Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961

Cuba, 1961–1962

1. Telegram From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of StateSource: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Cuba. Official Use Only; Niact. Havana, January 3, 1961, 1 a.m.

2674. Reference: Embassy telegram 2667.In telegram 2667 from Havana, January 2, Charge Daniel M. Braddock reported that Castro had just announced that his government had decided that the United States would not be allowed to have a greater number of diplomatic personnel in Cuba than Cuba maintained in the United States. Castro indicated that if all the U.S. officials remaining in Cuba decided to leave that would be “perfectly all right with us.” He added that “90 percent of functionaries are spies anyway.” (Ibid.) Note received from Ministry of Foreign Relations at 1:20 a.m. January 3 reading in translation as follows:

Havana, January 2, 1961, Year of Education

Mr. Charge dʼAffaires:

I have the honor to inform you that the Revolutionary Government has decided that under present circumstances the personnel of the Embassy and Consulate of Cuba in the City of Washington, whether diplomatic, consular, or of other character, whatever their nationality, should not exceed eleven persons. Likewise it has decided that the personnel of the Embassy and Consulate of the United States in the city of Habana, whether diplomatic, consular or of other character, whatever their nationality, should likewise be limited to eleven persons.

For the purpose of facilitating the departure of the persons who for this reason must abandon the national territory, a period of 48 hours has been fixed from the time of receipt of this note.

I take the opportunity, Mr. Charge dʼAffaires, to reiterate to you the assurance of my reciprocity of your considerations.Braddock assessed the Cuban note and its impact in telegram 2675 from Havana, January 3. His conclusion was that it would be impossible to maintain a useful operation at the level authorized by the Cuban Government. Braddock recommended that the United States respond by breaking relations immediately. (Ibid.) The note is also printed in Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1961, p. 104.

Signed Carlos Olivares.

Braddock

2. Editorial Note

On January 3, 1961, at 9 a.m., a meeting was held at the White House to consider a response to the note from the Cuban Foreign Ministry which was transmitted in telegram 2674 from Havana. (Document 1) According to notes on the meeting taken by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, the participants included President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Christian Herter, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gordon Gray, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell, Bissellʼs Assistant C. Tracy Barnes, and several officials from the Department of State, including Under Secretary Livingston Merchant and Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann.

Herter summarized the Cuban note and read Charge Braddockʼs message recommending an immediate break in relations. (See footnote 2, Document 1) Mann noted that, in the event of a break in relations, the Swiss Embassy in Havana could be expected to look after U.S. interests in Cuba. The President asked how the United States would know what was happening in Cuba if relations were broken and was told that, outside of Cuban exile sources, the United States would have only limited sources of information in Cuba after relations were broken. After some discussion, it was concluded that a break in relations would not affect the treaty guaranteeing the United States the use of Guantanamo naval base. Gates and Merchant questioned the need to respond immediately to the Cuban note, but Eisenhower decided to make a clean break and directed Herter to take the steps necessary to effect the break as quickly as possible.

Lemnitzerʼs notes conclude with the action assigned to the Joint Chiefs: “Look into ways and means of training Cuban refugees & expand the program.” The program he referred to was the program developing under CIA direction to launch an invasion of Cuba with a force of Cuban exiles. (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Notes, Miscellaneous Meetings, 1961) Notes on the meeting were also taken by Barnes, who recorded that it was agreed that the number of Cuban exiles being trained for the invasion should be increased, possibly up to 1,500, and additional training sites would have to be developed. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 2, Vol. III, Part IV) For another record of the meeting, see Document 3.

3. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960-Jan 20, 1961. Secret. Prepared by Barnes. According to a chronology prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency on May 24, 1961, entitled “Special Group Consideration of the Strike Force Concept,” those attending the meeting included Secretary of State Herter, Secretary of Defense Gates, Secretary of the Treasury Anderson, Director of Central Intelligence Dulles, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Gray, Under Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas, Under Secretary of State Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State Mann, CIA Deputy Director for Plans Bissell, his assistant Tracy Barnes, and Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster. The location of the meeting is not given. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol. II) The chronology covers the period November 1960 through January 1961 and is included in the Supplement. Washington, January 3, 1961. SUBJECT Outline of 3 January 1961 Meeting

Points covered were: 1. A discussion of whether or not to break relations which it was quickly decided should be done. It was stated that it might be more difficult [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The importance of commo obviously is to know on a current basis what the situation is and what sort of treatment is being accorded to American nationals. The tone of the meeting was clearly in support of overt introduction of U.S. forces if any steps were taken by the Cubans either to harm American citizens or to attack or damage official U.S. property (e.g. Guantanamo). 2. A fairly detailed discussion followed as to when the break should be announced. The upshot of this was to favor slightly an immediate break, i.e. even prior to the expected Cuban attack in the UN on 4 January but subject to discussions by the Department with Messrs. Braddock and Wadsworth in order to obtain their views. The Department will make the final decision. 3. There was considerable discussion of the situation in Cuba with general agreement on its seriousness and on the need for action. It again was made clear that action would be taken immediately should the Cubans provoke it in any aggressive way. Even without such provocation, it was clear that the meeting felt that pretty rigorous action should be taken and obviously could successfully be taken—the danger, however, being that if it went too far it might rupture the structure of the OAS which, of course, is undesirable. 4. As to present preparations, there was some discussion about the use of U.S. soil for training. The consensus of the meeting was against this although it was agreed that efforts should be made to try and increase the number of trainees, possibly up to 1500, which if done would require additional training sites. In this connection it was felt that perhaps some additional trainees might be spread around in relatively small groups and given some training. The cover story could be that enlistment in these small cadres was the best way to keep them together, cover the language problems, provide them with some sustenance and keep them occupied. Another possibility suggested was some military training in refugee camps, some of which have already been created. The conclusion, however, was clear that preparations should proceed and that to the extent possible the size of the force should be increased. 5. There was some discussion about talking with other Latin American countries on a bi-lateral basis with a view to having them consider providing support against Cuba at an appropriate moment. This would involve breaking of relations at the proper time and possible active support such as recognition of an opposition government and the provision of material, men and conceivably a little money. In this connection it was made clear that action against Trujillo should be seriously pushed. It was urged that in all future propaganda Trujilloʼs name be paired with that of Castro in order to increase in peopleʼs minds the similarity between them as dictators and help overcome distinctions such as one being right and the other being left. It was suggested that possibly Venezuela would be willing to attack the DR if it could be assured of some U.S. support. This plan was thought to be worth examination particularly if it could be worked out so as to occur at the same time as an effort against Cuba. 6. There was some discussion as to when it might be advisable to recognize a provisional Cuban government. Although there was some argument that it might be well to do so fairly soon, the sense of the meeting was that it would be preferable to wait until the individuals involved were located on Cuban soil. 7. It was clearly the sense of the meeting that all possible reasonable efforts should be made now and through the immediate future to provide materiel support to opposition elements inside Cuba and to step up propaganda including leaflet missions. 8. (See below)

C. Tracy BarnesPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

8. In addition to the above points, there was a brief discussion about briefing members of the new administration. The State Department made it clear that it considered such a briefing important, particularly for Mr. Rusk. No definite schedule was agreed upon but the consensus of the meeting was that appropriate briefings should be considered for the near future.Presumably paragraph 8 was added at a later time.

4. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and Dean RuskSource: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, 1957-61. Secret. Drafted by Herter. Dean Rusk was Secretary of State-designate. Washington, January 3, 1961, 12:30 p.m.

I discussed with Dean Rusk the following three matters:

1. The Cuban situation resulting from the noteDocument 1. sent through the Embassy in Havana to the effect that our personnel had to be reduced within 48 hours to a total of eleven, including locals. I explained that our Charge dʼAffaires in Havana had recommended that the best course for us would be to break off diplomatic relations completely since it would be impossible to carry on in anything like a dignified or effective way with such small staff. I further told him that we had checked with WadsworthJames J. Wadsworth, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. in New York, who had felt that such a break would not interfere with the debate on the charges brought by Cuba against us to begin tomorrow, and I, likewise, checked with Braddock in Havana, who reiterated his recommendation for a clean break and felt that such a break would not jeopardize the situation with respect to the remaining U.S. citizens in Cuba.

I then told Dean Rusk that I thought a decision would be reached this afternoon with respect to breaking diplomatic relations, and that my expectation was that this would be done. He asked if he could have until 3.00 p.m. to report reactions, and that his own impression was that there would be no reaction unless there was a very violent feeling on the part of the President-elect.Rusk telephoned Herter later the same afternoon to indicate that he had passed along the information concerning the possibility of breaking relations with Cuba, and that Kennedy did not want to comment on the merits “either way.” (Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)

[Here follows a summary of discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Christian A. HerterPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

5. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Herter and President EisenhowerSource: Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Washington, January 3, 1961, 7:30 p.m.

The President telephoned that if the Cubans attack Guantanamo, they would be kicked out with force. The Secretary said our Legal AdviserEric Hager. was doing what he was supposed to do in looking into it. He said we would move right along on this. The President said they were waiting for the other paperNot further identified. and the Secretary said it was on its way.

6. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Cuba. No classification marking. Drafted by Goodpaster. Washington, January 5, 1961.

On the evening of January third, Secretary Herter called me to say that he was sending a recommendation to the President as to timing of breaking relations with Cuba (the meeting with the President in the morningSee Documents 2 and 3. had resulted in the Presidentʼs approval to break relations, with a request to State Department to give him their view on timing). Mr. Herter said the matter was entirely clear-cut, except that, contrary to his statement in the morning, it did seem that there is some basis for a possible charge that breach of relations would vitiate our treaty rights in Guantanamo. He said he would call me back shortly to elaborate on this point.

He called back within an hour and said the point was essentially this—that the agreement reached in 1903For text of the agreement between the United States and the Republic of Cuba for the lease of lands in Cuba for coaling and naval stations, which was signed by the President of Cuba on February 1, 1903, and by the President of the United States on February 23, 1903, see Foreign Relations, 1903, pp. 350–351. The terms of the lease, signed at Havana on July 2, 1903, established an annual rent of $2,000 in gold coin for naval or coaling stations in Guantanamo and Bahia Honda, Cuba. (Ibid., pp. 351–353) involved a payment of rental on the part of the United States, and an undertaking to return fugitives. These provisions were confirmed in 1934 when the treaty was extended to state that it could not be altered or abrogated without agreement of both parties.For text of the agreement signed by the United States and Cuba on May 29, 1934, which extended the provisions of the 1903 treaty concerning the lease of the Guantanamo naval base, see Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1933-1937, pp. 4054-4055. He said the problem is that it might be argued we would not be in position to carry out the provision about return of fugitives. I asked Mr. Herter whether the weight of legal opinion would support this charge, would support us against the charge, or would be rather evenly divided. He said he could not say, but had the legal advisor, Mr. Hager, come on the phone and talk to me about this.A fuller record of this conversation and several others on January 3 involving Herter and the question of breaking relations with Cuba are in the Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations. Mr. Hager said this is a very gray area of international law. He added that a very good argument could be made by us, and a lot of non-Soviet nations would see some weight in our position, which would be a respectable one. However, the argument would be a very good one against us as well. He added that one key point is that he cannot think of a forum in which this charge could be effectively brought to bear, since the question would be held to be a political rather than a legal one.

I asked Mr. Herter, who had heard all of this, whether in light of all these considerations he would still recommend that the President go forward with the proposed action. He said he would.

I then met with the President in the Mansion and he approved the proposed action and statements.See Document 8. On my suggestion he talked by telephone to Mr. Herter in the foregoing sense.

A.J. GoodpasterPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Brigadier General, USA

7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in CubaSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1-361. Unclassified; Niact; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Hurwitch and approved by Vallon. The text of the note is also printed in Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1961, pp. 103-104. Washington, January 3, 1961, 9:05 p.m.

1347. Following is text of note delivered 8:30 p.m. January 3 to Cuban Charge:

“Sir:

I have the honor to refer to a note dated January 2, 1961See Document 1. from the Government of Cuba to the Charge dʼAffaires of the United States Embassy in Habana stating that the Government of Cuba has decided that personnel of the Embassy and Consulate of the United States in the City of Habana, regardless of nationality, shall not exceed eleven persons.

This unwarranted action by the Government of Cuba places crippling limitations on the ability of the United States Mission to carry on its normal diplomatic and consular functions. It would consequently appear that it is designed to achieve an effective termination of diplomatic and consular relations between the Government of Cuba and the Government of the United States. Accordingly, the Government of the United States hereby formally notifies the Government of Cuba of the termination of such relations.

The Government of the United States intends to comply with the requirement of the Government of Cuba concerning the withdrawal of all but eleven persons within the period of 48 hours from 1:20 a.m. on January 3, the time of the delivery of the note under reference. In addition, the Government of the United States will withdraw its remaining diplomatic and consular personnel in Cuba as soon as possible thereafter.

The Government of Cuba is requested to withdraw from the United States as soon as possible all Cuban nationals employed in the Cuban Embassy in Washington and in all Cuban Consular establishments in the United States.

The Government of the United States is requesting the Government of Switzerland to assume diplomatic and consular representation in Cuba on behalf of the Government of the United States.A copy of the note addressed to the Swiss Government of January 4, requesting Switzerland to assume diplomatic and consular representation in Cuba on behalf of the United States, is in the Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Cuba.

I take this opportunity to reiterate to you the assurances of my reciprocity of your considerations.”The Cuban Government acknowledged the “rupture” of relations in a note addressed to the U.S. Embassy in Havana on January 4. The note indicated that the Government of Czechoslovakia had been requested to assume responsibility for the diplomatic and consular interests of Cuba in the United States. (Despatch 1506 from Havana, January 4; Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/1-461)

Herter

8. Editorial Note

In conjunction with the delivery on January 3, 1961, of the note notifying the Cuban Embassy of the U.S. decision to terminate relations between the two countries (see Document 7), the White House released a statement by President Eisenhower. Eisenhower made reference to the note received earlier in the day from the Cuban Government, which he stated “can have no other purpose than to render impossible the conduct of normal diplomatic relations with that Government.” It was, he added, a “calculated action on the part of the Castro government” and “the latest of a long series of harassments, baseless accusations, and vilification.” Accordingly, he had instructed Secretary Herter to return a note stating that the United States “is hereby formally terminating diplomatic and consular relations with the Government of Cuba.” He stressed that this move did not affect U.S. friendship and concern for the people of Cuba who were, he said, “suffering under the yoke of a dictator.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-61, page 891)

On January 4 White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty issued a supplementary statement concerning the Guantanamo naval base: “The termination of our diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba has no effect on the status of our naval station at Guantanamo. The treaty rights under which we maintain the naval station may not be abrogated without the consent of the United States.” (Department of State Bulletin, January 23, 1961, page 104)

9. Memorandum From the Chief of WH/4/PM, Central Intelligence Agency (Hawkins) to the Chief of WH/4 of the Directorate for Plans (Esterline)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret. Branch 4 of the Western Hemishere Division was an internal task force created within the CIA in January 1960 to direct the Cuban project. J.D. Esterline became task force director on January 18, 1960. Esterline reported on the project to the Deputy Director for Plans, Richard M. Bissell, although Bissellʼs principal aide, Tracy Barnes, who acted for Bissell about 50 percent of the time. Branch 4 began with a staff of 20 and grew by April 1961 to a staff of more than 500 with its own communications, propaganda, and military sections. Marine Corps Colonel Jack Hawkins was assigned to Branch 4 in September 1960, with direct responsibility for military training operations. (Minutes of the Paramilitary Study Group, May 22, 1961, Envelope 6; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) Washington, January 4, 1961. SUBJECT Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of Strike Operations Against Government of Cuba

1. Purpose:

The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the current status of our preparations for the conduct of amphibious/airborne and tactical air operations against the Government of Cuba and to set forth certain requirements for policy decisions which must be reached and implemented if these operations are to be carried out.

2. Concept:

As a basis for the policy requirements to be presented below, it would appear appropriate to review briefly the concept of the strike operations contemplated and outline the objectives which these operations are designed to accomplish.

The concept envisages the seizure of a small lodgement on Cuban soil by an all-Cuban amphibious/airborne force of about 750 men. The landings in Cuba will be preceded by a tactical air preparation, beginning at dawn of D-1 Day. The primary purpose of the air preparation will be to destroy or neutralize all Cuban military aircraft and naval vessels constituting a threat to the invasion force. When this task is accomplished, attacks will then be directed against other military targets, including artillery parks, tank parks, military vehicles, supply dumps, etc. Close air support will be provided to the invasion force on D-Day and thereafter as long as the force is engaged in combat. The primary targets during this time will be opposing military formations in the field. Particular efforts will be made to interdict opposing troop movements against the lodgement.

The initial mission of the invasion force will be to seize and defend a small area, which under ideal conditions will include an airfield and access to the sea for logistic support. Plans must provide, however, for the eventuality that the force will be driven into a tight defensive formation which will preclude supply by sea or control of an airfield. Under such circumstances supply would have to be provided entirely by air drop. The primary objective of the force will be to survive and maintain its integrity on Cuban soil. There will be no early attempt to break out of the lodgement for further offensive operations unless and until there is a general uprising against the Castro regime or overt military intervention by United States forces has taken place.

It is expected that these operations will precipitate a general uprising throughout Cuba and cause the revolt of large segments of the Cuban Army and Militia. The lodgement, it is hoped, will serve as a rallying point for the thousands who are ready for overt resistance to Castro but who hesitate to act until they can feel some assurance of success. A general revolt in Cuba, if one is successfully triggered by our operations, may serve to topple the Castro regime within a period of weeks.

If matters do not eventuate as predicted above, the lodgement established by our force can be used as the site for establishment of a provisional government which can be recognized by the United States, and hopefully by other American states, and given overt military assistance. The way will then be paved for United States military intervention aimed at pacification of Cuba, and this will result in the prompt overthrow of the Castro Government.

While this paper is directed to the subject of strike operations, it should not be presumed that other paramilitary programs will be suspended or abandoned. These are being intensified and accelerated. They include the supply by air and sea of guerrilla elements in Cuba, the conduct of sabotage operations, the introduction of specially trained paramilitary teams, and the expansion of our agent networks throughout the island.

3. Status of Forces:

a. Air. The Project tactical air force includes ten B-28 aircraft currently based in Guatamala and at Eglin Air Force Base. However, there are only five Cuban B-26 pilots available at this time who are considered to be of highly technical competence. Six additional Cuban pilots are available, but their proficiency is questionable.

It is planned that seven C-54 and four C-46 transports will be available for strike operations. Here again, the number of qualified Cuban crews is insufficient. There is one qualified C-54 crew on hand at this time, and three C-46 crews.

Aviation ordnance for conduct of strike operations is yet to be positioned at the strike base in Nicaragua. Necessary construction and repairs at this base are now scheduled to commence, and there appears to be no obstacle to placing this facility in a state of readiness in time for operations as planned.

Conclusions: (1) The number of qualified Cuban B-26 crews available is inadequate for conduct of strike operations. (2) The number of qualified Cuban transport crews is grossly inadequate for supply operations which will be required in support of the invasion forces and other friendly forces which are expected to join or operate in conjunction with it in many parts of Cuba. It is anticipated that multiple sorties will be required on a daily basis.

b. Maritime. Amphibious craft for the operation, including three LOUʼs and four LCVPʼs are now at Viaques, Puerto Rico, where Cuban crew training is progressing satisfactorily. These craft with their crews will soon be ready for operations.

The Barbara J (LCI), now enroute to the United States from Puerto Rico, requires repairs which may take up to two weeks for completion. The sister ship, the Blagar, is outfitting in Miami, and its crew is being assembled. It is expected that both vessels will be fully operational by mid-January at the latest.

In view of the difficulty and delay encountered in purchasing, outfitting and readying for sea the two LCIʼs, the decision has been reached to purchase no more major vessels, but to charter them instead. The motor ship, Rio Escondido (converted LCT) will be chartered this week and one additional steam ship, somewhat larger, will be chartered early in February. Both ships belong to a Panamanian Corporation controlled by the Garcia family of Cuba, who are actively cooperating with this Project. These two ships will provide sufficient lift for troops and supplies in the invasion operation.

Conclusion:

Maritime assets required will be available in ample time for strike operations in late February.

a. Ground. There are approximately 500 Cuban personnel now in training in Guatemala. Results being achieved in the FRD recruiting drive now underway in Miami indicate that extraordinary measures may be required if the ranks of the Assault Brigade are to be filled to its planned strength of 750 by mid-January. Special recruiting teams comprised of members of the Assault Brigade are being brought to Miami to assist in recruiting efforts in that city and possibly in other countries, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. All recruits should be available by mid-January to allow at least four to six weeks of training prior to commitment.

The Assault Brigade has been formed into its basic organization (a quadrangular infantry battalion, including four rifle companies, and a weapons company). Training is proceeding to the extent possible with the limited number of military instructors available. This force cannot be adequately trained for combat unless additional military trainers are provided.

Conclusion: (1) It is probable that the Assault Brigade can reach its planned strength of 750 prior to commitment, but it is possible that upwards of 100 of these men will be recruited too late for adequate training. (2) Unless U.S. Army Special Forces training teams as requested are sent promptly to Guatemala, the Assault Brigade cannot be readied for combat by late February as planned and desired. (3) The Assault Brigade should not be committed to action until it has received at least four and preferably six weeks of training under supervision of the U.S. Army team. This means that the latter half of February is the earliest satisfactory time for the strike operation.

4. Major Policy Questions Requiring Resolution:

In order that planning and preparation for the strike operation may proceed in an orderly manner and correct positioning of hundreds of tons of supplies and equipment can be effected, a number of firm decisions concerning major questions or policy are required. These are discussed below.

The Concept Itself.

Discussion. The question of whether the incoming administration of President-Elect Kennedy will concur in the conduct of the strike operations outlined above needs to be resolved at the earlist possible time. If these operations are not to be conducted, then preparations for them should cease forthwith in order to avoid the needless waste of great human effort and many millions of dollars. Recruitment of additional Cuban personnel should be stopped, for every new recruit who is not employed in operations as intended presents an additional problem of eventual disposition.

Recommendation. That the Director of Central Intelligence attempt to determine the position of the President-Elect and his Secretary of State-Designate in regard to this question as soon as possible.

Timing of the Operation.

If Army Special Forces training teams are made available and dispatched to Guatemala by mid-January, the Assault Brigade can achieve acceptable readiness for combat during the latter half of February, 1961. All other required preparations can be made by that same time. The operation should be launched during this period. Any delay beyond 1 March, 1961, would be inadvisable for the following reasons: (1) It is doubtful that Cuban forces can be maintained at our Guatemalan training base beyond 1 March, 1961. Pressures upon the Government of Guatemala may become unmanageable if Cuban ground troops are not removed by that date. (2) Cuban trainees cannot be held in training for much longer. Many have been in the camp for months under most austere and restrictive conditions. They are becoming restive and if not committed to action soon there will probably be a general lowering of morale. Large-scale desertions could occur with attendant possibilities of surfacing the entire program. (3) While the support of the Castro Government by the Cuban populace is deteriorating rapidly and time is working in our favor in that sense, it is working to our disadvantage in a military sense. Cuban jet pilots are being trained in Czechoslovakia and the appearance of modern radar throughout Cuba indicates a strong possibility that Castro may soon have an all-weather jet intercept capability. His ground forces have received vast quantities of military equipment from the Bloc countries, including medium and heavy tanks, field artillery, heavy mortars and anti-aircraft artillery. Bloc technicians are training his forces in the use of this formidable equipment. Undoubtedly, within the near future Castroʼs hard core of loyal armed forces will achieve technical proficiency in the use of available modern weapons. (4) Castro is making rapid progress in establishing a Communist-style police state which will be difficult to unseat by any means short of overt intervention by U.S. military forces.

Recommendation. That the strike operation be conducted in the latter half of February, and not later than 1 March, 1961.

Air Strike.

The question has been raised in some quarters as to whether amphibious/airborne operation could not be mounted without tactical air preparation or support or with minimal air support. It is axiomatic in amphibious operations that control of air and sea in the objective area is absolutely required. The Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable of opposing our landing must be knocked out or neutralized before our amphibious shipping makes its final run into the beach. If this is not done, we will be courting disaster. Also, since our invasion force is very small in comparison to forces which may be thrown against it, we must compensate for numerical inferiority by effective tactical air support not only during the landing but thereafter as long as the force remains in combat. It is essential that opposing military targets such as artillery parks, tank parks, supply dumps, military convoys and troops in the field be brought under effective and continuing air attack. Psychological considerations also make such attacks essential. The spectacular aspects of air operations will go far toward producing the uprising in Cuba that we seek.

Recommendations. (1) That the air preparation commence not later than dawn of D minus 1 day. (2) That any move to curtail the number of aircraft to be employed from those available be firmly resisted. (3) That the operation be abandoned if policy does not provide for use of adequate tactical air support.

Use of American Contract Pilots.

The paragraph above outlines the requirement for precise and effective air strikes, while an earlier paragraph points up the shortage of qualified Cuban pilots. It is very questionable that the limited number of Cuban B-26 pilots available to us can produce the desired results unless augmented by highly skillful American contract pilots to serve as section and flight leaders in attacks against the more critical targets. The Cuban pilots are inexperienced in war and of limited technical competence in navigation and gunnery. There is reason also to suspect that they may lack the motivation to take the stern measures required against targets in their own country. It is considered that the success of the operation will be jeopardized unless a few American contract B-26 pilots are employed.

With regard to logistical air operations, the shortage of Cuban crews has already been mentioned. There is no prospect of producing sufficient Cuban C-54 crews to run the seven C-54 aircraft to be used in the operation. Our experience to date with the Cuban transport crews has left much to be desired. It is concluded that the only satisfactory solution to the problem of air logistical support of the strike force and other forces joining it will be to employ a number of American contract crews.

Recommendation:

That policy approval be obtained for use of American contract crews for tactical and transport aircraft in augmentation of the inadequate number of Cuban crews available.

Use of Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua.

The airfield at Puerto Cabezas is essential for conduct of the air strike operation unless a base is made available in the United States. Our air lease [base?] in Guatemala is 800 miles from central Cuba—too distant for B-26 operations and for air supply operations of the magnitude required, using the C-46 and C-54 aircraft. Puerto Cabezas is only 500 miles from central Cuba—acceptable, although too distant to be completely desirable, for B-26 and transport operations.

Puerto Cabezas will also serve as the staging area for loading assault troops into transports much more satisfactorily than Puerto Barries, Guatemala which is exposed to hostile observation and lacks security. It is planned that troops will be flown in from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, placed in covered trucks, loaded over the docks at night into amphibious shipping, which will then immediately retire to sea.

Conclusion.

The strike operation cannot be conducted unless the Puerto Cabezas air facility is available for our use, or unless an air base in the United States is made available.

Recommendation. That firm policy be obtained for use of Puerto Cabezas as an air strike base and staging area.

Use of U.S. Air Base for Logistical Flights.

An air base in southern Florida would be roughly twice as close to central Cuba as Puerto Cabezas. This means that the logistical capability of our limited number of transport aircraft would be almost doubled if operated from Florida rather than Puerto Cabezas. Logistical support of the strike force in the target would be much more certain and efficient if flown from Florida.

There is also a possibility that once the strike operations commence, conditions would develop which would force us out of the Nicaraguan air base. Without some flexibility of air base with pre-positioned supplies in the United States, we could conceivably be confronted with a situation wherein the Assault Brigade would be left entirely without logistical air support. Supply by sea cannot be relied upon, for the Brigade may be driven by superior forces from the beach area. Such a situation could lead to complete defeat of the Brigade and failure of the mission.

It seems obvious that the only real estate which the United States can, without question, continue to employ once the operation commences is its own soil. Therefore, an air base for logistical support should be provided in the United States. This will offer the possibility of continued, flexible operations, if one or both of our bases in Guatemala and/or Nicaragua are lost to our use.

Recommendation.

That policy be established to permit use of an air base in southern Florida (preferably Opa Locka which is now available to us and has storage facilities for supplies) for logistical support flights to Cuba.

J. HawkinsPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

10. Editorial Note

On January 4, 1961, the U.N. Security Council met in response to a request on December 31, 1960, from the Foreign Minister of Cuba to adopt the measures necessary to prevent the armed forces of the United States from violating the sovereignty of Cuba. (U.N. doc. S/4605) James J. Wadsworth, U.S. Representative in the Security Council, dismissed Cuban allegations of a “sinister plan,” which he stated were based on “the kind of second-hand rumor which Dr. Roa uses instead of evidence.” Wadsworth added that it was “natural and readily understandable” that some of the Cuban exiles who had found refuge in the United States would want to attempt to overturn the government which had caused them and their homeland so much hardship. But he stated that “the United States Government has been in no way associated with such activities.” (U.N. doc. S/PV.921)

At the afternoon meeting of the Security Council on January 4, the Representatives of Chile and Ecuador introduced a draft resolution calling upon the Governments of the United States and Cuba to resolve their differences. (U.N. doc. S/4612) Debate on the Cuban complaint carried over to January 5, and the Council dropped the complaint for want of sufficient grounds for taking action. The Representatives of Chile and Ecuador did not press for a vote on their draft resolution. (U.N. doc. S/PV.923)

11. Editorial Note

In briefing the National Security Council on January 5, 1961, on significant world developments affecting U.S. security, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles offered the following assessment of developments relating to Cuba:

“Mr. Dulles reported that Castro had reacted violently and defiantly to the rupture in U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations. The controlled Cuban press had hurled a great deal of invective at the U.S. On the eve of the rupture in diplomatic relations, Khrushchev had said at a Cuban reception in Moscow that the U.S. was pursuing a dangerous policy in attempting to suppress the Cuban revolution; while reiterating Soviet support for Cuba, he had remained vague as to the character of that support. Peru was pleased at our action in breaking off diplomatic relations; Chile had indicated it would not follow our example; Venezuela, Honduras and other countries were considering a rupture but will take no immediate action. Newspapers in Brazil are calling the present situation a crisis and suggesting that Latin American countries do not follow the U.S. lead. The President said this was a typical South American reaction. Continuing, Mr. Dulles said Panama seemed on the verge of declaring the Cuban Ambassador persona non grata while Mexico had remarked that it would now be difficult to influence Cuba and get rid of Castro. Secretary Herter said the reaction from Mexico had been much more moderate than anticipated.

“Mr. Dulles said that all Latin American Communists and Communist front groups were urging support for Castro. Apparently, Canada will continue to maintain relations with Cuba. Mr. Dulles said the 50,000 applicants for U.S. visas in Cuba were very distressed at the severance of diplomatic relations. He added that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the Soviet, Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Chinese Communist embassies in Cuba now contained about 100 persons and that 200 additional Bloc nationals not directly attached to the embassies were in Cuba. Five more Bloc countries—Hungary, Roumania, Albania, North Vietnam, and Mongolia—had been recognized by Cuba. Military equipment from the Bloc continues to arrive in Cuba.

“Secretary Anderson pointed out that economic controls had not been applied against Cuba. He thought such controls would have little effect now although they might have had some effect if applied a year ago. The Treasury Department was prepared to apply these controls if a political decision were made to do so. Secretary Herter said the application of these controls would involve invoking the Trading-with-the Enemy Act. Secretary Gates asked why it would not be desirable to apply such controls. He thought this would mean a desirable psychological move even though there was not much U.S.-Cuban trade at present. The President said that the Secretary of Commerce should be consulted with respect to our trade with Cuba. The Vice President noted that many people in Florida objected very strenuously to such trade as we still carried on with Cuba. Mr. Dulles said the businessmen he talked to believed that the elimination of our lard exports to Cuba would have a desirable effect because the Cuban people would blame Castro for the lack of lard.

“The President asked whether economic controls could be applied to Cuba without a public order. Secretary Herter said an Executive Order would be required. Secretary Anderson said the application of such controls would not have much economic effect now, so that the decision for such application should rest on a political judgment. The Vice President felt that economic controls should be applied to Cuba now that diplomatic relations with that country had been severed. In response to a question from the President, Mr. Randall said that while he had been opposed to the early invocation of the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, he now favored using all the instruments at hand against Cuba and would, therefore, favor economic controls. The President asked Secretary Herter, consulting as necessary with Secretaries Anderson and Mueller, to let him have recommendations on the imposition of economic controls against Cuba.” (Memorandum of discussion at the 473d meeting of the National Security Council, prepared on January 5 by Deputy Executive Secretary Marion W. Boggs; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) The Trading with the Enemy Act was enacted on October 6, 1917. For text, and revisions, see 40 Stat. 411, as amended.

12. Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President EisenhowerSource: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series. Secret. Initialed as seen by President Eisenhower. A handwritten note on the source text by Goodpaster, dated January 6, reads: “Told State President has approved.” Washington, January 5, 1961. SUBJECT Invocation of Trading with the Enemy Act Against Cuba

From an economic point of view the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act would have a limited effect. The assets of the Cuban Government in the United States are believed to be very small. We have already embargoed exports from the United States to Cuba under the Export Control Act except for certain foods and medical supplies which continue to go forward on humanitarian grounds. On the import side you have already exercised your authority to eliminate imports of Cuban sugar, which constitute approximately 70% of Cubaʼs exports to the United States. The principal economic effect of the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act would therefore be to limit the remaining 30% of Cubaʼs exports to the United States, consisting principally of tobacco, molasses, fruits and vegetables. Cuba obtains about $100 million a year for these items, but not all of this trade would be lost since Cuba could presumably market most of these items in other countries.

From a political standpoint the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act would create certain problems. In freezing Cuban assets in the United States it would be necessary to exempt the funds of some Cuban nationals in order to avoid creating hardships on anti-Castro elements. This would lead to difficult problems of selection in individual instances.

But more importantly, there would be the problem of our taking unilateral action in an area where it has hitherto been our policy to act multilaterally through the Organization of American States and under the Rio Treaty.For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, pp. 789-796. Whether or not a new proclamation were issued under the Trading with the Enemy Act, it would be necessary to make some public statement regarding the reasons for invoking the Act. Such a statement would of necessity base such invocation on a threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere caused by the Communist and interventionist character of the Cuban regime. This is an area which the Rio Treaty contemplates would be treated with in a multilateral way. Failure to act under the Treaty would expose us to charges in Latin America that we failed to avail ourselves of the inter-American machinery for the maintenance of security in the Hemisphere.

Nevertheless, I believe that the time is fast approaching when it should be possible to ascertain whether there is any reasonable prospect for prompt action in this direction on a multilateral basis. If this multilateral action is not taken in the near future, I believe we should then proceed unilaterally. I think it would be appropriate for me to say to Mr. Rusk that had it not been for the time factor this Administration would have applied the Trading with the Enemy Act and to recommend to him that he give this matter his urgent attention.

On balance, it is my recommendation that, given the extent to which this step would commit the new Administration, this decision be left to them.

Christian A. Herter

13. Memorandum From the Assistant to the Deputy Director (Plans) for Covert Operations (Barnes) to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 2, Vol. III, Part IV. Secret. Washington, January 5, 1961. SUBJECT Material for the 5 January Special Group MeetingSee Document 14.

Essentially what we should try to obtain from this meeting is some specific understandings on certain important problems, all of which have been discussed but no precise resolutions reached. We should also report on certain of our plans to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding.

A. Points on which we should report:

1. The 3 January meeting spoke of increasing the strike force.See Documents 2 and 3. We all agree that this would be useful but we should make it absolutely clear that we are only able to handle the 750 maximum planned. Assuming we get the Special Force trainers, we can be ready by the end of February with, we believe, 750 although it is likely that a number of these will only have been in training by then a very short time. In this connection, a definite understanding should be reached as to: a. Where will the additional men (i.e. over 750) be sought? Who will do the recruiting? Where will they be maintained? Who has the responsibility for preparing the site or sites? Who will undertake whatever training is necessary? b. In the remaining time, how realistic is it to assume any additional individuals can be obtained? Moreover, since this would become substantially overt and since the U.S. has now broken relations, wouldnʼt it be better to concentrate on some acceptable method of providing military back up with U.S. forces joined perhaps overtly by a few Latin American countries? 2. We have started to prepare the Puerto Cabezas strike base since it is absolutely essential that we have a strike base and since the Nicaraguan base is the only available one if we cannot use some U.S. base. 3. We are presently contemplating resupply (after the strike landing) from Puerto Cabezas and from Guatemala. We should have, however, a U.S. base for this purpose. Authority to do so is needed immediately in order to get ready but if this is impossible at least authority to settle on which base could be used if later approved. 4. We are planning to move to Puerto Cabezas substantial amounts of material starting around the 15th or 20th of January including aviation ordnance, resupply ammo and weapons for ground forces, aviation gas, diesel fuel, and possibly some extra one-man packs. Should we delay longer, there is a danger that we might not be able to get the needed inventories in place in time. It should be recognized, however, that in making those moves, we are risking a possible loss of the inventories since Somoza will unquestionably take them over if they are not used as planned. Consequently, if there is any likelihood that ultimately U.S. bases may be authorized, these preparations would result in a substantial increase in our costs as the inventories will roughly have an estimated value of about $1,500,000.

B. Issues which we should clarify with the State Department:

1. There has been a lot of talk about bi-lateral arrangements with selected Latin American countries in order to get them on our side. Work on this should start immediately particularly now that there has been a break in relations. We are prepared to help on this. With whom should we work, what countries will be involved and what will the approaches to these countries consist of and when will they be made? 2. For sometime now it has been agreed that a post-Castro regime should receive economic aid from the U.S. Definitive decisions as to how much and what kind should be reached very soon and plans made as to how it may best be announced since an announcement will clearly give a strong political boost to any provisional government. 3. A number of issues regarding the provisional government must immediately be decided. a. It has been stated that such a government will be recognized but it has not definitively been indicated that there are no legal objections. b. When will it be recognized? We still believe that it should not be recognized until it is in place or about to be put in place on some Cuban real estate. c. Who should be in the provisional government and how should they be selected? In this connection, we believe that the U.S. should retain control of designating the individuals, at least the two or three leaders of the original junta, leaving the expansion to these individuals and such selection process as the times may produce. d. Precisely what benefits will recognition of a provisional government provide, i.e., presumably it will mean support both in equipment and men to defend any Cuban real estate held by the provisional government (on an analogy to the recent U.S. action in support of Nicaragua and Guatemala). e. Will it mean overt U.S. support to enable the provisional government to extend its control over the rest of Cuba by overcoming Castroʼs forces? 3. Who has the responsibility for doing something about Trujillo and what will be done? Again, the time is very short. We had a program approved last week but it is not one that can move rapidly enough to meet the kind of time schedules discussed on 3 January. Figueres has been invited to come to Washington as soon as possible.

C. Issues which we should clarify with the Defense Department:

1. The top levels of Defense should make it clear in appropriate places that we should obtain full and rapid cooperation from the services on matters requested through General Erskineʼs office. We are happy to work with Erskineʼs office but the actual support must come from the services and the channels have been very unclear and consequently slow in a number of cases. This could be clarified if the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense could call in an appropriate representative of each of the services together with a representative of Erskineʼs office and direct them to take the responsibility to see that appropriate requests are rapidly supported. The case of the Special Force trainers is a ghastly example of how things can go badly. 2. Is there any need for us to work with appropriate Defense elements with respect to post-strike support which may be needed? C. Tracy BarnesPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

14. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Special Group Mtgs-Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. No drafting information is given. Washington, January 5, 1961.

SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS—CUBA

5 January 1961

1. Mr. Douglas felt that Defense (Col. Prouty) was now in a position to iron out all the difficulties in connection with the Special Forces personnel for Guatemala. It was agreed that State concurrence in the arrangements should be obtained, but Mr. Douglas said Defense would not slow down its activities awaiting this. 2. Mr. Douglas then read from a paperNot found. left with him by Gen. Lemnitzer. This indicated a schedule of training time, if training were conducted under Army auspices, which would approximate 24 weeks or—on a sketchier basis—12-16 weeks. The memo also referred to numerous difficulties which might arise, such as medical care, pay, etc., as well as problems of cover, political orientation and the like. All agreed that a training schedule of this kind is totally impractical in current circumstances. The members appeared to agree that this constituted a good argument for a re-examination of basic concepts, particularly as to the need for overt intervention and early recognition of an exile government. 3. Mr. Barnes pointed out that due to the different political colorations of the emigres, if for no other reason, it would be difficult to name a government before members of it are physically on Cuban soil. 4. It was agreed that in any case a decision as to ultimate overt intervention is required, but that it will probably not be practicable to obtain this in the next fifteen days. Mr. Gray undertook to pass on the word that the Army plans, as outlined in the paper read by Mr. Douglas, were not responsive to the need. Mr. Bissell said that one alternative action that can be taken is to obtain Cubans who have already had military experience and to train them in the U.S. He recognized that this would constitute essentially an overt act. 5. Mr. Barnes pointed out the desirability, in the course of bilateral discussions with other Latin American countries, of attempting to obtain commitments for limited personnel support at an appropriate time. In answer to a question, Mr. Merchant said that he did not forsee the necessity for a temporary evacuation of the Guatemala base.

15. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Merchant) to Secretary of State HerterSource: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56314/1-1061. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. Washington, January 10, 1961.

The meeting with the President this afternoon on the New York Times Guatemala base storyThe New York Times on January 10 ran a front-page article under the headline “U.S. Helps Train an Anti-Castro Force at Secret Guatemalan Air-Ground Base.” was attended by Messrs. Gates, Douglas, Dulles, Gray, Willauer, Mann, J.C. King, General Goodpaster, and myself.

After considerable discussion the President decided that we should make no statement to the press today on the matter and continue to refuse to comment.In response to questions concerning The New York Times story, Department of State spokesman Lincoln White denied any knowledge of a base to train Cuban exiles in Guatemala. (The New York Times, January 11, 1961) The question of a statement, however, can be re-examined if news interest persists and grows.

The statement which we had agreed upon in advance and showed to the PresidentNot found. was modified during the course of the discussion by inserting after the words in the first sentence “—to train a small number of men” the additional words “including some Cuban refugees,—”. The President also struck out the opening clause in the second sentence “in the face of this threat.”

Two questions were raised indicating weaknesses in the statement, the first being the reference to the purpose of training as being purely defensive and designed to cope with infiltration and subversion. Mr. Gates in particular felt that this was misleading and could cause us later trouble.

The second point discussed and criticized was the implication in the second sentence that the special training was merely an extension of the conventional training program whereas actually it was carried out in a different area under different trainers of a different character.

Concerning the meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow, after considerable discussion (during the course of which the President indicated that he felt we allowed ourselves to be pushed around to an unwarranted extent by Congressional committees) the President ruled that Mr. Dulles should testify but that he should insist on no record being kept and no one else being present other than members of the committee and the Chief Clerk. The billed purpose for the committee meeting would be a general intelligence round-up by Mr. Dulles similar to those given in past years.

16. Editorial Note

According to a chronology of JCS participation in planning for operations against Cuba, maintained in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, working level officers on the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were informed on January 11, 1961, for the first time of the plan being developed in the CIA for an invasion of Cuba by a Cuban exile force:

“Mr. Willauer and a CIA representative briefed Gen Bonesteel and Gen Gray on the general concept, in Gen Bonesteelʼs office. This was the first time the JCS at the working level had knowledge of this project. At this meeting, Gen Gray pointed out the necessity for the establishment of a special interdepartmental working group and suggested this matter be brought before the 5412 Group at their next meeting the following day.” (Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

The chronology indicates that the 5412 Group reviewed the planning on January 12, and arranged for the establishment of a State-Defense-CIA-JCS working group to evaluate the additional measures that might be required; see Document 17. On January 13 the Interdepartmental Working Group held its first meeting at the Department of State; see Document 18. Brigadier General David W. Gray, the JCS representative at the meeting, was given the mission of preparing an evaluation of the possible military courses of action necessary to overthrow the Castro government in the event the currently planned political and paramilitary operations were determined to be inadequate. The evaluation prepared in the Department of Defense for General Gray is printed as Document 19.

17. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Special Group Mtgs-Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. No drafting information is given. Washington, January 12, 1961.

SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS—CUBA

12 January 1961

1. Mr. Dulles reported the information received from General Goodpaster to the effect that a large delegation from the above-mentioned group (Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front) reportedly will visit Washington on Saturday. 2. Mr. Willauer outlined a proposal to establish a task force consisting of representatives of State, CIA, Defense and the Joint Staff to draw up contingency plans covering the possible eventual use of overt U.S. forces. 3. All members agreed that such planning is an essential step. Mr. Gray asked that a preliminary report of the task force be available for the meeting of January 19th. 4. In answer to a question, Mr. Barnes gave details of the Cuban governmentʼs capture of materiel from two airdrops plus one cache. 5. Mr. Parrott outlined the status of the answer to a request from the Department of Justice to the Department of State for an opinion on whether such action would run counter to U.S. foreign policy interests. He said that all members of the Group had concurred, with the exception of Mr. Douglas. Particularly for the benefit of Mr. Irwin, who had not been exposed to this subject, Mr. Parrott outlined various reasons why State and CIA feel strongly that something must be done to stop Masferrer.Rolando Masferrer, a former pro-Batista Cuban senator. Mr. Irwin deferred to the judgment of those two agencies. 6. The Group then approved the suggested exchange of correspondence,Not further identified. with some editing designed to give as much flexibility as possible. It was also agreed that every attempt should be made to avoid undue publicity in connection with whatever action is taken.

18. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960-Jan 20, 1961. Top Secret. Drafted in M by E. Glion Curtis. Washington, January 13, 1961. PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Whiting Willauer, Assistant Secretary of Defense John Irwin, General Gray, JCS, Captain Spore, OSO, Mr. Tracy Barnes, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Mr. Joseph W. Scott, Mr. Glion Curtis, Mr. Wym Coerr, and Mr. Frank DevineWillauer, Scott, Curtis, Coerr, and Devine represented the Department of State. Irwin and Spore represented the Department of Defense. Gray represented the JCS. Barnes, [text not declassified] represented the CIA. This was the interdepartmental working group described in Document 16.

The meeting opened at 10:05 a.m. with Ambassador Willauer in the chair. There were some introductory remarks emphasizing the special security restrictions on any matters discussed—Secretary Irwin noted that in the Defense Department only Secretary Erskine, Secretary Douglas, Secretary Gates and Secretary-designate McNamara will be informed. There was some preliminary discussion as to the nature of the job to be done which is brought out more fully in the remarks noted later on. Ambassador Willauer indicated that the reason for the existence of the working group was to provide a third prong to the two-pronged approach. The two-pronged approach is the overt program for Cuba on the one hand, and the accompanying covert program contained in the document dated December 6 and December 20.The December 6 version of this document, which does not include the second part dealing with the covert program, is in the Supplement. The December 20 version of the document has not been found.

Ambassador Willauer then proceeded to read through the document, stopping at various points to comment or to respond to questions. This record will not attempt to reproduce the content of the document, but merely to identify the place where the reading ceased and discussion took place.

Ambassador Willauer read Part I. Basic Assumptions through the sentence on economic dislocations (line 5, first paragraph). At this point he noted that he felt, and he quoted Jose Figueres as concurring in this viewpoint, that there was a high probability that the Soviet Union would pump in enough economic assistance to make a show case of Cuba. He noted that dissatisfaction arising from economic factors is not overlooked. He indicated that for all practical purposes, he felt, the notion had been abandoned that there was any hope of overthrowing the Castro regime with economic warfare measures alone, even if they include an effective blockade.

He then read through the rest of the Basic Assumptions section.

He then read Part II. Suggested Solution through the first paragraph. Comment: Ambassador Willauer indicated that events had overtaken the provisions of this paragraph. He said that at this time no one foresees any Foreign Ministers Meeting by February 1, nor do they foresee any effective collective sanctions decision. Ambassador Willauer then went on to note that an obscure item which appears in the New York Times of January 12 indicated an inclination on the part of President Betancourt of Venezuela to call an OAS Foreign Ministers meeting for the purpose of acting against dictators both of the right and of the left. Mr. Coerr noted that the type of reaction which had occurred yesterday in Uruguay against the Communist and Castro activities could build up to an OAS meeting. Ambassador Willauer commented that we had not given up all hope, but we cannot count on such a meeting taking place. Ambassador Willauer then read the second paragraph. He then noted that again events have overtaken the provisions of the paper in that the United States has already broken relations with Cuba. He noted that Peru had broken relations unilaterally and perhaps Uruguay is about to do so. The other Latin American countries, however, are reviewing their political situation and appear to be receding from their somewhat stronger attitude toward breaking relations which existed prior to the United States action. He specifically cited the Chilean elections and the Argentine evidence of softening of its position.

Ambassador Willauer then read the third paragraph of this section. He noted that this type of action is all overt, nevertheless, assistance to a government in exile, particularly in terms of personnel training and military materiel support, brings in the Defense Department immediately. Secretary Irwin directed attention to the provision of assistance “after” recognition and raised the question particularly with reference to training, as to whether it shouldnʼt be done ahead of time and be ready for use at the time of recognition. Ambassador Willauer quoted General Gray as having said that the force of 750 men could perhaps hold a perimeter of only 1,000 yards across. He noted that the actual amount of real estate controlled by the government is not important and even expressed the possibility that one could be recognized without any real estate at all. In response to General Grayʼs question, Mr. Scott noted that although the phrase used in the paper is government-in-exile, what is really meant is a provisional government. Ambassador Willauer then noted the fact that the Agency is smuggling into Cuba two Cuban leaders. These persons might constitute a rallying point for the formation of a government within Cuba.

Mr. Barnes asked whether it is realistic to speak of recognizing a government in exile while the Castro Government is still in existence and asked whether this was really possible. Mr. Coerr replied, “yes” with the proviso that it would, of course, not be done if the situation were so flimsy as to be ludicrous. In response to Mr. Barnesʼ question whether real estate is essential or not, Mr. Scott replied that the present legal opinion is that real estate is essential. Secretary Irwin indicated he had the same concern as Mr. Barnes. As he described it, his problem is that it is not sufficient to establish control over a piece of territory but in addition there must be an ability to maintain that control. His question is whether 750 men really will be able to do that. Ambassador Willauer made the point that perhaps there is already sufficient real estate of one sort or another available in the Escambray in dissident hands to warrant recognition of a government which controlled that territory.

Secretary Irwin commented that the real question was not one of recognition, but rather whether or not we are prepared to do enough with sufficient speed to enable the provisional government to establish its control over all of Cuba. He noted that he is currently very concerned with such a problem in Laos, where volunteers were encouraged but no decision had been taken yet as to how far we would go.

Mr. Scott observed that this was one of the reasons for this current meeting. How do we make recognition effective? How much do you need to provide for the purpose? In this picture the abilities and limitations of the Defense Department constitute the third prong in the program.

Ambassador Willauer raised the question of training volunteers such as Argentines or Cubans. Tracy Barnes estimated that there are now 70,000 Cubans in and around the Miami area, of whom perhaps 10,000 could be of military age. Ambassador Willauer then continued with “Suppose we figured on the basis of 10,000 Cubans and perhaps 5,000 other Latin American volunteers for training, then questions might be: Where could they be trained? What would be required for the purpose? and, How long would it take? Tracy Barnes noted that there may be a question of what types of people would be acceptable. For example, he said that a military background of some sort may be necessary. Ambassador Willauer suggested that this was a Department of Defense judgment. Mr. Coerr observed that the size of the force may be dependent upon the kind of victory which is considered to be necessary. In amplification he said one sized force might be sufficient to knock Castro off, but to eliminate his government quickly and thoroughly might require more people. Captain Spore asked whether the first step isnʼt really to surface a new leader before recognition of the government. Ambassador Willauer commented that it would never be possible to pull all the Cubans together. Captain Spore inquired about the need for some massive program within Cuba.

At this point Secretary Irwin left the meeting.

General Gray, responding to Captain Sporeʼs last question, indicated that the documentReference is to the staff study prepared in the Department of Defense on January 16; see Document 19. will answer that question. Ambassador Willauer then noted that it will be necessary to make several assumptions. One is that whatever government is recognized must be assumed to be satisfactory for our purposes. A second is that Castro is in power in Cuba and has certain military equipment and capabilities. One of our questions is, in the light of these assumptions, what is required from the outside to assure success of the provisional government?

At this point Mr. Devine made three comments. He noted that with reference to our recruitment of volunteers, Castro is also busy recruiting Latin American volunteers for his own purposes. Secondly, he noted that the principal point implicit in the element of establishing a safe haven perimeter within Cuba was the expectation that this would encourage and in fact produce large-scale adherence from defectors within Cuba. Thirdly, he wished to be sure that the fact that two Cuban anti-Castro leaders are being infiltrated into Cuba at this time does not represent a decision already taken that these are the chosen instruments. Mr. Devine was reassured on this latter point.

There was then an exchange between Ambassador Willauer and General Gray. General Gray indicated that his directive from General Bonesteel was that this working group was to write an overall plan with all three elements; that subordinate to this general plan was to be a family of plans for detailed operations in support. Ambassador Willauer indicated this is correct.

The reading of the document continued from the third section “Measures to implement Proposed Solutions.” There was no further comment or discussion down through paragraph d of the section “Recognition of a Cuban Government-in-exile,” however, Ambassador Willauer did note in passing that unilateral action by the United States has already been taken and that the collective action section has been overtaken by events. He also noted that the language calling for recognition of government-in-exile immediately upon breaking relations has been overtaken by events.

Secretary Irwin returned to the meeting at this point.

Mr. Barnes then noted that there is a group of 400 to 1,000 Cubans who expect to make some calls on President Eisenhower and elsewhere during the course of today and tomorrow. Ambassador Willauer then continued the reading through the end of Part I.

Ambassador Willauer read Part II—Covert Action, Section 1—Objectives. He commented that the Agency is doing a tremendous amount of work—Tracy Barnes indicated that there are 180 different groups of Cubans. Mr. Barnes also said that two representatives of opposition groups are about to go inside Cuba. One is a member of the FRD, the second is not. He continued by saying that perhaps Arellano Sanchez Arango might also go in. Sanchez Arango claims to have a lot of support, but so far has not identified any of it. Ambassador Willauer then read Section 2—Present Status, and noted that the support spring boards are located in Guatemala, Nicaragua and the Canal Zone.

The Ambassador then continued reading sections 3 and 4 and then invited comment by Mr. Barnes on the geographic score, the main thrust and the broadcast activity in the political action and propaganda fields. Mr. Barnes reported in considerable detail about activities of Swan Island, the three newspapers, and the magazine, as well as trips through Latin America by the jurists, labor groups, representatives of Cuban women, and students organizations. He noted the political stand taken last May by Tony Varona in Mexico City and Caracas, the development and announcement of a political platform, which he characterized as being somewhat negative. He indicated in some detail the reasons why it was felt that a more positive approach to the platform provisions was not desirable at the stage reached when the platform was released. He then indicated that Radio Swan is commencing to discuss various approaches to such important questions as land reform, elections and other elements of a platform. General Gray asked who was the leading candidate. Mr. Barnes indicated that he has lists from many sources with detailed information about the individuals. He said that he is ready to sit down and consider the candidates and reach a decision as to who are most appropriate. He noted that at this stage we should not go so far as to select one individual who might be shot, and that the selection of a single candidate should follow some demonstration that he can survive in Cuba and does in fact have a substantial political following.

Ambassador Willauer noted that there is one military contingency plan which will have to be ready for use if Castro should start slaughtering Americans. This would be a purely military plan and would include military occupation. General Gray noted that such a plan already exists and is being revived. Ambassador Willauer noted that the hardest political problem was that the Cubans would not work together. Mr. Barnes then noted that the tabs to the paper give full details about the individuals, names, background, etc.

Secretary Irwin at this point left the meeting.

Ambassador Willauer then read the paramilitary section, number 5. Mr. Barnes commented on the communication teams in Cuba. He first noted, however, that so far the activities have not developed any cracks and crevices in the Castro structure. There is still hope that these might become visible during the next sixty days with increased propaganda, support, and other activities. He indicated that at one time there were ten communications teams active. For various reasons these have now been reduced to six. There is no indication yet of Cuban DF capability. In contrast the Agency with Navy help feels that it knows every movement of any Cuban ship and has good information about the ground forces and secret police, and does not have much information about air activity.

Ambassador Willauer then continued reading in the paramilitary section through the sentence ending “and carry out sabotage.” At this point [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was asked to comment, since he just recently came from Havana. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] indicated that the various elements of the opposition are cooperating with each other in sabotage activities. Recently, there has been a decrease of such activity because of the Fidel-inspired invasion scare, the militia activity, and the introduction of death penalties. Some of the sabotage teams have been picked up but some are still in existence, willing and able to act; however, more material is necessary. Ambassador Willauer noted the need for labor to cut the cane. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] continued by noting that the sabotage units can be coordinated with any landing. Some details of the supply drops were reported. Mr. Barnes indicated that of the six missions flown within the past ten days (out of a total to date of ten supply drops)—five were supply missions. Of these, two were fully successful, one was partially successful, one was mechanically successful but the material was lost subsequent to its receipt by the people to whom it was destined, and the fifth was not good. Mr. Barnes indicated that better results will be possible in the future, now that there are on-site communications units in action. Ambassador Willauer noted in passing that with a collapse of the Castro regime after successful efforts, it may be necessary to provide certain facilities, such as electric power or communications, particularly in a place such as Havana, if the sabotage efforts are as successful as is hoped. Thus it might be wise to earmark early some Naval ship with this thought in mind.

The final paragraph of the paramilitary section was read. Ambassador Willauer noted the Paul Kennedy article in the New York Times,See footnote 1, Document 15. which he indicated as giving pretty accurate information about the training and asked whether anyone required additional information. Ambassador Willauer indicated that it still may be possible to have U.S. strike bases; that this matter has not yet been finally decided. He also mentioned the question of contract pilots. He said that the idea of air strikes beginning three days before D-day has been killed, and that a strike beginning the day before D-day has now been accepted. He noted that it is possible that Cuba may have a jet air force based on the pilots being trained in Czechoslovakia. As yet there is no evidence that there are any jet airplanes in Cuba. However, Ambassador Willauer raised the problem that, if Castro has a jet air force, how would it be possible to explain the use by the FRD of a jet capability. He suggested the possibility of a volunteer group, to acquire and provide the jet pilots and planes. Ambassador Willauer indicated that he hoped the Defense Department would include in its estimates some indication of what might be required to counteract a Cuban jet air force, and some estimate as to how soon Cuba could have effective jet capability after delivery of such planes in Cuba. Following Mr. Barnes comment that there is no magic to any specific number of days before D-day for a pre strike, and that sufficient facts are not now on hand to reach a decision, Ambassador Willauer commented that with the present Cuban air force one day before D-day is sufficient. Mr. Devine noted that one of the problems of activity prior to D-day is what will be happening during that period in the U.N. and the O.A.S.

Ambassador Willauer then finished the reading of the paper with the miscellaneous section.

Captain Spore then commented at length on the sea lift problem. He gave a run down of what vessels the Agency now has indicating that it would not be sufficient for the number of troops involved. He said that the Navy is quite concerned about the problem of selecting a beach. He also said that heretofore calculations had been based on an unopposed landing. If an opposed landing is a possibility, there will be a requirement for naval support and the vessels in hand have no armament. He also expressed Navy concern over the actual landing and transportation without Castroʼs prior knowledge from port of embarkation. Ambassador Willauer noted the possibility of a pre-dawn strike.

Ambassador Willauer then explained about the timing problem, indicating that the next meeting of the Group is early ThursdayJanuary 20. morning, and that this working group has been instructed to obtain the third prong document from Defense before that meeting. He suggested that the next working group meeting be MondayJanuary 16. when some type of progress report might be helpful. General Gray raised some general questions. He then specifically asked if the plan just read is valid. He noted that there are so many contingencies raised, the plan does not seem to have yet been determined. Ambassador Willauer indicated that the Special Group could not go beyond the point which the Ambassador has described in stating what the United States policy will be. This will be something that has to be determined and set by the new administration. In the meantime the Group does require from Defense a statement regarding the questions he, the Ambassador, has raised.

General Gray and Ambassador Willauer then discussed the nature of the job to be done by Defense and what is required.

General Gray then attempted to sum up what he understood was needed. He said (1) The Group seems to want an estimate of the time to organize and train a Cuban indigenous army, including an estimate of its chances; (2) What U.S. support would be required for the 750 men in terms of air and naval power; (3) What U.S. ground forces will be required to support the action. A separate paper, he said, would deal with U.S. unilateral intervention to protect U.S. lives and property, involving ground, air and naval forces. He would contemplate this situation arising so quickly that there would be no possibility to inter mix it with the plan. And (4) the use of U.S. and indigenous forces on a planned basis.

There was considerable discussion by Captain Spore, Ambassador Willauer, General Gray, and Mr. Barnes on the need to work on the assumption that the 750 men may not be able to do the job unassisted. At one point, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] estimated, on the basis of observation of visa applicants, that in the group of 70,000, there would be less than 1,000 able-bodied men available for training for military duties. Ambassador Willauer suggested that General Gray note, as a problem in connection with training Cubans, the question of who pays the trainees, who pays their dependents, and who would pay indemnity in case of their death.

Mr. Barnes noted that the study would not be complete without consideration of the timing factor. Nor without consideration of two further points, namely, coordination with action vs. Trujillo, and an estimate of why an embargo, including activity which amounts to acts of war, will not work. Ambassador Willauer noted that there is perhaps insufficient time to do all this in the final report, however, he suggested that the desirability of also dealing with Trujillo should be noted, and that the Agency might include an evaluation of the effects of a complete economic embargo. It was also considered that at some point the Agency will have to prepare and put up for the reaction of the Special Group, its assessment of the possibility of success by the 750 unaided. There would also be required an assessment of the political feeling in the country which it is hoped might be developed between now and the end of February.

The next meeting is on the calendar for Monday at 1600 hrs.

19. Staff Study Prepared in the Department of DefenseSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 1, Source Documents-DCI-8, Vol. I, Part III. Top Secret. The source text has a handwritten date of January 16 on a cover sheet. A handwritten note on the cover sheet, in an unknown hand, confirms that the evaluation was discussed on January 16 by the Interdepartmental Working Group on Cuba; see Document 20. Washington, January 16, 1961.

EVALUATION OF POSSIBLE MILITARY COURSES OF ACTIONIN CUBA (S)According to a chronology prepared in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, General Gray received informal approval of the evaluation on January 19 from General Lemnitzer and Joint Staff Director General Earle Wheeler. (Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) On January 22 General Lemnitzer used the evaluation in a briefing on the Cuba project at the Department of State for several members of the new Kennedy administration. (Memorandum No. 1 from the Cuban Study Group to the President, June 13; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

The Problem

1. To evaluate possible military courses of action to overthrow the Castro Government in Cuba in the event currently planned political and paramilitary operations are determined to be inadequate.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

2. The basis of the problem was a request by the Department of State for an evaluation of the following possible military courses of action in Cuba.

a. U.S. unilateral action with U.S. Air, Naval, and Army forces. b. Invasion by a U.S. trained and supported volunteer Army composed of Cubans and other anti-Castro Latin Americans. c. Invasion by a combination of a and b above.

3. The estimated strength and capabilities of Cuban Armed Forces are as follows: a.

Ground (1) Revolutionary Army—32,000; capability low, except for guerrilla type operations. (2) Revolutionary National Police—9,000; capable of security only. (3) Militia—200,000 to 300,000; capability low except for guerrilla type operations.

b. Naval (1) Strength, 4 to 5,000 personnel; 3 PF, 2 PCE and 43 smaller craft; capabilities very low. c.

Air Force

The Revolutionary Air Force, from which almost all the rated pilots were purged by Castro, has almost no combat capabilities at this time. However, reports indicate that as many as 100 pilots are undergoing flight training in Czechoslovakia. Also, the Air Force has received several Czech trainees and 6-10 helicopters recently.

4. In the military field, the Soviets have delivered to Cuba in the past five months, at least 20,000 tons of arms and equipment, including small arms, armored vehicles, personnel carriers, helicopters, trainer aircraft, a variety of artillery, and large quantities of ammunition. So far, the U.S. has no evidence of the Soviets providing Cuba with sophisticated weapons such as missiles or nuclear devices, or MIG jet fighter aircraft.

5. There are fifteen airfields in Cuba which are capable of handling jet aircraft.

6. The U.S. has available on the East Coast of the U.S. the following combat forces.

a. U.S. Atlantic Fleet, including at least two attack carriers, a Marine Division, and a Marine Air Wing. b. The Strategic Army Command. c. Elements of the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command.

7. Mr. Tracy Voorhees, Special Advisor to the President on Cuba, has reported that approximately 40,000 anti-Castro refugees have entered the U.S. in 1960.

8. From 1950 through 1959, approximately 70,000 Cubans entered the U.S., 10,000 of whom have been naturalized.

9. The CIA estimates that there has been a total of 65,000 anti-Castro Cuban exiles of all classes of which 3,000 are Cuban males capable of performing military service. Of these 3,000, CIA estimates that 750 are willing to perform military service in a Volunteer Army.

10. That an adequate number of troop age (18-65) physically able male Cuban exiles are available in the U.S. to form a Volunteer Army of sufficient strength to have the capability of establishing and holding a lodgement on the Island of Cuba.

11. That it is impossible to train covertly, in the Free World, a force adequate to assure a successful permanent lodgement in Cuba.

12. Massive internal popular support by the Cuban people of action to overthrow the Castro Government cannot be assured.

13. That the Soviet Bloc will continue its assistance to Cuba, but will not openly intervene on behalf of the Castro Government.

Discussion

14. U.S. Unilateral Action: a. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command, has a contingency planNot found. prepared and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which provides for the employment of Army, Naval and Air Forces for the overthrow of the Castro Government in Cuba. This contingency plan is currently undergoing revision in view of increased capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces and militia. This revision generally reflects only an increase in U.S. Military Forces to be employed. b. If U.S. unilateral action were directed the forces assigned for commitment to this operation are considered adequate and on an emergency basis could begin commitment within a matter of hours. If circumstances prove this force to be inadequate the proximity of Cuba to the U.S. simplifies the problem of rapid reinforcement of the Task Force from other U.S. based forces. This reinforcement would be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as required. c. Unilateral action in Cuba by the U.S. would have a tremendous impact on U.S. prestige in the Caribbean and Latin America (as well as the rest of the free world) unless it had strong support of Latin American public opinion and, preferably, token Latin American participation. It would therefore be desirable that, prior to the implementation of this course of action, a concerted effort be made either through the OAS or through selected Latin American countries, to obtain condemnation of the Castro regime and open Latin American support for action to eliminate that regime. d. This course of action could also be justified if Castro attacked Guantanamo Bay or if such an attack were “staged”. With prior propaganda effort by the U.S., Free World opinion could be sufficiently swayed, or the facts sufficiently “muddled”, that U.S. unilateral action in response to such an attack, actual or “staged” would have less impact on U.S. prestige in the Free World.

15. A second possible course of action would be invasion by an overtly U.S. trained and supported Volunteer Army, adequate in size and capability to assure a successful lodgement in Cuba.

a. This force would be trained in both guerrilla and battalion type tactics. It would not be organized above the level of reinforced battle group combat teams. b. The training would be conducted at bases presently on a caretaker status, in Southeastern United States or Puerto Rico, and which could be made available. c. It is believed this force could be trained to minimum standards in seven months with time phases as follows: 8 weeks for the initial planning, assembly of equipment, instructors and trainees; 8 weeks basic; 6 weeks advanced individual training and small unit training; and 6 weeks unit training. During the 2 months basic training phase potential leaders and technicians would be identified. Their training, to a minimum acceptable level, would be conducted during the five months remaining in the basic training period outlined above. d. Refresher and/or advanced flying training, to minimum acceptable standards, can be provided former Cuban pilots on bases in Southeast United States during the seven month training period envisioned above. e. Dependent upon the size of this force, and the degree of direct U.S. participation, provision of adequate amphibious lift would be a problem. Crews necessary to operate these craft can be trained during the seven month training period at bases in Southeastern United States or on Islands in the Caribbean. f. A force adequate in size to assure a lodgement in Cuba would require a sustained source of supply in such quantity, and by such means, that it would obviously be beyond the capabilities of Cuban exiles and beyond U.S. capability to provide covertly. Consequently, logistic support would have to be provided overtly by the United States unilaterally, or in conjunction with one or more Latin American countries. In either event, adequate logistic support would be assured. g. In training and committing a Volunteer Army certain problems arise which are beyond the present resources and purview of the Department of Defense. For example: (1) The pay of the Volunteer Cuban Army; (2) The costs of the training, equipment, and logistic support; (3) Care for the dependents of these forces; (4) Hospitalization facilities and costs, and (5) Indemnities for casualties. These problems are not insurmountable but must have early consideration in planning. h. The problem of maintaining the lodgement and assuring supply would be complicated somewhat if the Castro regime obtains jet aircraft prior to the invasion by the Volunteer Army. Once jet aircraft are seen in Cuba, a jet capability must be assumed. However, this problem could be reduced to manageable proportions if prior to the invasion a limited number of B-26 aircraft made a surprise attack on the fifteen Cuban airfields capable of handling jet aircraft. It is believed such an attack would destroy all, or nearly all, of their aircraft, and render their airstrips inoperable. On the basis that such a surprise attack did not destroy Castroʼs jet capability, it would be desirable to have the immediate participation of jet aircraft from Latin American countries as part of the OAS contribution. If used these aircraft would have to operate from U.S. bases. i. The capabilities of this Volunteer Army to take and hold a lodgement in Cuba would be dependent on opposition to Castro within Cuba, and the popular attraction of the leaders of the Volunteer Army, and of the provisional government. Both of these factors will be subject to change before and after the envisaged invasion. Unless extensive internal popular support is received, a force based upon the personnel availability estimate in paragraph 9 could hold a lodgement for only a very brief time. To hold a lodgement for any appreciable period without massive popular support would require a minimum force of 5,000.

16. Invasion by a combination of possible courses of action a and b.

a. The possible third course of action would involve the employment of a U.S. trained Volunteer Army and U.S. Army, Naval and Air Forces for invasion. Such a course of action would have as its objective the overthrow of the Castro Government and control of the Island of Cuba. This U.S. participation could range in scope from the provision of Army, Naval and Air Force combat units to logistical support only. b. This course of action from the viewpoint of operational planning would involve only a downward revision of forces allocated to CINC-LANTʼs contingency plan comparable to the strength and capability of the Volunteer Army. c. As in the case of unilateral U.S. action this course of action would accomplish its objective; for, if circumstances indicate a requirement for additional forces, the proximity of U.S. military bases to Cuba and the availability of additional U.S. based forces simplify the problem of rapid reinforcement of the Task Force. Such reinforcement, as required, would be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. d. The problems facing the employment of this course of action are a combination of those for courses of action a and b.

Conclusions

17. Courses of action a and c are the only courses of action which assure success.

18. Course of action b will require, as a minimum, U.S. logistic support and will not necessarily accomplish the mission of overthrowing the Castro Government.

19. Course of action c will be subject to the same objections as course of action a, however would have a better chance of obtaining Cuban popular support.

20. Since courses of action b and c could not be accomplished covertly and would take at a minimum 7 months to prepare, the U.S. would have to face a long period of world condemnation, as compared to course of action a which could be accomplished expeditiously without prior world knowledge of U.S. intentions.

Recommendations

21. It is recommended that the above conclusions be considered by the Group in any further evaluation of plans for action aimed at the overthrow of the Castro Government.

20. Memorandum for the FilesSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960-Jan 20, 1961. Secret. Drafted by Curtis. Washington, January 16, 1961. SUBJECT Meeting 4:10 p.m., January 16, 1961 PERSONS PRESENT Ambassador Willauer, General Gray, Messrs. Barnes, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Captain Spore, Messrs. Scott, Devine, and Curtis

General Gray presented his draft of the Defense Department paper.Document 19. He read through the document and noted several language changes on his copy for incorporation in the final document.

