both the United Nations and the nations associated with the United Nations should be invited. The Chinese agreed with us.
The Soviet representatives maintained the position that the Conference should be restricted to the United Nations, but did not rule out the possibility that the associated nations might be admitted to membership in the Organization immediately after the United Nations had signed.
The British representatives did not object to the American position, suggesting only that additional states might desirably be invited to be initial members though not to take part in the Conference.
The British since then have seemed to feel that the problem is particularly an American one; six of the associated nations are American Republics, the other two being Egypt and Iceland. The six American countries are: Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Although we are suggesting to these six countries the desirability of their adhering to the United Nations Declaration, special problems in each country make such action unlikely for some months.
The question of which nations should be invited to the Conference may arise in discussion of the voting problem since, apparently, the Soviet view was advanced chiefly for bargaining in that connection. The question will more certainly arise if the voting problem is solved, since such agreement will remove the main obstacle to calling the Conference.
Should this development occur, it is recommended that this Government maintain its previous position. If we cannot obtain concurrence with it, the preferable alternative would be to invite the associated nations to send observers, if possible with right to present views, and to sign the Charter immediately after the United Nations have signed.
In order to provide for admission of other states, prior to the coming into force of the Charter, it is recommended that the Charter be held open for adherence by certain states, agreed upon through consultation, in the category of adhering signatories.
Dependent Territories
The Department has tentatively formulated, for use when approved, a Draft Plan for International Trusteeship, a Draft Plan for Regional Advisory Commissions for Dependent Areas, and a Draft Declaration Regarding Administration of Dependent Areas.
No discussion with other governments has as yet occurred regarding these papers. While we were prepared to transmit a proposal on trusteeship prior to the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, this part of our Tentative Proposals was taken out . . . Accordingly, no formal discussion occurred during those Conversations. However, the British, Soviet, and Chinese representatives informally expressed much interest in the matter, and it was understood that this question would be considered later as one of the questions left open.
Our Draft Plans are being submitted to review, in the light of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, by the Secretary’s Staff Committee and by the War and Navy Departments for presentation to the President before communication to other governments. Their essential points are summarized below.
Categories of Dependent Territories.—Dependent areas should be divided, for reasons of status and corresponding difference in degree and directness of international concern, into two categories: (a) trust (or mandated) territories whose special status makes it desirable to place them under the authority of the general international organization astrustee;and (b) other dependent territories whose control by individual states is recognized pending their development toward self-government to the fullest extent of the capacity of the dependent people.
Declaration of Principles.—The authorities responsible for the administration of dependent territories should agree upon a general declaration of principles designed to establish minimum political, economic, and social standards applicable toallnon-self-governing territories, whether colonies, protectorates, or trust territories.These principles should be formulated in accord with two essential assumptions: (1) that the welfare of dependent peoples and the development of the resources of dependent territories should be recognized as of proper concern to the international community at large; and (2) that states responsible for the administration of dependent territories should recognize the principle of some measure of
accountabilityto the international community for such administration.
A Trusteeship Mechanism.—A trusteeship mechanism should be provided by which the international organization would succeed to the rights, titles, and interests of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and to the rights and responsibilities of the League of Nations with respect to the mandates. It should also be given authority over certain territories which may be detached from the present enemy states, and over any other territories which by agreement may be placed under its control.
Regional Advisory Commissions.—Regional advisory commissions should be established, wherever practicable, in regions in which dependent territories are numerous, to assist the responsible authorities in the discharge of their international accountability for such territories together with their obligation to develop the resources and promote the welfare of these territories and their peoples. The regional advisory commissions should as a general rule have wide membership, including states which hold colonies in a given region, independent states and certain advanced dependent territories in the region, and other states which have major strategic or economic interests in the region. They should be entitled to call on the general organization and on specialized economic or social agencies related to the general international organization for advice and assistance and should make reports available to the general organization and related agencies.
I urge that consideration be given to a recommendation to the
President that he make a proposal along the following lines at his
forthcoming meeting with Marshal
It is hoped that the proposed Provisional Security Council for Europe could be established immediately. This would involve exchanges with the French Government in addition to consultation between the Big Three.
It would be exceedingly helpful but not indispensable to have the announcement of the Provisional Security Council for Europe accompanied by a statement that real progress had been made as between the Big Three in settling the remaining 10% of unfinished business at Dumbarton Oaks and that it was expected that a conference of the United Nations would be held at an early date.
It is hoped that the Provisional Security Council for Europe could deal at once with the situations in Greece and Poland. The Soviet Government might well look with favor on the idea of the establishment of the Provisional Security Council for Europe but be reluctant to have it deal with Poland. It would be desirable for every possible effort to be made to induce the Soviet Government to agree to the Provisional Council’s dealing with Poland.
We have a pretty clear idea of the Soviet objectives in Eastern
Europe. We know the terms of their settlement with Finland. We know
that the three Baltic States have been re-incorporated into the
Soviet Union and that nothing which we can do can alter this. It is
not a question of whether we like it; I personally don’t like it
although I recognize that the Soviet Government has arguments on its
side. The point is it has been done and nothing which it is within
the power Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace
Conference, 1919, vol. xiii, pp.
793–794.
I would favor using any bargaining power that exists in connection with the foregoing matters to induce the Russians to go along with a satisfactory United Nations organization and the proposed Provisional Security Council for Europe to deal with Poland, Greece and other trouble spots. I would favor our agreeing to accept as a fact the re-incorporation of the three Baltic States into the Soviet Union and our recognition of these areas as Soviet territory. This would involve our withdrawing recognition from the three diplomatic representatives of those countries in the United States.
I would favor our agreeing at the appropriate time to accept the
transfer of that portion of East Prussia to the Soviet Union which
that country insists on having. I would likewise favor our agreeing
to accept as a fact at the appropriate time, the
The recognition of the return of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union should present no difficulties to us.
We must have the support of the Soviet Union to defeat Germany. We sorely need the Soviet Union in the war against Japan when the war in Europe is over. The importance of these two things can be reckoned in terms of American lives. We must have the cooperation of the Soviet Union to organize the peace. There are certain things in connection with the foregoing proposals which are repugnant to me personally, but I am prepared to urge their adoption to obtain the cooperation of the Soviet Union in winning the war and organizing the peace. By acting on these things, we may be able to work out a regime which will obtain the cooperation of the Soviet Union for the rest of Europe and the rest of the world. There are good arguments from the Soviet point of view in favor of all of these proposals. I am willing to sponsor and support the Soviet arguments if it will save American lives in winning the war and if it will save the rest of Europe from the diplomacy of the jungle which is almost certain to ensue otherwise.
If the proposals set forth in the foregoing paragraphs should be
adopted as the policy of the United States Government, a program
should be undertaken immediately to prepare public opinion for them.
This would involve off-the-record discussions with Congress, with
Summary of Proposals of Senator Vandenberg, Senator Connally, and Proposed Emergency
High Commission for Liberated Europe
Senator Vandenberg’s Treaty ProposalCongressional Record, vol. 91,
pt. 1, pp. 164–167.
A treaty to be signed immediately by the
major allies to keep Germany and Japan permanently
demilitarized.
The Commander in Chief to have instant power to take military action under this treaty without reference to Congress.
Senator Connolly’s Interim Council
ProposalNew York Times, January 15, 1945, p. 10.
An Interim United Nations Council to be set up at the United Nations Conference with membership of 11 states like that of permanent Security Council.
The Interim Council to act in an advisory capacity on behalf of all the United Nations in dealing with controversies until the coming into force of the Charter.
Proposed Emergency High Commission for Liberated
Europe
An Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe to be set up at the
Three-Power meeting, composed of the U. S., U. K., U. S. S. R. and
France, with provision for ad hoc
representation by governments and authorities when matters of direct
interest to them are under consideration.
The Commission to assist in Europe in establishing popular and stable governments and in facilitating solution of emergency economic problems in former occupied and satellite states (with no responsibilities for postwar control of Germany), until need removed by the functioning of popular and stable governments and operations of the general organization.
contrasts between high commission and interim
council
Memorandum for the President
Establishment of an Emergency High Commission for
Liberated Europe
I recommend that at your meeting with Marshal
The proposed Emergency High Commission would be set up as a joint,
temporary agency of the four governments through which they would
act together to assist in establishing popular governments and in
facilitating the solution of emergency economic problems in the
former occupied and satellite states of Europe. It would not have responsibilities in regard to the
conduct of the war, or the post-war control of Germany. Questions
regarding Germany would remain solely in the province of the
European Advisory Commission,post, p. 110,
footnote 1.
Announcement from your meeting of agreement on the establishment of
such a commission would reassure public opinion in the United
There is urgent need for these four nations to achieve unity of
policy, and joint action, with respect to:
The proposed Emergency High Commission would constitute the agency for providing for the necessary regular consultation and cooperative action in these matters. Also it would greatly help to remove the difficulties being encountered by United Nations’ agencies in related fields.
The President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, having consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe, jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert the action of their four governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and its satellites to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.
The retreat of the Nazi war machine and the collapse of its puppet regimes, under the relentless blows of the victorious armies and resistance forces of the United Nations, are leaving behind confusion and disorder, and incalculable distress and suffering. The agony of the liberated peoples must be relieved. Swift steps must be taken to help them in the orderly reconstruction of their daily living.
The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of
national economic life must be achieved by processes which will
enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of
Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of
their own choice. This is a promise of the Atlantic Charter
To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic have agreed to establish, for such joint action as may be necessary, an Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe, as set forth by the protocol of this date.
By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to the peace and security and the general well-being of all mankind.
Pursuant to the Declaration on Liberated Europe, and with a view to concerting their policies with respect to the objectives set forth therein, the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic hereby establish an Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe.
A. Functions and Scope
1. The Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe shall have
responsibility in such former occupied states of Europe and in
such former enemy states as in the judgment of the four
governments conditions may make necessary:
2. The Emergency High Commission shall have no authority, functions, or responsibilities with regard to the conduct of military operations in the prosecution of the present war against Germany, or the occupation and control of Germany.
3. The Emergency High Commission shall consult with other international agencies as necessary on problems which are of mutual concern.
B. Membership
1. The membership of the Emergency High Commission shall consist of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic, each of which shall appoint one representative. As may be necessary the Emergency High Commission may enlarge its membership.
2. Representatives of other United Nations and of provisional authorities or of governments in Europe shall be invited by the Emergency High Commission to sit with it when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.
C. Location and
Organization
1. The headquarters of the Emergency High Commission shall be in
[Paris].
2. It may designate officials of member governments to represent it in individual countries or areas.
3. The Governments which are members of the Emergency High Commission shall provide such military or other special advisers as may be required to assist it in performing its functions.
4. It shall organize its technical staff and otherwise establish and perfect its organization and procedure. Its chairmanship shall be held successively by representatives of the member governments.
D. Termination
The Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe shall
terminate when the functioning of popular and stable governments
and the operations of appropriate organs or agencies of the
general international organization shall have removed the need
for its activities.
Memorandum for the Secretary
Subject: Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe
In addition to the decisions which are recommended in the attached
memoranda,ante, pp.
81–85.
You asked me to remind you to speak to the Secretary tomorrow about
the inclusion in the forthcoming conversations of a discussion of
the problem of provisional governments as, for example, the
provisional government to be set up in Yugoslavia. It was suggested
at the
May I add a word as to my personal conviction that this matter is
extremely important. The wave of disillusionment which has
distressed us in the last several weeks will be increased if the
impression is permitted to get abroad that potentially totalitarian
provisional
(Copy to Mr.
Subject: The necessity of the three principal Allies arriving at a common political program for liberated countries.
Although the principal Allies have been able to work out a generally satisfactory coordination of military strategy and operations in the prosecution of the war against Germany, there has been no such coordination in regard to political policies. Recent events in Europe have demonstrated the very real danger not only to Allied unity during the war but to the hope of a stable peace, as a result of the failure of the Allies to evolve an agreed and mutually acceptable political program.
Growing evidence of Anglo-Soviet rivalry on the continent of Europe and the resulting power politics scramble for position is due less to the difficulties over territorial questions than to the question of the political character of the governments in various countries of Europe beyond the Soviet borders. On the one hand, it is evident that the Soviet Government suspects that Great Britain desires to see installed wherever possible right-wing governments which from the Soviet point of view would be hostile to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the British view with apprehension the possibility that the Soviet Government will endeavor in its turn to install and support left-wing totalitarian governments as far west as possible in Europe.
In actual fact these mutual suspicions appear to be unjustified in that it is not a fixed and calculated British policy to support right-wing elements in Europe, nor on the basis of existing evidence can it be said that the Soviet Government is determined to install Communist regimes throughout Europe. However, these interacting mutual suspicions tend to push British policy, in action, farther to the right and Soviet policy farther to the left. Recent events in Greece will undoubtedly be widely interpreted in Moscow as confirmation of their suspicions of Great Britain’s intentions, and the recent events in Poland with the formation of the Lublin Committee into a provisional government will likewise confirm British fears in regard to Soviet policy.
If the situation is to be saved it is essential for the three
principal Allies to examine carefully the present political forces
at work in the
Judging from present indications the general mood of the people of
Europe is to the left and strongly in favor of far-reaching economic
and social reforms, but not, however, in favor of a left-wing
totalitarian regime to achieve these reforms. Until such time as it
is possible to hold genuine elections in the liberated areas, in
certain countries at least, such as Greece and Poland, it will
probably be necessary for the principal Allies, and for this purpose
France should be included in that category, to accept and support
interim governments. The character and composition of these
governments is precisely the place where the Allies must have an
agreed political program. These governments must be sufficiently to
the left to satisfy the prevailing mood in Europe and to allay
Soviet suspicions. Conversely, they should be sufficiently
representative of the center and petit
bourgeois elements of the population so that they would not
be regarded as mere preludes to a Communist dictatorship.
In so far as the United States is concerned, the following two criteria could be applied to any proposed interim government: (1) that it should be dedicated to the preservation of civil liberties; (2) that it should favor social and economic reforms.
In order to work out with its Allies for the interim period an agreed, mutually acceptable political basis for coordinated policies, the United States Government should be prepared, when the internal condition of a liberated country so demands, to participate in inter-Allied commissions to act as observers and to insure that at the proper time the people of that country will be given a genuine opportunity to elect their future government.
American Policy Toward Spheres of
Influence
Summary
Much of the underlying paper is a record of the background facts
concerning what we know of the spheres of influence arrangement
between the British and Soviet Governments in their relations as
regards Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia. It is supposed
Our position (pp. 2–3) is that while we acknowledge the usefulness of arrangements for the conduct of the war, we cannot give our approval to such plans as would extend beyond the military field and retard the processes of broader international cooperation. The paper refers also to the argumentation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (annex to the paper) setting forth the importance from the point of view of American national interest of preventing if possible a contest for power between the British and Soviet Governments.
American Policy Toward Spheres of
Influence
The American attitude toward spheres of influence took definite and
public form as a result of the Moscow Conference. In Mr. Bulletin, November 20, 1943, vol. ix, pp. 341–345.
“As the provisions of the Four Nation Declaration are carried into effect there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power or any other of the separate alliances [
special arrangements], through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests.”
In the late spring of 1944 the Department was informed of a
contemplated arrangement between the USSR and Great Britain whereby
Rumanian affairs should be the “main concern” of the Soviet
Government and Greek affairs should be the “main concern” of the
British Government.
The question has since arisen in connection with the Soviet and British interest in the political situation, and with somewhat more precision, in a proposed arrangement between the Soviet and British Governments for the rearmament of Yugoslavia.
Reverting to the earliest communication from the British, upon their
learning of our misgivings concerning the proposal, Mr.
The Department had also received a note from the Soviet Embassy
It is thus our reply to the Soviet note, a copy of which was sent also to the British, which best sets forth the American position, which is briefly as follows:
Our assent to the trial period of three-months was given in consideration of the present war strategy. Except for this overriding consideration, this Government would wish to make known its apprehension lest the proposed agreement might, by the natural tendency of such arrangements, lead to the division in fact of the Balkan region into spheres of influence.
It would be unfortunate, in view of the decisions of the Moscow Conference, if any temporary arrangement should be so conceived as to appear to be a departure from the principle adopted by the three Governments at Moscow, in definite rejection of the spheres of influence idea. Consequently this Government hopes that no projected measures will be allowed to prejudice the efforts toward directing the policies of the Allied Governments along lines of collaboration rather than independent action, since any arrangement suggestive of spheres of influence cannot but militate against the establishment and effective functioning of a broader system of general security in which all countries will have their part.
It was supposed that the three-month trial period would enable the British and Soviet Governments to determine whether such an arrangement is practicable and efficacious as applicable only to war conditions and essentially related to the military operations of their respective forces, without in any way affecting the rights and responsibilities which each of the three principal Allies will have to exercise during the period of the reestablishment of peace, and afterwards, in regard to the whole of Europe.
Finally, this Government assumes that the arrangement would have
neither direct nor indirect validity as affecting the interests of
In somewhat further detail we had stated to the British that we acknowledge that the Government whose military forces are operating in a given territory will in the ordinary course of events take the principal initiative in making decisions affecting that territory, due to the circumstances of the military operations therein. We believe that the natural tendency for such initiatives to extend to other than military fields would be strengthened by the conclusion of an agreement of the type suggested, and that the practical and military advantages sought in resorting to plans of this general nature do not counterbalance the evils inherent in such a system.
The Department’s views in opposition to the doctrine of spheres of
influence, with particular reference to Great Britain and the USSR,
is in full accord with the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as
set forth in Admiral
The evolution of events in recent months indicates that the British and Soviet Governments are in fact operating under such an arrangement, as shown chiefly by the Soviet forbearance in Greece and the teamwork in Yugoslavia where the British seem to feel, however, that the odds are against them. In Albania, where, so far as we know, no arrangement was made, the British have tried to keep a little ahead of the Russians. In Hungary the Russian military position has given the Soviet Government a predominant position, which the British have perforce had to accept. With only a somewhat precarious “lead” in Greece, the British may well feel that the scheme has neither divided in an equitable manner the areas of influence, nor protected the British position in the Mediterranean. This may account for the revival of British interest in a Balkan federation, which, if it includes Albania and Turkey, might limit to a certain degree the Slav power in the area which otherwise seems inevitably to reach toward Salonika and the Aegean coast line.
The remainder of Admiral
“My dear Mr. Secretary: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered your memoranda of 26 April, 1 May, and 6 May 1944, enclosing copies of memoranda exchanged with the President and of two despatches concerning British proposals for the disposition of Italian overseas territories. Although the original despatch has been cancelled by the British, you state that the views of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff would be of assistance to the State Department in formulating definite views concerning the disposition of the territories in question.
“From the narrower view of purely national defense, there is little in the British proposals that directly affects the United States post-war military position. From a broader aspect of national and world-wide security, however, there are involved in these proposals, and others which will follow, implications which the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard with considerable concern.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“Turning now to the specific British proposals in question, it is believed that the above remarks apply in general to the whole of the proposals but with much greater force to those proposals affecting the Dodecanese, Crete, and the general Aegean situation. While Russia might well have a political interest in the disposition of other Italian territory, she has a specific military interest in the disposition of those Mediterranean and Aegean Islands which dominate her exit from the Black Sea. This is merely the extension of her ancient interest in the Straits question, since with the modern submarine and air power, exit from the Black Sea can be denied her almost as effectively by bases in these islands as by actual possession of the Straits themselves.
“As to the question of whether bases should be under national or United Nations’ jurisdiction, each case should be examined on its merits—it being important to remember that our policy and interests require that we support the concept of national as distinguished from United Nations’ jurisdiction as regards the Japanese Mandates in the Pacific.
“To summarize: from the limited viewpoint of national security, there are no direct objections to the British proposals for the disposition of Italian overseas territories since United States postwar military interests are not directly affected. From the broader view of national and world-wide security, however, the United States should not support any such British proposals prior to ascertaining Russian views, lest post-war disunity of the three great powers be thereby fostered with all of the possibility of ultimate impact upon the military position of the United States which such a disaster would entail.” (865.014/5–1644.)
“From the point of view of national and world-wide security, our
basic national policy in post-war settlements of this kind
should seek to maintain the solidarity of the three great powers
and in all other
“It would seem clear that there cannot be a world war, or even a great war, which does not find one or more of the great military powers on each side. At the conclusion of the present war, there will be, for the foreseeable future, only three such powers—the United States, Britain and Russia. Since it would seem in the highest degree unlikely that Britain and Russia, or Russia alone, would be aligned against the United States, it is apparent that any future world conflict in the foreseeable future will find Britain and Russia in opposite camps.
“In appraising possibilities of this nature, the outstanding fact
to be noted is the recent phenomenal development of the
heretofore latent Russian military and economic strength—a
development which seems certain to prove epochal in its bearing
on future politico-military international relationships, and
which has yet to reach the
“It is apparent that the United States should, now and in the future, exert its utmost efforts and utilize all its influence to prevent such a situation arising and to promote a spirit of mutual cooperation between Britain, Russia and ourselves. So long as Britain and Russia cooperate and collaborate in the interests of peace, there can be no great war in the foreseeable future.
“The greatest likelihood of eventual conflict between Britain and
Russia would seem to grow out of either nation initiating
attempts to build up its strength, by seeking to attach to
herself parts of Europe to the disadvantage and possible danger
of her potential adversary. Having regard to the inherent
suspicions of the Russians, to present Russia with any agreement
on such matters as between the British and ourselves, prior to
consultation with Russia, might well result in starting a train
of events that would lead eventually in [to] the situation we most wish to avoid.”
My Dear Mr. President: If it is true, as
rumored, that you will soon meet with Prime Minister
1.
2. At the last meeting of the Council of post,
pp. 238–240.
3. To dispose of these and other points over which a mutual
understanding has not been developed with the Soviet Union, I
proposed in June 1944, as you know, that a mission representing
Request
I hope that you can bring these matters to the attention of Marshal
Faithfully yours,
Relations Between
and the Soviet Government
It is important that a) granting Governor b) issuing visas to permit c) making
arrangements for the transit of supplies through Soviet territory.
Furthermore,
The first concrete development occurred on January 18 when
The difficulties which
Report by the European Advisory Commission
to the Governments of the United States of America, the
United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics
In virtue of the Terms of Reference of the European Advisory
Commission,
We have individually reported to our respective Governments on the course of the discussions which have resulted in the settlement of the terms of the draft Instrument. It is unnecessary for us therefore to rehearse the history of those discussions. It should be sufficient for us to say that the draft is designed as a predominantly military Instrument, consisting essentially of three parts. The first is the Preamble, which includes unqualified acknowledgment on the part of Germany of the complete defeat of the German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air. The second part is a short series of military Articles, which provide for the cessation of hostilities by all German armed forces, and which will enable the Allied Representatives to carry out the more immediate measures of disarmament in Germany. The third part is a general Article setting forth the supreme authority of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with respect to Germany, including the power completely to disarm and to demilitarize Germany and to take such other steps as the three Governments may deem requisite for future peace and security. The Article further states that the Allied Representatives will present additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the surrender of Germany which the German authorities bind themselves to carry out unconditionally. The Commission will submit in due course, for the consideration of the three Governments, drafts of basic Proclamations, Orders, Ordinances or Instructions laying down additional requirements as provided in the general Article.
There are three matters in the draft upon which the Commission makes supplementary observations and recommendations.
I.
The Preamble states that the Allied Representatives, “acting by authority of their respective Governments and in the interests of the United Nations, announce the following terms of surrender, with which Germany shall comply”.
The Commission has considered what action it should take or what procedure it should recommend in order to give effect to the statement that the Allied Representatives would be acting “in the interests of the United Nations”.
In virtue of the discretion extended to it in its terms of
reference, the Commission has, as a first step, addressed a
communication, a copy of which is annexed,
Note: The Representative of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission
reserves his position in relation to the Polish Government in
London.
II.
Article 2(b) of the draft Instrument
states:—
“The personnel of the formations and units of all the forces referred to in paragraph (
a) above, shall, at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Allied State concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending further decisions, and shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the respective Allied Representatives.”
The Commission recommends to the three Governments the following
understanding as regards Article 2 (b):—
“Under Article 2 (
b) of the draft Instrument of Surrender of Germany, there is no obligation on any of the three Allied Powers to declare all or any part of the personnel of the German armed forces prisoners of war: it is their right. Such a decision may or may not be taken, depending on the discretion of the respective Commanders-in-Chief. Prisoners of war so declared will be treated in accordance with the standards of international law.”
III.
Article 11 of the draft Instrument states:—
“The Allied Representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.”
The Commission will submit for the consideration of the three
Governments a draft Protocol on the Zones of occupation in
Germany and the administration of “Greater Berlin”.Post, pp.
118–121.
The Commission will also submit for the consideration of the
three Governments a draft Protocol regarding the military
occupation of Austria.
“. . . Text of surrender terms of Germany
was agreed upon in the European Advisory Commission
on July 25, 1944. Notification of the President’s
approval of this document was received by the
Department of State on August 8, 1944. Ambassador
An agreement of May 1, 1945, between the United
States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and
France (not printed), amended this agreement to
include France within its provisions, as a result of
decisions reached at Yalta. The draft instrument of
July 25, 1944, as amended on May 1, 1945, was not
used, however, on the occasion of the actual
surrender of Germany, but was incorporated in large
part into the Declaration Regarding Defeat of
Germany and Assumption of Supreme Authority by
Allied Powers, issued on June 5, 1945. See Walter
Bedell Smith, My Three Years in
Moscow (New York, 1950), pp. 19–20; also Decade, pp. 505–511; or
Department of State Bulletin,
June 10, 1945, vol. xii,
pp. 1051–1055.
The German Government and the German High Command, recognising and acknowledging the complete defeat of the German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air, hereby announce Germany’s unconditional surrender.
The Representatives of the Supreme Commands of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter called the “Allied Representatives,” acting by authority of their respective Governments and in interests of the United Nations, announce the following terms of surrender, with which Germany shall comply:—
Article 1.
Germany will cease hostilities in all theaters of war against
the forces of the United Nations on land, at sea, and in the
air. The German Government and the German High Command will
at once issue instructions to all German military, naval and
air authorities and to all forces under German control to
cease hostilities at . . . . hours Central European Time on
. . . . . . . . (date) . . . . .
Article 2.
(a) All armed forces of Germany or
under German control, wherever they may be situated,
including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, the S.
S., S. A. and
(b) The personnel of the formations
and units of all the forces referred to in paragraph (a) above shall, at the discretion of
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied
State concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending
further decisions, and shall be subject to such conditions
and directions as may be prescribed by the Allied
Representatives.
(c) All forces referred to in
paragraph (a) above, wherever they
may be, will remain in their present positions pending
instructions from the Allied Representatives.
(d) Evacuation by the said forces of
all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they
existed on the 31st December, 1937, will proceed according
to instructions to be given by the Allied
Representatives.
(e) Detachments of civil police to be
armed with small arms only, for the maintenance of order and
for guard duties, will be designated by the Allied
Representatives.
Article 3.
(a) All aircraft of any kind or
nationality in Germany or German-occupied or controlled
territories or waters, military, naval or civil, other than
aircraft in the service of the Allies, will remain on the
ground, on the water or aboard ships pending further
instructions.
(b) The German authorities will
forthwith order all German or German-controlled aircraft in
or over territories or waters not occupied or controlled by
Germany to proceed to Germany or to such other place or
places as may be specified by the Allied
Representatives.
Article 4.
(a) The German authorities will issue
orders to all German or German-controlled naval vessels,
surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft, and merchant
and other shipping, wherever such vessels may be at the time
of surrender, and to all other merchant ships of whatever
nationality in German ports, to remain in or proceed
immediately to ports and bases as specified by the Allied
Representatives. The crews of such vessels will remain on
board pending further instructions.
(b) All ships and vessels of the
United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as
the result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at
the disposal of Germany or under German control at the time
of surrender, will proceed at the dates and to the ports or
bases specified by the Allied Representatives.
Article 5.
(a) The German authorities will hold
intact and in good condition at the disposal of the Allied
Representatives, for such purposes and at such times and
places as they may prescribe—
(b) The German authorities will at the
demand of the Allied Representatives furnish—
a) above; and
(c) The German authorities will at the
demand of the Allied Representatives provide all facilities
for the movement of Allied troops and agencies, their
equipment and supplies, on the railways, roads and other
land communications or by sea, river or air. The German
authorities will maintain all means of transportation in
good order and repair and will furnish the labor, services
and plant necessary therefor.
Article 6.
(a) The German authorities will
release to the Allied Representatives, in accordance with
the procedure to be laid down by them, all prisoners of war
at present in their power, belonging to the forces of the
United Nations, and will furnish full lists of these persons
indicating the places of their detention in Germany or
territory occupied by Germany. Pending the release of such
prisoners of war, the German authorities will protect them
in their persons and property and provide them with adequate
food, clothing, shelter, medical attention and money in
accordance with their rank or official position.
(b) The German authorities will in
like manner provide for and release all other nationals of
the United Nations who are confined, interned or otherwise
under restraint, and all other persons who may
(c) Without prejudice to the foregoing
provisions of this Article the German authorities will hand
over control of the places of detention there mentioned to
such officers as may be designated for the purpose by the
Allied Representatives.
Article 7.
The German authorities will furnish to the Allied Representatives—
- full information regarding the forces referred to in Article 2 (
a), and in particular will within twenty-four hours of the time of surrender furnish all information which the Allied Representatives may require concerning the numbers, locations and dispositions of such forces, whether located inside or outside Germany;- complete and detailed information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith. All such safety lanes will be kept open and clearly marked; all mines, minefields and other dangerous obstacles will as far as possible be rendered safe, and all aids to navigation will be reinstated. Unarmed German military and civilian personnel with the necessary equipment will be made available and utilised for the above purposes and for the removal of mines, minefields and other obstacles as directed by the Allied Representatives.
Article 8.
The German authorities will prevent the destruction, removal, concealment, transfer or scuttling of, or damage to, all military, naval, air, shipping, port, industrial and other like property and facilities and all records and archives, wherever they may be situated, except as may be directed by the Allied Representatives.
Article 9.
Pending the institution of control by the Allied Representatives over all means of communication, all radio and telecommunication installations and other forms of wire or wireless communications, whether ashore or afloat, under German control, will cease transmission except as directed by the Allied Representatives.
Article 10.
The forces, nationals, ships, aircraft, military equipment, and other property in Germany or in German control or service or at German disposal, of any other country at war with any of the Allies, will be subject to the provisions of this Instrument and of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.
Article 11.
The Allied Representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.
Article 12.
(a) The United States of America, the
United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In
the exercise of such authority they will take such steps,
including the complete disarmament and demilitarisation of
Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace and
security.
(b) The Allied Representatives will
present additional political, administrative, economic,
financial, military and other requirements arising from the
surrender of Germany. The Allied Representatives, or persons
or agencies duly designated to act on their authority, will
issue proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions for
the purpose of laying down such additional requirements and
of giving effect to the other provisions of the present
Instrument. The German Government, the German High Command,
all German authorities and the German people shall carry out
unconditionally the requirements of the Allied
Representatives and shall fully comply with all such
proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions.
Article 13.
This Instrument will enter into force and effect immediately upon signature. In the event of failure on the part of the German authorities or people promptly and completely to fulfil their obligations hereby or hereafter imposed, the Allied Representatives will take whatever action may be deemed by them to be appropriate under the circumstances.
Article 14.
This Instrument is drawn up in the English, Russian and German languages. The English and Russian are the only authentic texts. In case of any question as to the meaning of any of the provisions of this Instrument, the decision of the Allied Representatives shall be final.
The above text of the Unconditional
Surrender of Germany has been prepared by the
European Advisory Commission on the
The text of the Unconditional Surrender, as agreed in the English and Russian languages, consists of fourteen articles and has been unanimously accepted by the Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission at a meeting of the Commission held on the 25th July, 1944 and is now submitted to their respective Governments for approval.
An undated appendix to J. C. S. 577/28 consists of a draft of a message to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy as follows:
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend you advise Secretary of State that there are no reasons from a military viewpoint why the draft Protocol of European Advisory Commission relative to Zones of Occupation in Germany and Administration of Greater Berlin should not be approved.”
For the text of the agreement of November 14, 1944,
between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union regarding amendments to this protocol see
infra.
A letter from the Acting Secretary of State (
“. . . Notification of the President’s approval of the
protocol as amended was received by the Department of
State on December 4, 1944. Pending the conclusion of
conversations between British and American military
authorities with regard to the zones, however, it was
not until February 1, 1945 in a telegram sent from Malta
by the Secretary of State that Ambassador post, p.
515.
Protocol
between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of “Greater Berlin”.
The Governments of the United States of America, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics have reached the following agreement
with regard to the execution of Article 11 of the Instrument of
Unconditional Surrender of Germany:Ante, p.
116.
1. Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December, 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into three zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the three Powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the three Powers.
2. The boundaries of the three zones and of the Berlin area, and the allocation of the three zones as between the U. S. A., the U. K. and the U. S. S. R. will be as follows:—
3. The occupying forces in each of the three zones into which Germany is divided will be under a Commander-in-Chief designated by the Government of the country whose forces occupy that zone.
4. Each of the three Powers may, at its discretion, include among the forces assigned to occupation duties under the command of its Commander-in-Chief, auxiliary contingents from the forces of any other Allied Power which has participated in military operations against Germany.
5. An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Komendatura) consisting
of three Commandants, appointed by their respective
Commanders-in-Chief,
6. This Protocol has been drawn up in triplicate in the English and Russian languages. Both texts are authentic. The Protocol will come into force on the signature by Germany of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender.
The above text of the Protocol between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of “Greater Berlin” has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on 12th September, 1944, with the exception of the allocation of the North-Western and South-Western zones of occupation in Germany and the North-Western and Southern parts of “Greater Berlin”, which requires further consideration and joint agreement by the Governments of the U. S. A., U. K. and U. S. S. R.
Agreement regarding Amendments to the Protocol of 12th September, 1944, between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of “Greater Berlin”.
1. In place of the description of the North-Western Zone given in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol, the description of the North-Western Zone will read as follows:—
2. In place of the description of the South-Western Zone given in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol, the description of the South-Western Zone will read as follows:—
3. The following additional paragraph will be inserted after the description of the South-Western Zone:—
“For the purpose of facilitating communications between the
South-Western Zone and the sea, the Commander-in-Chief of the
United States forces in the South-Western Zone will
4. At the end of the description of the North-Western part of “Greater Berlin” given in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol, insert the following words:—
“the United Kingdom”
5. At the end of the description of the Southern part of “Greater Berlin” given in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol, insert the following words:—
“the United States of America”
6. In the English text of the sub-paragraph in paragraph 2 of the above-mentioned Protocol beginning with the words ‘The frontiers of States (Länder) and Provinces,” the words “descriptions to the zones” will read “descriptions of the zones.”
The above text of the Agreement regarding Amendments to the Protocol of 12th September, 1944, between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of “Greater Berlin” has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on the 14th November, 1944.
Memorandum for the President
There is attached hereto a photostatic copy of an agreement
reached in the European Advisory Commission for submission to
the American, British and Soviet Governments, with regard to
control machinery in Germany, together with the minutes of the
meeting of the Commission on November 14, 1944, at which the
agreement was signed.
The Department of State would appreciate being informed whether
this agreement, which is the result of careful consideration and
close consultation with the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
War and Navy Departments, is agreeable to you in order that
Ambassador
“. . . The Department of State was informed
of its approval by the President on January 23, 1945
and on January 24, 1945 Ambassador
The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have reached the following Agreement with regard to the organisation of the Allied control machinery in Germany in the period during which Germany will be carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender:—
Article 1.
Supreme authority in Germany will be exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the supreme organ of control constituted under the present Agreement.
Article 2.
Each Commander-in-Chief in his zone of occupation will have attached to him military, naval and air representatives of the other two Commanders-in-Chief for liaison duties.
Article 3.
(a) The three Commanders-in-Chief,
acting together as a body, will constitute a supreme organ
of control called the Control Council.
(b) The functions of the Control
Council will be:—
(c) The Control Council will meet at
least once in ten days; and it will meet at any time upon
request of any one of its members. Decisions of the Control
Council shall be unanimous. The chairmanship of the Control
Council will be held in rotation by each of its three
members.
(d) Each member of the Control Council
will be assisted by a political adviser, who will, when
necessary, attend meetings of the Control Council. Each
member of the Control Council may also, when necessary, be
assisted at meetings of the Council by naval or air
advisers.
Article 4.
A permanent Co-ordinating Committee will be established under the Control Council, composed of one representative of each of the three Commanders-in-Chief, not below the rank of General Officer or the equivalent rank in the naval or air forces. Members of the Coordinating Committee will, when necessary, attend meetings of the Control Council.
Article 5.
The duties of the Co-ordinating Committee, acting on behalf
of the Control Council and through the Control Staff, will
include:—
Article 6.
(a) The members of the Control Staff,
appointed by their respective national authorities, will be
organised in the following Divisions:—
Military; Naval; Air; Transport; Political; Economic; Finance; Reparation, Deliveries and Restitution; Internal Affairs and Communications; Legal; Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons; Man-power.
Adjustments in the number and functions of the Divisions may be made in the light of experience.
(b) At the head of each Division there
will be three high-ranking officials, one from each Power.
The duties of the three heads of each Division, acting
jointly, will include:—
(c) The three heads of a Division will
take part in meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee at
which matters affecting the work of their Division are on
the agenda.
(d) The staffs of the Divisions may
include civilian as well as military personnel. They may
also, in special cases, include nationals of other United
Nations, appointed in their personal capacity.
Article 7.
(a) An Inter-Allied Governing
Authority (Komendatura) consisting of three Commandants, one
from each Power, appointed by their respective
Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly
the administration of the “Greater Berlin” area. Each of the
Commandants will serve in rotation, in the position of Chief
Commandant, as head of the Inter-Allied Governing
Authority.
(b) A Technical Staff, consisting of
personnel of each of the three Powers, will be established
under the Inter-Allied Governing Authority, and will be
organised to serve the purpose of supervising and
controlling the activities of the local organs of “Greater
Berlin” which are responsible for its municipal
services.
(c) The Inter-Allied Governing
Authority will operate under the general direction of the
Control Council and will receive orders through the
Co-ordinating Committee.
Article 8.
The necessary liaison with the Governments of other United Nations chiefly interested will be ensured by the appointment by such Governments of military missions (which may include civilian members) to the Control Council, having access, through the appropriate channels, to the organs of control.
Article 9.
United Nations’ organisations which may be admitted by the Control Council to operate in Germany will, in respect of their activities in Germany, be subordinate to the Allied control machinery and answerable to it.
Article 10.
The Allied organs for the control and administration of Germany outlined above will operate during the initial period of the occupation of Germany immediately following surrender, that is, the period when Germany is carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender.
Article 11.
The question of the Allied organs required for carrying out the functions of control and administration in Germany in a later period will be the subject of a separate Agreement between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
The above text of the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany between the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been prepared and unanimously adopted by the Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission at a meeting held on 14th November, 1944, and is now submitted to their respective Governments for approval.
Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels.
A copy of this message was sent from the White House to
the Department of State with a memorandum of January 10
“for preparation of a draft reply”. A notation by
have] been awaiting Pres’ O. K.
on control machinery for Germany & therefore could
not answer
Personal and Secret for the President from
I have been informed by the State Department that the agreement
on control machinerySupra.Ante, pp.
118–123.
The control machinery agreement has been approved by the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I understand similar approval will be given to the German occupation protocol when the Combined Chiefs of Staff have come to an agreement on the U. S. control of Bremen and Bremerhaven, which includes rail, highway and canal facilities for the supply of our troops in the American zone. Both these papers have had governmental approval by the U. K. Government. Gousev tells me the Russians are favorably considering them, and I believe they are waiting action by us.
It has been my hope that these together with the surrender
instrument,Ante, pp.
113–118.
The only basic policy directive that we have received from the heads of the three governments was agreement on unconditional surrender. The surrender terms were based on that directive and are in conformity with it. They provide for the three Allies taking complete military and civil power over Germany.
The agreement on control establishes the necessary machinery to
implement the surrender terms but in no way prejudges the policy
which may be applied toward Germany. It simply establishes the
The German occupation protocol is an agreement on the delineation of zones of occupation in Germany and the division of areas for joint occupation of Berlin. It also defines the agreed area of Berlin. Again this paper in no way prejudges policy with respect to the treatment of Germany.
The unconditional surrender instrument is drawn so that surrender can be signed by both civil and military German authorities, or can be signed by either the civil or the military. If the defeat of Germany, on the other hand, can only be accomplished by the surrender of local commanders, the instrument can, with few verbal changes, be issued as a surrender proclamation.
All these three documents were recommended by the European Advisory Commission prior to the admission of a French representative. Whatever changes may be asked for by the French, and agreed to by the three Governments, can be accomplished by later amendment. The important thing in my judgment is to get agreement by the three major powers.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Agreement with regard to control Machinery for Germany
There is attached hereto a copy of my memorandum of November 25,
1944Ante, p.
124.Ante, pp.
124–127.
The members of the Commission were formally notified of the
approval of this agreement by the British Government on December
5, 1944 and similar approval by the Soviet Government is
expected momentarily. It is, therefore, a matter of the utmost
urgency that Ambassador
The Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy in a letter dated
December 27, 1944,
Dear Mr. President: At a conference
called by Mr.
I believe it was in part as a result of these informal conversations that the idea of the Moscow Conference emerged. One of the results of that Conference was the establishment of the European Advisory Commission. It was while we were at Teheran, fourteen months ago, that you made me a member of that Commission. The Russians were not members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the creation of the European Advisory Commission gave them representation on a continuing body to study and recommend joint policies for the treatment of Germany and Austria and of the satellite states.
Each of the three countries appointed Advisers to their respective representatives from their State Departments and from the three branches of their armed services—Army, Navy and Air. The responsibility for appointment of the Advisers rested on the respective services. The conclusions and recommendations reached by the Commission have been by unanimous agreement and with the concurrence of the Advisers.
When I returned to London to take up my duties on the Commission, I understood from you that there was agreement at Teheran on the basic principle of unconditional surrender, and that you supported the principle of tripartite responsibility following unconditional surrender. You also told me that you wished United States troops to occupy the northwestern zone in Germany following unconditional surrender. These directions which you gave me as guidance I followed without compromise. Holding to your instruction to insist on the northwestern zone was responsible for delay in reaching agreement on zones of occupation.
By last November 14 three basic agreements had been reached in
the European Advisory Commission: the Unconditional Surrender
Instrument, the Control Machinery for Germany, and the Protocol
on Zones of Occupation.Ante, pp.
113–118, 118–123, and 124–127 respectively.
All three Governments have agreed on the Unconditional Surrender
Instrument. The United States Government and the United Kingdom
have agreed on the Control Machinery. U. S. approval of the
Protocol on Zones in Germany and Areas in Berlin has been
waiting until the British conceded the control of Bremen and
Bremerhaven and of rail, road and canal facilities for our use
in supplying our troops in the southern zone. I understand that
the British and U. S. Chiefs of Staff have now reached agreement
on these facilities.post, pp. 635–636, 639).
Other matters that are before the European Advisory Commission I
hope I will have an opportunity to discuss with you after your
meeting at Argonaut
Control machinery was worked out within the Commission with the understanding that in the first phase of occupation after unconditional surrender there would be military control in Germany. It was understood that the commanding general of each of the three forces would both serve as a member of the Control Council and be in command of his own zone with, of course, authority to delegate such powers as he saw fit. If the French, who have been admitted to the European Commission, are to sign the Unconditional Surrender Instrument and be admitted to the Control Council and be given a zone of occupation, you would then have quadripartite instead of tripartite participation. The British have conceded this; neither the Russian representative nor myself has as yet been authorized to state a position on the French proposal.
The theory on which we have proceeded is that broad overall
policies in matters affecting Germany as a whole would be
arrived at by agreement between the participating Powers, either
in the form of general orders or directives, and that the
residue of powers would
The converse of this is that agreements by the generals, even in the Control Council, would be subject to interference by the Governments. It is true, the generals could ask for governmental agreement, but our experience in dealing with the Russians has shown that it is easier to get agreement prior to occupation than after occupation.
If the position stated by the British and Russian Governments in the European Advisory Commission is in any way a criterion of the position of their respective Governments, they mean to force the central German government agencies, after stripping them of Nazi political leadership, to carry out their will in Germany. The question of an orderly decentralization of political Germany can come later. Both the Russian and British concept is to prevent disorder and disease, for the protection of Allied occupying forces, by making full use of German administrative functionaries. This has nothing to do with a “hard” or “soft” policy that may be adopted toward Germany.
The suggestion in the overall Civil Affairs Directive . . .,post, 143–154.
There are two other considerations that I believe should not be
lost sight of. One, that contradictory basic regulations in the
separate zones are likely to lead to serious friction between
the Allied forces of occupation and would encourage the Germans
to try to play one Ally against another. Two, since we have
insisted in the Surrender Instrument that the signatory Powers
are “acting in the interests of the United Nations”, we have
taken on a trustee obligation to other
I hope I may have an opportunity to discuss these problems with you when we meet.
Sincerely,
Dear Ed, Since I have not had an
opportunity to see you, there are two matters that I would like
to bring to your attention before the coming Conference.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The other matter I want to take up with you has to do with the
European Advisory Commission. I am enclosing a copy of a letter
which 1 am sending to the President,Supra.post, pp. 152–154.post, pp.
190–191.
The proposal in the Economic Directive forwarded to me is so contrary to the Russian position and to that of the British that I am postponing introducing it into the Commission until I have had an opportunity to talk with the President. If I did introduce it, the Russian Government might fail to confirm either the Control Machinery Agreement or the Protocol on Zones of Occupation recommended by the European Commission to the respective Governments. Failure to get agreement on zones of occupation in Germany, with the Russians one hundred miles from Berlin, might lead to frictions and disagreements, which would affect not only the occupation of that country but the future of Allied unity. The Control Machinery Agreement is equally necessary.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Memorandum
The Secretary had a meeting in his office this morning attended
by Secretary Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, pp. 244–245;
New York Times, September 17,
1944; The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol.
i, pp. 207–208, vol. ii, pp. 1602–1622, 1701; On Active Service in Peace and War (New York,
1947), pp. 568–583; Germany Is
Our Problem (New York, 1945); New York
Post, November 24–29, 1947; Sherwood, pp. 813–819;
Secretary
In reply to a question from Secretary
The next day Mr.
Mr.
On Lend-Lease Mr.
The Secretary expressed his shocked feelings at the way such vital matters were settled without any consultation with our Government experts or regard for what has gone before.
Memorandum for the Secretary’s Files
Meeting in Secretary
The Secretary had requested the meeting for the purpose of
reporting to Secretaries on?] his
(Secretary Morgenthau’s) participation in the Quebec
Conference.
The meeting began by Secretary
Secretary On Active Service in Peace and
War, pp. 576–577.
Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
The Secretary handed Secretary
Secretary
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Secretary
I said that the directive and the accompanying memorandum could
be interpreted so as to permit some flexibility of decision so
far as the Americans were concerned in the amount and character
of lend-lease aid that could be given the British. I mentioned
that the British wanted to leave as little flexibility as
possible for the committee’s decision because they were quite
content with the President’s promise of the specific magnitude
mentioned in the memorandum. Secretary
Secretary
Secretary
The Secretary said that the State Department had sent a
memorandum to the President recommending the signing of
agreements and that
The Secretary asked Secretary
The Secretary said that he wanted to ask Secretary
Secretary
The Secretary later told Mr.
I told Jack post, pp.
143–154.
At a meeting yesterday in the War Department on the interim directive for Germany in which representatives of State, War and Treasury participated, there were several developments of which I think you should be apprised.
The Treasury representatives were
Memorandum for the President
Referring to your memorandum of September 15 from Quebecante, p. 134, footnote 4.
It would seem highly advisable to have the firm agreement of the Governments of Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the policy to be adopted as we have thus far acted on the basis that every action followed with respect to Germany, particularly in the post-hostilities period, would be on an agreed tripartite basis. It has been our understanding that the Soviet Government has also acted on this general assumption, and of course the European Advisory Commission, established by the Moscow Conference, was set up for the purpose of working out the problems of the treatment of Germany. We must realize that the adoption of any other basis of procedure would enormously increase the difficulties and responsibilities not only of our soldiers in the immediate military occupational period but also of our officials in the control period following.
Our information up to the present has been to the effect that the British Government no doubt has ideas of its own with respect to the application of economic controls to Germany, and we have not yet had any indication that the British Government would be in favor of complete eradication of German industrial productive capacity in the Ruhr and Saar. We have no idea as yet what the Soviet Government has in mind. Would it not be well at this time for the State Department to sound out the British and Russian views on the treatment of German industry either through the European Advisory Commission or otherwise?
The Secretary of State encloses, for the background information
and guidance of the Ambassador, a copy of “Directive to
The enclosed directive is intended to cover the interim period which may result after the defeat or surrender of Germany but before a directive has been prepared containing the policies agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Directive to
Regarding the Military Government of
Germany in the Period Immediately Following the
Cessation of Organized Resistance (Post-Defeat)Bulletin, October 21,
1945, vol. xiii, pp.
596–607.
1. In the event that Rankin “C”
conditions obtain in Germany or that the German forces are
either defeated or surrender before you have received a
directive containing policies agreed upon by the three
governments of the U. S., U. K., and U. S. S. R., you will
be guided by the following policies, principles and
instructions.
2. Prior to the defeat or surrender of Germany the primary objective of your civil affairs administration has been to aid and support your military objective: the prompt defeat of the enemy. Your objective now is primarily the occupation and administration of a conquered country with such military operations as are necessary for the complete elimination of all resistance.
3. Pending the receipt of directives containing long range
policies, your objectives must be of short term and military
character, in order not to prejudice whatever ultimate
policies may be later determined upon. Germany will not be
occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated
enemy nation. The clear fact of German military defeat and
the inevitable consequences of aggression must be
appreciated by all levels of the German population. The
German people must be made to understand that all necessary
steps will be taken to guarantee against a third attempt by
them to conquer the world. Your aim is not oppression, but
to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the
peace of the world. In the
4. Your occupation and administration will be just but firm and distant. You will strongly discourage fraternization between Allied troops and the German officials and population.
5. You will establish military government over all parts of Germany under your command. Your rights, powers and status in Germany are based upon the unconditional surrender or the complete defeat of Germany.
6. a. By virtue of your position you
are clothed with supreme legislative, executive and judicial
authority in the areas occupied by forces under your
command. This authority will be broadly construed and
includes authority to take all measures deemed by you
necessary, desirable or appropriate in relation to military
exigencies and the objectives of a firm military
government.
b. You are authorized at your
discretion to delegate the authority herein granted to you
in whole or in part to members of your command and further
to authorize them at their discretion to make appropriate
sub-delegations.
c. You should take the necessary
measures to enforce the terms of surrender and complete the
disarmament of Germany.
d. The Military Government shall be a
military administration which, until you receive further
advices, will show the characteristics of an Allied
undertaking acting in the interests of the United
Nations.
7. The administrative policies shall be uniform throughout those parts of Germany occupied by forces under your command subject to any special requirements due to local circumstances.
8. Representatives of civilian agencies of the U. S., U. K.
and U. S. S. R. governments shall not participate unless and
until you consider such participation desirable.
Representatives of the civilian agencies of other Allied
Governments or of
9. It is contemplated that a tripartite administration by the U. S., U. K. and U. S. S. R., covering the whole of Germany will be established. You have previously received advices in this connection.
10. You are authorized as
11. Military administration shall be directed toward the promotion of the decentralization of the political structure of Germany. In the administration of areas under your command, all dealings in so far as possible should be with municipal and provincial government officials rather than with Central government officials.
12. Appendix “A”, Political Directive; Appendix “B”,
Financial Directive; Appendix “C”, Economic Directive; and
Appendix “D”, Relief Directive, are attached hereto. At
Appendix “E” there is a chart suggestive of the tripartite
form which military government for Germany might take.Ante, pp.
113–118.
Appendix “A”
Political Directive
1. You will search out, arrest, and hold, pending receipt by
you of further instructions as to their disposition,
Of equal if not greater importance in the ultimate destruction of German Militarism is the elimination of the German Professional Officer Corps as an institution. All General Staff Corps officers who are not taken into custody as prisoners of war should therefore be arrested and held pending receipt of further instructions as to their disposition. You will receive further instructions as to how to deal with other members of the German Officers Corps.
2. If in your opinion it would be of aid in carrying out the above program and the other purposes of your occupation, you may issue such regulations dealing with the registration and identification of persons within Germany as you deem advisable.
3. You will issue a proclamation dissolving the Nazi party and its affiliates. Every possible effort should be made, to prevent any attempts to reconstitute them in underground or disguised form. You will abrogate the laws establishing the political structure of National Socialism and will take all necessary measures to uproot and discredit Nazi doctrines. No secret organizations or societies of any kind shall be permitted. Property, real and personal, of the Nazi party and its affiliates, wherever found, shall be taken into custody and may be used for such purposes as you may direct. You may require health or welfare organizations which were set up by the Party but which are of direct benefit to the people to transfer their functions and personnel, purged of Nazi elements and practices, to new organizations formed to carry out such functions.
4. You will make special efforts to preserve from destruction
all records and plans of the following:
You may seize and remove such of these records as you may deem desirable or as you may be instructed by subsequent directive.
5. You will take immediate steps to abrogate all laws, decrees, regulations or aspects thereof, which discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed, or political opinions. All persons who are detained or placed in custody by the Nazis on these grounds will be released, subject to the interests of the individuals concerned. You will take steps to insure that such people, if not released, are provided with adequate clothing, food and quarters.
6. The criminal and civil courts of Germany will be closed. After the elimination of all Nazi elements, at such time and under such regulations, supervision and control as you may determine, you may permit the courts to resume functioning. You will retain full power of review and veto of all courts which are allowed to function. All politically objectionable courts; e. g., People’s Courts, will be abolished. Criminal and ordinary police, and such others as it may be proper to retain, under appropriate supervision, must be purged of Nazi or otherwise undesirable elements, who will also be arrested and held for disposition.
7. No person in Germany, other than United Nations nationals as authorized by you, shall be permitted to possess arms of any character except that such local police as you may utilize to maintain order may be armed with such law enforcement weapons as you may deem appropriate.
8. a. All members of the Nazi party
and ardent supporters of Naziism will be removed immediately
from all government positions (other than clerks and
non-policy making functionaries) and from all leading
positions in industry, banking, education, judiciary, and
other public services. Under no circumstances shall such
persons be retained in such offices for the purpose of
administrative convenience or expediency.
b. You will decide whether the
objectives of military government are better served by the
appointment of officers of the occupation forces or by the
use of the services of Germans who have been cleared by the
security branches of the Allied armies. Failure by such
Germans as are permitted to fill Government posts to conform
with Allied directives and instructions will be cause for
removal and such punishment as you may deem advisable.
9. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 and to the extent that military interests are not prejudiced, freedom of speech and press, and of religious worship, will be permitted. Consistent with military necessity, all religious institutions will be respected and all efforts will be made to preserve historical archives, classical monuments and fine arts, except that all archives, monuments and museums of Nazi inception, or which are devoted to the perpetuation of German militarism shall be seized, closed, and their properties held pending further instructions.
10. a. Prisoners of war belonging to
the forces of the United Nations and associated nations will
be freed from confinement and placed under military control
or restriction as may be appropriate pending other
disposition.
b. All allied nations nationals who
have been removed to Germany under duress to serve in labor
battalions, or any other units organized by the Nazis, after
identification will be repatriated in accordance with
c. All allied civilians resident or
interned in Germany as a result of their presence in that
country upon the outbreak of war shall be identified,
examined closely and may, if you deem it advisable, be
placed under restricted residence. These people will be
dealt with in accordance with instructions to be furnished
you by their respective governments. In general, all
practical measures will be taken to insure the health and
welfare of United Nations nationals, including provision for
employment as authorized and practicable, and repatriation
should be undertaken as rapidly as military conditions
permit.
d. All Japanese diplomatic and
consular officials will be taken into protective custody and
held for further disposition. All other Japanese nationals
will be interned. All nationals of other countries with
which any of the United Nations are or have been at war
(except Germany) will be identified and registered and may
be interned or their activities curtailed as may be
necessary under the circumstances. Diplomatic and consular
officials of such countries will be taken into protective
custody and held for further disposition.
e. All German diplomats and consular
officials and other agents will be recalled. If their recall
cannot be effected or if their recall is not practicable by
reasons of nationality, their authority as agents for
Germany will be terminated. All records and files of these
agents and officers will be ordered returned to Germany or
otherwise made available for appropriate inspection.
f. Nationals of neutral countries
must register with the appropriate military authorities.
Every facility and encouragement will be given these people
to return to their home countries, except those neutrals who
have actively participated in any way in the war against any
one of the United Nations in which event they will be
detained, pending receipt by you of further instructions as
to their disposition. Neutral nationals will be accorded no
special privileges of communication or business
relationships with their home countries or people resident
outside Germany. You shall place such restrictions on
neutrals entering Germany as you deem advisable. Diplomatic
and consular officials of neutrals are to be dealt with in
accordance with instructions which will hereafter be
issued.
11. a. Propagation of Nazi doctrines
and Nazi propaganda in any form shall be prohibited. All
schools and universities will be closed. Elementary schools
should be reopened as soon as Nazi personnel have
b. No political activities of any
kind shall be countenanced unless authorized by you. No
political personalities or organized political groups shall
have any part in determining the policies of the military
administration. It is essential to avoid any commitments to
any political elements.
c. The publication of all newspapers,
magazines, journals and other publications and the operation
of all German radio stations and the dissemination of news
or information by mail, movies, telephone, cable or other
means throughout the area under your command will be
suspended. Thereafter, you will permit the dissemination of
news or information subject to such censorship and control
as you consider necessary in the interests of military
security and intelligence and to carry out the principles
laid down in this directive.
12. No person shall be permitted to leave or enter the area under your command without your authority.
13. No German parades, military or political, civilian or sports, shall be permitted anywhere in Germany. No German military music, or German national or Nazi anthems shall be played or sung in public or before any groups or gatherings. Public display of German national or Nazi flags and other paraphernalia of Nazi or affiliated organizations shall be prohibited. All flags, publications, other paraphernalia, records, documents and publications in the offices of the Nazi party or affiliated organizations shall be seized and amounts shall be set aside to distribute to approved foreign museums and the remainder will be held for disposition under the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staffs.
Appendix “B”
Financial Directive
1. United States, British and other Allied forces will use
Allied Military marks and Reichsmark currency or coins in
their possession. Allied Military marks and Reichsmark
currency and coin now in circulation in Germany will be
legal tender without distinction and will be interchangeable
at a rate of 1 Allied Military mark for 1 Reichsmark.
Records will be kept of the amounts of the German
2. In the event, however, that for any reason adequate supplies of Allied Military marks and/or Reichsmarks are not available, the United States forces will use yellow seal dollars and regular United States coins and the British forces will use British Military authority notes and regular British coins. Records will be kept of the amounts of currencies used by the United States and British forces.
3. If it is found necessary to use U. S. yellow seal dollars
and
4. The rate of exchange to be used exclusively for pay of troops and military accounting purposes will be —— marks to the dollar and —— marks to the pound sterling. A general rate of exchange may be furnished to you later. Holders of mark currency or deposits will not be entitled to purchase foreign exchange without special permission. They will obtain dollars or pounds, or any other foreign currency or foreign exchange credits, only in accordance with exchange regulations issued by you.
5. The Financial Division of the Civil Affairs Section for
Germany will include in its functions the control of all
funds to be used by the Allied Military Forces within the
area, except yellow seal dollars and
cash?] requirements of military
components of
6. You will take the following steps and will put into effect
only such further financial measures as you may deem to be
necessary from a strictly military occupation standpoint:
c
below.
7. All dealings in gold and foreign exchange and all foreign
financial and foreign trade transactions of any kind,
including all exports and imports of currency, will be
prohibited except as permitted under such regulations as you
may issue relative thereto. Except as you may otherwise
authorize, local banks will be permitted to open and operate
only mark accounts, but if yellow seal dollars and
8. Non-yellow seal U. S. dollar notes and regular British pound notes will not be legal tender. No person, agency or bank engaged in the exchange of money will acquire or otherwise deal in those notes except as you may so authorize. U. S. Army and Navy Finance Officers and British Paymasters may, however, be authorized to accept non-yellow seal U. S. dollar notes and regular British pound notes from United States and British Military or authorized personnel for conversion into Allied Military mark or Reichsmark currency at the decreed general rate of exchange, after satisfying themselves as to the source of the notes.
9. No military pensions (except for physical disability limiting the pensioner’s ability to work) shall be paid. Nor shall any pensions or other emoluments be paid for membership in or services to the Nazi party or affiliated organizations.
10. The railways, postal, telegraph and telephone service, radio and all government monopolies will be placed under your control and their revenues made available to the military government.
11. Taxes discriminating on the basis of race, color, creed, or political opinions shall be abolished.
Appendix “C”
Economic Directive
1. You shall assume such control of existing German
industrial, agricultural, utility, communication and
transportation facilities, supplies, and services, as are
necessary for the following purposes:
Except for the purposes specified above, you will take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany nor designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy. Except to the extent necessary to accomplish the purposes set out above, the responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing or transportation will remain with the German people and the German authorities.
2. You will make a survey to determine the extent to which local productive capacity and local supplies are or can be made available for export for relief and rehabilitation in the devastated areas of Europe or for such other purposes as may later be determined.
3. You will take such steps as are necessary to protect from destruction by the Germans, and maintain for such ultimate disposition as you may be directed to make by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, all plants, property, patents and equipment and all books and records of large German industrial companies and trade and research associations that have been essential to the German war effort and the German economy. In this connection you will pay particular attention to research and experimental establishments of such concerns.
4. You should take measures to prevent transfers of title of real and personal property intended to defeat, evade or avoid the orders, proclamations or decrees of the military government or the decision of the courts established by it.
5. Substantial amounts of private and public property of various categories have been seized, looted or otherwise improperly acquired by various Nazi officials and organizations. While it is contemplated that a suitable commission will ultimately deal with this problem, you should take such steps as may be practicable to collect any available information as to property of this kind and to preserve any such property found in the area under your control.
6. a. All property in the German
territory belonging to any country with which any of the
United Nations are, or have been at war may be controlled,
subject to such use thereof as you may direct.
b. Your responsibility for the
property of the United Nations, other than U.K. and U.S.,
and their nationals, in areas occupied by Allied forces
shall be the same as for the property of U.K. and U.S. and
their nationals, except where a distinction is expressly
provided by treaty or agreement. Within such limits as are
imposed by the military situation you should take all
reasonable steps necessary to preserve and protect such
property.
Appendix “D”
Relief Directive
1. You will be responsible for the provision and distribution of supplies for civilian relief only to the extent necessary to prevent disease and such disorder as might endanger or impede military occupation. For this purpose you will make maximum use of supplies, stockpiles and resources available within Germany in order to limit the extent to which imports, if any, will be required. German import requirements shall be strictly limited to minimum quotas of critical items and shall not, in any instance, take precedence over fulfillment of the supply requirements of any liberated territory.
2. German food and other agricultural supplies will be utilized for the German population. However, it will be necessary to hold German consumption to a minimum so as to increase to the maximum the surplus of agricultural products which can be made available to the devastated countries of Europe. You will report on any surpluses that may be available with regard for which separate instructions will be issued.
3. You will permit the German authorities to maintain or reestablish such health services and facilities as may be available to them under the circumstances. In the event that disease and epidemics should threaten the safety of Allied troops or endanger or impede military occupation, you shall take such steps as you deem necessary to protect the health of Allied troops and to eradicate sources of contamination.
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
I do not think that in the present stage any good purpose would be served by having the State Department or any other department sound out the British and Russian views on the treatment of German industry. Most certainly it should not be taken up with the European Advisory Commission which, in a case like this, is on a tertiary and not even a secondary level.
The real nub of the situation is to keep Britain from going into complete bankruptcy at the end of the war.
Somebody has been talking not only out of turn to the papers or on facts which are not fundamentally true.
No one wants to make Germany a wholly agricultural nation again, and yet somebody down the line has handed this out to the press. I wish we could catch and chastise him.
You know that before the war Germany was not only building up war manufacture, but was also building up enough of a foreign trade to finance re-arming sufficiently and still maintain enough international credit to keep out of international bankruptcy.
I just can not go along with the idea of seeing the British empire collapse financially, and Germany at the same time building up a potential re-armament machine to make another war possible in twenty years. Mere inspection of plants will not prevent that.
But no one wants “complete eradication of German industrial -productive capacity in the Ruhr and Saar”.
It is possible, however, in those two particular areas to enforce
rather complete controls. Also, it must not be forgotten that
outside of the Ruhr and Saar, Germany has many other areas and facilities for turning
out large exports.
In regard to the Soviet government, it is true that we have no idea as yet what they have in mind, but we have to remember that in their occupied territory they will do more or less what they wish. We cannot afford to get into a position of merely recording protests on our part unless there is some chance of some of the protests being heeded.
I do not intend by this to break off or delay negotiations with
the Soviet government over lend-lease either on the contract
basis or on the proposed Fourth Protocol basis.Soviet Supply Protocols,
Department of State Publication 2759 (Washington, Government
Printing Office, no date).
Memorandum for the President
The Cabinet Committee has not been able to agree upon a statement
of American policy for the post-war treatment of Germany. The
memorandum presented by the Secretary of the Treasury
1. Status of Negotiations With
the British and Russians
The instrument of unconditional surrender of GermanyAnte, pp.
113–118.
2. Important Problems For
Which High Policy Decisions Must Be Worked Out by the Three
Governments
The fundamental question to be decided is what kind of a Germany
we want and what policy should be put into effect during
occupation to attain our objectives. The most important of these
problems are set forth below with an explanation of the State
Department’s views. It should be emphasized, however, that these
objectives will have to be worked out with our principal Allies
if they are to be applied throughout the German
(a) Demilitarization
of Germany. The complete dissolution of all German
armed forces and all Nazi military, para-military and police
organizations, and the destruction or scrapping of all arms,
ammunition and implements of war should be effected. Further
manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition and implements of war
should be prohibited.
(b) Dissolution of
the Nazi party and all affiliated organizations. The
Nazi Party should be immediately dissolved. Large groups of
particularly objectionable elements, especially the
(c) Extensive
controls should be maintained over communications, press and
propaganda for the purpose of eliminating Nazi
doctrines or similar teachings.
(d) Extensive
controls over German educational system should be
established for the purpose of eliminating all Nazi influence
and propaganda.
(e) No decision
should be taken on the possible partition of Germany
(as distinguished from territorial amputations) until we see
what the internal situation is and what is the attitude of our
principal Allies on this question. We should encourage a
decentralization of the German governmental structure and if any
tendencies toward spontaneous partition of Germany arise they
should not be discouraged.
(f) Economic
Objectives. The primary and continuing objectives of
our economic policy are: (1) to render Germany incapable of
waging war, (2) to eliminate permanently German economic
domination of Europe A shorter term objective is to require the
performance by Germany of acts of restitution and reparation for
injuries done to the United Nations.
To achieve the first two objectives, it will be essential (1) to
destroy all factories incapable of conversion to peaceful
purposes and to prevent their reconstruction, (2) to enforce the
conversion of all other plants, (3) to eliminate
self-sufficiency by imposing reforms that will
This Government has little direct interest in obtaining reparations from Germany and no interest in building up German economy in order to collect continuing reparations. However, the U. S. S. R. and a number of other states which have been victims of German destruction and exploitation may press claims for German production and labor service for rehabilitation and construction.
Extensive controls over industry and foreign trade will be essential during the immediate period of demilitarization and dismantlement, as well as during the period of reparations. After this phase, a system of control and supervision of German industry and trade will have to be worked out in the light of world security developments. This system should be of such a character that the victor powers will be able and willing to enforce it over a considerable period.
It is of the highest importance that the standard of living of the German people in the early years be such as to bring home to them that they have lost the war and to impress on them that they must abandon all their pretentious theories that they are a superior race created to govern the world. Through lack of luxuries we may teach them that war does not pay.
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
In regard to your memorandum of September twenty-ninthy I think it is all very well for us to make all kinds of preparations for the treatment of Germany but there are some matters in regard to such treatment that lead me to believe that speed on these matters is not an essential at the present moment. It may be in a week, or it may be in a month, or it may be several months hence. I dislike making detailed plans for a country which we do not yet occupy.
Your memorandum paragraph No. 1
I agree except for going into too much detail and directives at the present moment, and we must emphasize the fact that the European Advisory Commission is “Advisory” and that you and I are not bound by this advice. This is something which is sometimes overlooked and if we do not remember that word “advisory” they may go ahead and execute some of the advice, which, when the time comes, we may not like at all.
Your memorandum paragraph No. 2
In view of the fact that we have not occupied Germany, I cannot agree at this moment as to what kind of a Germany we want in every detail.
In regard to the problems involved, there are some which are perfectly clear and which can be approved now.
Sub-paragraph (a) on the Demilitarization
of Germany is, of course, correct but should include everything
to do with aircraft. This should be made specific. It must apply
not merely to the assembly of aircraft but to everything that
goes into an aircraft. We must remember that somebody may claim
that the aircraft is for non-military purposes, such as a
transport plane. Germany must be prevented from making any
aircraft of any type in the future.
I am in hearty agreement with Sub-paragraph (b) Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all affiliated
organizations.
In the same way, I agree with Sub-Paragraph (c) Extensive controls should be maintained over
communications, press and propaganda.
Sub-paragraph (d) Extensive controls over
German educational system. I should like to talk with your
experts in regard to just what this means.
I agree with Sub-paragraph (e) No decision
should be taken on the possible partition of Germany.
Sub-paragraph (f) Economic Objectives. I
should like to discuss this with the State Department in regard
to some of the language. I agree with it in principle, but I do
not know what part of it means. Much of this sub-head is
dependent on what we and the Allies find when we get into
Germany—and we are not there yet.
Prime Minister to President
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Developments in the Formulation of American
Policy for the Post-War Treatment of Germany
On September 1, 1944, Mr.
It was at this meeting that Dr.
A lengthy discussion followed, in which Mr.
At this meeting of the three Secretaries, Mr. On Active Service in Peace and
War, pp. 571–573.
There the matter rested until the Quebec Conference to which Mr.
In the meantime, a reply to the President’s memorandum of
September 15 was prepared in the State Department under date of
September 29 and was presented by the Secretary to the President
on October 1, 1944.Ante, pp.
156–158.
After reviewing the status of the negotiations in the European
Advisory Commission, this memorandum advocated the following
objectives which, it was emphasized, would have to be worked out
with the British and Russians if they are to be applied
throughout the German
A memorandum, also under date of September 29, from the President
to the Secretary of State was received in the Department on
October 3, 1944.Ante, p.
155.Ante, pp.
158–159.
Realizing that the European Advisory Commission might not have
agreed directives ready by the time Germany collapsed, both Mr.
Ante, pp.
143–154.
Dear Ed: I am sending you herewith
Memorandum on the British Draft of Policy Directive for
Germany.
This was shown to the War Department, and with their
approvalpost, p.
165.
Sincerely yours,
Memorandum on the British Draft of
Policy Directive for Germany
1. Examination of the British document suggests that it was intended as a long range program. We are not prepared to make decisions on these long range issues at this time. Moreover, the British document does not cover the major questions involved. If, on the other hand, the British document is only intended as an interim program it prejudices the long range decision on important issues. In any event, its 97 pages of detailed instructions, often on unimportant points, is not a satisfactory medium for a high level policy determination. The document confuses principles with details of administration, and thus does not provide a basis on which decisions can be readily reached through the exchange of views. We feel strongly that we should confine our discussions now to the major policy decisions needed for the interim period and leave the details to be worked out at a staff level.
2. The appropriate document for immediate discussion is the
American interim directive document.Ante, pp.
143–154.
3. The following are some of the major policy issues which
the British document fails to deal with adequately and which
must be dealt with in any long range program:
4. While it is difficult to evaluate the significance of the
detailed policy questions without an understanding of the
underlying objectives, the following comments on the British
group of directives may indicate the difference in approach:
The attached enclosure to Secretary Supra.
Mr.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Economic Treatment of Germany
As agreed in our conversation yesterday afternoon, I am sending
to you herewith, as you requested in your memorandum to the
Secretary of October 20,Ante, pp.
158–159.
If this draft does not accurately set forth your views, perhaps you will let us talk to you again in order that the memorandum may be redone in accordance with your desires.
As I stated yesterday, it is rather important that we give the European Advisory Commission our views on this matter promptly since the treatment of Germany must be coordinated with our British and Russian allies.
Draft
Memorandum for the President
There are presented in the following paragraphs the recommendations of the Department of State for American policy with regard to economic treatment of Germany:
1. Urgency of Tripartite
Agreement
It is essential that economic policies with respect to Germany be directed toward the central aim of disarming Germany and keeping her disarmed through an effective international security organization. To achieve this aim, preliminary agreement is necessary among the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union on certain basic policies governing economic treatment of Germany.
The matter is urgent because present British, Russian and American attitudes on the question show major divergencies which, if allowed to persist, would begin to be reflected in widely different policies at an early stage in the occupation of Germany. Such differences, in turn, would lay the basis for new European rivalries and endanger the effectiveness of an international security organization. Without effective security organization, no economic program alone can be relied upon to keep Germany disarmed. It is of urgent importance, therefore, that a substantial measure of agreement be obtained in advance on economic policies toward Germany, and that such policies be so framed as to remove this potential source of new European rivalries.
Complete identity of methods and objectives in the several
zones of occupation is unnecessary and unattainable; it is
essential, however, in the economic as in other fields, that
the policies carried out in each zone be such as to
facilitate a solution of the German problem in a
The need for such compatibility of policies has been accepted in principle by the three powers. It is probable, therefore, that existing divergences in attitude concerning economic treatment of Germany can be progressively narrowed through discussion and negotiation, if the subject is taken up promptly.
2. Present Tendencies of
British and Russian Policy
Policies with respect to economic treatment of Germany are not definitely fixed but will progressively crystallize over a period of years. Moreover, our knowledge of the present tendencies of British and Russian policy is largely inferential, owing to the absence, so far, of any official discussion of these questions. Nevertheless, available information is sufficient to reveal certain general tendencies of policy which should be taken into account in determining our own course of action.
In the economic field, the principal differences between
present British and Russian attitudes are as follows:
British policy envisages the retention, during the occupation period, of as large a part of the existing organization and structure of the German economy as is compatible with the destruction of the Nazi regime. The main elements of the present machinery of economic control would, so far as conditions permit, be held together after eliminating their discriminatory, Nazi feature; the existing executive and managerial personnel of private industry would continue in their positions, after removal of active Nazis who had held governmental or party posts. The aims of this policy are to prevent economic breakdown and to preserve a situation in which control over the economy can be exercised.
One important British objective in controlling the German
economy is to limit German competition with British exports.
In relation to this objective Britain’s interest as a
reparation claimant is distinctly secondary. Britain’s
program for accomplishing this objective is, however,
moderate and restrained, relying primarily upon controls
rather than upon basic economic impairment of Germany. There
Britain appears to envisage a continuation of certain indirect controls over the German economy, primarily through exports and imports, beyond the period of military government. Such controls, although proposed partly as a means of enforcing disarmament, are also desired as a method of regulating German competition. A leading British industrialist has suggested that in the long run this problem of restraining German competition might best be handled through cartel-type arrangements with German industry on terms which would assure British goods a larger share of common markets than before the war but would still leave Germany sufficient export opportunities to meet her essential requirements.
Russian policy seems to envisage removal from positions of control of most industrialists and large landowners. The legal basis for such action is provided in the Russian declaration that Germans who employed Russian labor are war criminals. This will open the way for designation of new managers to operate under direction of the occupation authority. While the British look to the retention of much of the existing organization and personnel as a means of exercising control over the German economy, the Soviet Union intends to effect its control by selection of new German personnel for managerial posts in industry. Both powers apparently intend to exercise comprehensive control over the German economy.
One major Russian objective of economic control will be
energetic exploitation of the German economy for Russian
reconstruction and development. Russia has no economic
interest in restraining German competition. Although
reparation will be collected in part through transfer to
Russia of usable German capital equipment and through labor
services, Russian semi-official statements have indicated
It is apparent that these divergent tendencies of policy could result in markedly different economic developments in the British and Russian zones of occupation.
It is difficult to foresee the final results of these divergent tendencies, but it is clear that they seriously endanger long-run cooperation between Britain and the U. S. S. R.
In addition to the basic interest of both countries in sustaining cooperation, certain economic factors are present which increase the prospects for adoption of compatible policies.
First, there appears to be agreement on important points of economic policy.
In the second place, both countries have an important interest in maintaining inter-zonal movement of goods during the occupation period. The British zone is heavily deficient in foodstuffs, and the industries of the Russian zone can be operated only at a reduced level without imports of basic industrial materials, notably coal and steel.
3. United States Policy
toward Economic Treatment of Germany
The foregoing analysis of present tendencies in British and
Russian policies has important implications for American
policy toward economic treatment of Germany. In addition to
thorough disarmament, it is essential that we strive for
such an orientation of the German economy as will remove the
danger of new rivalries from this
A program of sweeping deindustrialization does not provide an adequate basis for sustained international security cooperation, nor does it provide a satisfactory alternative to such cooperation. A program designed to impose lasting restraint on Germany’s industrial exports to Western markets also involves the danger of generating serious, new rivalries in Europe and of weakening the basis for international security cooperation.
In the Department’s view, our long-term objectives with respect to economic treatment of Germany must be (1) abolition of German self-sufficiency, and (2) elimination of German economic domination over Europe. These two objectives conform to the general economic foreign policy of the United States. More important, however, it is only through the kind of orientation of the German economy which is envisaged in these objectives that the basis for international security organization can be protected.
These two objectives are closely related. Abolition of self-sufficiency requires the removal of all protection and subsidies to high-cost domestic production. Elimination of German economic domination over Europe requires the prohibition of all discriminatory trade controls, clearing agreements and international cartel arrangements.
The basic objectives can be carried out only gradually, and in short-run they will have to be qualified to conform to the immediate requirements of the occuption and transition period. Their adoption, even over the longer term, will be dependent upon our general success in achieving world trade expansion under liberal conditions of trade.
It is recommended that in discussion with the British and
Russians, we should adopt the policies given below as a
basis for agreed action during the period of Allied control.
Subject: Treatment of Germany
In reply to the Under Secretary’s question, the President said
that he had read the memorandum submitted to him on the
treatment of GermanySupra.
As he saw the picture, the system that would become established
would be that General
Mr.
The President said he was still in a tough mood and that he is determined to be tough with Germany. After some discussion, he agreed that the memorandum was sufficiently tough. He said that what he liked about it particularly was that it did not dot all the i’s and cross all the t’s. There are many questions that must be left for future determination, since we have no way of knowing what we shall find in Germany. He himself used to know Germany well, having studied there. But he would not want to rely on that as a basis of reliable judgment as to what Germany will be like after the termination of hostilities.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Economic Treatment of Germany
At the time that you redraft the memorandum on the Economic Treatment of Germany you might find the attached memorandum useful.
Subject: Summary of Department’s Views on Economic Treatment of Germany
The Department of State believes:
(1) The German economy should be operated as nearly as
possible as a unit during the
occupation period.
(2) Allied occupation policy should be severe—
(3) We must rely on an effective international security organization to keep Germany disarmed. We can’t make Germany so weak that it will be impossible for her to recover. A look at Russia in 1920 and in 1940 demonstrates how quickly industrial strength can be built up if a country is left alone “to stew in its own juice”. Disarmament requires prohibition of arms and aircraft production and destruction of specialized facilities for their manufacture. Some other permanent or semi-permanent industrial restrictions and controls may be necessary, but if the security organization is prepared to use force to prevent rearmament, we don’t have to cut deep into the German economy, and if it isn’t, no amount of once-and-for-all economic destruction will make much lasting difference.
(4) In the long run, we should look forward to a German economy geared into a liberal world economy on the basis of efficient specialization. This will imply equitable German access to export markets, abolition of German self-sufficiency, and abandonment of instruments of German economic aggression—private international cartels, bilateral barter arrangements, etc. This alone is compatible with the emergence of a stable non-aggressive Germany. This may prove to be unattainable, but for the present we should take no action which would permanently preclude peaceful development of Germany.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: British Views on the Economic Treatment of Germany
For your convenience I have summarized below a series of telegrams received from the Embassy in London on the British views on the economic treatment of Germany.
The reports generally confirm the statement of the British
position which was outlined in the Department’s draft of
November 10 on the economic treatment of Germany.Ante, pp.
166–171.
The British emphasize the need for selecting measures which will enjoy lasting public support and which will be enforceable a generation hence, after the emotions of wartime have cooled down.
They advocate conversion of the German economy to peacetime production and payment of reparation in kind.
They are eager to begin discussions on restitution of looted property even if discussion of broader economic questions is not yet practicable, and they intend to introduce shortly into the European Advisory Commission a proposal on machinery to handle restitution.
Memorandum for Hon. Stettinius,
Jr.
I have yours of November 29th on the Economic Treatment of Germany. There are two things which I think the State Department ought to keep in the linings of their hats. (1) That in the Economic Treatment of Germany we should let her come back industrially to meet her own needs, but not to do any exporting for sometime and we know better how things are going to work out.
(2) We are against reparations.
(3) We do want restitution of looted property of all kinds.
Memorandum
Re: Long Range Program for
Germany.
1. The single objective of any long range program towards Germany
is that of doing all that we can now to prevent Germany from
starting a third World War in the next generation. To accomplish
this objective, the following principles are clear:
guarantee peace in
the years to come. We can not expect to find a panacea.
There are certain minimum steps which we must take now.
Developments in the next five or ten years may require
that we take additional steps at that time. So long as
the German people retain the will to wage war, we must
be ever vigilant to see to it that they do not obtain
the means to exercise this will.
2. There are many essential facets to a long range program for Germany. Without intending at all to exclude from consideration the other essential elements of the program, it is desired at this time to emphasize the importance of dealing effectively with German heavy industry because industry represents an indispensable means by which Germany can exercise her will to wage war again. Although political, military and economic controls over Germany in the post-war period are essential, they afford no reasonable assurance that a strong industrial Germany could not within twenty to thirty years again plunge the world into war. In order to make reasonably sure that we have deprived Germany of the ability to make war again within the next generation, it is absolutely essential that she be deprived of her chemical, metallurgical and electrical industries. Although this does not mean that other measures are unnecessary, the elimination of heavy industry is one of the essential steps we must take now.
At the same time that German heavy industry is eliminated in
Germany every effort should be made to build up heavy industry
in the liberated countries surrounding Germany. The industrial
equipment moved from Germany as well as the resources in the
Rhine and Ruhr
3. After careful study, we completely reject the following
propositions:
Conversation
Subject: German Questions
By prearrangement I called on
1) Germany should be broken up although no agreement had been reached on the precise method. He did not go into detail but indicated that the Rhineland, including the Ruhr, might be an independent state and there might be a Catholic republic including Bavaria and Württemberg.
2) Germany should be demilitarized industrially. Steel production
should be limited too, but should include sufficient production
to give Germany the necessary steel and iron products to
maintain her economy, with perhaps a small export. He spoke
about a cut to 25% of Germany’s previous production. Heavy
industry should be allowed to furnish electrical equipment, etc.
for her own needs. German economy should be encouraged to expand
agricultural production and
3) In connection with reparations the Soviet Government had security in mind first and therefore would not ask for reparations which would call for strong heavy industries. Their demands would be to strip Germany’s heavy industries of their machinery and equipment and other products not involving heavy industry. The Soviet Government did not have in mind payments over a long period but spoke of ten years.
4) He classified German labor as part of reparations. No definite numbers had been agreed upon as a demand but it would run into the millions. He said the Government was more conservative than the Russian people on this point. Later on, but without definite significance, he mentioned two or three millions. In reply to my question he said that of course the group taken to Russia to work should be carefully selected; in the first instance the lesser war criminals as well as those active in the Nazi Party. If these were not sufficient, men could be selected from other categories, perhaps those that did not appear likely to find employment. He said they had been talking principally about men but some women might be required. They should come to Russia or other countries to work for a definite period and they considered it should be the same period as the reparations payments, say ten years.
It was the Russians’ hope that this experience, although partly punishment and partly reparations for damage caused, should be handled in such a way as to reeducate the Germans. If they showed signs of becoming more reasonable in their attitude greater freedom and a fuller life might be provided. These were questions that only experience could decide. It was the Russians’ hope that they would go back to Germany in a better frame of mind. It was not the intention of the Soviet Government to treat them badly but rather to attempt to educate them.
5) He did not warm up much to a discussion of an Austrian or Danube Basin confederation. He said this was out of his immediate study. He himself was spending his time on all aspects of reparations as described above.
6) He emphasized that the principal objective of the Soviet Government was security and that if they were satisfied with that aspect they would not have to support as large an army. This aspect would be taken into account in connection with the size of reparations. I assumed he particularly had in mind such things as breaking up Germany into smaller states and production of the heavy industries and those industries such as aviation and chemicals which could be put to war use.
7) He said they thought Germany might have a small merchant shipping but the Soviet Government would be quite satisfied to have much of Germany’s trade carried in foreign bottoms.
8) In talking about reparation demands of other countries he said that certain principles ought to be set down as to priorities of claim such as first priority should be for damage caused by enemy action. Also the contribution in the defeat of Germany should be taken into account. Those who had done the most fighting should get the most. Another consideration should be the percentage of damage in relation to national wealth. He mentioned France for example. He had noted in the papers they were building up enormous claims but that France had not done any fighting. They would not want any German labor. He did not seem to have too much sympathy for her claims in relation to Russia’s.
When
As to the British, he did not know what their ideas would be but spoke sympathetically of their rights. Also for Poland. He thought perhaps the United States could be paid by taking over German property in the United States. This part of the conversation was very general.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Treatment of Germany
Summary
I. Policy for the Period
Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized
Resistance
It is recommended that the draft “Agreement on Control Machinery
in Germany”Ante, pp.
124–127.
It is recommended that immediate security measures include (1)
expeditious disbandment and future prohibition of all German
military and para-military forces, (2) seizure and destruction
of all existing
It is recommended that the National Socialist system be destroyed through the dissolution of Party organizations, abrogation of Nazi laws and Nazi public institutions, and the elimination of active Nazis from public office and from positions of importance in private enterprise.
It is recommended that direct inter-allied military government
supplant the central government of the
It is recommended that the Control Council assume authority over all German informational services and cultural activities and that schools be reopened as soon as objectionable text-books and teaching personnel can be replaced.
II. Long-Range Objectives and
Measures
The attached paper also discusses our long-range objectives in Germany.
III. Frontier Settlements
It is recommended that this Government adopt, as its basic principles in the settlement of territorial disputes, (1) the most reasonable prospect of general acceptance and stability, and (2) the maximum contribution to the orderly development of general international order.
It is recommended that: (1) the Danish-German frontier remain unchanged, (2) that the water-boundary between the Netherlands and Germany be moved to the main channel of the Ems Estuary and that further consideration be given to any Netherlands claims on German territory as compensation for war damage, (3) that the 1920–1940 boundary between Belgium and Germany be restored, (4) that Alsace-Lorraine be returned to France, (5) that the pre-1938 Austro-German frontier, with a slight rectification, be restored, (6) that the pre-Munich frontiers between Czechoslovakia and Germany be in principle restored, subject to any minor rectifications which the Czechoslovak Government might wish to propose, and (7) that Poland acquire East Prussia (except for the Koenigsberg area), the Free City of Danzig, German Upper Silesia, and Pomerania.
It is recommended that although this Government should not oppose a general transfer of the German minorities from neighboring states, it should, wherever possible, favor a selective transfer. Such action, if carried out gradually, in an orderly manner, and under international supervision, would contribute to better relations between the states concerned.
The Treatment of Germany
I. Policy for the Period
Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized
Resistance
A. Control Machinery
1. The Department of State recommends that the draft “Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany” should be accepted without reservation.
This proposal provides for the exercise of supreme authority over
Germany by the American, British and Soviet generals, each in
his own zone of occupation and also jointly, in matters
affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of a
supreme organ of control designated as the Control Council. The
functions of this Council would be (a) to
ensure uniformity of action in the several zones of occupation,
(b) to initiate plans and make
agreements, within the powers granted by the respective
Governments, for dealing with questions involving the whole of
Germany, (c) to control and direct the
central German administration, and (d) to
direct the administration of the joint zone of Greater Berlin.
Appropriate sub-agencies would be organized on a tripartite
basis to carry out the administrative and supervisory functions
of the Control Council.
2. The Department of State recommends that the directives given to the commanding generals should so define their duties that the Control Council’s authority would be paramount throughout Germany and that the zones of occupation would become, in so far as feasible, areas for the enforcement of the Council’s decisions rather than regions in which the commanders would possess a wide latitude of autonomous power.
This recommendation rests on two convictions: (1) that it is highly desirable, even at the expense of curtailing to some degree the freedom of action of the commander of the United States zone, to prevent any of the occupying powers from dealing as it pleases with its zone of occupation, and (2) that it is essential, in the interest of effective military government to maintain such parts of the normal administrative unity of Germany as will have survived the defeat. The problem, for example, of providing sufficient food for the German people to prevent epidemics and disorders would be seriously complicated if the Control Council could not direct the transportation and distribution of the total food supply within Germany. Should the surplus supplies of the eastern zone be denied to the southern and northwestern zones, the United States and British Governments would be faced with the choice between delivering large quantities of foodstuffs from their own stores or allowing wholesale starvation.
B. Functions of Military
Government
1. Security Measures
The Department of State recommends the adoption of the following policies with respect to immediate security measures:
a. Demobilization and disbandment of the
German armed forces, including para-military organizations.
This recommendation would not exclude the detention of
individuals and units of the Waffen
b. Dissolution and prohibition of all
military and para-military agencies including the General Staff,
party military and quasi-military organizations, reserve corps,
military academies and military training, civilian
administrative units performing purely military functions,
together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep
alive the military tradition in Germany.
c. Seizure and destruction of all German
arms, ammunition and implements of war.
The recommendation for the destruction of these categories of war material, which are in general not convertible to peace-time purposes, is based on belief that the rearming of the European nations with surrendered German equipment would complicate the problem of restoring political stability, render future general disarmament more difficult, tend to make the countries acquiring the equipment look to Germany and to German technicians for spare parts and replacements, and might inaugurate an armaments race detrimental to the hopes for international peace and security.
d. Confiscation of military archives and
military research facilities and vesting authority over them in
the Control Council.
e. Immediate prohibition on the
manufacture of arms, ammunition and implements of war.
f. Destruction of industrial plants and
machinery incapable of conversion to peaceful uses.
g. Dismantlement of aircraft industry and
prohibition on manufacture of aircraft.
2. Political Actions
a. Destruction of the National Socialist
System.
The Department of State recommends the following measures designed to destroy the Nazi tyranny in Germany:
(1) Dissolution of the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organs with the transfer to public agencies of such social services now performed by the Nazi groups as it may be found desirable to continue.
(2) Abrogation of the Nazi laws which provided the legal basis of the régime and which established discriminations on the basis of race, creed and political opinion.
(3) Abolition of Nazi public institutions, such as the People’s Courts and the Labor Front, which were set up as instruments of Party domination.
(4) The elimination of active Nazis from public and quasi-public office and from positions of importance in private enterprise.
The Department of State believes it desirable to distinguish between the total membership of the Nazi Party, numbering probably more than 6 million, and those Germans, numbering about 2 million, who have been Party leaders at all levels of its organization. This latter group can be easily identified in a preliminary way by office-holding in the various Party organizations. So many Germans have joined the Party for so many different reasons that nominal membership is no serious index of political conviction. Selective expulsion of the proposed sort would effectively destroy the structure and influence of National Socialism and would immeasurably lighten the administrative burden of military government.
(5) The selection of personnel for labor reparation, in case
certain of our Allies insist on that form of reparation, from
the ranks of active Nazis and of Nazi organizations such as the
This recommended procedure would place the burden where it most justly belongs and would remove from Germany some of the most dangerous political influences during the period when an effort must be made to establish an acceptable government.
(6) The arrest and punishment of the principal political malefactors and of war criminals.
b. The Government of Germany
The Department of State recommends that, after the destruction of
the Nazi régime, no central German government be recognized and
that tripartite military government, as envisaged in the
surrender instrument,Ante, pp.
113–118.
Direct military government will be desirable as a means of
reinforcing the reality of defeat on the German mind. It will
probably be necessary in any case because of internal confusion.
Since there is little prospect that the Nazi and militaristic
groups who should bear the onus of defeat will survive, it is
politically undesirable to
The establishment of comprehensive military government would prevent the equally undesirable development of the importation into Germany of a substantially ready-made provisional government perhaps recognized by and functioning under special foreign auspices.
c. Future Change to Civilian Control. The
Department of State recommends that, as soon as military
considerations cease to be paramount, the control machinery in
Germany should be transferred to inter-allied civilian
hands.
d. German Political Activity and
Association.—The Department of State recommends that,
when security conditions permit, political parties opposing Nazi
and other kinds of ultra-nationalistic ideologies be permitted
to organize and to engage in public discussion.
This recommendation is based on the conviction that the German people will need information, public debate and political organization before they are prepared to decide their future form of government, and that there is advantage in the Germans beginning these activities while National Socialism is perhaps in greatest discredit under the immediate impact of defeat.
3. Control over Information and Cultural
Activities.
a. Public Information.—The Department of
State recommends that, under the direction and supervision of
the Control Council, there be established throughout Germany a
system of control over all media for the dissemination of public
information.
This proposal is designed to insure against the further dissemination of Nazi propaganda, to facilitate the Control Council’s presentation of instructions and information to the German people, and, as security permits, to allow responsible Germans to carry on an orderly discussion of political reform.
The Department of State wishes to emphasize the importance of placing this control function under the authority of the Control Council rather than leaving it to the discretion of the zonal commanders.
b. Educational Policy.—The Department of
State recommends a system of control over German education
designed to eradicate Nazi doctrines and to inculcate democratic
values. To this end it is recommended, as the first step, that
the German schools, beginning at the elementary level, be
reopened as soon as military considerations permit and when
objectionable text-books and teaching personnel can be
satisfactorily replaced. The Department believes that it should
be the policy of military government to work as unobtrusively as
possible through existing German educational machinery after
Nazi influences have been removed, and likewise to leave the
initiative of positive educational reform to the Germans
themselves, subject to review by
The desirability of keeping changes in German education to a
common procedure throughout the
The Department believes it urgent to reopen the schools as promptly as possible in order that the younger children can be looked after and the youth can be kept from the streets and subject to discipline which may be otherwise lacking because of the break-up of families and the dissolution of the Nazi youth organizations.
In the Department’s opinion the Control Council’s role must be largely in terms of prohibiting certain things and in consenting to changes proposed by the Germans. A new direction of German education and a new positive content will necessarily be the work of German educators and the victors can do little more than encourage the adoption of a set of beliefs and objectives to take the place of the perverted concepts now being inculcated. The problem for the victors, consequently, is (1) to determine what kind of teaching in Germany would be most conducive to our long-range aims of world security, and (2) to consider what means could be employed to foster that teaching.
The Department is well aware of the difficulties but sees no constructive alternative, as an ultimate objective, to a German school system promoting the psychological disarmament of the German people and reflecting a democratic outlook in which a humanitarian and international outlook will supersede the current ultra-nationalism.
This program is recommended as a contribution toward that end. The Department foresees, however, that no fundamental change in the German mentality can be effected by the schools alone. The hope for a transformation of educational values will depend less on what is done in the school room than on the whole experience of the German people in the occupation and post-war periods.
c. Religious Activity.—The Department of
State recommends that the Nazi legislation and organizations for
maintaining the Party’s tyranny over German religion should be
terminated and that full religious freedom, including the rights
of teaching, publishing and conducting social service, should be
established as quickly as security needs will permit.
II. Long-Range Objectives and
Measures
The Department of State recommends that the measures applied during the period of military government should from the beginning be worked out and applied in the light of long-range objectives with respect to Germany and Germany’s ultimate place in the projected world order.
The enduring interest of the United States is peace, and so far as Germany is concerned the basic objective of this Government must be to see to it that that country does not disturb the peace.
Security against a renewal of German aggression must be guaranteed during the foreseeable future by a rigorously enforced prohibition of a German military establishment and by a vigilant control of German war potential.
An indefinitely continued coercion of so many millions of technically resourceful people, however, would be at best an expensive undertaking. There is, moreover, no certainty that the victor powers will be willing and able indefinitely to apply coercion. In the long run, therefore, the best guaranty of security, and the least expensive, would be the assimilation of the German people into the world society of peace-loving nations.
These considerations urge the search for a continuing policy which will prevent a renewal of German aggression and, at the same time, pave the way for the German people in the course of time to join willingly in the common enterprises of peace.
A. Security Controls
The Department of State believes that it would be premature at present to attempt to specify the nature of the long-term security controls to be established over Germany beyond the general principles of complete disarmament and control of war potential.
In determining the exact manner in which Germany’s ability to make war is to be destroyed, the Department of State believes that the various proposals should be judged by their prospective effectiveness and the possibility of their continued enforceability. There are several ways in which Germany could be effectively made militarily impotent. The most obvious method would be the prohibition of a military machine through forbidding military training and the possession or acquisition of arms. Manifestly a Germany without soldiers and without weapons would be no menace to the peace of the world. Various kinds of intervention in German industry and commerce would likewise add further effective restraints.
With such latitude in the choice of measures afforded by the test of effectiveness, the crucial test is that of enforceability over a period of years or even decades.
There is involved in this second criterion the problem of devising controls which would be relatively inexpensive and simple in operation, particularly with respect to detecting German attempts at evasion There is involved also the more dangerous problem of choosing a series of measures which the victor powers will be willing to maintain after war passions have cooled. Experience during the period between the two great wars suggests that the crucial issue is not so much the exact nature of the controls as the determination of the Allies to maintain them. Experience likewise indicates that once the process of giving up controls has begun, it is difficult to halt the disintegrating process short of war.
Since it believes that the more complex and the more numerous the controls the greater the danger of their being abandoned, the Department of State recommends that the controls over Germany should be as simple and as few in number as would be compatible with safety.
B. Political Reconstruction of
Germany
1. The Ultimate Objective.—Germany’s
repudiation of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideologies
will in the long-run depend on the psychological disarmament of
the German people, tolerable economic conditions, and the
development of stable political conditions.
The most plausible hope for lasting political reconstruction and orderly development lies in the establishment of democratic government despite the fact that serious difficulties will beset such an attempt. The Department of State therefore recommends that it be made the aim of United States policy to prepare the German people for self-government as soon as self-government is possible in terms of internal conditions and security considerations.
The successful establishment of a democratic régime will depend in considerable measure not only on a tolerable standard of living but also on a moderation of the ultra-nationalistic mentality now dominant. A democratic experiment will labor under a heavy burden because of its necessary submission to the will of the victors and it must, if it is to survive, be able to offer some claim to the loyalty and to the patriotism of the German people. In order to encourage a constructive fresh start in political life, the Department of State recommends that there be offered to the Germans the assurance that a democratic Germany which demonstrates its intention and ability to live at peace can earn an honorable place in the society of nations. In order to avoid raising an issue similar to that which, after 1919, was exploited by the nationalists to discredit democracy and international cooperation, the Department of State opposes writing into the peace settlement a war-guilt clause directed against the German people as a whole.
2. Partition.—The Department of State
recommends that this Government oppose the forcible partition of
Germany.
An imposed dismemberment of Germany would not obviate the necessity for enforcing the same security controls that should be set up if Germany is left intact. Because of the high degree of economic, political and cultural integration in Germany, it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed but also maintained by force. The victor powers, by imposing partition, would take on themselves a burdensome and never-ending task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between the partite states and of restraining the nationalistic determination to reunite which would, in all probability, be the response of the German people. The economic aspects of partition, finally, would create a serious dilemma. A political dismemberment which left the German economy substantially unified would have little significance as a security measure; the disruption of German economy, on the other hand, would carry with it an unnecessary decline of the European, as well as the German, standard of living.
3. Decentralization—The Department of
State recommends that encouragement be given to a return to
federal decentralization, including the division of Prussia into
several medium-sized states, but it would oppose the imposition
of a decentralization more sweeping than that acceptable to
moderate groups.
Such an action, like an imposed partition, would provide a
readymade program for nationalistic agitators. A
decentralization extensive enough to make the central government
of the
A return to wide provincial autonomy might again offer to
undesirable elements an advantageous means of capturing the
various state governments, as happened prior to 1933, when the
National Socialists gained control of several of the smaller
states and carried on their terroristic agitation in complete
immunity from
Decentralization, even if successfully imposed, is not necessary
as a security measure and would not of itself be an
insurmountable barrier to unified national action if at some
future time the German people wanted to organize their forces
for new aggression. The military effectiveness of Germany under
the cumbersome Bismarckian constitution might illustrate this
observation. It remains to be remarked that the traditional
democratic groups in Germany have generally favored a greater
unification of the
4. Steps in Political Reconstruction—While
the character of developments in Germany cannot be foreseen, the
Department of State
The Department of State believes that, in this process of positive reconstruction, external influence should be limited to the encouragement of popular self-government and should not be exerted to determine the precise form of government to be established. At the same time it is a dictate of security that the victor powers, and after them the international organization, should reserve the right, and be prepared to intervene in Germany to prevent the re-emergence of dangerous nationalistic activities and to hold Germany to the observance of the obligations imposed by the peace settlement and by the post-war security system.
III. Frontier Settlements
The Department of State believes that in establishing the post-war boundaries of Europe it should be the policy of this Government to seek a solution of each dispute based on the merits of the specific problem and on the relation of that problem to the whole settlement. The Department believes the chief criteria to be (1) the most reasonable prospect of general acceptance and stability and (2) the maximum contribution to the orderly development of general international order.
A. Recommendations
In the light of such considerations, the Department of State
submits the following recommendations with respect to the
frontiers of Germany:
The Department of State proposes this solution of an extremely difficult frontier problem as the one representing in the light of present circumstances the most equitable settlement and the one offering the best promise of international tranquillity in eastern Europe. It is realized, however, that there may well be strong pressure for the acquisition by Poland of a still larger portion of German territory. If this is the case it is not believed that it would be feasible for the United States to oppose such a proposal.
The solution just recommended would mean the addition for Poland of an area of about 21,000 square miles containing approximately 4,200,000 inhabitants. The Polish-German frontier north of Upper Silesia would be straightened and shortened by 130 miles. Poland’s sea coast would be lengthened to some 200 miles with adequate port facilities in Gdynia and Danzig. The annexation of Upper Silesia would substantially strengthen Poland’s industrial resources and would make possible a unified and rationalized operation of the greater Upper Silesian district.
Because of the importance of this question, a special study of
it, prepared in the Department, is attached.post, pp.
230–234.
B. The Transfer of German
Minorities
The cessions to Poland recommended above would bring under Polish sovereignty approximately 3,400,000 Germans in addition to more than 700,000 resident there before the present war. Both the Polish Government-in-exile and the Lublin Committee have expressed the desire to expel this German population. In addition the Government-in-exile of Czechoslovakia wishes to remove more than 1,500,000 Sudeten Germans.
During the final stages of war, and during the early post-war
period, it is the belief of the Department of State that an
indiscriminate expulsion of so many people would add enormously
to the confusion likely to exist in that area, threatening the
public health of much of Europe and jeopardizing the peace and
good order of the continent. Nevertheless, it is not considered
that it would be expedient
Economic Policies Toward Germany
Summary
1. Our eventual objectives with respect to economic treatment of Germany should be (1) abolition of German self-sufficiency, and (2) elimination of the instruments for German economic aggression.
For a prolonged period of control and surveillance, however, economic policies with respect to Germany will have to be largely based upon other objectives, namely, (1) reduction of Germany’s economic war potential, and (2) assisting the economic reconstruction and development of the victorious countries.
2. The following policies recommended for adoption in discussion
with British and Russians:
Economic Policies Toward Germany
1. Need for Multilateral
Determination of Policies
It is essential, in the economic as in other fields, that policies with respect to Germany be directed toward the central aim of keeping her disarmed through an effective international security organization. A substantial measure of agreement must be obtained in advance on economic policies toward Germany, and such policies must be so framed as to minimize the danger of new European rivalries from this source.
2. Policy Recommendations
In the Department’s view, our eventual objectives with respect to economic treatment of Germany should be (1) abolition of German self-sufficiency, and (2) elimination of the instruments for German economic aggression. These two objectives conform to the general economic foreign policy of the United States. More important, however, it is only through the kind of orientation of the German economy which is envisaged in these objectives that the basis for international security organization can be permanently assured.
These two objectives are closely related. Abolition of self-sufficiency requires the removal of all protection and subsidies to high-cost domestic production. Elimination of the instruments for German economic aggression requires the prohibition of all discriminatory trade controls, clearing agreements and international cartel arrangements.
The eventual objectives imply the assimilation—on a basis of equality—of a reformed, peaceful and economically non-aggressive Germany into a liberal system of world trade. During the period of military government, and over a control period of much longer duration, economic policies with respect to Germany will have to be largely based upon other objectives, namely, (1) reduction of Germany’s economic war potential, and (2) assisting the economic reconstruction and development of the victorious countries. Although these latter objectives must be over-riding, it is important that development of the German economy should not be so drastically restricted as to prevent the maintenance of a basic livelihood for the German people.
It is recommended that in discussion with the British and
Russians we should adopt the policies given below as a basis for
agreed action during the period of Allied control.
c) above.
Extensive restrictions on heavy industrial exports imply
a comparatively small reparation program, with emphasis
on transfer of existing German capital equipment rather
than of current German output.
Reparation and Restitution Policy Toward
Germany
Summary
1. Nature of American
Interest
A mistaken reparation policy may not only have adverse effects on the future economic stability of Europe but may jeopardize the political and economic objectives of this country with respect to Germany. For this reason German reparation should be supported only to the extent that it does not conflict with more important objectives.
2. Policy
Recommendations.
a) Reparation should consist of the
entire surplus above the output needed to maintain a minimum
prescribed standard of living and to pay for relief, occupation
costs and other prior charges. It should be made clear that the
U. S. will not finance the transfer of reparation either
directly or indirectly.
b) To minimize interference with normal
trade the reparation period should be short: if possible five
years, and in any event not over ten.
c) Reparation should be payable
predominantly “in kind.” Labor services within reasonable limits
should not be opposed provided a distinction is made in the
treatment accorded to formerly active Nazis and politically
passive Germans, respectively.
d) The principal basis of apportionment
should be damage to non-military property exclusive of current
output. A supplementary basis, admissible only at a lower
weighting, should be occupation costs. The reparation settlement
should be considered as clearing finally all claims against
Germany arising out of the war.
e) Germany should be obliged to restitute
all identifiable stolen property. Gold and unique objects (but
not other property) should be replaced with equivalents from
German stocks if lost or destroyed.
f) United Nations should have the option
of retaining and disposing of German property within their
territories, the proceeds to be applied against reparation
claims.
1. Nature of American
Interest
It is dangerous to assume, because the reparation claims of this country are likely to be very small, that we have little interest in the subject of reparation. Not only can an ill-conceived reparation policy give rise to mischievous consequences in itself but, what is even more important, it may jeopardize the achievement of the political and economic objectives of this country vis-à-vis Germany. For these reasons the reparation settlement with Germany is an issue of major importance to the United States.
Accordingly, the guiding principle of U. S. policy in regard to reparation should be that the reparation claims of our Allies should be supported only if, and to the extent that, such claims do not conflict with the other elements of the settlement with Germany. Reparation policies must conform and be subordinate to the security and economic measures adopted with respect to Germany; these measures should not be modified or weakened to enable Germany to pay more reparation.
Conceived thus as a “residual”, the reparation program will be determined, in its main outlines, by prior decisions with regard to industrial controls, export restrictions, territorial adjustments, etc. which may be imposed on Germany. For example, if chief reliance for economic security is placed on selective prohibitions and controls, Germany may be able (barring extreme war damage) to deliver a large volume of reparation goods out of current production. If, on the other hand, large sections of German industry are to be permanently dismantled, the bulk of reparation payments would necessarily take the form of transfers of existing German capital equipment, rather than of current output, and the total volume of reparation deliveries is likely to be comparatively small. Similarly, restriction of exports for commercial reasons, or important transfers of territory, would likewise affect the amount and form of reparation.
The following recommendations with regard to reparation are
intended to be consistent with the proposals of the State
Department for the economic treatment of Germany.
2. Reparation Policy
Recommendations
The most important elements of the German reparation program
will be (a) its “weight”, (b) its duration, (c) its form, (d) the
allocation of payments.