The salient features are incorporated in the following paragraphs.

The problem was stated to be to evaluate the possible military courses of action in event of a determination of inadequacy of the present political and paramilitary program to remove Castro.

There was a three fold approach to the problem. The first (a) is unilateral action by the U.S.; the second (b) is with a volunteer “Cuban” army; and the third (c) is a combination of the first two.

Intelligence estimates of Cuban strength were reported and included some present jet capability. There is an estimate of the availability of only 750 able-bodied Cubans willing to fight out of the estimated 65,000 Cubans in the Miami area. Under approach (b) it is estimated that a minimum of 5,000 men, preferably 10,000, will have to be overtly trained and that 7 months is the minimum time period required. Mr. Scott noted that the basis for estimating a force of 5,000 will have materially changed in 7 months with present trends in Cuba and the probable degree of USSR support to Castro. It was noted that with a requirement of 5,000 and only 750 Cubans available substantial numbers of other Latin volunteers are required.

The final conclusion is that course (a) is the only realistic one with a certainty of the outcome. There was discussion of a further contingency to provide support for a spontaneous indigenous uprising. There was discussion of format and procedures. Ambassador Willauer presented his draft of a covering statementNot found to Mr. Barnes and Mr. Scott for study.

General Gray did not expect that another meeting will be required and plans delivering the final draft of his paper on WednesdayJanuary 18. morning to Mr. Scott.

21. Memorandum From the Assistant to the Deputy Director (Plans) for Covert Operations (Barnes) to the Chief of WH/4 of the Directorate for Plans (Esterline), Central Intelligence AgencySource: Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Nov 1960-Jan 20, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent through the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division. Washington, January 18, 1961. SUBJECT Meeting with General Gray—18 January 1961 1. I saw General David Gray (JCS Staff assigned to the Willauer Planning Group by General Bonesteel) on 18 January in order to have a general discussion with him of the Cuban planning problems. I found him not only extremely cooperative and understanding but amazingly in agreement with our views. He pointed out that any operation of this type must be thought of in terms of a series of possible approaches on a graduated scale, each step requiring more effort and more commitment by the U.S. His scale ran from the mere use of pressure to open unilateral U.S. intervention. The intermediate steps generally were support of an internal uprising, a small invasion force bringing about an uprising, a trained guerrilla force, a volunteer army, and a volunteer army in connection with a U.S. effort. He felt that our planning in effect carried through the first three steps and what we now need is some planning that will prepare the U.S. for any possible contingency. In effect, the planning now needed should carry us from where our plans end through the various phases in the scale, including the final step of overt U.S. military action. He stated that a paperReference is to the staff study dated January 16, Document 19. is being prepared by Defense to explain this planning cycle and he said, as of the present, he believes that probably the most likely action would be the use of our element followed by substantially overt U.S. support, presumably after the recognition of some provisional government. He said that his worry is that a decision might be made to land the FRD force without having first decided upon and prepared the supporting U.S. effort. His position was that it would be too late to try to do this after the FRD force was on its way. I told him that all of us agreed thoroughly with him and we were all equally anxious to obtain firm plans and decisions that would permit the use of such force as the situation may require. 2. General Gray thought that it would be better not to undertake any planning on the overt support post an FRD strike force landing until the Defense paper has been completed, which he feels should be ready next week. General Gray did feel that we could start immediately to plan for possible support needs in case an internal uprising should occur before any FRD force landing. Such planning, he said, should begin with him although it would involve discussions with logistics officers. I told him that we were prepared to give some estimates on the logistics side as to what we felt might be involved in such support. I plan to get in touch with General Gray to make an appointment early next week for Jake Esterline, Jack Hawkins, a WH-4 logistics officer and myself. 3. General Gray, in my opinion, presently believes that the potential Cuban opposition is probably too great for any force of only 750 men. He admits that internal support could change this but says that he cannot help feeling that 200,000 militia each with a sub-machine gun is, in itself, a pretty strong force if they do nothing more than stand and pull the triggers. He agreed, however, that the next few weeks should be very revealing as to the future of internal opposition and further agreed that from the planning point of view these issues are not involved since one must assume the worst situation in order to be properly prepared. Such preparation does not necessarily mean that it will all have to be used. 4. General Gray said that he was quite aware of the difficulties of holding a group of alert young men in a readiness condition for too long. He said, however, that if the present deadlines, for whatever reasons (i.e. political or otherwise) are delayed, the military might be able to be helpful in providing exercises to stimulate actual conditions that might have to be faced. Such training could be useful, he said, and would keep the men busy for at least some additional period. It should be noted that General Gray did not say that the extension of time was unavoidable but was only talking on the basis that it might occur. 5. A point on which I think we must be realistic is that if the FRD force does go into action and then is provided with U.S. military aid, the command of the operation will at the moment the aid begins to be provided shift to CINCLANT. Personally, this does not bother me because it seems to me that at that point CINCLANT is the proper C-in-C. C. Tracy BarnesPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

22. Editorial Note

On January 19, 1961, President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy met at the White House, together with their principal advisers, to discuss various foreign policy concerns. According to a memorandum prepared by Clark Clifford, who was helping to organize the transition for Kennedy, Eisenhower brought up the issue of Cuba briefly, in a discussion devoted to the problem of Laos:

“President Eisenhower said with reference to guerrilla forces which are opposed to Castro that it was the policy of this government to help such forces to the utmost. At the present time, we are helping train anti-Castro forces in Guatemala. It was his recommendation that this effort be continued and accelerated.” (Memorandum by Clifford, January 24; Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, White House Correspond-ence, 1/61-11/63)

Robert McNamara also prepared a memorandum for the President-elect in which he summarized the discussion at the meeting. His summary of the discussion on Cuba reads as follows:

“President Eisenhower stated in the long run the United States cannot allow the Castro Government to continue to exist in Cuba.” (Memorandum from McNamara to Kennedy, January 24; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, 381 Cuba, 18 Jan. 61)

23. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Special Group Mtgs-Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. No drafting information is given. Washington, January 19, 1961.

SPECIAL GROUP MEETINGS—CUBA

19 January 1961

1. Mr. Willauer presented the highlights of a paperReference is to a memorandum from Ambassador Willauer to Under Secretary of State Merchant dated January 18. For text, see the Supplement. which he had prepared following meetings of the special contingency planning group. He concluded that several major aspects of the overall plan require clarification or further decision, citing the following: (a) the use of U.S. air bases for strikes before and after D-Day, (b) staging of the invasion force, possibly from the U.S., (c) specific action, including timing, to get support of other Latin American countries, (d) how and when to recognize a provisional government, (e) the possibility of having to provide considerably more overt support than originally planned. 2. Mr. Dulles noted that the next ten-day period poses a number of problems from the standpoint of policy approval. In answer to a question, Mr. Barnes said we are not planning specific overflights in the immediate future but urged that we be in a position to service requests as quickly as possible. The Group agreed that dispatches by sea can be continued without further approval at this time. It was also agreed that a high level meeting, to include the new Secretaries of State and of Defense should be arranged as soon as possible to reaffirm basic concepts. 3. Mr. Merchant said that the Department of Justice is not now prepared to take any action against Masferrer. The Group agreed this seemed reasonable under the circumstances. 4. Mr. Merchant reported the opinion of Assistant Secretary Mann that President YdigorasGeneral Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, President of Guatemala. may be overthrown in the next few days, perhaps by leftists in the Army or Air Force. Mann had urged that it be agreed that no Cuban trainees be placed at the disposal of Ydigoras and that plans for evacuation on very short notice be firmed up. It was noted that Mr. Mann and Col. King are in close touch on this matter.

24. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Jan 21, 1961. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on January 23; no other drafting information is given on the source text. For another record of the meeting, see Document 25. Washington, January 22, 1961, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Meeting on Cuba PARTICIPANTS The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Attorney General The Under Secretary of State-designate The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mr. Allen W. Dulles Mr. Paul Nitze General Bonesteel Ambassador Hugh S. Cumming Mr. Thomas Mann Ambassador Whiting Willauer Mr. Richard Bissell Mr. Tracy Barnes General David Gray Colonel Cecil Shuler Mr. Joseph W. Scott

The Secretary called on Mr. Mann to give a resume of activities regarding Cuba in the diplomatic field over the last several months. Mr. Mann said that several months ago he had talked with members of the Latin American diplomatic corps and had indicated to them that the United States wanted to know whether the OAS system could prevent Castroʼs exportation of communism elsewhere in the hemisphere. The reaction of most members of the corps was that they wanted to know first where the Kennedy administration and the Quadros administration would stand. A short time ago, the Colombian Ambassador suggested to Mr. Mann that he go to Colombia and talk with President Lleras, who had once been Secretary General of OAS and who could be expected to be eager to see the OAS used in an effort to stop Castro. Mr. Mann then presented at some length a procedure for lining up support in the OAS for sanctions against Castro. He mentioned that a complicating factor was the problem posed by the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic. He then listed the possible lineup in the OAS which might favor effective action against Castro if properly approached. In summary Mr. Mann felt that the basic choice was whether we go it alone or multilaterally. (After the meeting, Mr. Mann made clear to some of the participants that the multilateral approach he had in mind should proceed simultaneously with the development of action plans in other fields and should in any case provide us with a realistic estimate of multilateral possibilities within about a month from the time soundings were begun.)

At this point, Mr. Merchant noted that two distinctions should be made regarding possible Latin American support for action against Castro. First a distinction should be drawn between the attitudes of governments and the attitudes of peoples within Latin American countries. A second distinction should be made with regard to the difference between what governments would be willing to support publicly and what they would be willing to support only privately.

Ambassador Willauer said that one of the matters that had captured his attention from his position in the field was how the fear engendered by Castro had dried up private capital activities in all of Latin America. Not only American firms, but also local sources of capital were seeking to escape.

With reference to the distinction between governmental and public attitudes, the Secretary asked Mr. Mann whether we might be in some rather tight situations in a number of countries of the hemisphere if Moscow pushed the button, i.e., with respect to pro-Castro movements in a number of countries. Mr. Mann said this would definitely be the case and mentioned Venezuela and Colombia as examples. As a further example of this [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] mentioned that he had a private meeting with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had been brutally frank. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] mentioned he would send the Secretary a memorandum on his talk [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

The Secretary asked whether a systematic review had been made of possible actions under the Monroe Doctrine. He thought we ought to know what would be the legal situation under the Doctrine with regard to differing levels of action. Mr. Mann replied that a lot of thought had been given to this but as far as he was aware no systematic study had been made of it. He mentioned that Mr. Arthur Dean had recommended a young lawyer to study this problem. Mr. Mann felt that we should have outside legal advice on it.

The Secretary next asked at what point did we begin to consider that Castro had gone beyond the watershed in Cuba, adding that it seemed clear there was little hope now. Mr. Mann indicated it was difficult to name a specific point. There were a number of things that Castro had done that led to the conclusion that he had crossed the watershed. One early action on his part was his initiative in seeking ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc, which he had undertaken before we had acted on sugar quotas. Mr. Mann then listed other actions on Castroʼs part such as expropriation of land, setting up the militia, etc. He summarized by saying that history may indicate that Cuba had been one of the most rapidly communized states—faster even than those in Eastern Europe. He pointed out that Castro has complete control, something totally different from the situation in the traditional dictatorships in Latin America.

Mr. Bowles asked whether we had an estimate on the economic needs of Cuba and how far the Sino-Soviet bloc would likely go to meet them. Mr. Mann indicated there was such an estimate which needed, however, to be updated.

The Secretary then called on General Lemnitzer to review the military situation in Cuba. After having emphasized the extreme sensitivity of some of the information he was about to give, General Lemnitzer estimated that the Revolutionary Army had 32,000, the Revolutionary National Police 9,000, the Militia over 200,000. He said that Cuba was an armed camp. They had received more than 30,000 tons of arms and equipment over the past five or six months. This buildup had made a decided change in the U.S. contingency plans to deal with it. He said there was no evidence of jet aircraft, missiles, or nuclear weapons; on the other hand, about 100 Cuban pilots were being trained in jet aircraft in Czechoslovakia. Their return to Cuba would add a new dimension to the problem.

With respect to Guantanamo, the General identified the critical problem for us as being the water supply. In response to a question from the Secretary he said there was no evidence of a buildup of Cuban forces around Guantanamo. He also indicated that very precise rules of engagement had been worked out for our aircraft in the area of Cuba. These included hot pursuit into Cuban airspace. The Secretary wanted to know whether the Cubans knew about this. The General said that they did not. The Secretary then asked whether the Cubans had any air-strike capability against Miami. The General replied they didnʼt have much now but when the pilots now training in Czechoslovakia return and if jet aircraft became available for them this would change the picture.

The Secretary then called on Mr. Dulles to outline the program for which he has been responsible with regard to Cuba. Mr. Dulles said that last March 17th the President had approved a covert action program to eliminate Castro. There had been three major lines of development under this program. The first was the political front, the second the psychological front, and the third was training Cubans for paramilitary activities. With regard to the political front he indicated that a vehicle had been created, the FRD, to enable the Agency to pull together as many of the disparate anti-Castro groups as possible. At one time there had been 184 anti-Castro refugee groups. He thought that on the whole the FRD was a reasonable representation of the anti-Castro political spectrum now inside Cuba. It covered the range from a little to the right to a little to the left of center. There were no Batista-ites or Communists in the FRD. The essentials of its program were the restoration of the Cuban constitution of 1940 and the original reforms announced by Castro, which had been subsequently laid aside. He then mentioned that under the mechanism of the FRD they had proceeded with psychological and paramilitary activities. Under the former he mentioned Swan Island, WRUL and certain radio stations in the Miami area, publications such as Avance, El Mundo, Diario de la Marina and Bohemia.

Mr. Dulles next described the paramilitary training activities going on at Retalhuleu in Guatemala. Under cover of the FRD, he said, we now have about five to six hundred highly trained Cuban foot soldiers. These have been trained by three Special Forces teams from Fort Bragg. The head trainer considered them the best-trained men in Latin America. In addition, we had sixteen B-26ʼs, four or five C-46ʼs and seven C-54ʼs. At the present time, we had six active communications teams in Cuba and were planning to put in small paramilitary teams of six to eight men whose mission would be to try to line up resistance in Cuba.

The Secretary asked what was the estimated strength of resistance in Cuba at the present time and Mr. Dulles said he thought we could count on about 1,000, who were somewhat scattered. The Secretary then asked whether we have a capability to establish a going resistance movement without use of U.S. forces. Mr. Dulles said this would necessarily depend on how many came over to the dissident side. He said that our present Cuban force in training would reach 700 to 800. He then went on to mention the difficult problem of keeping them in Guatemala. At the best, we had six weeks to two months left before something would have to be done about them.

Mr. Dulles then said that in the normal course of events the Agency would continue drops—the next ones were scheduled for January 25-26—but that policy guidance was now needed from the new administration. He mentioned that the 5412 Group had met weekly and it had heretofore been possible for him to get his guidance from that Group. He said that at the moment what he needed was policy guidance on the following matters: (1) continuance of training, (2) introduction of small teams into Cuba with sabotage and communications capability, and (3) drops of food and supplies to dissidents now in Cuba. Mr. Barnes added that guidance was also needed on infiltrating political leaders into Cuba. He mentioned Artime and Manuel Ray.

Secretary McNamara asked what size Cuban force was considered necessary to buildup enough strength to overthrow Castro. Mr. Dulles said he thought that our presently planned Cuban force could probably hold a beachhead long enough for us to recognize a provisional government and aid that government openly. Secretary McNamara then asked whether the estimate was that time was strengthening or weakening us. Mr. Dulles replied that it now was weakening us. This could change if people in Cuba got hungry, but this might be a long time off. Food was still being sent to Cuba from the United States. General Lemnitzer interjected to say that Castroʼs popularity might be going down but his grip was getting tighter daily.

Mr. Bowles asked whether we knew of any cliques in the Castro hierarchy. Mr. Dulles said we didnʼt think there were any; that it now seemed to be down to the hard core. Mr. Bowles recalled the division between Trotsky and Stalin. Mr. Dulles replied that they didnʼt see any such division in the Cuban picture. He said he believed that the Castro regime had plans to export Castroʼs communism; that they already have power among the people in the Caribbean countries and elsewhere, particularly in Venezuela and Colombia.

The Attorney General said that about five days ago he had been approached by a former attorney of Castroʼs who was till close to Raul Castro, who had indicated that Raul might be going over into counter-Revolutionary efforts, principally against Che Guevara. The attorney had asked him what were the prospects for cutting off petroleum shipments to Cuba in the event of Raulʼs defection. He expected the attorney, who is now in Cuba, to return shortly with more on this.

Turning to the possibility of recognizing a provisional government, the Secretary indicated that seizing the Isle of Pines would have a number of advantages. Mr. Dulles said it had indeed a number of advantages but one major problem was how could dissidents in Cuba join up with a force landed there. General Lemnitzer said the Isle of Pines was heavily defended. Ambassador Willauer said that his first reaction had been very much in favor of trying to seize Pine Island. The head of the Special Forces team training the unit in Guatemala, however, had informed him that they would expect to lose roughly 50% of an invading force. He also brought up the possibility of a counter-attack by Castro forces from Cuba itself. The Secretary then said he was thinking about a two-step operation; first the establishment of a beachhead on the Isle of Pines and then moving on to Cuba itself. In this connection he asked whether we had a Puerto Rican ranger battalion and General Lemnitzer said we did not.

The Secretary next asked whether we anticipated any problem about restaffing Cuban personnel at the Guantanamo base. General Lemnitzer said there was no problem about this at the moment. About 1,000 Cubans lived on the base. The rest lived outside. The Secretary asked what about the possibility of putting the force now in Guatemala on the base at Guantanamo. General Lemnitzer replied that there might be some problem of concealment and an action of that sort might justify an attack against the base. The Secretary then asked in terms of contingency planning how many U.S. divisions were being thought of. General Lemnitzer in reply said two plus or maybe three.

The Secretary then commented on the enormous implications of putting U.S. forces ashore in Cuba and said we should consider everything short of this, including rough stuff, before doing so. He said he felt we might be confronted by serious uprisings all over Latin America if U.S. forces were to go in, not to mention the temptation that the commitment of such forces in Cuba would provide elsewhere in the world. In this connection he again mentioned the possibility of a physical base on the Isle of Pines for a provisional government which we could recognize. This he thought would be a powerful step forward. What we needed was a “fig leaf.” A Cuban provisional government on the Isle of Pines, for example, could sink Soviet ships carrying supplies to Castro with less danger than would be the case with direct involvement of U.S. forces.

The Secretary then asked Mr. Dulles if he could say offhand how much money the Cuban operation had cost to date. Mr. Dulles said that it had cost about $6 million last year and $28 million was earmarked for the first six months of 1961. The Secretary asked him whether he could use a quarter of a billion dollars. Was there a possibility, for example, of suborning a unit on the Isle of Pines. This in the long run would be much cheaper than using U.S. forces directly. The Secretary also mentioned that we should inquire into the possible usefulness of a pacific blockade with a carefully and publicly defined mission. In elaboration he mentioned the possibility of “making some international law.” Should we, for example, announce that the introduction of jet aircraft into this hemisphere by the Bloc would be regarded as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. It would then be the Blocʼs responsibility if they chose to “escalate” in the face of such an announcement.

General Lemnitzer then asked permission for General Bonesteel to show a chart of several possible courses of action in ascending scale which had been drawn up for contingency planning purposes. General Bonesteel summarized the chart and said that in his view we needed an overall national plan. The Secretary agreed and said it was clear a task force was needed to devote itself to the development of such a plan. He thought that the task force should be composed of representatives of State, Defense, and CIA. Mr. Dulles said that perhaps also representatives of Treasury and Justice should be included as needed.

Mr. Merchant commented that the inadequacies of the original March 17th plan only began to become apparent in November and mentioned that the intelligence community had brought out an estimate in the first part of DecemberReference is to SNIE 85-3-60, dated December 8, 1960. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. VI, pp. 1168–1174. concluding that time was running against us in Cuba. He then mentioned that we were now working against some important deadlines. Among these were the shakiness of the Ydigoras regime, and the so-called “shelf-life” of the Cuban unit in Guatemala. The possibility of bringing the Cuban forces to the United States raised the question of how overtly the United States was prepared to show its hand. These problems were of an immediate nature, and another reason why policy guidance was needed as soon as possible.

Mr. Dulles said he hoped that the 5412 Group would be continued and could resume its meetings as soon as possible. The Secretary concluded by saying he would try to work out some arrangement about this tomorrow or the next day.

(At the end of the meeting, Ambassador Willauer gave the Secretary a memorandum he had written for Mr. Merchant on January 18For text, see the Supplement. which outlined a number of major issues on which policy guidance is needed. The memorandum was a reflection of views developed at the first meetings of a tripartite (State, DOD, and CIA) task force on the Cuban problem which had been chaired by Ambassador Willauer. A copy is attached to the original of this memorandum.)

25. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 3, Vol. IV (6). Secret. Drafted by Tracy Barnes on January 23. Washington, January 22, 1961. SUBJECT Conclusions of Dean Ruskʼs 22 January Meeting on CubaFor another record of this meeting, see Document 24. PRESENT See attached listNot printed. For the list of meeting participants, see Document 24.

The meeting was long and covered the entire problem in considerable detail. It is the purpose of this memorandum mainly to record the points of significance to CIA. It might be said, however, that in general no definite conclusions were reached other than to say that within a day or two the DCI will be advised by Secretary Rusk as to the views of the present administration on how to proceed and the status of the Special Group with particular reference to the grant of authority for actions in connection with Cuba.

The actions to be taken by CIA are: 1. To continue planning with the State Department with respect to the political side of the proposed provisional government or junta, i.e. who should be selected and when, how and where should they be selected. This is already underway and will be continued. 2. To plan with the Pentagon with regard to specific support which might be provided by the Pentagon in the event that conditions make support necessary. Such planning with respect to the possibility of support for a pre-FRD strike landing is already underway. Other contingencies are also under consideration. 3. An estimate should be made of the effects of overt U.S. action in Cuba on the rest of the world with particular reference to the rest of Latin America, the OAS, close NATO allies and possible Soviet and ChiCom moves in other parts of the world, e.g., Berlin, Laos, Korea, and possibly the Congo. Sherman Kent has been alerted to this and proposes to do a memo to the DirectorOn February 11 the Board of National Estimates sent CIA Director Dulles a memorandum prepared in the Office of National Estimates, entitled “Probable International Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action Against the Castro Regime.” (Central Intelligence Agency,DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, DCI (McCone) General Maxwell Taylor Committee on Cuba, 28 Jan-21 May 1961) The text of this memorandum, which was forwarded to the U.S. Intelligence Board on the same day, is in the Supplement. which can be coordinated if the Director so desires. 4. To prepare a briefing for the DD/P, possibly the DCI, regarding what is being done in connection with sabotage within Cuba and what might be done to increase same. 5. To prepare a briefing regarding the theory underlying the selection of a landing site for the FRD strike force and some of the possible areas which would fit this theory. 6. To prepare a short paperNot found. identifying individuals either connected with the project or supporting the project who had FBI experience in Latin America during the war; also stating the present working relationships with the FBI in connection with the project. (There is nothing peculiar about this. It was asked for by the DCI in order to be ready in case Secretary Rusk again raises a question along these lines based on his own personal recollections of wartime actions.)

Nos. 4, 5 and 6 are being taken care of by WH/4.

C. Tracy BarnesPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.A/DDP/A

26. Memorandum of Conference With President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, JCS Conferences with the President, Vol. I. Top Secret. Drafted on January 27 by Goodpaster. Washington, January 25, 1961, 10:15 a.m. OTHERS PRESENT General Lemnitzer General Decker Admiral Burke General White General Shoup General Clifton General Goodpaster

The President first told the group that General Clifton would be taking over from me the Defense Liaison functions. He expressed appreciation for the help I have been enabled to give him by staying on for a short while. He said he would hope to make use of General Clifton in order to stay in very close touch with the Chiefs. General Lemnitzer confirmed that it has been valuable to have someone here with whom the Chiefs could take up specific items, and whom they could get to take up questions with the President for them. The President said he is extremely anxious to keep in close contact with the Chiefs. He recognized that he would be seeing General Lemnitzer frequently when he comes to NSC meetings, attends meetings with the Secretary of State, etc.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

The President asked what the Chiefs think should be done regarding Cuba. General Lemnitzer replied, recalling that the initial plans were for clandestine operations. However, with the shipment in of heavy new military equipment from Czechoslovakia—30,000 tons or more—the clandestine forces are not strong enough. We must increase the size of this force and this creates very difficult problems. What is required is a basic expansion of plans. He noted that time is working against us—although living conditions in Cuba are deteriorating, Castro is tightening police state controls within the area. He is also sending agents and arms into other countries of Latin America. General Lemnitzer thought that the hope is to get a government in exile, then put some troops ashore, and have guerrilla groups start their activities. At that point we would come in and support them. He noted that plans are ready for such action. General Decker added that this action should be taken under a recognized Cuban leader, and, unfortunately, we do not have one at present. General Lemnitzer confirmed that there are a multitude of splinter groups. The President commented that Castro has been able to develop a great and striking personality throughout Latin America and this gives him a great advantage. Admiral Burke agreed that there is lack of a leader to rally around, and that we need somebody to fill this role.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

27. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity-Cuba. Top Secret. Drafted by Bissell for a Presidential briefing. The briefing apparently was that provided by Dulles to President Kennedy and other members of the new administration on January 28. For records of that meeting, see Documents 30 and 31. Washington, January 26, 1961.

CUBA

A. Concept of the Operation:

1. We believe the present plan can establish a beachhead on Cuban soil and maintain it for a period of two weeks, possibly as long as thirty days. It will be of sufficient size to enable a provisional government to be introduced and exist without being under small arms fire. It will contain an air strip and will permit access by sea. 2. There is reasonable chance that the success of the above plan would set in motion forces which would cause the downfall of the regime. 3. There is a greater than even likelihood, however, that, although the consolidation of the beachhead would elicit wide-spread rebellious activities and great disorganization, it would not by itself and with such other support as could be rendered by Agency resources cause the downfall of the regime. Nevertheless, supplemented by the infiltration of other PM teams in other parts of Cuba and by harassing air activity, it could produce a set of affairs describable as continuing civil war. 4. Under these conditions and assuming that the provisional government had been recognized by the United States, there would appear to be a basis for an overt, open U.S. initiative to institute a military occupation of the island by a composite OAS force in order to put a stop to the civil war. This would almost certainly have to be accompanied by a commitment on the part of the OAS to hold supervised free elections reasonably promptly. 5. The provisional government would indicate its readiness to cooperate with such an OAS force whereas the Castro regime would almost certainly refuse to permit a period of OAS pacification followed by an OAS supervised election. Thus the initiative referred to above would in fact lead to overt military intervention against the Castro regime.

B. Immediate Decisions Required:

1. Activities now in progress include (a) political preparations to form an acceptable junta representing all groups; (b) propaganda; (c) the final recruitment and training of PM forces; and (d) active softening up operations in Cuba, including infiltration of teams, maritime resupply, sabotage, extension of agent communication nets, and air resupply and leaflet missions. 2. The softening up activities listed under paragraph 1. (d) preceding are essential not only as preparation for the final effort to overthrow the regime but also to test the temper of the Cuban people, to enable operational assessment of the actual and potential strength of the resist-ance and furnish other hard intelligence. If these activities are continued for another two to three weeks, it should be possible to form a far better judgment than at present of the chances for the success of the operation outlined in part A. above. Both the continued evidence to the world of active resistance in the island and the intelligence thus obtained will be of equal value as preparation for the operation outlined above, or for overt U.S. or OAS military action or as continuing pressure in the event that paramilitary or military action is substantially delayed. 3. It is recommended: a. That the activities currently in progress set forth in paragraph B.1. above be continued for three weeks pending a reassessment of the chances of success of the operation as planned. b. That the detailed military planning be reviewed by not more than one or two senior officers on behalf of the JCS with a view to confirming or modifying the military estimate contained in paragraph A.1. above.

28. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, China-Cuba, 1961. Top Secret. JCSM-44-61 Washington, January 27, 1961. SUBJECT U.S. Plan of Action in Cuba 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are becoming increasingly concerned with the situation presented by steadily increasing military strength of the Castro Government and the tight grasp of the Communists over the means of counter-revolution, including the military, the police and governmental financial resources as well as the organs of propaganda. Unless the United States takes immediate and forceful action, there is a great and present danger that Cuba will become permanently established as a part of the Communist Bloc, with disastrous consequences to the security of the Western Hemisphere. Cuba provides a Communist base of operations for export of similar revolutions to an already unstable and potentially explosive Latin America. 2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the primary objective of the United States in Cuba should be the speedy overthrow of the Castro Government, followed by the establishment of a pro-U.S. Government which, with U.S. support, will accomplish the desired objectives for the Cuban people. Great emphasis is placed on the urgent necessity for the United States to locate, train and support such Cuban nationals as will be capable of establishing a new non-Communist government once Castro is overthrown. 3. The current Political-Para-Military PlanA summary of this plan, referred to as the Trinidad Plan, is in the Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee. See the Supplement. does not assure the accomplishment of the above objective nor has there been detailed follow-up planning to exploit that plan if it succeeds or for any direct action that might be required if the plan is found to be inadequate. 4. As you recall, at the conference between the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on 22 January 1961See Documents 24 and 25. this problem was addressed. At the time the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pre-sented a Joint Staff concept of an ascending scale of U.S. supported or directed actions to accomplish the overthrow of the Castro Government. This concept, which is appended hereto, was intended to demonstrate the key elements in the development of an over-all U.S.Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government. That conference informally agreed that an Inter-Departmental Planning Group should be established to develop a detailed over-all U.S. Plan of Action along the general lines indicated in the Appendix. 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that: a. An over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government be developed by an Inter-Departmental Planning Group. b. Such an over-all U.S. Plan of Action for the overthrow of the Castro Government include, but not be limited to the following: (1) Mission (2) Each feasible course of action (as set forth in the Appendix hereto, or as revised by the planners), with sub-elements as follows: (a) The concept of operations for the course of action. (b) Specific Tasks required of Executive Agencies concerned to accomplish the course of action. (3) Coordinating Instructions (a) Designation of Agency or individual responsible for inter-departmental coordination and arrangement for reviewing and approval of the Plan. (4) Requirements for supporting plans. (5) Special provisions for continuous evaluation of the situation as a basis for determining U.S. course of action. (6) Command relationships for implementation of each course of action. c. The resultant over-all U.S. Plan of Action, after review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other appropriate agencies and approval by the President, be supported by detailed plans by the cognizant Executive Agencies for the implementation of tasks set forth in the over-all U.S. Plan of Action. 6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to assign personnel to participate in this Inter-Departmental Planning for the Department of Defense. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:L.L. LemnitzerChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staffs Appendix

CONCEPT OF ACTIONS

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Pressure Internal uprising Volunteer invasion force w/covert support Guerilla force with covert support Volunteer invasion force with overt action Overt U.S. action supported by L.A. volunteers Unilateral overt U.S. action Concept Economic break dip relations O.A.S. acn. Propaganda & info; Naval/Aerial surveillance; Embargo; Show of force; Comm & trans.; Isolation Foster thru propaganda & pressure a general internal uprising by the Cuban people Train and equip small vol. force Cuban exiles to invade, establish a center of resistance for anti-Castro Cubans to rally to establish pro U.S. Govt. Train anti-Castro Cuban exiles in U.W., insert into Cuba to est. U.W. units, initiate guerilla warfare w U.S. covert support Same as (3) plus planned overt follow up by U.S. forces; Naval blockade Invasion by U.S. military forces in conjunction w L.A. volunteers Naval blockade Invasion by U.S. military forces only; Naval blockade Mil. Req. Naval/Aerial surveillance; Embargo; Show of force Log. supt. Logistic support Logistic support

Army, Naval & A.F. combat units Logistic units

Supplies Naval blockade

Same as (5)

Naval blockade

Same as (5)

Naval blockade

Status of Mil. Req. Current naval maneuvers No plan; (Plan being initiated) Support provided as required No action No action(Plan required) Modification of current cont. plan required est program of L.A. vol. req CINCLANT contingency plan (Being modified)

29. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Cuba 1961 000.1–092. Secret. JCSM-45-61 Washington, January 27, 1961. SUBJECT Increased Tempo of the U.S. Information Offensive Toward Cuba (C) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that it would serve the National interest to intensify the information offensive of informing the Cuban citizens of the dangers inherent in the Castro governmentʼs alignment with the Sino-Soviets and their isolation from the Inter-American System. Such increased activity would definitely tend to offset the distorted view of U.S. objectives and policy that the Cuban populace now receive from their government and would contribute to the internal problems of the Castro regime. 2. One means of accelerating the information offensive could be through the greater employment of the Voice of America and Radio Swan, using increased power, and the long wave band so as to reach the largest possible segment of the Cuban populace. Consideration should be given to the employment of continental U.S. stations which would transmit regular commercial news and selected television programs using increased power for these broadcasts. It may be feasible to employ commercial stations in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, as well as leading dissident Cubans now residing in these areas to assist in this offensive. 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of Defense forward the memorandum in the AppendixNot printed. to the Secretary of State. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:L.L. LemnitzerPrinted from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff

30. Memorandum of DiscussionSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bundy and initialed by Kennedy. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. Another set of notes of this meeting, prepared by Lemnitzer, is in National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Notes, Miscellaneous Meetings, 1961. Tracy Barnes also prepared a record of this meeting; see Document 31. Washington, January 28, 1961.

MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION ON CUBA

PRESENT The President, The Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretary Mann, Assistant Secretary Nitze, Mr. Tracy Barnes, Mr. McGeorge Bundy

The meeting began with a description of the present situation in Cuba by the Director of Central Intelligence. The judgment expressed without dissent was that Cuba is now for practical purposes a Communist-controlled state. The two basic elements in the present situation are a rapid and continuing build-up of Castroʼs military power, and a great increase also in popular opposition to his regime.

The United States has undertaken a number of covert measures against Castro, including propaganda, sabotage, political action, and direct assistance to anti-Castro Cubans in military training. A particularly urgent question is the use to be made of a group of such Cubans now in training in Guatemala, who cannot remain indefinitely where they are.

The present estimate of the Department of Defense is that no course of action currently authorized by the United States Government will be effective in reaching the agreed national goal of overthrowing the Castro regime. Meanwhile, the Department of State sees grave political dangers to our position throughout the Western hemisphere in any overt military action not authorized and supported by the Organization of American States.

After considerable discussion,

According to a “Review of record of proceedings related to Cuban Situation,” prepared by Naval Intelligence for the Director of Naval Operations on May 5, Lemnitzerʼs debriefing following the White House meeting on January 28 outlined the discussion as follows:

“The President wanted to know how the JCS felt about the prospects for success of a landing in Cuba by the forces being trained in Guatemala. It was indicated that they wanted a JCS study and evaluation of CIAʼs plan and the JCS opinion of its chances for success. The Chairman offered a personal opinion that in view of the strong forces Castro now had that the Cubans would have very little chance of success. As opposed to this, CIA took a very optimistic view of the forceʼs ability to land and hold a beach head. The Chairman also pointed out that whereas they might be able to take a small beach head that after a relatively short time Castro would be able to mount heavy forces against them. The problem would then be one of who would come to their assistance.” (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

the following proceedings were authorized by the President: 1. A continuation and accentuation of current activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, including increased propaganda, increased political action and increased sabotage. Continued overflights for these purposes were specifically authorized. 2. The Defense Department, with CIA, will review proposals for the active deployment of anti-Castro Cuban forces on Cuban territory, and the results of this analysis will be promptly reported to the President. 3. The Department of State will prepare a concrete proposal for action with other Latin American countries to isolate the Castro regime and to bring against it the judgment of the Organization of American States. It is expected that this proposal may involve a commitment of the Presidentʼs personal authority behind a special mission or missions to such Latin American leaders as Lleras, Betancourt and Quadros.

Finally, it was agreed that the United States must make entirely clear that its position with respect to the Cuban Government is currently governed by its firm opposition to Communist penetration of the American Republics, and not by any hostility to democratic social revolution and economic reform. The President intends to deal with this matter himself in the State of the Union Address.In his State of the Union message on January 30, President Kennedy drew a distinction between opposition to Communist penetration and control in Cuba and Latin America and support for social and economic reform. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 15.

The President particularly desires that no hint of these discussions reach any personnel beyond those most immediately concerned within the Executive Branch.

McGeorge Bundy

31. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C. T. Barnes Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Barnes on January 30. Washington, January 28, 1961. SUBJECT Cuban Meeting on 28 January 1961For another record of the meeting, see Document 30.

The decisions reached at the meeting were: 1. To continue all present project activities including propaganda, political action, sabotage, exfiltration and infiltration and overflights both leaflet and supply. 2. To present, as soon as possible, the project tactical PM plan to a limited number of senior officers designated by General Lemnitzer. These officers should, as soon as possible, report their views of the plan in order that a DOD position may be formulated. 3.

In addition, it was the sense of the meeting that the 5412 Group should probably be reconstituted and should probably take cognizance of the Cuban problem as well as other covert projects as it has in the past. With respect to Cuba, it was also the sense of the meeting that a task force, constituted generally along the same lines as that previously set up under the Special Group, should be reconstituted for purposes of coordinating the U.S. effort and keeping the senior levels of the interested Departments advised as to the status of planning and actions taken, as well as notifying appropriate individuals whenever any important aspect of the plan is in arrears or needs special attention.

There was some discussion, initiated in connection with consideration of Laos, regarding the need for machinery in the government for centralizing governmental control and decisions. The problem in addition to Laos was thought to exist as well with respect to the Congo and to a lesser extent Cuba. Mr. Nitze was asked to work with Mr. Merchant on this problem and to make recommendations at the next NSC meeting as to what might be done.

4. The Department of Defense clearly has the view that, due to the military build-up which has occurred in Cuba in the last four or five months, a fairly substantial effort will be necessary to overcome the resistance. General Lemnitzer indicated that he is quite prepared to have our tactical plan examined, but his present feeling obviously is that no force of 600 to 800 men is adequate for success. He anticipates, therefore, that final planning will have to include agreed plans for providing additional support for the Cuban force—presumably such support to be U.S. 5. The State Department agrees with General Lemnitzerʼs views mentioned in the above paragraph. Moreover, State is anxious that no decision be made in favor of any strike force landing until it is quite clear that all other possible steps have been fully pursued. In general, the State Department would advocate taking action to isolate Cuba within the hemisphere. Discussions with Lleras Camargo, Betancourt and Quadros might be initiated for this purpose on the theory that if their support could be obtained, it would go a long way toward lining up other Latin American countries and possibly provide a basis for OAS action. In addition, State would like to examine the possibilities of harassment of Cubans employing action similar to these used against the Nazi penetrations during World War II. Finally, State would favor actions of a covert nature in Cuba itself, including a continuation of all the activities now under way. 6. Should a strike force effort be made against Cuba, State clearly would want such an effort to obtain a fairly sizable piece of Cuban real estate with an ability to hold it in order to enable a provisional government to be identified and recognized and in order to provide territory from which such provisional government could operate against the Castro regime. The Isle of Pines is an obvious possibility along these lines and it was agreed that it should be so examined. On the other hand, it was recognized that this has been recently further fortified and, in addition, is difficult to get at for hydrographic reasons. Nevertheless, it provides good evidence of the way State is thinking. 7. There was some discussion of the possibility of using the Cuban strike force as a guerrilla force. Such use would be an alternative to a strike force landing and would assume the use of a greater number of teams and a much longer term approach to the problem.

C. Tracy BarnesPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

32. Editorial Note

At 2:30 p.m. on January 28, 1961, following the meeting at the White House concerning the proposed plan of action against Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met at the Pentagon with McNamara, Dulles, Rusk, Gilpatric, Bowles, and Nitze to consider the implications of the meeting with the President and the nature of the proposed operation: “Mr. McNamara expressed his concern about the Cuba operation and pointed out the necessity for determining whether the CIA plan was satisfactory or not. He was informed that the Joint Staff had been told to appraise and evaluate the Cuban plan. Mr. McNamara, in effect, questioned whether such a small force could really achieve a worthwhile objective. Admiral Burke pointed out that a big question was the matter of support for the force. He also mentioned that the Cubans could get on the beach but it was a matter of how long they could stay there.SecDef pointed out that at the next meeting CIA should be told that their plan is not considered to be a good one and therefore the necessity for development of an alternate plan. The Chairman agreed with him.” (“Review of record of proceedings related to Cuban Situation,” prepared by Naval Intelligence for the Director of Naval Operations, May 5; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

33. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State RuskSource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Confidential. The source text indicates that the memorandum was dictated by the President. Washington, January 31, 1961.

It seems to me important that our efforts to organize support along the lines discussed last week should proceed as quickly as possible. I have suggested to Bundy that he get in touch with Mann and ask him for a report before the end of the week on the ways and means by which these negotiations might be conducted more quickly. At last Saturdayʼs meetingJanuary 28; see Documents 30 and 31. Mr. Mann suggested it might take up to six weeks. This seems to me an excessively long time. Can we do anything about it?

34. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Secretary of State RuskSource: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, 1/21/61-2/15/61. No classification marking. Prepared in Ruskʼs office by Phyllis D. Bernau. Washington, February 3, 1961, 7 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR. BUNDY

B said the Pres has been saying re Cuba that he has the feeling he has heard different arguments from different kinds of people and he wonders if Berle is going to be involved in that kind of problem and wants him to if it is all right with the Sec. The Sec said yes—he is in charge of the total Latin American task force—Willauer is a subcomm on the particular country. B said if there is a serious difference of view he would like the people to come over and argue with him. R confirmed that Berle is fully informed. B said he got an extremely instructive lecture from Mann and there is a divergence of his view and the Agencyʼs view. If there is a real divergence it will help Mannʼs view to have it argued out direct with the Pres. R is not concerned as Mannʼs view is Berleʼs and his and the other part must not prevail. B said it may be important given the level of that feeling—the Pres is ready to listen—otherwise he is assuming it is going all right.

R said he would like to see the Pres this week end re high-level visitors—would prefer Sunday. B said OʼDonnell will call this office to set a time.

35. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. According to a May 4 memorandum in which he detailed his briefings of the JCS on the paramilitary plan, Major General David W. Gray gave the JCS a 20-minute briefing on February 3 on the CIA Para-Military Plan, Trinidad area, which is outlined in JCSM-57-61. (Ibid.) JCSM-57-61 Washington, February 3, 1961. SUBJECT Military Evaluation of the Cuban Plan

Attached hereto is the Military Evaluation of the Central Intelligence Agency Para-Military Plan, Cuba. Subject to your concurrence,In a handwritten note on the source text at this point, McNamara authorized the Joint Chiefs to forward the assessment to the CIA and to discuss the project with CIA officials in light of the assessment. the Joint Chiefs of Staff propose to forward copies of their assessment of the plan to the Director for Central Intelligence with the proposal that they meet with the Director for Central Intelligence and members of his staff for further discussion of this project.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:L.L. LemnitzerPrinted from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff AttachmentTop Secret; Limited Distribution. The memorandum is marked as a draft, but it is the assessment forwarded to McNamara on February 3, under cover of JCSM-57-61.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the feasibility of the military portion of the CIA plan for action to effect the overthrow of the Castro regime and arrived at the following conclusions: a. Since the success of this operation is dependent on the degree of local Cuban support, this factor should be a matter of continuous evaluation until a decision to execute the operation is made. b. Based on an independent analysis by the Joint Staff the beachhead area is considered to be the best area in Cuba for accomplishment of the Task Force mission. c. There should be a review of the plan for air movement to the embarkation point to eliminate the possibility of compromise. d. In view of the complexity of the loading and marshaling phase of this amphibious operation, the current plans should be reviewed to ensure detailed coordination and centralized control. e. If surprise is achieved and the estimates of Castroʼs air defense capabilities are correct, the plan of air operations is within the capability of the Air units and should be successful. f. Since it is highly improbable that the airborne assault would be opposed, it should be successful. g. The amphibious assault should be successful even if lightly opposed; however the personnel and plans for logistic support are marginal at best. Against moderate, determined resistance logistic support as presently planned will be inadequate. h. The scheme of maneuver to secure the beachhead area is basically sound. i. Additional planning is required concerning the control and utilization of indigenous facilities, and personnel both for combat and support functions. j. It would appear more desirable for guerrilla bands to support from outside the beachhead area rather than combining with the invasion force as currently planned. k. Without interference from the air, obstacles or guerrillas the Cuban Army could move substantial forces to the area by D+2. Necessity to develop the situation and prepare a coordinated attack would take an estimated two additional days at a minimum. Interference by any of the three above factors would further delay a coordinated attack. l. Since the Cuban Army is without experience in coordinated offensive action, the invasion force should be able to successfully resist the initial attacks. m. Even if the task force is expanded by local volunteers, it is estimated that, lacking a popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces, the Cuban Army could eventually reduce the beachhead, but no estimate of the time this would require is possible. n. This operation as presently envisaged would not necessarily require overt U.S. intervention. o. In view of loading requirements, a decision as to the execution of this operation must be made by D-21. p. In summary, evaluation of the current plan results in a favorable assessment, modified by the specific conclusions set forth above, of the likelihood of achieving initial military success. It is obvious that ultimate success will depend upon political factors; i.e., a sizeable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces. It should be noted that assessment of the combat worth of assault forces is based upon second and third hand reports, and certain logistic aspects of the plan are highly complex and critical to initial success. For these reasons, an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans should be made by a team of Army, Naval, and Air Force officers, if this can be done without danger of compromise of the plan. q. Despite the shortcomings pointed out in the assessment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that timely execution of this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even if it does not achieve immediately the full results desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime. 2. It is recommended that the enclosed study be forwarded to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, for information and consideration.

[Here follows a 3-page section entitled “Military Evaluation of Para-Military Plan,” which is identical with the conclusions outlined in paragraphs a-q above. The only substantive difference is the addition of a paragraph 2, under the heading “Facts Bearing on the Problem”; see footnote 7 below.]

Annex “A”

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Enemy Forces. (Appendix “A” for details)Appendices A-E to Annex A are attached but not printed. a. Cuban Army—Total, 32,000 personnel, including 9,000 police, organized into four infantry regiments (strength, 2,000), three artillery battalions, three tank battalions and one AAA battalion. Nearest Army force to beachhead is approximately 100 miles away, consisting of 6,000 troops (one infantry regiment, one artillery battalion and one tank battalion, not confirmed). In beachhead area, there is a police squadron. b. Air Force—Three F-47; one F-51; 14 Sea Fury; 13 B-26; six TBM-38; 15 transport type aircraft; 22 helicopters of various types. c. Navy—Total, approximately 5,000 personnel. Three PF; two PCE; 43 smaller craft. d. Militia—Between 200,000 and 300,000 in strength. Well armed but combat capability is questionable. Approximately 1,200 militia are located in the beachhead area. e. Combat Readiness of Cuban Armed Forces is low but improving. This improvement partially offset by deteriorating morale. 2. Friendly Forces. (Appendix “B” for details) a. Cuban Task Force—1,004 personnel. (1) An Infantry Battalion of four rifle companies (one airborne), totaling approximately 826 personnel and armed to include 4.2 mortars and 77 mm recoilless rifles, and a tank platoon of 5 M41 tanks. (2) An Air Force consisting of 17 B-26ʼs; 10 C-54ʼs; 5 C-46ʼs; supported by approximately 100 personnel, 18 of which are pilots. Maintenance is excellent and has adequate logistic support. (3) Navy—3 LCUʼs; 2 LST type; 2 LCI; 4 LCP; 1 LSD (USN); and supported by approximately 40 Naval personnel. b. Guerrillas—In Cuba, total 1,500 but in general area of beachhead (25 mile radius) five bands with an estimated strength of 660. c. Cuban Volunteers after invasion. CIA is counting on a sizeable number of indigenous volunteers. This support will undoubtedly develop but the numbers cannot be estimated. Arms for 1,500 volunteers are included in initial lift. 3. Characteristics of the Invasion Area. a. Terrain—The beachhead area is generally semicircular with a perimeter of approximately 11 miles. Within the beachhead area is a small city,Trinidad. a small airfield, roadnet and a river. The perimeter of the beachhead is generally anchored on low hill masses with a commanding hill mass, approximately 700 feet in height, at its north center. The area between the hill masses and the ocean is generally flat, with wooded and cultivated areas. Two good roads enter the area from the east and the west, with a railroad entering from the northeast. Tanks generally can operate throughout the beachhead. b. Landing beaches—There are three small beaches in the landing area, two at river mouths and one on the west side of the bay formed by the rivers. The left river mouth beach is 100 to 150 yards in length, with 12 foot water depth up to the beach. The center beach, at the main river mouth, is 100 to 150 yards in length, with shoal water off the beach making it suitable only for LCVPʼs. The third beach, on the west side of the bay, is 50 to 60 yards in width with 7 feet of water up to the beach and easily identifiable by four buildings to the rear of the beach. Exits at all beaches are suitable for small vehicles, while the exit from the west beach is very good, suitable for vehicles and tanks. The seaward approaches are clear. c. Airborne drop zone—The planned drop zone is approximately 2,000 yards in length, open and generally flat. It is located near the commanding hill mass within the beachhead. It is considered suitable for a company drop zone. d. Strategic location—The beachhead is so located that it is remote from known concentrations of Cuban Army, access routes are limited and it can be readily isolated by cutting highway and railroad bridges at river crossings outside the beachhead area. Rugged terrain in the vicinity facilitates expansion of para-military operations. 4. Concept. (Appendix “C” for details) On D-1, air strikes are designed to neutralize Cuban Air Force, Cuban Naval patrol vessels, key communications facilities, and destroy tanks and artillery in parks. Second priority is isolation of the objective area. Following a feint on the night of D-1, prior to first light on D Day, the task force will invade by simultaneous air drop in the vicinity of the key hill mass and by amphibious landing on the selected beaches. Avoiding the city, control of the beachhead area will be established by seizing and organizing four strong points on key terrain along the perimeter which dominate entrance routes into the area. Contact will be established with guerrilla bands in general area of operations. Small air strip in area will be cleared. Every effort will be made to increase force by local volunteers for which arms will be provided. Force will establish control within beachhead area and if driven therefrom, be prepared to withdraw from beachhead area and link with guerrilla forces to continue guerrilla activities. For detailed concept of air employment and capabilities, see Appendix “D” to Annex “A”. 5. Logistics. (Appendix “E” for details) The supply of Class I, III and VClass I covered subsistence materials, including food, Class III involved petroleum products, and Class V was ammunition. is adequate. The shipping is limited and allows no margin for miscalculation or unforeseen contingencies. Of the 826 personnel in the Brigade, only 18 are specifically designated for logistic tasks. These 18 are in the 85 man Brigade Headquarters. The quantities of Class I, III and V supplies are adequate for the operation. The Brigade is without engineer or bridging capability. Plans call for Class I, III and V supplies to be mounted-out from New Orleans, Guatemala and Nicaragua. These supplies are available for both air and surface lift. Transportation is adequate for the initial phases of the operation on an austere basis. Annex “B”

DISCUSSION

1. Friendly Forces a. A task force with an approximate strength of 1040 officers and enlisted men has been recruited, assembled and is now undergoing training. This task force consists of a ground force unit with an approximate strength of 826 personnel, a seaborne support element of approximately 40 individuals, and an air combat and support element with an approximate personnel strength of 100. b. The ground force unit is organized along the lines of a U.S. Infantry Battalion and consists of one Headquarters and Support Company, four Rifle Companies, one Heavy Gun Company and one Tank (M41) Platoon. One Rifle Company has received airborne training, one Rifle Company has received training as motorized infantry to operate with the Tank Platoon, and three of the Rifle Companies are theoretically trained to engage in amphibious landings. To date, no actual training in amphibious landings has been accomplished by the Rifle Companies. Boat crews to operate the landing craft are currently undergoing training. M41 tank crews have not received sufficient training as yet; however, it is anticipated that adequate training will be provided within the United States. Eighty airborne trained personnel have received additional training as a special purpose unit, designed to parachute into general area of operation on D-Day to insure that strategic bridges are demolished and thereby denied to the enemy. (For further details on assault force, see Appendix “B” to Annex “A”.) c. Seaborne support unit has available a limited number of vessels and landing craft for training and for the conduct of its operational mission. (For further details, see Appendix “B” to Annex “A”.) A detachment of 11 personnel is receiving specialized training in underwater operations to qualify them to mark the channel of approach for landing craft on D-Day. d. The Air Force combat and support element has available 18 trained pilots within its total strength of 100. Aircraft available and being used for training are: 17 B-26ʼs, 10 C-54ʼs, and 5 C-46ʼs. e. All of the above information was obtained by representatives of the Joint Staff as a result of a briefing held 31 January 1961. There is no indication that personnel of the task force have received a combat type checklist evaluation to determine its combat readiness. 2. Beachhead Area. The general objective area is isolated from the location of Cuban Army units and is strategically located so as to facilitate blocking rapid reinforcement by cutting bridges on the two main roads and the railroad into the area. The location of the area also facilitates expansion of military and para-military operations. The selected beaches for the amphibious assault are suitable for the landing envisaged, provide adequate exits, and can be readily identified from seaward. The airborne landing area is adequate for the planned one company drop and is adjacent to the companyʼs objective area. Tanks can operate throughout most of the beachhead area. Overall, the objective area is considered desirable for the type operation envisaged. 3. Air Movement to the Port of Embarkation. The troops that are to be moved amphibiously will be flown to Puerto Cabezas during three consecutive nights prior to their departure for Cuba. This airlift is well within the capability of the volunteer force. However, this traffic converging on Puerto Cabezas, coming on the heels of recent construction there, might alert Castro-Communist elements who could possibly observe the loading of the troops on the LSTʼs and report this information to Cuba. To eliminate this possibility, other plans for moving these troops to the LSTʼs should be examined. For example: It might be feasible to airlift these troops from Retalehuleu to Swan Island for loading onto the LSTʼs. This would reduce the likelihood of being observed by Castro-Communist elements, and would cut the time needed to move from the point of embarkation to the invasion beaches by approximately one day. 4. Sea Movement a. The plan requires that shipping be loaded at New Orleans, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Vieques. Commencing at D-15, shipping will load supplies at New Orleans and proceed independently to ports in Guatemala and Nicaragua. At the same time, other ships of the invasion force will be loading personnel and equipment at Vieques. All shipping, upon completion of embarkation, will steam independently to a rendezvous area off the Cayman Islands to arrive on D-1. Each ship will travel on individual orders without knowledge of the orders of other ships in the force. The result will be dependent on the coordination and control exercised in the execution of a detailed, exacting plan. Once in the rendezvous area at the Cayman Islands, certain key personnel will conduct pre-D-Day transfer among shipping. The final movement into the objective area includes the rendezvous with the invasion fleet of one U.S. Navy LSD. Final juncture of shipping is effected at H-5 hours on D-Day off the invasion beaches. b. The complicated and multiple ship movements for the 14 days prior to D-Day will require plans in exact detail, executed under centralized control and coordination. 5. Air Operations a. Given the correctness of the current CIA estimate of Cuban air defense capabilities, and assuming the air attack will have the advantage of surprise, the D-1 and D-Day air operations should be generally successful. b. However, if the CIA estimate is incorrect, and it develops that the Cubans possess jet aircraft and pilots, and ground to air missiles, the air strikes could fail. c. Furthermore, if the element of surprise is lost, the Cubans could utilize a few of their Sea Furys and B-26 aircraft airborne. The Cubans could also set sugar cane fires generating smoke that could frustrate at least some air strike missions, with the over-all effect that the D-1 and D-Day air operations would not accomplish all assigned missions. 6. Airborne Assault. The task force has adequate transport aircraft to lift the entire airborne infantry company to the landing zone within the beachhead. In view of the size of the drop zone, and its location in relation to the airborne companyʼs objective, the airborne assault should be successful in seizing and holding the key terrain objective. 7. The Amphibious Assault a. The amphibious element of the force has received no amphibious training and is not now scheduled to receive any prior to the operation. This deficiency will not be too serious if estimate of unopposed landing holds true. Nevertheless, lack of sufficient trained shore party personnel will complicate control in moving personnel and materiel across the beaches. Facilities for handling broached boats are not available. Trained personnel are not generally available for traffic control, beach installations, and control of dump sites. b. Beaches are adequate to land personnel and equipment according to plan. Routes of egress restrict the landing of heavy vehicles to the beach on the right flank. Beaches are generally marked by significant terrain features. In addition, UDT trained personnel will be utilized to mark the approaches to the principal beach on the right flank. c. The amphibious assault does appear feasible, but there should be detailed plans to insure coordination of landing and effective handling of supplies and equipment across the beach and at least mockup training should be conducted. d. The personnel and plans for logistic support are marginal at best. This operation may be supported logistically on an austere basis during an unopposed landing. If opposition increases, the logistical aspects will rapidly worsen. Against moderate, determined resistance, this plan will fail to provide adequate logistic support. 8. Concept of Control of Beachhead Area a. The concept of the invasion assigns the airborne company the mission of seizing the key hill mass which dominates the northern portion of the beachhead area and the town. One company lands amphibiously on the left flank beach, then proceeds to an objective area on the left flank which controls routes of ingress from the west. The first company to land amphibiously on the right flank beach clears the airfield, then moves to an objective area on the northeast portion of the beachhead area which controls the main highway and railroad from the east. The last company leaves one platoon on the right flank beach to assist in beach operations; the remainder of the company clears the port, then proceeds to an objective area on the eastern part of the beachhead area to control the unimproved roads in that area that lead to the east. b. The units will maintain control by establishment of strong points, road blocks, and neutralization of avenues of approach. Patrols will be utilized to cover the principal routes leading into the beachhead area. c. A major problem could arise in control of indigenous personnel. In this regard, desirability of control of radio and news media may be stressed. Provisions need be made for the prevention of sabotage, operation of port facilities, traffic control measures to restrict civilian movement in the beachhead area, care and control of POWʼs, and utilization of indigenous labor. Particular attention is required to restrict local civilian personnel from interfering with air operations at the air strip within the beachhead area. The question of local procurement of materiel on the local market may merit consideration. The plan is deficient in that it does not provide for these matters. It has been indicated that plans are being prepared which will take these problems into account. However, the size and composition of the force as it now stands is inadequate to fulfill the requirements described above. d. The invasion force intends to establish contact with the guerrilla bands now operating in the general area of operations. According to currently available intelligence, it is estimated that within a 25 mile radius of the objective area, five guerrilla bands with a total estimated strength of 660 may cooperate with the task force. Another guerrilla band with an estimated strength of 90 is operating approximately 30 miles west of the objective area. Two additional guerrilla bands are operating some 40 miles north of the objective area. The concept is for these bands to reinforce the invasion force in the beachhead area. This part of the concept is not considered sound. It would appear that it would be desirable for the guerrilla bands now established within the area of operations to intensify operations and hold their current operating areas as a base to which the invasion force can withdraw if it is forced out of the beachhead. 9. Local Indigenous Support a. Any invasion to overthrow the Castro regime would probably be supported by many segments of the population, especially if it showed some early success. Continued support of the invasion would depend largely on the identification of leaders with the hopes and aspirations of the bulk of the population. While some preliminary softening probably would be accepted as necessary for success of the operation, wholesale bombings would tend to unite the people behind Castro, especially if there was high loss of life as a result. b. If the leaders of the movement can get their message across to the people rapidly and with a united voice, support probably will be forthcoming from all segments, including the armed forces and militia and widespread defections could be expected. However, a split in the leadership, or lack of a clear program appealing to the people, could well prevent any effective support developing. In the general area of operations, the loyalty of the militia and police units is probably divided between support for Castro and support for the anti-Castro guerrillas operating in the mountains. The militia units now engaged in counter-guerrilla operations were drawn from other provinces in order to assure their loyalty. Therefore, considerable local support for the invasion force can probably be expected. Likewise, if widespread support for the invasion force develops, it would reduce the militia units and rebel army elements available to oppose the landing force in subsequent operations. 10. Resistance to Invasion and Time and Space Factors on Cuban Army Reaction a. The nearest Cuban Army Forces, approximately 100 miles away, are not normally concentrated but scattered throughout the area. Even if assembly of these forces commences on the evening of D-1, it is estimated that only a small element (approximately 1 battalion) could commence movement towards the area by the night of D-Day. Additional forces could begin departing for the area immediately thereafter as transportation becomes available. The initial elements of these forces could arrive in the area in about 8 hours, and could begin to probe the beachhead by D+1. b. By U.S. combat standards without interference from the air, obstacles or guerrillas, a force of approximate regimental size should be able to attack late on D+1. However, in view of the inexperience of the Cuban Army in this type of operation it is estimated that a force large enough to attack in strength could not be assembled in the beachhead area before D+2. The necessity to develop the location of the invasion force positions and prepare a coordinated attack would probably take an additional two days, although minor attacks or piecemeal attacks could occur between D+2 and D+4. If there is interference as planned from the air, obstacles or guerrillas, the mounting of a coordinated counterattack would be further delayed. c. Without interference, tank units could reach the area from Santa Clara by road in approximately 8 hours and from Managua by rail and road in a maximum of 56 hours after starting to load. d. Even if the invasion task force is expanded by local volunteers, it is estimated that, lacking a popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces, the Cuban Army could eventually reduce the beachhead, but no estimate of the time this would require is possible. 11. Political-Military Considerations a. When this plan was originally briefed to the Joint Staff in outline form the impression was gained that the force would occupy a small perimeter in the mountains where it could fairly easily be surrounded and destroyed. If such an event should appear imminent after declaration of a provisional government and U.S. recognition, U.S. overt support would have to be given to uphold U.S. prestige regardless of the international consequences. The detailed explanation of the plan now reveals that if the beachhead area cannot be held, the force together with leaders of the provisional government will withdraw into the mountains and join existing guerrilla bands. In this eventuality, the invasion force will not have completely failed in its mission, and the U.S. would not necessarily be committed to overt support. Therefore, a decision to commit this force would not necessarily require a simultaneous decision for overt U.S. military action. b. If the United States had not recognized the provisional government prior to abandonment of the beachhead, subsequent U.S. actions could be in the form of continued covert support of a guerrilla movement. If the United States had recognized the provisional government, prior to abandonment of the beachhead, then a decision as to whether U.S. prestige would require overt support would be required. This eventuality should be considered at the time the basic decision to execute the plan is made. c. The present plan does not allow for the possibility of follow-up support from other Latin American countries in subsequent phases of the operation. Such support would increase the capabilities of the military force and, it is estimated, would intensify local Cuban support. The introduction of such forces would create problems of supply, command, prestige, etc. which would be solvable, but which would have to be anticipated and included in prior planning. Therefore, a decision as to possible OAS support should be sought without delay. 12. Ability to Accomplish Mission a. The following are factors favorable to the invasion force: (1) Probably unopposed landing. (2) Probable lack of air opposition. (3) Availability of friendly air support. (4) Suitability of terrain for fixed defense. (5) Remoteness of beachhead area. (6) Assistance from guerrillas. (7) High motivation and morale. b. Following are factors unfavorable to the invasion force: (1) Lack of reserves. (2) Lack of logistic support elements. (3) Lack of freedom of maneuver. c. Following are unknown factors: (1) Degree of popular support. (2) Capabilities of Cuban Army to successfully counterattack. d. Considering the above factors, on balance the invasion force should be able to accomplish objectives as stated in paragraph 2a and c.

Paragraph 2 of the first section of the study, not printed, lists a 3-part mission for the Cuban exile force: “a. Invade the island of Cuba by amphibious and airborne assault. “b. Hold a beachhead long enough to establish a provisional government, act as a rallying point for volunteers and a catalyst for uprisings throughout Cuba. “c. Integrate with existing guerrilla bands and carry on guerrilla operations if driven from the beachhead area.”

Since objective stated in paragraph 2b is dependent on degree of popular support and success of the political, psychological part of this plan rather than on purely military factors, success of this part of the mission cannot be definitely assured, but it is estimated has a fair chance of success.According to General Grayʼs May 4 list of JCS briefings, on February 8 the Director of Central Intelligence and several CIA officials met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the JCS comments on the Trinidad Plan outlined in JCSM-57-61. Agreement was reached that a team of military officers would evaluate the combat effectiveness of the Cuban Expeditionary Force.

36. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2-2461. Confidential. Drafted by Pryce on February 18. Initialed as accurate by Mann. Washington, February 4, 1961. SUBJECT Possible Cuban-U.S. Rapprochement PARTICIPANTS Constantine Kangles, Chicago Attorney (said to have represented the 26th of July Movement until January 1959, and subsequently registered agent of the Castro regime) Thomas C. Mann—ARA William T. Pryce—ARA

Mr. Kangles, having just left the Attorney Generalʼs office,At 2:24 p.m. on February 4, Secretary Rusk received a telephone call from Attorney General Kennedy concerning Kangles. Kangles was in Kennedyʼs office and Kennedy suggested that someone in the Department of State talk to him, as Kennedy saw no point in continuing to be directly involved in conversations with Kangles. The Attorney General stated, however, that it was worthwhile to talk with Kangles because of his relationship with Castro. (Ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, 1/21/61-2/15/61) Rusk in turn called Mann and relayed Robert Kennedyʼs message. Mann agreed to see Kangles as soon as he arrived at the Department. (Ibid.) called on Mr. Mann. In the course of a prolonged conversation Mr. Kangles said:

He had made a trip to Cuba hoping to meet with Raul Castro. He was not able to do so but did talk with Raulʼs “secretary” who related the following information on Raul Castro: 1. There has been a decided difference of opinion between Raul and Fidel since April 1960. In a recent conversation two points of disagreement emerged: a) Raul was strongly opposed to Fidelʼs policy of allowing the militia to have arms and ammunition, and b) Raul felt that some sort of “agreement” should be reached with the U.S. Raul was able to convince Fidel on the first point but not on the second. 2. Raul is alarmed at the degree of power exercised by Cuban Communists, particularly “Che” Guevara. He wished to remove the Cuban Communists from power but before doing so needed assurances from the U.S. that it would replace any support lost from the Sino-Soviet Bloc as a result of his actions. Specifically, Raul would want the U.S. to resume diplomatic relations with Cuba and begin buying Cuban sugar before he made his move. It was not clear whether or when Raul would break relations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, but Mr. Kangles thought that a gradual forced withdrawal of Sino-Soviet influence, including an eventual break, would take place.

Mr. Kangles proposed that Mr. Gentry, who is reportedly an “advisor” to the Cuban Government, make a trip to Cuba in order to further sound out Raul on the above. Mr. Kangles would fabricate a story for Mr. Gentry saying that Mr. Gentry wished to travel to Cuba in order to clear up certain matters relating to his U.S. citizenship. In order to perform this travel it would be necessary for Mr. Kanglesʼ passport to be validated for travel to Cuba.

Mr. Mann thanked Mr. Kangles for his information and said that he would talk it over with members of his staff and would be in touch with Mr. Kangles if this was thought fruitful.

37. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2-661. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch. Washington, February 6, 1961. SUBJECT Views of Opposition Leader: Dr. Antonio Varona PARTICIPANTS Dr. Antonio Varona Dr. Carlos Piad Ambassador Bonsal—ARA/COAS ARA:CMA—Mr. Vallon ARA:CMA—Mr. Stevenson ARA:CMA/C—Mr. Hurwitch

Dr. Varona said he had come to discuss a very serious and unfortunate development affecting the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD) of which he is the leader. He related the following:

He had some time ago appointed Colonel Martin Elena as the Frenteʼs military expert in charge of training and military planning. Despite repeated requests, neither he nor Col. Martin had been permitted to visit the “camp” where Cubans are being trained under the control and supervision of U.S. officials. On the latest occasion when Col. Martin, on Varonaʼs instructions, had sought permission to visit the camp, he was bluntly told by a U.S. official named Roderick that the “training camp” activities were of no concern to the Frente. The primary function of the Frente, Roderick continued, was that of recruiting new members and supervising civilian activities of its members. Suggestion by the Frente of the possible composition of the future Government of Cuba was criticized by Roderick as an inappropriate Frente activity. In short, Martin was clearly given to understand that the U.S. was engaging in activities involving Cuban exiles and had plans affecting Cuba that the Frente was not entitled to know.

Dr. Varona took strong exception to the development. He insisted that Cubans in training should be placed under Cuban control, and that U.S. officials act only in an advisory capacity. He considered his organization as allied with, but not subordinate to, the U.S. He was extremely concerned that training activities at the “camp”, carried on with the collaboration of Cuban military officers who were not controlled by the Frente, might result in the eventual establishment of a government in Cuba after Castroʼs overthrow in which the Cuban military elements would have a preponderant voice. A post-Castro government of this nature would be unacceptable to the majority of the Cuban people.

The U.S. attitude revealed to Martin was especially untimely in that the Frente Executive Committee was in the process of expanding to include other opposition group leaders such as Miro Cardona, Luis Conte Aguero, Alvarez Diaz and Carlos Hevia. Varona concluded by stating that the Frente would not accept this new state of affairs and would resign en masse if the present relationship of the Frente to the “training camp” were permitted to persist.

Ambassador Bonsal expressed his pleasure at the opportunity to talk again with Dr. Varona, but told him that he had no knowledge of the above matters and could therefore make no useful comment. He added only that situations of this kind are frequently the result of a misunderstanding. He then drew Dr. Varona into a general conversation on the situation in Cuba and invited him to call on him again on his next visit to Washington. Dr. Varona appeared most appreciative of the fact that he had been received by Ambassador Bonsal.Varona returned to see Bonsal on February 9 following a meeting he had just had with “certain United States officials.” He complained that the attitude of these officials remained as it was before, and it was clear that the Frente was not to have any influence on activities at the “camp.” Varona likened the situation to a time bomb, and said that he could not return to Miami unless a solution acceptable to the FRD was reached. He asked to see Berle, and Bonsal said that he would relay the request. (Ibid., 737.00/2-961)

38. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 3, Vol. 4, Ch 3. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, February 7, 1961. SUBJECT Meeting on Cuba

PLACE

Office of Mr. Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State

PARTICIPANTS Mr. Adolph A. Berle, Chief of Department of State Latin American Task Force Mr. Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State Mr. William Bundy, Department of Defense Mr. Haydn Williams, Department of Defense Gen. Gray, Joint Chiefs of Staff Mr. Wymberley Coerr, Department of State Amb. Achilles, Counsellor of Department of State Mr. Richard Goodwin, White House Staff Mr. Richard Bissell, CIA Mr. Tracy Barnes, CIA Col. J.C. King, CIA [name not declassified]

Mr. Berle chaired the meeting. The meeting lasted three hours—from 10 a.m. until 1 p.m. The following topics were discussed:

Naval Blockade

Mr. Berle indicated that he had given considerable thought to the establishment of a naval blockade of Cuba as a weapon against the Castro regime. The matter of a naval blockade was then discussed. The Defense representative, Mr. Williams, reported that a blockade of Cuba was physically feasible. Such a blockade, to be effective, would require the stopping, boarding and searching of all vessels destined to Cuba, regardless of flag. The opinion was expressed by Mr. Williams that the Soviet Government would consider such treatment of its vessels as an act of war. He also stated that unless Cuba committed a unilateral aggression against the United States, the blockade of Cuban ports would in itself be considered an act of war and would violate two treaties to which we are a signator, including the Rio Treaty. Other aspects of a blockade were discussed, and Mr. Berle concluded that a blockade of ingress would create more problems for us than it would solve. It was agreed that search and seizure tactics could be employed against shipping from Cuba at non-Cuban ports of call and especially in Western Hemisphere ports where local arrangements could be set up without any particular difficulty or risk.