(a) In principle, the entire surplus
above the output needed (1) to maintain a minimum prescribed
standard of living, and (2) to pay for occupation costs,
relief, and other prior charges, should be appropriated for
reparation.
It would probably be desirable to make it clear to the other interested powers that the U.S. will not finance the transfer of reparation either directly by extending loans or credits to Germany, or indirectly by assuming the burden of supplying at its own expense essential goods or equipment to Germany.
In order to avoid difficulties with public opinion in the Allied countries, which is likely to regard any given amount of reparation as inadequate to compensate for the damage and suffering inflicted by Germany, as well as for other reasons, the statement of the reparation obligation in terms of a specific monetary amount should be avoided.
(b) It is essential for the early
recovery of normal trade that the reparation program should
be of relatively short duration. The uncompensated, one-way,
transfers of reparation goods from Germany must necessarily
interfere with the export trade of other countries. The
longer reparation lasts, moreover, the more strongly is
Germany likely to become entrenched in the markets of the
claimant states; the more difficult, also, will be the
readjustment of both paying and receiving countries at the
end of the reparation period. The interference with normal
trade may be relatively slight in the first two or three
years after the war when trading conditions are in any case
apt to be highly abnormal and the overall supply of goods
may fall short of reconstruction needs and deferred demands.
Beyond that time, however, the interference with normal
trade will become progressively greater. It is recommended,
accordingly, that the reparation period should be limited,
if possible, to five years, and in any event should not
exceed ten years.
(c) To avoid “transfer” difficulties,
the reparation obligation should be payable preponderantly
“in kind”, i. e., in goods and services, rather than in
foreign exchange. The goods should be such as Germany is
able to deliver and the claimant countries are willing to
receive, both conditions being necessary for
“transferability”.
United Nations claiming reparation from Germany, in addition to being entitled to payments in kind, should have the option of retaining and disposing of all German property and rights within their territories and to apply the proceeds against their reparation claims.
The Soviet Government will probably demand, in satisfaction of part its reparation claim, the performance of labor services by German manpower in Russia. There is no compelling reason for the United States to oppose such claims within reasonable limits, provided that in the conscription of the labor force a distinction is made between formerly active Nazis and politically passive Germans, with minimum standards of treatment and a relatively short period of service for the latter.
(d) The principal basis for the
apportionment of reparation among the claimant states should
be the amount of damage to and loss of non-military
property, exclusive of current output, caused by or incident
to hostilities. As a supplementary basis of allocation,
occupation costs (including for this purpose clearing
balances accrued in Germany during the occupation period)
should also be allowed as an admissible claim, but at a
lower weighting than property losses. The reparation
settlement should be considered as clearing finally all
outstanding claims against Germany arising out of the
war.
3. Restitution
The following policy recommendations are made:
The British Government has been pressing in the European Advisory Commission for the early establishment of a Restitution Commission to cope with the complex problems of restitution which will arise as soon as enemy territory is occupied to any appreciable extent. This Government has indicated its general approval of the British proposal, subject to certain reservations.
The French have also introduced a proposal for restitution into the European Advisory Commission. Their concept of “restitution”, however, apparently goes far beyond the mere restoration of identifiable objects and would include the replacement of lost or destroyed objects with similar or equivalent goods found in Germany at the time of surrender. It is believed that such a broad application of the principle of replacement is undesirable. Claims for lost or destroyed property should be embraced in the reparation settlement; “replacement” should be confined to unique objects such as art treasures, and possibly gold.
4. German Foreign
Holdings
“German” property in neutral and satellite countries can be
divided into three categories:
Looted Property. This is not
properly German property, and the principle of
restitution has already been indicated.Flight Capital. This is
property which is and has been leaving Germany for
refuge from post-hostilities Allied control. Efforts
are now being made to have the neutrals prevent
ingress of such property, and to segregate and
control that which has already left Germany.German Foreign Investment.
Control over this property is essential to the
control of the German economic system. Cooperative
U. S. and U. K. efforts are being made to conduct a
census of such property, to have it segregated, and
make it available for such disposition as may be
agreed on among the Allies.
A coordinated effort, particularly directed at the neutrals,
to control these classes of property is being made. The
United States, United Kingdom, and USSR, among others of the
United Nations, have cooperated in the issuance and
endorsement of the following documents: Declaration of
January 5, 1943, declaring a policy of refusal to recognize
Axis acts of dispossession, in whatever form;Bulletin, January 9, 1943. vol. viii, pp. 21–22.Federal
Register, February 23, 1944, vol. 9, p.
2096.Proceedings and Documents of the
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference,
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944 (Washington, Government
Printing Office, 1948), vol. i, pp. 939–940.
116. . . . Formal action [on proposals for control of Bremen
area] has not been taken only because of desire to avoid sharp
issue and in hope that attempts to work out solution would be
successful. Yesterday at conference with Lord
“The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave as described will be under complete American control including military government but will be generally administered as a subdistrict of a larger British-controlled area. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the larger district subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.
“The United States interest in transit passage from the Bremen area to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one Government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsible service, it is proposed that each military zone commander will accept a deputy controller of movement and transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.”
We will have large army deep in enemy country with a great
redeployment problem to deal with. It is vital therefore that we
have the full use of the port which in turn involves authority
over labor, telephone traffic and other communication systems
within the area. There is no half way point of control that can
be worked out, certainly not at high level. In view of our
predominant and important interest as well as of the fact that
we relinquished control of the northwest zone on this condition
real control is essential. As
Dear Mr. McCloy:
Bremen Enclave
1. I am now glad to be able to inform you that the British Chiefs of Staff are prepared to accept the formula which was arrived at [at] our meeting in the War Department on the 5th January subject to the American Chiefs of Staff confirming their interpretation of one or two points.
For convenience I attach a copy of the formula with two small amendments inserted which I have underlined. These amendments are proposed in order to ensure that the British and American interpretations of the formula are the same.
2. I think you will agree that the interpretation by the British Chiefs of Staff as indicated by these amendments is correct. With regard to the amendment in paragraph 2 the British Chiefs of Staff understand the “Deputy Controller” to be an officer deputed to a functional control office situated outside his national zone, which controls the agents of that office situated within his national zone. He controls such agents only, and does not, in the absence of the “Controller” assume authority over any other portion of the area within the sphere of that Controller.
3. The British Chiefs of Staff would also like confirmation that administrative questions such as wage rates, which raise points of principle, will necessarily fall into line with the general policies of the Governments or of the Control Commission.
4. The British Chiefs of Staff understand that the proposed
formula will have to be read in conjunction with paragraph 7 of
C. C. S. 320/34
It would appear that such modification, however, will be in favor of American interests and providing that it is understood that paragraph 7 of C. C. S. 320/34 is modified by the formula, the British Chiefs of Staff do not consider it necessary to amend C. C. S. 320/34.
5. If you can confirm that the American Chiefs of Staff agree
[to] the interpretation of the formula in paragraphs 1 to 4
above, the British Chiefs of Staff propose:
b) of C. C. S. 320/33Ante, pp. 118–123.
6. If the United States Chiefs of Staff agree [to] the above proposals, perhaps you will initiate the issue by the United States Chiefs of Staff of the appropriate instructions in accordance with paragraph 5 above.
Yours sincerely,
The Bremen Enclave
1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization but will be generally administered as a subdistrict of a larger British controlled area. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the larger district subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.
2. The U. S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen area
to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British
interest in possible movement through the American zone to
Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and
personnel for the one government through the zone controlled
by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve
responsible service, each military zone commander will
accept a Deputy Controller
for
United States
(or
British)
requirements of Movement and
Transport from the other to assist in the
3. The map referred to is that attached to C. C. S.
320/29.
Memorandum for the Secretary of
State:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Occupation Zones in
Germany—British-American
This is the matter of the so-called Bremen enclave. We have
sought ever since Quebec to get the matter of our control of the
Bremen area clarified. It was hedged about by the British after
we had agreed to relinquish the Northwest section of Germany to
the British. After representations were made to Ante, pp.
118–123.
If you could get the staff people at the conference to clear up
the major difficulties, the protocol can be ratified and all
details thereafter can be dealt with by the respective local
commanders. I have asked the Army people to do their utmost to
reach an understanding and it may be possible to have the thing
cleared up before the conference. In any case, you should
inquire about the status of it at the conference because it
ought to be got out of the way in order to permit
Personal and Top Secret for the President from
Appendix to Committee Report on Communist
Takeover and Occupation of Poland: Polish Documents Report
of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House
of Representatives Report 2684, pt. 4, 83d de facto line of demarcation. He suggested a
formula on this basis which would allow the Poles to present their
case for adjustment and final settlement at the peace table. He
warned
Both
In reply to these statements
The meeting broke up with the understanding that
Conversation.
Place: Spaso House
Subject: The Polish Boundary Situation.
Mr. supra.
I told Mr.
I told Mr.
Mr.
I told
Mr. Ambassador
In this connexion I should like to recall that during the
conversations which I had the honour to have with the President
in Washington, in June 1944, I was told that only Marshal
I would be most grateful to you, Mr.
Accept, Mr.
Prime Minister to President
Many thanks for your number 631.
Para 1. On our last day at Moscow Mik
Para 2. Later at my request
Para 3. After the Kremlin dinner we put it bluntly to
Para 4. Apart from the above Mik is going to urge upon his London
colleagues the
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Number 632, Personal and Top Secret, from the President to the Prime Minister.
Your 795,Supra.
I am delighted to learn of your success at Moscow in making progress toward a compromise solution of the Polish problem.
When and if a solution is arrived at, I should like to be consulted as to the advisability from this point of view of delaying its publication for about two weeks. You will understand.
Everything is going well here at the present time.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Polish Ambassador has received today a telegram from Premier
Text of Premier
Mr. President: From Ambassador
Harriman you undoubtedly know the pressure being exercised on the Polish Government definitely to accept already at present and without any reservations the so-calledCurzon Line as the basis of the future frontier between Poland and Soviet Russia. In all my political activities I have proved how fully I realize the necessity of Polish-Soviet understanding and how sincerely I desire to achieve it, not only in the interest of my own country, but also in that of the common cause of the United Nations and of future peace.I am no less convinced, however, that the Polish nation would feel itself terribly deceived and wronged if, as the response to all its sacrifices, to its indomitable attitude, and its uninterrupted part in the fight in the course of this war it were faced as a result with the loss of nearly one-half of its territory on which are situated great centers of its national and cultural life and considerable economic values. The Polish Government cannot give its agreement to such a solution,
as it realizes that it would thereby lose the confidence and following of its nation to such an extent that this would close its way to the exploration of possibilities of reaching understanding with the Government of the USSR in other fields. It would in fact deprive the activities of the Polish Government of practical value. In the course of the Moscow conversations I have applied all my best efforts to convince Marshal
Stalin and PremierChurchill of the importance of the above considerations. In particular I stressed that it would constitute a great conciliatory and amicable gesture on the part of Russia towards Poland,—a gesture which would be regarded as such by the Polish people and make it easier for the Polish nation to reconcile itself with the other already so great territorial sacrifices demanded of it, if the City of Lwów and the East Galician oilfields were left with Poland in accordance with the so-called Line “B”. This line would not infringe on the principle of theCurzon Line, as the latter did not formally extend through East Galicia.However, my endeavors in this direction have hitherto remained unsuccessful. I cannot, in the face of my great responsibility, regard these endeavors as exhausted as long as you, Mr. President, have not expressed your stand in this matter. I retain in vivid and grateful memory your assurances given me in the course of our conversations of June, last, in Washington, pertaining particularly to Lwów and the adjacent territories. The memory of these assurances has not been dispelled even by Mr.
Molotov ’s onesided version about your attitude in Teheran, which he gave me during the last conversations in Moscow. I have no doubt that in your attitude, Mr. President, purely objective arguments have played the most important part. It is known that for the last six hundred years Lwów has been a Polish city no less than Cracow and Warsaw, and one of the sources of Polish civilization. On the other hand, the production of the East Galician oil fields, so important to the economic system of Poland, constitutes barely one per cent of the oil production of the USSR.I fully realize how deeply absorbed you are in your duties at this time and in the course of the next days. I believe, however, that in the face of the great importance of the decisions facing the Polish Government, which will bear on the entire future of the Polish Nation, and in a great measure on world relations as a whole, you will not refuse, Mr. President, my fervent prayer once more to throw the weight of your decisive influence and authority on the scales of events.
I am firmly convinced that if you, Mr. President, will consider it possible immediately to address a personal message to Marshal
Stalin , pointing out that it is of consequence to you that the Polish question should be settled in such a way that the City of Lwów and the oil field basin of East Galicia should be left in Poland,—such a demarche, as foreseen by you, would have chances of being effective.By removing from the way the chief and basic difference of opinions in the present negotiations between the Polish and the Soviet Governments,—such a demarche would render possible the achievement of an over-all Polish-Soviet understanding and would bring to you, Mr. President, not only a new title to the warm gratitude of the Polish people, but likewise an agelong merit of having solved one of the capital difficulties on the way of collaboration of the United Nations and of the future peace of Europe and the world.
I place in your hands, Mr. President, this matter with the greatest
confidence and I shall await your decision. Signed:
Memorandum for the President
The following suggestions as to policy in regard to the Polish
question and in particular to Prime Minister
The Polish issue is so acute that we believe some statement of this
Government’s position on general lines is due Premier
I suggest that Ambassador
Enclosure:
Suggested letter to Premier infra.
My Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I have had
constantly in mind the problems you are facing in your endeavors to
bring about an equitable and permanent solution of the Polish-Soviet
difficulties and particularly the questions which you raised in your
message of October 26. I have asked Ambassador
While I would have preferred to postpone the entire question of this
Government’s attitude until the general postwar settlement in
Europe, I fully realize your urgent desire to receive some
indication of the position of the United States Government with the
least possible delay. Therefore, I am giving below in broad outline
the general position of this Government in the hope that it may be
of some assistance to you in your difficult task.
Very sincerely yours,
Poles 125. From
I saw
He realized the attack he would have been subjected to if the
Government had made the concessions desired by the Soviets but he
[If] He could have had more time, he would also have wished to gather up and preserve the “capital of energy” that Poland still disposes of abroad. If the parties could have united on a policy this would have been a source of strength in withstanding efforts to produce a Communist Poland. But divided they were necessarily ineffective. Furthermore, there were several hundred thousand Poles in western Europe and perhaps even a million in Germany. A surprising number had already been found in prison camps in recently captured German territory. He would have liked to recruit them for military service both in the interest of the war effort and of their own rehabilitation and to use them as a nucleus to build up Poland anew. But the Supreme Allied Command felt it was too late to train them for the war effort and would permit only the numbers necessary to replace losses in existing Polish military units. Without unity among the parties and without greater support from the Allies, he could not hope to bring about this conservation of Polish energies.
In all the circumstances, he had felt obliged to resign.
As for his immediate plans,
He spoke throughout with quiet simplicity and, though somewhat more subdued than usual, retained all his normal calm and self-possession. Only as I took leave of him and told him how sorry I was that he had given over, did he show any emotion. He expressed deep appreciation of the understanding that had always been shown him from the American side and asked me to express his appreciation and great admiration to the President.
Telegram to the President
Subject: Resignation of Prime Minister
I assume that you have read Ambassador
We are following the situation with the closest attention and we recommend that for the moment our best policy is to take no action but carefully watch developments.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Resignation of
I think you will be interested in looking at the two enclosed
telegrams in regard to the Polish situation, the first reporting a
conversation between Ante, pp.
210–212.
In order to counteract the London news stories regarding the frontier guarantee, the Department on November 25 released the following statement:
The specific question of the guarantee of the Polish frontier by this Government was not and could not have been an issue since this Government’s traditional policy of not guaranteeing specific frontiers in Europe is well known.
Special Information for the President
[Excerpts]post,
pp. 250, 266, 430.
These international developments of the past two or three days will be of especial interest to you:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Polish Cabinet. Schoenfeld reports that
the new Polish Government is generally considered to be made up of
the anti-Russian wing of the London Poles. The
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2828. In view of the apparent impossibility of the present Polish
Cabinet to work out any agreement with the Soviet Government
regarding the future of Poland (your 4656, December 5
In any discussions you might have with Soviet officials, you should be guided by the fact that this Government has continued recognition of the Polish Government in London. While it is realized that the Soviet Government can and may accord full recognition to the Lublin Committee, you may, if you feel it would be helpful, indicate that we would not look favorably on such a step by the Soviet Government.
It is possible that the present Polish Government will be unable to
make any headway in solving Polish problems and therefore may fall.
For the President from the Secretary of State.
You have undoubtedly seen the press reports on Mr. Parliamentary Delates,
House of Commons, 5th
You will recall that on November 15 [17] you
sent by Ambassador Ante, pp.
209–210.
I am sending a full summary of these four points so that you will have them before you, since you will undoubtedly be questioned at your first press conference on your return. I hope to talk over with you the possible necessity of some public statement making clear our position along the lines of the four points.
It is not clear from the reports we have so far received on
In view of the uncertainty as to infra.
Number 674, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for the former Naval Person.
I have seen the newspaper reports of your statement in the House on
the Polish question. In order that we may cooperate fully in this
matter I would appreciate receiving the benefit of your ideas as to
what steps we can now take in regard to this question. Particularly
I would like to have your evaluation of the possibility of
You will recall the contents of the letter I sent to
Knowing that we have in mind the same basic objectives in regard to Poland I want to be sure to coordinate with you any steps which I may contemplate in this matter.
853. I thank you cordially for your telegram Number 674 about Poland.
I trust you will carry out your proposal to send a message to
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Number 136, Personal and Top Secret, from the President for Marshal
A draft of this message to “We feel that it is necessary for me to make a statement
reemphasizing and perhaps clarifying our position on the
Polish matter along the lines of your letter to Mr.
“I believe that by giving The message was communicated to
In view of the interest raised in this country by Prime Minister
- “1. The United States Government stands unequivocally for a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland.
- 2. In regard to the question of future frontiers of Poland, the United States, although considering it desirable that territorial questions await the general postwar settlement, recognizes that a settlement before that time is in the interest of the common war effort and therefore would have no objection if the territorial questions involved in the Polish situation, including the proposed compensation from Germany, were settled by mutual agreement between the parties directly concerned.
- 3. Recognizing that the transfer of minorities in some cases is feasible and would contribute to the general security and tranquility in the areas concerned, the United States Government would have
no objection if the Government and the people of Poland desire to transfer nationals and would join in assisting such transfers. - 4. In conformity with its announced aim, this Government is prepared to assist, subject to legislative authority, and in so far as may be practicable, in the economic reconstruction of countries devastated by Nazi aggression. This policy applies equally to Poland as to other such devastated countries of the United Nations.”
Because this message from Roosevelt toStalin did not reach the Embassy in Moscow until December 20, and because in the meantime, on December 18, the Department of State had issued a press release regarding Poland (infra) which differed somewhat from the statement here quoted, AmbassadorHarriman , in transmitting the message toStalin , omitted these four paragraphs and sent instead the text of the press release, with the explanation that an outline of its substance had been contained in the message (760C.61/12–2344, White House memorandum forStettinius quoting a paraphrase of a message fromHarriman toRoosevelt , December 21, 1944).
The proposed statement, as you will note, will contain nothing, I am
sure, that is not known to you as the general attitude of this
Government and is I believe in so far as it goes in general accord
with the results of your discussion with Prime Minister
I feel it is of the highest importance that until the three of us can
get together and thoroughly discuss this troublesome question there
be no action on any side which would render our discussions more
difficult. I have seen indications that the Lublin Committee may be
intending to give itself the status of a provisional government of
Poland. I fully appreciate the desirability from your point of view
of having a clarification of Polish authority before your armies
move further into Poland. I very much hope, however, that because of
the great political implications which such a step would entail you
would find it possible to refrain from recognizing the Lublin
Committee as a government of Poland before we meet, which I hope
will be immediately after my inauguration on January 20. Could you
not until that date continue to deal with the Committee in its
present form. I know that Prime Minister
The United States Government’s position as regards Poland has been
steadfastly guided by full understanding and sympathy for the
interests of the Polish people. This position has been communicated
on previous occasions to the interested governments, including the
Government of Poland. It may be summarized as follows:
Bulletin,
April 15, 1944, vol. x, pp.
335–342.
The policy of the United States Government regarding Poland outlined above has as its objective the attainment of the announced basic principles of United States foreign policy.
4913. (Secret for the Secretary)
I am somewhat concerned over the expanding concept of the Soviet Government in connection with the future western frontier of Poland.
The first Soviet proposal indicated a willingness that Poland should
have East Prussia except the Koenigsberg area and an expansion of
her western frontier perhaps even as far as the Oder and possibly
including the cities of Stettin and Breslau. Subsequently the Soviet
intention appeared fixed that the western boundary should be the
line of the Oder including Stettin and Breslau. In discussions with
Pravda article.)
In this connection
When
Both the Lublin Poles and
We have not here exact information on the total transfers of Germans involved in these various areas nor have we information on where these people could be re-established within Germany. We have little information to appraise the consequences to European economy and stability if so large an area were to be occupied by Poles presumably evacuated largely from the backward districts incorporated into the Soviet Union and to answer the question of where the technical skill could be found to administer and operate these highly developed and industrialized areas.
The Soviet policy towards Poland superficially appears to be that the Soviets are attempting to justify their annexation of old Polish territory and their domination of the internal affairs of Poland by expandingly generous offers of territory in the West at the expense of Germany.
I fully recognize our policy is not to commit ourselves in boundary
questions until the peace settlement. The question I have in mind
however is whether, if we have reservations in the present case,
they should not be registered on an appropriate occasion with the
British and Soviet Governments before these concepts become so fixed
that they are virtually a fait accompli.
Translation
I have received your message on Polish mattersante, pp. 217–218.
personal and secret
As regards Mr.
A number of facts which took place during the time after the last
visit of émigré government—with all palpability
proves that the negotiations of Mr. Arciszewskiémigré government
have made the situation even worse and have created a precipice
between Poland and the émigré government.
Meanwhile the Polish National Committee has made serious achievements
in the strengthening of the Polish state and the apparatus of
governmental power on the territory of Poland, in the expansion
It seems to me that now we should be interested in the support of the Polish National Committee and all those who want and are capable to work together with it and that is especially important for the Allies and for the solution of our common task—the speeding of the defeat of Hitlerite Germany. For the Soviet Union, which is bearing the whole burden for the liberation of Poland from German occupationists, the question of relations with Poland under present conditions is the task of daily close and friendly relations with a power which has been established by the Polish people on its own soil and which has already grown strong and has its own army which together with the Red Army is fighting against the Germans.
I have to say frankly that if the Polish Committee of National
Liberation will transform itself into a Provisional Polish
Government then, in view of the above-said, the Soviet Government
will not have any serious ground for postponement of the question of
its recognition. It is necessary to bear in mind that in the
strengthening of a pro-Allied and democratic Poland the Soviet Union
is interested more than any other power not only because the Soviet
Union is bearing the main brunt of the battle for liberation of
Poland but also because Poland is a border state with the Soviet
Union and the problem of Poland is inseparable from the problem of
security of the Soviet Union. To this we have to add that the
successes of the Red Army in Poland in the fight against the Germans
are to a great degree dependent on the presence of peaceful and
trustworthy rear in Poland, and the Polish National Committee fully
takes into account this circumstance while the émigré government and its underground agents by their
terroristic actions are creating a threat of civil war in the rear
of the Red Army and counteract the success of the latter. On the
other hand, under the conditions which exist in Poland at the
present time there are no reasons for the continuation of the policy
of support of the émigré government, which
has lost all confidence of the Polish population in the country and
besides creates a threat of civil war in the rear of the Red Army,
violating thus our common interests of a successful fight against
the Germans. I think that it would be natural, just and profitable
for our common cause if the governments of the Allied countries as
the first step have agreed on an immediate exchange of
representatives with the Polish National Committee so that after a
certain time it would be recognized as the lawful government of
Poland after the transformation of the National Committee into a
provisional
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Suggested Reply to
I have seen Supra.16]Ante, pp.
217–218.
According to our information, the recognition of the Lublin Committee
as the provisional government of Poland is expected to occur on
December 31. For this reason, while I would have much preferred to
have had an opportunity to discuss a reply to infra.ante, p. 216, footnote
2.
153. I am disturbed and deeply disappointed over your message of
December 27 in regard to PolandAnte, pp.
221–223.
There was no suggestion in my request that you curtail your practical relations with the Lublin Committee nor any thought that you should deal with or accept the London Government in its present composition. I had urged this delay upon you because I felt you would realize how extremely unfortunate and even serious it would be at this period in the war in its effect on world opinion and enemy morale if your Government should formally recognize one Government of Poland while the majority of the other United Nations including the United States and Great Britain continue to recognize and to maintain diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London.
I must tell you with a frankness equal to your own that I see no
prospect of this Government’s following suit and transferring its
recognition from the Government in London to the Lublin Committee
fin its present form. This is in no sense due to any special ties or
feelings for the London Government. The fact is that neither the
Government nor the people of the United States have as yet seen any
evidence either arising from the manner of its creation or from
subsequent developments to justify the conclusion that the Lublin
Committee as at present constituted represents the people of Poland.
I cannot ignore the fact that up to the present only a small
fraction of Poland proper west of the
If at some future date following the liberation of Poland a provisional government of Poland with popular support is established, the attitude of this Government would of course be governed by the decision of the Polish people.
I fully share your view that the departure of Mr.
I am sending you this message so that you will know the position of this Government in regard to the recognition at the present time of the Lublin Committee as the provisional government. I am more than ever convinced that when the three of us get together we can reach a solution of the Polish problem, and I therefore still hope that you can hold in abeyance until then the formal recognition of the Lublin Committee as a government of Poland. I cannot, from a military angle, see any great objection to a delay of a month.
Number 691. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.
There is quoted herewith following for your information
“1 January 1945. I have received your message of December 31 [
30].I am extremely sorry that I did not succeed in convincing you of the correctness of the position of the Soviet Government on the Polish question. Nevertheless, I hope that events will convince you that the Polish National Committee has all the time rendered and is continuing to render the Allies, in particular the Red Army, important assistance in the fight against Hitlerite Germany whereas the
émigréGovernment in London is bringing disorganization into this struggle and thus is aiding the Germans.Of course, your suggestion to postpone for a month the recognition of the Provisional Government of Poland by the Soviet Union is perfectly
understandable to me. But there is one circumstance which makes me powerless to fulfill your wish. The fact is that on December 27 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to an appropriate request of the Poles has already informed them that it intends to recognize the Provisional Government of Poland as soon as it is formed. This circumstance makes me powerless to fulfill your wish. Permit me to congratulate you on the New Year and to wish you health and success.”
This message from Stalin had been communicated to the President by the Soviet Embassy in Washington.
I have not told
Prime Minister to President Supra.
Thank you for the information and it is interesting to see that the “Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR” has now been brought up into the line.
Ante, pp.
217–218.Argonaut
You may rest assured of our entire support.
Conversation
* * * * * * *
In connection with Poland we got on the political question. He said
he thought the London Government had “missed the bus”. Many
opportunities had been given to them including last October.
Maiski said there had been a number of calculations of the Germans that would have to be taken out of territory that was to be given to Poland. The calculations came to between six and eight million Germans but Maiski thought six million was nearer right. I did not discuss the Polish question with him because of the coming meeting except to emphasize its importance as an issue that must be settled, and its effect on our relations.
* * * * * * *
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Polish-Soviet Difference
The Polish Ambassador called at the Department on January 22 to deliver the attached note containing his Government’s proposals for the solution of the Polish-Soviet difference. He asked that the proposals be sent to you immediately. The proposals do not appear to offer any real basis for an approach to the Soviet Government. They may be outlined as follows:
1. While the Polish Government would prefer to defer territorial
settlements until the end of the war, it apparently is willing to
discuss this question with the Soviet Government now provided it
involves
2. The Polish Government desires to conclude an alliance with the Soviet Government guaranteeing the security of both states within the framework of the International Security Organization.
3. It will not recognize any unilateral solutions and it demands the right to regulate its own internal life.
4. If the Soviet Government does not agree to negotiate with the Polish Government, the latter suggests that an inter-Allied military commission be created to control in Poland the local administration (those loyal to London) apparently until free elections are held.
5. The hope is expressed that the United States Government will not take any decisions concerning Poland without the consent of the Polish Government and will not recognize the Lublin Government.
The Polish Ambassador has today received instructions from his Government immediately to communicate to the Secretary of State the following memorandum from the Polish Government:
“Foreseeing that matters concerning Poland will be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the three great Powers, and having full confidence in the intentions of the President of the United States of ensuring the Polish State real independence and the guarantee of its rights,—the Polish Government would like to take this opportunity to express the following views:
“I—The Polish Government shares the attitude taken by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain that territorial questions should be settled only after the termination of hostilities. The Polish Government is ready to reach an amicable settlement of the Polish-Soviet controversy which has arisen as a result of the claims of the USSR to the eastern territories of the Polish Republic and will accept any one of the methods foreseen by international law for the just and fair solution of the controversy with the participation of both parties concerned. Moreover, the Polish Government is decided to conclude with the USSR an alliance guaranteeing the security of both states and closely to collaborate with the USSR in the framework of a general international organization of security and of the economic organization of the States of Central-Eastern Europe.
“Under no circumstances will the Polish Government recognize unilateral solutions, mindful of the fact that Poland, belonging as she does to the family of United Nations in the common struggle for
freedom of the world, has made enormous sacrifices of her most precious values and has lost practically one-fifth of her population fallen in battle, murdered in penal camps, in Ghettos or deceased in prisons, in exile or in labor camps. “The Polish Government is convinced that the simultaneous establishment and guaranteeing of the over-all territorial status of the Polish State, the solution of the controversy with the USSR, the grant to Poland of territories to which she has rightful claim situated to the North and the West of her frontiers, the insurance of her real independence and full right to organize her internal life in accordance with the will of the Polish Nation untrammeled by any foreign intervention,—is a vital matter not only for Poland, but for the whole of Europe.
“II.—Should the Soviet Government, notwithstanding the insistent efforts of the Polish Government, refuse to enter into a voluntary understanding, the Polish Government, desirous of insuring internal peace and freedom to its country, suggests that a Military Inter-Allied Commission should be created under whose control the local administration of Poland could perform its functions until it will be possible for the legal Polish Government to take over authority.
“Such a Commission should have at its disposal military contingents of the States represented on it. The statutes of the Commission and the principles upon which the local administration would be based should be established in detail in agreement with the Polish Government. The Polish Government additionally stresses that the authorities of the Polish Republic, abolished by the German occupying authorities in violation of the stipulations of the IV-th Hague Convention of 1907,
For the text of this convention regarding the laws and customs of war on land, signed at The Hague October 18, 1907, see Department of State Treaty Series No. 539, or 36 in effect continued to function underground and should constitute the foundation of the administration of the country.Stat . 2277.“After the return to Poland of her Supreme State Authorities as well as of her citizens who are at present outside her frontiers due to war events, elections will be held on the basis of a universal, secret, equal, direct and proportional electoral law, giving to all political parties full freedom of electoral action, and to all citizens equal and free right of expressing their will.
“The Polish Government will retain its authority until the convocation of the Parliament (Sejm) on the above mentioned principles and the creation in Poland of a new legal government.
“III.—The Polish Government trusts that the United States Government will not take part in any decisions concerning the Allied Polish State taken without the participation and consent of the Polish Government.
“The Polish Government is convinced that at the meeting of the three great Powers the United States Government will express its decision of not recognizing in Poland accomplished facts and particularly of not recognizing a ‘puppet government’. The recognition of such a ‘government’ in Poland would be equivalent to the cancellation of the recognition of an independent Poland, for the maintenance of which the present war started.”
Suggested United States Policy Regarding
Poland
Summary
With regard to Poland, we should continue to maintain our announced
policy which has for its objective the eventual establishment by the
Polish people of a truly democratic government of their own choice.
In the attainment of this end, we should endeavor to prevent any
interim regime from being established which would exclude any major
element of the population and threaten to crystallize into a
permanent government before the will of the population could become
manifest. In pursuance of this policy, we should not recognize the
Provisional Government of Lublin, at least until more conclusive
evidence is received that it does in fact represent the basic wishes
of the Polish people. With the same objective in view, we should use
our full influence to see that the Polish Peasant Party, the largest
in the country, and its leader,
With respect to the Polish frontier, we should use our influence to
obtain a solution of this problem which would minimize future points
of friction, possible Irredentism and the number of minority groups
which would have to be transferred as a part of the settlement in
order that the solution would contribute to the fullest possible
extent to the peace and future tranquility of Europe. In pursuance
of this objective, we should support a frontier settlement which in
the east would take the
Suggested United States Policy Regarding
Poland
It is not known how representative of the basic desires of the Polish
people the present Polish cabinet in London may be, or how
representative a new cabinet which
Given the fact that less than half of Poland has already been liberated, and that consequently the majority of Poles are not in a position to express an opinion, it would be against our announced policies to recognize the provisional government of Lublin at least until more conclusive evidence is received that it does in fact represent the basic wishes of the Polish people.
Because of the activities of diverse groups, interim regimes of various sorts are springing up in liberated countries. These regimes may well crystallize into permanent governments through the power they may wield during the period of bewilderment after liberation. It would appear highly desirable, therefore, if the influence of the United States is to be felt and if the types of truly democratic governments the American people hope to see established in Europe are to be set up, for the United States Government now to take an active part in seeing that in each liberated country liberal democratic groups are given a full opportunity to participate in the activities of their interim regimes. If we do not use our influence to this end, it may not be possible later to establish permanent democratic regimes based on the four freedoms.
It is for this reason that in regard to Poland we should use our
influence in an effort to see that the Polish Peasant Party, the
largest in the country, and its head,
Moreover, in order to assure, in conformity with our announced
policies, that the Polish people shall be permitted eventually to
express their preference as to the permanent government they desire
and in actual fact regulate their own internal affairs, we should
continue during the interim period to exert our influence to assure
that the Polish people have the full possibility at a later date
freely to express their will in the choice of their government and
that they have the right to establish a truly democratic government
which would foster and maintain freedom of expression, freedom of
the press and information,
Frontier Question
Although the frontier question has figured prominently in the discussion of the Polish-Soviet dispute, it is felt that this matter is definitely secondary to the major problem, the establishment of a viable and truly independent Polish Government.
In this regard it is felt that the United States Government should use its influence to obtain a solution of this problem which would minimize future points of friction, possible Irredentism and minimize the number of minority groups which would have to be transferred as part of the settlement in order that the solution would contribute to the fullest possible extent to the peace and future tranquility of Europe.
The provisional government of Lublin and its predecessors including
the Moscow-sponsored Union of Polish Patriots have for more than a
year and a half been steadily increasing their demands for
“compensation” for Poland from Germany. While the motivation for
these increased demands is not clear, it is possible that the
following factors may have figured in making these increased
demands:
While it appears that the Soviet Government is now sponsoring
“compensation” for Poland from Germany, up to the so-called
Oder–Neisse River Line (line (a) on attached
mapb) on attached map), the United States
Government should use its influence to obtain the less radical
solution outlined below which it is felt would, from a long range
point
It is believed, therefore, that every effort should be made to persuade the British Government and, if necessary, the Polish Government to stand for a frontier settlement along the following lines in order that efforts could be made to persuade the Soviet Government to accept this solution.
In regard to the Eastern frontier, efforts should be made to effect a
solution with the
While this solution would reduce considerably the size of Poland compared to its prewar frontiers, it would include only areas which are predominantly Polish, would make for a viable Polish state from an economic point of view and would reduce to a minimum the problems of the transfer of populations (these boundaries are indicated on the attached map).
In regard to the British attitude on this question, Mr. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons,
5th c) on the
attached map (which approximates the suggested American solution
outlined above).
Before discussing the proposal for a frontier solution with the Soviet authorities, it might be well to make an effort to obtain tentative concurrence with the British on this proposed solution.
If our full efforts determined to attain this solution fail, we
should then concentrate on obtaining a solution of the Polish
frontier which would minimize the possibility of Irredentism and
population transfers and should resist any proposals for a solution
based on either the Oder or the Oder-Neisse Line (line (b) and (a) on the
attached map).
In connection with any final frontier settlement agreed upon, we should in so far as practicable and in collaboration with the other United Nations be prepared to assist in the orderly transfer of minority groups provided the Polish Government so desires.
Reconstruction
In order to implement our efforts to establish a truly free democratic Polish state, we should be prepared, subject to legislative authority, to assist through credits or otherwise in the reconstruction of the country. As a corollary to this we should insist upon the establishment of a policy of equal opportunity for private American firms to carry on business activities in Poland.
Reconstruction of Poland and the Balkans:
American Interests and Soviet Attitude
Summary
1. United States economic interests in the reconstruction of Poland and the Balkan states are general, the early return of trade to a multilateral basis and the achievement of European economic stability and prosperity. Politically, while this Government probably would not oppose predominant Soviet influence in the area, neither would it wish American influence to be completely nullified.
2. All of the nations require assistance in improving present primitive agricultural methods. All will probably require reconstruction of their railways, replacement of rolling stock, and rehabilitation of road-bed and bridges. Whether Poland will require extensive industrial reconstruction will depend on the future course of the war and whether the Germans “scorch” the area.
3. The United States will share in such reconstruction by Export-Import Bank credits, by technical aid especially to agriculture, and by participation in loans by the proposed International Bank.
4. The Soviet attitude towards United States participation in this area is uncertain. She may feel so strong that American financial aid will not be unwelcome, although she would probably prefer to act as the intermediary or to see the loans made by the International Bank.
Reconstruction of Poland and the Balkans:
American Interests and Soviet Attitude
1. Interests of the United
States
Economic
a. Interest in the early return of trade to a
multilateral basis under the freest possible conditions. The pattern
of Europe’s future commercial policy will be strongly influenced, if
not largely determined, by policies and procedures established
during the period of reconstruction. Whether postwar conditions lead
back to bilateralism, restriction and autarchy, or are resolved in a
manner which will permit the progressive growth and liberalization
of trade and investment will depend in no small measure on the
ability of the wartorn countries to obtain outside (i. e., mostly
American) help in reconstruction.
b. Interest in general European economic
stability. This stability depends on the maintenance of sound
economic conditions and reasonable prosperity in all parts of the
Continent.
Political
It now seems clear that the Soviet Union will exert predominant political influence over the areas in question. While this Government probably would not want to oppose itself to such a political configuration, neither would it desire to see American influence in this part of the world completely nullified.
In the situation which is likely to prevail in Poland and the Balkan states after the war, the United States can hope to make its influence felt only if some degree of equal opportunity in trade, investment, and access to sources of information is preserved. American aid in the reconstruction of these areas would not only gain the good-will of the populations involved, but would also help bring about conditions which would permit the adoption of relatively liberal policies of this nature.
2. Types of Reconstruction
Needs
The reconstruction needs of the areas under reference will, of
course, vary from country to country. Poland is the only country
that may require extensive industrial reconstruction. This will
depend almost entirely on the future course of the war over Polish
territory. If the extensive industrial installations in the west
remain intact, Poland may be able to supply almost all of her
reconstruction requirements from internal resources. Should these
districts be “scorched”, however, not only would the amount of
damage be enormously increased,
All of the countries involved are likely to stand in need of reconstruction of their railway systems, owing to the large-scale, thoroughgoing looting of rolling stock by the retreating enemy, destruction of road-bed and bridges, etc.
The economies of both Poland and the Balkan states, particularly of the latter, are predominantly agricultural, and in the field of agriculture it is difficult to draw a sharp line between “reconstruction” and “development.” Much of the agriculture in these countries is conducted by primitive methods, and improvement in this sector of the economy holds out the greatest hope for raising standards of living from their present very low level.
3. Possible Forms of American
Participation
The United States can share in the reconstruction of Poland and the Balkans in several different ways, prominent among which would be direct loans from the Export-Import Bank and participation in loans by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Private American investment is unlikely in this area for some years to come at least.
Probably one of the most useful and at the same time least expensive forms in which the United States can aid in the reconstruction of Poland and the Balkan states is by making available to them technical assistance, especially in the field of agriculture.
4. The Soviet Attitude toward
United States Participation
The attitude of the Soviet Union toward American participation in the reconstruction of Poland and the Balkans is uncertain. It seems clear that, for security reasons, the Soviet Government is seeking to make sure that these countries will be oriented to the East both politically and economically.
However, in the case of one or another of the border countries, Poland for example, the Russians might have grounds to feel at an early date that an Eastern political orientation was more or less assured in any case and that foreign loans to such countries could have no decisive influence in this respect. Furthermore, the Soviet Union will have some interest in seeing that her neighbors prosper under her tutelage.
The Soviet Union probably would like most to borrow herself the money that might be available for the border countries, and to finance from the resources available to her their reconstruction and development needs. The Soviet Union might prefer, in any case, to have the reconstruction and development of the border countries financed through the International Bank rather than through direct loans from the United States.
General Balkan Policy
It is the desire of this Government that the three principal Allies should consider the problems of Southeastern Europe in their relation to general European welfare and security. The distinctions between Allied and enemy states are gradually merging into a single problem as the “satellites” come under the administration of Allied Control Commissions, with some participation in the war against Germany in a status approaching co-belligerency.
An important aspect of this problem is the tendency of one or another
of the principal Allies to exert a particular influence in a given
country, or to come to an arrangement defining the regions where
such influence would be admitted as paramount (See separate paper on
American Policy toward Spheres of InfluenceAnte, pp.103–108.
In a recent consideration of these problems the Department agreed on
certain basic principles by which the policy of this Government
should be guided. They are:
The United States should also be prepared to participate through recommendations in territorial settlements of questions involving general security.
Since each of the Balkan countries presents separate problems, the solution of which would carry forward the ideas expressed above, separate papers have been prepared discussing them.
There are two correlated questions which may shortly require attention, with reference to the whole Southern European region; namely, the project for a union of Bulgaria with Yugoslavia, and the agitation for an integral Macedonia. Both of these questions really involve consideration of the scheme for a Balkan federation. The British Government has just informed us that it would welcome such a grouping, to include both allied and enemy states, and possibly to include Turkey, but would not favor an exclusive union or federation involving only Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, since this would be unlikely to promote the larger grouping and would also isolate Greece and endanger her position. As regards Macedonia the British Government is willing to acquiesce in the formation of a Macedonian state as a federal unit in Yugoslavia provided only territories previously belonging to Yugoslavia are involved leaving the “Macedonia” parts of Bulgaria and Greece to these respective countries. The British have also communicated these views to the Soviet Government. The Department is now considering its reply to this communication. Our present thinking is generally in line with the British attitude.
American Position on Allied Control Commissions
in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary
The United States is represented on the Allied Control Commissions established to control the execution of the armistice agreements with Rumania and Bulgaria. The Commissions are organized on the same general pattern as the Allied Commission in Italy with Russia playing the leading role which Great Britain and the United States have in Italy. The Commission for Rumania operates under statutes drawn up by the Soviet Government. So far as the Department is aware, no similar statutes govern the operations of the Commission for Bulgaria. The organization of the Commission for Hungary is now under discussion at Moscow.
The United States Government has not taken exception to the Soviet
view that the actual operation of the Commissions should be in the
hands of the Soviet military authorities, at least in the period
before the surrender of Germany. The Department believes strongly,
however, that policy directives should not be issued to the local
Following Germany’s surrender the United States would like to see the Control Commissions become genuinely tripartite in character, with all three Allied Governments having equal participation.
In Rumania, the Soviet
In the case of Bulgaria the Department has been informed that prior
consultation does not take place. In the case of Hungary we have
proposed a protocol to the armistice clearly defining the rights of
our representatives. At the present moment of negotiation it appears
that our proposed text of this protocol may not be accepted, but the
discussion now taking place at Moscow will doubtless result in more
satisfactory provisions as regards our representation in Hungary,
than had been proposed by the Soviet Government, and will probably
serve also to remove some of the sources of complaint in Rumania and
Bulgaria.
With respect to the second part of the armistice period the Department has taken no action regarding the Commission for Rumania. In the case of Bulgaria, on which our views were made clear during the discussion of armistice terms, the British and Soviet Governments have been informed that we reserve the right to reopen discussion of the matter at a later date. As for Hungary, we are seeking to have our equal participation stipulated in the armistice agreement period, failing which we shall make a similar reservation as in the case of Bulgaria.
In addition to its military representation on the Control
Commissions, this Government has in Rumania and Bulgaria civilian
“United States Representatives”, who have the personal rank of
Minister and who maintain informal relations with the Rumanian and
Bulgarian Governments, respectively. The United Kingdom has similar
representatives in Rumania and Bulgaria, and, according
The United States Representatives have no connection with the work of the Allied Control Commissions except in so far as they may be consulted by the American representatives on those Commissions on matters of American foreign policy. Both delegations have of course instructions for close cooperation in the protection of American interests.
Principal Bulgarian Problems
Summary
With the signing of the Bulgarian Armistice terms at Moscow on October 28, 1944, a completely new orientation of Bulgarian affairs in the international scheme of things was initiated. The present stage through which Bulgaria is passing is of great importance not only because of its probable future influence on the Balkans generally but also because Bulgaria in certain respects is a testing ground in the relations of the three principal Allies.
The United States Government does not expect or desire a responsibility or participation fully equal with that of the Soviet Government in the Control Commission for Bulgaria, but does expect a better definition of the Allied Control Commission’s authority, with provisions safeguarding the proper functions and rights of the American delegation. It may be possible to work this out on the spot. We have reserved the right to reopen, at some later date, the question of making the Allied Control Commission more genuinely tripartite in the period after hostilities with Germany are terminated.
We are anxious that Bulgarian reparation and restitution deliveries to Greece be expedited, but we anticipate some reluctance on the part of the Soviet authorities in the Allied Control Commission to carry out this program.
If any of these questions are to be discussed on a high level, it is
recommended:
Principal Bulgarian Problems
Allied Control Commission
Pursuant to Article 18 of the Armistice terms, an Allied Control Commission has been set up to govern Bulgaria pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace. The article by its terms gives the Soviet Union a large measure of control over Bulgaria during the period from the signing of the Armistice until the termination of hostilities against Germany. The Soviet Government expects such control to continue also after this period, but the United States has not accepted the Soviet position. We maintain, and have so advised the Soviet Government, that we wish to make the division of powers among the members of the Control Commission during the second period a matter of future discussion.
Thus far the Soviet rôle in the Control Commission has even exceeded
the proportions assigned it by Article 18. Developments have reached
a stage disquieting to ourselves and alarming to the British. The
latter have communicated their grievances to Moscow in the form of a
personal note from Mr.
We are preparing an approach to Moscow designed principally to effect a modification of the present Soviet practice of making decisions and instituting measures in the name of the Allied Control Commission, without consultation with the American and British representatives. We also expect to effect the removal of restrictions on the movements of our representatives in Bulgaria, and better facilities for clearance of personnel and aircraft entering Bulgaria.
Conditions within Bulgaria
The country is ruled—aside from the Soviet
Bulgarian Relations with Greece and
Yugoslavia
Bulgarian foreign relations are in effect under the supervision of
the Control Commission, meaning, for practical purposes, the Soviet
The Armistice and its accompanying Protocol provide for the delivery of reparation and restitution goods from Bulgaria to Greece, but no appreciable progress has been made as yet. Two Greek delegations arrived in Sofia, but neither of them could show proper credentials or authority, and a duly accredited official representative to the Allied Control Commission has not yet been sent to Sofia, due probably to the political difficulties in Greece. While the Soviet chairman of the Allied Control Commission has indicated a willingness to have a Greek representative at Sofia, there may well be opposition, on the part of the Russians, to deliveries from Bulgaria to Greece on any such scale as the Greeks demand. Bulgarian relations with Greece are further complicated by the reported incursions of Bulgarian irregular forces into Greek Thrace and Macedonia.
In marked contrast to her relations with Greece, Bulgarian relations
with
Principal Hungarian Problems
Summary
The long-range interest of the United States in the maintenance of peace and stability in central Europe may be involved in the issues now arising in connection with terms of armistice for Hungary, with the control of Hungary during the armistice period, and with the territorial settlement. The two most pressing problems are (1) the share which the United States will have in the work of the Allied Control Commission, and (2) the payment of reparation by Hungary.
It is possible that Soviet and American policy may not be in harmony
if the Soviet Union uses its position as the power in actual control
of the execution of the armistice to intervene in Hungarian domestic
affairs, to dominate Hungary, or to pursue a severe policy on the
reparation question which would cripple Hungarian economy and thus
delay the economic recovery of Europe and the restoration of
While American and British interests are more or less the same in
these questions, we prefer an independent approach to the Russians
and should seek agreement on solutions and procedures which take
account of the interests of all these and of the other United
Nations. It would be desirable to secure the agreement of the
British and Soviet Governments to the following principles:
Principal Hungarian Problems
Long-Range American Interest in Hungary
The long-range interest of the United States in Hungary centers in our desire to see established peaceful and stable relationships among European nations. The United States has an interest in the achievement of solutions of Hungary’s boundary disputes and its political and economic problems which will promote orderly progress and peace with neighboring states. We believe this interest would be served by a territorial settlement which would rectify the frontier with Rumania in favor of Hungary on ethnic grounds. While Hungary must of course renounce the territorial gains made at the expense of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia with German help, the United States would favor, for example, an eventual negotiated settlement which would transfer to Hungary some of the predominantly Hungarian-populated districts of southern Slovakia. Economically, the United States has an interest in maintaining equal treatment and opportunity in Hungary for all nations. The largest single private American interest in Hungary is the petroleum company “Maort”, owned by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey; the fields in its concession have excellent prospects for future development.
At present Hungary, as an enemy state which has been associated with
Germany’s aggressions since 1938 and the last satellite to desert
the Axis, has no valid claim to leniency on the part of the Allies.
During the period of the armistice Hungary must be subjected to
American Policy on Immediate Questions concerning
Hungary
The “Provisional National Government of Hungary” formed on December 23, 1944, at Debrecen in the Soviet-occupied portion of Hungary, has asked the Allies for an armistice and has declared war on Germany. This body appears to represent the significant pro-Allied political forces in Hungary today. While the United States has not yet recognized it as a provisional government, it is probable that it will be so recognized and that the armistice terms, upon which the three principal Allies are now reaching agreement, will be presented to it.
The United States has agreed that the general pattern of the Rumanian
armistice terms should be applied in the case of Hungary, with two
important exceptions:
Consideration is being given to the advisability of standing firm on the questions of the Control Commission and of reparation to the point of signing the armistice with a formal reservation on one or both of them.
American Policy in the Armistice Period
While the United States would not, of course, take the position of supporting Hungary against the Soviet Union, it is possible that American and Soviet policies toward Hungary during the armistice period may not be in harmony, especially if there is an absence of agreement on some of the important armistice terms or if the position gained by the Soviet Union by virtue of its military campaign and under the armistice agreement is used to dominate Hungary or to strip it of a great part of its resources.
The United States Government recognizes that the Soviet Union’s
interest in Hungary is more direct than ours. We have had no
objection to the Soviet Government’s taking the lead in the
negotiations for the armistice and in the control of Hungary in the
armistice period until the surrender of Germany. We do not, however,
consider that the Soviet Union has any special privileged or
dominant position in Hungary. In the armistice period we expect to
have a civilian mission in Hungary headed by Mr.
The interests of the United States would be served by the conclusion of peace with Hungary at the earliest practicable date. Such a step would put an end to many of the powers of control which under the armistice will be exercised by the Soviet Union, and by opening the way to the resumption of normal diplomatic relations between the United States and Hungary would give the United States Government a better opportunity to protect American interests in that country.
It is also in our interest that free elections be held and that Hungary be left to manage its own internal affairs as soon as possible.
Note: There is attached a copy of the armistice terms for Hungary now
under discussion at Moscow. Substantial agreement has been reached
on all articles except Article 12 and Article 18. Those two articles
appear in this text in the form suggested by the Soviet
Government.ante, p. 239,
footnote 1.
Principal Rumanian Problems
Summary
The long-range interest of the United States in the maintenance of
peace and stability in eastern Europe may be involved in the issues
Under the armistice agreement, to which all three principal Allied Governments were parties, the Allied Control Commission operates under the general direction of the Soviet High Command. The Soviet authorities have taken a number of unilateral decisions, such as those involving the property of American-owned petroleum companies, on matters which the Department believes should have been made the subject of consultation and agreement among the three Allied Governments.
It would be desirable to secure the agreement of the British and
Soviet Governments to the following principles:
Principal Rumanian Problems
Long-Range American Interest in Rumania
The principal long-range American interest in Rumania is that that country should once more become a peaceful member of the community of nations, and should not, either through its relationships with larger powers or through the policies of its own rulers, become a menace to peace. It is our belief that this aim is most likely of attainment if Rumania is an independent state, with a government of its own choosing, and if solutions of its territorial, minority and economic problems are found which represent a maximum contribution to the stability of the region. Economically, the United States has an interest in maintaining equal treatment and opportunity in Rumania for all nations.
Execution of the Armistice Agreement
Rumania has been within the Soviet theater of military operations. The United States did not object to the Soviet Union’s taking the leading role in the negotiation of the armistice with Rumania and in the control of Rumania during the armistice period. We have not objected to the Soviet view that the executive functions of the Allied Control Commission should be exercised by the Soviet military authorites, nor do we deny that the Soviet Union has a more direct interest in Rumania than do the other Allied powers.
The United States, however, as a signatory to the armistice
agreement, bears some responsibility for its execution. We have
taken the position that the principal American representative on the
Control Commission,
A recent illustration of this point is the Soviet proposal to deport “racial” Germans from Rumania for labor service in the USSR, issuing the necessary orders to the Rumanian Government in the name of the Allied Control Commission. The United States Government does not desire to be associated with this action, on the ground that it is not justified under the Armistice Agreement with Rumania and involves certain general questions, such as payment of reparation by Germany in the form of labor service and the transfer of national minorities, on which an agreed Allied policy has not yet been formulated. The American representatives in Rumania have been instructed to make our position clear to the Soviet authorities and to the Rumanian Government.
The tendency of the Soviet authorities to take unilateral decisions
on matter of direct concern to other Allied states, as, for example,
in the removal of petroleum refinery equipment from the premises of
oil companies, including the American-owned Romano-Americana, is a
cause of some concern to the Department. Ambassador
Soviet Policy and American Interests
The United States has a civilian representative in Rumania, Mr.
Rumania has several times requested co-belligerent status and permission to send diplomatic representatives to United Nations capitals. The Department has taken the position that there should be no official statement declaring Rumania to be a co-belligerent, although the wording of the Armistice Agreement, statements made at the time it was presented to the Rumanian delegation in Moscow, and the actual contribution of Rumania to the military operations against Germany give Rumania a good basis to claim such a status. The Department has seen no reason for Rumania to be represented in Washington until the conclusion of peace between the United States and Rumania. Any decision to grant either of the Rumanian requests should be made only after agreement among the three principal Allied Governments.
The strong influence of the Soviet Union in Rumania has been the
cause of some alarm, especially in British circles which fear that
it will block the British plans to restore their pre-war political
and economic position in Rumania. Prominent Rumanian leaders,
including Mr.
It would be advantageous if reassurances could be obtained from the
Soviet Government that:
The United States should favor the conclusion of peace between Rumania and the Allies at the earliest possible date permitted by military and political conditions. American interests in Rumania would probably be better protected if normal diplomatic relations should replace the present system of control under the armistice which gives such wide powers to the Soviet authorities. It is also in our interest that free elections be held and that Rumania be left to manage its own internal affairs as soon as possible.
Greece
Bulgaria’s Restitution of Greek Property and
Delivery to Greece of Supplies for Relief and
Rehabilitation
The Germans, in withdrawing from Greece, deliberately destroyed the
economy of the country. The Corinth Canal was blocked, railways and
bridges blown up, port facilities wrecked, and enormous quantities
of transport removed, including draft animals. Only five locomotives
and forty cars are left in all Greece. The country has been stripped
of livestock and agricultural machinery. Although much of the looted
material has been taken to Germany, some probably remains in
Bulgaria, and any delay in restoring it to Greece will make its
identification more difficult. Two Greek delegations have already
attempted to present claims to the Allied (Soviet) Control
Commission in Bulgaria but have been turned back for lack of proper
credentials. The U. S. and U. K. Governments agree that Greek needs
could be met more effectively by the accreditation of a Greek
liaison officer or military mission to
It is to the interest of this Government that, on the basis of the Bulgarian Armistice, measures should be taken for the prompt restitution of Greek property in Bulgarian hands and the immediate shipment to Greece on reparations account of the maximum obtainable quantities of foodstuffs, livestock, agricultural implements, and transport equipment. The Bulgarian Armistice, unlike the Finnish or the Rumanian, provides for no direct reparations to Russia, nor are any specific demands included, though both Greece and Yugoslavia are recognized as claimant countries for damages suffered by Bulgarian aggression. Yugoslavia, of course, has legitimate claims against Bulgaria, but Greece has been the main victim and should, therefore, have first priority on Bulgaria’s capacity to make restitution.
As Greek needs are most urgent, and as any postponement in demanding
restitution and reparations would give Bulgaria an opportunity to
conceal stolen property or to plead that her effort in the
prosecution of the war should reduce the claims against her, it is
advisable to press for immediate aid to Greece. Careful analyses
indicate that without unduly upsetting her economy, Bulgaria could
deliver to claimant countries within the next six months appreciable
quantities of supplies, including 150 locomotives, 200 passenger
cars, 3,000 freight cars, 1,000 motor trucks, 500 motor cars,
500,000 tons of
Although the U. S. Government is not participating in the military operations in Greece, it is committed to a comprehensive program of relief and rehabilitation involving heavy outlays of supplies and shipping. Any supplies similar to those scheduled from Anglo-American sources which can be made available to Greece from Bulgaria will proportionately reduce American financial responsibilities and release shipping space for other vital war needs.
Special Information for the President
[Excerpts]ante,
p. 213, and post, pp. 266, 430.
These international developments of the past two or three days will be of especial interest to you:
· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Tito Subasic
Agreement.
Subject: Agreements between Dr.
Sir: I have the honor to report that Prime
Minister
Copies of these translations are enclosed. The translation of the
agreement of November 1, 1944 is apparently a revision of the
undated draft submitted by Mr.
Respectfully submitted,
restricted
Agreement
between the President of the National Committee
of Liberation of Yugoslavia,
In compliance with the principle of the continuity of the Yugoslav State from the point of view of international law, and the clearly expressed will of all Yugoslav nations, demonstrated by their four years’ struggle for a new, independent and federal State, built up on the principles of democracy, we desire and make every effort for the people’s will to be respected at every step and by everybody, both with regard to the internal organization of the State and to the form of government, and therefore intend to comply with the fundamental and general principles of constitutional government proper to all truly democratic States.
Yogoslavia being acknowledged among the United Nations in its established form, and functioning as such, we shall continue to represent our country abroad and in all acts pertaining to foreign policy in the same way, up to the time when our State, the democratic, federative Yugoslavia of the future, assumes, by a free decision of the people, the definite form of its government.
In order to avoid any possible tension of relations in the
country, we have agreed that King
The Regency Council will be appointed by a constitutional act of
the Bang, on the proposal of the Royal Government, and in
agreement
The President of the National Committee of Liberation of
Yugoslavia, Marshal
This form of government in Yugoslavia shall remain in force up to the decision of the Constituent Assembly, i. e., until the final constitutional organization of the State will be established.
The new Government will publish a declaration proclaiming the
fundamental principles of the democratic liberties and
guaranteeing their application. Personal freedom, freedom from
fear, freedom of worship, liberty of conscience, freedom of
speech, liberty of the press, freedom of assembly and
association, will be specially emphasized and guaranteed; and,
in the same way, the right of property and private initiative.
The sovereignty of the national individualities within the State
and their equal rights will be respected and safeguarded, as
Elections for the Constituent Assembly and
Organization of Public Powers
1. Elections for the Constituent Assembly will be decided upon
within three months of the liberation of the whole country. The
elections will be held in accordance with the
2. The Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia will wield the legislative power until the Constituent Assembly will have completed its task.
3. The Government will be responsible for the organization of the executive power.
4. One of the first and foremost tasks of the new Government will be to organize the judiciary power in the country in a democratic spirit. The Courts of Justice will be independent in their proceedings and the judges will decide according to the law and to their conscience.
Property of H. M. the King and Regency
Council
1. H. M. King
2. Regular intercourse between H. M. the King and the Regency Council will be established and guaranteed.
3. In case of disability, ill-health, death or resignation of one of the Regents, H. M. the King will, on the proposal of the Government, appoint one other Regent in his place.
(Note by Embassy: The Croatian copy of the above agreement is dated December 7, 1944)
Communiqué
In the course of the negotiations which have taken place in
Belgrade between the President of the National Liberation
Committee of Yugoslavia, Marshal
At that occasion, it was decided that a single Yugoslav Government be formed, consisting of representatives of all nations and federal units of Yugoslavia and including individuals of various political opinions supporting the fundamental aspirations of the national liberation struggle. This Government would be expected, as early as may be, to establish civic authorities in the country, to proceed to economic reconstruction, and to prepare and carry out elections to the Constituent Assembly.
Decisions were also taken making it possible for the nations of Yugoslavia to express, in these elections, their true will in full freedom.
During the talks, Marshal
Memorandum
As suggested by Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Since Mr.
As for the terms of the proposed agreement, it may be said in
amplification of the observations communicated to Mr.
While provision is made for the representation of various parties and
national groups, there is no indication of any change in
Account must be taken of course of the actualities of the situation.
The Partisan organization appears in fact to be in effective control
of the liberated parts of Yugoslavia. Its present armed strength,
the presence of Soviet armies under a formal agreement with Marshal
This Government has consistently defended the rights of the various peoples of Yugoslavia to work out their own forms of Government without the exercise of any foreign influence or the imposition of the rule of any one national or political group within the country, even though claiming majority support, over other elements. It has favored the extension of military aid to those resistance forces actively engaged against the Germans, without political distinction, and has avoided giving political support to either the nationalists or the Partisans. It deplores the cleavages and controversies which have taken place within Yugoslavia amounting at times to active civil war, and between the Yugoslavs at home and their representatives abroad. It thinks that many of these problems are an outgrowth of the diverse national and social elements, and exposure to the stress and hardships of war conditions, and that the desire for democratic government is today general in the country, and not the monopoly of any one group or party.
As forces within the country assume a greater share of responsibility in the Government it is the hope of this Government that genuine efforts will be made to assemble representatives with sound claim to speak for the broad masses of the population, to consider, without other influence, the relations among various elements in Yugoslavia and their respective projects of governmental reform.
In evaluating the problems now present the Department has given some
thought to the fact that the Soviet and British Governments have
acted as advisers in the negotiations between Prime Minister
7. From Ambassador
“King
Peter II of Yugoslavia has closely studied draft agreement prepared by Dr.Subasic Prime Minister of Royal Yugoslav Government and by MarshalTito President of National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia for solution of pending problems. Faithful to democratic traditions of his forefathers KingPeter II approves basic proposals laid down in draft agreement and its amendments whereby future constitution and form of Government of his country shall be determined solely by free decision of peoples of Yugoslavia. The King will accept such a decision but as a constitutional monarch it is his sacred duty to see to it that the people shall be consulted and their freely expressed will given full respect.King of Yugoslavia wholeheartedly welcomes interest with which the great Allied nations envisage reorganization of postwar Europe. On basis of freely recorded will of its peoples he fully agrees with their established policy that widest possible grouping of democratic parties and movements from left to right is the only guarantee of really free expression of popular will. He is deeply convinced that same path must be followed in his own country and even more so than in other countries where population is more homogeneous.
In consequence His Majesty has raised two essential objections to agreement in its present form. First concerns suggested form of regency and second the provisions of Article 2 of amendment by which anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation would wield unrestricted legislative power until Constituent Assembly had finished its work. This suggests transfer of power in Yugoslavia to single political group. King
Peter believes on contrary that setting up of all-party government comprising every political movement would furnish sole valid guarantee for new and better future in country to which he hopes shortly to return.King
Peter who brought his country into this war on side of his great Allies like whole population of Yugoslavia has followed with keenest sympathy and admiration magnificent prowess of Russian armies under MarshalStalin . Fraternity with Russia is basic sentiment of Slav peoples and King has the greatest regard for MarshalStalin whose name has meant so much to the Yugoslav people in their heroic resistance.Peter II R”.Churchill informedRoosevelt by telegram No. 888, dated January 14, 1945 (not printed), that KingPeter had issued this statement without consulting either the British Government or his own Prime Minister,Šubašić (Roosevelt Papers).
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the
British Ambassador and acknowledges the receipt of the Embassy’s
note of yesterday’s dateaide-mémoire of January 20
The substance of the Department’s telegram to Ambassador 17]Ante, pp.
255–257.
In substance, therefore, the Department is in agreement with the objective under which the Yugoslav Government would return to the country to work together with the various elements within Yugoslavia. When that time comes, the Department would prefer of course, that the regular American diplomatic and consular establishment should accompany or shortly follow the returning Government.
The question has meanwhile arisen as to the attitude of the principal
Allied Governments in the event that Dr.
In this connection the Department has examined the Embassy’s aide-mémoire of even date
As regards the Embassy’s suggestion that the three principal Allies
should agree that it is desirable for the agreement to come into
force and should inform Marshal
· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Yugoslav situation.
· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Patterson telegraphed yesterday that Ambassador aide-mémoire of January 23Ante, pp.
259–260.
We telegraphed to
In my telegram to aide-mémoire to the British to meet
the position which they had taken with respect to the new
governmental authority in Yugoslavia, and that our position had the
President’s approval. I continued “In the light of the President’s
message to Congress it would be difficult for us to foreclose our
position with respect to the expected developments in Yugoslavia by
a commitment at this time which might be at variance with the
declared policy of this Government toward liberated countries in
general. The President’s message has had warm public approval here
and I do not believe the American public would support our going out
in advance of the developments before we know what the circumstances
are. It does not seem to me that there is any possibility of
interpreting our action as a rift between us and the British and
Soviet Governments, as we have stated our willingness to send our
diplomatic
Principal Yugoslav Problems
Summary
The Partisan organization appears in fact to be in effective control
of the liberated parts of Yugoslavia. Its present armed strength,
the presence of Soviet armies under a formal agreement with Marshal
The
We have also placed on record our uncertainty as to what extent the
proposed agreement, in the formulation of which both Mr.
If an effort is made to associate this Government with this Yugoslav
arrangement, it is recommended: (1) that we should emphasize our
complete independence of action in dealing with the Yugoslav
situation, despite any commitments which may be or may have been
made
We could say frankly that Marshal
Note: The above summary and attached statement were based on the
situation existing before King
At this writing we do not know whether negotiations on the agreement
will continue (the King has indicated his approval of the
agreement’s basic proposals) or whether Marshal de jure government of Yugoslavia.
Principal Yugoslav Problems
Tito Subasic
Negotiations. Conversations are now in progress in London
between the British and Royal Yugoslav Governments concerning
ratification of agreements concluded during recent months between
Yugoslav Prime Minister Dr. ante, pp. 251–254.
We have been asked by the British Government to state our position
with reference to the agreements mentioned, in connection with the
London conversations. We have instructed Mr. de jure
government, we would wish to re-examine the situation within
Yugoslavia.
Our instructions to Mr.
American Representation. We recently
instructed Mr.
Relief Negotiations. Negotiations for the
conclusion of a relief agreement to operate in Yugoslavia during the
military period preceding the assumption by
We have insisted on observers with a view to insuring the impartial distribution of supplies and to avoid allowing such supplies to be used as a weapon of political coercion.
The Partisan delegate did not return to Bari, and while the
negotiations have been resumed at Belgrade a Partisan propaganda
campaign has been emphasizing that Allied relief was being withheld
from starving Yugoslavs by the Anglo-American insistence on sending
The
Mihailovich. General Mihailovich, the leader
of the Nationalist movement which opposes the Partisans, was forced
to retreat from Serbia into Bosnia following the entry of Soviet
forces into Serbia late in September 1944. He has made repeated
appeals for supplies to enable him to continue the fight against the
Germans under Allied direction, all of which have been ignored by
the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre. Supporters of
Mihailovich report that his army and the refugees who accompanied
him are suffering great privations in the Bosnian mountains, and are
under constant attack by Germans and Partisans.
It should be noted that reports of American observers tend to refute the charges against Mihailovich of collaboration with the Germans, and indicate that the Partisans, with the help of Allied military supplies, are fighting the nationalists and otherwise establishing a repressive political hegemony in Yugoslavia. The Allied observers attached to the Partisans do not have the freedom of movement which would enable them to evaluate the real situation.
Partisan Excesses. Official and unofficial
reports received from Yugoslavia point to the probability that
large-scale executions and confiscations of property of persons
opposed to the Partisan movement are taking place. We have already
received two inquiries from Congressmen regarding this question.
Moreover, the present complaints originate from Serb elements in the
United States, who form a decided minority of the Yugoslav-American
population; if such terrorism is practiced in Croatia and Slovenia,
when those areas are liberated from the enemy, we may expect
vigorous protests not only from the large Croatian and Slovenian
population in the United States but perhaps from Roman Catholic
elements in general.
Special Information for the President
[Excerpt]ante,
pp. 213, 250.
These international developments of the past two or three days will be of especial interest to you:
Italian Political Crisis.
The Department of State has received a number of inquiries from correspondents in regard to the position of this Government concerning the recent cabinet crisis in Italy.
The position of this Government has been consistently that the
composition of the Italian Government is purely an Italian affair
except in the case of appointments where important military factors
are concerned. This Government has not in any way intimated to the
Italian Government that there would be any opposition on its part to
My Dear Ed: I send you a copy of a
personal telegram I had last night from the Prime Minister, that
will set out the feeling of His Majesty’s Government about
I have, of course, made plain to London that I supposed the principal
point on which the State Department had felt disturbed, had been the
fact that we had said what we had in regard to
The feeling of London on this would be, I think, that the thing came
up very suddenly and
I am going off to New York and will call you up and come and see you, if I may, when I get back in two days time.
Yours ever,
Personal Message From the Prime Minister to
Lord Halifax, Dated
December 4th, 1944
“1. There is no question of His Majesty’s Government putting a
veto on the appointment of
2. The reasons why we have lost all confidence in
3. No sooner however had he returned to Italy than he began
violent and continuous intrigues against the
4. When the
5. In short, if I were compelled, which I should regret, to state
my objections to
6. Finally, you should remind our friends, as I shall, if necessary, remind the President, of the great trouble I have taken personally to secure mitigations of Italy’s position. At Quebec I laid before the President a series of proposals, all of which have been carried out and some improved upon, for easing the Italian situation, especially before the Presidential elections. I consider therefore that I am entitled to expect considerate treatment from the State Department.”
Memorandum of Conversation
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
I then explained that in our views, all we had done was to reiterate
the policy which had been agreed upon by our respective governments
at Moscow, and that there was nothing new in my statement. We had
been somewhat put out by the action they had taken without
consulting us, and I offered it as my opinion that the whole
incident should never have occurred. Mr.
I then told Mr.
Number 669, Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.
Your 845.post, p. 431,
and in Sherwood, pp. 838-839.
As you know, the letter to
I deplore any offense which the press release on Italy may have given
you personally or any implication of my lack of understanding of
your responsibility before your country. You must recognize,
however, the untenable position in which we were put by Mr.
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th
You will remember my feeling on this score expressed to you at the
time
Dear Lord Halifax:
I am sure you know how much I value your friendship; as long as we can talk things out freely and frankly with each other at all times, there can be no serious differences between us.
With assurances of my respect and esteem,
Sincerely yours,
“Your personal message was read to me this afternoon and I wish to let you know without delay that it is a source of deep regret to me that so soon after taking office a difference should have arisen between us. I have always worked so closely with you and my British friends, both as Lend-Lease Administrator before coming into the State Department and more particularly since I have been here. We must keep up the close and intimate association which has always been so helpful in getting over even points of difficult discussion in dealing with our respective countries’ interests. I count upon, as one of my greatest supports in the tasks ahead, your close friendship. I know, and you must feel, that anything which we put up to each other for cooperative working out can be solved to the entire satisfaction of both our responsibilities. Let us resolve that we will see that everything of any importance comes right up to the two of us for approval.
If the reaffirmation of our policy with regard to Italy has
caused you embarrassment I am truly sorry. The feeling is such
in this country, however, and the inquiries from all quarters so
pressing, following your public statement in the House of
Commons, that we had no other choice than to make clear our
position. I am sure that had there been prior consultation we
could have worked the matter out together as we have done in the
past and, I feel sure, we will be able to do in the future.
post, p. 433.
Aide-Mémoire
Instructions have been sent to the United States representative in
Rome to inform Signor
He was further instructed for his guidance, that when the new Italian Cabinet should be submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, for approval, this Government was of the opinion that individual nominations might be approved or disapproved by the Supreme Allied Commander solely on important military grounds, and that further reference to Allied authorities or Governments by the Supreme Allied Commander was not necessary or desirable.
The Department also expressed to Mr.
All of these instructions seem to be in general agreement with the
instructions to aide-mémoire of December 4, 1944
With regard to granting Allied “approval” of any Italian Government which may evolve, the Government of the United States is of the opinion that objection to individuals should be made by the Supreme Allied Commander only on important military grounds. This Government, however, does consider the representative character of a new Government to be of major importance and concern to the Allied Governments and will wish to give careful consideration to this aspect of the political solution, when found, before extending recognition to the new Government.
It is anticipated that there will be consultation in this regard between the British and American Governments at the appropriate time.
My Dear Ed: I have just received a
telegram asking me to convey to you the enclosed personal message
from Anthony, in reply to yours of December 7th.
Yours ever,
Personal Message From Mr. Eden to Mr. Stettinius
Thank you so much for your helpful and understanding message
which I received through
I want you to know of the reply which ante, p.
272.
For your background on this matter, you should know that our
statementAnte, pp.
266–267.
The American and British Ambassadors in Rome have been in close
contact during the recent developments in Italy. The American
Ambassador,
The United States Government, in accord with the British Government,
is happy to see the new Italian Government under Signor
7016. For Acting Secretary of State only from Secretary
I hope you will hold up any action with regard to proposed joint
statement on Italy
All-State Horseshoe.
For the Secretary from the Acting Secretary.
Proposed joint statement on Italy drafted in
In any event we will not agree to release without your approval.
United States policy toward Italy is, briefly, to encourage the development of Italy into a democratic and constructive force in the future Europe and to assist Italy to become politically independent and economically self-supporting as quickly as possible. The steps which this Government has taken to date to implement these policies are recounted.
Major questions of policy which might be taken up with the British
and Soviet Governments and their concurrence obtained are:
Questions which the British or Soviet Governments may raise
concerning Italy requiring this Government to take a position are as
follows:
United States Policy Toward Italy
Summary of Present United States Policy
During a time when the United States has a peculiar position of authority in Italy, as a result of military operations, it is supporting and encouraging elements and aspirations which will develop the Italian nation into a democratic and constructive force in the future Europe. Since the economic dependence of one State upon another is not conducive to internal stability and peaceful relations with other, states, it is sound American policy to help Italy become self-supporting and financially independent as quickly as possible.
The United States does not accept the theory of economic and political “spheres of influence”. While, for geographic reasons, this country’s interest in Italy may not be as great as that of certain other powers, it has, nevertheless, very real interest in the development of normal and mutually profitable trade relations, in the protection of American property and investments in Italy and in insuring that Italy becomes a positive force for peace and cooperation in the postwar world. The blood sacrifices made by American men from Sicily to the Alps cannot be ignored in the determination of our interest in, and our policy toward, Italy.
To implement these policies, this Government has, in addition to the
encouragement and support that has been given to develop a
representative government in Italy, taken the following steps in the
political field: it has assumed the lead in attempting to modify the
prisoner of war status in which many Italian soldiers continue to be
held in United Nations territory (as a result of this initiative it
is believed that Italian prisoners of war in Italy will soon be
released from that status); it suggested that we invite the Italian
Government to send a representative to the Financial and Monetary
Conference at Bretton Woods last year but was unable to carry out
this proposal because of strong British and French opposition; it
encouraged the International Business Conference held at Rye, New
York, November last, to invite representatives of Italian business
(a representative of the International Chamber of Commerce in Rome
attended); it has instructed the United States delegate to the
International Labor Organization to support the Italian application
for readmission to the Bulletin, October 1,
1944, vol. xi. p. 338.
On the economic side the United States Government participates in the
Allied Commission, which among other things, provides for the
distribution of civilian supplies in Italy. Since the invasion of
Sicily in July 1943 the Allied military authorities had spent, up to
November 1, 1944, approximately $158,000,000 for civilian supplies
for Italy. The American share of this total has been approximately
$120,000,000. In October 1944 the President informed the War
Department that in spite of the current shipping situation he had
decided to assume the responsibility for directing the Supreme
Allied Commander, Mediterranean, to increase the bread ration to 300
grams throughout all of Italy occupied by Allied forces (a directive
to this end is being prepared in the Combined Civil Affairs
Committee—Combined Chiefs of Staff—to Marshal Alexander). The
President announced in OctoberBulletin, October 15, 1944, vol. xi, p. 403.
In appraising Allied economic policy toward Italy it must be remembered that the various relief measures and civilian supply programs are all subject to the present severe limitations placed upon United Nations’ shipping. In view of the heavy military commitments throughout the world, it has not been possible to allocate to the Mediterranean theatre sufficient shipping to carry the civilian supplies available. While United States declarations of policy in the economic field have consistently shown an enlightened view, the implementation of this policy continues to be severely handicapped by the actual physical factors of acute worldwide shipping shortage.
Major Questions of Policy on which Soviet and
British Concurrence is Desired
1. Supersession of Italian Armistice Terms by
Convention to Terminate State of War.
The basic ambiguity in the present relations between Italy and the
United Nations stems principally from the technical state of war
which still exists and the de facto relations
of Italy with the United Nations as a co-belligerent in the war
against Germany. Italy’s status as a co-belligerent is obviously
incompatible and inconsistent with its status as an enemy.
Elimination of the armistice and of the status of “enemy” would
bring the legal relationship of the United Nations to Italy into
line with the present practical working relationship that has
developed in the last fifteen months. Because there are many
questions, such as colonies, frontiers, fleet, reparations, et
cetera, which should be considered in the general peace settlement
with Germany and Japan, it is not possible to conclude a definitive
peace with Italy at the present time. All of these questions could,
however, be specifically reserved for later settlement. Sixteen
months having elapsed since the end of hostilities with Italy, it is
clear that the unconditional surrender instrument and enemy status
are outmoded and that adjustment of our legal position should be no
longer delayed. The Supreme Allied Commander would of course embody
within his Civil Affairs agreement with the Italian Government all
military clauses required to protect his operations.
2. Italian Request for Participation in United
Nations International Bodies and Conferences as an Associated
Nation. One of the steps which the Italian Government
considers most important in its moral and political rehabilitation
is participation in international conferences and organizations,
particularly those dealing with post-war problems. It is therefore
desirable that the Italians should not be isolated from the current
United Nations’ thinking and discussions as expressed in the new
bodies and organizations which are being set up. The Secretary of
State last August expressed to the Italian Prime Minister this
Government’s sympathy and support for the Italian Government’s
aspirations in this regard. Sympathetic consideration of the Italian
position on this question by all the United Nations is essential if
Italy is to become a constructive force in Europe.
3. Italian Participation in the German Surrender as
an Associated Nation. Italy has been at war with Germany
for fifteen months. During that period it has suffered heavy
destruction of lives and resources. Italy is naturally interested in
the armistice arrangements for Germany and the whole problem of the
Italian position is involved in whether or not Italy will be
permitted by the United Nations to participate in their armistice
arrangements for Germany. We think that Italian views should be
considered and Italy should be permitted to associate herself with
the United Nations armistice with Germany at the time of the German
surrender.
4. Italian Committee of National Liberation as
Basis for Representative Government during Interim Period.
The Italian Committee of National Liberation is composed of six
anti-Fascist political parties ranging from right to left as
follows:
It would be a stabilizing factor, during the interim period before Italy is free to hold national elections, if the three principal Allies would agree that they would continue to recognize only those governments in Italy which continue to be representative of the parties in the Committee of National Liberation.
5. Italian National Elections, after the Germans
have been Expelled, to Determine Form of Government and
Constitution. In view of
6. Italian Participation in the War against
Japan. The present Italian position of co-belligerency was
recognized by the three powers on October 13, 1943, as a result of
the Italian declaration of war against Germany.Bulletin, October 16, 1943, vol. ix, pp. 253–254.
In the first instance the United Nations must decide whether they desire Italian participation in the war against Japan. If so, Allied authorities in Italy should be instructed to take steps to obtain undertakings of the Italian Government to this effect.
Italy should not be expected to participate in the war against Japan unless her status vis-à-vis the United Nations is clarified. She should be recognized as an Ally in that struggle or be permitted to adhere to the United Nations pact.
Italy might be used as a “Mediterranean work shop” in the prosecution of the war against Japan, after Germany has been defeated, in view of its many large ports and surplus skilled laborers. Consideration should be given to paying Italy for goods furnished and services rendered in the war against Japan, as distinct from goods and services it is now furnishing, in the prosecution of the war against Germany, under the armistice terms. Aside from any Italian contribution to the war in the Pacific such a program would prove a timely factor in Italian economic rehabilitation.
Questions which may be Raised by the British or
the Soviet Governments concerning Italy
1. Support of the House of Savoy. At the
present time the Allied Commission for Italy has followed the custom
of extracting from each succeeding Italian government a pledge that
it will not raise the institutional question (monarchy) until all of
Italy has been liberated. Thus far the various Italian governments
have given this undertaking without question, since this is also the
present program of the Italian Committee of National Liberation.
While it is to be hoped that the question will not become an issue
as eventual succeeding governments may be formed prior to the first
national elections, the liberation of the northern industrial areas
such as Milan and Turin might well precipitate the monarchical
question before all Italy is liberated.
If the subject is raised by one of our Allies we should not agree at this time to any course of action which would bind us to support the Italian Monarchy in the event the present compromise and working agreement between the Monarchy and the political parties should become unacceptable to the latter. We should reserve complete freedom of action, subject of course always to consultation with the British and Soviet Governments and without prejudice to our pledge that ultimately all the Italians will be able to express their will on the issue.
2. Territorial Dispositions and Reparations.
Should the question be raised, we should not agree directly or
indirectly at this time to final disposition of any Italian
territories, colonies or fleet, or to boundary rectifications or
final claims against Italian assets or to any interim arrangements
prejudicing the final settlement. It is considered desirable to
reserve all of these questions for the general peace settlement at
which time all the United Nations will be in a better position to
judge Italy’s contribution to their war effort.
3. Progress of Defascistization in Italy. The
threat of the purge continues to be a paralyzing factor in Italian
public life, affecting even the police force and army. The recent
crisis was largely due to disagreement over the purge,
The Moscow Declaration called for the removal of “all Fascist or
pro-Fascist elements …Decade, pp. 12–13.
4. Use of Allied Forces to Support Italian
Government in Event of Civil War. This Government should
support, by force if necessary, any truly representative Italian
Government during such period as Italy continues to be a theatre of
combined Anglo-American military responsibility.
It may be assumed that any Italian Government in office would possess the representative requisites which the Allied Governments would have considered essential before according it recognition in the first instance. Nevertheless we should reexamine the composition of any government carefully, from the standpoint of its representative character, in the event of crisis requiring Allied armed assistance to support its authority. Our best measure would be the Italian Committee of National Liberation.
Memorandum
Preparation for Big Three Meeting
· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
2. There is another matter which should be brought to the attention
of the President and that is the request of the British Embassy here
for our opinion as to whether France, Belgium, and Holland should be
rearmed at this time with a view to (a)
permitting their troops to take part in the occupation of Germany
and (b) to making those countries militarily
strong within the British idea of a “defensive” confederation
composed of Great Britain and the Western European countries. We
have asked the opinion of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and find
that from a purely military point of view they are in favor of this
rearming. The British propose that they rearm the Dutch and the
Belgians and that we undertake to rearm the French to an extent of
somewhere between eight and twelve divisions. This would be all new
armament and supplementary to the rearming of the several French
divisions we have provided so far and which are now in action. The
British say that the divisions we have already armed would not be
suitable for the occupation of Germany because they are colonial and
colored troops and that new divisions formed of recruits from
metropolitan France should be activated for this new purpose. The
President would have to decide whether, from the point of view of
major policy, we wish to rearm France. This new rearming would, of
course, be carried out on the basis of cash payment and not lend-
· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Prime Minister to President ante, p.
15.
· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
3. Thank you for your kind wishes about the Paris-ante, p.
14.
4. I see statements being put out in the French press and other
quarters that all sorts of things were decided by us in Paris. You
may be sure that our discussions on important things took place
solely on an ad referendum basis to the three
great powers, and of course especially to you who have by far the
largest forces in France.
5. At the same time I sympathize with the French wish to take over
more line, to have the best share they can in the fighting or what
is left of it, and there may be plenty, and not to have to go into
Germany as a so-called conqueror who has not fought. I remarked that
this was a sentimental point which ought never the less to receive
consideration. The important thing for France was to have an army
prepared for the task which it would actually have to discharge,
6. On this second point the French pressed very strongly to have a share in the occupation of Germany not merely as subparticipation under British or American command but as a French command. I expressed my sympathy with this, knowing well that there will be a time not many years distant when the American armies will go home and when the British will have great difficulty in maintaining large forces overseas, so contrary to our mode of life and disproportionate to our resources, and I urged them to study the type of army fitted for that purpose, which is totally different in form from the organization by divisions required to break the resistance of a modern war-hardened enemy army. They were impressed by this argument but nevertheless pressed their view.
7. I see a Reuter message, emanating no doubt unofficially from
Paris, that it was agreed France should be assigned certain areas,
the Ruhr, the Rhineland, etc., for their troops to garrison. There
is no truth in this and it is obvious that nothing of this kind can
be settled on such a subject except in agreement with you. All I
said to
8. It is evident however that there are a number of questions which
press for decision at a level higher than that of the high commands,
without which decisions no clear guidance can be given to the high
commands. Here is another reason why we should have a triple meeting
if U. J. will not come, or a quadruple meeting if he will. In the
latter case the French would be in on some subjects and out on
others. One must always realize that before five years are out there
must be made a French army to take on the main task of holding down
Germany. The main question of discussion between
9. I thought I would give you this account at once in case of further tendentious statements being put out in the press.
10. I thought very well of
Number 649, Personal and Top Secret from the President for the Prime Minister.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Regardless of available shipping and availability of material in the United States, I have no authority at present to equip an eight division post war French army. I, of course, sympathize with the French point of view and hope that we may all be able to help her meet post war responsibilities. You know, of course, that after 1 Germany’s collapse I must bring American troops home as rapidly as transportation problems will permit. …
Prime Minister to President
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Para two of your 649Supra.
Number 658. Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In regard to paragraph six of your 825,Supra.
In any event, I have at the present time no authority under which it would be possible for me to equip any post-war foreign army, and the prospect of getting such authority from the Congress is more than doubtful.
Prime Minister to President
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Your last paragraph.Supra.
Strictly Confidential and Personal from Premier
According to all data General
1. About the conclusion of Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance
similar to Anglo-Soviet pact.Bulletin, September 26, 1942, vol, vii, pp. 781–783.
It is difficult for us to object. But I would like to know your opinion on this question. I ask you to give me your advice.
2. Probably General
It is possible that this control provides the participation of France. Thus the proposal of the French concerning the shift of the frontier to the Rhine will compete with the project of establishment of the Rhine region under the international control.
I ask your advice on this question as well.
I sent a similar message to Mr.
Secret and Personal from Premier
The meeting with General
As to the frontier of France on the Rhine I expressed the idea that this question cannot be solved without knowledge and consent of our main Allies, whose forces are carrying on the struggle for liberation against the Germans on the French territory. I stressed the complexity of the solution of this question.
In connection with the proposal of Franco-Soviet pact I pointed out the necessity of close study of this question, the necessity of clarification of juridical nature of such pact, in particular such question as who will ratify this pact in France under the present conditions. Thus the Frenchmen should still give some explanations which we have not yet received from them.
In sending you this message I would appreciate your reply and your comments on these questions.
Similar message I sent to Mr.
I send you my best wishes.
Admiral
I have received from U. J. messages dated second and third
DecemberSupra.
I would like to have your views before I reply to
Prime Minister to President
I have replied as follows to
- “1. Your telegram about
De Gaulle ’s visit and the two questions he will raise. We have no objection whatever to a Franco Sovietpact of mutual assistance similar to the Anglo Soviet pact. On the contrary, His Majesty’s Government consider it desirable and an additional link between us all. Indeed, it also occurs to us that it might be best of all if we were to conclude a tripartite treaty between the three of us which would embody our existing Anglo Soviet treaty with any improvements. In this way the obligations of each one of us would be identical and linked together. Please let me know if this idea appeals to you as I hope it may. We should both of course tell the United States. - 2. The question of changing the eastern frontier of France to the left bank of the Rhine or alternatively of forming a Rhenish-West-phalian province under international control, together with other alternatives ought to await settlement at the peace table. There is, however, no reason why, when the three heads of government meet, we should not come much closer to conclusions about all this than we have done so far. As you have seen, the President does not expect
De Gaulle to come to the meeting of the three. I would hope that this could be modified to his coming in later on when decisions, especially affecting France, were under discussion.- 3. Meanwhile, would it not be a good thing to let the European Advisory Commission sitting in London, of which France is a member, explore the topic for us all without comitting in any way the heads of governments?
- 4. I am keeping the President informed.”
2. There seems much to be said for a tripartite Anglo Franco Soviet pact. In that way we can be sure that our mutual obligations to each other are harmonised from the beginning. Public opinion too would think such a joint agreement more satisfactory than an arrangement whereby relations between the French and ourselves were governed by agreements which each of us had entered into separately with Russia.
3. I should welcome your views.
For the President from Admiral
The following quoted reply to
I think it should be quoted to Prime for his information. We are now
preparing a draft replyinfra.Supra.
“Personal and Secret from the President to Marshal
Stalin .Thank you for your two informative messages of December 2 and December 3.
In regard to a proposed Franco-Soviet pact along the lines of the Anglo-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, this Government would have no objection in principle if you and General
de Gaulle considered such a pact in the interests of both your countries and European security in general.I am in complete agreement with your replies to General
de Gaulle with regard to the post-war frontier of France. It appears to me at the present time that no advantage to our common war effort would result from an attempt to settle this question now and that its settlement subsequent to the collapse of Germany is preferable.”This message was transmitted without change subsequently the same day, and it was quoted in a telegram of Roosevelt toChurchill of even date, printed inChurchill , pp. 258–259.
Number 670, Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.
Your 846.
You will have seen from my replySupra.
I still adhere to my position that any attempt to include
In regard to your suggestion to Uncle Joe that the question of France’s postwar frontiers be referred to the European Advisory Commission I feel that since the Commission is fully occupied with questions relating to the surrender of Germany, it would be a mistake to attempt to bring up at this stage before it any questions of postwar frontiers. It seems to me preferable to leave this specific topic for further exploration between us.
I fully appreciate the advantages which you see in a possible tripartite Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact. I am somewhat dubious, however, as to the effect of such an arrangement on the question of an international security organization to which, as you know, I attach the very highest importance. I fear that a tripartite pact might be interpreted by public opinion here as a competitor to a future world organization, whereas a bilateral arrangement between France and the Soviet Union similar to the Soviet-British Pact would be more understandable. I realize, however, that this is a subject which is of primary concern to the three countries involved.
Translation
Personal and Secret from Premier
Thank you for your replyAnte, pp.
290–291.Bulletin, January 7,
1945, vol. xii, pp. 39–40.
As to the post-war border of France, the consideration of this
question, as I have already written to you,ante, pp. 288–289.
16. General
The letter reads in translation as follows:
“Mr. President, events have proved that we will not defeat Germany completely without throwing in new forces; now, France, in spite of the loss or absence of 3,000,000 men, is in a position to increase her military forces powerfully and rapidly. I might add that she ardently desires to do so.
We are trying to put our armament factories back into operation. But this takes a great deal of time because our machine tools have seriously suffered and above all we lack raw materials.
You have already furnished us in North Africa armament and equipment for eight divisions. It is an effort which I believe you know was not lost.
You have recently agreed to send United States armament and equipment for eight divisions. Thank you most sincerely, but I ask you, in our common interests, to hasten the shipment of this material, all of which the French Army is in a position to use on the battlefield within the next three months.
If I were sure that you would afterwards send us more armament and equipment material, and if I could know in advance, even approximately, the quantities, the nature and the rhythm of these shipments,
this information would be of great assistance to the French Government in preparing its plans for mobilization. We could have before the end of this year about 50 good French divisions if we were able to arm and equip them. If you could give me a favorable reply in principle, all details could be settled with your technical services by General
Juin , Chief of the General Staff of National Defense, whom I would send at once to Washington.With my deeply sincere wishes for this year 1945 which will be hard but glorious for our two countries, I beg of you to accept, Mr. President, the expression of my feelings of devoted friendship,
De Gaulle .”
(I assume in paragraph four he is speaking of the conversations
mentioned in my 1146, December 30, 6 p. m.)
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Proposals Regarding French Participation in Certain Tripartite Plans for the Occupation of Germany.
The Embassy at London reports that the French representative on the
European Advisory Commission has circulated a memorandum giving the
views of his Government concerning the instrument of surrender for
Germany, the protocol and amendment on the zones of occupation in
Germany, and the agreement on control machinery.Ante, pp.
113–118, 118–123,
and 124–127 respectively.
Subject to the approval of the military authorities, it is recommended that this Government approve the French requests. The following reasons suggest this course.
It is in the interests of the United States to assist France to
regain her former position in world affairs in order that she may
increase her contribution in the war effort and play an appropriate
part in Bulletin, November 12, 1944, vol. xi, p. 583.
There is every likelihood that the British and Soviet Governments will support the French. Consequently, disapproval by this Government would probably result in our being placed in the position of being the only Government to stand in the way of French aspirations. It would seem the part of wisdom to accept the proposals now, when credit can be obtained for that action, rather than to wait until it is made to appear that the concessions are won from us grudgingly.
Acceptance of full French participation will probably prove popular with the other small countries of Europe which profess to fear the results of a peace imposed by non-European powers.
Acceptance of the proposals now may help to create a cooperative spirit among the French who may as a consequence be less inclined to raise objections to many of the arrangements which have already been agreed to.
This Government may well wish, after the early period of occupation, to withdraw a considerable proportion of its troops from Germany. It would be logical to assume that they would be replaced by French forces and this replacement is likely to be facilitated if the French are fully associated with plans for the occupation from the outset.
It can be justifiably argued that the French requests are out of all proportion to France’s power today and that the acceptance of a fourth country on an equal basis may only serve to make more complicated an already complex problem. It is not believed, however, that these considerations can outweigh the arguments in favor of the move. In the long run this Government will undoubtedly gain more by making concessions to French prestige and by treating France on the basis of her potential power and influence, than we will by treating her on the basis of her actual strength at this time.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Proposals Regarding French Participation in Certain Tripartite Plans for the Occupation of Germany.
In my previous memorandum on the above subject I indicated that the French Provisional Government, through its representative on the European Advisory Commission, had put forward five specific proposals, the purposes of which were to place France on a footing of equality with the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union with regard to German affairs.
I recommended that subject to the approval of our military authorities, this Government approve the French request. The views of the War and Navy Departments are being sought through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.
A subsequent telegram from the Ambassador at London (No. 59 of
January 2, 1945
I think that it would be useful if we could take the same position at an early date prior to detailed consideration with the War and Navy Departments of the specific French proposals when they are received.
Ambassador
Memorandum for the President
Subject: French Request for Participation in Big Three Meeting
I am transmitting herewith a copy of a telegram from
cc to Mr.
215. Reference my telegram 214,
The Provisional Government of the French Republic has learned through public information of a proposed conference between the representatives of Great Britain, the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for the purpose of determining precisely the conditions of their cooperation in the war.
In this connection the Provisional Government of the French Republic believes it should bring to the attention of the Government of the United States of America the following observations: The Military operations in the West are taking place at the present time on French territory or in the immediate neighborhood of its frontiers. France is making to the full extent of its present possibilities, an important and increasing contribution thereto, not only by its land, sea and air armed forces, but also by certain resources indispensable to the struggle, especially its means of transport and its ports.
Moreover, it appears, in the light of recent military events,
that the continuation of the struggle to victory necessitates a
constantly increasing participation of France in the common war
effort. This participation cannot be assured under satisfactory
conditions without a revision of the program of production,
supply and transport which are [is] in
effect at the present time between the Allies, a revision which
cannot be advantageously undertaken without the direct
participation of the Provisional Government of the French
Republic.
Moreover, it must be observed that the conferences held between the other great allied powers lead these to decide in advance, without the participation of France, the settlement of certain questions of a political or economic character which, however, interest France directly or indirectly, in which case the Provisional Government of the French Republic evidently could not consider itself bound by any of the decisions taken without it and, consequently, such decisions lose some of their value.
Independently of motives of high political and moral propriety,
it therefore appears opportune to the Provisional Government of
the French Republic to make it known that its participation in
such conferences is, in its eyes, necessary in matters relating
to problems
The Provisional Government of the French Republic cannot doubt that its point of view will be shared by the other great allied powers.
January 13, 1945.
With reference to your coming conversation with the President on Sunday with regard to French views on the Rhineland and on a French zone of occupation in Germany, the following may be of use:
I General. You will recall that the French
have proposed, and the President has already approved in principle,
the following:
In a note dated January 13,supra.
II French Zone of Occupation in Germany. So
far, the French have given no indication concerning the boundaries
of the zone that they would like to have, although they have
indicated informally that they would be satisfied with a small zone
at the outset, provided it was made clear that this zone could be
expanded at a later date. It seems safe to assume, however, that
they will eventually wish to occupy all German territory touching
the boundaries of France, and
When he was in Paris, Mr.
III French Views on the Rhineland. Only last
week General
It is possible that the French have not yet definitely formulated their views on the Rhineland. It is also likely that even if they favored annexation, they would deem it prudent not to put forward such an extreme claim at this time. It is clear, however, that they at least envisage a military occupation of so long duration that it might easily lead to annexation if the French consider that feasible in the light of future developments.
Although there are increasing indications, (in spite of official denials) that the French are thinking of the Rhineland in terms of eventual assimilation, it is believed that as far as the Ruhr is concerned they may be satisfied with the establishment of some form of permanent international control in which France will, of course, have an important part.
328. Please hand the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following letter from the Acting Secretary of State:
“I wish you to know promptly that General
De Gaulle ’s recent letter to the President with regard to the further arming of French forces, which has been received from AmbassadorCaffery , is deeply appreciated and is now before the United States Chiefs of Staff for their consideration and advice. It is hoped that a definitive reply to GeneralDe Gaulle ’s letter may soon be possible.“In this interim manner, however, I wish to assure you that this Government fully understands the fervent desire of the French Government to contribute to the fullest extent possible to the defeat of Germany. The French forces already fighting at the side of their allies are making an outstanding contribution to the Allied cause. It is a source of gratification to this Government to know that the United States, despite the strain placed upon it of equipping American as well as Allied forces, has been able to assist France by equipping French forces in action against the common enemy. It appreciates General
De Gaulle ’s reference in this regard to the earlier arming of French forces in North Africa and to the recent approval given to the arming of eight additional French divisions. Every effort is being made to send armament and equipment for these latter divisions at the earliest date possible.“I am sure that you will understand that the assistance we are gladly giving to our many allies places the utmost strain on our production capacity. At the same time, I wish you to know that it is the hope of this Government that further assistance can be given.”
427.
There was then some discussion in regard to the suggested voting
procedure of the security council of the United Nations organization
and also of the suggested emergency high commission for liberated
Europe. In both cases
At luncheon we were with the Ministers of Finance, Communication and
Transportation also. Hopkins was in very good form and gave them a
frank and useful talk; he repeated what he had said to
He talked also about the next big three conference; told them that he
knew that President
· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
France
Summary
1) Role in United Nations
Councils
American interests require that every effort be made by this Government to assist France, morally as well as physically, to regain her strength and her influence, not only with a view toward increasing the French contribution to the war effort, but also with a view toward enabling the French to assume larger responsibilities in connection with the maintenance of peace. It is likewise in the interest of this Government to treat France in all respects on the basis of her potential power and influence rather than on the basis of her present strength.
2) Zone of Occupation in
Germany
The President has already approved in principle five proposals
forwarded by the French which are designed to place France on a
3) Control Machinery for
Germany
One of the French proposals approved by the President in principle is that the French will have an equal part in the control machinery for Germany.
4) Attitude Toward Future German
Economy
Indications are that the French do not wish to see Germany reduced to
economic misery since they believe that this would inevitably breed
trouble. They do, however, favor the elimination of all German war
industries and near war industries. General
France
(1) Role in United Nations
Councils
Since liberation, France has made enormous strides in regaining her
former position of influence and may now be regarded as occupying a
place in the United Nations Councils directly after the United
States, Soviet Russia, Great Britain and China. This development has
been high-lighted by such events as the recognition of General
The best interests of the United States require that every effort be
made by this Government to assist France, morally as well as
physically, to regain her strength and her influence, not only with
a view toward increasing the French contribution to the war effort,
but also with a view toward enabling the French to assume larger
responsibilities in connection with the maintenance of peace. The
vital interest of France in the solution of the German problem and
the importance of the part she should and will inevitably play in
maintaining the future peace in Europe were publicly acknowledged by
this Government on November 11, 1944 when France was invited to
accept full membership in the European Advisory Commission.
(2) Zone of Occupation in
Germany
The United States, United Kingdom, and the U. S. S. R. have agreed
that any nation which takes part in military operations against
Germany may contribute troops for the occupation. It has been
further agreed that Great Britain shall have the right to use
“auxiliary contingents” from the other United Nations under British
command. This special provision was not to prejudge the more
extensive participation by other nations and it was clear from the
outset that France would never be satisfied with such a position. In
this connection Foreign Minister
The French have now proposed the following in the European Advisory
Commission:ante, p, 293.
These proposals have been approved in principle by the President.
So far the French have given no indication concerning the boundaries
of the zone of occupation which they would like to have, although
they have suggested that they would be satisfied with a small zone
at the outset with provision for increasing its size at a later
date. It is likely that they will eventually ask for the entire area
bounded by the west bank of the Rhine. If granted, long standing
French ambitions in this area may lead to more or less open efforts
to favor separatism, as was done in 1919. There is no official
indication that France at this time desires to annex German
territory, and official spokesmen have made
There is no indication that the U. S. S. R. has made definite
commitments to support the French with regard to the western
boundary of Germany, although
The British are not known to have made any definite commitments to
the French except that
This Government may well wish, after the early period of occupation, to withdraw a considerable proportion of its troops from Germany. It would be logical to assume that they would be replaced by French forces and this replacement is likely to be facilitated if the French are fully associated from the outset with plans for the occupation. In general, this would appear to be entirely in harmony with our efforts to assist the French to gain in strength and influence in order that they may be in a position to assume larger responsibilities in connection with the maintenance of peace.
(3) Control Machinery for
Germany
The reasons in favor of permitting the French to have an equal part with the United States, Great Britain and the U. S. S. R. in the control machinery for Germany are similar to those relating to the question of a zone of occupation.
(4) Attitude toward Future German
Economy
In a memorandum presented to the European Advisory Committee on
January 8,
The French Foreign Minister indicated a short time ago that the
Government did not wish to see Germany reduced to economic misery
because this would inevitably breed trouble. They did feel, however,
that all German war industries and near war industries should be
eliminated. General
Rearming of French Forces
Last August the British Embassy raised with the Department of State the question of equipping the armed forces of certain Western European Allies to enable them to maintain security in their own countries and to take part in the occupation of Germany. At that same time the British Chiefs of Staff placed the same proposal before the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. The British proposed that in view of the fact that French ground military units were presently furnished with American arms, that the United States should furnish arms and equipment to the French forces for the purposes indicated. The British, on the other hand, would furnish arms and equipment to the Belgians, Dutch, Norwegians and eventually the Danish. The British proposed that they furnish the French with air equipment. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Department of State that the British proposals, from a military point of view, were acceptable to them, but that the matter should be handled on a Government to Government level and not on a Combined Chiefs of Staff level.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also indicated their view that the Soviet
Government should be informed of the proposed action. Two memoranda
(copies attached) on the subject were submitted to the President for
his approval.
The manner in which payment may be made by the French Government for the supplies thus envisaged is to be determined in discussion with the French authorities.
The British Embassy has informed the Department of State that the Departments of the French Government concerned in this matter are considering the complicated question of how far the mutual aid agreements between the United Kingdom Government and the countries in question are applicable to the equipment and training of Allied forces for the post-hostilities period. The British Embassy states that when final conclusions have been reached the Department of State will be informed. The equipping and training by the United Kingdom Government of Belgian, Norwegian and Dutch forces are at present governed by mutual aid agreements in force between the United Kingdom and the Governments in question.
Subject: Arming of French Forces.
In late August, the British Embassy approached the State Department, and the British Chiefs of Staff approached the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with reference to the adequate equipment of the forces of the Western European Allies, to enable them to maintain security in their own countries and to take part in occupying Germany. The question was asked whether the United States Government would be willing to re-equip a French Army for such purposes from American sources during the next few years, having in mind that present French land forces are provided with American munitions and matériel. British Chiefs of Staff suggested a continuance of British supply to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium.
The United States Chiefs of Staff, through Admiral
The authority to deliver supplies for security or occupation
forces is given by the Lend-Lease Act, and these munitions could
be furnished on straight lend-lease or on credit under Section 3
(c) of the Act. We could also furnish
such supplies for cash, but cash purchases might use on [up?] dollars needed for civilian supply
and reconstruction.
I recommend that we accept the British proposal, but suggest dealing directly with the French. Our present policy toward France is based on the belief that it is in the best interests of the United States that France resume her traditional position as a principal power capable of playing a part in the occupation of Germany and in maintaining peace in Europe. The recruiting and equipping of French land forces would be a natural corollary of this policy, and politically such a move could be portrayed as a further evidence of American friendship for France and a proof of our desire to see her as a strong nation. … However, it must be borne in mind that France will make every effort to obtain arms from any source.
We are presently in the process of preparing a lend-lease agreement to be proposed to the French, and under that proposal these military supplies could be furnished on a straight lend-lease basis. However, unless the British are agreeable to furnishing comparable military supplies to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium on a similar basis, we may have to reconsider the implementation of our proposal in order to standardize the terms of our arrangements with the French and those made by the British with the other four countries in question.
I recommend further that the Soviet Government be informed of what the British and the American Governments propose to do, and that it be pointed out that the arming of the Western European Allies is on a non-restrictive basis.
(The foregoing proposal and recommendation are not of course
related to the equipment and maintenance of French ground forces
by General
Subject: Desire of British Government to Assist in Re-equipping the French Air Force
A communication has been received from the British Embassy
relative to the desire of the British Government to make an
immediate offer to the French authorities to assist in
re-equipping the French Air Force. A copy of the communication
in question is attached here-with.
As indicated in the British aide-mémoire,
the specific proposal now advanced was considered by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Admiral
The “certain French air units” referred to in Admiral aide-mémoire.
The British attach importance to proceeding with this matter as soon as possible and in view of the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is recommended that we notify the British that we approve.
The question of our supplying equipment for French land forces,
which was the main subject of Admiral
French Views on the Treatment of Germany
General Observations
A very considerable proportion of the French population—possibly a majority—still holds that some Germans are not beyond salvation and that a purged and chastened Germany must eventually regain an important position in Europe. The most consistent exponents of this viewpoint have been the Socialists. However, the Socialists have few illusions about the Germans and regard a European federation as primarily designed to keep Germany in check. During the past year the attitude of the Socialists has hardened on the German problem.
The Communists, while generally avoiding comment on the German problem, have shown some tendency to distinguish between “good” and “bad” Germans.
The elements commonly referred to as
General
Even those Frenchmen who outspokenly oppose dismemberment appear
willing to see extensive territorial transfers carried out. For
The French agree that Germany, whether dismembered or not, must be
subjected to a long military occupation, coupled with rigid economic
controls. The exact nature of these controls remains a subject of
discussion and has not been greatly clarified by the so-called
“
While both Right and Left in France demand direct security measures in Germany, the Socialists are the most inclined to persist in their old faith that collective security, organized on both a European and world scale, will in the long run be of equal importance in curbing German aggression. They are particularly attracted to the idea of a European federation.
With regard to the Rhineland and the Ruhr, virtually every Frenchman who has expressed an opinion favors special measures of some sort in that area. These views range from outright annexation of all or part of the area to measures of international economic control which single out this region from the rest of Germany. Recently, there has been increasing evidence of a desire to sever the Rhineland from main German state.