Radar Surveillance

The possibility of detecting non-scheduled air flights from Cuba which might be directed at other American states, principally Venezuela, was discussed. Although radar coverage under certain circumstances might be fairly effective, it was the opinion of CINCLANT authorities that the chances of detecting non-scheduled Cuban flights would be—at best—one in ten. It was agreed that the best protection for places such as Venezuela or Colombia would be the erection of fixed radar intercept facilities in those countries to guard against surprise attacks. It was noted that radar coverage by CINCLANT would not be effective against air-craft flying at altitudes of less than 500 feet.

The Agency Plan

The Agency PlanSee Document 9. and the JCS evaluationDocument 28. thereof were also discussed. While the soundness of the plan itself was at no time questioned, a number of questions were raised. Would any American citizens be included in the landing party? Answer negative. However, Americans would accompany the ships and be involved in the landing exercise. Would any American citizens be involved in the air strike? Answer, probably some American flyers under contract, but the great majority would be Cubans. The possibility of civilian casualties resulting from the air strike was raised. Gen. Gray thought the chances minimal since the targets were easily identifiable and away from civilian populations. Mr. Bissell said every effort would be made to minimize the risk, but no guarantee could be made that some civilians employed at the targets would not be killed or injured.

Considerable interest was evinced by both Mr. Mann and Mr. Berle on the possibility of the strike force reaching the safety of the mountains in the event they found themselves in an untenable position at the beachhead. Gen. Gray indicated he was confident that the strike force would be able to hold the beachhead at least six days before Castro would be in a position to throw any sizable group of army or militia units against the strike force. Since defensible mountain terrain is within only a few miles of the landing site, Gen. Gray was confident that the main body of the landing party could retreat to the mountains and maintain themselves there indefinitely. Later he also expressed the belief that the strike force could break through any encirclement that Castro might throw around the mountain area under consideration and make its way to the beach in the event an evacuation by sea should be required. The target site was not specifically identified during the discussion and Mr. Berle admitted to all concerned that he did not know and did not wish to know its exact location.

The question was raised as to the probable popular reaction to a landing of the nature contemplated. Col. King reported that our best information indicates that the civilian population and campesinos would probably be friendly to the invasion force, as they currently are to the guerrillas who have been operating in the hills. He added that intelligence also discloses that there is widespread dissatisfaction among field workers, who have been taken from their labors to serve in the militia, and that the morale of the militia itself is low, with many defections daily reported. Gen. Gray remarked that the combat effectiveness of the army was low, and that of the militia considerably lower. One reason for the low effectiveness of the army is absence of training in larger units. That to defend his long coast line Castro has had to spread his army thin, and that through the use of deception tactics he could be kept off balance on D-Day. However, Gen. Gray did question the wisdom of knocking out certain bridges in the target area on D-Day minus one, since he fears that this may provide Castro with a tip-off as to the actual landing site, although he admitted that it would probably be three or four days anyway before Castro could get any sizable force of troops with equipment to the area. In a later discussion of the possible world reaction to the air strike and landing party, Mr. Berle said that from time immemorial Cuba has experienced invasions from the sea. However, the simultaneous bombing of a number of Cuban targets from the air was another matter and one that could not be shrugged off. Although he did not pursue this line of thought, there appears to be no doubt that it is causing him some concern. The possibility of fuzzing up the location of the bases from which the planes operate through the use of deception devices was briefly discussed. In this connection the question of how far we can go to protect, or support, Somoza and Ydigoras was lightly touched on by Mr. Mann and Mr. Barnes, with Mr. Barnes stating that while no specific commitment has been made, we have indicated that we “would back them” in the event they are charged with intervention. Mr. Mann concurred that they should be backed.

Policy Approval

Mr. Berle stated that he would like, if possible, to lay before the Secretary and the President a proposal for action which has our unanimous agreement. However, he said if there is any difference or differences which cannot be resolved, it then would be necessary to take both points of view to the Secretary and to the President for their consideration. He then identified what he feels are the three broad courses of action open to us: 1. Drifting, with no military action by organized Cuban or American forces 2. Agency plan 3. Massive intervention—war.

He then enumerated his reasons for favoring the agency plan, which he referred to as the intermediate possibility. These points were: 1. The question of time. We cannot delay or drift. If we do, we will soon find Castro with a large military capability which can only be reduced by war. 2. It would take a long time and a lot of work before we could effectively prevent Castro from exporting his revolution to other areas of the Caribbean. The implementation of the Agency plan would give Castro things to preoccupy himself with at home and minimize the chance of his embarking on any foreign adventures. 3. We do not have to presume—if the Agency plan is implemented—that U.S. forces will have to be committed, since there is expert opinion that the strike force can find safe haven in the mountains and maintain itself there indefinitely. 4. There is intelligence that the invading force would attract popular support of the people of Cuba at this time. This may not be true some months later when Castro will have tightened his grip on the island. 5. And on moral grounds, since the risk of loss of life would be less with this proposal than with any other course.

In supporting Mr. Berleʼs contention that we cannot afford to wait, mention was made of the present training in Czechoslovakia of some 60 to 100 Cuban pilots in jet aircraft and the possibility that these pilots may complete their training in March of this year. No one questioned the fact that the acquisition of a jet capability by Castro would greatly alter the picture in his favor.

With the exception of Mr. Mann there appeared to be general agreement with Mr. Berleʼs summing up of the situation and the conclusion he arrived at. Specifically, Mr. Mann would not accept the premise that we do not have to presume commitment of U.S. forces as a follow-up to the landing of the strike force. He contended that once we permitted the strike force to land, we (the United States Government) were then committed; that the United States Government would have to underwrite the success of the venture even if it meant the employment of U.S. naval and military forces. This being the case it was essential, in his opinion, that we first take certain diplomatic action—specifically—consult with a number of other Latin American nations, in order to beef up our moral position in the eyes of the hemisphere before we embark on this adventure. He then outlined his “thesis” as follows: 1. He and other State Department officials (he suggested Mr. Berle might visit Brazil) would contact the presidents and foreign ministers of a number of important South American countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, and perhaps others) and consult with them on the problem of Cuba. Hopefully, they would share our view that Castro is a menace to the peace of the hemisphere and that positive action—preferably under OAS sponsorship—should be taken. If they are unwilling to go along with multilateral intervention within the framework of the OAS, perhaps they will be willing to break with Castro and recognize the Junta when it surfaces itself in Cuba. If they are unwilling to take any action against Castro, then at least they will not be able to say—as they did in connection with the recent protective blockade of Guatemala and Nicaraguan coasts—that we did not consult them. Without specifically stating what we are planning to do, we would at least acquaint them with the fact that we were not going to permit Castro to menace the peace of the hemisphere, etc. Since anyone who knows how to read already knows that the United States is supporting training bases in Guatemala and financing revolutionary groups in the United States, there will be no doubt in the minds of these leaders as to the type of action we have in mind. 2. However, if a number of countries would break with Castro and recognize the Junta, this would open the way to legal intervention—would prepare public opinion at home and abroad—and give us a defensible position in the U.N. The use of armed forces and the supplying of arms to the Junta would then be possible with some degree of legality. 3. Mr. Mann indicated that it would take at least six weeks to complete these consultations, and consequently if his “thesis” is adopted, the landing of the strike force cannot take place prior to 31 March 1961 at the earliest.

Once the selected countries had been sounded out—and regardless of whether their reaction is favorable or unfavorable—Mr. Mann visualized the following sequence of events: A. Consultation with other American countries—time, six weeks. B. Members of a Junta enter Cuba clandestinely and from Cuban territory announce the establishment of a provisional government and request recognition of the United States and all Latin American nations. It would also request the support of all Cuban patriots at home and abroad. C. In answer to this appeal the strike force would land and endeavor to carry out its mission of establishing a beachhead and increasing its real estate until Castro is finally overthrown. D. The United States will recognize the Junta and endeavor to get other OAS states to do likewise. E. If the strike force appears to be in danger of annihilation, the United States, preferably in concert with other OAS countries but unilaterally if necessary, will take whatever steps may be necessary to guarantee victory, and this in all probability will require the use of United States armed forces.

Mr. Berle then tried to get Mr. Mann to admit to the possibility or the probability that the strike force would not be annihilated but would, if faced with the necessity, be able to make its way to the mountains and to maintain itself there indefinitely—which is the opinion of our military experts. Assuming all this, Mr. Mann was asked whether he still insisted that prior commitment to employ the United States armed forces was necessary. Mr. Mann said that he would not agree to the landing of the strike force unless it was first agreed as policy that the United States Government was prepared to go all the way to insure victory.

Mr. Barnes then stated that he felt it was necessary to point out that the threat to the peace of the hemisphere now exists and that it is increasing, and that if we delay in taking action until later, we shall lose an immediate capability of dealing with the problem—namely, our strike force. He pointed out that pressure is building up, we are already losing recruits through the AWOL channel, that these men have been in training for six months, and that we had originally contemplated their going into action as early as last November; that we could not keep the lid on much longer.

At this juncture Mr. Bissell stated that he wanted it clearly understood that the Agency could not and would not guarantee that it could get any member of the Junta into Cuba prior to the landing of the strike force.

Mr. Berleʼs Counter Proposal

Mr. Berle then outlined another possible course of action which would achieve a certain measure of legality—and thus satisfy Mr. Mannʼs requirement of a defensible position in the U.N., etc.—and still permit us to proceed with the project. In broad outline his proposal is as follows: 1. To prepare public opinion and to put the hemisphere on notice as to the serious view the United States takes of the Castro menace, the United States Government would withdraw recognition of the Castro government. In other words, we would go one step further than a mere break of relations. We would publicly declare that the Castro regime is not recognized by the United States as the Government of Cuba. 2. Immediately thereafter a revolutionary group “seeking to be the Government of Cuba” would be surfaced. This group would publicize a program of action which would promise elections, individual liberties, etc., which the former Castro government had failed to provide, and we would “recognize” this group as a revolutionary group “seeking to be the government.” 3. We would use our influence with other Latin American countries to also de-recognize Castro and to “recognize” the revolutionary group. 4. The strike force would go in, the revolutionary group would send its representatives in and form a revolutionary Junta, and civil war would become widespread on the island. 5. We would then take the initiative in calling the OAS into session and we would demand action under the OAS charter and the appropriate treaties which would restore peace in Cuba through armed military intervention. We would go to this meeting prepared to prove that Castro is a menace to peace, that his regime has become dominated by an extra-continental totalitarian power, namely the Soviet Union, and we would demand that the OAS take the action open to it and required of it by its treaty obligations. 6. If the other OAS nations jointly refuse to face up to their responsibilities and either take no action whatsoever, or stall, or attempt to mediate the Cuban problem—as a problem between the United States and Cuba—then we shall make it clear to the OAS that we consider the OAS ineffectual as an organization and that in order to live up to our responsibilities under the treaties and the Monroe Document,The reference is to the Monroe Doctrine, a unilateral policy statement made by President Monroe in an address to Congress on December 2, 1823. we have no recourse but to take unilateral military action to remove this menace to hemispheric peace and reestablish peace on the Island.

Conclusion

Mr. Berle announced that since differences of opinion still existed as to what course of action should be recommended to the Secretary and the President, it would be necessary for him and Mr. Mann to take their differences to the Secretary for consideration. Mr. Goodwin then remarked that the President had made it quite clear that if there were unresolved differences of opinion on the Cuban problem, the persons concerned should come to the Presidentʼs office and in his presence orally set forth their arguments for his consideration and eventual decision.

Mr. Berle thought they would be able to discuss the matter with the Secretary this afternoon and possibly with the President this evening.See Document 40.

Mr. Barnes brought up the question of training some 25 Cubans in the operation of M——— tanks at stateside army installations and asked that authority be given to the appropriate officials of the Defense Department in order that this needed training could take place at the earliest possible date. Although no one posed any serious objections to the training of these Cubans in an American army installation, there was some uncertainty as to exactly who could authorize this. Someone said that perhaps the Secretary of State should send a letter to the Secretary of DefenseNo such letter has been found. but the question seemed to be left hanging, although it is most probable that Gen. Gray and the Defense officials attending may have considered Mr. Berleʼs and Mr. Mannʼs concurrence as sufficient authority on which to proceed.

39. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Top Secret. The source text was initialed by the President. Washington, February 8, 1961.

When you have your meeting this afternoon on Cuba, I think you will find that there is a divergence of view between State on the one hand and CIA and Defense on the other. Defense and CIA now feel quite enthusiastic about the invasion from Guatemala—at the worst they think the invaders would get into the mountains, and at the best they think they might get a full-fledged civil war in which we could then back the anti-Castro forces openly. State Department takes a much cooler view, primarily because of its belief that the political consequences would be very grave both in the United Nations and in Latin America. I think they will urge careful and extended diplomatic discussions with other American states, looking toward an increasing diplomatic isolation of Cuba and the Dominican Republic before any drastic action is taken. This divergence of view has not been openly and plainly considered in recent task force discussions, as I understand it. Therefore, you are quite likely to hear it in quite fresh form this afternoon.

Dick Goodwin has been in on most of the Cuban discussions, and he and I join in believing that there should certainly not be an invasion adventure without careful diplomatic soundings. We also think it almost certain that such soundings would confirm the judgment you are likely to hear from State.

McG. B.Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

40. Memorandum of Meeting With President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Top Secret. Prepared by Bundy on February 9. Washington, February 8, 1961. PRESENT Messrs. Rusk, Berle, Mann, Bohlen, McNamara, Nitze, Barnes, W.P. Bundy, Haydn Williams, Dulles, Bissell, McG. Bundy

The meeting opened with an account by Mr. Bissell of the current plan for launching the troops from Guatemala. He reported that the JCS, after careful study, believed that this plan had a fair chance of success—“success” meaning ability to survive, hold ground, and attract growing support from Cubans. At the worst, the invaders should be able to fight their way to the Escambray and go into guerrilla action. If the troops are to land in top form, the operation should not be delayed, at the longest, beyond March 31, and the decision to land for it must be made before D minus 21.

Secretary Rusk stated that without careful—and successful—diplomatic preparation such an operation could have grave effects upon the U.S. position in Latin America and at the U.N. Mr. Berle said that it would be impossible, as things stand now, to avoid being cast in the role of aggressor. Both Mr. Rusk and Mr. Berle believed that no present decision on the proposed invasion was necessary, but both made clear their conviction that U.S. policy should not be driven to drastic and irrevocable choice by the urgencies, however real, of a single battalion of men.

The President pressed for alternatives to a full-fledged “invasion,” supported by U.S. planes, ships and supplies. While CIA doubted that other really satisfactory uses of the troops in Guatemala could be found, it was agreed that the matter should be carefully studied. Could not such a force be landed gradually and quietly and make its first major military efforts from the mountains—then taking shape as a Cuban force within Cuba, not as an invasion force sent by the Yankees?

The State Department envisioned a long and complex effort to win support and understanding—from other American States for a strong line against Castro—the Dominican Republic thrown in. Mr. Berle believed that the Presidentʼs own authority and leadership would be needed in making the U.S. view understood both at home and abroad. The President asked that the State Department prepare a clear statement of the course it would recommend, and meanwhile he urged all concerned to seek for ways in which the Administration would make it clear to Latin Americans that it stands squarely for reform and progress in the Americas.

The only new action authorized at the meeting was the organization of a small junta of anti-Castro Cuban leaders, to be supported by a larger Revolutionary Council. This junta will have a strong left-of-center balance, and it will be a response to the urgent demands of the troops in Guatemala for a sense of political direction and purpose. Its members will be selected for their ability, among other things, to join the landing force.In a separate memorandum on this meeting, also prepared on February 9, Bundy noted that the discussion resulted in a decision by the President to authorize the encouragement of a junta and a revolutionary council, and that plans would be prepared for extensive diplomatic conversations and possible public statements on the nature of the Cuban problem. He added that alternative plans for action by anti-Castro Cubans would be explored. Beyond that, no other action “will be taken until after further authorization from the President.” (Ibid.)

McG. BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

41. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Task Force on Latin America (Berle) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Inter-Agency Staff Study. Secret. Washington, February 9, 1961.

This refers to the White House discussion yesterday.See Document 40.

CIA are preparing and sending over a paper indicating the danger that a number of countries will go over the watershed, in case the operation we discussed yesterday is abandoned. This will come to you, and if they are right, we shall have some stiff decisions to make early next week.

Iʼm assuming that the White House meeting authorized taking soundings to ascertain the possibility of OAS or Rio Pact Ministersʼ action. We are working on and will have an outline of the scope of such explorations. The CIA paper may suggest an enlargement of the meas-ures which we may want to ask the other American countries to authorize.

42. Editorial Note

Cuba was discussed under two separate headings at the 476th meeting of the National Security Council on February 9, 1961. The available record of the discussion is very limited, however. According to the Record of NSC Actions, approved by the President on February 11, a proposed purchase of Cuban molasses by a United States firm was discussed under the heading of “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.” The Council also discussed Cuba in conjunction with an oral report by the Secretary of State under the agenda item entitled “Discussion of Crisis Areas.” No further substantive record of the NSC discussion has been found. (Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95)

43. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Cuba 1961, Box 31. Top Secret. Washington, February 11, 1961.

As you know, there is great pressure within the government in favor of a drastic decision with regard to Cuba.

There is, it seems to me, a plausible argument for this decision if one excludes everything but Cuba itself and looks only at the pace of military consolidation within Cuba and the mounting impatience of the armed exiles.

However, as soon as one begins to broaden the focus beyond Cuba to include the hemisphere and the rest of the world, the arguments against this decision begin to gain force.

However well disguised any action might be, it will be ascribed to the United States. The result would be a wave of massive protest, agitation and sabotage throughout Latin America, Europe, Asia and Africa (not to speak of Canada and of certain quarters in the United States). Worst of all, this would be your first dramatic foreign policy initiative. At one stroke, it would dissipate all the extraordinary good will which has been rising toward the new Administration through the world. It would fix a malevolent image of the new Administration in the minds of millions.

It may be that on balance the drastic decision may have to be made. If so, every care must be taken to protect ourselves against the inevitable political and diplomatic fall-out.

1. Would it not be possible to induce Castro to take offensive action first? He has already launched expeditions against Panama and against the Dominican Republic. One can conceive a black operation in, say, Haiti which might in time lure Castro into sending a few boatloads of men on to a Haitian beach in what could be portrayed as an effort to overthrow the Haitian regime. If only Castro could be induced to commit an offensive act, then the moral issue would be clouded, and the anti-US campaign would be hobbled from the start. 2. Should you not consider at some point addressing a speech to the whole hemisphere setting forth in eloquent terms your own conception of inter-American progress toward individual freedom and social justice? Such a speech would identify our Latin American policy with the aspirations of the plain people of the hemisphere. As part of this speech, you could point out the threats raised against the inter-American system by dictatorial states, and especially by dictatorial states under the control of non-hemisphere governments or ideologies. If this were done properly, action against Castro could be seen as in the interests of the hemisphere and not just of American corporations. 3. Could we not bring down Castro and Trujillo at the same time? If the fall of the Castro regime could be accompanied or preceded by the fall of the Trujillo regime, it would show that we have a principled concern for human freedom and do not object only to left-wing dictators.

If the drastic decision proves necessary in the end, I hope that steps of this sort can do something to mitigate the effects. And, if we do take the drastic decision, it must be made clear that we have done so, not lightly, but only after we had exhausted every conceivable alternative.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

44. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Task Force on Latin America (Berle) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Inter-Agency Staff Study. Secret. Washington, February 14, 1961. SUBJECT Cuba

As the White House conferenceNo other record of this conference has been found. broke up, we (a) arranged leadership for the camps; (b) kept the operation standing; (c) agreed the situation would need review not later than early next week.

Should we not set up another White House meeting late this week to determine the next step?

In this connection the CIA paperA possible reference to a draft of the paper on Cuba submitted by the CIA to the White House on February 17; see Document 46. I referred to in an earlier memorandumDocument 41. has probably reached you. I have seen it. It suggests that dismantling the Cuban operation may mean explosions in three or four countries in Central America. If this is accurate, we should be prepared for the consequences of dismantling.

The countries involved are [1 line of source text not declassified] Nicaragua and Guatemala.

I think the danger may be a little overdrawn [1½ lines of source text not declassified] though Guatemala may be an issue, but we do have to get our lines straight.

45. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General 1/61-4/61. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Mann. Washington, February 15, 1961. SUBJECT The March 1960 PlanReference is to a memorandum prepared in the CIA entitled “A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime,” which was approved by President Eisenhower on March 17, 1960. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. VI, pp. 850–851.

Attached for your consideration is a list of my conclusions concerning the March 1960 plan which has been under discussion. If my conclusions are accepted, there can, of course, be no certainty we will not be faced with the necessity, perhaps before this year is out, of using armed force. If this should become necessary we would, I believe, be far better off to do whatever has to be done in an open way and in accordance with the American tradition after preparing public opinion both at home and abroad. If you should decide not to press at this time for a collective decision to recognize a rebel government in Cuba, we might explore, in a very general and tentative way, the possibility of getting agreement in principle that something along this line will be done if conditions within Cuba seem to offer a more solid basis for such action at the time the Foreign Ministers MeetingReference is to the projected but still unscheduled Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics. The seventh such meeting was held in San Jose, Costa Rica, August 22-29, 1960. The eighth meeting was not held until January 22-31, 1962, in Punta del Este, Uruguay. is held. I am intrigued with the thought that a great many of the impediments to dealing with the Cuban situation would be cleared away if a rebel government could be recognized.

Finally, I thought it would be desirable for Mr. Berle, before he leaves for Brazil, to have a pretty clear idea of your views on the substantive points so that he can speak confidently and effectively.

LIST OF CONCLUSIONS

The March 1960 Plan

What is proposed is the landing of a brigade of approximately 800 men from bases in Guatemala and Nicaragua, supported by an air strike from the same bases either simultaneously with the landing or 24 hours preceding it. Naval craft, with some “contracted” United States nationals aboard, would transport the brigade and supply logistic support. It is planned that the brigade, if unopposed and if surprise were achieved, would be able to consolidate their position and hold a beachhead for a limited number of days. If internal support does not materialize, it is planned that the brigade could either march directly to nearby mountains or be withdrawn from the beach to other nearby beaches from whence they could move into the mountains. Once in the mountains they would operate as a guerrilla unit.

My conclusions regarding this proposal are as follows:

(1) The military evaluation of this proposal is that “ultimate success will depend upon political factors, i.e., a sizeable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces.”See Document 35. It is unlikely that a popular uprising would promptly take place in Cuba of a scale and kind which would make it impossible for the Castro regime to oppose the brigade with superior numbers of well armed troops.

(2) It therefore appears possible, even probable, that we would be faced with the alternative of a) abandoning the brigade to its fate, which would cost us dearly in prestige and respect or b) attempting execution of the plan to move the brigade into the mountains as guerrillas, which would pose a prolonged problem of air drops or supplies or c) overt U.S. military intervention; a JCS staff officer has estimated there is at least a 10% chance that U.S. forces would be required unless alternative (a) were adopted.

(3) Execution of the proposed plan would be in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, and Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,For text of the Charter of the United Nations, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 95-110. Articles 18 and 25 of the Charter of the Organization of American States,For text of the Charter of the Organization of American States, signed at Bogota, Colombia on April 30, 1948, see ibid., pp. 230-242. and Article 1 of the Rio Treaty, which, in general, proscribe the use of armed force with the sole exception of the right of self-defense “if an armed attack occurs.”

The Castro regime could be expected to call on the other American States (Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Rio Treaty) to assist them in repelling the attack, and to request the Security Council (Chapter 7 of the UN Charter) to take action to “maintain and restore international peace and security.” The chances of promptly presenting both international organizations with a fait accompli are, in my opinion, virtually nil. It would therefore be extremely difficult to deal with Castro demarches of this kind. We could not disassociate ourselves from our complicity with Guatemala and Nicaragua; and if we tried to do so, both Ydigoras and Somoza are in possession of sufficient information to implicate the United States in the eye of reasonable men.

(4) Since the proposal comes closer to being a military invasion than a covert operation of the Guatemala type, account must be taken of the possibility that the execution of this proposal would attract to Castro additional support within Cuba. More important, a majority of the people of Latin America would oppose the operation, and we would expect that the Communists and Castroites would organize and lead demonstrations designed to bring about the overthrow of governments friendly to us. At best, our moral posture throughout the hemisphere would be impaired. At worst, the effect on our position of hemispheric leadership would be catastrophic.

(5) Time is running against us in Cuba in a military sense since it is probable Castro soon will acquire jet aircraft, since he may acquire missiles and since Castro needs time to train his army and militia. Nevertheless, Defense does not currently consider Cuba to represent a threat to our national security. If later it should become a threat we are able to deal with it. If so, new developments which make Cuba an immediate threat to our national security might increase our chances of obtaining hemispheric support for collective action.

(6) The intelligence community was, and probably still is, unanimously of the opinion that time is running against us in Cuba in the sense that a declining curve of Castro popularity is offset by a rising curve of Castro control over the Cuban people. Nevertheless, it is not impossible that rifts between leaders in the Castro regime, mounting economic difficulties and rising resentment with terrorist methods will lead to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime by the Cubans themselves, aided only by the more “conventional” type of covert activities now being carried out. In any case, time is not currently running against us in terms of Latin American public opinion; there has already been a significant decline in Castroʼs popularity in Latin America, a trend which we have reason to hope will continue, assuming Castro continues to employ the same methods. If one looks at the Castro problem in the context of the struggle between the East and the West for Latin America, if one assumes the success or failure of the Castro policies to achieve a better life for the masses will significantly influence future hemisphere thought and action, and if one assumes that discipline and austerity will be hallmarks of Castroism, the political advantages to us of letting Latin America see for itself the practical results of applying communist theory in a Latin American country could well give us a decisive advantage in the ideological hemisphere struggle ahead of us.

(7) I therefore conclude it would not be in the national interest to proceed unilaterally to put this plan into execution.

(8) I also conclude that in spite of the difficulty maintaining or re-creating our Cuban “asset”, we should consider proceeding as planned only if we receive strong support for collective action by the two-thirds majority required by the Rio Treaty. The chances of obtaining this agreement within the time limits imposed on us by the plan are not good. The attitudes of Quadros, Lleras, Betancourt and Frondizi may well be decisive. Mexican support is not expected. Venezuelan support would certainly be conditional on simultaneous action against Trujillo.

(9) To determine whether Latin American support will be forthcoming it will be necessary discreetly to make soundings. There is no chance of obtaining Latin American support for a resolution authorizing the use of armed force against Cuba. Our best chance of getting support would be to propose a resolution for the collective recognition of a rebel government. The Latin Americans would understand the relationship between recognition of a rebel government and the Cuban “asset” in Central America without being told, i.e. that the recognition of the government would give at least a color of legality to support the proposed operation. A possible resolution along this line for Cuba is at Tab (A)None of the draft OAS resolutions attached to the source text is printed. and a possible resolution on the Dominican Republic is at Tab (B).

(10) The resolution at Tab (A) would be subject to the juridical objection that the rebel government does not control significant portions of Cuban territory and to the objection that not all members of the revolutionary junta are resident in Cuba. To this we would have to answer that the rebel government speaks for the guerrillas in the mountains who have been fighting for months. In any case, we will be much better off in the UN and the OAS if we are debating this issue than if we are debating the issue of whether the proposed operation constitutes an armed attack. It would offer the additional advantage of converting our posture from covert to overt, a posture which is in keeping with the American tradition.

Alternative Proposal

(11) Assuming you do not wish to engage in soundings to determine whether there is support for a resolution along the lines suggested at Tab (A) or having made the soundings we do not receive strong support from the American community, we should determine whether there would be support for collective action, short of the use of armed force, directed to the insulation of Latin America from Cuba and steps to control and, if possible, eliminate Castro-communist subversion. A draft resolution along these lines is at Tab (C).

(12) If the March 1960 plan is abandoned, it will be necessary to determine what use is to be made of the brigade, including the feasibility of their introduction into the mountains of Cuba as guerrillas. This would require further study.

III

Search and Seizure

(13) Consideration has also been given to the feasibility of reducing the future military risk by interception on the high seas of arms, including jets and missiles, destined for Cuba. This has been abandoned as impracticable because of staff opinion that this would be clearly illegal and because of the probability that our friends and allies would be no more amenable now to a search and seizure procedure than they were during the Guatemalan venture. Furthermore, this procedure would have the disadvantage of bringing us head on into conflict with the Soviet Union.

Other Considerations

(14) Outside the scope of this list of conclusions are non-ARA questions such as estimates of probable reactions of our NATO Allies and the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

46. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the cover sheet of the paper reads “Bissellʼs View.” A copy of the paper in CIA files indicates that it was drafted by Bissell. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activities-Cuba) Washington, February 17, 1961.

CUBA

1. Background: About a year ago the Agency was directed to set in motion the organization of a broadly based opposition to the Castro regime and the development of propaganda channels, clandestine agent nets within Cuba, and trained paramilitary ground and air forces wherewith that opposition could overthrow the Cuban regime. The concept was that this should be so far as possible a Cuban operation, though it was well understood that support in many forms would have to come from the United States. Great progress has been made in this undertaking. A Government-in-Exile will soon be formed embracing most reputable opposition elements. It will have a left-of-center political orientation and should command the support of liberals both within Cuba and throughout the hemisphere. It will sponsor and increasingly control trained and combat-ready military forces based in Central America. A decision must soon be made as to the support (if any) the United States will render the opposition henceforth. 2. Prospects for the Castro Regime: The Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. Assuming that the United States applies political and economic pressures at roughly present levels of severity, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support. There is no significant likelihood that the Castro regime will fall of its own weight. a. The regime is proceeding methodically to solidify its control over all the major institutions of the society and to employ them on the Communist pattern as instruments of repression. The Government now directly controls all radio, television, and the press. It has placed politically dependable leadership in labor unions, student groups, and professional organizations. It has nationalized most productive and financial enterprises and is using a program of so-called land reform to exercise effective control over the peasantry. It has destroyed all political parties except the Communist party. Politically reliable and increasingly effective internal security and military forces are being built up. b. Cuba is in economic difficulties but the Communist Bloc will almost certainly take whatever steps are necessary to forestall any decisive intensification of these troubles. Economic dislocations will occur but will not lead to the collapse or the significant weakening of the Castro regime. c. At the present time the regular Cuban military establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained Cuban pilots of known political reliability. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date probably no more than six months away it will become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combat of a sizeable organized military force. The option of action by the Cuban opposition will no longer be open. 3. The Nature of the Threat: Cuba will, of course, never present a direct military threat to the United States and it is unlikely that Cuba would attempt open invasion of any other Latin American country since the U.S. could and almost certainly would enter the conflict on the side of the invaded country. Nevertheless, as Castro further stabilizes his regime, obtains more sophisticated weapons, and further trains the militia, Cuba will provide an effective and solidly defended base for Soviet operations and expansion of influence in the Western Hemisphere. Arms, money, organizational and other support can be provided from Cuba to dissident leaders and groups throughout Latin America in order to create political instability, encourage Communism, weaken the prestige of the U.S., and foster the inevitable popular support that Castroʼs continuance of power will engender. A National Estimate states: “For the Communist powers, Cuba represents an opportunity of incalculable value. More importantly, the advent of Castro has provided the Communists with a friendly base for propaganda and agitation throughout the rest of Latin America and with a highly exploitable example of revolutionary achievement and successful defiance of the United States.” 4.

Possible Courses of Action: For reasons which require no elaboration the overt use of U.S. military forces to mount an invasion of Cuba has been excluded as a practical alternative. Broadly defined the following three possible alternative courses of action remain for consideration: a. Intensification of economic and political pressures coupled with continued covert support of sabotage and minor guerrilla actions but excluding substantial commitment of the Cuban oppositionʼs paramilitary force. b. Employment of the paramilitary force but in a manner which would not have the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside. c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in a surprise landing, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action in terrain suited for that purpose.

These alternatives are discussed in the following paragraphs.

5. Diplomatic and Economic Pressure: There is little that can be done to impose real political and economic pressure on the Castro regime and no such course of action now under serious consideration seems likely to bring about its overthrow. a. A true blockade of Cuba enforced by the United States would involve technical acts of war and has now been dismissed as infeasible. b. Action to halt arms shipments from Cuba into any other part of the hemisphere would be cumbersome and easily evaded if air transport were employed. While undoubtedly of some value it is difficult to see that the institution of such measures would either impose severe pressure on the Castro regime or effectively insulate the rest of the hemisphere from it. Castroʼs principal tools of subversion are people, ideology, the force of example and money. The flow of these items cannot be dammed up. c. Further economic sanctions are theoretically possible but can quite readily be offset by an increase of trade with the Bloc. d. In any event, it is estimated that the prospects for effective international action are poor. 6. The Middle Course: Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary force gradually to an assembly point in suitable terrain, hopefully avoiding major encounters in the process, and committing it to extensive guerrilla action. This course of action would have the advantage of rendering unnecessary a single major landing which could be described as an invasion. The infiltration phase would take on the coloration of efforts by small groups of Cubans to join an already existing resistance movement. Unfortunately, it has been found to be infeasible on military grounds. Basically the reasons (explained more fully in the attachment) are: a. It is considered militarily infeasible to infiltrate in small units a force of this size to a single area where it could assemble, receive supplies, and engage in coordinated military action. Such an operation would have to be done over a period of time and the loss of the element of surprise after initial infiltrations would permit government forces to frustrate further reinforcements to the same area. b. Military units significantly smaller than the battalion presently undergoing unit training would fall short of the “minimum critical mass” required to give any significant likelihood of success. Smaller scale infiltrations would not produce a psychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings of wide-spread revolt among disaffected elements of Castroʼs armed forces. c. Actually, the least costly and most efficient way to infiltrate the force into a terrain suitable for protracted and powerful guerrilla operations would be by a single landing of the whole force as currently planned and its retirement from the landing point into the chosen redoubt. 7. A Landing in Force: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the military aspects of the plan for a landing by the Cuban opposition.See Document 35. They have concluded that “this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success” (that is of detonating a major and ultimately successful revolt against Castro) and that, if ultimate success is not achieved there is every likelihood that the landing can be the means of establishing in favorable terrain a powerful guerrilla force which could be sustained almost indefinitely. The latter outcome would not be (and need not appear as) a serious defeat. It would be the means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime and would be a continuing demonstration of inability of the regime to establish order. It could create an opportunity for an OAS intervention to impose a cease-fire and hold elections. a. Any evaluation of the chances of success of the assault force should be realistic about the fighting qualities of the militia. No definitive conclusions can be advanced but it must be remembered that the majority of the militia are not fighters by instinct or background and are not militiamen by their own choice. Their training has been slight and they have never been exposed to actual fire (particularly any heavy fire power) nor to air attack. Moreover, the instabilities within Cuba are such that if the tide shifts against the regime, the chances are strong that substantial numbers will desert or change sides. b. There is no doubt that the paramilitary force would be widely assumed to be U.S. supported. Nevertheless, this conclusion would be difficult to prove and the scale of its activity would not be inconsistent with the potentialities for support by private Cuban and American groups rather than by the U.S. Government. It must be emphasized, moreover, that this enterprise would have nothing in common (as would the use of U.S. military forces) with the Russian suppression of Hungary or the Chinese suppression of the Tibetans. This would be a force of dissident Cubans with Cuban political and military leadership. c. There would be adverse political repercussions to a landing in force but it is not clear how serious these would be. Most Latin American Governments would at least privately approve of unobtrusive U.S. support for such an opposition move, especially if the political coloration of the opposition were left-of-center. The reaction of the rest of the free world, it is estimated, would be minimal in the case of unobtrusive U.S. support for such an attempt. It might produce a good deal of cynicism throughout the world about the U.S. role but if quickly successful little lasting reaction. Generally speaking it is believed that the political cost would be low in the event of a fairly quick success. The political dangers flowing from long continued large scale guerrilla warfare would be greater but there are diplomatic preparations that could be made to forestall extreme adverse reactions in this contingency. 8. Dissolution of the Military Force: A decision not to use the paramilitary force must consider the problem of dissolution, since its dissolution will surely be the only alternative if it is not used within the next four to six weeks. It is hoped that at least one hundred volunteers could be retained for infiltration in small teams but it is doubtful whether more than this number would be available or useful for this type of activity. a. There is no doubt that dissolution in and of itself will be a blow to U.S. prestige as it will be interpreted in many Latin American countries and elsewhere as evidence of the U.S. inability to take decisive action with regard to Castro. David will again have defeated Goliath. Anti-U.S. regimes like that of Trujillo would gain strength while pro-U.S. Betancourt would undoubtedly suffer. Surely Ydigoras, who has been an exceedingly strong ally, would also be placed in a very difficult position for his support of a disbanded effort. It must be remembered in this connection that there are sectors of Latin American opinion which criticize the U.S. for not dealing sufficiently forcefully with the Castro regime. In fact, one reason why many Latin American governments are holding back in opposing Castro is because they feel that sooner or later the U.S. will be compelled to take strong measures. b. The resettlement of the military force will unavoidably cause practical problems. Its members will be angry, disillusioned and aggressive with the inevitable result that they will provide honey for the press bees and the U.S. will have to face the resulting indignities and embarrassments. Perhaps more important, however, will be the loss of good relations with the opposition Cuban leaders. To date almost all non-Batista, non-Communist political leaders have been encouraged or offered help in fighting Castro. An abandonment to the military force will be considered by them as a withdrawal of all practical support. In view of the breadth of the political spectrum involved, this will cause some difficulties for the future since it is hard to imagine any acceptable post-Castro leadership that will not include some of the exiles dealt with during the past year. 9. Conclusions: a. Castroʼs position is daily getting stronger and will soon be consolidated to the point that his overthrow will only be possible by drastic, politically undesirable actions such as an all-out embargo or an overt use of military force. b. A failure to remove Castro by external action will lead in the near future to the elimination of all internal and external Cuban opposition of any effective nature. Moreover, the continuance of the Castro regime will be a substantial victory for the Sino-Soviet Bloc which will use Cuba as a base for increased activity throughout the Western Hemisphere, thereby accentuating political instability and weakening U.S. prestige and influence. c. The Cuban paramilitary force, if used, has a good chance of overthrowing Castro or at the very least causing a damaging civil war without requiring the U.S. to commit itself to overt action against Cuba. Whatever embarrassment the alleged (though deniable) U.S. support may cause, it may well be considerably less than that resulting from the continuation of the Castro regime or from the more drastic and more attributable actions necessary to accomplish the result at a later date. d. Even though the best estimate of likely Soviet reaction to a successful movement against Castro indicates problems to the U.S. arising from the removal or substantial weakening of the Castro regime, Soviet propaganda and political moves will still be much less prejudicial to the long-range interests of the U.S. than would the results of a failure to remove Castro. Appendix A

Clandestine Infiltration by Sea of Small Groups (up to 50 men)

1. The only areas of Cuba with mountainous terrain of sufficient extent and ruggedness for guerrilla operations are the Sierra Escambray of Las Villas Province in Central Cuba and the Sierra Maestra of Oriente Province at the eastern extremity of the island. The Sierra de los Organos of Western Cuba do not encompass sufficient area and are not rugged enough to sustain guerrilla operations against strong opposition. Of the two areas with adequate terrain, only the Sierra Escambray is truly suitable for our purposes, since the mountains in Eastern Cuba are too distant from air bases in Latin America available to CIA for air logistical support operations. Primary reliance would have to be placed on this method of supply for guerrilla forces. 2. The Government of Cuba (GOC) has concentrated large forces of army and militia in both Las Villas and Oriente Provinces. Estimates of troop strength in Las Villas have varied recently from 17,000 to as high as 60,000 men, while up to 12,000 men are believed to be stationed in Oriente. 3. While of dubious efficiency and morale, the militia, by sheer weight of numbers has been able to surround and eliminate small groups of insurgents. A landing by 27 men of the Masferrer Group in Oriente, for example, was pursued and eliminated by 2,000 militia. A similar group of insurgents in Western Cuba was attacked and destroyed by six battalions of army and militia (about 3,000 men). 4. A build-up of force in a given area by infiltration of small groups would require a series of night landings in the same general vicinity. Discovery of the initial landing by GOC forces would be almost a certainty, since security posts are located at all possible landing areas. Even if the initial landing were successful, the GOC could be expected to move troops and naval patrol craft to the area making further landings difficult if not impossible. Any small force landed, experience has shown, will be rapidly engaged by forces vastly superior in numbers. Therefore, it is considered unlikely that small groups landing on successive occasions would succeed in joining forces later. A series of surrounded pockets of resistance would be the result. 5. Repeated approaches to the Cuban coast by vessels large enough to land up to 50 men would probably provoke attack by the Cuban Navy and/or Air Force, either of which is capable of destroying any vessels which could be used by CIA for these purposes. 6. In the Sierra Escambray, which is the only area of Cuba in which true guerrilla operations are now being conducted, ill-equipped and untrained groups of up to 200 to 300 men have been hard pressed to survive and have been unable to conduct effective operations. The only worthwhile accomplishment of these bands has been to serve as a symbol of resistance. Smaller groups, even though better trained and equipped, could not be expected to be effective. 7. There are very few sites on the south coast of the Sierra Escambray where small boats can be landed. These are found principally at the mouths of rivers and are all guarded by militia posts armed with machine guns. A small group landing at such a point by shuttling from a larger vessel in small boats would probably receive heavy casualties. 8. Small-scale infiltrations would not produce a psychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings and widespread revolt among disaffected elements of Castroʼs armed forces. These conditions must be produced before the Castro Government can be overthrown by any means short of overt intervention by United States armed forces. As long as the armed forces respond to Castroʼs orders, he can maintain himself in power indefinitely. The history of all police-type states bears out this conclusion. 9. The CIA Cuban Assault Force, composed entirely of volunteers, has been trained for action as a compact, heavily armed, hard-hitting military unit, and the troops are aware of the combat power which they possess as a unit. They have been indoctrinated in the military principle of mass and instructed that dispersion of force leads to defeat in detail. They will be quick to recognize the disadvantages of the infiltration concept, and it is unlikely that all would volunteer for piecemeal commitment to military action in Cuba. The troops can be used in combat only on a voluntary basis. The Government of the United States exercises no legal command or disciplinary authority over them.

Conclusions:

1. This course of action would result in large scale loss of life, both through military action against forces vastly superior in numbers and as a result of drum-head justice and firing squad execution of those captured. 2. This alternative could achieve no effective military or psychological results.

47. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Top Secret. Washington, February 18, 1961.

Here, in sharp form, are the issues on Cuba. Bissell and Mann are the real antagonists at the staff level. Since I think you lean to Mannʼs view, I have put Bissell on top.See Documents 45 and 46.

On balance I think the gloomier parts of both papers are right. Diplomatic and public opinion are surely not ready for an invasion, but Castroʼs internal strength continues to grow. The battalionʼs dispersal would be a blow to U.S. prestige, but we should today have a hard time at the U.N. if it goes in.

The one hope I see is in an early—even if thin—recognition of a rival regime. I think if a Government-in-Exile can be surfaced promptly we could and should follow Mannʼs suggestion of working toward its recognition fairly soon. (We could also put in a full trade embargo against Castro, and you could sorrowfully read him out of the liberal family in a strong and factual speech about his outrages.) Then, conceivably, we could hold back Bissellʼs battalion for about three months and even build it up somewhat. And when it did go in, the color of civil war would be quite a lot stronger.

McG. B.

48. Editorial Note

According to summary notes prepared by General David W. Gray, a meeting was convened at the White House on February 17, 1961, to discuss the differing views held by Department of State and CIA officials on the best way to proceed with the paramilitary operation directed at Cuba. The Presidentʼs appointment book establishes, however, that the meeting took place on February 18, after McGeorge Bundy passed to President Kennedy the contending memoranda drafted by Assistant Secretary of State Mann and Deputy CIA Director Bissell. (Document 47) (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) According to Grayʼs notes on the meeting:

“Mr. Bissell discussed the status of planning and preparations. Mr. Bissell also discussed necessity for a decision concerning the surfacing of political leadership. Mr. Rusk discussed the fact that it would be much better to delay any action and to attempt to build up OAS support. He was concerned about charge of aggression in UN. Mr. Berle believed that support could be generated in Latin America but not by 31 March. The President asked if there was anything he could do to develop a political position to support action such as a speech on traditional liberalism in the western hemisphere. He also asked if there was any way the build up of jets and rockets in Cuba could be linked to this operation. Mr. Bohlen expressed the view that Russia would not react if the operation was finished quickly but might react if it dragged on. The President indicated that he would be in favor of a more moderate approach to the problem such as mass infiltration. No definite decisions were reached at this meeting.” (Summary notes prepared on May 9, 1961; ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

49. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to Senator George A. SmathersSource: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, 2/16/61-3/23/61. No classification marking. Senator Smathers was Democratic Senator from Florida. Washington, February 18, 1961.

Dear Senator Smathers: As I promised in my letter of January 10, we have studied the recommendation in your letter of January 7Neither of the letters has been found. that the provisions of Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 stipulated the withdrawal of all trade concessions as they applied to imports from the Soviet Union, or any other Communist-controlled country or area; 65 Stat. 72. be invoked to prevent the importation of all dutiable Cuban exports in order to deprive the Castro regime of as many United States dollars as possible.

In fulfilling its responsibility to ensure a reliable source of sugar for the domestic market, the United States Government has, as you know, already taken the major step of eliminating imports of Cuban sugar, which constituted approximately 70% of Cubaʼs exports to the United States. The principal economic purpose of the application of further measures would, therefore, be to eliminate the remainder of Cubaʼs exports to the United States, consisting mainly of tobacco, molasses, fruits and vegetables. Toward the end of 1960, Cuba was exporting to the United States at the rate of $65,000,000 a year, virtually all of which consisted of dutiable imports. This rate of export represents a reduction by approximately one-half of the rate of exports of these same products during early 1960, and also reflects the degree to which Cuba has altered its traditional trading pattern with the United States by trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

Sharing your serious concern over the nature and policies of the present Cuban Government, the Department has for some time been studying additional measures, including invocation of Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, with a view toward achieving the maximum economic effect while at the same time minimizing undesirable repercussions on our relations with other countries. The complexity of this problem is such as to require further study of economic, legal and foreign policy aspects. I am sorry that I cannot give you a final point of view at this writing.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Rusk

50. National Security Action Memorandum No. 23Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC-5902 Memoranda. Secret. Washington, February 21, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In calling my attention to the letter which Senator George A. Smathers wrote to youDocument 49. suggesting urgent consideration of placing an embargo on Cuban fruits, vegetables and other commodities imported into the United States, the President said he would like to have from you a memorandum responding to the following three questions: a. Would an embargo save us dollar foreign exchange? b. Would it make things more difficult for Castro? c. Would it be in the public interest?

The President asked that your memorandum to him include the views of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

McGeorge Bundy

51. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Secret. Washington, February 24, 1961. SUBJECT Questions Arising from Senator Smathersʼ Recommendation that Remaining Exports from Cuba to the United States be Embargoed

Mr. Bundyʼs memorandum of February 21, 1961Document 50. to me asked three questions:

Question: Would an embargo save on dollar foreign exchange?

Answer: Cuban exports to the United States are steadily declining and are presently moving at the rate of $60-70 million annually. An embargo would result in a saving of perhaps only 1/2 of this amount in dollar exchange since some of these items would probably be imported from other sources.

The principal items still imported from Cuba are tobacco, molasses, and fresh fruits and vegetables.

Imports of tobacco from Cuba in 1960 amounted to about 27 million dollars. United States cigar manufacturers would have difficulty finding comparable tobacco from other foreign sources, and would be forced to turn to domestically produced cigar filler. This is in surplus supply in the United States, and is higher priced. About 5 million dollarsʼ worth of high quality cigars were imported from Cuba in 1960. An embargo on Cuban cigars would result in considerable inconvenience to United States consumers, as cigars of comparable quality could not be obtained from other sources.

Imports of fruits and vegetables from Cuba (amounting to over 10 million dollars in 1960) occur mainly during the period of December-May. These imports are largely supplementary to our domestic production and for the most part would not be replaced from other sources. Thus some saving in dollar exchange could result, although the 1960-61 season is for the most part completed.

Imports of molasses from Cuba amounted to over 11 million dollars in 1960. In a typical year Cuba provides about 25 percent of our total utilization of molasses. It is likely that an embargo on imports of molasses from Cuba would mean a saving of dollar exchange, as molasses for distillation would probably not be available from other sources. Some replacement supplies for livestock feed probably would be obtained from other sources.

Question: Would it make things more difficult for Castro?

Answer: It will deprive Castro of dollar exchange and to the extent that he is unable to dispose of approximately $60-70 million annually of these commodities in this market or in other markets with convertible currencies, it will deplete his already low foreign exchange position. In my opinion, the economic disadvantage to Castro would outweigh any political advantage which he might gain by charging us with economic aggression and the unilateral application of economic measures.

Question: Would it be in the public interest?

Answer: For the reasons stated in answer to the second question I believe the answer to this is in the affirmative.

Some months ago serious consideration was given to applying the Trading With the Enemy Act.See Document 12. It was decided to postpone applying this Act until Latin American public opinion understood better the true nature of the danger which Castro represents to the Hemisphere, and until the possibility of securing multilateral action against Cuba through the OAS was improved. We therefore decided to rely on the existing authority granted in the Sugar ActSugar Act of 1948, enacted August 8, 1947; 61 Stat. 922, as amended. and the Export Control Act,Export Control Act, enacted February 26, 1949; 63 Stat. 7, as amended. as interim measures to stop both imports of Cuban sugar as well as most of our exports to Cuba.

Several weeks ago it was decided that Latin American public opinion would no longer strongly resist our unilateral application of the Trading With the Enemy Act even though the necessary two-thirds of the member nations of the OAS do not yet appear to be prepared to join in multilateral action. In addition, recent developments in Cuba, such as Cubaʼs urgent requirement to sell molasses and increased armed resist-ance to Castro, make it important that we act at once to deny the United States market to Cuban exports and to lend moral support and encouragement to those now engaged in resisting the Castro regime. Consequently I believe we should proceed with this action which, in our view, is the most effective measure available. Staff work between State and Treasury has now been virtually completed and I expect to be able to present to you early next week a final recommendation regarding the application of the Trading With the Enemy Act.

Dean Rusk

52. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-461. Confidential; Priority. Buenos Aires, March 4, 1961, 11 p.m.

1011. Arnaldo Musich, Economic Advisor Foreign Office, called Hoyt late this afternoon to inform Embassy “in confidence” action taken by GOA respect Cuban note February 23.On February 23, Raul Roa Garcia, Cuban Minister for External Relations, sent a note to each of the Foreign Ministers of the Latin American nations warning that the United States was creating conditions to attempt to justify indirect military aggression against Cuba. Roa called upon the Ministers to use their good offices to prevent aggression. A copy of the note was also sent to the United Nations. (U.N. doc. A/4701, February 28, 1961) Stated telegrams sent directly by Taboada to RuskDocument 53. and Roa informing them GOA designating special envoys to Cuban and US Governments because “GOA in its desire to improve relations between states is willing make available its friendly offices to seek formulas which might resolve or alleviate the state of tension originating in the worsening relations between the US and Cuba.”

Circular telegrams sent to all other American states and Canada telling of GOA action. Press conference held earlier in afternoon gave text note to Cuba.

Musich said envoys not yet named but those under consideration of highest calibre.

Musich instructed by President to emphasize to Embassy GOA had not referred to contents or accusations in Cuba note and in reply had merely repeated Roaʼs words, i.e., “interponer sus amistosos oficios en la busque dad de formulas que puedan resolver lao aliviarla.”

When questioned as to why GOA had decided this course Musich said it based on: (1) GOA concern that Cuban situation continuing be disturbing influence relations other Latin American states with US; (2) Solution must be one which will eliminate Soviet and Communist influence Cuba as well as stop exportation Cuban revolution without arousing leftist elements in hemisphere; (3) Other countries of hemisphere who have offered mediate have done so because of own internal problems, Argentina not in this class. (4) As President Frondizi had explained Schlesinger, McGovernGeorge McGovern, Director of Food for Peace and Special Assistant to the President, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., led a Food for Peace mission to Argentina, February 12-16. They met with President Frondizi on February 15. (Telegram 944 from Buenos Aires, February 16; Department of State, Central Files, 800.03/2-1661) Argentina of opinion overthrow Castro by anti-Castro Cuban from US or Guatemala would probably bring about criticism which would worsen Latin American relations.

Hoyt pointed out action seems be change from statements made by Taboada to American Ambassador. Embtel 989Telegram 989 from Buenos Aires, February 28, summarized a conversation between Ambassador Rubottom and Foreign Minister Taboada in which the problem posed by Cuba was discussed as engaging the concern of the entire hemisphere. (Ibid., 303/2-2861) and from reply to Chiriboga is that GOA action would seem have effect placing problem as one between US-Cuba rather than hemisphere problem which it is. Musich denied this GOA intent and reiterated banalities re desire be helpful.

Also pointed out to Musich Cuba had refused receive committee established by San Jose ConferenceReference is to the Ad Hoc Good Offices Committee established on August 29, 1960, at the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics at San Jose, Costa Rica. The committee was composed of representatives of the Governments of Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Costa Rica, and was directed to facilitate the settlement of controversies between American states and report to the Council of the Organization of American States. For text of final act of the seventh meeting, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 219-221. and also refused any airing of problem despite US reiterated willingness have charges fully investigated. Hoyt pointed out US had not asked special envoy and in view fact committee created by San Jose available to study question Cuba not sure what attitude US would take toward unsolicited offer send envoy who would seem superfluous as long as committee available. Expressed regret we had not been consulted before action taken.

Musich confirmed Amoedo finds situation in Cuba deteriorating. Hoyt then asked him whether it not evident Cuba note sent in desperation and action such as advocated by GOA would only help prolong his existence and hurt action anti-Castro Cuban groups. Musich just brushed question aside.

Comment: This apparently attempt by Argentina retain position leadership Latin America and take any play on Cuba away from Brazil. Furthermore, despite denials it has anything do with Argentina internal situation, it obvious this very definitely involved and that Placios Triumph and UCRI defeats last two elections in mind. May be indication Frondizi belief he can now use Cuban situation to political advantage, or that he at least unwilling permit too sharp a contrast in public eyes between GOA and apparent emerging Brazilian position. Emphasizes increasing importance influence Musich who states was with President and Foreign Minister until 4 a.m. today working out this action.

Rubottom

53. Telegram From Foreign Minister Taboada to Secretary of State RuskSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-1761. No classification marking. The telegram was sent in Spanish via commercial telegraph channels. The source text is a translation prepared by the Department of State Division of Language Services. Buenos Aires, March 4, 1961.

Mr. Secretary: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have replied today to the note of February 23 received from Dr. Raul Roa,See footnote 1, Document 52. Minister of Foreign Relations of Cuba. In my reply I said that the Government of the Argentine Republic, once more confirming its unvarying determination to promote the best relations between states, is prepared to use its good offices to seek formulas to resolve or alleviate the state of tension caused by the worsening of relations between the United States of America and Cuba. To that end, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the Argentine Republic has considered the advisability of appointing a special envoy to the Government of the United States of America and another representative of the same character to the Government of Cuba. This possibility has also been made known to His Excellency Raul Roa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in my reply to the above-mentioned note.

May God keep Your Excellency

Diogenes Taboada

54. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 3, Vol. 4, Ch. 3. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A handwritten note on the source text, in an unknown hand, indicates that this paper was used to brief Director of Central Intelligence Dulles for a meeting with the President. Washington, March 10, 1961.

STATUS OF EFFORTS TO FORM A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CUBA

1. Late in February 1961, at the covert instigation of the Agency, six leading figures of the Cuban opposition met in New York City for the purpose of (a) agreeing to a procedure for the purpose of electing a Revolutionary Council which would subsequently become the provisional government of Cuba and (b) drawing up a minimal political-social and economic program which would spell out the basic political philosophy of that government. These six Cuban leaders were: Manuel “Tony” Varona (Center-Autentico-Party-FRD Member) Manuel Artime (Left of Center-MRR-FRD Member) Justo Carrillo (Left-Montecristi-FRD Member) Manuel Ray (Left-MRP) Raul Chibas (Left-MRP) Felipe Pazos (Left-MRP)

2. While the six men named above do not represent the broad political spectrum from left to right, and thus do not represent all the Cuban political opposition, they nonetheless do represent sectors of the opposition now in militant opposition to Castro. Moreover they are figures who enjoy good reputations and respect inside and outside of Cuba; but being in politics they are also controversial. 3.

Following several days of deliberation this informal Committee of Six came up with the following formula for the election of a chairman of the Revolutionary Council. First, they agreed upon six candidates for the chairmanship. These are: Dr. Felipe Pazos (MRP-Left) Dr. Justo Carrillo (Montecristi-Left) Dr. Jose Miro Cardona (Independent-Center) Dr. Carlos Hevia (Independent-Right Center) Judge Emilio Menendez (Independent-Supreme Court Judge) Manuel “Tony” Varona (Autentico-Center)

The above names are currently being circulated among the various political groups both in and out of Cuba to ascertain the degree of acceptability of these individuals as candidates for the chairmanship. In 7-10 days hence, the Committee of Six—which may enlarge itself to eight or ten in order to embrace additional significant sectors of the opposition—will then elect a chairman (Provisional President) from this slate of six.

4. The chairman, once elected, will then appoint a minimum number of members of his council. The complete council will not be named until the government is established in Cuba. In addition to persons who have been active in exile, the full council will include a majority of persons who have fought and served in the Cuban underground and in the hills. The members of the council—which will number some 20 to 24 ministers—will have for the duration of the provisional government both legislative and executive functions. 5.

The Program:

The political economic-social program upon which agreement in principle has been reached by the “Committee of Six” includes—among others—the following basic planks: A. Overthrow of Castro and return to law and order. B. Re-establishment of Constitution of 1940 with certain amendments. C. Holding of general elections in eighteen months. D. The Provisional President will be ineligible to run for elective office in first general elections. E. Adoption of economic policies designed to increase the national income and raise the standard of living. F. Stimulation of investments of private capital, both national and foreign, and guarantee free initiative and private ownership in its broadest concept of social function. G. Establishment of an Agrarian Program which will give full title to the peasants and at the same time provide the former owner a fair price in duly guaranteed bonds. H. Restore to their legitimate owners the properties seized by the Castro Government, with exception of certain public utilities and other properties which the State considers expropriable in the national interest. I. Dissolve the Militia. J. Amnesty for political prisoners. K. Illegalization of the Communist Party and eradication of Communism and all anti-democratic activity. L. Denunciation of international agreements and treaties which undermine the national sovereignty and place the peace and security of the hemisphere in danger. Immediate resumption of traditional relations with the democratic countries of the world and the fulfillment of legitimate international pacts.

6. The foregoing was approved by the Berle task force on 7 March. 7. It is anticipated that within approximately 7 days a provisional Cuban government, in the form of a Revolutionary Council, will be formed. Hopefully it will merit the confidence and respect of the Cuban people and other peoples and governments of the hemisphere; it will be pledged to carry out a political, economic and social program which will hold forth to the people of Cuba the hope of a better future.

55. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Confidential. Washington, March 10, 1961. SUBJECT Cuba

I very much hope that your SaturdayMarch 11. See Document 59. meeting will consider the problem of launching a comprehensive campaign to acquaint the hemisphere with the facts of the Castro situation. Such a campaign would seem an indispensable preliminary to any hard decisions on Cuba.

The recent willingness of liberal leaders, like Betancourt of Venezue-la and Haya de la Torre of Peru, to condemn the Castro regime suggests that the time is ripe for a propaganda counter-offensive. A number of Latin Americans urged on me the importance of getting people to understand what has really happened in Cuba.

The campaign should consider the possibility of utilizing a variety of media through the hemisphere to make some sober points about the Castro regime—its Communist character, its provision of facilities to the USSR, its refusal to cooperate with the OAS, its intervention in the internal affairs of other republics, etc.

You might want to put together a group to look into this. I would suggest Berle, Murrow, Mann, Goodwin and myself.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

56. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret; Limited Distribution. JCSM-146-61 Washington, March 10, 1961. SUBJECT Evaluation of the CIA Cuban Volunteer Task Force (S) 1. JCSM-57-61, dated 3 February 1961,Document 35. which forwarded the conclusions of the Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, pointed up the desirability for the conduct of an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans by a team of Army, Naval and Air Force officers if practicable without danger of compromise of the Plan. 2. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 February 1961, the Director of Central Intelligence concurred and requested that such an evaluation be conducted. 3. The report by the inspection team is attached as an Appendix hereto. a. The conclusions contained in paragraphs 6 through 10 of the report are generally valid. In view of the odds for achieving surprise as expressed in paragraph 10 of the report, CIA should investigate means for improving the security and cover for movement of the Task Force. If this investigation reveals that appreciable improvement in security is not practicable, then the chances of success of the CIA Para-Military Plan should be reevaluated. b. Implementation of the recommendation contained in paragraph 12 of the report would give more assurance of surprise. However, there are serious drawbacks to a totally airborne operation in these particular circumstances. Any damage to the airstrip or crash of an aircraft on the strip would probably hinder operations for a considerable period of time. This would be particularly serious since no alternate strip is available. Also, if only one Cuban combat plane escapes destruction and interdicts the field, the operation would be seriously handicapped. Therefore, it is not believed that the increased surprise achieved outweighs the risk of possible failure. 4. Based upon a general review of the military portion of the plan, an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the forces, and an analysis of the logistics plans, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that, from a military standpoint, since the small invasion force will retain the initiative until the location of the landing is determined the plan could be expected to achieve initial success. Ultimate success will depend on the extent to which the initial assault serves as a catalyst for further action on the part of anti-Castro elements throughout Cuba. 5. It is recommended that: a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in paragraph 4 above. b. A decision with respect to the employment of this task force be made at the earliest practicable date in order to initiate final preparation and training. c. A military instructor, experienced in operational logistics, be assigned to the training unit immediately for the final phase of training. d. The views expressed in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, and the recommendation contained in subparagraph c above, be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, together with three copies of the report in the Appendix hereto, for his information and consideration. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:L.L. LemnitzerChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff Attachment

EVALUATION OF CIA TASK FORCE

The Problem

1. To inspect the Cuban Volunteer Force in order to evaluate its military effectiveness and determine the adequacy of its logistic support.

Factors Bearing on the Problem

2. Approval of paragraph 1-p of JCSM 57-61, 3 February 1961 required an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and a detailed analysis of logistic plans.

3. The evaluation team left CONUS 24 February, spent two days in the training area, and returned to CONUS 27 February 1961.

4. For additional factors, see: a. Enclosure “A” for air factors. b. Enclosure “B” for ground factors. c. Enclosure “C” for logistic factors.

Discussion

5. a. See Enclosure “A” for a discussion of the military effective-ness of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force.

b. See Enclosure “B” for a discussion of the tactical training of the ground element and its capability to carry out its contemplated mission.

c. See Enclosure “C” for a discussion of the adequacy of logistic support for Cuban Volunteer Forces relative to the assigned mission.

Conclusions

6. By 15 March 1961 the aircrews and support elements of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit accomplishment of the air mission.

7. By 15 March 1961, the ground element of the task force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit it to successfully carry out its mission.

8. The Cuban Volunteer Force is not able to sustain itself logistically for an extended operation. There is a marginal capability of operating for a period of thirty days with the present logistic organization.

9. The logistic organization is not well defined, solidly constituted, nor adequately trained. Assignment of a qualified military instructor for logistic training should increase the logistic capability to an acceptable minimum.

10. Surprise is essential to the success of the mission. However, odds against achieving surprise are believed to be about 85 to 15. Loss of surprise would likely create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Force. This could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

Recommendations

11. It is recommended that a decision to use this force against Castro be made at the earliest practicable date in order to permit final preparation and training to be initiated.

12. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

13. It is recommended that a military instructor experienced in operational logistics be assigned to the training unit immediately for the final phase of training.

Air Evaluator—Lt Col B.W. Tarwater, USAFPrinted from a copy on which all the evaluatorsʼ names are typed.

Ground Evaluator—Col J.R. Wright, USA

Logistic Evaluator—Lt Col R.B. Wall, USMC

Enclosure “A”

EVALUATION OF AIR ELEMENT CIA TASK FORCE

The Problem

1. To evaluate the military effectiveness of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force.

Factors Bearing on the Problem

2. Facts—The Cuban Volunteer Air Force has: a. 16 B-26 pilots, 9 of these have between 1800 and 11,500 hours total flying time, with between 76 hours and 33 minutes, and 99 hours 25 minutes training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu. Each of these pilots has flown approximately 20 strafing sorties, fired 16, 5 inch rockets and dropped 30 bombs—15 skip and 15 glide. The other 7 B-26 pilots have between 1200 and 6000 hours total flying time, with between 20 hours and 10 minutes, and 48 hours and 45 minutes training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu. Each of these 7 pilots has flown approximately 5 strafing sorties, fired 6, 5 inch rockets, and dropped 9 bombs—3 skip and 6 glide. b. They have 16 navigator-co-pilots for the B-26s with Loran and low level navigation qualifications. c. They have 7 crews trained in the C-46, and 8 crews trained in the C-54. d. Nine of the sixteen B-26 crews, three of the C-46 crews, and five of the C-54 crews have flown missions over Cuba from Retalhuleu. As far as is known all these crews successfully reached the assigned drop zones. e. Except for one ride with a Cuban pilot on a strafing, rocket firing, and bombing mission, evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the aircrews is based on second hand reports. f. All Americans and Cubans queried as to the operational effectiveness of the aircrews agreed that it was definitely adequate to accomplish the assigned mission. g. The Volunteer Air Force at Retalhuleu has an overall in-commission rate of approximately 92%. h. The para-drop personnel at Retalhuleu are daily successfully preparing para-drops. i. The armorers at Retalhuleu are daily successfully arming B-26 aircraft for strafing, rocket, and bombing training. j. There are adequate support personnel, aircraft, aircraft parts, P.O.L. and munitions on hand, on the way, or on order, to permit mission accomplishment. (See the Appendix for additional Facts Bearing on the Problem.)

3. Assumptions—on which CIA bases its current plan: a. The air strikes will be conducted with the benefit of surprise. b. The combat aircraft of the Cuban Air Force will probably be located on three, and not more than six airfields. c. Intelligence estimates indicating very poor Cuban air defense capabilities are accurate. d. The anti-aircraft gunners will continue to be required to receive permission from their headquarters in Havana before firing on unidentified aircraft. e. The B-26 missions will be flown from Puerto Cabezas.

4. Assumption—of the evaluator: a. As indicated by personnel in charge of the air operation: (1) Simulated strikes against an airfield with dispersed aircraft, and a maximum effort refueling and rearming exercise, will be conducted by the B-26 crews during the first week in March, and any apparent weaknesses which may develop will be eliminated. (2) After the B-26s have moved to Puerto Cabezas nine B-26s will be simultaneously refueled and rearmed in minimum time, and any apparent weaknesses which may develop will be eliminated. b. As indicated by personnel in charge of the air operation they will have adequate runway clearing equipment available during the air operation. c. As indicated by personnel in charge, the operation will be conducted during the dry season, or a shelter will be built for the preparation and loading of the para-drops, and pierced steel planking will be provided to assure all weather parking for the aircraft.

Discussion

5. Due to operational and scheduled training requirements it was impossible to observe the Volunteer Cuban Air Force in simulated tactical operations as requested. Consequently, with the exception of one ride with a Cuban pilot on a strafing, rocket firing, and bombing mission, the evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the aircrews is based on an examination of personnel and training records, and conversations with Cuban and American personnel.

6. In evaluating the military effectiveness of the aircrews the following factors were considered: a. The pre-flight procedures, air work, gunnery, rocketry, bombing, and emergency procedures of the Cuban pilot, with whom the evaluator flew, were outstanding. b. The Cuban pilots have much more total time than the average US pilot that went into combat in World War II. c. Nine of the B-26 pilots have had between 76 and 100 hours in flying, navigation, and gunnery training in the B-26 at Retalhuleu; and the other seven B-26 pilots have received between 20 and 48 hours in flying, navigation, and gunnery at Retalhuleu, and also have more total time than the average US pilot that went into combat in World War II; and henceforth the seven pilots with the least training will be given priority in B-26 training at Retalhuleu until their time in the B-26 equals that of the first nine B-26 pilots. d. All of the sixteen B-26 navigator-co-pilots are former pilots and have received Loran and low level navigation training at Retalhuleu. e. The B-26 crews will participate in simulated tactical operations during the first week in March. Any weaknesses which may become apparent will be eliminated. f. All Cubans and Americans queried as to the operational effectiveness of the aircrews agreed that it was definitely adequate to accomplish the assigned mission. g. Nine of the sixteen B-26 crews, three of the C-46 crews, and five of the C-54 crews have flown missions over Cuba from Retalhuleu. As far as is known all of these crews successfully reached their assigned drop zones. h. Aircrew effectiveness can be most realistically evaluated when measured against the mission requirements. The primary mission requirement of the Cuban Volunteer Air Force is the destruction of Castroʼs combat aircraft. The airstrikes against these aircraft are being planned on the basis of the assumption that surprise will be achieved. As a consequence, Castroʼs combat aircraft will remain based almost entirely upon three airfields, with possibly a few on three other airfields. Furthermore, with the benefit of surprise the numerous anti-aircraft guns at these six airfields, and other primary targets, will not be used against the initial strike, since Castroʼs anti-aircraft gunners are under orders not to fire on any aircraft without permission from their Headquarters in Havana. The rest of the air mission includes air strikes against 4 communication centers, destruction of interdiction targets, and other targets that may develop just prior to or during the invasion. Air drops and logistic support on an emergency basis will also be provided by the Volunteer Cuban Air Force. i. In addition to the Cuban aircrews listed above, 6 American B-26 pilots, with between 3 to 6000 hours total time each, and combat time in World War II or Korea or both, will be given refresher training in the B-26 and used in the initial air strikes. One of the American pilots will be used in the strikes against each of the six airfields on which Castroʼs combat aircraft are based.

7. On the basis of the factors listed above it is logical to conclude that the aircrews of the Volunteer Air Force have sufficient military effectiveness to achieve the mission requirements.

8. Inasmuch as: a. The volunteer Air Force at Retalhuleu has an overall in-commission rate of 92%. b. The para-drop personnel at Retalhuleu are daily successfully preparing para-drops. c. The armorers at Retalhuleu are daily successfully arming B-26 aircraft for strafing, rocket and bombing training. d. There are adequate personnel, aircraft, aircraft parts, P.O.L., and munitions on hand, enroute, or on order to permit mission accomplishment. (See the Appendix) In view of the factors listed above, it is concluded that the maintenance, armament, para-drop, and supply capability of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force is adequate to promote military effectiveness to the extent necessary for mission accomplishment.

9. Based on an understanding of Castroʼs and the USSRʼs vital concern in maintaining Castro in power, first hand observations of security conditions at both Retalhuleu and Puerto Cabezas, and conversations with people assigned at both bases, it is concluded that the odds are about 85 to 15 against surprise being achieved in the attack against Castroʼs Cuba. If surprise is not achieved, it is most likely that the air mission will fail. As a consequence, one or more of Castroʼs combat aircraft will likely be available for use against the invasion force, and an aircraft armed with 50 caliber machine guns could sink all or most of the invasion force.

10. The reasons for believing that the odds are about 85 to 15 against surprise being achieved are as follows: a. With a communist infiltrated town approximately one mile from the airfield, and a railroad on one side of the base and a highway on the other, and trees surrounding the entire base, all providing a constant opportunity for observation of activities at Retalhuleu, it is believed the Castro-communists will know when the main invasion force is airlifted from Retalhuleu to Puerto Cabezas over a period of three nights. b. The airfield at Puerto Cabezas is presently being developed as the primary strike base. A tent city has been erected off one end of the main runway with adequate facilities for approximately 160 men. Plastic bags are being filled with aviation gas and placed on parking areas off the main runway. The airfield, which is three miles from the town of Puerto Cabezas, has been placed off limits and is guarded by 60 of President Somozaʼs best troops, thereby alerting anyone interested that something unusual is happening at the airfield. Furthermore, several commercial flights arrive daily on this same airstrip, and 50 Nicaraguans from the town of Puerto Cabezas are employed in readying the strike base; and of course they return to their homes in town each night. The docks from which the troops will move into ships for transport to Cuba are three miles from the airfield via a road which runs along the town. So again, in view of Castro-communist interest in maintaining Castro in power, it seems likely that they are aware of the present activities at Puerto Cabezas, and will know when the main invasion force goes aboard the ships for their two day trip to Cuba. Knowing this, it then becomes a not too difficult submarine or air search problem, or both, to determine where and when the force will land. Furthermore, once the main force boards the ships, and it becomes obvious the force is on its way, Castroʼs combat aircraft could be scattered from the six primary airfields, and the anti-aircraft crews alerted, and orders given to shoot unidentified aircraft on sight. These two actions, as well as others that could be taken, could create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force. This in turn could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

11. A cursory consideration of some of the major factors concerned indicates that the troops of the invasion force could be air rather than amphibious lifted. This would reduce the time necessary to transport the invasion force from Guatemala to Cuba from five days to one day—thereby increasing the chances of achieving surprise by a factor of five to one.

12. Consequently, itʼs believed serious consideration should be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

Conclusions

13. If the assumption of surprise is correct, and intelligence estimates of Castroʼs air defense capabilities are correct, by 15 March 1961 the aircrews and support elements of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force will have achieved adequate military effectiveness to permit accomplishment of the air mission.

14. The odds against achieving surprise however, are believed to be about 85 to 15. Loss of surprise would likely create conditions beyond the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Cuban Air Force. This could lead to the destruction of part or all of the invasion force.

Recommendations

15. It is recommended that serious consideration be given to airlifting the troops of the invasion force, rather than continuing with the amphibious operation, except as it might be used as a cover, and for major logistic support.

Air Evaluator—Lt Col B.W. Tarwater, USAF

Enclosure “B”

EVALUATION OF GROUND ELEMENT CIA TASK FORCE

The Problem

1. To evaluate the tactical training of the ground element of the task force and to estimate its capability to carry out its contemplated mission.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

2. For facts bearing on the problem, see Appendix “A”.

Discussion

3. For discussion, see Appendix “B”.

Conclusions

4. Based on observations and conversations with trainer personnel on the spot, it is believed that the ground element of this task force has been properly trained to successfully carry out its mission with the exceptions noted below.

5. Additional tactical training is required in defensive operations, coordination, preparation of defensive positions, and counter-attack. These matters are scheduled to be included in the future programmed training.

6. An early decision to proceed with this operation is imperative. The point of no return has been passed and a decision to abandon the scheme is untenable. In the event such a decision should be made, a revolt within the assembled force would probably occur with dire consequences both for the US trainer personnel and for US interests abroad.

Recommendations

7. It is recommended that a decision to proceed with the operation be made at the earliest practicable date.

Ground Evaluator—Colonel J.R. Wright, USA

Appendix “A”

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Length of service of personnel: a. Varies—few days to 8 months. b. Includes former members of the Cuban Constitutional Army, Rebel Army, militia, and personnel with no previous training. 2. Organization: a. Brig. Hq. (116) and 4 rifle battalions (varies 109-162). T/O for each Bn 150. 1st Bn—parachutists (145). b. Hv. Gun Bn (104) incl. 4.2 mort., 75 mm recoilless rifles (6-4.2 mort., 3 each RR). c. Tank Bn (25) now training at Ft. Knox. 3. Training: a. Guerrilla Opns—by civilian contract pers. b. Basic military training—some by own personnel, remainder by Special Forces Teams. c. 40 days at 16 hours per day supervised—additional on own time. d. Airborne—Physical conditioning, 4 & 8 ft. platform, mock door, harness (chute) control, at least 3 jumps—jumpmaster at least 5 jumps. e. Infiltration course—day and night—all pers. f. Reaction course—all personnel. g. Close combat, unarmed defense—all personnel. h. Maps and compass—incl. night compass course. i. Raids, ambushes, patrolling—day and night. j. Weapons—familiarization firing on all weapons—cross training—field firing exercise. k. Battalion and Brigade staff procedures and tactical operations including infantry—tank team theory, but no practical work—organization and conduct of the defense. l. Demolitions and field fortifications. m. Bayonet training. n. Communications—nets and procedure. o. Approximately 25% of all training conducted at night. p. Physical conditioning stressed in all training. q. Forward air controllers trained to mark targets and call in air strike, communications adequate. r. Unit training through battalion (company) completed. Brigade (battalion) level training in progress. Will include simulated beach landings on terrain similar to objective area. 4. Observed Training: a. Brigade (battalion) in attack; (1) Included drop of parachute battalion (company) air support (2 B-26), simulated supporting fires by 4.2” and 81 mm mortar sections—blank ammo used. (2) Use of terrain—good—covered routes used. (3) Control—fair. (4) Leadership—good. (5) Reorganization on objective—good. (6) Organization of position—good. b. Battalion (company) in attack; (1) Live ammunition used in pre-set problem. (2) Demolition charges used to simulate incoming fire. (3) Supporting weapons fired live overhead—fire on objective. (4) Tactics were restricted due to nature of area. (5) Use of weapons—good to excellent. (6) Fire and maneuver—excellent. (7) Evacuation of casualties—good. (8) Control—excellent. (9) Physical fitness—superior. (10) Morale—superior. c. Firing demonstration—Heavy Gun Battalion; (1) Included 4.2” mortars, 81 mm mortars, 75 mm recoilless rifles and .50 cal MG. (2) Accuracy—excellent. (3) Control—excellent. (4) Condition of equipment—superior. (5) Immediate action—excellent. d. Individual Training; (1) Mechanical training, cal 30 light MG, M1917A1, Reaction course, field demolitions. (2) Instructor personnel—good—used interpreters to communicate with trainees. (3) Effectiveness of instruction—good—interest was high—almost all practical work. 5. Equipment: a. There are no shortages of equipment which adversely effect training except proper maps of the local area. b. Minor shortages in T/O&E are enroute to area and are arriving as rapidly as air lift permits. c. Equipment is well cared for and when all enroute is received will be adequate for contemplated mission. d. Communications equipment is partly military and partly commercial. These are 72 PRC-10ʼs, 10 PE-33ʼs, and 10 TP-1ʼs used for tactical communications within the Brigade. Equipment is in excellent condition and all in working order. There is an adequate supply of batteries on hand. e. Parachutes are repacked in the area by well qualified riggers. There have been no chute failures to date. f. 5-M41 light tanks are at Ft. Knox where the tank unit is currently undergoing training. It was reported that driver training was completed and gunnery training was beginning. 6. Future Training Programmed: a. Brigade exercises; (1) Brigade in attack—2 ea of 2 days duration. (2) Brigade in defense—2 ea of 2 days duration. (3) Simulated beach landing—5 ea—1 day exercises. b. Brigade march—35 miles cross-country to beach and return—2 days each way. c. Final shakedown, rehabilitation of equipment, repair and testing of weapons—7 days. Appendix “B”

DISCUSSION

1. Individuals observed demonstrated a high degree of competence, considering the quality of personnel and the amount of time that they have been in training. 2. All personnel observed demonstrated excellent physical condition, high morale, and an apparent desire to get on with the job. 3. The leadership appears to be good. Leaders have been carefully selected and replaced when required by personnel who exhibited better potential than those originally selected. There have been very few leaders replaced in the course of the training. None of the leaders appears to harbor any personal political ambitions, nor a burning desire to make the service a career after the operation is completed. 4. All personnel can fire their weapons effectively, can and do maintain them properly, and are cross-trained on other weapons. Most of them have already fired more rounds than the average US soldier would fire in a two-year term of service. 5. The greatest problem facing the Brigade is the long confinement to the area which, while not now an immediate problem, could lead to a breakdown of discipline and control if prolonged or if the incentive which binds them together is removed. 6. Personnel appear eager to learn and it was reported that they devote long hours outside of training time to study and practice. 7. The quality of the personnel is amazing. College graduates with degrees in engineering are employed in the FDC as computers. All forward observers and their radio operators are qualified to adjust the fire of the mortars. Most of the personnel are young, generally from 18 to 31 years of age, and come from the middle class. There are a few older men in camp, but they are not favored and if they canʼt keep up are returned to Miami. 8. Security a. Every effort has been made to keep this operation secret, but it is obvious that many people in the area are aware of what is going on. Although all troop movements are made at night, firing, explosions, aircraft orbiting over an objective area, parachute drops, and an abnormal number of unfamiliar aircraft in the area are a dead giveaway. A clandestine radio transmitter is known to be operating in the Retalhuleu area. The mayor of Retalhuleu is a card-carrying communist and lives about a mile from the airstrip. Leaflets have been circulated in Guatemala City by the Communist Party giving many of the details of the activity. Although there are some inaccuracies in this material, much of it is accurate. It can therefore be presumed that Castro knows practically all about the operation except when, where, and in what strength. b. There have been some cases of AWOL among the trainees. At the time of our visit, a group of eight including one company (platoon) commander was missing. On Saturday night, a group of 21 men left the camp and went into a small village nearby to attend a fiesta. By Sunday noon, 19 of this group had returned. Obviously, the presence of Cubans in fairly large groups is known to the people in the area. Enclosure “C”

EVALUATION OF THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THECIA TASK FORCE

1. The Problem

a. The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the adequacy of logistic support for Cuban Volunteer Forces relative to the assigned mission.

2. Factors Bearing on the Problem

a. Cuban Volunteer Forces are now in a field bivouac situation while conducting training operations. b. There are no personnel in the training area either in the Special Forces instruction group or within the Cuban Volunteer Forces who are qualified to instruct in operational logistics. c. Minimal training of Motor Transport drivers is being conducted due to political considerations. d. No formal training in operational logistics is being conducted. e. Aerial delivery equipment and capabilities are adequate for emergency air resupply requirements. f. No significant shortages of equipment and material were evident. Items not in the training area were described by instructor personnel as being in the backlog of material in CONUS. There were no means by which the inspecting officer could verify this assertion.

3. Discussion

a. Cuban Volunteer Forces are now in a field bivouac situation. Supply operations within the bivouac area are satisfactory. Supply support from CONUS to the training area is by air. Recent inclement weather caused a backlog of supplies to build up in CONUS. Planes did not fly to the training area for over one week. Airlift has been resumed, however supplies delivered from backlog stocks are not responsive to immediate needs. It appears that planes are loaded with material available and receiving units are unaware of items delivered until they open boxes after delivery. No action was being taken to designate priorities since all items were so considered. There was a lack of logistic coordination in this instance. b. Personnel are receiving limited logistic training due to the on-the-job situation in bivouac. Preparation of meals, break-down and issue of supplies, and repair and maintenance of equipment are being conducted in camp. No training is being conducted in the amphibious aspects of logistics. No shore party organization has been formed nor is training being conducted in shore party operations. No training is being conducted in the assault aspects of logistics to include: establishment and operation of supply point, inventory control, movement and distribution of supplies to deployed units, or field messing operations. The logistic concept of instructor personnel was that tonnages of supplies could be deposited in the objective area and units could help themselves to fulfill their requirements. c. The motor transport officer is receiving adequate training in convoy and general operational procedures. Local laws require that vehicles be operated by citizens of that country or by instructor personnel. Cuban Volunteer Force Motor Transport drivers receive no training in night and blackout driving. Actual driver training is extremely limited. In view of the complicated process of backing vehicles over sand and beach matting in to LCUʼs, this deficiency is considered of major importance. d. Facilities in the training area for the preparation and packaging of supplies for air drop were inspected. The capability is adequate for operations of an emergency resupply nature. Delivery is limited to parachute delivery or air landing of supplies. e. The medical organization of the force is well organized and equipped. The planning and procedures to be employed during the operation are simple, clear, concrete, and appear to be understood by all personnel involved. Equipment is adequate, clean, well cared for and properly packed. Personnel appear competent and adequate. f. Service functions are adequate. Enough trained personnel are available to perform the second and limited third echelon maintenance required. Tools and equipment are adequate. g. Clothing, weapons, individual, and organizational equipment are in good condition and well cared for. Vehicles utilized in the training area will be replaced for the operation. Rough terrain and maximum utilization have resulted in inordinate wear to tie-rods, springs, and various organic parts of the vehicles. This is understandable since the vehicles are standard, commercial types and are being utilized under field conditions. h. Morale appears excellent. There was some indication in remarks made by individuals that they were anxious to enter the objective area. Instructors indicated anxiety over the fact that delay in definitely indicating D-day would result in deterioration of morale. Many troops have been confined within the camp area on a rigorous training schedule for six months or more and are living under austere conditions. Their primary incentive is the prospect of moving to the objective area. i. A decision as to whether or not the operation will take place is necessary in the near future due to the impending rainy season. It is considered that operations during the rainy season would present unsurmountable difficulties in view of the limited equipment available. Logistic requirements for the shipment of supplies by railroad to POE; loading and sailing time for ships; etc., necessitate approximately a three-week leadtime. The estimation of time involved was provided by CIA since they are handling shipping arrangements.

4. Conclusions

a. The Cuban Volunteer Force is not presently able to sustain itself logistically for an extended operation. It has a marginal capability of operating for a period of thirty days with its present logistic organization. b. The logistic organization within the Cuban Volunteer Force is not well defined, solidly constituted, nor adequately trained. It needs emphasis to provide a cohesive, effective logistic support capability. c. It is imperative that an instructor experienced in operational logistics be provided to the training unit at the earliest practicable date. d. An organized shore party unit needs to be formed and trained as soon as possible. e. More vigorous action is needed in training motor transport drivers to handle vehicles. This could be partially accomplished by night operations within the camp areas. f. The Cuban Volunteer Force is adequately supported medically for operational functions well in excess of 30 days. g. The service capabilities of the Cuban Volunteer Force are adequate for the operation.

5. Action Recommended

a. That a military instructor experienced in operational logistics be assigned to the training unit as soon as practicable.

Logistic Evaluator—Lt Col R.B. Wall, USMC

57. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. Washington, March 10, 1961.

JCSM-149-61

SUBJECT Evaluation of Proposed Supplementary Phase, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba (S) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the military aspects of a supplementary phase to the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, which is being proposed by the CIA to meet certain Department of State objections to the basic plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff military evaluation of the basic plan was forwarded to you by JCSM-57-61, subject: “Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba,” dated 3 February 1961.Document 35. 2. The details of the proposed supplementary phase to the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, are set forth in the Appendix hereto. 3. The conclusions of the evaluation of the military aspects of the proposed supplementary phase are as follows: a. The selected objective area and the landing beach are suitable and adequate for the proposed operation. b. In the time available the company can be assembled, organized, and reasonably well trained to accomplish its mission. c. The company can be transported to and landed in the objective area. d. The concept of the plan and the known or expected location of Cuban military forces indicate that surprise should be achieved and that the landing will be unopposed. e. The company will have the capability to protect the provisional government representation and to sustain itself ashore for a minimum of three to four days and will have a good chance of sustaining itself indefinitely. f. The proposed operation can be supported logistically. 4. It is recommended that: a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the above conclusions. b. The views expressed in the above conclusions be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for his information. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:L.L. LemnitzerChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff Appendix

DETAILS OF PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTARY PHASE TO THE CIA PARA-MILITARY PLAN, CUBA

1. The purpose of this supplementary phase is to land an element of the provisional government and a Cuban volunteer infantry company of 162 men, in a separate objective area in Cuba prior to the implementation of the basic plan. 2. To accomplish this, CIA proposes to take the following meas-ures: a. Move 130 of the Cuban volunteers currently recruited in the Miami area to [1½ lines of source text not declassified] to join a cadre of 32 Cuban para-military trained personnel [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. These 162 volunteers will be organized into a company and receive concentrated training by a cadre of US Army Special Forces personnel, from those currently assigned in Guatemala, for a period of approximately 12 days. The cadre of 32 para-military personnel have received approximately 9 months guerrilla training in Panama as action teams. Some of the 130 recruits have had previous military training. b. This company will be equipped with small arms, mortars, and 57 mm recoilless rifles. c. The company, with the provisional government representation, will be loaded [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on a 1500 ton Cuban commercial ship presently under contract to CIA and transported to the objective area. At the objective area, the landing will be effected at night by using four outboard motor fishing craft transported by the merchant ship. This landing will be made 24-48 hours prior to the implementation of the basic plan. After the main landing has been made this company will continue to act as guerrillas in support of the main effort. d. The company will be provided with communications equipment for contact with CIA base and aircraft. e. The CIA plan envisions the company moving onto the high ground approximately two miles from the beach where it will provide protection for the provisional government representation. f. Plan calls for utilization of airdrop for logistic support. 3. The Cuban provisional government in the US will announce through news media the establishment of provisional government representation ashore in Cuba. The implementation of the CIA propaganda plan will immediately follow. 4. The basic para-military plan, details of which are set forth in the staff study, subject: “Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba,” dated 3 February 1961, will then be implemented. To give the Task Force an increased capability a fifth infantry company is currently being organized in Guatemala. This company will have the mission of performing basic logistic tasks and constitute a reserve element for the Task Force.

58. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1961. Top Secret. A copy of this paper in CIA files indicates that it was drafted by Bissell for the March 11 meeting with President Kennedy. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity-Cuba) Washington, March 11, 1961.

PROPOSED OPERATION AGAINST CUBA

Status of Preparatory Action: About a year ago the Agency was directed to set in motion: the organization of a broadly-based opposition to the Castro regime; a major propaganda campaign; support for both peaceful and violent resistance activities in Cuba; and the development of trained paramilitary ground and air forces of Cuban volunteers.

A decision should shortly be made as to the future of these activities and the employment or disposition of assets that have been created. The status of the more important activities is as follows: a.

Political: Over a period of nearly a year, the FRD (Frente Revolucioniaro Democratico), which was created in the hope that it would become the organizational embodiment of a unified opposition to Castro, has proved to be highly useful as a cover and administrative mechanism but important political elements refused to join it.

Accordingly, a major effort was undertaken three weeks ago to form a more broadly-based revolutionary council which would include the FRD, and which could lead to the setting up of a provisional government. Considerable progress has been made in negotiations with the principal Cuban leaders in which great efforts have been made to permit the Cubans to chart their own course. It is expected that the desired result will be accomplished shortly. What is emerging from these negotiations is a provisional government with a center to left-of-center political orientation, and a political platform embodying most of the originally stated goals of the 26 July movement. It is believed that this will command the support of a very large majority of anti-Castro Cubans although it will not be altogether acceptable to the more conservative groups.

Military: The following paramilitary forces have been recruited and trained and will shortly be in an advanced state of readiness. (1) A reinforced battalion with a present strength of 850 which will be brought up to a strength of approximately 1,000 through the addition of one more infantry company to be used primarily for logistic purposes and as a reserve. (2) A briefly trained paramilitary force of approximately 160 intended to be used for a diversionary night landing to be undertaken in advance of commitment of the battalion. (3) An air force of 16 B-26 light bombers, 10 C-54s and 5 C-46s. (4) Shipping including 2 1000-ton ships, 5 1500-ton ships, 2 LCIs, 3 LCUs and 4 LCVPs.

A JCS team recently inspected the battalion and the air force at their bases in Guatemala. Their findings led them to conclude that these forces could be combat-ready by 1 April. Certain deficiencies were indicated that are in progress of correction partly by further training and partly by the recruitment of the additional infantry company referred to above.

c. Timing: It will be infeasible to hold all these forces together beyond early April. They are in large part volunteers, some of whom have been in hard training, quartered in austere facilities for as much as six months. Their motivation for action is high but their morale cannot be maintained if their commitment to action is long delayed. The onset of the rainy season in Guatemala in April would greatly accentuate this problem and the Guatemalan Government is in any event unwilling to have them remain in the country beyond early April. The rainy season in Cuba would also make their landing on the island more difficult.

2. The Situation in Cuba: We estimate that time is against us. The Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. In the absence of greatly increased external pressure or action, it will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support as the machinery of authoritarian control becomes increasingly effective. a. The regime is proceeding methodically to solidify its control over all the major institutions of the society and to employ them on the Communist pattern as instruments of repression. The Government now directly controls all radio, television, and the press. It has placed politically dependable leadership in labor unions, student groups, and professional organizations. It has nationalized most productive and financial enterprises and is using a program of so-called land reform to exercise effective control over the peasantry. It has destroyed all political parties except the Communist party. Politically reliable and increasingly effective internal security and military forces are being built up. b. There is still much active opposition in Cuba. It is estimated that there are some 1200 active guerrillas and another thousand individuals engaging in various acts of conspiracy and sabotage, the tempo of which has been rising in recent weeks. Nevertheless, the government has shown considerable skill in espionage and counter-espionage. It is making good use of the militia against guerrilla activities and the infiltration of people and hardware. The militia is relatively untrained and there is evidence that its morale is low but the government is able to use very large numbers against small groups of guerrillas and is able to exercise surveillance of suspicious activities throughout the island. Short of some shock that will disorganize or bring about the defection of significant parts of the militia, it must be anticipated that violent opposition of all kinds will gradually be suppressed. c. At the present time the regular Cuban military establishment, especially the Navy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained and well indoctrinated Cuban pilots. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date, probably no more than six months away it will probably become militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combat of a more sizable organized military force than can be recruited from among the Cuban exiles. 3. Possible Courses of Action: Four alternative courses of action involving the commitment of the paramilitary force described above are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. They are: a. Employment of the paramilitary force in a manner which would minimize the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside. b. Commitment of the paramilitary force in a surprise landing with tactical air support, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action in terrain suited for that purpose. c. Commitment of the paramilitary force in two successive operations: First, the landing of one company without air support in a remote area in which it could sustain itself for some days (hopefully indefinitely), and second, the landing of the main force forty-eight hours later in a widely different location in the same manner as in paragraph 3.b. above. d. Commitment of the whole force in an inaccessible region where it would be expected to keep control of a beachhead for a long period of time to permit installation and recognition of a provisional government and a gradual build-up of military strength. 4. Covert Landing of the Paramilitary Forces: Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary forces in a night amphibious landing, using man-portable equipment and weapons and taking ashore only such supplies as can be carried by the troops. The force would move immediately in-land to the mountains and commence operations as a powerful guerrilla force relying entirely upon continuing air logistical support. Shipping would retire from the coast before dawn and no tactical air operations would be conducted. Unfortunately, it is believed that such an operation would involve unacceptable military risks. a. The paramilitary force would run the risk of becoming completely disorganized and scattered in a night landing. (Such an operation is very difficult for even highly trained forces experienced in amphibious operations.) b. The force would not have motor transport, heavy mortar, 75 mm recoiling rifles, heavy machine guns, nor tanks. Initial ammunition and food supplies would be limited and it would be wholly dependent on air logistical support. If the rainy season commences in April, overcast conditions could prevent effective support. Casualties could not be evac-uated. c. Since tactical aircraft would not participate, the objective area could not be isolated; enemy forces could move against the beachhead unimpeded. The Castro Air Force would be left intact. 5. A Landing in Full Force: This operation would involve an amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air support, to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead had been secured. If initial military operations were successful and especially if there were evidence of spreading disaffection against the Castro regime, the provisional government could be recognized and a legal basis provided for at least non-governmental logistic support. a. The military plan contemplates the holding of a perimeter around the beachhead area. It is believed that initial attacks by the Castro militia, even if conducted in considerable force, could be repulsed with substantial loss to the attacking forces. The scale of the operation and the display of professional competence and of determination on the part of the assault force would, it is hoped, demoralize the militia and induce defections therefrom, impair the morale of the Castro regime, and induce widespread rebellion. If the initial actions proved to be unsuccessful in thus detonating a major revolt, the assault force would retreat to the contiguous mountain area and continue operations as a powerful guerrilla force. b. This course of action has a better chance than any other of leading to the prompt overthrow of the Castro regime because it holds the possibility of administering a demoralizing shock. c. If this operation were not successful in setting off widespread revolt, freedom of action of the U.S. would be preserved because there is an alternative outcome which would neither require U.S. intervention nor constitute a serious defeat; i.e., guerrilla action could be continued on a sizable scale in favorable terrain. This would be a means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime. 6. A Diversionary Landing: As a variant of the above plan, it would be feasible to conduct a diversionary landing with a force of about 160 men in an inaccessible area as a prelude to a landing of the main assault force. The initial operation would be conducted at night without tactical air support. At least a part of the provisional government would go in with the diversionary landing and presumably the establishment of the provisional government on Cuban soil would thereupon be announced. The subsequent landing of the main assault force would be carried out as outlined in paragraph 5 preceding. a. This course of action might have certain political advantages in that the initial action in the campaign would be of a character that could plausibly have been carried out by the Cubans with little outside help. b. There would be a military advantage in that the diversionary landing would distract attention and possibly divide some enemy forces from the objective area for the main assault. If reports had reached the Castro government that troops trained in Guatemala were on the move, the diversionary landing might well be taken to be the main attack, thus enhancing the element of surprise for the main assault force. These advantages would be counterbalanced by the diversion of troops otherwise supporting the main unit. 7. Landing and Slow Build-up: Under this fourth alternative the whole paramilitary force could carry out a landing and seize a beachhead in the most remote and inaccessible terrain on the island with intent to hold indefinitely an area thus protected by geography against prompt or well-supported attacks from the land. This would permit the installation there of the provisional government, its recognition by the U.S. after a decent interval, and (if needed) a long period of build-up during which additional volunteers and military supplies would be moved into the beachhead. a. A major political advantage of this course of action would be that the initial assault might be conducted in such a way as to involve less display of relatively advanced weaponry and of professional military organization than the landing in force discussed above, especially so as there is every likelihood that the initial landing would be virtually unopposed by land forces. Recognition could provide a suitable political and legal basis for a protracted build-up after the initial assault. b. Such an operation would, however, require tactical air support sufficient to destroy or neutralize the Castro Air Force. If this were not provided concurrently with the landing, it would be needed soon thereafter in order to permit ships to operate into the beachhead and the planned build-up to go forward. If the initial landing could include seizure of an air strip, the necessary air support could fairly soon be provided from within the territory controlled by friendly forces. There is, however, no location which both contains a usable airstrip and is so difficult of access by land as to permit protection of a slow build-up. c. This type of operation by the very fact of being clandestine in nature and remote geographically would have far less initial impact politically and militarily than courses two or three. 8. Conclusions: a. The Castro regime will not fall of its own weight. In the absence of external action against it, the gradual weakening of internal Cuban opposition must be expected. b. Within a matter of months the capabilities of Castroʼs military forces will probably increase to such a degree that the overthrow of his regime, from within or without the country, by the Cuban opposition will be most unlikely. c. The Cuban paramilitary force if effectively used has a good chance of overthrowing Castro, or of causing a damaging civil war, without the necessity for the United States to commit itself to overt action against Cuba. d. Among the alternative courses of action here reviewed, an assault in force preceded by a diversionary landing offers the best chance of achieving the desired result.

59. Editorial Note

According to summary notes prepared by General Gray, a meeting was convened at the White House on March 11, 1961, to discuss preparations for the Trinidad operation, as outlined in the paper prepared in the CIA on March 11. (Document 58) The Presidentʼs appointment book indicates that the meeting took place at 10:05 a.m. and lasted until 12:15 p.m. The meeting was attended by Vice President Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Mann, Berle, Dulles, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, Gray, and Colonel B.W. Tarwater. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) Although not listed in the appointment book, Bissell called the meeting and no doubt attended and made the presentation for the CIA. According to Grayʼs notes on the meeting:

“At a meeting with the President, CIA presented a paper which summarized preparations to date for the Trinidad operation. After full discussion, the President stated that he was willing to take the chance of going ahead; that he could not endorse a plan that put us in so openly, in view of the world situation. He directed the development of a plan where US assistance would be less obvious and would like to meet again within the next few days.” (Summary notes prepared on May 9, 1961; ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

The meeting with the President was preceded by a meeting of Bissell, Rusk, Mann, and Berle. Mann arranged the meeting between Bissell and Department of State officials after Rusk discovered that the meeting with the President to discuss the Trinidad operation had been called at Bissellʼs request without prior knowledge of or discussion with Department officials. Rusk felt that the CIA was attempting to bypass the Department of State, and he was assured by McGeorge Bundy that coordination of the planning for the operation rested with the Task Force on Latin America, under Berle. (Memorandum from Executive Secretary Lucius D. Battle to Rusk, March 9; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-961)

60. National Security Action Memorandum No. 31Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, National Security Action Memoranda,NSAMs #26-#50. Top Secret. Washington, March 11, 1961.

Memorandum of Discussion on Cuba, March 11, 1961

The President directed that the following actions be taken: 1. Every effort should be made to assist patriotic Cubans in forming a new and strong political organization, and in conjunction with this effort a maximum amount of publicity buildup should be sought for the emerging political leaders of this organization, especially those who may be active participants in a military campaign of liberation. Action: Central Intelligence Agency. 2. The United States Government must have ready a white paper on Cuba, and should also be ready to give appropriate assistance to Cuban patriots in a similar effort. Action: Arthur Schlesinger in cooperation with the Department of State. 3. The Department of State will present recommendations with respect to a demarche in the Organization of American States, looking toward a united demand for prompt free elections in Cuba, with appropriate safeguards and opportunity for all patriotic Cubans. Action: Department of State. 4. The President expects to authorize U.S. support for an appropriate number of patriotic Cubans to return to their homeland. He believes that the best possible plan, from the point of view of combined military, political and psychological considerations, has not yet been presented, and new proposals are to be concerted promptly. Action: Central Intelligence Agency, with appropriate consultation.

McGeorge Bundy

61. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1961. Top Secret. A copy of this paper in CIA files indicates it was drafted by Bissell. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity-Cuba) Washington, March 15, 1961.

REVISED CUBAN OPERATION

1. Political Requirements: The plan for a Cuban operation and the variants thereof presented on 11 March were considered to be politically objectionable on the ground that the contemplated operation would not have the appearance of an infiltration of guerrillas in support of an internal revolution but rather that of a small-scale World War II type of amphibious assault. In undertaking to develop alternative plans and to judge their political acceptability, it has been necessary to infer from the comments made on the earlier plan the characteristics which a new plan should possess in order to be politically acceptable. They would appear to be the following: a. An Unspectacular Landing: The initial landing should be as unspectacular as possible and should have neither immediately prior nor concurrent tactical air support. It should conform as closely as possible to the typical pattern of the landings of small groups intended to establish themselves or to join others in terrain suited for guerrilla operations. In the absence of air support and in order to fit the pattern, it should probably be at night. b. A Base for Tactical Air Operations: It was emphasized that ultimate success of the operation will require tactical air operations leading to the establishment of the control of the air over Cuba. In order to fit the pattern of revolution, these operations should be conducted from an air base within territory held by opposition forces. Since it is impracticable to undertake construction of an air base in the rainy season and before any air support is available, the territory seized in the original landing must include an air strip that can support tactical operations. c. Slower Tempo: The operation should be so designed that there could be an appreciable period of build up after the initial landing before major offensive action was undertaken. This would allow for a minimum decent interval between the establishment and the recognition by the U.S. of a provisional government and would fit more closely the pattern of a typical revolution. d. Guerrilla Warfare Alternative: Ideally, the terrain should not only be protected by geography against prompt or well-supported attack from land but also suitable for guerrilla warfare in the event that an organized perimeter could not be held. 2. Alternative Areas: Five different areas, three of them on the mainland of Cuba and two on islands off the coast, were studied carefully to determine whether they would permit an operation fitting the above conditions. One of the areas appears to be eminently suited for the operation. All the others had to be rejected either because of unfavorable geography (notably the absence of a suitable air strip) or heavy concentrations of enemy forces, or both. The area selected is located at the head of a well protected deep water estuary on the south coast of Cuba. It is almost surrounded by swamps impenetrable to infantry in any numbers and entirely impenetrable to vehicles, except along two narrow and easily defended approaches. Although strategically isolated by these terrain features, the area is near the center of the island and the presence of an opposition force there will soon become known to the entire population of Cuba and constitute a serious threat to the regime. The beachhead area contains one and possibly two air strips adequate to handle B-26ʼs. There are several good landing beaches. It is of interest that this area has been the scene of resistance activities and of outright guerrilla warfare for over a hundred years. 3. Phases of the Operation: a. The operation will begin with a night landing. There are no known enemy forces (even police) in the objective area and it is anticipated that the landing can be carried out with few if any casualties and with no serious combat. As many supplies as possible will be unloaded over the beaches but the ships will put to sea in time to be well offshore by dawn. The whole beachhead area including the air strips will be immediately occupied and approach routes defended. No tanks will be brought ashore in the initial landing. It is believed that this operation can be accomplished quite unobtrusively and that the Castro regime will have little idea of the size of the force involved. b. The second phase, preferably commencing at dawn following the landing, will involve the movement into the beachhead of tactical aircraft and their prompt commitment for strikes against the Castro Air Force. Concurrently C-46ʼs will move in with gas in drums, minimal maintenance equipment, and maintenance personnel. As rapidly as possible, the whole tactical air operation will be based in the beachhead but initially only enough aircraft will be based there plausibly to account for all observable activity over the island. c. In the third phase, as soon as there is adequate protection for shipping from enemy air attack, ships will move back into the beach to discharge supplies and equipment (including tanks). It must be presumed that counter attacks against the beachhead will be undertaken within 24 to 48 hours of the landing but the perimeter can easily be held against attacks along the most direct approach routes. The terrain may well prevent any sizable attacks (providing the enemy air force has been rendered ineffective) until the opposition force is ready to attempt to break out of the beachhead. d. The timing and direction of such offensive action will depend upon the course of events in the island. At least three directions of break out are possible. Because of the canalization of the approaches to the beachhead from the interior, a break out will require close support by tactical air to be successful unless enemy forces are thoroughly disorganized. The opposition force will have the option, however, of undertaking an amphibious assault with tactical air support against a different objective area if it should seem desirable. 4. Political Action: The beachhead area proposed to be occupied is both large enough and safe enough so that it should be entirely feasible to install the provisional government there as soon as aircraft can land safely. Once installed, the tempo of the operation will permit the U.S. Government to extend recognition after a decent interval and thus to prepare the way for more open and more extensive logistical support if this should be necessary. 5. Military Advantages: a. This is a safer military operation than the daylight landing in force originally proposed. The landing itself is more likely to be unopposed or very lightly opposed and the beachhead perimeter could be more easily held. b. There are no known communications facilities in the immediate target area. This circumstance, coupled with the plan for a night landing, increases the chance of achieving surprise. c. By comparison with any of the known inaccessible parts of the Oriente Province the objective area is closer to rear bases for air and sea logistical support. d. The plan has the disadvantage that the build up of force can be only gradual since there is virtually no local population from which to recruit additional troops and volunteers from other parts of Cuba will be able to infiltrate into the area only gradually. 6. Political Acceptability: The proposal here outlined fits the three conditions stated in paragraph 1 above for the political acceptability of a paramilitary operation. The landing is unspectacular; no tactical air support will be provided until an air base of sorts is active within the beachhead area; the tempo of the operation is as desired; and the terrain is such as to minimize the risk of defeat and maximize the options open to the opposition force. a. It may be objected that the undertaking of tactical air operations so promptly after the landing is inconsistent with the pattern of a revolution. But most Latin American revolutions in recent years have used aircraft and it is only natural that they would be used in this case as soon as the opposition had secured control of an air strip. Wherever in the island a paramilitary operation is attempted and whatever its tempo, command of the air will sooner or later have to be established, and aircraft will have to be flown into a beachhead to enable this to be done. Sooner or later, then, it is bound to be revealed that the opposition in Cuba has friends outside who are able and willing to supply it with obsolescent combat aircraft. This revelation will be neither surprising nor out of keeping with traditional practice. b. An alternative way to handle this problem would be to make a few strafing runs against the Castro Air Force some days before the landing and apparently as an opposition act unrelated to any other military moves. 7. Conclusion: The operation here outlined, despite the revision of concept to meet the political requirements stated above, will still have a political cost. The study over the past several months of many possible paramilitary operations makes perfectly clear, however, that it is impossible to introduce into Cuba and commit to action military resources that will have a good chance of setting in motion the overthrow of the regime without paying some price in terms of accusations by the Communists and possible criticism by others. It is believed that the plan here outlined goes as far as possible in the direction of minimizing the political cost without impairing its soundness and chance of success as a military operation. The alternative would appear to be the demobilization of the paramilitary force and the return of its members to the United States. It is, of course, well understood that this course of action too involves certain risks.

62. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret. According to a memorandum for the record prepared by General Gray on May 4, Gray briefed the Joint Chiefs for 20 minutes on March 15 on the three concepts outlined in JCSM-166-61. (Ibid.) Washington, March 15, 1961.

JCSM-166-61

SUBJECT Evaluation of the Military Aspects of Alternate Concepts, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba (S) 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have evaluated the military aspects of three alternate concepts for the CIA Para-Military plan for action to effect the overthrow of the Castro Government. The military evaluation of the basic plan was forwarded to you by JCSM-57-61, subject: “Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba”, dated 3 February 1961,Document 35. and the evaluation of the proposed supplementary phase to the basic plan was forwarded to you by JCSM-149-61, subject: “Evaluation of Proposed Supplementary Phase, CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba”, dated 10 March 1961.Document 57. 2. The following CIA alternate concepts of operations were evaluated: a. Alternative I—Original para-military plan, except main landings at night, without benefit of airborne landing or air strikes. See Appendix A hereto for details and evaluation. b. Alternative II—At an objective area on NE coast, employment of airborne company at evening nautical twilight to seize key terrain features astride two separate roads leading into objective area to isolate same; this followed by night debarkation of remainder of Task Force; shipping then departs area prior to daylight; aircraft initiate air operations from airstrip within objective area following day. See Appendix B hereto for details and evaluation. c. Alternative III—At an objective area on the southern coast, amphibious landing of two infantry companies after dark to seize key areas; during the night, land remainder of Task Force; shipping then departs area prior to daylight; aircraft initiate air operations from the airstrips the following day. See Appendix C hereto for details and evaluation. 3. The conclusions of the evaluation of the military aspects of the three alternative concepts are as follows: a. Alternative I—Without the psychological impact of the original concept, together with the difficulties of landing at night in this area and the lack of ability to initiate air operations, the ultimate success of Alternative I is doubtful. b. Alternative II—Even though the Cuban Volunteer Force could be landed and sustained for a minimum of 3 days, the distance from the seat of government, together with the problem of continuous resupply over long distances, causes this course of action to be least likely to accomplish the objective. c. Alternative III has all the prerequisites necessary to successfully establish the Cuban Voluntary Task Force, including air elements, in the objective area and sustain itself with outside logistic support for several weeks; however, inaccessibility of the area may limit the support anticipated from the Cuban populace. d. Of the alternative concepts, Alternative III is considered the most feasible and the most likely to accomplish the objective. e. None of the alternative concepts are considered as feasible and likely to accomplish the objective as the basic para-military plan. 4. It is recommended that: a. The Secretary of Defense support the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the above conclusions. b. The views expressed in the above conclusions be transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence, together with three copies of the Appendices hereto, for his information and consideration. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:L.L. LemnitzerPrinted from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.ChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff Appendix A

Evaluation of the Military Aspects of the Original CIA Paramilitary Plan for Cuba: With the Changes That the Amphibious Landing Will Be Made at Night, Without Benefit of the Airborne Assault, or Air Strikes

1. The concept of the plan is as follows: Following a deception landing on the night of D-1 the Task Force, accompanied by provisional government representation, will invade at night by amphibious landing on the selected beaches. The force will immediately move around the city to occupy the high ground which dominates the objective area. At dawn control of the beachhead area will be established by seizing and organizing four strong points on key terrain along the perimeter which dominates entrance routes into the area. Contact will be established with guerrilla bands in the general area of operations. The small airstrip will be cleared. Every effort will be made to increase the force by local volunteers for which arms will be provided. The force will establish control within the beachhead area and if driven therefrom, will be prepared to withdraw and link with guerrilla forces to continue guerrilla activities. 2. The enemy forces, terrain, beaches, man-made installations and populace, remain the same as set forth in the original plan; the time and space factors remain the same with the exceptions that: a. The amphibious landing will be made at night; b. Immediately upon landing, the force will move around the city to occupy the high ground which dominates the city. Then at dawn they will move out to seize and organize the strong points on key terrain as originally planned; c. The airborne assault and the air strikes will not be conducted. 3. a. Advantages (1) The force will move ashore at night, increasing the possibility of achieving tactical surprise. (2) The landing will be near a mountainous region in the event the force is unable to maintain its lodgement, and it becomes necessary to move out of the beachhead area and conduct guerrilla operations. (3) The landing area is relatively near the seat of government, thereby making it potentially possible to move upon the ultimate objective area in a relatively short period of time. (4) Large numbers of the populace in the landing area are believed to be antagonistic to Castroʼs regime. (5) The beachhead area is considered to be the best area in Cuba for the accomplishment of the Task Force mission. b. Disadvantages: (1) The airstrip is inadequate for B-26 operations. (2) Without benefit of air operations, elements of Castroʼs Air Force would be available for use against the force. These aircraft could make it impossible for the force to hold a lodgement in the beachhead area, or virtually any fixed or exposed position, thereby forcing the volunteers to move into the mountains as a guerrilla force almost immediately. (3) It will be difficult for a force inexperienced in amphibious operations to locate and use the narrow landing beaches at night. 4. Conclusions: a. Despite the disadvantages enumerated above, this concept would provide a fair chance of success in landing and seizing initial objectives. b. The lack of air support and the difficulties of supply at night, or under possible air attack if attempted in daylight, indicate small chance of ultimate success for this concept. Appendix B

Concept of Operation for an Alternate Proposal To Land on the Eastern End of the Island To Accomplish Objectives of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba

1. The concept of operation for landing on the Eastern end of the Island envisages the employment of an airborne company to land during the hours of darkness on D-Day to seize a landing pier in the area together with key terrain features astride two separate roads leading into the area. During the night of D-Day, ships transporting the remainder of the Cuban Volunteer Task Force will dock alongside the landing pier, discharge the personnel and supplies and depart the area prior to daylight. Units of the Task Force will proceed inland, seize an airfield, other strategic terrain features, and establish contact with the Airborne Company to assure protection of the lodgement area. 2. One company of the Cuban military forces is located in the objective area and probably patrols the area. The closest known Cuban Army units which could be used as reinforcements are, one Infantry Battalion and one Field Artillery Battalion located 35 miles away. These units probably could not be assembled and moved to the area in less than 24 hours due to limited transportation available and condition of the roads over which they must travel. 3. The objective area consists of rolling terrain adjacent to the shoreline and backed by swamp lands which extend inland. The terrain features and vegetation can provide adequate protection and concealment for the landing force. Water approaches to the landing pier are protected from the open sea by extensions of land on either side and depth of water will accept all shipping available to the Task Force. However, negotiation of the channels at night will be difficult. a. There are two improved roads leading into the area; however, connection between them consists of unimproved roads and trails. Absence of a well developed road net combined with the swampy terrain will hamper movement of large military forces. b. An airfield is located 1.5 miles Southeast of the proposed landing area. Its description is as follows: Runway dimensions 4000ʼx120ʼ Surface construction is asphalt and oiled sand The field will accept C-47 type aircraft Runway extensibility, 11,000 ft. Operations capabilities are negligible and the field can only be classified as a good all-weather emergency strip. c. Adjacent to the landing pier is a village with approximate population of 18,000. The rural area adjacent thereto is underdeveloped and sparsely populated. Attitude of the local populace toward the Castro Government is not known, however, due to the remoteness of the area it may be assumed that a neutral attitude would prevail during the initial phases of the operation. 4. Conclusions a. The selected objective area, drop zones and landing piers are suitable and adequate for the proposed operation. b. The known or expected location of Cuban Military Forces indicates that complete surprise may not be attained. c. Operational capabilities of the airfield in the area are negligible and can be classified as only a good all weather emergency strip. d. Given the opportunity to seize its proposed objectives, the Task Force will have the capability to sustain itself without resupply for a minimum of 3 days. e. A landing in this area would be so far removed from the seat of Government it is doubtful that the desired psychological effect on the Cuban people would be attained. f. If the Task Force is required to abandon its primary mission, evacuation by sea could probably be accomplished or elements of the force could continue to operate as guerrilla units in the area. The mountainous area approximately 10 miles inland is considered suitable for guerrilla operations. g. This operation would be difficult to support from a logistic standpoint. h. The disadvantages outweigh the advantages of this proposed course of action. Appendix C

Concept of an Alternate Proposal To Land on an Objective Area on the Southern Coast

1. Concept: Under cover of darkness, two companies will land over the two beaches at the head of the bay, rapidly move inland, seize their assigned objectives, and prepare to defend them. A small combat outpost will be landed on the east side of the entrance to the bay to provide warning and block the coast road from the east. A combat outpost will be established to close the road across the swamp to the west of the landing beaches. The remaining four companies will be landed prior to dawn and will proceed to their assigned objectives. All boats will withdraw to sea and be clear of the area prior to daylight. At daylight, B-26 aircraft will land on the seized airfield or airfields and conduct air operations from these locations immediately thereafter. 2. Enemy Forces: There are no known enemy forces in the objective area, although it is probable that militia patrols maintain surveillance over the coast road. The nearest concentration of Cuban Rebel Army forces are located at Managua, near Havana, and at Santa Clara. Rural police posts are located in the villages and towns, but their capability is limited to employment in small groups using small arms. The nearest sizable militia unit is located at Cienfuegos, but there may be smaller militia elements as close as ten miles from the landing beaches. 3. Terrain: The terrain in the objective area is flat, swamp land covered with a dense growth of mangrove, except for a strip east of the landing beaches. This strip rises from 5 to 30 feet above mean sea level and is covered with scrub growth and high savanna grass. Entry into and exit from the area is confined to the established roads and a single track narrow gauge railroad bed. Trafficability off roads is poor except that foot troops may move with difficulty. There are approximately seven possible exits from the area to the north and west. 4. Beaches: The bay has a number of usable beaches located along the east shore, but the best are at the head of the bay. The two beaches selected are each approximately 400 yards long and have easy exits to the coast road which skirts the bay. Seaward approaches are clear and deep water extends to within a few yards of the shore. Beach gradients from available photography appear to be suitable for dry-ramp landings of personnel and light vehicles. 5. Man-Made Installations: There are two airfields in the area, one firmly packed sod strip, carried as approximately 4000 feet long and the other a newly constructed packed coral and sand strip approximately 6000 feet long. Recently it has been reported that the sod strip is being lengthened to over 6000 feet. Both strips are currently in various stages of construction. There has been considerable road building noted in this area in the past year. The coast road has been widened and resurfaced with a concrete surface. A new road has been constructed across the eastern portion of the swamp, but this road has not yet intersected the coast road. There are no roads to the west. 6. Attitude of Populace: The objective area is very sparsely settled with no towns or villages of any size. A few scattered houses, not closely grouped, comprise the only habitations in the area. The attitude of the populace vis-a-vis Castro is unknown. 7. Time and Space Factors: Due to the sparse population, tele-communications in the area are probably poor or non-existent. The area has been an historically suitable guerrilla area. Reaction time for the Cuban Rebel Armed Forces is probably greater than elsewhere on the island due to the distance to be covered, the nature of the terrain, and the relatively poor road net. However, the area is within range of suitable positions for Cuban heavy artillery (122 mm gun). Observation of fire would be restricted to aerial observation by aircraft. 8. Advantages and Disadvantages: a. Advantages (1) Two probably usable airfields are in the area. (2) A remote and inaccessible area making reaction against the invasion force slow and difficult. (3) No known Cuban armed forces in the area. (4) Swampy terrain would prevent the use of armor against the invasion force except tank gun fire. (5) Defectors could join the invasion force, however with difficulty. A small band (approximately 100) of guerrillas are close to the area. (6) Surprise could probably be achieved if operation was carefully timed. (7) Relatively close to the seat of government for the resulting psychological effect on the Cuban people. b. Disadvantages (1) Resupply, including food, must come from outside Cuba. (2) Exits from objective area could be sealed off and prevent expansion of operations. (3) Firm ground in area is within range of suitable heavy artillery positions. (4) No sizable immediate help could be expected from the local populace. (5) No civilian hospital facilities available. (6) All supply must be across the beach. 9. Conclusions: a. In the absence of significant enemy forces in the area, the invasion force can be landed successfully in the objective area and can be sustained in the area provided resupply of essential items is accomplished. b. The area meets the requirements imposed including the availability of an airfield, suitability for a clandestine landing, and possibly suitable for extending operations to cause the downfall of Castro.

63. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Secret. Washington, March 15, 1961. SUBJECT Cuba 1.

Free elections statement. Tom Mann, on further consideration, has backed away from the idea of a demarche on free elections. He argues that the risk is too great that Castro might accept the challenge, stage ostensibly free elections, win by a large majority and thereafter claim popular sanction for his regime. Mann points out that a genuinely free election requires more than freedom of balloting; it requires freedom of press and assembly for some months prior to the election. Without such prior freedom from intimidation, the election itself will not be genuinely free, even with OAS supervision of the actual voting process.

I agree with this view. It does seem to me that setting up free elections as a test might give Castro an opportunity to put on a show and recover prestige.

White Paper. I am at work on a White Paper on Cuba. I wonder, however, whether we should not consider issuing at the same time a White Paper on the Dominican Republic. This would emphasize the fact that our opposition is to dictatorship in principle and not just to dictatorships which expropriate US business. Tom Mann agrees that it might be a good idea to issue a simultaneous White Paper on the Dominican Republic.

If you agree, let me know, and I will get someone at State to start putting the material together.

Cuban policy. I thought your response to the proposals submitted last SaturdayMarch 11. See Document 59. was absolutely right. The trouble with the operation is that the less the military risk, the greater the political risk, and vice versa. It seems to me that the utilization of the men under conditions of minimum political risk is clearly the thing to aim at.

I had the impression that the military aspects of the problem had received more thoughtful attention than the political aspects. It did not seem to me that the political risks had been adequately assessed or that convincing plans had been laid to minimize them. For example, it was not clear that anyone had thought through the question of our public response if the operation should be undertaken. Do we take the public position that it is a spontaneous Cuban enterprise? Do you say in your press conference, for example, that the US had nothing to do with it? Do we swear this in the United Nations? What happens then when Castro produces a couple of prisoners who testify that they were armed, trained and briefed by Americans? Do we continue to deny this? or change our original story?

It would seem to me absolutely essential to work out in advance a consistent line which can hold for every conceivable contingency. Otherwise we will find ourselves in a new U-2 imbroglio, with the government either changing its story midstream or else clinging to a position which the rest of the world will regard as a lie.

I should add that there seems to me a slight danger of our being rushed into something because CIA has on its hands a band of people it doesnʼt quite know what to do with. When you were out of the room, Allen Dulles said, “Donʼt forget that we have a disposal problem. If we have to take these men out of Guatemala, we will have to transfer them to the US, and we canʼt have them wandering around the country telling everyone what they have been doing.” Obviously this is a genuine problem, but it canʼt be permitted to govern US policy.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

64. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Top Secret. Washington, March 15, 1961. SUBJECT Meeting on Cuba, 4:00 PM, March 15, 1961

CIA will present a revised plan for the Cuban operation.See Documents 65 and 66. They have done a remarkable job of reframing the landing plan so as to make it unspectacular and quiet, and plausibly Cuban in its essentials.

The one major problem which remains is the air battle. I think there is unanimous agreement that at some stage the Castro Air Force must be removed. It is a very sketchy force, in very poor shape at the present, and Colonel Hawkins (Bissellʼs military brain) thinks it can be removed by six to eight simultaneous sorties of B-26s. These will be undertaken by Cuban pilots in planes with Cuban Air Force markings. This is the only really noisy enterprise that remains.

My own belief is that this air battle has to come sooner or later, and that the longer we put it off, the harder it will be. Castroʼs Air Force is currently his Achillesʼ heel, but he is making drastic efforts to strengthen it with Russian planes and Russian-trained pilots.

Even the revised landing plan depends strongly upon prompt action against Castroʼs air. The question in my mind is whether we cannot solve this problem by having the air strike come some little time before the invasion. A group of patriotic airplanes flying from Nicaraguan bases might knock out Castroʼs Air Force in a single day without anyone knowing (for some time) where they came from, and with nothing to prove that it was not an interior rebellion by the Cuban Air Force, which has been of very doubtful loyalty in the past; the pilots will in fact be members of the Cuban Air Force who went into the opposition some time ago. Then the invasion could come as a separate enterprise, and neither the air strike nor the quiet landing of patriots would in itself give Castro anything to take to the United Nations.

I have been a skeptic about Bissellʼs operation, but now I think we are on the edge of a good answer. I also think that Bissell and Hawkins have done an honorable job of meeting the proper criticisms and cautions of the Department of State.

McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

65. Editorial Note

According to summary notes prepared by General Gray, CIA officials returned to the White House on March 15, 1961, to present a revised plan for the operation against Cuba; see Document 64. The Presidentʼs appointment book indicates that the meeting took place from 4:30 to 5:45 p.m. The meeting was attended by Vice President Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Mann, Berle, Dulles, Bissell, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, and Gray. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) Although not listed in the appointment book, it is likely that at least one member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, probably General Lemnitzer or Admiral Burke, also attended. According to Grayʼs notes on the meeting:

“At this meeting the Zapata plan was presented to the President and a full-length discussion of it followed. The President expressed the belief that uprisings all along the island would be better than to concentrate and strike. The President asked how soon it was intended to break out from this area and Mr. Bissell stated that not before about D+10. The President was also concerned about ability to extricate the forces. The President did not like the idea of the dawn landing and felt that in order to make this appear as an inside guerrilla-type operation, the ships should be clear of the area by dawn. He directed that this planning be reviewed and another meeting be held the following morning.” (Summary notes prepared on May 9, 1961; Kennedy Library, National Security File, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

66. Editorial Note

On March 16, 1961, CIA officials outlined for President Kennedy the revisions to the Zapata plan that the President had called for on the previous day. The Presidentʼs appointment book indicates that the meeting took place in the White House from 4:15 to 5:23 p.m. The meeting was attended by Vice President Johnson, McNamara, Rusk, Mann, Berle, Dulles, Bissell, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, and Gray. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) Although not listed in the appointment book, it is clear from his subsequent debriefing on the meeting that Admiral Burke also attended. According to Grayʼs notes on the meeting:

“At meeting with the President, CIA presented revised concepts for the landing at Zapata wherein there would be air drops at first light with the landing at night and all of the ships away from the objective area by dawn. The President decided to go ahead with the Zapata planning; to see what we could do about increasing support to the guerrillas inside the country; to interrogate one member of the force to determine what he knows; and he reserved the right to call off the plan even up to 24 hours prior to the landing.” (Summary notes prepared on May 9, 1961, by General Gray; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

On March 17 Admiral Burke provided the JCS with additional details about the discussion of the revised Zapata plan. According to Burke, the President wanted to know what the consequences would be if the operation failed. He asked Burke how he viewed the operationʼs chance of success. Burke indicated that he had given the President a probability figure of about 50 percent. President Kennedy also inquired what would happen if it developed after the invasion that the Cuban exile force were pinned down and being slaughtered on the beach. If they were to be re-embarked, the President wanted to know where they could be taken. According to Burkeʼs account of the meeting: “It was decided they would not be re-embarked because there was no place to go. Once they were landed they were there.” In the course of the discussion, it was emphasized that the plan was dependent on a general uprising in Cuba, and that the entire operation would fail without such an uprising. (Review of Record of Proceedings Related to Cuban Situation, May 5; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

67. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in ArgentinaSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-1861. Official Use Only. Drafted on March 17 in ARA by C.A. Boonstra and Mann. Cleared in CMA, RPA, in substance with Berle, and by Rusk. Washington, March 18, 1961, 11:57 a.m.

1295. Verbatim Text. Proposed reply from Secretary to FonMin: “I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellencyʼs telegram of March 4Document 53. concerning your reply of that date to the note of February 23 from the Minister of Foreign Relations of Cuba.See footnote 1, Document 52.

The United States is pleased always to have the views of the Government of the Argentine Republic not only because of the attachment of our two governments to common principles of freedom but also because of the forthright and constructive stand which Your Excellencyʼs Government has consistently taken in defense of constitutional democracy and spiritual and material progress of the peoples of the Americas.

I know that Your Excellencyʼs Government shares fully with the Government of the United States the desire to see the people of Cuba advancing side by side with the peoples of all of the Americas under the banner of human dignity in a great hemisphere movement of economic development and social progress. I venture to express the belief also that Your Excellencyʼs Government recognizes the reality of the capture of the Cuban revolution by the Sino-Soviet bloc and that its concern with respect to this development motivated Your Excellencyʼs telegram of March 4 to me.

If the Government of Cuba should decide to separate itself, in fact as well as in theory, from the imperialistic ambitions of the Sino-Soviet bloc; if it should decide to honor, by its deeds as well as its words, its inter-American commitments and to make it possible for Cuba to regain its historic place within the inter-American family, this would indeed be a cause for deep satisfaction on the part of the Government and people of the United States. If the Government of the Argentine Republic should find it possible to determine whether the Government of Cuba is disposed to take effective steps to achieve these results, the Government of the United States, after such a determination, would be pleased to have the opportunity to discuss with Your Excellencyʼs Government this hemisphere problem.The Embassy reported in telegram 1136 from Buenos Aires, March 22, that Ambassador Rubottom delivered the message transmitted in telegram 1295 to Foreign Minister Taboada. Taboada made no direct response to the Secretaryʼs message, but stated that Argentina had not changed its attitude toward Cuba, and continued to align itself with the United States on major issues. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-2261) The Embassy had reported earlier, in telegram 1043 from Buenos Aires, March 9, that Cuba had accepted the Argentine offer of good offices, and that the Argentine Government had released the text of the Cuban response to the press. (Ibid., 737.00/3-961)

Accept, etc.”

Rusk

68. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba 1961, Box 31. Secret. Washington, March 20, 1961. 1.

CIA expects agreement on a selection of a Prime Minister tonight. Manuel Ray, the liberal leader, has indicated that he will back Miro Cardona, which makes the latterʼs selection almost certain. The group will then go ahead and pick up a cabinet.

The group may very likely make an announcement on its own almost immediately. I suggested that some liberal newspaperman, like Arnold Beichmann, be put in charge of its public relations. Everything possible ought to be done in the next few weeks to build up the status and dignity of the Government-in-exile as a functioning organization.

2. On the question of timing of the US White Paper,See Document 79. both Mann and Tracy Barnes (CIA) think that it should not come on the heels of the Government-in-exile. Barnes feels that the Government-in-exile must be given a little time to take root on its own. Mann feels in addition that the White Paper would constitute, in effect, a rejection of the recent Argentine demarche;See Document 53. the State Department has been warned that this might lead to an overthrow of the Frondizi government; so Mann would much rather delay the White Paper until there is time to compose the Argentine situation. We should have the draft in nearly final form by Friday;March 24. but release ought to be delayed, it is presently felt, until the end of the month. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

69. Memorandum From the Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) for Covert Operations (Barnes) to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Exiles, 1961. Secret. Washington, March 21, 1961. SUBJECT [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Political Events

The following events and actions have occurred over the weekend and yesterday in Miami. Since the procedures have been pretty rapid-fire and since the parties of interest are moving about at the moment, there are a few points which cannot be definitively stated: 1. A meeting was held on Saturday evening, 18 March, attended by 13 of the 15 members of the FRD (the 2 not present were Goar Mestre and Pepin Bosch) both of whom were out of town), plus 5 non-members of the FRD, i.e. Manolo Ray plus 4 other members of his MRP Party; namely, Dr. Felipe Pazos, Jorge Beruff and two brothers, Armando Lora and Raul Lora. For your information the following is the total membership of the expanded FRD with the names of the five original members underlined. Left Left of center Center Right Carrillo Artime Varona Maceo Jesus Fernandez (Labor, 30 Nov) Collada (Labor for Fraginals) Rasco Vargas Gomez Fernadez Travieso Carlos Hevia Miro Cardona (Student for Muller) Goar Mestre Alvarez Diaz Sergio Carbo Pepin Bosch

2. You will remember that it was agreed as a result of a number of meetings between Tony Varona, representing the FRD, and Manolo Ray, the principal non-FRD political leader, that the following procedure should be adopted in the formation of an exile political government: a. A chairman of a revolutionary council should be selected who, in turn, would select the main membership of the council. After establishment in Cuba, such council would be transformed into a provisional government with the chairman as the president. b. The selection of the chairman was to be from a panel of six candidates whose names were chosen by an organization committee of six individuals agreed to by Ray and Varona. The two leading candidates were Miro Cardona and Felipe Pazos. 3. After the above Ray/Varona agreements, the Cuban exile groups swung somewhat against Ray with the result that the five-man FRD headed by Varona was expanded to fifteen members in an effort to strengthen Varonaʼs position. 4. At our request, the enlarged FRD agreed to go ahead with the selection of a chairman of the revolutionary council and to include in this process Ray and some of his MRP Party associates. The result was the meeting of 18 Cubans referred to in para. 1 above. Our representative opened the meeting with a prepared speech urging unity, asking the Cubans to assume responsibility in this important task and requesting that a chairman be selected by Monday night, 20 March. He then left the meeting. After two long sessions, the meeting, with everyone voting, unanimously selected Miro Cardona. 5. Miro Cardona is presently on his way to New York accompanied by Tony Varona, Justo Carrillo, Artime, all original members of the FRD; plus Manolo Ray and two of his MRP Party, Felipe Pazos and Raul Chibas. In addition, Rojas, the former Cuban Ambassador to London, is accompanying the party as interpreter. The purpose of the trip is to announce officially the election of Miro Cardona and the formation of a Revolutionary Council. Presumably all of those accompanying Miro Cardona, with the possible exception of Rojas, are members of the Council although this has not been definitively confirmed nor do we have any indication, if they are members, as to whether they have any assigned portfolio. The Miami Herald ran a small story yesterday on the proceedings but it was a pure news story and not in any sense an announcement. 6. We understand that the New York release will also include a statement of principles which is expected to be very close to the points agreed to by Ray and Varona in their talks referred above. A copy of these points is attached. You will remember that they were known to Mr. Berleʼs State Department Task Force and considered acceptable.

C. Tracy BarnesPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.A/DDP/A Attachment A. Overthrow of Castro and return to law and order. B. Re-establishment of Constitution of 1940 with certain amendments. C. Holding of general elections in eighteen months. D. The Provisional President will be ineligible to run for elective office in first general elections. E. Adoption of economic policies designed to increase the national income and raise the standard of living. F. Stimulation of investments of private capital, both national and foreign, and guarantee free initiative and private ownership in its broadest concept of social function. G. Establishment of an Agrarian Program which will give full title to the peasants and at the same time provide the former owner a fair price in duly guaranteed bonds. H. Restore to their legitimate owners the properties seized by the Castro Government, with exception of certain public utilities and other properties which the State considers expropriable in the national interest. I. Dissolve the Militia. J. Amnesty for political prisoners. K. Illegalization of the Communist Party and eradication of Communism and all anti-democratic activity. L. Denunciation of international agreements and treaties which undermine the national sovereignty and place the peace and security of the hemisphere in danger. Immediate resumption of traditional relations with the democratic countries of the world and the fulfillment of legitimate international pacts.

70. Memorandum From Gerald P. Lamberty of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs to the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Hurwitch)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-2261. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Lamberty worked in the economic section of the Embassy in Havana until it was closed in January. Thereafter, he and a number of the other members of the Embassy staff were transferred to an office of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, which was established in Miami to maintain liaison with the Cuban exile community. Miami, March 22, 1961. SUBJECT Miscellaneous Comments on Local Situation

A well-informed, reliable source, who would prefer to remain unnamed, passed on the following information: 1) The Cubans are up in arms about Mr. B.Frank Bender. So are some Americans. The complaints are that he is high-handed, refuses to think beyond the military phase, is impatient with economic or political problems, knows nothing about Cuba or Cubans, and speaks with a German accent. There are also complaints he plays favorites and boasts he can make or break any organization or leader. 2)

Artime is a growing power. Artimeʼs rivals claim he has two main pillars of support—the Jesuits and Mr. B.

Mr. B. is supposed to like Artime because the latter talks military problems rather than political. Mr. B. is supposed to be much more interested in the military aspects of the situation, and thus prefers Artime to his more politically minded companions.

Cubans, including Varona and Miro Cardona, argue that this attitude permitted Castro and the Communists to come to power—that everyone thought that once Batista was out everything would be fine. All Cuban leaders try to explain this to Mr. B. except Artime.

One example of favoritism cited is that when Varona finally was given permission to visit the camps, Artime went along with him, while no other leaders were permitted to go.

Opponents of Artime claim he is trying to make up for his lack of a military organization or mass support by tapping the one source of Cuban manpower that is not being used—the Batistianos. These opponents say some Batistianos already have been recruited for the camps.

Miro Cardona was extremely elated following the meeting of March 20 which named him to head the new Revolutionary Council. Miro is quoted as saying “the meeting today will go down as one of the brilliant pages of Cuban history.”

Miro said it appears that all difficulties are being ironed out within the Frente and the MRP and between the two groups and that the meeting to be held in New York will probably merely be a formality to put the final stamp on agreements which have already been reached.

Miro said agents who had just arrived from Cuba sat in on the meeting at the Frente, and brought a “vote of confidence” from the underground in the program being pursued here, and in the men who are pursuing it. They also brought a call for the exiles to hurry the attack on Castro.

Miro said “I smell something. The whole thing is coming very fast. It is jumping, not walking.”

4) A writer and photographer from Life Magazine are trying to make arrangements to go into Cuba with a small guerrilla unit when the push comes. They already have brought their gear. 5) Many Cuban politicians and diplomats are going into the secret training camps for Cuban guerrillas. They are determined to carry guns in the planned attack on Castroʼs Cuba. Their reason is their conviction that only those who fight Castro actively, with guns will be listened to by the Cuban people after Castro is gone. Ambassador Guillermo Salazar, who represented Castro in Bern, left for camp on Monday, March 13, to serve as a medical doctor with the troops when they go into Cuba. Ambassador Sergio Rojas Santamaria, who served in London, is leaving within a few days.

71. Editorial Note

The Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road, maintained in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, indicates that the initial meeting of the inter-agency Working Group established to coordinate planning on the Zapata operation was held on March 22, 1961:

“The first meeting of the official Working Group which consisted of Gen Gray representing the DOD, Mr. Braddock representing State, and Mr. Barnes representing CIA. This group was given the responsibility by the President at the last meeting to coordinate interdepartmental planning and operations for the conduct of ‘Bumpy Road.ʼ At this meeting, Gen Gray presented a suggested outline operation plan for the agreed upon course of action. It was agreed, however, that time did not permit full implementation of a plan. However, this Working Group would draw up an agreed list of tasks to be accomplished by the agencies concerned and submit same to their bosses for approval.” (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

72. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. CM-154-61 Washington, March 25, 1961. SUBJECT Tasks, Para-Military Plan, Cuba 1. Recommend you approve the enclosed memorandum which sets forth the tasks to be accomplished by the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency Representatives charged with the coordination of planning and conduct of the subject plan.According to the Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road, maintained in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, on March 28 McNamara approved the agreed list of tasks to be accomplished by the Department of Defense, as outlined in CM-154-61. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) The memorandum includes a time schedule for the completion of tasks set forth for the Pre-D-Day Phase. 2. In accordance with your desires, Brigadier General David W. Gray, USA, Chief, Subsidiary Activities Division, J-5, the Joint Staff, has been designated the DOD Representative and has been directed to keep your office informed on the status of plans and operations. L.L. LemnitzerPrinted from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original. Enclosure Washington, March 23, 1961. MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Director of Central Intelligence Agency FROM Tasks, Para-Military Plan, Cuba 1. The Working Group assigned to work out the detailed tasks for the planning and conduct of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, and act as members of a Central Office for the operation, has agreed upon the tasks to be accomplished by the representatives of your respective departments and agency. The tasks are set forth for three phases: Pre-D-Day Phase; D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition; and Post-Recognition Phase. 2. The tasks for the Pre-D-Day Phase are set forth in Enclosure A hereto. 3. The tasks for the D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase until Recognition are set forth in Enclosure B hereto. 4. The tasks for the Post-Recognition Phase are set forth in Enclosure C hereto. 5. The proposed time schedule for the Pre-D-Day Phase is attached as Enclosure D hereto. Department of State RepresentativeDepartment of Defense RepresentativeCIA Representative Enclosure A

PRE-D-DAY PHASE

1. Department of State representatives will: a. Prepare White Paper for Presidential approval. b. Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material for Presidential statements. c. Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what “recognition” really means. d.

Determine action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to Latin American countries—e.g. (1) Guatemala (2) Nicaragua

and other countries, e.g. (1) United Kingdom (2) France

e. Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the development of the Free Cuba Government. f. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, including possible action in the United Nations or in the Organization of American States. g. Prepare plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established. h. Provide policy guidance to USIA to support this plan. i. Prepare plan for Post-D-Day actions. 2. Department of Defense representatives will: a. Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CIA. b. Prepare logistics plans for arms, ammunition, and equipment support beyond the capabilities of the initial CIA logistics support. c. Prepare plans for provision of support from operational forces as required. d. Prepare letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and CONAD for support of this operation. e. Keep CINCLANT planners informed. 3. CIA representatives will: a. Establish a Central Office from which Executive Department and Agency representatives will coordinate planning and conduct operations. b. Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and required. c. Assist in the organization of a Free Cuba Government. d. Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts and provide information to the President as soon as possible. e. Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Volunteer Force in Cuba and follow up plans. Execute these plans on order. f. Continue to recruit, train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force. g. Prepare detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition, establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible. h. Exert effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel. (N.B: The defection of the military commander of the Isle of Pines, or at least officers who could control the Isle, would be particularly desirable.) i. Continue detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America particularly his efforts to export revolution. j. Support the preparation of a White Paper to be issued by the Free Cuba Government. k. Review cover plans. l. Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support requirements. m. Review and implement a pre-D-Day psychological warfare plan. n. Review Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and Post-D-Day Phase. o. Intensify UW activities in Cuba. Enclosure B

D-DAY AND POST-D-DAY PHASE UNTIL RECOGNITION

1. Department of State representatives will: a. Take such steps as may be feasible for the protection of U.S. citizens in Cuba. b. Execute plans for support of the Revolutionary Council or Free Cuba Government in the United Nations or Organization of American States and to counter communist and/or Castro charges in the United Nations or Organization of American States, as appropriate. c. Lend support to the objectives and actions of the Cuban Volunteer Force and the Free Cuba Government. d. Revise plans as necessary for support of the Free Cuba Government. e. Recognize Free Cuba Government as appropriate. 2. Department of Defense representatives will: a. Provide follow-up logistic support as requested by CIA and/or in accordance with logistics plan. b. Provide support from operational forces as directed. c. Prepare detailed plans to support the U.S. aid plan for the Free Cuba Government for implementation when overt support is given. d. Coordinate support by DOD agencies and commands. 3. CIA representatives will: a. Execute and support over-all para-military plan. b. Inform DOD representatives of logistics requirements. c. Continue execution of psychological warfare plan. d. Be responsible for the continuous operation of the Central Office and present briefings of the situation as required or directed. e. Introduce representatives of the Revolutionary Council and of the Free Cuba Government into Cuba at an appropriate time. Enclosure C

POST RECOGNITION PHASE

The Departments and the Agency will prepare, coordinate and execute, as appropriate, such contingency plans as may be required and will, moreover, plan for the resumption of their regularly assigned functions in relation to the new Cuban government.