General
Those who favor international rather than French control of the Rhineland believe that such a policy would commit other nations to the maintenance of French security. They are therefore against annexation by France, either outright or disguised.
Conclusions
Although a consistent French program for defeated Germany is still in
process of gestation, the following tentative conclusions seem
justified:
My Dear Mr. President: During the last
year I have discussed several times with Ambassador Accessibility of Strategic and
Critical Materials to the United States in Time of War and
for Our Expanding Economy, Senate Report No. 1627, 83d
Ambassador
You will recall that at Quebec Mr.
I am convinced that if we were to come forward now and present to the Russians a concrete plan to aid them in the reconstruction period it would contribute a great deal towards ironing out many of the difficulties we have been having with respect to their problems and policies.
If a financial plan of this nature interests you at this time, I
would appreciate an early opportunity to discuss it with you and Mr.
I am sending Mr.
Sincerely,
29. At aide-mémoire dated January 3 the
substance of which was as follows:
“In
Gromyko ’s note of October 31st concerning the fourth protocol,See it was stated that the Soviet Government would put forward for our government’s consideration its proposals for a long term credit to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government accordingly wishes to state the following: Having in mind the repeated statements of American public figures concerning the desirability of receiving extensive largeante, p. 155, footnote 2.Soviet orders for the postwar and transition period, the Soviet Government considers it possible to place orders on the basis of long term credits to the amount of six billion dollars. Such orders would be for manufactured goods (oil pipes, rails, railroad cars, locomotives and other products) and industrial equipment. The credit would also cover orders for locomotives, railroad cars, rails and trucks and industrial equipment placed under Lend Lease but not delivered to the Soviet Union before the end of the war. The credits should run for 30 years, amortization to begin on the last day of the 9th year and to end on the last day of the 30th year. Amortization should take place in the following annual payments reckoned from end of 9th year: First 4 years 2½% of principal; second 4 years 3½%; third 4 years 4½; fourth 4 years 5½%; last 6 years 6%. Soviet Government will be entitled to pay up principal prematurely either in full or in part. If the two governments decide that because of unusual and unfavorable economic conditions payment of current installments at any time might not be to mutual interest, payment may be postponed for an agreed period. Annual interest to be fixed at 2¼%. The United States Government should grant to Soviet Union a discount of 20% off the government contracts with firms, of all orders placed before end of war and falling under this credit. Prices for orders placed after the end of the war should be left to agreement between the American firms in question and Soviet representatives.”
After reading the memorandum, I stated that there would be no use in
my making any general comments thereon and that I would report it at
once to my government. I called
I added that I was sure that my government would wish to divide into two parts the proposal advanced in the memorandum namely the Lend Lease period and postwar. With respect to the Lend Lease period, I was satisfied that our answer would be the final terms that had already been submitted to the Soviet Government.
I asked him over what period the Soviet Government would expect to obtain delivery of these six billion dollars worth of goods. He said over a period of several years, the limits of which would have to be determined by agreement between the two governments.
In conclusion I reminded
I will send the Department in a subsequent cable my comments on this proposal extraordinary both in form and substance.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Soviet Request for Long-Term Credits
aide-mémoire requesting from the United
States six billion dollars in post-war credits to run for thirty
years at an interest rate of two and one-half percent. In
transmitting the text of the aide-mémoire,
61. Now that I have recovered from my surprise at aide-mémoire, I believe the
Department will be interested in receiving my reactions. (
One. I feel we should entirely disregard the unconventional
character of the document and the unreasonableness of its terms
and chalk it up to ignorance of normal business procedures and
the strange ideas of the Russians on how to get the best trade.
From our experience it has become increasingly my impression
that
Two.
Three. It would seem probable that the timing of the delivery of this note had in mind the prospects of “a meeting”. I interpret it therefore to indicate that should there be a meeting the Russians would expect this subject to be discussed.
Four. It would seem that the time had arrived when our government’s policy should be crystallized and a decision reached on what we are prepared to do provided other aspects of our relations develop satisfactorily.
Five. It is my basic conviction that we should do everything we
can to assist the Soviet Union through credits in developing a
sound economy. I feel strongly that the sooner the Soviet Union
can develop a decent life for its people the more tolerant they
will become. One has to live in Russia a considerable period of
time to appreciate fully the unbelievably low standards which
prevail among the Russian people and the extent to which this
affects their outlook. The Soviet Government has proved in this
war that it can organize production effectively, and I am
satisfied that the great urge of
Six. I believe that the United States Government should retain control of any credits granted in order that the political advantages may be retained and that we may be satisfied the equipment purchased is for purposes that meet our general approval.
Seven. I notice in the noteaide-mémoire handed me. If this is correct, it would
seem that the Soviet Government is attempting to improve our
proposals for the three C credit under Lend-Leasec) of the Lend-Lease Act of March 11,
1941 (55
Eight. Quite apart from the question of the postwar credits, I
recommend that the Department inform the Soviet Government
promptly, either through
Memorandum for the President
A $10 Billion Reconstruction Credit for the
U. S. S. R.
I suggest consideration be given to a financial arrangement with the U. S. S. R. to provide her with $10 billion credits for the purchase of reconstruction goods in the U. S., with provision for repayment to us chiefly in strategic raw materials in short supply in the U. S.
1. The interest rate could be 2%, amortized over a period of 35
years. A schedule of repayments is attached.Accessibility of Strategic and Critical
Materials to the United States in Time of War and for Our
Expanding Economy, Senate Report No. 1627, 83d
2. The Russians have more than adequate means to assure full
repayment. There are three principal sources from which she can
obtain the necessary amount of dollars.
3. An important feature of this proposal is that we will be conserving our depleted natural resources by drawing on Russia’s huge reserves for current needs of industrial raw materials in short supply here. We would be able to obtain a provision in the financial agreement whereby we could call upon Russia for whatever raw materials we need without giving a commitment on our part to buy.
4. This credit to Russia would be a major step in your program to provide 60 million jobs in the post-war period.
Dear Ed: Ambassador Ante, pp.
310–312.Ante, pp.
313–315.
These questions are so important I would like to suggest that you and I speak with the President about them for a few minutes.
I am enclosing a rough draft of the points which we would like to see
made in the reply of this Government to
I know that you appreciate the importance of having the President informed of our united views on this subject.
Sincerely yours,
Draft Reply to Molotov’s Proposal for Long-Term Credit
Arrangements with the Soviet Union and Ambassador Gromyko’s Note on the
Fourth Protocol
1) Projects financed under the Lend-Lease Act are part of this Government’s war supply program. They must be segregated and processed entirely apart from projects which may be financed under long-term credits for postwar requirements.
2). With regard to the question of long-term credits for postwar projects, this Government is now making a study as to the ways and means of accomplishing this. However, it will require some time to effect the necessary legislative enactments and a determination of the amounts that may be available for this purpose. These are conditions precedent to the formalization of a definite agreement. This Government feels that such long-term credits will be an important element in the development of postwar relations between the two countries and is pleased to receive from the Soviet Union at this time as much information as possible as to the magnitude and scope of Soviet requirements and terms of repayment the Soviet Government is prepared to offer.
3) The proposed amendment to the Master Agreement offered the Soviet Government some months ago provides the only method now possible for this Government to render greater aid to the Soviet Union than is being currently rendered under Protocol arrangements.
4) Within the authority contained in the Lend-Lease Act and
taking into account the amount of lend-lease funds available at
that time, this Government offered in the proposed amendment the
maximum program of projects which could then be undertaken to
meet the requirements of the Soviet Government. The terms of
credit, the price of the goods and other conditions set forth in
the amendment were arrived at after giving due consideration to
the views of the Soviet representative, Mr.
5) This Government does not understand Ambassador
6) Much time has elapsed since the amendment to the Master Agreement was offered to the Soviet Government. Since then, the increased tempo in the war both in Europe and the Pacific has brought about greatly increased demands on the internal economy of this country in the categories of manpower, production facilities and raw materials. The diversion of these to the production of capital goods and semi-finished products to meet Allied requirements has become increasingly difficult.
7) To guide our future approach to these problems we should receive without further delay a definite indication from the Soviet Government as to its acceptance or rejection of the proposed amendment to the Master Agreement. The answer will have a definite bearing on the extent of Soviet requirements it will be possible to include in the war production program for the next fiscal year and on estimates of the required funds now being prepared for early submission to the Congress.
Mr. Secretary: I feel that it would be
helpful, in connection with any discussions you may have with the
President or Secretary Ante, p.
315.
Proposed 3 (c) supplementary agreement to the Master Lend-Lease
Agreement
1. In regard to the Treasury proposal that we should now offer the
Soviet Government the proposed 3 (c)
agreement without interest charges, it is felt that, if at this time
we should change our ground, it, in all probability, would cause
definite repercussions in other political or economic negotiations
we may have with the Soviet Government. In this connection, we told
the Soviet negotiators, in full good faith and with definite
Treasury concurrence, that the last 3 (c)
proposals we made to them were our final offer, and that because of
legal and other grounds, we could not grant them any better terms.
If we should now make the same proposals except for the exclusion of
interest charges we could not help but give the impression to the
Soviet authorities that what we said last summer was not true, and
thus we might unwittingly kindle the fire of suspicion which they
have had in the past as to our good faith. Moreover, by making this
new proposal, we would definitely give the impression that we were
most anxious, almost on any terms, to make available postwar goods
to the Soviet Union. While we are naturally desirous to increase our
trade with the Soviet Union to the maximum, and it is in our
interest to do so, it would be tactically harmful to deepen the
impression they already have that no matter what happens we are
going to have to sell goods to the Soviet Union in order to keep our
own economy going.
2. Apparently one of the reasons motivating the Treasury suggestion
that the 3(c) agreement should bear no
interest rate is tied with certain suggested proposals which may be
made to the British and French providing for delivery of certain
types of goods on a deferred-payment basis with no interest charges.
I understand that in the case of the British these proposals only
involve food stuffs which may be in the “pipeline” after the
termination of hostilities and therefore would not amount to a great
deal, and that the deferred payments, in all probability, would
cover a comparatively short period. Moreover, the British are paying
for all capital goods now delivered under Lend-Lease including many
items offered to the Soviet Government c) agreement (locomotives, freight cars, machine tools,
etc.). In regard to the French negotiations, it is understood that
Mr. c)
agreement. In view of this, the French and British proposals would
not appear to be precedents for the Soviet case.
For the above reasons, it is felt that we should accept Ambassador
c) agreement are final.
Postwar Credits.
In regard to Secretary
Memorandum
Proposals Made by the Secretary of Treasury
to Secretary of State Regarding Postwar Trade With the
Soviet Union
During the course of the conversation in Mr.
Mr. c) supplementary
agreement to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement by which it was
proposed to make available at this time to the Soviet Union
certain industrial plants which have both a wartime and
peacetime use. He stated that he felt it was too bad more than
nine months had passed since negotiations were started and still
no agreement had been reached. He attributed this to the fact
that we had endeavored to bargain and bicker with the Soviet
negotiators instead of making a clear-cut, very favorable
proposal which would be considered by the Soviet Government as a
concrete gesture of our good will. He added that he did not
agree with Ambassador Ante, pp.
313–315.c)
negotiations and indicate to the Soviet Government that this
continues to be the most favorable offer we could make.
Instead of this course of action, Mr. c) agreement which would offer to
the Soviet Union the same amount of goods on approximately the
same terms except that we should charge them no interest on the
credit extended, but on the other hand we should not accept any
reduction in cost as proposed by the Soviet Government.
Because of the position we had taken with the Soviet
representatives in the 3(c) negotiations,
which was to the effect that we could not accept a rate of
interest lower than that at which the United States Government
could borrow money, and because of the fact that the delays in
reaching an agreement with the Soviet Government on this
question had been due primarily to the Soviet Government’s
reluctance to accept the terms offered, Mr.
He stated that early last year when representatives of the State
Department, Treasury, Foreign Economic Administration, and other
interested agencies were endeavoring to work out a scheme by
which the Soviet Government could be immediately furnished under
Lend-Lease industrial plants which took a long time to produce,
had a long life, and which could be used for both wartime and
peacetime purposes, it had been suggested that we might be able
to offer these plants under Lend-Lease on a deferred-payment
basis at no interest. This suggestion had, at that time, been
vetoed by representatives of the Treasury Department who stated
that we could not offer such long-term credits sic] in mind, there had been worked out a proposed
agreement which was submitted to the Soviet Government on May
24, 1944. Mr. c) offer without interest. It was
indicated that this matter would be given consideration.
Apart from this proposal for the immediate extension of
approximately a billion dollars credit at no interest, Mr.
Ante, p.
315.
Mr.
173. Everyone here—State, Treasury, and Ante, pp.
310–312, 313–315.aide-mémoire with special reference to the
3-C agreement. The present message is to provide you with background
information regarding Washington views on post-war credit
possibilities.
A study prepared in the Department which will be sent to you for
comment highlights the following points in Russia’s interest in
foreign credits:
The Treasury has suggested a $10 billion credit at 2 percent, 35 years, coupled with an option for United States purchases at reasonable world prices of petroleum and minerals from the Soviets over a like period.
Preliminary views of the Department are that such a proposal can of
course be made only after Congressional action of some sort; that it
would be preferable to obtain blanket loan authority rather than
seek specific loan authorization for the U. S. S. R. or any
particular nation; that the rate of interest entails many
complications in our relations with other countries, with general
Export-Import Bank
The general matter of credits to Russia has been discussed with the
President who has displayed a keen interest and believes that it
should not be pressed further pending actual discussions between
himself and Marshal
Post-war credits to Russia. In the collection
of papers given to Ante, pp.
310–312, 313–315.Supra.
Russian Request for Financing of Acquisitions
of Capital Equipment During and After the War
Summary
1. The Russians have requested a $6 billion credit at 2¼% with
amortization concluding in the thirtieth year to cover both
immediate and true postwar acquisitions of industrial
equipment.ante, pp. 310–311.
2. The Department proposes to inform the Soviets through Ambassador
3. With respect to true postwar credits the Department is considering with the Treasury the lending agency or authority under which such credits might be extended; the effect of extensions of credits to Russia on special terms upon general operations of the Export-Import Bank, the proposed Bretton Woods bank, and possible revival of private lending; the possibility of setting the Russian credit apart by some distinctive feature in order to avoid the establishment of restrictive precedents; and the amount of the credit.
4. The Department believes the U. S. S. R. will contract only such credits as it can service. Current Russian gold production of about $200 million a year could service the $6 billion credit on the terms proposed by the Soviets; about $3 billion on usual Export-Import Bank credits.
5. Postwar credits to the U. S. S. R. can serve as a useful instrument in our overall relations with the U. S. S. R.
Discussions Concerning Post-War Trade
Policy
(Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreements)
Summary
In Article VII
The pledge on trade barriers was put in Article VII because it is essential to all the rest: to carry out our own and Britain’s full employment programs, to assure the success of the Monetary Fund and International Bank, to make possible eventual repayment of the large loans we will need to extend, directly and indirectly, to the rest of the world.
Unless we and the British get together urgently, while the political and trade situation is favorable, on adequate measures in the field of commercial policy (including cartels and commodity arrangements), there is grave danger that our whole foreign economic program may be undermined. While satisfactory exploratory talks on a commercial-policy plan were held with the British (on the technical level) in late 1943, the British have not appeared eager to resume discussions.
We are convinced that unless you bring your strong personal influence to bear on the Prime Minister and urge him to get these discussions started promptly, on the ministerial level and on a more definitive basis than those held earlier, the British cabinet will continue to postpone these matters indefinitely. This would be fatal to all our hopes.
To date, the Russians have not accepted any of our invitations to conduct exploratory Article VII conversations. We are prepared to hold such exploratory talks immediately and when we are ready to have formal discussions with the British we will be in a position to schedule formal discussions with the Russians and others.
Recommendations
It is strongly recommended (1) that you point out to Mr.
Discussions Concerning Post-War Trade
Policy
(Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreements)
The status of post-war trade discussions with the British and Russians is as follows:
With the British
Informal and exploratory Article VII conversations, covering trade barriers, commodity arrangements and cartels, were held with British experts over a year ago. Although these talks have not been resumed, our Economic Counselor at London is currently sounding out the direction of recent British thinking on the various topics.
When discussions are resumed, they should be on a more definitive and
formal basis than the exploratory talks in 1943. What is needed now
is a meeting between full delegations, headed by persons of
ministerial rank (Mr.
With regard to the position of the United States in these discussions, the President has already approved the policy recommended by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy with respect to intergovernmental commodity agreements. The President has also received from the Executive Committee a tentative statement of policy with regard to international cartel practices. The Committee now has under consideration detailed proposals dealing with trade barriers and it is expected that recommendations can be submitted to the President shortly.
Renewal of discussions of these matters with the British as soon as
possible is of the greatest importance. However, there is reason to
believe that the British cabinet will be reluctant to give the
necessary clearance, primarily because of the opposition of a few
members to the trade-barrier objectives of Article VII and because
of the failure to perceive that these objectives are an essential
and integral part of the broader plan, set out in Article VII, for
measures “directed to the expansion, by appropriate international
and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange
and consumption of goods.” It is believed that even though the
majority of the cabinet may be favorable to these discussions, they
are unlikely to make a strong stand unless they are convinced that
the United States objectives in the trade barrier field are not
limited to the State Department but are also shared by the President
and have
With the Russians
Although we have issued repeated invitations, we have made no headway in getting together with the Russians, even on an exploratory basis. We are ready to have exploratory talks with the Russians now, at the technical level. When we are ready to have formal discussions with the British we will also be in a position to schedule formal discussions with the Russians and others.
Recommendations
1. It is recommended that the President express to Mr.
2. It is recommended that the President endeavor to obtain the
agreement of Mr.
[Excerpts]
Prime Minister to President
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Para 9. U. J. also raised formally
Memorandum Regarding the Question of the
Turkish Straits
This Government hopes that no question
regarding the Turkish Straits will be raised because:
clxxiii, pp.
213–241.
This Government might not object if minor changes in the Convention are suggested by the U. S. S. R. (the Great Power primarily at interest), or Great Britain. Such proposals should, of course, be carefully considered by the Navy and War Departments.
No valid claim can be made for altering the Convention so far as merchant vessels are concerned, because, under its provisions, defensively armed merchant vessels of any flag, with any cargo, are free to transit the Straits subject to certain Turkish security provisions.
Under its terms the Montreux Convention can be reconsidered in 1946—it would be preferable to leave all changes until then and to have them made within the framework of the Convention itself.
“Internationalization” of the Straits is not a practical solution at this time because, if that is done, the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal logically should receive the same treatment. Turkey would strongly resist such a proposal.
If asked whether the United States would be willing to participate in a revised Montreux Convention in 1946 or some other future regime of the Straits, the reply might be that we, having in mind Dumbarton Oaks, would be prepared to give sympathetic consideration to the idea.
Note: Navy and War Departments concur with the above.
749. Prime Minister confirmed to me last night that oil concession
negotiations had been postponed until after war (
622. You are requested to inform the Iranian Government (
2566. You are requested to inform the Soviet authorities that the
Government of the United States has observed indications of Soviet
annoyance, as demonstrated by articles in the Soviet press and
statements by Mr.
In this connection the American Government desires to let the Soviet
authorities know that the American Embassy in Tehran was
instructedsupra.
Our policy in this case is based on the American Government’s
recognition of the sovereign right of an independent nation such as
Iran, acting in a nondiscriminatory manner, to grant or withhold
commercial concessions within its territory. We are particularly
concerned with the strict application of this policy in Iran, in
view of the Declaration signed in Tehran as recently as December 1,
1943, by President Post, pp.
748–749.
Sent to Moscow. Repeated to Tehran and London.
9503. In discussing the impasse between the Iranian and Soviet Government on oil concessions, a Foreign Office official today said that the British Government is gravely concerned over the Russian attitude. If the Iranian Government should give in and allow the Russians to have the concession they desire it would simply be a major step in the inclusion of northern Iran permanently in the Russian orbit as a sphere of influence.
The Soviet request for the concession was unlimited in scope, said the official, adding that when the British or Americans negotiate for such concessions they have always stated what royalties they will pay and other details of that nature. The Russians however have never said that they will pay anything to the Iranian Government.
The Foreign Office official continued to describe in the following terms other Russian activities in Iran:
The Soviets have bought up a lot of the less important or cheap
newspapers, which of course contain Russian propaganda; and these
papers have now taken the attitude of attacking the Persian Prime
Times (ReEmbtel 9505, November 2
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Soviet-Iranian Relations
As agreed in our recent conversation, I present below for your convenience, a summary of the status of Soviet-Iranian relations and a recommendation as to this Government’s attitude.
The British Government has taken up again with the Soviet Government
the question of Soviet pressure on Iran which has resulted in the
resignation of the Iranian Prime Minister and which, while it
appeared to have relaxed for a brief time, is now apparently being
renewed. The British are basing their plea for the respect of
Iranian sovereignty on the Declaration of Iran of December 1,
1943Post, pp.
748–749.Bulletin, March 21, 1942, vol.vi, pp. 249–252.
We are of course following the developments in Iran with the closest attention, and should be prepared to make representations to the Soviet Government if the situation appears to warrant such a step. I am not yet convinced that we should immediately take up the question with the Russians as the British request but would like to have your approval in advance in order that we may be able to take quick action if that appears necessary.
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
I think this Soviet-Iranian matter should be taken up by
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Soviet-Iranian Relations
Your memorandum of December 8, 1944 suggested that
An approach by us to the Russians at this moment might aggravate the
situation, causing the Russians to flare up with a harder policy
against Iran than ever. I believe it would be a mistake for
I should like to talk with you about the free port-railway
trusteeship plan at one of our early meetings.post, pp.
344–345), the President
was dissuaded from reviving his pian and the subject was not
discussed with the British or the Russians at Malta or
Yalta.
My Dear Mr. Secretary: In connection with
the note of November 1, of the Chargé d’Affaires of the U. S. A. in
Moscow, Mr. ante, pp.
330–331.
In September the Soviet Government dispatched to Iran an official
commission headed by the Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign
Affairs,
In the beginning of the negotiations the head of the Government of
Iran, Mr.
Thus the Government of Mr.
As can be seen from the events which followed in Iran, the hostile
attitude taken toward the U. S. S. R. by the former Prime Minister,
Mr.
Such are the circumstances of the case concerning the Soviet proposals pertaining to the oil concession in Iran. The Soviet Government considers it its duty to mention these circumstances, so that the Government of the United States of America may have correct information on this question.
At the same time the Soviet Government cannot overlook the unsympathetic attitude taken by America with regard to Soviet-Iran negotiations regarding the oil concession. As appears from the information set forth above, any statements about interference on the part of the Soviet in the internal affairs of Iran have no foundation whatever.
The Soviet Government cannot agree with arguments that the granting of an oil concession to the Soviet Union can in any degree affect the sovereignty of Iran. If these arguments were recognized as sound, they would in the first place affect Great Britain which, as is known, has for a long time had an important oil concession in Iran.
In the opinion of the Soviet Government, there are not sufficient reasons to assert either that the question of the granting of an oil concession to the Soviet Union cannot be settled at the present time, and that this question must be postponed until the post-war period.
The former Government of Post, pp.
748–749.
The above might be supplemented by the following.
Early in December, concealed from public opinion and in violation of
the Iranian Constitution, the former Prime Minister Mr.
In connection with this, the Deputy People’s Commissar,
Apart from that, this resolution contradicts the fact of the
existence on the territory of Iran of an important oil concession
belonging to a foreign country. After having made this statement,
Informing the Government of the United States of America of the
above, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to remark that
on the question concerning the oil concession in Iran it continues
to maintain the attitude expressed in this note, in particular in
the statement of the Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
Sincerely yours,
296. In a general discussion of Iranian matters today at the Foreign Office, the official dealing directly with Iranian affairs said that serious consideration was being given by the British to the thought that at the next “Big Three” meeting the general question of Iran be raised, particularly with reference to Soviet pressure in connection with the recent incidents over oil concessions.
President
1. One of the questions which I think should be discussed at our
meeting with
2. In the declaration about Persia which we and post, pp.
748–749.
3. You will have seen reports of the recent attitude of the Russians in Persia. We here feel that the various forms of pressure which they have been exerting constitute a departure from the statement quoted above. They have refused to accept the Persian decision to grant no concessions until after the war: and they have brought about the fall of a Persian Prime Minister who, believing that there could be no free or fair negotiations so long as Russian (or other foreign) troops were in Persia, refused the immediate grant of their oil demands. The new Persian Prime Minister, supported by the Parliament, has maintained his predecessor’s attitude on this question. But the Russians have indicated that they do not intend to drop their demands.
4. This may be something of a test case. Persia is a country where we, yourselves and the Russians are all involved: and we have given a joint undertaking to treat the Persians decently. If the Russians are now able not only to save their face by securing the fall of the Persian Prime Minister who opposed them, but also to secure what they want by their use of the big stick, Persia is not the only place where the bad effect will be felt.
5. Please let me know whether you agree that this should be taken up
with the Russians: and if so, whether you feel that it should be
handled by ourselves with
6. We do not wish the Russian Government to represent that they were
not warned in time of the strength of our feelings on this matter.
If, therefore, you agree generally with my suggestion, I propose
that we should separately or jointly let
7. Before replying to this telegram, I think that you should see
Soviet note of December 29 to Foreign Office, which we have
communicated to State Department.ante, pp.
334–336.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: The Iranian Question
There is enclosed in accordance with your directions a suggested
reply to the Prime Minister’s telegram no. 890, January 15, 1945,
regarding the Iranian oil concession controversy. You will note that
we in the Department feel that the subject should be discussed at
the forthcoming meeting, as the Prime Minister suggests, and that
the talks should be among you,
1. I concur fully that the Iranian question should be discussed
at our next meeting and feel that it should be with
2. We have not seen sufficient evidence in Iran during recent days to demonstrate conclusively that Russia intends to insist upon an oil concession now or even upon the repeal of the Iranian law which forbids concession negotiations during the war, but Russia’s continued and avowed dissatisfaction with the law arouses apprehension which should be quieted.
3. The Soviets also replied to our noteante, pp.
330–331. The Soviet
reply, of December 28, 1944, is printed ante, pp. 334–336.
I concur that a test case may well arise in this matter which may
Memorandum of Conversation
Copies to:
The Iranian Minister called upon me at his request today. He said that he had been instructed by his Government to call upon me and to call to my attention the great concern that the Persian people had relative to the attitude and actions of Russia toward their country. They were very apprehensive and hoped that the United States would take a firm hand in insisting on a strong independent Iran at the forthcoming Conference.
I assured the Minister that we had constantly in mind the welfare of
the Persian people and that I was confident that the President in
his forthcoming conversations with
The Minister then stated that he had been instructed by his Government to offer the facilities of his Government for the forthcoming meeting of the Big Three. I told the Minister that we greatly appreciated this gesture of friendship and I would immediately pass on this kind offer to the President.
The Minister seemed very pleasant and cooperative.
Mr. Secretary: The Iranian Minister
wants to emphasize to you his Government’s fear that Russia will
use forceful methods to obtain concessions and political control
in the northern part of his country. Iran hopes the United
States and Great Britain will support Iran’s independence at the
forthcoming high level conversations.
We have already assured the Minister that you and the President are well aware of the situation.
Memoranda Concerning Iran
[Summary]
I American Policy in Iran
The U. S. supports Iranian independence and seeks to strengthen the country internally, so that excuses for outside interference will be minimized. Iran is considered a testing ground for U. S., U. K., and U. S. S. R. cooperation and for the principles of Dumbarton Oaks.
American, British and Soviet Ambassadors in Iran should be authorized and instructed to cooperate and consult closely on all questions of mutai interest. Allied wartime controls in Iran should be removed as rapidly as possible.
II Problem of Oil Concessions in
Iran
We should dispel any idea in Soviet minds that U. S. officials or
individuals prompted Iran to refuse the Soviet request for an oil
concession. Effort should be made, however, to persuade the Soviet
authorities that pressure on Iran to grant a concession would be
contrary to assurance of respect for Iranian sovereignty contained
in the Declaration on Iran.Post, pp.
748–749.
III Desirability of Limiting or
Removing Allied Military Censorship in Iran
The progress of the war no longer requires the strict censorship now in force.
IV Suggested International
Trusteeship to Operate Iranian Railways and Free Port on Persian
Gulf
While the aims of the proposal are excellent, the Department sees no possibility of its being made acceptable.
[Memoranda Concerning
Iran]
I American Policy in Iran;
Continued and Growing American Interest in Iran as a Testing Ground
for the Atlantic Charter and for Allied Good Faith
The basis of our policy toward Iran is a desire to contribute to the
maintenance of the independence of Iran and to increase its internal
strength. This policy is based on four principal desires:
This policy was crystallized and given emphasis by the Declaration on
Iran signed at Tehran on December 1, 1943, by the President, Prime
Minister
Our policy toward Iran has been implemented in various ways: by the
development of a comprehensive American adviser program, by American
participation in the Middle East Supply Center program of meeting
Iran’s essential needs, by supplying the Iranian Army and Gendarmerie with the military supplies
necessary to maintain internal security, and by other similar means.
The cornerstone of this program has been the American adviser
program, under which we have assisted Iran in finding, always on
specific Iranian request, a large number of American citizens to
advise them in the fields of finance, economy, public health, army,
gendarmerie, and irrigation. The largest
of these advisory missions is that headed by Dr.
The Allies have a unique opportunity in Iran, common meeting place of
the three great powers, to set a pattern of cooperation and develop
a mode of conduct in dealing with small nations which will serve as
a model in the postwar world. Since the sincere cooperation of the
British and Russians must be obtained if this objective is to be
realized, we should endeavor constantly to bring about allied
consultation and common action in all matters of mutual interest
regarding Iran. In the development of our own policy toward Iran, we
should bear in mind the special historic interests of the British
and Russians in that country. We should avoid the impression that we
stand at Iran’s side as a buffer to restrain other countries or that
we have undertaken a unilateral obligation to defend Iran by armed
force. Toward this end, we should make a special effort to bring the
Russians and British into common allied deliberations regarding Iran
and should seek their active collaboration in carrying out an agreed
policy. Moscow should be requested to instruct the Soviet Ambassador
at Tehran to consult fully with his American and British colleagues
on all questions of mutual interest. The three Ambassadors might
Effort should be made to remove two specific causes for allied friction in Iran. They are: the oil concession controversy; and the continuance of allied censorship. Each subject is discussed in a separate paper.
II The Problem of Oil Concessions
in Iran and the Disturbing Effect recent Negotiations have
had on Soviet-Iranian Relations
Soviet displeasure at the action of the Iranian Government in suspending, until after the war, all negotiations for oil concessions is an ominous development which should be carefully followed.
A brief summary of the immediate background of this matter follows.
American and British oil companies began negotiations with the
Iranian Government in early 1944 for a petroleum concession in southern Iran. The American and British
Embassies in Iran were aware of these negotiations but regarded them
as private commercial ventures and in no way participated in the
negotiations. The negotiations seemed about to terminate
successfully in September when a large Soviet delegation, headed by
Vice Commissar northern
provinces of Iran. The Iranian Government, alarmed by the sweeping
Soviet demands, disturbed by Soviet refusal to discuss terms or
conditions, and fearful that Iranian sovereignty would be
jeopardized if a foreign government should obtain such wide and
lasting control in the country, announced that all petroleum
negotiations were suspended until the end of the war.
The United States Government promptly informed the Iranian Government
that, while American companies were disappointed, we recognized the
sovereign right of Iran to grant or withhold concessions within its
territory. We asked that, when negotiations are resumed, American
companies be informed and be placed in no less favorable position
than granted to any foreign company or government. The British
followed a similar policy although they made no formal statement to
the Iranian Government, as far as we are aware. The Russians showed
great annoyance, taking the Iranian action as an affront. The Soviet
press began a strong and concerted attack on Iranian Prime Minister
The American Embassy in Moscow informed the Soviet Government on
November 1, 1944ante, pp.
330–331.Ante, pp.
334–336.
The British Government, for its part, subsequently called the attention of the Soviet Government to the harmful effects of Soviet action in Iran and has asked the Russians to state frankly their designs and intentions in this matter. The British have asked us to make similar representations in Moscow but we have taken no action other than our original note of November 1.
The situation is potentially dangerous, not only as regards Iranian sovereignty but in the more important bearing it may have on allied relations. The British, however willing they may be to make concessions to the Russians in Eastern Europe, will probably refuse to consider concessions in the Middle East, which is so vitally important to Empire communications. The consequences of this dispute, if it is allowed to continue, may be serious.
The American Government should continue to maintain the reasonable and tenable position we have taken; that we recognize the sovereign right of Iran to grant or withhold concessions within its territory. We should stress to the Russians, at the highest possible level and in the most friendly and constructive manner, the harmful effects of their action in Iran. While British opposition to the Soviet action may be based primarily on strategic grounds, our chief concern is that the assurances of the great powers of respect for Iranian sovereignty be not violated. The confidence of the world in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals could be seriously affected by action to force Iran to grant an oil concession.
III Desirability of Limiting or
Removing Allied Military Censorship in Iran
When Russian and British troops entered Iran in August 1941 the
British and Russian military authorities agreed upon a joint
censorship arrangement under which each could exercise a veto over
the release in Iran or dispatch from that country of any information
considered harmful to the war effort. When American troops entered
Iran in 1942, the American military authorities were invited to
participate,
In actual practice, the arrangement has given the Russian a veto over
the dissemination of news in Iran from American and British sources
and over the dispatch from Iran of any news contrary to Soviet
interests, while the British and American authorities have had no
such veto, due to the fact that Tass
despatches between Moscow and Tehran in both directions are sent
over the Soviet Embassy wire and are consequently uncensored.
As a result of this situation, the Soviet authorities were able to prevent the facts regarding the recent oil concession controversy between Russia and Iran from being disseminated abroad, and even prevented the Iranian Government from telegraphing to its diplomatic representatives in Moscow, London and Washington.
The censorship has been irksome, not only to the Iranian Government but also to foreign newspapermen and civilians in Iran, who have frequently been denied American and British publications addressed to them by mail. Both the British and American authorities have complained about the operation of the censorship, but the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran claims that it is a matter of military censorship which he cannot control.
Iran is not a zone of military operations, and the excuse for
military censorship there has practically disappeared. There is no
excuse whatsoever for this censorship to be extended to political
information. Its operation during the past two years has been a
serious infringement of Iranian sovereignty and is no longer
justifiable. Ambassador
Soviet control of news in Iran is an important phase of the larger question of the freedom of information in which this Government is so greatly interested. A solution would be to eliminate the veto feature and to require American, British, Soviet and Iranian concurrence before items are censored and to restrict censorship to strictly military questions. The remoteness of Iran from the war and the rapidly diminishing importance of Iran as a corridor for military supplies justify this move. An alternative would be to remove allied censorship, placing censorship responsibilities in the hands of Iran, one of the United Nations.
IV Suggested International
Trusteeship to Operate Iranian Railways and Free Port on Persian
Gulf
The Department has given careful study to a suggestion that the
Iranian railways and an Iranian port on the Persian Gulf might be
Ante. p.
333.a) to provide to Russia an
assured economic outlet to the Persian Gulf; (b) to assist Iran economically by developing transit of
goods through the country; (c) to avoid more
forceful methods by Russia to gain an outlet to the Gulf; and (d) to develop international cooperation
rather than rivalry in Iran.
The aims of the proposal are excellent. A properly conducted trusteeship of this kind would bring advantages to Iran and to the world. The Department regrets that there are not, in its view, any feasible means for accomplishing the results desired.
No matter how drawn up or proposed, the plan would appear to Iran, and doubtless to the world, as a thinly disguised cover for power politics and old-world imperialism. Iranians are highly suspicious of foreign influence in the country and would unquestionably resent any extension of foreign control there. The railway, built by their own strenuous efforts at a cost of some $150,000,000, without foreign borrowing, is a source of especial and intense patriotic pride. The Department’s judgment is that the trusteeship could only be imposed on Iran, a sovereign, allied nation, by force of arms.
There is little reason to believe that Soviet Russia would be interested, at least for the present, in participating in an international trusteeship in Iran in the genuine manner contemplated, particularly if it included an element of non-Russian control in northern Iran.
The British, we feel, would almost certainly raise equally strenuous objections. British policy for more than a hundred years has been pointed toward preventing any other great power, and especially Russia, from gaining a foothold on the Persian Gulf. There is no indication that this policy has been altered. If we proceed on the assumption that the continuance of the British Empire in some reasonable strength is in the strategic interest of the United States, it might be considered wise, in protection of vital British communications in this important area, to discourage such a trusteeship. The British also will probably continue to endeavor to keep the Russians away from the vital South Iranian oil fields.
The laudable ends contemplated by the proposal might be accomplished in some measure through the employment by Iran of foreign technicians to assist them in operating the railway and port. The Iranians would prefer to employ Americans or the nationals of small European countries (Sweden or Switzerland) for this purpose, if they should agree to the idea.
Bracketed insertions in message indicate text as sent, according to microfilmed copy of message in Embassy files (893.00/1–1049).
Hurley sent the substance of this message to the Department
of State in a series of three telegrams, and under date of
February 2, 1945,
Copy in
“Hold for President—per Adm[iral]
“Extracts sent to Gen[eral]
(
United States Relations with
China, Department of State Publication 3573
(Washington, 1949), pp. 74–75.Ibid., p. 75.should] be
present at the conference. In this letter he stated that before
further negotiations could take place between the Communist Party
and the Nationalist Government, the government should first
voluntarily carry out four additional points. At that time I was
unable to account for the drastic change in position of the
Communists. I subsequently discovered that the cause was within our
own ranks which is explained later in this report.
I consulted the G[eneral]issimo on the situation and on January 7 I
wrote regretting] that in addition to their
previous five-point proposal they should ask the government first to
voluntarily carry out four new points. I stated that since General
For your information, the Government was prepared to offer at the
proposed Yenan Conference the following:
a coalition]
war cabinet.[)]
Since the Generalissimo had already on New Year’s Day announced the calling of a National Assembly for the adoption of a constitution this year, this fresh condition coming on top of the original five points and the subsequent four points, the G[eneral]issimo could not entertain.
Since my arrival in China, in accordance with your policy, I have exerted my utmost to help bring about Chinese national unification. The G[eneral]issimo was at first cold to the plan but after your suggestions the G(eneral]issimo has shown himself ready to grant concessions to the Communists far beyond what he had been willing to grant in the past. He is now favorable to unification, reformation and agreement with the Communists.
I had a meeting with the G[eneral]issimo this morning to discuss the Communist reply. He agreed that with or without Communist participation he will immediately take steps to liberalize the Government in spite of the war situation. He is considering with members of the Government the announcement next Monday of the formation of a war cabinet with inclusion of representative members of other parties besides the Kuomintang. He intends to invite the Communists to participate in it, disregarding the latest rebuff from them. By means of the war cabinet he intends to start liberalizing and cleansing the government even before the convocation of the National Assembly and the adoption of a constitution, a measure which I consider a substantial step forward in the organization of a stable, unified and democratic government in China. This program has one weakness. It gives the Communists what they have demanded but it does not require submission of Communist troops to the National Government which 1 had provided in the five point agreement. Therefore during the reformation of the government and after reformation there would still be the threat of civil war by the armed Communist Party.
I have heretofore recited to you the elements which constitute the
opposition to the unification of China. Briefly again they are:
We had overcome all of these elements of opposition when the
Communists walked out on us. It has taken from the first of January
until now to find the fundamental cause of the break. Here it is.
During the absence of General plan], I did
not know it had been presented to the Communists until that was made
apparent by the Communists applying to United States Relations with China, p. 78).
I, therefore, suggest the following program. In your heralded
forthcoming meeting, secure the approval of
When you have secured that agreement we will be able to place in your
hands complete plans for the unification of the military forces of
China; for the recognition of the Chinese Communist Party as a legal
political party; for representation of all parties in the
administration of the Chinese Government; for the liberalization of
the Chinese Government; for the promotion of democratic processes
and the establishment of fundamental individual rights and the
reconstruction of a free, united, democratic China. We should then
offer a meeting with you to both
The overall of the military situation indicates that the Japanese
offensive capabilities remain as they were a month ago.
I am sending this report to you but I have no objection to giving it
to the State Department if you approve. I have complete confidence
in
Political and Military Situation in China in
the Event the U. S. S. R. Enters the War in the Far East
Background:
Territory now controlled by the Chinese Communists covers large portions of North China and disconnected areas to the east and south. Reports also indicate that Communist underground strength in Manchuria is considerable. The Communists claim to have 500,000 regular troops and 2,000,000 militia. The soldiers are poorly equipped but are well-trained in guerrilla warfare and are in good physical condition.
Inner Mongolia lies between Outer Mongolia and the northern areas under Chinese Communist control. The Chinese armies in Inner Mongolia are of poor quality. They are passively hostile to the Communist armies.
It is reasonable to anticipate, or one must at least be prepared for the eventuality, that one line of attack by Russian armies would be from Outer Mongolia, where military strength could be amassed in advance of hostilities, through Inner Mongolia toward Shanhaikuan, the principal gateway between North China and Manchuria. After traversing Inner Mongolia, the Russians would have on their right flank Chinese Communist armies.
(When he returned from Chungking last spring, the Chinese Ambassador
made the disturbing comment to Mr.
Solution:
It is of course highly desirable that embarrassment and difficulties,
political or military, be avoided in the event of Russian military
operations in north China. The obvious and reasonable solution would
be a working agreement between the Chinese Government and the
An alternative solution would be an over-all American command of Chinese troops. If Russia enters the war in the Far East, it would be highly advantageous to have in China such a command rather than a disunited Chinese command. Furthermore, it would make practicable supply of ammunition and demolition material to the Communists and would obviate political difficulties in the event of coastal landings adjacent to areas under Communist control. And finally, an American command could serve as a stabilizing influence in the period immediately following the conclusion of hostilities in China.
Recommended Action:
Continuation of efforts to bring about a settlement between Chinese Government and Communist leaders which would bring about united military command and action.
At the same time negotiations looking toward the establishment of an over-all American command in China directly under the Generalissimo. Institution of such a command may not be immediately feasible but the groundwork should be laid to enable smooth establishment of such a command if and when developments make such a step advisable.
In the event neither of these courses of action bring about the desired results, it is recommended that this Government, and the British Government, lend no support to a policy by the Chinese Government which might impede Russian military action against Japan. On the positive side, the two Governments should make every effort to bring about cooperation between all Chinese forces and the Russian military command in order to prevent military developments from further widening the gap between the Communists and the Chinese Government and increasing the possibility of a disunited China after hostilities.
Unity of Anglo-American-Soviet Policy Toward
China
Summary
There exist areas of potential discord between our policies and those
of the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. toward China. There appear
to be elements among the British who, out of imperial
considerations, desire a weak and possibly disunited China in the
postwar period. Some apprehension has been voiced lest the Russians
We recommend that we assume the leadership in assisting China to develop a strong, stable and unified government in order that she may become the principal stabilizing factor in the Far East. We also recommend that we seek British and Russian cooperation to achieve this objective.
Unity of Anglo-American-Soviet Policy Toward
China
There exist areas of potential discord between our policies and those of the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. toward China. At present, the British recognize that China is a theater of primary concern to us in the prosecution of the war, and the Russians desire to see established in China a government friendly to them. But the progress of events during the war and in the immediate post-war period may develop discords detrimental to the achievement of victory and peace—detrimental to our objective of a united, progressive China capable of contributing to security and prosperity in the Far East.
An unstable, divided, and reactionary China would make stability and progress in the Far East impossible, and would greatly increase the difficult task, which will be largely ours, of maintaining peace in the western Pacific. A strong, friendly China would do much to lighten our task and to promote mutually beneficial cultural and commercial intercourse.
It is not enough that we merely hope for a strong, friendly China or that we simply pursue the negative policies of the pre-war period. We should assume the leadership in the development of the kind of China that will contribute toward peace in the Pacific in cooperation with the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. We may reasonably expect that a strong, united China will cooperate with the United States, the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. in dealing with post-war Japan.
There is now Kuomintang China, Communist China, and puppet China. Kuomintang China is being weakened by dissident elements and widespread popular discontent. Communist China is growing in material and popular strength. Puppet China is filled with pockets of Communist guerrilla resistance. A partial settlement between the Kuomintang and the Communists would not eliminate the fundamental struggle for power, one aspect of which will be competition to win over the puppet troops as Japan is driven from China. The only hope of preventing civil war and disunity will lie in the creation of a democratic framework within which the opposing groups can reconcile their differences on a political level.
There are reports that elements among the British out of imperial considerations desire a weak and possibly disunited China in the post-war period. The British are undoubtedly less optimistic—more cynical—than we are regarding the future of China but neither the British Government nor the British people will derive benefit from an unstable China in the post-war period.
Some apprehension has been voiced lest the Russians may utilize the Chinese Communists to establish an independent or autonomous area in north China and Manchuria. There is nothing in Russia’s present attitude as officially disclosed to us to substantiate those fears. But if Russia comes into the war in the Far East, or if an open break between the Kuomintang and the Communists occurs, Russia may be strongly tempted to abandon its policy declared in 1924 of non-interference in China’s internal affairs.
It is our task to bring about British and Russian support of our objective of a united China which will cooperate with them as well as with us. The British attitude is characterized by skepticism and is influenced by a residue of nineteenth century thinking. We hope that the British, given a clear knowledge of our objective and assurance that we mean to work consistently and energetically for that objective, will support our efforts. The Russians primarily want a China friendly to them. We should give Russia definite assurance that we too desire and are working for a united China friendly to all its neighbors.
Our policy toward China is not based on sentiment. It is based on an enlightened national self-interest motivated by considerations of international security and well-being. Unless the United Kingdom and the U. S. S. R. are in substantial agreement with us it is doubtful whether we can accomplish the objective of our policies.
Outline of Short-Range Objectives and Policies
of the United States With Respect to China
The principal and immediate objectives of the United States Government are to keep China in the war against Japan and to mobilize China’s full military and economic strength in the vigorous prosecution of the war. To accomplish these objectives the United States Government has undertaken the following measures:
(a) Direct
Military Assistance to China and the Chinese Armed Forces
We are keeping China in the war by supplying war materials to the
Chinese armed forces, by maintaining an effective air force in China
and an American expeditionary force based in India but
(b) Promotion of Effective Sino-American Military Cooperation
Sino-American military cooperation has been strengthened since the
appointment of General
(c) Encouragement to the Chinese to Contribute their Maximum Effort
in the War
Internal disunity, economic instability (including severe inflation),
lack of supplies and general war weariness are greatly impeding
China’s war effort. It is this Government’s policy to support and
encourage all measures designed to resolve these difficulties.
Through the exercise of friendly good offices our Ambassador is
endeavoring to promote greater internal unity, including the
reconciliation of the fundamental differences between the Chungking
Government and the Communist group. The establishment of a Chinese
This Government believes that China can and should make every effort to collaborate with us to the full extent of her capabilities in the vigorous prosecution of the war. We consider that the Generalissimo should continue earnestly to seek to bring about internal unity, that he should take immediate measures adequately to feed and clothe his troops and that he should strengthen national morale and increase popular participation in the war by the introduction of fundamental governmental reforms.
Outline of Long-Range Objectives and Policies
of the United States With Respect to China Summary
The American Government’s long-range policy with respect to China is
based on the belief that the need for China to be a principal
stabilizing factor in the Far East is a fundamental requirement for
peace and security in that area. Our policy is accordingly directed
toward the following objectives:
Political: A strong, stable and
united China with a government representative of the wishes
of the Chinese people.Economic: The development of an
integrated and well-balanced Chinese economy and a fuller
flow of trade between China and other countries.Cultural: Cultural and scientific
cooperation with China as a basis for common understanding
and progress.
Outline of Long-Range Objectives and Policies
of the United States With Respect to China
The American Government’s long-range policy with respect to China is based on the belief that the need for China to be a principal stabilizing factor in the Far East is a fundamental requirement for peace and security in that area. Our policy is accordingly directed toward the following objectives:
1. Political: A strong stable and united China
with a government representative of the wishes of the Chinese
people:
a. We seek by every proper means to promote
establishment of a broadly representative government which will
bring about internal unity, including reconcilement of
Kuomintang-Communist differences, and which will effectively
discharge its internal and international responsibilities. While
favoring no political faction, we continue to support the existing
Government of China as the central authority recognized by the
Chinese people and we look for the establishment within its
framework of the unified and effective type of government that is
needed.
b. Should these expectations fail of
achievement and the authority of the existing government
disintegrate, we would reexamine our position in the light of the
manifested wishes of the Chinese people and regard sympathetically
any government or movement which gave promise of achieving unity and
of contributing to peace and security in eastern Asia.
c. We regard Sino-Soviet cooperation as a sine qua non of peace and security in the Far
East and seek to aid in removing the existing mistrust
d. We consider cooperation between China and
Great Britain to be an essential part of United Nations’ solidarity
and necessary for the development of China as a stabilizing factor
in the Far East, We would welcome the restoration by Great Britain
of Hong Kong to China and we are prepared in that event to urge upon
China the desirability of preserving its status as a free port.
Should other territorial problems arise between the two powers, we
would hope to see them settled by friendly negotiation.
e. We favor the establishment by China of
close and friendly relations with Korea, Burma, Thailand, Indochina
and other neighboring areas. We do not favor Chinese domination or
political control over such areas.
f. We believe that China’s territorial
integrity should be respected, including her claim to sovereign
rights over such outlying territories as Tibet and Outer Mongolia.
We would not oppose, however, any agreements respecting those
territories reached by process of amicable negotiation between China
and other interested governments. We hope that the Chinese
Government will meet the aspirations of the native peoples of such
territories for local autonomy.
g. In line with the policy enunciated at
Moscow and the pattern outlined at Dumbarton Oaks, we offer and seek
full collaboration with China as an equal among the major sovereign
powers entitled and needed to share primary responsibility in the
organization and maintenance of world peace and security.
2. Economic: The development of an integrated
and well-balanced Chinese economy and a fuller flow of trade between
China and other countries. Toward these objectives we intend to:
a. Continue to give to China all practicable
economic and financial assistance which she may request within the
framework of our traditional principles of equality of opportunity
and respect for national sovereignty and the liberal trade policies
to which this Government is endeavoring to secure general
adherence.
b. Negotiate with China a comprehensive
treaty relating to commerce and navigation on the basis of
unconditional most-favored-nation treatment and looking toward the
elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment.
c. Give practicable assistance to China in
connection with her efforts to plan an integrated and well-balanced
economy, with particular reference to agriculture, transportation,
communication and industry. Such assistance would be extended at
China’s request.
d. Make available such technical assistance
as may be desired by China, including the training of Chinese
technicians in the United States.
e. Provide such financial assistance as may
be appropriate in the light of conditions obtaining in China,
largely through private financing and investment.
f. Promote American trade with China by all
practicable means to the mutual benefit and advantage of China and
the United States.
In extending such forms of support, we propose to take careful cognizance of the commercial policies of the Chinese Government and of actual conditions affecting American trade with and in China.
3. Cultural: Cultural and scientific
cooperation with China as a basis for common understanding and
progress:
a. We consider most essential closer
association between China and other United Nations in cultural and
scientific fields. Toward that end we are undertaking in various
ways to promote between the Chinese and American peoples a better
appreciation of each other’s thought and culture and to make
available to China scientific knowledge and assistance which she
needs for her development and contribution to international
progress.
Inter-Allied Consultation Regarding Korea
Summary
It is desirable that an understanding be reached with the British and Chinese Governments and depending upon developments, with the Soviet Government, on the question of what countries should participate (1) in the military occupation of Korea and (2) in an interim international administration or trusteeship for Korea if it is decided that such an administration should be established.
In reference to the first part of the question it is the view of the Department that the problems of Korea are of such an international character that with the completion of military operations in Korea, (1) there should be, so far as practicable, Allied representation in the army of occupation and military government in Korea; (2) such representation should be by those countries which have a real interest in the future status of Korea, such as the United States, Great Britain, and China and the Soviet Union if it has entered the war in the Pacific; and (3) the representation of other states should not be so large as to reduce the proportionate strength of the United States to a point where its effectiveness would be weakened.
As regards the second part of the question, it is the Department’s tentative opinion that (1) an interim international administration or trusteeship should be established for Korea either under the authority of the proposed international organization or independently of it; and that (2) the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union should be included in any such administration.
[Inter-Allied Consultation
Regarding Korea]
The Problem
Which countries should participate 1) in the military occupation of Korea and 2) in an interim international administration or trusteeship for Korea if it is decided that such an administration should be established?
Discussion
(1) Joint action in connection with the establishment of Korean
independence is both important and necessary for the following
reasons:
While the questions relating to the operations of Allied military,
naval and air forces are admittedly of a purely military character
and hence are not of direct concern to the Department, military
operations and subsequent military occupation in Korea by any single
state alone might have far-reaching political consequences. China
would fear that exclusive Soviet responsibility for military
government in Korea might lead to the growth of a Soviet sphere of
influence in Manchuria and north China. Likewise, the Soviet Union
would be resentful of any arrangement whereby China would have
exclusive responsibility for military government in Korea after the
cessation of hostilities. It is our view, therefore, that with the
completion of military operations in Korea, there should be, so far
as practicable, Allied representation in the army of occupation and
in military government in Korea and that such military government
should be organized on the principle of centralized administration
with all of Korea administered as a single unit and not as separate
zones. Such representation should be by those countries which have a
real interest in the future political status of Korea, but the
representation of other states should not be so large as to
prejudice the effectiveness of American participation in that
occupation. An
Studies on post-war Korean problems are now being undertaken by the Department and the British and Chinese Foreign Offices, based on a draft questionnaire which relates to various political, military and economic aspects of post-war Korea. When these studies have been completed, papers on these questions will be exchanged informally without in any way committing the respective Governments on matters of policy. Informal bilateral parallel discussions will then be held to clarify points of difference.
The question of which countries should participate in the military occupation of Korea is of immediate importance and should receive careful consideration because 1) at the request of the British Foreign Office, the problems of military occupation in Korea are not included among those questions now being studied in the Department and by the British and Chinese Foreign Offices, 2) the entrance of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan would result in the presence of Soviet forces in Korea which would be an important factor in determining the composition of the occupational forces, and 3) the traditional interest of the Soviet Union in Korea raises the possibility that it will wish to participate in the military occupation of Korea even though the Soviet Union may not enter the war in the Pacific.
(2) The second important question concerning Korea prior to independence is what countries should participate in an interim international administration or trusteeship for Korea if it is decided that such an administration should be established. In order to reduce to a minimum the period of military occupation of Korea and at the same time to prepare the Korean people for the responsibilities which will come with independence, it is our present opinion that there should be in Korea, following the period of occupation and prior to the establishment of Korean independence, some form of international administration or trusteeship, such administration or trusteeship to function until such time as the Koreans are able to govern themselves.
If an interim international administration or trusteeship is
established for Korea under the authority of the projected
international organization, that organization would presumably
appoint as trustees those countries principally interested in Korea
including the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet
Union. Moreover, even if an interim administrative authority for
Korea is established independently of the projected international
organization, the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet
Union would naturally take an active part in such an administration.
The position of the
The studies on problems of post-war Korea have not yet progressed far enough to enable the Department to make recommendations on either the exact structure of any interim international supervisory authority for Korea, or the time when Korea should be granted independence. However, it is the view of the Department that an agreement should be reached at an early date among the principal interested powers on the question of whether an interim international supervisory authority is to be established for Korea and if so what powers are to be represented thereon in order to avoid the possibility of an extended period of occupation and to prevent an unnecessary postponement of Korean independence.
Number 76. Top Secret and Personal from the President to Ambassador
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Will you please deliver the following message to Marshal
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
You will, by this time, have received from General infra.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Number 626, 4 October 1944, Top Secret and Personal from the President for the Prime Minister.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I am asking our military people in Moscow to make available to you
our Joint Chiefs’ statement to a) making
Petropavlovsk available for United States use as a naval base
and areas on the Kamchatka Peninsula as air bases; (b) neutralization by air of southern
Sakhalin and Hokkaido; (c) improvement of
port facilities and inland transportation at and from
Nikolaevsk, Magadan, Petropavlovsk, and Sovietskaya Gagan; (d) military occupation of southern
Sakhalin; and (e) Soviet naval
cooperation with the United States Navy as the situation
dictated. See b. See post, pp. 392–393.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Personal and Top Secret for the President from
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. As to the Far East I am a little concerned that the Prime
Minister’s talks with
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
It would be helpful to have your reaction to any of the above for my guidance.
Personal and Top Secret for the President from
I had a satisfactory talk with post, pp. 364–368.
Number 83. Top Secret and Personal. From the President for Ambassador
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Regarding our war plans for the Pacific, I understand that
If
You are correct in assuming that the Pacific campaign will remain an
American command and there is no objection to
(Personal and Top Secret for the eyes only of the President from
At a military conference last night General
General infra.Shevchenko
Tonight
The meeting opened with Field Marshal
With regard to the situation in France Marshal
The Prime Minister then gave a complete résumé of British participation in the war indicating that they had the equivalent of 90 divisions involved including of course all the home forces and separate and foreign garrisons.
Field Marshal
I was then called upon to discuss the Pacific campaign. My summary was along the following lines. First a brief description of the period of Japanese aggression, the strategy which has been consistently approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the turn of the tide at Coral Sea and Midway and the operations in the Aleutians, and a description of the southern approach through the Solomons and New Guinea and the central Pacific approach thus bringing the situation up to date.
I then gave them the information about proposed operations which you
sent to me in your last telegram.
I then gave them the strategic objectives which you authorized me to
suggest to them as coming from you.ante, p.
362, footnote 2.
I concluded by stating that the Chiefs of Staff were most concerned
in the answers to the following questions:
Marshal
It was agreed that Marshal
Following my talk General
Marshal Debrecen?] area.
When pressed by the Prime Minister as to when the invasion of Germany
proper would start Marshal
At the conclusion of the meeting Marshal
Tomorrow night’s meeting on the Pacific should be productive of information we have been seeking for a long time and I shall record it fully.
Personal and Top Secret for the eyes of the President only from
Personal and Top Secret for the eyes of the President only from
General Infra.
One subject that he asks be given urgent consideration is cooperation from us in the build up of supplies and equipment in the Far East through Pacific ports prior to the outbreak of hostilities. He gave us the detailed list of requirements for both ground forces and tactical and strategic air forces for two months’ stocking of certain items and provision of necessary equipment totaling in all about a million tons. Other supplies he is planning to stock from the west. He will let us know within two weeks when he wishes the flow of 4-engine bombers and training of his crews to begin. He unqualifiedly asserted that this strategic air force would be built up for use only in the Far East. He hopes for help from our Navy and specifically offered us the use of Petropavlovsk as a base. He is prepared to proceed with detailed planning of all aspects of our mutual cooperation ground, air and naval and agreed to authorize his army and navy staffs to proceed accordingly with our military mission in Moscow.
He emphasized the need for secrecy and the mutual disadvantage of
arousing prematurely Japanese suspicions. He referred to
He generally approved our Chiefs of Staff’s suggestions presented by
To
In railroad equipment they need 500 locomotives and 5 or 6,000 cars of various types as well as about 800 kilometers of rail.
Marshal
Mr.
He first asked if the strategic objectives we had given, those
suggested by you, met with Marshal
Marshal
He is prepared to start the flow of aircraft for the build up of their strategic air force as soon as fields are prepared to receive the airplanes. Meanwhile, he feels that we should deliver the first 20 airplanes which would be used for training purposes and the training thus acquired would facilitate in delivery of the flow once it starts. He said that he would let us know in about two weeks when the flow of planes should be started. He is prepared to start a training program with our instructors for the training in the operation of a strategic air force.
Marshal
He seems to fear a premature Japanese attack but repeated several times that once the build up is accomplished he will remove most of the restrictions of secrecy. I gained the impression that he wanted to start the build up at once. He thinks that stock piling would be safe in a valley about 150 miles north of Vladivostok and also in the Komsomolsk area.
In speaking of the Japanese intentions he said that their first and
major effort would be against Valdivostok and expected both a land
Marshal
I told Marshal
The Ambassador then pressed Marshal
Inasmuch as note taking was “Taboo” I have dictated this from memory. However, our interpreter did take notes and as soon as I obtain a copy of them I may be able to supplement this cable. In any case, the Ambassador will be in Washington at the end of the week and will go into more detail.
I feel most encouraged by the meeting tonight and would like to add that I feel the trip of the Prime Minister has resulted in expediting the discussions. The British have done everything possible to assist us in presenting the matter in the way we thought best.
Action: Gen McFarland (
Info:
Gen
Gen
C of S
J. C. S. 1176/1
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Russian Participation in the War Against
Japan
Reference: J. C. S. 1176post, pp. 388–394, and the memorandum from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, January 23, 1945, post, pp.
396–400.
Note by the Secretaries
The enclosed memorandum from the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, dated 3 December 1944, has been referred to the Joint Staff Planners in collaboration with the Joint Logistics Committee for necessary action.
Memorandum for the Secretary, Joint Chiefs
of Staff:
Subject: Russian Participation in the War against Japan
Reference:
1. I approve
2. I am aware that detailed planning in some cases cannot be
realistically undertaken until fuller information is available
concerning Russia’s capabilities and intentions. Additional
facts are also required on the Far Eastern-Siberian area. There
are nevertheless a number of phases of Russian participation in
the war which in my opinion should be anticipated and studied
without delay on the basis of information now at hand. I have in
mind such problems as:
3. It seems to me that these and other operations, some of which are already under consideration, must be carefully gone into immediately by the Joint Staff Planners, the Joint Logistics Committee, and other agencies concerned, with a view to submitting appropriate reports and recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those operations which are accepted should be developed and plans prepared as to when they must be done, who is going to do them, how they are going to be done, and what supplies and forces will be required. This line of action will make it possible to negotiate more realistically with the Russians, and to inform them for example that a particular operation will take twelve months to mount, which accordingly requires a decision by the Russians at once.
4. I consider that on short notice we should be prepared to present a paper to the Russians at the next staff meeting, setting forth the point of view of the United States Chiefs of Staff. A paper of this kind obviously cannot be completed far in advance, as the situation is fluid and subject to change in the light of the work of the Roberts Mission and further facts that may become available. The Joint Staff Planners should nevertheless have ready at all times studies which are as complete as possible under existing circumstances so that a single paper can be quickly prepared setting forth our objectives, capabilities and requirements as well as those of the Russians.
J. C. S. 1176/2
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Operations in the Kuriles
References:
Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, United
States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations
10 December 1944.
1. Reference (a) presents various aspects of
prospective Russian participation in the war against Japan. In this
paper possible operations in the Kuriles and the necessity therefor
are considered. In reference (b), General
2. I have previously expressed my view that we must broaden the base for operations leading to the accomplishment of the first phase of our overall objective in the Pacific Theater. Insofar as our capabilities will permit, it will be to our advantage to keep the Japanese spread out. To this end, diversionary operations, particularly those which keep his air power from being concentrated, I believe will be found most helpful. From this standpoint, as well as from others which have been examined in connection with the establishment of an alternate sea route to the Maritime Provinces, it appears that an operation in the Kuriles, preferably in the month of May, should be planned.
3. It is recognized that unless the war in Europe ends at an early
date, we probably shall not have the resources to conduct a Kuriles
operation unless we depart from the concept of operations which we
have adopted for planning purposes. This applies particularly to
ground and service troops (it appears probable that the Naval
forces, including amphibious craft, and probably air forces could be
found). However, it is my opinion that we should make a decision now
to carry out an operation in the Kuriles in the month of May on the
Personal and Top Secret for the President from
In my talk with
I said that I recalled that you and he had discussed this question at
Teheran and that, if my memory was correct, you had in fact
initiated yourself the question of the need for Russia to have
access to a warm water port in the Pacific but that on the other
hand I thought you had in mind an international free port rather
than the lease of this area by the Russians; that this method, you
felt, would give the Soviets the needed protection and was more in
the line with present day concepts of how international questions of
this kind could best be dealt with. He said “This can be discussed”,
status quo in Outer Mongolia—the maintenance
of the Republic of Outer Mongolia as an independent identity.
This latter did not surprise me as I have been convinced for many months that this would be the Soviet attitude because of their desire for protection for their long southern Siberian boundary.
Except for my remarks regarding the ports I made no comment. I will not bring the subject up again unless you instruct me to do so. I feel that if you wish more detailed information it might be useful for me to obtain it prior to your meeting.
Japan:
Territorial Problems:
The Kurile Islands
I. The Problem
The problem is the future disposition of the Kurile Islands.
II. Basic Factors
The Kurile Islands have strategic importance for Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States. They also have appreciable economic value for Japan.
A. Description
The Kuriles form a chain of 47 sparsely inhabited volcanic islands
extending for about 690 miles in a northeasterly direction from
Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan’s main islands, to the Russian
peninsula of Kamchatka. They have an area of approximately 3,944
square miles. The permanent population 17,550 (1940), all Japanese,
is increased during the summer months by 20,000 to 30,000 seasonal
workers in the fishing industry. Japan has been in possession of the
southern Kuriles since about 1800. Russia, which
The economic importance of the islands is due almost entirely to the fishing industry, whose output in 1938 was estimated at about $9,000,000. Fish products are essential in the Japanese diet and form an important item in Japan’s export trade. The Kurile fishing industry will be of increasing importance to Japan if the Soviet Union further restricts or closes to the Japanese access to the inshore fishing grounds of Eastern Siberia.
The Kuriles are important strategically to both Japan and the Soviet Union because they are a connecting chain between the two countries and provide bases for both defense and attack. They are also important to the Soviet Union because they form a military screen to the ocean approach to the Okhotsk Sea and the Maritime provinces. They are important to the United States because they are near the Aleutians, form part of the land-bridge between Japan and Alaska, and are situated on the great-circle route between the United States and Japan. Japan has established a number of fortified air and naval bases on the islands.
The Kuriles may be divided into three groups: southern, central and northern. The southern group, which extends about 235 miles north from Hokkaido up to and including the island of Etorofu, contains 90 percent of the total population of the Kuriles and has been admittedly Japanese territory since about 1800. The nearest point in the group is only about 12 miles from Hokkaido. The people are Japanese and their life is the same as that in the main islands of Japan. The stragetic value of these islands is limited by the fact that for about half of the year the waters of Okhotsk Sea to the west of the Kuriles is largely filled with ice and almost impassable.
The central group, beginning with the large island of Uruppu, extends
north about 375 miles, is largely unpopulated and has almost
negligible economic value. It is important strategically; the
islands lie across the entrance into Okhotsk Sea, and Shimushiru, 31
miles long and 5 miles wide, encloses Broughton (Buroton) Bay, which
can be developed into an important base and possible fleet
anchorage. The Handbook on the Kurile
Islands, issued in November, 1943 by the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, says of this bay: “If the entrance has been
improved, Broughton Bay is now a magnificent harbor.” The Survey of the Kurile Islands, issued by
the Military Intelligence Service of the War Department, states:
“This bay would be one of the critical factors in operations in the
Kurile Islands.” The
The northern group, comprising three principal islands, Paramushiro, Shimushu and Araito, is important both for its fisheries and for its air and naval bases. The value of the fisheries and of other marine products in and around the northern group amounted in 1938 to $7,000,000 of the total $9,000,000 for all of the Kuriles. Geographically, the group represents a continuation of Kamchatka, the strait separating Shimushu from Kamchatka being only seven miles wide.
Important factors which may affect the decision as to the disposition of the Kuriles are (1) the desire of the American Navy that a United Nations base or bases should be established on some of the islands, (2) possible pressure from the Soviet Government, whether or not it enters the war against Japan, for the acquisition of the northern and central groups and possibly of all the Kuriles, and (3) the desirability of extending the principle of international control to all of the islands detached from the Japanese Empire as a result of the war.
B. Claims and Possible Solutions
1. Japan
Japan has a strong claim to the southern group of the Kuriles on the basis of nationality, self-determination, geographic propinquity, economic need and historic possession.
Japan’s claim to the central islands is based almost solely on the ground of possession. If, as it may be assumed, the southern and central islands should be demilitarized and subject, for such a period as may appear adequate, to a system of military inspection by an international agency, their retention by Japan would appear not to constitute a threat to other states.
To the northern group Japan’s claim is based primarily on its need to retain the fishing industry centered on those islands. Ownership of the islands would be more satisfactory to Japan than a grant of fishing rights in territory under control of one or more other powers. However, whatever disposition may be made of the Kuriles, Japan might be permitted to continue to carry on its fishing industry throughout the islands.
2. The Soviet Union
The Soviet Union has a substantial claim to the northern group, Shimushu, Paramushiro and Araito, on the grounds of propinquity and the consequent desirability of controlling these islands to prevent them from becoming a military menace if in the possession of a hostile power.
The Soviet Government may ask not only for the northern islands, but also for the central and possibly even for the southern group. Possession of the northern and central islands would give the Soviet Union control of passages into the Okhotsk Sea which are practically ice-free throughout the year There would seem, however, to be few factors which would justify a Soviet claim to the southern islands; this transfer to the Soviet Union would create a situation which a future Japan would find difficult to accept as a permanent solution. It would deprive Japan of islands which are historically and ethnically Japanese and of waters which are valuable for fishing. If the southern islands should be fortified they would be a continuing menace to Japan.
The situation may be complicated by a Soviet demand that the other
United Nations agree to the transfer to the Soviet Union of the
northern group or of both the northern and central groups as a quid pro quo for the Soviet Union’s entering
the war against Japan.
3. The United States
The United States Navy wishes a base on the Kuriles which it might use in case of naval operations in this area. It is not clear whether such a base would be under international administration or whether it would be a Russian base open to American ships and planes under designated conditions.
4. The Projected International Organization
The northern group or both the northern and central groups might be placed under the authority of the projected international organization. This solution would most completely remove the military menace from their use by any one power. It would also make possible the establishment on the northern group, which is of particular strategic importance, of an international base or bases.
The international organization might designate as administering authority either an international mixed commission, or more likely the Soviet Union. In the latter case the Soviet Union would doubtless establish the base or bases which, it is hoped would be available for the use of the United States and other United Nations.
It would appear undesirable for the United States to be sole administrator of these islands or to have sole possession of bases, since it would place this country in a distant and dangerous position in case of future difficulties with the Soviet Union.
If the northern and central groups should be placed under the
projected international organization rather than given to the Soviet
Union in full sovereignty it would be more likely that Japan might
obtain the right to continue to carry on the fishing industry in and
around the northern islands, an important factor in Japan’s national
economy; and (2) it would be easier to obtain general American
support for the recommendations that Japan’s Mandated Islands and
III. Recommendations
It is recommended that:
Prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East.
Subject: Atomic Fission Bombs
To: The Chief of Staff
It is now reasonably certain that our operation plans should be based
on the gun type bomb, which, it is
estimated, will produce the equivalent of a ten thousand ton TNT
explosion. The first bomb, without previous full scale test which we
do not believe will be necessary, should be
ready about 1 August 1945.Military Situation
in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed
Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, 82d
Our previous hopes that an implosion (compression) type of bomb might
be developed in the late spring have now
been dissipated by scientific difficulties which we have not as yet
been able to solve. The present effects of these difficulties are
that more material will be required and that the material will be
less efficiently used. We should have
sufficient material for the first implosion type bomb sometime
in the latter part of July. This bomb would have an effect
which would be equivalent to about 500 tons of TNT. During the
remainder of 1945 it is estimated that we can produce . . .
additional bombs. The effectiveness of these should increase towards
1000 tons each as development proceeds and, if some of our problems
are solved, to as much as 2500 tons.
The plan of operations while based on the more certain more powerful
gun type bomb also provides for the use of the implosion type bombs
when they become available. . . . The time schedule must not be
adversely affected by anything other than the difficulties of
solving our scientific problems. The 509th
Composite Group, 20th Air Force has been organized and it is now
undergoing training as well as assisting in essential
tests.
The time has now come when we should acquaint the Assistant Chief of
Staff
The need for security will be emphasized to the officers whom it is proposed to alert.
I have consulted with General
Your approval is recommended.
[Endorsements:]
To S/W I think the foregoing proposal should be approved with
your concurrence
The
Japan:
Territorial Problems:
Japanese Karafuto (Southern Sakhalin)
I. The Problem
The problem is the future disposition of Japanese Karafuto or Southern Sakhalin.
II. Basic Factors
The problem arises from the probable presentation of Soviet claims to re-annex this territory. Factors which favor the transfer of Japanese Karafuto to the Soviet Union are 1) the probability that the Soviet Union will enter the war against Japan and that it will have occupied Japanese Karafuto and hence will be in a strong position to press demands for acquisition of that territory, 2) the strategic location of Japanese Karafuto in relation to the Siberian Maritime provinces and 3) its comparatively recent acquisition by Japan. On the other hand, the completely Japanese character of the population of Japanese Karafuto, its close economic integration with Japan proper, and its questionable strategic value if Japan is disarmed would seem to be logical reasons for its retention by Japan, but political factors may make such a solution impossible.
Sovereignty over Sakhalin has long been a cause of friction between
Russia and Japan. In 1875 Japan gave up all claims to Sakhalin in
exchange for full title to the Kuriles, but by the Treaty of
Portsmouth (1905)Foreign Relations, 1905, pp.
824–828.
Japanese interest in Sakhalin in recent times has not been restricted
to the southern portion of the island. In 1920, Japan occupied
Russian Sakhalin and held it until 1925. By the convention signed at
British and
Foreign State Papers, vol. cxxii, pp. 894–905.lxxx, pp. 341–399.Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic
War (London, etc., 1945–1946), vol. ii, pp. 59–61.
The population of Japanese Karafuto totalled 415,000 in 1940 and was almost exclusively Japanese (99.4 percent). This total, while substantial, equals less than one percent of the population of Japan proper. The area of Japanese Karafuto of nearly 14,000 square miles is equal to 9 percent of the homeland.
Economically, Japanese Karafuto is closely integrated with Japan and practically all trade is with the homeland. By 1937 coal production amounted to seven percent and pulp and paper accounted for 16 percent of the total Japanese production, and the output of timber reached 14 percent of that of the main islands of Japan. About ten percent of the arable land in Japanese Karafuto has been under cultivation, but if the remaining portion were developed, it might sustain an increased population of nearly half a million persons.
From the point of view of the future security of the Soviet Union, Japanese Karafuto is of strategic importance. It lies athwart the most direct airline to Shanghai and Singapore from San Francisco via Dutch Harbor, Petropavlovsk and Vladivostok. It commands the approaches from the northeast to the Japan Sea, the Maritime Province of the Soviet Union and Vladivostok.
The Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943Bulletin, December 4, 1943, vol. ix, p. 393; or Decade, p.
22.
If Japan were expelled from Japanese Karafuto, the half million
Japanese inhabitants now living there would either have to be
repatriated, which would increase the population pressure within
Japan
However, a claim of the Soviet Union for Japanese Karafuto will make
a strong appeal. It may claim, though doubtless incorrectly, that
voiding the Treaty of Portsmouth would automatically restore
southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, as this
territory was part of the Russian Empire prior to 1905, its transfer
to the Soviet Union would not necessarily fall within the usual
category of conquest and annexation.
In view of these circumstances,
III. Recommendations
It is recommended that:
a) as a prerequisite to the
Soviet Union’s entering the war against b), having entered the war against Japan, as a
recompense for the Soviet Union’s military contribution, the
United States endeavor to satisfy the Soviet Union with the
promise of United States support at the peace table in a
proposal whereby Karafuto would be designated as a trust
area and placed under the authority of the projected
international organization which would appoint the Soviet
Union as administering authority.
(special distribution)
J. C. S. 1176/6
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Russian Participation in the War Against
Japan
Reference: J. C. S. 1176 Series
Note by the Secretaries
1. The attached report (Enclosure “A”), prepared by the Joint Staff Planners on their own initiative, is submitted for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. A memorandum by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces is
attached as Enclosure “B.”
1. The coming Allied staff conference offers a favorable
opportunity for advancing U. S. planning based on Russian
participation in the war against Japan. In recent negotiations
between General
2. A summary of important statements attributed to the Russians,
briefed from messages from our military mission in Moscow, is
contained in Appendix “C” (page 90).
3. In the Enclosure to J. C. S. 1176,
a. Paragraph 32 states:
“32. It is concluded that:
“Basic principles regarding our policy toward Russia’s entry into the war against Japan are:
- “
a. We desire Russian entry at the earliest possible date consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations and are prepared to offer the maximum support possible without prejudice to our main effort against Japan.- “
b. We consider that the mission of Russian Far Eastern Forces should be to conduct an all-out offensive against Manchuriato force the commitment of Japanese forces and resources in North China and Manchuria that might otherwise be employed in the defense of Japan, to conduct intensive air operations against Japan proper and to interdict lines of communication between Japan and the mainland of Asia.”
b. Paragraph 33 states:
“33. In furtherance of these principles we should adopt the following courses of action to assist the Russians in preparations for war:
- “
a. Deliver maximum possible supplies to Russia.- “
b. Provide full assistance to the creation and training of a Russian strategic air force and the provision and preparation of adequate bases for strategic air forces in eastern Siberia and Kamchatka.”
c. Paragraph 34 states:
“34. We should enter into immediate negotiations with Russia to determine the feasibility, practicability, desirability and necessity for undertaking any or all of the following courses of action:
- “
a. To establish air and naval forces in Kamchatka, including the naval base at Petropavlovsk.- “
b. To base U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Kamchatka and the Maritime Provinces.- “
c. To develop an air transport route from Kamchatka to eastern Siberia.- “
d. To seize one or more positions in the Kurile Islands.- “
e. To permit Russian submarines and light naval craft to operate from our bases in the Aleutians.”
4. The special planning group headed by General
5. Previous staff studies have developed the following factors in
regard to any operations on our part in the northwestern
Pacific.
Milepost
conclusions
“6. We conclude that:
a. In negotiations with the Russians we
should determine as soon as possible:
b. We should:
c. The points discussed above have to do
with U. S.-U. S. S. R. matters essentially, and should be taken
up if possible in U. S.– U. S. S. R. meetings; details should be
worked out between U. S. and U. S. S. R. staff representatives.
If taken up at the tripartite meetings they should be covered
only in the broadest terms. (A proposed message to General
recommendations
7. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
post, pp.
396–400.
Message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
Commanding GeneralU. S. Military
Mission to U. S. S. R.
In
Milepost
The United States Chiefs of Staff would welcome Soviet
suggestions as to additions or modifications to the above.
This replies to your
In such further discussions with the Russians as you consider
profitable in the limited time prior to Argonaut
a. Determine from the Russians, without
giving any impression whatsoever of commitments, if any
trans-Pacific aid will be required to sustain Russian effort after
she enters the war, assuming that Milepost
b. Indicate to the Russians that any
operations by U. S. to open sea routes to Sea of Okhotsk-Amur river
ports will be costly and at the expense of our own efforts toward
Japan from the south; that because of limitation of means amphibious
operations in the North Pacific in 1945 are remote.
c. Emphasize that if a difficult campaign
were conducted to open a sea route of only limited capacity the U.
S. and U. S. S. R. should insure that use made of the route will be
that which will bring about earliest defeat of Japan.
d. Stress the desirability of the early
employment and exploitation of the combined Russian and U. S. air
superiority over the Japanese. Point out limitations of island air
bases available to U. S. within air range of Japan and the
availability immediately after hostilities of experienced U. S.
Strategic Air Force Units. In view of Soviet opposition to basing U.
S. Forces in the Maritime Provinces, point out that surely in
eastern Siberia, there must be areas from which U. S. Air Forces,
either heavy or very heavy bombers could operate. Emphasize that
there is no intention of displacing Russian Air Forces by U. S.
Units, or of interfering with the Russian campaign on the Asiatic
mainland. Emphasize that operations of U. S. Strategic Air
e. Because detailed plans for the employment
of U. S. Air Forces in eastern Siberia, such as the one you propose
have not been fully examined, particularly as to logistics, you will
not submit any such plans to the Russians at this time, or propose
the basing in Russia of a U. S. Air Force of definite
composition.
Finally therefore you should endeavor to secure agreement in principle by the Russians to the eventual employment of U. S. Air Forces from eastern Siberian bases in the event future developments indicate this employment to be both practicable and advantageous.
C. C. S. 417/11
Operations for the Defeat of Japan
1. The agreed over-all objective in the war against Japan has been
expressed as follows (C. C. S. 417/9
To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:
2. The United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following as a basis for planning in the war against Japan:
The concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific is (C.
C. S. 417/10):
3. The following sequence and timing of operations have been directed by the United States Chiefs of Staff and plans prepared by theater commanders:—
4. Until a firm date can be established when redeployment from Europe can begin, planning will be continued for an operation to seize a position in the Chusan-Ningpo area and for invasion of Kyushu-Honshu in the winter of 1945–1946.
5. Examination is being conducted of the necessity for and cost of operations to maintain and defend a sea route to the Sea of Okhotsk when the entry of Russia into the war against Japan becomes imminent. Examination so far has shown that the possibility of seizing a position in the Kuriles for that purpose during the favorable weather period of 1945 is remote due to lack of sufficient resources. The possibility of maintaining and defending such a sea route from bases in Kamchatka alone is being further examined.
6. The United States Chiefs of Staff have also directed examination and preparation of a plan of campaign against Japan in the event that prolongation of the European war requires postponement of the invasion of Japan until well into 1946.
Memorandum for the President
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been guided by the following basic principles in working toward U.S.S.R. entry into the war against Japan:
Russia’s entry at as early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations. The U. S. will provide maximum support possible without interfering with our main effort against Japan.
The objective of Russia’s military effort against Japan in the Far East should be the defeat of the Japanese forces in Manchuria, air operations against Japan proper in collaboration with U. S. air forces based in eastern Siberia, and maximum interference with Japanese sea traffic between Japan and the mainland of Asia.
The following paragraphs set forth the status to date of negotiations with the Russians and indicate the objectives which we believe should be achieved at the coming conference.
a. Assistance prior to hostilities. The
project to stockpile supplies in eastern Siberia in preparation for
Russian entry into the war against Japan is making excellent
progress. Of the ¾ of a million tons of dry cargo required in this
initial project, it is estimated ¼ of a million tons will be
available in U. S. ports by 1 March. The date of the Russian entry
is of great importance to the U. S. both in planning the delivery of
supplies and also in planning our operations. The Russians have
recently made intensive staff studies which should enable them to
give us at the coming conference a better estimate than we have
received to date of the timing and planning of their operations.
b. Opening of a sea route to eastern Siberia.
The required capacity of any sea route across the North Pacific to
eastern Siberia has not yet been determined. Such a route must be
through one of the northern Kuriles straits, across the Sea of
Okhotsk, and around northern Sakhalin to eastern Siberian ports,
although it is possible that by moving supplies overland between
Petropavlovsk and Ust Bol-sheretsk a route of limited capacity could
be established without having to pass convoys through the Kuriles.
Because of ice, either route would only be navigable from June
through October. The requirements of the war in Europe and our
shortage of resources in the Pacific make remote any possibility of
conducting amphibious operations in the Kuriles during 1945. The
Russians have indicated a willingness to allow us to establish our
forces in southern Kamchatka at the proper time. This measure alone
may permit sufficient neutralization of Jap forces in the northern
Kuriles to allow convoys to pass through the chain. It appears now
that the bulk of supplies for any U. S. strategic air forces in
eastern Siberia would have to come across the North Pacific rather
than over the trans-Sib.
In view of the fact that the route to Vladivostok will be closed by
the Japanese at the beginning of war and in order to make plans and
preparations, we should at this conference determine from the
Russians the extent to which their operations against the Japanese
will depend on supplies continuing to be brought across the North
Pacific. However, no commitment to undertake an operation in the
North Pacific should be made at this time. Also, all possible
information
c. Operations of U. S. strategic air forces from
Russian bases. Entry of Russia into the war against Japan
will provide additional areas from which our seasoned European
strategic air forces can be utilized. Shortage of suitable heavy
bomber bases elsewhere and the desirability of increasing the number
of directions from which we strike Japan indicate we should make
every effort to exploit the potential of Russian bases. At the
d. Russian strategic air forces. The United
States Chiefs of Staff do not propose to raise the question of
Russian strategic air forces at the forthcoming conference. The
Commanding General, Army Air Forces, has offered to the Russians
some 200 heavy bomber type aircraft, implying that these should be
used as a Russian strategic air force employed jointly with a U. S.
strategic air force of equal size; has offered to provide a nucleus
establishment for the organization and training of a Russian
strategic air force; and has further indicated that additional
aircraft might be forthcoming if desired. To date the Russians have
not accepted these proposals and we have not pressed the matter. It
should not be raised on our part, but, if brought up, we should say
that the matter will be further examined by the two military
staffs.
e. U. S. assistance in Kamchatka. At the
At the conference, we should determine the Russian ideas on any U S. assistance that they might need to defend Kamchatka, particularly as regards ground forces. In this connection any assistance that Russia could render in regards to developing housing, airfields and communications in Kamchatka before her entry in the war and without arousing Japanese suspicions would make our task much easier.
f. Use of Aleutian naval bases by the
Russians. At the
g. Installation of U.S.A.A.F. Weather Reporting
Stations in the U.S.S.R. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider
it highly important that additional weather reports be made
available from Far Eastern U.S.S.R. to support our approved
operations and future planned operations against the Japanese.
Weather pertinent to our operations against Japan is formed in
Eastern Siberia and the Mongolian Plateau. Marshal
h. Improvement of U.S–U.S.S.R. collaboration.
The working efficiency of U.S. and U.S.S.R. collaboration to date
has been low, even though there appears to have been quick agreement
on general principles pertaining to military problems on the highest
level. This inefficiency is largely attributable to administrative
delays on the part of the Russians and a reluctance on staff levels
to exchange with the U. S. the information essential to the carrying
out of broad decisions. Any specific example is a detail but the
cumulative effect of the failure of the Russians to act on
reasonable requests—space for couriers on airlines, movement of mail
and dispatches, securing of visas for military personnel, replies in
a reasonable time to requests from the Joint Chiefs of Staff
addressed to the Soviet General Staff, and many others—all these
make progress difficult. The Chiefs of Staff suggest that Marshal
A special planning mission headed by
The Chiefs of Staff feel that all the above points, if raised at the tripartite conference, should be discussed on the broadest basis; the details should be worked out separately between the staff representatives of the U. S. and U. S. S. R.
Prime Minister to President
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Para 5. Major war criminals U. J. took an unexpectedly
ultra-respectable line. There must be no executions without trial
otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try them. I pointed
out the difficulties in International law but he replied if there
were no trials there must be no death sentences, but only life-long
confinements. In face of this view from this quarter I do not wish
to press the memo I gave you which you said you would have examined
by the State Department. Kindly therefore treat it as
withdrawn. In reply (No. 632, dated October 22, 1944) The text of
Memorandum for the Secretary of State
Please send me a brief report on the status of the proceedings before
the War Crimes Commission, and particularly the attitude of the U.
S. representative on offenses to be brought against
Memorandum for the President
Subject: War Crimes Commission
The following is in response to your memorandum of January 3: Briefly the status of the work of the War Crimes Commission is as follows—
The Commission has compiled two lists of war criminals, one German,
the other Italian. They contain over seven hundred names, including
The American representative on the Commission has gone along with
these recommendations and thinks, as do all of us, that
The question whether the Nazi leaders and members of the
The Secretary: There are attached two
memoranda, marked A and B, regarding War Crimes.
Memorandum A is the one which you, Secretary
Memorandum B is a suggested draft in which the basic ideas of the
first-mentioned paper are brought together in a form which can be
signed or initialed, if it is approved. It would constitute the
first step toward putting machinery into operation. A copy has been
delivered to Judge
The international tribunal referred to would be short-lived. It would try and adjudge the principal culprits and would lay the foundation for the subsequent trial of the other offenders. The latter would be tried in the occupation courts or tribunals and in the national courts—civil or military—of the different countries as might be decided.
The plan would implement the Moscow DeclarationDecade, pp.
13–14; also in Department of State Bulletin, November 6, 1943, vol. ix, pp. 310–311.
You will see from my short memorandum to Judge Post, p.
408.
Memorandum for the PresidentReport of Robert H.
Jackson, United States Representative to
the International Conference on Military Trials,
Department of State Publication 3080 (London, 1945), pp. 3–9.
Subject: Trial and Punishment of Nazi War Criminals.
This memorandum deals with ways and means for carrying out the
policy regarding the trial and punishment of Nazi criminals, as
established in the statements on that subject which are annexed
(Tabs A to F
I. The Moscow Declaration
In the Moscow Declaration (Tab D) the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union took note of the atrocities perpetrated by the Germans and laid down the policy: (1) that those German officers and men who have been responsible for or have taken a consenting part in these atrocities “will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be created therein”: and (2) that the above declaration “is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offenses have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.”
II. United Nations War Crimes
Commission
The United Nations War Crimes Commission is located in London, and consists of representatives of some fifteen of the United Nations. The Soviet Government is not a member.
This Commission has been charged with the collection of lists of the criminals referred to, the recording of the available supporting proof, and the making of recommendations as to the tribunals to try and the procedure for trying such criminals. The Commission has no investigative or prosecuting authority or personnel. It has no authority to try offenders of any kind.
The War Crimes Commission receives its lists of war criminals
from the investigating authorities, if any, set up by the
respective United Nations. The first unofficial meeting of the
Commission was held in London on October 26, 1943, and the first
official meeting was held there on January 18, 1944. Up to this
time, the cases of approximately 1,000 offenders have been
docketed with the Commission.
The Commission has been widely and publicly criticized for the
paucity of the results of its work. In recent months its
activities have been marked by dissensions. The British
representative, who was also
III. Scope and Dimensions of
the War Crimes Problem
The crimes to be punished. The
criminality of the German leaders and their associates does not
consist solely of individual outrages, but represents the result
of a systematic and planned reign of terror within Germany, in
the satellite Axis countries, and in the occupied countries of
Europe. This conduct goes back at least as far as 1933, when
We are satisfied that these atrocities were perpetrated in pursuance of a premeditated criminal plan or enterprise which either contemplated or necessarily involved their commission.
The criminals to be punished. The
outstanding offenders are, of course, those leaders of the Nazi
Party and German
In addition, the Nazi leaders created and utilized a numerous
organization for carrying out the acts of oppression and
terrorism which their program involved. Chief among the
instrumentalities used by them are the
IV Difficulties of an
Effective War Crimes Program
Difficulties of identification and proof.
The names of the chief German leaders are well known, and the
proof of their guilt will not offer great difficulties. However,
the crimes to be punished have been committed upon such a large
scale that the problem of identification, trial and punishment
of their perpetrators presents a situation without parallel in
the administration of criminal justice. In thousands of cases,
it will be impossible to establish the offender’s identity or to
Legal Difficulties. The attempt to punish
the Nazi leaders and their associates for all of the atrocities
committed by them also involves serious legal difficulties. Many
of these atrocities, as noted in your statement on the subject
of persecution dated 24 March 1944 (Tab E), were “begun by the Nazis in the days of
peace and multiplied by them a hundred times in time of
war.” These pre-war atrocities are neither “war crimes” in the
technical sense, nor offenses against international law; and the
extent to which they may have been in violation of German law,
as changed by the Nazis, is doubtful. Nevertheless, the declared
policy of the United Nations is that these crimes, too, shall be
punished; and the interests of postwar security and a necessary
rehabilitation of German peoples, as well as the demands of
justice, require that this be done.
V. Recommended Program
After Germany’s unconditional surrender the United Nations could,
if they elected, put to death the most notorious Nazi criminals,
such as
We think that the just and effective solution lies in the use of the judicial method. Condemnation of these criminals after a trial, moreover, would command maximum public support in our own times and receive the respect of history. The use of the judicial method will, in addition, make available for all mankind to study in future years an authentic record of Nazi crimes and criminality.
We recommend the following:
The German leaders and the organizations employed by them, such
as those referred to above (
The trial of this charge and the determination of the guilty parties would be carried out in two stages:
The United Nations would, in the first instance, bring before an international tribunal created by Executive Agreement, the highest ranking German leaders to a number fairly representative of the groups and organizations charged with complicity in the basic criminal plan. Adjudication would be sought not only of the guilt of those individuals physically before the court, but also of the complicity of the members of the organizations included within the charge. The court would make findings adjudicating the facts established, including the nature and purposes of the criminal plan, the identity of the groups and organizations guilty of complicity in it, and the acts committed in its execution. The court would also sentence those individual defendants physically before it who are convicted.
The above would complete the mission of this international tribunal.
Thereafter, there would be brought before occupation courts the
individuals not sent back for trial under the provisions of the
Moscow Declaration, and members of the organizations who are
charged with complicity through such membership, but against
whom there is not sufficient proof of specific atrocities. In
view of the nature of the charges and the representative
character of the defendants who were before the court in the
first trial, the findings of that court should justly be taken
to constitute a general adjudication of the criminal character
of the groups and organizations referred to, binding upon all
the members thereof in their subsequent trials in occupation
courts. In these subsequent trials, therefore, the only
necessary proof of guilt of any particular defendant would be
his membership in one of these organizations. Proof would also
be taken of the nature and extent of the individual’s
participation. The punishment of each
Individual defendants who can be connected with specific atrocities will be tried and punished in the national courts of the countries concerned, as contemplated in the Moscow Declaration.
VI. Nature and Composition of
Tribunals
We favor the trial of the prime leaders by an international military commission or military court, established by Executive Agreement of the heads of State of the interested United Nations. This would require no enabling legislation or treaty. If deemed preferable the tribunal could be established by action of the Supreme Authority (Control Council for Germany).
The court might consist of seven members, one each to be appointed by The British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union and France, and three to be appointed by agreement among the other United Nations who become parties to the proposed procedure.
The court may consist of civilian or military personnel, or both. We would prefer a court of military personnel, as being less likely to give undue weight to technical contentions and legalistic arguments.
The subsequent trials would be had, as noted, in occupation courts; or in the national courts of the country concerned or in their own military courts; or, if desired, by international military courts.
VII. Preparation of Case
A successful prosecution of the basic charge will manifestly depend upon early, careful, and thorough compilation of the necessary evidence. This is particularly important with regard to so much of the case as involves the basic criminal plan. Success will depend, further, upon cooperative action in this regard among the interested United Nations, and the early establishment of a competent executive and technical staff to carry out the project.
In our opinion, the United Nations War Crimes Commission cannot be satisfactorily employed for this purpose, and having performed its mission, may now be dissolved.
We recommend that there be set up a full time executive group consisting of one military representative each of the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France. This group should have under it an adequate staff of attorneys and research personnel to search out the available data, analyze them, prepare the charges to conform to the proof, and arrange the evidence for presentation to the international military tribunal.
VIII. Soviet Attitude
The Soviet attitude, we believe, is indicated in the Note of
IX. British Attitude
In an Aide-Mémoire from the British
Embassy to the Department of State dated October 30, 1944,Aide-Mémoire, to include those cases
where a person is accused of having committed war crimes against
the nationals of several of the United Nations.
Memorandum for Judge Rosenman
The White House
There is attached the implementing instrument which you asked the Attorney General to have me draw up and send to you.
In my opinion the effect of thus putting together in one paper the implementing provisions without discussion or explanatory matter, is to clarify the nature of the project and how it will work out.
You will observe that the enclosed does not go into questions such as the procedure to be followed by the tribunals, or by what majority decisions should be reached. If the basic plan is approved by the interested parties, such questions will naturally arise. However, in my opinion, their introduction here might tend to bog down the project on details. While fully realizing the importance of such questions and the extent to which differences of opinion may arise about them, I am in favor of not trying to cover them at this time.
The United Nations have on various occasions expressed their abhorrence for the unspeakable crimes and atrocities of which the German leaders and their associates are guilty, and have pledged themselves that those responsible for such crimes and atrocities shall not escape retribution.
The United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union in
the Declaration issued at Moscow November 1, 1943 stated:
The criminality of the German leaders and their associates does not consist solely of individual outrages, but represents the result of a systematic and planned reign of terror within Germany and within the areas occupied by German military forces, in connection with which the crimes and atrocities referred to were committed. We are satisfied that these crimes and atrocities were perpetrated pursuant to a premeditated criminal plan.
For the carrying out of the acts of oppression and terrorism
which their program involved, the Nazi leaders and their
associates created and utilized a numerous organization, chief
among which are the
Having in view the foregoing, and in order to press on with the necessary practical measures to bring to justice the criminals referred to, the President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union have agreed upon the following:
I
The German leaders and their associates, and the organizations
employed by them, such as those referred to above, will be
charged with both the commission of their atrocious crimes, and
also with joint participation in a broad criminal enterprise
which included and intended these crimes, or was reasonably
calculated to bring them about. The allegation of the criminal
enterprise will be so couched as to permit full proof of the
entire Nazi plan from its inception and the means used in its
furtherance and execution, including the pre-war atrocities and
those committed against their own nationals, neutrals,
II
The trial of the charge described in Article I and the determination of the guilty parties will be carried out in two stages:
(a) There will be brought before an
international tribunal to be created the highest ranking German
leaders to a number fairly representative of the groups and
organizations charged with complicity in the basic criminal
plan. Adjudication will be sought not only of the guilt of those
individuals physically before the tribunal, but also of the
complicity of the members of the organizations included within
the charge. The tribunal will make findings adjudicating the
facts established, including the nature and purposes of the
criminal plan, the identity of the groups and organizations
guilty of complicity in it, and the acts committed in its
execution. The tribunal will sentence those individual
defendants physically before it who are convicted.
The above will complete the mission of this international tribunal.
(b) Thereafter, other individuals charged
with specific atrocities and members of the organizations who
are charged with complicity through such membership in the basic
criminal plan but against whom there is not sufficient proof of
specific atrocities shall, unless held for trial by one of the
United Nations or sent back for trial under the provisions of
the Moscow Declaration, be brought before occupation or other
appropriate tribunals. The findings of the tribunal in the trial
provided for in paragraph (a) of this
Article will be taken to constitute a general adjudication of
the criminal character of the groups and organizations referred
to, binding upon all the members thereof in their subsequent
trials in occupation tribunals or in other tribunals established
under this instrument. In these subsequent trials the only
necessary proof of guilt of any particular defendant, as regards
the charge of complicity, will be his membership in one of those
organizations. Proof will also be taken of the nature and extent
of the individual’s participation.
(c) The defendant in each case shall, upon
conviction, suffer death or such other punishment as the
tribunal may direct, depending upon the gravity of the offense
and the degree of culpability of the defendant.
III
The tribunal for the trial of the basic crime referred to in
Article II (a) shall consist of seven
members, to be appointed as follows: one each by the British
Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet Union, and France,
and three by agreement among the other United Nations who become
parties to this instrument.
The members of the tribunal may be civilian or military as the appointing authority in each case may prefer.
IV
(a) There shall be created a full time
executive group consisting of one military representative each
of the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet
Union, and France. This group shall be assisted by an adequate
staff of attorneys and research personnel to compile and analyze
data, prepare the charges to conform to the proof and arrange
the evidence for presentation to the international tribunal.
(b) The presentation of the case before
the international tribunal shall be made by persons designated
by the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet
Union, and France, each of these countries being entitled to
designate one person, who may be its member of the executive
group referred to in paragraph (a) of
this Article.
V
(a) The emoluments and expenses of those
members of the tribunal provided for in Article III, designated
by the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Soviet
Union, and France, and of the executive group provided for in
Article IV (a), shall be borne by the
respective Governments just mentioned.
(b) The emoluments and expenses of the
other three members of the tribunal shall be borne by the
Governments of the other United Nations parties to this
instrument.
(c) The emoluments and expenses of the
staff assisting the executive group, and of secretarial staffs
for the tribunal and the executive group, and incidental
expenses, such as rent, heat, light, stationery and printing,
shall be borne by the parties to this instrument in equal
shares.
VI
All members of the United Nations shall be invited by the Government of the United Kingdom, acting on behalf of the other signatories hereto, to adhere to this instrument. Such adherence shall in each case be notified to the Government of the United Kingdom which shall promptly inform the other parties to this instrument.
Done at _____________ this the _____________ day of _____________, 1945.
I have noticed in the press that you are to participate in the forthcoming international conference. Recently, the War Refugee Board has received several urgent requests from Jewish organizations in this country for the issuance of a United Nations’ warning to the German Government and the German people against further extermination and other forms of persecution of Jews in Germany and German-occupied territory. It occurs to me that, if you find it feasible to do so, this matter might be raised by you at the conference.
As you know, we have never been able to get the Russians to join us
in any of our past statements, other than the Moscow Statement on
Atrocities issued on November 1, 1943. It is my feeling that if a
new warning to the Germans were issued by President
For your convenience, alternative drafts of such a warning are attached.
Draft A
A declaration released by us on November 1, 1943, has warned Germans and their remaining satellites against continuing their ruthless campaign of atrocities, massacres, and mass-executions. Since that time, new evidence has been discovered in territories liberated by the United Nations, indicating that these cruelties are being continued. In liberated United Nations territory—in the Soviet Union, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Yugoslavia, in Greece, in Norway, in the Netherlands, in Belgium, in Luxemburg, and in France, as well as in the territories of Germany’s former allies—in Italy, in Hungary, in Bulgaria, and in Rumania, evidence has been piling up of brutal treatment and barbarous murder of nationals of the United Nations and of Jews of whatever nationality. There are indications that German troops and officials, previous to retreating, prepare to exterminate large numbers of local inhabitants and of Jewish deportees and internees in the territories still occupied by Germany, and that they prepare to extend this policy of mass-extermination to foreign deportees and to Jews of whatever nationality within German territory.
In the face of this evidence and of these indications, we
consider it our solemn duty once more to issue this solemn
warning that all participants in this savage scheme of
mass-murder, whether they are
Draft B
Despite the protests of the whole civilized world, the Nazis, in their hour of defeat, apparently are preparing to complete in frenzied hatred the systematic mass murder of the Jews regardless of nationality and other groups in German and German-occupied territory. We, in the hour of victory, again call upon the German Government and the German people to cease these acts of unspeakable savagery.
Let the Germans and their collaborators understand that all participants in this program of persecution and death shall receive full and prompt punishment; that all who share the guilt shall share the punishment. Let them know that this warning is supported by the determination and the full military might of outraged and victorious peoples.
4526. At the request of General
I have now received a reply from
“The immediate rendering of assistance and return to their homes of Soviet prisoners and also Soviet citizens forcibly deported by the Germans to Germany and German occupied countries who have been liberated as a result of Allied military operations in the west is of interest to the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government is prepared to accept in principle the proposals which Mr.
Harriman set forth in his letter of August 30 concerning measures regarding the return of American and Soviet war prisoners to their homeland.The Soviet Government is prepared to designate representatives to study plans with American representatives concerning the reciprocal repatriation of war prisoners and interned nations [
nationals] of both countries and also concerning the evacuation to the Soviet Union of Soviet citizens who have been forcibly deported by the Germans.In this respect the Soviet Government has in mind that the above mention should also cover fully all those Soviet war prisoners and other Soviet nations [
nationals] who have been previously set free, some of whom were sent to the United States and are there at the present time.The Soviet Government in this respect desires to bring to the attention of the American Government the inadmissibility, in relations between Allied countries, of a situation in which the above mentioned Soviet citizens are held in American prisoner of war camps together with German war prisoners—our common enemies—and subordinated to administrations of these camps which are appointed from German prisoners.
The American Government is requested by the Soviet Government to see that this situation is immediately corrected and that the Soviet Ambassador in Washington is furnished by the appropriate American authorities full information regarding these Soviet Nationals, such information to contain data on the number of such prisoners, their whereabouts and living conditions. In this respect, the Soviet Government considers that these citizens should be regarded not as war prisoners but as free nationals of an Allied power and that they should consequently be placed in barracks separate from enemy war prisoners and that they should be accorded normal living conditions in the United States until they are repatriated. The hope is expressed, furthermore, that all questions connected with the appointment of the administrations at the residence of the Soviet nationals and with their movements on American territory until they are returned to their homeland be reached in agreement with the Soviet Embassy.
Until these Soviet nationals are repatriated to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government hopes that the American authorities will furnish them sufficient food, medical-sanitary services and clothing
in agreement with Soviet representatives. The Soviet Government will reimburse the American Government for expenses undergone in this respect. It goes without saying that those special questions regarding American prisoners in the Budapest and Rumanian areas, brought up in the Ambassador’s and Mr.
Kennan ’s letters, may be discussed at the meeting of our representatives authorized to study the question of repatriation of American-Soviet nationals.It would be appreciated if you would transmit the contents of this letter to the American Government and inform me of the reply to the questions raised in it.”
5053. I have received a letter from Vyshinski (Supra.
18. Department is extremely anxious that in any discussion concerning
the repatriation of American and Soviet prisoners of war and
civilians that there be no connection between the return of
Americans found in German prisoner of war and civilian internment
camps on the one hand, and Soviet nationals found among German
prisoners of war taken by the American forces on the other hand.
Among the persons found fighting with the German troops are a few with Slavic names who disclaim Soviet nationality. Over 1100 Soviet nationals found fighting with German troops were turned over to the Soviet authorities at a west coast port last week. A further report of the problems which have arisen in this connection will be sent to you for your information.
Soviet Draft of Reciprocal Agreement
In reply to Embassy’s note of December 11th,
“1. All Soviet citizens liberated by Allied Armies and British subjects liberated by the Red Army will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until repatriation.
British and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.
2. Both sides shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other side of Soviet or British citizens or subjects respectively found by them, at the same time taking the steps which follow from this agreement. Soviet and British repatriation representatives will immediately be permitted into the concentration camps and points where citizens of their country are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration, establish internal order and administration in accordance with laws of their country.
The Commandant’s organisation of the camp and civilian protection will be established in accordance with the directions of the military commandant within the zone in which the given camp is located.
The removal of camps as well as transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be accomplished only in agreement between competent Soviet and British authorities. Enemy propaganda directed against the contracting sides or against United Nations will not be allowed among liberated citizens.
3. The competent British and Soviet authorities will supply liberated Soviet citizens and British subjects with food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the authorities at the other side at places agreed upon between the sides on the following basis:
- Ex-prisoners of war shall be provided with all forms of supply (stores and food) on a basis laid down respectively for privates, noncommissioned officers and officers.
- Civilians will be supplied on a basis laid down for privates.
The parties will not mutually demand compensation for these or other services which their authorities may respectively supply to liberated Soviet citizens or British subjects.
4. Soviet and British military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of respective governments to liberated British subjects and Soviet citizens as competent Soviet and British authorities shall agree upon between themselves beforehand.
Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of Allied occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.
In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and British governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens, necessary settlements with the
governments of respective territory who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose. 5. Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the parties until their repatriation may be employed on work in aiding the common war effort as to which competent Soviet and British authorities shall agree among themselves. The question of payment and other labour conditions shall be determined in agreement between these authorities.
6. Both parties shall use all means at their disposal to ensure the evacuation to the rear of the above-mentioned citizens or subjects of the other party if this proves necessary and quickest possible repatriation of these persons.
7. If the British Government agree to these principles the Soviet Government suggests presentation of note and British reply to it should constitute an agreement which would guide the parties in this matter.”
683. For 8], 1945, from
post, p. 697.
Repeat to Moscow.
Dear Ed: Since I have not had an
opportunity to see you, there are two matters that I would like to
bring to your attention before the coming Conference.
One has to do with Prisoners of War. The Russians feel deeply about
this problem, which affects hundreds of thousands of their people
who have been brutally treated by the Germans and who are now being
liberated in growing numbers by the Allied Armies. As you know, the
Russians are pressing the American and British Governments, through
their Military Missions in Moscow, to sign bilateral agreements
providing for reciprocal treatment by each Government of each
other’s liberated nationals on the standard applied to its own
soldiers. In this respect the Russians regard both soldiers and
civilians as being in the same category.
One of the factors which have made this question difficult to handle with the Russians, and which has great psychological and political importance for future Allied relations, is that we have been unable to get to grips with it in the European Advisory Commission. At the end of November the British, the Russians and the French were ready to discuss it in a special subcommittee set up by the Commission. The subcommittee was unable to meet since I was left totally without instructions. Other Delegations were naturally unwilling to treat with an American Delegation which could only sit and listen.
In October I sent back a draft directive on United Nations Prisoners
of War,
Concurrently, ten commissioned and ten noncommissioned U. S. officers
are waiting in London for visas to go to Russia and look after
It is also very important for us to have an instruction or an
approved draft directive on treatment of Displaced Persons, since
the Russians and our other continental Allies are also deeply
concerned about their civilian deportees and political prisoners in
Germany and will want to deal with this question along with that of
Prisoners of War. I have been asking Washington for an instruction
on Displaced Persons since November, and have had no indication that
it is being prepared there for presentation in the European
Commission along with the Prisoners of War paper.ante, p.