Enclosure D

TIME SCHEDULE

1. D-14 a. Department of State Representatives: (1) Complete White Paper for Presidential approval. (2) Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the Free Cuba Government (continuous). b. Department of Defense Representatives: (1) Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CIA. c. CIA Representatives: (1) Establish a Central Office. (2) Continue to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible and required (continuous). (3) Assist in organization of Free Cuba Government. (4) Continue to train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force. (5) Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support requirements (continuous). (6) Intensify UW activities in Cuba. 2. D-11 a. Department of State Representatives: (1) Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material for Presidential statements (continuous). (2) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established. 3. D-10 a. DOD Representatives: (1) Complete letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and CONAD for support of this operation. 4. D-9 a. Department of State Representatives: (1) Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what “recognition” really means. (2) Have approved policy position regarding action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to foreign countries. (3) Complete plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, etc. (4) Complete plans for Post-D-Day actions. b. DOD Representatives: (1) Complete logistics plans for DOD follow-up support. c. CIA Representatives: (1) Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Cuban Volunteer Force. (2) Complete detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition and for establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible. (3) Initiate effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel. (4) Complete review and implement a pre-D-Day Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and post-D-Day phase. (5) Complete review of Psychological Warfare Plan for D-Day and post-D-Day phase. 5. D-8 a. CIA Representatives: (1) Complete support of a White Paper to be issued by the Free Cuba Government and arrange to have that Government issue same. 6. D-7 a. CIA Representatives: (1) Complete review of cover plans. 7. D-6 a. CIA Representatives: (1) Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts and provide information to the President as soon as possible. 8. D-5 a. DOD Representatives: (1) Brief CINCLANT and CONAD planners. b. CIA Representatives: (1) Complete contingency plan for the disposition, if necessary, of the Cuban Volunteer Force. (2) Complete preparation of final briefing on entire operation. 9. D-3 a. Department of State Representatives: (1) Provide policy guidance to USIA to support this plan. b. CIA Representatives: (1) Complete detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America. 10. D-2 a. DOD Representatives: (1) Complete plans for provision of support from operational forces as required. b. CIA Representatives: (1) Present final briefing on entire operation (if not given prior to this date).

73. Memorandum From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Sensitive; Limited Distribution. Norfolk, Virginia, March 28, 1961. SUBJ CIA Operation Crosspatch REF (a) Your memo CM-152-61 of 24 Mar 1961Not found. 1. I will be prepared to execute the missions directed in enclosures A, B and C of reference (a). I will be prepared also to reinforce the Naval Base at Guantanamo with a reinforced Marine Battalion Landing Team from the Caribbean Amphibious Squadron. 2. I intend to provide at least two destroyers instead of one for the convoy. The purpose of providing two is for mutual support, defense against possible coordinated surface and air attack, and in case units of the convoy become separated. 3. The following is a summary of forces in the area and their planned employment: a. The antisubmarine carrier Essex with seven destroyers is scheduled to be conducting ASW operations in the Gulf of Mexico during the period 3-18 April. About 7 April a squadron of jet aircraft will be flown aboard Essex. The ASW group will then proceed to an area southwest of Cuba. The convoy destroyers and combat air patrol will be provided from this group. The control of the combat air patrol may be exercised from the ships best situated and equipped at the time and as directed by the Commander of the ASW Group or Essex. b. There will be 18 destroyer types conducting routine training operations in the Guantanamo area during the two week period commencing 3 April. c. PHIBRON-2 with BLT 1/6 embarked will be operating in the area south of Guantanamo preceding a scheduled visit to Jamaica 13 April. d. One jet fighter or attack squadron will be conducting routine training operations in the vicinity of each of the following bases: Guantanamo Key West 4. I request that the JCS inform CINCNORAD of these plans in order that Florida may be protected from possible retaliatory attack. 5. There is a necessity for issuing specific “rules of engagement” orders to units involved. Therefore, with your concurrence, I intend to issue the following instructions: a. In executing the destroyer mission a DD commanding officer will: (1) Place his ship between the convoy and any suspicious or Cuban surface craft sighted. (2) Warn the craft not to approach within gun range of the convoy. (3) If the surface craft persists in closing the convoy, fire a warning shot across his bow. (4) If he continues to close the convoy to 2000 yards or he opens fire on the convoy, open fire on him, persisting until he surrenders, retires, or is destroyed. b. In executing the combat air patrol mission pilots and air controllers will be instructed as follows: (1) Any unidentified aircraft approaching within radar range of the convoy and closing will be investigated. (2) If investigation reveals the aircraft to be Cuban the investigating aircraft will make successive close passes ensuring that the Cuban aircraft is aware of his presence. (3) If Cuban aircraft maintains course to close the convoy CAP will continue to make close passes in an attempt to divert. (4) If Cuban aircraft insists in closing and takes position to attack the convoy it will be fired on until it retires or is destroyed. 6. It is noted that the subject of your memorandum is “CIA Operation Crosspatch.” Since a number of my staff and various others in the Atlantic Command associate this code name with establishment of Swan Island radio last year it is suggested that this term not be used by DOD personnel when referring to the current operation.Crosspatch was the early CIA operational name for what later became known as Operation Bumpy Road. The operation codename was changed to Bumpy Road effective April 1 at the request of the Department of the Navy. (JCS 2304/26, April 1, Tab B, Annex 29, Taylor Report Part III; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)/2/ Robert L. Dennison

74. Editorial Note

On March 29, 1961, President Kennedy held a meeting at the White House at 4:15 p.m. and discussed the Zapata plan for over an hour with McGeorge Bundy, McNamara, Dulles, Bissell, Bowles, Mann, Schles-inger, and William Bundy. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) Although not listed in the appointment book, it is clear from the notes taken at the meeting that General Lemnitzer and General Gray also attended the meeting. According to summary notes on the meeting prepared by General Gray on May 9:

“Mr. Bissell discussed the results of photo reconnaissance, the possible use of a small diversionary force of 150 and a plan to obtain key defections. The President inquired whether there had been any statements by Castro indicating knowledge of the plan and answer was in the negative. Mr. Bissell presented the plan as to the disposal of the force in the event the operation was cancelled. The general idea was to bring the force into Belle Chase, debrief them, give them leave and then reassemble those who wished to continue at some other training base. The President also questioned whether the force could fade into the brush and not look like a failure and also the possibilities of diverting the force while still at sea. Mr. Bissell indicated that if the operation failed, the force would probably have to be withdrawn. At this meeting the tentative D-Day of 5 April was postponed and the next tentative date set as 10 April. The next decision meeting was set as 4 April.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

General Lemnitzerʼs notes on the meeting list, under the heading of main developments, “change in timing, later at night, ships do not approach until after dark, build-up of small para-mil force—diversionary—east end,” and “Cover plan. If failure—must be re-landed in Cuba.” (National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Notes, Miscellaneous Meetings, 1961)

Secretary of Defense McNamara later recalled that the President issued instructions at this meeting that prior to the invasion the brigade leaders were to be informed that U.S. strike forces would not be allowed to participate in or support the invasion in any way. McNamara wrote that Kennedy asked that the brigade leaders be queried as to whether they believed the operation would be successful with this restriction and whether they wished on that basis to proceed. McNamara recalled that the President was subsequently informed that the brigade leaders indicated that, despite the prohibition on the use of U.S. strike forces, they wished to proceed with the invasion. McNamara noted that his recollection of these details was confirmed in discussions with McGeorge Bundy and Bissell. (Notes Relating to Instructions on Bay of Pigs Invasion, February 9, 1963; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files:FRC 71 A 3470, Cuba)

75. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Yale University, Bowles Papers, Box 300, Mansfield, Folder 536. No classification marking. Washington, March 31, 1961.

On Tuesday, April 4th, a meeting will be held at the White House at which a decision will be reached on the Cuban adventure.

During your absence I have had an opportunity to become better acquainted with the proposal, and I find it profoundly disturbing.

Let me frankly say, however, that I am not a wholly objective judge of the practical aspects.

In considerable degree, my concern stems from a deep personal conviction that our national interests are poorly served by a covert operation of this kind at a time when our new President is effectively appealing to world opinion on the basis of high principle.

Even in our imperfect world, the differences which distinguish us from the Russians are of vital importance. This is true not only in a moral sense but in the practical effect of these differences on our capacity to rally the non-Communist world in behalf of our traditional democratic objectives.

In saying this, I do not overlook the ruthless nature of the struggle in which we are involved, nor do I ignore the need on occasion for action which is expedient and distasteful. Yet I cannot persuade myself that means can be wholly divorced from ends—even within the context of the Cold War.

Against this background, let me suggest several points which I earnestly hope will be fully taken into account in reaching the final decision.

In sponsoring the Cuban operation, for instance, we would be deliberately violating the fundamental obligations we assumed in the Act of Bogota establishing the Organization of American States. The Act provides:

“No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.

“No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.

“The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever … .”

I think it fair to say that these articles, signalling an end of US unilateralism, comprise the central features of the OAS from the point of view of the Latin American countries.

To act deliberately in defiance of these obligations would deal a blow to the Inter-American System from which I doubt it would soon recover. The suggestion that Cuba has somehow “removed itself” from the System is a transparent rationalization for the exercise of our own will.

More generally, the United States is the leading force in and substantial beneficiary of a network of treaties and alliances stretching around the world. That these treaty obligations should be recognized as binding in law and conscience is the condition not only of a lawful and orderly world, but of the mobilization of our own power.

We cannot expect the benefits of this regime of treaties if we are unwilling to accept the limitations it imposes upon our freedom to act.

Those most familiar with the Cuban operation seem to agree that as the venture is now planned, the chances of success are not greater than one out of three. This makes it a highly risky operation. If it fails, Castroʼs prestige and strength will be greatly enhanced.

The one way we can reduce the risk is by a sharply increased commitment of direct American support. In talking to Bob McNamara and Ros Gilpatric at lunch Tuesday at the Pentagon, I gathered that this is precisely what the military people feel we should do.

Under the very best of circumstances, I believe this operation will have a much more adverse effect on world opinion than most people contemplate. It is admitted that there will be riots and a new wave of anti-Americanism throughout Latin America. It is also assumed that there will be many who quietly wish us well and, if the operation succeeds, will heave a sigh of relief.

Moreover, even if the reaction in Latin America is less damaging than we expect, I believe that in Europe, Asia, and Africa, the reaction against the United States will be angry and the fresh, favorable image of the Kennedy Administration will be correspondingly dimmed. It would be a grave mistake for us to minimize this factor and its impact on our capacity to operate effectively in cooperation with other nations in other parts of the world.

4. If the operation appears to be a failure in its early stages, the pressure on us to scrap our self-imposed restriction on direct American involvement will be difficult to resist, and our own responsibility correspondingly increased. 5.

A pertinent question, of course, is what will happen in Cuba if this operation is cancelled and we limit ourselves to small and scattered operations?

There is the possibility that the Castro effort will be a failure without any further intervention from us. It is not easy to create a viable Communist state on an island, totally dependent upon open sea lanes, with a large population, and inadequate resources. As Castro applies more and more pressure, the spirit of rebellion is likely to grow.

It appears more likely that Castro will succeed in solidifying his political position. Although this would be sharply contrary to our national interest, it does not mean that we would be impotent to deal with him.

If the Soviets should attempt to provide Castro with substantially larger amounts of arms, including naval vessels, we have the power to throw a blockade around Cuba and to extend it, if necessary, to petroleum supplies. This could bring the Cuban economy to a grinding halt within a few months.

Technically, this would be an act of war. However, I believe we would find it vastly easier to live with direct action of this kind in the face of what we could fairly describe as an open Soviet move to establish Cuba as a military base than with the covert operation now under consideration.

Another possibility is that Castro, once he has created sufficient military power, will move against a neighboring area, such as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, or perhaps into Central America. If this occurs, we can move to block him with whatever force is required, presumably through the Organization of American States and with the full support of the people in Latin America and elsewhere.

Since January 20th our position has been dramatically improved in the eyes of the world vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The Kennedy Administration has been doing particularly well in Africa and Latin America, and with a little luck in Laos and more affirm-ative policies, we may soon be able to improve our position in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Within the next few months we can also begin to strengthen our relations with Western Europe.

I believe it would be a grave mistake for us to jeopardize the favorable position we have steadily developed in most of the non-Communist world by the responsible and restrained policies which are now associated with the President by embarking on a major covert adventure with such very heavy built-in risks.

I realize that this operation has been put together over a period of months. A great deal of time and money has been put into it, and many able and dedicated people have become emotionally involved in its success. We should not, however, proceed with this adventure simply because we are wound up and cannot stop.

I believe that it is important for you to discuss this venture with people who can bring to it a fresh and objective view; for instance, Ed Murrow, Abe Chayes, Harlan Cleveland, Phillips Talbot, George McGhee, Soapy Williams, or Phil Coombs.

If you agree after careful thought that this operation would be a mistake, I suggest that you personally and privately communicate your views to the President. It is my guess that your voice will be decisive.

In that event he may decide to call off tomorrowʼs meeting and transmit his decision directly to Allen Dulles, Bob McNamara and other interested people

76. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. The source text is marked “Draft” and is Enclosure A to JCS 2304/26, April 1. The covering memorandum of JCS 2304/26 indicates that the Joint Chiefs approved SM-363-61 on April 1 and forwarded it to CINCLANT. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) Washington, April 1, 1961.

SM-363-61

SUBJECT “Bumpy Road” REFERENCE Your memo Special C0029/61, dated 28 March 1961, Subject: “CIA Operation Crosspatch”Document 73. 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the contents of the reference memorandum and have concluded the following: a. The assignment of an additional destroyer as escort for the convoy is approved. b. The disposition and employment of LANTCOM forces in the general area is considered normal and will insure the readiness of your command in case of an emergency. c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff letter of instruction for the subject operation is now before the Secretary of Defense for approval. That letter, which is also addressed to you, provides for informing CINCONAD of his requirements. d. Your rules of engagement are approved. It was also noted that no mention was made of Soviet submarines. Your current instructions in regards to Soviet submarines will apply for attack. In the event the convoy is shadowed or closed by a surfaced submarine, it will be treated under the rules for engagement as a surface ship. If the convoy is shadowed or closed by a submerged submarine; (1) Request submarine identify itself. (2) If identity refused, repeat request stating its actions considered hostile and attack will be made if identity not given. (3) If identity still refused, assume submarine is attacking force and attack with all authorized means available until submarine retires, surfaces and identifies itself (thereby coming under rules of engagement for surface ships), or the submarine is destroyed. 2. It will be noted that the nickname “Bumpy Road” has now been applied to the CIA Para-military Plan. This nickname is assigned with the concurrence of CIA. 3. You will be kept informed of any changes in requirements and/or schedule for the subject operation resulting from the final review.

77. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4-161. Confidential; Priority. Moscow, April 1, 1961, 5 p.m.

2362. Eyes Only Secretary. [Here follows the account of the discussion between Chairman Khrushchev and Ambassador Thompson on Laos and the Congo; the full text of this telegram is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume V.]

Turning to Cuba he [Khrushchev] could not agree with our policy there. Each country should be free to choose its social system. They did not agree, for example, with Yugoslav internal policies but this did not prevent them from having good relations with that country. He said President had indicated that financial aid would be given to aid in overthrow of present Cuban Govt. Bands of emigres had been formed and threats made against Cuban Govt. He said Soviet Govt would openly support Cuban Govt and would give them economic aid. He pointed out Soviet Union had no base in Cuba and only base there belonged to US. He then went on to question our policy of having bases all around Soviet Union.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Reverting again to Cuba he asked why we did not establish diplomatic relations with that country and try to resolve our problems with it peacefully. He made clear Cubans had not put him up to this but he was merely speaking his own mind.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.] I went on to say that I thought what bothered us particularly about Cuba was its use as a base for attempts on overthrow of other Latin American govts. When he disputed this I said I had heard Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia in flying jet planes. Cuba would never be able attack US and therefore these presumably were designed for use against other Latin American countries. I said we had been most patient with Castro. In first place we had cut off supply of arms to Batista and although there had been differences of opinion in US about Castro we had been fully prepared accept his govt. However he had made most violent statements against us and had confiscated our assets there without compensation and finally had insisted on reducing our Embassy to handful of people. We had tried to be patient but he had given us no choice. Khrushchev replied Castro said we were using Embassy to harbor spies and Castro was not Communist. He said he had not heard of any training of jet pilots but if he were Castro he would buy jet planes since these were necessary to prevent arms being dropped to counter-revolutionaries from planes flying from US. He thought that in one case we had even admitted this. I said we had taken strict steps to prevent such activities although there had I believed been one case in which a plane had gotten through. In concluding Khrushchev said we should continue to be patient and should try to improve our relations with Cuba.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thompson

78. Editorial Note

According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Naval Commander G.A. Mitchell, Secretary of Defense McNamara was briefed on April 2, 1961, on the proposed rules of engagement that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved on April 1 in SM-363-61, Document 76. McNamara had reservations about the latitude allowed by the rules:

“On 2 April the Secretary of Defense was briefed on the Bumpy Road situation and advised as to the approved rules. He was further advised by the JCS that after the President had made a firm ‛go aheadʼ decision, these rules should be submitted to the President for his approval. The Secretary of Defense felt that the rules were allowed too much interpretation at lower level and stated that the JCS should study the matter further.” (Mitchellʼs memorandum is undated but covers developments dealing with the rules of engagement for Operation Bumpy Road through April 20; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study)

79. Editorial Note

On April 3, 1961, the Department of State released a 36-page pamphlet entitled “Cuba.” This “White Paper” was initially drafted in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs but was extensively revised in the White House by Arthur Schlesinger, with the assistance of Richard Goodwin. President Kennedy carefully reviewed the final draft. The White Paper charged that Premier Castro had instituted a “repressive dictatorship” in Cuba, had delivered his country “to the Sino-Soviet bloc,” and was mounting an attack on the entire inter-American system. The United States called upon Cuba, in the White Paper, “to sever its links with the international Communist movement” and “to restore the dignity” of the original Cuban revolution. “If this call is unheeded, we are confident that the Cuban people, with their passion for liberty, will continue to strive for a free Cuba.” (Department of State Publication 7171, Inter-American Series 66, April 1961) There is extensive material relating to the preparation of this paper in the Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Cuba (White Paper).

President Kennedy was asked to comment on the White Paper on Cuba during a press conference on April 12. He was asked whether the White Paper meant that he considered Fidel Castro a Communist. Kennedy replied: “I would not want to characterize Mr. Castro except to say that by his own words he has indicated his hostility to democratic rule in this hemisphere, to democratic liberal leaders in many of the countries of the hemisphere who are attempting to improve the life of their people, and has associated himself most intimately with the Sino-Soviet bloc, and has indicated his desire to spread the influence of that bloc throughout this hemisphere.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, page 259)

80. Editorial Note

On April 4, 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered, approved, and forwarded to Secretary McNamaraJCSM-210-61, a plan of logistic support for the Zapata operation. The plan included a detailed concept of development for the later phase of the operation and programmed covert military support for the concept. (Chronology of JCS Participation in Bumpy Road; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

From 6 to 8:18 p.m. that evening, President Kennedy met at the Department of State with members of the Joint Chiefs and others involved in planning the Zapata operation. The Presidentʼs appointment book does not indicate the participants in the meeting, but notes taken on the meeting establish that Senator William Fulbright was invited to participate. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) According to summary notes on the meeting prepared by General Gray on May 9:

“This meeting was held in the State Department and Senator Fulbright was also present. Senator Fulbright spoke out against the plan. The President again indicated his preference for an operation which would infiltrate the force in units of 200-250 and then develop them through a build up. Colonel Hawkins from CIA expressed the belief that landing small groups would merely serve to alert Castro and they would be eliminated one by one. He indicated that a group of 200 was below the critical number able to defend themselves. Mr. Rusk expressed opposition to the plan but Mr. Berle and Mr. Mann expressed general approval. Mr. McNamara also expressed approval of the general concept. The President indicated that he still wished to make the operation appear as an internal uprising and wished to consider the matter further the next morning.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

After the conference with the President on April 4, Secretary McNamara requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconsider the rules of engagement for the Bumpy Road operation to ensure that the United States would not become overtly engaged with Castroʼs armed forces. (Memorandum for the record, prepared by Mitchell; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study)

81. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Secret. Washington, April 5, 1961. SUBJECT Cuba 1. When you asked me after the meeting yesterdaySee Document 80. what I thought about the Cuban proposal, I am afraid that I did not give a properly ordered answer. 2. My brief answer is that I am in favor of a continuation and expansion of the present approach to Cuba—i.e., quiet infiltration of anti-Castro exiles into Cuba and subsequent support through air drops. The beachhead operation, with the landing and recognition of the provisional government, would represent, however, a change of phase in our Cuban policy. If entirely successful, it would have the highly beneficial result of getting rid of the Castro regime. If we could achieve this by a swift, surgical stroke, I would be for it. But in present circumstances the operation seems to me to involve many hazards; and on balance—and despite the intelligence and responsibility with which the case for the action has been presented—I am against it. 3. The following considerations concerning the beachhead operation seem to me vital: a) No matter how “Cuban” the equipment and personnel, the US will be held accountable for the operation, and our prestige will be committed to its success. b) Since the Castro regime is presumably too strong to be toppled by a single landing, the operation will turn into a protracted civil conflict. 4. If these assumptions are true, it seems to me that the operation involves the following hazards: a) The protraction of the struggle and the commitment of American prestige (especially if we proceed to recognize and supply a provisional government) will create increasing pressure on us to guarantee the success of the operation through ever more intense and overt involvement. It will seem increasingly intolerable to subject ourselves to the humiliation of a defeat in Cuba. If the landing fails to trigger uprisings behind the lines and defections in the Militia (and the evidence that it would do so is inconclusive), the logic of the situation could well lead us, step by step, to the point where the last step would be to dispatch the Marines. b)

The protraction of the struggle will give the Soviet Union a magnificent opportunity to wage political warfare. Cuba will become our Hungary; and, since our pretensions to international good behavior have been greater than those of the Russians, we would be more damaged by Hungary than they were (and they were considerably damaged). The situation is made to order for the Communist agitprop apparatus. Jose Marti Brigades and no doubt Abraham Lincoln Brigades will be recruited to support Castro, not just from beyond the Iron Curtain, but in Western Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. There will be demonstrations and riots around the world on the model of the movement for Loyalist Spain in the late Thirties. There will be resolutions in the United Nations, with testimony by prisoners or Castro agents about the US preparation of and responsibility for the action.

(I must say, however, that I question the view that this operation would have serious substantive effect on Soviet policy, in Laos or elsewhere. My guess is that the Soviet Union regards Cuba as in our domain and is rather surprised that we have not taken action before this to rid ourselves of Castro.

(I also think that the operation would be more easily accepted in Latin America, where there is spreading knowledge about the nature of the Castro regime, than in Western Europe, Africa or Asia, where it will seem gross, unprovoked and bullying imperialism.)

As the struggle protracts itself and as the political campaign mounts against the US, our government—and you—will have to meet penetrating questions about our role in the affair. We will have either to evade the questions and thereby tacitly plead guilty; or deny involvement; or declare ignorance. Each course presents obvious difficulties. If we admit involvement, we admit action taken in violation of the basic characters of the hemisphere and of the United Nations. If we justify such violation by pleading a higher law, we place ourselves thereafter on the same moral plane as the Soviet Union. If we deny involvement, few will believe us; and we invite a repetition of the U-2 episode, which made us look absurd before the world.

Whatever we do, the effect will be to spoil the new US image—the image of intelligence, reasonableness and honest firmness which has already had such an extraordinary effect in changing world opinion about the US and increasing world confidence in US methods and purposes.

d) And there is the Fulbright point: our responsibility for the post-Castro regime. The eyes of the world will be upon us, and we cannot afford a post-Castro mess. On the basis of the documentsThe reference is unclear. they have submitted to us containing their ideas for the future, I rather share his doubts as to the competence of the exile leaders. 5.

These hazards would be outweighed, in my judgment, by the advantage of getting rid of Castro a) if the operation could be swift and surgical b) if support were forthcoming from our allies, both in Latin America and in Europe c) if the danger to the US were visible and overwhelming.

Conditions (a) and (b) seem doubtful. Of (c), it can only be said that it is not self-evident to many people (including the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).

The counter argument would be: why not wait? Every month Castro is making himself more unpopular both through the hemisphere and in his own country. Every month more people through the world are coming to understand the nature of his regime. Opinion has changed tremendously in the last six months; it will change even more in the next six months, if Castro is not made a martyr. The combination of internal discontent and external isolation will doom his regime.

The counter argument to this, of course, is that time will permit a military build-up and a perfection of internal control which will make Castro invulnerable to anything but a major invasion. In the meantime, he will prosecute his campaign against the hemisphere. The counter argument to that is that the measures which increase his invulnerability will also increase his unpopularity; that the more he tries to totalitarianize and terrorize Cuba, the more he makes Communism an object of hatred through the hemisphere; and, if he uses his military strength against any other state, he gives us the excuse we need for collective intervention.

I am not sure that this debate permits a categorical judgment on the question whether time would run for or against us in Cuba.

The consequences of abandonment remain to be considered. Abandonment would conceivably suggest a US failure of nerve. It might seem to place a premium on the defiance of Castro; it would certainly dishearten those in Latin America who have exposed themselves by demanding action against Castro; it would certainly disillusion the brave men we have gathered in Guatemala; it would confront us with the problem of demobilizing and resettling these men. The fact that the expedition was conceived, prepared and then called off at the last moment would increase Castroʼs prestige and power.

These are all powerful points. They weigh very heavily in my mind on the side of going ahead. However, I hesitate to say that we should do something simply because we have seemed to commit ourselves to doing it which, if we were starting fresh, we would not do.

On balance, I think that the risks of the operation slightly outweigh the risks of abandonment. These latter risks would be mitigated somewhat if we could manage a partial rather than a total abandonment (i.e., if we could put the men into Cuba quietly).

We might also be able to make some diplomatic capital out of the abandonment. We might have Thompson say to Khrushchev, for example, that we have discouraged an invasion of Cuba; that this shows our genuine desire to compose differences; but that K. should tell his friend to behave, because our patience is not inexhaustible and we cannot hope to restrain the Cuban patriots indefinitely. Conceivably we might be able to turn abandonment to some diplomatic advantage within the hemisphere too.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

82. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Coerr) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-561. Confidential. Drafted by Coerr and by William I. Cargo, Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs. Cleared in substance by Cleveland in IO. Washington, April 5, 1961. SUBJECT Suggestion that we support Miro Cardona, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, at the UN

Discussion

The above suggestion has been made with a view to gaining publicity favorable to the Cuban Revolutionary Council and to blunting the attack that Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa is expected to make against the United States in the UNGA.

Although the basic UN concept is that the UN is an organization of states, UNGA procedures would permit a hearing of Miro Cardona by Committee One if proposed by a member of that committee and approved by its majority vote. Most nations, however, including the Europeans and the Afro-Asians—and very probably the Latin Americans—would almost certainly fear the precedent of giving a hearing to a minority dissident group and many could be expected to vote against the proposal. The Soviet bloc and extreme neutralist group would probably oppose. While Committee Four has heard individual petitioners under specific Charter provisions, Committee One has heard non-governmental persons only rarely. We would face almost certain defeat if we were to support a hearing for Miro Cardona.

The United States has privately opposed the hearing of representatives of the FLN in connection with the Algerian question; and soon will again oppose a hearing for North Korean representatives, in Committee One. U.S. support for a hearing of Mir# Cardona might well weaken our position on this kind of an issue.

Recommendation

That we do not support a hearing for Miro Cardona. (Should you approve this recommendation we will support other means of doing it.)The source text is stamped to indicate that Rusk initialed his approval on April 4. April 5, the date typed in the heading of the document, is probably the date on which Rusk received and approved the recommendation in the memorandum.

83. Editorial Note

At 8:30 a.m. on April 5, 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Lemnitzer met at the White House with CIA officials Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, and General Cabell in advance of the meeting called by President Kennedy to continue consideration of the Zapata plan. McNamara and Lemnitzer discussed with the CIA officials the proposed rules of engagement for the projected operation against Cuba. “It was agreed that the rules should definitely spell out the Presidentʼs desire that if United States forces were required to protect CEF ships from damage or capture the operation would be aborted and the CEF ships directed to a port to be designated by the JCS.” (Memorandum for the record, by Mitchell; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study)

President Kennedy met later with the participants in the 8:30 meeting and with unspecified representatives from the Department of State. The Presidentʼs appointment book does not indicate either the time or the participants in the meeting. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) According to summary notes on the meeting prepared by General Gray on May 9:

“There was a very small meeting with the President where only Secretary McNamara, General Lemnitzer and representatives of State and CIA were present. At this meeting the general idea of fake defections and preliminary strikes were discussed. The President indicated approval of the general idea but indicated that everyone should consider further measures overnight and there would be another meeting the following morning.” (Ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

84. Editorial Note

At 9:15 a.m. on April 6, 1961, President Kennedy convened another meeting at the White House to discuss the projected Zapata operation against Cuba. According to the Presidentʼs appointment book the meeting lasted an hour and a half, and was attended by Rusk, McNamara, Dulles, Berle, Mann, and Coerr. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) Although Bissell is not listed in the appointment book, Grayʼs notes indicate that he attended and made the principal presentation for the CIA. Gray was also there, and it is probable that Lemnitzer, Burke, and Cabell attended as well. According to summary notes on the meeting prepared by General Gray on May 9:

“At this meeting Mr. Bissell presented the plan to arrest Mas Farer, to seize a B-25 aircraft known to be operating against Cuba and also to seize one or more small boats being used by counter-revolutionaries. All of this intended to show US disassociation with former Batista followers. Mr. Bissell then gave an outline of the planned defection of a pilot on D-3, coupled with air strikes and a D-2 guerrilla landing. This would then be followed by a guerrilla uprising on D+5 in Pinar Del Rio. The President indicated that the council should not be informed ahead of time. Mr. Rusk, when queried by the President, stated that he felt that this plan was as good as could be devised, but that we should now take a look at other questions that might arise. One would be what would the US do in the event there was a serious call for help? Second, what might the Soviets do? The President indicated that Mr. Macmillan had been informed of the prospect. The President questioned whether or not a preliminary strike wasnʼt an alarm bell. The President also asked as to the last date on which he could delay or cancel the operation, and he was told 16 April. He wanted to know what he could do if the operation was called off and was told by Mr. Bissell that the plan was to divert the force to Vieques. At the end of the meeting the President gave the following guidance: continue planning, spread the convoy, provide additional air protection for the Miami area, increase press conferences for Cardona, limit air strikes to essential targets, and diversionary landing was OK. In summary, the President indicated a desire to use the force but he wanted to do everything possible to make it appear to be a Cuban operation partly from within Cuba but supported from without Cuba, the objective being to make it more plausible for US denial of association with the operation although recognizing that we would be accused.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

85. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret. In a memorandum for the record summarizing the changes in the rules of engagement for the Bumpy Road operation, Commander Mitchell noted that this memorandum was drafted in response to a memorandum sent from the CIA to General Gray on April 7, modifying the U.S. naval support requirements. The modifications called for destroyers to provide area coverage, rather than convoying the CEF ships, from 0600 on D-2 to the transport area. The requirement for U.S. naval air cover was changed to provide an additional day of air protection, from 0600 to sunset on D-2 and D-1. D-Day was changed to April 17. Mitchell noted that CM-179-61 was dispatched by special courier to Admiral Dennison on April 8. He added that the naval task group assigned to screen the Cuban Expeditionary Force was already at sea and had made an anti-submarine sweep of the area off Nicaragua. (Ibid.) CM-179-61 Washington, April 7, 1961. SUBJECT “Bumpy Road” REFERENCES a. CM-152-61 Dated 24 March 1961, Subj: CIA Operation CrosspatchNot found. b. CINCLANT Memo Serial Special 00029/61 Dated 28 March 1961Document 73. c. SM-363-61 Dated 1 April 1961Document 76.

ENCLOSURESA handwritten note in the margin at this point reads: “Deleted from this copy, GAMitchell, Cdr. USN” Mitchell drew a box around the first five enclosures listed to indicate that they had been deleted from the copy included in the Taylor Report. Another copy of CM-179-61, with all of the enclosures attached, is in the Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials.

A. DD Support B. LSD Support C. Combat Air Patrol D. Navigational Reference Points E. Individual Ship Movement Schedule (Code Name) F. Instructions for DD Escort and CAP 1. Reference a requested certain naval support for the subject para-military operation. Due to required changes in concept of movement of surface units, the requirements for U.S. Naval support as set forth in reference a are superseded by those contained in Enclosures A, B, and C hereto. 2. Enclosures D and E contain the required navigational and individual ship movements information for the ships of the Cuban Volunteer Force. 3. It is necessary to take precautions to assure that U.S. support of the Cuban Volunteer Force is not apparent and that support for this operation be undertaken so that the United States may plausibly deny participation. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to modify the instructions for the escorting destroyers and the combat air patrol. Accordingly, the specific “rules of engagement” as set forth in references b and c are superseded by the instructions contained in Enclosure F hereto. 4. D-Day is now scheduled for 17 April 1961. L.L. LemnitzerPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature. Enclosure FTop Secret; Limited Distribution.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR DESTROYER ESCORT AND COMBAT AIR PATROL

Commander Mitchell subsequently summarized the changes in the rules of engagement, outlined in Enclosure F, as follows:

“The changes to the rules pointed out the necessity for avoiding any sign of U.S. participation. The U.S. naval air cover was to be flown in such a manner that the planes did not appear to be covering the CEF ships. During daylight hours the escorting destroyers were to maintain maximum practicable range ahead of the CEF ships and to use courses and speeds so that they provided protection but didnʼt appear to be screening the CEF ships. During the hours of darkness the destroyers could close the CEF ships to provide adequate protection. The destroyers were not to approach within 20 miles (instead of the previous 3 miles) of Cuban territory and, as soon as the San Marcos (the LSD) had withdrawn from the transfer area for the landing craft, the destroyers were to withdraw to join the U.S. naval task group (about 125 miles from Blue Beach). The rules of engagement were modified so that U.S. naval units would not open fire on Cuban ships or aircraft until they opened fire (or opened bomb bays and started a bombing run) (Note: Sea Furies and T-33ʼs do not have bomb bays) on the CEF ships. In essence, the U.S. protecting forces could only open fire if the CEF was attacked. (Instead of opening fire when a Cuban ship or aircraft made a threatening move.) If the U.S. forces intervened to protect the CEF ships, the operation was automatically cancelled. U.S. forces were then to take all steps short of firing on the CEF ships to cause them to withdraw to a port to be designated by the JCS.” (Memorandum for the Record, Rules of Engagement Operation “Bumpy Road”; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

1. The US destroyers providing the area coverage of the Cuban Volunteer Force ships will take the following precautions to avoid overt association with ships of the Cuban Force: a. During daylight hours they will maintain maximum practicable range ahead of the ships of the Cuban Force and maintain a patrol using courses and speeds so as to provide protection but not appear to be screening the Cuban Force ships. b. During the hours of darkness the US destroyers are permitted to take station with respect to the Cuban Force ships to provide adequate protection. c. US Naval support will not be used to support the landing operation. The US destroyers covering the transport ships of the Cuban Force will not close within 20 miles of the target area. After withdrawal of the San Marcos from Point Oldsmobile, the US destroyers will withdraw to Point Packard and rejoin the US Naval Task Group. 2. The surface and subsurface special rules of engagement are as follows: a. Prior to the rendezvous of the Cuban Force ships: (1) If intervention by US forces is required to protect the Cuban Force ships from att-ack or to prevent their capture, the US forces will intervene as necessary to protect the Cuban Force ship(s). (2) This intervention will cancel the landing operation and the US destroyers will take measures short of firing on the Cuban Force ships, to cause them to withdraw to a port to be designated by the JCS upon receipt of the report of intervention. (3) Subsequent to the intervention and withdrawal, the US destroyers will maintain close escort of the Cuban Force to provide protection and witness compliance with the withdrawal order. (4) U.S. forces will open fire only if the Cuban Force ship(s) is attacked. b. After rendezvous of the Cuban Force ships at 1730 R, D-1 Day and until convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area, a DD commanding officer will: (1) Place his ship between the convoy and any suspicious or Cuban surface craft sighted. (2) Warn the craft not to approach within gun range of the convoy. (3) If the surface craft persists in closing the convoy, the DD will intervene as necessary to protect the Cuban Force ships, then follow instructions set forth in paragraph 2a(2) and (3) above. c. Intervention by US destroyers after Cuban Force convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area will be limited to that required to assist the San Marcos at her request. 3. The combat air patrol mission pilots and air controllers will be instructed as follows: a. The CAP will take station so that it will not give the appearance of covering the ships of the Cuban Force. b. The “rules of engagement” are as follows: (1) Any unidentified aircraft approaching within radar range of the Cuban Force ships and closing will be investigated. (2) If investigation reveals the aircraft to be Cuban, the investigating aircraft will make successive close passes ensuring that the Cuban aircraft is aware of his presence. (3) If Cuban aircraft maintains course to close the Cuban Force ship(s)CAP will continue to make close passes in an attempt to divert. (4) If Cuban aircraft insists in closing and attempts to take position to attack the Cuban Force ship(s), the CAP aircraft will open fire if the Cuban aircraft commences to fire on the Cuban Force ship(s) or if it opens its bomb bays and commences its bomb run.

86. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Secret. Washington, April 10, 1961. SUBJECT Cuba: Political, Diplomatic and Economic Problems 1. Introduction. The operational planning for the Cuban project seems much farther advanced than the political, diplomatic and economic planning which properly should accompany it. As a result, preparations to deal with the political, diplomatic and economic repercussions of the operation are inadequate. Unless we speed these preparations, we run the risk that a successful military result may be to a considerable degree nullified by seriously adverse results in the political, diplomatic and economic areas. 2. What is at stake. In the days since January 20, your administration has changed the face of American foreign policy. The soberness of style, the absence of cold war cliches, the lack of self-righteousness and sermonizing, the impressive combination of reasonableness and firmness, the generosity to new ideas, the dedication to social progress, the tough-minded idealism of purpose—all these factors have transformed (to use that repellent word) the “image” of the United States before the world. The result has been to go far toward restoring confidence in the intelligence, maturity and restraint of American leadership. People around the world have forgotten the muddling and moralizing conservation of the Eisenhower period with surprising speed. The United States is emerging again as a great, mature and liberal nation, coolly and intelligently dedicated to the job of stopping Communism, strengthening the free and neutral nations and working for peace. It is this reawakening world faith in America which is at stake in the Cuban operation. 3. U.S. vulnerabilities. I do not mean to suggest that the use of force to protect a reasonable national security interest would necessarily have an adverse effect on the world per se. If force is used efficiently and effectively, and if the threat to national security is demonstrable and convincing, the controlled use of force for limited objectives might well enhance respect for the United States. To define these conditions, however, calls immediate attention to one of our main vulnerabilities in the Cuban affair. In the first place, however “Cuban” the operation will seem to be, the U.S. will be held accountable for it before the bar of world opinion: our own press has seen to that. Beyond this, there is an obstinate fact: A great many people simply do not at this moment see that Cuba presents so grave and compelling a threat to our national security as to justify a course of action which much of the world will interpret as calculated aggression against a small nation in defiance both of treaty obligations and of the international standards we have repeatedly asserted against the Communist world. It is only necessary to remark that the people who fail to understand the pressing necessity for this action include the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (and that he has said that the only members of his Committee whom he thinks would support the action are Senators Dodd and Lausche—which perhaps suggests the kind of people to whom the idea will automatically appeal). 4.

In short, many people in the United States and probably most people outside the United States will—unless countermeasures are put into immediate play—see a vast gap between what they regard as the minor threat presented by a tiny nation of 7 million to the great United States and the massive response (i.e., the instigation of civil war and the overthrow of the government) proposed by the United States. To say that the Russians are doing worse in Laos is true but irrelevant, since we profess to be acting according to higher motives and higher principles than the Russians. Because the alleged threat to our national security will not seem to many people great enough to justify so flagrant a violation of our professed principles, these people will assume that our action is provoked by a threat to something other than our security. Given the mythology of our relationship to Latin America, they will assume that we are acting, not to protect our safety, but to protect our property and investments. In short, for many people the easiest explanation of our action will be as a reversion to economic imperialism of the pre-World War I, Platt-Amendment, big-stick, gunboat-diplomacy kind.

It need hardly be said that the apparent revival of these strains in American foreign policy—and especially their revival in connection with the most dramatic foreign policy initiative of the new administration—will jeopardize the new “image” of the United States and will threaten to wipe out the great gains of the last two and a half months.

How the USSR will exploit the situation. We can consider the meas-ures necessary to prevent this outcome better if we first speculate about the Communist reaction to a landing in Cuba.

The first Communist effort will be to nail down the already existing impression that such a landing is sponsored by the U.S. In doing this, the Communists have already had the indispensable assistance of the American press. They will be able to make their case almost entirely by quotations from U.S. sources. No matter how ostensibly “Cuban” the operation in fact is in personnel and in equipment, most of the world—our friends as well as our foes—will assume (on the basis of American press reports) that it is American in its conception and in its preparation.

If the landing succeeds in setting off uprisings behind the line and in stimulating defections from Castroʼs militia, and if the regime collapses with reasonable speed, then the political damage will be minimized. But if it settles down to a protracted conflict, then we can be certain that the world Communist agitprop apparatus will swing into full and vigorous action.

The Communists will be able to count, first, on a generalized sympathy for the underdog against the bully, for David against Goliath—as in such past cases as the Boers vs. Britain or Finland vs. the USSR. Even some of our friends will derive a certain satisfaction from watching Castro defy the great United States.

The Communists will next seek to use the alleged U.S. initiative to bolster the Marxist interpretation of history. They will portray it as an effort on the part of the greatest capitalist nation to punish a small country for its desire to achieve political and economic independence. Throughout the underdeveloped world, they will try to persuade local nationalists to identify Castroʼs cause with their own struggles. There will be particular emphasis (already visible in official Cuban propaganda) on Castro as the defender of the colored races against white imperialism.

The first stage in this will be the fomenting of riots and demonstrations. American Embassies will be attacked and American diplomats (and other American personnel) mobbed. The underdeveloped countries will be urged in the United Nations to defend their own future freedom of action by defending Castro; we can expect to be placed on the defensive in the U.N. for some time and to be subjected to a series of harassing debates and resolutions. Ex-colonial nations everywhere will be called on to identify their own problems with those of Castro.

Nor will Soviet agitational operations be confined to Asia, Africa and Latin America (though they will probably be most profitable there). The assault against Castro will add fuel to the fires of anti-Americanism throughout Europe. It will be the latest scandal of St. German des Pres (Sartre of course hailed Castroʼs Cuba; even Raymond Aronʼs recent series of pieces after his Cuban visit, published in Figaro in February, were relatively measured and would not lead people to think that drastic action against Castro was necessary to save the west). The people who have been crowding Trafalgar Square to protest the bomb will be crowding it again to shout for Castro and denounce the U.S. as the last stronghold of imperialism.

We can doubtless weather the public opinion storm. The second stage will be operational. Funds will be collected for Castro around the world. No Russian troops need be sent to Cuba; but volunteers will quickly appear from Western Europe, from Asia and especially from Africa, organized in Jose Marti Brigades and even probably in Abraham Lincoln Brigades. U.S. efforts to intercept shiploads of such volunteers will heap further coals on the anti-American conflagration. One ship sunk, and there will be new mobs, new demonstrations, new riots and new brigades.

The model for this operation, of course, will be the Spanish Civil War; but the added dimension of imperialism vs. nationalism will mean that the whole thing is even more made to order for Soviet exploitation. The objective will be to portray the Soviet Union as the patron and protector of nationalists, Negroes, new nations and peace and to portray the Kennedy Administration as a gang of capitalist imperialists maddened by the loss of profits and driven to aggression and war. If this strategem is permitted to succeed, it will abolish all the progress we have made in recent months to win the confidence of the new nations. Even political leaders in other lands who understand our problem and sympathize with our objective will hardly be able to ignore the surge of public anger in their own countries.

Countermeasures to nullify the Communist offensive. Our problem is how to protect the post-January 20 impression of the United States as a mature and liberal nation, opposed to imperialism and colonialism and dedicated to justice, peace and freedom.

The operational contribution to this effort—i.e., Cubanizing the operation and doing nothing which would be inconsistent with a spontaneous Cuban effort—has been worked out with skill and care. But the supporting political and diplomatic measures seem still in a highly rudimentary stage.

The United States line. The impending Stevenson speech in the United Nations represents our first effort at a political-diplomatic counter-offensive. The essential elements of this speech are (a) that Castro is threatened, not by Americans, but by Cubans justly indignant over his betrayal of his own revolution, (b) that we sympathize with these patriotic Cubans, and (c) that there will be no American participation in any military aggression against Castroʼs Cuba. If our representatives cannot evade in debate the question whether the CIA has actually helped the Cuban rebels, they will presumably be obliged, in the traditional, pre-U-2 manner, to deny any such CIA activity. (If Castro flies a group of captured Cubans to New York to testify that they were organized and trained by CIA, we will have to be prepared to show that the alleged CIA personnel were errant idealists or soldiers-of-fortune working on their own.)

If this—or something like it—is the general line we are prepared to take and stick to, then the State Department should prepare a definitive statement of this position.

That statement should be communicated first to the information officers of our government likely to be confronted with questions about the Cuban operation—Salinger, Murrow, Tubby, White, Sylvester. A meeting of these officers should be convened in the next few days.

At an appropriate moment, the statement should be communicated to United States Ambassadors, and especially to those in the new nations.

What about the Senate Foreign Relations Committee? What about the House Foreign Affairs Committee? What about Senators and Congressmen in general? Someone should begin to think what they should be told.

A Committee for a Free Cuba should be organized with impressive liberal names to backstop the Revolutionary Council and offset the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

9. Diversionary measures. Some thought should be given to possible diversionary measures which might offset the Soviet propaganda offensive. The arrest of Masferrer was a good stroke.On April 8 agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation took into custody Rolando Masferrer, a former pro-Batista Cuban senator and head of a private army. Could not something be done against the Dominican Republic in the next few days?—some new call for action against the Trujillo tyranny? Can we not affirm in some striking way our support for some progressive government in Latin America, like Venezuela? Can we not do something in Africa or Asia which will counteract the Soviet claim that we are unregenerate imperialists? Could something be brought before the United Nations in the next ten days which would permit us to take a strong anti-imperialist position? 10.

Protection of the President. The character and repute of President Kennedy constitute one of our greatest national resources. Nothing should be done to jeopardize this invaluable asset. When lies must be told, they should be told by subordinate officials. At no point should the President be asked to lend himself to the cover operation. For this reason, there seems to me merit in Secretary Ruskʼs suggestion that someone other than the President make the final decision and do so in his absence—someone whose head can later be placed on the block if things go terribly wrong.

Someone should start thinking about press conferences.

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us about the reported invasion of Cuba this morning?

A. We are doing our best to get the exact facts. So far as I can tell at present, a number of opponents of the Castro regime have landed on Cuba. I understand that the Revolutionary Council is trying to make contact with these people.

Q. Sir, according to the newspapers, the rebel forces were trained in American camps and supplied by American agencies.

A. There have been many thousands of Cuban refugees in Florida in these last months. I have no doubt that many of them have been determined to do what they can at the earliest possible moment to restore freedom to their homeland. They have the sympathy of American citizens in this effort—just as the forces of Castro enjoyed similar sympathy three years ago when they were conducting their rebellion against Batista. I suppose that, just as the Castro forces got money and arms from sources in the United States, these new rebels may well have too. But, so far as I can tell, this is a purely Cuban operation. I doubt whether Cuban patriots in exile would have to be stimulated and organized by the United States in order to persuade them to liberate their nation from a Communist dictator.

Q. Mr. President, have you any plans for the recognition of the Revolutionary Council as a provisional government?

A. None at this time.

Q. Mr. President, is CIA involved in this affair?

A. As I said a moment ago, I imagine that elements in the United States helped these opponents of Castro, as they helped Castro himself in 1958. I can assure you that the United States Government has no intention of using force to overthrow the Castro regime or of contributing force for that purpose unless compelled to do so in the interests of self-defense. [Hardly satisfactory: it is imperative that a better formula be worked out before your next press conference.]Brackets in the source text.

Q. Mr. President, would you say that, so far as Cuba is concerned, the U.S. has been faithful to its treaty pledges against intervention in other countries? Would you say that it has resolutely enforced the laws forbidding the use of U.S. territory to prepare revolutionary action against another state?

A. ????

11.

Protection against involvement. A great danger is that U.S. prestige will become committed to the success of the rebellion: that, if the rebellion appears to be failing, the rebels will call for U.S. armed help; that members of Congress will take up the cry; and that pressures will build up which will make it politically hard to resist the demand to send in the Marines. If we do this, then our intervention will become blatant and obvious and the political consequences almost irreparable. We will have presented the Soviet Union with an American Hungary.

The first protection against step-by-step involvement is to convince the Cuban leaders that in no foreseeable circumstances will we send in U.S. troops. U.S. prestige will not be publicly committed to the success of the operation until we recognize a provisional government; so we must tell the Revolutionary Council that it cannot expect immediate U.S. recognition; that recognition will only come when they have a better than 50-50 chance of winning under their own steam; that this is a fight which Cubans will have in essence to win for themselves. These points must be made clearly and emphatically; my present impression is that the exiles expect recognition as soon as they land in Cuba.

When senatorial voices are raised demanding overt U.S. intervention, our people must be primed to oppose this demand.

12.

Support of Free Cuba. If this operation should succeed, the United States will acquire full responsibility for post-Castro Cuba. The eyes of the world will be fixed on Cuba, as they were never fixed, for example, on post-Communist Guatemala. We simply will not be able to afford another Castillo Armas. If the post-Castro regime begins by devoting its first attention to owners of expropriated properties and to foreign investors; if it kicks the ordinary people off the beaches and out of the hotels; if it tries to turn back the social and economic clock—such things would triumphantly document the Soviet contention that the American motive in overthrowing Castro was to make Cuba safe again for American capitalism.

I personally do not have great confidence in the competence of the Revolutionary Council. Their statements and manifestos do not up to this point exhibit much realistic understanding of the social and economic problems they would encounter in post-Castro Cuba. Their approach seems essentially legalistic; they are thinking in terms of the assurances of liberties to the professional and business classes. They have done very little to reassure the lower classes that the social and economic gains of the Castro period will not be reversed.

If we are not going to be cursed throughout the underdeveloped world as unregenerate imperialists, post-Castro Cuba will have to be at least as progressive as Betancourtʼs Venezuela. The Revolutionary Council must be made to understand this. Above all, we must begin thinking very quickly of a man sufficiently astute, aggressive and influential to go to Habana as U.S. Ambassador and make sure that the new regime gets off on a socially progressive track.

13.

Emergency economic program. The civil conflict will probably create much disorganization and havoc. The exact economic state of post-Castro Cuba cannot, of course, be predicted. But economics somewhere should be at work on a series of relief and reconstruction programs pegged at various levels of need; and someone should be checking the immediate availability of the commodities necessary to meet the requirements. Someone else should be drafting the necessary legislation. We ought to have a look at these things in the next week or so.

In addition, another group of economists should be working on a long-range development plan for Cuba to serve as a guide for the post-Castro government. The main sketch for such a plan should be ready by May 1.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

87. Operation Order From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution; CO Eyes Only/By Hand. The order was signed for Dennison by Vice Admiral Fitzhugh Lee. Special Task Group 81.8 was commanded by Rear Admiral John E. Clark. The Task Group was composed of: Carrier Unit 81.8.1, USS Essex (CVS-9); Destroyer Unit 81.8.2, commanded by Captain G. M. Slonim, composed of USS Waller (DDE-466), USS Conway (DDE-507), USS Cony (DDE-508), USS Eaton (DDE-510), USS Bache (DDE-470), USS Beale (DDE-471), and USS Murray (DDE-576); Convoy Escort Unit 81.8.3, commanded by Captain R. P. Crutchfield, composed of USS Eaton (DDE-510) and USS Murray (DDE-576); Amphibious Support Unit 81.8.4, commanded by Commander R. Cousins, composed of USS San Marcos (LSD-25); and Replenishment Unit 81.8.8, com-manded by Captain P.K. Blesh, composed of USS Elokomin (AO-55). CINCLANTFLT No. 25-61 Norfolk, April 10, 1961.

[Here follows the text of Operation Order 25-61, Annex A, and Appendix I to Annex A. The operation order outlines the units involved in the operation, the overall situation and intent of the operation, the type of friendly and unfriendly forces involved, and the tasks to be undertaken. Annex A briefly outlines the Concept of Operations, including the stipulation that “U.S. Naval vessels and aircraft will not enter Cuban Territorial Waters or airspace (three mile limit).” Appendix I to Annex A presents, in outline form, with scheduled times listed, a detailed Table of Events from the point at which the Cuban Expeditionary Force was scheduled to embark to the transfer to landing craft off the coast of Cuba.]

Appendix II to Annex A

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. DDʼs assigned to provide area coverage of the CEF will avoid overt association with the CEF shipsThe ships of the Cuban Expeditionary Force were identified in Operation Order 25-61 as Blagar and Barbara J, which were described as ex-U.S. Navy LCIs, SS Caribe, SS Atlantico, SS Houston, and SS Rio Escondido, identified as WW II Liberty hulls, but it was subsequently established that they were not. The LCIs would be flying Nicaraguan ensigns and the merchant ships would be flying Liberian ensigns. as follows: (a) During daylight hours. Maintain maximum practicable range ahead of CEF ships and use patrol courses and speeds to provide protection but not appear to be screening the CEF. (b) During hours of darkness. DDʼs may take station with respect to the CEF ships to provide adequate protection. (c) DDʼs will not be used to support the landing operation and will not close within 20 miles of the objective area. After withdrawal of TG 81.8.4 from Point OldsmobileAppendix III to Annex A gives the coordinates for the codeworded reference points listed in the operation order. Point Oldsmobile is 22-01.5N, 81-02W. all DDʼs will proceed to join CTG 81.8. 2. Surface and sub-surface rules of engagement as follows: (a) Prior to rendezvous of CEF ships at Point Zulu:The coordinates for Point Zulu are not given in the operation order. (1) If intervention by US forces is required to protect the CEF ships from surface attack or to prevent their capture, US forces will intervene as necessary to protect the CEF ship(s). (2) This intervention will cancel the landing operation and TG 81.8 ships will take measures short of firing on CEF ships to cause them to withdraw to a port to be designated by the JCS upon receipt of the report of intervention. (3) Subsequent to intervention and withdrawal, TG 81.8 DDʼs will maintain close escort of the CEF ships to provide protection and witness compliance with the withdrawal order. (4) US forces will open fire only if CEF ship(s) is attacked. (b) After rendezvous of CEF ships at Point Zulu on D-1 Day and until convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area, a DD commanding officer will: (1) Place his ship between the convoy and any suspicious or Castro surface craft sighted. (2) Warn the craft not to approach within gun range of the convoy. (3) If the surface craft persists in closing the convoy, the DD will intervene as necessary to protect the CEF ships, then follow the instructions set forth in paragraph 2 (a) (2) and (3) above. (c) Intervention by TG 81.8 DDʼs after the CEF convoy has moved to a point within 20 miles of the objective area will be limited to that required to assist CTU 81.8.4 at his request. 3. The CAP pilots and air controllers will be instructed as follows: (a) CAP will be stationed so that it will not appear to be covering the CEF ships. (b) Air rules of engagement are as follows: (1) Any unidentified aircraft approaching within radar range of CEF ships and closing will be investigated. (2) If investigation reveals the aircraft to be Castroʼs, the investigating aircraft will make successive close passes ensuring that the Castro aircraft is aware of his presence. (3) If Castro aircraft maintains course to close CEF ship(s), CAP will continue to make close passes in an attempt to divert. (4) If Castro aircraft commences firing on the CEF ship(s) or opens its bomb bays and commences a bomb run, CAP will open fire. Robert L. DennisonPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Admiral, U.S. Navy

[Here follow Appendix III to Annex A, which outlines reference points; Annex B, which deals with communications; and Annex C, which briefly summarizes intelligence relating to the operation.]

88. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1061. Confidential; Priority. New York, April 10, 1961, 8 p.m.

2803. Cuba. Padilla NervoLuis Padilla Nervo, Permanent Representative of Mexico at the United Nations. (Mexico) came to see me Sunday to report that he had been asked to join in co-sponsoring an African-Asian resolution on Cuba along with Morocco, UAR and Indonesia. He told me his FonMin had approved Mexican sponsorship if US did not object. He did not seem to be very much involved in the matter, but advanced several arguments as to why a res like the Chile-Ecuador res of 4 Jan 1961See Document 10. would be desirable.

In first place, he insists that OAS does not exclude in any way access by an American state to UN before OAS consideration. He said this view is universally shared. He said also that if any res called for peaceful solution they would have to vote for it even if they did not cosponsor. The idea that such a res admitted the existence of a dispute which we denied, he said, would appeal to few in view of recent newspaper reports of American encouragement for counter revolutionary activities.

Finally, he made the point that if the res is not adopted by UN, Cuba can come back over and over again as they already have done, and if a res were adopted, the next step would be in the OAS.

He handed me a draft of a res which we are transmitting by separate telegram.

The Mexican draft resolution was transmitted to the Department in telegram 2804, April 10. The operative paragraphs of the resolution read as follows: “1. Recommends to the Governments of the Republic of Cuba and of the USA that they make every effort to resolve their differences by peaceful means; “2. Urges member states to refrain from any action which might aggravate the present tension between the two countries.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1061)

When I demurred to operative para 1, he suggested that perhaps it would be more acceptable if UN merely expressed the hope our difficulties with Cuba would be resolved by peaceful means.

Finally, he suggested for our consideration the appointment of a GOCGood Offices Committee. of Latin American states either named by the Pres of GA or including same ones named by Costa Rican conference, Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Brazil and Chile.See footnote 5, Document 52.

At our meeting today I told him that we were still strongly opposed to any res for the familiar reasons, and he assured me he would talk to his FonMin tonight and implied in circumstances they would not co-sponsor an ASAFAsian-African. res but if one were submitted anyway, they would probably have to vote in favor. He added while he still believed in validity of his arguments, he would state forcibly to FonMin Tello US was strongly opposed to any res and said he would let us know the result of his conversation.

Stevenson

89. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1161. Confidential; Priority. New York, April 11, 1961, 9 p.m.

2821. Cuba. Yost met with Freitas Valle (Brazil), Amadeo (Argentina), Sosa Rodriguez (Venezuela), Padilla Nervo (Mexico), Fabregat (Uruguay), Schweitzer (Chile), Araujo (Colombia)U.N. Representatives Cyro de Freitas-Valle, Mario Amadeo, Carlos Sosa Rodriguez, Luis Padilla Nervo, Enrique Rodrigues Fabregat, and Daniel Schweitzer. Araujo was not listed by the United Nations as a Representative of Colombia. to discuss Cuban item.

Sosa Rodriguez said Guinea, without as far as he knew any LA co-sponsor, had planned table res this afternoon. Res was based on Chile-Ecuador SC draft.See Document 10. He had asked Guinea delay submission to which Guinea had agreed. Sosa Rodriguez said LAs did not want to be faced with ASAF res and wanted be in position ask ASAFs to delay because LAs had res of their own. Rodriguez considered debate so explosive that he could not imagine it being conducted completely without res. He said LAs needed firm ground on which to stand in event Cuba or socialists presented res which because of reasonableness and conformance with Charter LAs would be unable to oppose.

Freitas Valle said he had visited Roa (Cuba) who was almost voiceless, running fever, very nervous and planning to speak Thurs. Roa told Freitas Valle he did not intend propose res but Cuba prepared negotiate with US. Roa told Padilla Nervo Brazilian Pres had sent message to Cuban Pres to effect Brazil would not allow anything to be done against Cuba (it was not clear in what context this was meant whether in UN or outside UN). Freitas Valle said he had proposed to Roa he might wish to return to SC and find out if new US admin had changed position re Cuba but Roa had demurred. Freitas Valle said Roa said Cuba did not want problem in OAS as this organization dominated by US. Freitas Valleʼs impression was Roa was nervous and discouraged and desirous negotiate with US.

Padilla Nervo said LAs did not want reasonable res conforming to Charter presented by socialists as either to vote for or against it would align LAs on Cuba or US side which would produce unfavorable reaction with local public opinion. He said LAs did not want to pass judgment on situation but wanted res in order to block item being passed to SC. Furthermore, lack of res in debate would be attributed to US with unfavorable reactions LA public opinion. Schweitzer pointed out that res would give focus to debate and give speakers something to lean on.

Amadeo told group he had given text of proposed LA res to Yost.The text of the Argentine draft resolution was transmitted to the Department in telegram 2808, April 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1061)

Yost reiterated US did not desire res because it served to dignify Cuban complaint and said he had sent text given him by Amadeo to Dept for comment. He said in view LAs feeling res unavoidable US desirous consult closely with LAs. He said we expected specific comments on Amadeo draft tomorrow morning. In general, we were concerned about paras referring to Cuba and US.

Numbered paragraphs 3 and 7, which concerned USUN in the resolution transmitted in telegram 2808, read as follows:

(3) “Deeply concerned by the present situation existing between Cuba and the United States of America;” and

(7) “Urges all other members to refrain from whatever action that could aggravate the existing tension between Cuba and the United States of America.” (Ibid.)

We anxious to find language which in no way limited controversy to US and Cuba because we considered situation encompassed entire hemisphere. Sosa Rodriguez agreed problem belonged in OAS but each nation must have access to UN. Yost agreed to meet with group 10:30 tomorrow morning with specific comments Amadeo text.

Comment: Dept suggested resSee Document 90. had not arrived in time for Yost to take up with LAs at mtg.

Stevenson

90. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1161. Confidential; Verbatim Text. Drafted in ARA/RPA by Jamison and in IO/UNP by Sisco. Cleared by Coerr and Cleveland. Pouched to all posts in the American Republics. Washington, April 11, 1961, 9:26 p.m.

1981. Re Cuba. On basis Pedersen-Sisco telecon, we understand that 12 LAs which have diplomatic relations with Cuba have caucused and have agreed that a resolution on Cuban situation should be submitted. It our further understanding that if LAs submit resolution Padillo Nervo would not join with Afro-Asian effort directed towards resolution contained urtel 2804.See footnote 3, Document 88. Department, of course, regrets that it has not been possible convince LAs to refrain from submission resolution on this matter, despite your efforts and those which have been made in capitals. In light foregoing therefore, you requested see Amadeo and other key selected LAs with view to (a) assuring that no resolution submitted by LAs before full consultation with us; and (b) obtaining their agreement any resolution should be along lines described Deptel 1913.Dated April 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4-461) As indicated Deptel 1913, we believe any resolution on this matter should be addressed to fact that Communist tyranny imposed on people has driven thousands of Cubans, many of them original supporters of Castroʼs revolutionary regime, from their homeland. Cuban people have been and continue to be subjected to destruction and violation of their human rights and liberty which repressive dictatorship in Communist mold cannot tolerate. In short, if there is to be a resolution, it should put this whole matter in proper perspective by focusing on root cause of difficulties.

Following is suggested redraft Argentine draft resolution. As you will note from changes contained therein, we have sought wherever possible to retain Amadeoʼs language. Changes are designed to expose falsity assumption dispute is basically bilateral and to emphasize above described approach. While we recognize that proposed changes may go further than some of LAs may be willing to go, we believe revised resolution should be put to Amadeo in first instance.

“The General Assembly,

Having heard the statements by the Minister of State of Cuba, by the Permanent Representative of the United States of America, and by others;

Taking into account the communication addressed by the Secretary General of the OAS to the Secretary General of the United Nations, dated 7 November 1960;U.N. doc. S/4559.

Deeply concerned by the present tensions in the Western Hemisphere which are largely the product of extracontinental intervention;

Noting that the OAS has condemned emphatically the intervention or threat of intervention by extracontinental powers in the affairs of the American Republics;

Noting the conditions of tyranny in Cuba in which freedom and justice have been denied to Cubans and human rights violated;

Noting that many thousands of Cuban citizens have sought and gained refuge from tyranny imposed by their government in close alignment with extracontinental totalitarian powers, and that these Cuban citizens understandably seek the establishment of conditions of freedom and justice within Cuba;

Considering that the Member States of the United Nations have the obligation to find solutions to their controversies through negotiation and other peaceful means prescribed in the Charter of the United Nations, and that this should be done in accordance with principles of freedom and justice for all concerned;

Taking also into account that the Organization of American States aims, amongst other objectives, to promote the solution of conflicts between their members through peaceful means and to achieve a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man; 1. Expresses the hope that the Member States of the Organization of American States will provide all the necessary assistance to reach a solution of the problems conforming with the principles and purposes of the Organization of American States and the Charter of the United Nations; 2. Urges all other members to refrain from whatever action that could aggravate the existing tensions in the Western Hemisphere.”

Rusk

91. Memorandum From C. Tracy Barnes, Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) for Covert Action, Central Intelligence Agency, to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1961. Secret. Schlesinger passed the memorandum from Barnes on to McGeorge Bundy on April 12, under cover of a note suggesting that Bundy would be interested in the memorandum. (Ibid.) Washington, April 11, 1961. SUBJECT Cuba

I have mentioned our conversation to Mr. Dulles and Dick Bissell, both of whom are thinking about the two main points, i.e., how to answer the direct question regarding support or involvement; and, secondly, should anything further be done with respect to particular individuals “on the Hill.” The latter question might appropriately be raised at the meeting Wednesday afternoon.April 12. The Presidentʼs appointment book indicates that the President met with a number of the leaders of both Houses of Congress on April 12, along with the senior officials of the Departments of State and Defense, but no record has been found that indicates that the issue of Cuba or the impending invasion was discussed at that meeting. (Kennedy Library)

With regard to the other question, if we have any brilliant thoughts we will pass along. In the meantime, I would like to list a few ideas, some of which repeat part of our conversation: 1. The support or involvement question unavoidably requires the answer to a specific issue, namely, do you want directly to deny or to avoid denial by using some less direct and therefore inevitably ambiguous form of words. The working press is too smart and, at the moment, too well informed to assume anything but an affirmative from an answer failing directly to deny. Assuming a denial is not feasible, I would suggest consideration of the following: a. A statement that there have been many allegations regarding U.S. support, all of which have been denied and none of which have been proved. In addition, it might be said that any specific evidence indicating impropriety will, of course, be considered. (I believe that we can live with this one. You will remember that it is the same position all agreed should be used in New York.) b. If possible, it would be fine to include in an answer a few of the good ringing phrases that were to be used by Stevenson in New York in case his speech does not occur. The ones I have in mind deal with the placing of blame on the Castro regime and the fact that the anti-Castro efforts, such as they are, are Cuban not American. c. Roaʼs appearance is now definitely off until Thursday.April 13. Moreover, there have been reports (Tuesday and Tuesday night) that he is very shaky, upset and possibly (repeat possibly) going to collapse. Also note the attached cableNot found attached. which, I think, is probably petty accurate. A point can at least be made that having come to New York like a lion with all sorts of bluster and fire, he has now failed to show twice when given an opportunity to state his case. If anything further develops, Iʼll let you know immediately. d. I have been thinking about the opening phrase in Mac Bundyʼs suggested paragraph

On April 11 Bundy sent a memorandum to Schlesinger in which he suggested the following answer for the President in response to a question regarding CIA involvement:

“This Administration does not propose to discuss in public at any time the work of CIA, but I can say this: the people and the government of the U.S. have inevitably had a sympathetic interest in the plight of Cuban patriots—anti-Communist and anti-Batista. But no effort has been made—and none will be made—to put U.S. interests in the place of Cuban interests. As far as we are concerned, any revolt against the Castro dictatorship inside Cuba, and any return to Cuba by exiled patriots, will be altogether Cuban in spirit, membership, and purpose.

“—And let me say one word more. There have been contingency plans, in another Administration, for U.S. armed forces to respond, if called on, in any Cuban civil war—on the side of freedom, of course. This Administration has shelved those plans. The armed forces of the United States will stand guard against any act of external aggression by the Castro dictatorship, and against any intervention in the hemisphere by foreign imperialists of left or right. They will not be used in the internal struggle for freedom of the people of Cuba.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61)

which has to do with not speaking of the doings of the Agency, and I hope that any such phraseology can be avoided. As you know, historically, intelligence activities have been denied but not with a preamble of this sort. I feel certain that such a preamble will not go down well with the press or the public. Moreover, it will always be construed, in the particular case where used, as evidence that the Agency is involved. The press is sophisticated enough to interpolate the preamble where a denial is given and would, in my opinion, prefer to do so than to have it explained. 2. The arrest of Rolando Masferrer may be brought up with an inference that he may have been discriminated against since he is persona non grata to the Revolutionary Council. The answer to this is pretty easy, namely, Mr. Masferrer was, indeed, one of Batistaʼs most notorious aides but a violation of the Neutrality ActThe Neutrality Act of 1939; 54 Stat. 4, et seq. was the reason that his asylum was rescinded by the State Department and that he was arrested by the I&NS and indicted by a Federal Grand Jury. There would be no harm in this connection in indicating that similar action would be taken against any other individuals where the evidence was sufficient to justify a comparable charge.

C. Tracy BarnesPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

92. Editorial Note

According to summary notes on the meeting prepared by General Gray, a meeting was held at the White House at 5:45 p.m. on April 12, 1961, to consider final preparations for the Zapata operation against Cuba. According to the Presidentʼs appointment book the meeting lasted an hour and a quarter and was attended by Rusk, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, Lemnitzer, Bissell, Barnes, and McGeorge Bundy. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) Although Gray is not listed in the appointment book, his notes indicate that he attended and it is probable that some of the other responsible officials from the Department of State attended as well. Grayʼs notes summarized the meeting as follows:

“At this meeting CIA presented a paper which outlined the latest changes for the Zapata operation including the defections and air strikes on D-2. Many questions were discussed concerning training of additional forces, statements, if any, on D-2 operations, how to prevent headlines, and acceleration of internal troubles. The President stressed the necessity for non-association with the US and directed that all training activities being conducted within the US should stop. He was informed that no-go time for preliminary operations would be 1200, Friday, 14 April, and for the main landing 1200, Sunday, 16 April.” (Summary notes prepared on May 9, 1961; ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. For the text of the CIA paper, see Document 93.)

The President did not give final approval to the CIA plan at this meeting. (Memorandum No. 1 from the Cuba Study Group to the President; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

93. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 1, Source Documents, DCI-8, Vol. I, Part III. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text, in an unknown hand, indicates that the paper was the final revised version. Another handwritten note reads: “Bissell Briefing on Zapata Update.” Washington, April 12, 1961.