133.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I wish you every success in the coming Conference.
Memorandum of Agreement
The following represents the agreed views of the respective United States and United Kingdom authorities concerning the shipment of supplies to liberated European countries during the first six months of 1945;
1. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force has signified his willingness to allocate to the French Provisional Government and to the Belgian Government certain port facilities and inland clearance for national government import programs separate from and additional to military programs.
2. A four-party committee consisting of representatives of the French Provisional Government, the United States and the United Kingdom Governments and Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force has reviewed and recommended an import program put forward by the French Provisional Government. It is expected that the import program of the Belgian Government will be recommended through a similar procedure in the near future.
3. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration has
submitted a program for Italy. The Supreme Allied Commander
Mediterranean has endorsed it provided that its implementation
4. It is expected that in due course import programs will be put forward in a similar manner for other liberated European countries by their governments or by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration on their behalf.
5. The French import program and the other import programs when received are endorsed for planning purposes and the United States and United Kingdom agencies concerned should as necessary facilitate, through the established procedures, procurement against these programs so that supplies will be readily available for shipment.
6. Subject to military necessity, ships are to be allocated against these programs for January, February and March loading from North America as follows:
7. There is attached a Table showing for the period January through June 1945 the overall shipping deficiency. The deficit cannot be met by minor adjustments and calls for decision at the coming conference of heads of Governments In the meantime the responsible United States and United Kingdom civilian and military authorities should consider what recommendations they can make to the coming conference of the heads of Governments to reduce the deficit either by downward adjustment of programs or more effective use of shipping.
8. Pending the final decision the allocations referred to in
Paragraph 6 are not to be reduced except in the face of military
necessity and not without prior discussion with Mr.
9. The theater commander, the Allied governments, the combined Boards and the departments and agencies concerned of the United States and United Kingdom Governments are to be notified of the action agreed under paragraphs 5 and 6.
10. Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to alter any present procedures whereby the availability of shipping tonnage shall be determined by the appropriate shipping authorities after clearance with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff. It is also understood that the determination of port and inland clearance capacity shall be certified by the theater commander.
Dear Mr. Hopkins:
Memorandum of Agreement
In initialling this agreement on behalf of His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, I must refer to the interpretation of clause 10 which I should have liked to see clarified if time had permitted and if all those concerned had been accessible.
I interpret this clause as a “no prejudice” clause leaving present procedures for the determining of shipping availability as they stand and making it clear that this document in no way compromises any position or claim of anyone as to what those procedures are or should be. I do not interpret it, and I feel sure that it cannot reasonably be interpreted, as introducing any change whatever in current procedures. As you know, my understanding is that these procedures do not provide for “clearance” in the sense of a veto by the military authorities on civilian shipping allocations, but do in practice result in the fullest exchange of information and consultation between the shipping authorities and the Chiefs of Staff.
Yours sincerely,
[Excerpt]ante,
p. 201.
Memorandum for the Secretary of State:
The Shipping Situation and the Law Mission
There is, therefore, no need to go into it in any detail here. The
statement of the need for a civilian rehabilitation program for
Europe and particularly for France and Belgium, was made by Mr.
There are grave political dangers in a large unemployed population,
which is also hungry and ill-clothed, and these dangers may affect
the military situation as well. All this the armed services realize
but they take this position, and I do not see how it can be
successfully attacked:
The overall shipping survey has shown a substantial deficit of ships for military purposes. The war is in a critical stage where if it can be shortened by as much as a month the boon to civilian populations will be immeasurably greater than any intervening allocations of ships can induce. The point is that there can not be set up any fixed programs such as the Russian protocols for European or other relief areas while ships are short items and the war is at its present pitch. Do it on a spot basis in consultation with the military and naval authorities in spite of the inconveniences this may cause in long range planning and the chances are greatly in favor of there being a substantial number of ships in addition to the military-civilian programs.
The only alternative is to cut out some approved operations and that would not be palatable to the people of this country or desirable from the point of view of the intended beneficiaries.
I believe this matter will be brought up at the conference—probably on a high level—but I believe that no satisfactory solution can be reached which does not recognize the above principles.
I attach a copy of the Ante, pp.
420–422.
C. C. S. 765/1
Subjects for Consideration at the Next U.
S.- British-U. S. S. R. Staff Conference
1. The United States Chiefs of Staff suggest that the following subjects be considered at the next U. S.-British-U. S. S. R. staff conference:
a. The War Against Germany
(1) Enemy dispositions, capabilities and intentions. (A discussion and exchange of information.)
(2) Coordination of operations in western Europe and Italy with
operations in eastern Europe.
(3) Shuttle bombing and arrangements for staging and/or basing units of Fifteenth Air Force in Vienna-Budapest area.
(4) Military aspects of Zones of Occupation in Germany and Austria.
(Discussion of the necessity that the areas allotted each nation,
particularly in Berlin and Vienna, contain adequate military
administrative
b. War Against Japan
(1) Japanese dispositions, capabilities and intentions in the Far East.
(A discussion and exchange of information.)
(2). Russian participation in the war against Japan:
2. In this connection General
3. Aside from discussion at the conference concerning broad strategic objectives of the U. S. S. R. in the Pacific war, the Russians may wish to discuss with the U. S. staff representatives the operational details such as the supply project now under way for stockpiles in Siberia and other operational details.
C. C. S. 765/4
Subjects for Consideration at the Next U.
S.- British-U. S. S. R. Staff Conference
1. The British Chiefs of Staff agree with the subjects proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff for discussion at the next U. S.-British-U. S. S. R. staff conference, as set out in C. C. S. 765/1.
2. With reference to Item a. (4) in paragraph
1 of C. C. S. 765/1, the British Chiefs of Staff point out that the
French are now represented on the European Advisory Commission and
have already expressed their views on French participation in
control of Germany and Austria. Thus it would seem to the British
Chiefs of Staff that any conclusions reached at the conference on
the military aspects of the Zones of Occupation in these countries,
should either take into account French aspirations or else be
subject to discussion with the French after the conference.
C. C. S. 765/8
Agenda for the Next U. S.-British Staff Conference
The British Chiefs of Staff suggest the following agenda for the
discussions at Cricket
1. The War Against Germany
(A) Strategy in Northwest Europe
(i) Discussion with General
(ii) Draft directive to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force will be tabled by the British Chiefs of Staff.
(B) Strategy in the Mediterranean
(i) Discussion with
(ii) Draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean will be tabled by the British Chiefs of Staff.
(C) Coordination of Operations on the Three European Fronts Bomblines and air liaison with the Russians.
(D) The U-Boat Threat
Memorandum may be tabled by the British Chiefs of Staff.
(E) The Combined Bomber Offensive (Unless disposed of separately)
(F) Planning Date for the End of the German War
2. The War Against Japan
(A) Strategy in Southeast Asia Command (
Draft directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command will be tabled by the British Chiefs of Staff.
(B) Allocation of Resources between
(C) Pacific Operations
Proposals tabled by the United States Chiefs of Staff.
(D) Planning Date for the End of the Japanese War
3. Review of Cargo Shipping
Consideration of report in the light of discussions on strategy.
4. Basic Undertakings in Support
of Over-All Strategic Concept
About the draft we discussed over the phone this noon.
It seems to me the communiqué might well begin with a restatement of Allied war aims, in which it would be declared that our purpose was not the destruction of a nation or of a people, but the destruction of the military might of our enemies and preventive measures which would assure the world that our enemies would not be able to renew their threat to the peace of the world. These objectives will be attained by the unconditional surrender of the German armies, the disbanding of those armies, the destruction or removal of military equipment, the neutralization, so far as military production is concerned, of German industry, the punishment of war criminals, and the termination of the propaganda of international hatred and of racial superiority to which the German people had been subjected. This list of the measures to be taken is, of course, incomplete. I put it here merely to suggest the desirability of restating the unconditional surrender principle in a context which will make its meaning clear— viz, the fact that unconditional surrender is a means to obtain the liquidation of the German military menace rather than a means to destroy the German nation or its people. This can best be done, in my opinion, by an affirmative statement rather than a negative statement.
The communiqué would then go on to state the Allied peace aims,
putting first among those aims the completion of the world
organization discussed at Dumbarton Oaks, but referring, at the same
time, to the negotiation of bilateral agreements, such as were
contemplated in and by the Dumbarton Oaks conversations. This part
of the communiqué should reaffirm, in the most emphatic language
possible, the purpose of the Allies, not merely to win a peace, but
to create one—and, above all, their
purpose to create the peace in terms of international organization.
The references to international organization should not be limited
to the security organization only, but much should be made of the
intention to remove the causes of war in the economic and social
field and to improve the lot of humanity through advances in
education, in health, in food, etc., in living standards generally,
etc. etc. This part of the communiqué would gain great strength if
it included an announcement of the date of the next
The point should be made that actions taken with reference to Germany will be taken by the three principal belligerents in their capacity as nations allied for the prosecution of the war, whereas the creation of the peace will be the work of the three allied powers acting in concert with the United Nations.
A third part of the communiqué would deal with the policy of the Allies toward liberated areas. It would be a blessing to the world if we could walk straight up to this question. If the Allies are agreed on the two points which have been repeatedly made by the President and the Secretary of State, and if the two points could be stated in conjunction, it would go far to clear up one of the most potentially dangerous spots in the whole public opinion picture. The two points are, first, that the peoples of the liberated areas are to have an opportunity, when conditions permit them to express their will, to decide for themselves what kind of government they want; second, that they can have any kind of government they want, so long as it is not a government, the existence of which would endanger the peace of the world—and a fascist government, in our opinion, does endanger the peace of the world by its mere existence.
[This memorandum was discussed with Mr. MacL[eish]
The Department of State has the typewritten ribbon copy (Top Secret) of
what is entitled “Record of
“While I was Secretary of State I maintained a Record of my principal official activities in Washington, believing that a view of the immediate past can be a guide for the future. This record is based on personal conversations, letters, cables, press reports and considerable other material. It is a straight factual account, omitting any personal comments except for my own conversations. . . .
“In order to focus important features of the wide panorama of world affairs, the Record is for the most part divided into weekly Sections, with these Sections further divided into topical subsections. ... In the course of developing the Record, Sections One to Five were set down in the third person, while the first person has been used in the remainder of the narrative.”
Since the Record was maintained only for the periods during which
The excerpts from this Record which are reproduced on the following pages
represent those portions from the period December 1, 1944–January 23,
1945 which concerned preparations for the conferences at Malta and Yalta
or dealt with negotiations on subjects that came up for discussion at
those conferences. (As noted in the introduction, p. xiii, the
The Record contains a considerable number of references to sources from which the Record was compiled, such as “Secretary’s appointments”, “Summaries of Telegrams”, and “News Digests”. In the portions of the Record presented herein, these source references have been omitted and have been replaced, wherever appropriate, by cross-references to pertinent documents contained in this volume.
Week of 1–9 December 1944
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trouble in Italy and Greece
A statement of “Special Information for the President” which I had signed
December 1, carried the following item:ante, pp. 213, 250, 266.
“The British Ambassador has clearly stated to
Bonomi that the appointment ofSforza as Foreign Minister would be unacceptable.Kirk considers this an undue interference in Italian internal affairs which, since Itaty is a theatre of combined operations, to some extent involves the United States.”
On Monday, December 4, according to Mr.
“The next morning I informed the Secretary of State by telephone in
regard to the great number of queries now pending before the Department
and read him the statement as drafted for his approval with the
suggestion that it be released prior to the Press Conference in order
that he would not be subjected to the very embarrassing questions which
were being put to the Department by the correspondents. The Secretary
after hearing the statement, which he had me repeat several times,
instructed me to take it to Mr. ante, pp. 266–267.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Questioned at his noon press conference shortly afterward, Secretary
A letter dated December 5 from Ambassador Ante, pp.
267–269.ante, p. 268.
On the morning of Wednesday the 6th, Mr.
Meanwhile Prime Minister ante, pp.
267–269, 271.
The President in replying to Ante, p.
271.
While deploring any difference, the President pointed to the “untenable
position in which we were put” by
On inquiring of Dr. Ante, pp.
269–270.
The Secretary replied (having decided with Mr.
The Secretary concluded, “I must send a message to Ante, p.
272.
“I was interested to note that in his statement on the Greek situation on December 5 Prime Minister
Churchill told the House of Commons the following: ‘Our own position, as I have said is extremely clear. Whether the Greek people form themselves into a monarchy or republic is for their decision. Whether they form a government of the right or left is for their decision. These are entirely matters for them.’ With this statement I am in full agreement. It is also our earnest hope that the people and authorities of Greece and our British Allies will work together in rebuilding that ravished country.”
A wire from the Secretary to the President early that afternoon referred
to
Mr. Ante, pp.
271–272.sic].”
An aide-mémoire was drafted that dayAnte, pp.
273–274.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Toward the end of the week Lord
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Sixth of December
Wednesday the sixth was destined to be an active day, full of
complications. The first appointment was on US-
“Powers responsible for dependent territories should accept the principle of trusteeship, already applicable in the case of mandated territories. In such dependent territories the purpose of the trust is the welfare and advancement of the native peoples.
Colonial Powers should undertake to make regular reports to an international bodyanalogous to the Permanent Mandates Commission, set upwithin the framework of the General Organization. This body should be empowered to publish reports of its deliberations and toinspect dependent territories.”(underlining supplied)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Italy, Greece, and the Soviet-Polish
Border
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On Saturday the sixteenth Mr. ante, p.
214.
On Friday, Mr.
In Italy,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet-Polish Border
On Sunday, December 17 the Secretary received a phone call from Mr.
Ante, pp.
218–219.
Phoning Lord
Mr. ante, pp. 218–219.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
After issuance of the release, the Secretary told Mr. Post
has a very good editorial on it,” which acclaimed the statement as
“based squarely on war aims of the United Nations.”
In a memorandum to the President on Friday after an overly enthusiastic reaction by the Poles to Monday’s statement, the Secretary submitted a proposed letter to go to the Polish Prime Minister emphasizing that “we believe an early settlement of the frontier question would be a great benefit to the Polish nation and people.”
Various Developments Abroad
Lord ante, pp. 251–254.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On the eighteenth a memorandum to the PresidentAnte, p.
333.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Civilian Supply
At 11 o’clock Monday morning, Secretary
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
War Crimes
Mr. ante, pp. 401–402.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United Nations (Big-Three Conference)
On Saturday, December 30, newspapers reported that “
Soviet and Polish Problems
Late Friday afternoon (December 29) Secretary Uncle] Joe’ on Poland” and Miss
Saturday morning (December 30) Ambassador
Mr. Stettinius: Yes. We worked through the
night on it. I am seeing the President today. We must say the same
thing. . . .
The Secretary then called Mr.
After “the President agreed with ante, pp.
224–225.
The message was repeated to the Prime Minister with the notation:
“You will see we are in step.” This reference was in response to an
earlier plea for cooperation voiced by Mr. ante, p. 225, footnote 3.
Various Developments Abroad
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The hapless position of King
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Year’s Day
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Secretary told Mr.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United Nations
On WednesdayMr. Stettinius was hopeful “we
could have a United Nations Conference in the spring.”
Various Developments Abroad
Soviet and Polish Problems. During the New
Year weekend, Soviet Russia announced its recognition of the Lublin
Committee, and there was widespread alarm that this meant another
division among the Allies. However, the Secretary on Friday arranged
with the President that he could “tell the press that we were
consulted re Russia’s recognition of the Lublin National Committee
in Poland.”
. . . Meanwhile, discussions continued regarding handling of Soviet
prisoners of the Germans captured by Allied armies.Ante, p.
416.
As for Germany, the Department’s proposalante, pp.
166–171.Ante, p.
295.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
War Crimes. In asking for a report on the
status of the War Crimes Commission, the President told Secretary
Ante, p.
401.Ante, pp.
401–402.
Other. Ambassador ante, pp. 128–129.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United Nations
Preparation for the other conferences—the Big-Three Chiefs of
State—occupied much of my thought during these weeks. After
attending the annual meeting of the American Red Cross on the
morning of the eighth, I saw Messrs. Ante, pp.
66–68.
On Wednesday the tenth I told the members of my Staff Committee to
speed up preparation of memoranda for the President to take to the
meeting of the Big-Three, that the material should be ready on
January 18th, and all memoranda in the hands of Mr. See ante, pp.
42–43.
I told Mr.
On the same occasion I explained that if things went well at the
Big-Three meeting, I wanted to be able to cable Mr.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Of course, the major matter outstanding from the Dumbarton Oaks
Conference to be considered at the conference was the procedure for
voting, and on the tenth I asked Mr. Ante, p. 77.
When the forthcoming conference of the Big-Three first became known
to the public, it was not stated that I would accompany the
President. A good deal of newspaper comment began to develop.
Senator
Details and plans for the big trip were discussed on the eighteenth
with Major Tyson and Major Ante, p.
338.
At 3:30 on Tuesday the 23rd I held a small off-the-record meeting of the members of the party in final preparation for our departure.
A hopeful sign for international cooperation appeared in a successful
Ante, pp.
97–100.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A number of financial and economic matters involved relations with
the Soviet Union. Ambassador Aide-Mémoire which asked a postwar credit of six billion
dollars to run for thirty years at 2½ per cent a year, and which
suggested that development of friendly relations would depend upon a
generous credit.Ante, pp.
310–315.
I wrote Secretary Morgenthau that we had studied the Treasury’s
letter of January 1 to the President,Ante, pp.
309–310.Ante, pp.
316–317.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soviet authorities were pleased that Dr.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On my return to Washington, Wednesday, January 17th, I met with the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the Capitol. I had a very
friendly reception. I spoke for thirty or forty minutes and was
questioned for about the same time. Nothing arose of an embarrassing
or dangerous nature. Mr.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Various Developments Abroad
Europe. The Polish Ambassador called on me
Tuesday morning January 9th asking what the next step of our
Government would be on the Polish situation. The Ambassador pressed
me to say that I personally felt it would be advantageous for
The Soviet Government took an aggressive attitude toward our
releasing Soviet nationals captured by our forces, regardless of
retaliatory measures the Germans might take against American
prisoners of war; and it appeared urgent for us to express our views
emphatically as soon as we had received all necessary information
from the War Department. When Secretary
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . We informed Ambassador ante, pp.
143–154. For ante, pp. 132, 133.providing] for immediate activation in London
of the Control Council for Germany.ante, p.
180.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
At my press conference on the nineteenth a correspondent inquired
whether the U. S. policy was still the same regarding punishment of
Memorandum for the President:
I attach a letter from General
General
I have furnished the Secretary of State with a copy of General
Dear General Marshall: Now that I have been in Russia
for some time and am qualified as an “expert,” I think it might be
of some interest to you to have my general reactions. They may be of
value to you since I have served under you long enough to enable you
to evaluate them. A report is always more useful if one knows the
reporter.
Everyone will agree on the importance of collaboration with
Russia—now and in the future. It won’t be worth a hoot, however,
unless it is based on mutual respect and made to work both ways. I
have sat at innumerable Russian banquets and become gradually
nauseated by Russian food, vodka, and protestations of friendship.
This picture may be overdrawn, but not much. When the Red Army was back on its heels, it was right for us to give them all possible assistance with no questions asked. It was right to bolster their morale in every way we could. However, they are no longer back on their heels; and, if there is one thing they have plenty of, it’s self-confidence. The situation has changed, but our policy has not. We still meet their requests to the limit of our ability, and they meet ours to the minimum that will keep us sweet.
The truth is that they want to have as little to do with foreigners, Americans included, as possible. We never make a request or proposal to the Soviets that is not viewed with suspicion. They simply cannot understand giving without taking, and as a result even our giving is viewed with suspicion. Gratitude cannot be banked in the Soviet Union. Each transaction is complete in itself without regard to past favors. The party of the second part is either a shrewd trader to be admired or a sucker to be despised.
We have obtained some concessions after exerting all the pressure we
could assemble. These included the Frantic
The picture is not all bad. The individual Russian is a likeable
person. Their racial characteristics are similar to ours.
Individually I think they would be friendly if they dared to
be—however, I have yet to see the inside of a Russian home.
Officials dare not become too friendly with us, and others are
persecuted for this offense. The Soviets have done an amazing job
for their own people—both in the war and in the pre-war period. One
cannot help admire their war effort and the spirit with which it has
been accomplished. We have
In closing, I believe we should revise our present attitude along the
following lines.
quid pro quo.
I think there is something here worth fighting for, and it is simply a question of the tactics to be employed. If the procedure I suggest above were to be followed, there would be a period in which our interests would suffer. However, I feel certain that we must be tougher if we are to gain their respect and be able to work with them in the future.
Sincerely yours,
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Soviet Foreign Policy
While you may not have time to read in full the enclosed lengthy
interpretive report from
90. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary.
Herewith my ninth interpretative report on developments in Soviet
policy based on the Press for the period October 13 to December 31
for distribution as suggested in my 2215, December 14, 2 p. m.,
1943.
Report begins: No. 9.
The relative lull in military activities on the Eastern Front has in effect given the Soviet Union a chance to pursue its political objectives in areas liberated by Russian Army. As a result the pattern of Soviet tactics in Eastern Europe and the Balkans has taken shape and the nature of Soviet aims has been clarified. It has become apparent that the Soviets, while eschewing direct attempts to incorporate into the Soviet Union alien peoples who were not embraced within the frontiers of June 21, 1941, are nevertheless employing the wide variety of means at their disposal—occupation troops, secret police, local communist parties, labor unions, sympathetic leftist organizations, sponsored cultural societies, and economic pressure—to assure the establishment of regimes which, while maintaining an outward appearance of independence and of broad popular support, actually depend for their existence on groups responsive to all suggestions emanating from the Kremlin. The tactics are endless in their variety and are selected to meet the situation in each particular country, dependent largely on the extent and strength of the resistance to Soviet penetration. It is particularly noteworthy that no practical distinction seems to be made in this connection between members of the United Nations whose territory is liberated by Soviet troops and ex-enemy countries which have been occupied.
The overriding consideration in Soviet foreign policy is the
preoccupation with “security”, as Moscow sees it. This objective
explains most of the recent Soviet actions which have roused
criticism abroad: the demand for unanimity of decision in the
council of the security organization; the opposition to regional
blocs; the sponsorship of puppet regimes in all contiguous
countries; the demand for the thorough purge of reactionary elements
in all liberated areas, the constant harping at the European
neutrals; the demands for vast oil and mineral concessions in Iran.
The Soviet Union seeks a period of freedom from danger during which
it can recover from the wounds of war and complete its industrial
revolution. The Soviet conception
1. The major theme of Allied unity, dominant since the Tehran and Moscow conferences, continued to be played in all major pronouncements on foreign affairs; but it had acquired a certain perfunctory quality; and a minor chord was introduced to condition the Soviet public for differences which the approaching end of war in Europe might bring. The German offensive in the Ardennes was dispassionately portrayed to the Soviet reader as a sally with limited objectives designed to throw the grand Allied offensive off balance. Meanwhile the Soviet reader was frequently reminded that the bulk of German manpower was engaged by the Red army in the East, and the press was quick to resent any implication that the Red army was not doing its share and that the operations in Hungary served primarily political aims.
2. Keen but wary interest continued to be manifested in projects for
international cooperation in various fields. No change occurred in
the Soviet attitude toward participation of the great powers in
voting in the security council on issues involving themselves, and
the Soviet position was reiterated by War and the Working Class in December advanced a proposal
for continental zones within the security organization in which the
great powers would be represented if their interests were involved.
This scheme was patently designed to offset projects for regional
blocs to which the Soviets, fearing that such blocs may sooner or
later be directed against the Soviet Union, are strongly
opposed.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. After several months of unsuccessful attempts to effect a
reconciliation on Soviet terms of the Lublin Committee with the more
moderate elements of the Polish Government in London, the Soviets
abandoned the effort following
The committee proceeded energetically with its program of land reform and by the end of the year was able to announce that the division of large estates and the distribution of the land to peasants had been practically completed in the area liberated to date. It was obvious that the parcelling up of the estates was uneconomic, since the new holdings were very small and their new owners often without draught animals and tools to work them. It appeared inevitable that some kind of cooperative or collective system would have to be introduced before the new holdings could be worked with any degree of efficiency. Meanwhile the reform doubtless served the purpose of increasing support for the Lublin Committee in an area where the Communist industrial element was small and the peasantry largely apathetic.
5. In the other United Nations countries on whose soil the Red army
was fighting, the situation was apparently much less complicated
than in Poland. After the entry of Soviet troops into Ruthenia a
mission headed by War and the Working Class on two occasions
took Czech Foreign Minister
The entry of Soviet troops into Belgrade was the occasion for a
message of gratitude and solidarity from
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. In the ex-enemy countries which have broken with Germany the Soviets have been interested primarily in the prompt and complete fulfillment of the armistice terms and the purge of former Fascist and Collaborationist elements. . . .
In contrast to its coolness toward Finland, the Soviet attitude toward Bulgaria was one of warmth and approbation. The abject and servile submission of the Bulgarian delegates during the Armistice negotiations, Soviet satisfaction with the Fatherland Front Government and the enthusiasm with which purge measures were adopted coupled with the traditional benevolence of the Russians for the Slav, Bulgars and the strategic position of Bulgaria adjacent to British occupied Greece, combined to create for Bulgaria a place of special privilege among the defeated powers. Suggestions for the federation of Bulgaria with Yugoslavia received the endorsement of the Soviet press.
Rumania remained the bad boy. Although Press material for the most
part was light, the Russians did not conceal their dislike for the
Rumanians and their dissatisfaction with Rumanian failure to
cooperate fully in meeting their obligations under the Armistice.
Vice Foreign Commissar
The coup d’état in Hungary following
7. The general attitude of the Press toward United Nations countries which were not liberated or in the process of liberation by Soviet troops was one of polite reserve. Soviet sympathy for the resistance forces in these countries which were frequently under Communist leadership was not concealed. . . .
ante, p. 292.
8. On the expressed assumption that the war was approaching its end
the press published rather less than the usual amount of material
against Germany. It expressed concern about efforts of leading Nazi
to flee Germany and the transfer of German resources to neutral
countries. . . . An appeal by 50 German generals headed by Marshal
Several reports of the Extraordinary State Commission described
ghastly German atrocities committed in the Baltic States and the
Lwów region. Long lists of Germans charged with responsibility
including Commanding Front generals formed part of the reports and
in one
9. Those European neutrals who are without diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union namely Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal were under almost constant Press attack. . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11. Refusal by Iran to consider the grant of oil concessions in
northern Iran to the Soviets until after the war led to a violent
campaign against the Saed Government which eventually brought about
its resignation. Mass meetings in Iran organized by Soviet
sympathizers and attacks on Saed in the left wing papers were fully
reported by the Soviet Press. It was alleged that Saed and his
government were Fascist in their outlook, that they maintained
contact with bandits who interfered with supply lines leading to the
Soviet Union, that their continuance in office was detrimental to
the prosecution of the war. At the height of the controversy Izvestiya asserted that there was no legal
basis for the presence of American troops in Iran. Saed Xiaedden
Seyid
Zia-ed-din
12. Most significant development in Soviet policy in the Far East was
Hostility continued to be expressed toward the
13. . . .
Great interest was manifested in the return of all categories of Soviet Nationals or persons who could be claimed as such particularly those found among German forces captured by Allies. A special commission was established to expedite repatriation. Extreme touchiness was shown over reported reluctance of many of these people to return and over alleged encouragement being given to such sentiments by foreign authorities. Press stories of warm reception accorded repatriates did not check with reports of Embassy observers and apparently reflected a desire to disarm the suspicions of those still abroad. Population transfers along western borders continued.
Press devoted much space to the progress of reconstruction in the Baltic area while inveighing against so called “Bourgeois-Nationalist” groups both there and in the Ukraine. It seemed clear that Nationalist remnants survived in these areas and were creating difficulties for the Soviet authorities.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
While occasional anti-religious articles still appear in the press
the trend is increasingly toward recognition of the church as a
beneficial factor in Soviet society. Metropolitan
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The document referred to in this volume as the President’s Log
constitutes the major portion of the 83-page booklet entitled “The
President’s Trip to the Crimea Conference and Great Bitter Lake, Egypt,
January 22 to February 28, 1945”. This booklet, which was prepared by
Lieutenant J. G. Rigdon and approved by the President’s Naval Aide, Vice
Admiral
The Malta Conference began on January 30, 1945, but President post, pp. 549–561.
Friday, February 2nd:
0000: In Mediterranean Sea, enroute Malta from
Gibraltar, steaming on various courses and at various speeds while
conforming to our prescribed routing.
0610: We sighted the island of Sicily, bearing
055, distant 50 miles.
0616: We sighted the islands of Goza
0935: We passed through the submarine net gate
and entered Grand Harbor, Valetta,
1001: The Quincy moored,
starboard side to, at Berth 9 in Grand Harbor, Valetta. The U. S. S. Memphis (light cruiser and flagship of Vice
Admiral SiriusOrion, in which he had his quarters.Quincy tied up.
Total distance steamed, Newport News to Malta, 4883 miles.
Quincy
had been moored: Mr.
A few days before our arrival at Malta we began to receive disconcerting
messages from the Prime Minister about the difficulties of reaching
Yalta and the unhealthy living conditions there. The first gun came from
Mr. Catoctin had accomplished a very effective
job of de-bugging at Yalta.
1020: Secretary of State Quincy to confer with the President. Sergeant
1042: His Excellency, the Governor-General of
Malta (Lieutenant General Sir Edmond Quincy and called on the President. The President was on deck
(port side, first superstructure deck) at the time, enjoying the warm
sun. He received all his distinguished guests there during the
forenoon.
1052: Admiral
1107: General of the Army
1143: Admiral
1148: Prime Minister Quincy and called on the President.
1155: The Right Honorable Anthony
1300: The President entertained at lunch in his
quarters aboard the Quincy. His guests included:
The Prime Minister, Mr.
1415: The Governor-General, Mrs.
1430: Vice Admiral Emory S.
1443: The President, the Governor-General, Mrs.
New York Times, December 11, 1943, pp. 1,
2.
To those of us who had been with the President on his previous visit, the many signs of rebuilding were most evident all about the island.
The weather was delightful. The average temperature was 58.
1625: The President and Mrs.
1630: The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff
came on board and the President met with them in his quarters. Present
were: Fleet Admiral post,
plate 3 following p. 546.
1800: The Prime Minister, accompanied by the
members of the British Staff, came on board. The President then met with
the Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (American and
British) in his cabin. Present were: The President, the Prime Minister,
Fleet Admiral
2000: The President was host at dinner in his
quarters. His guests included: The Prime Minister, Mr.
2215: The Prime Minister, Mr.
2230: Lieutenant (
2300: The President and members of his party left
the Quincy by automobile for the Luqa Airfield,
Malta. On arrival at the airfield they embarked in assigned aircraft to
await scheduled departure times. The entire British and American
delegations to the Conference at Yalta were on the move and departed
from Malta during the night. This involved approximately 700 people, so
that the Luqa airport was a very busy place throughout the night.
Commencing at about 2330, huge planes took off at about 10-minute
intervals all night long. The Air Transport Command aircraft specially
fitted for the President’s use was used by the President for all flights
on this cruise. It has private quarters for the President and an
elevator which lowers to ground level to facilitate his embarking and
disembarking.
The President turned in at once as his plane was not scheduled to take off until 0330 tomorrow.
2330:
2345: The special cargo aircraft transporting our
heavy baggage and freight departed Malta for Saki. Embarked were Agents
Dorsey and Williams and Messmen Estrada, Calinao, Floresca and Sarate.
Air Transport Command planes were used exclusively by the American
delegation.
Present
SecretariatBrigadier General
McFarland
Captain Graves
1. Agenda for Next U.
S.-British Staff Conference
(C. C. S. 765/8)Ante, p.
426.
General Marshall
said that this paper set forth the British Chiefs of Staff
suggestion for the agenda for the Combined Chiefs of Staff
discussions at Cricket
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve C. C. S. 765/8.
2. Overall Review of Cargo
Shipping
(J. C. S. 1205/3)post, pp. 536–538.
General Marshall
said that this subject was on the agenda in order to
determine the status of the study. J. C. S. 1205/3 contains the
recommendation of the Joint Staff Planners.
Admiral King
recommended approval of the paper as presented.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C.
S. 1205/3. (Memorandum subsequently circulated as C. C. S.
746/7)Post, pp.
536–538.
3. Strategy in Northwest
Europe
(J. C. S. 1237 Argonaut
General Marshall
said this subject had been placed on the agenda for
examination and discussion of Allied strategy in Northwest
Europe with a view to formulating the United States stand
thereon. He called upon General post, pp.
828–829.
General Smith
said that timing is the important consideration at
present. As much as possible to occupy German forces should be
accomplished while the Russian offensive is under way. Our
present operations were making good progress, and with the
withdrawal of the 15th Panzer Division, apprehension had been
relieved. The plan outlined in General
There were three distinct phases in General a) operations to the west of the Rhine,
(b) operations involving the
establishment of bridgeheads, and (c)
operations to the east of the Rhine.
In the first place, the logistics implications of operations
north of the Ruhr had been given serious study, and it had been
estimated by the 21st Army Group that 20 to 21 divisions could
be maintained in
In the Ruhr area of the Rhine where the main effort would take
place, there were three good and two possible points for
establishing bridgeheads. General Smith
desired to emphasize, however, that no matter how many
divisions were employed in the effort, the crossing would be
accomplished with but five, due to the restricted front. There
is no foundation in the British analogy between the
cross-Channel attack and the crossing of the Rhine. Our effort
will obviously be met in strength behind the Ruhr, and General
In the plan proposed by Field Marshal
All of
The decision has not yet been made as to the area in which the
secondary operation will be mounted. General
In answer to a question by Admiral General Smith
explained that it had been planned to provide a strategic
reserve of ten divisions. Our infantry divisions are completely
mobile and can be moved into position rapidly. If the secondary
effort is accepted, it must of course go forward rapidly and not
be allowed to stop at any point short of the objective. It is
felt that forward movement can be adequately maintained by the
rotation of the planned reserve.
In referring again to the planned effort in the Cologne-Bonn
area, General Smith
stated that
If it becomes impossible to accomplish the major effort before the 15th of March, the Germans could transfer divisions from the Eastern Front to the Western Front. We would then be extended west of the Rhine in a long line requiring 10 to 15 more divisions than if we were along the Rhine proper. If it becomes impossible to establish a firm bridgehead, it may be necessary to coordinate our operations with the Russians in June.
General Bull
explained the effect of the spring thaw, about 1 March, on
the Rhine crossings. In the lower Rhine area, crossings would
not be greatly affected, but upper Rhine crossings would not be
possible after the first of March until the high water and ice
had receded.
In response to an inquiry by General General Smith
explained that the operations in the Eifel area were all
part of the build-up for the main effort in the north. He
anticipated that General GrenadeVeritable
General Marshall
referred to the last sentence of the third paragraph of
Appendix “A” to J. C. S. 1237 and suggested certain amendments
in the light of the British position concerning the operations
referred to therein.
General Smith
emphasized the necessity for maintaining flexibility in
the Supreme Commander’s plans. It would be dangerous to try to
define in detail how the battle should be fought. Too much
depends upon the seizing of opportunities as they are presented.
General
General Marshall
referred to the fourth paragraph of Appendix “A” to J. C.
S. 1237 and suggested certain amendments affecting command
arrangements for
General Smith
said he felt that the British would not raise the question
of command at the present time. They had proposed that General
Alexander be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander, but due to
General
After further discussion,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Approved the memorandum in Appendix “A” of J. C. S. 1237 as
amended during the discussion and directed that it be presented
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as C.
C. S. 761/4 Argonaut
Present
Secretariat
1. Procedure for the
Conference
Sir Alan Brooke
Magneto
General Marshall
agreed to this proposal.
Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral King, in agreeing to this proposal,
stated that alterations in the timing might have to be made in
the light of circumstances.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to meet daily at 1430, circumstances permitting.
2. Agenda for the
Conference
(C. C. S. 765/8)Ante, p.
426.
Sir Alan Brooke
infra.
General Marshall
said that the United States Chiefs of Staff agreed to
these proposals. He felt, however, that one or two items should
be earmarked as susceptible of earlier consideration if time
allowed.
It was agreed that the U-boat threat and the planning date for the end of the Japanese war should be so earmarked.
3. German Flying Bomb and
Rocket Attacks
General Marshall
referred to the data made available by the British Chiefs
of Staff to enable him to show the Congress the scale of rocket
and flying bomb attacks on London. He explained that in the
course of his talk to the CongressCongressional
Record, January 22, 1945, vol. 91, p. 365).
Sir Alan Brooke
Sir Charles Portal
then explained the proposals for air action against the
rocket attacks and the course of action which it had been
decided to follow.
Sir Charles Portal
then explained the difficulties which had arisen with
regard to the United States proposal to use war-weary bombers
against industrial targets. The possibility of retaliation
against the unique target of London had been felt to outweigh
the advantages of the employment of this weapon.
General Marshall
then outlined certain discussions he had had at Allied
Force Headquarters with regard to the possibility of employing
small formations of fighter-bombers to attack communications
Sir Charles Portal
said that he was not accurately informed as to the
topography of the terrain above the underground factory
concerned and thought it likely that baffles had been erected
before the entrances. It was probably also extremely well
defended by guns; however, the possibility of skip bombing the
entrances to this factory was very well worth investigating.
With regard to attacks on communications, he had recently
discussed the possibility of further attacks on communications
with General
General Marshall
then referred to the possibility of the Germans
instigating suicide attacks on vital targets, particularly in
the Antwerp area in which the lock gates were a vital and
vulnerable target.
Some doubt was expressed as to the suitability of the German temperament to such a form of attack.
In reply to a question, Admiral King
said that the Japanese suicide attacks were, on the whole,
slightly less numerous than they had been, but they were still
difficult to meet and there was apparently no panacea for it.
The Commander of the Pacific Fleet had recently issued explicit
instructions as to the method of employing anti-aircraft gunnery
against these attacks.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Took note with interest of the above statements.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff adjourned
until 1430.
4. Strategy in Northwest
Europe
(C. C. S. 761/3 and 761/4)
At General Bedell General Bull
outlined the projected operations in Northwest Europe. The
first phase entailed a closing up to the Rhine and the
destruction of the enemy forces to the west of that river; the
second phase consisted of obtaining bridgeheads across the
Rhine; the third phase, of advancing into the heart of Germany
and defeating her armed forces. The first phase was now going
on. General Veritable
Grenade
General Bull
then outlined these two operations. Field Marshal
Turning to the second phase—the seizure of bridgeheads across the
Rhine—General Bull
explained that in the North between Emmerich and Wesel
there were three good and two possible positions for bridging
points. In the South, in the Mainz area, there were four good
bridging points and in addition two possible ones. In the
center, in the Cologne-Bonn area, there were three possible
bridging sites.
Field Marshal Veritable
Grenade
General Bull
explained that the Supreme Commander
The Supreme Commander had emphasized throughout the importance of
flexibility in his planning. All forces which could be
maintained would be employed in the northern thrust but the
short length of the river available for the crossings, together
with other limiting
General Bedell Smith
explained that the only factor which had altered since
General ante, p. 464, footnote
8.
Turning to the question of the distribution of forces, General Smith
explained that initially the Staff of 21st Army Group had
said that only about 21 divisions could be maintained in the
northern thrust; this strength was obviously too small a
proportion to use in the main thrust out of a total of some 85
divisions available. The Supreme Commander, however, had
directed that logistic arrangements be made to support initially
30 divisions in the main effort and later a total of 36
divisions. These arrangements were under way. Grave thought had
been given to the area in which the secondary effort should be
staged. The neighborhood of Cologne presented certain advantages
in that there could be no question of an Allied dispersal of
forces. On the other hand this area was so close to the area of
the main effort that the Germans could quickly reinforce between
these two threatened areas and little diversion of enemy
strength would be achieved. To sum up, in General
In reply to a question, General Smith
explained that it was obviously desirable to close the
Rhine throughout its whole length but that the Supreme Commander
did not intend to do this if resistance was such that the
operation would delay the main attack until midsummer or would
militate against an opportunity to seize a bridgehead and effect
a crossing in strength on the northern front. A discussion then
ensued as to the effect of the spring thaws on the possibilities
of crossing the Rhine. General Smith
and General Bull
explained
Sir Alan Brooke
Another doubt which had been felt by the British Chiefs of Staff
was in regard to the closing up to the Rhine on its whole
length, which it was felt would slow up the advance into
Germany. This point had already been cleared up by the
explanations given by General
General Smith
emphasized that the Supreme Commander intended to put into
the northern effort every single division which could be
maintained logistically. The plan called for an ultimate
strength of 36 divisions in the northern thrust. There would
also be about ten additional divisions in strategic reserve
available to exploit success. A very strong airborne force would
be used for the northern crossing. It was, however, impossible
to overlook the fact that the northern attack would, of
necessity, take place on a narrow four-divisional front and
might bog down. The southern advance
Sir Alan Brooke
General Marshall, in referring to a point
previously made by Field Marshal
Sir Alan Brooke
General Smith
gave the proposed general deployment of divisions. He said
that while 36 would be available for the northern thrust they
would not all be in the line at the same time. There would also
be a strategic reserve of about ten divisions which would permit
rotation. About 12 divisions would be used in the secondary
attack and the remainder would be holding relatively quiet
sectors of the line, where tired divisions could be rotated for
rest and refit.
Turning to the employment of French divisions, General Smith
said that every effort was being made to arm the new
divisions as quickly as possible. Equipment for the first three
of the new divisions was already moving, and they would be ready
for action together with their corps troops by the latter part
of April. The French had certain
Sir Alan Brooke
Sir Charles Portal
drew attention to paragraph 20 of
General Smith
said that as he understood it, it had never been General
General Bull
confirmed this view and said that such action had not been
intended if heavy fighting and consequent delay was thereby
entailed. However, closing up to the Rhine on its whole length
was obviously desirable if it could be achieved without
delay.
General Smith
said that if the Germans resisted our attack in the North
with their full strength it was likely that they would only have
Volksgrenadier divisions available to hold the ground west of
the Rhine to the south.
Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral King
drew attention to paragraph 22 which he felt clarified the
position.
In reply to a question by General Smith
said that the southern thrust was likely to start from
some position between the Siegfried Line and the Rhine. He felt
that about 12 divisions could successfully achieve this thrust
if the Germans concentrated to oppose the main effort and the
Siegfried Line would not impose an insuperable obstacle. In
general he felt that the Siegfried Line could be “nibbled
through” by two or three good divisions in 15 days in almost any
position.
Sir Alan Brooke
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Deferred action on the above subject pending further consideration by the British Chiefs of Staff.
5. Coordination of Operations
With the Russians
Sir Alan Brooke
General Marshall
confirmed that the United States Chiefs of Staff were
still in complete agreement with the contents of this message,
no answer to which had yet been received from the Russians. He
felt it would be necessary to raise the issue with them during
the forthcoming conference.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to press the Russians to agree at Argonaut
6. The Combined Bomber
Offensive
(C. C. S. 166 Series)
Sir Charles Portal
explained that his object in raising this question was to
find out if the United States Chiefs of Staff had any views on
the possible move of the Fifteenth Air Force from the
Mediterranean to Western Europe. Such a move, involving some
1,000 heavy bombers, would, of course, have considerable effect
on the potentialities in other theaters.
General Kuter
explained that C. C. S. 400/2
General Marshall
said that he had directed an examination of the
possibility of using the Fifteenth Air Force, or part of it,
from southern France, thus avoiding the bad weather over the Po
Valley. This proposal, however, had not commended itself to his
staffs.
Sir Charles Portal
pointed out that any large move as between theaters
should, he felt, be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
since it had a great effect on the strategy in the theaters
concerned. The number of bombers available in Italy, for
instance, very materially affected the possibility of
withdrawing ground forces from that theater.
General Marshall
said that as he remembered it, the agreement with regard
to the movement of the Fifteenth Air Force was designed to
permit the commander of the strategic air forces the freedom of
movement and flexibility to employ his forces temporarily in
whichever theater provided the best weather at that time. There
was in his mind no question of a permanent move of forces.
Sir Charles Portal
said that it had been felt that temporary moves of air
units to the United Kingdom was undesirable in view
Admiral King
said that he considered the permanent allocations of
forces to be the function of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If
necessary, the paper under discussion (C. C. S. 400/2) should be
modified to bring it into line with this view.
Sir Charles Portal
said that he was entirely reassured by General
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not at present contemplating the transfer of any formations of the Fifteenth Air Force from the Mediterranean.
7. Planning Date for the End
of the War With Germany
(C. C. S. 772)Post, pp.
478–480.
Sir Alan Brooke
General Marshall
explained that United States production planning was based
on a bracket of the first of July and the 31st of December,
1945.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Deferred action on C. C. S. 772 pending consideration by the United States Chiefs of Staff.
8. Planning Date for the End
of the War With Japan
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Reaffirmed the planning date for the end of the war against Japan
as recommended in paragraph 32 of C. C. S. 680/2.post, pp. 830–831.
9. The U-Boat Threat
Sir Andrew Cunningham
Further, the Germans were fitting a radar device on their
schnorkel which enabled them to detect the
In the last month there had been six sinkings in the Irish Sea,
an escort carrier had been torpedoed in the Clyde, and at least
four ships sunk in the Channel. He hoped, however, that the
position would improve, and, in fact, two submarines had been
sunk in the Irish Sea in the last week and a further one south
of Land’s End. The object was to force the submarines back into
deep water where the
The Chief of the Air Staff explained
that from the air point of view new devices were being brought
into action, . . . It must be remembered, however, that with a
submerged submarine using her schnorkel, the aircraft, even
after it had contacted the submarine, found difficulty in
sinking it since it could dive in some three seconds and left no
swirl at which to aim.
Sir Andrew Cunningham
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Took note with interest of the foregoing statements.
Proposed Programme of Work
Tuesday, 30th January
1. A. War Against Germany
1. C. Co-ordination of Operations
Bomblines, etc.
1. E. Combined Bomber Offensive
1. F. Planning Date for End of German War
Wednesday, 31st January
1. B. Strategy in Mediterranean
2. War Against Japan
Thursday, 1st February
2. C. Pacific Operations
2. D. Planning Date for End of Japanese War
1. D. U-Boat Threat
Friday, 2nd February
3. Review of Cargo Shipping
4. Basic undertakings
Castille,
C. C. S. 772
Planning Date for the End of the War With
Germany
We have reviewed the planning date for the end of the war against Germany as follows:—
1. In considering German capacity to resist we have been guided
by the latest study by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee on
this subject. Their conclusions are:—
2. Based on the above, we have considered three cases:
the best case
3. It is clear from paragraph 1 a. above
that there is a possibility that the result of the present
Russian offensive may lead to a German collapse by mid-April. We
do not consider, however, that there is sufficient likelihood of
this timing being realised to justify its acceptance, for
planning purposes, as the earliest date for the defeat of
Germany.
the reasonably favourable case
4. Eastern Front. Distance and stiffening
German resistance may well bring the Russians to a halt on
approximately the line Landsberg–Giant Mountains. Thereafter,
the Russians will have to re-establish their communications and
prepare for a further major offensive as soon as weather
conditions and their logistics allow. This might be in mid-May
or early June.
5. Western Front. Preliminary operations
to reach the Rhine should be completed before the end of March.
An all-out Allied offensive could then be launched in the latter
part of April or early May, with the object of isolating the
Ruhr and advancing deep into Germany.
6. The result of these two offensives, if successful, should bring the end of organised German resistance by the end of June.
the unfavourable case
7. Eastern Front. In this case, we assume
that the Russian advance is stopped short of Upper Silesia.
Thereafter, if all factors are unfavourable, the combination of
German resistance and Russian logistic difficulties may prevent
a further major Russian offensive from being launched until the
late summer.
8. Western Front. The Allied offensive in
the spring may fail to achieve any decisive result. This might
be caused by too great a dispersion of effort along the whole
front, together with the qualitative superiority of the German
heavy tanks and jet-propelled aircraft. It would then be
necessary to re-group with a view to launching another
offensive. This offensive could be launched in the summer, but
it might well suffer in weight and momentum as the result of a
successful U-boat campaign of which the effects are likely to be
felt in the third quarter of the year.
9. In these circumstances we consider that the results of these two offensives, particularly the Russian, should bring about the end of German organised resistance by the beginning of November.
conclusion
10. There is a possibility that, as a result of the present Russian offensive, Germany may be defeated by the middle of April. This, however, should be regarded as a bonus and should not influence our production or manpower planning.
For planning purposes, we consider that:—
Present
No record of the substance of this meeting has been found.
Orion in Grand
Harbor, Malta. The information given here as to the meeting and
the participants is taken from
Present
SecretariatBrigadier General
McFarland
Captain Graves
1. Approval of Minutes of
the C. C. S. 182d
MeetingAnte, pp.
467–477.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend approval of the Conclusions of the C. C. S. 182d Meeting and approval of the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.
2. Strategy in Northwest
Europe
(C. C. S. 761/3 and 761/4)
General Marshall
said that the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of
Staff in C. C. S. 761/4 had been presented at the 182d Meeting
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (30 January 1945) and discussed
at that time. He called on General
General Bull
said that immediately following the meeting of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, General
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Took note of the foregoing statement.
3. Planning Date for End of
War With Germany
(C. C. S. 772Ante, pp.
478–480.
General Marshall
said that C. C. S. 772, the British memorandum on this
subject, had been presented at the Combined Chiefs of Staff 182d
Meeting (30 January 1945). Action had been deferred pending
consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Staff Planners had studied the British proposals and
now recommend in J. C. S. 1239 that action on C. C. S. 772
relative to the planning date for the end of the war with
Germany be deferred until the end of the tripartite
conversations at Argonaut
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff defer
action on C. C. S. 772 until the conclusion of Argonaut
4. Strategy in the
Mediterranean
(C. C. S. 762; J. C. S. 1236 and J. C. S. 1236/1; C. C. S.
773)post, p. 485, footnote 5.
General Marshall
said that J. C. S. 1236 contains an examination and
discussion by the Joint Staff Planners of Allied strategy in
Italy in the light of recent developments, and of the issues
raised by the Supreme Allied Commander in C. C. S. 762, with a
view to establishing the position of the United States Chiefs of
Staff as to operations in Italy. The Joint Staff Planners
recommend that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the conclusions
and the proposed directive in J. C. S. 1236 as the basis for
discussion with the British Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff at this point considered an advance
copy of a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff containing a
draft directive to
General Marshall
drew attention to the proposal to withdraw 6 British,
Canadian and American divisions from Italy for use in France. It
was his opinion that only British and Canadian divisions should
be withdrawn, and that the number should be reduced to five.
Admiral King
concurred with General
General Kuter
pointed out that the draft directive proposed by the
British stated specifically that no tactical air forces were to
be
General Marshall
felt that before a decision was taken on the proposed
directive, General
The Joint Chiefs of Staff then discussed and agreed upon certain amendments to the British directive.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
a. Approved the message to General
b. Directed the Secretaries to draft a
memorandum embodying the agreed amendments to the British
directive with a view to its circulation after the receipt of
General
5. a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command
(C. C. S. 452/35)
b. Allocation of
Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters
(J. C. S. 1238)
General Marshall
said that the British Chiefs of Staff had presented a
memorandum on operations in Southeast Asia Command in C. C. S.
452/35, which contained a draft directive to the Supreme Allied
Commander, Southeast Asia.
In J. C. S. 1238 the Joint Staff Planners had examined strategy
in the Southeast Asia Command, India-Burma and China theaters in
the light of recent developments and the recommendations of
General
After discussion,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C.
S. 1238, subject to the amendment of the memorandum in Appendix
“A” as agreed during the discussion. (Appendix “A” subsequently
circulated as C. C. S. 452/36).
6. Estimate of the Enemy
Situation—Europe
(C. C. S. 660/3)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note of C. C. S. 660/3.
7. Bombing of U-Boat Assembly
Yards and Operating Bases
(J. C. S. 1219/1)
General Marshall
said that J. C. S. 1219/1 contained a study by the Joint
Staff Planners of the possible resurgence of U-boat activity
against North Atlantic shipping.
Admiral King
felt that the directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and
General
Admiral Duncan
explained that the directive had been purposely prepared
in this manner after a discussion of the present air directive
under which the bomber forces were operating.
General Anderson
explained that the present bombing directive had been
drawn up to indicate certain priorities which included petroleum
reserves and the installations of the German air force. Bombing
of these objectives had definite bearing on the over-all effort.
The destruction of petroleum reserves had the effect of cutting
down the activities of the German air force, and slowing down
the submarine and training programs. Certain areas were selected
for each operation and at daily meetings targets were selected
to take advantage of current opportunities. The general
directive includes the bombing of U-boat building and assembly
yards and bases.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the recommendations of the Joint Staff Planners in J. C.
S. 1219/1. (Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 774).
Present
Secretariat
1. Approval of Minutes of
C. C. S. 182d MeetingAnte, pp.
467–477.
Sir Alan Brooke
Grenade
Veritable
GrenadeVeritable
Grenade
General Smith
explained that General Veritable
GrenadeVeritable
Grenade
General Marshall
said that in recent discussions General Grenade
General Smith
said that it was his personal opinion that it would
probably be necessary to stop General Grenade
General Marshall
pointed out that if General
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the conclusions of the 182d Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.
2. Operations in the
Mediterranean
(C. C. S. 773)post, pp. 832–833) to the report of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff to the President and the Prime Minister at
Yalta.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had
before them a draft directive to the Supreme Allied Commander,
Mediterranean,
Sir Alan Brooke
General Marshall
stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not yet
in a position to give their final views on the draft directive,
particularly with reference to possible moves of part of the
Twelfth Air Force. However, there were certain United States
proposals which he would like to put to the British Chiefs of
Staff at once. The United States Chiefs of Staff suggested the
following amendments: In paragraph 2 the substitution of the
word “British” for “our” wherever it occurred; in paragraph 4
the substitution of “five” for “six” divisions; in paragraph 5,
first sentence, the deletion of the words “United States” and
“in equal proportions.”
General Marshall
explained that it was felt wiser to leave the Fifth Army
intact as a well balanced organic force, and that it would be
preferable to reinforce France with British and Canadian
divisions in order to increase the strength of Field Marshal
The United States Chiefs of Staff agreed to the removal of three divisions, British or Canadian, at once, and the remainder as soon as they could be released from Greece, since this was the only way of finding the additional forces required. The question of the equipment of Greek forces had also been considered, since on this depended the release of the British divisions now in that country, but this was a complicated problem which he would like to consider further. The United States proposal was therefore that five divisions, two of which should be Canadian and the remainder British, should eventually be moved to France. With regard to the transfer of these forces, a preliminary study went to show that use of air transport could expedite the transfer of at least the first two divisions. He felt that if motor transport could be provided for these divisions from the United Kingdom, the date by which they would be available for operations in France would be greatly expedited.
Sir Alan Brooke
Field Marshal Alexander
Sir Alan Brooke
General Marshall
said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had in mind to
propose the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of a part of the
Twelfth Tactical Air Force to include five fighter groups, one
light bomber group, one reconnaissance unit, and two squadrons
of night fighters. These air forces would be used to assist the
First French Army and the Seventh United States Army.
Field Marshal Alexander
General Smith
said that he was not asking for light bombers to be
withdrawn from the Mediterranean Theater to Northwest
Europe.
General Anderson
pointed out that the greatest need was for
fighter-bombers. The Southern Group of Armies had been robbed of
these in order to strengthen the northern forces. He felt that
if the Mediterranean Theater was passing to the defensive and
the troops were being transferred to Northwest Europe, then the
appropriate air components should, if possible, accompany them.
The main deficiencies in Northwest Europe were in P–47’s which
could be used as either fighters or fighter-bombers.
General Kuter
explained that the proposal to move the 47th Light Bomber
Group from Italy had been made in view of the fact that it was
trained for night intruder work which it was felt would be of
more value in Northwest Europe than in Italy.
General Smith
said that he would be delighted to accept this group but
only if
Field Marshal Alexander
General Smith
said that the five fighter-bomber groups were his minimum
requirement for France and the light bombers, though desirable,
were not essential.
Field Marshal Alexander
General Smith
said that he was entirely prepared to leave the final
decision to
Sir Alan Brooke
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Deferred action on this subject.
3. Strategy in Northwest
Europe
(C. C. S. 761/3 and 761/4)
Sir Alan Brooke
General Smith
then presented a redraft of the Supreme Commander’s plan
as contained in paragraph 21 of
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Deferred action on this subject.
4. Planning Date for the End
of the War With Germany
(C. C. S. 772)Ante, pp.
478–480.
General Marshall
said that he felt it wiser to defer consideration of this
item until after discussion with the Russian General Staff.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Deferred action on this subject until the conclusion of Argonaut
5. a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command
(C. C. S. 452/35 and 452/36)
b. Allocation of
Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters
Sir Alan Brooke
General Marshall
said that he felt that the question of a directive to the
Supreme Commander should be linked with the problem of the
allocation of resources between the India-Burma and China
Theaters. He drew attention to a memorandum by the United States
Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 452/36) which, while concurring in the
directive proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff, linked this
directive to an understanding as to the allocation of United
States resources to the Southeast Asia Command. He felt that the
situation was developing to a point where the resources of the
China and Burma-India Theaters would be separated. U. S.
resources required for China would not be available for
operations in Malaysia. It was important that Admiral
General
Summing up, General Marshall
said that the proposed directive to Admiral
Sir Alan Brooke
Sir Charles Portal asked for
clarification of the meaning of the United States Chiefs of
Staff memorandum (C. C. S. 452/36). Did this memorandum imply
that, although Admiral
General Marshall
said that the memorandum was meant to make it quite clear
that the employment of United States forces outside Burma must
be the subject of fresh agreement and that Admiral
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Deferred action on C. C. S. 452/36 pending further study by the British Chiefs of Staff.
6. Estimate of the Enemy
Situation—Europe
(C. C. S. 660/3)ante,
pp. 478–480.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Took note of C. C. S. 660/3.
7. Bombing of U-Boat Assembly
Yards and Operating Bases
(C. C. S. 774)post, p. 828.
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that he
would prefer to consider this memorandum at the same time as the
paper he was putting forward with regard to the U-boat
threat.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Deferred action on C. C. S. 774 pending study by the British Chiefs of Staff
Present
The only record of the substance of this meeting that has been
found is a summary of conversation between
Present
No record of the substance of this meeting has been found.
Sirius in
Grand Harbor, Malta, went ashore in the early part of the
morning and took a walk, during the course of which, it seems,
they “discussed some of the problems to be raised at Yalta”.
This information is taken from
Present
SecretariatBrigadier General
McFarland Captain Graves
1. a. Approval of the Minutes of the J. C.
S. 184th MeetingAnte, pp.
481–484.
General Kuter
requested that the last sentence of the remarks of General
Anderson in Item 7 be changed to read: “The general directive
includes the bombing of U-boat building and assembly yards and
bases.”
b. Approval of the
Minutes of the C. C. S. 183d
MeetingAnte, pp.
485–490.
General Marshall
requested the amendment of his remarks in the third
paragraph of Item 1 to read as follows: “General Marshall
said that in recent discussions General Grenade
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
a. Approved the minutes of the J. C. S.
184th Meeting, subject to the amendment agreed during the
discussion.
b. Agreed to recommend that the Combined
Chiefs of Staff approve the conclusions of the C. C. S. 183d
Meeting and approve the detailed record of the meeting, subject
to the amendment agreed during the above discussion and to later
minor amendments.
2. Strategy in the
Mediterranean
(C. C. S. 773)ante, p.
485, footnote 5.
General Marshall
said that the Secretaries had prepared a draft of the
directive to
In light of General
General Kuter
proposed that a new paragraph 5 should be added to the
directive as follows:
“The U. S. Twelfth Air Force, less such units as may be selected by agreement between you and
SCAEF , shall be made available for transfer toSCAEF , together with necessary service units.”
An appropriate sequence of paragraphs in the directive was then discussed and agreed.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the draft memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
prepared by the Secretaries, as amended during the discussion.
(Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 773/1.
3. Equipment of Allied and
Liberated Forces
(J. C. S. 1240post, pp. 522–524.
General Marshall
read a brief of J. C. S. 1240 and proposed that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff approve the recommendations of the Joint
Logistics Committee, subject to the following amendments:
Page 5, delete the last three lines of paragraph 11 and after the
word “reviewing” add “
Page 8, line 2, insert the words “already approved in principle” between the words “provision” and “of.”
Page 8, paragraph 9, line 3, after the word “review” delete the
remainder of the sentence and substitute therefor “
General Somervell
said he felt certain that when the British restudy their
requirements for the supply of Greek forces, they would find
that they could not meet them. It might then be suggested that
the agreed figure of equipment for 460,000 liberated manpower in
Europe could be reduced to 400,000 and the equipment for the
60,000 remaining be applied to the requirement for the Greek
Army.
After further discussion,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in
J. C. S. 1240, subject to the amendments proposed by General
Post, pp.
522–524.
4. Operations in Southeast
Asia Command
(C. C. S. 452/35, 452/36Post, pp.
524–525.
General Marshall
said that in C. C. S. 452/35 the British proposed a
directive to Admiral
The point at issue appears to be whether the United States Chiefs
of Staff can order transfers of resources when they do not
jeopardize British forces engaged in approved operations in
Burma or whether every transfer requires agreement by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff as proposed by the British. The U. S.
proposal as now written appears to safeguard sufficiently the
British interests. Under the British proposal the Combined
Chiefs of Staff would become involved in lengthy discussions of
purely operational matters and the transfer of one air squadron
or one Quartermaster company would be the subject for C. C. S.
decision unless acceptable to
No compromise should be accepted which involves C. C. S. approval of transfer or requires discussion in the Combined Chiefs of Staff except where the British Chiefs think their forces are jeopardized. The U. S. paper provides clearly for this.
General Marshall
recommended that the United States Chiefs of Staff should
recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the approval of the
proposals made in the U. S. memorandum in C. C. S. 452/36. By
this action both the policy for the transfer of U. S. resources
and the directive for Admiral
The Secretary stated that the British
Chiefs of Staff are prepared to withdraw their paper, C. C. S.
747/7, if the United States Chiefs of Staff will agree to delete
the words “British forces engaged in” in the eighth line of the
second paragraph of C. C. S. 452/36, which paper would then be
acceptable to them.
Colonel Lincoln
said that the proposed British amendment would nullify the
intentions of the United States Chiefs of Staff because it would
transfer the “jeopardy” from the “forces engaged” to
“operations.” While the jeopardy to the forces actually engaged
in operations
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to adhere to the position outlined by them in C. C. S. 452/36.
5. Pacific Operations
(C. C. S. 417/11)Ante, pp.
395–396.
Admiral King
said that this paper was on the agenda for the purpose of
reaffirming the position of the United States Chiefs of Staff on
the operations for the defeat of Japan. He doubted the
possibility of maintaining and defending a sea route to the Sea
of Okhotsk from bases in Kamchatka alone, but suggested
reaffirming the paper for planning purposes.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Reaffirmed their approval of C. C. S. 417/11.
6. U-Boat Threat
(C. C. S. 774 and 774/1)post, p. 828.
General Marshall
said that C. C. S. 774, upon which action had been
deferred at the C. C. S. 183d Meeting, was the U. S. proposal
for the directive to Air Marshal Bottomley and General
Admiral King
was of the opinion that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would
be obliged to accept the directive proposed in C. C. S. 774 in
the light of the British paper which implied that immediate
action was necessary. He suggested that the British paper should
be noted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
General Marshall
drew attention to the fact that the British paper would
provoke serious complications in the allotment of tonnage being
considered in current shipping studies and would provide the
British with arguments for the increase of the figure of 8
percent which had been set for estimated shipping deficiencies.
He was merely examining this aspect of the problem in order to
formulate some reply to the British if the point were
raised.
Admiral King
felt that the British paper might be accepted if the
acceptance was without prejudice to the shipping deficiencies
established in the current studies. He advised against any
attempt to revise the percentage figure of assumed losses at
this time.
Admiral
Cooke
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff take note of C. C. S. 774/1 and review the percentage of deficiencies in sailings on 1 April 1945.
7. Strategy in Northwest
Europe
In closed session,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff accept
ante, p.
464, footnote 8.
“The following letter received this date:
‘My dear
Kuter . Since the British Chiefs of Staff issuedCCS 691Not printed. about British participation in the very long range bombing of Japan and the United States Chiefs of Staff replied inCCS 691/1.Not printed. we have made considerable progress in the development of ourVLR bombing potential.‘The bombing of the “Tirpitz” proved that it is possible to increase the all up weight of the Lancaster beyond our expectations and we now hope to achieve an effective radius of action of some 1,500 miles carrying a useful load of the order of 6,000 pounds with either the Lancaster or with its replacement the
Lincoln . We are however carrying on with flight refueling experiments as an insurance.‘The rate at which we will be able to bring our Bomber Force into action against Japan cannot finally be determined until we know more about the bases that will be available for our operations and the facilities we can count on at those bases. Assuming that bases are made available I estimate that our first squadrons could be fully operational in the Pacific 7 months after Germany is defeated, and the whole force some 5 months later.
‘This
RAF force will be thoroughly experienced in the technique of night bombing and in sea-mining, and will be capable of droppingthe very effective 1,500 pound British mines. I feel that particularly in these respects the Force will be able to make a valuable contribution to our efforts against Japan. ‘I am anxious to get our plans for the
RAF very long range Force into more concrete form, particularly with regard to the rate of its deployment, the provision of bases, availability of common user items, local defence and the general administrative arrangements for the contingent.‘I would like to send the
AOC designate of our Force together with a small number of staff officers, over to the United States at an early date in order to make contact with your Air Force authorities and the officers under whom he would be serving, to make as much progress as possible with these arrangements. It would also be helpful if he could visit the Pacific area and learn at first hand something about the operating conditions in that Theatre. Following this visit, I propose that theAOC would return to the United Kingdom to continue with the preparation of his Force. I realize the difficulties of deciding on the exact base facilities that will be available so far in advance, but I am anxious to make a definite start even on a small scale, and would be prepared to initiate planning on the assumption that you would make available to us, say, 4 bases for heavy bombers 6 months after Germany is defeated.‘I would very much like to discuss this
VLR project with you during this conference, either here or at. Magneto‘Yours sincerely, Charles Portal.’
“Anticipating such proposal, I have cleared with Magneto
“Understand Air Marshal
“Expect that 36 squadrons of
“All discussions will be based on condition that
“Will tie resurrection of Weary
Willie project into same conversation and hope to
establish full freedom for our development and operation
from French bases and freedom to develop and operate
accurately controlled types from
Cricket
Present
Mr. Eden
asked Mr.
Mr. Stettinius
said that he hoped it would be possible for agreement to
be reached between the British and American Delegations
forthwith on the urgent question of—
1. Zones of Occupation in
Germany
Mr. Stettinius
thought that though there had been agreement between the
Americans and British on the zones of occupation in Germany,
there were still relatively minor points outstanding, notably in
connexion with the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven. He thought
it important to get agreement on these, particularly in view of
the fact that the Russians might soon be in Berlin and have
views of their own as regards the zones if our two Governments
do not approve the carefully negotiated protocol.Ante, pp.
118–123.
Mr. Eden
said that he understood that there were only certain small
points unsettled; he agreed that it was desirable to get these
post, pp. 514–515.]
It was agreed that it would be most important for us to get the
Russians to approve the protocols on control machineryAnte, pp.
124–127.
Mr. Stettinius
next raised the question of zones for the French. The
President was disposed to give the French a zone. This might
include the southern part of the British zone and the northern
part of the American, said Mr.
Sir A. Cadogan
It was agreed that the approval of the Russians should be sought to the proposal that the Americans and British should agree on a zone with the French; it was also agreed that the French should be integrated into the control machinery.
2. Zones of Occupation in
Austria
Mr. Eden
raised the question of zones of occupation in Austria.
Mr. Matthews
said that there had been general agreement as to the areas
except as to exact extent of the Viennese zone.
Mr. Eden
said that Sir William ante, p. 110, footnote 1.
It was recalled that the French had also asked for a zone in Austria.
3. Poland
Mr. Stettinius
said that from the point of view of American public
opinion it was extremely important that some equitable solution
should be reached. It was impossible for the United States
Government simply to recognise the Lublin Provisional
Government. What seemed to be required was some kind of Council
including all the relevant sections including
Mr. Eden
agreed that the British too could not simply recognise the
Lublin Provisional Government.
Sir A. Cadogan
It was agreed, upon the proposal of Mr. Post, pp.
508–511.
The possibility was discussed of the Russians refusing to play.
It was agreed that a deadlock would be bad but that a simple recognition of the Lublin Provisional Government would be even worse.
4. Persia
Mr. Eden
raised the subject of Persia. He said that the essential
point was to maintain the independence of Persia which was still
threatened by the pressure which the Russian Government had been
maintaining for some time on the Persian Government, mainly in
connexion with the oil concession which the Persian Government
had declined to give them. He suggested that an offer might be
made to the Russians for the withdrawal of troops gradually and
pari passu, after the Governments had
agreed that the supply route through Persia was no longer
required, which might be about June. He was obliged, however, to
make a reservation that our military might feel it necessary to
retain certain troops for the protection of the vital oilfields
in southern Persia.
Mr. Matthews
pointed out that in this case the Russians would insist on
maintaining troops in the north.
It was recalled that both Americans and British had a grievance against the Russians in that British and American companies had proceeded quite far in their applications for oil concessions in South Persia and that their negotiations had been arrested by the ham-handed procedure of the Russians in demanding a concession in the north which raised political issues.
It was agreed that for the three Powers to appear to default on
the specific undertakings in the Tehran Declarationpost. pp. 748–749.ante, pp. 340–341.a) to the
principle of gradual pari passu
withdrawal and (b) that the Persian
Government were entitled to decline to negotiate oil concessions
as long as foreign troops were in occupation of their
territory.ante, pp. 330–331.
5. Warm Water Port for
Russia (Straits and the Far
East)
Mr. Stettinius
Mr. Eden
said that the Russians certainly wished to revise the
Montreux Convention.ante, pp. 328–329.
Mr. Eden
Far East also. In his view if the
Russians decided to enter the war against Japan they would take
the decision because they considered it in their interests that
the Japanese war should not be successfully finished by the U.
S. and Great Britain alone. There was therefore no need for us
to offer a high price for their participation, and if we were
prepared to agree to their territorial demands in the Far East
we should see to it that we obtained a good return in respect of
the points on which we required concessions from them.
In the course of discussion the views were put forward that the Russians would certainly want the lower part of Sakhalin and transit rights in southern Manchuria.
6. China
The desirability of unity being achieved between the Kuomintang and the Communists was raised, and reference was made to the President having some doubts as to whether the British desired this unity.
Mr. Eden
could not account for this idea having arisen; we were
most anxious that unity should be secured.
Mr. Stettinius
said that he had not heard the report.
It was agreed that the military situation had improved somewhat, partly through the diversion of two divisions from Burma to China, and partly through the reopening of the Burma Road.
Mr. Stettinius
urged that the British, Soviet and American Governments
make every effort to bring about agreement between
7. Emergency High Commission
for Europe
Mr. Stettinius
referred to the two papers on this subject which Mr.
ante, pp.
98–100.
Mr. Hiss
said that the essential purpose was to secure unity of
approach between the three Big powers to the manifold
difficulties that must arise in liberated territories in Europe.
The proposed High Commission would be a temporary body
functioning until the World Organisation was set up. It would
not include Germany, which was handled by the European Advisory
Council; but in any case the scope including the psychological
approach was different.
Mr. Stettinius
stressed that the Commission would be composed of four
members, i. e. by the inclusion of the French, or possibly
more.
Mr. Eden
made it clear that the British were much attracted by the
proposal.
Mr. Matthews
said that its presentation to the Russians would require
considerable care, as the question of Poland was involved.
Mr. Eden
foresaw that one difficulty would be to find members of
the Council who would be able to take responsibility for
decisions of importance—the Russians would find this
particularly difficult. Apart from this there was the further
difficulty that responsibility for such decisions vis-à-vis
their own public opinion must rest with the Foreign Secretaries
of each country, who could neither be permanently in session in
a foreign country, nor delegate their duties beyond a certain
measure.
Mr. Stettinius
shared this view, but explained that the intention had
been that the members of the proposed Council would refer to
their home Governments before the Council took decisions of
importance.
Mr. Eden
raised the further point of the relation between the
Council and quarterly meetings of the Foreign Secretaries to
which he attached importance. It was felt that it should not be
impossible to work [out?] an arrangement combining both
plans.
There was some discussion as to the title of the body. It was
felt that some title must be found which would not wound the
susceptibilities of the smaller Allies and at the same time
would not seem to cut across the duties of the European Advisory
Council and the Allied Control Commissions in certain enemy
countries. It was thought that Mr.
Mr. Stettinius
stressed that the proposal must still be regarded as
informal and unofficial as the President had not yet approved
it. The President had indeed some misgiving that its adoption
might prejudice the prospects of the World Organisation which
was the question of paramount importance.
Mr. Matthews
pointed out that if the idea fructified some public
announcement would be necessary as regards it and certain other
kindred subjects.
Mr. Stettinius
said that the ideal result of Argonaut
It was agreed that in view of the informality of the proposal the Prime Minister should be advised not to raise the question of the Emergency High Commission with the President.
8. Germany
Some discussion followed on the future of Germany. It was felt that both the political and economic aspects needed working out by some international body.
Mr. Stettinius
enquired whether this was not in the province of the
European Advisory Council and there was agreement that it
was.
Mr. Eden
summed up that with the Russians so close to Berlin it was
urgently necessary to reach tripartite agreement.
Other questions requiring study would be the transfer of population and prisoners of war.
It was agreed that a note should be drafted embodying the views
of the two Governments for the use of the President and the
Prime Minister at Argonaut.post, pp. 511–512. The
American views on the treatment of Germany were included in
a memorandum drafted at Malta on February 2 but presented to
the President at Yalta on February 4. See post, pp. 567–569.
9. Dumbarton Oaks
Mr. Eden
said that he liked the President’s proposal for overcoming
the difficulty as regards voting by the Big Powers.Ante, pp.
58–60.
Mr. Matthews
stressed that its adoption was virtually essential to the
creation of the World Organisation.
Sir
Cadogan
At Mr. Mr. Hiss
briefly described the American proposal. It distinguished
between cases involving Enforcement and cases dealt with by
Discussion. For the former unanimity in the part of the Great
Powers would be necessary, whereas for the latter parties to the
dispute, whether Big Powers or small, would not be entitled to
vote. He stressed that this proposal, which had been described
as a compromise, in effect was not so, but was actually the
preferred solution of the United States Government.
Sir
Cadogan
Mr. Eden
agreed.
It was agreed (1) that two types of documents were required;
first, a document setting out the American proposal which would
be the document to be presented to the Russians; and secondly,
brief and clear explanations of it for the information of the
President and the Prime Minister; and (2) that if approved it
would be for the President to present the plan formally at Argonaut both to Marshal post, pp. 660–661.
Points arising in the event of agreement being
reached on Dumbarton Oaks plan.
(a) Position of France and China
It was agreed that the French and Chinese Governments should be
consulted as soon as agreement was reached, and if the Russians
concurred
(b) The invitations to other States to be
present at the eventual United Nations Conference should be
issued jointly in the name of all five Governments and by each
of them individually. It was realised that the Russian
Government might raise some objection to this in connection with
China.
10. Polish-German
frontier
Mr. Eden
said that the apparent desire of the Lublin Provisional
Government to secure for Poland large additional sections of
Germany involving eight million persons was causing him some
anxiety. He thought that Poland was entitled to East Prussia and
part of Upper Silesia, and certain other territories up to the
Oder.
Mr. Matthews
said that that was the American view and referred also to
the inclusion of the eastern tip of Pomerania. He stressed also
the American view that the transfer of populations should be
gradual and not precipitate.
Sir
Cadogan
11. Austro-Yugoslav
frontier
Mr. Eden
referred to the fact that British troops under the
proposed zone arrangement would be responsible for the Austrian
frontier with Yugoslavia, and that one could not exclude the
possibility that Marshal
Mr. Stettinius
expressed concurrence in this procedure.
12. Conduct of the Russians in
Eastern Europe
It was pointed out that there were two main questions on which we
had reason for complaint in regard to Russian conduct (a) in connexion with the Control
Commissions and (b) in connexion with the
British and American oil interest in Roumania.
It was generally felt that while the position on the Control
Commission for Roumania was now more satisfactory it was
important to insist with the Russians that before the
Commissions took action there must be prior consultation with
the Americans and British. Should the Russian Government feel
obliged to take any unilateral action on
It was agreed that the British Delegation should draw up a
paperPost, pp.
513–514, 889–890.
13. Civil Supplies
Mr. Eden
raised this question and Mr.
It was understood that the next stage would be for the matter to be discussed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and if agreement were not reached by them, between the President and the Prime Minister.
14. Prisoners of War
Sir
Cadogan
Argonaut
a) the treatment of Allied civilian and
military prisoners of war who were liberated by the Russians and
(b) our own treatment of Russian
prisoners of war who came into our hands.
It was agreed that the procedure for handling this with the
Russian expert should be discussed by the American and British
experts who were present at Cricket
15. Anglo-American warning to
Germany about Allied prisoners of war
Mr. Matthews
said that the State Department were disposed to agree with
the text proposed by the Foreign Office
It was agreed that the timing of any statement would be important
and that the proper time would be when the German collapse
seemed imminent or when some German outrage was threatened.Bulletin, April 29, 1945, vol. xii, p. 811.
16. Treatment of major War
Criminals
Mr. Eden
said that when this was discussed at Moscow in October
Marshal ante, p.
400.
1. General information. post,
pp. 953–954.
2. Allstate. Horseshoe.
3. . . . (This is our fifth message.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
P. M. (A) 2.
Prime Minister.
Conversations with Mr. Stettinius
Poland
We found that we were in broad agreement on the necessity for
finding a solution and that it was impossible for our
Governments to recognise the Lublin Government. Mr.
2. I agreed that a “Russian” solution of the question would be very likely to produce the latter result.
3. We found that we had very similar ideas on the lines of a
possible solution. We should have to stress to Marshal
4. The time has probably gone by for a “fusion” of London and
Lublin, and the only remedy that we can see is the creation of a
new interim Government in Poland,
pledged to hold free elections as soon as conditions permit.
This would be representative of all Polish political parties and
would no doubt include elements from the Lublin Government, from
Poles in Poland, and from Poles abroad. There are no good
candidates from the Government in London, but if
5. If it would facilitate the realisation of this plan, we should
be ready to see the adoption of
6. If the Russians persist in their present policy, that would only neutralise the efforts of all those in our two countries most anxious to work with Russia.
7. There remains the territorial problem. As regards Poland’s
eastern frontier, H. M. G. have already agreed with the Russians
and announced publicly that this should be the
8. The cessions upon which we and the Americans are agreed would involve the transfer of some 2½ million Germans. The Oder frontier, without Breslau and Stettin would involve a further 2¼ millions. The western Neisse frontier with Breslau and Stettin would involve an additional 3¼ millions making 8 millions in all.
9. We were prepared last October in Moscow to let
10. If the Russians refuse to accept any solution such as that outlined above, the present deadlock must continue. That would be bad, but a simple recognition of the Lublin Government would be even worse.
Concrete Proposals on the Polish
Question
Territorial Problems
We should make every effort to obtain agreement for a Polish
frontier in the east which should run along the
In regard to German territory to be turned over to Poland, we should make every effort to limit this compensation to East Prussia (except Koenigsberg), a small salient of Pomerania, which would include an area about one hundred miles west along the Baltic coast to the Polish Corridor and Upper Silesia.
If we are unable to obtain Lwow Province for Poland, and if efforts are made to obtain greater compensation for Poland in the west, we should make every effort to keep this compensation to a minimum particularly because of the large population transfers which would have to be carried out if these purely German areas are included in Poland. We should resist vigorously efforts to extend the Polish frontier to the Oder Line or the Oder-Neisse Line.
Political Problems
The problem here involves the future independence of the Polish
State. The Lublin Government in its present form cannot be
regarded as representative of the Polish people. For this reason
without violation of our commitments to the Polish people and
without causing the most serious repercussions in American
public opinion, we cannot transfer our recognition from the
London Government to the Lublin Government. We must make every
effort to resolve the question of the creation of a new interim
Polish Government of national unity which should be composed of
representative members of all important Polish political
parties. This new interim government should not be in the form
of an amalgamation of the Polish Government in London and of the
Lublin Government. The first step in the direction of such a
solution might be an agreement at this meeting to set up a
Presidential Council which would be charged by the three powers
(four if France would be included) with appointment ZulawskiBujakKutrzeba
This Presidential Council would be commissioned by the three or four powers possibly acting through the medium of the proposed Emergency High Commission or by agreement among themselves to form an interim government which would be pledged to the holding of free elections when conditions inside Poland permit. The High Commission or other Allied instrument would assume responsibility for seeing that the Presidential Council selected an interim government based on a fair representation of Polish political parties and also that the interim government would carry out its pledge to hold free elections as soon as conditions permit.
Among the representatives of the Polish political parties making
up this government would, of course, be certain present members
of the Lublin Government as well as Poles from abroad, in
particular
P. M. (A) 4.
Prime Minister
The Future of Germany
As a result of developments in the war situation, it is becoming increasingly urgent to co-ordinate the policy of the major Allied Powers in regard to the future of Germany. It is clearly of paramount importance to future unity and security that there should be no divergence of policy between the Allies in dealing with Germany.
2. The E. A. C. was set up in 1943 to “study and make joint
recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions
connected with the termination of hostilities”. So far the
Commission have agreed and referred to Governments three
documents: (1) Terms of surrender for Germany,Ante, pp.
113–118.Ante, pp.
118–123.Ante, pp.
124–127.
3. There are a considerable number of major questions of policy on which no decisions have been reached, though there have been exchanges of views at earlier conferences. In my view we should be wise to suspend final decisions until we see what conditions are in Germany. But there is a great deal of preparatory work which can and should be done. Governments have no doubt been studying all these questions individually; but the time has come when they could usefully be examined jointly by British, American, Soviet and French experts with a view to coordinating the individual studies. The obvious body to undertake this task is the E. A. C.
4. I would accordingly suggest that at the forthcoming conference
we should try to get general agreement that the E. A. C. should
be directed to examine and make joint recommendations at an
early date to the member Governments regarding future political
and economic policy towards Germany. In doing so, the Commission
should pay particular attention to, inter
alia, provisions for the disarmament and
demilitarisation of Germany and the prevention of rearmament,
dismemberment, decentralisation, measures of economic security,
reparation, the future of the Rheno-Westphalian basin, the Kiel
area, and transfers of population.
5. If this is agreed, it will be important that member Governments should ensure that their delegations are adequately staffed to cope with the increased work.
6. It might also be useful, in order to give the public some idea
of the Commission’s work, that the communiqué to be issued at
the end of the Conference should announce the approval of the
three Governments of the three documents so far negotiated by
the E. A. C. This will, however, raise awkward problems as
regards the French. While they are unlikely to propose any
alterations of substance, they have not yet formally approved
the documents, which will have to be recast in quadripartite
form. We are telegraphing to the Foreign Office to ask (a) what effect it would be likely to have
on the French if we announce the approval of the three
Governments only of the three documents, and (b) whether they can devise a formula which we could
use to cover the French.
Allied (Soviet) Control Commissions in
Bulgaria and Hungary
H. M. G. regard it as essential (a) that
their representatives in Bulgaria and Hungary should enjoy
reasonable freedom of movement and communication, and (b) that decisions about which they have
not been consulted should not be taken in their name. In the
case of Hungary, (a) has been
satisfactorily dealt with in the “Statutes of the Allied Control
Commission in Hungary”, and H. M. G. suggest that identical
Statutes should be adopted for the Control Commission in
Bulgaria in order to meet the points made in the message from
Mr. ante, p. 241.
H. M. G. also consider that during the first period there should be prior consultation with the British and American representatives and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the Armistice, it should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government only.
During the second period, i. e. after the conclusion of
hostilities, H. M. G. wish to ensure that
de facto control of the satellite
countries through the presence of Soviet troops, insist
upon issuing directives to the local Governments or
taking action which are not approved by both the British
and American representatives they should act
unilaterally in their own name.
Roumania
H. M. G. have been glad to note that the Soviet authorities have
now agreed to stop removing equipment from the oil fields in
Roumania in which British interests are involved and have also
agreed that the Ruat plant should remain in
situ. But if the large quantities of equipment which
have already been removed are not to be returned H. M. G.
considers that they must be regarded as deliveries on account of
reparations, and arrangements made for compensating the oil
companies. Similarly the Ruat plant should be restored to its
previous condition and brought into production as soon as
possible. As the Soviet Government have made no attempt to
refute the argument advanced by H. M. G. that any equipment
which may be removed should be regarded as reparation and not as
war booty, H. M. G. can only refer the Soviet Government to the
statement of the case which has already been made. It should
also be pointed out that these difficulties would never have
arisen if the Soviet representatives in Roumania had discussed
problems affecting the Roumanian oil industry with their British
and American colleagues on the Control Commission instead of
taking unilateral action.post, pp.
889–890, 893.
Present
The only records of the substance of this meeting that have been
found are in (a) b) a telegram of infra). The telegram quotes the text of
the message on this subject which
Nr: Cricket
For Acting Secretary of State Only from
Secretary
Have dispatched the following to
“You are Authorized immediately to inform the European Advisory Commission of this government’s approval of the protocol on zones of occupation for Germany.
Eden is likewise telegraphing the British Government’s approval.”
Please advise
Present
Secretariat
1. Approval of Minutes of
C. C. S. 183d MeetingAnte, pp.
485–490.
General Marshall
said that he would like the first statement attributed to
him in item 1 of the minutes amended to read as follows:—
“
Generalsaid that in recent discussions GeneralMarshall Eisenhower had explained that he would have to take a decision by 1 February as to whether to continue with GeneralBradley ’s operations or to stop them and start the movement of troops preliminary to launchingGrenade.”
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 183d
Meeting, and approved the detailed record of the meeting,
subject to the amendment proposed by General
2. Strategy in the
Mediterranean
(C. C. S. 773/1 and 773/2)
Field Marshal Brooke
b. of this directive should read as follows:—
“Further complete formations as the forces now in Greece are released from that country.”
It was explained that this amendment was consequent upon the reduction of the number of divisions to move to Northwest Europe from six to five. Three divisions would go from Italy and therefore it would only be necessary for two of the three divisions in Greece to follow them.
Sir Charles Portal
referred to paragraph 5 of the draft directive. He felt
that Field Marshal c., which
instructed him to be prepared to take immediate advantage of any
weakening or withdrawal of the German forces. He might also
require it to maintain the security of his front, though it
might well be possible to release it after the Germans had
withdrawn to the Adige. A further point was that since it was
proposed to move the first three divisions quickly, it might not
be possible to transfer air forces at the same time.
In reply to a question, Sir Charles
Portal
confirmed that it was his view that the Twelfth Air Force
should remain in the Mediterranean in the event that the German
forces did not retire.
General Marshall
said that in his view it was important to transfer such
air forces as was possible to the decisive theater.
Sir Charles Portal
suggested that the remainder of the directive should be
approved and, in lieu of paragraph 5, the Supreme Commander
should be informed that the question of the transference of
parts of the Twelfth Air Force was still under
consideration.
General Marshall
said he was not in favor of this proposal.
General Kuter
suggested that General
General Smith
said that General
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Deferred action on this subject until their next meeting.
3. Equipment for Allied and
Liberated Forces
(C. C. S. 768/1)Post, pp.
522–524.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Deferred action on C. C. S. 768/1 until their next meeting.
4. a. Operations in Southeast Asia Command
(C. C. S. 452/35, C. C. S. 452/36)
b. Allocation of
Resources Between the India-Burma and China Theaters
(C. C. S. 747/7 (ArgonautPost, pp.
524–525.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the wording of the final sentence of paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 452/36.
General Marshall
said that he understood that the British Chiefs of Staff
wished to delete the words “British forces engaged in.” This he
felt fundamentally altered the sense of the sentence. It implied
that operations rather than forces should not be placed in
jeopardy. It might result in lengthy discussions each time the
question of the possibility of moving forces to China arose.
Sir Charles Portal
explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were asking
only that discussion should take place before such a move was
ordered. He felt that the crowning success of an approved
operation might well be jeopardized by the withdrawal of United
States forces without the British Chiefs of Staff or the Supreme
Commander having an opportunity of laying before the Combined
Chiefs of Staff the full consequences of such a withdrawal.
After further discussion, The Combined
Chiefs of Staff agreed on the following wording of the
final sentence of paragraph 2 of C. C. S. 452/36:
“Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would jeopardize those operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.”
Sir Alan Brooke
Argonaut
General Marshall
said that the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted the
draft directive put forward by the British Chiefs of Staff in C.
C. S. 452/35, subject to the communication to the Supreme
Commander of the policy recorded in C. C. S. 452/36 and amended
in the course of discussion.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
a. Approved the policy set out in the
first and second paragraphs of C. C. S. 452/36, subject to the
amendment of the last sentence of the second paragraph as agreed
above. (The policy, as amended and approved, subsequently
circulated as C. C. S. 452/37.post,
p. 830.
b. Approved the directive to the Supreme
Allied Commander, Southeast Asia contained in C. C. S. 452/35,
subject to the addition of a paragraph drawing his attention to
the policy set out in C. C. S. 452/37.
c. Took note that the British Chiefs of
Staff withdraw C. C. S. 747/7 (Argonaut).
5. Pacific Operations
(C. C. S. 417/11)Ante, pp.
395–396.
At the request of General Marshall
and Admiral King
explained the future course of operations in the Pacific
and various plans and projects which were under examination by
the United States Chiefs of Staff. Plans had been prepared
aiming at an attack on Kyushu in September of 1945 and the
invasion of the
An attack on the Island of
Hainan. This had the advantage not only of securing
an air base to assist in cutting Japanese sea and land
communications but also afforded a new airway into the
heart of China, thereby assisting the Chinese to take a
more active part in operations.An attack on North Borneo. The
advantages of such an operation were that it secured to
the United Nations the valuable oil supplies in that
area. In this connection it was interesting to note that
certain of these oil wells afforded fuel which required
but little refinement before it was ready for
use.An operation against the Chusan-Ningpo
area. This operation was extremely valuable in
broadening the base for air attack against the Island
Empire. In addition, it had the great merit of
throttling Japanese communications up the Yangtze River.
The area concerned contained a series of islands and a
peninsula and was therefore one in which operations
against the Japanese could be undertaken without
permitting the enemy to deploy large land forces against
us.
When Okinawa had been seized a decision could be taken as to which of the courses of action outlined above was likely to afford the most valuable results. At the same time it might be found desirable to capture additional islands in the Ryukyus either to the north or south of Okinawa.
In general, future operations in the Pacific were designed to avoid full-scale land battles against Japanese forces, involving heavy casualties and slowing up the conduct of the campaign.
With regard to operations in the Philippines it was not
visualized that major United States forces would be used in
mopping-up operations nor that the island of Mindanao and others
to the south would be assaulted by United States forces. Rather,
it was hoped that
In view of the above considerations it was hoped to avoid an assault on Formosa and to isolate and bomb Japanese forces in the island from positions in the Ryukyus and Luzon.
The dates on which any of the possible alternative operations could be undertaken and the choice of such operations was dependent on the results of present operations in Luzon and on the date of the termination of the war in Europe. It was unlikely that both Hainan and North Borneo could be undertaken.
The importance of adequate bases and staging points was stressed.
A fleet base was being developed on the southeast tip of Samar
and it was estimated that three months’ work could be achieved
on this base before any work could be done to render Manila
available to the fleet. It might, in fact, be decided not to
recondition the Manila base at all. A base had also been
developed in Ulithi
The difficulties of developing the northern sea route to Russia were emphasized. The two divisions which had been earmarked for an assault on the Kuriles had now been diverted to Europe and it was unlikely that further forces would be available for this operation. Further, the sea lane to Russian ports was rendered difficult and in certain instances impossible during the winter months due to ice conditions.
The Russians had asked for some 85 additional ships to enable them to stock up their eastern armies. The provision of such ships would of course affect the course of operations elsewhere. In order to make a sea route safe and effective it would be necessary to seize an island in the Kuriles from which air cover could provide safe passage either to the north or south of it. Unless such an operational base was seized by the first of July its value would be lost due to ice conditions preventing the passage of ships. At present ships flying the Russian flag were convoying “civilian-type” supplies to the Maritime Provinces.
To sum up, it was unlikely that the operation against Kyushu could be undertaken until four months after the defeat of Germany. In the period intervening before such an operation could be under-taken, further operations would be carried out with the forces available. These operations would be designed to secure positions best calculated to assist the final attack on the Empire.
In further discussion the shortage of service troops was stressed. These forces would be the first to be redeployed from Europe. They were in short supply throughout the world and additional commitments were caused by the inability of the French to provide service forces to maintain their own troops.
With regard to the employment of Australian troops, it was explained that these forces were relieving United States divisions wherever possible. They were carrying out mopping-up operations in New Guinea and were garrisoning such points as Bougainville and the Admiralty Islands. Two Australian divisions had also been included in a plan to assault Mindanao, which might not now be used.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Took note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 417/11.
6. a. U-Boat Threat
(C. C. S. 774/1 and 774/2)post, p.
828.
b. Bombing of
Assembly Yards and Operating Bases
(C. C. S. 774)post, p.
828.
General Marshall
said the United States Chiefs of Staff suggested that C.
C. S. 774/1 should be noted and the situation with regard to
estimated shipping losses should be reviewed on the first of
April.
Sir Andrew Cunningham
Sir Charles Portal, referring to C. C. S. 774, said
that he felt the proposals contained in the memorandum by the
United States Chiefs of Staff would not be implemented by the
suggested directive to the air forces. He felt that if
persistent bombing of U-boat assembly yards was now undertaken
the effect of this action on the attacks on the vital oil
targets would be unacceptable. Both the oil targets and the
submarine targets necessitated visual bombing and there were
very few days in the month available for such operations in
Northwest Europe at the present time of year. His proposal was
that the “marginal effort” should be used against submarine
targets and explained that such a decision would mean that, when
an attack against an oil target had been ordered and it was
found that the weather over the oil target prevented visual
bombing, the aircraft concerned would
He felt it right to point out that the issuance of the draft directive proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff would not materially increase the weight of bombs dropped on submarine targets.
General Kuter
said that some directive on the subject of the submarine
menace would be valuable in focusing attention upon it.
Admiral King
said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should record their
views with regard to the submarine menace and issue a directive
on the action to be taken to counter it.
Sir Andrew Cunningham
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then
considered the summary of countermeasures set out in C. C. S.
774 and 774/2. It was agreed that the action proposed in
paragraph 10 of this paper should be communicated to the
appropriate authorities in the form of a directive.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
a. Took note of C. C. S. 774/1 and agreed
to review this paper on 1 April 1945.
b. Directed the Secretaries to draft and
circulate for approval a directive based on C. C. S. 774 and C.
C. S. 774/2.
7. Strategy in Northwest
Europe
(C. C. S. 761/5 and 761/6)
In closed session,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Took note of ante,
p. 464, footnote 8.
C. C. S. 768/1 (Argonaut
Equipment for Allied and Liberated
Forces
1. In the 183d Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 31
January 1945 the British Chiefs of Staff indicated the urgency
for implementing action during the current conference covering
the
2. It is noted that no difficulty is anticipated in meeting the phased requirements for the bulk of the items from British resources in or “due in” the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, but that all issues made for this purpose will require replacement.
3. The categories of supply required for either initial issue or replacement purposes involve many classes of equipment presently in or approaching a short supply position in the United States.
4. The Combined Administrative Committee is presently studying
the problem of equipping Allied and liberated manpower in
northwestern Europe. This program involves the provision of
necessary matériel for:—
5. The United States have assumed responsibility for supplying those requirements requested from United States resources for the French Metropolitan Rearmament Program, and initial shipments thereon are now in progress. It has been tentatively agreed that the British will accept responsibility for supplying the 2d Polish Division and the six Belgium brigades. It has been proposed on the United States side that necessary equipment for liberated manpower program be also a British responsibility with the understanding that special equipment required for labor units to perform designated projects will be provided by the United Kingdom or the United States for those projects in the sphere of their respective armies. No finalized action on this latter program has been possible on the subcommittee level because of the inability of the British members to secure advice from London.
6. Until the program covering equipment for Allied and liberated manpower in northwestern Europe is resolved, it is impracticable to make a determination of availability of United States equipment to meet any commitments necessary to implement the Greek Army proposal.
7. The subject of providing equipment for additional liberated
manpower has been under study since early November. In view of
the desirability of making maximum use of liberated manpower in
northwestern Europe at the earliest practicable date, as
emphasized
8. Pending a satisfactory resolution of the program covering the equipping of Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe, the United States Chiefs of Staff can make no commitments of United States resources towards implementing the proposed Greek Army. They have no objection, however, to the implementation of this program provided that the British Chiefs of Staff can give assurances that such implementation will not interfere with the provision already approved in principle of equipment for Allied and liberated forces in northwestern Europe and without subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.
9. Upon resolution of the problem of equipment for Allied and
liberated forces of northwestern Europe, the United States
Chiefs of Staff will be glad to review
C. C. S. 747/7 (Argonaut
Allocation of Resources Between India-Burma
and China Theaters
1. The British Chiefs of Staff fully recognise the importance and magnitude of the United States commitments to China, both political and military.
2. They trust that the United States Chiefs of Staff will also recognise the political and military importance of the British stake in operations in Burma.
3. The circumstances in which the British Chiefs of Staff
accepted without discussion in conference the United States
reservation stated in C. C. S. 308
4. In present circumstances, the British Chiefs of Staff feel bound to reopen the question and to ask that no transfer of forces to the China Theatre from the India-Burma Theatre which is not acceptable to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command should be made without the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The British Chiefs of Staff are very ready to discuss means of reducing to an absolute minimum the time occupied in discussion of projected moves.
Present
Present
SecretariatBrigadier General
McFarland Captain
Graves
1. a. Approval of
Minutes of the J. C. S. 185th
MeetingAnte, pp.
492–496.
General Kuter
stated that his remarks on British participation in the
Cricket
Ante, pp.
496–497.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the minutes of the J. C. S. 185th Meeting, subject to
the attachment requested by General
b. Approval of
Minutes of the C. C. S. 184th
MeetingAnte, pp.
516–522.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the conclusions of the C. C. S. 184th Meeting and approve the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.
2. Strategy in the
Mediterranean
(C. C. S. 773/1 and 773/2)
General Marshall
said that the principal issue in this item was the
transfer of the Twelfth Air Force. Air Marshal
“5. Two fighter groups of Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to the accomplishment of your mission. Your recommendations are desired at once.”
General Marshall
said that he felt the Combined Chiefs of Staff should
decide the overall strength that should be withdrawn from the
Twelfth Air Force for use in France and that the details of the
withdrawal should be left to negotiations between
Admiral King
felt that the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean was
considering the use of air in as great strength as possible in
the event of a German withdrawal.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend the substitution in the directive to
3. Provision of
s for
Mediterranean
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Equipment for Allied and
Liberated Forces
(C. C. S. 768/1)Ante, pp.
522–524.
General Marshall
said that this subject had been discussed in the preceding
J. C. S. meeting (185th Meeting, 1 February 1945). General
General Somervell
said that General Octagon
General Bull
felt that the only satisfactory solution to the problem
was to reduce the requirements to fit the supplies available.
This was especially desirable in order to avoid the bad feeling
which would result from the arousing of false hopes.
General Somervell
added that it might be possible to meet the requirements
in phases starting with the figure of 300,000 and completing the
remainder subject to the availability of equipment.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Took note of the foregoing statements.
5. U-Boat Threat
General Marshall
said that the directive before the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on countermeasures to the U-boat threat had been Ante, pp.
521–522.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the directive drafted by the Secretaries.
6. Review of Cargo
Shipping
(C. C. S. 746/7,Post, pp.
536–537.ante, pp. 420–422. See also the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to the President, January 30, 1945, post, pp. 534–538.
General Marshall
said that the Combined Military Transportation Committee
and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Boardb.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend approval of C. C. S. 746/10 by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff subject to the amendment proposed by General
7. Levels of Supply of
Petroleum Products in U. K. and Northwestern Europe
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Basic Undertakings
(C. C. S. 775)Post, p.
539.
General Marshall
said that in C. C. S. 775 the British Chiefs of Staff
recommend that the basic undertakings agreed upon at Octagon
post, p. 539, footnote 1.h as indicated in this paper.
Admiral Duncan
said that the Joint Staff Planners recommended the
amendment of the first and last sentences of the paragraph in
order to prevent the supply of liberated areas from being placed
in the same category as the supply of allies such as France,
Russia or China.
General Somervell
explained that unless the last sentence of the proposed
new paragraph is altered or deleted altogether, it will if
General Marshall
suggested that the first line of the last sentence be
deleted and that the phrase “without prejudice to the
fulfillment of other basic undertakings” precede the words “to
provide” in the remainder of the sentence.
After further discussion,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that
paragraph h be modified to read:
“Provide assistance to each of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to apply this assistance against the enemy powers in the present war. Without prejudice to the fulfillment of the other basic undertakings to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity against Germany and Japan.”
Present
Secretariat
1. Approval of Minutes of
C. C. S. 184th MeetingAnte, pp.
516–522.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 184th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.
2. Equipment for Allied and
Liberated Forces
(C. C. S. 768/1)Ante, pp.
522–524.
Sir Alan Brooke
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
a. Took note that
b. Agreed to the implementation of the
proposals in
3. Review of Cargo
Shipping
(C. C. S. 746/8ante
p 528, footnote 9.
Sir Alan Brooke
d., he felt that it should be made clear
that the shipping and resources annex to the final report by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff at Argonaut
Magneto
Cricket
Magneto
Cricket
General Marshall
suggested the deletion of the word “other” before the word
“programs” in paragraph 5 b.
Turning to C. C. S. 746/8, Sir Alan Brooke
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
a. Approved C. C. S. 746/10 subject to
the substitution of “some” for “present” in the first line of
paragraph 4 and the deletion of “other” in the fourth line of
paragraph 5 b.
b. Approved the recommendation of the
United States Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 of C. C. S. 746/8
subject to the addition to that paragraph of the following:
“Coordination should also be effected with the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.”
c. Agreed that during the absence of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff in ArgonautCricket
ArgonautParliamentary
Debates, House of Commons, 5th post, p. 831.
4. Levels of Supply of
Petroleum Products in U. K. and
Northwest Europe
5. Transfer of Tactical Air
Forces From
to
(C. C. S. 773/1 and 773/2)
General Marshall
said that as he saw it the British proposal left the
matter of the transfer of aircraft open for consideration later.
He felt that the two commanders concerned should be allowed to
negotiate direct. He considered that the Twelfth Air Force
should
Sir Alan Brooke
General Marshall
pointed out that there was considerable air strength in
Italy. He agreed that the final decision on moves should be
taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff but felt that the
commanders should consult and put up agreed proposals.
Sir Charles Portal
said that he felt a valuable opportunity might be afforded
us in Italy if the enemy started to withdraw. In such an event
the United States’ P–47’s would be of the utmost help in cutting
communications beyond the limits of the shorter ranged British
fighters. He pointed out that the tactical air forces comprised
4,300 aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 1,950 in the
Mediterranean; including strategic air forces there were 9,000
aircraft on the Western Front as opposed to 3,580 in the
Mediterranean.
There was another point involved: the move of the tactical air
force to France might interfere with the agreed troop movement.
The commander concerned must of course say which he required
first, but there were also political factors involved. The
public were more impressed with the number of divisions taking
part in a battle than with the number of aircraft. It seemed to
him that to withhold a movement of the tactical air force for
the present fitted in well with this political consideration
since the divisions could move to France first, thus leaving the
tactical air force in Italy to exploit any opportunity which
arose. However, to meet the views put forward by the United
States Chiefs of Staff he was prepared to accept a liberal
interpretation of the words “substantial reduction” in paragraph
2 of C. C. S. 773/2. This he felt should not be allowed to rule
out the immediate move of the two fighter-bomber groups
particularly required by General
General Marshall
said he understood that the 6th Army Group was
inadequately supplied with air staffs and that the headquarters
of the Twelfth Air Force was important to them.
General Kuter
said that he personally felt that the whole of the Twelfth
Air Force should be transferred to France to assist in the
General Marshall
said that the French forces in the South were inadequately
provided with air support and the air forces in question were
urgently required for the reduction of the Colmar pocket.
Sir Alan Brooke
Field Marshal Alexander
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, contained in C. C. S. 773/1 subject to the substitution of the following for the existing paragraph 5:
“5. Two fighter groups of the Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. The Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to your mission. You should consult with
SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.”
6. Provision of
s for
the Mediterranean
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. U-Boat Threat
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had
before them a draft directive prepared by the Secretariat in
accordance with Conclusion 6 b. of the C.
C. S. 184th Meeting.Ante, pp.
521–522.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the draft directive submitted by the Secretaries and
invited the United States and British Chiefs of Staff to
dispatch it to all appropriate commanders. (Subsequently
circulated as C. C. S. 774/3.
8. Basic Undertakings
(C. C. S. 775)Post, p.
539.
In reply to a question from General Marshall
outlined the strategic reasons which rendered the
maintenance of Russian goodwill of such vital importance. He
appreciated, however, the importance of insuring also that a
state of affairs did not arise in France which would hinder our
operations based on that country.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then
discussed the effect of various proposals to amend the basic
undertakings contained in paragraph h. of the interim
report to the President and Prime Minister (C. C. S. 776post, p.
828.
General Marshall
explained that the British proposal would introduce a new
category of basic undertakings which would affect the
availability of shipping for military operations. He recalled
the difficult decision which had been necessitated when, in
considering the timing of operations against the Bonins and
Ryukyus, a deficiency of some forty sailings had arisen.
Simultaneously, a demand for an additional forty ships to
increase the bread ration in Italy had been put forward.
General Somervell
pointed out that requirements to prevent disease and
unrest and requirements to implement the U. S. military
manufacturing programs in liberated areas were already included
under the military shipping requirements.
After further discussion,
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Deferred action on this subject.
9. Interim Report to the
President and Prime Minister
(C. C. S. 776)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed
that paragraph 6 h. of C. C. S. 776
should be left blank with a notation to the effect that it was
still under discussion.
Sir Alan Brooke
h. of the interim report
along the lines indicated in C. C. S. 775.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the draft interim report as amended during the discussion.
Nr: No #.
Top Secret memorandum for the President.
Mr. Ante, pp.
420–422.
The United States Chiefs of Staff are seriously concerned over the present determined effort to divert shipping to non-military uses, with the resulting effect on our military operations, and over the implied willingness of the British to consider qualifying our objective of ending the war at the earliest possible date. Extensive technical shipping studies show a considerable deficit in cargo shipping during the next 6 months. The United States Chiefs of Staff believe that even the present estimated deficits are optimistic. Stated requirements of the United States Theater Commanders have been carefully reviewed in Washington and it is felt they have been cut to the bone; perhaps cut further than will prove, in fact, acceptable if we are to stick to the principle of finishing the war as quickly as possible. Furthermore, the availability of shipping has been computed on a loss rate which did not allow for the Germans attaining any degree of success in the campaign they may launch with their new fast submarines.
The Chiefs of Staff consider that the issue is now clear. The decision lies between continuing unqualified priority to beating Germany and Japan or compromising this policy by diverting to non-military programs shipping essential to military operations. Any compromise almost certainly means prolongation of the war. Any unnecessary prolongation means ever-increasing pressure and demands for more diversions to non-military purposes. The overriding objection from the military standpoint to these proposals which amount to slowing down our military effort is that the price is paid directly in the unnecessary loss of the lives of many American fighting men and also in expenditure of American resources. The Chiefs of Staff know of no reason sufficiently pressing to justify the acceptance of such an extra and, what appears to them, unnecessary cost.
The military necessity for essential Civil Affairs supplies has
always been recognized and these are included under the theater
commander’s military priorities. There is no doubt that more
shipping and supplies are desirable for rehabilitation to help
out the liberated peoples.
Before working out the details of shipping allocations it is essential to have certain basic principles agreed. The United States Chiefs of Staff have in the attached memorandum presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff proposed recommendations to the heads of State as to what these principles should be. It is considered that material change in the spirit of these principles may well result in prolonging the war with all the costs consequent thereto.
C. C. S. 746/7
After considering C. C. S. 746/6
A definite but secondary consideration is the cost in money
and resources to the United States resulting from any
prolongation of the war. The effect of any let-up in our
maximum military pressure or any delay in operations is much
more than the actual number of days’ delay to a particular
operation which would result from acceding to a demand for
resources to rehabilitate liberated areas. It means we lose
our momentum and give the enemy time to recoup his losses
and build up his resistance with consequent unnecessary cost
in American blood and resources. As to the Thesis of the
British representatives of the combined military
transportation committee that cuts in estimates
The United States Chiefs of Staff recognize the military necessity for preventing disease and unrest among the liberated areas and continue to subscribe to a policy under which the theater commander includes essential civil affairs supplies in his military priorities.
They recognize that there may be consideration other than military so over-riding as to justify at times some small allocation of shipping for rehabilitation of liberated areas, regardless of routine military requirements, but however subject always to cancellation due to urgent military necessity.
Before the Combined Military Transportation Committee in collaboration with the Combined Shipping authorities can proceed with the allocation of shipping, made particularly difficult by the present apparent large deficit, it is essential for them to have basic principles agreed for their guidance. It is recommended that insofar as liberated areas are concerned the following principle be recommended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the heads of government:
Provision of resources for liberated areas will not be at the expense of current and projected operations to press the war to its earliest successful conclusion.
It is further recommended that the following be presented to the heads of government as guiding principles in working out the details of shipping allocation:
A. First priority to
B. Second priority to civilian programs desirable but not essential to the war making capacity of the United Nations. This includes rehabilitation of liberated areas beyond that envisaged in civil relief under A above of direct value to the war making capacity of the United Nations.
C. Third priority to military requirements necessary for stockpiling not directly contributory to any approved or projected operation under the agreed strategic concepts.
D. Last priority to civil economy requirements which only indirectly affect the war effort.
3 [E]. Requirements in higher
priorities will, in general, be filled before any in lower
priorities.
F. So long as military requirements are not met in full shipping for civilian programs will not be allocated without prior consultation with the Chiefs of Staff.
G. Deficits will be absorbed on as broad a base as practicable within the above guidance in order that the incidence of limited shipping availability on programs essential to the military effort may be minimized.
H. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will decide priority classification of military requirements. Appropriate civilian agencies will decide the priority classification of civilian requirements.
To the Secretary of State from Allstate-Horseshoe)” are at the end of the third
paragraph.
Reference Russian attitude towards Agreement on shipping control.
On August 5, 1944 Belgium, Canada, Greece, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, United Kindom and the United States of America signed an
Agreement on Principles looking towards continued control of all
merchant shipping until after the war with Japan.
Because of its position as a maritime nation, special consideration was given to the accession of Sweden to this Agreement. In the negotiations with respect to Swedish accession, it has become apparent that Russia has intimated to Sweden that it would prefer Sweden not to adhere to the Agreement. This will probably not deter Sweden from signing, but Sweden is concerned about Russian attitude in light of general relations with the Soviet Union.
The Norwegian Government-in-Exile, a member of the shipping
control, is worried also about the unfavorable Russian attitude
towards the Shipping Agreement.
Those of our people who have been working on the Agreement tell
us that Lord Leathers, head of Ministry of War Transport at
London, has made several attempts to explain the Shipping
Agreement to Russian officials in London. He believes that the
full information has not been forwarded to Moscow. Ambassador
It is believed that a joint approach by the United States and
Great Britain should be made directly to
Admiral Land is familiar with this matter.
C. C. S. 775
Basic Undertakings in Support of Over-All
Strategic Concept
The British Chiefs of Staff recommend that the basic undertakings
agreed upon at Octagon
post,
p. 828.
For existing h. substitute the
following:—
“
h. Continue assistance to the forces of the liberated areas in Europe to enable them to fulfill an active role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Within the limits of our available resources to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations.”
Present
The only record of the substance of this meeting that has been
found is in ante, p.
461, supplemented by
Present
Secretariat
The Meeting had under consideration an
interim report to the President and the Prime Minister by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff (C. C. S. 776/1post, pp.
827–833.
The President expressed his
appreciation of the amount of progress which had been made in so
short a time in the military discussions.
The report was then considered paragraph by paragraph.
a. Paragraph 6 h.
The President and The Prime Minister were informed that discussion was
proceeding upon the wording of the basic undertaking to be
included in this paragraph.
General Marshall
said that the wording proposed by the British Chiefs of
Staffante, p.
539.
The Prime Minister inquired whether
the British import program would be affected. He pointed out
that Great Britain had had less than half her pre-war imports
for over five years, and he was afraid lest the requirements of
liberated areas, and even certain of the military requirements,
would necessitate a reduction in the tonnage which it was hoped
to import into Great Britain in 1945.
Sir Alan Brooke
The Prime Minister, referring to
paragraph 6 f., thought that great
efforts should now be made to pass supplies to Russia via the
Dardanelles.
Admiral King
said that this was all in hand and the first convoy was
expected to go through on 15 February. The delay had been caused
by the fact that the port of Odessa had not previously been
ready to receive the supplies.
b. The U-Boat War (paragraphs 7 and 8)
The Prime Minister expressed his
agreement with this paragraph. He thought the time had not yet
come to take drastic measures at the expense of other
operations, though it might be necessary to do so if the U-boat
campaign developed in the way expected.
c. Operations in Northwest Europe (paragraphs 9 and 10)
The President and The Prime Minister were informed that complete
agreement had been reached on this question.
The Prime Minister referred to the
importance of having plenty of divisions available for the
support of the main operation in the North, so that tired
divisions could be replaced.
Sir Alan Brooke
The Prime Minister inquired what
action had been taken on ante, p. 464. footnote
8.
Sir Alan Brooke
Ante, pp.
471–474.ante, p. 464, footnote 8); the other
telegram has not been identified.
The Prime Minister questioned the
meaning of the words “to close the Rhine” which occurred in
paragraph 10 of the report.
It was explained that these words were a quotation from General
d. Strategy in the Mediterranean (paragraphs 11, 12, and 13)
The President inquired whether the
Combined Chiefs of Staff were satisfied that if the forces
proposed were withdrawn from the Italian Front, enough troops
would be left behind for the task in hand.
Sir Alan Brooke
The Prime Minister said that there
should be no obligation to take forces away from Greece until
the situation there admitted of their withdrawal. It was
necessary to build up a Greek National Army under a broad-based
government.
Sir Alan Brooke
post, pp. 832–833.
The Prime Minister said that he
expected that by the time the first three divisions had moved it
would be possible to start withdrawing troops from Greece. He
was in full agreement with the course proposed, and was
particularly glad that General
In reply to an inquiry by the President, Sir
Henry Maitland Wilson
said that he was in complete agreement with the course
proposed.
With regard to the proposed withdrawal of air forces, Sir Charles Portal
explained, in reply to an inquiry by the President, that
the move of five groups was in question. Two were to go now, and
proposals for further moves were to be made by the Supreme
Commanders in consultation.
The Prime Minister agreed that it
would be unwise to make any significant withdrawal of amphibious
assault forces from Italy, as to do so would be to relieve the
Germans of an ever-present anxiety.
Referring to paragraph 7 of the proposed directive to the Supreme
Allied Commander, Mediterranean, The Prime
Minister said that he attached great importance to a
rapid follow-up of any withdrawal or of any surrender of the
German forces in Italy. He felt it was essential that we should
occupy as much of Austria as possible as it was undesirable that
more of Western Europe than necessary should be occupied by the
Russians.
Referring to paragraph 8 of the proposed directive, dealing with
support to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, The Prime Minister said that he
presumed that the phrase “the territory of Yugoslavia” should be
interpreted to mean the existing or lawful territory of
Yugoslavia. There were certain territories which were claimed by
both Yugoslavia and Italy and he was unwilling to give any
suggestion of support to the claims of either side. For example,
Trieste ought to be a valuable outlet to Southern Europe and the
question of sovereignty in that area should be entirely
reserved.
The President agreed and said that he
was unwilling to see either the Yugoslavs or the Italians in
complete control.
Sir Alan Brooke
The War Against Japan
e. Operations in Southeast Asia Command
(paragraphs 18 and 19)
The Prime Minister said that the main
object of the operations to clear the enemy from Burma was to
liberate the important army engaged there for further operations
against Japan. He inquired whether the Staffs had come to any
conclusion on what these further operations should be.
Sir Alan Brooke
post, p. 833.
The Prime Minister hoped there would
be time to review this matter in accordance with developments.
For example, if the Japanese forces in Java or Sumatra were
greatly weakened, small detachments might be able to go in and
liberate these countries. His object, however, was to go where a
good opportunity would be presented of heavy fighting with the
Japanese, particularly in the air, as this was the only way
which the British had been able to discover of helping the main
American operations in the Pacific.
Sir Alan Brooke
The Prime Minister inquired whether
paragraph 18 meant that there would be no help from United
States air forces in operations in the Kra Peninsula, Malaya, et
cetera.
Sir Charles Portal
pointed out that any such help would be the subject of a
separate agreement when the plan had been received.
The Prime Minister inquired whether
the President had not been somewhat disappointed at the results
achieved by the Chinese, having regard to the tremendous
American efforts which had been made to give them support.
The President said that three
generations of education and training would be required before
China could become a serious factor.
General Marshall
pointed out that the picture in China was now considerably
changed. In the first place certain well-trained Chinese troops
were now in China, having been transferred there from Burma.
Secondly, the opening of the Burma Road had meant that the first
artillery for the Chinese Army had been able to go through.
Thirdly, if operations in Burma continued to go well, additional
trained Chinese troops could move back to China, and it was
hoped that an effective reinforced Chinese corps would soon be
in existence.
The Prime Minister said that it now
appeared that the American and British operations in this part
of the world were diverging. The American effort was going on
into China and the British effort was turning to the south. He
inquired whether any consideration had been given to the move of
British or Indian divisions from Burma into China to take part
in the operations there.
Sir Alan Brooke
General Marshall
agreed that the maintenance of British forces in China was
not a practical proposition. There was only one reinforced
United States brigade in China, which would act as a spearhead
for critical operations. There was the reinforced Chinese corps,
which had a stiffening of United States personnel in their
tanks, armored cars, tank destroyers, et cetera, and there was
an effective air force. These forces should now be able to
insure that the Japanese could no longer go wherever they
pleased in China. The aid which could be given by these forces
to the American arrival on the Chinese Pacific Coast would be
important. A pincer movement against the Japanese could in this
way be initiated—one arm of the pincer being represented by the
forces assaulting the selected spot on the Chinese Pacific
Coast. This arm would be strong. The other arm of the pincer
would be the Chinese and American forces in China. This arm
would be weak, but nevertheless of value. The progress of the
American main operations in the Pacific and the campaign in the
Philippines had changed the picture in Southeast Asia, and would
make further operations by Admiral
The Prime Minister repeated that if
the Americans made any request for British troops to go into
China he would certainly be prepared to consider it.
Admiral
Leahy
General Marshall
agreed, and said that he did not think it would be
practicable to increase the forces in China until a port had
been secured. Up to the present it had been possible to do only
a very little in the way of equipping the Chinese ground army.
Nearly all the transportation had had to be used for the needs
of the American air forces. It would now be possible to handle
the requirements of the Chinese ground forces.
Referring to paragraph 17, and Appendix “B,”ante, pp.
395–396.The Prime
Minister inquired whether it had been decided to delay
the assault on Japan until after the close of the German
war.
General Marshall
said that this delay had been necessitated by the fact
that until the German war ended, shipping, air forces, and
service troops, could not be made available in sufficient
quantities to enable the main operations against Japan to be
carried out. If the German war had ended in December of 1944, it
would have been possible to operate against Kyushu in the autumn
of 1945. There were also certain seasonal limitations on
operations in this area.
Summing up, The Prime Minister said
that he was glad to see that such a great measure of agreement
had been reached. He understood that the present report was
merely designed to keep the President and himself abreast of the
progress of the discussions, and that a final report would be
rendered later.
The President agreed, and again
expressed his appreciation of the work which had been
accomplished.
Discussion then turned upon the conduct of future discussions,
and Sir Alan Brooke
The President and The Prime Minister expressed their agreement with this
action, and said that although final plans need not be made
until later, it appeared highly probable that a short meeting at
Malta on the return journey would be desirable.
The Meeting then adjourned.
Present
The only record of the substance of this meeting that has been
found is in ante, p.
462.
U. S. Army photograph
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in
Plate 1
U. S. Army photograph
President Quincy at Malta,
February 2, 1945.
Plate 2
U. S. Army photograph
President Quincy at Malta, February 2, 1945. Left
to right: Fleet Admiral
Plate 3
U. S. Army photograph
Meeting of President
Plate 4
U. S. Army photograph
Plenary Meeting in Livadia Palace, Yalta, February 1945. Left to
right:
Plate 5
U. S. Army photograph
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Yusupov Palace, Koreiz,
February 7, 1945. Left to right: Mr.
Plate 6
U. S. Army photograph
Prime Minister
Plate 7
U. S. Army photograph
Tripartite Luncheon Meeting in Livadia Palace, Yalta, February
11, 1945. Left to right: Secretary
Plate 8
Saturday, February 3rd:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1210: The President’s plane (#1), escorted by
five fighters, arrived at Saki [in the Crimea]. The fighters had joined
the flight at Athens. A sixth P–38 had to turn back to Athens because of
engine trouble.
At the airport to meet the President were the Honorable V.
The President did not leave his plane at once but remained embarked until the Prime Minister arrived from Malta some twenty minutes later.
Distance traveled, Malta to Saki, 1375 miles.
We were met at Saki by Agents Rowley, Peterson,
1230: The Prime Minister and his party arrived at
Saki in his special aircraft escorted by six fighters. The Prime
Minister disembarked and came over to the President’s plane. The
President then left his plane and entered a jeep. As the President and
the Prime Minister approached the guard of honor, honors were rendered
for them. The honors consisted of the guard presenting arms and the band
playing the Star Spangled Banner, God Save the King, and the Third
Internationale. Then, while in the jeep, the President drove down the
ranks of the guard and made an inspection of them. Afterwards the guard
of honor passed in review before the President and the Prime Minister.
The President took the review while seated in the jeep.
1306: The ceremonies at the airport over, the
President and members of his party left Saki by automobile for Livadia
Palace, near Yalta, some 80 miles distant. Mrs.
The first stretch of our drive, from Saki to Simferopol, was over
rolling, snow-covered country somewhat like that of our Middle-West.
From Simferopol, the capital city of the Crimea, we went on to Alushta, a small town on the east coast of the Crimean Peninsula. From Alushta we followed the “Route Romanoff” to Yalta. This is a high and very winding road that passes around the west side of the Roman Kosh (the highest mountain in the Crimea—5,055 feet) and ascends to the Red Crag (4,760 feet). The entire distance from Saki to Yalta was guarded by Soviet troops. It was noted that a considerable number of them were young girls.
1750: We passed through the city of Yalta.
1800: We arrived at Livadia Palace, two miles
south of Yalta. This was our headquarters during the Crimea Conference.
Miss
We were all very tired, so it was a case of bathing, dining and to bed for us this evening.
The Prime Minister’s party proceeded separately from the President’s and went from Saki to Vorontsov Villa (located about 12.5 miles south of Livadia), where they made their headquarters during the conference.
Commander Catoctin.
2100: Lieutenant
The U. S. minesweepers Pinnacle and Implicit were moored in the harbor at Yalta. The
naval auxiliary Catoctin, the liberty ship William Blount and the minesweepers Incessant and Incredible
were moored in the harbor at Sevastopol, 80 miles to the southwest. The
Soviet authorities had declined to permit the Catoctin or the William Blount to
continue on to Yalta because of the presence of mines in that area of
the Black Sea. This task group had been sailed from the Mediterranean
Area some ten days previously in order to be on hand to furnish
miscellaneous services to the American Delegation at Yalta. These ships
were the first Allied vessels to pass through the Dardanelles since the
beginning of the present war and they opened communications with
Sevastopol and Yalta.
Because the Catoctin could not come to Yalta, or
closer than Sevastopol, it was necessary for us to communicate by
landline (teletype) with the Catoctin which
vessel served as communications relay ship for our party during the
conference. For the first few days we experienced “wire trouble” between
Livadia and Sevastopol. Our communication engineers eventually laid an
entirely new line from Livadia to Sevastopol and thereafter no further
wire trouble was experienced.
Yalta
Yalta before the war was the center of the health resorts on the south coast of the Crimea. In 1928 it had a normal population of 29,000. It is picturesquely situated in the valley of the river Utchan-Su and is surrounded on three sides by mountains. The mountain range to the north thwarts the cold blasts headed that way and permits the warm sun to exert its full effect in and around Yalta. The mean annual temperature there is 56.65. The thermometer hovered around 40 during our visit but it was not at all uncomfortable.
Livadia Palace
The buildings used by the American Delegation during the Crimea Conference are the former summer palace of the Czars. The main building is called the Livadia and the two auxiliary buildings the Svitski Korpus.
After the Revolution Livadia was used by the Soviet Government as a rest home for tubercular patients. During the German occupation of the Crimea it was used by their high command, who did a very thorough job of looting when they were forced to leave. The buildings were left in complete disrepair and the grounds in equally bad condition. The only original furnishings in the building (Livadia) at the time we resided there were the two pictures in the President’s bedroom.
The Soviet Government had performed an amazing job, however, in
completely renovating the place during the three weeks period
immediately preceding the conference; amazing because of the critical
shortage of materials and the very limited time available. This was
because it was not until about 15 January that it was definitely decided
to hold the conference at Yalta. Hotel staffs were brought in from
Moscow and furniture and furnishings were obtained from Moscow and other
Soviet cities or from local sanitoria and rest homes. It should be added
here that in addition to everything that the Soviets did, Lieutenant
Commander L. H. Backus, Catoctin) did an outstanding job in transforming Livadia, an
infested building since the German occupation and pillage, to a place
that was completely habitable and comfortable, and prevented what might
have been a most serious threat to the health of the entire party.
The New Palace (Livadia) was built from white Inkerman granite in 1911,
in the style of the Italian renaissance, from plans by the architect
The first floor of the 50-room palace was used by
The second floor was used principally by the Czarina and her four
daughters. The room occupied by General
The parks and gardens, which stretch down to the seaside, contain fifteen
miles of paths and lanes lined with cypress, cedar, yew and bay trees.
There are many rare and beautiful plants and trees in the parks, brought
there from all over the world by Count
Sunday, February 4th:
Marshal
1100: The President conferred with Mr.
1615: Marshal
1630: The President conferred with Mr.
1710: The First Formal Meeting of the Crimea
Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present:
This meeting adjourned at 1950.
2030: The President was host at dinner at Livadia
to the Prime Minister, Marshal
Monday, February 5th:
0730: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier arrived at
Livadia with White House mail. This mail had been dispatched from
Washington on January 31st.
0800: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier departed
Livadia with mail for the White House.
1300: The President had lunch at Livadia with the
members of his Mess.
1430: The President conferred with Mr.
1600: The second Formal Meeting of the Crimea
Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:
The meeting adjourned at 1945.
2030: Dinner at Livadia.—The President, General
Tuesday, February 6th:
0800: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier departed
Livadia for Washington with White House mail.
1300: Luncheon at Livadia.—The President, the
Prime Minister, Mr.
1615: The Third Formal Meeting of the Crimea
Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:
The following preliminary statement concerning the conference was agreed
on at today’s meeting for release at 1630 tomorrow (Washington
time).post, p.
659.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mrs.
1900: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier arrived
from Washington with White House mail.
2030: Dinner at Livadia.—The President, Mrs.
This afternoon Commander
Wednesday, February 7th:
1300: Lunch at Livadia.—The President, Mrs.
1610: The Fourth Formal Meeting of the Crimea
Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:
This meeting adjourned at 2000.
2030: Dinner at Livadia.—The President, Mrs.
Thursday, February 8th:
1200: The President conferred with Mr.
The British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff met in the grand ballroom at Livadia. Neither the President nor the Prime Minister attended this meeting.
1330: The President and Mrs.
1500: The President signed an Executive Order
authorizing the Secretary of War to take over and operate the plants and
facilities of the Detroit Edison Company of Detroit, Michigan.
1545: Marshal
1615: The Fifth Formal Meeting of the Crimea
Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present were:
The meeting adjourned at 1940.
2030: The President and certain members of his
party left Livadia by motor for Koreiz Villa to dine as guests of
Marshal
Friday, February 9th:
1230: The President attended a plenary meeting of
the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Livadia. Present were:
1330: Lunch at Livadia.—The President, the Prime
Minister, Mrs.
1600: The President, the Prime Minister and
Marshal
1615: The Sixth Formal Meeting of the Crimea
Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present:
The meeting adjourned at 1950.
1930:
2030: Dinner at Livadia.—The President, Mrs.
Saturday, February 10th:
0800: White House mail was dispatched to
Washington via a Joint Chiefs of Staff courier who left Livadia this
morning.
1300: Lunch at Livadia.—The President, Mrs.
1500: Justice
1600: The President presented specially engraved
Fourth-Term Inaugural Medallions to the Prime Minister, Marshal
1630: Marshal
1650: The Seventh Formal Meeting of the Crimea
Conference was convened at Livadia. Present:
The meeting adjourned at 2000.
2030: The President, Mr.
Sunday, February 11th:
1130: The President, accompanied by Mrs.
1200: The Eighth Formal Meeting of the Crimea
Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present:
The conference recessed at 1250.
1300: The President was host at luncheon at
Livadia to the Prime Minister, Marshal
Conference discussions continued at the lunch table under 1545, at which time the Crimea Conference formally adjourned.
1555: Marshal
Legion of Merit (Degree of Chief Commander) for Marshal
Legion of Merit (Degree of Chief Commander) for Marshal
Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Colonel
General
Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Lieutenant
General
Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Lieutenant
General
Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Major General
Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Major General
Legion of Merit (Degree of Commander) for Colonel
As we were leaving Livadia the President was presented numerous gift packages by the Soviet Authorities at the palace, as also were various other members of the party. These packages contained vodka, several kinds of wine, champagne, caviar, butter, oranges and tangerines.
General Comment
The weather at Livadia was most pleasant during our visit. The average
temperature was 40. The Russians accredited the good weather to the
President and called it “Roosevelt weather.” For
During the period 4–11 February, daily meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries were held in addition to their attendance at the major conferences. Livadia, Vorontsov and Koreiz shared these Foreign Secretary meetings.
Our mail was brought to Yalta by Joint Chief of Staff couriers who used the regular Air Transport Command facilities from Washington to Cairo and the shuttle service from Cairo to Saki. The average time employed for the journey from Washington to Conference Headquarters was four days.
The British party had daily mail service. Their mail was flown directly from London to Saki in “Mosquito” type aircraft, the flights following a direct course between the two points involved.
Our radio communications were handled by a two-way high speed circuit set
up between Radio Washington and the Catoctin (at
Sevastopol), using Navy Radio Oran as an intermediate relay station. The
messages were broadcast over the Washington “Catoctin and
Livadia was by a land line or by telephone.
A number of U. S. Naval personnel who speak Russian were assembled by
Admiral Catoctin. This team proved most helpful in
working with the Soviets to complete the preparations for our visit and
they were also very helpful to us as interpreters during our eight days
at Livadia. They were:
Lieut. George Scherbatoff, U. S. N. R.
Lieut. Dimitri P. Keusseff, U. S. N. R.
Lieut. C. Norris Houghton, U. S. N. R.
Lieut. Michael Kimack, U. S. N. R.
Lt (jg) John Cheplick, U. S. N. R.
Lt (jg) John P. Romanov, U. S. N.
Andrew M. Bacha, Chief Yeoman, U. S. N. R.
Andrew Sawchuck, Yeoman 2/c, U. S. N. R.
Harry Sklenar, Yeoman 2/c, U. S. N. R.
Alexis Nestoruk, Yeoman 2/c, U. S. N. R.
Nickolas Korniloff, Yeoman 3/c, U. S. N. R.
Russel Koval, Yeoman 3/c, U. S. N. R.
1600: The President and members of his party left
Livadia by motor for Sevastopol. Mr.
The drive to Sevastopol was over high and winding mountain roads along the Black Sea coast. It took us over the battlefield, nearly a century old, where the historic Light Brigade made its famous charge in the Crimean War of 1854–1856, and for many miles led through territory bitterly contested by the Russians and Germans in the recent Crimean campaign.
1840: The President and his party arrived in
Sevastopol and proceeded to the U. S. S. Catoctin, a naval auxiliary moored at the Soviet naval base.
It was dusk when we arrived in Sevastopol but the President saw scenes of stark destruction there wrought by the Germans. The city was virtually leveled to the ground except for the walls of homes and other buildings which the mines, bombs and shells in recent battles left standing like billboards—mute testimony of the horrorful wanton Nazi vengeance. Of thousands of buildings in the city, the President was told that only six were left in useful condition when the Germans fled.
Distance traveled, Livadia to Sevastopol, 80 miles.
1855: The President and his party went on board
the Catoctin where they spent the night. The Catoctin manned the rail and accorded the
President full honors as he went on board.
The Catoctin served a delicious steak dinner to
us, which was a real treat for us after eight days of Russian fare.
After dinner Admiral
2130: Mr. Catoctin from Livadia and the encoding and radio transmission
of the Conference communiqué was started. The communiqué was to be
released simultaneously in Washington, London, and Moscow at 1630
tomorrow, February 12th. Lieutenant Catoctin are to be commended for the expeditious
manner in which this communiqué was encoded and transmitted to
Washington. See Annex A for complete text of the communiqué.post, pp.
968–975.
Captain C. O. Comp, U. S. N., commanded the Catoctin. Her Executive Officer was Lieutenant Commander
Monday, February 12th:
0655: After a very comfortable night, the
President and members of his party left the Catoctin and proceeded by automobile to the airfield at Saki.
Vice Admiral Batistii [BasistyCatoctin had enabled our party to avoid tiring mountain
driving on the same day as the long plane flight to Egypt, as most of
the road from Sevastopol to Simferopol was over rolling country.
Present
SecretariatBrigadier General
McFarland Captain
Graves
1. Agenda for Tripartite
Discussions at Argonaut
(J.C.S. 1176/9, J.C.S. 1227/3 and J.C.S. Info. Memo 359)
Admiral
Leahy
Admiral
Cooke
The first item involved British, U. S. and Russian negotiations. This matter has been under discussion for a considerable length of time and little progress has been made. The second item involved only discussions between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. This matter has been the subject of examination by the special U. S. mission now in Russia. There are certain phases of the problem which are not progressing very well.
The papers before the Chiefs were presented by the Planners with the view to formulating for the President a form of approach in the forthcoming discussions. It was felt that the President should be thoroughly familiar with matters which will be the basis of the tripartite discussions.
The agenda items listed in Appendix “A” in J.C.S. 1227/3 have
been presented to the Soviets and the British. To date no answer
has been received from the Soviets.ante, pp. 424–425.
In response to a question by Admiral General Deane
expressed the opinion that the Soviets would withhold
their views on the agenda until they met in formal tripartite
session. The Russian military staff would be adequately
represented at such a meeting and having already received the
views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff on the agenda items, they
would be prepared to discuss them.
General Marshall
said it was important to keep the consideration of
military matters alive during the conference while political
talks were taking place on higher levels.
Admiral King
felt that the President should be advised to ask Premier
Admiral
Cooke
General Marshall
felt that the first and important step should be to inform
the President of the subjects to be discussed in the tripartite
sessions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should put before the
President the agenda as outlined in Appendix “A” and “B” of J.
C. S. 1227/3.ante, pp.
393–394.
Admiral
Leahy
Admiral King
emphasized the necessity for clearing up the matter of
direct liaison between General
Admiral
Leahy
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Took note that Admiral
Memorandum for General Antonov
It is the desire of the American Staff to discuss with the Soviet Staff details of possible participation in the war against Japan. Can you obtain approval of this suggestion?
PresentThe President
Fleet Admiral
Leahy General of the Army
Marshall Fleet Admiral
King Major General
Kuter Secretary
Stettinius Mr.
Harriman Mr.
Matthews Mr.
Hiss
SecretaryBrigadier General
McFarland
Admiral
Leahy
General Marshall
said that the establishment of direct liaison for day to
day communication between the Allied commanders and the Russians
was highly desirable. In his opinion the important thing was to
obtain agreement to the general idea as early as possible and
leave the detailed procedure to be worked out later. The
difficulty had been, not with the Russians but with the British
who wish to effect the liaison through the Combined Chiefs of
Staff. General Marshall
pointed out that with the Russians within 40 miles of
Berlin there was not time enough to go through the Combined
Chiefs of Staff. He thought the British reluctance to agree to
direct liaison was probably due to the objection which the
Russians had raised to the presence of General
Mr. Harriman
said with reference to discussions between the Russian and
Allied staffs that Marshal
At this point, a memorandum from the President to the Prime
Minister enclosing a memorandum requesting Marshal
The President considered the agendas
contained in Appendices “A” and “B” of J. C. S. 1227/3.ante, p. 563, footnotes 3 and 4.
In answer to the President’s question with reference to item e, General Marshall
explained that Milepost
In reply to the President’s question as to whether the British
troops released from Burma would go into China, General Marshall
said that the British had not raised this point. He
thought it more likely that the British troops would be used in
Thailand.
The President asked if any material
and supplies would be stockpiled in Petropavlovsk.
General Marshall
replied that the Russians wanted some of it there but the
bulk of it was desired at Vladivostok.
General Marshall
then read to the President a telegraphic report
summarizing the situation on all war fronts and explained it on
the map.
The President stated any action in
Indochina which resulted in damage to the Japanese was
satisfactory to him. He had no objection to any U. S. action
which it was considered desirable to take in Indochina as long
as it did not involve any alignments with the French.
Mr. Stettinius
informed the President that there were seven major topics
which he thought the President should be prepared to discuss
with the Prime Minister and Marshal
The second topic was the matter of the creation of an emergency European high commission to function during the interim period between the end of the war and the setting up of the permanent organization.
The President indicated that he
preferred periodic meetings between Mr.
The third topic was the treatment of Germany, political and economic.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that the Russians were interested in taking this up
as the first subject to be discussed by the tripartite
conference. The fourth topic was the subject of Poland.
The fifth topic was the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The attitude manifested by the Russians toward the U. S. and British delegations on these commissions made necessary an early clarification of the situation.
The sixth subject was the question of Iranian relations.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that the British were willing to withdraw troops in
Iran in June.
The seventh topic was China. It was desirable to seek Soviet and British assistance in composing the relations between the Chinese Government and the Communists.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that papers have been prepared by the Department of
State on all of the subjects listed and would be available for
the President’s information.
Mr. Harriman
stated that Marshal status quo in Outer Mongolia and to obtain control
over the railroad running to Dairen.
The President said he wished to have
the views of Generalissimo status quo in Mongolia but was ready to go ahead on
the other questions.
At this point Mr.
Memorandum of Suggested Action Items for
the President
1. International
Organization.
We should seek adoption of United States proposal for voting formula and agreement to announce immediately calling of general United Nations Conference.
(Copies of text of United States proposal and analysis thereof
are available if you wish to hand them to
Argumentation: Our proposal safeguards unity of the great powers so far as is possible by any formula—enforcement action will require unanimous vote—only with respect to discussion will a party to a dispute not be able to vote. Latin American and other small powers will be disillusioned if discussion can be vetoed.
Note: If the voting issue is settled,
additional points would have to be agreed to before a United
Nations Conference could be called: International Trusteeships,
France as fifth sponsoring power, list of nations to be invited,
date of conference and its being held in United States,
invitations to be by United States on behalf of other four
sponsoring powers, United States to consult China and France on
behalf of Britain and Russia, form of announcement of agreement
on International Organization matters (we have available the
necessary papers on these points).
2. Adoption of Emergency
European High Commission.
(Copies of draft text of declaration and of accompanying protocol
are available if you wish to hand them to
Argumentation: Unity of great power policy with respect to liberated and Axis satellite countries is highly desirable, and France should be included as one of the great powers for this purpose.
3. Treatment of
Germany.
(a) Final agreement should be reached with
respect to control machinery and zones of occupation.
Announcement should be made of such agreement and of the earlier
agreement on surrender terms.
(b) Boundaries: It is not expected that
definitive, detailed commitments will have to be made at this
time. However, if it proves necessary, our detailed position has
been prepared and is available.
(c) Minorities: We should oppose, so far
as possible, indiscriminate mass transfer of minorities with
neighboring states. Transfers should be carried out gradually
under international supervision.
(d) Long range economic policies: We
should favor abolition of German self-sufficiency and its
position of economic domination of Europe, elimination of
certain key industries, prohibition of manufacture of arms and
of all types of aircraft, and continuing control to achieve
these aims.
4. Poland.
(a) Boundaries: We favor the
(b) We should be prepared to assist in the
formation of a new representative interim government pledged to
free elections when conditions permit. We should urge inclusion
in a provisional government of
5. Allied Control Commissions
in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.
Our representatives must be assured of: (a) freedom of movement, and (b)
consultation before decisions are made by the Control
Commissions.
6. Iran.
We should seek Soviet agreement not to press for oil concessions in Iran until termination of hostilities and withdrawal of Allied troops.
7. China.
We should seek Soviet and British support for our efforts to bring about Kuomintang-Communist agreement.
Argumentation: Cooperation between the two groups will expedite conclusion of the war in the Far East and prevent possible internal conflict and foreign intervention in China.
2/4
Jebb joined us
Jebb said: Have paper on Dep.
He then read rapidly a paper containing following points
1. Goal is Int. collabor, to promote well being of colonial
peoples by:
2. Majority of problems are not in dep. areas themselves
3. ... need something broader & more flexible than mandates
4. Proposal—regional bodies
5. Full publicity re colonial admn—desire uniformity of admn.
Proposal: Regional bodies could make recommends. to individual govts or gen. decl.
Eur H Com.
Put temporary nature into Protocol
To assist, where conditions require, in the maintenance of internal order, such assistance to include where other means fail the joint use of force.
to take, upon the unanimous decision of the Commission, action designed to accomplish the following aims:
When the emergency which has given rise to action by the Commission in any country has terminated the Commission will terminate
Justice
(
Pres. fears taking internal rep.
Pres. doesn’t like “big” organ.
Mr. B doesn’t like indep. autb. of U. S. Commissioner Would
prefer decl. with auth. to Ambassadors
to act as specified in protocol. Ambs. are appointed with
consent of Pres. & are under control of
Mr. B fears any agency would perpetuate itself
Redraft as mere decl.—ad hoc commission for any country
Present
Subject: General Discussion.
After an exchange of amenities, in which the President thanked
Marshal
Marshal Stalin
replied that this was certainly true, and that the Soviet
armies were moving very successfully onto the line of the
Oder.
The President replied that he had made
a number of bets on board the cruiser coming over as to whether
the Russians would get to Berlin before the Americans would get
to Manila.
Marshal Stalin
remarked that he was certain the Americans would get to
Manila before the Russians got to Berlin, since there was at
present very hard fighting going on for the Oder line.
There followed a discussion about the climate and characteristics of the Crimea.
The President said that he had been
very much struck by the extent of German destruction in the
Crimea and therefore he was more bloodthirsty in regard to the
Germans than he had been a year ago, and he hoped that Marshal
Marshal Stalin
replied that because of the honest blood shed in fighting
the Germans, everyone was more bloodthirsty than they had been a
year ago, adding that the destruction in the Crimea is nothing
compared to that which occurred in the Ukraine. He said in the
Crimea the Germans had been out-flanked and had had little time
to carry out planned destruction, whereas in the Ukraine they
had done it with method and calculation. He said the Germans
were savages and seemed to hate with a sadistic hatred the
creative work of human beings.
The President agreed with this.
Marshal Stalin
then inquired about the military situation on the Western
Front.
The President replied that General
Marshal Stalin
expressed gratification at this news, and said that
General
The President said he felt that the
armies were getting close enough to have contact between and he
hoped General
Marshal Stalin
agreed and thought it was very important and promised that
the staffs while here would work out the details of this
suggestion. He added that if the Germans were deprived of all
their coal, since they were already short of bread, there was a
possibility that the German collapse would come before absolute
military defeat.
The President inquired whether the
Soviet bridgeheads across the Oder were sufficient for further
offensive action.
Marshal Stalin
replied that in regard to these bridgeheads, of which
there were five or six, fierce battles were in progress on the
Eastern front.
The President said that one of the
difficulties on the Western Front was that we had no secure
bridgeheads and that on the upper
The President then inquired how
Marshal
Marshal Stalin
replied that he had not found de
The President then described his
conversation with de
Marshal Stalin
replied that de
The President replied that he recently
decided to arm eight new French divisions composed of Frenchmen
who had had previous military training.
Marshal Stalin
said that was good insofar as it would help the American
armies but at present he felt the de
The President said he had recently
heard that the French Government did not plan to annex outright
any German territory but they are willing to have it placed
under international control.
Marshal Stalin
replied that was not the story de
The President said he would now tell
the Marshal something indiscreet, since he would not wish to say
it in front of Prime Minister
The President then said that he
understood the tripartite zones in regard to occupation of
Germany were already agreed upon, to which Marshal have] preferred to have the northwest zone which would
be independent of communications through France, but the British
seemed to think that the Americans should restore order in
France and then return political control to the British.
Marshal Stalin
inquired whether the President thought France should have
a zone of occupation, and for what reason.
The President said he thought it was
not a bad idea, but he added that it was only out of
kindness.
Both Marshal Stalin
and Mr. Molotov
spoke up vigorously and said that would be the only reason
to give France a zone. Marshal
As it was then three minutes to five, the President suggested
that they proceed to the conference room where the military
staffs were gathered.ante, p.
552) indicates that the President met with
Present
Subject: The Military Situation.
Marshal Stalin
said he hoped the President would again consent to opening
the meeting.
The President replied that his opening
of this meeting, as had been the case in Tehran, was not based
on any law or historic tradition but merely by chance. He said
that he was honored to open this great Conference and he wished
first of all to express on behalf of the American guests here
their deep appreciation for the hospitality and splendid
arrangements made by Marshal
General Antonov
then read a prepared paper, giving in great detail the
background development of the Soviet offensive of early January,
the estimate of enemy probabilities and the results of the
offensive. He concluded with the statement of Soviet desires
with regard to the actions of their Allies. (A copy in
translation of General post, pp.
581–583.
In regard to the part of the Soviet report where General
Prime Minister asked if he could go
into more detail as to where they were coming from.
General Antonov
stated that they anticipated that there would be five
German divisions from Norway, twelve from the Western
The President then inquired whether in
the advance into Germany the Russians had altered the gauge of
the railroads from the customary European gauge to the wide
Russian gauge.
General Antonov
replied that the majority of the locomotives and wagons
which they had captured from the Germans had been so badly
damaged that they had been useless and it was, therefore,
necessary to widen the gauge on a few important lines of the
railroads in order to accommodate Russian rolling stock to
supply the troops.
The President said that as our armies
are now approaching each other in Germany it was important that
the staffs should discuss this problem so that there would be a
definite place in Germany where the different gauges would
meet.
Marshal Stalin
answered at this point that the greater part of the German
railroad lines would remain of their customary gauge and that it
was not for pleasure but for absolute necessity that any at all
had been changed, since the Soviet Union did not have adequate
resources to adopt this expedient to a greater extent than was
absolutely necessary.
The Prime Minister then said that he
had a number of questions in regard to General
General Marshall
then gave the following general summary of the situation
on the Western Front:
The Ardennes bulge had now been eliminated and in certain places the Allied armies were further to the East than they had been when the German offensive began.
In the last week General
Small German bridgeheads to the north of Strasbourg were being eliminated. When our forces have reached the Rhine a number of divisions will be released through the shortening of the line.
Field Marshal
The passage of the Rhine is considered possible after the first of March. Although a crossing would be attempted if the Rhine were reached before that date it would be a hazardous operation because of ice conditions and the strength of the current. There are three good crossings in this sector and a fourth may be attempted. Only five divisions could be accommodated on the actual front of the assault.
In the South the left wing of the United States First Army was endeavoring to carry out the capture of two dams on the Roer River. Despite air action these dams remained intact and there was a danger of imperilling our positions in that area if the Germans were to open the dams.
Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the area of Frankfort as an alternative if the main operation in the North suffers a check.
Operations on the Western Front had been limited by the shortage of supplies due to inadequacy of shipping. The opening of the port of Antwerp has remedied this situation and the armies are now receiving adequate supplies. The utilization of the town of Rouen has facilitated the movement of supplies. It is now possible to bring in 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo and 12,000 to 15,000 tons of wet cargo a day. The Germans were endeavoring to disrupt the use of the port of Antwerp by robot bombs and rockets and sporadic air attack. The day before yesterday sixty robot bombs and six rockets fell on the city of Antwerp. One ship had been destroyed and one oil dump blown up. The chief danger was that a lucky hit might destroy the Antwerp lock gates. When weather permitted the American Air Forces had been extremely active in destroying German transport, railroad lines and troop convoys, particularly in the direction of Cologne.
Marshal Stalin
then inquired if there was any definite estimate of the
actual destruction done by the tactical air force.
General Marshall
replied that he did not have the exact estimates but the
destruction had been very heavy. According to present data the
German oil production had been reduced to about 20% of its
former capacity as a result of Allied heavy bombing. They had
also struck at tank factories, motor transport factories, rail
communications and assembly yards. In these operations were
included the heavy bombers from Italy which, when the weather
did not permit a strike on Germany, operated in the valley of
the Po and against railroad lines leading from Italy into
Germany.
In reply to a question General
General Marshall
mentioned briefly the submarine danger which was more
threatening at the moment than it had been in the past, due
largely to improvements in German technical methods. At the time
of the African landings there had been 100 enemy submarines
operating in the Atlantic. At the present time there were
between 30 and 35 in the Atlantic and their threat was potential
rather than actual. He said difficulty had been encountered in
attacking submarines in the shallow waters around the British
Isles because the tide made it difficult for
General Marshall
concluded by saying that Field Marshal
The Prime Minister said he hoped that
Field Marshal
Marshal Stalin
asked what were the other points.
Admiral Cunningham
replied: Kiel and Hamburg.
The Prime Minister said that we had
had great experience with the United States forces in working
out the crossing of oceans for landing operations but that we
hoped to benefit by the Russian experience in crossing rivers.
There was an officer here especially charged with that duty and
he hoped to be able to get into contact with the Russian staff
on this subject.
Marshal Stalin
then asked a number of questions particularly relating to
the potentials which the Anglo-Americans would have in
General Marshall
said that approximately one in three Allied divisions was
armored comprising 200–300 units. There was some discussion as
to the relative strength of the German and Allied divisions in
which General
The Prime Minister said that he
understood that the British division was composed of 18,000 men
and the American 14,000 with tank divisions of approximately
10,000 men.
Sir Charles Portal, in reply to a question from
Marshal
The Prime Minister said, in reply to
Marshal
General Marshall
stated that ten days ago there had been 79 German
divisions on the Western Front opposing 78 Anglo-American
divisions.
Marshal Stalin
then said that in the present offensive the Soviet armies
had enjoyed artillery supremacy of four to one and gave a brief
description in the manner in which the special Soviet artillery
“break-through” divisions had been organized. He said that these
artillery divisions had from 300 to 400 guns and in addition to
offensive operations the corps artillery was added during the
attack. For example, on a front from 35 to 45 kilometers,
Marshal
The Prime Minister said first of all
that he wished to express the gratitude of England and he was
sure of America for the massive power and successes of the
Soviet offensive.
Marshal Stalin
replied that this was not a desire. Marshal
The President said that he thoroughly
agreed with Marshal
The Prime Minister remarked that the
reason no request had been made on Marshal
Marshal Stalin
agreed with the Prime Minister but stated that they had to
take into account what had occurred; that when the
Anglo-American armies were on the offensive in the West the
Soviet armies were not ready and conversely. He felt that it
would be most useful for the staffs to discuss the question of a
summer offensive against Germany because he was not so sure that
the war would be over before summer.
Mr. Churchill
replied that he thoroughly shared the view of the Marshal
and that we should take full advantage of this gathering.
Admiral Cunningham
then gave a short review of the situation in regard to
German submarines. He said that the threat was more potential
than actual at the present time. The Germans had kept
technically ahead of the Allies although the present sinkings
around the British Isles were not serious. We knew, however,
that based on a prefabricated method of construction the Germans
were building large submarines of a new type fitted out with the
latest devices and with high underwater speed. He said that
these submarines were being built primarily at Kiel, Hamburg and
Danzig and that since the Marshal had asked for our desires he
would give a naval desire, namely, that the Red Army should as
soon as possible take Danzig where 30% of the German submarine
construction was being carried out.
The President asked if Danzig was
within range of Soviet artillery fire.
Marshal Stalin
replied in the negative but expressed the hope that it
soon would be.
It was then agreed that the Military Staffs would meet tomorrow
at 12:00 noon at the Soviet villa at Koreis and that tomorrow,
February 5, there would be a meeting at the Livadia Palace at
4:00 p. m. between the President, Marshal
Marshal Stalin
asked the President to open the meeting.
The President said that he was very
happy to open such a historic meeting in such a lovely spot. In
view of the conveniences and comforts that had been provided the
visiting delegations, he wished to thank Marshal
Marshal Stalin
said that Colonel General
General Antonov
made the following statement:
Soviet forces from the 12th to the 15th of January went into
attack on the front from the Niemen River to the Carpathians, a
distance of 700 kilometers. Forces of General Cherniakhovsky
advanced towards Koenigsberg; forces of Marshal
Because of the unfavorable weather conditions, this operation was to commence at the end of January when weather conditions were expected to improve. Since the operation was planned and prepared as an operation in full strength, it was hoped to carry it out under the most favorable conditions possible. Nevertheless, in view of the difficult circumstances on the Western Front in connection with the German attack in the Ardennes, the High Command of the Soviet Army gave an order to commence the attack not later than the middle of January, not waiting for improvement in weather.
The enemy grouping, after the Soviet forces reached the Narev and
Vistula Rivers, was the most concentrated on the central sector
of the front, since striking from this sector led our troops out
along the shortest route to the vital centers of Germany. In
order to create for ourselves more advantageous conditions for
attack, the Supreme Soviet Command decided to extend it to the
central group of the enemy. For this purpose this operation was
conducted as a subsidiary against East Prussia, and the advance
in Hungary toward Budapest was continued. Both of these attacks
were for the Germans very painful, and they quickly reacted to
our attack by a swift transfer of power onto the flank at the
expense of the central sector of our front; thus, out of 24 tank
divisions on our front, representing the principal German
striking power, 11 tank divisions were drawn in to the Budapest
sector, 6 tank divisions on the East Prussian (3 tank divisions
were located in Courland), and thus on the central part of the
front there
On the front from Ostrolenka to Crakow, that is, in the area of our greatest attack, the enemy had up to 80 divisions. We set up a grouping calculated on having a superiority over the enemy: in infantry, more than double; in artillery, tanks and aviation, a decided superiority.
The massing of artillery on the sectors of the break-through amounted to 220–230 guns (from 75 mm. and above) on one kilometer of the front.
The advance was begun under extremely unfavorable weather conditions—low visibility and fog, which completely ruled out the possibility of air operations and limited artillery observation to several hundred meters.
Due to good preliminary reconnaissance of the enemy positions and a powerful artillery advance, the fire power of the enemy was overwhelmed and his fortifications destroyed. This situation permitted our troops during the first day of the advance to move forward 10 to 15 kilometers, that is, to completely break through the entire tactical depth of the enemy defense.
The following results were achieved:
a. During the 18 days of the advance, the
Soviet troops moved forward up to 500 kilometers in the
direction of the main offensive.
Thus the average speed of forward movement was 25–30 kilometers per day.
b. The Soviet troops came out onto the
Oder River on the sector from Kyustrin (north of Frankfurt) and
south and seized the Silesian industrial area.
c. They cut across the main roads and cut
off enemy groups in East Prussia from central Germany; thus, in
addition to the Courland group (26 divisions) isolated 27
divisions of the enemy group; a series of divisional groupings
were surrounded and annihilated in the region of Lodz, Torne,
Poznan, Shneidmul and others, an approximate total of up to 15
divisions.
d. Break-throughs in force of long
duration of German defensive positions in East Prussia in the
Koenigsberg and Latvian directions.
e. Destroyed 45 German divisions against
which we sustained the following losses:
Probable enemy action:
a. The Germans will defend Berlin for
which they will try to hold up the movement of the Soviet troops
in the area of the Oder River, setting
For the defense of Pomerania they will try to use their Courland grouping, moving it over by sea beyond the Vistula.
b. The Germans will probably cover the
direction leading to Vienna more strongly, strengthening this
sector at the expense of troops now in action in Italy.
The shifting of enemy troops:
a. On our front there have already
appeared:
b. In the process of being shifted:
c. It is probable that there will yet be
shifted up to 30–35 divisions (at the expense of the Western
European Front, Norway, Italy, and reserves located in
Germany).
In this manner there can appear on our front an additional 35 to 40 divisions.
Our wishes are:
a. To speed up the advance of the Allied
troops on the Western Front, for which the present situation is
very favorable:
It is desirable to begin the advance during the first half of February.
b. By air action on communications hinder
the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the
East from the Western Front, from Norway, and from Italy.
In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig.
c. Not permit the enemy to remove his
forces from Italy.
The President asked whether the
Russians proposed to change the gauge of the railroad rolling
stock captured from the Germans or to widen the gauge of the
lines.
General Antonov
replied that much of the equipment was unfit for use. At
present the Russians are widening the gauge of those lines
The Prime Minister stated that the
British Delegation would have a number of questions to address
to the Russians. As these were of a technical and military
nature, he thought it would be more advantageous if they could
be brought up between the military staffs.
The Prime Minister then suggested that
General
The President pointed out the
increasing necessity for coordinating the operations of the
three Allies now that the British and American armies are
getting so close to the Russians. By reason of the short
distance separating the Western and Eastern Fronts the Germans
are now able to transfer their reserves quickly from one front
to the other.
General Marshall
then gave a résumé of the operations planned for the
Western Front. He said that the German bulge in the Ardennes had
now been eliminated and the Allied forces have advanced in some
areas beyond the line originally held. During the past week
General
North of Strasbourg the small German bridgeheads across the Rhine are being eliminated. As soon as the Rhine is reached it will be possible to reduce the number of divisions in the front line and release them for other employments. Some released divisions are even now moving north in preparation for the larger operations.
Field Marshal
From the standpoint of weather, the passage of the Rhine is considered possible after 1 March. A crossing will be attempted as soon as the river is reached, but it is recognized that ice will make hazardous any crossing prior to 1 March. Three good crossing sites are available for the operation and a fourth may be attempted. However, the front of the assault will accommodate initially only five divisions.
Plans have been made for a secondary effort in the vicinity of Frankfurt which can be exploited if the main effort in the North should fail to go through. The troops composing the left of the American First Army are now conducting an operation designed to capture the two dams controlling the water in the Roer River. As long as these dams are in the hands of the Germans, there is a danger that the bridges established for the river crossing may be swept away by the release of the impounded water.
The opening of the port of Antwerp has relieved the limitation on operations on the Western Front imposed by a lack of supplies. It is now possible to bring in from 75,000 to 80,000 tons of dry cargo a day. The Germans have realized the importance of Antwerp in the Allied supply scheme and have made a continuous effort to interfere with the operations of that port through the use of robot bombs and rockets. This constitutes a danger as there is, of course, always a chance of a lucky hit being made against the Antwerp lock gates. Only scattered attacks have been made by air.
United States and British fighters and light bombers supporting the ground troops have destroyed a great deal of German transport. Considerable effort has been directed against trains operating in the vicinity of Cologne and on the east bank of the Rhine. Although definite final reports have not yet been received, there is every indication of severe damage having been done to panzer divisions withdrawing from the Ardennes.
The heavy bombers have been employed primarily against German oil supplies in order to reduce the German supply of fuel for airplanes and motor transport. Present data indicate that these operations have resulted in a reduction of German oil production to 20 percent of the former capacity. The heavy bombers have also been used against German rail communications and assembly yards and a continuous effort has been maintained to destroy German fighter forces. These planes have also struck heavily at tank factories. The air forces in these operations include United States heavy bombers operating from the Italian Front. When weather prevents profitable operations in the Po Valley, they are directed against communications leading into Germany.
There are now about 32 enemy divisions on the Italian Front, 27 German and 5 Italian. The number of Allied divisions is approximately equal. The Allied forces have great superiority in fighter airplanes and these, in good weather, are able to ravage the Po Valley. The destruction of rail lines and rolling stock has been heavy.
Indications point to a serious resumption of the German submarine
war as the result of technical developments which are making the
detection of the submarines increasingly difficult. The
submarines have developed considerable skill in operating in
shallow waters where the tide makes it difficult for
In concluding, General Marshall
said he would be glad to have Field Marshal Sir Alan
Brooke amplify his remarks in any way he thought desirable.
The Prime Minister stated he would be
very glad for Field Marshal
The Prime Minister pointed out that
Danzig is the place where much of the assembling of the
submarines is done and expressed satisfaction in the thought
that the city is now not far from the Russian front lines, which
are daily drawing closer.
In answer to a question from Marshal Prime
Minister said that other submarine assembling points
were Kiel and Hamburg.
Field Marshal Brooke
said that General
The Prime Minister stated that both
the British and Americans have amphibious branches in their
services. The officer commanding the British amphibious branch
is at present in Argonaut
In reply to a question from Marshal General Marshall
explained that the front of the main effort in the
impending operations covered three crossings over a distance of
25 or 30 miles and afforded room for not more than five
divisions. The front eventually would extend all along the Rhine
down as far as Düsseldorf, a total of some 50 or 60 miles. He
pointed out that, as was the case in Normandy, it will be
necessary to assault initially on a narrow front but this front
would be expanded as rapidly as possible. He said that the Ruhr
was very heavily fortified and for that reason would
In answer to a question from Marshal General Marshall
said the reserves available for the proposed attack were
believed to be ample.
Marshal Stalin
said that he asked the question because in the Russian
central campaign 9,000 tanks were used up. He would like to know
how many tanks the Allies expected to employ.
General Marshall
said that roughly one in every three divisions employed
would be a tank division. He said that on March 1st General
Through answers to his questions it was made clear to Marshal
Marshal Stalin
explained that in their attack on the central German
position, the Russians employed 100 divisions, which was 20 more
than the Germans had. He was interested in the preponderance
that the British and Americans would have over the Germans.
The Prime Minister pointed out that
the British and American forces had overwhelming preponderance
in airplanes and armored troops but not great preponderance in
infantry. He stressed the necessity of exploiting to the full
such superiority in strength as existed.
Marshal Stalin
said that the British and Americans had asked the Russians
to express their wishes. He would like to know now what the
wishes of the British and Americans were.
The Prime Minister said that his
greatest wish was to express profound gratitude and admiration
as he witnessed the marvelous advance of the Russian troops. He
said the British and Americans recognized the hard and difficult
task lying before them in their impending operations but had
full confidence in their power to execute it. All they could ask
from the Russians was that the Russians continue to do as they
are doing now.
Marshal Stalin
said there had been no demand from the British and
Americans for the Russian winter offensive and no pressure was
exerted by them to bring it about.
The President had asked that
information of the offensive be given to General
Marshal Stalin
said they had staged their winter offensive because they
felt it to be their duty as Allies to do it. They greatly
appreciated the attitude manifested by both the President and
the Prime Minister in this matter.
The Prime Minister said the reason
that neither the British nor Americans had made any attempt to
bargain with Marshal
Marshal Stalin
agreed that the offensives had not been fully synchronized
at first and that action should be taken to do this now. He
thought it would be well also to consider a summer offensive as
he was not at all certain that the war would be over by that
time.
Admiral Cunningham
said that he would like to add something to General
In answer to a question by the President, Marshal Stalin
stated that Danzig was not yet within artillery range of
the Russian guns but it was hoped that it soon would be.
Discussion then turned upon the time and place of the next meeting. After discussion, it was agreed that the Staffs of the three nations would meet at 1200 on Monday, 5 February, at the headquarters of the Russian Delegation.
Present
Subject: Voice of Smaller Powers in Postwar Peace Organization.
Before dinner and during the greater part of the dinner the
conversation was general and personal in character. Marshal
Marshal Stalin
made it quite plain on a number of occasions that he felt
that the three Great Powers which had borne the brunt of the war
and had liberated from German domination the small powers should
have the unanimous right to preserve the peace of the world. He
said that he could serve no other interest than that of the
Soviet state and people but that in the international arena the
Soviet Union was prepared to pay its share in the preservation
of peace. He said that it was ridiculous to believe that Albania
would have an equal voice with the three Great Powers who had
won the war and were present at this dinner. He said some of the
liberated countries seemed to believe that the Great Powers had
been forced to shed their blood in order to liberate them and
that they were now scolding these Great Powers for failure to
take into consideration the rights of these small powers.
Marshal Stalin
said that he was prepared in concert with the United
States and Great Britain to protect the rights of the small
powers but that he would never agree to having any action of any
of the Great Powers submitted to the judgment of the small
powers.
The President said he agreed that the
Great Powers bore the greater responsibility and that the peace
should be written by the Three Powers represented at this
table.
The Prime Minister said that there was
no question of the small powers dictating to the big powers but
that the great nations of the world should discharge their moral
responsibility and leadership and should exercise their power
with moderation and great respect for the rights of the smaller
nations. (Mr.
Following a toast by the Prime Minister to the proletariat masses of the world, there was considerable discussion about the rights of people to govern themselves in relation to their leaders.
The Prime Minister said that although
he was constantly being “beaten up” as a reactionary, he was the
only representative present who could be thrown out at any time
by the universal suffrage of his own people and that personally
he gloried in that danger.
Marshal Stalin
ironically remarked that the Prime Minister seemed to fear
these elections, to which the Prime
Minister replied that he not only did not fear them but
that he was proud of the right of the British people to change
their government at any time they saw fit. He added that he felt
that the three nations represented here were moving toward the
same goal by different methods.
The Prime Minister, referring to the
rights of the small nations, gave a quotation which said: “The
eagle should permit the small birds to sing and care not
wherefor they sang.”
After Marshal The Prime
Minister said that he was inclined to the Russian view
on voting procedure because he felt that everything depended on
the unity of the three Great Powers and that without that the
world would be subjected to inestimable catastrophe; anything
that deserved [preserved?] that unity
would have his vote. Mr. Eden
took vigorous exception to the Prime Minister and pointed
out that there would be no attraction or reason for the small
nations to join an organization based on that principle and that
he personally believed it would find no support among the
English public. The Prime Minister
said that he did not agree in the slightest with Mr.
In reply to an inquiry of the Prime Minister in regard to the
American proposal to the solution of the voting question, Mr. Bohlen
remarked that the American proposal reminded him of the
story of
Soon thereafter the Prime Minister and Mr.
Present
SecretariatBrigadier General
McFarland Captain
Graves
1. Approval of the Minutes,
185th Meeting of C. C. S.Ante, pp.
530–534.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend approval of the conclusions of the Minutes of the 185th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.
2. British Proposal to Abandon
the Plan to Return to “ Cricket”
(
Admiral
Leahy
Magneto
General Marshall
said that the proposal was agreeable to him as the next
best thing to do. He preferred to have the United States
Shipping Representatives sent to Magneto
General Somervell
explained that the point at issue was the agreement on a
planning date for the end of the war with Germany. The dates of
1 April, 1 July, and 1 November had already been
considered,ante, pp. 478–480.
Admiral King
said that Russian concurrence should be obtained on the
planning date.
General Marshall
suggested that the course of action should be as
follows:
a. Obtain Russian concurrence to a
planning date of 1 July 1945 for the end of the war with
Germany, and
b. Detach a suitable number of personnel
from Magneto
Cricket
After further discussion,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to seek Russian concurrence on
the date of 1 July 1945 as the date of the collapse of
Germany.
b. Agreed to accept the proposals of the
British Chiefs of Staff contained in their memorandum of 4
February 1945 and directed the Secretaries to take necessary
action.
3. Allocation of Zones of
Occupation in Germany
(J. C. S. 577/26)
Reference:
Admiral
Leahy
General Marshall
explained that J. C. S. 577/26 is the last of a long
series of papers pertaining to the controversy with the British
Ante, pp.
199–201.
The Joint Logistics Committee in this paper has proposed a 4¼
page memorandum to the British in which the argument is somewhat
unbending and proposes an agreement which amounts to amending
General
Failure to reach agreement on this paper is holding up the
protocol on the zones of occupation in Germany.ante, pp.
118–123.
General Marshall
then distributed copies of the memorandum to be presented
to the British in lieu of the memorandum proposed by the Joint
Logistics Committee.
After further discussion,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to present to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the memorandum
proposed by General Post, pp.
637–639.
4. Russian Participation in
the War Against Japan
(J. C. S. 1176/10, J. C. S. 1176/11)
Admiral
Leahy
post, pp.
760–765.
Admiral Duncan
explained that the memorandum embodied in J. C. S. 1176/11
had to do with a special U. S. planning staff in Moscow and
would be understood by the Russians.
General Deane
explained further that this planning group had already had
one meeting with the Russian Staff in Moscow previous to this
conference and this memorandum was intended to facilitate
General Marshall
agreed and recommended approval of the memorandum for
transmission to the Russians, preliminary to a meeting with
them. He recommended further that a memorandum be prepared for
the President to present to Marshal
“The following are two basic military questions to which the
United States Chiefs of Staff would appreciate an early answer
at this conference:
In reply to a question by General General Deane
said that the memorandum he had proposed was entirely
satisfactory. He thought that after discussion of the two basic
questions with the Russian Staff we should outline the main
points and request the President to ask Marshal
After further discussion,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
a. Approved the recommendations of the
Joint Staff Planners in J. C. S. 1176/10 and 1176/11.
b. Agreed to send to the President the
memorandum proposed by General
Present
top secret
At the suggestion of General
Coordination of Offensive Operations
Sir Alan Brooke
Should operations in the North aimed at the Ruhr be held up, it was the intention to carry out further operations in the South. It was safe to say, therefore, that during the months of February, March and April, active operations would be in progress during almost the entire time.
The actual crossing of the Rhine presented the greatest
difficulties and it was during the period of this crossing that
the Allies were anxious to prevent a concentration of German
forces against the armies in the West. It was therefore hoped
that during March operations on the Eastern Front would be able
to continue. Sir Alan Brooke
General. Marshall
said that during the Tripartite Plenary Meeting on the
previous day the number of divisions, the amount of artillery,
and the number of tanks on the Eastern Front had been
enumerated. In considering the Western Front it was important to
bear in mind that operations must be conducted to meet the
special conditions existing. In the West there was no
superiority in ground forces. There were delicate lines of sea
communications, particularly in the Scheldt Estuary. The Allies,
however, did enjoy a preponderance of air power, but in this
connection the weather was an important consideration. If the
Allies were unable to take full advantage of their air
superiority they did not have sufficient superiority on the
ground to overcome enemy opposition. Operations must therefore
be conducted on this basis. Another restriction arose from the
fact that there were only a small number of favorable locations
for crossing the Rhine. It was therefore most important to
insure that the enemy could not concentrate strongly at the
point of attack.
The enemy were now operating behind the Rhine and the Siegfried line and therefore had great freedom of maneuver. We must therefore arrange to occupy the Germans as much as possible to prevent them from concentrating against us on the very narrow bridgehead area available to us.
With regard to air forces, on the Western Front some 3,000 to
4,000 fighter-bomber sorties could be undertaken each day. There
was
General Antonov
said that, as Marshal
In connection with the western offensive in February, it was not believed that the Germans could transfer forces from the Eastern Front to the West in large numbers. The Soviet Staff, however, was also interested in the Italian Front, from where the Germans had the opportunity of transferring troops to the Eastern Front. In view of this, the Soviet General Staff would like to know the potentialities of the Allied armies now fighting the Germans in Italy.
Sir Alan Brooke
At present our troops were preparing for further offensive action
when the weather improved. It had, however, been decided that it
would be better to transfer some of the forces now in Italy to
the Western Front, where at present we did not have sufficient
superiority in ground forces. Five divisions were therefore now
to be transferred from Italy to France and certain air forces
would accompany them. The forces remaining in Italy had been
instructed to carry out offensive operations and to seize every
opportunity to inflict heavy blows on the enemy. Their object
was to retain as many of
To sum up, it was proposed to take what action was possible to stop the German withdrawal in Italy, though it was not thought that this could be entirely prevented. For this reason, it had been decided to withdraw certain forces from Italy to the vital front in Northwest Europe.
General Marshall
said that he agreed with Sir Alan Brooke’s summary of the
position but felt that a reference should be made to the value
of our air power in Italy.
General Antonov
asked the number of German troops believed to be in
Italy.
Field Marshal Alexander
Sir Alan Brooke
Sir Charles Portal
said that on the Western and Italian Fronts together the
United States and British air forces consisted of some fourteen
thousand aircraft. This figure did not include the reserve
behind the front line. Should the land campaign have to halt,
the war in the air would continue, so far as weather permitted,
even more strongly than before. Everything possible would be
done, as General
So far as the requirements of the land battle permitted, it was the intention to concentrate the strategic bomber forces on the enemy’s oil supply. Evidence was available almost daily that the destruction of his oil production capacity was imposing limitations on the enemy’s operations. It was believed that the destruction of enemy oil was the best contribution which the air forces could make, both to the offensive on land and in the air. Much had been done and would continue to be done to disorganize the enemy’s rail communications, but it was our experience that an attempt to cut all railways in the middle of Germany to stop troop movements would produce disappointing results in view of the relative ease with which the enemy could repair such destruction.
It was known that the Germans intended to assemble a strong force
of jet-propelled fighters during the course of the present year.
It had therefore been decided that, in order to maintain our air
superiority into the summer, a proportion of our air effort must
be devoted to attacks on the German jet-propelled fighter
manufacturing plants. Nevertheless, it was an agreed principle
that when the land offensive
Before the advance of the Soviet armies, Allied air power had been brought to bear as far afield as Koenigsberg, Danzig, Posen and Warsaw. The great range of our strategic air forces made it most necessary that Allied air operations should be coordinated with the advance of the Soviet armies both to prevent accidents and to obtain the best value from our bomber effort.
General Marshall
invited
Field Marshal Alexander
In the Valley of the Po there was a series of extremely strong holding positions and it would therefore be difficult to force the enemy to withdraw faster than he planned. Nevertheless, when the weather improved from May onwards, considerable damage could be done to the withdrawing German forces and to their lines of communication. However, in February, March and April the weather was bad, with low clouds, which hindered the air effort to a great extent. Further, the Germans had destroyed nearly all the bridges over the River Po and had replaced them with some 30 to 40 pontoon bridges which were not kept in position during the day but were hidden along the banks. The destruction of these bridges was therefore extremely difficult.
To sum up, the better the weather the more damage could be done to the enemy by air action but however successful the air action, he did not believe that it would be possible entirely to prevent a German withdrawal by this means.
General Marshall
said that at the Tripartite Plenary Meeting on the
previous day the desire had been expressed that every effort
should be made to stop the movement of German forces from west
to east by air action and, in particular, to paralyze the vital
rail junctions of Berlin and Leipzig. In this connection a
report he had received that day summarizing Allied air
operations in the last few days was of interest. On Friday, the
second of February, the Royal Air Force had flown 2,400 sorties,
concentrating on rail and road targets in Euskirchen and
Coblenz. The latter, in particular, was of vital importance in
the transfer of German forces to the East. Similar destruction
of rail targets had taken place east of Alsace. On the same
night a thousand of our bombers had attacked Wiesbaden,
Karlsruhe
In relation to the destruction of communications and the interference with enemy movements the following data had been received relating to the effect of air attacks carried out on the 22d and 23d of January: On these two days alone 2,500 motor cars and trucks had been destroyed and 1,500 damaged; a thousand railway cars had been destroyed and 700 damaged; 93 tanks and self-propelled guns had been destroyed and a further 93 damaged; 25 locomotives had been destroyed and 4 damaged; 50 horse-drawn vehicles had been destroyed and 88 damaged. In addition, 62 known gun positions had been wiped out and 21 marshalling yards damaged. These very large results had been obtained on the two days he had referred to, but similar attacks were carried out on almost every fine day by the Allied air forces. He had referred on the previous day to the thousand-bomber attack on Berlin carried out on the third of February. There was also ready a plan to carry out a similar attack on Leipzig.
Marshal Khudyakov
said that, as Marshal
Field Marshal Alexander
said that this object was contained in his directive.
Marshal Khudyakov
said that he was glad to hear of this. In Italy there were
fewer railways to assist the enemy withdrawal.
Field Marshal Alexander
explained that the Germans in Italy largely used roads for
their withdrawals.
General Antonov
said that in addition to the Soviet offensives in the
North, offensives would also continue in the direction of Vienna
and west of Lake Balaton. It was for this reason that Allied
action in Italy was of importance to the Soviets. It seemed to
him expedient
Sir Alan Brooke
2. Movement of German Forces
From Norway
General Antonov
said that the Germans were transferring forces from Norway
to Denmark. He asked if there was any way in which such a
movement could be stopped.
Sir Andrew Cunningham
Sir Charles Portal
Sir Alan Brooke
3. Use of Artillery and Air in
Future Operations
General Antonov
said he felt it would be interesting to exchange
information with regard to the method of carrying out operations
in the autumn, winter and spring when, by reason of weather, it
was not always possible to make use of air power. On these
occasions the role of artillery became one of particular
importance. As Marshal
General Bull
said that the northern army group, which would take part
in the next offensive, possessed some 1,500 guns of 105
millimeters and upwards, and the United States Army group which
would also take part in the offensive, had some 3,000 guns of
similar calibers. The army commanders concerned, by
concentrating their artillery power on a narrow front, would be
able to use some 200 guns to the mile in the area of the
break-through. To this offensive power should be added the power
of the air forces. In the three days preceding the attack on the
eighth of February, it could be expected that some 1,600 heavy
bombers would be used, capable of delivering 4,500 tons of bombs
on the first day. For the remaining two days before the
offensive, a slightly less weight of bombs could be dropped, but
closer to the point of attack. Not only would communications
behind the front be bombed, but also positions known to be
strongly held.
On the day of the attack itself, “carpet bombing” would be used, and some 4,000 tons could be dropped on an area two miles square. He felt the effect of the air attack and the artillery concentration should produce a break-through, thus allowing our armor to operate in the enemy’s rear. A similar pattern of attack had been used on previous occasions with great success.
Marshal Khudyakov
asked what action would be taken if it was found that
weather prohibited the air [forces.?] from operating on the day
of attack.
General Bull
explained that the attack was normally timed for a day on
which it was predicted that the weather would enable “carpet
bombing” to be carried out. During the actual attack the bombing
was carried out some 2,000 yards ahead of our own front line,
but earlier bombing on targets further behind the line could be
undertaken through overcast.
Marshal Khudyakov
explained that all Russian operations in winter were
planned on the supposition that bad weather would exist,
General Marshall said that he had
endeavored to explain that the Allies did not possess the same
superiority in ground forces as did the Russians. The Allies did
not have 300 divisions, nor was it possible to produce them. It
was therefore essential to make full use of our air superiority.
He would like to point out the advance across France had, in
fact, been accomplished with the same number of divisions as the
enemy himself had. This was made possible by a combination of
ground and air power.
General Antonov
said that he now had a very clear picture of Allied
offensive intentions. Were there any questions which the British
or United States Chiefs of Staff would like to ask?
4. Liaison Arrangements
Admiral Leahy
said that in view of the very frank discussion of plans
which was taking place, he would like to bring up the question
of liaison between the Eastern and Western Fronts. The distance
between the two armies was now so short that direct liaison was
a matter of great importance. He had been directed by the
President to bring up this question of liaison before the
British, Russian and United States Chiefs of Staff. It was the
opinion of the United States Chiefs of Staff, who had not yet
discussed it with their British colleagues, that arrangements
should be made for the Allied armies in the West to deal rapidly
with the Soviet commanders on the Eastern Front through the
Military Missions now in Moscow. He would be glad to take back
to the President the views of the Soviet and British Chiefs of
Staffs on this matter.
Sir Alan Brooke
In the case of the Supreme Commander on the Western Front, he would require direct liaison with the commanders of the Russian, armies in the East. Thus there would be coordination between the high commands dealing with future action and in addition, direct coordination between the Allied and Soviet armies, who were closely in contact, on such matters as the employment of air forces and the coordination of day-to-day action.
General Antonov
said that the question of liaison between the general
staffs was very important and, as had already been mentioned,
could be undertaken through the Missions in Moscow. In the
present state of the offensives, this should be perfectly
satisfactory until the forces came closer into contact with each
other. Later, as operations advanced, the question of liaison
between Army commanders could be reviewed and adjusted. These
proposals would be reported to Marshal
General Marshall said that he had not
entirely understood the necessity for limiting liaison.
General Antonov
explained that his proposal was to limit liaison to that
through the General Staff in Moscow and the U. S. and British
Missions. Such arrangements, however, could be revised and
adjusted later to meet changing conditions.
General Marshall pointed out that
difficulties and serious results had already occurred in air
operations from Italy over the Balkans. Such operations were
directed from day to day and even from hour to hour, depending
on weather and other conditions. If contact had to be maintained
between the armies concerned through Moscow, difficulties would
be certain to arise.
If this round-about method of communications through many busy people had to be adopted, there was a risk that our powerful air weapon could not be properly used.
General Antonov
said that the accident to which General Marshall referred
had occurred not because of lack of liaison but due to the
pilots concerned losing their way. They had, in fact, made a
navigational mistake with regard to the correct point for
bombing.
General Marshall said that he
recognized this. However, the bombline at that time excluded
roads crowded with retreating Germans who could not be bombed by
the Allied forces without an approach being made through Moscow.
A powerful air force was available and good weather existed but
the Allied air force was unable to act and the Germans profited
thereby.
Sir Alan Brooke
General Antonov
said that at the present time no tactical coordination was
required between Allied and Russian ground forces. We should, he
believed, aim at planning the strategic requirements of our air
forces. The use of all Soviet air forces was dictated by the
Soviet General Staff in Moscow. It was for this reason that the
coordination of the air effort should, in his view, be carried
out through the Soviet General Staff in Moscow, who alone could
solve the problems. It was possible to agree on the objectives
for strategic bombing irrespective of a bombline.
Sir Charles Portal
The second problem was in respect to the constant air operations
out from Italy in relation to Russian operations in the Balkans
and Hungary. In that theater liaison was required, not so much
on policy as on an interchange of information. The British
Chiefs of Staff entirely agreed with the United States view that
it was inefficient for liaison between Field Marshal
Marshal Khudyakov
said that concerning air action into Germany itself, this
could be done through the General Staff in Moscow as suggested
by
General Antonov
asked if it could not be agreed that a bombline should be
established running from Berlin to Dresden, Vienna and Zagreb,
all these places being allotted to the Allied air forces. Such a
line could, of course, be changed as the front changed.
Admiral Leahy
and Sir Alan Brooke
5. Naval Operations in Support
of the Land Offensive
Admiral Kuznetsov
asked if plans had been made for any naval operations in
direct assistance to the land attack which was shortly to be
carried out. He referred not so much to the normal naval
operations in the defense of communications and day-to-day
operations of the fleet to control the seas but rather to direct
operations in support of a land offensive.
Sir Andrew Cunningham
Admiral Kuznetsov
said he had no particular operation in mind but rather the
possibility of some operation in the neighborhood of Denmark
that would not have any direct tactical connection with the army
operations but would have a strategic connection.
Sir Andrew Cunningham
Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral King
asked if Admiral
Admiral Kuznetsov
said that operations of the Soviet Fleet to cut German
communications in the Baltic had been undertaken by submarines
and naval aircraft. When the area of Memel was reached, it
became possible to transfer torpedo boats to augment Russian
naval activity in that area. However, all operations were at
present hampered by ice conditions and, further, the Gulf of
Finland and the Gulf of Riga were heavily mined by the enemy,
and mine clearance was hampered by weather conditions and
ice.
Admiral King
said that he appreciated that ice conditions were now
limiting operations but had asked this question in view of
earlier Soviet communiqués mentioning the damage or destruction
of German shipping.
Admiral Kuznetsov
said that the earlier destruction of German shipping had
been carried out by naval air forces and submarines.
6. Date of the End of the War
With Germany
Admiral Leahy
said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were engaged
in making logistic plans for that phase of the war following the
collapse of Germany. It had been suggested that such plans
should now be based on a probable date of the first of July for
the
General Antonov
said that until the eastern and western offensives
developed it was difficult if not impossible to predict the date
of the collapse of Germany.
Admiral Leahy
said he entirely appreciated the uncertainty but for
planning purposes he would be glad to know if the Soviet Staff
regarded the first of July as the earliest date as a reasonable
assumption.
General Antonov
said he regarded such assumptions as being difficult to
make. He could assure Admiral
General Marshall explained that a year
ago it had been necessary to assume a date for the defeat of
Germany on which to base calculations on such matters as
production and the construction of shipping. It was necessary to
revise this date from time to time, particularly in connection
with the handling of shipping throughout the world. It had been
proposed to take two target dates, one the earliest and one the
latest likely date for the defeat of Germany. Such dates were
now under consideration between the United States and British
Chiefs of Staff who were in agreement that the first of July was
the earliest likely date but differed by two months with regard
to the latest likely date. The United States assumption in this
connection was the 31st of December. Did General
General Antonov
said that he regarded the summer as the earliest date and
the winter as the latest. The first of July should be a
reasonably certain date for the defeat of Germany if all our
efforts were applied to this end.
7. Future Business
A brief discussion took place on future business.
Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral King
said he would be prepared to make a statement on
operations taking place in the Pacific and his conception of the
future development of the war in that theater. He would welcome
any questions which the Soviet Staff might wish to ask on this
subject.
General Antonov
said he would be glad to listen to a description of the
situation in the Far East and operations in that area, but as
far
Present
Subjects:
1. Toasts.
Mr. Molotov
opened the luncheon by proposing a toast to the leaders of
the three countries. Upon being informed by Mr. Harriman
that Manila had been captured, Mr.
Molotov
immediately proposed a toast to this victory of the Allied
armies.
After a brief toast by Mr. Eden
to Mr. Mr. Stettinius
also proposed a toast to Mr.
Mr. Molotov
immediately rose and proposed a toast to the recovery of
Secretary Mr. Stettinius
to his Dumbarton Oaks colleagues (Messrs. Mr. Molotov, and a toast
to the important head of the Drafting Committee who asserted
such control over the “Moscow Commission,” Mr. Mr. Harriman.
Mr. Justice Byrnes
then proposed that the guests drink to the Great Armies of
the Soviet Union and Ambassador Gromyko
toasted Mr.
Mr. Vyshinski
suggested that Messrs.
Mr. Stettinius
then raised his glass to Ambassador
Mr. Molotov
remarked that there had been enough toasts to the
diplomats. He wished to raise his glass to Mr.
Mr. Eden
then toasted the men who were fighting the war.
After a toast to the success of the present conference, Mr. Maisky
was requested to make a few remarks. He raised his glass
to the closest possible unity between the peoples, governments
and chiefs of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet
Union and remarked that the future of mankind depended upon this
unity.
2. Name of the
Conference.
During the course of the luncheon Mr.
Molotov
proposed a toast to the “Crimean Conference.” After a
brief discussion it was suggested that the Conference should be
so-called.
3. Treatment of
Germany.
Mr. Eden
inquired of Mr.
Mr. Molotov
replied that the Russian Delegation was prepared to
discuss any question the United States or the United Kingdom
Delegations so desired. This included those relating to the
breaking up of Germany as well as political and economic matters
relative to that country.
Mr. Eden
stated that the general subject needed further study
before any final decisions could be made.
Mr. Molotov
remarked that in his view the Americans and British were
considerably ahead of the Russians in their studies on this
question.
Mr. Eden
replied that although the British had studied the matter
on a technical level, there had yet been no Cabinet discussions
on the question. He stated that the President, the Prime
Minister, and Marshal
Mr. Molotov
favored this idea.
Mr. Eden
continued with the suggestion that the Prime Minister, the
President and Marshal
Mr. Molotov
indicated his approval of this proposal.
4. Economic Matters Relating
to Germany.
Mr. Stettinius
stated in an aside remark to Mr.
Mr. Molotov
indicated that the Soviet Government expected to receive
reparations from Germany in kind and hoped that the United
States would furnish the Soviet Union with long term
credits.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that his Government had studied this question and
that he personally was ready to discuss it at any time with Mr.
Mr. Molotov
indicated that now that the end of the war was in sight it
was most important that agreement be reached on these economic
questions.
Present
President
Roosevelt Mr.
Hopkins Mr.
Matthews Mr.
Bohlen
No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The
information given here as to the meeting and the participants is
taken from the Log, ante, p. 553, which states that the
discussions continued
Present
Subject: Treatment of Germany.
The President opened the meeting by
stating that it was his understanding that political matters
affecting Germany would be discussed today. He said that they
would not cover the map of the world and discuss Dakar or
Indochina, but confine themselves to the political aspects of
the future treatment of Germany. He said that the first question
was that of the zones of occupation, which he understood had
been agreed upon in the European Advisory Commission. He said
there was one question still open and that was the desire of
France to have a zone of occupation and French participation in
the control machinery for Germany. He emphasized that the
question of zones did not relate to the permanent treatment of
Germany.
The President then handed a map
Marshal Stalin
said that in the discussion of Germany he would like to
include the following points:
The President replied that, as he
understood it, the permanent treatment of Germany might grow out
of the question of the zones of occupation, although the two
were not directly connected.
Marshal Stalin
replied that what he wished to find out here was whether
or not it was the joint intention to dismember Germany or not.
He said that at Tehran, when the question had been discussed,
the President had proposed the division of Germany into five
parts. The Prime Minister, after some hesitation, had suggested
the division of Germany into two parts with a separation of
Prussia from the southern part of Germany. He said that he had
associated himself with the views of the President, but the
discussion at Tehran had only been an exchange of views. He
added that at Moscow with the Prime Minister they had discussed
the possibility of dividing Germany into two parts with Prussia
on the one hand and Bavaria and Austria on the other, with the
Ruhr and Westphalia under international control. He said that he
thought that this plan was feasible but that no decision had
been taken since the President was not there. He inquired
whether the time had not come to make a decision on the
dismemberment of Germany.
The Prime Minister stated that the
British Government agreed in principle to dismemberment but he
felt that the actual method and a final decision as to the
manner of dismemberment was too complicated to be done here in
four or five days. He said it would require elaborate searchings
by experienced statesmen on the historical, political, economic
and sociological aspects of the problem and prolonged study by a
subcommittee. He added that the informal talks at Tehran and
Moscow had been very general in character and had not been
intended to lay down any precise plan. In fact, he added, if he
were asked to state here how Germany should be divided he would
not be in a position to answer, and for this reason he couldn’t
commit himself to any definite plan for the dismemberment of
Germany. The Prime Minister said, however, that personally he
felt that the isolation of Prussia and the elimination of her
might from Germany would remove the arch evil—the German war
potential would be
greatly diminished. He added that a south German state with perhaps a government in Vienna might indicate the line of great division of Germany. He said that we are agreed that Germany should lose certain territories conquered by the Red Army which would form part of the Polish settlement, but he added that the question of the Rhine valley and the industrial areas of the Ruhr and Saar capable of producing armaments had not yet been decided; should they go to one country, or should they be independent, or part of Germany, or should they come under the trusteeship of the world organization which would delegate certain large powers to see to it that these areas were not used to threaten the peace of the world. All this, the Prime Minister said, required careful study, and the British Government had not yet any fixed ideas on the subject. Furthermore, he said, no decision had been reached on the question as to whether Prussia after being isolated from the rest of Germany should be further divided internally. He said that we might set up machinery which would examine the best method of studying the question. Such a body could report to the three governments before any final decision is reached. He said we are well prepared for the immediate future, both as to thought and plans concerning the surrender of Germany. All that was required was a final agreement on zones of occupation and the question of a zone for France.
Marshal Stalin
replied that it wasn’t clear to him as to the surrender.
Suppose, for example, a German group had declared that they had
overthrown
The Prime Minister replied that in
that case we would present the terms of surrender, but if
Marshal Stalin
inquired whether the three Allies should bring up
dismemberment at the time of the presentation of the terms of
unconditional surrender. In fact, he added, would it not be wise
to add a clause to these terms saying that Germany would be
dismembered, without going into any details?
The Prime Minister said he did not
feel there was any need to discuss with any German any question
about their future—that unconditional
Marshal Stalin
said that he did not think that the question of
dismemberment was an additional question, but one of the most
important.
The Prime Minister replied that it was
extremely important, but that it was not necessary to discuss it
with the Germans but only among ourselves.
Marshal Stalin
replied that he agreed with this view but felt a decision
should be made now.
The Prime Minister replied that there
was not sufficient time, as it was a problem that required
careful study.
The President then said that it seemed
to him that they were both talking about the same thing, and
what Marshal
The Prime Minister interrupted to say
“or less”, to which the President agreed.
The Prime Minister remarked that there
was no need, in his opinion, to inform the Germans of our future
policy—that they must surrender unconditionally and then await
our decision. He said we are dealing with the fate of eighty
million people and that required more than eighty minutes to
consider. He said it might not be fully determined until a month
or so after our troops occupy Germany.post, p. 633, was
passed to the President at about this point. See this
portion of the post, p. 626.
The President said he thought the
Prime Minister was talking about the question of dismemberment.
In his view he said he thought it would be a great mistake to
have any public discussion of the dismemberment of Germany as he
would certainly receive as many plans as there had been German
states in the past. He suggested that the Conference ask the
three Foreign Ministers to submit a recommendation as to the
best method for the study of plans to dismember Germany and to
report within twenty-four hours.
The Prime Minister said the British
Government was prepared to accept now the principle of
dismemberment of Germany and to set up suitable machinery to
determine the best method to carry this out, but he couldn’t
agree to any specific method here.
Marshal Stalin
said he wished to put a question in order to ascertain
exactly what the intentions of the three governments are. He
said events in Germany were moving toward catastrophe for the
German people and that German defeats would increase in
magnitude since the Allies of the Soviet Union intend to launch
an important offensive very soon on the Western Front. In
addition, he said that Germany was threatened with internal
collapse because of the lack of bread and coal with the loss of
Silesia and the potential destruction of the Ruhr. He said that
such rapid developments made it imperative that the three
governments not fall behind events but be ready to deal with the
question when the German collapse occurred. He said he fully
understood the Prime Minister’s difficulties in setting out a
detailed plan, and he felt therefore that the President’s
suggestion might be acceptable: namely, (1) agreement in
principle that Germany should be dismembered; (2) to charge a
commission of the Foreign Ministers to work out the details;
and, (3) to add to the surrender terms a clause stating that
Germany would be dismembered without giving any details. He said
he thought this latter point was important as it would
definitely inform the group in power who would accept surrender
unconditionally, whether generals or others, that the intention
of the Allies is to dismember Germany. This group by their
signature would then bind the German people to this clause. He
said he thought it was very risky to follow the plan of the
Prime Minister and say nothing to the German people about
dismemberment by the Allies. The advantage of saying it in
advance would facilitate acceptance by the whole German people
of what was in store for them.
The Prime Minister then read the text
of Article 12 of the surrender terms agreed on by the European
Advisory Commission, in which he pointed out that the Allied
governments have full power and authority over the future of
Germany.ante, pp. 113–118.
The President said that he shared
Marshal
The Prime Minister said that the
psychological effect on the Germans might stiffen their
resistance.
Both The President and Marshal Stalin
said there was no question of making the decision public,
and Marshal Stalin
added that as far as he knew the surrender terms which
Italy had accepted had not yet been made public.
The Prime Minister said he would find
it difficult to go further than to give the assent of the
British to the principle of dismemberment and the setting up of
machinery to study the best method of putting it into
effect.
It was agreed that the three Foreign Ministers should consider Article 12 of the surrender terms instrument in order to ascertain the best method of bringing in a reference to the intention to dismember Germany.
The President then said that the
question of the French zone remained to be decided. He said that
he had understood from Marshal
Marshal Stalin
replied that this was not the case, since during the visit
of General
The Prime Minister said that he did
not feel it possible to discuss possible frontiers as they were
considering only the zones of temporary military occupation. He
added that he was for giving the French a definite zone which
could come out of the British and possibly the American zones
and that all he sought here was that the Soviet Government would
agree that the British and American Governments should have the
right to work out with the French a zone of occupation. He added
that this zone would not in any way affect the proposed Soviet
zone.
Marshal Stalin
inquired whether or not the granting of a zone to France
would not serve as a precedent to other states.
The Prime Minister pointed out that
the occupation of Germany might be a long one and that the
British Government was not sure that it could bear the burden
alone for an extended period and that the French might be able
to be of real assistance in this matter.
Marshal Stalin
said that if the French were given a zone, would not that
change the Tripartite control of Germany to a four-nation
control.
The Prime Minister replied that the
British Government expected that if France were given a zone
they would, of course, participate in the control machinery, but
that in regard to other nations that might assist in the
occupation, such as Belgium or Holland, there would be no
question of a specific zone and thus no part in the
participation of the control machinery [sic].
Marshal Stalin
stated that he thought it would bring up many
complications if we should have four nations instead of three
participating in the determination of German matters. He thought
that some method might be evolved whereby England might let the
French, Belgians and Dutch assist in the occupation but without
the right to
The Prime Minister replied that he
felt that this brought up the whole question of the future role
of France in Europe and that he personally felt that France
should play a very important role. He pointed out that France
had had a long experience in dealing with the Germans, that they
were the largest naval power, and could be of great help in the
administration of Germany. He went on to say that Great Britain
did not wish to bear the whole weight of an attack by Germany in
the future and for this reason they would like to see France
strong and in possession of a large army. He said it was
problematical how long the United States forces would be able to
stay in Europe, and therefore, it was essential that France be
relied upon to assist in the long term control of Germany.
The President replied that he did not
believe that American troops would stay in Europe much more than
two years. He went on to say that he felt that he could obtain
support in Congress and throughout the country for any
reasonable measures designed to safeguard the future peace, but
he did not believe that this would extend to the maintenance of
an appreciable American force in Europe.
The Prime Minister said that he felt
that France should have a large army since it was the only ally
that Great Britain had in the West, whereas the Soviet Union in
addition to their own powerful military establishment could
count on the support of the Poles.
Marshal Stalin
said he fully appreciated the necessity of a strong
France, which had recently signed a treaty of alliance with the
Soviet Union.Bulletin, January
7, 1945, vol. xii, pp.
39–40.
The President then remarked that he
felt that France should be given a zone, but that he personally
felt that it would be a mistake to bring other nations into the
general question of the control of Germany.
Marshal Stalin
observed that if France was given the right to participate
in the control machinery for Germany, it would be difficult to
refuse other nations. He repeated that he wished to see France a
strong power but that he could not destroy the truth, which was
that France had contributed little to this war and had opened
the gate to the enemy. In his opinion, he said, the control
commission for Germany should be run by those who have stood
firmly against Germany and have made the greatest sacrifices in
bringing victory.
The Prime Minister replied that every
nation had had their difficulties in the beginning of the war
and had made mistakes. He said that France had gone down before
the attacks of the new German tank and air units and while it
was true that France had not been much help in the war, she
still remained the nearest neighbor of Germany and of great
importance to Great Britain. He agreed that it would be
inconvenient to add France to the present group of major allies,
but he felt that British public opinion would not understand why
France was being excluded from a problem which was of such
direct concern to her. He observed that the destiny of great
nations was not decided by the temporary state of their
technical apparatus. He said that sooner or later we would have
to take France in. He mentioned, however, that he had been
against the participation of France in the present conference,
which he understood was the opinion of the President and had
gathered here was also that of Marshal
Marshal Stalin
repeated that he would not like to see France as a
participant in the control machinery for Germany, although he
had no objection to their being given a zone within the British
and American zones.
The Prime Minister pointed out that
the control commission will be an extraordinary body under the
orders of the governments concerned and that there was no reason
to fear that basic policy in regard to Germany would be made by
this commission.post, p. 634, was passed to the
President at about this point. See this portion of the
post, p.
629.
The President pointed out at this
point that France was in fact a full member of the European
Advisory Commission which was the only Allied body, apart from
this Conference, which was considering the German problem.
The President said that he favored the
acceptance of the French request for a zone, but that he agreed
with Marshal post, p. 634, was passed to the
President at about this point.
Mr. Eden
then pointed out that there was no question of any zones
for any other power except France, but that France would not
accept a zone of occupation within the British and American
zones without participation in the control commission.
Marshal Stalin
remarked that Great Britain could speak for France in the
control commission.
The Prime Minister supported Mr.
Marshal Stalin
said that the control machinery for Germany would not be
an advisory body but would be actively engaged every day in the
administration of Germany. He added that he felt French
participation would serve as a precedent for others.
The Prime Minister then suggested that
the three Foreign Ministers be asked to study the question in
relation to [of the relationship of?] the
French zone to the control commission.
Mr. Molotov
said that the European Advisory Commission had already
worked out a definite agreement on a tripartite administration
of Germany.ante, pp. 124–127.
Mr. Eden
replied that there was no intention of reversing that
decision but that he felt as a practical matter the question of
the relationship of the French zone to that of the control
commission should be considered.
In reply to a question from Mr. The Prime
Minister repeated that there was no intention of giving
the Belgians or Dutch a zone.
Mr. Eden
repeated that the case of France was different and that
they would not accept a zone subordinate to British control.
Marshal Stalin
then said that he felt that there was agreement on the
fact that France should be given a zone but should not be given
participation in the control commission. The three Foreign
Ministers should study the question of the relationship of the
French zone to that of the commission.
Marshal Stalin
then said that he would like to discuss the question of
German reparations.
The President said that in regard to
reparations there was first of all the question of the desires
and needs of principal allies and then subsequently that of the
smaller countries, such as Belgium, Holland, Norway, etc. He
said he would like to bring up the question of the Russian
desires in regard to the utilization of German manpower.post, p. 634, was
passed to the President at about this point.
Marshal Stalin
replied that they had a plan for reparations in kind but
were not ready yet to present any plan in regard to German
manpower. He then said that Mr.
Mr. Maisky
then outlined the Soviet plan for reparations for Germany.
He said that the Soviet plan for reparations in kind envisaged
two categories: (1) the removal from the national wealth of
Germany of plants, machine tools, rolling stock, etc. to be
completed within a period of two years after the end of
hostilities, (2) yearly payments in kind to last for ten years.
He said that in order to restore Soviet economy which had
suffered so much from German aggression, and to safeguard the
future security of Europe, it would be necessary to reduce
German heavy industry by 80%. By heavy industry he meant iron
and steel, electrical power and chemical industries. Specialized
industry useful only for military purposes should be 100%
removed. In this category would fall all aviation factories,
synthetic oil refineries, etc. He said that the Soviet
Government felt that with 20% of her heavy industry Germany
would be in position to cover the economic needs of the country.
He said the list of goods to be delivered during the 10 year
period could be definitely fixed later on. He further proposed
that in the interests of the orderly execution of the
reparations plan and for the security of Europe there should be
an Anglo-Soviet-American control over German economy which would
last beyond the period of the reparations payment. All German
enterprises which could be utilized for war purposes should be
placed under international control with representatives of the
Three Powers sitting on the boards of such enterprises. Mr.
The Prime Minister stated that he
recalled very well the end of the last war and that although he
did not participate in the peace settlement he had been very
fully informed of the discussions. He remembered well that there
had been only two billion pounds extracted from Germany in the
form of reparations by the Allies after the last war and that
even this would not have been possible had not the United States
given Germany credits. He said, for example, that they had taken
some old Atlantic liners from the Germans, who had immediately
proceeded on credit to build new and better ships. He recognized
that the suffering which the Soviet Union had undergone in this
war had been greater than any other power, but he felt that the
Soviet Union would get nowhere near the sum which Mr.
Marshal Stalin
observed that that was right, but care should be taken to
see that the horse did not turn around and kick you.
The President remarked that he had
also been through the last war and that he remembered very
vividly that the United States had lost a great deal of money.
He said that we had lent over ten billion dollars to Germany and
that this time we would not repeat our past mistakes. He said
that in the United States after the last war the German property
that had been sequestered during the war had been
Mr. Maisky
then stated that while he appreciated the Prime Minister’s
points concerning the experiences after the last war in the
matter of reparations, he felt that the failure in this respect
had been due not to the fact that the reparations had been too
heavy but to the transfer problem which was the rock on which
the reparations policy was founded. He said that he must add
that the financial policies of the United States and Great
Britain contributed to the German refusal to pay. He said that
the Germans had never paid more than one-quarter of the total
reparations figure and had received a great deal more in credits
and loans. Mr.
The Prime Minister said that the
question of reparations should be examined by a sub-commission
and that this commission should consider the claims of other
countries who bore the facts of Nazi aggression as well.
The President said that in his opinion
the commission should be confined to the representatives of the
Three Powers, to which Stalin
The Prime Minister said that he was in
agreement, that in the first instance the representatives of the
three major powers should consider the question.
Marshal Stalin
said he felt that the commission could accomplish nothing
unless it was given general directives from this Conference. He
said he felt that the commission composed of the representatives
of the three principal Allies must work on the basis that these
Powers had contributed most to the common victory and should be
given priority in the matter of reparations. He said that
although the United States did not need machine tools she might
well need raw materials which she could receive from Germany. He
mentioned that the United States would take over German property
in the United States as a part of her share.
The President expressed agreement with
this view.
Marshal Stalin
continued that in calculating German capabilities,
Germany’s post-war resources should be also taken into
consideration. Then all factories and farms would work not for
war but for peace. He repeated that the Three Powers who had
made the most sacrifices and had been the organizers of victory
should have first claim on reparations. He stated that he did
not include France among these powers since she had suffered
less than Belgium, Yugoslavia, or Poland.
The Prime Minister pointed out that
the Allies had done a great deal of the damage in France.
Marshal Stalin
replied that France could not expect to get reparations
from the Allies. He said that he respected France but that he
could not ignore the truth and that at the present moment France
only had eight divisions in the war, Yugoslavia twelve and the
Lublin Government of the Poles thirteen.
It was then agreed that the question of the main directives to a commission on reparations which would sit in Moscow would be referred to the Foreign Ministers who would report back to the Conference. It was agreed that the next meeting would be 4:00 p. m. tomorrow, February 6, and that the questions of Dumbarton Oaks and Poland would be considered.
The President opened the meeting and said that he thought they
should talk about the general aims of peace rather than about
Dakar and China. There were many things to discuss. He said that
one of the first questions to discuss of immediate importance
was that of zones of occupation of Germany now that the
situation seemed to be coming to a head. He meant not the
permanent solution of Germany but just that of occupation. It
was a question of the French who want a zone. Occupation also
involves control machinery. He showed a map to those at the
table and said that is what he and Prime Minister
Stalinbut?] there were no decisions. I understand that we
are all in favor of dismemberment but I would like to know
definitely do we agree, and if so, what form of dismemberment. (2) Do we admit the
setting up of any government in Germany or not? Or should we
confine ourselves merely to establishing their administration?
If we divide Germany will each part have its own government or
will each part have its own administration? (3) Unconditional
surrender. We are agreed on that, but if
President: All these other questions
are permanent and grow out of the zones of occupation.
Eden
Stalin
Prime Minister: In principle I think
we are all agreed on dismemberment, but the actual method, the
tracing of lines, is much too complicated a matter to settle
here in five or six days. It requires very searching examination
of geography, history and economic facts and is deserving of
prolonged consideration by sub-committees or committees to be
set up to go into the question. The two conversations mentioned
by Marshal
We are not ill-prepared for the immediate effect of German surrender. All details have been worked out and are well known to the three governments. There remains only formal agreement on zones of occupation and control machinery. If Germany surrenders in a few weeks or a month unconditionally we have only to march in and occupy by processes already agreed upon.
Stalin
Eden
(I left the room at this point to get a copy of the surrender terms and missed the next few minutes.)
Prime Minister: In that case we must
make up our mind whether the group is worth dealing with. If so,
we must make them sign the agreed terms. If they are not worth
dealing with we should continue the war and occupy the whole
country.
Stalin
Prime Minister: If they sign we do not
discuss with them any question about the future. There is no
need to raise the question. We reserve all rights over their
land, their liberty and their lives.
Stalin
Prime Minister: I agree. But it is not
necessary to discuss it with the Germans.
StalinNo, simply to demand from them.
Prime Minister: I do not think it
possible to discuss the exact form of dismemberment. That would
come at the peace conference.
President: We have not decided what
the Marshal proposed. Are we going to dismember or not? He wants
the matter settled in principle but not as to details. The Prime
Minister says he is not yet ready to lay down the limit; that
requires study. In effect, these are our terms and in addition
we shall dismember. That is the only difference. Shall we all
agree that Germany should be dismembered? As at Tehran, I am
very much personally in favor of decentralization. Forty years
ago when I was in Germany there was no word for the
Prime Minister: I see no need to
inform the Germans at the time of surrender whether we will
dismember them or not. It is enough to tell them, “Await our
decision as to your future.” We might be able to tell while our
troops are marching in what is needed.
President: If this question is
discussed all over the world there will be a hundred plans for
dismemberment. Therefore, I ask that we confine it to ourselves
and that the three foreign secretaries bring in tomorrow a plan
for dismemberment.
Prime Minister: You mean a plan for
the study of the question of
dismemberment, not a plan for dismemberment itself?
President: Yes, for the study of
dismemberment.
Prime Minister: His Majesty’s
Government would be prepared now to assent [to the] principle of
dismemberment and to set on foot the best body to study the
method.
Stalin
(I left the room to get a glass of water for the President and missed the following few minutes.)
Stalin
Prime Minister: The terms of
unconditional surrender are terms on which the fighting stops.
(He reads article 12 of surrender terms.) That is what they have
got to sign.
President: The first paragraph on
disarmament does not mention dismemberment and does not make it
clear enough. The Marshal’s idea, which is somewhat my own, is
that it will make it easier if it be in the terms and tell
them.
Prime Minister: But you don’t want to
tell them.
President: My own feeling is that the
people have suffered so much that they are now beyond questions
of psychological warfare.
Staltn: No, these conditions for the
moment are only for us. They should not be public until the time of surrender. We can do
as we have done with Italy where the surrender terms are not yet
public. I want it agreed (1) to dismember and (2) to put
dismemberment into the surrender terms.
Prime Minister: I find it difficult to
go beyond assent to the principle of dismemberment and the
setting on foot of machinery as to the best method of doing it.
I agree to a most rapid examination of the question of the best
means of studying a method of dismemberment.
President: Would you put in Article 12
in addition the word “dismemberment”?
Prime Minister: Yes, I would
agree.
Eden
Stalin
President: Now to take up the next
question—a zone of occupation for France. (A portion missed
here.)
Stalin
Prime Minister: I can’t agree. There
is a question of a condominium on the Rhine. The present
question is different. It applies only to zones of occupation.
We are all now agreed, are we not, on the three zones? The
French want a zone and I am in favor of granting it to them. I
would gladly give them part of the British zone. All we want is
this: It does not affect the Soviet zone. Will our Russian
allies agree that the British and Americans get together on a
zone to allot to the French? The line of the Moselle seems a
convenient place to let them in. They are not in a position to
occupy a large zone.
Stalin
Prime Minister: Our answer is that
France should come in and as its army grows take a larger part
in the occupation.
Stalin
Prime Minister: The discussion is on
the immediate question of France. They have had long experience
in occupying Germany. They do it very well and they would not be
lenient. We want to see their might grow to help keep Germany
down. I do not know how long the United States will remain with
us in occupation. (The President: “Two years.”) Therefore the
French army should grow in strength and help us share the
burden. If Russia wants some other power in her zone we should
not object.
Stalin
President: I can get the people and
Congress to cooperate fully for peace but not to keep an army in
Europe a long time. Two years would be the limit.
Prime Minister: I hope that would be
according to circumstances. At all events we shall need the
French to help us.
Stalin
President: I should much rather have a
small number on the control machinery. I should be just as
satisfied if the French are not in on the control machinery.
Stalinso far France does not belong to this
group.
Prime Minister: We were all in
difficulties early in this war and France went down before the
new tanks and I admit they were not much help in this war. But
the fact remains they are the neighbor of the Germans and the
most important neighbor. British public opinion would not
understand if decisions vital to France are being made with
regard to Germany over France’s head. I hope, therefore, that we
shall not decide for an indefinite exclusion of France for all
time. I was very much against General
Stalin
Prime Minister: I agree. (Several
sentences not understood) That France cannot be a member of this
group but cannot we let her into control machinery.
President: (On the basis of a note
from Mr.
Stalin
President: The Netherlands are in a
very serious situation. Several millions of their farmers are
thrown off their land by flooding and
Eden
Stalin
Prime Minister and Eden: We cannot
undertake to do that and the French would never submit to
it.
Eden
Stalin
Prime Minister: Is it agreed that the
Americans and British set aside a zone for France? I propose to
leave the next step as to the future status of France when it
may be approved as a whole. I propose that the three foreign
secretaries sketch out the kind of commission for control to be
set up. (After
Maisky
Molotov
Reparations
President: The three of us are
involved in this question and there is also the question of what
the small powers want. First, there is the question of manpower.
What does Russia want? The United States and British I believe
do not want reparations in manpower.
Stalin
Prime Minister: Could we hear about
your plan for reparations in kind?
(
Maisky
To restore Russian economy and for the security of Europe it is
necessary to cut down German heavy industry by 80%. By heavy
industry is meant iron and steel, metal working, engineering,
chemicals, tri-partite control over Germany. The
details can be settled later on but it must be established that
the most important industries should be internationalized and
members of the three great allies should be on the boards of
directors, such representation to continue for the ten-year
period. In estimating reparations we have considered the kind of
losses to be covered. The figures are so astronomical that we
believe that only those losses under the category of direct material losses, that is,
destruction of state and private property of all sorts should be
included. Even this is so large that the whole amount of
reparations cannot be covered. Therefore, priorities among
countries should be fixed by indices. We make two suggestions:
(1) The proportion of contribution by a country to the winning
of the war to its losses of material in the war. The highest
should be in the first category and
the others in the second category. (2)
For discussion of the principles and details on reparations we
suggest that a commission with its seat in Moscow should be set
up. The question now comes how much would Russia want for
reparations. We would want not less than ten billion
dollars.
Prime Minister: I remember well the
last war and the sad experience in reparations that followed. It
was with great difficulty that one billion pounds was finally
extracted from Germany and that was due to the fact that Germany
received much larger amounts in loans from the United States. I
remember we took over some old Atlantic liners which permitted
Germany to build better new ones. I do not want to repeat that
experience. I admit that Russian losses are much greater than
those of any other country. I feel that the removal of certain
plants and materials from Germany is the proper step for
restitution. I am sure that we will never get out of Germany
anything like 250 million pounds a year. We too have suffered.
Our houses have been destroyed. We are faced with an export
problem. We must export in order to buy food, one half of which
we must import. We have incurred very heavy debts outside
lend-lease. No victorious country will come out so burdened
financially as Great Britain. If I could see any benefit in
reparations I would be glad to have them but I am very doubtful.
Other countries also have suffered great devastation—France,
Belgium, Norway. We
Stalin
Prime Minister: I am in favor of
setting up a commission to study the question.
President: We lent Germany far more
than we got after the last war. That cannot happen again. We
want no manpower. We do not want their machine tools or their
factories. Therefore, what can we get? German stock and property
in the United States? This has at present been taken over by the
Alien Property Custodian. After the last war it was used as an
off-set against our claims in Germany. I hope to get legislation
this time to take it over as a trust fund.
We must think of the future of Germany. We have always been generous through our Red Cross but we can’t guarantee the future of Germany. We don’t want to kill the people. We want Germany to live but not to have a higher standard of living than that of the U. S. S. R. I envision a Germany that is self-sustaining but not starving. There will be no lending of money. Our objective is seeing that Germany will not starve in helping the Soviet get all it can in manpower and factories and helping the British get all they can in exports to former German markets. Therefore, the time has come to set up a reparations commission. In re-building we must get all we can but we can’t get it all. Leave Germany enough industry and work to keep her from starving.
Maisky
Prime Minister: I agree on the setting
up of a reparations commission but we must keep it secret.
Stalin
Prime Minister: The commission must
also consider the claims of all the victims, the assets
available, and the priorities to be assigned.
Stalin
Prime Minister: They should settle the
heads of the directives— the guiding principles—and I hope that
within one month the governments can receive their version. You
must remember I have a cabinet and parliament. Also the point of
the first index on damage sustained I think is enough. I do not
think that the exertion in the war should be taken into
consideration. Remember the saying of each according to his
needs. The President agrees to the setting up of the reparations
commission in Moscow; the Prime Minister agrees also.