CUBAN OPERATION

1. Orientation and Concept: The present concept of the operation being mounted to overthrow Castro is that it should have the appearance of a growing and increasingly effective internal resistance, helped by the activities of defected Cuban aircraft and by the infiltration (over a period of time and at several places) of weapons and small groups of men. External support should appear to be organized and controlled by the Revolutionary Council under Miro Cardona as the successor to a number of separate groups. To support this picture and to minimize emphasis on invasion, the following steps have been taken: a. The public statements of Cardona have emphasized that the overthrow of Castro was the responsibility of the Cubans, that it must be performed mainly by the Cubans in Cuba rather than from outside, and that he and his colleagues are organizing this external support free of control by or official help from the U.S. Government. b. The plans for air operations have been modified to provide for operations on a limited scale on D-2 and again on D-Day itself instead of placing reliance on a larger strike coordinated with the landings on D-Day. c. Shortly after the first air strikes on D-2 a B-26 with Cuban pilot will land at Miami airport seeking asylum. He will state that he defected with two other B-26 pilots and aircraft and that they strafed aircraft on the ground before departing. d. A preliminary diversionary landing of true guerrilla type will be made in Oriente Province on D-2. The main D-Day landings will be made by three groups at locations spaced some distance apart on the coast. These will be followed about one week later by a further guerrilla type landing in Pinar del Rio (at the western end of the island). e. Ships carrying the main forces leave the staging base at staggered times. (The first one sailed on Tuesday morning.) They will follow independent courses to a rendezvous for the final run-in. Until nearly dusk on D-1 they would appear to air observation to be pursuing unrelated courses so there will be no appearance of a convoy. f. All the landings will be at night. At least in the first 24 hours, supply activity over the beaches will be at night. There will be no obtrusive “beachhead” to be seen by aircraft. Most troops will be deployed promptly to positions inland. 2. The Time Table of the plan is as follows: D-7: Commence staging main force—staging completed night of D-5. D-6: First vessel sails from staging area—last vessel departs early morning D-4. D-2: B-26 defection operation—limited air strikes. D-2: Diversionary landing in Oriente (night D-3 to D-2). D-Day: Main landings (night D-1 to D)—limited air strikes. Two B-26s and liaison plane land on seized air strip. D to D+1: Vessels return night of D to D+1 to complete discharge of supplies. D+7: Diversionary landing in Pinar del Rio. 3. Diversion or Cancellation: It would now be infeasible to halt the staging and embarkation of the troops. In the event of a decision to modify the operational plan or to cancel the operation, ships will be diverted at sea, either to Vieques Island or to ports in the U.S. If cancellation is directed, the troops and shipsʼ officers will be told that the reason for the diversion is that all details of the operation, including time and place of intended landings, had been blown to the Castro regime and that under these circumstances the landings would be suicidal. This explanation would be adhered to after the demobilization of the force in the U.S. The U.S. Government could take the position that this enterprise had been undertaken by the Cubans without U.S. Governmental support, that it had failed because of their poor security, and that the U.S. could not refuse to grant asylum to the Cuban volunteers. If by reason of either new intelligence or policy considerations it is necessary to effect a major change in the operational plan, it will be necessary to divert to Vieques Island so that officers of the brigade and shipsʼ captains can be assembled and briefed on the new plan. (The advantages of this location are its security together with the opportunity for the troops to be ashore briefly after some days on board ship.) 4. Naval Protection: The ships carrying the main force will receive unobtrusive Naval protection up to the time they enter Cuban territorial waters. If they are attacked they will be protected by U.S. Naval vessels but following such an intervention they would be escorted to a U.S. port and the force would be demobilized. 5. Defections: Every effort is being made to induce the defection of individuals of military and political significance. At the present time contact has been established by and through Cuban agents and anti-Castro Cuban groups with some thirty-one specific military and police officers, including [4 lines of source text not declassified]. There are, of course, in addition many others rumored to be disaffected but to whom no channel of approach is available. The objective of these efforts is not to induce immediate defections but to prepare the individuals for appropriate action in place after D-day. 6. Internal Resistance Movements: On the latest estimate there are nearly 7,000 insurgents responsive to some degree of control through agents with whom communications are currently active. About 3,000 of these are in Havana itself, over 2,000 in Oriente, about 700 in Las Villas in central Cuba. For the most part, the individual groups are small and very inadequately armed. Air drops are currently suspended because available aircraft are tied up in the movement of troops from their training area to the staging base. After D-Day when it is hoped that the effectiveness of the Castro air force will be greatly reduced, it is planned to supply these groups by daytime air drops. Every effort will be made to coordinate their operations with those of the landing parties. Efforts will be made also to sabotage or destroy by air attack the microwave links on which Castroʼs communication system depends. The objective is of course to create a revolutionary situation, initially perhaps in Oriente and Las Villas Provinces, and then spreading to all parts of the island. 7. Propaganda and Communications: Currently medium and short wave broadcasting in opposition to Castro is being carried on from seven stations in addition to Radio Swan. Antennae modifications of the latter have increased its effective power in Cuba and it is believed that there is now good medium wave reception of Swan everywhere except in Havana itself where it can still be effectively jammed. The number of hours of broadcasting per day will be increased beginning immediately from about 25 to almost 75 soon after D-Day. The combination of multiple long and short wave stations which will then be in use, supplemented by three boats which carry broadcasting equipment (two short wave and one medium wave) will assure heavy coverage of all parts of the island virtually at all times. Radio programs will avoid any reference to an invasion but will call for up-rising and will of course announce defections and carry news of all revolutionary action. Soon after D-Day a small radio transmitter will be put in operation on Cuban soil. 8. The Political Leadership: As of the present moment, the six members of Cardonaʼs Revolutionary Council, notably including Ray, have reaffirmed their membership. Although no specific portfolios have been confirmed, the following possibilities are currently under discussion: Varona, Defense; Ray, Gobernacion (Interior); Carrillo, Finance; Hevia, State; Maceo, Public Health. The political leaders have not yet been briefed on the military plan but they will be informed at each phase of military operations. Advance consultation with the political leaders is considered unacceptably dangerous on security grounds and although last minute briefings will be resented, it is believed that the political leaders will want to take credit for and assume control as quickly as possible over these major operations against Castro. The present plan is that one of them (Artime) will go into Cuba with the main force, others will follow as soon as possible after D-Day and they will announce the establishment of a Provisional Government on Cuban soil. 9. Command: Military command will be exercised in the name of the Revolutionary Council and later of the Provisional Government. In fact, however, the CIA staff constitutes the general staff of the operation and the Agency controls both logistics support and communications. Accordingly, in the early stages at least, the functions of a general head-quarters will be exercised from the Agency with the Cuban brigade commander exercising field command over the units that land on D-Day.

94. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1261. Confidential; Priority. New York, April 12, 1961, 9 p.m.

2833. Cuban item. Yost this morning gave Amadeo text US substitute res.See Document 90. Amadeoʼs immediate reaction was while he personally could accept res, he was sure paras 5 and 6 referring specifically to Cuba would be unacceptable to some LAs and would be virtually impossible to get approved in comite. He promised to consult LA group on US text and give us their reaction.

During course of day USDel received various reports that reaction to US text had been sharply adverse. Amadeo at one point reported LAs had decided to drop attempt to work out satisfactory res. Padilla Nervo said one-sidedness US res reflected US not taking LA group seriously and, therefore, they were discontinuing effort.

Yost met with Amadeo and LA group (reps LAs, except Bolivia, still recognizing Cuba) late afternoon. They expressed strong objection to US draft. Principal points: (1) it would divide LAs, many of which for domestic reasons could not support US res; (2) it would draw fire from countries in other areas and provoke debate, instead of providing mechanism for rapid disposition of item.

Yost explained US position and succeeded in quieting LAs down. He made very clear US (1) could not accept any res which envisaged situation as bilateral dispute between Cuba and US and (2) wanted to have res include reference to extracontinental threat. LAs requested time to revise their draft (USUN 2808)See footnote 4, Document 89. taking into account US views. Promised to furnish new draft tomorrow.

This afternoon Diallo Telli (Guinea) called on Stevenson to get reaction res they had prepared. Res based on Ecuador-Chile res presented SC last Jan.See Document 10. Text sent ourtel 2835.Dated April 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1261) Stevenson explained US favored no res, Cuban situation not bilateral problem, and Guinea draft unacceptable. Stevenson gave no indication US talking with LAs on res but said we would inform Guinea if it became necessary have res and one acceptable to US presented.

Stevenson

95. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Top Secret. Also sent to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. Washington, April 13, 1961.

The following decisions, of which you are already aware, are reported for appropriate action: 1. There will be no employment of U.S. armed forces against Cuba unless quite new circumstances develop. 2. The specific plan for paramilitary support, Nestor, has been rejected, and the President does not wish further planning of any such operations for an invasion of Cuba. There will be quiet disengagement from associations developed in connection with Nestor.

McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

96. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret. Sent as a JCS/OSD telegram. According to the memorandum for the record prepared by Mitchell, which outlined the evolution of the rules of engagement for Operation Bumpy Road, this telegram was drafted after General Cabell discussed with General Lemnitzer and General Bonesteel the rules of engagement set forth in CM-179-61, Document 85. Cabell was particularly concerned that U.S. naval forces might intervene before seriously needed, thus forcing abandonment of the operation. The message to Dennison printed here was cleared with Admiral Russell,USN, General Dean, J-3, and Admiral Wellings, Deputy Director of the Joint Staff, and was then approved by General Lemnitzer. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report) Washington, April 13, 1961, 6:30 p.m.

JCS 468-61. Exclusive for Admiral Dennison, General Lemnitzer sends.

1. Original concept for U.S. naval support of Bumpy Road was to ensure that when once embarked this operation must not fail. This concept modified by the later plan which provides that cancellation possible until landing phase actually starts. Concept further modified by provision in rules of engagement that if intervention by U.S. military element is required and actually takes place while CEF en route to transport area then operation must abort. 2. In view above a change of emphasis is now required. That is, it now important that premature U.S. intervention not occur which would be the cause for cancellation of this highly important and desirable operation. 3. To this end it is important to success of operation that commanders of all sea and air units of your forces engaged in protection of expedition clearly understand and apply rules of engagement along following lines: A. It is desired to minimize the need to abort the operation because of U.S. engagement of Castro ships or aircraft in conduct of protective mission assigned to you. B. Actual engagement of Castro ships or aircraft should be withheld until last possible moment and action taken only after it becomes clear that otherwise total destruction of friendly ship or ships may be imminent. For example, non-engagement in event of initial strafing or bomb run by Castro aircraft on friendly ship is acceptable rather than too hasty U.S. intervention with resultant need to abort the whole operation. Same applies importantly to intervention by U.S. surface ships. Initial firing on friendly ship by Castro surface ship is acceptable and U.S. engagement of Castro ship should await evidence that Castro ship is boring in for a kill or capture. C. Preliminary maneuvering of U.S. aircraft or ships should take into account the above. Effort should be made to minimize blowing the operation by overly active intervention. 4. In the event actual U.S. engagement of Castro craft takes place, immediate report should be passed to Washington together with salient facts involved. Particularly desired are any facts which would support argument that it could be plausibly denied that U.S. intervention was in direct support of CEF. 5. In summary, hope is that over-all operation will not need to be aborted because of U.S. military intervention and to this end CEF prepared to take substantial risks.

97. Telegram From the Director of the Joint Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Washington, April 13, 1961, 7:55 p.m.

JCS 469-61. Exclusive for Adm Dennison, Gen Wheeler sends. Operation Bumpy Road contingency planning.

1. If operation aborted A. Main force will be diverted or moved to Camp Garcia Vieques Island for billeting. In order to prepare for this eventuality HQ MC is directing FMFLANT airlift camp equipment and rations for 1500 men to Camp Garcia commencing 14 April. B. Request you reschedule MarCorps BLT training exercise scheduled for 15-18 April at Vieques to a date not earlier that 25 April. C. Request you have contingency plan for use of armed MarCorps unit to seal compound of Camp Garcia to maintain order in CEF group if necessary. 2. If operation executed A. If operation proceeds as planned, a force of about 175 CEF men with 25 US instructors will train in the Camp Garcia maneuver area for about three weeks commencing about 23 April. B. It is anticipated that about 160 US Army personnel may be sent to Vieques to establish a 100 bed hospital if the need arises. C. The foregoing units will be supported by camp equipment and rations prepositioned at Camp Garcia under paragraph 1 A above. 3. New item same subject. A report has been received from CIA that a Navy P2V7 flew over Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua at low altitude during the morning of 13 April. If possible, without arousing undue interest, desire US aircraft stay clear that area.CIA has also requested US military aircraft remain south of line between 2146 N 8431 W and 1951 N 7714 W from 14 April until operation completed. We do not desire undue attention directed to that area so this request is passed to you for such action as you consider appropriate and consistent with performance of assigned missions.

98. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency to General Maxwell D. TaylorSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret. General Taylor, former Chief of Staff of the Army, was brought back to Washington on April 22 by President Kennedy after the failure of Bay of Pigs operation, to try to help piece together what went wrong. He chaired a committee composed of himself, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, which was charged by the President with responsibility to investigate the causes of the Bay of Pigs failure and to make recommendations to the President. Washington, April 26, 1961. 1. Following is the text of a precedence Emergency cable sent to Col. Jack Hawkins (USMC) at Puerto Cabezas on 13 April 1961 by the Project Chief:Copies of the two telegrams quoted in this memorandum are in Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee. (a) Please advise Emergency precedence if your experiences during the last few days have in any way changed your evaluation of the Brigade. (b) For your information: The President has stated that under no conditions will U.S. intervene with any U.S. forces. 2. Following is the text of Col. Hawkinsʼ reply of the same day: (a) My observations the last few days have increased my confidence in the ability of this force to accomplish not only initial combat missions but also the ultimate objective of Castroʼs overthrow. (b) Reference (paragraph 1 above) arrived during the final briefing of the Brigade and Battalion commanders. They now know all details of the plan and are enthusiastic. These officers are young, vigorous, intelligent and motivated with a fanatical urge to begin battle for which most of them have been preparing in the rugged conditions of training camps for almost a year. I have talked to many of them in their language. Without exception, they have utmost confidence in their ability to win. They say they know their own people and believe after they have inflicted one serious defeat upon opposing forces, the latter will melt away from Castro, who they have no wish to support. They say it is Cuban tradition to join a winner and they have supreme confidence they will win all engagements against the best Castro has to offer. I share their confidence. (c) The Brigade is well organized and is more heavily armed and better equipped in some respects than U.S. infantry units. The men have received intensive training in the use of their weapons, including more firing experience than U.S. troops would normally receive. I was impressed with the serious attitude of the men as they arrived here and moved to their ships. Movements were quiet, disciplined and efficient, and the embarkation was accomplished with remarkable smoothness. (d) The Brigade now numbers 1,400; a truly formidable force. (e) I have also carefully observed the Cuban Air Force. The aircraft are kept with pride and some of the B-26 crews are so eager to commence contemplated operations that they have already armed their aircraft. Lt. Col. George Gaines (USAF) informed me today that he considers the B-26 squadron equal to the best U.S. Air Force squadron. (f) The Brigade officers do not expect help from U.S. Armed Forces. They ask only for continued delivery of supplies. This can be done covertly. (g) This Cuban Air Force is motivated, strong, well trained, armed to the teeth, and ready. I believe profoundly that it would be a serious mistake for the United States to deter it from its intended purpose. EsterlineJ.D. Esterline signed for Colonel J.C. King above Kingʼs typed signature.

99. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1361. Confidential; Priority; Verbatim Text. New York, April 13, 1961, 10 p.m.

2848. Cuban item. Sosa Rodriguez (Venezuela) informed Yost late today Amadeo LA group had held long session on US suggested revisions (USUN 2847) to LA group revised res (USUN 2845).Both telegrams 2845 and 2847 are dated April 13. (Ibid.) He reported our desire retain original language of first operative para accepted by group. Our additional preambulary para (third in text given below) provoked extensive discussion. Group reached tentative accord on dropping following words in para: “Causes of” and “acted on”. Several dels indicated they wished consult their govts on draft and are doing so tonight. Amadeo (Argentina) later told us he was pessimistic about groupʼs reactions.

Res with modification listed above would read:

“The General Assembly

Having heard the statements made by the Minister of State of Cuba, by the Rep of the US of America and by other representatives;

Deeply concerned by the situation pointed out in the above-mentioned statements, which threatens the peace and security in the Western hemisphere;

Noting that the present tensions in the Western hemisphere were considered at the seventh meeting of consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics;

Taking into consideration the communication addressed by the SYG of the OAS to the SYG of the UN, dated Nov 7, 1960;

Considering that the member states of the UN are bound to find a solution to their controversies by negotiation and other peaceful means in order that international peace and security and justice would not be endangered; 1. Urges the member states who integrate the OAS to provide all the assistance necessary to reach a solution conforming with the principles and precepts of the Charter of the UN and the Charter of the OAS; 2. Urges all the states members to refrain from any action that could aggravate the existent tensions.”

USUN considers foregoing draft covers basic points US position and is best res that can be obtained. Unless Dept feels otherwise, plan tell LAs tomorrow we agreeable to their introducing this text and to urge them do so promptly.

Sosa Rodriguez indicated he did not believe Cuba would speak before Mon, April 17.

Stevenson

100. Telegram From the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Exclusive; Bumpy Road. Repeated to Lemnitzer, Burke, Smith, McElroy, and OʼDonnell. USS Essex, Caribbean, April 14, 1961, 12:26 p.m.

141726Z. Exclusive for Dennison, info Lemnitzer, Burke, Smith, McElroy, OʼDonnell from Clark. Completed fueling 141630ZApril 14, 11:30 a.m. at lat 18-38N long 85-28W. Units proceeding independently to station. Have assigned 1 DD to escort each CEF ship with orders to remain outside visual range during daylight. Plan launch from lat 18-30N long 81-00W at 151030ZApril 15, 5:30 a.m. as follows; 3 VS for search ahead of CEF, 1 AD to assist in location CEF ships as required. Will begin routine Bumpy Road reporting at 151030Z.

Intelligence. No surface contacts. Will maneuver to avoid being sighted. 6 aircraft contacts within 60 miles. 4 engine transport passed overhead at 1710Z.12:10 p.m. All aircraft probably commercial airlines. No apparent surveillance activity. Elokomin proceeding via South Mariposa Bank to station at 19-00N 80-00W ETA 171200Z.April 17, 7 a.m. SOA controlled to avoid contact with CEF.

101. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President KennedySource: Department of State, Central Files, 731.00/4-1461. Secret. Washington, April 14, 1961. SUBJECT Conversation with Dr. Miro Cardona

On April 13 Mr. Berle and I had a conversation with Dr. Miro Cardona at the Century Club in New York.

Our purpose was to put over to him the two points mentioned in last Wednesdayʼs meeting:April 12; see Document 92. (1) that no U.S. troops would be sent in support of the Cuban anti-Castro operations; and (2) that, if the Revolutionary Council goes to Cuba and proclaims itself a Provisional Government, recognition will not be automatic.

On the first point, Dr. Cardona displayed considerable resist-ance. He said that, if the Cuban movement against Castro failed, not only the Revolutionary Council but the United States would be held responsible. Everyone knows, Dr. Cardona said, that the United States is behind the Cuban operation.

Dr. Cardona declared that, if the Cuban patriots succeeded in establishing a provisional government on a Cuban beach-head, and if things then began to go wrong, he plans to call for help from all the countries of the hemisphere—including the United States. “This help must come,” Dr. Cardona said. If the Cuban patriots win as a result of U.S. intervention, no one will care. If they lose, then the U.S. will have suffered a severe defeat on its own doorstep, Communism will be consolidated in Cuba, and the Castro movement will move on to tear down the Inter-American system. “You must understand what will happen to your interests if we lose. You must commit yourselves to full support of our efforts.”

2. On the question of recognition, Dr. Cardona seemed to understand that this was dependent on circumstances and would not be automatic. 3. On the question of possible negotiation with the Castro regime, Dr. Cardona argued that any suggestions to this effect coming from pro-Castro quarters were serving Castroʼs purposes. “Negotiation is the maneuver of a man who is losing.” If such suggestions were taken up, the only effect would be to prolong Castroʼs tenure of power. The proper response to such suggestions should be that this is a Cuban affair and that, so long as Castro remains in power, there is nothing to negotiate. 4.

Dr. Cardona raised the question of the operational plans. “There must be some military plan I donʼt know about. I would like to know about it for purposes of coordination. I donʼt want to know these things—but I have to know to make our efforts effective.” He suggested the establishment of some sort of liaison with the operational side. We said that we would pass this request on but offered him no hope that it might be fulfilled. We see no reason why it should be.

Dr. Cardona predicted that, once landings take place, 10,000 Cubans would immediately align themselves with the “invading” forces.

5. Dr. Cardona struck me as a proud, intelligent and liberal minded man. He is a serious person and will not be easily moved from his present position. Nonetheless I think a very tough effort should be made to get him to accept the Presidentʼs press conference statement concerning the non-commitment of U.S. troops as the basis for his future relations with the United States.In response to a question during a press conference at the White House on April 12, President Kennedy stated that “there will not be, under any conditions, an intervention in Cuba by the United States Armed Forces. This Government will do everything it possibly can … to make sure that there are no Americans involved in any actions inside Cuba. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 258) Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

102. Editorial Note

On April 15, 1961, a “Bumpy Road” Operations Center was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to monitor the operation. At 8:29 a.m. the Center received a message from Admiral Clark reporting that Task Group 81.8 had effected a rendezvous with all of the ships of the Cuban Expeditionary Force and was proceeding according to plan. (Telegram 151329Z from CTG 81.8 to CINCLANTFLT; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) At 12:48 p.m. Admiral Dennison reported to the Joint Chiefs that everything was going according to plan. The Commander of the Air Defenses at Key West had reported that a B-26 bomber, bearing the markings of the Cuban Air Force, had made an emergency landing at Key West, after having bombed Havana. (CINC-LANT telegram 151748Z to the JCS; ibid.)

The chronology maintained in the Operations Center for April 15 concludes with the general observation that the purported defection of the Cuban pilot and the air strikes against the airfields at Havana, San Antonio de los Banos and Santiago de Cuba went off on schedule. But a diversionary landing, which was to have been made by a force of 163 men approximately 35 miles east of the Guantanamo Naval Base, was aborted due to “weak leadership” and difficulty in locating the designated landing beach. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

103. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol. I. No classification marking. Washington, April 15, 1961. SUBJECT Air BranchAir Branch was handwritten on the source text above the excised material. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Combat Mission ReportAccording to Bissellʼs memoirs, he was instructed by President Kennedy on April 14 to “play down the magnitude of the invasion,” and to reduce the scale of the initial air strike and make it “minimal.” Bissellʼs impression was that the President issued this instruction without consulting the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Defense. Acting on the Presidentʼs instruction, Bissell cut the size of the air strike for April 15 from 16 aircraft to 8. (Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Reflections of a Cold Warrior (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), page 183)

Santiago

Both aircraft returned to base safely. Pilots reported airfield completely destroyed and fires everywhere. One B-26 reported destroyed by rockets, one T-33 probably destroyed by .50 calibre fire, and one C-47 destroyed by .50 calibre fire. All aircraft on ramp reported afire. AAA reported as heavy and determined. Aircraft repeatedly exchanged fire with AAA positions until AAA ceased. One aircraft returned base with numerous holes, complete hydraulic failure and one hung rocket. However, landed without incident.

San Antonio

Two aircraft returned base safely and pilots reported attack destroyed 75 per cent of field. Operations building was destroyed and one T-33 on alert exploded. Two additional T-33ʼs were possibly destroyed. Smoke from bombs partially obliterated target and precluded accurate damage assessment. Heavy AAA was reported. One aircraft landed at Grand Cayman Island because of low fuel.

Libertad

One aircraft returned to base safely and pilot reported target partially destroyed. All bombs fell within confines of the base. (Press reports stated one bomb scored direct hit on an Air Force ammunition dump and explosions were still occurring 30 minutes after the attack.) Heavy AAA was reported. One aircraft was damaged by AAA and forced to feather engine which was on fire. Companion aircraft accompanied toward Key West but observed damaged aircraft in uncontrolled crash into ocean. No parachutes or survivors were observed. Second aircraft, now low on fuel, continued to Florida and landed at Boca Chica. Extent of damage not yet determined.

Special Aircraft

The special aircraft landed at destination as planned.An apparent reference to the B-26 bomber bearing the markings of the Cuban Air Force, which landed at Key West on April 15; see Document 102.

Airborne Spare

One airborne spare aircraft aborted on take-off due to engine trouble.

Stanley W. BeerliPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Colonel, USAFActing Chief, DPD-DD/P

104. Editorial Note

In a communique issued in Havana on April 15, 1961, Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro charged that at 6 a.m. that morning B-26 bombers from the United States simultaneously bombed points in the cities of Havana, San Antonio de los Banos, and Santiago. Castro accused the United States of “imperialist aggression” and added that the Cuban Delegation to the United Nations had been instructed to ask the United Nations to respond to a formal charge of aggression against Cuba by the United States. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, page 289) In New York a statement issued on April 15 by Miro Cardona, as President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, contended that the bombing of Cuban airfields that morning was done by “certain members of the Cuban Air Force,” who had been in contact with, and were encouraged by the Cuban Revolutionary Council. (Ibid., page 290)

On the afternoon of April 15, an urgent meeting of the Political (First) Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations was called to consider the conflict developing in Cuba. The committee had on its agenda a complaint by Cuba pending from October 18, 1960, that the United States was preparing “various plans of aggression and acts of intervention against Cuba.” (U.N. doc. A/4543) The Political Committee took up the agenda item 2 days earlier than scheduled in response to reports of bombing in Cuba, and Cuban Foreign Minister Roa accused the United States of aggression against the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Cuba. Roaʼs charge was supported by the Soviet Representative, Valerian A. Zorin, who warned that “Cuba has many friends in the world who were ready to come to its aid, including the Soviet Union.”

Ambassador Stevenson answered for the United States and denied the Cuban charges of aggression. Stevenson cited President Kennedyʼs press conference statement of April 12 that United States armed forces would not “under any conditions” intervene in Cuba, and that the United States would do everything in its power to ensure that no United States citizens would participate in actions against Cuba. Stevenson added that President Kennedy was opposed to the use of United States territory to mount an offensive against a foreign government. According to his information, Stevenson told the committee, the air raids against the Cuban cities had been carried out by defectors from the Cuban Air Force who had subsequently landed in Florida and had asked for political asylum. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.1149)

105. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4-1661. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Another copy of this telegram indicates that it was drafted by Richard F. Pedersen. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Tels 1962 (TS, EXDIS, etc)) New York, April 16, 1961, 6 p.m.

2892. For Secretary and Dulles from Stevenson.

1. Greatly disturbed by clear indications received during day in process developing rebuttal material that bombing incidents in Cuba on Saturday were launched in part at least from outside Cuba. 2. I had definite impression from BarnesStevenson was unaware of the planning for an operation against Cuba until several days before the invasion occurred. At that point, he was briefed, in general terms, by Arthur Schlesinger, Tracy Barnes, Harlan Cleveland, and William Bowdler, in a special meeting called for that purpose at the Mission in New York. (Memorandum on Cuba, April 1961; Princeton University, Stevenson Papers, Emb-Box 2, Cuba) when he was here that no action would be taken which could give us political difficulty during current UN debate. This raid, if such it was, if exposed will gravely alter whole atmosphere in GA. If Cuba now proves any of planes and pilots came from outside we will face increasingly hostile atmosphere. No one will believe the bombing attacks on Cuba from outside could have been organized without our complicity. 3. I do not understand how we could let such attack take place two days before debate on Cuban issue in GA. Nor can I understand if we could not prevent such outside attack from taking place at this time why I could not have been warned and provided pre-prepared material with which to defend us. Answers I made to Roaʼs statements about incident on Saturday were hastily concocted in Department, and revised by me at last minute on assumption this was clear case of attacks by defectors inside Cuba. 4. There is gravest risk of another U-2 disaster in such uncoordinated action. Stevenson

106. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1661. Secret; Priority. New York, April 16, 1961, 7 p.m.

2894. For the President and Secretary from Stevenson. Cuba.

Key issue in forthcoming GA debate has now been clearly defined in USSR speech SaturdayApril 15; see Document 104. as follows:

“Nothing was said by (President Kennedy) to the effect that activities which are hostile to Cuba would be stopped on the territory of the United States …”

“They have no grounds for undertaking any action on their territory which would prove to be of assistance to Cuban underground elements or elements in other Latin American countries which are preparing for aggression against Cuba …We expect the Government of the US to make its position clearer as this discussion continues …”

2. In addition Zorin stated that among the “sincere” friends of Cuba, “who are ready to provide any assistance, the USSR is to be found.” He charged that “aggression” against Cuba was being carried out “from the territory of the United States and with the assistance of American arms.” 3. My speech now contains no statement on the key issue as set forth in paragraph 1 above except: “I do not see that it is the obligation of the United States to protect Dr. Castro from the consequences of his treason, etc.” 4. I feel certain we will have to meet this issue more directly before the debate ends. And I believe we would do best to meet it in advance. I therefore raise again desirability of doing so in this speech. I note President in April 12 press conferenceSee footnote 2, Document 101. stated he “would be opposed to mounting an offensive” against Castro from this country. 5. We must have a clear policy position on this point that we can all stick to. I believe I should say tomorrow something to this effect at end of paragraph saying US has no aggressive purposes against Cuba: “We sympathize with the desire of the Cuban exiles, as well as the people of Cuba themselves, to seek Cubaʼs independence and freedom and to bring about democratic processes in Cuba. We have no intention whatever of repressing the Cuban refugees in the United States, who have such a burning desire to restore a betrayed revolution. I wish to make clear, however, that we would be opposed to the use of our territory for mounting an offensive against any foreign government.” 6. Request your authority to do so. Stevenson

107. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 3, Vol. 4, Ch. 3. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, April 16, 1961. SUBJECT General Grayʼs Briefing for DOD [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Operations 1. Per instructions of Chief, WH/4, I attended a briefing at 0900 hours this date held by General Gray in the JCS Briefing Room. In addition to those members of General Grayʼs immediate staff who are working on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] support, the briefing was attended by Secretary of Defense McNamara, Mr. Bundy from Defense, and Generals Lemnitzer, Shoup, LeMay, Eddleman and Admiral Burke. (Some additional Generals whom I could not identify were also present.) 2. General Gray conducted a briefing primarily from the DOD support angle, however, his opening minutes were devoted to the air strike, the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Operation and the impending brigade assault. When the results of the air strike were discussed, it was pointed out that only a preliminary analysis of photographs had been accomplished and definitive results would not be available until later the morning of the 16th. Secretary McNamara asked how many B-26ʼs are shown to be still on the airfields in Cuba. The answer to this question was being obtained by Lt. Colonel Tarwater from the PM Staff the morning of the 16th for return to Secretary McNamara. In discussing the losses incurred by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Secretary McNamara asked if DOD had any more B-26ʼs to give to the operation. General LeMay said yes, and Secretary McNamara said he wanted all to be delivered as soon as possible. When queried I informed him that we had enough crews to ferry these to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. (Colonel VanDine is talking to Colonel Beerli, DPD, on this matter.) 3. In discussing the convoy movement it was pointed out that the escort ships had taken off two injured from the Atlantico. General Gray requested that these men be taken off the Navyʼs hands as soon as possible. (I have passed this request to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of PM.) 4. On logistics matters they discussed a ship scheduled to sail tonight. I did not know to what they were referring. (Something from St. Maryʼs?) 5. Next subject was regarding the priorities and movement of the additional supplies for 5,000-10,000-15,000 increments. Secretary McNamara was insistent that everything should be moved to as close a position as possible in order to allow the necessary shipment when called for. I gather that all this material is being positioned at Anniston Depot in Alabama. Discussions continued regarding 48 two and one-half ton trucks and 24 jeeps, 8 M-51 tanks and mechanized graders. On these items Secretary McNamara also recommended that they be put in as near a position for utilization as possible. 6. The question was raised on the use of personnel carriers during which it was pointed out that these items are attributable to the United States and could not be very well explained away if supplied through a covert channel. 7. It became apparent that it was Secretary McNamaraʼs understanding that a great amount of the equipment to be provided was predicated on the fact that a Provisional Government holding Cuban territory would be supported by the U.S. and supplies furnished overtly. In this case the problem of attributability for the personnel carriers does not exist. All agreed that there are plenty of personnel carriers in the Georgia, Alabama and Texas areas to supply these if needed. In addition, under these conditions, DOD would take over the delivery of the supplies all the way. 8. Someone raised the point that it would be best if other L.A. nations put in token forces in support of the Provisional Government; General Lemnitzer stated that this action was Stateʼs affair and of no concern to DOD. 9. On the hospital matter it was pointed out that the Services were going ahead with scheduling for the movement of a hospital unit to Vieques. The first priority would be a Marine Unit, 60 beds, which could be moved to meet our deadline of 22 April. A second hospital unit could be provided by our deadline of 6 May possibly through additional elements of a Marine hospital unit or a separate Army organization. No problem envisaged here. 10. Question then returned to the use of tanks, personnel carriers, and other heavy equipment and Secretary McNamara asked if more Cubans would be available to man this equipment. I told him that recruitment was continuing and that these trainees could be provided with perhaps some already capable of operating some of the equipment types involved. Secretary McNamara suggested that we try to recruit 25 or more trainees who can be trained here to operate tanks, etc. General Gray interrupted to note that the President had stated no training would be accomplished in the States; Secretary McNamara said he thought surely the President would agree to this training being accomplished. (Who takes action on this item regarding recruitment of trainees?) In discuss-ing training, Secretary McNamara said, of course, they canʼt be trained in Guatemala because it has been agreed that everything would be closed out in Guatemala and no further activity take place in that area. [1 line of source text not declassified] 11. Discussions turned next to unfinished business. First problem brought up was the request for Avon Park with General Gray noting that the Air Force did not agree that the use of this site was feasible. General LeMay said he could not understand why Eglin, part of which is already being used in support of our activities, could not perform the tasks that we have requested. He noted that Avon Park could be covered if necessary by the Air Force stating they were using it for bombing again, but that he thought Eglin with its already existing facilities would make much more sense for this activity. (This matter will be discussed with DPD by Air Force officers.) 12. Other items of unfinished business called for no comment: i.e. hospital arrangements noted above, early warning coverage for Nicaragua by Essex, mechanized grader no longer needed. 13. At this point Colonel Tarwater indicated he had received word that the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] operation had not been run as scheduled.Reference is to the aborted diversionary landing; see Document 108. General Lemnitzer pointed out that if the area had been alerted this would have accomplished the same thing as if the landing had been made. 14. When questioned as to the failure of the preceding night on the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] mission it was pointed out that the vessel involved had difficulty in finding the landing beach. Secretary McNamara suggested that perhaps they needed to provide sterilized Navy personnel for use on our vessels, if this was necessary to insure that the navigational needs of the operations be met. Admiral Burke was in agreement. 15. Secretary McNamara again returned to the problem of backup support for the force and future military operations on Cuba after the assault. He said he wanted to be sure that everything that would be needed would be provided. Did we have enough stock piled for airdrops? He seemed to feel that arms for 4,000 to 5,000 men might not be enough. He suggested that every effort be made to package for air and small boat delivery everything that we estimated would be needed to support our efforts. Admiral Burke noted here that small boat operations were very effective in supplying bulk tonnage. [name not declassified]AC/WH/4/SA/Mil

108. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Cabell) to General Maxwell D. TaylorSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret. Washington, May 9, 1961. SUBJECT Cuban Operation 1. At about 9:30 p.m. on 16 April (D-1) I was called in the CIA headquarters for the Cuban operation by the Special Assistant to the President, Mr. McGeorge Bundy. He notified me that we would not be permitted to launch air strikes the next morning until they could be conducted from a strip within the beachhead. Any further consultation regarding this matter should be with the Secretary of State. 2. I called the Secretary and asked him if I could come immediately to his office and discuss this decision. Mr. Bissell joined me at the Secretaryʼs office where we both arrived at about 10:15 p.m. 3. The Secretary informed us that there were political considerations preventing the planned air strikes before the beachhead airfield was in our hands and usable. The air strikes on D-2 had been allowed because of military considerations. Political requirements at the present time were overriding. The main consideration involved the situation at the United Nations. The Secretary described Ambassador Stevensonʼs attitude in some detail. Ambassador Stevenson had insisted essentially that the air strikes would make it absolutely impossible for the U.S. position to be sustained. The Secretary stated that such a result was unacceptable. 4. In the light of this he asked that we describe the implications of the decision. We told him that the time was such (now almost 11:00 p.m.) that it was now physically impossible to stop the over-all landing operation, as the convoy was at that time just about beginning to put the first boat ashore, and that failure to make air strikes in the immediate beachhead area the first thing in the morning (D-Day) would clearly be disastrous. I informed him that there would be four effects of the cancellation order as it applied to strikes against Cuban airfields. a. There would be a great risk of loss of one or more of the ships as they withdrew from the beach. This would be serious but not catastrophic, provided that the unloading had proceeded as scheduled and all planned unloading had occurred by daylight. In view of the fact that this was a night landing and close timing was required, it was pointed out that the probability of smooth performance here was doubtful. (As it turned out, the unloading was not accomplished in the time planned.) b. The disembarked forces in the beachhead would be subjected to a heavier scale of air attack than would otherwise have been the case. In view of the fact that the Cuban Air Force was inadequate for massive air attacks, the attacks to be expected under the new circumstances would be damaging to these forces but not decisive. c. Failure essentially to neutralize the Cuban Air Force very early on D-Day would have its most serious effect on the use of the Expeditionary Air Forceʼs B-26s to isolate the battlefield. The B-26s were being counted upon to attack approaching Cuban ground and Naval elements and close-in artillery and tanks. No fighter cover was being provided for the B-26s and they would thus face the prospect of serious attrition during these battlefield operations. The beachhead could then be overwhelmed by the superior surface attack which could be brought against it. d. Loss of efficiency would result from this late change of orders. 5. After considering the foregoing, the Secretary of State agreed that strikes could be made in the immediate beachhead area but confirmed that the planned air strikes against Cuban airfields, a harbor, and a radio broadcasting station, could not be permitted and the decision to cancel would stand. He asked if I should like to speak to the President. Mr. Bissell and I were impressed with the extremely delicate situation with Ambassador Stevenson and the United Nations and the risk to the entire political position of the United States, and the firm position of the Secretary. We saw no point in my speaking personally to the President and so informed the Secretary.In a subsequent memorandum to President Kennedy on September 1, 1961, McGeorge Bundy recalled: “I made it very clear to Cabell and Bissell on Sunday evening that if they disagreed, you would be willing to hear arguments from them. Rusk was not ʼin commandʼ; he was simply in charge in Washington—who else could be?” Bundy concluded that if the air strike had been allowed and had succeeded, the invasion would still have failed. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/61-12/61) 6. Our immediate problem then was quickly to dispatch the necessary order to the Air Base in Puerto Cabezas carrying out the instructions to stop the planned air strike and to require re-planning and re-briefing of crews. (This was barely accomplished as the order to cancel caught the crews in their cockpits.) 7. Our next task was to try and compensate for the loss of effective air strikes.Another record of Cabell and Bissellʼs meeting with Rusk was prepared in the CIA on May 3. According to this account, when Cabell and Bissell informed Hawkins, Esterline, and Drain of the cancellation of the D-Day air strike, they responded that it would probably mean the failure of the mission. Cabell replied that the CIA had its “marching orders” and would comply. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Papers Furnished the Green Committee) For text, see the Supplement. In order to protect the shipping as it withdrew from the beachhead, I arranged with the Navy to stand by pending authority to give fighter cover. At 4:30 a.m., 17 April (D-Day), I called on the Secretary of State at his home and reiterated the need to protect the shipping. The Secretary telephoned the President and put me on the phone. After I made the request the President asked that the Secretary be put back on. After conversation with the President, the Secretary informed me that the request for air cover was disapproved.At a press conference on January 24, 1963, President Kennedy was asked about allegations that the Cuban Expeditionary Force had been promised that it could expect U.S. air cover during the invasion. Kennedy replied that no U.S. air cover was planned because “if you are going to have U.S. air cover, you might as well have a complete U.S. commitment, which would have meant a full fledged invasion by the U.S. That was not the policy of the U.S. in April 1961.” He noted that the decision to delay the air strike planned by the CEFʼs B-26 bombers for the morning of D-day contributed to the failure of the invasion, but he did not discuss the reasons for the delay. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 92) C.P. CabellPrinted from a copy that bears these typed signatures.General, USAF

The foregoing conforms to my recollection:

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.Deputy Director (Plans)

109. Report by Grayston Lynch of the Central Intelligence AgencySource: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study. Secret; Eyes Only. Lynch prepared the report for the investigative committee chaired by General Taylor. Washington, May 4, 1961.

AFTER ACTION REPORT ON OPERATION [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

1. Preparation:

On 28 March 1961 the LCIʼs Blagar and Barbara J. departed Stock Island, Key West, Florida for Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, arriving on 2 April 1961. The two case officers of the ships, Mr. William Robertson of the Barbara J. and Mr. Grayston Lynch of the Blagar and the two shipsʼ captains [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the Blagar and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the Barbara J., had been told that they were to lead and direct the landing phase of the coming invasion of Cuba which would be staged from Puerto Cabezas and all the details of the operation would be given us in Puerto Cabezas. Enroute we received a cable directing us upon arrival at Puerto Cabezas to assemble and test 36 small boats that were to be used in the coming operation. After arrival in Puerto Cabezas, the crews of the two ships carried out this mission completing it on 10 April. The briefing team from Washington arrived about 11 April and briefings were conducted on 12, 13, and 14 April. These briefings and the operations and administrative plans given us were clear and thorough. The Blagar was given the position of command ship and the mission of landing troops on both Blue and Green Beaches. The Barbara J. was to land troops on Red Beach and then patrol to the east to cover the landing areas.

2. Plan For Blue Beach:

The plan for Blue Beach called for landing two battalions, the 4th aboard the Caribe and the 6th aboard the Rio Escondido, beginning at approprimately 0100 hours 17 April in 4 LCVPʼs. Three LCUʼs preloaded with tanks, trucks and other vehicles were aboard a Navy LSD which would rendezvous with us five miles from Blue Beach and transfer the craft to us. They were to land on Blue Beach at first light. After the landing at Blue Beach was well underway, the Blagar was to come alongside the Atlantico and take aboard the 3rd battalion and with one LCVP following proceed 16 miles east to Green Beach, put the battalion ashore and return to Blue Beach to act as Command Ship and direct the off loading of the cargo ships. Aboard each LCI was a thousand man pack of arms and ammunition plus some resupply of ammunition. This was to be on call for the brigade ashore. The landing at Green Beach was to be conducted as soon as we felt we could leave Blue Beach, but was not expected to be done until after daylight of the 17th.

The reconnaissance of the beach itself and the marking of the landing sites was to be conducted by the UDT, teams that had been especially trained for this job for the last four months. There were three of these teams: one three-man team in the Barbara J. for Red Beach, one five-man team for Blue Beach, and one three-man team for Green Beach were aboard the Blagar. They were to land as soon as the LCIʼs arrived in the landing areas and while the LCVPʼs and small boats were loading the troops. It was felt that they would have about one hour to perfom their missions.

3. Plan For Red Beach:

The LCI Barbara J. was escort for the cargo ship Houston which held the 2nd and 5th battalions into the Bay of Cochinos and land them at the head of the bay on Red Beach. This was to be done utilizing the small boats (12) of the Houston. It was planned to load each boat with ten men and their equipment. After this landing was completed the Barbara J. was to escort the Houston back to Blue Beach where its cargo was to be off loaded by the LCUʼs. The Barbara J. was then to patrol for ten miles to the east of Green Beach.

In all this planning we were told that early morning air strikes on the air bases in Cuba were planned and that these would take out all of Castroʼs air force.

4. Movement To The Beach Areas:

The Rio Escondido had damaged her props on logs coming out of New Orleans enroute to Puerto Cabezas and could only do five knots so this ship was loaded first and left Puerto Cabezas on 12 April. All the other ships left on the night of 14 April and proceeded independently to an assembly area at point AA. The brigade commander and staff were aboard the Blagar. All ships arrived on station at 1730 hours 16 April and formed a column for the run into the beaches. The column was led by the Blagar and followed at 800 yard intervals by the Caribe, Atlantico, Barbara J., Houston and the Rio Escondido. At five miles from Blue Beach the LSD rendezvoused with the column and the transfer of the landing craft began. At this point the Barbara J. and the Houston left the column and proceeded toward Red Beach. The Blagar moved on up to within two miles of Blue Beach to launch the UDT teams. This five-man team and Mr. Lynch departed the Blagar at 2345 hours 16 April in a seven-man, Navy rubber UDT boat with a 16 HP silent motor. Two men were armed with BARʼs and the other four with Thompson sub-machine guns. The team was equipped with a PRC-10 radio and lighting sets for beach and buoys for marking the channels. Escorting them part of the way was a 20 foot catamaran boat from the Blagar. This boat also had a PRC-10 radio and mounted one .50 and one .30 caliber machine gun. This boat was to lie off the beach and provide cover for the UDT teams.

5. Landing At Blue Beach:

The town of Playa Giron was well lighted and a cluster of very bright lights on the right of the town proved to be from the small group of buildings at the jetty which marked the right boundary of the landing area. At about 1000 yards out, six men were observed outside these buildings looking seaward. As there were no lights or noise from the ships it was assumed that they were merely coast watchers which later checking proved to be correct. The UDT team started into the beach about 300 yards west of these buildings and at when 500 yards out, all the lights in the buildings were switched off. The UDT team discovered a coral ridge about 100 yards from the beach running across the front of the landing area and one foot below the surface. They crossed this and started the boat into the beach. Fifty yards from shore a jeep came from the town down the beach road, and headed east and picked them up in its headlights. This jeep stopped directly in front of the team and turned toward the water throwing its headlights on the boat. It then caught the full fire of two BARʼs and four Thompsons and was knocked out instantly. The team moved onto the beach and called the Blagar on the radio and told them what had happened. They also called for an immediate landing of troops on the beach before the enemy could rush in its troops. The team placed a red light by the jeep, moved toward the jetty 150 yards to the east and placed the other one; then moved out onto the jetty and placed the large white light to guide the landing craft in. While this was taking place someone pulled the master switch and blacked out Playa Giron completely. Three trucks were then observed moving toward the beach area without lights. These trucks discharged some troops who moved in on the UDT team who were in position in some old ruins on the jetty. The Blagar then moved in near the jetty to lend fire support to the landing. The Blagar was armed with eleven .50 caliber machine guns, five .30 caliber machine guns and two .75 MM RR. The militia was fired upon by the UDT team when they attempted to remove the red marker lights off the beach. This fire fight was in progress when the Blagar opened fire on the beach from a distance of 400 yards, clearing it completely in a few minutes. The only return fire was from one .50 caliber machine gun firing from the direction of the town. This fire wounded one man on the Blagar and then ceased fire. After about ten minutes of firing on the beach area, the Blagar moved back and the first two LCVPʼs came in. They struck the coral about 75 yards from the beach and tried to ride over it but could not. They then dropped their ramps and the troops waded ashore. The first troops came ashore yelling but once on the beach moved out quickly and quietly. The UDT team called the second two LCVPʼs to land and warned them about the coral and had them come in slower and to discharge their troops as soon as they grounded on the coral. The brigade commander and his staff landed in a boat from Blagar at this time and took command of the beach. His radio was not working so his messages were relayed over the radio of the UDT team. There was no opposition to this landing as the fire from the Blagar had driven the militia away and no firing was heard until the troops started moving through the town. Mr. Lynch then returned to the Blagar to direct the rest of the landing, and to prepare to go to Green Beach. The five men of the UDT team were left on the beach to find a landing site for the LCUʼs. They had the PRC-10 radio and the boat and motor. The landing of troops continued and by first light all the troops of the 4th battalion were ashore and the 6th battalion was starting its troops ashore using the small boats from the Rio Escondido. Two of the LCVPʼs were holed by coral and after making several trips ashore one was forced to beach itself and the other sunk but the crew was picked up and sent to the beach. The UDT team continued to search for a landing site for the LCUʼs with no luck until a local fisherman was found who showed them a passage through the coral that could be used at high tide about 0630. This was a narrow channel and could only be used by one LCU at a time. The channel was marked by buoys and at 0600 hours the first LCU landed. After this LCU was off loaded, it backed out and another moved into the channel. The empty one was sent to the Rio Escondido to complete the off loading of the 6th battalion. As this was taking place Red Beach called and reported they were under air attack by a B-26. About ten minutes later or at 0630 the first enemy aircraft appeared at Blue Beach. It was a B-26 which came from the east and strafed the LCUʼs landing on the beach causing some damage to the motor of one LCVP which proceeded into the beach under its own power. There were no casualties from this attack and all anti-aircraft guns were firing on the plane. It left to the west in the direction of Red Beach. As this plane was leaving two more planes were sighted coming from the west and fire was put on them before it was discovered they were a friendly B-26 escorting a C-46 for the parachute drop. When they were recognized as friendly the fire ceased. No apparent damage was done to the planes but we were told later that one paratrooper was wounded but jumped anyway. The blue wing bands that were to identify our planes could not be seen until the planes were overhead and proved to be of little value in telling friend from foe. The enemy air attacks, although practically continuous, were never in groups of over two planes each. Each plane attacked independently and when he had fired his rockets left immediately. The only types observed were B-26ʼs, which strafed and fired rockets, Sea Furyʼs which usually only fired rockets (four) and T-33 jets which fired rockets also. The B-26ʼs and Sea Furyʼs were usually brought under AA fire with some effect but the T-33ʼs always came from high out of the sun and we were never able to bring effective fire on them. After the first air attacks I called the brigade commander on the radio and advised him against moving the Blagar east to make the landing at Green Beach. The reasons given were that the departure of the Blagar would leave the ships in the beach area without their most effective anti-aircraft fire. Also by this time we had lost 3 of the 4 LCVPʼs and if the enemy planes hit us on our way down to Green Beach (a 2 hour trip), it might result in the loss of the battalion plus the command ship. I told him I could put the battalion ashore right away on Blue Beach by using the LCUʼs, and he could then start them toward Green Beach on the road. He agreed to this and two of the LCUʼs took this battalion ashore on Blue Beach.

At about 0700 our own B-26ʼs were on station over the landing area and we thought the air attacks were finished but at 0800 a Sea Fury came in and dove on one of our C-46ʼs that was returning from dropping the paratroopers. He came through our AA fire and made a firing pass on the C-46 which had dropped down next to the water and was staying within the harbor area. The Sea Fury was caught by our fire as he pulled up from his firing pass and started smoking and crashed into the water, exploded and sank. This cheered up the AA crews and other attacks later on were met with all guns that could fire. At about this time we received a message from the Barbara J. that the Houston was hit and sinking and that they would beach her. The Barbara J. was damaged by near misses by rockets that had split her seams and she was taking in water. She started out of the Bay of Cochinos to Blue Beach. At this time a Sea Fury came through our fire and fired four rockets at the Rio Escondido one of which exploded the drums of aviation gasoline on her decks. An LCU was at this time enroute to the Rio to take off this gasoline and her other cargo. The fire soon spread and it was apparent that the ship was lost. The crew started jumping over the sides and swimming away from the ship. All the small boats in the beach area headed for the Rio and soon picked up all of her crew. These boats were about 1000 yards away from her taking the crew to other ships when she blew up and sank. The depth of the water at this point is 6 fathoms. The crew of the Rio was put aboard the Blagar and the gun and boat crews of the Rio were sent to the beach. A message was sent to Headquarters advising them of the loss of the two ships and an answer was received directing us to take all the rest of the ships to sea and return and unload under the cover of darkness. At this time we were attacked by a B-26 and the fire from the ships and from a friendly B-26 sent him away smoking. The Barbara J. and the two cargo ships the Caribe and the Atlantico were told to proceed ahead of us and wait 15 miles out. At this time I called the UDT team of 5 men ashore on Blue Beach and told them to return to the ship as we were going out to sea and return that night. They replied that they would stay on the beach and light it for us when we returned that night. All these men were captured when Blue Beach fell. The Blagar was to escort the three LCUʼs which could only do six knots. Two friendly B-26ʼs flew cover for us on the way out although the wing tank of one was loose on the front end and was hanging down. These planes stayed with us until their reserve gas supply was gone and then one of them asked permission to drop his bombs on the Cienfuegos Airport on the way home. This permission was given and he departed. Results unknown. When we reached the 15 mile point we called the other ships and told them to assemble on us but only the Barbara J. showed up. The two cargo ships could not be found nor would they answer the radio calls. Soon after the Barbara J. rejoined us we were attacked by a B-26 and a Sea Fury coming from the beach area. The B-26 started an approach on the Blagar but was hit and as the plane fired its rockets it exploded in flames. The rockets struck 50 yards from the Blagar and the plane hit the water in the same place and bounced over the ship clearing the deck by only 20 feet. It struck the water about 100 yards over the ship and burned and sank. Parts of the plane were scattered over the deck of the Blagar. The Sea Fury did not press his attack but made one short strafing pass at the Barbara J. hitting her with two or three .20 MM shells. He then threw four rockets at the LCUʼs from a high altitude all of which missed and he departed. Two more attacks were made on us later in the day by lone B-26ʼs none of which pressed the attack. The AA fire held them at a distance and they fired their rockets wide of the targets.

After dark of D-Day we continued south hoping to make some contact with the cargo ships but to no avail. Sometime during the night a message was received directing the Barbara J. to unload her ammunition and a 500-man pack into one of the LCUʼs for a run into the beach that night. It was felt that the Blagar should go because of the damage the Barbara J. had sustained; however, upon charting the course we found that due to the slow speed of the LCU, we could not arrive until after daylight of D plus 1. Headquarters was notified of this and we were told not to go. While the planning for the run into the beach was underway, some of the crew of the Rio that we had rescued went into the engine room and stopped the engines. They said they would not go back into the beach area without jet air cover. They were subdued and the engines were started again. Some of the Cuban crew of the Blagar were in sympathy with them and there were some rumors of mutiny. The day of D plus 1 was spent looking for the cargo ships which joined us late in the evening. We had orders to off load all their cargo plus the ammunition from the two LCIʼs into the LCUʼs and run it into the beach that night. We were told we must be in, unload and be off the beach by daylight. The LCUʼs were loaded and we started into the beach but again we notified Headquarters that we could not arrive until after first light. We were told not to go in but to stay where we were. All this time we were the only radio link with the brigade on the beach and they were sending out a steady stream of messages from the beach. Most of them were asking for air cover and air drops of ammunition. We relayed to brigade all the messages from Headquarters and from the air base. We were told that several air drops were to be made on the night of D plus 1 on the air field and the brigade was notified and marked the strip. The first air drop on the field was made but most of the chutes drifted off the strip into the woods. (These were recovered the next morning.) The brigade then requested that the drops be made on the town itself and the two later drops that night went there; one of them was right on target and the supplies landed in the streets and were quickly recovered but the last one was too close to the water and most of the chutes drifted into the sea. Some of these were recovered by small boats later on. We were also told that a C-46 escorted by two F-51ʼs would arrive that night and land at the strip but they never appeared. One message also said that C-46ʼs would land on the strip and discharge supplies and take off the wounded. The brigade was told to move its wounded (about 50 at this time) to the strip and they said they would. Later talks with survivors revealed that the brigade surgeon would not move the wounded to the strip for fear of losing them by air attacks. One C-46 did land at the strip at first light, discharged its cargo and departed taking one wounded man that the brigade commander had sent out with the situation report on the beach. This plane load was the last supplies ever to reach the beach. During the morning of D plus 2 the brigade kept reporting very heavy air, tank and artillery attacks from both north and east and asked continually for jet cover. These messages were sent back and we were told jet cover would be provided by unmarked jets and the brigade reported seeing them arrive over the beach area. We were not told that this was for one hour only. Later the brigade reported they were under air attack again and asked where the jet cover had gone. I could not answer this because we thought it would be continuous. The brigade also asked for close air support and sent back locations of troop concentrations and tank and artillery positions on the roads to the north. At this time the brigade was still in contact with the paratroopers to the north and was reporting them as being under heavy artillery fire and fire by tanks. The brigade reported three MIGs were over Blue Beach but it is possible they saw the unmarked jets and mistook them for MIGs. At 0500 on D plus 2 the brigade commander said that unless he got ammunition right away that he could not hold. I told him help was on the way and we would evacuate him. His reply was that he would never evacuate and that he would fight as long as he had ammunition. At about noon on D plus 2 the Blagar, the Barbara J. and the three LCUʼs loaded with supplies started for the beach. Our ETA was about 1800 hours. At 1300 I was told by the Navy and relayed to the brigade that close jet air support was coming. It never appeared. At 1430 the brigade commander told me that he was out of contact with all units, out of ammunition, fighting in the water and under direct fire from tanks 500 yards away. He said he was destroying his equipment and heading for the woods. He then went off the air. At this time Headquarters was notified and the convoy reversed course as there was no need now for going in. One hour later a friendly PBY came from the direction of Blue Beach and passed us going S.W.

6. Rescue Operations:

On D plus 3 we received an order to take the UDT personnel left aboard the LCIʼs (3 on Blagar and 3 on Barbara J.) and transfer them to the destroyer Eaton which was escorting us. This transfer was made using rubber UDT boats in very rough seas. Mr. Lynch and Mr. Robertson also transferred with the teams to lead them on the operation. The information we had indicated that the survivors of the Houston were on the west side of the Bay of Cochinos and were still intact. The night of D plus 3 was spent cruising the inlets and small islands west of the Bay of Cochinos looking for the Castro patrol boat SV-3 which was reported captured by our people. No sign of this craft was found and at first light of D plus 4 we sailed into the Bay of Cochinos and up to the Houston. It was aground about 200 yards from shore and the decks were just above water. There was no sign of life and no trace of anyone ashore. We came out of the bay very close to the west shore and searched it with glasses but saw no one. We checked the lighthouse on the island of Cayo Piederas and found one of our 20 foot CEF boats drawn up on shore. We blew the shipʼs whistle repeatedly and went up and down both sides several times but found no sign of life. We then sailed to the west of the bay and started checking the keys that run off the swamps on the west side of the bay. On Cayo Blanco we spotted our first two survivors. The destroyer was about 800 yards from shore and the men ran out on the beach and started waving their shirts. We picked them up by sending the UDT team in to shore in the rubber boat using the 16 HP silent motor. We then spotted other survivors and spent all day picking up small groups in the same manner. The destroyer then put its whale boat in the water to assist. Although these boats were forbidden to actually land on the beach they could transfer the survivors from the rubber boat and take them back to the ship leaving the UDT to continue their search. One UDT team of three men were put ashore and combed the islands all day to find the ones who could not or would not come to the beach. Later in the day two Navy A.D.ʼs, propeller planes, were sent to us. They flew very low over the beaches and swamps and spotted several small groups. The UDT teams were then directed to these groups by radio and picked them up. The search was broken off at dark on D plus 4 and Mr. Lynch and three UDT men were transferred to the destroyer Murrary which joined us that night. On D plus 5 the search was continued by both ships. The Murrary was given the west side of the Bay of Cochinos down to the first islands and the Eaton and the Conway which also joined us that night had everything to the west. At first light on D plus 5, Mr. Lynch and three UDT men landed four miles south of the Houston and started to search for survivors. The coast was searched all the way to the islands but none found. We then started to comb the same keys as the day before and picked up several more small groups. Due to physical exhaustion during this period, I cannot remember exact days. I believe we spent three or four days on this operation and were at one time or the other on four destroyers, one submarine and the aircraft carrier Essex twice. In all we picked up 26 survivors and found and buried one man on the beach. These survivors were in very bad condition and had been without food or water for five or six days. Most of them had only underwear or parts of uniforms left and some were naked. In all only two weapons were found among them, one pistol and one carbine. During this time three Castro helicopters were seen to the north of us flying very low over the swamps and were observed shooting the survivors by submachine guns from the air. They were seen to land on two occasions. One of these was a two place helicopter and the other two large Russian types painted greeen with no markings. On 24 and 25 April I conducted interviews with 19 of the survivors aboard the Eaton. The following picture of events on the beaches came from these men: A.

Action At Red Beach:

The UDT team from the Barbara J. led by Mr. Robertson landed at about 0130 and placed the marker light on the right side of the beach but was fired on from shore when attempting to place the left marker. This fire was from small automatic weapons and was silenced by the fire of the UDT team firing BARʼs and submachine guns from the rubber boat. The first troops of the 2nd battalion started ashore in the small (19 1/2 foot) boats of the Houston and the UDT team marked the left of the beach with a flashlight from 100 yards out in the rubber boat. The second wave received fire from shore while on the way in. This fire was silenced by the Barbara J. firing over the heads of the landing force. The militia fled leaving some of their weapons behind. Once ashore the troops moved through the town and cleaned it out. The landings continued until all the 2nd battalion minus one squad was ashore and the weapons company of the 5th battalion landed also. (For more details on this period see report by Mr. Robertson on Red Beach.) One survivor, the Company Commander of the weapons company of the 2nd battalion stated that soon after daylight the beach was secured and they had captured over 40 prisoners. They discovered that 12 militia had been stationed in the town to guard a small militia radio station but that 30 or 40 had come in the day before on a picnic and were spending the night there. After the town was secured and the radio station was captured, the force which was under the command of the Brigade Deputy Commander sent a group out and captured a motor pool of trucks and gasoline at a motel and park construction project west of town. He also stated that 40 men from this small village offered to join them and fight against Castro. These men were put to work driving the captured trucks and other labor jobs on the beach. They were in complete control of the town and were not hurt by the air attacks which were directed against the town itself. These attacks and later ones caused many civilian casualties. The first attack by the militia came at 1000 on D-day and was from the north. This force was estimated at between 500 and 600 militia and had some tanks but friendly airplanes knocked out the tanks before they could go into action. This attack was beaten off with very heavy casualties suffered by the militia. As they were running short of ammunition a call for help was sent to Blue Beach and one tank and two 2 1/2 ton trucks of ammunition was sent to them along the beach road. This arrived at 1400 just as the next big attack was about to hit them and the tank went into action as soon as it arrived. This attack was launched down the road from the north. The troops, all militia, were in open, 2 1/2 ton trucks and open, semi-trailer trucks. The fire of the tank and the 57 MM R.R.ʼs, 3.5ʼs and the 50 caliber machine guns of the landing force hit them before they could get out of the trucks. This force was estimated at 1500 and all the survivors of this action claimed they killed or wounded over half of them and destroyed most of the trucks. The next attack came late in the evening and continued all night. During the night action at least five enemy tanks were knocked out, two Russian ones and three American Sherman tanks. These were destroyed by 57 MM R.R. and 3.5ʼs. How many were knocked out by the tank is unknown. The militia at one time sent an ambulance under a white flag to pick up wounded but tried to sneak two trucks loaded with militia in behind it. The tank destroyed all three vehicles with one round and the machine guns finished the job. At another time some militia that were trapped in some buildings came out to surrender but when the CEF troops moved toward them they dropped to the ground and opened fire. All this group was then wiped out by the CEF troops. The survivors stated that all the troops opposing them were militia and all prisoners had the Communist party card on their persons. When asked about these cards they stated that if they had no cards they could not get work. Most of the militia stated also that they were willing to fight against Castro. At about 0730 on D plus 1 the force at Red Beach was low on ammunition and was withdrawn to Blue Beach in the captured trucks, their own trucks and the tank. They took their wounded with them but released all their prisoners upon departure. They destroyed the radio station and all the trucks that they could not use. Upon arrival at Blue Beach they held a muster to account for everyone. Blue Beach at this time on D plus 1 was quiet and the survivors stated that they had lunch and slept, cleaned up and were issued ammunition. That afternoon they went into action at Blue Beach, fought all night and at about 1100 the next morning 90 men of the 2nd battalion under the command of the Deputy Brigade Commander (Oliva) were sent back to Red Beach to stop a large column of militia, tanks and artillery that was mass-ing there. This force it is believed never reached Red Beach but it is known that they went into action because they called for mortar fire and the 2nd battalion mortars fired 120 rounds for them and then was out of ammunition. Two tanks went out with this group and were seen coming back to Blue Beach about 1300 damaged and out of ammunition. Nothing more was heard of this group and soon after the enemy force came down the road from Red Beach and attacked it from the west. This force was very large and had heavy artillery (larger than 4.2) and tanks. One survivor stated that at 1400 he went to Brigade Headquarters which was by the beach for ammunition and the Brigade Commander and staff were there but when he made a second trip at 1530 the Brigade Headquarters was gone and also a sailboat that was tied up near it. He states that starting at 1600 the front lines collapsed due to the lack of ammunition and at about 1700 all resistance ceased. He left Blue Beach with four companions in a row boat and saw many other small boats leaving at the same time. The enemy planes strafed these boats and caused many casualties. His boat drifted all night and at dawn they found themselves on the beach on the west side of the Bay of Cochinos. They then made their way down the keys to the point where they were rescued by the UDT teams. One survivor stated that his company was hit in Blue Beach on the night of D plus 1 by a shell fired from a tank that emitted some smoke and threw droplets on their clothing. The droplets did not burn, but the smoke did and caused choking and pain. They ran out of the area and when they returned later they found several dead from this shell, but he claims there were no wounds and the men died from what he thinks was a gas shell. He also stated that the next morning several men told him of the same thing occurring in their sectors, also by tank fire. Detailed action on Blue Beach is unknown due to lack of any survivors who landed there in the original force.

Sinking of Houston:

The Houston was hit sometime after first light by rockets while still at Red Beach. These rockets started fires in the number one and number three holds and the Houston pulled out from the beach. The fires were put out by the crew and the ship turned and started back in. At this time she was hit the second time by two rockets fired from a T-33 jet. These struck the stern somewhere around the screws knocking out the steering. The ship was crosswise in the bay and could only go forward or backward. She attempted to back up but started sinking by the stern so the Captain ran her up on the beach on the west side of the bay. This was about five miles south of Red Beach. The planes came back again so the order was given to abandon ship. Aboard at this time was one squad of the 2nd Battalion and most of the 5th Battalion plus a 20-man shipʼs crew, approximately 220 men. Six men were killed by the air attack and seven more drowned swimming to shore. Small boats were used plus lines to the shore to get the men off. After everyone was ashore the C.O. of the 5th Battalion took command and organized a perimeter. He then sent men back aboard to try to salvage what arms and equipment they could. Some was gotten off but as the holds were filled with water, this was not easy. He then sent scouts out in the direction of Red Beach, but they returned and told of running into militia between them and Red Beach. This beach perimeter was held until D plus 2. Some food and water was gotten off the Houston but not nearly enough. On D plus 2 a patrol craft about 35 feet long and mounting one machine gun came from the east and pulled up to the Houston. It is believed that this was the Castro craft SV-3. The boat checked the Houston and then came in to the beach to check the three small boats drawn up on shore. When it reached the beach, the troops ashore fired on it and killed four of its six-man crew. Two were captured. The Captain of the Houston then took this craft together with the C.O. of the 5th Battalion, the padre, two or three of the doctors and five other officers of the 5th Battalion out to the Houston and put aboard all the gasoline and supplies they could find. The Battalion C.O. then gave the order for the beachhead to break up in small groups and try to get out to the south. Some groups went to the north, some went inland but most started down the coast to the south. The Battalion C.O. then left to the south in the captured boat and said he was headed for Grand Cayman. Out of the groups who started south down the beach 21 were later rescued, including some of the crew of the Houston.

110. After Action ReportSource: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study. Secret; Eyes Only. Robertson prepared the report for the Taylor Committee. Washington, May 4, 1961.

MR. ROBERTSONʼS REPORT OF ACTIVITIES ON BARBARA J

The writer was Operations Officer on the Barbara J. The Barbara J. is an LCI fitted with eight .50 cal machine guns, three .30 machine guns, a 75mm recoilless rifle, and a 57mm recoilless rifle, plus various automatic hand carried weapons. The job for the Barbara J during the operation was as follows: 1. The Barbara J was to escort the transport ship Houston into Bahia Cochinos to Red Beach. The Houston had aboard the 2nd and 5th Battalions Reinforced. 2. The Barbara J was to spot the Houston offshore, while the Barbara Jʼs beach reconnaissance team reconnoitered the beach and set light markers at each flank of a suitable landing site. 3. The Barbara J was to provide gunfire support when necessary and assist in the unloading of the Houstonʼs men and supplies at Red Beach. 4. When the beach was considered in good shape, the Barbara J was to escort the Houston out of Bahia Cochinos and proceed to patrol the beach from Green Beach eastward for five miles, engaging any enemy sea or road convoys heading toward Green Beach. 5. The Barbara J was to engage in any harassment operations which would confuse the enemy and help our own forces.

The objective of the 2nd Battalion on Red Beach was to secure the beachhead, proceed northward to Sopillar airstrip, link up with the paratroopers, and proceed to Objective A on the railroad at 82.0-72.0 on the 1:50,000 map. The objective of the 5th Battalion was to land behind the 2nd Battalion and take over and safeguard the beachhead.

At 2330 on D-1 the Barbara J and the Houston separated from the major convoy on schedule. At 0115 on D-Day the Barbara J and the Houston were on station opposite Red Beach. One Barbara J small boat with radio was dispatched to stand by with the Houston. The other small boat with the reconnaissance team and the writer proceeded ashore to the right of Red Beach and scouted and marked the right flank without being detected. Then the team proceeded by water to the point which was to be the left flank of Red Beach and discovered the point was occupied by enemy men. The 2nd Battalion commander was asked to notify us when he was within ten minutes of dispatching his first wave to the Beach. When the Battalion commander signified he was ready, the recon team approached the point. At about 30 yards off the point four or five machine guns and submachine guns opened fire on the recon boat. The recon boat returned fire and silenced these guns. The recon boat backed up to approximately 100 yards off the point and marked the left flank with a blinking flashlight towards sea. The first forty soldiers landed without opposition, though sporadic fire started as soon as they had landed ashore. This fire was their initial contact with the 50 militiamen in the village at the time of the landing.

Within twenty minutes of the reconnaissance teamʼs initial contact with the enemy, six or seven trucks were seen entering the area from the left flank. The writer called for supporting fire from the Barbara J. The Barbara Jʼs first shots hit the lead truck and threw the convoy into darkness and confusion and apparently helped delay the convoyʼs arrival at Red Beach until later in the morning.

The reconnaissance group proceeded then to help in landing the troops. These troops were landed with approximately two units of fire and a minimum of equipment other than their personal weapons and the unit weapons. The unit weapons we succeeded in getting ashore were four .30 cal light machine guns, four 81mm mortars, and four 57mm recoilless rifles, plus 3.5 rocket launchers. On the second trip to Red Beach, our boat was hit by machine gun fire coming from about 200 yards left of the Red Beach left flank. One man in the boat was killed. On arrival at the beach this second trip, the writer sent for a representative of the 2nd Battalion command post, and between the two, an airstrike plan was set up in the event that communication might be out when the daylight airstrike arrived. In the plan, the aircraft would take on any targets moving along the beach towards Red Beach or along the road from the north towards Red Beach, and at first daylight the 2nd Battalion commander would send a well-briefed officer to the beach carrying a red flag for further conference with the writer. The commanding officer at this conference requested that future landing craft be landed nearer the right flank of the beach in as much as all enemy activity to date was being encountered from the left. There were explosions within the beachhead at this time which the writer took to be incoming mortar fire with some light calibre.

During this period, some .50 cal machinegun fire was directed at the Barbara J. The Barbara J was lying about 500 yards offshore and the Barbara J engaged this machine gun and silenced it.

The Houston reported that there were no small boats, so our recon team tied onto one of the Barbara Jʼs rubber boats to the lee side of the Houston where we found seven or eight small aluminum boats huddled with no troop movement going on. The writer climbed aboard and got a boat-load and a half of soldiers off-loaded before being stopped by a Cuban believed to be the 5th Battalion Commander. The writer believes that this manʼs intention was to wait until first daylight before continuing off-loading the 5th Battalion. At this point, 270 soldiers had been off-loaded. This was the 2nd Battalion Reinforced and the weapons company from the 5th Battalion and the Assistant Brigade Commander.

On the trip into shore, first daylight had arrived and at approximately 6 oʼclock a B-26 appeared low and machine-gunned our small boat without success on this first run. When he came again we turned our small weapons and the weapons of all the soldiers in the small boat and fired back at him. On this pass the B-26 wounded one soldier with a freak shot that passed through another manʼs weapon before hitting the soldier. On the third pass of the B-26, he immediately, after passing over head, started smoking and wobbling and soon went down over land with one survivor parachuting out.