The meeting adjourned at 8 p. m. after determining that the next meeting should be held at 4 tomorrow afternoon, and that the world organization should be taken up first and Poland second.
Mr. President:—
I would suggest that you say this is a very important and urgent
matter and that the three foreign ministers present a proposal
tomorrow as to the proceedure by which a
determination as to to dismemberment can be arrived at an early
date
1. France is on the European Advisory committee now. That is only body considering
German affairs now.
2. Promise a zone.
3. Postpone decision about Control Commission.
Why
not
agree
to
a
French
zone
and
consider
later
the
question
of
putting
them
on
control
commission
for
Germany?
or
not—
Could you not add that French participation on Control Commission might be considered later?
Could you ask him
1. Why not take all
Present
Secretariat
1. Approval of Minutes of
the 185th MeetingAnte, pp.
530–534.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C.C.S. 185th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.
2. Levels of Supply of
Petroleum Products in U. K. and
North-west Europe
* * * * * * *
3. Planning Date for the End
of the War Against Germany
(C. C. S. 772)ante, pp. 478–480.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to accept for planning purposes the following dates for
the end of the war with Germany:—
4. Provision of LVT’s for the
Mediterranean
* * * * * * *
5. Allocation of Zones of
Occupation in Germany
(C. C. S. 320/35)Infra.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had
before them a memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff
proposing the acceptance of an agreement regarding the Bremen
and Bremerhaven enclave and the use of the railway from Bremen
to the southwest zone, on the understanding that this agreement
did not involve the question of command of the
Bremen-Bremerhaven area.
General Marshall
referred to the fact that the letter at Enclosure “B”
(page 5)post, p. 637, and ante, pp.
199–201.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then
agreed to the following amendments to the Appendix to Enclosure
“B” of C. C. S. 320/35:—
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
post, p. 639.
6. Basic Undertakings
(C. C. S. 775)Ante, p.
539.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had
before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
recommending a substitution for the existing paragraph 6h in C.
C. S. 680/2.
Sir Alan Brooke
h., as it had been amended informally in discussion at a
previous C. C. S. meeting when this had been discussed.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to the following revised subparagraph h.:
“
h. Provide assistance to such of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of the other basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations against Germany and/or Japan.”
7. Liaison With the Soviet
High Command Over Anglo-American Strategic Bombing in
Eastern Germany
(C. C. S. 778)post, pp. 640–641.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had
before them a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
suggesting a line that might be taken with the Soviet General
Staff at a meeting which was to be held later the same day to
discuss the matter of the bombline.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed
the desirability of putting forward this fresh memorandum in the
place of the one recently submitted in
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed that the United States Chiefs of Staff should put forward to the Russians the views expressed in C. C. S. 778, as amended in discussion.
8. Next Meeting, Combined
Chiefs of Staff
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to meet again, provisionally at 1000 on Thursday, 8
February 1945, to finish off any outstanding items on the Argonaut
C. C. S. 320/35
Allocation of Zones of Occupation in
Germany
1. With regard to the draft agreement concerning the
Bremen-Bremerhaven area proposed by General Ante, pp.
199–201.
2. As regards the numerous points proposed in General
3. It has been our understanding that the draft agreement as
proposed by Lord
4. If the British Chiefs of Staff prefer to retain the wording of
the agreement attached to General
5. The United States Chiefs of Staff urge that this matter be completed before the end of the present conference.
(Paragraph numbers conform to the attachment to General
Mac-ready’s letter. Underlining and italicizing represent amendments to that
attachment.)
1. The Bremen and - Bremerhaven enclave Area as shown on the attached
map will be under complete American control including
military government and responsibility for disarmament and
demilitarization but will be generally
administered as a subdistrict of a larger British
controlled area. It is understood that the American
military government will conform to the general policies
pursued in the administration of the larger district
British Zone, subject always to
the right of the American commander to vary the
administration of the enclave
Bremen-Bremerhaven Area in any
particular that he may find necessary on military
grounds.
2.
The United States Chiefs of Staff agree
to permit necessary access by the British to offices,
and necessary use of available installations, situated
in the Bremen-Bremerhaven Area, which provide services
essential to British administration of the British Zone
of Occupation.
2. 3. The
U. S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen-Bremerhaven Area to the Southwestern Zone is so dominant and the British interest in
possible movement through the American Zone to Austria so
evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for
the one government through the zone controlled by the other
is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsible
responsive service, each military
zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for United
States (or British) requirements of Movement and Transport
from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement
and transport involved in such essential traffic.
3.4. The
map referred to is
attached is the same as that
attached to C. C. S. 320/29.
C. C. S. 320/37
The Bremen Enclave
1. The Bremen and Bremerhaven enclave as shown on the attached map will be under complete American control including military government and responsibility for disarmament and demilitarization. It is understood that the American military government will conform to the general policies pursued in the administration of the British zone subject always to the right of the American commander to vary the administration of the enclave in any particular that he may find necessary on military grounds.
2. The U. S. interest in transit passage from the Bremen area to the southwestern zone is so dominant and the British interest in possible movement through the American zone to Austria so evident that obligation to carry stores and personnel for the one government through the zone controlled by the other is mutually recognized. To better achieve responsive service, each military zone commander will accept a Deputy Controller for (United States/British) requirements of Movement and Transport from the other to assist in the coordination of the movement and transport involved in such essential traffic.
3. The map referred to is that attached to C. C. S. 320/29.
Present
Chairmanship
General Antonov
requested Admiral
Admiral Leahy
thanked General
1. Bombline and Liaison
Arrangements
Sir Alan Brooke
General Kuter
said he would like to read a statement on behalf of the
United States Chiefs of Staff, setting out their views on this
matter. This statement read as follows:
not to attack. We should require
at least 24, and preferably 48 hours’ notice for action
upon such requests.
General Kuter
said that he would like to add that in addition to his
objection to the principle of a fixed line on the map, there was
the further objection that there were valuable strategic targets
to the east of the proposed line. From among some 20 such
strategic targets which would be denied to Allied air power he
would mention a few. These included the oil targets at Politz,
the main production center of high octane gasoline and main
source of fuel supply for the
There was one further point he would like to make. Apart from the strategic implication of the line, it was unacceptable in view of topographical considerations. A bombline must be clearly visible to a pilot in the air, both from high and low altitudes.
General Marshall
said he would like to add an additional illustration of
the point made by General
With the speed of modern fighters the aircraft taking part in this raid were involved in operations only five minutes flying time from the Russian ground forces. Yet it must be remembered that these aircraft were bombing a definite point which the Russian staff had requested should be attacked. Unless better methods of handling liaison were evolved, it would mean that the most powerful weapon of the war would be denied its proper use in assisting the Russians. He asked that an immediate and really practical solution should be found to this problem.
Sir Charles Portal
Speaking for the British Air Staff, he fully supported the
proposals which had been put forth by General
General Antonov
explained that in putting forward at the previous meeting
his proposal with regard to the bombline, he had in mind the
wishes expressed by the United States and British Chiefs of
Staff which had been put forward by General
Sir Charles Portal
General Kuter
said he would like to comment on two points. He was glad
to learn that the Soviet wishes were similar to his own, as
indicated by General
General Marshall
asked confirmation that General
General Antonov
said the line which he had indicated was a rough guide
only. He felt that the Heads of the Air Staffs could work out
the details of this line so as to insure its recognition from
the air. This redefinition of the line could, he believed, be
undertaken at the present conference. He also supported the
statement made by
Sir Alan Brooke
Sir Charles Portal
General Antonov
said that the line he had proposed was designed to secure
Soviet land forces from the possibility of accidental
bombardment by the Allied air forces. Such a line could not be
permanent and would be changed frequently to conform to changes
in the land front. The actions of the strategic air forces, both
Soviet and Allied, would not be bound by this line, however. It
was drawn so close to the Soviet front that he presumed that the
Allied strategic air forces would not find many targets to the
east of this line though such targets might exist and in this
case action against any of them could be decided upon
individually. As to the Soviet strategic air force it would
appear that in most cases their attacks would take place to the
west of the line.
Admiral Leahy
suggested that, since there appeared to be a large measure
of agreement, time would be saved if the three air staffs met
together and worked out the details of the proposed
bombline.
Sir Charles Portal
Admiral Leahy
said that he accepted
General Antonov
said that he agreed with Admiral
It was agreed that Marshal
Sir Alan Brooke
General Antonov
said he had reported on this matter to Marshal
2. Coordination of Offensive
Operations
Sir Alan Brooke
General Antonov
said that Soviet offensive action had started and would
continue. The Soviet forces would press forward until hampered
by weather. With regard to the summer offensive, it would be
difficult to give exact data with regard to the interval between
the end of the winter and beginning of the summer attack. The
most difficult season from the point of view of weather was the
second part of March and the month of April. This was the period
when roads became impassable.
General Marshall
asked, with regard to General
General Antonov
said that, if during this period operations in the West
were carried out actively, the Soviets would take every possible
action on the Eastern Front wherever this could be done.
General Marshall
emphasized that the interval between the winter and summer
offensives would probably be the period at which the Allies
would be trying to cross the Rhine. He was therefore most
anxious that the enemy should not be able to concentrate forces
against the Allies on the Western Front at that particular
time.
General Antonov
said that he could assure General
3. Exchange of Information
With Regard to River-Crossing Technique and Equipment
Admiral Leahy
said that at the first meeting between the Heads of State,
the British Prime Minister had raised the question of exchanging
information with regard to technique and equipment employed by
the Soviet forces in river crossings. At the present time in
view of the Allied proximity to the River Rhine this was a most
immediate problem for the Allied forces. There were now two
officers present from General
General Antonov
said that the Soviet Army was always ready to share its
battle experience with its allies. However, at the moment there
were no specialists in this technique available and he would
like therefore time to look into this matter. He would furnish
the required information later.
Admiral Leahy
thanked General
4. Bases for U. S. Strategic Bomber Forces in the
Vienna-Budapest Area
General Marshall
said that as the Soviet advance proceeded it would be
found logistically possible to move U. S. strategic bomber
forces now in Italy, with their protecting fighters, to bases in
the Vienna-Budapest area. It was very desirable for such
aircraft to operate from that vicinity. It was therefore the
hope of the United States Chiefs of Staff that this could be
arranged by having a staging area or zone of passage in that
area so that it could be arranged for some 670 individual heavy
bomber sorties to be undertaken each month. This would require
the support of about 1,800 fighter missions in the same period.
To effect this it would be necessary to carry out certain
construction work for which some 2,000 United States personnel
could be provided from Italy and 200 from elsewhere. The
greatest difficulty would be the transfer of the necessary
supplies and equipment. 22,000 tons would be required initially
and a further 8,300 tons a month thereafter. The President of
the United States was likely to present this project to Marshal
General Antonov
said that the matter would probably be decided between
Marshal
General Marshall
said he would be very happy for this to be arranged.
5. Provision of Soviet
Airfields for Damaged British Night Bombers
Sir Charles Portal
Marshal Khudyakov
said that he regarded this as a technical question. Up to
the present the Soviet forces had never denied assistance to
Allied fliers, who had always been met and taken care of. He
suggested the details of
6. Enemy Intelligence
General Antonov
said that at the previous Conference he had referred to
the fact that the Germans would endeavor to stop the Russian
offensive on the line of the Oder. Quite possibly they would not
only adopt a passive defense on this line but would try to
gather together counterattack forces for a break-through. He
would be glad to know if the Allied commander in the West had
any intelligence with regard to the collection of such forces,
their movements or the likely point for such an attack. He was
particularly interested in the transference of the Sixth S. S.
Panzer Army.
General Bull
said that when he left General
General Marshall
said that he had received a message on the previous day
which gave definite information of the moves of certain
divisions of the Sixth Panzer Army from the Western Front. This
message had also given the new total of enemy divisions on the
Western Front as 69. This morning’s operational report raised
this total to
Sir Alan Brooke
General Antonov
said he was very grateful for the information given him
and was particularly interested in the transfer of the Sixth
Panzer Army to the eastward.
Sir Alan Brooke
General Marshall
said it might be helpful, if the Soviet Staff was not
already aware of them, to give details of the attack in the
Ardennes. This attack had been made by the Fifth and Sixth
Panzer Armies. Prior to the attack the Sixth Panzer Army had
been out of the line for several months and had been located
northeast of the Ruhr with five divisions. The Fifth Panzer Army
had been in the front line or close to it. The Sixth Panzer Army
had crossed to the west of the Rhine a month or six weeks before
the offensive had taken place but had not been located until the
attack was launched. The Sixth Panzer Army had been the first to
be withdrawn from the attack and the Fifth Panzer Army was
finally also withdrawn though it was not known if it had left
the front.
Marshal Khudyakov
asked if the losses in the Fifth Panzer Army were
known.
General Marshall
said it was difficult to differentiate between losses
incurred by the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. At the meeting on
the previous day he had given information with regard to the
destruction inflicted on one or the other of these armies in the
course of two days operations. It was believed that very heavy
casualties had been inflicted on the motor vehicles and tanks of
almost all the divisions of both the Fifth and Sixth Panzer
Armies.
General Bull
said the Fifth Panzer Army had attacked in the center and,
of the two, made the most progress. The Sixth Panzer Army had
attacked in the north in the direction of Malmedy-Liege. Both
the Fifth and the Sixth Armies had suffered considerable losses
in armor and two divisions of the Fifth Army in particular were
known to have suffered heavily.
7. Pacific Operations
Admiral King
said that the general principles for the conduct of the
war against Germany and Japan were: firstly, the defeat of both
Germany and Japan at the earliest possible date; secondly, that
Germany was the principal enemy; thirdly, that continuous and
unremitting pressure would be maintained against the Japanese
forces. Efforts would be made to attain positions from which the
final attack on Japan could be staged when the necessary forces
became available from Europe. There had been no fixed schedule
but endeavor had been made to go as fast and as far as the
available means permitted. At the present time our operations
were hampered chiefly by lack of shipping and the shortage of
service and auxiliary troops. It was worthy of note that all
operations in the Pacific had, of necessity, been amphibious
operations and some were carried out over great distances.
In general, the forward line now held included Attu, the Marianas, and Luzon. In addition, we had control of the sea and air not only up to this line, but beyond it to China, Formosa, the Ryukyus, and even to the coast of Japan itself. The present fighting was taking place on the island of Luzon, about 1,500 sea miles from Japan itself. The Japanese appeared to prefer to keep the fighting at that distance from their homeland. What was important was that it was still possible to inflict casualties on the Japanese navy, air forces, and shipping. The British Pacific Fleet was now available, and had been reported to him as being available for operations about the 15th of March.
Regarding future operations, it was proposed to continue the liberation of the Philippines and to establish air bases in Luzon from which to interdict enemy air and shipping in the north part of the China Sea, including the China coast and the area of Formosa. On the 19th of February the United States forces would seize the Bonin Islands, which would be used chiefly as a base for fighters accompanying the heavy bombers on raids on Japan. About the first of April it was proposed to go into Okinawa in the Ryukyus for the purpose of establishing air bases and an advance naval base, and to intensify the sea and air blockade of Japan.
Though no decision had been taken, planning was proceeding on an operation to go into the Chusan Archipelago to broaden the base for intensifying the air and sea blockade of Japan. This would also assist interdiction of communications in the Shanghai-Hankow area, including the great water highway of the Yangtze.
In the North Pacific, air operations were being conducted from
the Aleutians and occasional ship bombardments of the Kuriles,
chiefly against the islands of Paramushiru and Shushima in the
extreme north of the chain. The weather for air operations in
this area was particularly
For a period of about a year examination and study had been continuing of the possibility of securing a safe sea passage through the Kuriles by seizing an island, preferably in the central part of the chain, whose topography was such as to permit the establishment of airfields. Lack of means made it unlikely that such operations would take place during 1945 unless they became so vitally important that ways and means would have to be found to do them, even though the over-all means available for the war against Japan were limited.
Admiral Kuznetsov
asked if the capture of an island in the Kuriles was
planned for 1945.
Admiral King
said that means were not available to undertake it as well
as the other operations which had been planned; however, as
always, it was a question of the relative importance of the
various operations under consideration.
General Marshall
said he would like to add that from the point of view of
the Army, plans were kept up to date in great detail,
particularly with regard to shipping, in order to effect the
most rapid possible movement of forces from Europe to the
Pacific. These plans were so arranged that the movement would
start one week after the termination of the war in Europe. The
total transfer would, however, take a long time. Air would move
first, accompanied by the service units needed to support the
air forces and to prepare bases for the other troops. The
necessity for these plans was one of the reasons why an
estimated date for the end of the war against Germany had been
required.
General Antonov
said that, as he had mentioned on the previous day, it
would be more convenient to discuss questions concerning the Far
East after this matter had been considered by the Heads of
State.
8. Bomber Operations Against Japan
General Kuter
said that the B–29’s, the heavy long-range United States
bombers, were organized into the Twentieth Air Force commanded
by General
9. Operations in Burma and
China
Sir Alan Brooke
Sir Charles Portal
General Marshall
said that the United States maintained a considerable air
force in China, consisting, at the present time, of some 600
planes with more to come. The sole source of supply for these
forces was over the 17,000-foot mountains between northeast
Burma and Kunming. These operations presented an extremely
difficult proposition from every point of view. As
A United States general (General
General Antonov
asked if the operations in Burma were regarded as decisive
operations or secondary operations.
Sir Alan Brooke
General Antonov
asked if it was considered that there were enough troops
for decisive action on the two fronts—the Far East and Europe.
Would not concentration on the main front hasten the end of the
war in Europe and thus hasten the end of the war against Japan
by making additional forces available?
Sir Alan Brooke
General Marshall
explained that the policy of the United States Government
played a great part in the decisions with regard to operations
in Burma. The United States Government placed great importance
on the maintenance of the present regime in China. From the
military point of view it would be a very serious matter if all
China passed into Japanese control. Only relatively small
American forces had been used except for transport aircraft.
It was imperative, however, that operations should not stand still in the Pacific. This would enable the Japanese to build up a solid line in the occupied areas. In the first year of the war only small land and air forces had been available to assist the strong naval force in the Pacific. These forces had, however, pushed forward by by-passing Japanese positions. At present some 200,000 to 300,000 Japanese troops had been cut off in these by-passed positions and a comparable number could now be considered as cut off in Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and even Burma.
Admiral Kuznetsov
asked for information with regard to the area of the
United States submarine operations in the Pacific.
Admiral King
said that the United States submarine force had always
operated where the most Japanese shipping was to be found. The
main submarine force used Hawaii as its main base and worked
generally north of the latitude of 20° N. A further submarine
force was based on Australia and was now supplemented by a
considerable number of British submarines. This force worked in
the area of the East Indies. Allied submarines in the Pacific
had taken a heavy toll of Japanese shipping, which was now
reduced from a maximum of some seven million tons to two million
tons. These Japanese losses had been inflicted by submarines, by
air forces and by naval surface vessels. United States submarine
losses had remained relatively constant at about two per month.
The number of United States submarines operating was still
increasing. It was clear that the closer operations come to
Japan the tougher would be the opposition not only for
submarines but also for air and naval forces and for ground
troops.
Admiral Kuznetsov
asked if it was intended that United States submarines
should operate in the Sea of Japan.
Admiral King
said that so far they had not operated in the Sea of Japan
though they operated in the Yellow Sea.
Admiral Kuznetsov
suggested that the Japanese were likely to shift their sea
lines of communication to the Sea of Japan.
Admiral King
explained that such a line of communications already
existed as did a Japanese sea line of communications to
Manchuria and to the North China coast.
10. Future Business
After a brief discussion it was agreed that all the necessary subjects had already been covered and that no further meetings were called for until such time as the Heads of State might submit additional problems to the military staffs.
In reply to a question from General Antonov
said that he felt that for the present no written report
to the Heads of State was necessary, but rather that each staff
should report individually to its own Head of State. Should a
written report be required, this could easily be prepared
later.
In conclusion, Sir Alan Brooke
Present
Subjects:
1. Press Release.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that it had been deemed advisable to issue a
preliminary communiqué on the Crimean Conference. He had
requested Mr. Stephen Early, the Assistant to the President on
press matters, to make a few remarks on this subject. A copy of
this release is attached hereto.Post, p.
658.
During the course of the discussion Mr.
Molotov
suggested that the word “common” be inserted before the
word “enemy” and Mr. deletions]. He stated that
he would have to refer the release to Marshal
Mr. Stettinius
pointed out that the release would be held in strict
secrecy until its simultaneous issuance in London, Moscow and
Washington on Thursday.
2. The Dismemberment of
Germany.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that this topic had been referred to the Foreign
Secretaries for discussion. In his opinion much research and
study would be necessary before agreement could be reached, but
he hoped that they could come to agreement on the general
principles involved. At the present session he would like to
suggest that the word “dismemberment” be added after the word
“demilitarization” in Article 12 of the surrender instrument for
Germany.ante, p. 117.
Mr. Molotov
stated that Mr.
Mr. Eden
stated that he had worked out another formula which
included the addition of the words “and measures for the
dissolution of the German unitary state” which he wished
included in the second paragraph of Article 12.
Mr. Molotov
then suggested that the paragraph commence with the words
“In order to secure peace and security of Europe, they will take
measures for the dismemberment of Germany.” He felt that this
reading would reflect the agreement reached at yesterday’s
plenary session.
Mr. Eden
maintained that this wording would commit the three powers
to too great an extent before the question had been thoroughly
studied. He stated that he would prefer merely to add the words
“and the dismemberment.” He felt that his proposed draft would
not only cover the dismemberment of Germany but also its
decentralization.
Mr. Molotov
continued to press for the Soviet draft.
Mr. Eden
maintained that the British Delegation could go no further
than the addition of the words “and the dismemberment.”
Mr. Stettinius
suggested as a possible alternative a phrase reading to
the effect that “including dismemberment to the degree necessary
to safeguard the peace and security . . .
Mr. Molotov
was inclined to prefer the second draft submitted by Mr.
Mr. Eden
strongly objected.
Mr. Molotov
then suggested rephrasing the paragraph by including the
words “for the future peace and security” and eliminating the
words “as deemed requisite.”
Mr. Eden
maintained that he would be unable to accept this draft,
since it was too broad. However, he would readily accept Mr.
After some discussion as to the merits of Mr.
3. Reference of the Question
Concerning the Dismemberment of Germany to the EAC.
Mr. Stettinius
inquired whether it might not be agreed that the question
concerning the dismemberment of Germany might not be referred to
the
Mr. Molotov
suggested that this question be taken up at a later time.
He said that since it was a specific matter it might be better
to establish a special commission to study the question.
1. Communiqué
Mol. Preliminary One suggestion: add
“common” enemy. Likes communiqué.
No objection to mention Black Sea area. Must be approved by
2. S. announces 3 questions before the 3 F. M. On first point.
Adding “dismemberment” to Art 12
Mol. Accepts addition of word.
Eden
Mol: Will exercise sup.
Agreed to add: “And the dismemberment” after demilitarization.
No agreement on Russian change.
Press Communiqué
The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their chiefs of staff, their foreign secretaries and other advisors, are now meeting in the Black Sea area.
Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of
the enemy and for building, with their allies, firm foundations
for a lasting peace. While
their
discussions
have
not
progressed
as
yet
beyond
the
preliminary
stages, they
have
been
marked
by
most
encouraging
expressions
of
unity
of
purpose, frankness and friendship.
Meetings are continuing day and night.
The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged. There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.
Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, for meeting the immediate political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain the peace.
A complete communiqué will be issued at the conclusion of the Conference.
[Yalta,] February 6, 1945.
Crimean Conference Press Release
Statement for the press and radio released at 4:30 o’clock p. m., Eastern War Time Wednesday, February 7, 1945.
“The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their chiefs of staff, the three foreign secretaries and other advisors, are now meeting in the Black Sea area.
“Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the common enemy and for building, with their Allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace. Meetings are proceeding continuously.
“The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged. There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.
“Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, the political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain Peace.
“A communiqué will be issued at the conclusion of the Conference.”
Approved by Marshal
Present
No record of the substance of this meeting has been found. The
information given here as to the meeting and the participants is
taken from the Log, ante, p. 554, which
states that the discussions continued after lunch until 3 p.
m.
Present
Subjects:
World Security Organization
The President inquired whether the
committee of Foreign Ministers had anything to report to the
Conference.
Mr. Stettinius
said it had been decided to insert the word
“dismemberment” of Germany into Article 12 of the unconditional
surrender terms, but that Mr.
Mr. Molotov
replied that he was withdrawing his proposed additional
words.
Mr. Stettinius
then said that they could report full agreement to insert
the word “dismemberment” into Article 12 of the surrender terms
but that they would like to have some more time before reporting
on reparations and the relationship of the French zone to the
control commission.
The Prime Minister said that he had
not had an opportunity to obtain the consent of the War Cabinet
to the proposed insertion but that he was glad to accept on the
behalf of the British Government the decision on this point. He
went on to say that in regard to the French zone he felt that
the importance of France in the future had been enhanced by the
limitation which the President yesterday had placed on the
length of time United States forces might stay in Europe. He
said that Great Britain would not be strong enough alone to
guard the Western approaches to the Channel.
The President said that he had spoken
on the basis of present conditions and he felt public opinion in
the United States would be prepared to support an international
organization along the lines of Dumbarton Oaks and that this
might change their attitude in regard post, pp. 994–996.
Mr. Stettinius
then read the following statement of the American position
on voting in the Council:post, pp. 682–683.
“1.
Review of Status of this Question.“It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.
“At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.
“On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal
Stalin and to Prime MinisterChurchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:
- ‘C.
Voting- ‘1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
- ‘2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
- ‘3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members: provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.’
“2.
Analysis of the American Proposal.“(
a) We believe that our proposal is entirely consistent with the special responsibilities of the great powers for the preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.“(
b) At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.“We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization which we
all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated. “The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations
sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote. Post, pp. 684–686.“3.
Reasons for the American Position.“From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure,
“First, there is the necessity for unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of the peace of the world.
“Second, it is of particular importance to the people of the United States, that there be provision for a fair hearing for all members of the organization, large and small.
“We believe that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal
Stalin and Prime MinisterChurchill on December 5 of last yearprovide a reasonable and just solution and satisfactorily combine these two main considerations. Ante, pp. 58–59.“It is our earnest hope that our two great Allies will find it possible to accept the President’s proposal.”
The President suggested that the
Secretary of State (Mr.
Mr. Stettinius
reported as follows:post, pp.
684–686.
- “II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.
- “Under the above formula the following decisions would require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members:
- “I. Recommendations to the General Assembly on
- “1. Admission of new members;
- “2. Suspension of a member;
- “3. Expulsion of a member;
- “4. Election of the Secretary General.
- “II. Restoration of the rights and privileges of a suspended member.
- “III. Removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of the peace, including the following questions:
- “1. Whether failure on the part of the parties to a dispute to settle it by means of their own choice or in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council in fact constitutes a threat to the peace;
- “2. Whether any other actions on the part of any country constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace;
- “3. What measures should be taken by the Council to maintain or restore the peace and the manner in which such measures should be carried out;
- “4. Whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement.
- “IV. Approval of special agreement or agreements for the provision of armed forces and facilities.
- “V. Formulation of plans for a general system of regulation of armaments and submission of such plans to the member states.
- “VI. Determination of whether the nature and the activities of a regional agency or arrangement for the maintenance of peace and security are consistent with the purposes and principles of the general organization.
- “The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party:
- “I. Whether a dispute or a situation brought to the Council’s attention is of such a nature that its continuation is likely to threaten the peace;
- “II. Whether the Council should call on the parties to settle or adjust the dispute or situation by means of their own choice;
- “III. Whether the Council should make a recommendation to the parties as to methods and procedures of settlement;
- “IV. Whether the legal aspects of the matter before it should be referred by the Council for advice to the international court of justice;
- “V. Whether, if there exists a regional agency for peaceful settlement of local disputes, such an agency should be asked to concern itself with the controversy.”
Marshal Stalin
inquired what was new in Mr.
The President replied that there had
been no change of any significance.
Mr. Stettinius
said that there had been a minor drafting change (this
minor change was explained to Mr.
Mr. Molotov
said that the Soviet Government attached great importance
to the question of voting in the Security Council and,
therefore, he wished to study the United States proposal and in
particular the effect of the drafting change and would be ready
to discuss the question tomorrow.
The Prime Minister stated that the
British Government had given the most careful consideration to
the United States proposals.
Marshal Stalin
inquired whether or not Egypt, for example, would be on
the assembly.
Mr. Eden
replied “yes, but not on the Council unless elected.”
Marshal Stalin
then said suppose Egypt raised the question of the return
of the Suez Canal.
The Prime Minister replied that he
hoped that Marshal
The Prime Minister said that under
paragraph 3 of Mr.
The President then said that he
recalled that in the Tehran Declaration the Three Powers had
stated:
“We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world. . . .
Points appear in the original. ”
The President added that he thought
this Declaration was pertinent to the discussion in
progress.
The Prime Minister said that since he
saw no reason to fear the United States proposals he was glad to
associate the British Government with them. He added that
because of our great power, which is still protected by the veto
if we do not agree, we should allow others to be heard.
Marshal Stalin
said that he would like to have this document to study,
since only hearing it orally it was impossible to catch all of
the implications. He said that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals
already give the right of discussion in the assembly, but he did
not believe that any nation would be satisfied with expressing
its opinion. They would want some decision. He said that if Mr.
The Prime Minister replied that he had
spoken of the three Great Powers who could collectively place
themselves so high over the others that the whole world would
say these three desired to rule.
Marshal Stalin
then said ironically that it looks as though two Great
Powers have already accepted a document which would avoid any
such accusation but that the third has not yet signified its
assent. He then went on to say that in his opinion there was a
more serious question than the voting procedure or the question
of the domination of the world. They all knew that as long as
the three of them lived none of them would involve their
countries in aggressive actions, but after all, ten years from
now none of them might be present. A new generation would come
into being not knowing the horrors of the
Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Stettinius
pointed out that under the United States proposal the
power of the World Organization could not be directed against
any of the permanent members.
Marshal Stalin
said that he was afraid that any conflict might break the
unity of our united front.
The Prime Minister replied that he saw
the force of that argument, but he did not believe that the
world organization would eliminate disputes between powers and
that would remain the function of diplomacy.
Marshal Stalin
said that his colleagues in Moscow could not forget the
events of December 1939 during the Finnish war when at the
instigation of England and France the League of Nations expelled
the Soviet Union from the League and mobilized world opinion
against the Soviet Union, even going so far as to speak of a
crusade.
The Prime Minister answered that at
that time the British and French Governments were very angry at
the Soviet Union and in any
Marshal Stalin
said he was not thinking of expulsion but of the question
of the mobilization of opinion against one country.
The Prime Minister answered that he
thought this might happen to any nation, but he doubted very
much if either the President or Marshal
The President then said that he felt
that the unity of the Great Powers was one of our first aims and
that the United States policy promoted rather than impaired this
aim. He said that should there unfortunately be any differences
between the Great Powers, and there might well be, this fact
would become fully known to the world no matter what voting
procedure was adopted. In any event, there was no method of
preventing discussions of differences in the assembly. He said
that full and friendly discussions in the Council would in no
sense promote disunity, but on the contrary, would serve to
demonstrate the confidence which the Great Powers had in each
other and in the justice of their own policies.
The Polish Question
The President inquired whether the
Polish question should be taken up now or postponed until the
next meeting.
The Prime Minister said that he hoped
that at least a start could be made today.
The President said that the United
States was farther away from Poland than anyone else here, and
that there were times when a long distance point of view was
useful. He said that at Tehran he had stated that he believed
the American people were in general favorably inclined to the
Marshal Stalin
replied that Poland should maintain friendly relations not
only with the Soviet Union but with the other Allies.
The President said he had merely put
forth a suggestion but he thought if we could solve the Polish
question it would be a great help to all of us. He added he
didn’t know personally any members of the London government or
Lublin government, but he had met Mr.
The Prime Minister said that he had
consistently declared in Parliament and elsewhere that the
British Government would support the Polish people?] by free vote
could select and form their own government. He concluded by
saying he was interested in the President’s suggestion.
At the suggestion of Marshal
Marshal Stalin
then gave the following summary of his views on the Polish
question: Mr.
In regard to the
As to the question of the Polish government, Mr. ArciszewskiRaczkiewiczZeligowski
As a military man I demand from a country liberated by the Red
Army that there be no civil war in the rear. The men in the Red
Army are indifferent to the type of government as long as it
will maintain order and they will not be shot in the back. The
Warsaw, or Lublin, government has not badly fulfilled this task.
There are, however, agents of the London government who claim to
be agents of the underground forces of resistance. I must say
that no good and much evil comes from these forces. Up to the
present time they have killed 212 of our military men. They
attack our supply bases to obtain arms. Although it has been
proclaimed that all radio stations must be registered and obtain
permission to operate, agents of the London government are
violating these regulations. We have arrested some of them and
if they continue to disturb our rear we will shoot them as
military law requires. When I compare what the agents of the
Lublin government have done and what the agents of the London
government have done I see the first are good and the second
bad. We want tranquility in our rear. We will support the
government which gives us peace in the rear, and as a military
man I could not do otherwise. Without a secure rear there can be
no more victories for the Red Army. Any military man and even
the non-military man will understand this situation.post, p. 686, was
passed to the President at some point during the foregoing
statement by
The Prime Minister said that he must
put on record the fact that the British and Soviet Governments
have different sources of information in Poland and therefore
they obtain different views of the situation there. He said it
is possible that their reports are mistaken as it is not always
possible to believe everything that anyone tells you. He
believed, he added, that with the best of all their information
he could not feel that the Lublin government represents more
than one third of the people and would be maintained in power if
the people were free to express their opinion. One of the
reasons why the British have so earnestly sought a solution had
been the fear that the Polish underground army would come into
collision with the Lublin government, which would lead to great
bloodshed, arrests and deportations which could not fail to have
a bad effect on the whole Polish question. The Prime Minister
said he agreed that anyone who attacks the Red Army should be
punished, but he repeated that the British Government could not
agree to recognizing the Lublin government of Poland.
The Conference then adjourned until four o’clock tomorrow.
From penciled notes in longhand. For this meeting the
notes appear to have been taken by
A penciled diagram at the head of these notes shows the
seating arrangement around the conference table
clockwise as follows:
Livadia
Letter from
ERS to vish.
for set of
pictures
2/6 4.15 pm—6.20
(Then Poland)
1. Pres, ERS,
2. P. M.,
3.
ERS reported that the words “and the dismemberment” be added to Art XII of Articles of Surrender. Mr. Mol. has a further proposal which will require more discussion. Ask to submit final report tomorrow
ERS made final report
Church, said instrument of dismemberment had not been approved by Cabinet but he is glad agt has been reached
Church: Position of Fr. becomes of great importance to us. Must have a strong French army
Pres: Pub. opinion in US will determine;—but in his opinion if we
get D. O.
ERS
Read
analysis
Pres: ERS explain US proposal as he was at D. O. & none of 3 heads of deleg. were.
Feel strongly people going to insist on getting something that will ensure peace, not for all time, but say for 50 years
ERS: read statement
3 ribbon copies to each of 3 heads of deleg.
Pres. suggested ERS read types of decisions requiring unan.
Agreed
I shall first present 6 situations in which unan. of great powers must be maintained at all times
Read I to VI of Part II our paper (analysis)
I shall now read the situations which also require etc. . . .
.
Read I to IV [
V?]Brackets appear in the original.
Pres that ends the reading & explanation of part of the procedure
Thing we have to remember—objective of the 5 great & of all nations is same & on a q. of procedure there ought not be any real difficulty
Asked about minor phraseological change
Long discussion
Asked for more time to study the proposal made by ERS as compared with Pres. proposal
Could we put it off to tomorrow
Church. Agrees to study of this particular & to adjourn q. to tomorrow
I cannot conceal from the company that
On studying the Pres. new proposal my anxieties have been removed so far as Brit Com of Ns & Brit Empire are concerned.
I & the self governing dominions have the feeling that of course whether world peace is achieved on a lasting found, can only depend in the last resort upon the collab of the 3 great powers
Not doing justice to our true heart felt intentions if didn’t provide for the free statement of grievances by the many smaller states of the world
It might look as if we were claiming to rule the world—we 3
Whereas our desire is to serve the world & to preserve it
from renewal of the frightful horrors which have fallen upon the
lap of its inhabs. ∴ I feel that we great powers—3—should make
what I would call a proud submission to the commun of the world.
Within the limits stated. I’ve naturally been looking at this as
to how it would affect the fortunes & ints of Brit Em &
Com. I’m going to take a part, instance to illustrate why I do
not feel this submission wh. we make to the whole world will be
damaging to Brit, interests. The case I take is a difficult one
which affects Gt. Brit. I take the case of HK
St. Who is we
Church I’m speaking only of the Brit Govt
St. Will Eg.
Church In Ass. but not in Coun. unless elected
St. Any member of Ass. could freely express his opin.
Church: Yes & so long as Brit
G concerned these 5q’s the Brit Govt would not be
allowed to vote. I say we agree to these procedural matters
being decided without our vote—I’m only taking HK illus.—we
means Brit Govt
I humbly beg to be allowed to keep to illus. I introduced & then others can follow
What his majesty’s Govt could not agree to is that the other matters in ¶ III the 4 matters set out there
I consider that we are suff. safeguarding ag. being overruled in a matter affecting sovereignty because of our rights under ¶ III
We have in fact the right by our veto power to stop all further action ag. us by the world organ.
∴ I can not feel that we should have to agree to any dec. contrary to our free choice in these matters as set out. We should be protected by our rt. of veto ag. all measures of the kind in ¶ III
No (missed more)
On other hand I feel it would be wrong that Ch. should not have oppor to state its case fully & Coun not have powers in last 5 ¶s US paper & we not vote on those
In the same way if Eg raises a q. ag the Brit affecting Suez canal—
Pres. read sentence from Tehran re good will
HMG see no danger from their own point of view in associating themselves with prop. in the US paper & we see great advantage in the 3 great powers not assuming the position of rulers of all the rest without even allowing them to state their case. In fact we feel it would not be right to take that position of denying them the rt. to state the case & we rely on ¶ III if we are not convinced by the arguments made ag. us.
(Absent see Doc
Reference here is to )Matthews .
St. If any nation raise any import, q. will raise not only q. but will want a dec. Already have rt to express opin in Ass. Mr. Church thinks that Ch after raising q of HK would be content to express her opin. Ch. might ask for a decision.
Will demand a dec.
∴ matter is much more serious than merely to secure for each nation rt. to express its opin
Also it is not a matter of 3 powers liking to be master of world, D. O. proposals should be a break upon such a group of powers. I don’t know any great power which would have intention to master world. Perhaps I am mistaken & see not everything.
I would like to ask my friend Mr Ch. to name which powers might intend domin world
Im sure Mr Ch & Brit doesn’t want domin. I’m sure US hasn’t opin. of this kind. USSR hasn’t There remains only 1 power. China
Church I was speaking of 3 great powers gathered here collectively lifting themselves so high that others would consider they were trying to domin world—not any 1 power but the 3 Not 1 but a trinity
(St) If 2 great powers accept provs. which excuse them from that. 1 power has not yet agreed to that
I will examine the doc. & perhaps I will understand what is the matter but at present everything is not clear to me.
Think much more serious q than rt of powers express opin or appear domin world
I fear—we are not now & will not allow that any of our gt countries—act of agg. But in 10 yrs time we will disappear—new generations will come which did not experience horrors of war & forget what we been thru
Seems we would like to secure peace at least for 50 yrs. I have such an idea. I think we have now to build up such a form which would put as many obstacles as possible to domination of world. I think that the task is to secure our unity of 3 powers in future & for this purpose must elaborate such a covenant which would in certain respects (?) The greatest danger for future is possibility of conflicts among ourselves If unity Ger danger not very great & now we have to think how to create—that our great powers & poss. Ch. & Fr. will keep united fronts in future There must be elaborated a statement which would prevent conflicts among great powers.
I must apologize I was real busy other matters & not chance study this q in detail As far as I understand what was said by Ams today all points divided in 2 categories—
In 1st cat. as I understood belong such things as sanctions econ, pol & mil & in other cat. all those conflicts which could be settled by peaceful means without sanctions
Also understood that in consid. of conflicts of both types contemplated free discussion of the Council
I understood in consid. of q’s of 1st cat.
perm, members being party to dispute has rt. to vote & not be asked to withdraw
But in conflicts of 2nd cat. party in dispute not be allowed to vote.
We Rs being accused talking too much about how to vote. But Issues are being decided by vote & we are interested in the decisions & less in discussions Can discuss for 100 yrs & nothing settled, but I’m interested in decs.
Suppose Ch. suggests HK be returned or Suez Can. to Eg. I can assure Mr Church Ch & Eg. will be not alone. They will have some friends in Ass. & possibly some protectors
Church: I would say no when it came to use of Leag. powers. Powers should not be used ag. us if we remained unconvinced
St: Is it so.
Church It is as I understand it
ERS No econ. sanction or use of force without unan. of perm,
members of
ERS Yes
St I’m afraid these conflicts re HK might break our unity
Church See force of that but whole force of diplomacy proceeds & is not prevented by World Org. Members will always be discussing matters among themselves
St: Another picture my colleagues in Mosc cannot forget the case which occurred in Dec 39 during Rus-Fin war when Brit & Fr. used Leag. ag us & eventually expelled us, & isolated us & later mobilised all the powers ag. us in matter of crusade
Church: we were very angry, were all alone
St: How guar, such thing not occur ag.
Church We couldn’t do it here
St. Couldn’t we make more obstacles in way of it
Church: Expulsion must be unan. & gt. power could veto.
St. First time we have
Pres: Should emphasize action like Fin. one would be impossible as would require unan. of 5
St. Not only expulsion but mobilization of opinion
Church. I see the case which cause anxiety to any of us, agitation be worked up & lot of abuse be levelled at one of us. Might be Brit I can only say dip. would be active
Everything would be done to prevent anything that would mar our unity
I’m quite sure Mar. St. wouldn’t make a harsh att on Brit Em— verbally I mean—without talking to us first We would get to some arrangement, in any event we should be very careful not to let the unity be destroyed
St: I would prob. but what of
Pres: Let’s put it another way. Whole doc. is drawn up to promote
not impair unity. Will be differences—will be known—will be
talked in Assembly. To permit discussion in Coun. will in no
sense impair
St tomorrow continue, meanwhile study
Poland
In intermission
(The first part of the meeting was devoted to a discussion of the
voting procedure for the world organization. This is covered in
Mr.
Poland
President: I should like to bring up
Poland. I come from a great distance and therefore have the
advantage of a more distant point of view of the problem. There
are six or seven million Poles in the United States. As I said
in Tehran, in general I am in favor of the
Stalinémigré Poles?
President: The Poles would like East
Prussia and part of Germany. It would make it easier for me at
home if the Soviet Government could give something to Poland. I
raised the question of giving them Lvov at Tehran. It has now
been suggested that the oil lands in the southwest of Lvov might
be given them. I am not making a definite statement but I hope
that Marshal
But the most important matter is that of a permanent government
for Poland. Opinion in the United States is against recognition
of the Lublin government on the ground that it represents a
small
The main suggestion I want to make is that there be created an ad interim government which will have the support of the majority of the Polish people. There are many ways of creating such a government. One of the many suggestions is the possibility of creating a presidency council made up of a small number of men who would be the controlling force ad interim to set up a more permanent government. I make this suggestion as from the distance of three thousand miles. Sometimes distance is an advantage. We want a Poland that will be thoroughly friendly to the Soviet for years to come. This is essential.
Stalin
President: This is my only suggestion.
If we can work out some solution of this problem it will make
peace much easier.
Prime Minister: I have made repeated
declarations in Parliament in support of the Soviet claims to
the
However, I am more interested in the question of Poland’s
sovereign independence and freedom than in particular frontier
lines. I want the Poles to have a home in Europe and to be free
to live their own life there. That is an objective which I have
always heard Marshal
(
Stalin
I refer now to our allies appeal with regard to the
Now about the government. The Prime Minister has said that he
wants to create a Polish government here. I am afraid that was a
slip of the tongue. Without the participation of Poles we can
create no Polish government. They all say that I am a dictator
but I have enough democratic feeling not to set up a Polish
government without Poles. It must be with participation of
Poles. We had the opportunity in Moscow to create a Polish
government with Poles. Both London and Lublin groups met in
Moscow and certain points of agreement were reached. ArciezewskiRaczkiewiczZeligowski
Now as a military man I must say what I demand of a country liberated by the Red Army. First there should be peace and quiet in the wake of the army. The men of the Red Army are indifferent as to what kind of government there is in Poland but they do want one that will maintain order behind the lines. The Lublin Warsaw government fulfils this role not badly. There are agents of the London government connected with the so-called underground. They are called resistance forces. We have had nothing good from them but much evil. So far their agents have killed 212 Russian military men. They have attacked supply bases for arms. It was announced that all wireless stations must be registered but these forces continued to break all the laws of war and complained of being arrested. If they attack the Red Army any more they will be shot. When I compare the agents of both governments I find that the Lublin ones are useful and the others the contrary. The military must have peace and quiet. The military will support such a government and I cannot do otherwise. Such is the situation.
(The President says that it is now quarter to eight and that the meeting should adjourn.)
Prime Minister: I must put on record
that both the British and Soviet governments have different
sources of information in Poland and get different facts.
Perhaps we are mistaken but I do not feel that the Lublin
government represents even one third of the Polish people. This
is my honest opinion and I may be wrong. Still, I have felt that
the underground might have collisions with the Lublin
government. I have feared bloodshed, arrests, deportation, and I
fear the effect on the whole Polish question. Anyone who attacks
the Red Army should be punished but I cannot feel that the
Lublin government has any right to represent the Polish
nation.
Statement on the American Position on
Voting in the Council
1. Review of Status of this
Question.
It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.
At Dumbarton Oaks, the three Delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three Governments.
On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal
“C.
Voting
- Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
- Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
- Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.”
The text I have just read contains a minor drafting change in accordance with Soviet and British comments on the original text submitted by the President.
2. Analysis of the American
Proposal.
(a) It is entirely consonant with the
special responsibilities of the great powers for the
preservation of the peace of the world. In this respect our
proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent
members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the
preservation of peace, including all economic and military
enforcement measures.
(b) At the same time our proposal
recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly
stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which
may arise is a matter of general world interest in which the
sovereign member states other than the permanent members have a
right to state their case without arbitrary prohibition.
We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization we all desire would be seriously jeopardized, if not made impossible. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from that we have contemplated.
The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity and, separately, those matters in the area of discussion and peaceful settlement in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.
3. Reasons for the American
Position.
From the point of view of the United States Government there are two important elements in the matter of voting procedure.
First, there is the necessity for
unanimity among the permanent members for the preservation of
the peace of the world to which I have referred.
Second, it is of particular importance to
the people of the United States, that there be provision for
justice for all members of the organization.
It is our task to reconcile these two major elements. We believe
that the proposals submitted by the President to Marshal
[Yalta,] February 6, 1945.
Voting Procedure
Supplementary Arguments for Use of
Secretary
1. Doubt as to acceptability of Organization unless our proposal is adopted. Our main concern is being able to establish the Organization.
American public opinion and the smaller nations, especially the Latin American nations, and—we believe—the British Dominions, may not accept an Organization which they believe fails to accord them a just and reasonable position.
2. Importance of the Organization starting off with good will of all members and of world public opinion.
In the Teheran Declaration, the three powers stated:
“We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the nations to make a peace which will command good will from the overwhelming masses of the peoples of the world. . . .”
Without this good will on the part of all members of the
Organization—even if it could be established—its future
would
To insure this good will so necessary to the effective operation
of the Organization, we must avoid the charge
3. Unity of the great powers is one of our
major aims and is promoted rather than impaired by our
proposal.
If there should unfortunately be any differences between the great powers, the fact would become fully known to the world, whatever voting procedure is adopted.
Discussion of differences cannot be prevented in the Assembly in
any event.
To permit full and free discussion in the Council will in no sense promote disunity, but will, on the contrary, demonstrate the confidence the great powers have in each other and in the justice of their own policies.
[Yalta,] February 6, 1945.
Proposed Formula for Voting Procedure in
the Security Council of the United Nations Organization and
Analysis of the Effects of That Formula
I. Proposed formula as communicated on December 5, 1944 to
Marshal Ante, pp.
58–59.
The provisions of Section C. of Chapter VI of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would read as follows:
“C.
Voting
- Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
- Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
- Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.”
II. Analysis of effect of above formula on principal substantive decisions on which the Security Council would have to vote.
Under the above formula the following decisions would require the
affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council
including the votes of all the permanent members:
The following decisions relating to peaceful settlement of
disputes would also require the affirmative votes of seven
members of the Security Council including the votes of all the
permanent members,
Mr. President
Why not let this wind up today when
Present
SecretariatBrigadier General
McFarland Captain
Graves
1. Approval of Minutes of
C. C. S. 186th MeetingAnte, pp.
635–637.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend approval of the conclusions of the Minutes of the 186th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.
2. Utilization of the
Fifteenth Air Force in Vienna-Budapest Area
(J. C. S. 1241)
Admiral Leahy
said that the Joint Staff Planners had in this paper
reviewed the problem of basing or staging U.S. strategic air
forces in the Vienna-Budapest area and recommended that a
memorandum be sent to the President requesting Marshal
General Marshall
drew attention to the fact that this subject had been
discussed with the Russians at the tripartite meeting on 6
February 1945,ante, p. 647.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to present to the President the memorandum in Appendix “A”
of J. C. S. 1241 enclosing the draft memorandum to Marshal
3. Reciprocal Agreement on
Prisoners of War
(C. C. S. 777;ante, pp. 416–418. The British redraft is post, pp.
694–696.Argonautpost, p.
697.
Admiral Leahy
said that J. C. S. 1266/1 (Argonautad hoc committee which
expresses agreement with the Argonaut
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the memorandum in the Appendix of J. C. S. 1266/1 and
directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
(Subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 777/1).post,
pp. 754–756.
4. Supplies and Equipment
Requested by the U.S.S.R.
(J. C. S. 1138/3, J. C.
S. Info. Memo 360—Milepost
Summary)
Admiral Leahy
said that the Joint Logistics Committee had reviewed J. C.
S. 1138/2Milepost
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Took note of the facts and conclusions developed in the report of the Joint Logistics Committee in J. C. S. 1138/3 and directed that a copy of the report be furnished to the Executive, President’s Soviet Protocol Committee.
5. Protocol on Zones of
Occupation in Germany and Administration of “Greater
Berlin”
(J. C. S. 577/28)ante, p. 118, footnote
1.
Admiral Leahy
said that the Joint Logistics Committee had recommended as
the final action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the protocol on
zones of occupation in Germany and administration of “Greater
Berlin,”Ante, pp.
118–123.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to dispatch to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy the message contained in the Appendix to J.C.S. 577/28.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9. Zone of Limitation for
British and U. S. Air Operations in Advance of the Soviet
Armies
General Marshall
requested General
General Kuter
said that the draft agreement reached had been circulated
to the Chiefs of Staff informally. It had been decided not to
use the term “bombline” because of the difference between the
Russian, British and American definitions but to use instead,
the expression “zone of limitation.” There were two items in the
agreement which were not entirely satisfactory. The first was
the 24-hour notice of Allied air operations required by the
Soviet General Staff and second, the depth of the zone, which
would be deeper than the Allied command desired. However, it was
the best arrangement that could be worked out. The agreement had
been changed in one respect. He had substituted the words
“British and U. S.” wherever the word “Allied” occurred. He
requested the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In reply to a question by General General Kuter
explained that the Mission in Moscow would be furnished
daily information of the location of the Soviet front lines,
which automatically fixed the location of the zone of
limitation.
General Kuter
said that the matter of Allied-Russian liaison on a lower
level had also been brought up at the meeting. For the necessity
of such liaison the strategic air operations to the east of
Berlin which had involved bombing within an extremely short
distance of the Soviet lines had been used as an example. It was
suggested that the Russians consider the use of
Admiral Leahy
recommended that the agreement be approved as General
After further discussion,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the agreement for a zone of limitation for British and
U. S. air operations in advance of the Soviet armies prepared by
the
10. Meeting of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff With the Soviet General Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the dispatch to General post, pp. 698–699.
11. Report by Combined
Shipping Staffs
General Somervell
said that combined oil and shipping studies had been
progressing. Eight of the ten points involved in the oil studies
had been resolved and a paper would be circulated to the
Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible. It had been
decided to defer action on the remaining two points of
difference in the oil studies.
The report of the Combined Shipping Staffs would be completed and
circulated sometime during the night and would be ready for
consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the meeting
scheduled for 8 February 1945.post, pp.
750–751.
Several disturbing points had arisen. The Russians had demanded
additional ships, and what was of greater concern, there was the
accompanying question of cargo requirements, chiefly the item of
trucks. As yet it was not known how the Russian requirements
could be filled. There was also the question of a cut in British
requirements. The Prime Minister was intensely concerned in this
matter and was reluctant to accept any reduction in imports but
would do so if necessary. It was his, General
In response to a question by Admiral General Somervell
explained that the necessary military shipping would be
found but he felt that the Director of War Mobilization would
require complete information and would wish to discuss the
matter before making any final allocation.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Took note of General
My Dear Secretary of State: As you
know, one of the matters which we agreed should be discussed
with the Russians during the present Conference is the question
of concluding a Reciprocal Agreement with them about the
treatment of Soviet citizens liberated by the Allied Armies in
western and southern Europe and British and American nationals
liberated by the Soviet forces in eastern Europe. The British
Chiefs of Staff approved the draft text of such an agreement
yesterday and I understand that the Combined Chiefs of Staff
will be taking it [up] today. If, as I hope, the text is
approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we shall be in a
position to take the matter up with the Russians as soon as
possible.
In present circumstances where the Soviet forces are overrunning
the sites of British and United States prisoners of war camps
very fast, and we know that a number of British prisoners of war
(though not exactly how many) are in Soviet hands, and no doubt
some United States prisoners of war also, it is really urgent to
reach agreement with the Soviet Government on this draft
Agreement during Argonaut
There is one further point, however, which I should like to mention. It is clear, as S.H.A.E.F. have already reported, that the only V real solution to the problem of the Soviet citizens who are likely to fall into British and American hands shortly is to repatriate them as soon as possible. For this shipping is required and we have already sent 10,000 back from the United Kingdom and 7,500 from the Mediterranean.
It seems to me that it would materially help the proposed
negotiations if we could inform the Russians at a suitable
moment of our plans to repatriate their citizens. From the
British point of view I can say that we have found shipping to
send back from the United Kingdom a further 7,000 of these men
during the latter part of this month and it is hoped that we can
provide further ships to take some 4,000 a month from the
Mediterranean during March, April and May, even though the
Soviet citizens in the southern part of France and half of those
liberated in Italy are primarily the responsibility of the
United States. I am however without any information on the
United States plans on this. General
Whilst it is clear that the discussions should not be delayed in order that a statement can be made on the shipping position, I would be very glad to know as soon as possible whether you can give the Russians any information on the lines I hope to give him from the British point of view, since the sooner this information can be provided the better are the chances of reaching an agreement during this Conference.
Yours sincerely,
Memorandum:
To: Mr.
From: Admiral Land
Subject: Mr.
1. After request by British Chiefs of Staff, U. S. Chiefs of Staff agreed to use of troopships for repatriation of Russians equivalent to British assistance of 10,000 personnel lift trans-Atlantic each month, contingent upon use of overland transportation after the defeat of Germany, when redeployment will require all available trooplift.
2. Following this authorization,
3. In Washington the C.M.T.C. in the belief the British Chiefs of
Staff had failed to implement the approval described in
paragraph 1 above, signalled London to determine whether
4. Informal discussion with British personnel movement officers
at Cricket
5. The type of ship referred to above involves the desire to use
medium size troopships which means physical assistance by U. S.
transports since British trans-Atlantic shipping is primarily of
large
You will remember that during the Moscow conversations of last
October, I discussed with you and with Marshal
Since then our two Governments have exchanged Drafts and on 20th
January our Embassy received from your Government a redraft of a
Reciprocal Agreement on this matter.Ante, pp.
416–418.
In view of the integrated character of the Allied Commands in western and southern Europe, it seems to us essential that any agreement should be tripartite and cover British and United States Combined Commands. We have accordingly prepared a redraft of the text taking as basis your Government’s Draft and making some amendments to cover this point and also to cover certain other points where alterations appear to us necessary.
I have brought with me experts on this matter and I would like to suggest that it should be remitted to them and to experts of your Government and the United States Government with a view to reaching a text which is mutually satisfactory to all three Governments before this Conference breaks up.
On 20th January, your Government also presented to the British
Embassy a redraft of the proposed Agreement covering the
liberated Soviet citizens in the United Kingdom.
I hope very much that you will agree with these suggestions and will instruct your experts to meet their British and American colleagues at once. I feel that the conclusion of this Agreement would be a very happy result of the present Conference and would give the greatest satisfaction in our two countries where so many families are affected by them.
I have given a copy of this letter to Mr.
I enclose a copy of the British redraft of the Reciprocal
Agreement.Infra.
His Excellency Monsieur Molotov
Redraft of Soviet Government’s Draft
Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by
the Soviet Armies and Allied Armies
Article 1.
All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under Allied Command and British subjects and American citizens liberated by the Soviet forces will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.
Allied and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.
Article 2.
The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens or subjects of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and Allied repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens or subjects are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.
Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of
officers of their own nationality to camps or points of
concentration where liberated members of the respective
forces are located and there are
The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or Allied authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.
Article 3.
Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article
may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with
the use of
The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens or subjects of the other contracting party.
Article 4.
Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party.
Article 5.
Soviet and Allied military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated subjects and citizens of the other contracting party citizens as the competent Soviet and Allied authorities shall agree upon beforehand.
Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.
In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and Allied governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens or subjects necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.
Article 6.
Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and
civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until
their repatriation, be employed on work in the vicinity of
their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in
accordance with agreements to be reached between the
competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of
payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by
agreement between those authorities. It is understood that
liberated members of the respective forces will be employed
in accordance with military standards and procedure. On a second carbon copy of this “Redraft” in the
Department file, article 6 is replaced by the
following text (underscoring as in the source
paper):
Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers)
and civilians of each of the contracting Parties,
may until their repatriation, be employed (Redrafted) Article 6
on a voluntary basis on work
in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the
common war effort in accordance with agreements to
be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied
authorities. The question of payment and conditions
of labour shall be determined by agreement between
those authorities. It is understood that liberated
members of the respective forces will be employed in
accordance with the military standards and procedure
and under the supervision of
their own officers. Any liberated member of the
respective forces or civilian who is unwilling to
perform such work will be exercised under similar
supervision.
Article 7.
The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens and subjects. They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens and subjects to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens and subjects shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.
Article 8.
The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.
War Department has just made available message dated February 7
from post, pp.
754–756.
(Allstate Horseshoe) It is felt that
these questions and others referred to in post, pp. 756–757.
Memorandum for the President
The Joint Chiefs of Staff find that it is necessary to obtain
Marshal Stalin’s approval of holding a meeting with the Soviet
Staff to discuss details of possible participation in the war
against Japan and suggest that you speak to Marshal
My Dear General Antonov: The U. S. Chiefs of Staff
desire to meet with the Soviet Chiefs for a most secret
discussion tomorrow, Thursday, February 8 at 3 P. M. at the
Russian headquarters. No one to be present but the Chiefs of
Staff and one interpreter, your Russian interpreter being
satisfactory for our purpose.
[Translation]
Dear Admiral Leahy: In reply to your letter of the
seventh of February concerning your wish to meet with the Soviet
Chiefs of Staff, I inform you that I shall be glad to meet with
you on the eighth of February at three o’clock in the afternoon
at the headquarters of the Russian Staff.
I hope you will be kind enough to inform me of the persons who will attend with you at this meeting.
Yours very respectfully,
Presentpost, p. 705)
likewise show one other person present, whose name
Subject[s]:
1. Dumbarton Oaks.
Mr. Stettinius
inquired at the outset whether there were any questions
regarding Dumbarton Oaks which the American Delegation had
failed to make clear at yesterday’s plenary session. He said
that if so he was prepared to answer with his colleagues any
questions which remained open or which needed to be
expanded.
Mr. Molotov
remarked that the World Security Organization had not been
referred to the Foreign Secretaries for discussion. He continued
that although he had a few questions to advance he was not
prepared to go into this subject at the present time.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he was always ready now or at a later date to
discuss the matter. He added that he wished merely to make the
offer to discuss the question; he personally had no new points
to bring up.
2. The Dismemberment of
Germany.
Mr. Molotov
recalled that it had been agreed to limit the changes in
Article 12 of the German surrender instrumentAnte, p.
117.
It was decided to authorize Messrs.
3. Creation of a Commission to
Study the Procedure for the Dismemberment of
Germany.
Mr. Molotov
suggested that such a commission be set up in London
consisting of Messrs.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he felt the creation of this commission was a
most important matter. If this question were not referred to the
Mr. Eden
pointed out that if the dismemberment of Germany were
included in the
Mr. Stettinius
stated that it was entirely agreeable to have these
studies carried on in London and to appoint Mr.
Mr. Molotov
stated that the subject under discussion was the study of
procedure for dismembering Germany and not the actual
dismemberment or detail thereof. Therefore, it could be assigned
to a special committee. Later, perhaps, it might be handed over
to the
Mr. Eden
remarked that he thought that the body handling this
question should go further than merely studying questions of
procedure. He stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the
terms of reference of that body. On the assumption that Germany
was to be broken up into individual states, that body, he
believed, should examine when this separation should take place;
should look into boundary questions and measures needed to
insure the proper functioning
Mr. Molotov
stated that he did not believe that there was any need for
a special commission at this stage and suggested that the
question be studied through diplomatic channels in London. He
expressed doubt that the foreign secretaries had received any
directive to form an actual commission.
Mr. Eden
stated that they had not; however they had the power to
make recommendations.
Mr. Molotov
continued that he was not insisting on a commission.
Mr. Eden
stated that he felt worried about the absence of the
French. They were neighbors of Germany and had certain ideas on
control of the Ruhr and Rhine. He felt that it would be a
mistake to keep them out.
Mr. Molotov
suggested that the question of French participation be
subsequently decided by Messrs.
Messrs. Stettinius
and Eden
Mr. Eden
stated that in view of his many activities it might be
impossible for him personally to participate in the London
discussions.
Mr. Molotov
stated that he of course had the right to deputize someone
to represent him.
4. The Integration of France
into the German Control Machinery on Condition that France
were to receive a Zone of Occupation.
Mr. Molotov
submitted a statement on this matter (see attached)Post, p.
707.
Mr. Eden
stated that since it had been agreed upon that France
would receive a zone of occupation he hoped that it might also
be agreed that France would participate on the Control
Commission itself. He said that he foresaw all kinds of
difficulties if the French were not to participate and expressed
the opinion that
Mr. Molotov
stated that he felt that at the present stage the question
of France should be limited to the two proposals contained in
the Soviet statement. If at a later date it were necessary to
study French participation on the Control Commission it could be
done. He felt that it was only proper that actual control should
be in the hands of the three commanders-in-chief.
It was decided that the three secretaries should submit a report
to the plenary session stating that: (a)
it had been agreed upon to give to France a zone of occupation;
and, (b) with respect to the question
concerning the participation of France in the Control
Commission, Messrs.
Mr. Eden
stated that he believed that if France were admitted to
the Control Commission the three foreign secretaries should
agree that no other power should be given a zone of
occupation.
Mr. Molotov
suggested that there was not sufficient time to discuss
that question at the present conference.
5. Reparations.
Mr. Molotov
submitted a statement on this subject and summarized it in
brief (copy attached).Post, p.
707.
Mr. Maisky
stated that the Soviet authorities had come to the figure
of 20 billion dollars (ten billion dollars of property to be
removed immediately after the war and ten billion dollars of
reparations to be paid in kind over a period of ten years) the
following way. The national wealth of Germany at the beginning
of the war amounted to 125 billion dollars. It was figured that
this national wealth would be reduced by 40 per cent or less
during the course of the war. Thus, the national wealth of
Germany at the termination of the war would amount to 75 billion
dollars. An analysis of the national wealths of the more highly
industrialized countries had shown that the mobile part of this
wealth which could be transferred abroad amounted to
approximately 30 per cent or in the case of Germany to 22–23
billion dollars. The Soviet Government proposed to remove ten
billion dollars of this mobile wealth. The remainder would be
left to Germany which would secure for that country living
standards comparable
Mr. Eden
stated that there was one point in the opening paragraph
of the Soviet statement on which he wished to comment. The Prime
Minister had stated that the test for reparations payments
should be not only the exertion of a country in the war, but
also the sufferings endured at the hands of the enemy. On either
basis the Soviet Union stood well. He would like to see
reference made also to the sacrifices undergone by the Allies in
the first paragraph of the Soviet statement. He continued that
he agreed in principle with the second paragraph of the Soviet
statement. He wished, however, to give thorough study to the
Soviet document before continuing discussion of it.
Mr. Molotov
stated that there would be no objections to the addition
in paragraph one of the words suggested by Mr.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he also wished to give a thorough study to the
Soviet document. He recalled that the President at the plenary
session had stated that the United States itself would not be
interested in large reparations, except with respect to German
foreign investments and perhaps raw materials. He expressed the
hope that at this afternoon’s plenary session the foreign
secretaries could report that the reparation matter had been
discussed and that it had been agreed that a commission should
be established in Moscow where it would immediately commence
work on the question of reparations.
Mr. Molotov
stated that whenever the British and American
representatives were prepared he would be ready to continue the
discussions. With respect to the amount of reparations for the
United States and Great Britain that was entirely the concern of
those countries. However, in view of their losses, especially at
sea, the Soviet Government felt that it was only just to make
mention in the reparations statement of compensation going to
the United States and Great Britain. He favored Mr.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that it would be helpful for the American
Delegation to know whether the subject of labor would be
discussed at the Crimean Conference or at a later date.
Mr. Molotov
stated that this question was very complicated, that the
Soviet representatives needed time for further study on it and
that they were not prepared to discuss it at the present
conference. He agreed that it should be discussed by the
reparations Commission in Moscow.
Mr. Molotov’s interpreter then read a
second paper on the creation of the reparations commission (see
attached).Post, p.
708.Stettinius stated that his Government was prepared to
accept the statement on the understanding that it had not yet
agreed on the principles mentioned in it.
Mr. Eden
inquired whether the Moscow Reparations Commission should
not also be authorized to study German industry in connection
with future security and control. If this were so, he suggested
that this subject be dealt with in the draft terms of reference
of the commission.
Mr. Molotov
maintained that the commission would deal with German
industry only in connection with reparations. The question of
security, of course, would always be kept in mind although it
was not the principal task of the commission.
Mr. Stettinius
suggested that as a practical measure the German Control
Commission should have the responsibility for the control of
German industry for security purposes. The Reparations
Commission should, of course, coordinate its work with the
policy of the Control Machinery and should establish liaison
with it.
Mr. Molotov
was in agreement with this proposal.
Dumbarton—No clarification needed
Agenda
1. Dismemberment. Formula Art 12. Next=Commission to study.
Mol: suggests
Eden
Mol. Perhaps no commission
necessary.
Eden
Eden
Reparations
Mol. Explains paper
Maisky
Eden
In general agreement on principles of Par. 2.
S. Prep, to study. As Pres said U. S. not interested except for invest possible raw materials. Hopes we can agree Com. to start immed.
M: Business of U. S. but they thought it fair. Our losses & Brit very great. Not ready to discuss at this conference. But would be studied by Moscow Commis.
E: Should Com. examine econ. security provisions
Mol: To extent necessary for
reparations.
These handwritten notes cover three unnumbered Pages in
the
For citations to pertinent documents, see the preceding
2/7 12.00 meeting ERS,
ERS at outset asked if there were any q’s re D. O. which we failed to make clear yesterday If so I am prepared to answer with my colleagues any q’s that may remain open & to expand in any way
Mol. Not quite prepared to ask any q’s
now
ERS merely made the offer but no desire to discuss it. No new points to bring up.
Mol. Thanks
ERS Ready at any time now or later
ERS report—1 p. by 4 p. m.
2/7 For Mins Mol. Chm
France
→Report: We are agreed that Fr. should
have a zone of occupation in Ger. for occup. by Fr. forces. Mr.
Mol & ERS believe q. of particip by Fr. in Control Com.
should be studied by
Reparations
Mol: add 20,000,000,000 total
Principles—Eden wants add suffering to ¶ 1 Agreed by Mol.
ERS wants study memo—will do so promptly & discuss it at your pleasure. Pres. at plenary session that U S would be interested in no reparations except for. investments & perhaps raw materials Would be surprised if it would approach figure suggested. Perhaps Brit would take some of what U S gives up. Mol. up to U S & Brit.
Hopes can report we agreed Commission should be est. immediately to go to work.
Mol. ready to go on when Brit & Am. Delegs. have had time study R draft.
→Report we have discussed this q.
today; Will discuss it further & agreed Com. should be est
in Mos. & begin work immediately
ERS asked Mol. if wants discuss work labor here or later. Mol—may not be ready to discuss here but agreed will be discussed by Rep. Commission at Mos.
Machinery
Mol. amendment delete “on recommend,
of the Allied Com. or on their own initiative” OK Ed. change
“may” to “shall” OK
ERS: Approves doc. on understanding we have not yet agreed on principles
Ed. Should Rep. Com. study control of Ger. industry for security purposes.
ERS—
Ed. Amended suggestion: We should consider whether this Com.
ERS: Control machinery should have responsibility for control of German industry for security purposes. The Reparation Commission should, of course, coordinate its work with the policies of the Control machinery & establish liaison. Agreed.
Mol. It is bus. not only of Com but also of 3 govts
Regarding a Separate Zone of Occupation in
Germany To Be Allotted to France
1. It has been found desirable to allot to France a separate zone of occupation in Germany for occupation by French forces.
2. It has been decided that the French occupational authorities shall exercise control in their zone of occupation under the general guidance of the Control Council.
Basic Principles of Exaction of Reparations
From Germany
1. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war and have organized victory over the enemy.
All other countries are to receive reparations in the second place.
2. Setting aside for the moment the use of German labour by way
of reparations, this question to be considered at a later date,
reparations in kind are to be exacted from Germany in the two
following forms:
3. The total sum of the German reparations in the form of removals from her national wealth as well as in the form of annual deliveries of commodities after the end of the war is fixed at 20 billion dollars.
This amount shall be distributed as follows:
Regarding the Organization of an Allied
Reparation Committee
The Allied Reparation Committee shall be set up on the following basis:
1. The Committee shall consist of three representatives one from U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom and U. S. A. Each representative shall be entitled to call in to assist in the work of the Committee any number of experts.
2. The function of the Committee shall be to work out a detailed plan for exaction of reparations from Germany according to the principles adopted at the Crimean Conference of the Three Powers.
3. The Governments of USSR,
4. The activities of the Committee shall proceed in strict secrecy.
5. The Allied Reparation Committee shall be established in Moscow.
Present
Subject[s]:
The President said in regard to
the Polish question he wished again to emphasize that he was
less interested in the tracing of the frontier lines than he
was in the problem of the Polish Government. He said that he
did not attach any importance to the continuity or legality
of any Polish Government since he thought in some years
there had in reality been no Polish Government. He added
that before proceeding with the Polish question he
understood that Mr.
Mr. Molotov
then read the results of the Foreign Ministers’
meeting, as follows:
“Decisions Adopted at the Meeting of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
V. M. Molotov , Mr.Stettinius and Mr.Eden February 7, 1945.
“1. Regarding the Dismemberment of Germany.
(
a)A. Y. Vyshinski , Mr.Cadogan and Mr.Matthews were entrusted with the preparation of the final draft of Article 12 of the instrument “unconditional surrender of Germany” having in view the insertion in the text of Article 12 of the word “dismemberment.”(
b) The study of the question of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr.Eden , Mr.Winant andF. T. Gusev .“2. Regarding the Zone of Occupation in Germany for France.
(
a) The allotment to France of a zone in Germany to be occupied by French occupational forces has been agreed upon.(
b) As regards the question of the participation of France in the Control Commission,V. M. Molotov and Mr.Stettinius feel [it] desirable to refer the question to theEAC . Mr.Eden considers it necessary to discuss this question now and to give France a place on the Control Commission.“3. Regarding the Reparations to be Exacted from Germany.
(
a) It was agreed that in the paragraph one of the Soviet proposals mention should be made of sacrifices borne.(
b) It was decided that the residence of the Reparations Committee should be in the City of Moscow. It was agreed that the Committee should begin its work immediately upon the approval of the principles of the exacting of the reparations.(
c) It was decided that the discussion of the two documents relating to the matter of the reparations which have been submitted byV. M. Molotov , first, regarding the basic principles of exacting the reparationsfrom Germany, and, second, regarding the organization of an Allied Reparations Committee, should be continued at the Crimean Conference.” Text of report also in the Hiss Collection.
The President said that we are all
grateful for the productive work of the three Foreign
Ministers.
The Prime Minister added that he
joined the President in thanking the Committee for their
fruitful work but he said that since he had only heard their
report orally he would wish to study the English
translation, although, except for one point, he felt that he
would be in complete agreement.
The President inquired whether the
document included Mr. Mr. Eden
replied in the affirmative.
The Prime Minister stated that the
British Government was unconvinced by the argument that it
would be possible to accord a zone to the French without
participation in the Control Commission. If the French were
given a zone without participation they would cause endless
trouble. If we were strict in our zones, they might be
lenient in theirs and vice versa. He felt that it was of the
utmost importance that there should be uniformity in the
treatment of Germany by the three or four Allies. He
repeated that he felt the Control Commission for Germany
would be a subordinate instrument as was the case in Italy,
although we recognized that the German Commission would have
more important tasks. He said he wished to make it clear
that he did not consider that French participation in the
Control Commission would give them any right to attend a
conference such as this one, at least for the time being. He
said he must state frankly that he found the arguments on
the subject somewhat futile since it was obvious that France
would accept no zone unless they were given participation in
the Control Commission and he for one thought that they were
right. He felt it was no good to refer the question to the
European Advisory Commission which was a weaker body and
particularly as France was represented on the Commission and
only a deadlock could result with the French and British on
one side and the Russians and Americans on the other. He
therefore was of the opinion that the matter should be
settled here, but it still required further study.
Marshal Stalin
inquired whether the Prime Minister meant that it
should be settled now or later.
The Prime Minister answered that
it should be done now, but at some later stage of this
Conference.
The President then observed that
would it not be better to postpone it for two or three weeks
instead of two or three days.
The Prime Minister answered that
he felt that once they had separated after this Conference
it would be difficult to settle the question.
Marshal Stalin
remarked that the three Governments had been able to
settle a good many things by correspondence. Marshal
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The President said that he agreed
that France should not join this body but he was doubtful
whether this would keep them quiet. He then suggested that
they go on with the Polish question.
Marshal Stalin
stated that he had received the President’s
letterpost, pp. 727–728.Łódz?]. He had
attempted to ascertain their opinion. As to the others, he
was not sure that they could be located in time for them to
come to the Crimea and he mentioned in this connection
especially post, p.
989.
Mr. Molotov
said that yesterday we have heard Mr. namely?] that of participation of the
Soviet Republics as initial members of the World
Organization. He said the Soviet views were known as were
those of the British and American Governments. He said the
Soviet views were based on the constitutional changes which
had occurred in February of last year and he did not think
that this Conference should ignore this request.
It was not the Soviet intention to raise the question in the
same form as had been done at Dumbarton Oaks, but they would
be satisfied with the admission of three or at least two of
the Soviet Republics as original members.
The President then inquired
whether Mr.
Mr. Molotov
replied “yes,” that they should be included among
other members of that body. The Dominions of the British
Commonwealth have gradually and patiently achieved their
place as entities in international affairs. He said he felt
that it was only right that three, or at least two, of these
Soviet Republics should find a worthy place among the
members of the Assembly. Their sacrifices and contributions
to the war earned them this place. He said in closing that
he wished to repeat that he fully agreed with the
President’s proposals and withdrew any objections or
amendments but would request that three, or at least two, of
the Soviet Republics mentioned above be given a chance to
become equal members of the World Organization.
The President said he was very
happy to hear from Mr. post, p. 729, was passed to the
President at about this point.
The Prime Minister said he would
like to express his heartfelt thanks to Marshal sic]
they knew they could not often be consulted on major
matters. He said that Great Britain could not agree to any
organization which would reduce the status of the Dominions
or exclude them from participation. That is why, Mr.
President, the Prime Minister said, he had great sympathy
with the Soviet request. His heart went out to mighty Russia
which though bleeding was beating down the tyrants in her
path. He said he could understand their point of view, as
they were represented by only one voice in comparison with
the British organization which had a smaller population, if
only white people were considered. He was glad, therefore,
that the President had made an answer to the Soviet proposal
which in no way constituted a final negation. He added,
however, that he could not exceed his authority and as he
had just heard this proposal he would like to discuss it
with the Foreign Secretary and possibly communicate it to
London and he asked Marshal
The President remarked that his
recommendations had been somewhat different. He had merely
meant that the Foreign Ministers should study the question
as well as that of the time and place of the conference and
who should be invited.
The Prime Minister said that he
did not disagree with the President’s suggestions but he
felt that the Foreign Ministers had already had a good deal
of work thrust upon them. He said he must speak frankly and
say that he foresaw difficulties in attempting to hold a
meeting as soon as March. The battle would be at its height
and more soldiers would be involved than at any time of the
war. British domestic problems would be very pressing and
their Ministers, including the Foreign Secretary, would be
greatly occupied in Parliament. He also wondered whether the
state of the world and in Europe in particular was not such
as to make very difficult a meeting of all of the United
Nations. He doubted whether any representatives at such
conference would be able to have behind them the full
thought of the vital forces of their countries.post, p. 729, were written at about this point. For
a facsimile of a note regarding
The President observed that he had
only in mind a meeting to organize the setting up of the
world organization, and that the world organization itself
would probably not come into being for from three to six
months after the conference.
The Prime Minister said that he
had in mind the fact that some nations in March would still
be under the German yoke and would be represented by
governments in exile whose authority in regard to their own
people would be questionable. Other countries would be
starving and in misery, such as Holland. France would be
there with a loud voice. There would be other countries
represented there who had not suffered at all in the war and
who had not lost a man. He wondered how such a gathering
could really undertake the immense task of the future
organization of the world.
The President repeated his
proposal, namely, that the Foreign Ministers could consider
(1) the Soviet proposal regarding membership, (2) the date
and place of the conference, and (3) what nations should be
invited.
The Prime Minister said he had no
object[ion] to the Foreign Ministers discussing this point
but he said he must emphasize that this was no technical
question but one of great decision. With this qualification,
he agreed to the President’s proposal.
Marshal Stalin
remarked that the Foreign Ministers will not make
decisions but merely report to the Conference.
There was a short intermission at this point.
The Prime Minister said that he
proposed that the Foreign Ministers should consider the
question of Iran and other matters of perhaps secondary
importance but which should be considered.
The President and Marshal Stalin
agreed.
The President then said, jokingly,
that he hoped that forestry would be one of the points
considered since he had not seen a tree in his visit last
year to Tehran. He went on to say that he thought Iran was a
good example of the type of economic problem that might
confront the world if we are to bring about expansion of
world trade and greater exchange of goods. He said that
Persia did not have the purchasing power to buy foreign
goods, and if expansion of world trade was to occur measures
must be considered for helping those countries like Persia
that did not have any purchasing power. He mentioned that
before the advent of the Turks, Persia had had plenty of
timber and thus plenty of water and her people had been
reasonably prosperous, but that he personally had never seen
a poorer country than Persia was at the present time. He
therefore very much hoped that the new world organization
would conduct a world-wide survey with a view to extending
help to countries and areas that did not have sufficient
purchasing power, either in cash or in foreign exchange.
The President added that there was
a parallel, he thought, in
Mr. Molotov
then read his proposals in regard to the Polish
question, as follows:
émigré circles.
After reading the proposals, Mr.
The President replied that he must
say he felt progress had been made in the light of Mr.
émigré”. He said he did
not see any necessity to go to émigrés since you could find enough Poles in
Poland for the purpose. He repeated what he had said
yesterday, namely that he did not know any of the Poles in
the
The Prime Minister said he shared
the President’s dislike of the word “émigré”. The word had originated during the French
revolution and meant in England a person who had been driven
out of a country by his own people. He said in the case of
the Poles this wasn’t true, since they had left their
country as a result of the brutal German attack. He
therefore preferred in place of the word “émigré” to refer to them as “Poles temporarily
abroad”. He said in regard to the second point of Mr.
Marshal Stalin
remarked that most Germans in those areas had already
run away from the Red Army.
The Prime Minister said this, of
course, simplified the problem, and in regard to the
question of space in Germany for these deported persons he
felt that the fact that Germany had had six to seven million
casualties in this war and would probably have a million
more would simplify that problem.
Marshal Stalin
replied that the Germans might well have one or
possibly two million more casualties.
The Prime Minister said that he
wasn’t afraid of the problem of transfer of populations
provided that it was proportioned to the capacity of the
Poles to handle it and the capability of the Germans to
receive them. He felt, however, that it needs study, not
only in principle but as a practical matter. He said he had
one other comment. In the Soviet proposal some reference
should be made to other democratic leaders from within
Poland itself.
Marshal Stalin
agreed and the words “and from inside Poland” were
added at the end of paragraph 3 of the Soviet statement.
The Prime Minister then concluded
that he agreed with the President that it would be well to
sleep on this problem and take it up tomorrow, but he did
feel that some progress had been made.
At the President’s suggestion the meeting was adjourned until four o’clock tomorrow afternoon.
President: I think we should take
up the Polish question. When we concluded our meeting
yesterday Marshal
(Molotov reads his report. A copy of the text is
attached.)ante, pp. 709–710.
Prime Minister: I wish to thank
the committee for their labor. I am in general agreement
with the report with a single exception. However, I should
like to see in writing what has been decided as I have only
now been orally informed of what took place. On the question
of giving the French a zone but not a place on the control
commission His Majesty’s Government remains quite
unconvinced. No solution has been found for controlling the
French while they are controlling the Germans. If the French
decide to accept the task of having a zone and wish to be
tiresome they could produce conditions in their zone which
would cause trouble in the other zones. If we decide to be
strict they could be lenient. If we decide to be lenient
they could be strict. I firmly believe that there must be
uniformity in treatment of Germany between the four allies
or there will be endless bitter disputes. I regard the
Allied Control Commission as a subordinate instrument to the
will of the governments. In principle, it is no more than
the Allied Commission in Italy but they have a much more
important task. I do not think that giving France a
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
President: Shall we go on with the
discussion of Poland?
Stalin
(Infra.
The President made some remarks on the low purchasing power
of Persians and other nations which he stated was another
reason for organizing the world organization. He likewise
threw out the idea of setting up a
Molotovante, p.
716.
President: I think we are making
definite progress. I should like to wait until tomorrow to
study these proposals and to talk them over with the
Secretary of State and officials of the State Department.
There is one word in them I do not like. That is “émigré.” It is not necessary to take
émigrés. There may be people who
are now in Poland who are now satisfied. May we postpone
discussion?
Stalin
Prime Minister: I share the
President’s dislike of the word “émigré.” It was applied during the French
Revolution to people driven out by their own countrymen, but
the Poles were driven out by a brutal enemy. With regard to
the frontier on the River Neisse I should like to say a
word. I have always qualified a movement west by the Poles,
but say that the Poles should be free to take territory but
not more than they wish or can manage. I do not wish to
stuff the Polish goose until it dies of German indigestion.
I also feel conscious of the large school of thought in
England which is shocked at the idea of transferring
millions of people by force. Personally I am not shocked but
much of the opinion in England is. However, the exchange of
Greeks and Turks was a great success but that only involved
two million. If the Poles take East Prussia and Silesia that
means moving six millions. That is manageable but there will
be big arguments against it still.
Stalin
Prime Minister: Then there is the
problem of how to handle them in Germany. We have killed six
or seven million and probably will kill another million
before the end of the war.
Stalin
Prime Minister: Oh I am not
proposing any limitation on them. So there should be room in
Germany for some who will need to fill the vacancy. I am not
afraid of the problem of the transfer of populations as long
as it is in proportion to what the Poles can manage and what
can be put in the place of the dead in Germany.
I have only one other comment. It is a reference in Mr.
émigré circles. Would Marshal
Stalin
Prime Minister: Well, I am in
agreement with the President’s suggestion that we should
sleep on this till tomorrow.
Stalin
The meeting is adjourned until four tomorrow.
“Crimea Conf.”
Plenary
2/7 4:10 p. m.
Ed
D. O.
Mol.—Yesterday heard full report from ERS We are satisfied
with this report & we have got some explanations (to ask). After this report
& after these explanations certain q’s became much
clearer We paid much atten to what Church told us After
report of ES & remarks of Church the q is considerably
clarified for us In the light of these explanations &
remarks we believe it would secure the unan. of 3 powers in
guar. p. & sec. after the war. Our position in the qs of
D. O. essentially was to secure max. of unity among 3 gt.
powers in q of p & sec after the war. We believe the
decs. taken at D. O & modifications suggested by Pres
will secure collab by all nations great & small after
war. ... we consider the proposals which were presented as
acceptable to us We believe that now there is reach full agt
& clarity among ourselves I have to touch upon one q.
which was raised in D. O. but not decided yet. This is the q
about particip of Sov. Reps in the org. of sec. You know our
point of view It is based on the modifs carried out in our
Const. in Feb of last yr. We explained our point of view
& know the point of view of US Govt & Brit Govt We
consider its fair that should not pass these qs without
notice but do not raise this q now in same form as in D.
O.
We would consider it fair that at least 3 of our Reps or
perhaps 2 be accepted as orig members. Have in mind Ukraine,
Byelo Russia & Lith. Those 3
or at any rate 2 have full rts to be considered orig.
members.
Ukraine’s Importance, pop., econ importance all well known I
don’t want to go into detail in describing also import, of
B–R & Lith also from point of view of for. rels These
reps made the
Pres. Much gratified at what Mol. has said in acceding to the gen. plan That is making real progress. Next thing we have consider is timing What is next step. Invitations will go out to all nations that have had a place in this war
Church—the Ger War Pres Yes
Pres No use talking much further about Un Ns We are all agreed except it has not been set up. Next we should invite all nations to assemble. Gt. sentiment in US be held soon as possible—end of Mar., 1st of April
Physically repres. of Un Ns could meet in 4 wks—1 month.
Personally I think that quicker q of Un Ns meeting is
determined, quicker we can take up what Mr Mol has said
which is very interesting to me. But that in itself will
mean the later meetings after the organ. is set up As a
practical matter when we have this organizing meeting whom
shall we ask? Nations in the war or those associated but not
in the war. For instance shall we invite—— The assoc.
nations have broken rels with Ger. but have not declared
war. We Read list. We’ve got
to decide who we’re going to invite What we have heard from
Mr Mol. gives me a very great int. in matter of a vote for
Uk, Wh. R, Lith. We 3 M. St., P. M & I have different
views because our terrs. are so very different The Brit Em
has great pops like Austr, Can., S Af Sov Govt has great
masses of pop. like 3 areas Mol mentioned. US is
contiguous—no colonies, const. provides for 1 For Min. Those
things require study, require study of q of more than 1 vote
for the larger nations in the world. In same way certain
nations have large terrs. Brazil smaller than S. U but
larger than U. S. In same way many small countries like
Haiti, Honduras & we should consider whether by giving
any govt more than 1 vote we would break down prin of 1 vote
for each. ∴ if we can agree on gen plan for meeting to
organ. U Ns we can consider these q’s by For Mins or at the
meeting of the organizers
Pres: For Mins have so successful suggested q. of voting in Ass. be referred to For Mins. Also to recommend time & place of a conf.
Church: I should like to express my heartfelt thanks to Mar.
St. & Sov Govt for the enormous step they have taken to
put forward D. O. I’m sure the agt of the 3 gt powers such
as has already been expressed around this table will give
joy & relief to thinking people around the world. On the
q of voting membership of
the Ass., it has been put before us in quite a new form by
our R. friends & allies
Everyone I’m sure will feel that here again a very remarkable
advance to gen. agt. has been made. I must fully agree with
the Pres that the position of the US & of the Brit Em.
are different. We have our 4 selfgoverning domins, that for
nearly a quarter of a century have played a part in the
organ. of p. which broke down before the present war. All
these 4 doms have worked for p & for democratic purposes
& all without hesitation sprang into the war when we
declared it though they knew how weak we were. We had no
means of compelling them & no rt. to give them any
summons but they came freely in a matter in which they could
only be partially consulted. We could never agree to any
system which excluded them from the position they have held
& justified for over ¼ of a century. It is for this very
reason that I could not listen to the proposal of the Sov
Govt without a feeling of profound sympathy. My heart goes
out to mighty Russia, bleeding from her wounds &
conquering & beating down the tyrant in her path. I
should feel that a nation so great with 180,000,000 people
would perhaps have cause to look at our Brit org with a
questioning eye if they had but one vote when their nos. far
exceed our own, speaking of whites. I was very glad that the
Pres made an answer which could in no way be considered a
final neg. to the consideration of this proposal. I must not
however exceed my own personal auth. We have only just heard
this new proposal & I should like to discuss it with the
For
Pres My motion was a little different It did not call for a dec. today. Refer the study to For Mins & second where it should be held & who should be invited.
Church Very glad—we are putting great deal on them—very large
& simple Re meeting suggested by Pres I shouldn’t think
it desirable hold it so early as March. In Mar. we shall be
at the very height of the battle on both the fronts, more
millions of soldiers will be engaged than ever before. Our
dom. problems in Eng are very complicated with shortage of
labor, housing & need of supplying fighting forces at
the front. We also have a Par which is in active
We are now already a quarter thru Feb I wonder also whether state of the world & Eur. particularly is such as not to make a meeting diff. of all the Un Ns If they are charged with the most tremendous tasks of the future will they have behind them the full thought of their people. Will they have anything left over after vital needs of the war are met. I wonder what the aspect of the Ass. would wear. Could premiers be present?
Pres: This is not a meeting of the Ass.—only of the organizing conf.
Church But they would be same people How many of the nations there will still be in the bondage of the Gers. We do not know how they will represent their people. Another group will be starving in their frightful misery amid the scenes of war. Holland will be there with her ghastly ruins. Fr. will be there with a loud voice. With all these agonized communities will also be joined a large no. of nations who have not suffered at all in the war. Ns that have not even declared war. I can not think that the meeting of such an ass. would be free from the danger of becoming chaotic. Some ns will be screaming in agony & others will be calmly weighing the problems of the future. I see particular diffs for an early meeting so far as Brit. is concerned
Church Position in Eng though perfectly calm & steady is governed by our own const. We may have a gen. election impending. May have new parliament to carry with us, may have entirely new set of ministers
Will always do our best to comply with the Pres. wishes but I feel it absolutely nec. to put on record the very great diff. which I see, practically And I should be very disappointed if the settlement of the membership of Ass was postponed till new meeting of Un Ns can be held
Pres again propose to refer to For Mins to study membership & date & place of meeting & who should be invited
Stalin agreed
Church I said earlier no objection to it being discussed by For Mins but is not a technical matter but one of large & broad dec. Not at all sure matters will be advanced by the discussion
St. 3 Mins will meet, discuss & report
Agreed
(Intermission)
Church. proposed Iran be remitted to For Mins
Pres. raised q. of int. economics—another reason for early
estab. of Un Ns Org—should be some way of getting ns that
have no purchasing power to get some—historically Persia
well wooded before Turks came—no erosion, water—today
poorest place I have ever seen in the world. That is why I
hope new Un Ns Org. will concern itself with those countries
that have no money with which to get goods While on this
subject—parallel one—in Eur. some areas have coal, cheap
power & light from water. Why favoritism to those who
have coal & water or cheap elec. light rates when others
50 miles away have no water, no light Sov. govts. all the
Soviets are all thinking in terms like that. We are thinking
in terms like that—
Poland
Mol. In
In W. from Stettin along Oder, then along Neisse
Add some emigres to Pol. Govt
Allies recog. Pol Govt now
Prov. Govt. hold elections soon as possible
Mol, Harr.,
Can’t reach Poles by phone in time to come here
Pres. We are making real
progress
Wants ERS study this tonight.
Knows one word he doesn’t like—“emigre”
Not nec. take emigres Like to have S. D.Church Agrees with Pres
re “emigre”
Re Neisse—we have always qualified movement of Pol. frontier to W that they shouldn’t take much more than they wish or can take care of. Great pity to stuff Pol. goose so full of Ger. food that he died of indigestion. Large school of opin. shocked by transferring many millions of people by force. I am not. Referred to success of Gk-Turk transfers after last war—but only ½ million
If take E. Pr. Silesia up to Oder means 6,000,000 Gers. That might be managed with modern facilities
St. Says there are no more Gers there. Where our troops come in they find no Gers.
Church We have killed 5 or 6 mil. prob. another million before the end. There ought to be room in Ger. for people transferred They will be needed to fill vacancies So not afraid of prob. of transferring pop. so long as proportioned.
Draft
My Dear Marshal Stalin, I have been
giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this
afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is
on my mind.
In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.
I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determinations that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this.
You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.
You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.
Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this
matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a
little and suggest ZulawskiBujakKutrzeba
I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.
It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.
My Dear Marshal Stalin: I have been
giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this
afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is
on my mind.
In so far as the Polish Government is concerned, I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our people to think there is a breach between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.
I was very much impressed with some of the things you said
today, particularly your determination that your rear must
be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot,
and we must not,
You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.
I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize the Lublin Government as now composed, and the world would regard it as a lamentable outcome of our work here if we parted with an open and obvious divergence between us on this issue.
You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.
Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this
matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a
little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr.
I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.
It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.
Most sincerely yours,
Mr. President I think you should
try to get this referred to Foreign ministers before there
is trouble.
All of the below refers to
There is something behind this talk that we do not know of its basis.
Perhaps we better to wait till later tonight what is on his mind.
All this is rot! local
politics
I am quite sure now he is thinking about the next election in Britain.
Argonaut
In view of certain discussions here, please take no repeat no action with regard to our position on French participation in German affairs until further instructions.
War Department please furnish copy of above message to Acting
Secretary of State
Present
SecretariatBrigadier General
McFarland Captain
Graves
1. Levels of Supply of All
Petroleum Products in All Theaters
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Overall Review of Cargo
and Troop Shipping Position for the Remainder of
1945
(C. C. S. 746/11)
Admiral Leahy
said that although the paper was an agreed report by
the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the
Combined Shipping Adjustment Board it appeared to him that
the essence of the report was an agreement to reexamine the
position when a need for further study arose.
General Somervell
said that the necessity for a revision had already
arisen, particularly with reference to redeployment plans.
On the other hand, he felt that the paper in its present
form was entirely satisfactory. Referring to paragraph 4b (1) (d) of
the paper he said that during the Committee negotiations the
British had insisted upon the submission of the report
referred to therein on 1 June.
General Marshall
said that if the war ended by 1 April 1945 the
combined redeployment plan and the related combined report
by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and
shipping authorities would be too late if submitted on 30
April 1945, as required in the paper.
General Somervell
felt that the date for the submission of the report
might well be moved up to 1 April.
Admiral King
pointed out that the reports could be submitted at any
time prior to 30 April. The requirement as stated in the
paper was that they should be ready not later than 30
April.
Colonel Lincoln
said that as far as the U. S. side was concerned the
Planners already had a redeployment paper under way and that
they could make this plan available by 1 April.
Admiral Leahy
said that a change of the date to 1 April might not be
acceptable to the British.
Admiral Smith
said that the British members of the combined
committees appeared to have no objection to a 1 April date.
The date of 30 April had been selected to afford the U. S.
Planners ample time to produce their redeployment plan.
General Somervell
thought there might be some objection on the part of
the British to moving the date up to 1 April. He understood
that the British plans for redeployment had not progressed
as far as the U. S. plans.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to recommend approval of C. C. S. 746/11 subject to
the change of the date in the third line on
3. Employment of War Weary
U. S. Bombers Against Large Industrial Target Areas in
Germany
(J. C. S. 1150/1)
Admiral Leahy
said that in this paper the representative of the
Commanding General, Army Air Forces, proposed that the
question of the employment of war weary bombers be reopened
by recommending that the President address a memorandum on
the subject to the Prime Minister. He understood the Prime
Minister had instructed the British Chiefs of Staff to
withdraw their previous concurrence in the employment of
this type of weapon and felt that to request the President
to ask the Prime Minister to reverse his stand would be
undesirable.
General Anderson
explained that there was no intention of launching
uncontrolled aircraft indiscriminately against the German
countryside. He believed that there had been a
misunderstanding on the part of the British as to the
employment of this weapon. Recent developments had proved
that explosive-laden aircraft could be
General Marshall
said that as he understood it, the British Chiefs of
Staff have no military objection to the project but that
certain Cabinet Members had opposed it. He doubted the
propriety of having the President press the Prime Minister
to urge these Cabinet Members to reverse their position, for
heretofore these same Members had supported the British
Chiefs of Staff in war measures advocated by the U. S.
In reply to a question by Admiral King as to why this project
should not be restricted entirely to France, General Anderson
said that while the launchings were to be made in
France all of the developments so far had taken place in
base installations set up in England and to move these base
installations to France would be a waste of effort.
General Kuter
pointed out that further development of this project
was highly important in view of the prospects of a very
profitable employment of this type of weapon against
Japanese targets.
Admiral Leahy
said the discussion had given him an entirely
different conception of the weapon. When this matter first
came up, he understood that the aircraft would be launched
in the general direction of Germany and that the
explosive-laden planes would fall aimlessly when the fuel
was exhausted. This he considered an inhuman and barbarous
type of warfare with which the United States should not be
associated; but now, since it appeared that the missiles
could be controlled with a considerable degree of accuracy,
he agreed that they could be usefully employed. He inquired
why, since the planes employed were American and would be
operated under American command, it was necessary to
collaborate with the British in their use.
General Kuter
said that, in view of the instructions already
received on this subject by the British Chiefs of Staff and
since the matter had heretofore been dealt with on a
combined basis, it would be undesirable for the United
States now to employ this weapon unilaterally. Moreover, the
bases where the project was being developed were located in
England.
Admiral Duncan
felt that it would be entirely proper for the United
States Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their original proposal
to use uncontrolled missiles and present the project as a
development of a controlled
missile.
General Kuter
said that the development of the control of this type
of aircraft had progressed very rapidly, and it was
essential that this development continue.
In view of the foregoing, Admiral
Leahy
said that he felt an approach should be made to the
British Chiefs of Staff for reconsideration at the next
meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to bring up for discussion at the meeting of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff to follow, the question of the
employment of radio-controlled explosive-laden bombers.
4. Subjects for First
U. S.–U. S. S. R. Staff Meeting
(J.C.S. 1227/4 and 1227/5)Post, pp.
762–766.
Admiral Leahy
said that in J.C.S. 1227/4 the Joint Staff Planners
suggest certain subjects which the United States Chiefs of
Staff should discuss with the Soviet General Staff. In
J.C.S. 1227/5 General
Admiral Leahy
said that he entertained little hope of engaging in
extended conversations with the Soviet General Staff.
General Marshall
observed that our success in arranging a meeting with
the Soviet Army Staff was a good omen as to the Soviets’
willingness to discuss the matters in which we are
interested.
Admiral King
said that he favored the approach to the Soviets
advanced by the Planners.
General Deane
said that he found no fault with the Planners’ paper
except that he would not recommend that the status of the
Milepost
General Deane
felt that it would be a mistake to bring up the matter
of the exchange of weather information in view of the
satisfactory progress that had been made so far. The Soviets
had met every United States request for the exchange of this
information.
General Kuter
said that the weather information received so far did
not meet the full requirements of the Twentieth Air Force in
dealing with Japanese targets and suggested that there
should be an increase in the number of weather stations in
Siberia.
Admiral Olsen
said that the Soviets had encountered considerable
difficulty in setting up weather stations in Siberia because
of the lack of transportation and communication facilities.
They prefer to use their own personnel and equipment and
therefore, if it were suggested that more stations be
installed, the request should indicate willingness
General Deane
said he had arranged his list of questions with a view
to permitting the Soviets to do the talking. The questions
were designed to draw out Soviet views. Whether or not the
questions were proper ones is a matter for decision by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In reply to an inquiry by Admiral General Deane
said that the operations referred to in Question 7 in
J. C. S. 1227/5 were those to be initially undertaken by the
Soviets if they entered the war against Japan. General
The Joint Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed to use both J. C. S. 1227/4 and 1227/5 in their conference with the Soviet General Staff.
Present
Subjects:
1. World Security
Organization
Mr. Eden, who presided, stated that the
Foreign Secretaries had been requested to consider two
points vis-à-vis the World Security
Mr. Stettinius
interjected that there was also the question of
exactly which nations should be invited to the initial
conference.post, pp. 746–749.
Mr. Eden
inquired whether anyone desired to initiate the
discussion on this general question.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he wished to start at the bottom. He said
that he would be delighted to invite the great Allies to
confer in the United States. He hoped that the President had
not shocked the Foreign Secretaries yesterday by mentioning
the month of March as the time for the opening of the
conference, and he continued that he felt sure that the time
could be arranged to fit in with the convenience of Mr.
Mr. Molotov
stated that he had expressed his views on the
inclusion of two or three Soviet Republics in the World
Organization at the last plenary meeting. He requested Mr.
Mr. Eden
stated that he would be glad to accept the invitation
of the United States Government to hold the conference in
the United States. He only wished to enter one caveat. He
remarked that Mr.
Mr. Stettinius
and Mr. Molotov
supported Mr.
Mr. Eden
continued that since some time would be needed to get
the Chinese and possibly the French in line, and since the
lawyers would need possibly two weeks before the conference
opened, he would prefer to postpone the opening of the
conference until the second half of April. He pointed out
that he would be committed to debates in Parliament before
he would be able to go to the United States. After some
discussion it was agreed by Mr.
Molotov
and Mr. Eden
that the conference should open on April 25.
Mr. Molotov
had previously accepted the invitation to hold the
conference in the United States.
Mr. Eden
stated that he wished to make a few observations on
the inclusion of Soviet Republics in the Organization. He
said that he was sympathetically inclined to the Soviet
position in this respect and would be ready to say so at
whatever was considered to be an appropriate moment.
Mr. Molotov
interjected “The sooner the better.” Mr.
Mr. Molotov
then referred to Mr.
Mr. Eden
immediately interjected that this was a good reason
for settling the Polish problem now.
Mr. Molotov
continued that certain countries which did not
maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would
also be invited. He stated that he would like to check the
exact list of states which would attend the conference.
Mr. Stettinius
gave Mr. Post, pp.
747–748.
Mr. Molotov
pointed out that if agreement could not be reached on
the membership of the organization it should be reported
accordingly.
Mr. Eden
stated that only the question of the membership of the
two Soviet Republics remained open.
Mr. Cadogan
pointed out that if a conference were called to
complete the work of Dumbarton Oaks and to reach final
agreement on a charter, he did not see how any of the
original members of the organization could be excluded from
the conference.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that the United Nations should meet to complete
the charter. New members could be elected at this meeting.
He said that he was trying to find a way to arrange for
consideration of the Soviet request before the first meeting
of the assembly.
Mr. Eden
suggested as a possible procedure that the United
Nations might meet and might draw up an order of the day
which would include the question of extending foundation
membership to two Soviet Republics. He said that he was
quite ready to agree to this proposal.
Mr. Molotov
suggested an amendment to Mr.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he was favorably impressed with what Mr.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that there were a number of other details with
respect to Dumbarton Oaks, such as the status of France, how
China would be consulted, who would issue the invitations,
etc.
Mr. Eden
suggested that a sub-committee be set up to study
these details and report back to the Foreign Secretaries.
Messrs. post, p. 782. For a post-conference
memorandum on these negotiations, see post, pp. 991–992.
2. Yugoslavian
Frontiers.
Mr. Eden
stated that although he did not wish to raise the
question of Yugoslavian frontiers with Austria and Italy, he
would like to point out that with the occupation of Austria
by the Red Army there might well be administrative questions
relative to the frontiers which should be handled. For this
reason, the British Delegation was submitting a note to the
Soviet Delegation on the question.post, p. 887.
3. Control Commission in
Bulgaria and Hungary.
Mr. Eden
stated that he also wished to discuss the question of
a Control Commission in Bulgaria in the light of the
decisions reached vis-à-vis the Hungarian Control
Commission. It was agreed to confine the present meeting to
those matters which had been referred to the Foreign
Secretaries by the Chiefs of State for consideration.
4. Reparations.
Mr. Molotov
inquired as to when the American and British
Delegations would be prepared to discuss the question of
reparations.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he would be ready tomorrow.
Mr. Eden
added that he hoped that the British side would also
be ready.
5. Iran.
Mr. Eden
recalled the signing of the Declaration on Iran.post, pp. 748–749.Bulletin, March 21, 1942, vol. vi, pp. 249–252.
Mr. Molotov
maintained that there were two different questions
involved, i. e. those concerning the oil concessions and the
withdrawal of Allied troops. With respect to the withdrawal
of the troops, this question had never been placed before
the Soviet Government until today. He maintained that this
was a question of fulfilling the provisions of the treaty
signed by Iran. If there were any need to amend this
agreement the question should be studied. This would take
some time.
With respect to the oil concessions, Mr.
Molotov
stated that he would like to make a few comments. The
Soviet Government had asked Ambassador
During the second stage the situation changed. The Iranians then stated that it would not be appropriate to carry on the negotiations. Thereupon, the Medjlis had adopted a decision to the effect that there should be no concessions during the war. Subsequently, many Iranians had stated that this decision had been adopted in too great a hurry and that it was unwise.
Why could there not be a third stage? Since the Iranians had
changed their minds in one direction the Soviets saw no
reason why
Mr. Stettinius
pointed out that the United States had no wartime
treaty with the Iranian Government. American firms had
carried on negotiations for oil concessions but these had
been dropped following the Medjlis decision. The firms were
consequently in the same position as the Soviets. With
respect to the withdrawal of troops from Iran he wished to
point out that the American troops there were serving the
interests of the Soviet Union in moving Lend-Lease supplies
from the Persian Gulf. The United States Government was
content to leave the question of oil negotiations until the
end of the war. He wished fully to support Mr.
Mr. Eden
remarked that the British Government had no opposition
to the granting of oil concessions to the Soviet
Government.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that the United States Government took the same
position.
Mr. Eden
pointed out that the British had also carried on
negotiations with the Iranians, even before the Soviet
negotiations had started. As a result of the present
attitude of the Iranian Government all of these negotiations
were now held in abeyance. He said that if some statement
were released, as suggested by him, it might reassure the
Iranians and facilitate the recommencement of oil
negotiations. With respect to the renewal [withdrawal] of Allied troops, there was no need to
amend the Iranian treaty which stated that Allied troops
would be withdrawn not later than six months after the
termination of hostilities. He felt that it would be wise to
withdraw these troops as soon as the supply route was no
longer necessary.
Mr. Molotov
stated that he believed it might be advisable to limit
the matter to an exchange of views on the subject. He
offered to summon
Mr. Eden
stated that he would like to think over what Mr.
1. Austria-Yugoslav. Must agree on boundary for purpose of admin. Note.
2. Bulgarian & Hungary Control: Com:
3. Reparations tomorrow
4. Iran.—
Oil—no dispute on Sov. to get oil from N. Persia. No obstacle
on Rus. concession if & when Pers. are prepared to
negotiate. We should all make it known we will not press
matters further until Allied Troops withdrawn. We prepared
to issue statement prepared to withdraw troops earlier pari passu—when supply route closes.
Would show world prepared to carry out Teh
Mol:
Oil—What was beginning? Negot began by asking Pers. govt
attitude on concess N Persia. Answer was attitude would be
most favorable Dep. Com Kav
Something has changed. No time for details but Govt. said would not continue discussions Persia during war. Mejlis would not discuss. Said decision was taken in a hurry. Why not now a third phase. Why can’t Pers. govt change position again. Trying to persuade them thats all. Kav. has returned home & method which might seem strong has changed. No negot. now but reserve right to take. Why special attention now? Why not let things go their way. Situation not acute.
S. We have no treaty with Our oil concessions also advanced
stage & were in same position. Supports
Eden
On troop withdrawal no change in treaty necessary. Would help reassure Pers & therefore negot.
Mol: Thinks we should limit
ourselves to an exchange of views Might bring in
ERS see Ed. →Wire S. Am states act Immediately
For Mins
2/8
Eden: 1st World Org. q. 2 q’s referred to us
AH
Note to Pres
re Art VIIpost, p. 962.