A second B-26 appeared and started after the Barbara J and Houston. He strafed and dropped two large bombs, both misses. The Barbara Jʼs skipper was circling the Houston tightly and bringing all her firepower in support of the Houston during this action.

At this point, our cargo planes bearing paratroopers and accompanied by two friendly B-26ʼs arrived in the area and the enemy aircraft departed. At the departure of our aircraft, we were attacked by a fighter plane which I believe was a Sea Fury. The skipper of the Barbara J decided to disperse until our air cover had better control and so moved the Barbara J and the Houston away from Red Beach about five miles.

The writer suggests that the following is a likely account of the short history of Red Beach. The account is compiled from observation and interrogation of survivors. Very little action occurred at Red Beach before daylight. Most of the shooting was our own. The air attack at daybreak, which included bombing and strafing the beachhead, damaged nothing important. At approximately 1000 a truck-mounted attack from the north involving 500 or 600 militia was broken up by Red Beach forces. This was accomplished with small losses to our forces and considerable loss to the milita. Fifty to seventy of the militia were captured, most of which were willing to join the Red Beach forces. The paratroopers were apparently engaged immediately upon landing, and link between the paratroopers and Red Beach forces was not accomplished. At 1400 on D-Day, another attack was made from the north involving 1,500 militia. An unknown amount were destroyed en route to this battle by a friendly B-26. Two of our own tanks which had been sent up from Blue Beach assisted in stopping this attack. From all accounts, this force was well handled by our forces, and we claimed 1,000 casualties were inflicted. Seven tanks, which arrived after midnight were engaged by our 57mm recoilless rifles and 3.5 rockets, and five were destroyed. On D+1 an orderly withdrawal to Blue Beach was effected, since Red Beach was out of ammunition. Red Beach losses at this time were 25 dead, and an unknown amount wounded. The wounded were carried to Blue Beach.

On arrival at Blue Beach, the 2nd Battalion was put into the Blue Beach defense line which had been comparatively quiet till this point. In the afternoon, a battle started which put 1,500 militiamen against the 2nd Battalion. This battle lasted all night. The following morning an attempt was made to regain Red Beach, but the 2nd Battalion encountered tanks, trucks, troops, and artillery, and it is believed, did not reach Red Beach. The heavy mortars supported the 2nd Battalion until out of ammunition. Two tanks which were supporting the 2nd Battalion were returned to Blue Beach damaged by this action. It is believed that the 2nd Battalion was lost with Blue Beach.

At the time when the skipper of the Barbara J ordered the dispersal of the convoy, a B-26 arrived requesting targets for his bombs at Red Beach. He was instructed to go to Objective A on the north road and engage any mobile forces moving towards Red Beach. He located a convoy moving into Red Beach with blue marked trucks and was refrained from interfering with this convoy since it was known to be ours.

At this point the skipper of the Barbara J turned the convoy back towards Red Beach. The Barbara J and the Houston arrived off the point Carazones. When a T-33 jet arrived and strafed and fired rockets, with near misses for the Barbara J and hits on the Houston, a welded seam on the Barbara J was split, causing the Barbara J to take water at the rate of four feet each two and a half hours. The Houston announced the loss of their steering capability, and was at this time headed towards the beach. The skipper of the Barbara J ordered the Houston to reverse engines and back away from the beach. The Houston attempted to do this, but was observed to begin sinking rapidly by the stern. At the same time another Sea Fury started attacking the Houston. Gasoline was covering the water all around both ships, and the Houston reversed its engines again and made straight into the shore, grounding about 100 yards off-shore. As she struck shore, men were seen diving over the side in life jackets. The Sea Fury continued its strafing runs against the ship and the men in the water. From subsequent reports, we believe from seven to twenty men were killed in the strafing, and ten drowned from inability to swim. The Barbara J had no small boats; the Houston didnʼt attempt to use its three small boats. There was speculation as to whether we should attempt an evacuation, but this was tempered by the idea that the occupants of the Houston were scheduled to go ashore with the possibility that they could make a tie-up at Red Beach. The Barbara J was ordered to move to the Blue Beach to provide protection for the unloading operations there, the ships at Blue Beach being under air attack also.

From interrogation of survivors, it is learned that the Houston group proceeded towards Red Beach, but the scouts observed militiamen, and the entire group withdrew to the swamp. My last radio contact with this group was an announcement by the 5th Battalion Commander that he had successfully regrouped 1-1/2 miles west of the sunken ship. Information on his position was requested for an intended air supply drop. Within a half hour he was under attack. His request was for small boats so that he could strip the Houston of necessary supplies. Arrangements were made for RB-12 rubber boats and paddles to be dropped at first darkness. Within a half hour after this arrangement, the Houston was under attack and apparently the enemy was trying to split it up. I feel that our voice communication was being monitored. The folowing night an enemy patrol craft approached the Houston and landed five militiamen. These five were attacked by the survivors of the Houston. Two militiamen were killed and three taken prisoners. The three prisoners were executed because of the logistical problems they made for the survivors. On the 19th the skipper of the Houston, the 5th Battalion Commander, five 5th Battalion officers, the Chaplain, and three doctors left the beach in the captured patrol craft, bidding their men to scatter and make out for themselves. This might indicate a reason why the 5th Battalion seemed reluctant to go ashore at Red Beach. Of the remaining men, a few immediately made their way north through the swamps, and a few made their way south. Those that were rescued on the southern islands had swum most of the way in the swamps. The Houston skipper and the small boat reportedly departed for Cayo Guano, but radio Cuba reported it landed at Cayo Largo and the men were captured.

As the Barbara J departed from Bahia Cochinos, a Sea Fury was circling, but apparently was bluffed by two of our B-26ʼs which were flying protection for Barbara J. A jet T-33 was seen to attack one of the B-26ʼs, and the B-26 was seen to fly lower and to either crash or make a crash landing on the airstrip at Blue Beach area. The remaining B-26 hovered over the Barbara J, reported he was out of ammunition, and asked for instructions. I requested that he stay as long as possible to bluff enemy aircraft, which he did, until he had only fifteen minutes reserve gasoline supply. This manʼs name was Farrari and should be commended for courageous work.

At the entrance of Bahia Cochinos we had observed the Rio Escondido catch fire and blow up.

On arrival in the Blue Beach area, all ships were ordered south. We departed with the Atlantico and Caribe leading, and the Barbara J providing close support. The U-boats protected by the Blagar followed. The Blagar requested all ships to merge for mutual self-protection. The Barbara J joined the Blagar and U-boats, and the Caribe and Atlantico disappeared over the horizon. One strafing and bombing pass was made on the right flank LCU, with the Blagar and Barbara J giving her support. What appeared to be a salvo boat of shore-based artillery splashed five shells within the convoy on the way out. This was possibly 1 oʼclock to 2 oʼclock in the afternoon of D-Day.

At approximately 3:30, when the convoy was outside the continental limit, a Sea Fury and a B-26 attacked. The Sea Fury circled high and the B-26 came for a low strafing attack, lining up the Barbara J and the Blagar. As the B-26 passed over the Blagar, it exploded in a great ball of flame. It is believed that hits from Blagar guns had entered the gas tanks, and that the pilot fired his rockets, causing the explosion. The Sea Fury then circled for a few minutes and started a run on the Barbara J, but peeled off early, probably because of the Barbara Jʼs gunfire. He scored 20mm hits on the Barbara J. At this time we were ordered further out to sea.

Preparations were made for a night run into Blue Beach. When the order arrived, headquarters was notified that we were without the cargo ships, and that it was felt that it was impossible to arrive at Blue Beach before daylight. Air and/or sea support was requested, with the warning that we felt we were sure to be sunk without this protection and thus be no good to Blue Beach. During the night we were ordered to cancel this run. The following evening the cargo ships had been reassembled, and the Caribe was unloaded into LCUs. The Barbara J was unloaded into an LCU when the order came for the Barbara J to make a 500-man pack supply run to Blue Beach. The Barbara J was leaking and one bank of engines was out and emptied of supplies and had no small boats, so the responsibility was shifted to the Blagar. The writer transferred to the Blagar to assist in this run and to assist the Blagar Operations Officer with communications functions. At approximately midnight the run was started, with an additional warning to headquarters that we were going to arrive in daylight. An air or sea support was necessary. Sometime during the night this trip was cancelled.

The writer relieved the Operations Officer of the Blagar of communication duties at times during the night. The gist of the communication can be summed up as follows: The Brigade Commander continually reported he was out of anti-tank ammunition and surgical supplies and had wounded to evacuate. All messages were forwarded to strike base and U.S. Navy. From strike base and U.S. Navy we continually received assurances that re-supplies and evacuation of wounded were being carried on and that a close air support strike was arranged for first light. A tank column had been located coming into Blue Beach from the north. Its exact location was reported by the Brigade Commander. Arrangements were made for strike base to take on these tanks at first light, and U.S. Navy jets were “on the way.” The jets had not appeared when first light arrived and their whereabouts was requested. We were told that they were still “on the way.”

At 20 minutes daylight a request from headquarters came that either of the two operations officers go on beach to evaluate the situation. A Cuban CW operator was recruited to go with the writer. No boat operator was found who would go. Subsequent activity negated this operation.

At daylight the beach was under air, tank, and artillery attack. During the night, two re-supply drops had been made, part of which went into the ocean, part of which was received. A C-46 had landed on the airstrip, dumped its supplies, and departed evacuating one wounded. The Brigade Commander began talking in terms of his men standing in the water fighting, and “being massacred” and “murdered.” At one point he could see four Navy jets high overhead, and was being attacked simultaneously by three enemy Sea Furyʼs. When he asked that the jets enter the fight and was told that we were doing everything to get permission, his comment was “God damn it, God damn you, God damn you. Do not wait for permission.” He continually spotted tanks, artillery locations, and continually asked when would they be attacked by our airplanes. About midday the base announced that we were going in in full force, shooting, for evacuation purposes. The Brigade Commander was told that within three hours the Navy forces, air and sea, plus our cargo convoy would be there to pick them up. He announced that an enemy tank was within 400 yards of his command post firing at him and he had no ammunition with which to fight it. He said he would not be there in three hours. In his next message he said he was destroying his communications set and going into the woods. We were trying to get him to hold on when communication abruptly broke. We have two reports: (1) That the Brigade Commander was seen going to sea in a small sailboat, and (2) That he had gone inland to Excambrey. The convoy started out to sea.

On the morning of D+3 the operations officers of the Blagar and the Barbara J were transferred by rubber boat, along with six UDT men and personal weapons and radios, aboard the USS Eaton. Subsequently we boarded the aircraft carrier Essex along with the commander of the destroyer group, Captain Crutchfield, for the purpose of conferring with Admiral Clark and Marine Colonel Mallard about effecting rescue operations. It was generally thought among all concerned that the Houston survivors could be sought only if the information concerning them was recent, accurate, and reliable. The Eaton was dispatched towards Bahia Cochinos with our operations officers and UDT men aboard with the understanding that Mallard and Clark would seek information on the validity and accuracy of intelligence concerning survivors on the beach, and would send authorization or cancellation of that operation prior to the arrival of the Eaton on station. The operation was cancelled by Admiral Clark and we spent the night sailing close to the beach for light signals. At daylight movement was seen on Cayo Blanco del Sur. A rubber boat was dispatched and contact made with four survivors, who were pulled aboard. A whaleboat was dispatched from the Eaton with U-boat personnel aboard. The whaleboat would carry the writer and three UDT men to a position 200 to 300 yards off the beach, from where we would make the approach and contact with the survivors by rubber boat. Seventeen survivors were removed in five separate operations by this group over a period of two days. Predawn landings and reconnaissance were made each day to assure that Castroʼs militiamen hadnʼt occupied the island during the night. Similar activity was conducted by the Blagar operations officer and three UDT men on other beaches. The final day these two groups swept Cayao Miguel and Cayao Blanco del Sur and the island of Carrario. We carried loud speakers and searched in the mangrove swamps and tried to reassure hidden refugees that the arms we carried were not against them, but against Castro. They were afraid of our arms. For example, one man had been lying with only his face out of the water, and when he saw the writer, he tried to sink under water. We tried to assure him, but he thought that the writer was a Russian. He said that there were no friends any more, and we were Russians. We broadcast that if they would call to us, we would approach them without clothing and arms. During this operation Castro had helicopters calling as if they were saviors of the refugees and then submachine gun those who would show themselves. I believe that we missed many survivors because of the smallness of our patrol. We could not cover every square foot of these islands, and the refugees were afraid to expose themselves to us. All were in weakened condition and at times had to be carried to the boat.

On this night, the militiamen moved onto the islands and set fire to the brush and claimed to have driven out 166 survivors. I believe that this is an exaggeration. On the following morning, the writer and four UDT men and rubber boats and equipment boarded the submarine USS Threadfin and started towards Bahia Cochinos for an attempted rescue near the sunken Houston. This operation was cancelled at 7 oʼclock in the evening and the Threadfin returned to sea because of an occurence which is U.S. Navy Top Secret and not to be recorded in this report. The writer and men returned to the Eaton. The writer and the operations officer of the Blagar were air-lifted to the Essex and subsequently to Guantanamo and to headquarters.

111. Telegram From the Chief of the Subsidiary Activities Division (Gray) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. A chronology of the Bumpy Road Operation, maintained in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, indicates that this telegram grew out of a 1 a.m. meeting on April 17 at CIA headquarters. CIA Deputy Director Cabell invited General Gray to the meeting to discuss air support for the CEF. Cabell stated that the dawn strikes planned by CEF planes had been disapproved owing to objections from the State Department. An air CAP for the force by U.S. carrier based fighters was therefore urgently needed. Gray relayed the request to General Wheeler and General Lemnitzer and informed the CIA at 3 a.m. that an air CAP and early warning for the CEF ships would be made available if CIA obtained the necessary higher approval. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) Washington, April 17, 1961, 4:22 a.m.

JCS 994221. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Clark & Adm Dennison from General Gray.

1. On 17 April CEF aircraft will be limited to defense of beachhead from air and ground attack. Limited Cuban aircraft patrol activity in area expected. 2. Be prepared to execute on order following missions as soon after first light as practicable throughout daylight hours 17 April: a. Provide Air Cap for CEF shipping outside territorial waters. Rules of engagement as stated in your OP PlanReference is to Operation Order 25-61, April 10, Document 87. apply as applicable. b. Provide EWEarly Warning. for CEF ships to include LCIʼs for purpose of warning ships of approaching aircraft.EW ships should remain maximum distance off shore consistent with capability to communicate with CEF ships. 3. This is a warning order.According to the memorandum for the record prepared by Commander Mitchell, which outlined the evolution of the rules of engagement for Operation Bumpy Road, at 5:30 a.m. on April 17, Bissell called the Operations Center at the JCS and stated that the White House had only approved the employment of an Early Warning vessel. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba Paramilitary Study) Accordingly, General Gray sent a message to Admirals Dennison and Clark countermanding the authorization to provide an air CAP for CEF shipping. In JCS telegram 994222, sent at 5:50 a.m., Gray, on behalf of the JCS, instructed Dennison and Clark to execute only the mission set forth in paragraph 2b of JCS telegram 994221, subject to the limitation that EW vessels were not to approach any closer than 30 miles from the Cuban coastline. Gray stipulated that an air CAP was not authorized. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

112. Editorial Note

The landings of the Cuban Expeditionary Force on the southern coast of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs began as scheduled at 1 a.m. on April 17, 1961. At 1:44 the San Marcos completed the discharge of LCUs and withdrew to sea. (Chronology maintained in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) Air support for the landings was limited to two CEF B-26 bombers, but Admiral Clark reported that the two destroyers he had assigned as Early Warning vessels would be on station some 30 miles offshore by 3:30 a.m. (CTG 81.8 telegram 171418Z, April 17; ibid.) Paratroopers of the First Battalion were dropped at 7:30 and seized the road center of San Blas, 10 miles northeast of Blue Beach. They were reinforced soon thereafter by the Third Battalion and a heavy weapons detachment. (Memorandum No. 1 from the Cuban Study Group to the President, June 13; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report)

At 9:40 a.m. units of Admiral Clarkʼs Task Group reported that the CEF ships supporting the invasion were under heavy air attack and were putting out to sea. (CINCLANT telegram 171608Z to JCS, April 17; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) By 10:17, the CIA reported to the JCS that the Rio Escondido and the Houston had been sunk, and the Blagar was under attack. (Chronology maintained in the Office of CNO; ibid.) Admiral Clark instructed the two destroyers providing early warning to withdraw if necessary, but not to become involved in action except for self defense. The Task Group would provide air CAP for the destroyers but not the CEF. (CINCLANT telegram 171608Z to JCS; ibid.) At 10:36 a.m. Admiral Dennison instructed Task Group 81.8, which had been retiring from the area according to plan, to reverse course and move north to a position which would allow closer support if authorized. (CINCLANTFLT telegram 171536Z to CTG 81.8, April 17; ibid.)

113. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Secretary of State RuskSource: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, 3/31/61-5/31/61. No classification marking. Transcribed in Ruskʼs office by Phyllis D. Bernau. Bundy was at USUN; Rusk was in Washington. April 17, 1961, 9:11 a.m.

TELEPHONE CALL FROM MR BUNDY IN NEW YORK

B said he administered the first shock—there is a morale problem there and glad he came for this reason. For various reasons heAn apparent reference to Stevenson. got himself in a state of mind this was not going to happen—partly because of a general conversation with our chief and partly because of a breakdown of communications. B conveyed general apologies for what happened over the week end. He will pick up the pieces to see where he can go. HeAnother apparent reference to Stevenson. patched up a picture of Uncle Sam and now is going to be in the middle of its destruction and not easy. B said maybe the Sec and the chief will want to talk this a.m. but meantime wait a bit. The Sec said not too much is coming in from there—canʼt tell too much about what is happening. B asked if there is anything he should do. The Sec said he is being called back at 9:30 and there may be something.

The Sec said there should be a message up there re Adlaiʼs speechCuban Foreign Minister Roa repeated and elaborated on charges of U.S. aggression against Cuba in debate in the First Committee on April 17. He charged that Cuba had been invaded by mercenary bands organized, armed, and financed by the Central Intelligence Agency. He stated that the mercenaries came from bases in Florida and Guatemala, and he listed addresses of recruiting centers in the United States. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.1150) Stevenson followed and categorically denied Roaʼs charges. The United States, he stated, “has committed no aggression against Cuba, and no offensive has been launched from Florida or from any other part of the United States.” (Ibid.)—something had come in here.

B asked to be called if anything came up.Bundy and Rusk talked again at 10:13 a.m. Bundy said that Stevenson had talked to the President, and “took a strong view.” (Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations, 3/31/61-5/31/61) At 10:15 a.m. General Cabell called Rusk to report that two of the CEF ships had been sunk in heavy air attacks. (Ibid.)

114. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Cuba 1961, Box 31. Secret. Washington, April 17, 1961. SUBJECT Cuba: Can We Recognize a Provisional Government?

I raised last week with the State Department the question of the conditions under which we could take formal diplomatic cognizance of an anti-Castro regime in Cuba. I have now received a memorandum from the Legal Adviser dealing with this question.This memorandum, entitled “Various Considerations If an Insurrectionary Movement Gains Control of a Specific Area in Cuba,” is dated April 7, and was forwarded to Schlesinger on April 17 under a covering memorandum from Executive Secretary Lucius D. Battle. (Ibid.)

1. The memorandum makes clear that the United States can not, under international law, recognize an insurrectionary group which has control of only a relatively small area in Cuba. The tests for recognition include possession of the machinery of state, administering the government with the assent of the people and without substantial resistance, and capacity to discharge international obligations. Obviously the Revolutionary Council will not meet these tests until it is established in Habana and until fighting has substantially ceased. Recognition of the insurgents at an earlier stage would probably constitute a casus belli. 2. The memorandum also makes it clear that, if the insurgents gain control over a particular area and if they organize a framework of government within that area, a case can be made for US recognition of a state of belligerency in Cuba.

If the US recognized a state of belligerency, we would have the position, under international law, of a neutral. Both parties to the war would have the rights of belligerents. While the US Government would be required to practice impartiality in its relations with the two belligerents, private persons and companies in the US could make loans, sell arms, etc., to the insurgents. The Castro regime, on the other hand, would have the right under international law to blockade ports held by the insurgents and to stop and search American vessels on the high seas and seize vessels carrying contraband of war.

The State Department points out that the recognition of belligerency in Cuba by the US would create, in the words of the Rio treaty, a “fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America,” and would thereby open the situation up to action by the OAS. Recognition of belligerency, in other words, could lay the basis for multilateral OAS action calling for an end to hostilities and supervised elections; or, failing this, for OAS quarantine of Cuba or general OAS recognition of belligerency in Cuba.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

115. Telegram From the Director of the Joint Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Immediate. The rules of engagement outlined in this telegram were drafted by Cabell and given to Gray at the CIA at 3:30 a.m. on April 17. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol. II) Washington, April 17, 1961, 3:35 p.m.

JCS 994247. Exclusive for Adm Dennison. Bumpy Road.

1. Effective on receipt and to continue until otherwise directed establish aircap in accordance with following restrictions: a. Carriers shall operate no closer than 50 miles from Cuban territory. b. Aircraft shall operate no closer than 15 miles to Cuban territory. c. No more than 4 aircraft on station at one time. 2. Paragraphs 3 B 2, 3 and 4, Appendix 2 to Annex A Operation Order CINCLANTFLT No 25-61Document 87. are superseded by the following instructions: a. US aircraft shall attack if unfriendly aircraft makes aggressive move by opening bomb bay doors when headed toward ship to be protected or starts a strafing run on it. Attacks will not be made by US aircraft under any other condition. b. No hot pursuit inside the 15 mile line from Cuban territory. c. US aircraft shall not come up close to unfriendly aircraft except when attacking it. d. If unfriendly aircraft is shot down every effort shall be made to hide the fact that such action has occurred. 3. The JCS interpret the foregoing to mean that you will establish a safe haven for friendly ships a minimum of fifteen miles off shore.Admiral Dennison relayed the new rules of engagement for air action to Admiral Clark at 4:56 p.m. (CINCLANTFLT telegram 172156Z to CTG 81.8, April 17; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) The chronology of the operation maintained by CNO noted that 1 hour and 31 minutes elapsed between the time that JCS 994247 was sent to Admiral Dennison and the time that the new rules relayed by CINCLANT to Task Group 81.8 were received by Admiral Clark. (Bumpy Road Chronology; ibid.) During that time, the JCS passed to CINCLANT at 4:26 a CIA report that the Barbara J. and the Atlantico were under heavy air attack 25 miles off the coast and urgently requesting support. (JCS telegram 172126Z to CINCLANT, April 17; ibid.) At 4:48 p.m., CINCLANTFLT reported to JCS that one of the destroyer units of CTG 81.8 reported that CEF ships some 26.6 miles southwest of the Bay of Pigs were under attack by a Sea Fury plane. One of the ships, believed to be the Barbara J., was on fire and requesting assistance. (CINCLANTFLT telegram 172148Z to JCS, April 17; ibid.)

116. Editorial Note

At 6 p.m. on April 17, 1961, Admiral Clark reported that the four remaining ships of the Cuban Expeditionary Force, Blagar, Barbara J., Atlantico, and Caribe, were 55 miles off the Bay of Pigs with the two EW destroyers assigned to the area maintaining distant contact. The CEF ships were proceeding south at 5 knots. (CTG 81.8 telegram 172300Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 17; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) During the early morning hours of April 18, Admiral Clark attempted to convince the CEF ships to return to Point Zulu, some 41.2 miles off the coast of Cuba. At 4:50 a.m. Clark reported that Blagar and Barbara J. had turned around and were expected to return to Point Zulu by 7 a.m. Atlantico and Caribe were still headed south, however, and the master of Atlantico stated that he would have trouble with his crew if he attempted to turn north, unless support from the Task Group was visible. Clark indicated that he planned to send CAP over the Atlantico at first light to boost morale. (CTG 81.8 telegram 180950Z to CINC-LANTFLT, April 18; ibid.) At 5:26 a.m. Clark reported that Atlantico had turned north but that he was still working on the reluctant Caribe. (CTG 81.8 telegram 181026Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 18; ibid.)

Blagar and Barbara J. reached Point Zulu by 11 a.m. and Clark reported that there was no hostile activity in the area. The CEF ships had been under an air CAP since first light. (CTG 81.8 telegram 181604Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 18; ibid.) At 12:26 p.m. Clark reported that the two planes that he had sent out to search for the Caribe had found the ship approximately 218 miles south of the Bay of Pigs and had persuaded the master to turn north toward Cuba. (CTG 81.8 telegram 181726Z to CINC-LANTFLT, April 18; ibid.)

117. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, 1961-1964, Special US-USSR File, 1961. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:53 a.m. The Embassy also reported that a demonstration against U.S. involvement in Cuba began outside the Embassy at 2:35 p.m. local time. (Telegram 2552 from Moscow, April 18; ibid., Central Files, 737.00/4-1861) The Soviet Government released the text of the letter to the press at the same time that it was presented to the Embassy in Moscow. The letter is also printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1961, p. 662. Ambassador Zorin read the text of Khrushchevʼs letter during debate in the First Committee on April 18. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/5R.1153) Moscow, April 18, 1961, 2 p.m.

2550. Following letter to President Kennedy from Khrushchev handed me by Acting Foreign Minister Semenov at 12:15 today. Begin text:

Mr. President, I send you this message in an hour of alarm, fraught with danger for the peace of the whole world. Armed aggression has begun against Cuba. It is a secret to no one that the armed bands invading this country were trained, equipped and armed in the United States of America. The planes which are bombing Cuban cities belong to the United States of America, the bombs they are dropping are being supplied by the American Government.

All of this evokes here in the Soviet Union an understandable feeling of indignation on the part of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people.

Only recently, in exchanging opinions through our respective representatives, we talked with you about the mutual desire of both sides to put forward joint efforts directed toward improving relations between our countries and eliminating the danger of war. Your statement a few days ago that the USA would not participate in military activities against CubaSee footnote 2, Document 101. created the impression that the top leaders of the United States were taking into account the consequences for general peace and for the USA itself which aggression against Cuba could have. How can what is being done by the United States in reality be understood, when an attack on Cuba has now become a fact?

It is still not late to avoid the irreparable. The Government of the USA still has the possibility of not allowing the flame of war ignited by interventions in Cuba to grow into an incomparable conflagration. I approach you, Mr. President, with an urgent call to put an end to aggression against the Republic of Cuba. Military armament and the world political situation are such at this time that any so-called “little war” can touch off a chain reaction in all parts of the globe.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, there should be no mistake about our position: We will render the Cuban people and their government all necessary help to repel armed attack on Cuba. We are sincerely interested in a relaxation of international tension, but if others proceed toward sharpening, we will answer them in full measure. And in general it is hardly possible so to conduct matters that the situation is settled in one area and conflagration extinguished, while a new conflagration is ignited in another area.

I hope that the Government of the USA will consider our views dictated by the sole concern not to allow steps which could lead the world to military catastrophe. End text.

Freers

118. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1861. Secret. Sent through Presidential Special Assistant Ralph A. Dungan. Drafted by J.P. Hoover in ARA on April 18. Washington, undated. SUBJECT Cuba Contingency Plan

Pursuant to your conversation with Mr. Coerr of April 18, 1961, I am enclosing the original of the Cuba Contingency Plan.

Since it may have some additional interest, I am also enclosing a penultimate draft of the planNot printed. which touches on broader aspects of the possible post-Castro situation such as United States objectives, conditions for recognition, etc.

You will observe that the Contingency Plan is being sent to you before it has been submitted to the Secretary.

L.D. BattlePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature. AttachmentSecret. Drafted by Hoover on March 24.

POSSIBLE US ASSISTANCE TO A FRIENDLY CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND SOME IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS AFFECTING US-CUBAN RELATIONS

1. A friendly government in Cuba might request from the US assistance in the following fields: (a) Loans and/or grants for critical foreign exchange needs. (b) PL-480The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954; 68 Stat. 454, et seq. foodstuffs. (c) Critical medical and public health supplies, and technical assist-ance. (d) Loans and/or grants providing local currency for immediate budgetary support. (e) Joint planning, in cooperation with the Cuban government and multilateral agencies and within the context of the “Act of Bogota”Recommendation I of the Report of the Secretary General of the OAS to the Council of the OAS, October 11, 1960. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 293-299. and the “Kennedy Program”,An apparent reference to the Alliance for Progress proposed by President Kennedy in his inaugural address and in his initial State of the Union Address. See ibid., pp. 8 and 18-19. toward programs for the economic, social and political reconstruction and development of Cuba. (f) Cooperative arrangements, either on a bilateral or multilateral basis, for programs in such fields as the following: (i) Agrarian reform, agricultural improvement and diversification; (ii) Educational reconstruction; (iii) Public administration and Civil Service improvement; (iv) Technical and development assistance; (v) Accelerated industrial expansion and diversification; (vi) Increased employment. 2. Financial Assistance. (a) General. The provision of immediate financial assistance for both critical foreign exchange needs and budgetary support will be required to permit the goverment to operate until lines of credit can be reopened and the economy can function again. Presumably, this period will not exceed 60-90 days, by which time, in addition to re-established commercial credits, action by other agencies in the nature of stand-by agreements, stabilization loans, etc., may have been taken. (b) Foreign Exchange. It is estimated that there should be immediately available $35 million to cover foreign exchange needs during the early critical period. This amount should be provided on a grant basis calling upon Cuba to deposit counterpart equivalent in local currency, which may in turn be granted or loaned by the US for budgetary support or other agreed-on purposes. (See Tab A)None of the attachments cited in the contingency plan is printed. (c) Budgetary Support. It is estimated that approximately $15 million per month may be required for budgetary support to enable a new Cuban government to continue paying salaries and wages of the minimum number of government employees and workers needed to maintain essential administrative services. The total required under this heading would be $45 million, which, if determined necessary, should be provided from counterpart funds generated from the grant $35 million contingency funds under 2(b) above, and as necessary by additional grant or loan. (See Tab B) (d) Need for New Currency. If the convertibility of the Cuban currency to a par with the US dollar is to be restored, it will probably be necessary for a new Cuban government to issue new currency, exchanging the new for old bills on the basis of a rate determined to represent a fair value in relation to the dollar at the time. A prospective new Cuban government ought to have prepared in advance a new currency issue of approximately $500 million, (see Tab C) which would probably require a currency stabilization loan of approximately $100 million. 3. Immediate Foodstuffs Requirements. (a) General. It is probable that a successor Cuban government will encounter an immediate need in feeding parts of the population owing to the interference of civil disorder, etc., in the normal production of local foodstuffs and to the presumed failure of the Castro government to maintain imports of basic necessities in sufficient quantity. (See Tab D) (b)

Quantities and Value. The following commodities will probably be required in the indicated amounts, and advance arrangements should be made to supply them under Title I of PL-480, during an immediate period of 60 days.

Commodity Metric Tons Approx. Value Lard 13,000 $3,000,000 Evaporated milk 1,000 300,000 Corn 18,000 $1,000,000 Rice 35,000 7,350,000 Wheat 23,000 1,850,000 Wheat flour 15,000 1,500,000 Total $15,000,000

Note: Any of the above not available through PL-480 should be financed by contingency funds.

(c)

Channels of Distribution. It is recommended that the distribution of the foregoing quantities of food within Cuba be handled by a joint committee composed of representatives of the successor Cuban government and of an American liaison group to serve temporarily as an adjunct of the Embassy. The joint committee should determine the proportions of the supplies to be made available for free distribution to the needy, for handling by voluntary relief agencies, and for sale to the public through existing registered food dealers. (See Tab E)

If internal transportation facilities are seriously disrupted, the successor Cuban government may find it necessary to undertake distribution directly to retail outlets.

Any sales proceeds would be granted for work relief, direct economic development, or economic development activities in the Cuban budget. Concurrently a Title I program for meeting the continuing commercial requirements should be developed.

(d) Procurement in the US. Procurement and shipment in the US should be handled in accordance with established procedures under Title II of PL-480. Outward freight charges have not been taken into account in the values indicated in (b) above, but should be assumed by the US. (e) Stockpiling in the US. In the belief that stocks of the basic commodities listed under (b) above are normally available at storage points at or near Gulf and East Coast ports, no special advance preparations would appear to be necessary for the stockpiling of foodstuffs for Cuba. 4. Non-Food Requirements. (a) General. In addition to financial assistance and supplies of foods, it is anticipated that immediate supplies of non-food items will be required for the rehabilitation of critical installations such as electric power, telephones and other communications, oil refineries, docks and transportation; and machinery spares, tires, automotive spares, steel bearings, fuels, lubricants, iron and steel semi-manufactures, copper products, fertilizers, dyes and chemicals, textile fibers and yarns, wood pulp, plastic molding materials, etc., for restoring important local industries to production. (See Tabs F & G) There will also be a need for medical and public health supplies. (b) Medical and Public Health Needs. Medical problems may arise, whether from military action, lack of doctors and supplies, or from a period of public disorder or paralysis cutting off medical supplies and shutting down health services. These problems might be met by emergency shipment of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment parts and replacements. The return of Cuban doctors, nurses and other medical personnel to Cuba should be facilitated by urgent means, and possibly a team of US doctors and sanitary engineers should also be sent to evaluate the situation and establish the basis for larger scale assistance. Dispatch of a hospital ship from the Atlantic Fleet would be a dramatic means of providing medical assistance. It is estimated that approximately $500,000 might be needed for medical and public health supplies, included in the $35 million in 2 (b) above. (c)

Rehabilitation of Critical Installations. It is assumed that critical installations will have been subjected to sabotage and other damage although the extent of damage cannot be foreseen, and that it will be of the utmost urgency to restore these installations to at least minimum operation.

Preliminary discussions have been held with representatives of the Cuban Electric Company and the Cuban Telephone Company alerting them to the necessity of having competent technical personnel ready on short notice to appraise the needs for rehabilitation parts and supplies.

It is estimated that emergency funds in the amount of $5 million be on hand (included in the $35 million mentioned in 2 (b) above) for this purpose. The major probable demands of supplies and parts follow: Cuban Electric Company $2.0 million Cuban Telephone Company 1.5 million Oil Refineries .5 million Railways 1.0 million

(d)

To assist in processing the procurement of parts and supplies, the organization of a liaison group composed of Americans with experience in Cuba will be required to work with the Embassy. These men should have had technical experience in the following industries; sugar refining, electric power, telephones, petroleum refining, railroad, mining, rubber, textiles, metals, agricultural and automobile equipment. It is anticipated that these men would work with Cuban counterparts named by the new Cuban government. (See Tab E)

The liaison group should prepare detailed recommendations for the allocation of the contingency funds mentioned in 2 (b) above, would review and approve specific procurement orders, and assume responsibility for seeing that plans and orders are complied with.

5. Seized US Properties. (a)

Steps to be Taken by the US. The following steps should be taken by the US: i. Assemble documented data on the claims of US interests against Cuba resulting from the actions of the Castro government. ii. Seek assurances from the new Cuban government that the ownership of property as it existed on January 1, 1959, be recognized, and an undertaking to accept as the premise for further discussions the provisions of the Cuban Constitution of 1940 which apply to seized properties. iii. Seek a commitment from the prospective successor Cuban government to establish a joint claims commission to administer and dispose of seized properties and to treat with former owners. iv. Correlate policies relating to US claims with the overall plan for the solution of the varied and complex economic and social problems that will face Cuba and which have been responsible for the development of political difficulties within Cuba during past years; and taking into account that the economic and political system prevailing in Cuba prior to the Castro period may be fundamentally modified in response to political necessities.

(b) Principles Governing the Disposition of Seized Properties. The following principles should govern the disposition of seized properties: i. Prompt, adequate and effective compensation, including agreement for long-term compensation, in cases where the Cuban government decides to retain seized properties. ii. The negotiation of terms of acquisition in cases where the Cuban government desires to retain the properties. iii. The provision of legislation or regulations providing that uncompensated losses and damages sustained during the period of seizure may be taken as tax losses under U.S. laws by the United States owners upon restitution of their properties, allowing adequate carry-forward of losses to insure that the benefit of the losses actually accrues to the owners. 6. Other Problems. (a)

Reconstituting US Embassy and Consular Staffs. The Department of State should be prepared to send an American staff of 29 persons, including Defense Attaches and Marine Guards, to reopen the US Embassy at Habana, and four Americans to reopen the US Consulate at Santiago de Cuba. These persons should be ready to proceed to Habana and Santiago on the day that a new Cuban government assumes power. (See Tab I)

One week later an additional 5 Americans should proceed to Habana and one additional American to Santiago.

(b) Control of Travel from the US to Cuba. With a friendly Cuban government in power, many persons will probably wish to travel to Cuba from the US. Most of these will be persons concerned with the promotion or protection of legitimate interests, Cubans and persons of other nationalities resident in Cuba and tourists, and the US will probably wish to encourage their travel. There will be other persons, however—irresponsible speculators, gamblers, gangsters, etc.—whose purposes will not be in the best interests of either Cuba or the US, and whose travel ought to be minimized. In view of the above, it is recommended that present travel controls be retained at least for the initial period. (c) Voluntary Relief Agencies. It may be anticipated that voluntary relief agencies, notably Catholic Welfare and the Church World Service will be active in post-Castro Cuba. A register of approved voluntary agencies is maintained by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid of the International Cooperation Agency. Government support for the operations of agencies listed in this register can be approved and provided in a minimum of time, and can include providing surplus foods and other supplies, paying the costs of ocean freight, etc. (See Tab K) 7.

Reconstruction of US-Cuban Relationships. A friendly Cuban government may provide an opportunity to rebuild the structure of US-Cuban relationships on a new basis, eliminating factors which have been the cause of strain in past years. Such factors would include the preferential commercial relationships (see Tab L), and the role and structure of sugar and mining companies, public utilities, and other US investments.

It is considered essential for the successor government to “capture” the vital forces of the Castro revolution, i.e., nationalism, obsession with economic and political independence, widespread pressures for land reform, industrialization, economic diversification and, above all, employment at all levels from manual labor to the utilization of skilled, technical, managerial and professional personnel. It is equally essential that the US be closely identified with this movement and with the solutions to these problems.

Whatever policy the US adopts toward Cuba is likely to be regarded as a model for US relationships with the rest of Latin America and as having implications with respect to US policies toward the rest of the underdeveloped world in Africa and Asia as well. Needless to say, the magnitude of a long-term aid, technical assistance and social development program in Cuba will be great. Preliminary estimates indicate it might be initiated at approximately $125 million per year.

119. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, April 1961. Top Secret Washington, April 18, 1961.

I think you will find at noon that the situation in Cuba is not a bit good.

The Cuban armed forces are stronger, the popular response is weaker, and our tactical position is feebler that we had hoped. Tanks have done in one beachhead, and the position is precarious at the others.

The CIA will press hard for further air help—this time by Navy cover to B-26s attacking the tanks. But I think we can expect other pleas in rapid crescendo, because we are up against a formidable enemy, who is reacting with military know-how and vigor.

The immediate request I would grant (because it cannot easily be proven against us and because men are in need), but the real question is whether to reopen the possibility of further intervention and support or to accept the high probability that our people, at best, will go into the mountains in defeat.

In my own judgment the right course now is to eliminate the Castro air force, by neutrally-painted U.S. planes if necessary, and then let the battle go its way.

McG. B.Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

120. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Agency Personnel in NicaraguaSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol. I. Top Secret; Emergency. Washington, April 18, 1961, 11:26 a.m.

4737. For [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]:

1. Following is for your guidance: A. Present air situation dictates following: (1) Maximum B-26 night attacks on strategic targets to eliminate Cuban air capability by Cuban crews. (2) Maximum resupply effort during hours of darkness American to beachhead only and Cuban all areas. (3) Use of F-51ʼs in support of ground forces from Playa Giron. (4) Support of ground forces by American crews (over beachhead and sea approaches only). (5) Four additional B-26ʼs being dispatched from Eglin to arrive evening 18 April. 2. American contract crews can be used B-26 strikes beachhead area and approaches only. Emphasize beachhead area only. Can not attach sufficient importance to fact American crews must not fall into hands enemy. In event this happens despite all precautions crews must state hired mercenaries, fighting communism, etc; US will deny any knowledge. 3. View above conserve all Cuban crews during daylight hours. Prepare for maximum effort strike tonight, Cuban crews frag bombs, three aircraft hit San Antonio de los Banos 19/0530Z and three additional aircraft strike same target 19/0700Z. Vary approaches effect maximum frag coverage all parking areas. Operational pattern future will be American air crews fly armed reccy roads beachhead area approx each four hours. Cuban crews fly night airstrikes.

Note: Additional details on tonightʼs mission will follow.

121. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret. This memorandum apparently was based on a tape recording later transcribed by Wilhide. The transcription printed here begins, as indicated in mid-conversation. The earlier portion of the conversation may not have been transcribed, and no record of it has been found. Wilhide was Burkeʼs aide at the time. Washington, April 18, 1961.

Admiral BURKEʼS CONVERSATION WITH CDR WILHIDE, 18 APRIL 1961

Adm Burke … Before we got started about 1140, I went down to hisIt is not clear to whom Burke was referring at this point. A chronology prepared from the records in Burkeʼs office indicates that he received a phone call from Gilpatric at 11:27 a.m. proposing arrangements to go to the White House for a meeting on Cuba. (Ibid.) Since he went to the White House with Gilpatric, he may have stopped at Gilpatricʼs office. office—about ten minutes after I got the word. Then he heard that McNamara and Lemnitzer were coming back. So we went down to the garage into a little anteroom there and talked for a few minutes. Then McNamara and Lemnitzer went over in their car. Gilpatric, Buzz Wheeler, BreitweiserMajor General Robert A. Breitweiser, Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff. and I went over—I guess Breitweiser went in McNamaraʼs car—all to the White House. We got over there in the Cabinet Room.The Presidentʼs appointment book indicates that this meeting began at noon and lasted until 1:25 p.m. Participants included, in addition to the President, Vice President Johnson, Rusk, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, Lemnitzer, McGeorge Bundy, Bohlen, and Foy Kohler. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) Burkeʼs account indicates that the CIA was also represented and that other members of the Department of Defense, JCS, and the Department of State were present at the meeting. The President was talking with CIA people, State Department people and Rostow and a lot of other people. They were talking about Cuba. Real big mess.

Nobody knew what to do nor did the CIA who were running the operation and who were wholly responsible for the operation know what to do or what was happening. A lot of things have happened and they have caused to happen and we the JCS donʼt know anything whatever about. We have been kept pretty ignorant of this and have just been told partial truths. They are in a real bad hole because they had the hell cut out of them. They were reporting, devising and talking and I kept quiet because I didnʼt know the general score. Once in a while I did make a little remark like “balls.” It wasnʼt very often. It was a serious meeting. They didnʼt know what the President should do. … When it came out as to what could the United States do—it was all Navy. The upshot of it was that the President moved into his room—his office with Rusk, McNamara, Dulles, Lemnitzer and me. We talked a little bit in there about what could we do, Rusk not being in favor of doing very much. Then we came out. I was sent for again and I was asked could we find out what the score really was, by landing people in helicopters or something like that. That was all right. I wrote some dispatchesDocuments 122 and 123. and did some things. Over there. And I came back.

Then Bobby Kennedy called me up and said the President is going to rely upon you to advise him on this situation. I said it is late! He needs advice. He said the rest of the people in the room werenʼt helpful. (Call from the President)The transcript indicates that the President called Burke again 20 minutes later. No further information is given regarding either call.

What do you do. He is bypassing Lemnitzer, the Chairman, the SecDef, SecNav, CIA and the whole works and putting me in charge of the operation. That is a helluva thing. We had better watch this one.

Cdr Wilhide: He must realize what he is doing.

Adm Burke: I told Bobby Kennedy this was bypassing. He said he knew.

[Here follows discussion relating to Admiral Burkeʼs concern about the implications of short-circuiting the usual channels of responsibility in the management of the crisis.]

122. Telegram From the Chief of the Subsidiary Activities Division (Gray) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Flash; Limited Distribution. According to the memorandum for the record prepared by Commander Mitchell, which traced the evolution of the rules of engagement, this message, sent on behalf of the JCS, was authorized by a telephone call to the JCS Operations Center from Admiral Burke at the White House. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study) Washington, April 18, 1961, 1:37 p.m.

JCS 994309. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and Adm Clark from Gen Gray.

1. With unmarked naval aircraft fly photo and eyeball reconnaissance ASAP to determine situation on beach. 2. 12 Castro tanks reported on Red Beach operating against Cuban revolutionaries. We need data on situation ASAP. 3. Use officer observers with amphibious experience if quickly practicable, to give us judgement of situation. There may be Castro MIGs in area. 4. Aircraft protect themselves from attack. Take all possible precautions to avoid having operations identified as US. Make complete and frequent reports. More later.

123. Telegram From the Chief of the Subsidiary Activities Division (Gray) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution. According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Commander Mitchell, this message, sent on behalf of the JCS, was authorized by a telephone call to the JCS Operations Center from Admiral Burke at the White House. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study) Washington, April 18, 1961, 2:49 p.m.

JCS 994317. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and Adm Clark from Gen Gray.

1. Following preparatory actions directed at high-level conference in light of loss of Red Beach, tank and air attack on Blue Beach and reported four Castro T-33ʼs and three Castro MIGs in action. a. Prepare unmarked Navy planes for possible combat use. Number suitable in view of above left to your discretion. This instruction in addition to earlier message regarding recce mission.Document 122. Amphibious group move to within four hours steaming of landing area. Prepare unmarked boats for possible evacuation of anti-Castro forces. 2. New subject. We are operating almost entirely in the dark. Forward assessment of situation as you see it. Any information at all would be helpful. 3. FYI. There is no intention of intervening with US forces.

124. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. A “chronology of events on Cuba taken from the records in Op-00 immediate office” indicates that this message was sent as a back channel message. (Ibid.) Washington, April 18, 1961, 3:23 p.m.

182023Z. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and RAdm Clark from Burke. There is little information here on status of operation. Few reports available indicate operation may be in desperate straits. No general uprising in Cuba yet.

What is most urgently needed here is information on which to make an assessment of the situation or a judgment on what to do at high levels.

Following questions at high-level conference were asked: A. Can anti-Castro forces go into bush as guerillas? B. Could anti-Castro forces be evacuated from beach by unmarked United States amphib boats? C. Is there a possibility that anti-Castro forces can break through?

Following possible United States actions were discussed:In his initial draft of this message Burke wrote: “Nobody here wants to commit United States forces to bail out this affair, but if situation is as bad as reported something may have to be done.” (Ibid.) A. Unmarked Naval aircraft fly cover over beach area to protect anti-Castro forces from air attack. B. Unmarked Naval aircraft destroy Castro tanks. C. Unmarked Naval aircraft furnish close air support. D. Unmarked amphib boats from United States evacuate anti-Castro forces from beach. E. Land experienced Marines by either helicopter or boat to assess situation and give judgment on what to do. F. Large air drops by United States Air Force aircraft to anti-Castro forces. G. Danger in all above actions of United States involvement. No decision was made to do any of these but air drop. The same subjects may be discussed later.

125. Telegram From the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Repeated to JCS,COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMWESTFOR, and COMNAVBASE GTMO. USS Essex, Caribbean, April 18, 1961, 4:42 p.m.

182142Z. Exclusive for Dennison, Gray, Smith, McElroy and OʼDonnell from Clark. Bumpy Road Int Sum.

1. Pending recovery my eyeball recco flight following is summary of messages intercepted between CEF beach commander and Dolores plus some addressed to Mallard. 2. From Brigade Commander Blue Beach intercepted at 181715Z.12:15 p.m. All times cited in the message are on April 18. “Blue Beach must have jet air support in next few hours or will be wiped out. Under heavy attacks by MIG jets and heavy tanks.” Intercepted at 1703Z.12:03 p.m. “Blue Beach under attack by MIG 15s and T-33s. Request jet support or cannot hold. Situation critical.” Intercepted at 1728Z.12:28 p.m. “Without jet air support cannot hold. Have no ammo left for tanks and very little left for troops. Enemy just launched heavy land attack supported by tanks. Cannot hold for long.” Intercept at 1509Z.10:09 a.m. “Under heavy attack supported by 12 tanks. Need air support immediately. Red Beach wiped out. Request air strikes immediately.” 3. From Brigade Commander to Colonel Mallard relayed from MarsopaCode name for Blagar. at 1825Z.1:25 p.m. “Under heavy attack supported by 12 tanks. Need air support immediately. Red Beach wiped out. Request air strikes. Need ammo of all types immediately. 4 B-26 ETA beach head 181900Z. Request Navy air CAP for beachhead. If not provided expect loss 4 B-26. Confident you can provide. Advise.” 4. All above held by Mallardʼs boss by other means. My work with CEF to date incicates they are a well organized and professional group. 5. 6 B-26 passed over me heading north at 182120Z.4:20 p.m. 6. My eyeball recco report in about one hour.

126. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Commander, Key West Forces (McElroy)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Repeated to JCS, COMNAVB GTMO, and CTG 81.8. Norfolk, April 18, 1961, 4:52 p.m.

182152Z. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for RAdm McElroy info RAdms OʼDonnell, Clark, Gen Gray from Dennison. Up to 4 MIGs have been reported in the objective area. In the event we have to give support against MIGs desire you paint out US markings on six F3 H, arm them with Sidewinders and/or Sparrows and prepare them for combat operations in the objective area by daylight 19 April. Any launch directive will be issued by CINCLANTFLT. Hold close and try conceal above preparatory measures.

127. Telegram From the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Emergency. Repeated to JCS, COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMKWESTFOR, and COMNAVBASE GTMO. USS Essex, Caribbean, April 18, 1961, 5:12 p.m.

182212Z. Exclusive for Dennison, Gray, Smith, OʼDonnell and McElroy from Clark. Bumpy Road. Eyeball recco report over area about 2120Z.4:20 p.m.

1. Convoy of large Castro tanks (10 to 14) with trucks and lorries on road from Gallinas extending to point about three miles south moving south and east. Only a few troops seen with convoy. No others sighted. 2. CEF tanks and trucks burned out alongside road near La Seiba. No sign of CEF troops. 3. No air activity seen. No sign of artillery or infantry action. 4. Own evaluation Red Beach wiped out. Attacks on other beaches thus far have been almost entirely by air.

128. Telegram From the Chief of the Subsidiary Activities Division (Gray) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution. Repeated to CTG 81.8, Exclusive for Admiral Clark from Gray. Washington, April 18, 1961, 5:29 p.m.

JCS 994349. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and Adm Clark from Gen Gray.

1. CIA received report from BarracudaCode name for the Barbara J. that she has been hit by bomb and 20 MM in air attack. 2. Request you render assistance. If unable to save, request you remove the crew and destroy.

129. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Joint Chiefs of StaffSource: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Bumpy Road. Exclusive for General Gray from Admiral Dennison. Repeated for information to CTG 81.8, Exclusive for Clark from Dennison. Norfolk, April 18, 1961, 6:06 p.m.

182306Z. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for General Gray info RAdm Clark from Dennison.

A. JCS 994317 DTG 181949Z Notal.Document 123. B. CTG 81.8 182212Z.Document 127. 1. Have ordered Phibron 2 with BLT 1/6 embarked to move to an area bounded by latitudes 21 and 21-30N and longitude 80 and 81W. He will paint out markings on boats and be prepared to evacuate CEF forces if directed. 2. TF 24 including Northampton and Independence with attack air group CVG 7 aboard proceeding southward at 24 kts to Mayport area for possible further movement south. 3. Phibron 8 with BLT embarked ordered to expedite arrival at GTMO Opare ETA 222300Z.April 22, 6 p.m. 4. COMKWESTFOR ordered to sanitize 6 F3 H2 equipped with air to air missiles to be available first light 19 April. 5. CTG 81.8 (Clark) reported results eyeball recco by reference B. 6. COMFAIRJAX undertaking on urgent basis to obtain covert high alt A3 D photo recco of objective area. This to be done 18 April if possible but good result unlikely because of poor late afternoon light. 7. Appreciate the need to do all possible to minimize evidence of our participation but point out that all US aircraft are exclusively USN types and will be recognized as such. 8. New subject. I too have been operating in the dark which has been generated by not being completely advised of CEF operations, the sudden laying on of requirements which could have been forecasted, and no intelligence assessment of situation within Cuba. My own assessment based on a very high degree of ignorance is that CEF operations are not going well and that if result is either inconclusive or total collapse we may expect strong retaliatory effort probably against Guantanamo. 9. It is inevitable that our participation will gradually become known to a degree at least by many people including those in Castroʼs government. Time is not on our side and it is certainly important to do all possible to tip the scales in favor of CEF. Have no suggestions at this time beyond continuing measures I have outlined above.

130. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1861. Confidential. Drafted by McSweeney. Washington, April 18, 1961, 6:50 p.m. SUBJECT Cuba PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Mr. McSweeney, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs Mikhail A. Menshikov, Soviet Ambassador Georgi M. Kornienko, Counselor, Soviet Embassy

The Secretary said he wished, on behalf of the President, to deliver to the Ambassador the Presidentʼs reply to the statement from Chairman Khrushchev to the President. He referred to the fact that Khrushchevʼs statement had been made public and said that the Presidentʼs statement would also be publicized. He then handed the Presidentʼs letter to Chairman Khrushchev to the Ambassador. (Attached)The text of the attached letter was released to the press immediately after it was conveyed to Ambassador Menshikov. It is also printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1961, pp. 661-662. Ambassador Stevenson read Kennedyʼs reply to Khrushchev during the evening session of debate in the First Committee on April 18. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/5R.1154) For Khrushchevʼs letter, see Document 117.

The Ambassador said that he would transmit the communication to his government, adding that personally he did not think it answered the question posed.

The Secretary said that if we were to understand that the Soviet Government planned to act in accordance with the doctrine set forth in the December 1960 communique of the Communist leaders,Reference is to the manifesto issued from Moscow on December 6, 1960, by the leaders of 81 national and regional Communist parties, which proclaimed the unity of all Communists in a continuing struggle against capitalism. (The New York Times, December 7, 1960) then it is inevitable that there will be serious trouble. We believe that it is in the interest of both peoples and governments to seek out solutions which will insure peace, but this cannot be a one-sided effort—we must find the means of recognizing the real issues between us and bring our positions into adjustment. The Soviet Government must understand the importance to the United States of peace and well-being in this hemisphere. The Presidentʼs reply is directed toward that point.

Ambassador Menshikov said the Soviet Government will never recognize intervention in the affairs of other countries as indicating a desire to have peace. Such intervention, he said, would only produce the contrary of peace.

The Secretary said that he could not accept a lecture from the Soviet Union regarding intervention, having in mind the activities all over the world since 1945 of the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Menshikov said that the Soviet Union had never intervened in the affairs of other countries—that this is a strict policy of the Soviet Government which has been followed consistently. He said the Soviet Government cannot fail to notice the introduction of forces into other countries to suppress the freedom and independence of those countries.

The Secretary asked if Mr. Menshikov were referring to Hungary.

The Ambassador said he referred to Cuba. As regards Hungary, he said, the Secretary should know what happened there. Without going into details, he would only reaffirm that in the Hungarian affair the Soviet Union had been asked by the legitimate government to help suppress counter-revolution. This the Soviet Union did.

The Secretary indicated that further conversation seemed unnecessary and the Ambassador left.

AttachmentUnclassified. Washington, April 18, 1961.

Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

Mr. Chairman: You are under a serious misapprehension in regard to events in Cuba. For months there has been evident and growing resist-ance to the Castro dictatorship. More than 100,000 refugees have recently fled from Cuba into neighboring countries. Their urgent hope is naturally to assist their fellow Cubans in their struggle for freedom. Many of these refugees fought along side Dr. Castro against the Batista dictatorship; among them are prominent leaders of his own original movement and government.

These are unmistakable signs that Cubans find intolerable the denial of democratic liberties and the subversion of the 26th of July Movement by an alien-dominated regime. It cannot be surprising that, as resistance within Cuba grows, refugees have been using whatever means are available to return and support their countrymen in the continuing struggle for freedom. Where people are denied the right of choice, recourse to such struggle is the only means of achieving their liberties.

I have previously stated, and I repeat now, that the United States intends no military intervention in Cuba. In the event of any military intervention by outside force we will immediately honor our obligations under the inter-American system to protect this hemisphere against external aggression. While refraining from military intervention in Cuba, the people of the United States do not conceal their admiration for Cuban patriots who wish to see a democratic system in an independent Cuba. The United States Government can take no action to stifle the spirit of liberty.

I have taken careful note of your statement that the events in Cuba might affect peace in all parts of the world. I trust that this does not mean that the Soviet Government, using the situation in Cuba as a pretext, is planning to inflame other areas of the world. I would like to think that your government has too great a sense of responsibility to embark upon any enterprise so dangerous to general peace.

I agree with you as to the desirability of steps to improve the international atmosphere. I continue to hope that you will cooperate in opportunities now available to this end. A prompt cease-fire and peaceful settlement of the dangerous situation in Laos, cooperation with the United Nations in the Congo and a speedy conclusion of an acceptable treaty for the banning of nuclear tests would be constructive steps in this direction. The regime in Cuba could make a similar contribution by permitting the Cuban people freely to determine their own future by democratic processes and freely to cooperate with their Latin American neighbors.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you should recognize that free peoples in all parts of the world do not accept the claim of historical inevitability for Communist revolution. What your government believes is its own business; what it does in the world is the worldʼs business. The great revolution in the history of man, past, present and future, is the revolution of those determined to be free.

John F. KennedyPrinted from a copy that indicates President Kennedy signed the original.

131. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution. Repeated to CTG 81.8, Exclusive for Clark from Gray. Washington, April 18, 1961, 7:57 p.m.

JCS 994363. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and Adm Clark from Gen Gray. For your info possibility exists that C-130 A/C with markings removed may be used for night drops on Blue Beach beginning 19-20 April until further notice.A note on the memorandum for the record prepared by Mitchell concerning the rules of engagement reads: “These air drops by C-130 were never conducted.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study)

132. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution. Repeated to CTG 81.8, Exclusive for Clark from Gray. Washington, April 18, 1961, 7:59 p.m.

JCS 994364. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and Adm Clark from Gen Gray. As feasible and without violating current restrictions request you determine location of airfields from which fighter aircraft attacking CEF beachhead are operating.

133. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Burke. A “chronology of events on Cuba taken from the records in Op-00 immediate office” indicates that this message was sent as a back channel message. (Ibid.) Washington, April 18, 1961, 8:37 p.m.

190137Z. Exclusive for Adm Dennison from Burke. Bumpy Road. Authorities appreciated CTG 81.8 182212ZDocument 127. but still want to know whether CEF can go into bush as guerrillas at a time Commander CEF thinks organized resistance no longer feasible. JohnnyAdmiral Clark. maybe could get dope from Mallard.

Authorities would like to be sure CEF could become guerrillas whenever they desire so that point could be emphasized in our publicity, i.e. that revolutionaries crossed the beach and are now operating as guerrillas. In other words if CEF can not hold beach head or fight their way inland it would be desirable for them to become guerrillas and head for a known destination and be supplied by air. Anything you can do to get answer to that question would be appreciated.

Next subject was getting wounded out if that becomes necessary. I suggested that wounded could be taken off beach in CEF ships who later could ask Essex to take them as humanitarian move. Clark would have to make arrangements through Mallard. Wounded should be kept in Essex until suitable hospital arrangements could be made on beach in some place inaccessible to news hawks.

New subject.

Authorities are concerned that if CEF cannot become guerrillas for any reason Cardona may ask United States to evacuate those who can not get into bush. I replied we could evacuate with Phibron Two tomorrow night if U.S. Government made decision to do so. Boats would necessarily have to be handled by U.S. personnel. We could send some Marines ashore, if U.S. made decision to do so, to cover evacuation. We might also have to fly air cover to protect evacuation from air attack. I did not know whether this operation should be done at night or in daylight if evacuation were necessary. Request advice.

If it does become necessary to evacuate, Clark will need also to use what helicopters he can to get data as well as men.

Suggest you fly another recon over beach in morning to get data but JCS should be informed you intend to do so.

134. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to CTG 81.8, Exclusive for Clark from Burke. Washington, April 18, 1961, 9:17 p.m.

190217Z. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and RAdm Clark from Burke. Bumpy Road. I was asked once again if it were possible to land an experienced Marine (or Naval officer who has amphibious knowledge) on beach with CEF without danger of him being killed or captured or it becoming known U.S. was involved. The urgency stems from lack of knowledge here of true situation on beach and what should be done now without overtly involving United States. If JohnnyAdmiral Clark. thinks it could be done within his own resources with little danger it should be done. I have said it too likely to fail but I may be wrong.

Please advise, Exclusive to Burke only, on this one along with any further information on situation or comments on how to get dope.

135. Telegram From the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Passed to JCS at 2:01 a.m. in CINCLANT telegram 190701Z, Exclusive for Gray from Dennison. (Ibid.) USS Essex, Caribbean, April 18, 1961, 11:52 p.m.

190452Z. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Dennison from Clark.

1. Following clear text from Brigade Commander to base intercepted “Do you people realize how desperate the situation is? Do you back us up or quit? All we want is low jet cover and jet close support. Enemy has this support. I need it badly or cannot survive. Please donʼt desert us. Am out of tank and bazooka ammo. Tanks will hit me at dawn. I will not be evacuated. Will fight to the end if we have to. Need medical supplies urgently.” 2. Following intercepted from MarsopaCode name for the Blagar. “If we cannot get Santiago to cover us on way in and out and low jet cover feel Cuban crew will mutiny. Crew ready to mutiny now. Request immed answer.”

136. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Agency Personnel in NicaraguaSource: Central Intelligence Agency Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 4, Vol. I. Top Secret; Flash. Washington, April 18, 1961.A handwritten note on the source text indicates the time of transmission of this telegram was between 11:26 and 11:52 a.m. The action authorized in the telegram indicates, however, that the telegram must have been drafted after 11:58 p.m. on April 18. See the source note, Document 140.

4739. Ref: [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] 833 (IN 4292).

1. Immediately upon receipt this message launch fifty percent B-26 strike aircraft armed your discretion destroy tanks and vehicles on approaches beachhead. Conserve Cuban crews for max effort night attacks target one. 2. US Navy air CAP over beachhead area will provide fighter cover your aircraft.

137. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Exclusive. Repeated to JCS. Norfolk, April 19, 1961, 1:27 a.m.

190627Z. Exclusive for Clark from Dennison info Gray.

1. At your discretion and with due regard for security your forces and need for concealing involvement U.S. conduct eyeball recco objective area first light 19 April. 2. New subject. If CEF effort has not been fully effective desire all info earliest as to whether guerilla operations have been started. If this is the case then it might be possible for us to arrange support by air drops etc. As you must realize I am groping in the dark and any info you can supply (possibly through Col Mallardʼs sources) would be of great help. 3. Another subject. We may be called upon for evacuation of wounded. This might involve helicopters and stop off in Essex prior transfer to yet undetermined destination.

138. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret. Norfolk, April 19, 1961, 2:01 a.m.

190701Z. Exclusive for Admiral Burke from Dennison.

A. Your 190137Z.Document 133. B. My 190627Z.Document 137. 1. See Ref B to CTG 81.8 info JCS. 2. Evacuation of wounded is completely out of the question without overt involvement of US forces. Furthermore, I know of no haven in some place “inaccessible to news hawks.” Evacuation either by day or night is a fantastically unrealistic project unless I am permitted to put sufficient force ashore, with air and gunfire support from the sea, to provide a beach head. Alternative would be for CEF ships to bring wounded from beach to sea.

139. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret. Norfolk, April 19, 1961, 2:11 a.m.

190711Z. Exclusive for Admiral Burke from Dennison.

A. Your 190217Z.Document 134.

It is impossible to give guarantee that I could land observer on the beach without danger of being killed or captured. On the contrary I could guarantee that any observer landed would be completely ineffective at best and probably would involve the United States. I have no information about contact sources on the beach, no info on communications ashore and no information on positions of CEF forces. The proposal is completely unrealistic and I will have no part of it.An unidentified handwritten note on the source text at this point reads: “He may have to.”

140. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Exclusive; Flash. Also sent to CTG 81.8. A chronology maintained in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations indicates that the instructions in this telegram resulted from a conference at the White House. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) The conference cited in the chronology was the one listed in the Presidentʼs appointment book as having begun at 11:58 p.m. on April 18 and concluded at 2:46 a.m. on April 19. No participants are listed for this off-the-record meeting on Cuba, and no other record of the meeting has been found. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) Washington, April 19, 1961, 3:37 a.m.

JCS 994369. Bumpy Road. Exclusive to Adm Dennison and RAdm Clark from JCS.

1. TG 81.8 to furnish air cover of 6 unmarked aircraft over CEF forces during period 0630 to 0730 local time 19 April to defend CEF against air attack from Castro forces. Do not seek air combat but defend CEF forces from air attack. Do not attack ground targets. Pilots carry as little identification as practicable. If necessary to ditch, ditch at sea. 2. CEF transport aircraft, to include C-46, C-54 and possibly C-130 types, are scheduled to air drop supplies to CEF forces in beachhead from 190630R to 190730R.6:30 to 7:30 local time. Friendly B-26ʼs are scheduled to attack Castro tanks and forces in vicinity of beachhead during same period. 3. U.S. Col. Robertson will land on beach by small boat during same period for consultation with CEF commander. 4. CEF very short of supplies and are being requested by other agencies to break out from beach as soon as practicable either as organized force or as small bands of guerillas. If this is not possible it may become necessary to evacuate CEF forces at last resort. Should this be necessary will probably use CEF ships but have Phibron 2 in position about 30 miles from beach by 191300R1 p.m. local time. prepared to conduct evacuation from Blue Beach or other designated beach at 191700R5 p.m. using unmarked amphibious craft with crews in dungarees so that they will not be easily identified on beach. If evacuation by U.S. ships ordered furnish air cover to protect landing craft and keep amphibious shipping not less than five miles from beach so as not to indicate U.S. ships are involved. What is latest time you will need executing order to evacuate at 191700R? 5. Make frequent reports after operation begins. 6. New subject. Furnish air cover to CEF ships more than 15 miles from coast as practicable.At 6:30 a.m., Clark cabled to Dennison: “Will devote my entire resources to execution JCS 190837Z [JCS 994369].” (CTG 81.8 telegram 191130Z to CINCLANTFLT; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

141. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Exclusive. Washington, April 19, 1961, 3:41 a.m.

190841Z. Exclusive for Adm Dennison from Burke. Your 190701ZDocument 138. not very helpful. You may have to evacuate CEF or wounded only. We realize US forces would be involved but we would want to hold involvement to as low a level as possible. If you evacuate wounded hold them in Essex and I will inform you location of haven. God knows this operation is as difficult as possible and we are trying to do all we can without much info and without having been in on all initial stages. I too am irked and tired and I realize many of these suggestions are most difficult. Yet we will have to do all we can to help even if it is not the way we would like to do it. Donʼt let the flag etc.

142. Editorial Note

General Gray briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the situation in Cuba at 7:30 the morning of April 19, 1961. Intelligence reports indicated that internal resistance in Cuba, aside from the CEF force, was limited to 1,000 guerrillas in the eastern part of Oriente Province, 850 guerrillas inland from Cienfuegos, and 100 guerrillas in the Pinar del Rio area. Only two of six scheduled CEF B-26 bombers had attacked San Antonio de los Banos during the night, and the crew of the Blagar had refused an order to deliver supplies to the beach because they could not finish the mission before daylight and no air cover was visible. Another effort was planned between 6:30 and 7:30 while CTG 81.8 air cover was scheduled. Two CEF C-54s had air dropped supplies in the area of the beach during the night, and one C-46 had landed on the air strip and unloaded. The last CTG 81.8 reconnaissance flight indicated that the late afternoon CEF strike on Cuban tank forces was a success. Several trucks and tanks were reported damaged.

Despite the few positive developments that Gray was able to report, his briefing emphasized the fact that the situation at the Bay of Pigs was becoming desperate. Gray noted that the CEF Brigade Commander had asked during the night: “Have you quit? Arenʼt you going to support me any more?” He stated that he could not hold out without help, but later radioed: “Regardless of whether you help or not, I will fight on regardless.” The question, however, was how long he would be able to fight. Information received during the briefing indicated that as of 7:50 a.m. the CEF battalion on Blue Beach was under artillery and air attack, and a truck convoy was advancing on the beach from the north. At 10 a.m. a call from CIA indicated that CIA was conferring and would probably recommend evacuation of the CEF. (J-5 Briefing 730R, 19 April 1961; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

143. Telegram From the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret. Repeated to JCS. USS Essex, Caribbean, April 19, 1961, 8:40 a.m.

191340Z. Exclusive for Dennison, Gray, from Clark. Bumpy Road. Your 190627Z.Document 137.

1. All evidence indicates CEF ashore still are organized fighting unit and not shifting to guerilla activity. Believe one body of survivors from Red Reach attempting to join main body at Blue Beach. Nothing was delivered to beach area by sea during the night. Indications are that CEF ashore is low on all supplies, including ammo and is hard pressed if not desperate. Air drops by CEF planes poorly delivered. Most fall into sea. 2. All above from intercepted CEF traffic. 3. All this radio traffic is addressed for either action or info to Cdr. Millardʼs boss, who is the same as Col. Mallardʼs boss.

144. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Exclusive. Repeated to JCS. Norfolk, April 19, 1961, 10:46 a.m.

191546Z. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for RAdm Clark from Dennison, info Gen Gray.

A. CTG 81.8 191448Z.In this telegram, sent to Dennison and Gray at 9:48 a.m., April 19, Clark reported a request to his Task Group from the CEF for close air support to meet an attack led by tanks against the CEF position on the beach. (Ibid.) Clark had reported 34 minutes earlier that CEF forces on Blue Beach were under artillery fire. (CTG 81.8 telegram 191414Z to CINC-LANTFLT, April 19; ibid.) B. JCS 994247 DTG 172035Z.Document 115. C. JCS 994309 DTG 181837Z.Document 122. D. JCS 994369 DTG 190838Z.Document 140. 1. Close air support cannot be furnished. Restrictions of ref B are applicable. Only exceptions to 15 mile limitation so far authorized are refs C and D.At 10:33 a.m., Clark reported to Dennison that the CEF commander had repeated his plea for close air support; the CEF was under continuing artillery fire and had been attacked twice by aircraft. (CTG 81.8 telegram 191533Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) At 11:09 a.m., Clark suggested that he be authorized to take advantage of the fact that two hostile planes were circling near one of his destroyers in order to launch an air strike from the Essex. (CTG 81.8 telegram 191609Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19; ibid.)

145. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Emergency; Exclusive. Repeated to JCS. Norfolk, April 19, 1961, 11:24 a.m.

191624Z. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Clark, info Gen Gray from Dennison.

1. Dispatch 2 DD to take station off Blue Beach to determine whether there is any chance for evacuation. 2. Provide air cover to protect DDs. 3. Fly recco over beach to determine situation.At 11:18 a.m., Clark reported to Dennison that he had received the following message from the CEF brigade ashore: “We are out of ammo and fighting on the beach. Please send help. We cannot hold. (Signed) Pepe.” (CTG 81.8 telegram 191618Z to CINC-LANTFLT, April 19; ibid.) 4. Report immediately by fastest possible means results observations. 5. CEF ships have been ordered to move into Blue Beach. 6. Final instructions on evacuation will follow.

146. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison) to the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Emergency; Exclusive. Repeated to JCS. Norfolk, April 19, 1961, 11:32 a.m.

191632Z. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for RAdm Clark info Gen Gray from Dennison.