ERS & Ns to be invited
ERS To start at bottom of list 1st I should like take this opportunity invite our great allies to conf in US
Hope Pres didn’t shock you yester. by mentioning March I’m sure time can be arranged to fit in with convenience of Mr Mol & Mr Ed However we are very anxious to have the conf. at earliest poss. time Pers. hope could be held not later than latter part Apr.
As to matter of those to be invited you will recall at D. O. there was much talk as to the Assoc. Ns as well as the Un Ns We have come to the conclusion that taking everything into consid. it would prob. be most satis. to limit those to be invited to those who had signed Un Ns Decl & declared war on our common enemy.
As to Mr.
In D. O. proposals we wrote in the provision each state have 1 vote. I have not yet been able to see clearly how D. O. proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. I wish again to refer to the Pres’ reaction yesterday to this matter when he said it was most interesting & deserved sympathetic study
Mol. Has expressed his ideas re
last q. As to 1st q. like Ed. to state his views
Ed. As regards time & place.
Glad to accept the invitation of the U S Govt I only want to
enter 1 caveat. Mr
ERS Agreed
Mol Quite poss.
Ed. Invitation not ultimatum
ERS Promptly accept
Mol We also
Ed As to time have to get Ch. into line & possibly Fr. Lawyers want 10 days or so I rather think I am committed to debates in Par. before I go I would like myself 2nd half April
ERS around about Apr 15
Ed I would give it a wk more 20 something
Mol Agreed
ERS latter part April?
Mol Agreed
ERS Wanted calendar Suggested Wed Apr 25
Mol. Agrees to both
Ed We mildly prefer second (date) Easter 1st
Agreed April 25
Mol. We accept your invitation to Wash & the date of 25th
Re 3 reps Ed. Definitely sympathetic to their inclusion in Ass. We would be ready to say that at whatever is considered the approp. moment
Mol—As soon as possible
Would like deal with this q. relation to remarks of Mr S. Mr S has reminded us Pres spoke of decs of D. O. & 1 vote. Like ask 1 q. Can & Austr part of U K.
Ed—Of Brit Em
Mol & members of Ass.
The amends to Sov Const which have been accepted Feb last yr
give reps rt of immed touch with for. states S U union of
states. Const Enlarges rts of reps. In this sense we must
develop rels with for. states, this already begun As to
their pol, econ, mil importance no use proving what impor.
have such reps as have reach dec. today
Re Proposal made by ERS that Un Ns Decl signers & decl. of war com.
Q. which Pol should be invited
Ed Another reason settle prob.
Mol. Some Ns have no dip. rels with S U
Would like to check up exact no. of states which would take place
ERS read list
Ecuador has recently declared war but has not yet declared
war [sic]
Ed: laughed
Mol If we can not arrive at agt re membership must say so & move on to another subject
Ed: all agreed except re 2 reps.
Cad: If you call a conf. to complete D. O. work & to agree finally on the Charter I don’t see how you can exclude any of members of that conf. from the Org.
ERS: The Un. Ns meet to complete a charter & all would be members They could elect new members before 1st meeting of Ass. Trying find way Sov request can be taken before 1st meeting
Ed Un Ns could meet as met last time & could agree amongst other bus. to extend foundation members to include the 2 Sov. Reps. We should be quite ready to agree to that
Mol. Suggests amend, to Ed proposal
We must formulate this q. as he proposed & add we 3 have agreed it would be advisable to give the 2 or 3 Sov. reps. a place in the Ass.
ERS asked Ed q.—Ed restated position
ERS I am favorably impressed with what Mr Ed. has said. I did not have an oppor. of discussing this with Pres this morn. ∴ at this time imp. make any firm commit. However delighted discuss with Pres promptly & would hope & expect U S be able give favorable answer before end of day
Mol. Agreed
Ed. “
Mol We leave now q of Pol.—in hope we reach agt.
Ed. Other items to consider
ERS There are a no. of details. If we could meet tomorrow
Status of Fr., Ch. participant at DO. & must be consulted, form of invitation, how & by whom & when invitations be issued
Ed. We might set up subcom. to prepare this & report to us
ERS
Ed. Other items for agenda
Mol. Dec. re Hung. Con. Com just arrived at. Other q’s
Agreed not try to list q’s still to come up at plenary session
Mol. when can we go on with q. of reparations?
ERS we will be prepared tomorrow to discuss Rep. further
Ed. Hope we will
Iran
Ed At Teheran we signed Decl. re Persia & each made
treaties with Iran
About oil—no dispute about SU’s need for oil. No part of our pol. to prevent S. U. from obtaining oil from N. Persia Indeed Sov. Un is a natural market for N. Per. oil. We do not wish to put any obstacle in way of R’s obtaining concession if & when Persians prepared to neg. it. We should all of us make it known that we will not press matters further re oil concessions until Allied troops have been withdrawn from Persia
Ready to consider making some statement indicating we would be prepared to start withdrawal Allied troops earlier than was agreed in treaty—which was conclusion of Eur war.
Mol. 2 diff. q’s oil & Allied troops in Persia
Q of withdrawal of troops was not taken up until today in such a way. Here is q of carrying out the agt already signed by Iran. If there is a nec. to change this agt, some time needed to study
About oil—Negs. began by Rs asking Ir Amb what would be Ir. att. toward Sov concession Said sure answer would be most favorable. Then Dep. Com Kav— went to Iran & talked to Saed. 1st position of Saed quite favorable—same re Shah
Seemed quite natural not only SU but Persia interested In accord with Decl on Iran would be solid assistance to Iran
Second stage—something has changed in Iran. Not now dealing with details but Per. govt said not prepared go on with discussions & Majlis took dec. not give concessions during war. Since then have heard many times from Per. officials dec was unfortunate & taken in hurry
Why can’t there be 3rd stage—return of Per Govt to its 1st
opin. If Per. Govt has changed mind in 1 direction what [sic] cant change in other dir. What
objection? May reopen negs. Brit already have concessions—no
inconvenience to Rs & R concession would not be to
Brit
Let things go own way. Nothing acute now
ERS Just a word. For the record US has not signed a war-time
treaty with Iran. Treaty was Sov-Brit-Iranian treaty. Also
certain Am. oil co’s were negotiating & we too were cut
short. I wish to support endorse entirely Mr.
As to oil we are perfectly contented not to resume negs. till after hostilities end.
Ed: No opposition to Sov. concession
ERS Same is true of U. S.
Ed. We were negotiationg another concession even before R negs began & now all that has come to an end as result of Per. Govts present attitude. Thought statement he proposed might reassure Persians, who were undoubtedly frightened at one time, & make negs easier
As to troops, no need amend treaty which says be withdrawn
not later than 6 mos after end
hostilities No diff. in Brit withdrawing earlier. Thought
might begin when supply line no longer going.
Mol Offered to have Kavtoradge come
Mol. Would like to have limit
selves to exch of views
Ed. to think over what Mol. said & may make new suggestions
Mol All of should think
List of Items Referred to Foreign
Ministers
1. Inclusion of Ukraine, White Russia and Lithuania among initial members of the Organization. (See attached paper)
2. Date and place of United Nations Conference.
3. Nations to be invited to United Nations Conference.
Emphasize membership should include all signatories of United Nations Declaration—not just the specific, listed countries which have already signed.
(See attached list)
4. The policy toward Iran. (See attached paper)
Arguments Against Inclusion of Any
of the Soviet Republics Among the Initial
Members
1. Soviet Republics
not Signatories of the United Nations
Declaration:
On further thought we have become impressed with the
Soviet view that the initial members of the United
Nations Organization should be the signatories of the
United Nations Declaration. As none of the Soviet
Republics are signatories of that Declaration, Mr.
2. The Question Should
Be Postponed Until the Organization is Formed:
The President indicated in his remarks yesterday at the plenary session that this question should not come up until after the Organization is formed.
Mr.
The question is such a novel one in international relations that the other members of the Organization should have a chance to consider the question before a decision is reached.
3. The Soviet
Republics are not Sovereign States under
International Practice:
The Soviet constitution does not permit the Soviet Republics to control their own foreign policy or affairs. Other aspects of central control over the Republics are also inconsistent with the Republics being sovereign.
(Note: India is one of the United
Nations. It, too, is not independent. The Soviet
representatives will probably argue that if India can be
a member so should their three Republics.
The answer:
India has for some period past been gradually developing international relations, and is generally regarded as having more of the attributes of separate nationhood than the Soviet Republics.)
List of Nations Which Were Invited
to the United Nations Conferences at Hot Springs,
Atlantic City and Bretton Woodsante, pp. 52–53.) The word “Turkey” was written in
longhand beside the list of Associated States (see
post, p. 774). Another copy of this list is an
attachment to the ante, p. 82.
United Nations
States Associated With the United
Nations in the War
Observers
Danish Minister at Washington, attending in a personal capacity
Policy on Iran
At Malta we agreed with the British on two points:ante, pp.
500–501.
1. We should urge the Soviet Government, in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943, to respect the decision of the Iranian Government to postpone negotiations for oil concessions until the termination of hostilities and withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran.
(The Declaration on Iran, which was signed by the
President, Prime Minister
2. Both Governments should state that when the truck
route to Russia across Iran is no longer needed, we
would be prepared to begin removing our troops pari passu (i. e., at the same
rate.)
The President of the United States, the Premier of the U. S. S. R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.
The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.
The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.
With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.
The Governments of the United States, the U. S. S. R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.
Present
Secretariat
1. Approval of the Minutes
of the 186th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 186th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.
2. Levels of Supply of All
Petroleum Products in All Theaters
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Over-all Review of
Cargo Shipping
(C. C. S. 746/11)
Admiral Leahy
said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had
examined this paper and it was acceptable to them with one
amendment. They would like to change the date referred to in
the first sentence of paragraph 4b.
(1) (d) on ante, pp. 730–731.
Lord Leathers
said that this amendment would suit him personally
very well if the staffs concerned could prepare the study in
time.
Admiral Leahy
said that the United States staffs believed this would
be possible.
Sir Alan Brooke
Continuing, b. (1) of the enclosure required
clarification as to the order of priority in which the tasks
referred to were to be undertaken. For instance, the fixing
of priorities for the continuance of the war against Japan
referred to in paragraph 4b. (1) (b) might well have to take place
before the preparation of the combined redeployment plan or
at least concurrently with it.
General Somervell
explained that the tasks referred to in paragraph 4b. (1) were not set out in the
sequence in which they would necessarily be undertaken.
Sir Alan Brooke
b. (1) (c) confer with the Combined Military
Transportation Committee and the appropriate shipping
authorities.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
a. Approved C. C. S. 746/11, subject
to the change of the date in the third line on
b. Directed the Combined Staff
Planners, in collaboration with the Combined Administrative
Committee, to take the action outlined in paragraph 4b. (1).
c. Invited the combined shipping
authorities to take the action outlined in paragraph 4b (2).
4. Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of
War
(C. C. S. 777/1)infra.
Sir Alan Brooke
As he saw it, the proposed agreement was susceptible to alteration by the State Department or Foreign Office, and all that was required was the assurance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they saw no objection to it in principle.
Admiral Leahy
said that he had understood the Combined Chiefs of
Staff should agree on the wording of the document and
recommend its acceptance to the State Department and Foreign
Office as a basis for discussion with the Russians.
Replying to a question by General Sir Charles Portal
Admiral Leahy
said the proposed amendment was acceptable.
Continuing, Sir Alan Brooke
Admiral Leahy
pointed out that such transfers might be operationally
necessary.
Sir Charles Portal
General Marshall
said that he was prepared to agree that paragraph 8
should be deleted.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved C. C. S. 777/1 subject to the following amendments:
Article 6: In the fifth line, after
“employed,” insert “on a voluntary basis.”
Article 8: Delete this article and
renumber the succeeding article as Article 8.
(Amended paper subsequently circulated as C. C. S. 777/2.)
5. Equipment for Greek
Forces
(C. C. S. 185th Mtg., Item 2; C. C. S. 768/1;ante, pp.
522–524.
Sir Alan Brooke
The British would therefore go ahead with the equipping of
the forces concerned. The British Chiefs of Staff would also
formalize
General Marshall
said that these assurances were satisfactory.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
6. Final Report to the
President and Prime Minister
(C. C. S. 776/1)post,
pp. 827–833.
Admiral Leahy
raised the question of the preparation of the final
report to the President and Prime Minister. He understood
that such a report would be ready for consideration on the
following morning. He understood also that the Prime
Minister had suggested a plenary meeting at noon, on Friday,
9 February. He would seek the wishes of the President in
this matter.
Sir Alan Brooke
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
7. Operations on the
Western Front
General Marshall
read out the latest information available on the
course of ground and air operations on the Western Front. He
felt it of particular interest to note that at the present
time there were 49 Allied divisions in the line with 33 in
reserve.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Took note with interest of the above statement.
Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War
and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet Armies and U.
S. (British) Armies
Preamble.
The Government of the U. S. S. R. and the Government of the United States of America (the Government of His Britannic Majesty) wishing to conclude an agreement on arranging for the care and repatriation of Soviet citizens freed by Allied troops, and for American citizens (British subjects) freed by the Red Army, through their appointed representatives, acting mutually in the authority duly and fully invested in them, have agreed as follows:—
Article 1.
All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under U. S. (British) command and American citizens (British subjects) liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or U. S. (British) authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.
U. S. (British) and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.
Article 2.
The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and U. S. (British) repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens (or subjects) are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.
Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of
officers of their own nationality to camps or points of
concentration where liberated members of the respective
forces are located and there are
The relocation of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or U. S. (British) authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.
Article 3.
Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article
may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with
the use of
The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party.
Article 4.
Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party.
Article 5.
Soviet and U. S. (British) military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens (and subjects) of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and U. S. (British) authorities shall agree upon beforehand.
Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.
In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and U. S. (British) Governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens (or subjects) necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.
Article 6.
Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and U. S. (British) authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labor shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure.
Article 7.
The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens (and subjects). They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens (and subjects) to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or U. S. (British) authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens (and subjects) shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.
Article 8.
The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.
Argonaut
The text referred to in your number 27, dated February
8,Ante, p.
697.ante,
pp. 694–696; the Soviet redraft
submitted on January 20 is printed ante, pp 416–418.
Argonaut
Present
Admiral Leahy
opened the conference with the statement that we would
discuss military problems in the Far East and that we
required specific data on which to base the long range
planning required by the great distances from the United
States to the Pacific Theater.
Admiral Leahy
then stated that we have prepared a series of
questions on which replies were desired.
General Antonov
asked to have all of the questions presented prior to
any replies or discussion.
Admiral Leahy
then read the questions set forth in the memorandum by
the Commanding General, U. S. Military Mission, Moscow,
“Subjects for First U. S.–U. S. S. R. Staff Meeting,” as
stated in Post, pp.
762–763.post, p. 764.
After brief discussion on the side with Admiral King, Admiral Leahy
posed two additional questions, the first consisting
of paragraph 3 of the memorandum by the Joint Staff
Planners, “Subjects for First U. S.–U. S. S. R. Staff
Meetings” as set forth in ArgonautPost, pp.
763–766.Admiral Leahy’s second additional question
was based on paragraph 7 of the Planners’ paper and asked if
arrangements could be made whereby weather information could
be made available to the U. S. from more stations than are
now being used in Eastern Siberia.
General Antonov
opened the period of reply and discussion with the
very clear statement that he had no authority to give
definite answers or promises or to make decisions on matters
pertaining to the Far East. He stated that his comments
represented his own personal opinion and views and further
that he would refer the questions to Marshal
The following replies to questions and discussion ensued:
Ante, pp. 370–374.General
Antonov
opened with the statement that the operation
of the Trans-Siberian Railroad “can be hampered” by
the enemy. The Soviets therefore cannot rely on that
rail line to support their forces. A maximum effort
will be made to keep the Trans-Siberian Railroad in
operation. However, the Soviets will require that
air and sea routes across the Pacific (mainly sea
routes) be kept open. They will particularly require
fuel (petroleum products) and foodstuffs.General
Antonov’s words was [were] that the Soviets “will
find American help useful.”
General Antonov
stated that he had planned in October to start
the movement of troops in early 1945. However, all
Soviet troops, including those released from Finland
and Latvia are now joined in the battle on the
Eastern Front. He stated that the intended troop
movements will, therefore, be delayed until the
necessary units can be disengaged from the present
battle. Later in the conversation, General Marshall
expanded the American requirement for firm
data on which to base future plans. He explained
that necessity had lead the U. S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff to relieve their Senior Planners from their
global responsibilities to permit them to move to
Moscow to concentrate on the Russian-American phase
of the war against Japan. He made it very clear that
we must have planning basis and that we are security
conscious. General Marshall
concluded with a forceful statement that
specific and constructive planning in Moscow must be
pursued. General Antonov
stated that he would do his best to improve
the planning situation in Moscow.
Admiral Kuznetsov
presented his desire to take over ships from the U. S.
at Dutch Harbor or Kodiak but accepted Admiral King’s
statement that Cold Bay was more desirable and would be
used. Some discussion followed and it was concluded that
Russian crews could be moved from Murmansk to the east coast
of the U. S. by returning convoys and then to be moved by
rail to the west coast. However, the provision of American
shipping to move these crews to Cold Bay was not viewed with
favor by Admiral King.
Except for the immediately preceding conversation, the Russians had no questions to ask.
General Marshall
presented a summary of recent operations—gave to
General
Air Marshal Khudyakov
presented a Russian version of the agreement to create
a restricted zone for air operations on the Russian
front.
Upon adjourning General Antonov
stated that he would see Marshal
Dictated to and transcribed by T/Sgt
Six (6) copies prepared with distribution to the individuals indicated below:
Memorandum
Subject: Questions posed by Admiral
1. (a) Question. What has been determined about the transfer
of ships to the Russians (presumably with reference to the
Milepost
(b) Answer. It
is difficult to be definite until we know more about the
U-boat offensive in the Atlantic. However, it would seem
practicable to work out a schedule of deliveries on a
step-by-step basis in which the later deliveries may have to
be delayed because of the U-boat situation in the
Atlantic.
2. (a) Question. If Dutch Harbor is not a suitable place for
the transfer of ships to the Russians and for the training
of Russian crews, the second preference would be Kodiak.
What is your view?
(b) Answer.
After thorough review of all considerations, it has been
decided that Cold Bay is the best place to effect the
delivery of ships to the Russians and the training of
Russian crews.
Note: Admiral
3. (a) Question. We wish to transfer crews from Murmansk by
utilizing convoys returning from Murmansk to the United
States, thence by rail across the United States to the West
Coast, and thence to Cold Bay. Can you manage this?
(b) Answer. It
would seem practicable to move Russian crews as far as the
West Coast of the United States in the manner you describe,
but it will be extremely difficult to move them from the
West Coast to Cold Bay because of the very bad shipping
situation in the Pacific. The matter will require the
closest examination and the answer must be understood to be
very uncertain at this time.
Note: Admiral
Note: After the Staff meeting
adjourned, I asked the Russian Admiral how many men, total,
they wish to move from Murmansk to Cold
4. Copies of this memorandum will be given to the distribution list below. All agencies that are involved are urged to pursue this matter to an acceptable solution.
Distribution List
J. C. S. 1227/5
(Argonaut
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Subjects for First U. S.–U. S. S.
R. Staff Meeting
References:
Memorandum by the Commanding
General, U. S. Military
Mission, Moscow
It is recommended that in your meeting with the Soviet Staff
you obtain their commitments or opinions, as appropriate, on
the following subjects:
J. C. S. 1227/4
(Argonaut
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Subjects for First U. S.–U. S. S.
R. Staff Meeting
References:
Memorandum by the Joint Staff
Planners
1. In the following paragraphs the Joint Staff Planners have set forth the various subjects and questions which it is considered should be brought up at the meeting and in so doing have used the phraseology which might be suitable for presenting each subject to the Red General Staff. Most of these have been presented previously in various papers and are repeated here for convenience of the Chiefs of Staff.
2. The President asked Marshal Ante, p.
594.
“Once war breaks out between Russia and Japan, is it essential to you that a supply line be kept open across the Pacific to Eastern Siberia?”
The second was:
“Will you assure us that United States air forces will be permitted to base in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk or some more suitable area providing developments show that these air forces can be operated and supplied without jeopardizing Russian operations?”
If the Red Army Staff gives an encouraging reply on basing the strategic air forces, suggest they be asked for agreement to entry of a U. S. survey party in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area at an early date, details to be worked out with the Mission.
3. On the assumption Russia can be ready to enter the war
against Japan three months after the end of the German war
as indicated by Marshal
4. Do you estimate that you are liable to need any U. S. assistance in defending Kamchatka once war breaks out with Japan?
Do you consider you will be able to develop bases in Kamchatka, particularly air bases, before the outbreak of hostilities with Japan?
In connnection with the foregoing, the United States Chiefs
of Staff sent you a memorandum concerning the Kamchatka
survey party. We consider it most important that this survey
party get under way in the very near future. Will you give
us your thoughts on our memorandum? (See Appendix “A” for
copy of memorandum.)ante, p.
594.
5. In connection with your plan of operations in Eastern Siberia, do you intend to take the southern half of Sakhalin?
If so, do you think you will be able to open the La Perouse Strait to shipping?
6. The United States Chiefs of Staff have sent you a
memorandum (see Appendix”B”)ante, p.
594.
7. In connection with our operations accurate information on weather is most important. This information will be equally necessary to your air forces as well as to ours operating over Japan. The United States Chiefs feel it important that they obtain weather information from more stations than are now being used in Eastern Siberia and request that you arrange this.
8. Providing the Red Staff elects to discuss Milepost
9. The Joint Staff Planners recommend that in the discussion
of the above subjects, the United States Chiefs of Staff
make clear to the Russians that:
Memorandum from the United States
Chiefs of Staff to the Representatives of the Soviet
General Staff
In order that there be complete understanding on the
arrangements for the entrance into Kamchatka of the
United States Reconnaissance Party, the composition of
which by name has already been furnished the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, it is requested that the
Soviet General Staff indicate agreement to the
following:
It is further urged that arrangements be completed in time to permit the departure of this party from Fairbanks, Alaska, not later than 15 February 1945.
Memorandum from the United States
Chiefs of Staff to the Representatives of the Soviet
General Staff
The United States Chiefs of Staff have noted with satisfaction the initiation of combined planning in Moscow. The work of this combined group is of the utmost importance to the planning and coordination of our operations for the defeat of Japan.
The United States Chiefs of Staff consider that special
effort should be made on both sides to expedite this
combined planning by a full, free and frank exchange of
information, data and ideas between
The United States Chiefs ask for your agreement to these views and for any comments or suggestions which you may care to make.
Present
Air Bases in the Far East
The President said that with the
fall of Manila the war in the Pacific was entering into a
new phase and that we hoped to establish bases on the Bonins
and on the islands near Formosa. He said the time had come
to make plans for additional bombing of Japan. He hoped that
it would not be necessary actually to invade the Japanese
islands and would do so only if absolutely necessary. The
Japanese had 4,000,000 men in their army and he hoped by
intensive bombing to be able to destroy Japan and its army
and thus save American lives.
Marshal Stalin
said he did not object to the United States having
bases at Komsomolsk or at Nikolaevsk. He said the first was
on the lower reaches of the Amur River and the second at its
mouth. He said that in regard to the bases on Kamchatka he
thought we would have to leave that until a later stage
since the presence of the Japanese Consul there made it
difficult at this time to make the necessary arrangements.
At any rate, he added, the other two bases in the Maritime
Provinces were nearer.
Marshal Stalin
added that there had been one phrase in regard to
“commercial routes” in the President’s letterante, p. 594.
The President said he had had in
mind the importance of the supply routes across the Pacific
and Eastern Siberia to the Soviet Union and he felt that
once war broke out between Japan and the Soviet Union it
would become very important but also very difficult to get
by the Japanese Islands.
Marshal Stalin
indicated that he recognized the importance of these
supply routes and again repeated that he had no objection to
the establishment of American bases in the Maritime
provinces.
The President handed the Marshal a
papersupra, Appendix “B”.
Marshal Stalin
indicated that he would give the necessary
instructions.
Use of airfields and survey of bomb damage
in Eastern and Southeastern Europe
The President said he had two
questions of a military nature relating to Europe which he
wished to take up with the Marshal. He then handed to
Marshal
The first was a request that the United States Air Force be allowed to use certain airfields in the vicinity of Budapest in order to carry out bombing operations against the Germans. The President said that at the present time the American bombers based in Italy had to make a long and hazardous flight over the Alps in order to reach Germany.
The second paper contained a request that a group of United States experts be permitted to make surveys of the effects of bombing in the areas liberated or occupied by the Red Army in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, similar to the surveys that had been made at Ploesti. The paper asked that this group be permitted to proceed at once since it was important to examine the damage while the evidence was still fresh and the people who had been there during the bombing still were on the spot.
Marshal Stalin
said he could grant both these requests and would
immediately give the necessary orders.
Sale of Ships to the Soviet Union after
the War Discussion of this
subject began at 3:45 p. m.
Marshal Stalin
mentioned that Mr.
The President said that this would
require some changes in legislation which he hoped to work
out so that surplus shipping after the war not needed by the
United States and Great Britain could be transferred on
credit without any interest. He said after the last war the
mistake had been made of attempting to charge interest for
the disposal of surplus property but it had not worked. His
idea was to transfer the ships for a fixed sum on credit
which would include the cost of the ship less the cost of
depreciation, so that in twenty years the entire credit
would be extinguished. He said that the British had never
sold anything without commercial interest but that he had
different ideas.
Marshal Stalin
expressed gratification at the President’s statement
and said this shipping would greatly ease the task of the
Soviet Union in the future.
The President replied that he
hoped the Soviet Union would interest itself in a large way
in the shipping game.
Marshal Stalin
said that he thought the President’s idea was a very
good one and also that Lend-Lease was a remarkable
invention, without which victory would have been delayed. He
said that in former wars some allies had subsidized others
but this had offended the allies receiving the subsidies and
had led to difficulties. Lend-Lease, however, produced no
such resentment, and he repeated his opinion of the
extraordinary contribution of Lend-Lease to the winning of
the war.
The President replied that four
years ago, when having a rest on his small yacht, he had
thought and thought of a way to help the Allies and at the
same time avoid the difficulties inherent in loans, and had
finally hit upon the scheme of Lend-Lease.
Far East: Russian Desires
Following the discussion of certain military questions
involved in the Far East, Marshal
Stalin
said that he would like to discuss the political
conditions under which the USSR would enter the war against
Japan. He said he had already had a conversation on this
subject with Ambassador
The President said he had received
a reportAnte, pp.
378–379.
Marshal Stalin
said there was another question and that involved the
use by the Russians of the Manchurian railways. He said the
Czars had use of the line running from Manchouli to Harbin
and from there to Dairen and Port Arthur, as well as the
line from Harbin running east to Nikolsk-Ussurisk connecting
there with the Khabarovsk to Vladivostok line.
The President said that again,
although he had not talked with Marshal
Marshal Stalin
said that it is clear that if these conditions are not
met it would be difficult for him and
The President replied that he had
not had an opportunity to talk to Marshal
Marshal Stalin
agreed and said he did not think it was necessary yet
to speak to the Chinese and that he could guarantee the
security of the Supreme Soviet. He added that it would be
well to leave here with these conditions set forth in
writing agreed to by the three powers.
The President indicated that he
thought that this could be done.
Marshal Stalin
went on to say that in regard to the Chinese,
Marshal Stalin
said that in regard to the question of a warm water
port the Russians would not be difficult and he would not
object to an internationalized free port.
Trusteeships
The President then said he wished
to discuss the question of trusteeships with Marshal
Marshal Stalin
said the shorter the period the better, and he
inquired whether any foreign troops would be stationed in
Korea.
The President replied in the
negative, to which Marshal
The President then said there was
one question in regard to Korea which was delicate. He
personally did not feel it was necessary to invite the
British to participate in the trusteeship of Korea, but he
felt that they might resent this.
Marshal Stalin
replied that they would most certainly be offended. In
fact, he said, the Prime Minister might “kill us”. In his
opinion he felt that the British should be invited.
The President then said he also
had in mind a trusteeship for Indochina. He added that the
British did not approve of this idea as they wished to give
it back to the French since they feared the implications of
a trusteeship as it might affect Burma.
Marshal Stalin
remarked that the British had lost Burma once through
reliance on Indochina, and it was not his opinion that
Britain was a sure country to protect this area. He added
that he thought Indochina was a very important area.
The President said that the
Indochinese were people of small stature, like the Javanese
and Burmese, and were not warlike. He added that France had
done nothing to improve the natives since she had the
colony. He said that General
Marshal Stalin
inquired where
The President replied that
Internal Conditions in China
The President said that for some
time we had been trying to keep China alive.
Marshal Stalin
expressed the opinion that China would remain alive.
He added that they needed some new leaders around
The President said General
Marshal Stalin
said he did not understand why they did not get
together since they should have a united front against the
Japanese. He thought that for this purpose
Present
Subjects: World Security
Organization
Poland
Periodic Meetings of Foreign
Ministers
Yugoslavia and Greece
The President opened the meeting
by stating that he understood the Foreign Secretaries could
report complete success and he wished
Mr. Eden
then read the report of that morning’s meeting of the
Foreign Secretaries:
“Report by Foreign Secretaries to Plenary Meeting of Conference on World Organization questions.
- The Foreign Secretaries met on February 8th
- To consider the question of membership of [
in] the World Organization of two (or three) of the Republics of the Soviet Union,- To recommend what states should be invited to the proposed United Nations Conference, and
- To recommend the time and place at which that Conference should be held.
- It was decided to make the following recommendations to the Plenary Meeting:
- The United Nations Conference on the proposed World Organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America,
- The United Nations, as they existed on February . . . .,
N. B. The blank represents the date of the end of the Conference. [Footnote in the original.] 1945, i. e. those who had at that date signed the United Nations Declaration, would be the only states invited to the Conference on World Organization. It will be for the Conference to determine the list of original members of the Organization. At that stage the Delegates of the U. K. and U. S. A. will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics.For a subsequent memorandum on the negotiation of this decision, see post, pp. 991–992. See alsopost, pp. 791–792.- The Foreign Ministers’ meeting has established a sub-committee to examine further details in connection with the proposals for a World Organization and will report shortly to the Plenary Meeting.”
Copies of the text as read by Eden were found in theUNA Files and in theHiss Collection.
Mr. Eden
concluded by saying that they were glad to accept the
invitation of the United States Government to hold the
meeting on April 25 in the United States. He added that he
hoped that the next meeting of Foreign Ministers would,
therefore, take place in London. Mr.
Marshal Stalin
said that among the states which would be represented
at the conference there were ten who had no diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union. He said that it was
somewhat strange for the Soviet Government to attempt to
build future world
The President replied that he knew
that most of these states would like to have relations with
the Soviet Union but had just not gotten around to doing
anything about it. There were a few, however, where the
reasons were different and where the influence of the
Catholic Church was very strong. He said that he would like
to point out, however, that the Soviet Union had sat down
with these states at Bretton Woods and
Marshal Stalin
replied that this was correct but that at this
conference they were to consider the vital question of the
establishment of world security.
The President then said that he
would have to go back a bit into history. Three years ago
the then Acting Secretary of State, Mr. post, p.
791, was apparently passed to the President at
about this point.
Marshal Stalin
then inquired about Argentina.
The President said that we are
considering a conference of United Nations and Associated
Nations who had helped in the war effort.
Marshal Stalin
said he had no love for Argentina but he felt that
there was a contradiction in logic. He inquired what was the
criteria [sic] for admission of
states and mentioned in this connection Turkey. He said he
felt there were nations who had really waged war and had
suffered, and there were others who had wavered and
speculated on being on the winning side.
The President replied that it was
his idea that only those Associated Nations who had declared
war should be invited and he suggested that the time limit
should be the first of March.
Marshal Stalin
agreed with this suggestion.
The Prime Minister said he
recommended the President’s suggestion that only those
countries who had declared war would be
The President remarked that in
addition to the South American countries there was, of
course, Iceland, the newest of the United Nations
Republics.
The Prime Minister said that in
the case of Egypt, she had on two occasions wished to
declare war but had been advised against it by the British
Government, who had felt that it would be more useful and
convenient to have Egypt a non-belligerent in order to
protect Cairo from systematic bombings. He said that the
Egyptian army had rendered good service to the cause. They
had maintained good order, guarded bridges, etc. He felt
that if Egypt now desired to declare war she should have the
opportunity. He said Iceland had rendered valuable service
at a time when the United States had not entered the war and
had permitted the entry of British and United States troops,
thus violating her neutrality in a marked manner, at the
same time assuring a vital lane of communications to the
British Isles.
Marshal Stalin
remarked that this did not apply to former enemy
states who had recently declared war on Germany.
The President and The Prime Minister heartily
agreed.
The Prime Minister said that he
certainly did not include Eire among the possible
candidates, since they still maintained German and Japanese
missions. He said he would refer to a new one that would not
be greeted with universal approbation, namely Turkey.
Turkey, however, had made an alliance with Great Britain at
a very difficult time, but after the war had been in
progress she had discovered she would not be up-to-date for
modern war. Her attitude had been friendly and helpful,
although she had not taken the chance provided them a year
ago to enter the war.
Marshal Stalin
replied that if Turkey declared war before the end of
February he agreed to her being invited to the
conference.
The Prime Minister expressed
gratification with the Marshal’s attitude.
The President then said that there
remained the question of Denmark, that they had been
over-run by the enemy in one night and that the King had
been virtually a prisoner and that only the Danish Minister
in Washington, Mr.
Marshal Stalin
observed that he thought Denmark should wait.
The President and The Prime Minister agreed and the
latter added that once she was liberated she would certainly
have the right to join the organization.
Marshal Stalin
remarked, however, that Denmark had let the Germans
in.
Marshal Stalin
then said he hoped that in the recommendations of the
Foreign Ministers it would be possible to name the Soviet
Republics, that is, the Ukrainian and White Russian
Republics. This was accepted.
Mr. Molotov
then asked would it not facilitate the admission of
these two Soviet Republics as members of the assembly if
they signed the United Nations Declaration before the first
of March.
The President reverting to the
list of countries to be invited to the conference proposed
that it be the United Nations, the Associated Nations and
Turkey, provided the latter declared war before the first of
March and signed the United Nations Declaration.
The Prime Minister remarked that
it would not seem quite right to him to take in small
countries who had done so little, simply by the expedient of
their declaring war and to exclude the two Soviet Republics
from the meeting. He said he had very much in mind the
martyrdom and sufferings of the Ukraine and White
Russia.
Marshal Stalin
said he also thought it was illogical and stated that
although the three Powers had agreed to recommend that the
Ukraine and White Russia be members of the assembly, might
not the fact that they had not signed the United Nations
Declaration serve as an excuse for excluding them.
The President and Mr. Stettinius
assured Marshal
The Prime Minister remarked that
he had preferred confining the conference to the United
Nations but if others would be added he thought the Soviet
Republics should also be added.
Marshal Stalin
said “I don’t want to embarrass the President, but if
he will explain his difficulties we will see what can be
done.”
The President then said that it
was a technical question but an important one. Up to the
present they had been discussing the question of invitations
to separate states, that is, new countries to be added to
the list but that now it was not a question of a new country
but of giving one of the Great Powers three votes instead of
one in the assembly and that he felt that was a matter which
would be put before the conference and that we had all three
agreed to support the Soviet request.
Marshal Stalin
inquired would it not be all right if the Ukraine and
White Russia signed the United Nations Declaration.
The President replied that he did
not think this would overcome the difficulty.
Marshal Stalin
then said he withdrew his proposal.Post, pp. 990–992.
The President expressed
gratification at the Marshal’s decision.
The Prime Minister then remarked
that he had had time to study yesterday’s report of the
meeting of the Foreign Ministers and that he could give it
his approval.
The President then turned to the
question of the proposals which he had sent to the British
and the Soviet Delegations this morning in regard to
Poland.Post, pp.
792–793.
Mr. Molotov
inquired whether the last point of the President’s
proposal in regard to the recognition of a Government of
National Unity would mean that the London Government would
then disappear.
The Prime Minister replied that
when we recognize the new government, we would of course
withdraw our recognition of the London Government.
Marshal Stalin
replied that when we recognized the new government,
what would happen then to the property and resources of the
London Government. Would they remain in the possession of
The Prime Minister replied that he
thought that the withdrawal of recognition would take care
of that and, [sic.]
The President said that in his
opinion the property would go to the new government.
There was then declared a short recess.
The Prime Minister said that the
British had put in a paper on PolandPost, pp.
869–870.
Mr. Molotov
said he had some observations to make on the
President’s proposals. He said that their proposals made
yesterdayAnte, p.
716.
Mr. Molotov
said in regard to the question of frontiers he was
glad to note the complete agreement on the eastern boundary,
namely the
Mr. Molotov
said with reference to negotiations in Moscow between
himself, Mr. Ante, pp.
727–728.
The President inquired whether Mr.
Mr. Molotov
replied that he thought it would be better to avoid
the presidential committee and to enlarge the National
Council and the Provisional Government.
The Prime Minister said that we
were now at the crucial point of this great conference. He
said we would be found wanting by the world should we
separate recognizing different Polish governments. This
would be accepted by the world as evidence of a breach
between Great Britain and the United States on one hand and
the Soviet Union on the other hand, with lamentable
consequences in the future. It was stamping this conference
with a seal of failure, and nothing else we did here would
overcome it. He admitted, on the other hand, that we take
different views of the same basic facts. According to the
information of the British Government, the Lublin, or
Warsaw, government does not commend itself to the
overwhelming masses of the Polish people, and it is
certainly not accepted abroad as representative of the
people. If the British Government brushed aside the London
government and went over to the Lublin government there
would be an angry outcry in Great Britain. There was, in
addition, the problem of the Poles outside Poland. He
reminded the conference that on the Western and Italian
fronts there was a Polish army of about 150,000 men who had
fought steadily and very bravely for our cause. He did not
believe that this army would be reconciled to the transfer
of the British Government’s support from the government with
which it had dealt since the beginning of the war. It would
be regarded as an act of betrayal of Poland. As Marshal
The Prime Minister made it clear
that, speaking only for Great Britain, it would be said that
the British Government had given away completely on the
frontiers, had accepted the Soviet view and had championed
it. To break altogether with the lawful government of Poland
which had been recognized during all these five years of war
would be an act subject to the most severe criticism in
England. It would be said that we did not know what was
going on in Poland— that we could not even get anyone in
there to find out what was going on and that we had accepted
in toto the view of the Lublin government. Great Britain
would be charged with forsaking the cause of Poland and he
was bound to say that the debates in Parliament would be
most painful and he might add most dangerous to Allied
unity. He added that all the above was on the supposition
that they might find it possible to agree to Mr.
Mr. Molotov
suggested that perhaps the talks in Moscow might give
some result, but it was very difficult to discuss the Polish
question without participation with the Poles.
The Prime Minister remarked it was
frightfully important that agreement should be reached on
the question and that we should part over a signed
agreement.
The President said we were all
agreed on the necessity of free elections and that the only
problem was how Poland was to be governed in the
interval.
Marshal Stalin
said that he had heard complaints from the Prime
Minister that he had no information in regard to the
situation in Poland. Mr.
The President asked how long it
would be, in the Marshal’s opinion, before elections could
be held in Poland.
Marshal Stalin
replied it might be possible in a month provided no
catastrophes occurred on the front and the Germans began to
beat them.
The Prime Minister said of course
they would welcome free elections but would not ask for
anything that would hamper military operations.
The President proposed that the
matter be referred to the Foreign Ministers for study, and
this was agreed to.
The Prime Minister said there was
one small matter he wished to bring up before adjournment,
and that was the periodic meeting of Foreign Ministers every
three months.
The President said he was in favor
of this idea, but he knew that Mr.
The Prime Minister said he hoped
that the first of these meetings could be in London, to
which the President and Marshal
Marshal Stalin
then said he had one small matter which he would like
to bring up. He would like to know what is holding back the
formation of a unified government in Yugoslavia. He would
also like to know what was going on in Greece. He said he
had no intention of criticizing British policy there but he
would merely like to know what was going on.
The Prime Minister said that
Greece would take a great deal of time to explain and he
would reserve it for the next meeting. He said in regard to
Yugoslavia that the King had been persuaded, or even forced,
to agree to a regency.
Marshal Stalin
replied that
The Prime Minister replied that he
felt that Marshal
Marshal Stalin
answered that he was not afraid.
The Prime Minister said that in
regard to Greece he was hopeful peace would come on the
basis of amnesties except for those who committed crimes
against the laws of war. He doubted that a government of all
the parties could be established since they hated each other
so much.
Marshal Stalin
said that the Greeks had not yet become used to
discussion and therefore they were cutting each others’
throats.
The Prime Minister concluded he
would be glad to give information on Greece. He said that
recently Sir Walter
Marshal Stalin
repeated that he had no intention of criticizing
British actions there or interfering in Greece, but merely
would like to know what was going on.
The conference adjourned until four p. m. tomorrow.
Pres called on
Ed: We met to consider etc. & read his report
re place Ed. repeated his statement of this morning that next meeting of For Mins be held in Lon & that seemed to meet with a measure of approval
Ed: Reason for saying those who are members now should be invited was to prevent nations from becoming Un Ns Just to be invited Understands Am. Del. has different view
St: I have the list of states which declared war on Ger I
count this no. into official members of the Ass. Among these
are 10 which
Pres: I think many of them will be glad to recog & est.
dip. rels with S U. Haven’t got round to it yet. In few is
very strong Cath. Church influence At same time we recognize
most of these who have not exch. dip. rels with Sov Un. have
sat with Sov Un at Bretton
St.: That’s right but on other hand is very diff. build up world sec. with countries which don’t recog. Sov Un
Pres: Easiest way to est. complete dip rels. is to invite
them. That involves matter of history which should be
explained. 3 yrs. ago Actg further by
bringing this to my attention 1 month ago. As a result I
sent a letter to the 6 pres. of these 6 reps explaining that
if they wanted to be invited they should declare war on
either Japan or Ger. Ecuador has declared war but hasn’t had
chance sign Un Ns decl. Paraguay will soon. Peru, Venezuela
etc (not Chile, soon) Will be embarrassing if not invited.
In meantime in past 4 yrs. all of these nations have helped
us in waging war because large part of raw materials for
munitions of war came from them.
Result is I’m in a somewhat diff. position
St: Not discussed today
Pres: We have phrase Associated Ns meaning nations which have broken rels but haven’t declared war.
The list of nations which Mr Stett gave to Mr
St. asked about Argentine
Pres: Not an assoc. nation
St: If “associates” come in that would include Argentina. Would include Turkey
Pres. My idea & it would save my life would be to invite
those who have are on the
list who have helped us on
condition that they declare war.
St: Before or after they declare war
Pres: Before, put a time limit, say 1st of March
St: Agreed
Church: I am glad to say these nations would be required to
declare war before they would be invited to the Conf. Of
course I feel like
Pres: I should like to add one name to list for sake of clarity—newest rep. in world Iceland
Church: re Eg.
Pres: In other words you’re in same fix I’m in
Church Also I must say on behalf of Eg that when enemy was only 30 miles from capital Egyptian Army rendered service, guarded bridges, communs & generally was more helpful than if she had declared war & made Cairo subject to air bombardment ∴Feel if Eg. now feels she wanted to declare war she should have the opportunity
Iceland also rendered very val. services. At a time when the
U. S. had not herself had
entered the war she admitted Brit & US troops, violated
her neutrality in a marked fashion & guarded a life line
across the Atlantic. I think those two have certainly a case
provided they declare war
Is it intended any nation which declares war.
Pres: no, only the Assoc Ns
(Italy,
Ireland—no)
Church: I shall mention a name which I think will cause universal satisfaction—Turkey T. made an alliance with us before the war at a very dangerous time. But when the war broke out, after it had been going on little while, T’s found their army was not equipped with any of weapons that decide modern battles. But att. has been friendly although they would not take the opportunity which was offered to us yr. ago
St. says all right if by end of Feb. It will declare war
Ger. is not yet defeated war & war hardly will terminate by end of Feb.
Pres: One other case—curious case.
Den.
Only one man claimed to represent Den. was the the Dan. Min. in Wash. He could not declare war but he disowned acts of his own govt
Would be with us 100% if they could
Church: Have they agreed to the independence of Iceland?
I do not think it is of very great importance. I think Mar & Pres are quite right in letting any one come to the party who declares war by end of month
St & Denmark could wait
Pres Yes
Church: She would have a perfect right to come if she is able to speak
Pres Amend Un Ns & also those of assoc. powers & T. who declare war by Mar 1
Church All who declare war
Ed. Un Ns as they exist on the 1st of Mar.
Church:
Pres Ger. or Japan
Common enemy
Mol Would it not facilitate position of Sov. Reps if they would sign Decl. of Un Ns before 1st of Mar.
Pres I think its easier to take the list we’ve got. San Marino & Andorra might sign, nations like that
Church. What is the position
St: But T is not fighting
Pres: read list of Assoc. Ns & T only if they declare war
Mol: If Uk & Byelo-R sign decl before 1st of Mar.
Pres. That had been settled in this formula We are prepared to support them.
St. I propose to name the Reps, which would be invited: Uk & Byelo-R. To call them by name in this protocol and secondly I propose that they should sign the Decl of Un Ns before 1st of Mar. Change the protocol
Church Delay invitations to two states of Sov. Un till we are all met If so many new ones are to be brought in now be confusing
St: I have point out that’s not quite logical. 3 great powers agree to seat White R & Uk But some might say they haven’t signed
Church: Two R states should be treated same as other late arrivals
St. I wouldn’t like to embarrass Pres. What is his difficulty. I might withdraw my proposal
Pres: Only technical. We have been discussing admitting other
people.
St. Withdrew his request. But names of the two republics should be in the report
Poland
The President asked Mr.
President: Has Mr.
Stalin
President: Just to make it clear
let me read it. (President reads the proposal. Copy
attached.)post, pp. 792–793.
Stalin
President: Yes.
Prime Minister: (Explains that
with the recognition of a new interim government recognition
would be transferred from the London government to that
regime.)
Stalin
President: That automatically
would go to the new government.
Prime Minister: I had prepared an
alternate suggestion but since discussion has already begun
on the President’s proposal I would rather continue on
that.
Molotov
The Poles usually select three people, Rola-Żymierski?
President: I should like to keep
the presidential committee and then there is the question of
election.
Molotov
Prime Minister: Of course we are
at the crucial point of this great conference. This is the
question for which the world is waiting. If we accept that
each recognize separate governments this will be interpreted
all over the world as a sign of cleavage between the Soviet
Molotov
Prime Minister: It is frightfully
important that this conference separate on a note of
agreement. We must struggle precisely for that.
President: From another hemisphere
I should like to say that we are agreed on free elections.
The only problem is how to govern in the meantime for a
relatively few months.
Stalin
Prime Minister: Certain
information but—
Stalinamour
propre and feelings, the prestige of the
provisional government is greatly increased. If we do not
talk to them they would accuse us of being occupiers and not
liberators.
President: How long before
elections could be held?
Stalin
Prime Minister: Free elections
would of course settle the worries of the British government
at least. That would supersede at a stroke all questions of
legality. Of course, we must not ask anything that would
impair military operations But if it is possible to learn
the opinion of the population in Poland in one or even two
months no one could object.
President: That is why it is worth
pursuing the subject. I move that we adjourn our talks until
tomorrow. I suggest that meanwhile the matter be referred to
the three foreign secretaries. They are very effective.
Molotov
Prime Minister: I have one bit of
business before we separate. It would be a great advantage
if we could set up permanent measures for consultation of
the foreign secretaries. I think they should meet every
three or four months to clear up difficulties between
us.
President: I think the idea is O.
K. but my foreign secretary has all South America to take
care of too. I think we should make it as often as necessary
rather than a specific period.
Prime Minister: I should also like
to suggest that the first meeting be held in London. (This
was agreed to)
Stalin
Prime Minister: It would take too
long to talk about Greece now. I could talk about it for
hours. As for Yugoslavia the King has been persuaded, indeed
forced, to sign agreement with regard to the regency.
Stalin
Prime Minister: I invited
Stalin
The meeting adjourned.
Mr. President:—The Joint Chiefs of
Staff told
The report by the Foreign Secretaries was accepted, subject
to paragraph 2 (b) being amended to
read as follows—“The United Nations as they exist on the 8th
February, 1945, and such of the Associated Nations
Carbon copy, endorsed “2/8 Presented by President.”
See ante, p. 776. The copy of this
paper in the
The ante, pp.
510–511.
The proposals submitted by Mr.
In regard to the frontier question, no objection is perceived
to point One of the Soviet proposals, namely, that the
eastern boundary of Poland should be the
In regard to point Two, while agreeing that compensation should be given to Poland at the expense of Germany, including that portion of East Prussia south of the Koenigsberg line, Upper Silesia, and up to the line of the Oder, there would appear to be little justification to the extension of the western boundary of Poland up to the Western Neisse River.
In regard to the proposals of the Soviet Government
concerning the future Government of Poland, it is proposed
that Mr.
Points To Take Up With the
President
1. Location of
Conference.
(See attached papers)
2. Consultation of France
before Invitations are Issued.
(a) France is listed in the proposals
as one of the five permanent members “in due course.”
At Dumbarton Oaks, “in due course” was understood to mean recognition—which has now occurred.
(b) We need France’s influence among
the smaller powers in “selling” the Organization.
(c) To save time, the United States
can consult France on behalf of Britian and Russia.
3. Consultation of China
before Invitations are Issued.
(a) China is a full fledged Dumbarton
Oaks participant and must be one of the sponsoring
powers.
(b) We can consult China on behalf of
Britain and Russia.
4. Mr. Stimson is Opposed to
Territorial Trusteeships.
(a) Joint Chiefs have agreed to
setting up the machinery of Territorial Trusteeships—without discussion of specific
territories.
(b) United States public opinion has
criticized Dumbarton Oaks for leaving out Territorial
Trusteeships.
(c) New organization can’t supersede
League of Nations without disposing of Mandates System.
(d) Chinese, Russians, Latin Americans
all want Territorial Trusteeships.
The British will agree.
We can’t be the one objecting power.
Items Still Remaining Open Before
Conference Can Be Called
1. Status of
France.
At Malta the British and we agreed that France should be a fifth sponsoring power and should be included along with China as one of the powers on whose behalf invitations will be issued.
2. Nature of Consultation
with France and China.
At Malta we and the British agreed that the United States should consult France and China on behalf of Britain and Russia.
Mr.
3. Form of
Invitation,
The invitations could most conveniently be issued by the United States on behalf of itself and the other four sponsoring powers. (We have a draft invitation.)
4. International
Trusteeships.
We should get agreement that the subjects of international trusteeships and dependent areas will be discussed at the United Nations Conference, and that provisions on these subject will be incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations.
(We should arrange for prompt interchange of papers on these subjects after the Crimean Conference in order to try to get agreed proposals drafted before the United Nations Conference.)
5. Communiqué of the
Crimean Conference on Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.
We have a drafted communiqué. (Wilder Foote is preparing an alternative draft for your consideration.)
Argonaut
1. For your urgent information only the five Latin American associated nations which have not yet declared war should be urged
Note by the Secretary of State Regarding
the Composition of the United States Delegation to the
United Nations Conference at San Francisco
to do so and adhere to the United Nations declaration with
the greatest promptness. It is absolutely essential that
this be accomplished by the end of this month if their
action is to be effective in their interests. Please limit
knowledge of the existence of this message to yourself,
2. I rely upon you to renew the Department’s recommendations to these countries without disclosing the cause for such renewal.
Present
Subject: General Conversation.
The atmosphere of the dinner was most cordial, and forty-five
toasts in all were drunk. Marshal
Marshal Stalin
proposed a toast to the health of the Prime Minister,
who he characterized as the bravest governmental figure in
the world. He said that due in large measure to Mr.
The Prime Minister, in his reply,
toasted Marshal
Marshal Stalin
then proposed the health of the President of the
United States. He said that he and Mr.
The President, in reply to this
toast, said he felt the atmosphere at this dinner was as
that of a family, and it was in those words that he liked to
characterize the relations that existed between our three
countries. He said that great changes had occurred in the
world during the last three years, and even greater changes
were to come. He said that each of the leaders represented
here were working in their own way for the interests of
their people. He said that fifty years ago there were vast
areas of the world where people had little opportunity and
no hope, but much had been accomplished, although there were
still great areas where people had little opportunity and
little hope, and their objectives here were to give to every
man, woman and child on this earth the possibility of
security and wellbeing.
In a subsequent toast to the alliance between the three great
powers, Marshal Stalin
remarked that it was not so difficult to keep unity in
time of war since there was a joint aim to defeat the common
enemy which was clear to everyone. He said the difficult
task came after the war when diverse interests tended to
divide the allies. He said he was confident that the present
alliance would meet this test also and that it was our duty
to see that it would, and that our relations in peacetime
should be as strong as they had been in war.
The Prime Minister then said he
felt we were all standing on the crest of a hill with the
glories of future possibilities stretching before us. He
said that in the modern world the function of leadership was
Justice Byrnes
proposed a toast to the common man all over the world.
He said there had been many toasts to leaders and officials
and while we all shared these sentiments we should never
forget the common man or woman who lives on this earth.
Miss Harriman, replying for the three
ladies present, then proposed a toast to those who had
worked so hard in the Crimea for our comfort, and having
seen the destruction wrought by the Germans here she had
fully realized what had been accomplished.
Present
Secretariat
1. Approval of the Minutes
of the 187th Meeting of
C. C. S.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the C. C. S. 187th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.
2. Draft Final Report to
the President and Prime Minister
(C. C. S. 776/2)post, pp.
827–833.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff
considered those paragraphs of the draft final report which
had been added since they had approved C. C. S. 776/1.
Sir Alan Brooke
“Reference paragraph 4 c. of the
directive issued to you . . .post, pp. 832–833).
General Marshall
said that this proposal was acceptable.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
3. Liaison With the Soviet
High Command With Regard to Strategic Bombing in Eastern
Germany
(C. C. S. 778, C. C. S. 186th Mtg., Item 7, Two
Tripartite Military Meetings)ante, pp. 637, 640–641.
Sir Charles Portal
referred to the discussions which had been taking
place between himself and General
General Kuter
said he had redrafted the Russian proposals in such a
way as to make them acceptable to the U. S. and British; he
proposed putting this new draft
Sir Charles Portal
explained the main difference between the Russian
proposals and the draft which had been agreed at the meeting
of the Heads of Air Staffs. In the original draft the Allied
air forces could bomb a target to the east of the line,
provided 24 hours’ notice was given to the Soviet High
Command and no objection was raised. In the Russian
proposal, however, it was necessary to obtain agreement for
any Allied bombing east of the line 24 hours before the
attack was to take place. It had been his understanding in
conversations with Marshal
General Kuter
pointed out that there was one further important
change in the Russian proposals. The Soviet Staff had now
proposed that a rigid line should exist which would be moved
from time to time by the Soviet Staff whereas in the
original agreement the bomb-line was to move forward
automatically at a given distance from the Russian front
line. An example of the difficulties which would arise under
Marshal
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then
discussed the best method of handling further action with
regard to the Russian proposals.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:—
Agreed that Marshal of the Royal Air Force
4. Concluding Remarks
Admiral Leahy
said he would like to express on behalf of the United
States Chiefs of Staff their appreciation for the
cooperation and assistance received from the British Chiefs
of Staff during the present conference. He felt that
progress had been made on the general plans of the war as a
whole, and that much had been accomplished.
Sir Alan Brooke
Present
Subject:
1. Points still before the
Foreign Secretaries.
Mr. Stettinius, who presided, stated
that he thought it might be helpful to have a general review
of the unfinished items. He stated these were as
follows:post, pp.
814–815.
After a brief discussion it was decided to touch upon the Polish question first.
2. The Polish Question.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he would like briefly to comment upon one
important point which had not been previously raised. There
had been quite a struggle in the United States on American
participation in the World Organization. From the standpoint
of psychology and public opinion the Polish situation was of
great importance at this time to the United States. He hoped
with all his heart that the Polish question could be settled
before the Crimean Conference broke up.
Mr. Stettinius
then read the following statement:Post, pp.
815–816.
“After further consideration I agree with Mr.
“I believe that, with this change, our three positions are
not far apart on the substance of the governmental question.
Mr.
“The following formula might therefore be considered:
“That the present Polish Provisional Government be
reorganized into a fully representative government based on
all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic
leaders from Poland abroad, to be termed The Provisional
Government of National Unity’; Mr.
“When a ‘Provisional Government of National Unity’ is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.”
Mr. Molotov
stated that he would like to obtain a copy of the text
of the statement in the Russian language, as he did not feel
prepared to reply to the oral statement.
Mr. Eden
said that he had some preliminary remarks on Mr.
As regards the Lublin Provisional Government, it was possible
that he might be quite wrong but he thought it was a fact
that hardly anyone in Great Britain believed that the Lublin
Government was representative of Poland. He should have
thought that that view was widely held in the rest of Europe
and in the United States of America. It was for that reason
that the documentPost,
pp. 869–870.
If agreement were reached here, this would involve a transfer of recognition from the London Government to the new Government. The British Government should have to abandon recognition of the London Government and such abandonment would be much easier for it if it were not made in favor of the existing Lublin Government but in favor of a new Government.
The British Government had considerable Polish forces
fighting with it—about 150,000 at present—and these forces
would increase as
He had one other comment which concerned a personality. It
had been said that there was considerable opposition to Mr.
Mr. Molotov
stated that while the American document was being
translated he wished to make some comments. Although he
could not, of course, go farther than what Marshal
With respect to Mr.
Molotov
stated that it might be a mistake to say that he was
unacceptable. The Poles themselves must decide this.
Conversations must be held with the Poles in and out of
Poland. Perhaps the
Mr. Eden
said he entirely agreed with Mr.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he supported Mr.
After a brief interruption, Mr.
Molotov,
on reading a translation of the American proposal, stated
that he would be unable to give a final answer to the new
American considerations until he had consulted Marshal
Firstly, it would be inadvisable to place too much emphasis on the formula of the question of the Polish Government before consulting the Poles themselves. He still believed that the new Polish Government should be created on the basis of the Lublin Government. If the three Foreign Ministers agreed to this in principle, it would not be difficult to find a formula.
Secondly, it might be better to leave out reference to the Allied Ambassadors in Warsaw since this reference would undoubtedly be offensive to the Poles as it would indicate that they, the Poles, were under the control of foreign diplomatic representatives. The Ambassadors would, of course, see and report as they desired. In the last analysis the question of a formula was not important—the question of an agreement on the fundamental issues was more so.
Mr. Eden
stated that the three Allied Governments considered
that a new situation would be created by the complete
liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This would call for
the establishment of a fully representative provisional
Polish Government which could be more broadly representative
than was possible before the liberation of Poland. This
Government should be comprised of members of the Lublin
Government and other democratic leaders in Poland and
abroad.
Mr. Eden
felt that this Government should be called the
Provisional Government of National Unity.
Mr. Molotov
continued to stress the advisability of forming the
new Government on the basis of the Lublin Government.
Otherwise an unstable situation would be established in the
rear of the Red Army. This Government would include other
representatives from Poland and from without the
country.
Mr. Stettinius
maintained that it would be preferable to start with
an entirely new Government and stated that unless the
Foreign Ministers could get away from the words “existing
Polish Government”, no agreement could be reached on this
question. He suggested that Mr. old and also on the democratic
leaders which will be brought in.
Mr. Molotov
maintained that it was very difficult to deal with the
Poles and that a serious situation would arise if a period
should be created in which there were no Government in
Poland. The authority of the present Lublin Government would
be undermined. He maintained that if the American or British
proposals were adopted everything would be standing in the
air and a period of instability would be created in
Poland.
Mr. Stettinius
pointed out that the present Polish Government would
continue until the new Government was formed.
Mr. Molotov
maintained that the Poles would know that negotiations
were proceeding on a change in government and that the
present government would not endure. This would create a
situation which might well cause difficulties for the Red
Army.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that Mr.
Mr. Molotov, however, adhered to his
former position of insisting that the new Polish Government
be formed on the basis of the Lublin Government. He
maintained that the matter would have to be discussed with
the Poles themselves before any decision could be
reached.
Mr. Stettinius
inquired as to Mr.
Mr. Molotov
replied that this could be taken up at a later
date.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that under present circumstances it would
probably be best to report to the plenary session that the
Foreign Ministers had discussed at length the Polish
Government question on the basis of the memorandum submitted
by the American Delegation and that although they had not
yet reached an agreement on the matter they had decided to
continue discussions at a later date.
Mr. Harriman
asked Mr. and also on other democratic
elements from outside and inside Poland.”
Mr. Molotov’s
reaction to this suggestion was negative. He appeared
to prefer the wording “based on the old government and with
the calling in of representatives . . . “
3. Reparations.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that Mr. post, p.
816.
Mr. Maisky
pointed out that Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the American
proposals were acceptable. However paragraph 3 should be
more fully clarified. In order to do so he suggested that
the Moscow Commission accept the total of $20,000,000,000
“as a basis” for its studies. The final figures arrived at
by the Commission might be a little more or less than
$20,000,000,000; however, the Soviet Delegation urged that
this figure be accepted as the basis.
Mr. Eden
stated that the Prime Minister was strongly against
stating a figure in the basic principles, even as a
basis.
Mr. Molotov
stated that the Soviet Delegation was thinking only of
the Soviet Union. Mr.
Mr. Stettinius
urged that the question of setting a figure be left to
the Commission. He continued that he of course could not
commit the United States but that he felt that Mr.
Mr. Molotov
inquired whether it would be agreeable to mention only
the reparations, in the amount of ten billion dollars, which
would go to the Soviet Union.
As a counter-proposal Mr. Stettinius
suggested that it merely be stated that 50% of the
total sum of reparations collected which would be not
specified would go to the Soviet Union.
Mr. Molotov
stated that he did not object to this suggestion;
however, the exact percentage might be a little more or less
than 50% of the amount collected. He again stressed the
importance of including a figure in the statement.
Mr. Eden
said that his Government well understood the suffering
and need of the Soviet Government and would not be niggardly
in the apportionment of reparations. However, he would like
the Commission to do its work and ascertain the total amount
of German reparations.
Mr. Molotov
stated that the Soviet delegation was not endeavoring
to supersede the work of the Commission but only to give it
guidance.
Mr. Stettinius
inquired as to what price levels the Soviet Government
had in mind.post, p.
816.
Mr. Molotov
replied that reparations should be based on 1938
prices since destruction had been in pre-war values.
Mr. Stettinius
inquired whether the Soviet Government also had in
mind additions of 15% to 20%.
Mr. Molotov
said that this was likely.
Mr. Stettinius
inquired as to the effect of the dismemberment of
Germany on payment of reparations.
Mr. Maisky
replied that it would not have any effect on the
removal from the national wealth of Germany of German
equipment located inside and outside of the country at the
termination of the war. It might affect annual payments in
the post war years. However, the Soviet Government had taken
this into consideration in drawing up its report.
After some discussion the Soviet and American Delegations
reached agreement on the wording of the third point to the
effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in
its initial studies as a basis for discussion suggestion of
the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparations
in accordance with the points (a) and
(b) of the preceding paragraph
should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should
go to the Soviet Union,
Mr. Eden
stated that he would be obliged to await instructions
from his Government.
4. Dumbarton Oaks.
Mr. Stettinius
presented copies of the draft invitation (see
attached)Post, p.
817.United Nations] Conference and stated
that it was his understanding that the United States would
consult with China and France before the invitations were
issued on the Dumbarton Oaks matters which had been
discussed in the Crimea.
Mr. Molotov
and Mr. Eden
agreed to this.
It was pointed out that some differences existed in the
invitation submitted at the meeting and a former draft.Post, p.
818.Post, p.
819.
It was also agreed that the paragraph relative to trusteeships should be omitted from the invitation and that the five governments which would have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the conference on the subject of territorial trusteeships and independent areas. This would be done on a diplomatic level.
Mr. Stettinius
explained that he did not contemplate any detailed
discussions on particular islands or territories but wished
to establish the right of the organization to deal with the
problem of trusteeships and to set up some machinery.
Mr. Molotov
and Mr. Eden
indicated agreement.
5. Iran.
Mr. Stettinius
inquired whether Mr.
Mr. Eden
stated that he had submitted a paper on this
question.Post, pp.
819–820.
Mr. Stettinius
remarked that the American Delegation was in entire
agreement with the British position, as stated by Mr.
Mr. Molotov
pointed out that the Soviet Delegation had not had
time to give study to Mr.
6. Yugoslavia.
Mr. Molotov
referred to the unstable situation in Yugoslavia and
to the Ante, pp.
251–254.
Mr. Eden
maintained that the amendments to the agreement which
had been suggested by the British Government were reasonable
in nature and provided for a more democratic
Yugoslavia.post, p. 821.
Mr. Molotov
continued to maintain that no useful purpose would be
served by the submission of supplementary agreements until
the original agreement had been effected.
Mr. Stettinius
suggested that representatives of Mr.
4th meeting
12.00 For Mins
ERS chmn
2/9
Poland
ERS: We have a hard fight in U. S. on particip. in Un. Ns Org. Polish sit. is of great importance to us from psych, point of view at this time. So hopes with all heart we can settle this Pol. matter before we break up in a manner which will be acceptable to the world.
Proposal Present Pol. Gov’t be
reorganized to include Pol. democrats in Pol & abroad
& be called Provisional Govt of Pol. Dem. Unity Pol.
Commission in Mos. to consult in first instance Lublin Govt
& Polish leaders in Pol & outside
Be pledged hold free elections, universal suffrage & secret ballot as soon as practicable
When Pol. Govt of Nat Unity is formed 3 Govts recognize Ambs. of 3 powers in Warsaw be charged report on holding of free elections
Reparations
ERS presented proposal
Point 1 acceptable
Point 3 add should consider 20,000,000,000 as a basis—final figures to be arrived by Commission
ERS: We think that figure should be taken into consideration.
We can accept it as a basis for
discussion.
Eden not prepared to mention any figure
Mol
ERS Can’t commit U. S. to any figure but as said before personally thinks it is a reasonable figure
Mol. Could it be mentioned as a basis for discussion also
ERS: suggests 50% as basis for discussion
Mol: No objection but should not insist on 50% may be more or less, but figure would have significance. Distribution of total sum may be different.
ERS Can’t go further at this time
Eden: What of effect of dismemberment
ERS 10% or 15% variation that applied to Hung.
M: possibly
Agreed can mention 50% applies to 20,000,000,000
Report
ERS presented draft invitation
Understands we are agreed U S permitted to consult China & Fr before
Agreed
ERS Agreed—to sub-committee but reserved re terr. trus.
ERS: We do not contemplate any detailed discussions re particular islands or territorials but do wish to establish right of org. to deal with this & to set up machinery
Mol. Agreed
Ed. Why mention it?
ERS Agreed to eliminate it in invitation.
Understood we will take it up at Conf. & meanwhile among us at dip. level
Report
Mol. Brit. did not object at D.
O
Ed. Agrees & should be in report to plenary session
Iran
Ed. mentioned his paper ERS said we agree
Poland
ERS Can we say U S–S U agree. Brit don’t
Yug.
Committee to prepare statement
Poland
New draft by Brit.
Mol. Can only give prelim. answer. Try to give final answer
by 4:00. Mustn’t say put too much in this formula, mustn’t
put in what we can’t say without consulting Poles. 1st
amend.: say based on Lublin Govt 2. Leave out reference to
Ambs in War.
Ed: The 3 Govts consider that a new sit. has been created by the complete lib. of Pol by the Red Army. This calls for the est. of a fully repres. Provisional Govt which can now be more broadly repres. than was recently poss. This govt should comprise members of Lub Govt etc Should be called Prov. of Nat Unity
Mol. Can’t leave out statement Govt is based on present one
proposes: The present Pol. Govt be reorg. into a fully repres. Govt based on the present govt & incl. etc
ERS Must be entirely new
Might say based on Lub & on etc
Mol. Will be very diff to deal with Poles Can’t do that when no auth. or stability in Pol.
ERS Present gov’t would go on during the negs. until new govt is formed.
Mol But Poles will know negs are going on & will know present govt won’t last long—make it weak & make negs last long That impossible sit. for Red Army
Mol.: Ed. proposal incompatible with his own Must discuss this proposal with Poles
ERS What about name of new govt?
Mol. We can consider this.
Report we have discussed matter
& will
continue
it
later. & were unable to
agree on this feature.
Mol Negative
We must be sure—no respon.—rests on us relative to Iceland,
Turkey, ete Egypt
Points Still Before the Foreign
Ministers
Suggestions in Regard to the Polish
Governmental Question
After further consideration I agree with Mr.
I believe that, with this change, our three positions are not
far apart on the substance of the governmental question. Mr.
The following formula might therefore be considered:
That the present Polish Provisional Government be reorganized
into a fully representative government based on all
democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders
from Poland abroad, to be termed “The Provisional Government
of National Unity”; Mr.
When a “Polish Government of National Unity” is satisfactorily formed, the three Governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.
I attach a suggested paper to hand to Mr.
I think you should likewise ask Mr.
Invitation
The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of ———to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at ——— in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.
The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:
“C. Voting
[The above named governments have agreed that it would, in
their opinion, be desirable that consideration be given at
the forthcoming Conference to the inclusion in the projected
Charter of provisions relating to territorial trusteeships
and dependent areas. They hope to be able to prepare and
place before the Conference proposals relating to these
subjects.]ante, p. 810.
Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.
In the event that the Government of ——— desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.
Invitation
The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of
itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of
China and of the Provisional Government of the French
Republic, invites the Government of ——— to send
representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be
held on April 25 or soon thereafter,
at ——— in the United States of
America to prepare a Charter for a General International
Organization for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
The above named governments suggest that the Conference
consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the
Proposals for the Establishment of a General International
Organization, a
copy
of
which
was
transmitted
to
you
for
your
information
on
October
9,
1944
which were made public last October
and which have now been supplemented
by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI: Insert→
[The above named governments have agreed that it would, in
their opinion, be desirable that consideration be given at
the forthcoming Conference to the inclusion in the projected
Charter of provisions relating to International
territorial trusteeships & dependent areas. They hope to be able
to prepare and place before the
Conference proposals relating to this
ese subjects.]
Further information as
to
the
exact
site
of
the
Conference
and as to arrangements will
be transmitted subsequently.
In the event that the Government of ——— desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.
Report to the Foreign Ministers
We were instructed on February 8 to prepare a report to the Foreign Ministers on the following subjects:
With regard to (a) we consider that
the United States on behalf of the three powers should
consult the Government of China and the Provisional French
Government.
With regard to (b) we attach for the
approval of the Ministers a draft invitation to all the
nations which will take part in the conference.ante, p.
810). A copy of this draft is in the
Draft Conclusion on Persia
The remarkable progress made in the war against Germany has
enabled the American, British and Russian representatives to
consider the application of Article 5 of the Tripartite
Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union and Persia regarding the withdrawal of Allied forces
from Persian territory. It has been agreed that a
commencement of the withdrawal of forces need not await the
termination of hostilities, but should begin pari passu in stages as military
considerations, including the use of the Persian supply
route, may allow. The stages of this gradual withdrawal,
Misunderstandings which have arisen in connection with applications for rights to develop oil resources in Persia were also discussed in the course of the conversations. It was agreed that in the light of the known views of the Persian Government within whose free decision the matter rests, none of the Governments involved would favour pressing any suggestions for further oil concessions upon the Persian Government pending the withdrawal of Allied troops from Persia.
(Possible addition to be held in reserve until it is seen how the discussion proceeds). After the withdrawal the whole question of the future exploitation of Persian oil resources not already covered by existing concessions should be the subject of discussions to be held within the framework of the Tehran Declaration of December 1st 1943 and to which the Persian Government would be a party.
When Dr.
2. The first of these points is that
3. The second point is that legislative acts passed by
[Yalta,] 6th February, 1945.
Draft for Discussion With the Soviet
and American Delegations
Message from the Soviet Government, His Majesty’s Government
and the United States Government to Marshal
The Heads of the three Governments have met and discussed the
Yugoslav question and have agreed to recommend to Marshal
Report to the Plenary Session of the
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, February 9, 1945
1. The Polish Question:
The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish
Governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted
by the American
With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the
Polish Government, Mr.
2. Reparations:
The American Delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.
Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and to the type of reparations in kind Germany should pay.
The Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the
wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the
Reparations Commission should consider in its initial
studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the
Soviet Government, that the total sum of the reparations in
accordance with the points (a) and
(b) of the preceding paragraph,
should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should
go to the Soviet Union. Mr.
The Soviet Delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15% on the prices of the items delivered.
3. Dumbarton Oaks:
It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the subjects of territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.
It was also agreed that these subjects should be discussed at the United Nations Conference itself.
The Sub-Committee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers today. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming Conference. This subject was discussed at today’s meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.
4. Iran:
Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet Delegation to
Notes Regarding the Site for the United
Nations Conference
give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr.
5. Yugoslavia:
On the proposal of the
There was also agreement that before the termination of the
Crimean Conference it would be desirable that agreement
should be reached on the execution of the
Present
Secretariat
Report to the President and the Prime
Minister (
The Meeting had before them the draft of the final report to
the President and the Prime Minister, containing the results
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Argonaut discussions (
The report was accepted and approved by the President and the Prime Minister without amendment.
In the course of the ensuing discussion, the following matters were touched on briefly:
a. There was a discussion of possible
developments after the defeat of Germany and the possible
action of Russia at that time.
1 The text of this report, renumbered C. C. S. 776/3 after
its approval by
The Prime Minister expressed the
opinion that it would be of great value if Russia could be
persuaded to join with the United States, the British
Empire, and China in the issue of a four-power ultimatum
calling upon Japan to surrender unconditionally, or else be
subjected to the overwhelming weight of all the forces of
the four powers. Japan might ask in these circumstances what
mitigation of the full rigour of unconditional surrender
would be extended to her if she accepted the ultimatum. In
this event it would be for the United States to judge the
matter; but there was no doubt that some mitigation would be
worth while if it led to the saving of a year or a year and
a half of a war in which so much blood and treasure would be
poured out. Great Britain would not press for any mitigation
but would be content to abide by the judgment of the United
States. Whatever the decision, Great Britain would see the
matter through to the end.
The President thought that this
was a matter which might well be mentioned to Marshal
b. The Prime
Minister expressed his thanks to the Combined
Chiefs of Staff for the work which they had accomplished. He
said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff was a wonderful
institution which smoothed out so many difficulties, issued
clear directions to the commanders in the field and would
without doubt be held up in years to come as a model of
cooperation between Allies. He hoped very much that the
Combined Chiefs of Staff could be kept in being for three or
four years more. There would be many problems affecting the
security of the two nations in this period, the solution of
which would be greatly facilitated if the Combined Chiefs of
Staff could continue to operate.
The President agreed that there
would be many matters affecting the two countries, such as
the use of bases, which would have to be effectively
handled.
In response to an inquiry by the Prime Minister, General Marshall
expressed his personal opinion that the continuance of
the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be advantageous. Its
existence had certainly simplified the solution of the
problems which had confronted the two nations during the
war.
c. There was a short discussion upon
the provision of intelligence to the Russian armies, and the
President and the Prime Minister were informed of certain
steps which had been agreed in discussion between General
The Meeting then adjourned.
C. C. S. 776/3
Report to the President and Prime
Minister of the Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by
the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the “Argonaut”
Conference
1. The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at Argonaut Conference is submitted
herewith:—
I.Over-all Objective
2. In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.
II.Over-all Strategic Concept for the
Prosecution of the War
3. In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany.
4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.
5. Upon the defeat of Germany, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
III.Basic Undertakings in Support of
Over-all Strategic Concept
6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation:—
IV. Execution of the Over-all Strategic
Concept
Defeat of Germany
The U-Boat War
7. We are concerned with the possibility that German U-boats may again constitute a serious threat to our North Atlantic shipping lanes. It is too early yet to assess the extent to which such an offensive could achieve success, and we propose to review the matter again on 1 April 1945.
8. Meanwhile, we have agreed on the following countermeasures:—
Operations in Northwest Europe
9. In two telegrams,
10 We have taken note of
Strategy in the Mediterranean
11. We have reviewed our strategy in the Mediterranean in the light of the development of the situation in Europe and of the fact that the enemy is at liberty at any time to make a voluntary withdrawal in Italy. We have agreed that our primary object in the war against Germany should be to build up the maximum possible strength on the Western Front and to seek a decision in that theater.
12. In accordance with this concept we have agreed to withdraw certain forces from the Mediterranean Theater and to place them at the disposal of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and to redefine the tasks of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.
13. Our proposals are contained in the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, attached as Appendix “A.”
The War Against Japan
Over-All Objective in the War Against
Japan
14. We have agreed that the over-all objective in the war against Japan should be expressed as follows:
To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:—
Operations in the Pacific Area
15. We have taken note of the plans and operations proposed
by the United States Chiefs of Staff in C. C. S. 417/11
(Appendix “B”).ante, pp. 395–396.
Operations in Southeast Asia Command
16. We have agreed to the following policy in respect of employment in Southeast Asia Command of United States resources deployed in the India-Burma Theater:—
17. We have reviewed the progress of the campaign in Burma and agreed upon the terms of a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. This directive is attached as Appendix “C.”
Planning Dates for the End of the War
Against Germany and Japan
18. We feel that it is important to agree and promulgate planning dates for the end of the war against Germany and Japan. These dates are necessary for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower.
We recommend that the planning dates for the end of the war against Germany should be as follows:—
We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany.
All the above dates to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.
Shipping
19. We have reviewed the over-all cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 1945 under the assumption that Germany is defeated on 1 July 1945.
For the first half of 1945 the principal difficulty will be with cargo shipping, which will be tight and in which deficits will approach unmanageable proportions until V-E Day. We have issued instructions to theater commanders to exercise strict control of shipping and have agreed that deficits should be adjusted in accordance with the following principles:—
In the event of a deficit in shipping resources, first
priority should be given to the basic undertakings in
support of the over-all strategic concepts as agreed in Argonaut.
So long as these first priority requirements are not adequately covered, shipping for other requirements will not be allocated without prior consultation with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff.
20. For the second half of 1945 the principal difficulty will be troop shipping, which will become particularly acute in the last quarter of the year. We have agreed that the matter should be reviewed and a report submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 1 April 1945. This report will take account, from the shipping point of view, of the possibility that the war against Germany may continue beyond 1 July 1945.
Oil
21. We have reviewed and agreed upon the levels of stocks of
all petroleum products that should be maintained in all
theaters. The text of our agreement is attached as Appendix
“D.”
Equipment for Allied and Liberated
Forces
22. The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, has
submitted proposals (
We have agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should proceed to implement the Supreme Commander’s proposals, on the understanding that this will not interfere with the provision of equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe, nor result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.
Directive to Supreme Allied
Commander, Mediterranean, Repeated to
1. It is our primary intention in the war against Germany to build up the maximum possible strength on the Western Front and to seek a decision in that theater. We have, therefore, reviewed your directive and decided as follows:—
Greece
2. The earliest possible discharge of British obligations in Greece must be your constant aim.
The object of British presence and operations in Greece is to secure that part of Greece which is necessary for the establishment of the authority of a free Greek Government.
3. This object must always be regarded in the light of the paramount need for releasing troops from Greece for use against the Germans. You should, therefore, concentrate on building up a Greek force on a national basis as soon as possible.
Italy
4. In pursuance of the policy given in paragraph 1, it has been decided to withdraw from your theater to the Western Front up to five divisions (of which not more than two should be armored) as follows:—
Air Forces
5. Two fighter groups of Twelfth Air Force will be moved
to France at once. Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to
move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth
Air Force as can be released without hazard to the
accomplishment of your mission. You should consult with
6. There will be no significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces.
7. We recognize that these withdrawals will affect the scope of your operations in the Italian Theater. We, therefore, redefine your objects as follows:—
Adriatic
8. Subject to the requirements of
the Italian Theater, you should continue to give all
possible support to the Yugoslav Army of National
Liberation, until the territory of Yugoslavia has been
completely cleared. You will carry out such minor
operations on the eastern shores of the Adriatic as your
resources allow.
Directive to the Supreme Allied
Commander, Southeast Asia
Present
For this luncheon meeting, ante, p.
556. According to Leahy, p.
312, “The conversation centered around voting
procedure in the proposed assembly of the world peace
organization. Churchill agreed orally to an arrangement
whereby the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet
Republics should have equal voting power in the Assembly.” A
notation on the post, p. 857.)
Presentante, p. 757,
General Antonov
opened the meeting with the statement that he had
discussed all of the points raised at the previous meeting
with Marshal ante, pp.
758, 762–763.
General Antonov
then asked for a statement as to our airbase
requirements in the Kamchatka-Nikolaevsk area. It was
decided to have the Air Staffs (Marshal
General Marshall
asked if the Soviets agreed that a high order of
security was necessary in handling all Far Eastern matters
because the Japs may attack if they learn of So
viet-American plans or of the movement of Soviet units. General Antonov
agreed with this view.
General Marshall
asked how many weeks it would be after the movement of
Soviet units to the East began that the Soviets would be
strong enough to meet a Jap attack. General Antonov
replied that it would be “not less than three
months.”
General Marshall
asked when these movements Eastward would begin. General Antonov
replied that the Soviets were initiating the movements
of supplies at this time and stated that “units of troops,
in any size, cannot be moved without attracting notice by
the Japs.”
General Marshall
asked if divisional equipment would precede the
divisions. General Antonov
stated that divisional armor and equipment would move
with the divisions. However, supplies (ammunition, food,
etc.) would precede the movement of divisions.
General Marshall
asked how many divisions per week could be moved from
the German to the Japanese front. General Antonov
replied that a three month period would be required to
move the necessary forces.
General Marshall
stated that Field Marshal
The principal meeting was adjourned with an exchange of statements of pleasure at the free, frank, clear, and definite interchange of information achieved in these conferences between the Russian and American military staffs.
Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
and Major General Kuter
continued to discuss the air side of the
Soviet-American business for
a. General
Kuter
gave to Marshal
b. General
Kuter
gave to Marshal Marshal Khudyakov
requested that Soviet experts on bomb damage
assessment would be permitted to accompany our survey
parties. General Kuter
stated that this was entirely acceptable, and
furthermore, our reports of this survey would be made
available to the Soviets on each of the targets within the
Soviet area if those reports were desired.
c. General
Kuter
stated that our broad requirement in the
Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area was for two large air bases, each
to accommodate one group of very heavy bombers (B–29
Superfortresses). He stated the requirement for 8500 foot
take-off strips with good approaches, and the heavy
construction needed for landing, take-off, and dispersed
parking by 150,000 pound aircraft. General discussion
followed on the heavy bomb tonnages and very heavy
100-octane gasoline requirements of B–29 groups. Marshal Khudyakov
appeared somewhat shaken by the magnitude of the air
base requirement to handle our very heavy bombers. He
repeated the probable necessity that we provide the
materials to handle aviation gasoline storage and
distribution, bomb trailers, and steel planking. Marshal
General Kuter
replied that American aviation engineers would be
available.
d. General Kuter
stated that our request for air bases asked for the
Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area or some more
suitable area. He explained the fact that two
groups of B–29’s in the far North in the
Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area could pour far fewer bombs on
Japan than would be possible if much larger numbers of heavy
bombers (B–17 and B–24) were based in the Vladivostok area
within range of Japanese targets. General Air Marshal
Khudyakov
clearly understood the desire not to prejudice other
decisions and that Vladivostok probably could not be used as
strategic air base area until the Russian ground war with
the Japs in Manchuria had progressed, but stated that he was
anxious to have heavy bombers attacking Japan and that he
would initiate action toward making two bases on the scale
of Poltava available to U. S. strategic air units in the
Vladivostok area.
e. Marshal
Khudyakov
stated his requirement for C–54 type transport
aircraft and acknowledged the reply that General
f. Marshal
Khudyakov
stated a requirement for four to five hundred single
and twin engine trainers, plus 1500—200 to 400 horsepower
trainer engines. The engines are for installation in Russian
trainers. This was a surprise request. General Kuter
replied that single engine primary trainers could be
provided if shipping is available and that sympathetic
consideration would be given to the request when received in
Washington.
g.The current tour of the Army Air
Forces Band in the European Theater, and General General
Kuter
stated that if the Soviets wished to have the band, we
would make it available and would request a visit to
American bases by a Russian military choral group as a
reciprocal gesture. Air Marshal
Khudyakov
voiced his personal hope that such arrangements could
be made and requested that General
h.General
Kuter
handed to Marshal ante, p. 801.Marshal Khudyakov
This meeting concluded in a friendly tone with the statement that the airmen can get along all right, but whatever the nationality, the airmen cannot guarantee agreement by General Staffs.
(Dictated to and transcribed by S/Sgt. Arthur Miller. General
Three (3) copies originally prepared, with distribution made to the individuals indicated below:
Admiral
General Hill–No. 2
General
Three (3) additional copies prepared, with distribution to the individuals indicated below:
General
Admiral King–No. 5
General
Memorandum for the United States Chiefs
of Staff:
Subject: Conference with Russian Staff.
On the afternoon of Friday, February 9th, General
To the First Question—(Changes in projected operations). No change, except for delay in transfer of troops which it had been planned to get under way the first of the year. These troops are now engaged in the Central Sector on the Eastern Front, therefore the delay.
To the Second Question—(Necessity for Pacific Supply route).
Marshal
To the Third Question—(U. S. Airbases). Aviation bases in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk region will be given the United States Air Forces. Reconnaissances can now be made.
To the Fourth Question—(U. S. Defenses Kamchatka). Because Kamchatka is very far from the mainland United States assistance there will be very helpful.
To the Fifth Question—(Soviet construction for U. S.). When it is finally decided in exactly what places and what types of construction are required for the United States Air Forces in the district mentioned in the third question, the Russians will be able to carry out this construction for the United States forces. Assistance in the way of matériel is very desirable—gasoline tankage, knock-down buildings, etc.
To the Sixth Question—(Kamchatka Survey party). With regard to the reconnaissance of the Kamchatka region we ask you to arrange for the departure of the party only at the very last moment because under present conditions it is impossible to make the reconnaissance in secrecy. This does not apply to the reconnaissance of the Amur River district.
To the Seventh Question—(Occupation of Sakhalin). The Russians will take the southern half of Sakhalin Island considering this should be one of the first operations.
(Opening of the Straits of La Perouse). Answer is the same as yesterday. The Russians will do this.
To the Eighth Question—(Moscow Planning). Marshal
To the Ninth Question—(Effect of weather on operations). From a ground force point of view the most difficult conditions will be experienced in the thaws and floods in April and May and although June is a favorable month, July and August are undesirable. As far as the ground forces are concerned weather will be most favorable in September, October and November. At sea weather is favorable in July, August and September.
To the Tenth Question—(Additional weather stations). Arrangements will be made to open additional stations if the details will be presented to the Russian authorities.
General
General
General
General
General
General
Present
The President said he understood
the Foreign Ministers had another report to make, and he
would ask Mr.
Mr. Stettinius
then reported on the results of xthe discussion
concerning the Polish question as follows:post, pp. 858–860.
The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish
Governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted
by the American Delegation.Ante, pp.
815–816.
With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the
Polish Government, Mr.
It was decided, at Mr.
Mr. Molotov
said that the Soviet Delegation accepted as a basis of
discussion the proposal put forward this morning at the
meeting by Mr.
The present Provisional Government of Poland should be reorganized on a wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad, and in this connection this government would be called the National Provisional Government of Poland.
He added that the next two sentences remained unchanged, but
he had a slight amendment to the last sentence, namely that
the words “non-Fascist and anti-Fascist” be added before the
words “democratic parties.” He then said that he felt the
last sentence dealing with the responsibilities of the
Ambassadors of the three Governments in Warsaw to observe
and report on the carrying out of the free elections should
be eliminated since he felt certain this would be offensive
to the
Mr. Molotov
said he had one more request, and that was that the
ante, pp.
251–254.
The Prime Minister replied he
thought that the Yugoslavia question was virtually settled
and would take no time, but he thought it better to proceed
immediately to discuss the Polish question. He said he was
glad to see that an advance had been made at the meeting of
the Foreign Ministers and to hear Mr.
The President then proposed that
Mr.
Marshal Stalin
and The Prime Minister
agreed.
The Prime Minister repeated that
he felt that this great prize should not be imperilled by
too much haste, and he definitely did not want to leave this
conference without an agreement on the subject, which he
felt to be the most important we had before us.
Mr. Stettinius
then read the following report of the meeting of
Foreign Ministers on the results of their discussions on
reparations:
The American Delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.
Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and to the types of reparations in kind Germany should pay.
The Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the
wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the
Reparations Commission should consider in its initial
studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the
Soviet Government, that the total sum of the reparations in
accordance with the points (a) and
(b) of the preceding paragraph,
should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should
go to the Soviet Union.
Mr.
The Soviet Delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15% on the prices of the items delivered.
Mr.
It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference [on] providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.
The Prime Minister interrupted
with great vigor to say that he did not agree with one
single word of this report on trusteeships. He said that he
had not been consulted nor had he heard of this subject up
to now. He said that under no circumstances would he ever
consent to forty or fifty nations thrusting interfering
fingers into the life’s existence of the British Empire. As
long as he was Minister, he would never yield one scrap of
their heritage. He continued in this vein for some
minutes.ix–x.
Mr. Stettinius
explained that this reference to the creation of
machinery was not intended to refer to the British Empire,
but that it had in mind particularly dependent areas which
would be taken out of enemy control, for example, the
Japanese islands in the Pacific. He said that it was felt
that provision had to be made for machinery to handle this
question of trusteeship for dependent areas taken from the
enemy and he repeated that this was not intended to refer to
the British Empire.
The Prime Minister accepted Mr.
Marshal Stalin
said he would be glad to give the Crimea as a place to
be used for meetings of the three powers.post, p. 858.
Mr. Stettinius
then completed reading the report of the meeting of
Foreign Ministers, as follows:
Trusteeships (continued)
It was also agreed that this subject should be discussed at the United Nations Conference itself.
The Sub-Committee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers today. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming Conference. This subject was discussed at today’s meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.
Iran
Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet
Delegation to give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr.
Ante, pp.
819–820.
Yugoslavia
On the proposal of the
There was also agreement that before the termination of the
Crimean Conference it would be desirable that agreement
should be reached on the execution of the
The Prime Minister then asked if
the Soviet Government had agreed to the two amendments
proposed by Mr.
Mr. Molotov
replied that it was a question of putting the
agreement speedily into effect and that amendments meant
more delays. He said that it would be better to ask
The Prime Minister inquired
whether it was too much to ask that legislative acts of the
temporary authorities be subject to confirmation by
democratic processes.
Marshal Stalin
said that delays were very undesirable and that if the
British proposed two more amendments the Soviet Government
might propose some of their own. In the meantime, the
government of Yugoslavia was held in the balance.
The Prime Minister said you
couldn’t say this, as
Marshal Stalin
replied that
Mr. Eden
replied that it was not a question of amendments
before the agreement went into force but merely that this
conference request that they be adopted. He said that
Subasic was going to ask for it anyway and as
Marshal Stalin
said the first of the British amendments provided that
any former members of the Skupshtina who had not
collaborated with the Germans should be included in the
anti-Fascist Vetch,
Mr. Eden remarked that he felt if
we could agree here on the amendments then we could ask
Marshal Stalin
agreed to this proposal. He added that he thought it
would be a good idea to send a telegram stating the desires
of the three powers to have the agreement put into effect
irrespective of the King’s wishes.
The Prime Minister and Mr. Eden
explained that the question of the King had been
settled and anyway wasn’t important, and Su-basic was on his
way to Yugoslavia, unless weather had prevented him, to put
the agreement into effect. The Prime Minister added that he
thought we should here agree to advise the adoption of the
amendments.
Marshal Stalin
said that he had already agreed, and as a man of his
word he would not go back on it.
There was then a half-hour intermission for the study of the Polish proposals.
The President said that after
studying Mr.
The Prime Minister said he agreed
with the President that progress had been made, but he felt
that the draft might be tied up by the Foreign Ministers
this afternoon. He said that he had two points now that he
wished to emphasize. He felt it was desirable to mention in
the beginning the new situation that had been created as a
result of the liberation of Poland by the Red Army which
called for a government more broadly based. He said this
might be an ornament but nevertheless an important ornament.
He said the second question was more important and related
to the last sentence of the United States draft. He said he
would make an appeal to Marshal
The Prime Minister continued that
he personally would welcome observers of the three powers in
any area where they appeared needed. He therefore felt that
the last sentence of the United States draft in regard to
responsibilities of the Ambassadors was very important. He
said that he understood that
Marshal Stalin
remarked that he understood the Egyptian elections
where he had heard that the very greatest politicians spent
their time buying each other, but this could not be compared
with Poland since there was a high degree of literacy in
Poland. He inquired as to the literacy in Egypt, and neither
the Prime Minister or Mr.
The Prime Minister remarked that
he did not mean to compare Poland with Egypt, but he had to
give the House of Commons real assurance that free elections
would be held. For instance, would
Marshal Stalin
remarked that
The Prime Minister suggested this
question be considered by the Foreign Ministers tonight.
Marshal Stalin
remarked that he thought this was a matter which
should be discussed in the presence of the Poles.
The Prime Minister said he thought
this was a matter which was necessary to carry through and
that it was important to assure the House of Commons that
free elections would be held in Poland, . . .
Marshal Stalin, in reply to this
observation, said they were good people and in olden times
many of them were scientists. He mentioned
The President said he would like
to add one word. He felt that the elections was the crux of
the whole matter, and since it was true, as Marshal
Marshal Stalin
then said he had before him the Declaration on
Liberated Europe, and Mr. post, pp. 862–863.
In this connection, support will be given to the political
leaders of those countries who have taken an active part in
the struggle against the German invaders.post, p. 863.
Marshal
The President pointed out that the
Declaration would of course apply to any areas or countries
where needed as well as to Poland.
The Prime Minister said he did not
dissent from the President’s proposed Declaration as long as
it was clearly understood that the reference to the Atlantic
Charter did not apply to the British Empire. He said he had
already made plain in the House of Commons that as far as
the British Empire was concerned the principles already
applied. He said he had given Mr.
The President inquired if that was
what had killed Mr.
The President said that in earlier
drafts France had been included but was now absent.
Marshal Stalin
remarked that three powers were better than four.
The Prime Minister said it might
be possible to ask France to associate itself with the
Declaration.
The President suggested that this
matter be considered by the three Foreign Ministers
tonight.
Marshal Stalin
said that the Prime Minister need have no anxiety that
Mr.
The Prime Minister said he was not
anxious about Greece—that he merely desired that everybody
should have a fair chance and do his duty.
Marshal Stalin
said he thought it would have been very dangerous if
he had allowed other forces than his own to go into
Greece.
The Prime Minister said he would
welcome a Soviet observer in Greece.
Marshal Stalin
said he had complete confidence in British policy in
Greece.
The Prime Minister expressed
gratification in this statement.
The Prime Minister then said that
they should touch on, at this conference, the question of
war criminals—that is, those whose crimes had no
geographical limitation.
Mr. Molotov
inquired whether his amendment to the Declaration was
acceptable.
The President replied that he
thought it should be considered by the Foreign
Ministers.
Marshal Stalin
said that we could then consider it agreed that the
The Prime Minister concurred.
Marshal Stalin
made some reference to sending a telegram to
The Prime Minister said that he
personally had drafted the Declaration on German atrocities
issued by the Moscow Conference which dealt with the subject
of the main criminals whose crimes had no geographical
location. He said it was an egg that he had laid himself and
he thought a list of the major criminals of this category
should be drawn up here. He said he thought they should be
shot once their identity is established.
Marshal Stalin
asked about
The Prime Minister said he thought
that events would catch up with
Marshal Stalin
replied in the affirmative. He then asked if the war
criminal question applied to prisoners of war.
The Prime Minister replied that it
did if they had violated the laws of war. He said that we
should merely have an exchange of views here and no
publicity should be given to the matter.
Marshal Stalin
inquired if the offensive on the Western Front had
begun.
The Prime Minister said yes—about
100,000 British launched an attack yesterday morning and
made an advance of about 3,000 yards over a five-mile front.
He said the defense had been weak except in two villages,
and were now in contact with the defenses of the Siegfried
Line. He said the second wave, of the United States 9th
Army, was to start tomorrow. He added that this offensive
was to continue and grow in intensity.
The meeting then adjourned until four o’clock tomorrow.
The President opened the meeting by calling on Mr.
Molotov: We accept as a basis the
proposal put forward this morning by Mr.
I have one more request to make. The carrying out of the
Yugoslav settlement has been delayed. Since Mr.
Prime Minister: We can settle that
in just a few minutes but let us wait until we finish
discussing Poland. (This was agreed to.) I am glad to see
that there has been a great advance towards a solution of
the Polish question. I should like to have more time to
study the problem.
(The President suggested a half hour intermission and this was agreed to but the Prime Minister continued.)
I mean more than that. I do not feel that we should hurry away from the Crimea leaving these vital problems unsolved or reach hasty decisions. These are among the most important days that any of us shall live. Of course you could all go away and leave me in this delightful spot but I do urge that we stay a little bit longer to conclude our discussions satisfactorily.
(There was no comment by either the President or Marshal
On Yugoslavia there were only two amendments to the agreement
which Marshal
Stalin: I agree with both of the
suggested amendments but after the unified government is
formed we will be in a position to carry them out. I propose
that we first proceed with the formation of this unified
government of
(A copy of the British proposed amendments to the ante, p. 821.
Eden: We agree to this if it is
likewise agreed that both of us will support the adoption of
these amendments.
Stalin: This must be finished
before we separate. We must have a promise that the
Eden: We telegraphed last night to
find out but have not yet heard. Any delay must be due to
weather.
(Here followed the intermission during which consideration
was given by the Americans and British to
President: I find that it is now
largely a question of etymology—of finding the right words.
We are nearer than we have ever been before. I believe there
is a chance of real agreement to settle this question of the
period before the Poles can hold their election. I have two
examples of what I mean by the use of words. Mr.
Prime Minister: I agree with the
President that there has been continuous progress towards a
united declaration by the three principal powers. I agree
with the President that the matter should be tidied up by
the three foreign secretaries and reported to us tomorrow.
But there are two points which I should like to emphasize
now. The first is a small one. It arises out of what Marshal
The other point is much more important. That is the last
sentence of the United States draft. I want to make an
appeal to Marshal
Stalin: I do not believe much in
Egyptian elections. It is all rotten corruption there. They
buy each other.
Prime Minister: Anyway, we seek
this formula.
Stalin: What percentage of the
people read and write in Egypt? In Poland 70% can read and
write.
Prime Minister: I do not know the
Egyptian percentage, but I meant no comparison with Poland.
I only wanted fair elections. This should be considered with
the Poles. I do not want to go on any longer. We have agreed
to think this over. But I must be able to tell Parliament
that elections will be free and fair.
Stalin:
Prime Minister: Yes, specifically
as a government is formed.
Stalin: Yes, the Peasant Party
will be represented. This can be done in the presence of the
Poles with various people present.
Prime Minister: In Parliament I
must be able to say that the elections will be held in a
fair way. I do not care much about Poles myself.
Stalin: There are some very good
people among the Poles. They are good fighters. Of course,
they fight among themselves too. I think on both sides there
are non-Fascist and anti-Fascist elements.
Prime Minister: I do not like this
division. Anybody can call anybody anything. We prefer the
terminology democratic parties.
Stalin: I refer to the declaration
on liberated areas. On the whole I approve it. I find in a
certain paragraph the same expression, anti-Nazism and
anti-Fascism.
President: This is the first
example for the use of the declaration. It has the phrase to
create democratic institutions of their own choice. The next
paragraph contains the following: (c)
to form interim governmental authorities broadly
representative of all democratic elements in the population
and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through
free elections of governments responsive to the will of the
people.
Stalin: We accept that paragraph
three.
President: I want this election in
Poland to be the first one beyond question. It should be
like
Stalin: They said that about her
but in fact she had her sins.
President: I don’t want the Poles
to be able to question the Polish elections. The matter is
not only one of principle but of practical politics.
Molotov: We are afraid to leave
this phrase in without consulting with the Poles. They will
feel that it shows a lack of confidence in them. It is
better to leave it to the Poles.
President: Why not leave this for
the foreign ministers and talk about it tomorrow?
Stalin: I think in the first place
in the words “present provisional Polish government” we can
delete the word “present.” We can say, “the Polish
government which acts in Poland.”
President: The only thing left is
this declaration on liberated areas.
Prime Minister: I do not dissent
from this declaration but I want to be on record that the
Atlantic Charter I once interpreted as affecting the British
empire. We are pursuing the Atlantic Charter. I sent a copy
of this interpretation to
President: Was that what killed
him? (Laughter)
Prime Minister: I will furnish the
conference with a copy of this record. (This part was not
clear.)
Eden: I suppose it would be left
open for France to associate herself with this declaration
at a later date.
Stalin: Three would be better.
Molotov: I should like to add at
the end of the third from last paragraph the following
phrase: “and there will be secured a wide measure of support
to men in those countries who have taken active part in the
struggle against German occupation.”
Prime Minister: (This seemed
irrelevant) On Greece there was no question of setting up an
allied commission but if Marshal
Stalin: I have full confidence in
the way things are going.
Prime Minister: I should like to
discuss the treatment of war criminals. I sent a paper to
the conference at Moscow. This is an egg I have laid myself.
(He then discusses at some length the question of having
lists prepared of principal war criminals and the question
of holding trials.) There is nothing of course that would be
said in public about this because I fear retaliation on our
prisoners. (The President indicates that we are not ready to
discuss this question at this meeting.)
President: I propose
adjournment.
Prime Minister: I should like to
announce that the British troops began an attack at dawn
yesterday in the Nijmegen area. They advanced about three
thousand years [yards] and are now in
contact with the Siegfried Line. They were not strongly
resisted. Several hundred prisoners were taken. Tomorrow the
second wave will follow and the American Ninth Army comes
in. The offensive will continue without cessation.
The meeting adjourned.
Get copy of Eden’s report of 2/8
Q of invitation to Poland
Plenary session
2/9 4.18 p m
ERS read his report
Mol: After Polish part
New suggestions—postponed
till
conclusion
of
report
Amendments to Am. proposal re “reorg” etc & re Ambs.
Church: glad see advance
But going say something before goes on Refers to some private
talks we have had about Lublin To Pres—if you will forgive
me Can’t
be
hurried Feels this matter
can’t be hurried. It may be complete meeting of minds can be
achieved in the time we have in view. There are only 48 hrs
left. I do not like to feel spoiling whole thing. Must say
we should, if nee, take a day’s latitude. If we leave here
without agt about Pol whatever else we say we shall have
failed on the most dangerous & tiresome matter I haven’t
taken it all in fully
Plenary session 2/9
4:28 p. m.
ERS read report
Mol. After Pol. section, Mol.
proposed amendments to U. S. paper of this morning
Re Terr trusteeship part of ERS
report
I absolutely refuse to engage myself in that without
consultation with the dominions. I will not have 1 scrap of
the Brit Empire . . . (lost) . . . .
I will not consent to a repres of Brit Em. going to any conference where we will be placed in the dock & asked to defend ourselves Never, Never, Never
If you tell me we are not to go & be brought up before a vague tribunal & be told how to be good & proper I will not object.
Every scrap of terr. over which Brit flag flies is immune
ERS: Only plan is to provide machinery for trusteeship if org. wants set it up. We had in mind Jap. mandated islands to be taken from Jap.
We have nothing in mind in relation to Brit Empire.
Church: We desire no territory
Say it will in no way affect integrity of Brit. Em.
(In intermission a formula was agreed to)
Decl, on Lib. Eur.
Referred Pol q. back to For. Mins. for night session
Church: made speech in favor of Ambs. watching over Pol election
When in discussion of this Church said we don’t like word fascist, St referred to Decl. on Lib. Eur. 2, 1st sentence & said he liked Decl.
Pres. then read ¶ 3 from (c) on.
St: We accept that
Pres: spoke of need of elections being above suspicion
Pres then brought up Decl,
formally
Church I do not assent from this but I would like it on
record that Atl. Ch. was interpreted by me on my return from
Newfoundland in short ¶ I read to H of C. that we were
pursuing these aims in Brit Em. That is a part of our
interpretation. I sent it to Wendel
Pres Was that what killed him?
Church. I will furnish conf, with copy of this code (?)
Ed. Might be left open to 3 powers to associate the Fr. with them if they so desire
St. Three will be better—looks better
Ed. I don’t want to change it now
Mol—amendment addition: at the end—of next to 3rd from last comma
&:
When
the
3
Govts
will
consult
the
other
Un
Ns give strong & there
will be executed wide measures of support to the men of
these countries who take took active part struggle in the
fight ag. Ger. occupation.
No other suggestion
Pres: I like the thought. Let For Mins look at the language
St to Church who was about to say something “Are you worried
about Gr.”
Church I should like election in Gr.
St. I don’t want to control Mr Church.
Church: I don’t want to control the elections
If Mar. St. wants to send in some of his resp. officers they can go where they like
St I have every conf. in the Brit. policy
Church Let
Church: One q. we shall have to consider at—war
criminals
Ret to AH
P. M. & President,
(Insert A)Add to ERS report of 2/9
Territorial trusteeship would apply only to:
It would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which
territories within the above categories would actually be
placed under trusteeship. No discussions of actual specific territories
are contemplated now or at the United Nations Conference.
Only machinery & principles of trusteeship would be
formulated at the Conference for inclusion in the
Charter.
Report to the Plenary Session of the
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, February 9, 1945
1. The Polish Question:
The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish
Governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted
by the American Delegation. This memorandum, in accordance
with Mr.
With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the
Polish Government, Mr.
2. Reparations:
The American Delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.
Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and to the types of reparations in kind, Germany should pay.
The Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the
wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the
Reparations Commission should consider in its inital studies
as a basis for discussion, the suggestion of the Soviet
Government, that the total sum of the reparations in
accordance with the points (a) and
(b) of the preceding paragraph,
should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should
go to the Soviet Union. Mr.
The Soviet Delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15% on the prices of the items delivered.
3. Dumbarton Oaks:
It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeships.
Territorial trusteeship would apply only to:
It would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which territories within the above categories would actually be placed under trusteeship. No discussions of specific territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations Conference. Only machinery and principles of trusteeship would be formulated at the Conference for inclusion in the Charter.
A Sub-Committee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming Conference.
This subject was discussed at today’s meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.
4. Iran:
Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet
Delegation to give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr.
5. Yugoslavia:
On the proposal of Mr.
There was also agreement that before the termination of the
Crimean Conference it would be desirable that agreement
should be reached on the execution of the
Declaration on Liberated Europe
The President of the United States of America, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert the action of their four governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.
The retreat of the Nazi war machine and the collapse of its
puppet regimes, under the relentless blows of the victorious
armies and resistance forces of the United Nations, are
leaving behind confusion and disorder, and incalculable
distress and suffering. The agony of the liberated peoples
must be relieved. Swift steps must be taken
The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a promise of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them.
To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may
exercise these rights, the four governments will take joint
action in any European liberated state and any former Axis
satellite state in Europe where in the judgment of the four
governments conditions may make such action necessary, to
assist the peoples concerned (a) to
establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for care of
distressed peoples and for solution of pressing economic
problems; (c) to set up governmental
authorities broadly representative of all democratic
elements in the population and pledged to the earliest
possible establishment through free elections of governments
responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to arrange and conduct free elections held to
determine the type and composition of governments.
The four governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.
In carrying out this declaration the four governments will, usually, act through their respective ambassadors nearest to the area concerned, although on occasion the four governments may determine to appoint special commissions charged with responsibility for carrying out the policy of this declaration with respect to particular areas. Such ambassadors of the four governments as have been authorized jointly to take action pursuant to the declaration, and any special commission which may be established for the same purpose, shall meet quarterly with the foreign ministers of the four governments at places to be selected hereafter.
By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and general well-being of all mankind.
Declaration on Liberated Europe
The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.
The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.
To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may
exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly
assist the people in any European liberated state or former
Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment
conditions require, (a) to establish
conditions of internal peace; (b) to
carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed
peoples; (c) to form interim
governmental authorities broadly representative of all
democratic elements in the population and pledged to the
earliest possible establishment through free elections of
governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the
holding of such elections.
The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.
When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.
By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.
Amendment proposed by Mr.
“and strong support will be given to those people in these countries who took an active part in the struggle against German occupation.”
Present
Subject: Examination of the Draft Relating
to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet
and Allied Armies.ante, pp. 754–756).
Examination of the Draft Relating to
Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet
and Allied Armies
Preamble.
No comment.
Article I.
No comment.
Article II paragraph 1.
Mr.
Article II, paragraph 3.
Mr.
Article III.
Mr. Ante, pp.
416–418.
“3. The competent British and Soviet authorities will supply liberated Soviet citizens and British subjects with food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the authorities at the other side at places agreed upon between the sides on the following basis:
“(a) Ex-prisoners of war shall be
provided with all forms of supply (stores and food) on a
basis laid down respectively for privates, non-commissioned
officers and officers.
“(b) Civilians will be supplied on a
basis laid down for privates.
“The parties will not mutually demand compensation for these or other services which their authorities may respectively supply to liberated Soviet citizens or British subjects.”
It will be noticed that the Soviet draft makes no mention of
In endeavoring to find a compromise the British suggested a draft omitting the first three lines of Article III (up to the parenthetical statement) and revise the last sentence of the first paragraph to read as follows:
“The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall make distinction between military rank but shall apply to liberated civilians and liberated members of the respective forces.”
The Soviets explained that the reference to
Article IV.
The Soviets requested the insertion of the words “in agreement with the other party” twice after the words “liberty to use.”
Article V.
The British wish to add the words “except for the cases of payment of Lira in Italy which shall be subject to future discussions” at the end of the second paragraph.
The Russians stated that they thought this insertion should read “except for the cases of payment of Lira,_______, and_______, in Italy, Rumania, and Bulgaria which shall be the subject of future discussions.”
Article VI.
The British pointed out that they had added a new sentence which had not as yet been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This sentence which comes at the end of the article, reads as follows:
“Any liberated member of the respective forces who is unwilling to perform such will be exercised under similar supervision.”
Article VII.
No comment.
Article VIII.
No comment.
In addition to the above comments, it was considered advisable to include an additional article reading to the effect that “the agreement enters into force upon signature.”
The British representative also stated that his Government desired to exchange notes with the Soviet Government concerning nationals of other countries, (Belgium, Holland, Poland), in British uniform who were liberated by the Russian armies.
The question also came up as to whether a tri-lateral or two bilateral agreements should be signed. The Russians indicated that they were prepared to sign either document.
It was suggested that a further meeting be called tomorrow at
3:30 p. m.
Revised British Wording, Feb.
9.
Article 6.
X [Ex-] Prisoners of War (with the
exception of officers) and civilians of each of the
contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be
employed in the management, maintenance and
administration of the camps or billets in which they are
situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis
on other work in the vicinity of their camps in
furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with
agreement to be reached between the competent Soviet
and
{United States/British authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between these authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their officers. Any liberated member of the respective forces who is unwilling to perform such work will be exercised under similar supervision.
Present
Subjects: Poland
Declaration on Liberated Areas
The meeting was opened by Mr. Molotov
announcing that we had come together to discuss
formulas with regard to Poland. Mr.
Eden
interrupted to say that he had just had a strong cable
from the War Cabinet indicating that the earlier basis of
discussion had not been satisfactory. He must, therefore,
frankly say if we cannot get something like his text of
three days ago there seems no chance of the British
Government approving a formula. (The text of Mr. Post, pp.
869–870.Post, pp.
870–871.Mr.
Molotov
objected, or whether it should be considered merely a
modification of the American formula to which amendments
could be added. This latter viewpoint was finally accepted,
Mr. Eden
explaining that the first two sentences were merely a
reiteration of what the Prime Minister had said in the
afternoon.
After a lengthy but amicable discussion, the following text was agreed to by all three:
“A new situation has been created by the complete liberation
of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment
of a provisional Polish government more broadly based than
was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland.
The provisional government now functioning in Poland should
be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the
inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from
those living abroad. This new government will then be called
the ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.’ Mr.
“When a ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition.”
The one important point on which considerable discussion failed to produce agreement was with respect to the addition of a further sentence along the following lines:
“The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.”
Mr. Stettinius
and Mr. Eden
emphasized the importance of the inclusion of some
such sentence if recognition is to be transferred from the
London Government because of its effect on public opinion in
their respective countries. Mr.
Molotov
insisted that this was a point that could be discussed
with the Poles by the commission of three in Moscow but
could not be included without such discussion as it would
offend their sensibilities. Mr.
Stettinius
then proposed a variation of that sentence, reading as
following:
“The three governments recognizing their responsibility as a result of the present agreement for the future right of the Polish people freely to choose the government and institutions under which they are to live, will receive reports on this subject from their ambassadors in Warsaw.”
Mr. Molotov
had the same objections to this sentence. It was left
that the question would be put up to the Big Three Meeting
this afternoon.
The second point discussed concerned Mr.
“And in this connection support should be given to the political leaders of these countries who took an active part in the struggle against the German invaders.”
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he could not accept this addition and that
it did not appear pertinent to the declaration. He said that
it appeared like too much interference in the affairs of
these countries and involved taking decisions on who had
collaborated with the enemy, which should be left to the
peoples of these countries themselves. Mr. Eden
expressed full concurrence with those views. It was
agreed likewise to refer this to the next session of the Big
Three.
Eden: Done work—put together a
piece of work.
Mol: Objects new text—Wants
old
Eden: Cable War Cab tonight
objecting his text 3 days ago. and extent of departure from
other text. Says frankly, if can’t get something like this
text no chance of Brit Govt approving
Mol: Cant talk from a new text
Eden: Has had text 2½ days
Mol: Until now hasnt had text
& can’t judge it.
Eden: 1st par. exactly what P. M.
read out this p. m.
Mol: Differs from text this a. m.
& big conference. Objects “represent” pol govt. Whether
de G.
Eden: Proposes amend, in 1st 2
sen. This in accord with P. M.s suggest.
Mol: Thinks “represent govt
requires much explan. De G. Amend in Connection with prev.
Govt now
Eden: Must be frank. Wants
transfer recog. to new govt—not
reorgan. Lublin govt.
Mol: One further step
Last ¶ must be discussed
Revised Formula for Poland
British Revised Formula Submitted at
the Meeting of Foreign Secretaries After the Plenary
Session of February 9, 1945
“A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a fully representative provisional Polish Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. This Government should be based upon the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland and upon other democratic Polish leaders from within Poland and from abroad. This new Government should be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
“Mr.
“When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been formed, which the three Governments can regard as fully representative of the Polish people, the three Governments will accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective Governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.”
Present
Subjects:post, p. 882.
Mr. Eden, who presided, opened the
meeting.
1. The Polish Formula.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that the American experts as well as the
President had given serious study to the Polish formulaAnte, p.
867.
Later in the conversation Mr. Eden
stated that he did not wish to indicate during the
conversation on the Polish formula that he agreed with the
American proposal to drop this last sentence.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he, of course, preferred the document as
it existed. The President, however, was so anxious to reach
agreement that he was willing to make this concession.
Mr. Molotov
stated that he had several amendments to the formula.
He proposed that “as soon as practicable” be changed to “as
soon as possible.” He also proposed that the last part of
the last paragraph be drafted to read: “the Governments of
the United States of America and Great Britain will
establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Government as
has been done by the Soviet Union.”post, p. 884.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he could not agree with this second
change.
Mr. Molotov
pointed out that a special situation existed in
Poland. The Soviet Government had accorded the Polish
Government recognition, whereas, the United States and Great
Britain had not.
Mr. Eden
said that the Government referred to in the formula
was a new government and that it was most necessary that the
three Allies move together in recognizing it.
Mr. Stettinius
supported Mr.
Mr. Molotov
stated that the present situation was a different one
and that the document would reflect this difference. He
referred to the inadvisability of prejudicing the present
situation or raising difficulties in the rear of the Red
Army. He suggested that the matter be given consideration
and be subsequently discussed. Mr. post, pp. 883–884, and Eden’s report to the Seventh Plenary
Meeting, post, p. 898.
2. Declaration on Liberated
Europe.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he had consulted with his experts and with
the President on the Declaration on Liberated Areas and that
he was obliged to say that the American Government found it
impossible to accept the amendment proposed by Mr. Ante, pp.
862–863.
Mr. Molotov
stated that he wished to submit a second amendment. He
suggested that in the fifth paragraph the words “they will
immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying
out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this
declaration,” be replaced by the words “they will
immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual
consultation.”
Mr. Stettinius
and Mr. Eden
agreed to this formula.
Mr. Stettinius
inquired as to the status of Mr.
Mr. Molotov
agreed that it should be dropped, though he remarked
that he thought it very useful in that it might prevent
recurrences similar to those in Greece.
Mr. Eden
inquired whether the British proposalsPost, p.
884.
Mr. Molotov replied that he had not
had sufficient time to give full consideration to this
proposal. He suggested that it be discussed at the four
o’clock meeting.
Mr. Stettinius
observed that he approved highly the British proposal
and recommended that it be included in the Declaration.
3. Yugoslavia.
Mr. Eden
stated that he had been informed that Subasic was due
to leave today or tomorrow for Belgrade. The principal
question under dispute, as he understood it, has been about
the names of the Regents. However, in the British view,
there was no reason why this should hold up the execution of
the agreement. If Mr.
Mr. Molotov
inquired whether any mention should be made of
Yugoslavia in the Crimea Conference Communiqué.
Mr. Eden
suggested that both courses might be advisable.
Mr.
Mr. Eden
stated that he would submit such a draft telegram to
the Foreign Ministers for consideration.Post, pp.
919–920.
4. Reparations.
Mr. Eden
stated that he wished to reserve the position of the
British Government with respect to pre-war debts and claims.
He was in favor of setting up the Reparations Commission as
soon as possible.
Mr. Maisky
interjected that unless the British agreed to the
American draft submitted February 9,Ante, p.
808.
Mr. Eden
stated that he agreed on the principles involved in
the American proposals concerning the immediate withdrawal
of property from Germany and the annual contributions.
However, he wished to submit a redraft of the
proposals.Post, p.
885.
Mr. Eden
stated that reparations should be considered in
connection with the dismemberment of Germany. There seemed
to be two Russian objectives which were difficult to
reconcile—the depletion of German manufacturing capacity and
the insuring of German ability to make large payments at a
later date. The British were most anxious to avoid
conditions in which it would be necessary for them to
finance and feed Germany at a later date as a result of
reparations. Furthermore, the British would like France on
the Moscow Commission from the start. The British Government
also felt that the question of labor should be considered by
the Moscow Commission and that it would be inadvisable to
name any figure for deliveries until the Moscow Commission
had started its work. In addition, reparations arrangements
should be made without prejudices to the restitution of
looted property.
Mr. Molotov
agreed to this last statement.
Mr. Maisky
stated that Mr.
Mr. Eden
interjected that this was not the case; however, he
could say that the Prime Minister did not believe that the
Russians would receive anywhere near as much as they hoped
for.
Mr. Maisky
stated that naturally when the dismemberment of
Germany had been decided in a practical form the reparations
plan must be adjusted. This problem was considered from its
initiation. There was no contradiction. The amount of annual
payments were quite possible after the contemplated
removals. If Mr. Mr. Maisky
maintained that the British could easily agree to the
formula.
Mr. Eden
maintained that the British wished a period shorter
than ten years for the reparations payments. They preferred
five years.
Mr. Stettinius
pointed out that the ten-year period was merely
mentioned as a basis for discussion. It might result that
all the capital movements could be effected in seven years.
He added that the Soviet Government was not committing
itself to ten years or twenty billion dollars.
Mr. Eden
inquired why this time limit should then be put in the
formula.
Mr. Maisky
replied that it was desired as a basis for
discussion.
Mr. Eden
stated that he would submit an alternative draft and
that he hoped that the subject might be discussed at the
4:00 o’clock meeting.
5. Communiqué on the Crimean
Conference.
Mr. Molotov
inquired whether any thought had been given to the
communiqué on the Conference.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that the American Delegation was drafting
something for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers. He
suggested that the first item on the afternoon’s agenda be
the question of a communiqué and that the drafting of a
communiqué be assigned to the Foreign Ministers.
Mr. Molotov
and Mr. Eden
agreed to this suggestion.
6. World Organization.
Mr. Eden
stated that he wished to submit a report of the
subcommittee.Post, pp.
885–886.
Mr. Molotov
stated that he agreed to both points contained in the
report, i. e., regarding the method of consulting France and
China and the text of the invitation to the Conference.
Mr. Eden
and Mr. Stettinius
also agreed.
7. Austro-Yugoslav Frontier.
Mr. Eden
stated that this problem would surely arise and that
he did not wish a repetition of “Athens”. He wished to
submit a small paper on the question.Post, p.
887.
Mr. Molotov
stated that he would wish to study this paper before
discussing it.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he felt that paragraph (b) on page two went beyond the period of
occupation and that it might be improved by redrafting.
8. Yugoslav-Italian Frontier.
Mr. Eden
stated that he wished to submit a paper on this
question. He added that he did not expect to discuss it at
the present meeting. A copy of this document is
attached.Post, pp.
888–889.
9. Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations.
In accordance with Mr. Mr.
Molotov
stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the
Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty of alliance. The British Embassy
in Moscow had transmitted to the
Narkomindel
a note on the Balkan Federation in which it was
stressed that such a Federation might include Turkey. This
was not an urgent matter at the present time; however there
were conversations in progress between Yugoslavia and
Bulgaria on a treaty of friendship and alliance. The Soviet
Government entertained favorable views on this treaty and
had informed the British accordingly. The Bulgarians and
Yugoslavs were collaborating militarily against the Germans
in Yugoslavia. There should, consequently, be no objections
to such a treaty.
Mr. Eden
stated that this treaty raised the important question
of principle. The British held the view that former enemy
states should be debarred from entering into treaty
relations with other states when they were under an
occupational regime and certainly not without the permission
of the Allies. Apart from this principle, the British were
somewhat anxious concerning the effect of the treaty on
reparations which Greece should obtain from Bulgaria. He
wished to submit a separate memorandum on this matter.Post, pp.
891–893.
Mr. Molotov
stated that the Soviet Foreign Office had received a
note from the British to the effect that former enemies
under an armistice regime should not have treaty relations
with other enemy states. But now it was a question of an
ex-enemy and a friendly state. He maintained that the
British had stated that they had no objections to treaties
between ex-enemy and friendly states.
Mr. Eden
questioned this.
Mr. Molotov
continued that this principle was also implied in the
British proposal concerning a Balkan Federation in which
former enemy and friendly states would enter.
Mr. Eden
maintained that he did not believe that states under
an armistice regime should be permitted to make peace
treaties without the permission of the Allies. Furthermore,
the British never had in mind a Balkan Federation until the
armistice period had terminated.
Mr. Stettinius
stated that he was completely in accord with Mr.
Mr. Eden
inquired whether it would not be preferable for the
states in question to wait.
Mr. Molotov
stated that he had no power to speak for them.
Mr. Eden
reminded him that Bulgaria had signed an
armistice
Mr. Stettinius
suggested that this question be discussed by the
Ambassadors and Mr.
Mr. Molotov
stated that it might be preferable to postpone
discussion of this matter until tomorrow and then to seek
agreement.
10. Iran.
Mr. Eden
inquired whether Mr. Ante, pp.
819–820.
Mr. Molotov
stated that he had nothing to add to what he had said
several days ago on the subject.
Mr. Eden
inquired whether it would not be advisable to issue a
communiqué on Iran.
Mr. Molotov
stated that this would be inadvisable.
Mr. Stettinius
urged that some reference be made that Iranian
problems had been discussed and clarified during the Crimean
Conference.
Mr. Molotov
stated that he opposed this idea.
Mr. Eden
suggested that it be stated that the declaration on
Iran had been reaffirmed and re-examined during the present
meeting.
Mr. Molotov
opposed this suggestion.
Ed. chmn
2/10
For Mins
12.10 p m
ERS asked make statement
We are prepared to withdraw our insistence on the final
sentence in the Polish memo, which Mr.
Mol. Would like to make a small amend. to yesterday’s text: one cond: as soon as possible
of U. S. & Gt Brit will est. dip. reis, with it as has been done by the Soviet Un
Ed. objected—It’s to be a new govt
Mol we can leave out “as has been done by the Soviet Un” Ed. But we would all have to recognize it.
Mol. our sit. is diff. from that of U. S. We have already given recog. to present govt
Ed: Yes but this will be a new gov’t
ERS: Advisable that we all move together
Mol: Present sit. being different the doc. must reflect this diff. We quite agree on the future. Let us think about it.
ERS Decl, on Lib. Areas Have discussed Mr.
Mol: Then I will propose another amend:
2nd ¶ from the end “they would immed. take measures for carrying out mutual consultation”
Suggests one or other amend.
Ed: An improvement
ERS I’m very favorably impressed
Mol. As to the former amend. Thinks it would be very useless because we don’t wish shots which have occurred in Athens to take place elsewhere
ERS. Sorry, I’m not authorized to consider this amend. any further.
New amend. agreed to
—>Mol Withdraws his former amend.
Ed: One other point. About Fr. sit. Proposed addition of a last ¶
Mol Hasn’t had time to study it, perhaps at 4.00
ERS As stated yesterday, thinks it most desirable
Ed. Little further inform. Re Yug. Sub.sic] understand, has been about names
of regents. But in our view no reason this should hold up
coming into force of agt. We can send tel. setting forth our
views as Mar. St. suggested
Mol. and communique?
Ed Can do that, too
Mol. Tel. telling them to hurry up That the agt. come into force immed.
Ed. Will show other 2 delegs. draft of tel.
Ed. Re Pol.—I didn’t mean to indicate agt. with Am. proposal to drop last sentence
ERS We would of course still prefer doc. as it exists but Pres so anxious reach agt, he is willing to make this concession
Mol. Thanks him Mr.
Reparations
Ed:
1. 1st reps should be
considered in connection with dismemberment
2. Two R objects—depletion Ger. mfg. capacity & ensuring ability make large payments later—are difficult to reconcile We are very anxious to avoid conditions making it nec. finance or feed Ger later as result reparations
3. Would like Fr. on Mos. Commission from start
4. Labor should be considered too
5. Can’t name any figure for deliveries until Commission has studied matter
Mol: Any points Mr Ed. agrees on?
Ed. Add: These arrangements are without prejudice to restitution of looted property Mol. Of course
Ed. reserve position re pre-war claims We are in favor of Com. being set up in Mos as soon as possible
Mol: No basis for work of Com. We don’t give it any directives or principles on which to work.
Ed. We agree on principles: immediate withdrawal of machinery, etc—quicker the better—& annual payments Has a redraft
Maisky: Mr.
Ed: Never said anything of kind but can say my P. M. doesn’t think you’ll get anything like as much as you think.
Re Ed’s points
1. Naturally when dismemberment decided in practical form, plan be adjusted
2. Problem was considered from beginning. No contradiction. Ain’t of annual payments quite possible after contemplated removals. If you have doubts, shortest cut to accept our formula of yesterday—to take our proposals as basis for discussion & then bring up your points Never expected support Ger.
Nothing on 3
4. Labor certainly will come in in elaboration of whole plan, but as Com. studies q.
5. Our formula doesn’t commit you to the figures. Taking into account all your points, you can easily agree to formula agreed on by Sov & Am. delegs
Ed. We consider $20 billion equals 500,000,000£ a yr.
Ed: We wanted a shorter period
Mol. Let us write down 10 yrs
Ed: We prefer 5 yrs
ERS Its all a basis of discussion Might end up all these capital movements possible in 7 yrs Sov. Gov’t isn’t committing itself to 10 yrs or $20 billion
Ed Then why put in 10 yrs
Maisky: As basis for discussion
Ed. Let each put in its own plan Will give alternate draft & discuss at 4.00 p m Agreed
Mol. re communique
ERS We are hard at work drafting something for your consid.
Mol: You take initiative?
ERS There will be a draft, we would be glad to take initiative I would suggest 1st order bus. this afternoon that drafting of commun. be assigned to For Mins
Mol. Good
Ed. all right
World Org. report of
subcommittee
Mol. I agree to both points—consultation of Ch & Fr. & the invitation
Ed We all agree then
Austria-Yug. frontiers
Ed: presented proposal
Mol. Translate & study
ERS: we feel (b) on p 2 should be
pretty carefully considered. We feel that as phrased this
goes beyond period of occupation
Ed: That is all that is meant Drafting may need to be made clearer
Yug-It frontier
Ed: proposal to be studied
Yug-Bul. relations
Mol. Mentioned treaty of alliance
between Yug & Bul.
1. Recently For. Commissariat rec’d a note re federation, stressing federation might include Turkey. This is not an urgent q.
2. There are conversations between Yug & Bul about a treaty of friendship & alliance Sov. Govt holds a favorable view. They are collaborating militarily ag. Gers in Yug. There should be no objections to it.
Ed: Glad to hear treaty is not
actual (?) Anxious about effect of this treaty on
reparations we are anxious & all agreed Gr.
Mol All obligs. of Bul. have been
enforced. No one can change them without consent of 3 powers
Bul & Rum. cannot have a treaty between them Now is q.
of treaty between 1 friendly country & an ex-enemy There
was a direct agt by Brit Govt to it. Q by Eden?
Mol. There were objections to treaty between 2 former enemies but not friendly & enemy
Ed. We do not think a country under armistice terms can make a treaty without consent of 3 powers. I never had it in mind a country under armistice would come into a federation until armistice over
ERS I’m completely in accord with Ed’s views
Ed: Can’t they wait?
Mol: Has no power to speak for them.
Ed. Bul. has signed armistice. Isn’t free to do as she wants. Although has threatened to shoot our planes coming here.
Mol. Our planes have been shot at in Yug but was mistake & our troops shot at by Am planes
Ed. I don’t know why Bul. can shoot at any planes Can we ask this wait awhile
Mol Can go on with discussions
ERS Suggest our Ambs discuss with Mol. in Mos. promptly Mol. Would wait until tomorrow
Iran
Mol. Has nothing to add
Ed: Would Mol like to put out communique
Mol: Undesirable. Can discuss this later
ERS I would urge some reference that Iranian problems have been discussed & clarified. Very troublesome q.
Mol Against that
Ed: Say re-examined & reaffirmed Teheran Decl.
Mol Against that
ERS status of Pol. Agreed Ed. to report on yesterday’s & today’s progress.
Reparations:
Mol.: mention in document just 2 figures as basis for discussion
Items Still Before the Foreign
Ministers
Text of Formula on Poland So Far Agreed
by the Three Foreign Ministers
“A new situation has been created by the complete liberation
of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment
of a provisional Polish government
“When a ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ has
been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three
governments will then accord it recognition.”
In lieu of the following sentence: “When a ‘Polish
Provisional Government of National Unity’ has been properly
formed in conformity with the above, the three governments
will then accord it recognition.” Mr.
“When a ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with it as has been done by the Soviet Union.”
This sentence was not accepted by Mr.
He said he would bring it up again at the four o’clock meeting this afternoon.
The British still advocate inclusion of the following sentence:
“The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.”
Mr.
“...
Points appear in the original. the Government of the USSR, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.”and will exchange Ambas. by whose reports the respect. Govts. will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.The last clause (printed in italics) was added in Matthews’ handwriting.
British Draft of Last Paragraph of
Declaration on Liberated Europe
In issuing this Declaration the three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the action and the procedure suggested.
Basic Principles of Exaction of
Reparation From Germany
Report to the Foreign Ministers
We were instructed on February 8 to prepare a report to the Foreign Ministers on the following subjects:
With regard to (a) we consider that
the United States on behalf of the three powers should
consult the Government of China and the Provisional French
Government.
With regard to (b) we attach for the
approval of the Ministers a draft invitation to all the
nations which will take part in the conference.
Invitation
The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of __________ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at ______ in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.
The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:
“C. Voting
Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.
In the event that the Government of _______ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.
British Statement on Austro-Yugoslav
Frontier
If the British proposals for the allocation of zones of occupation in Austria are approved, the whole length of the Austro-Yugoslav frontier will be a British responsibility. This may involve us in difficulties with Yugoslavia because though the Yugoslav Government have not so far asked for any alteration of the Styrian portion of this frontier they have advanced claims to Klagenfurt and those parts of Carinthia which they failed to obtain under the plebiscite held in 1919. Action may be required to resist Yugoslav efforts to assert these claims and to secure the withdrawal of Yugoslav partisans who in the course of operations may well advance into Carinthia and establish control over it. It would be invidious for H. M. G. to be solely responsible for such action and after our experiences in Greece we must try to prevent British troops from becoming involved in fighting with Allied partisans. We hope, therefore that an agreement might be reached between the three powers for the maintenance of the 1937 Austro-Yugoslav frontier pending the final territorial settlement and for joint measures to ensure its maintenance and observance by Yugoslavia.
It is therefore suggested we should agree at the present conference:
Notes for the Secretaries of State in
Regard to Venezia Giulia
I should like to draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that the province of Venezia Giulia in the northeast of Italy is a potential powder magazine. It is therefore likely that there will, as the war draws to a close, be clashes in this area between the Yugoslavs and the Italians, and we must prevent these outbursts to the best of our ability.
We had originally intended to set up Allied Military
Government over the whole province up to the 1937 frontier
but we now have doubts whether this would be a very
satisfactory course for the following reasons.
Finally I would point out that in any case, even if the area
west of my suggested provisional line is allotted to
Allied (Soviet) Control Commission in Bulgaria
His Majesty’s Government regard it as essential (a) that their representatives in
Bulgaria should enjoy reasonable freedom of movement and
communication, and (b) that
decisions about which they have not been consulted should
not be taken in their name. In the case of Hungary, (a) has been satisfactorily dealt with
in the “Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in
Hungary”, and His Majesty’s Government suggest that
identical Statutes should be adopted for the Control
Commission in Bulgaria in order to meet the points made in
the message from Mr. ante, p.
241.
His Majesty’s Government also consider that during the first period there should be prior consultation with the British and American representatives and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the Armistice, it should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government only.
During the second period, i. e. after the conclusion of hostilities with Germany, His Majesty’s Government wish to ensure that
Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations
His Majesty’s Government recently communicated to the Soviet Government an expression of their views regarding a possible Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. In replying to this communication, the Soviet Government informed His Majesty’s Government that they were aware that negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for the conclusion of a pact of alliance and mutual assistance were proceeding and added that their attitude towards this was favourable. The Soviet Government, however, considered that the question of a Balkan federation, and in particular of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation, was not at present actual and was of no practical importance.
While His Majesty’s Government are glad to learn that the Soviet Government do not consider the question of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation to be actual at present and that they regard the matter as of no practical importance, they are disturbed to learn that a pact of alliance and mutual assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria is under negotiation and that the attitude of the Soviet Government towards these negotiations is favourable.
His Majesty’s Government cannot but regard the pact now under
negotiation as open to the same objections which they felt
in regard to a possible federation. In their view an enemy
state whose status is still regulated by an armistice regime
must be debarred from entering
Quite apart from the important question of principle
involved, His Majesty’s Government are also anxious
regarding the effect of the pact now under negotiation
between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria upon the interests of Greece
which has hitherto not received from Bulgaria the full
reparation to which she is entitled under the terms of the
armistice. This aspect of the matter is treated in greater
detail in a separate aide-mémoire.
His Majesty’s Government accordingly consider that a
communication should be made to the Bulgarian Government by
all the victorious Powers with whom she recently concluded
an armistice, stating that they cannot agree to her entering
into special treaty relations with Yugoslavia at this stage
and that full reparation must be made to Greece before there
can be any question of such negotiations being resumed. His
Majesty’s Government consider that Marshal
Greek Claims Upon Bulgaria, More
Particularly in Regard to Reparations
His Majesty’s Government are concerned regarding the position
in regard to Greek claims against Bulgaria. On the occasion
of the signature of the Armistice with Hungary,
On January 23rd the Greek Government, with the support of His
Majesty’s Embassy in Moscow, approached the Soviet
Government
The Greek people have suffered very seriously from Bulgarian
depredations and are in the view of His Majesty’s Government
entitled to early satisfaction and to immediate reparation
deliveries of which Greece stands in urgent need. The Greek
Government have already presented to the Bulgarian Control
Commission a list of commodities necessary to the Greek
economy and due to them in virtue of the Bulgarian Armistice
Agreement, the delivery of which to Greece in the immediate
future is essential to the maintenance of Greek economy.
Deliveries which are more urgently required comprise, inter alia, food stuffs, locomotives,
agricultural implements and live-stock. Furthermore, in view
of the decision incorporated in the Hungarian armistice
terms allotting to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia fixed sums
payable in commodities as reparations over a period of six
years, it is in the view of His Majesty’s Government
equitable that similar arrangements should be made to fix a
lump sum due to Greece by Bulgaria to be paid similarly in
commodities over a period of six years. In the view of His
Majesty’s Government a corresponding sum should be allocated
to Yugoslavia which has also suffered from Bulgarian
occupation. In this connection his Majesty’s Government
desire to make it clear that, while they are in general
opposed to the fixing of lump sums for reparations to be
exacted from enemy countries, they consider it only
equitable, in view of the fact that lump sums have been
allocated to the Soviet, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav
Governments under the Rumanian, FinnishBulletin, February 18,
1945, vol. xii, pp. 261–268.
His Majesty’s Government accordingly trust that the Soviet
Government will accede to the proposals put to them on
January 23rd with the support of His Majesty’s Government
concerning Greek representation on the Control Commission in
Bulgaria. They further trust that the Soviet Government will
agree to give explicit instructions
Oil Equipment in Roumania
His Majesty’s Government have been glad to note that the
Soviet authorities have now agreed to stop removing
equipment from the oil fields in Roumania in which British
interests are involved and have also agreed that the Ruat
plant should remain in situ. But if
the large quantities of equipment which have already been
removed are not to be returned, His Majesty’s Government
considers that they must be regarded as deliveries on
account of reparations, and arrangements made for
compensating the oil companies. Similarly the Ruat plant
should be restored to its previous condition and brought
into production as soon as possible. As the Soviet
Government have made no attempt to refute the argument
advanced by His Majesty’s Government that any equipment
which may be removed should be regarded as reparation and
not as war booty, His Majesty’s Government can only refer
the Soviet Government to the statement of the case which has
already been made. It should also be pointed out that these
difficulties would never have arisen if the Soviet
representatives in Roumania had discussed problems affecting
the Roumanian oil industry with their British and American
colleagues on the Control Commission instead of taking
unilateral action.
Subject: The Far East—Political
At Mr. ante, pp. 768–770.
I explained to
2. b) should indicate
c) should cover the alternative of the railways
being operated by a Chinese-Soviet Commission, both of which
Marshal
Mr. Molotov
indicated that Marshal
On my return to Livadia I showed the President the proposed
draft (copy attached) with the amendments covering the
points mentioned
After the formal Conference meeting in the afternoon between
the President, the Prime Minister, Marshal
I suggested to Marshal
The President agreed to Marshal
Marshal Stalin
then explained that he agreed it would be more
appropriate for the Manchurian Railroads to be operated by a
Chinese-Soviet Commission. He further agreed in the need for
concurrence of the Generalissimo on these matters but stated
that the Generalissimo should also give his concurrence to
status quo in Outer Mongolia.
The President asked Marshal
post, pp.
952–953.
Marshal Stalin
replied that as he was an interested party he would
prefer to have the President do it.
The President then asked when the
subject should be discussed with the Generalissimo having in
mind the question of secrecy.
Marshal Stalin
said he would let the President know when he was
prepared to have this done.
The President said that he would
send an army officer from Washington through Moscow to
Chungking with a letter of instructions to Ambassador
At that moment the Prime Minister interrupted the discussion.
I had an opportunity later, however, to ask Marshal
Harriman
3. Attachmentspost, p. 984.
The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has ended the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:
1. Status quo in the Outer
Mongolia (the Mongolian Peoples Republic) should be
preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 should be restored viz:
a) the southern part of Sakhalin
as well as all the islands adjacent to this part of
Sakhalin should be returned to the Soviet Union,
b) possession of Port Arthur and
Dairen on lease should be restored.
c) the rights possessed by Russia
before the Russo-Japanese war to the operation of the
Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian
railroad providing an outlet to Dairen should be
restored on the understanding that China should continue
to possess full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kurile islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union. The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unquestionably satisfied after Japan has been defeated.
For its part the Soviet Union expresses its willingness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.
Item 2. b):
possession
lease of the port areas of Port Arthur and Dairen en
lease should be restored, or these
areas should become free ports under international
control.
Item 2. c):
Add the following after the word “Manchuria;” at the end
of the paragraph “or these
railroads should be placed under the operational
control of a Chinese-Soviet Commission.”
Item 3.:
Add final paragraph:
“It is understood that the agreement
concerning the ports and railways referred to above
requires the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek.”
Note: Portions crossed out are deletions and portions underlined are additions to original document.
Present
Subjects: Poland
French Participation in Control Commission for Germany
Yugoslavia
World Security Organization
Reparations from Germany
The Dardanelles
The President said that he thought
that Mr.
Mr. Eden
said that he had to report agreement on the future
Government of Poland, that there had been two questions
involved
A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
Mr.
When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
The Prime Minister said that the
document made no mention of frontiers. He said we are all
agreed on the Eastern frontier of Poland and he agreed that
Poland should receive compensation in the West, up to the
line of the Oder if the Poles so desired. He said that the
British Government was very doubtful about going any further
or mentioning any such possibility at this stage, since he
did not believe that the War Cabinet would accept the line
of the Western Neisse. He said he felt, however, that some
mention should be made of the territorial settlement
otherwise the whole world would wonder what had been decided
on this question. There would be some criticism, but
nevertheless, it would be better than no mention at
all.
The President said that the Polish
Government should be consulted before any statement was made
in regard to the Western frontier.
Marshal
Stalin
remarked that he thought that there should be some
statement on the Eastern frontier on which all present had
agreed.
The Prime Minister concurred with
this statement of Marshal
Mr. Molotov
remarked that it would be a good thing if something
definite could be said about the Eastern frontier, since it
would clarify and quiet the whole situation insofar as the
Poles were concerned. He said that it was certain that there
would be criticisms, but he felt it would in general be
beneficial. He suggested that the matter be referred to the
three Foreign Ministers to draft some statement on this
point. He added that it was perhaps not necessary to be as
specific in regard to the Western frontier as in regard to
the Eastern frontier.
The Prime Minister said that he
had already gone on record to the effect that Poland would
receive a good slice of territory in the North and in the
West but that the opinion of the New Polish Government of
National Unity would be sought.
The President said he had no
objection in principle to such a statement but he thought
the Prime Minister should draft it.
Mr. Molotov
suggested that it should form a last sentence of the
Polish statement.
Mr. Eden, continuing his report, said
that in regard to his [the]
declaration on liberated Europe the Soviet Delegation had
proposed an amendment in regard to the last sentence of the
fifth paragraph to the effect that the three Governments
should immediately take measures for the carrying out of
mutual consultations. Mr.
After some discussion as to what had been agreed upon at the
meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning, Marshal
post,
p. 908, for the agreed
wording of this proposal.
Mr. Eden
then said there was a note which he wished to attach
to this declaration, namely, that the French should be
invited to associate themselves with the declaration and
that his note would merely state that in issuing this
declaration the three heads of Governments expressed the
hope that the Provisional Government of France would
associate themselves in the actions and procedures envisaged
therein.Ante. p.
884.
The President then said that he
had changed his mind in regard to the question of the French
participation in the Control Commission.
Marshal Stalin
said he had no objections and that he agreed to
this.post, pp. 936–937.
The Prime Minister suggested that
there should be a joint telegram sent to post,
p. 948.
Mr. Eden
said the next subject was that of Yugoslavia and read
the text of a telegram to be sent to Marshal
post
pp. 919–920.
The President said he was not sure
whether he would be able to join in the statement on
Yugoslavia but when it had been read to him he agreed that
it was satisfactory and that he could associate himself with
it.
After some discussion Marshal Stalin
suggested that the telegram to Marshal
ante, pp.
820–821.post, p. 974.
The Prime Minister said he hoped
that both of the two amendments proposed by the British
could be in the communiqué.
Mr. Molotov
said he thought it would be better to confine the
telegram and reference in the communiqué to the entry into
force of the
The Prime Minister said he thought
the British people would be more reconciled to the
Government and it would have a better reception if the two
amendments were included.
After some discussion with the Prime Minister and Mr.
Marshal Stalin
said he thought that three points could be included in
the telegram: (1) that the Skupschina who had not collaborated with the
Germans could be included into the Vetch,
Mr. Eden
said that the sub-committee in regard to Dumbarton
Oaks had reported on the matter of informing the French and
Chinese Governments and on the form of the invitations,Ante, pp.
885–886.
The Prime Minister said he had
received instructions from the War Cabinet not to mention
figures and that that should be left to the reparations
committee to determine.
The President said that he was
afraid that if reparations and especially if any figures
were mentioned that the American people would believe that
it involved money.
Marshal Stalin
explained that the sum mentioned was only the
expression of the value of the reparations in kind.
The Prime Minister added that
nothing would be published, as he understood it, in regard
to reparations but that he could not agree to the inclusion
of a definite sum.
Marshal Stalin
said he wished to discuss the circumstances of the
matter. He did not understand why there should be any
confusion in regard to payment in money since the Soviet
Union had concluded three treaties with Finland, Rumania and
HungaryBulletin, February 18, 1945, vol. xii, pp.
261–268;
Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 490,
or 59
The President said he feared the
word “reparations” somewhat since he thought the people in
America would think it meant reparations in cash.
Someone replied that this could be easily avoided by using the term “compensation for damages caused by Germany during the war” instead of “reparations.”
Mr. Molotov said that the Moscow
commission would have the duty of finding out the total of
reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion the
American-Soviet formula.
The Prime Minister replied that
the British Government could not commit itself to any
figure.
Marshal Stalin
replied that there was no commitment involved but it
might be said that the Commission might take as material for
discussion the American-Soviet formula.
The Prime Minister then read a
telegram from the War Cabinet which said that they
considered it inadmissible to state any figure until an
investigation had been completed on the spot and that at any
rate the figure of twenty billion dollars was too great. It
was equal to Germany’s export trade in times of peace and it
was beyond the capacity of Germany to pay. It was true that
some of these reparations would come from Germany’s capital
assets but that in turn would make it more difficult for
Germany to pay her bills. The payments would more than cover
German imports and if these imports were not given a
priority ahead of reparations it would mean that the other
countries would be paying for German reparations to those
countries receiving them.
Marshal Stalin
said he did not want to go into the circumstances of
the telegram the Prime Minister had just read. The experts
may be right, but that all they were preparing was a figure
to be used as a basis for discussions—it could be reduced or
increased by the Commission in Moscow.
The President then suggested that
the whole matter be left to the Commission in Moscow.post, p. 920, was passed to the
President at about this point.
Marshal Stalin
said that he felt in principle that Germany should pay
reparations which would be stated by the three Governments
here.
Mr. Molotov
said that yesterday Mr.
Mr. Eden
said that rightly or wrongly, the British Government
felt that even the naming of a sum as the basis of
discussions would commit them. He said he proposed that the
Moscow Commission be instructed to examine the report of Mr.
Mr. Molotov
and Mr. Maisky
both replied that to refer a question put by the
Crimean Conference to a lesser body would be utterly
illogical.
The Prime Minister said that no
agreement had been reached as to the mention of a sum.
Mr. Eden
added that the first two points referred to by Mr.
Marshal Stalin
repeated that he was willing to propose the following
formula: (1) that the heads of the Governments had agreed
that Germany must pay compensation for the damages caused to
the Allied nations as a result of the war, and (2) that the
Moscow Commission be instructed to consider the amount of
reparations. This was agreed to by the Conference.
There was then a short intermission.
The President inquired whether
they could discuss the British text of the paragraph on
frontiers to be added to the Polish statement.
Mr. Molotov
replied that he had not yet received the Russian
translation.
Marshal Stalin
then said that he would like to say a few words about
the Montreux Convention regarding the Dardanelles.ante, pp, 328–329.
The President said he had one
general observation to make and that was that in the United
States we had a frontier of over 3,000 miles with Canada and
there was no fort and no armed forces. This situation had
existed over a hundred years and it was his hope that other
frontiers in the World would eventually be without forts or
armed forces on any part of their national boundaries.
The Prime Minister said that
Marshal See ante, p. 328.
Marshal Stalin
replied it was impossible to keep anything secret from
the Turks and that such assurance should be expressed.
The President agreed to this.
Marshal Stalin
said the Foreign Ministers could meet at the United
Nations Conference and discuss the question of the
Straits.
The Prime Minister said that he
thought that this matter affected the position of Great
Britain in the Mediterranean more than it did that of the
United States and that he felt that if the Foreign Ministers
had a meeting in London that that would be the proper place
to discuss this question. He went on to say that some years
ago he had tried very hard to get through the Dardanelles
and then the Russian Government had made available an armed
force to help but it did not succeed.
Marshal Stalin
said that the Prime Minister had been in too much of a
hurry in withdrawing his troops since the Germans and Turks
were on the verge of surrender.
The Prime Minister replied that by
that time he was out of the government because of the
Dardanelles campaign and had had nothing to do with that
decision.
Marshal Stalin
then inquired who was taking down decisions reached at
this conference.
Mr. Eden
replied there would be an agreed upon communiqué as
well as a list of the decisions taken.
The President then said he wished
to propose some small amendments in the paragraph regarding
frontiers in the Polish statement. He said these amendments
were necessary for American Constitutional reasons.
These amendments were accepted by the conference, and the following text approved:
“The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern
frontier of Poland should follow the
Mr. Molotov
said he had one suggestion and that was to add to the
second sentence “with the return to Poland of her ancient
frontiers in East Prussia and on the Oder”.
The President inquired how long
ago these lands had been Polish.
Mr. Molotov
said very long ago, but they had in fact been
Polish.
The President said this might lead
the British to ask for the return of the United States to
Great Britian.
Marshal Stalin
replied that the ocean prevented this. He added that
at the present the draft said nothing specific about
frontiers, which he thought was very important for the
Poles.
The Prime Minister said he would
prefer not to mention the frontier in the west since he
shared the same difficulties the President had spoken
of.
Mr. Eden
said that they had always said that they would accept
any line up to the Oder that the Poles desired.
The Prime Minister said that there
was no stopping place between what we proposed to do and the
line of the Oder, and if the question is asked about ancient
territories there would be no answer. He said that he was
not against the line of the Oder in principle if the Poles
so desired.
Mr. Molotov
said he thought it might be worthwhile considering
this wording.
Marshal Stalin
said he would withdraw the Soviet amendment and leave
the British draft as it had been.
The draft of the last paragraph regarding Polish frontiers was accepted.
The President then remarked he
would have to leave Yalta tomorrow at three o’clock in the
afternoon.
The Prime Minister remarked that
he doubted if it would be possible to get all the work done
by then, particularly the communiqué and the final text of
the documents.
There followed a discussion between the President, the Prime
Minister, Mr.
Marshal Stalin
remarked that there was very little time and he felt
it was impossible to complete the work in view of the
dinner. He suggested that the dinner might be cancelled.
After some discussion it was decided that a drafting committee for the communiqué should come to the Villa and report at ten o’clock to the Foreign Ministers and heads of government.
The meeting then adjourned.
top secret
The President opened the meeting (which was delayed owing to
an earlier discussion between Mr.
Eden: I should like to report that
with the exception of two points outstanding we have reached
a decision on the Polish question. I believe that we have
since worked out an agreement with regard to these two
points. (He reads the Polish formula,ante, p. 898.
Prime Minister: There is no
reference in this formula to the frontier question. The
world at large will ask about that. We are all agreed I
believe about the eastern frontier. We are all agreed in
principle about the western frontier. The only question is
where the line is to be drawn and how much to say about it
in our communiqué. We are doubtful about going further in
mentioning frontiers at this stage. I have received a
telegram from the War Cabinet deprecating any frontier going
as far west as the Neisse. They feel that the population
problem is too large to handle.
President: My position is that I
would rather hear from the new government of national unity
what they think about it. Therefore, I think we had better
leave out all references to frontiers.
Prime Minister: On the west?
Stalin: It is important to say
something.
Prime Minister: I agree. People
will immediately ask what is the settlement on the question
of the frontiers. We think that the eastern frontier is
settled. On the west the wishes of the Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity must be consulted.
President: I do not believe we
should say anything in the communiqué. I have no right to
make an agreement on boundaries at this time. That must be
done by the Senate later. Let the Prime Minister make some
public statement when he returns if that is necessary.
Molotov: I think it would be very
good if something could be said about full agreement of the
three heads of government on the eastern frontier. We could
say that the
Prime Minister: I agree we must
say something.
Molotov: Yes, but less specific if
you wish.
Prime Minister: We must say that
Poland is to get compensation in the west; also that there
is to be left for discussion with the Polish government
before the line is drawn.
Molotov: Very good.
Prime Minister: We must go out now
with the rest of our communiqué on Poland. (Matter is
referred to the three foreign ministers.)
Stalin: That could be done during
our intermission.
Eden: I shall next report on the
declaration on liberated areas. Mr.
“…
I should like to add a sentence with regard to the French which we proposed last evening to clear up the ambiguous situation in regard to France. (The following was approved:
“In issuing this declaration the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of France will associate itself with them.”)
President: I should like to say
that I have changed my mind with regard to the position of
the French on the Control Council for Germany. The more I
think of it the more I think that the Prime Minister is
right and that a nation with a zone of occupation must sit
in on the control machinery. I think it would be easier if
France is on the commission to get de
Stalin: I have no objection. (It
is agreed upon.)
Prime Minister: Of course France
may say that she will have no part in the declaration and
reserve all rights for the future. (laughing) We must face
that.
Molotov: We must be ready to
receive a rough answer.
Eden: Next is the question of
Yugoslavia. We prepared a draft on this which is still under
discussion. (After some discussion between the British and
Russians a draft telegram to Yugoslavia is agreed upon. Copy
attached.post, pp.
919–920.
There followed a lengthy and at times somewhat heated
discussion between Marshal
Molotov: We must give the Moscow
commission on reparations the task of finding out the total
of reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion
the American-Soviet formula. The commission need only take
that as the basis.
Prime Minister: We have had a very
important communication from our government on this
question. We cannot accept any specific figures in any
formula.
Stalin: I propose first that the
three heads of government agree that Germany must pay
compensation in kind for losses caused during the war. Two,
the heads of the three governments agree that Germany must
pay for losses to the allied nations. Three, the Moscow
reparations commission is given the task to consider the
amount to be paid. We bring our figures before the
commission and you bring yours, (to Churchill)
(This was followed by an intermission during which the formula to be used on Polish frontiers for inclusion in the communiqué was largely worked out.)
President: Marshal
Stalin: I should like to say a few
words on the Montreux Convention.
President: I only want to say that
we have three thousand miles of natural boundary with
Canada. There is no fort and no armed ship on this entire
distance. If other parts of the world would do the same it
would be a wonderful thing.
Prime Minister: Marshal
Stalin: Certainly we should give
such assurance. When the foreign ministers meet in April in
the United States at the end of the conference could they
not discuss the question of the straits?
Prime Minister: Well, I think this
question affects Britain with her Mediterranean interests
more than the United States. Therefore, I believe that the
meeting should be in London.
I tried some time ago to get through the Dardanelles
(smiling) and the former Russian government had two army
corps ready to help me
Stalin: You were in too much of a
hurry to take away your troops. Perhaps in another week you
would have won as the Germans and Turks were getting ready
to withdraw.
Prime Minister: I had nothing to
do with that decision. I was already out of the government.
(It was decided that the question would be discussed by the
three foreign ministers in London.)
President: The only thing left now
is the amended text on the frontiers of Poland. (The text is
then read for consideration by the Russians who had received
the Russian text.)ante, p.
905.
Stalin: I should like to suggest
an amendment in the phraseology to indicate that Poland
should receive the return of her ancient frontier of East
Prussia and the Oder.
President: (Laughing to Prime
Minister) Perhaps you would want us back?
Prime Minister: Well you might be
as indigestible for us as it might be for the Poles if they
took too much German territory.
Molotov: This change would give
great encouragement to the Poles.
Prime Minister: I prefer to leave
it as it is.
Molotov: But there is no mention
of frontiers in the west. What about the Oder? No exchange
was mentioned.
Prime Minister: Well, between what
we propose and the question of specifying ancient
territories up to the Oder there seems to be no stopping
place.
Stalin: I withdraw my suggestion
and agree to leave it as drawn. The President suggested
changes (change “agreed” to “consider” in the first sentence
and change “the three powers” to “the three heads of
government” in the third sentence) are accepted. This I
believe is our last point of decision.
President: There only remains the
question of the communiqué I must leave tomorrow at 3 p. m.
I hope we can get the communiqué done and I suggest that if
we meet at eleven tomorrow we can finish it by lunch. (This
suggestion is vigorously opposed by Churchill and to a
lesser degree by
The meeting then adjourned.
Plenary 2/10 4.55
Ed. reported on meeting For
Mins
We reached agt re Pol—there were two outstanding q’s Perhaps I may come to that in a moment. Read draft as it now stands (included some changes app. agreed to by Church & St. in their private meeting before plenary session) included Mol. amend of noon. and new amend:
“and will exchange Ambs. by whose reports the respective govts will be kept informed about the situation in Poland”
Church: We have made no reference to frontiers but of course people will ask at once about frontiers, what we have agreed. We are all agreed about the E. frontier, we are all agreed in prin. about W. frontier. The only q is where it is to be exactly drawn & how much we should say about it. We all agreed that the Poles are to have E. Pr. & be free to go to the line of the Oder if they so desire. We are very doubtful indeed about going further or mentioning at this stage—we have had a tel. from our War Cab. strongly deprecating frontier going as far as W. Neisse because they think the problem is larger than we could manage
Pres. We should rather hear from the Pol. Govt of Nat. Unity we had better leave out all references to boundaries
Church: on West?
Church people will immediately say what is the position about the frontier. We think E. frontier is settled. We think on W. frontier wishes of Pol Govt Nat Un be first consulted & matter finally settled at peace settlements
Pres: I cannot agree on Pol
boundaries at this time. It must be done by the Sen
later
Mol It would be very good if
something could be said about full agt of 3 heads about E.
frontier. Would clarify that important q. It would be good
to say gen. opin of all sides represented. Prob. would
provoke criticism for a time but in end would be good.
Proposes leave it to 3 Mins. to find nec. formula. Not nec.
to say anything about W frontier
Church: Something
Mol Yes, much less def.
Church: Say recog. by 3 powers Pol should receive substantial
accession of terr both to the N. & to the W.…
St: That would be very good That would correspond to wish of public opin. all around
Pres: 3 For Secs
Church: Along lines we have suggested
Maisk
St.: As a last ¶
Ed Decl, on Lib Areas (continuing
his report)
Read & Church amended the Mol. amend. to include “responsibilities” etc.
Mol: Wants his amend. to stand
Pres read it as agreed this morning
Church how can you carry out measure.
St. accepted Church. Formula
Agreed To be put in language
Document approved
Ed
sug. amend. re Fr.
“In issuing this decl. the 3 powers express the hope that the French Prov. Govt will be associated with them in the action & procedures contemplated”
Pres: I have rather changed my opin. I was opposed to Fr. sitting in on the Com. of 3, Control Machinery The more I think of it the more I think the PM’s contention that a country which has an area to control can not do so without sitting in on the Con. Com. I think it would be easier if Fr. is on that Con Com to get DeG to agree to this Decl. & other things. Like St. think about it
Pres agreed to add
also Ed. addition
St agreed
Ed. Yug.
Agreed For Mins. prepare first draft final communique
Pres Should communique contain Yug statement Will leave to Ed in Conf. with For Mins whether we join in on that or not.
Church These are very respectable issues
Pres I’m not trying to protect my purity
Mol What is agreed re Yug.
Ed We’ve agreed to send a message & we’ve agreed to draft a communique
Read d
Message for 3 Govts to
agreed to recommend
Pres: All right
Mol: Tel was to be very short & without last 2 ¶s
Ed Yes then later then the
amends second part.
Church. Hope commun. can mention both parts
Mol. We just had com. when agreed only 1st part be in tel.; 2nd part to be put off until United govt formed
Church But world will give more attention to immed. enforcement of agt if other part were mentioned, too. Would have effect of getting better reception for what we say.
St. It would be inconvenient if tel. & communique different & we agreed a second tel. will be sent
Church We have complex pub. opin. Want favorable reception of agt Believes it would help (include in commun)
Ed Might say: It was further agreed that when the agt is put into force, 3 govts would recommend to new govt to make a decl, of the 3 points
St. Without 3rd point, which is very objectionable
Ed. & Church: all right leave it out.
Church Besides it’s understood in
St. In any case change Tel—3 parts 1st Put agt in force immed 2nd members Vojnoj be later included 3rd all acts be confirmed later Church Very good & very helpful
St & all 3 also be in communique
Ed World Org. Report of subcom re
consultation Fr & China & Invitation was accepted by
For Mins & need not be discussed in plenary session.
→Pres OK’d invitation
Reparations
Church We were practically instructed by our gov’t not to men tion figures. Let Com. do that
Pres goes along my idea not to mention money, not make reps an am’t of money Let Com. do Talk about the equiv.
St. That’s only a monetary expression of what the goods cost. It is not money
Pres so many people at home will think of it in terms of $ & cents
Church I don’t understand what is to be published
Pres Nothing
Church not even subject
St. There is objection to mention dollars because someone will think will take reparations in money But we have already 3 treaties on reps, where reps in kind are expressed in dollars. Why in this case should there be a misunderstanding?
Church. I was going to suggest Mos. Com. be auth. to issue an interim report & not have to issue whole report before authorization is given to taking reps. For ex. factories would be taken at once by Sov Govt
St. I think we can be quite frank How compare goods we should
take from Ger. with our losses If we accept them we should
say we accept as reparation. E could take factories &
lands but better have a dec. I propose simple prin.: 1. Ger
must pay reps. for losses caused to Allies. 2. To ask Rep.
Com to find out am’t of reps. which would be nec. to take
& to report to govts Am. side agreed with us to take as
basis $20 million [sic] dollars. Does
it mean Am side withdraws its agt
Pres: No I am completely in agt. Only one word. Reparations mean to so many people money. Add parenthesis (in kind)
St. We won’t publish
Pres U S entirely prepared discuss sum & principles. Only q I raise is use of word reps
St. We can use another word. Compensation of losses Church “Compensation in kind for losses”
St: 3 govts agree Ger. must pay in kind losses caused by her
to Allies in course of war. To give to Mos Com the task to
find out the figures of the reps. to be paid taking as basis
To
give
Com
to for discussion the Am-Sov
formula
Church We can not commit ourselves to fig. of $20 billion or any other figures until Com has studied
St. No commitment
Ed What is value of the figure
St. Com. could change figures & modify them in any way.
Church You could propose that when the Com. meets Read excerpt from “communication from our govt” £500,000,000 a yr.= Ger’s pre-war exports This could not be paid by Ger. True some of it capital but that make it harder for Ger. to supply rest. Attach importance to some statement re paying for Ger imports. Unless priority at least equal to reps. we shall pay by exports (?) for reps.
St: Suppose experts say figure is wrong Then can fix new one. Our fig. not sacrosanct. We propose to discuss. It is nec. that things move forward.
Pres. suggest whole thing be left to Com at Mos.
Mol: Only yesterday ERS announced results of 3 For Mins
consids. Text
of Read ERS report
Ed. We think putting fig. in report might commit us to the figures. If desired would be willing say:
Mos Rep Com will be instructed: 1st To take into exam the report presented by Mr M. to the Crimean Conf
Mol. The 3 Mins considered this q. Eden’s proposal ignores fact this q has been discussed at Crimean Conf
Ed. we didn’t want say how many yrs
St. 1. The heads of 3 govts agree Ger must pay cocompensation in Kind for
losses caused to Allied Govts
2.
&
agree
Ger
must
pay
in
Kind
2. To the Mos. Rep Com has been given task to consider the am’t of reps, to be paid
3. In the Com. we will bring in our fig & you will bring yours Church: I agree
Intermission
St. Montreux Agt
I think this treaty is now out of date. In this treaty Jap. Emperor plays a very important role as one of the parties He plays perhaps more impor. role than S. U. The whole treaty is framed in such a way as to be linked up with Leag of Ns But Leag doesn’t exist any more, just as Jap Emperor is not in our ranks. According to this Treaty T. has rt to close Straits not only in case of war but also if T considers sit. dangerous. This also is difficult from modern point of view
The treaty was made when our rels with Gt Brit were not very tight but now G Bt wouldn’t want strangle R. . . I think this treaty should be very seriously modified. Now nearly indecent to say we observe the treaty of Montreux. I think there could be no objection to consideration of a revision of the treaty. In what sense I won’t go on to prejudge future decs. But I should like ints. of R to be taken account of. It is impossible to put up with a sit. where a small country will keep her hand at the throat of R. Ints of R must be taken into acct without infringing legit. ints of T. How to do it must be considered. I now propose the organ to study it. Is agreed 3 Mins will meet every few months Perhaps would be possible at 1st meeting to discuss so mins could report to their govts. That would be the preparatory stage for settlement of q. of the Straits
Pres. We have over 3,000 miles of natural boundary bet. US & Can No fort or armed ship on that boundary, Has existed for over 100 yrs. If we could get other govts do that would be wonderful thing
Church. it
would
bee, to tell T the matter
would be brought under consid. Shouldn’t like her to come in
to war with out knowing of it. Indeed I think we have some
promise to T that before anything is decided affecting her
she would be informed Mr Ed reminds me that after we came
back from Mos he mentioned the matter to the T. Amb. in
general terms, so we have Kept our engagements It is worth
considering whether at the time changes are made to meet the
wishes & needs of R in the Straits whether some
undertaking might be made to T that her indep. would in no
way be affected That would make it easy for her.
St. We can hide nothing from T & we should give her some assurances
Church Then we are agreed
St. So For Mins will meet at the end of the Conf in US
Church I think it affects Brit position in the Med. more than U.S. so conference might be in Lon. I tried hard some time ago to get thru the Dardanelles. The R. Govt of that day sent 2 army corps to help from the other end. However we did not succeed
St. They were in a hurry to take away the troops. If had
waited another wk. Gers & Ts all ready to capitulate Mr.
Pres No
St. No secretary of the Conf. Who is taking notes of the decs.
Ed. Will put before you a commun & a note of decisions taken Church In addition to commun.
Pres re Amended statement on Pol
line For const. reasons I have made a few changes Only 2
changes. Orig text was “The 3 Powers are agreed” etc Const.
q of whether I have a rt to say the 3 powers can change a
boundary . . the new lang: “The 3 heads of gov’t consider”
omit “3 powers” & change “agree” to “feel”
Mol Add Return her ancient terrs
in E. Pr. & westerly
Pres Depends how long back you go
Mol Quite a long time ago It is of great importance to Poles from a national point of view.
Church I feel it would be better not to draw the frontiers in the W. at the present time & not to mention localities
Mol There is no mention of the frontiers & with regard to the line of the Oder there was no objection
Church Never in pub.
Mol But at the Conf
Ed On contrary, we have always said as far toward Oder as Poles want to go.
Church: If you talk of restoring the ancient terrs. I shall be asked what they are & there will be no satis. answer We’re not ag. it
St Withdrew his suggestions & “your suggestion Mr Pres (to Pres) is accepted”
That will be the last point of paper on Pol
Pres we have only commun
Church: D.O. (i. e. terr. trusteeships) [Then his advisers
talked him out of it Prob. told him of revised copy of ERS
report. He said “I haven’t seen it” but then matter was app.
settled OK]
Pres suggested draft commun. be given to heads of govt tonight & then have 11.00 a.m. meeting tomorrow
Church Then said something about multiple membership in communique
Declaration on Liberated Europe
The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have considted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.
The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.
To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may
exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly
assist the people in any European liberated state or former
Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment
conditions require, (a) to establish
conditions of internal peace; (b) to
carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed
peoples; (c) to form interim
governmental authorities broadly representative of all
democratic elements in the population and pledged to the
earliest possible establishment through free elections of
governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the
holding of such elections.
The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.
When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in
any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite
state in Europe make such action necessary, they will
immediately (establish appropriate machinery for the
carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this
declaration) take measures for carrying
out mutual consultation.
By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles
of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by
the United Nations, and our determination to build in
cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order
under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general
well-being of all mankind.
860H.01/2–1145: Telegram
The British Foreign Secretary (Eden) to the
Foreign Office
most immediate
[Yalta, February 10, 1945.]
Following for Foreign Office from Foreign Secretary. Please repeat to Belgrade.
At plenary session of Crimea Conference on February 10th the
Heads of the three Governments discussed the Yugoslav
question and agreed to recommend to Marshal
2. Please arrange for a communication to be made at once on
above lines to Dr.
3. Similar instructions are being sent by Soviet and United
States Governments to their representatives with Dr.
Mr. President
The Russians have given in so much at this conference
that I don’t think we should let them down. Let the British
disagree if they want to—and continue their disagreement at
Moscow. Simply say it is all referred to the Reparations
Commission with the minutes to show the British disagree
about any mention of the 10 billion.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Recommendation that the three powers encourage Kuomintang-Communist unity in the war effort against Japan.
As this is likely to be the final plenary session, I suggest
that some time during today’s meeting you find occasion to
urge the Marshal and the Prime Minister to see that full
encouragement is given by
The importance of encouraging united Chinese efforts at this time must be apparent to all three Governments.
Present
At the beginning of dinner the conversation was general.
The Prime Minister then proposed a
toast to the King of England, the President of the United
States, and to Mr.
The President replied that the
Prime Minister’s toast brought back many memories—that he
recalled the first year as President of the United States in
the summer of 1933. His wife had gone down in the country to
open a school, and on the wall there had been a map on which
there had been a great blank space. He said the teacher had
told his wife that it was forbidden to speak about this
place, and this place had been the Soviet Union. He said he
had then decided to write a letter to Mr.
Marshal Stalin, in his conversation with
Prime Minister
The Prime Minister said that, on
the contrary, he very much hoped that Russia would receive
reparations in large quantities, but he remembered the last
war when they had placed the figure at more than the
capacity of Germany to pay.
Marshal Stalin
remarked that he thought it would be a good idea to
put some mention of the intention to make Germany pay for
the damage it had caused the Allied Nations, and also some
reference to the Reparations Commission, in the
communiqué.
The Prime Minister and The President agreed to the
inclusion of these statements in the communiqué.
The Prime Minister then proposed a
toast to the health of Marshal
“‘We have missed
you at our Conference and send you our affectionate
greetings and wish for you a speedy recovery in
order that we may all have the benefit of
association with you again. Signed: “I was instructed to send Mr. Stettinius
then proposed a toast to his predecessor, Mr.
the above message to you on behalf of the
above who were guests of the Prime Minister at
dinner this [last]
evening.”
The President then said that he
recalled that there had been an organization in the United
States called the Ku Klux Klan that had hated the Catholics
and the Jews, and once when he had been on a visit in a
small town in the South be had been the guest of the
president of the local Chamber of Commerce. He had sat next
to an Italian on one side and a Jew on the other and had
asked the president of the Chamber of Commerce whether they
were members of the Ku Klux Klan, to which the president had
replied that they were, but that they were considered all
right since everyone in the community knew them. The
President remarked that it was a good illustration
Marshal Stalin
said he felt that this was very true.
After considerable discussion between the Prime Minister and
Marshal The
President said that in his opinion any leader of a
people must take care of their primary needs. He said he
remembered when he first became President the United States
was close to revolution because the people lacked food,
clothing and shelter, but he had said, “If you elect me
President I will give you these things”, and since then
there was little problem in regard to social disorder in the
United States.
The President then said he desired
to propose a toast to the Prime Minister. He said that he
personally had been twenty-eight years old when he entered
political life, but even at that time Mr.
The Prime Minister said that he
would face difficult elections in the near future in England
since he did not know what the Left would do.
Marshal Stalin
said that he felt that Left and Right now were
parliamentary terms. For example, under classical political
concepts,
The President said that in 1940
there had been eighteen political parties in France and that
within one week he had had to deal with three different
prime ministers in Prance. He said that when he had seen de
The Prime Minister remarked that
Marshal
Marshal Stalin
replied that experience had shown one party was of
great convenience to a leader of a state.
The Prime Minister said if he
could get full agreement of all the British people it would
greatly facilitate his task, but he must say that during the
Greek crisis he had lost two votes in Parliament and the
opposition had consisted of only eleven votes against him.
He said he had accosted those Members of Parliament who had
deserted him and had asked them to have the courage of their
convictions. He added that they had been very unhappy
because they had had this stand against the government. He
concluded that he didn’t know what would be the result of
the election in England but he knew he and Mr.
The Prime Minister then remarked
that although he had had great difficulty with Mr.
Marshal Stalin
remarked that he did not believe the Labor Party could
ever form a government in England. He asked the President
whether there was any labor party in a political sense in
the United States.
The President replied that labor
was extremely powerful in the United States but there was no
one specific party.
•••••••
Marshal Stalin
then said he thought more time was needed to consider
and finish the business of the conference.
The President answered that he had
three Kings waiting for him in the Near East, including
•••••••
Marshal Stalin
said the Jewish problem was a very difficult one— that
they had tried to establish a national home for the Jews in
Virovidzhan but that they had only stayed there two or three
years and then scattered to the cities. He said the Jews
were natural traders but much had been accomplished by
putting small groups in some agricultural areas.
The President said he was a
Zionist and asked if Marshal
Marshal Stalin
said he was one in principle but he recognized the
difficulty.
During the course of the conversation, Marshal Stalin
remarked that the Soviet Government would never have
signed a treaty with the Germans in 1939Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941,
Department of State publication 3023, pp. 76–78.British and Foreign State Papers,
vol. cxxxvii, pp. 495–496.
Marshal Stalin
came over and spoke to the President and said he did
not think they could complete the work of the conference by
three o’clock tomorrow.
The President replied that if
necessary he would wait over until Monday, to which Marshal
It was tentatively agreed that there would be a plenary
session tomorrow at twelve noon, after which the Prime
Minister and Marshal
Present
There are no full minutes of this meeting in the
secret
At the last Plenary Session, the communiqué was discussed and
most of the conversation dealt with the details of language,
the results of which are apparent in the final communiqué
agreed upon. The Soviet suggested that in the part on voting
procedure no reference be made to the fact that the proposal
accepted was put forward by the President. Marshal
2/11 12.15 p. m.
Plenary
Communique
PM likes draft but too many “joints”.
Mol. We have an amendment that
does that
The 1st part: prefer more detail, naming personalities who took part
Church: At end
St: Better at beginning. Was at Teheran
Pres & PM: OK
St. no other remarks on opening
Church put in generals as well?
St. Yes
Church I agree with that
St name whomever you like
I Defeat of Ger.
Mol amends
Church: Is point of substance in introducing word “Hitlerite” It narrows it. We would prefer “Nazi” Germany
Mol. Withdraws amend. (re Hitlerite Ger)
Church. leave out “joint”, goes without saying various Church amendments
II OK with St.
Ed: Ought make it clear how zone is to be given
Shouldn’t indicate we have accepted the Fr. demand.
“Limits of the Fr. zone will be agreed by the 4 Govts thru
their repres. on the
Wire
to
Mol: After II a new chap. on reparations.
We consider the q. on the costs by Ger of Allied loss to Allied Govt in
this war it is fair to exact from Ger reparations in Kind in
the greatest poss. amt. to the greatest possible extent possible A
Commission is created on Reps which will have as its task
determining the amt. of reps.
The Com. will sit in Mos.
Pres Only q is whether it is worthwhile to have sep. Chapter or work it in. I can’t find a good place.
III
Mol After 1st 2 ¶s add:
It has been also resolved to recommend to the Conf. to invite Uk. & Wh. R as orig. member
Pres very embarrassing to me
Church If brought out pub. now without any explanation of US position will cause trouble.
3 members of the War Cab. are objecting to the prin. of more than 1 vote. This only shows controversies it will raise We are all pledged to it in the draft conclusions
I should have to ask for adjournment to consult dominions. It might take several days But we put it all down in the conclusions
St.: Withdrew it But in
Mol ¶s 4 & 5
These ¶s should read as follows:
Concerning voting proc. in the
Mol If the text which we rec’d last night is united draft of Brit & Ams we didn’t know it. It is agreed
ERS asked Pres if it would affect him politically back home if “put forward by the Pres” is retained & Pres said it would not. Pres preferred to leave the phrase in
P M wants to eliminate 1st sentence of Chap. V on Pol.
Chap IV agreed to
Ed: insert after inherent: “we were impressed by the dangers of any divergence of policy between the major allies toward Poland”
St leave it out altogether
Church: Would prefer Ed’s amended form
St: This is only a statement about proceedings of various representatives. Some may have been impressed, others not.
Pres read our proposed new sentence
Agreed
Church wants to say dec. re Pol. will be very heavily attacked in Eng. It will be said we have yielded completely on the frontiers & the whole matter to R.
St: Is it in earnest I doubt it
Church I assure you it is. Lon
St: But the other Poles will predominate
Church I hope you’re right. We’re not going back on it It’s not a q. of nos. of Poles but of the cause for which Brit drew the sword Will say you have completely swept away the only const. govt of Pol. However I will defend it to the best of my ability
VI Yug
Church translate
St That’s right. Not every one will understand
VII Agreed
VIII Prisoners of war
St suggests mention of prisoners of war should be
deleted. This is a q. among ourselves. We can take dec. but
not nec to pub
Mol Says he & Ed agreed will
come up in meeting For Mins
Church But can be published?
Agreed be published separately when text completed this afternoon
IX Unity O K with St.
Summary was dropped O K
IX Church what does “want” mean “It means privation & not desire”
Mol Will this communique be signed by the heads of govts
Pres Just as at Teheran
Should be signed first by St. because has been such a wonderful host
St I object
Church. If take alphabet I’ll be first
St—Am. Bloc
" If you take age I also come first
St If St. 1st signature will say he leads. Insists he be in last place
Who will take charge of final text
Church: Bridges
St. perhaps to the For Mins for final checking
Pres. Early
St Mol
& Vishinsky. He is not
interested in lunch
Pres: For Mins then to read it over in place of P. M, Mar. & me.
St. Who will make list of decs.post, pp. 947–948. The final list of decisions became the
Protocol of Proceedings, post,
pp. 975–982.
Pres On summary of conclusions re reps. (i e Sov. protocol) entirely satis to us with few changes
Church Not for publication
Prime Minister’s Amendments to Draft
Communiqué
Defeat of Germany
Line 8:
For“co-ordination”
Read: “concert”
Line 9:
After “launched”
Insert: “continuously”.
Three lines lower down, instead of
“our joint military plans”, read
“our combined military plans”.
The word “joint” appears twice in the next three lines, and the Prime Minister would omit it in these two places.
Occupation and Control of Germany
In the second line for the word
“jointly” substitute the word
“together”.
Line 7—the word “co-ordinated”
should be struck out and “united” substituted.
Line 10—the last sentence of the
paragraph should read as follows:—
“It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three Powers if she should so desire to take over a fourth zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission.”
In the first line of the next paragraph for “it is our joint purpose” read “It is our inflexible purpose”.
In the third line of this paragraph for “threaten” read
“disturb”.
Six lines from the bottom of the paragraph, instead of “to take jointly such
other measures” read “to take in
harmony such other measures”.
The last sentence of the paragraph on this page should read as follows:—
“It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and Militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for the Germans and a place for them in the comity of nations”.
Present
At the luncheon, which was attended by the President, the
Prime Minister, and Marshal
Present
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers to
Approve the “Summary of Proceedings of the
Conference”
At this meeting, the discussion was almost entirely related
to language and drafting problems. Mr.
2/11 4.20 p m
ERS Chmn
Final meeting of For Mins
ERS: 1st subject is approval of communique
to
report
on read communique
Re D. O.
Mol. Marshal
No objection if Mr. S. or anyone else should say this was the proposal of the Pres.
In no other place is it said on whose initiative it has been done
ERS This was discussed this morning in presence of Mar & Pres & I discussed it at length with Pres. Would be very diff. for me to agree
Mol Was no agt on this special point
We said we had another q on this par.
Simultaneously with the pub. of com. you or someone say this was the proposal put forward by the Pres. We don’t want to hush-hush this fact.
ERS: agreed to eliminate the reference to Pres.
Re consultation
Ed on procedure—US is to approach Ch. & Fr. Desirable
that consultation be done as soon as possible—48 hours if
possible as will be great interest in the subjectpost, pp.
793–795.
2/11
ERS Chmn
For. Mins.
(After intermission)
Summary of Conclusions
p. 1 Mol. what would be the title: “Decisions”?
Agreed: Protocol of the proceedings of the Crimea Conference
Mol. First phrase
The Crimean Conf. of the 3 heads of the Govts of USSR, US
& Gt Brit which took place in the Crimea from Feb 4 to
Feb 11 took came to the
following conclusions:
Ed. Would like to add Saudi Arabia before Turkey
Mol. Why
Ed They did want to declare war & we discouraged them
Mol. This q. was not discussed. There would then come others (i e new suggestions)
Ed. Good to have Moslem or two
ERS I have no objection. They have assisted in the prosecution of the war to some extent
Mol I don’t know if Saudi Arabia will be much help. Think it over & consider at end of protocol
p. 2
San Francisco inserted
Mol. I want to be there
p. 3 ERS “or in the preliminary consultations”
Agreed
p 5 Insert protocol in place of reparations section
Agreed
p 9 ERS agreed re Yug.
p 10 ERS suggests insert “among the For. Secs”
Suggests eliminate last
sentence
Mol: “Mr.
Eden: should not say views will be conveyed “aint any views” instead say: could not be approved
Persia
Mol: Suggests instead:
“Mr Ed, Mr S & Mr Mol exchanged views on the sit. in Iran”
Otherwise eliminate altogether
Ed add “It was decided agreed
that the matter would be pursued further through the dip. channel.”
Montreux
Mol. after “Convention”: which ceased to correspond to the contemporary sit.”
It’s a hint in regard to change
ERS we should consider sit. before suggest give a hint
Ed. Alternative: the
changes proposals which it
was understood the Sov. Govt would put forward with
reference in relation to the
Montreux Con.
Agreed to Ed. alternative with last sentence omitted
Ed. We will inform the Turks
Mol About the fact that this q.
will be raised
Ed insert informed “at the appropriate moment”
Mol. Insists on his amend
Ed. willing to stop there & leave out assurance point.
Transmit to Pres. copy of what ERS
signs Protocol & of 2
tels to
Ed. submitted the draft cable to de G. re zone of occup &
Control ComPost, p.
948.
ERS agreed
Mol. hadn’t had time to read
Mol. Gave his prelim. consent.
Mar. St. has not seen them. Will give his answer tonight
Saudi Arabia—Mol. to let Ed. Know
Crimea Conference
Summary
of
Conclusions.
Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea
Conference
The following conclusions were arrived at—
i. world organisation
It was decided:
invitation
“The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of
itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of
China and of the Provisional Government of the French
Republic, invite the Government of ——— to send
representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be
held on 25th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of
America to prepare a Charter for a General International
Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and
security.
The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:
“c. voting
Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.
In the event that the Government of ——— desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments”.
territorial trusteeship
It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.
The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being
made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to
(a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b)
territories detached from the enemy as a result of the
present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily
be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual
territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United
Nations Conference, or in the preliminary
consultations and it will be a matter for
subsequent agreement which territories within the above
categories will be placed under trusteeship.
ii. declaration on liberated
europe
The following declaration has been approved:
“The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.
The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of
national economic life must be achieved by processes which
will enable the
To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.
The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.
When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.
By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.
In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.”
iii. dismemberment of germany
It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:
“The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security.”
The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany
was referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr.
iv. zone of occupation for the french
and control commission for germany
It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the
French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone
would be formed
It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Commission for Germany.
v. reparation
The following protocol has been
approved:ante, p.
933) to substitute therefor the reparations
protocol (post, pp. 978–979).
It was agreed that a Reparations Commission should be set up in Moscow. This Commission will comprise one representative from the U. S. A., U. S. S. R., and U. K., each representative being assisted by such expert advisers as may be necessary. The Commission should begin its work as soon as possible.
It was agreed that the following should be the basic principles of exaction of reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.
vi. major war criminals
The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.
vii. poland
The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference:
“A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
M. as a Commission to
consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the
present Provisional Government and with other Polish
democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with
a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along
the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and
unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of
universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all
democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to
take part and to put forward candidates.
When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern
frontier of Poland should follow the It
is
They recognised that Poland must receive
substantial accessions of territory in the North and West.
They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional
Government of National Unity should be sought in due course
on the extent of these accessions and that the final
delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should
thereafter await the Peace Conference.”
viii. yugoslavia
It was agreed to recommend to
and that this statement should be published in the communique of the Conference.
ix. italo-yugoslav frontier
italo-austria frontier
Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.
x. yugoslav-bulgarian relations
There was an exchange of views among the
Foreign Ministers
Secretaries on the question of the desirability of
a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue
was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be
allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr.
of
the
views
of
the
Three
Powers.
that this could not be approved. Mr.
promised
to
consider
the
matter
and
to
give
his
views
on
the
following
day.
agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.
xi. south eastern europe
The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:
xii. persia
Mr.
xiii. meetings of the three foreign
secretaries
The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.
These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.
xiv. the montreux convention and the
straits
It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign
Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider what
changes
should
be
made
in
the
arrangements
for
the
Straits
laid
down
in
proposals which Sov Govt will make in
regard the Montreux Convention and report thereon to the three Governments. The
Turkish Government should be informed that
this
matter
is
under
consideration
and
should
be
given
an
assurance
that
their
independence
and
integrity
is
in
no
way
affected.
at the proper moment.
Joint Communiqué on International
Organization
The proposals for a general international organization resulting from the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks have been considered, and agreed proposals have been worked out on the major points left open at those conversations. Our views are being transmitted to the Government of China and to the Provisional Government of the French Republic for their consideration. As soon as these consultations have been completed, the proposals agreed upon will be made public and invitations will be issued to a United Nations Conference to be held in the United States about April 15. This conference will prepare the charter of the general international organization.
“Mr.
“Map room informed us about 1.30 p. m. that it had been sent.”
A copy of the same telegram obtained from the Roosevelt Papers indicates that the time of release was to be twenty-four, rather than forty-eight, hours after publication of the communiqué.
Argonaut 147 Top Secret. For
Acting Secretary of State from Secretary Stettinius. To be
delivered immediately.
1. The conference has agreed upon our proposal on voting
procedure and we are to consult China and France on behalf
of the other two powers. The date of the United Nations
Conference has been fixed for April 25, 1945, and the
location at San Francisco. The substance of the foregoing
will be announced in the communiqué to be issued Monday
night for Tuesday morning’s papers although the communiqué
will not itself state that the voting procedure agreed upon
was proposed by the United States. It is however understood
that we are at liberty, simultaneously with the release of
the communiqué, to state that our proposal on voting
procedure was the one that was adopted.ante, pp. 927–928.
2. It is of the utmost urgency that our consultations with
China and France be as brief as possible because of the
intense interest which will be aroused throughout the world
as to the substance of the voting provisions which are not
to be made public until the consultation is completed. Mr.
3. The text of the invitation as agreed upon reads as follows:—
“The government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of blank to send representatives to a conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.
“The above named governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:—
“‘C. Voting:—1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote. 2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members. 3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, party to a dispute should abstain from voting.’
“Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently. In the event that the government of blank desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating governments.”
4. It was also agreed that the nations to be invited to the
United Nations Conference should be the United Nations as
they existed on February 8th, 1945, and such of the
associated nations and Turkey as have declared war on the
common enemy by March 1, 1945. This explains my recent
urgent wire to you about the Latin American associated
nations.Ante, pp.
794, 797. A
notation concerning the preparation of this telegram may
be found ante, p. 782. As early as January
10, 1945, a memorandum (740.0011EW/1–1045) had been sent
by the Executive Secretary of the Secretary’s Staff
Committee (
5. It was also agreed that the five governments with
permanent seats in the Security Council should consult each
other prior to the United Nations Conference on providing
machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial
trusteeships which could apply only to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations;
(b) territory to be detached from
the enemy as a result of this war; and (c) any other territory that may voluntarily be
placed under trusteeship.
It was further agreed that no discussions of specific
territories will take place during the preliminary
consultations on trusteeships or at the United Nations
Conference itself. Only machinery and principles of
trusteeship will be formulated at the Conference for
inclusion in
“The Secretary urged that immediate action be taken to have our Embassies inform the six Latin American ‘Associated Nations’ of the possibility that they may be excluded from initial participation in the forthcoming United Nations Conference, unless they declare war on Germany or Japan, or both.”
6. We are relying on you to conduct the consultation with France and China in such manner as seems to you most effective and most expeditious and thereafter to publish the text of the voting provisions in concert with the other four powers.
7. I am leaving tonight for Moscow for a visit of only one or two days and can be reached through the Embassy. Please cable me summary of press and other public reaction to the communiqué as soon as it is available.
8. Allstate Horseshoe.
(Copy)
R’s
Mr. Early:
Please inform the President on behalf of Mr.
We consider this as a desirable move and suggest that the
President should inform
In any event
Will you please give the above information also to Admiral
From Secretary Early to post, pp. 968–975.
The following statement should be prepared for release
simultaneous with communiqué but should be given out as a
separate story,
Under these arrangements each ally will provide food, clothing, medical attention and other needs for the nationals of the others until transport is available for their repatriation. In caring for British subjects and American citizens the Soviet Government will be assisted by British and American officers. Soviet officers will assist British and American authorities in their task of caring for Soviet citizens liberated by the British and American forces during such time as they are on the continent of Europe or in the United Kingdom, awaiting transport to take them home.
We are pledged to give every assistance consistent with operational requirements to help to ensure that all these prisoners of war and civilians are speedily repatriated.
List of Decisions Arrived at by the
Three Heads of Government at the Crimean Conference
1. To include the word “dismemberment” in the German terms of surrender.
2. To appoint a committee composed of Mr.
3. To adopt proposal of the United States with respect to the voting procedure in the Security Council of the proposed world organization.
4. To hold a United Nations Conference on April 25, 1945, in the United States, to prepare the charter of the proposed world organization.
5. To authorize the United States, on behalf of the three powers, to consult the Government of China and the Provisional Government of France, with respect to decisions 3 and 4.
6. That the five Governments which will have permanent seats
on the Security Council should consult each other prior to
the United Nations Conference on providing machinery in the
world charter for dealing with territorial trusteeships
which would apply only to (a)
existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territory to be detached from the
enemy as a result of this war; (c)
any other territory that may voluntarily be placed under
trusteeship.
It was agreed it would be a matter of subsequent agreement as to which territories within the preceding categories would actually be placed under trusteeship and that no discussions of specific territories are contemplated now or at the United Nations Conference.
7. The United States and the United Kingdom to support at the
United Nations Conference, the Soviet request that the
Ukraine and
8. To issue the statement on Poland agreed to at the Conference.
9. That there should be immediately established in Moscow a
Commission on German reparations composed of Mr. a) Germany must pay in kind for
losses caused by it to the Allied Governments; (b) the amount of the reparations to
be paid by Germany should be considered by the Moscow
Reparations Commission and reported by it to the three
Governments; (c) the three
Governments will submit to the Commission their proposals
and data relating to the question of German reparations.
10. To issue the Declaration on Liberated Europe agreed to at the Conference.
11. To accord to the Provisional Government of France a German zone of occupation, and representation on the German Control Commission.
12. To send a joint telegram to Marshal
13. To hold periodic meetings of the three Foreign Ministers, the first meeting to be held in London in June, 1945.
14. That, at their first meeting, the three Foreign Ministers will consider revision of the Montreux Convention.
Argonaut
149. Secret and personal for the Ambassador from
Secretary of State
You should concert with your British and Soviet colleagues
and arrange to deliver to General de British drafts of these telegrams in the form
of undated and unsigned carbon copies are in the
Ambassador
ante, p.
933.
1. General information. In view of our
lukewarm attitude on the proposed tripartite statement recognizing
the Danes as Allies, and probable Soviet refusal to participate in
it, the British may refer the matter to the Big Three for decision.
Meanwhile we are sending through our own channels, with copies to
London and Moscow for the information of the British and Soviet
Governments, a secret message to the Freedom Council and the Danish
political party leaders, acknowledging their communication and
lauding the contributions being made by the Danish resistance
movement in the common cause. (This is eleventh message.)Allstate. Horseshoe. post, pp.
953–954.
In reply to Ambassador ante, p. 346, footnote
1.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
This telegram is endorsed “Text sent to President through Map
Room Feb. 3”. The telegram from
“6 February:
Shown to Mr.
R[obert] W B[ogue]”
Roosevelt acknowledged
Niact Poles 11. From
Schoenfeld.
Polish Foreign Office has sent me by hand, with the request that it
be urgently telegraphed, following letter dated February 3, 1945 for
the President from Prime Minister
“Mr. President.
At this time the fate of many nations rests in your hands and in the hands of Prime Minister Churchill. The whole world expects that these important discussions in which you and the Prime Minister of Great Britain are taking part will result in the creation of foundations for a future peace, a peace which should bring to nations the freedom of conscience and speech and secure for them freedom from fear and want. I trust that these essential freedoms will also be granted to our nation which has been fighting unflinchingly for their realization at the side of the great American and British democracies.
In particular I trust you will not permit any decisions to be taken which might jeopardize the legitimate rights of Poland or her independence and that you will not recognize any
faits accompliswith regard to Poland. If peace in Europe is to be durable it must be based on principles of justice, on respect of law, on good neighbourly relations as well as honesty in international life.While I am writing these words, the lives of many thousands of Poland’s best sons are in danger. The so-called provisional government
of Lublin has openly declared its intention to try as traitors all soldiers of the Polish home army and members of the Polish underground movement. Mass arrests and deportations have already taken place. You are well aware that they have fought the Germans gallantly and regardless of sacrifice throughout the five years of occupation. You assisted them yourself with your aid and in the memorable days of the Warsaw rising the American and British Governments recognized the home army as part of the regular Polish forces fighting alongside the United Nations. Today the lives of these soldiers are in danger because they recognize the independent, legal Polish Government and because they firmly insist on their rights as men and citizens. Therefore I beg of you to urge upon the Soviet Government whose armies are at present in occupation of the territory of Poland to give proof that they genuinely desire understanding with Poland and to prevent the execution of the criminal plans of the Lublin men. Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.
Telegram to the Secretary of State from the Acting Secretary.
1. . . . (This is message no. 13.)
2. . . . ante, p. 293.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Associated Nations. . . .
Medina in Venezuela somewhat taken aback by President’s letterante, pp. 794, 797.
5. Poland. We are repeating to the President a
message to him from Prime Minister Supra.
Argonaut
12. Crypto-War for Acting Secretary of State only from
Secretary Ante, pp.
949–950.
Please continue to keep us promptly informed of developments with respect to the associated nations. What is your estimate of the present status and time at which future action may be taken by each of the five Latin American countries other than Ecuador?
Reference your message No. 9 of February 1. Not printed. The paragraph in question reads as follows
(Defense Files, CM–in–130): “4. to] Moscow referred to in
paragraph 4. Allstate Horseshoe.
1. Soviet-Chinese Conversations.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Telegram to the Secretary of State from the Acting Secretary In
answer to first request in your cable of the 4th,Ante, p.
952.
The Polish people in the homeland desire to regulate Polish-Soviet
relations; they fear Poland will be forced into Communism; they pin
their hopes of independence on Great Britain and the United States
and advocate a guarantee by all the three great powers; frontier
changes should embrace all frontiers simultaneously; delineation of
the eastern frontiers should be effected by compromise, not
unilateral dictation; the eastern frontier should be more favorable
to Poland than the
Mikolajczyk states that question of frontiers and independence
closely intertwine. If Poland loses territory, it must not lose the
Polish population living in it. Plan for the eviction of Germans as
well as transfer of Poles in Russia must be prepared in advance and
coupled with plan of credits.
He presents following alternative solutions of problem of government
and administration during transition period:
Allstate. Horseshoe.)
Memorandum concludes that the prompt establishment of government
based on all democratic political movements is decisive for
independence of Poland.
Telegram to the Secretary of State from the Acting Secretary In
response to the second request in yours of the fourth,Ante, p.
952.
Ecuador has declared the existence of
a state of war with Japan since December 7, 1941.Paraguay—We are expecting action
momentarily. This is message No. eighteen. Allstate. Horseshoe.Peru indicates that action may be
taken soon by the Executive.Venezuela—No change since our message
No. thirteen.Ante, pp.
951–952.Uruguay—The Government is looking for
a justification for acting.Chile—No change since you
left.
On February 14 we are planning a ceremony when Ecuador and any other nations which have qualified will affix their signatures to the United Nations Declaration. We are advising our Embassies in the other five countries of this ceremony with the thought that several may wish to hasten their action so that they may participate as signers on that day.
In answer to your third inquiry, following is summary Department’s
reaction to
French Embassy on February 3 presented formal note stating that
French Government intends to address solemn warning to German
Government cautioning latter against maltreatment or reprisal
measures against French prisoners of war and deportees in violation
of international law. French Government believes such warning would
be more likely to be effective and might save thousands of lives if
issued by Governments of the United Nations as a whole. Embassy is
seeking clarification to ascertain whether warning will be worded to
Above is for your information in event matter is raised at Conference. If matter is not dealt with at conference, I will take it up here with War and Navy Departments.
To Secretary of State from Ambassador
Soviet acting representative on the European Advisory Commission has informed me that his government has approved the Protocol on zones of occupation and the control machinery agreement for Germany. All 3 governments have now approved without reservation the 3 basic documents for the control of Germany—the instrument of unconditional surrender, the Protocol on zones of occupation and the agreement on control machinery.
From Mr.
Pouch with letter, press conference transcript and so forth received. Exceedingly regret troubles you are facing but can honestly assure you our headaches are none the less severe. Situation here much too involved to explain. All we can do is carry on best we can. Regards.
Telegram to the Secretary of State from the Acting Secretary
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. French Developments. Following are French
developments which Daily Mail stated that it should be made
perfectly clear that U.S. and not Britain or Russia is responsible
for the failure to invite France to the Big Three conference.
3. General Information. (This is message No.
23.) The departure of the
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2073. It has come to my attention that Mr.
The United States Government, the United Kingdom and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics have approved without reservation the
Unconditional Surrender Instrument, the Protocol on Zones of
Occupation in Germany and the Agreement on Control Machinery.Ante, pp.
113–123, 124–127.
Nr:
Argonaut
45. Ref your No. 14.
As so clearly stated in the comments of the American members on the
aide-mémoire of
February 24, 1945, from the Acting President of the Allied
Commission in Italy (United States and Italy 1936–1946: Documentary Record, Department of State
Publication 2669 (Washington, Government Printing Office,
1946).Allstate Horseshoe.
Argonaut
71A. Crypto-War for Acting Secretary of State only from
Secretary
The British are disturbed over our having entered into an aviation
agreement with Ireland
No. 24. For Secretary of State
Allstate Horseshoe. Your
Argonaut
71–A. During the later part of the Chicago conference
Signature of agreement with Ireland does not indicate approval by the
United States of that country’s war attitude any more than in
Upon receipt from
You can obtain from the President’s Naval Aide the text of the
messages exchanged with him but you will wish to consider carefully
how much of the substance of this paragraph can be disclosed to
(Top Secret. From
NCR 4051. It has been suggested that if the President and his staff
and Prime Minister Churchill and his staff could visit Delhi and
invite the Generalissimo and his staff to meet them there it would
be a great morale builder in this theater. It would also afford an
opportunity to clarify policies and strategy. Delhi is suggested
rather than any place in China for two reasons: (1) Security and (2)
accommodations. A meeting at Delhi would probably make unnecessary
Telegram to the Secretary of State, From the Acting Secretary.
1. General information. Observes in Athens
consider that trial and sentencing of ante, p. 293.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Telegram to the Secretary of State, From the Acting Secretary.
1. . . . (This is thirty-third message) . . . . British Foreign
Office states that
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
From Mr.
Justice Byrnes should arrive Washington early next week. The Press
undoubtedly will want a conference with him. He and I have talked
and he understands. Suggest you and
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Article VII of the Lend-Lease
Agreement.
Before I left Washington, Mr.
This mistaken impression on the part of the Prime Minister has tended to encourage the British to take an unyielding attitude on the matter of their Empire preferences and trade barriers.
I think it would be helpful, in this connection, if you could send to
the Prime Minister the attached letterInfra.
Dear Winston: I have been hoping to find
an opportunity in the course of the present conferences to have a
brief word with you on the
Discussion on commercial policies, pursuant to Article VII have been
carried on from time to time between our two Governments ever since
the Fall of 1943. I think it most important that these talks be
re-invigorated and I should like to suggest the prompt naming of
full delegations on both sides, to be headed by a
Most sincerely yours,
Dear Winston: You have expressed some
concern with regard to our different viewpoints concerning the
policy to be pursued about Italy. I am happy to tell you that Mr.
I believe that some constructive steps should be taken to move away
from the present anomalous situation of onerous and obsolete
surrender terms which are no longer pertinent to the situation
today. I hope the Foreign Office and the State Department will be
able to work out some mutually satisfactory procedure to remedy this
situation. As you know, we accepted the Combined Chiefs of Staff’s
directive to General Alexander along the lines suggested by Mr.
Macmillan
At any rate, I want you to know that we are determined to pull together with you in Italy as we are in other areas, and that we believe that by full and continuous consultation and goodwill on both sides there is no danger of any serious split between us on this important question.
Most sincerely yours,
Owing to lack of time there are a few questions on which we were not
able to conclude our discussions during the Crimea Conference. These
were
Ante, pp.
887–889.a) you
will remember that the United States Delegation experienced
certain doubts regarding the phraseology of our proposal. I
therefore attach a redraftante, pp. 876–877.Ante, pp.
891–893.Ante, pp.
889–890.Ante, p.
893.
Monsieur V. M. Molotov.
My Dear Marshal Stalin: I have been
thinking, as I must, of possible political difficulties which I
might encounter in the United States in connection with the
number of votes which the Big Powers will enjoy in the Assembly
of the World Organization. We have agreed, and I shall certainly
carry out that agreement, to support at the forthcoming United
Nations Conference the admission of the Ukrainian and
I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you would perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forthcoming conference. I would greatly appreciate your letting me have your views in reply to this letter.
Most sincerely yours,
Dear Winston: As I said the other day,
I am somewhat concerned over the political difficulties I am apt
to encounter in the United
I am enclosing a copy of the letter which I have written to
Marshal
Most sincerely yours,
My Dear Franklin, I have given
consideration to your letter of February 10 about the political
difficulties which might arise in the United States in
connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton
Oaks Agreement because of the fact that the United States alone
among the three Great Powers will have only one vote in the
Assembly.
Our position is that we maintained the long-established
representation of the British Empire and Commonwealth; that the
Soviet Government are represented by its chief member, and the
two republics of the Ukraine and
I need hardly assure you that I should do everything possible to assist you in this matter.
Yours very sincerely,
Dear Mr. Roosevelt: I have received your letter
of February 10. I entirely agree with you that, since the number
of votes for the
I think that the number of votes for the
With sincere respects
Report of the Crimea Conference
For the past eight days,
In addition to the three Heads of Government, the following took part in the Conference:
For the United States of America:
Fleet Admiral
Justice
General of the Army George
Fleet Admiral
Lieutenant General
Vice Admiral
Major General
For the Soviet Union:
Admiral
Army General
Marshal of Aviation Khydyakov
For the United Kingdom:
Anthony
Lord
Field Marshal
Marshal of the Royal Air Force
Admiral of the Fleet
General
together with
Field Marshal
Field Marshal
Admiral
The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great
Britain, the President of the United States of America, and the
I
the defeat of germany
We have considered and determined the military plans of the three
allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The
military staffs of the three allied nations have met in daily
meetings throughout the Conference. These meetings have been
most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in
closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allies
than ever before. The fullest
Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staffs attained at this Conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.
Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.
II
the occupation and control of germany
We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the Three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the Three Powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three Powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.
It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and
Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to
disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and
disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the
German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the
resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German
military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry
that could be used for military production; bring all war
criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in
kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the
Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove
all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from
the cultural and economic life of the German people;
III
reparation by germany
We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A Commission for the Compensation of Damage will be established. The Commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied Countries. The Commission will work in Moscow.
IV
united nations conference
We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.
The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.
We have agreed that a Conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25th, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.
The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the Conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.
V
declaration on liberated europe
We have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration on liberated
Europe. This Declaration provides for concerting the policies of
the
The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.
The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to creat[e] democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.
To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may
exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist
the people in any European liberated state or former Axis
satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions
require (a) to establish conditions of
internal peace; (b) to carry out
emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; (c) to form interim governmental
authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in
the population and pledged to the earliest possible
establishment through free elections of governments responsive
to the will of the people; and (d) to
facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.
The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.
When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.
By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.
In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.
VI
poland
We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We reaffirm our common desire to see established a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussions we have agreed on the conditions in which a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major powers.
The agreement reached is as follows:
A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier
of Poland should follow the
VII
yugoslavia
We have agreed to recommend to Marshal ante, pp.
251–254.
We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been
formed, it should declare that:
There was also a general review of other Balkan question[s].
VIII
meetings of foreign secretaries
Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the Heads of Governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their advisers have also been held daily.
These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the Conference
agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular
consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will,
therefore,
IX
unity for peace as for war
Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.
Only with continuing and growing co-operation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, “afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want”.
Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.
Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea
Conference
The Crimea Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which took place from February 4th to 11th came to the following conclusions.
I. world organisation
It was decided:
invitation“The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of _____________ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.
“The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:
“‘C.
Voting
- ‘1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
- ‘2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
- ‘3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting’.
“Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.
“In the event that the Government of _____________ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments”.
territorial trusteeship
It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.
The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being
made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of
Nations; (b) territories detached from
the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be
placed under trusteeship; and (d) no
discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the
forthcoming United Nations Conference or in the preliminary
consultations,s of “consultations” was added with
pen and ink. The change is not initialed in the
margin.
ii. declaration on liberated europe
The following declaration has been approved:
“The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.
“The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.
“To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (
a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.“The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.
“When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.
“By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.
“In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.”
iii. dismemberment of germany
It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the
Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as
follows:
“The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security.”
The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was
referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr.
iv. zone of occupation for the french and
control council The word
“Council” is a substitution with pen and ink for
“Commission” as typed. In the margin opposite the change
is a small penned question mark. The change is not
initialed. for germany.
It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.
It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should
be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council
v. reparation
The following protocol has been approved:
1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the
Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be
received
2. Reparation in kind is
3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives—one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.
4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:
“The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (
a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”
The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.
The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.
vi. major war criminals
The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.
vii. poland
The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference:
“A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the Western part of Poland.
The phrase “of the Western part of Poland” read “of Western Poland” as typed, but was revised by hand on the original, with no initials in the margin. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.“M.
Molotov , Mr.Harriman and Sir A.Clark Kerr are authorised as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.“When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.
“The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the
Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.”
viii. yugoslavia
It was agreed to recommend to Marshal
ante, pp. 251–254.
ix. italo-yugoslav frontier
italo-austria frontierante, p. 876), of the
British proposals attached thereto (ante, p. 877), and of
the British note of February 11 (ante, p. 965) suggests
that the heading “Italo-Austria Frontier” should read
“Austro-Yugoslav Frontier”.
Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.
x. yugoslav-bulgarian relations
There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on
the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of
alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under
an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with
another state. Mr.
xi. south eastern europe
The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of
their colleagues on the following subjects:
xii. iran.
Mr.
xiii. meetings of the three foreign
secretaries
The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.
These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.
xiv. the montreux convention and the
straits
It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign
Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals
which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward
in relation to the Montreux Convention and report to their
Governments.
Protocol on the Talks Between the Heads of
the Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the
Question of the German Reparation in Kind
The Heads of the three governments agreed as follows:
1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the
Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparation areante, pp. 978–979.
2. Reparation in kind areante, pp.
978–979.
3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives—one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.
4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:
“The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (
a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”
The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.
The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.
Agreement
The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the
United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in
two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in
Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war
against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:
status quo in
Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People’s Republic) shall
be preserved;
It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia
and the ports and railroads referred to above will require
concurrence of Generalissimo
The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.
For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.
Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and
Civilians Liberated by Forces Operating Under Soviet Command
and Forces Operating Under United States of America
Command
The Government of the United States of America on the one hand and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other hand, wishing to make arrangements for the care and repatriation of United States citizens freed by forces operating under Soviet command and for Soviet citizens freed by forces operating under United States command, have agreed as follows:—
Article 1.
All Soviet citizens liberated by the forces operating under United States command and all United States citizens liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.
United States and Soviet military authorities will respectively take the necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.
Article 2.
The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens of the other contracting party found by them, and will at the same time take the necessary steps to implement the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and United States repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.
Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers
of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration
where liberated members of the respective forces are located and
there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of and
access to and from
The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be effected by agreement with the competent Soviet or United States authorities. The removal of camps and transfer of liberated citizens may, in exceptional circumstances, also be effected without preliminary agreement provided the competent authorities are immediately notified of such removal or transfer with a statement of the reasons. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.
Article 3.
The competent United States and Soviet authorities will supply liberated citizens with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall, subject to the provisions of Article 8, be fixed on a basis for privates, non-commissioned officers and officers. The basis fixed for civilians shall as far as possible be the same as that fixed for privates.
The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens of the other contracting party.
Article 4.
Each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens held by the other contracting party.
Article 5.
Soviet and United States military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and United States authorities shall agree upon beforehand.
Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.
In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and United States Governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens necessary settlements with the Governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.
Article 6.
Ex-prisoners of war and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and United States authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between these authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their own officers.
Article 7.
The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens. They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.
Article 8.
The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.
Article 9.
This Agreement shall come into force on signature.
Done at the Crimea in duplicate and in the English and Russian languages, both being equally authentic, this eleventh day of February, 1945.
In the course of compiling the present volume a few hitherto unpublished documents were found in which important participants at the Yalta Conference made authoritative statements on the proceedings, or portions of the proceedings, at the conference itself. Since these statements supplement the contemporary conference record, they have been reproduced at this point.
For previously published statements by participants regarding the proceedings at Yalta, the reader may wish to consult the following:
Message of President Bulletin, March 4, 1945, volume xii, pages 321–326, 361; Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st session, volume
91, pages 1618–1622.
Report by Prime Minister Churchill to the House of Commons, February
27, 1945, Parliamentary Debates, 5th series,
volume 408, columns 1267–1295.
Press conference of President The
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, compiled by
Statement by Secretary of State Bulletin, April 8, 1945, volume xii, pages 600–601.
Testimony of Communist Espionage in the United States
Government, Hearings before the Committee on Un-American
Activities, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, 2d session,
pages 656–657.
Testimony of George C. Marshall, Military Situation
in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed
Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 1, pages 559–565.
Statement of W. Averell Military Situation in
the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed
Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 5, pages 3328–3342.
Testimony of Nomination of Charles E.
Bohlen To Be United
States Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 83d Congress,
1st session, passim.
636. We had three more unproductive hours of discussion at the meeting of the commission on Poland this evening, going over much the same ground as last time.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Every argument ante,
p. 711.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Memorandum For the President
From: James F. Byrnes
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
At Yalta, the Prime Minister wished to discuss shipping and the
British Import Program.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Attached is a draft message from the President to Marshal
2. Mr. Postwar Foreign
Policy Preparation, p. 396, footnote 11.
Last Saturday Ambassador
Memorandum of Points To Be Made by the
Secretary in Talking to Ambassador Gromyko
1. I am very much disturbed about the statement made to Mr.
2. It was clearly settled at the Crimean Conference that the two republics would not be invited to San Francisco and would not be separately represented there.
3. In accordance with this decision no invitations have been issued to them.
4. It would be most embarrassing and contrary to the Crimean arrangements if their representatives should come to San Francisco.
5. Ambassador
Memorandum of Decisions Reached at the
Crimean Conference in the Matter of the Two Soviet
Republics
The Soviet Representatives proposed that two or three of the
Soviet Republics should be invited to the San Francisco
Conference and should become initial members of the
organization.Ante, p.
712.
This matter was referred to the Foreign Ministers for
consideration. At the Foreign Ministers’ meeting Mr. Ante, p.
737.Ante, pp.
772, 775.
The question of whether or not the two Soviet Republics should adhere to the United Nations Declaration prior to April 25 and the question of whether they should be invited to the Conference were both discussed fully at the plenary session and a negative decision was reached on each point.
(Personal and Top Secret for the President from
Aside from the major questions which are causing concern in our relations with the Soviet Union there has been an accumulation of minor incidents which started some six weeks ago. The following are only examples: . . . Little or no progress has been made in getting Soviet approval for our air teams to visit Soviet controlled territory for appraisal of bomb damage or for our naval team to [visit] Gdynia. Both proposals were agreed to at Yalta.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In connection with your message of April 1
Matters on the Polish question have really reached a dead end.
Where are the reasons for it? The reasons for it are that the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow—members of the Moscow Commission—have departed from the principles of the Crimea Conference and have introduced into the matter new elements not provided by the Crimea Conference.
Namely: a) At the Crimea Conference all three
of us considered the Provisional Government of Poland as the
government functioning in Poland at the present time which is
subject to reconstruction and which should serve as kernel of the
new government of national unity. But the Ambassadors of the United
States and England in Moscow depart from this principle. . . .
b) At the Crimea Conference all three of us
agreed that not more than five persons from Poland and three persons
from. London should be called for consultation. But the Ambassadors
of the United States and England in Moscow have departed from this
position and demand that each member of the Moscow Commission be
given the right to invite an unlimited number of people from Poland
and from London.
Naturally, the Soviet Government could not agree with this as the summons of people should be carried out according to decisions of the Crimea Conference, not by individual members of the Commission, but by the Commission as a whole, namely by the Commission as such. But the request of an unlimited number of persons summoned for consultation contradicts the plans of the Crimea Conference.
c) The Soviet Government proceeds from the
fact that in accordance with the meaning of the decisions of the
Crimea Conference such Polish leaders should be invited for
consultations who, firstly, recognize the decisions of the Crimea
Conference, including the decision on the
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Excerpts From Handwritten Notes of Plenary
Session of February 6, 1945
Dictated at San Francisco, June 3, 1945 on the basis of longhand notes made during the meeting of February 6, held at Livadia Palace, Yalta.
President
Mr. Ante, pp.
682–683.Ante, pp.
683–684.
The President then suggested that Mr. Ante, pp.
684–686.
In reading from this memorandum Mr.
The President then stated that that ended the reading and the explanation of the procedure involved in the American proposal. He said then that we have to remember that the objectives of the five great nations and of all nations is the same and that on the question of procedure there ought not to be any real difficulty.
There then ensued a lengthy discussion brought about by Stalin’s
question as to in what respect the voting formula as read by Mr.
Ante, pp.
58–60.
5. Please transmit the following to the President as from me:
“Referring to our telephone conversation yesterday on the veto aspects of the voting procedure, the precise issue at present, as to which there has been a great deal of confusion especially in the press, is whether the veto power applies on the part of a great power not involved in a dispute so as to enable that great power to prevent having a situation discussed in the Council where such discussion is merely for the purpose of enabling the Council to decide what of [
if] any action it should take or recommend. We are all in agreement that the unanimity of those great powers not involved in a dispute should apply to substantive decisions which the Council is called upon to make. The question of whether such a great power can prevent a situation from even being placed on the agenda and discussed in a preliminary way prior to the taking of substantive decisions was not covered either at Dumbarton Oaks or at Yalta. However, the British and we have always assumed and we have so stated publicly that any determination as to whether or not the Council itself undertake any such preliminary discussion should if a vote is required at all, be decided by not more than a procedural vote, i. e. without any of the great powers as such being able to exercise a veto. We are still hopeful that we will be able to reach agreement with the Soviet delegation on the interpretation of this question which is of course one on which we feel we cannot retreat.You may be interested to know that in the course of the statement on voting procedure which I made to the February 6
Plenary Session at Yalta, I emphasized the importance which we ascribe to full and
free discussion. That conference addressed itself only to the issue of a great power abstaining from voting in a dispute. However, my statement was in such broad terms that, especially when taken in conjunction with later interpretative public statements issued by the Department on the precise issue now under consideration, there can be no possible basis for any contention that our present position could be considered to be in violation of the Yalta agreements. According to the best records available to us here the exact language of the two paragraphs in my Yalta statement which referred to freedom of discussion was as follows: See ante, pp. 661–662.“Our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.
We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the council is permitted, the establishment of the world organization which we all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated.”
Notation on file copy reads: “Message sent to the White House 6/4/45 8:30 a. m.”