1. Provide continuous air cover over beaches today to protect CEF from air attack. 2. Protection from ground attack not authorized.At 11:31 a.m., Clark reported to Dennison that he had received the following message from Blue Beach: “Out of ammunition. Men fighting in water. If no help given Blue Beach lost.” (CTG 81.8 telegram 191631Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19; ibid.)

147. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution; Exclusive. Repeated to CTG 81.8. A chronology maintained in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations indicates that the instructions in this telegram resulted from a conference at the White House. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) It is not clear from the Presidentʼs appointment book which conference at the White House produced these instructions; President Kennedy was busy throughout much of the morning of April 19 in meetings with the visiting Prime Minister of Greece, Constantine Karamanlis. No meeting that might be interpreted as dealing with the crisis in Cuba was listed for the morning of April 19. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) Washington, April 19, 1961, 11:57 a.m.

JCS 994382. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and Adm Clark from Gen Gray.

1. Confirming phone conversation with Adm BurkeThe chronology cited in the source note above indicates that this telephone conversation took place at 10:20 a.m. between Burke and Dennison. send 2 destroyers off Blue Beach to determine whether there is any chance of evacuation or not. 2. Fly reconnaissance over beach to determine situation. 3. CEF ships have been ordered to move to beach. 4. Fly air cover for destroyers, CEF shipping and own air reconnaissance. This means active air to air combat against any aircraft in the area. You will be notified of time of any future friendly B-26 aircraft in area. No attack against ground forces authorized. 5. Report immediately by fastest means possible results of reconnaissance. Final instructions will be sent later.

148. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.37/4-1961. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. The outgoing copy of this telegram at USUN indicates that it was drafted by Yost and Pedersen and cleared in draft by Stevenson. (USUN Files: NYFRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Tels 1962) New York, April 19, 1961, noon.

2937. For President and Secretary from Stevenson. Cuba.

1. Atmosphere in UN, among both our friends and neutrals, is highly unsatisfactory and extremely dangerous to U.S. position throughout world. Sovs and Castro Cubans have been able capture and so far hold moral initiative. This is at least partly due to lack of advance planning on how to defend ourselves politically. 2. With sufficient high level approaches to friendly govts explaining our policy, Dept should be able assure enough votes to provide blocking third against SovOn April 19 the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution in the First Committee that called for the General Assembly to condemn armed aggression against Cuba, which the Soviet Union stated was sponsored by the United States, and called upon member states to render such assistance to Cuba as might be necessary to repel such aggression. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.277) or Rumanian resRomania submitted a draft resolution on April 17 that called for the General Assembly to demand the immediate cessation of military activities against the Republic of Cuba and to issue an urgent appeal to the states whose territory and means were being used to support the attack to stop such assistance. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.274) and against any Asian res or compromise if it is sufficiently slanted against us. If LAʼs prepared vote against Mexican resOn April 18 Mexico submitted a draft resolution in the First Committee that made reference to the obligation of observing the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of any state. The resolution called for the General Assembly to make an urgent appeal to all states to ensure that their territories were not being used to promote a civil war in Cuba and to urge cooperation in the search for a peaceful solution to the situation in Cuba. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.275) because of their own, we might be able defeat it as well. 7-power resAn additional draft resolution was submitted in the First Committee on April 18 by Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela. This resolution made reference to the general obligation to seek a peaceful solution to disputes and called for the General Assembly to encourage the member states of the Organization of American States to lend assistance in achieving a settlement. It also called for the General Assembly to exhort all member states to abstain from any action that might aggravate existing tensions. (U.N. doc. A/C.1/L.276) is best we can do. How strongly we should come out for it in capitals at this point, however, I am as yet uncertain but will make recommendation shortly. 3. So far we have received virtually no support in speeches of others. Immediate approaches in capitals is necessary if Dept desires favorable speeches. Situation so difficult here no one will speak, except those hostile to us, without definite instructions on their govtʼs policy. Introduction by 7 LAʼs of res may help this because it gives focus around which to turn debate. 4. We are also exposed with large number of other dels with whom we have policy disputes on other issues in UN. At just wrong moment we have managed alienate Arabs on Palestine refugees item and on Jordanian case in SC against Israeli Jerusalem parole. We are in difficulty with whole Brazzaville group because of Cameroon plebiscite. If we had known we would have to face current situation we would have undoubtedly followed different policies and could have avoided present strained relations which are seriously damaging our bargaining power with them on Cuba. 5. Everyone, of course, friend or foe, believes we have engineered this revolution and no amount of denials will change their minds. Our prestige is thus committed, particularly in Latin America. Some states—Communist and “positive neutralists”—are very hostile. Others are uneasy. And those who are for us, especially LAʼs, are afraid to speak out because they fear internal repercussions of fight in Cuba on their own countries; they pray that this revolt will succeed within hours. Also urgently need if possible language to meet universal view that aiding, instigating and organizing from outside is as culpable as intervention in international and inter-American law. 6. Whatever happens now we are in for period of very serious political trouble. If revolution succeeds within days without overt U.S. intervention our problem minimized but by no means overcome. If it fails, we will lose stature and strength, with all that this implies for our position in OAS, the Alliance for Peace Program, the attitude of LAʼs toward Sov blandishments, and their ability resist other Cubas in LA; these stakes are high and having started this operation and having already paid heavy political price for it, I hope we will use covert means to maximum, to make it succeed and succeed fast. If nevertheless it fails we can then only say we were not involved, we are appalled at victory of oppression; and we are confident that in time Cuban people will again be free. From viewpoint U.S. position in world as reflected in UN, overt U.S. intervention in Cuba, after all we have said, would probably be worse than failure present effort. Green (Canada) told me today if U.S. intervened directly it would put us in impossible situation. 7. If worse comes to worst and there is prolonged military stalemate in Cuba which we are committed to support most serious situation will arise which will put us in grave difficulties in UN. Overt U.S. military support of rebels in absence legal framework or adequate provocation would be politically disastrous. It would be considered as another Suez and we would have to expect world to react accordingly. Overt aid, if decided upon, must be based on sound legal position even if it is fiction. We feel there must, for example, at least be rebel govt established in Cuba with control of substantial section of Cuban territory and including major city as capital and which can appeal for help before we even consider such step. I wish make clear I am not recommending this be done; considerations which govern such decisions are not sufficiently known to me here. But if this point should be reached we must have legal position at least as firm as USSR has in Laos. Stevenson

149. Telegram From the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Emergency; Exclusive. Repeated to JCS,COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMKWESTFOR, and COMNAVBASEGTMO. USS Essex, Caribbean, April 19, 1961, 12:06 p.m.

191706Z. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Dennison, Gray, Smith, McElroy, OʼDonnell from Clark. Bumpy Road. Your 191624Z.Document 145.

1. Para 3. Area held by CEF appears to be one quarter to one half mile along the beach to a depth of about one quarter under artillery fire with tanks and vehicles to both east and west. Believe evacuation impossible without active engagement with Castro forces. 2. Destroyers on the way for observation only.Clark followed this telegram with another to Dennison at 12:44 which reads: “2 DD are proceeding to Blue Beach but feel I must point out that they will be subjected to air attack and surface artillery fire and in my opinion will not be able to make any contribution to decision as to feasibility of evacuation which is feasible if we stand ready to support by air cover and counter battery fire and start at once.” (CTG telegram 191744Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

150. Telegram From Central Intelligence Agency Personnel in Nicaragua to the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/LA/COG Files: Job 82-00679R, Box 3, Gen Maxwell Taylor, Green Study Group, Vol. II. Top Secret; Flash. Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, April 19, 1961, 12:07 p.m.

902. 1. Situation for air support beachhead completely out of our hands. This morningʼs effort extended us to the limit. Have now lost 5 Cuban pilots, 6 co-pilots, 2 American pilots, and one co-pilot, and observer either killed or captured. Unknown number aircraft out of commission. (Will advise.)

2. Two crews shot down today were shot down during period “positive aggressive” Navy air support and cover granted and for one hour 1130Z to 1230Z 19 April. Per Hqs. 4834Telegram 4834 to the Air Commander at Puerto Cabezas, April 19, 3:04 a.m., informed him that the Navy would provide 1 hour of air cover over the beaches at the Bay of Pigs, and enjoined him to make the best possible use of the opportunity to attack Cuban forces on the approaches to the airfield. (Ibid.) For text, see the Supplement. (OUT 7237).

3. Still have faith. Awaiting your guidance.

151. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Flash; Limited Distribution; Exclusive. Repeated to CTG 81.8. Washington, April 19, 1961, 1:12 p.m.

JCS 994392. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and Adm Clark from Gen Gray.

1. Direct DD to take personnel off the beach and from water to limit of their capability. We are anxious to save people as long as you can do so. We are extremely reluctant to become engaged but as long as we have some prospects of saving significant number of people to make hazards worthwhile, save the people. 2. Use CEF boats and craft as practicable. Provide air cover. If DD fired on they are authorized to return the fire to protect themselves while on this humanitarian mission. 3. Report when on the way and frequently thereafter. 4. If in your judgement there are substantial numbers that can be evacuated inform us ASAP, so that we can announce here that US will assist in evacuation. Naval commander in full charge of evacuation. Instructions to that effect are being sent by CIA to CEF commander. God be with you.At 1:45 p.m. Dennison ordered Clark to comply with the instructions in JCS 994392. (CINCLANTFLT telegram 191845Z to CTG 81.8, April 19; ibid.)

152. Telegram From the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Emergency; Exclusive. Repeated to JCS,COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMKWESTFOR, and COMNAVBASE GTMO. USS Essex, Caribbean, April 19, 1961, 1:57 p.m.

191857Z. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Dennison, Gray, Smith, McElroy, OʼDonnell from Clark. Bumpy Road.

1. AD-5W unable track Castro aircraft to and from bases. Observed unidentified jet following my returning CAP to seaward for about 20 miles then returning. 2. Castro B-26 orbiting over beach, probably gun spotter. I am initiating air to air combat over beach area.In response to this message, Dennison sent an order at 2:16 p.m. to the Commander of the air unit based at Key West, and the Commander of the naval base at Guantanamo: “Be prepared provide fighter assistance to CTG 81.8 on his request.” (CINCLANTFLT telegram 191916Z to COMKWESTFOR and COMNAVBASE GTMO, April 19; ibid.)

153. Telegram From the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Flash; Exclusive. Repeated to JCS, COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMKWESTFOR, and COMNAVBASE GTMO. USS Essex, Caribbean, April 19, 1961, 2:17 p.m.

191917Z. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Dennison, Gray, Smith, McElroy, OʼDonnell from Clark. Bumpy Road. CTU 81.8.3 reports following intercepted:

CEF ship Commander reported to his 2nd in command “that Blue Beach was lost and no troops were on Blue Beach. Men fled into woods.” CTF 81.8.3.2 passed yacht with 200 people on board possibly from beach. Report is that nothing left to salvage on the beach and that Castro is waiting on the beach.In light of the apparently hopeless situation on the beach, Clark reported to Dennison at 2:57 p.m. that he had ordered his air and surface units to fire only in self defense. (CTG 81.8 telegram 191957Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19; ibid.)

154. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution; Exclusive. Repeated to CTG 81.8. Washington, April 19, 1961, 3:10 p.m.

JCS 994409. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and Adm Clark from Gen Gray.

1. Based on report from CEF Commander ashore that he was destroying communications CIA has assumed he has taken to the woods. 2. CIA has ordered their shipping to disperse and proceed to various ports. Blagar and LCUʼs have been ordered to point CC. Request you assume operational control at CC and take action as feasible to salvage ships and cargo.At 7:27 p.m., the JCS amended this order to read: “Retain operational control of LCUʼs only.” The CIA had directed that the crews of the LCUs be transferred to the Caribe and remain under CIA control. (JCS telegram 994463 to CINCLANT, April 19; ibid.)

155. Telegram From the Commander of Special Task Group 81.8 (Clark) to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Exclusive. Repeated to JCS, COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMKWESTFOR, and COMNAVBASE GTMO. USS Essex, Caribbean, April 19, 1961, 3:45 p.m.

192045Z. Exclusive for Dennison, Gray, Smith, OʼDonnell, McElroy from Clark. Bumpy Road.

1. Final report from CTU 81.8.3 “saw nothing to indicate any chance of evacuation. Beach appears completely held by light Castro forces.” 2. My destroyers are clear of beach and rejoining CEF ships.At 3:20, Clark reported: “CTU 81.8.3 straddled by shore battery. Ordered withdrawal full speed.” (CTG 81.8 telegram 192020Z to CINCLANTFLT, April 19; ibid.)

156. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution; Exclusive. Repeated to CTG 81.8. Washington, April 19, 1961, 8:42 p.m.

JCS 994464. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and Adm Clark from JCS. Bumpy Road. Direct one destroyer to remain off beach during night outside of shore based gun range. Destroyer boat to patrol off beaches to pick up any evacuees. Destroyer keep boat under radar control. Destroyer depart area one hour before sunrise. Report results of search during night and on completion of patrol.At 5:10 p.m. Burke pressed Clark for more information: “Dammit, make lots of reports. We need data. Even negative helps.” (CNO telegram 192210Z to CTG 81.8, Exclusive for Clark from Burke, April 19; ibid.)

Realize this is most difficult and hazardous assignment but it is necessary.The JCS informed Dennison at 8:52 that existing instructions with respect to air and surface protection remained in effect, but there was no further requirement for an air CAP in the beachhead area. Dennison was directed to instruct his naval units in the area, with the exception of CTG 81.8, to resume normal operations. (JCS telegram 994465 to CINCLANT, April 19; ibid.)

157. Memorandum From the Attorney General (Kennedy) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, April 1961. No classification marking. A covering note indicates that the Attorney General sent the memorandum to the President through Presidential Special Assistant Kenneth OʼDonnell. (Ibid.) Washington, April 19, 1961.

The present situation in Cuba was precipitated by the deterioration of events inside that state. The news that 100 Cuban pilots were being trained in Czechoslovakia, the information that MIGs and other jet planes had already been shipped to Cuba and that these shipments were expected to continue, that thousands of tons of military equipment had arrived each month in Havana, were all matters of consternation. Cuba it was realized was swiftly becoming a major military arsenal for all of the activities of the Communist Bloc in the Western Hemisphere. For these arms were sent to Cuba not only to keep Castro in power but to provide the necessary tools for Communist agitators in other South American and Central American countries to overthrow their governments. A hundred jet fighters based in Havana and roaming the skies around Florida and Central America will have major repercussions. The psychological effect, let alone the military result of this show of power could conceivably be catastrophic.

The alternative to the steps that were taken this past week would have been to sit and wait and hope that in the future some fortuitous event would occur to change the situation. This, it was decided, should not be done. The immediate failure of the rebelsʼ activities in Cuba does not permit us, it seems to me, to return to the status quo with our policy toward Cuba being one of waiting and hoping for good luck. The events in the last few days makes this inconceivable.

Therefore, equally important to working out a plan to extricate ourselves gracefully from the situation in Cuba is developing a policy in light of what we expect we will be facing a year or two years from now!The Attorney General underscored the first sentence of this paragraph by hand, and added the exclamation point. Castro will be even more bombastic, will be more and more closely tied to Communism, will be better armed, and will be operating an even more tightly held state than if these events had not transpired.

Our long-range foreign policy objectives in Cuba are tied to survival far more than what is happening in Laos or the Congo or any other place in the world. Because of the proximity of that island our objective must be at the very least to prevent that island from becoming Mr. Khru-shchevʼs arsenal. In our concern over the present situation, we must not lose sight of our objective.

There are three ways that that can be accomplished: Number (1) to send American troops into Cuba; Number (2) to place a strict military blockade around the island of Cuba; Number (3) to call upon the nations of Central and South America to take steps to insure that all arms from outside forces (both American and Russian) are kept out of Cuba.

You have rejected Number (1) for good and sufficient reasons (although this might have to be reconsidered). Number (2) has the same inherent problems as Number (1) although possibly not as acute. On the other hand, it is a drawn-out affair which would lead to a good deal of worldwide bitterness over an extended period of time.

The only way to carry it out successfully would be to be able to demonstrate to the governments of Central and South America that because of the MIG fighters, the tanks and equipment provided by the Communist bloc, that the whole hemisphere is in danger. From my limited knowledge of the situation I suppose it would be most difficult to get them to agree to concerted action.

As for Number 3 and to some extent, Number 2, if it was reported that one or two of Castroʼs MIGs attacked Guantanamo Bay and the United States made noises like this was an act of war and that we might very well have to take armed action ourselves, would it be possible to get the countries of Central and South America through OAS to take some action to prohibit the shipment of arms or ammunition from any outside force into Cuba? At the same time they could guarantee the territorial integrity of Cuba so that the Cuban government could not say that they would be at the mercy of the United States.

It seems to me that something along these lines is absolutely essential. Maybe this is not the way to carry it out but something forceful and determined must be done. Furthermore, serious attention must be given to this problem immediately and not wait for the situation in Cuba to revert back to a time of relative peace and calm with the U.S. having been beaten off with her tail between her legs.

What has been going on in Cuba in the last few days must also be a tremendous strain on Castro. It seems to me that this is the time to decide what our long-term policies are going to be and what will be the results of those policies. The time has come for a showdown for in a year or two years the situation will be vastly worse. If we donʼt want Russia to set up missile bases in Cuba, we had better decide now what we are willing to do to stop it.

158. Notes on Cabinet MeetingSource: Yale University, Bowles Papers, Box 392, Folder 154. Personal. Drafted by Bowles. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that the notes were written in May 1961. The Presidentʼs appointment book indicates that the meeting took place between 11 a.m. and noon. Those listed as participants included the President, the Vice President, Bowles, Dillon, McNamara, Attorney General Kennedy, Postmaster General Day, Udall, Freeman, Secretary of Labor Goldberg, Secretary of Commerce Gudeman, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Ribicoff, David Bell, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, John Macy, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, and Jerome Wiesner, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) Washington, April 20, 1961.

NOTES ON CUBAN CRISIS

Cabinet Meeting on Thursday, April 20th, the first day immediately after the collapse of the Cuban expedition became known.

I attended the Cabinet meeting in Ruskʼs absence and it was about as grim as any meeting I can remember in all my experience in government, which is saying a good deal.

The President was really quite shattered, and understandably so. Almost without exception, his public career had been a long series of successes, without any noteworthy set backs. Those disappointments which had come his way, such as his failure to get the nomination for Vice President in 1956 were clearly attributable to religion.

Here for the first time he faced a situation where his judgment had been mistaken, in spite of the fact that week after week of conferences had taken place before he gave the green light.

It was not a pleasant experience. Reactions around the table were almost savage, as everyone appeared to be jumping on everyone else. The only really coherent statement was by Arthur Goldberg, who said that while it was doubtful that the expedition was wise in the first place, the Administration should not have undertaken it unless it was prepared to see it through with United States troops if necessary.

At least his remarks had an inherent logic to them, although I could not agree under any circumstances to sending troops into Cuba—violating every treaty obligation we have.

The most angry response of all came from Bob Kennedy and also, strangely enough, from Dave Bell, who I had always assumed was a very reasonable individual.

The discussion simply rambled in circles with no real coherent thought. Finally after three-quarters of an hour the President got up and walked toward his office. I was so distressed at what I felt was a dangerous mood that I walked after him, stopped him, and told him I would like an opportunity to come into his office and talk the whole thing out.

Lyndon Johnson, Bob McNamara, and Bob Kennedy joined us. Bobby continued his tough, savage comments, most of them directed against the Department of State for reasons which are difficult for me to understand.

When I took exception to some of the more extreme things he said by suggesting that the way to get out of our present jam was not to simply double up on everything we had done, he turned on me savagely.

What worries me is that two of the most powerful people in this administration—Lyndon Johnson and Bob Kennedy—have no experience in foreign affairs, and they both realize that this is the central question of this period and are determined to be experts at it.

The problems of foreign affairs are complex, involving politics, economics and social questions that require both understanding of history and various world cultures.

When a newcomer enters the field and finds himself confronted by the nuances of international questions, he becomes an easy target for the military-CIA-paramilitary type answers which are often in specific logistical terms which can be added, subtracted, multiplied, or divided.

This kind of thinking was almost dominant in the conference and I found it most alarming. The President appeared the most calm, yet it was clear to see that he had been suffering an acute shock and it was an open question in my mind as to what his reaction would be.

All through the meeting which took place in the Presidentʼs office and which lasted almost a half hour, there was an almost frantic reaction for an action program which people would grab onto.

[Here follows the remainder of Bowlesʼ notes; see Document 166.]

159. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. Washington, April 20, 1961.

The President has asked that the Defense Department develop a plan for the overthrow of the Castro government by the application of U.S. military force. The plan should include: 1. An appraisal of the strength of the Cuban military forces. 2. An appraisal of the probable behavior of the Cuban civilian population during the period of military action. 3. An analysis of alternative programs for accomplishing the objective; e.g., a complete naval and air blockade vs. an armed invasion. 4. For the recommended program: a. A detailed statement of the U.S. forces required. b. A timetable and a description of the specific actions considered necessary to accomplish the objective. c. An estimate of the potential U.S. and Cuban casualties. d. An estimate of the time required to accomplish the action. e. A list of contingencies which we should be prepared to face during the action. f. A detailed statement of the U.S. air, ground, and sea forces available for action elsewhere in the world during the period of the Cuban operations, and an appraisal of the extent to which such forces could cope with potential military conflicts in Laos, South Viet-Nam, and Berlin.

The request for this study should not be interpreted as an indication that U.S. military action against Cuba is probable.

By what date may I expect to receive a draft of your report on this subject?

Robert S. McNamaraPrinted from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

160. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Coerr) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Department of State, ARA Files: Lot 62 D 24, Cuba—Misc. March-April 1961. Confidential. Washington, April 20, 1961. SUBJECT Todayʼs Developments Relating to Cuba

Cuban developments continue in the headlines. The Castro Government claims complete victory over the invading forces. The Revolutionary Council has announced that at the cost of tragic losses sustained by a holding-action unit, the bulk of its forces has fought its way into the Escambray and linked up with other Freedom Fighters there. This latter announcement is also being broadcast by a new radio station in the Escambray mountains.

There is no further word as to the fate of the invading forces defeated at Cochinos Bay.

World reaction and press comment, as reported by incoming cables, continue adverse. Nehru, Nasser, and others charge the US with responsibility for events in Cuba and for violation of the principle of non-intervention. Anti-US demonstrations are reported from many cities on both sides of the Iron Curtain. There has as yet been no serious loss of property or American lives. Latin American demonstrations have for the most part been carried out by Communist and pro-Communist groups, have not yet elicited any general response from the rest of the population and have been fairly effectively controlled by local security forces.

President Kennedy delivered a forceful speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. He made clear our sympathy for Cuban patriots struggling against a Cuban dictator, reminded listeners that we had not intervened, but warned “our restraint is not inexhaustible”.Kennedy further amplified the warning: “Should it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-interference merely conceals or excuses a policy of nonaction—if the nations of this Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration—then I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are the security of our Nation.” For text of the Presidentʼs address, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 304-306. In plain language he called upon the free nations of the Hemisphere to face up to their responsibilities. The Presidentʼs speech was most timely and useful and may be expected to provoke immediate and wide-spread reaction.

I am informed that IO will brief you fully on UN developments relating to Cuba.

At the OAS, discreet soundings were made as to the possibility of Council action appealing for humanitarian treatment of prisoners taken by the Castro regime. Little encouragement was received on this score, as it appeared inevitable that any such move would only lead instead to a wide-ranging discussion of the entire Cuban problem. Word is expected tomorrow as to whether or not the Secretary General of the OAS might himself undertake such action. Steps are also being taken to attempt discreetly to focus public attention upon the prisoners and to interest the International Red Cross and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on their behalf.An instruction was cabled today to the Consul General at Geneva to communicate with the International Red Cross regarding this matter. [Footnote in the source text.] The Human Rights Commission meets tomorrow at 10:30 am to discuss the possibility of a message to the Castro Government appealing on humanitarian grounds for information on battle casualties and prisoners and expressing the hope that international practices will be observed.

There are continuing indications of a wave of general repression in Cuba including the arrest and other harassment of US citizens. Confirmation is being sought of a Habana radio broadcast late today that Henry Raymont, UPI Bureau Chief there, had been executed.

161. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution; Exclusive. Repeated to CTG 81.8, COMCARIBSEAFRON, COMKWESTFOR, and COMNAVBASE GTMO. In a telephone conversation with Commander Tazewell Shepard on April 21 Admiral Burke indicated that this order originated with President Kennedy, who was “deeply anxious” to rescue CEF survivors. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) Washington, April 20, 1961, 7:46 p.m.

JCS 994569. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Dennison. Info RAdms Clark, Smith, McElroy and OʼDonnell from Gen Gray.

1. Following is in order to indicate continuing US support for the counter revolutionary committee and for a Free Cuba. 2. Take charge CEF ships and personnel and get them safely to Vi-eques. Navy on-scene commander can relay message to CEF ships via me. 3. Conduct destroyer patrol off Blue Beach tonight for possible evacuation of survivors and instruct CO he is authorized to ground his ship if it will facilitate mission. Use of amphib ship and craft authorized in addition to DD if desired. Repeat patrol tomorrow night approaching area within sight of land but outside gun range prior darkness. Provide air cover. Rules of engagement during patrols same as before. 4. Mallardʼs boss has directed CEF ships to divert to Vieques. They may require logistic support in addition to protection.

162. Editorial Note

According to a memorandum for the record prepared by Admiral Burke, Secretary of Defense McNamara met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Services on April 21, 1961, to assess the impact of the Bay of Pigs failure. McNamara noted that the outcome of the operation had been a shock to the government and to the allies of the United States. He anticipated that there would be recrimination and “a tendency to have off with the heads.” It was critical, he emphasized, for the military services to accept appropriate responsibility and to avoid backbiting. McNamara stated that there were important lessons to be learned from the exercise, and he noted that the President was going to establish a high-level committee to reexamine the entire operation and make recommendations. McNamara felt that one lesson to be drawn was that military operations should be run by military personnel. Another lesson, he felt, was that the government should never start anything unless it could be finished, or the government was willing to face the consequences of failure. And he felt that the United States had to develop a coherent national policy concerning indirect aggression.

In assessing the specific implications of the Bay of Pigs, McNamara stated that a plan for an invasion of Cuba would have to be drawn up, although he added that an invasion was “unlikely.” In the context of this plan, he noted that it was necessary to examine the type of air and naval blockade that would facilitate a fast invasion of Cuba, as well as the requirements necessary to a more deliberate invasion. General Lemnitzer observed that the daily U-2 flights over Cuba had been resumed, and he emphasized the importance of the information obtained. If the CIA lost its nerve as a result of the Bay of Pigs, Lemnitzer felt that the JCS should provide what support was necessary for the rebels in Cuba through Admiral Dennisonʼs command. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

163. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President KennedySource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, China-Cuba, 1961. Top Secret. A note on the source text reads: “For: Secretary McNamara and Mr. Gilpatric Only.” Washington, April 21, 1961. SUBJECT The Problem We Face

1. Right now the greatest problem we face is not to have the whole of our foreign policy thrown off balance by what we feel and what we do about Cuba itself. We have suffered a serious setback; but that setback will be trivial compared to the consequences of not very soon regaining momentum along the lines which we have begun in the past three months.

[Here follows Rostowʼs assessment of the existing lines of U.S. foreign policy and his recommendations concerning reestablishing initiative and momentum.]

9. As for Cuba itself, I have little background and little wisdom. There are, evidently, three quite different threats which Cuba poses, which are now mixed up in our minds and in our policy. There is the military question of Communist arms and of a potential Soviet offensive base in Cuba. If we are not immediately to invade Cuba ourselves, we must decide whether we shall permit Castro, so long as he remains in power, to acquire defensive arms; and we must decide what the touchstones are between defensive arms and the creation of a Communist military base threatening to the U.S. itself. I assume that evidence of the latter we would take virtually as a cause of war, although we should bear in mind what the placing of missiles in Turkey looks like in the USSR. Second, there is the question of Cuba as a base for active infiltration and subversion in the rest of Latin America. Here, evidently, we must try to do more than we are now doing, and we should seek active hemispheric collaboration—wherever we can find it—in gathering and exchanging information on the networks involved and on counter-measures. This is, however, essentially a covert, professional operation. The more we talk about it—the more we overtly seek to pressure Latin American nations to join with us—the less likely we shall be able to get their cooperation in doing anything useful. Third, there is the simple ideological problem. Cuba is a Communist state, repressing every value we treasure. But on that ground alone we are prevented by our treaty obligations from acting directly and overtly. On the other hand, we are overtly also committed beyond sympathy to the support of those Cubans fighting for freedom. Here, how we proceed—what is to be done overtly and covertly—is a most searching question. I have no advice to give except this: Let there first be a first-class and careful intelligence evaluation of the situation inside Cuba, of Castroʼs control methods; of the nature and degree of dissidence of various groups; of recent trends and their pace; and an assessment of vulnerabilities.

10. As I said to the Attorney General the other day, when you are in a fight and knocked off your feet, the most dangerous thing to do is to come out swinging wildly. Clearly we must cope with Castro in the next several years—perhaps sooner, if he overplays his hand and gives us an acceptable legal and international basis. But short of that, we must think again clearly and cooly in the light of the facts as they are and are likely to be. We may emerge with a quite different approach to the Castro problem after such an exercise, or we may proceed with more of the same. But let us do some fresh homework.

11. In the meanwhile, what we must do is to build the foundation and the concepts, in Latin America, the North Atlantic Alliance, and the UN, which would permit us, next time round, to deal with the Cuban problem in ways which would not so grievously disrupt the rest of our total strategy.

[Here follows Rostowʼs recommendation that the President make a speech outlining “urgent action items” at home and abroad.]

164. Editorial Note

On April 21, 1961, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly completed debate on the Cuban agenda item and considered the several draft resolutions submitted during the debate. (For summaries of these resolutions, see footnotes 1–4, Document 148.) The Representatives of Romania and the Soviet Union elected not to press for a vote on their respective draft resolutions. The seven-power draft resolution, submitted by Latin American members and supported by the United States, was then adopted by a vote of 61 to 27 with 10 absentions. The Mexican draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 42 to 31, with 25 absentions. (U.N. doc. A/4744, April 21, 1961) In its report to the General Assembly on April 21, the First Committee recommended adoption of both draft resolutions. (Ibid.) The General Assembly acted on the report at its 995th plenary meeting, also on April 21. A compromise was effected under which the seven-power draft resolution was adopted, minus the key operative paragraph that would have referred the matter for action to the Organization of American States. (U.N. doc. A/RES/1616 (XV)) The Mexican draft resolution was not adopted.

165. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Limited Distribution; Exclusive. Repeated to CTG 81.8. In a telephone conversation with Dennison on April 22, Burke explained that this telegram was cleared by McNamara and the President, and that the President was directing the rescue operation personally. (Transcript of a telephone conversation, April 22; ibid.) Washington, April 21, 1961, 9:19 p.m.

JCS 994676. Bumpy Road. Exclusive for Adm Dennison and Adm Clark from Gen Gray. CIA advises that there are 3 UDT men with complete gear aboard Marsopa.Code name for the Blagar. They request they be introduced nite of 22nd April in vicinity of burned out patrol craft in effort to make contact with CEF personnel.At 5:47 p.m. on April 21, the JCS informed CINCLANT that information had just been received that several hundred CEF personnel had seized a Cuban patrol boat and had run it aground on the west side of the Bay of Pigs while trying to escape. Dennison was instructed to search for and protect the CEF personnel on the patrol boat. (JCS telegram 994644 to CINCLANT, April 21; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) Shortly thereafter Burke informed General Gray that he had just learned that the patrol boat had been sighted, but it was burned out and no CEF survivors were visible. (Transcript of a telephone conversation, April 21; ibid.) The UDT personnel plus any CEF personnel should be retrieved nite of 23 April. Suggest provision for additional small boats and rafts on nite of 23 April in case CEF group is contacted. Request comments so that CIA may be advised.

166. Notes on the 478th Meeting of the National Security CouncilSource: Yale University, Bowles Papers, Box 392, Folder 154. Personal. Drafted by Bowles in May. Washington, April 22, 1961.

NOTES ON CUBAN CRISIS

[Here follow 3-1/2 pages of Bowlesʼ notes; see Document 158.]

NSC Meeting, Saturday, April 22nd

There were some thirty-five people at the NSC meeting on Cuba. Again Bob Kennedy was present, and took the lead as at the previous meeting, slamming into anyone who suggested that we go slowly and try to move calmly and not repeat previous mistakes.

The atmosphere was almost as emotional as the Cabinet meeting two days earlier, the difference being that on this occasion the emphasis was on specific proposals to harass Castro.

On two or three occasions I suggested that the greatest mistake we could make would be to pit the United States with its 180 million people in a contest against a Cuban dictator on an island of 6 million people. I stressed that while we are already in a bad situation, it would be a mistake for us to assume that it could not disintegrate further and an almost sure way to lose ground was to reach out in ways that would almost surely be ineffective and which would tend to create additional sympathy for Castro in his David and Goliath struggle against the United States.

These comments were brushed aside brutally and abruptly by the various fire eaters who were present. I did think, however, that the faces of a few people around the table reflected some understanding of the views I was trying to present, notably Dick Goodwin, Ted Sorensen (which is surprising), Arthur Schlesinger, and above all Jerry Wiesner.

The President limited himself largely to asking questions—questions, however, which led in one direction.

I left the meeting with a feeling of intense alarm, tempered somewhat with the hope that this represented largely an emotional reaction of a group of people who were not used to setbacks or defeats and whose pride and confidence had been deeply wounded.

However, I felt again the great lack of moral integrity which I believe is the central guide in dealing with tense and difficult questions, particularly when the individuals involved are tired, frustrated, and personally humiliated.

If every question in the world becomes an intellectual exercise on a totally pragmatic basis, with no reference to moral considerations, it may be that we can escape disaster, but it will certainly be putting the minds of the White House group to a test when it becomes necessary to add up the components, large and small on the plus or minus side of a ledger, and when the minds that are attempting to do this are tired, uneasy, and unsure, the values and the arithmetic are unlikely to reflect wise courses.

[Here follows the remainder of Bowlesʼ notes; see Document 184.]

167. Record of Actions at the 478th Meeting of the National Security CouncilSource: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95. Top Secret. A note on the record of action indicates that the President approved the record on April 24. The time of the meeting is taken from the Presidentʼs appointment book. (Kennedy Library) Washington, April 22, 1961, 10 a.m.–noon.

The President presided at this meeting. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the actions below. The Attorney General; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the Deputy Under Secretary of State; the Counselor, Department of State; the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the Executive Secretary, National Aeronautics and Space Council; General Maxwell Taylor; General David Gray, U. S. Army; the Deputy Director (Plans), Central Intelligence Agency; the Special Counsel to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Science and Technology; Mr. Bromley Smith, National Security Council; and the Acting Executive Secretary, National Security Council, attended the meeting. The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Adviser to the President on Disarmament participated in NSC Action No. 2408. The Deputy to the Adviser to the President on Disarmament and the Deputy Director, U. S. Disarmament Administration, attended the meeting for NSC Action No. 2408.

2406. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba

a. Noted the Presidentʼs view that there should be no further discussion outside the Government of the meaning of recent landings in Cuba, since the object now is to move forward.

b. Noted the Presidentʼs view that U.S. citizens in Cuba should be shortly advised again of the view of this Government that they should leave Cuba, and that at an appropriate time publicity should be given to this advice.

c. Noted the Presidentʼs view that U.S. assistance to active guerrillas in Cuba should, for the present, be extended only where there is a moral obligation, or to assist in survival or evacuation. Guerrillas with whom the United States may be in contact should be advised to lie low for the present. This directive should, however, be constantly reviewed in the light of the changing internal situation in Cuba.

d. Discussed the training of Cuban soldiers, and agreed that the question of possible forms of large-scale, open enlistment of Cuban soldiers should be studied by the Departments of State and Defense.After the NSC meeting, Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr sent to McNamara a copy of the discussion paper that he used during the meeting to elaborate on this proposal. Stahr proposed the creation of a “Freedom Brigade” in the U.S. Army composed of volunteers from among Cuban refugees in the United States. After basic training, the unit would be given Special Forces type training. The object would be to create a highly trained, flexible force that could be used for such purposes as guerrilla or unconventional operations in Cuba to spearhead a U.S. invasion of Cuba and to undertake occupation responsibilities in the post-combat phase of an invasion. The assumption was that if U.S. forces did intervene in Cuba, they should “get in and get out” quickly and leave occupation responsibilities to refugee groups such as a “Freedom Brigade,” which would underpin any government that the United States might recognize. (Memorandum from Stahr to McNamara, April 22; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive)) McNamara sent a memorandum to Nitze on April 22 in which he instructed ISA, on the basis of the actions taken at the NSC meeting, to: “Explore with the State Department the political and military implications of recruiting and training volunteer Cuban nationals as a part of the U. S. Army. The Cubans might be organized into a ʼFreedom Brigadeʼ or alternatively they could be integrated into existing units.” (Ibid., Nitze Cuba File)

Action Memo sent to State and DefenseAll of the action memoranda listed in this record were issued on April 25 to the agencies indicated as National Security Action Memoranda. The titles of the memoranda requiring action were as follows: NSAM No. 42 “Assistance to Cuban Refugees”, NSAM No. 43 “Training to Cuban Nationals”,NSAM No. 44 “Caribbean Security Agency”, NSAM No. 45 “Coverage of Castro Activities in the United States”, NSAM No. 46 “Attitude of Various Governments during the Cuban Crisis”, and NSAM No. 47 “Soviet Assist-ance to Cuba”. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series)

e. Discussed the support of refugees, and noted the Presidentʼs directive that levels of support should be reported to him with recommendations for their improvement, and his desire that such support should be open and overt. The President also directed that the adjustment of Cubans to life in the United States should be given particular attention by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

Action Memo sent to HEW and CIA

f. Noted that an interdepartmental study group would be considering an increase in U. S. assistance to Latin American countries in matters relating to internal security and counter-guerrilla activities, and agreed that a representative of the Department of Justice should be added to this group.

g. Noted the Presidentʼs desire that there be prompt recommendations with regard to trading with Cuba from the Departments of State and the Treasury.

h. Noted the Presidentʼs directive that the possibility be studied of creating a Caribbean Security Agency, to which we and the other Caribbean countries would contribute forces, and to whom any nation attacked could appeal for help.

Action Memo sent to State and Defense

i. Noted that the Attorney General and the Director of Central Intelligence would examine the possibility of stepping up coverage of Castro activities in the United States.

Action Memo sent to Justice and CIA

j. Noted that the Secretary of State had established an Operations Group in the Department under Ambassador Achilles, who would be responsible for all action with respect to the Cuban situation.

k. Noted the Presidentʼs request that he and the Vice President receive from the Department of State prompt information as to which governments have been helpful in various parts of the Cuban crisis, and which unhelpful.

Action Memo sent to State

l. Noted the Presidentʼs desire that a prompt and up-to-date report on Soviet assistance to Cuba be furnished by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency to the Director, U. S. Information Agency, and the Department of State.

Action Memo sent to Defense and CIA

168. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke)Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Confidential. Washington, April 22, 1961.

In accordance with the discussions at todayʼs NSC meeting, please have J-2 move at once to coordinate with CIA in the prompt presentation of the material exposing the degree of Soviet Bloc military support to Cuba, and if possible Bloc participation in recent military actions. The object of this project should be to produce the most forceful possible public exposure on this matter. If some sacrifice of intelligence sources should be required to make the presentation effective, this could be considered. This project should be completed by Wednesday, the 26th.

Robert S. McNamara

169. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret. Drafted on April 23 in the CIA. The Taylor committee, composed of Taylor as chairman, Robert Kennedy, Dulles, and Burke, was established by President Kennedy on April 22 following a 10 a.m. meeting between the President and Taylor. Taylor recorded in his memoirs that the President called him in New York on April 21 and asked him to come to Washington to discuss the situation growing out of the Bay of Pigs problem. Kennedy asked Taylor to take leave of his responsibilities as President of the Lincoln Center and conduct an investigation into the causes of the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation. The Presidentʼs instructions to Taylor, contained in an April 22 letter, were “to take a close look at all our practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activities which fall short of outright war. I believe we need to strengthen our work in this area. In the course of your study, I hope that you will give special attention to the lessons which can be learned from recent events in Cuba.” (Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 180-184) Washington, April 22, 1961. SUBJECT First Meeting of General Maxwell Taylorʼs Board of Inquiry on Cuban Operations Conducted by CIAThe subject line of the original draft of this memorandum reads: First Meeting of the Green Study Group. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Box 12, Memoranda of Meetings) The group was usually referred to as the Cuba Study Group.

TIME AND PLACE

1400-1800 hours, 22 April 1961, Quarters Eye

PARTICIPANTS Study Group Members General Maxwell D. Taylor Attorney General Robert Kennedy Admiral Arleigh Burke Allen W. Dulles Department of Defense Major General David W. Gray Colonel C. W. Shuler Commander Mitchell CIA Personnel General C.P. Cabell C. Tracy Barnes Colonel J.C. King Jacob D. Esterline [name not declassified] Colonel Jack Hawkins 1. After discussion of procedural matters, it was decided that all papers and documents stemming from the inquiry would be retained by General Maxwell Taylor. Colonel J.C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, was designated recorder of the first meeting. 2. Mr. Dulles, in his opening remarks, cited the document which authorized CIA to conduct paramilitary operations. This document, NSC 5412,NSC 5412, March 15, 1954, was the National Security Council directive on covert operations. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Files of the Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, NSC 5412/2) The oversight committee for covert operations was, therefore, referred to as the 5412 Committee. was described as one of the most secret documents in the U. S. Government. Mr. Dulles said that under this authority CIA is directed to engage in activities such as the Cuban operation under the general supervision of the National Security Council. General Taylor indicated that he wanted a copy of this document to be made available to him for his study. General Gray indicated he had a copy and would give it to General Taylor. 3. Colonel King was then asked to describe Agency activities on the Cuban problem prior to the establishment of the Task Force, i.e., Branch 4 of the Western Hemisphere Division on 18 January 1960. In his remarks Colonel King stated that in late 1958 CIA made two attempts (each approved by the Department of State) to block Castroʼs ascension to power. The first attempt was made in November 1958 when contact was established with Justo Carrillo and the Montecristi Group. The second attempt was made on or about the 9th of December 1958 when former Ambassador William D. Pawley, supported by the CIA Chief of Station in Havana, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Colonel King, approached Batista and proposed the establishment of a Junta to whom Batista would turn over the reins of government. Colonel King was queried by the Attorney General as to the approximate date that the Agency concluded that Castro was unacceptable to the U.S. politically, if not actually a Communist, and when this conclusion reached the Secretary of State and the President. Colonel King commented that there were reports as early as June or July 1958 during the period that sailors from Guantanamo were held by Castro forces which indicated beyond a reas-onable doubt that the U.S. was up against an individual who could not be expected to be acceptable to U.S. Government interests. Admiral Burke also made reference to the fact that he had been in at least one meeting with Colonel King on or about 29 December 1958 in which officials of the Department of State, except for Under Secretary Robert Murphy, appeared to feel that Castro was politically compatible to U.S. objectives. Considerable discussion involving all members of the Investigating Committee followed on this point with the Attorney General requesting assurance that Agency reports at that time reached the highest authority. 4. Reference was made to the first few days of January 1959 in Havana when a primary target of the advance guard was the Communist files in BRAC. 5. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reported that on 21 September 1959 he assumed the responsibility for planning for potential Agency action in contingency situations that might evolve in Latin America. He stated that this was a staff position that conducted liaison with existing desks in an attempt to identify the existence or non-exist-ence of basic information which was an essential preliminary to the planning of clandestine operations within any given country. Most of the countries of Central America (Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador) were identified as potential contingency problems because of the instability of their governments. The Isle of Hispaniola—Haiti and the Dominican Republic—was a high priority target. In South America, Paraguay, Bolivia and Argentina were included among the countries which required review and potential action. Cuba, quite naturally, emerged as the number one target for contingency planning. Because of the national policy affecting Latin America, it was ascertained early in the survey that the operating desks did not have available in collated fashion the type of information that was required for planning purposes for covert operations. As a result of this discovery, the entire intelligence community was given a requirement to produce certain information on the various countries involved with special emphasis on Cuba as rapidly as possible. In time, a three-volume study was produced which included basic intelligence, political and psychological information, operational data, geographical information, selected potential areas for clandestine operations, and related operational data. 6.

The Cuban situation continued to deteriorate rapidly and in December 1959, it was decided that CIA needed to consider urgently the activation of two programs: A. The selection, recruitment and careful evaluation (including medical, psychological, psychiatric and polygraph) of approximately thirty-five (35) Cubans, preferably with previous military experience, for an intensive training program which would qualify them to become instructors in various paramilitary skills, including leadership, sabotage, communications, etc. B. The instructor cadre would in turn, in some third country in Latin America, conduct clandestinely a training of additional Cuban recruits who would be organized into small teams similar to the U.S. Army Special Forces concept, and infiltrated with communicators, into areas of Cuba where it had been determined numbers of dissidents existed who required specialized skills and leadership and military supplies.

At this time, the basic Agency concept of operations was that the members of the instructor cadre would never be committed to Cuban soil. The members of the paramilitary leadership groups would be introduced covertly into the target area.

7. As a result of this fundamental decision [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] went [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in mid-December 1959 to survey certain isolated areas [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to determine the potential usefulness of these areas for the training of the instructor cadre. In addition to the survey, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] held meetings with CINCARIB Lt. Gen. Ridgely Gaither, and CGUSARCARIB Major Gen. Charles Dasher, to familiarize them with the basic Agency thinking in the Cuban matter. 8. Mr. Esterline outlined the organization of the Task Force and the steps which led to the paper presented to the President on 14 March 1960 and approved 17 March 1960,For text, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. VI, pp. 850–851. which was the first authorization to mount an operation to get rid of Castro. General Taylor requested the original T/O of that Task Force. He also requested other T/Oʼs, including the present one, which will illustrate the buildup of the Force. 9. Mr. Bissell discussed the 17th of March approval. The concept then presented persisted for approximately 10 months. There were four major courses: A. Creation of a political opposition. This took 4 to 5 months and during that period it was found less and less possible to rely on the Cuban politicians. B. Mass communications to the Cuban people. C. Covert intelligence and action originating inside Cuba. D. The building of an adequate paramilitary force outside Cuba which called for cadres of leaders. 10. The original budget did not provide for the mounting of an organization of the type which eventually developed. 11. General Taylor then requested that the exact procedure followed in the clearance in this basic paper of 17 March 1960 be described. 12. Through 1958, 1959, 1960 and so far in 1961, weekly meetings have been held with the Assistant Secretary of State, his deputy, Special Assistant, and a representative from the Office of Special Operations in State, for the purpose of briefing them on the highlights of intelligence. Since the approval of the paper, they have also been kept informed in general terms of major operational aspects. 13. Mr. Bissell said that the language of the basic paper was general as we did not know then how large a force would be built up. During the autumn months of 1960, the military force took shape and the original concept went through subtle changes. 14. In June 1960, the FRD (Frente Revolucionario Democratico) came into being. This was one of the first orders of business. It was needed as an umbrella for the recruiting and training of a nucleus of a military force. The thinking then was that this military group would be used in small teams and serve as a catalyst for uprisings in Cuba. 15. The Attorney General then asked was it conceived that Castro could be overthrown with a catalyst force at that time. Mr. Bissell replied that the original concept was to generate various pressures on Castro including this force, and it was expected that the classic guerrilla pattern would be followed. The Attorney General then asked what step should we have taken at that time if we had known what we know now, and did we have any policy then. Mr. Dulles replied we did have a policy, which was to overthrow Castro in one way or another. 16. General Taylor asked if the plan was based on capabilities or on what we actually needed, to which Mr. Dulles replied in the negative. Mr. Bissell said we thought we could build up guerrilla resistance through teams being infiltrated to groups inside, which would lead to the formation of a large enough group to facilitate air drops of arms and other materiel. 17. Mr. Esterline said we had a navy of sorts which ran operations for the ex/infiltration of personnel and the introduction of arms and other materiel with better than 50% success. The buildup of guerrillas did not occur as expected and the number of successful drops was very low. This led to the further expansion of our military force to the point that it had gotten beyond the covert state about 1 November 1960. 18. General Taylor requested the date that military training began. He was informed that thirty (30) selected leaders were sent to a jungle area [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in July 1960. These were all recruited and carefully screened by the FRD. 19. General Taylor asked if maximum effort was made to raise manpower. Mr. Esterline answered that at first we were very selective and the troops came in at a trickle. Later they came in at a greater rate than we could handle. Mr. Esterline described the method of selection and screening. General Taylor asked if figures were available as to how many ex-officers of the Cuban army were recruited and as complete a breakdown as possible of personnel. 20. Mr. Barnes stated that beginning about mid-November 1960, there were weekly discussions in the Special Group. Mr. Dulles said recommendations from the Task Force were considered at these meetings. Special Group references show that on 16 November 1960, the changing concept of the operation was noted by Under Secretary Livingston Merchant. By November 1960, it was recognized that guerrilla warfare operations in the Escambray were not going well; we were having difficulty with air drops and some change in approach was needed. 21. Mr. Bissell said that one of the problems at this time was the Department of Stateʼs concern about tainting Guatemala and Nicaragua if the size was augmented. The Agency was asked to consider with-drawing from Guatemala and setting up an American base. After further consideration, the use of a base in the continental U.S. was ruled out. 22. In answer to General Taylorʼs question as to what bottle-necks existed, it was stated that there were no bases immediately available for the training of large numbers of the troops and that recruits came in at a trickle until the political base was broadened. 23. The Attorney General asked what was the purpose of a Strike Force, to which Mr. Bissell replied they would administer a strike which could lead to a general uprising or a formation of larger guerrilla units in the mountains with which dissidents could join forces. The Strike Force was not in repudiation of the guerrilla concept but in addition to it. 24. Col. Hawkins stated there never was a clear-cut decision in his mind policy-wise to use a Strike Force. 25. Mr. Bissell read excerpts from a memorandum of 8 December 1960 of a meeting of the Special Group where a changing concept had been presented by various members of the Task Force. General Taylor said that all members of the board want a copy of this paper.Not found. 26. Among the items requested in this memorandum, officers from the Special Forces for the training of the Strike Force were authorized, the use of an air strip at Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua was approved, supply missions were approved, and on Tuesday, 19 April, the use of American contract pilots was approved. Records are in General Lansdaleʼs office. 27. General Taylor asked what discussions there were with President Eisenhower during this period and requested copies of any existing memoranda. 28. Mr. Dulles said that the only minutes of the meetings of the 5412 Group were prepared and kept by CIA. These could be consulted by authorized individuals of other departments. 29. Mr. Bissell quoted from the minutes of a 5412 meeting where doubt was expressed that a covert force could succeed and consequently overt action might be required. About 1 January 1961, recruiting was greatly stepped up. 30. In reply to General Taylorʼs question as to when did we reach concept number three, Mr. Esterline said about 1 March 1961. In January and February 1961, JCS teams were sent to the camps under special arrangement and furnished the necessary instructor force for training of a larger strike force. 31. The Board agreed that one set of papers only would be kept, these to be by General Taylor. Documents desired are:

[Here follows a list of the documents requested by the committee.]

170. Editorial Note

On April 22, 1961, Chairman Khrushchev wrote to President Kennedy in reply to Kennedyʼs letter of April 18 concerning Cuba (attachment to Document 130). In an 8-page letter, Khrushchev reiterated and expanded upon the charge of aggression against Cuba that he had leveled against the United States in his letter to Kennedy on April 18 (see Document 117). It had been proved beyond doubt, he stated, “that it was precisely the United States which prepared the intervention, financed its arming and transported the gangs of mercenaries that invaded the territory of Cuba.” Khrushchev dismissed Kennedyʼs concern for “freedom” in Cuba as in fact concern on the part of the United States to reestablish control over the Cuban economy, and he again pledged Soviet support for the revolutionary government of Fidel Castro. As he had done in his previous letter, Khrushchev implied that the Soviet Union would retaliate against U.S. aggression in Cuba by menacing United States interests elsewhere: “there can be no stable place in the world if anywhere war is aflame.” He stated, however, that the Soviet Union did not seek advantages or privileges in Cuba. “We have no bases in Cuba, and we do not intend to establish any.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspond-ence: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, 1961-1964, Special US-USSR File, 1961) For text of the letter, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume VI, pages 10–16.

The Department of State issued a statement on April 22 in response to the letter from Khrushchev that day. The Department dismissed the letter as unworthy of further reply: “The President will not be drawn into an extended public debate with the Chairman on the basis of this latest exposition of the Communist distortion of the basic concepts of the rights of man.” (Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1961, page 663)

171. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts in Latin AmericaSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-2361. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Berle and cleared in L by Chayes and by Rusk. Repeated to Ciudad Trujillo. Washington, April 23, 1961, 3:58 p.m.

1661. Re Depcirtel 1662.In circular telegram 1662 to all posts, the Department provided background information for high-level official discussion relating to the Bay of Pigs operation. The tenor of the information was that it was a Cuban operation in inspiration and personnel, with some official and private U.S. support. (Ibid.) Take early occasion to discuss with highest authorities available following problems flowing from Cuban situation:

US deeply concerned over attempts of Sino-Soviet bloc to undermine free institutions everywhere. As new Administration has made amply clear it places maximum emphasis on this Hemisphere and its accelerated development in freedom. Unfortunately Hemisphere now facing unparalleled threat. US now considers dominance Castro regime by Sino-Soviet bloc established beyond possibility reasonable doubt by following facts:

Khrushchevʼs public message to President,See Document 170. disclosure Communist supplied arms and planes in large quantities, known presence of at least 300 bloc technicians including almost certainly military personnel, imposition of totalitarian methods in all branches of economic cultural life, calibration bloc and Commie apparatus in all parts of world with Castro regimeʼs interests. Effect is to build up formidable armed power center in Hemisphere whose hostile attitude towards all other Hemisphere governments is openly proclaimed by regimeʼs speeches and propaganda.

US now considers situation that of intrusion of extra-continental power into Hemisphere menacing Hemisphere peace and security and calling for measures of Hemispheric defense, defense of neighboring countries threatened and conceivably of self-defense of US.

Hemispheric defense matter for consideration under Rio Treaty and other Inter-American procedures but defense of threatened countries or of US may be subject of unilateral or bilateral action or group agreement between countries involved. In this case if OAS fails to take multilateral action or authorize action by one or more powers those governments threatened or in need of defense or prepared assume responsibility implied in obligations to oppose extra-continental aggression may act on their own singly or in group. Distinction between “intervention” in internal affairs of another State and defense against widening area of domination by extra-Hemispheric powers is vital one.

We plan going forward with vigorous preparations for Alliance for Progress meeting and implementation but clearly Alliance can be implemented only by free men in free Hemisphere.

Kindly obtain and report views of government to which accredited and get feeling regarding either (1) meetings of Foreign Ministers or (2) special session OAS or (3) organization consultation Rio Treaty under Article 6 on ground capture and use of Castro government by bloc threatens security of American states and peace of Americas.

FYI. Sentiment of several Latin American Ambassadors here suggests their governments hope for and would approve extremely vigorous action by US. Report promptly as our line of action will be decided quickly. Dept will carry on parallel conversations with Ambassadors here.The Department sent out another circular telegram on April 24 expressing concern over the continued transit of the territory of countries friendly to the United States by Soviet bloc aircraft en route to Havana. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-2461) End FYI.

Rusk

172. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. Also sent to Rusk and Dulles. Washington, April 24, 1961. SUBJECT Notes on Cuba Policy

Herewith, as promised, some notes on a possible approach to the problem of Cuba. You may wish to consider these tentative notions as you develop your own views in coming days.

1. The Approach. The line of approach suggested has these two characteristics: a. it would deal separately with each of the five separate threatening dimensions of the problem represented by Castro. b. it would deal with these problems in ways consistent with—and, if possible—reinforcing to our world-wide commitments and, especially, to our relations with other Latin American states. 2.

The Five Threats. The argument begins by identifying these five threats to us represented by the Castro regime. a. it might join with the USSR in setting up an offensive air or missile base. b. it might build up sufficient conventional military strength to trigger an arms race in the hemisphere and threaten the independence of other Latin American nations. c. it might develop its covert subversive network in ways which would threaten other Latin American nations from within. d. its ideological contours are a moral and political offense to us; and we are committed, by one means or another, to remove that offense, including our commitment to the Cuban refugees among us. e. its ideological contours and success may tend to inflame disruptive forces in the rest of Latin America, accentuating existing economic, social, and political tensions which we, in any case, confront.

Notes on possible lines of action towards each follow.

3. The Threat of an Offensive Base. Following the opening in Khru-shchevʼs latest note,See Document 170. Thompson should be instructed, at an early but cooler moment, to tell Gromyko: we note with satisfaction the Soviet commitment to forego an offensive base in Cuba; that, in line with the Presidentʼs speech to the newspaper publishers,See footnote 1, Document 160. this is one of the minimum conditions for world stability. A further action on this threat is noted in paragraph 4, below. 4.

The Threat of an Arms Build-up. An OAS meeting should be called soon, but after careful diplomatic preparation. The objective would be to achieve common assertion of the following propositions: a. The constructive tasks of this Hemisphere—symbolized by the Alliance for Progress—are such that we cannot afford to divert excessive resources to arms, picking up here from the proposal of Alessandri for hemispheric arms limitation. b. We are not prepared to see extra-hemispheric military forces emplaced in the Western Hemisphere.

On the basis of such declarations, the OAS would immediately mount arrangements for: hemispheric arms limitation; cooperative military arrangements to cope with any military extension of Castroʼs power; a demand that Castro accept arms limitation appropriate to the size of his country, under the common rules of the game; an assertion that the hemisphere will jointly act to prevent the creation of a foreign military base or other form of intrusion into the hemisphere.

If Castro failed to play, we would move towards a selective OAS blockade of Cuba, designed to prevent arms shipments to him by sea, if not by air.

5. The Threat of the Castro and Other Communist Networks. Quite independent of the OAS actions suggested under 4, above, we should begin covert cooperation with Latin American states to build up knowledge of the Communist network and to develop common counter-measures. Latin American governments will be able to work with us seriously to the extent that the effort is not made an overt political issue. Moreover, this is mainly a professional, not a political, job. 6.

The Ideological Threat of the Castro Regime Itself. Here the first step is to make a fresh analysis, on the basis of all the rich intelligence available to us, of the vulnerabilities of the Castro regime. This involves two things. First, a detailed assessment of the Cuban order of battle; of Castroʼs control mechanism; of attitudes of key individuals located at strategic points in the regime; of class and regional attitudes towards the regime and recent and foreseeable trends in those attitudes. We need a map of the cohesive forces and tensions within the Castro system. Second, we require a systematic analysis of various alternative means of exploiting in our interest the weaknesses of the regime that lie within our present capabilities or capabilities that might be developed.

It is possible that we shall conclude that an invasion of one sort or another is the only way to unseat the regime; but alternative forms of action may emerge. In any case, it is essential that we think again before acting in the old grooves.

7. The Threat of Castroism in Other Latin American States. The roots of Castroism lie in Latin American poverty, social inequality, and that form of xenophobic nationalism which goes with a prior history of inferiority on the world scene. The vulnerability of the Latin American populations to this form of appeal will depend on the pace of economic growth; the pace at which social inequality is reduced; and the pace at which the other Latin American nations move towards what they regard as dignified partnership with the U.S. What is required here is a radical acceleration and raising of sights in the programs being launched within the Alliance for Progress. 8. A Contingency Plan. We do not know what Castroʼs policy towards the U.S. will be; nor do we know what Soviet policy towards Cuba will be. A situation may arise at any moment when it will be required in the national interest to eliminate that regime by U.S. force. A fully developed contingency plan is evidently required. 9. The Ottawa Speech. If we can develop and agree a new line of approach to the Cuban problem in coming days, one possible occasion for suggesting some of its elements might be the Presidentʼs address in Ottawa, scheduled (I believe) for 17 May. This would be particularly appropriate if we propose to induce Canada to join in the OAS. Other occasions, however, could easily be found; and it is, of course, essential that we make various soundings in the Hemisphere before committing ourselves to this course, notably those outlined under paragraphs 4 and 5. 10. A Final Point. In two of the four areas where we inherited Communist enclaves of power in the Free World on January 20, we have, initially, not done terribly well. Laos, at best, will yield in the short run a muddy and weak Free World position; in Cuba our first effort at a solution failed. There is building up a sense of frustration and a perception that we are up against a game we canʼt handle. This frustration and simple anger could lead us to do unwise things or exert scarce national effort and resources in directions which would yield no significant results, while diverting us from our real problems. There is one area where success against Communist techniques is conceivable and where success is desperately required in the Free World interest. That area is Viet-Nam. A maximum effort—military, economic, political, and diplomatic—is required there; and it is required urgently.

It is not simple or automatic that we can divert anxieties, frustrations, and anger focussed on a place 90 miles off our shores to a place 7,000 miles away. On the other hand, I believe that the acute domestic tension over Cuba can be eased in the short run if we can get the OAS to move with us along the lines suggested here; and a clean-cut success in Viet-Nam would do much to hold the line in Asia while permitting us—and the world—to learn how to deal with indirect aggression.

In the end—given our kind of society—we must learn to deal overtly with major forms of covert Communist aggression. And we must teach the Free World how to do it. The combination of the suggested approaches to Cuba and Viet-Nam could help.On April 26, Paul Nitze sent a memorandum to McNamara discussing the Cuban aspects of Rostowʼs April 24 memorandum. He concluded: “The suggestions which have merit are the proposed actions (a) to quietly build up the internal capabilities of Latin American countries, (b) to develop all possible intelligence on the Castro regime, (c) to exploit this intelligence, (d) to develop a contingency plan, and (e) to think again before acting in the old grooves.” The suggestions that he felt were of doubtful merit were: “(a) to deal separately with individual dimensions of the Castro problem, (b) to make consistency with our other policies a criterion of action against Cuba, and (c) to make public statements to the Soviets and to the world indicating the approach we intend to take toward Cuba.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive))

173. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Secret. Prepared by Colonel Hawkins. Washington, April 24, 1961. SUBJECT Factors which Hampered Preparations for and Conduct of Effective Paramilitary Operations (Cuba)On May 5 Hawkins drafted a 48-page memorandum for the record that detailed the background and development of the Bay of Pigs operation. A copy is in Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 1, Area Activity-Western Hemisphere-Cuba. 1. The following factors tended to limit the effectiveness of paramilitary operations: a. Lack of clear-cut, detailed policy directives, in writing, from proper governmental authority. (The March 17 directiveAn apparent reference to the program of covert action against Cuba approved by President Eisenhower on March 17, 1960. was general in nature. Additional written directives should have been issued from time to time setting forth in detail concept, missions, objectives and authorized procedures. Verbal instructions do not suffice in matters of great import.) b. Slowness of governmental machinery in resolving policy questions once presented. (For example, two and a half months were requested to obtain the services of Special Forces training teams after original request by the Paramilitary Staff. Results of Special Group meetings were often inconclusive. Proceedings were verbal and minutes were recorded by individual departments. This led to misunderstanding. The Group itself did not have authority to resolve major questions, and there were no written policy directives forthcoming after meetings were conducted.) c. Over Centralization of Control. (Examples: The Special Group had to be consulted before launching each over-flight mission. Tactical headquarters were in Washington, whereas it has long been recognized that tactical operations must be controlled by a tactical headquarters in the field or at sea. It would have been better to place paramilitary operations under control of a special task force within the Unified Command. This task force should have included representatives from Army, Navy, Air Forces, Marine Corps and C.I.A.—all under a naval commander, since the target country was an island.) d. Lack of adequate organization, procedures, equipment, facilities and staff within C.I.A. for management of paramilitary operations. (The organization and procedures of C.I.A. are not suitable for control of paramilitary operations and its paramilitary staff is very small. C.I.A. must call upon the Defense Department for equipment, supplies and personnel to establish training bases, conduct training and prepare plans. It would be better to assign paramilitary responsibilities to the Defense Department which has vast resources, both human and materiel, for such purposes.) e. Failure to approve use of U.S. bases for training. (The paramilitary training base in Guatemala was entirely unsatisfactory. Troops had to live in prison-camp conditions and there were no adequate training areas or facilities available. Location of the base in Guatemala also introduced political complications and created tremendous logistical problems which were very difficult for C.I.A. to handle.) f. Failure to use U.S. bases for air logistical and tactical operations. (The air base in Guatemala was at too great a distance for satisfactory supply flights for support of agents and guerrilla organizations. The air base in Nicaragua was too distant for satisfactory B-26 operations. Two sorties per day were the maximum that could be programmed, and pilot fatigue made this impossible for a period longer than one or two days. Location of the air bases in third countries complicated security and political problems and increased the likelihood that use of the bases would be denied soon after commencement of operations. Location of bases in third countries also multiplied logistical problems.) g. Denial of the request to use American contract pilots for aerial supply of agents and guerrillas. (Cuban pilots demonstrated at an early date their inability to fly successful missions. Of twenty-seven attempted only four were successful. American pilots, on the other hand, have demonstrated their ability in this field in many areas of the world, working with a variety of indigenous guerrilla forces. The failure to supply guerrilla organizations was a critical failure in the over-all operation.) h. Denial of the request to use American contract pilots for B-26 strikes. (The paramilitary staff expressed in writing on January 4, 1961See Document 9. its doubts regarding the ability of the Cuban pilots to conduct satisfactory tactical air operations. Request for use of American pilots had been previously made to the Special Group which authorized their hiring but not their employment.) i. Long delay in obtaining Special Forces personnel for infantry training. (This request was submitted by the paramilitary staff on October 28, 1960. Personnel were not made available until January 12, 1961.) j. Rejection of the preferred invasion plan (Trinidad). (This plan was recommended by the paramilitary staff as the best possible plan and was endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the plan most likely to succeed.) k.

Restrictions imposed upon the conduct of effective tactical air operations. (The State Department from the outset opposed any tactical air operations. The paramilitary staff, on the other hand, consistently informed all authorities concerned that the operation could not be conducted unless the opposing air force was knocked out before the landing, and unless the landing force was continually supported by effective tactical air operations as long as it was in a combat situation.

The preferred plan presented by the paramilitary staff called for full scale air attacks on all airfields, using all available aircraft, commencing at dawn of D-1 and involving another full scale sortie in the afternoon and continuation of full scale operations on D-Day and thereafter.

Political decisions led eventually to a half strength attack on D-2 on only three airfields. After this strike, photographic interpretations and pilot debriefing indicated that the opposition still retained a number of offensive aircraft in operational condition.

This disadvantage could still have been overcome if full scale attacks on all airfields at dawn on D-Day had been permitted as planned.

Cancellation at the last moment, while the troops were already off the beaches preparing to land, of the air attacks planned for D-Day doomed the operation to failure. The paramilitary staff predicted loss of all shipping when informed of this decision at about 2230 on the night of the landing.

If this decision had been communicated to the paramilitary staff a few hours earlier, the operation would have been halted and the ships withdrawn with troops on board.

Restrictions on the use of napalm also contributed to failure. Use of this weapon against concentrated aircraft, tanks and trucks clearly visible in available photographs could have been a decisive factor. For example, photographs showed one concentrated tank park with 36 tanks and a truck park with 150 trucks.

Political considerations regarding use of air led to the selection of the Zapata area as an alternative of the preferred plan. A political requirement was established to seize an airfield capable of supporting B-26 operations. A study of all Cuba showed that there was no airfield that the Cuban force could hope to seize and hold except in Zapata.

The curtailment of tactical air must be regarded as the one factor which insured failure of the operation.)

Failure to include all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at high level meetings in which military matters were to be discussed. (The practice of including only the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at such meetings is, in the opinion of the writer, dangerous. It cannot be expected that any single military officer can advise on all the technical aspects of air, sea and ground warfare. The Cuban operation was essentially a seaborne invasion. Such operations are a specialty of the Navy and Marine Corps. Therefore, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations, if present at all meetings, would have been able to contribute invaluable advice at the proper time.

It is the hope of this writer that serious consideration will be given to the question posed above as military matters of greater significance are dealt with in the future.)

J. HawkinsPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Colonel, U.S. Marine CorpsChief, WH/4/PM

174. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Memoranda of Meetings. Top Secret. Drafted by [text not declassified]. Washington, April 24, 1961. SUBJECT Second Meeting of the Green Study Group

TIME AND PLACE

1020-1700 hours, 24 April 1961, CIA Administration Building

PARTICIPANTS Study Group Members General Maxwell D. Taylor Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy Admiral Arleigh Burke Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles Department of Defense General David W. Gray Commander Mitchell Colonel Stanley W. Beerli Colonel Ingelido Central Intelligence Agency General C.P. Cabell Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr. Colonel J.C. King Mr. C. Tracy Barnes Mr. Jacob D. Esterline Colonel Jack Hawkins

[Here follows discussion of record-keeping procedures.]

7. Mr. Bissell then commenced the discussion by resuming the chronological account of the development of the Project. He said on Saturday, 22 April, a review had been made of November and December, 1960, developments. By early January, the original concept of a 300-man force broken up into small teams for infiltration—after possible training in the United States—became shifted to the concept of a much stronger strike force. To Gen. Taylorʼs query as to whether this shift was covered by a formal paper, Mr. Bissell replied that there was no formal recording of the shift. The expansion of the forces in Guatemala was accelerated and on 12 January 1961, we received 38 officers from the Special Forces Group. Following the arrival of these officers at the camp, the character of the training changed. 8. At the end of January, 28 January to be precise, the President was briefed on our Agency plan. At this time, little more was involved than a presentation, largely oral, of the status and a decision was obtained to continue with the activities but there was no implication that military action would be undertaken. Gen. Taylor asked if this was the first time the plan had been presented to the President and Mr. Bissell said yes, but added that the President did not offer an opinion concerning it. Mr. Bissell said we were seeking authority to continue all our activities—overflights, etc. and to call attention to the fact that we were recruiting and moving men and accumulating material and expending money against mere contingencies, and that we were anxious to present our plan to Gen. Lemnitzer. (Gen. Gray was asked to provide a copy of this plan from his file. He remarked that this was the plan which the JCS had approved on 3 February 1961.)JCSM-57-61; for text, see Document 35. 9. Mr. Bissell stated that on or about 17 February 1961, another meeting, including the President, was held.See Document 48. By this time the JCS had evaluated the military plan which had been developed by Col. Hawkins. Gen. Taylor asked if this plan was considerably different from the final plan adopted and was answered affirmatively. At this February meeting, we felt a sense of urgency as the military plan called for a D-Day of 5 March. At the 17 February meeting, it became clear that there would be no immediate decision and that the plan would have to “slip” by one month. It was recalled that the President, the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Barnes, Gen. Gray, Col. Hawkins, Mr. Mann and Mr. Berle and possibly others, were present. Gen. Taylor asked if the outcome of that meeting was to decide to let D-Day slip and Mr. Bissell answered affirmatively adding that certain questions had been raised with respect to military implications. 10. Mr. Bissell then read from a paper he had prepared on 11 MarchDocument 58. which was a statement of the status of preparations, actions, timing and possible alternate courses of actions. This was presented at a meeting attended by much the same persons who attended the 17 February meeting.See Documents 59 and 60. At this juncture, Mr. Dulles called to the attention of the committee a copy of Mr. Bundyʼs record of action of the 28 January meeting (of the NSC?).See Documents 30 and 31. The January 28 meeting was not an NSC meeting. He stated he had no authority to disseminate copies but he would read it, which he did. The paper reported that the Director of Central Intelligence had reported on the situation in Cuba, that Cuba was rapidly becoming a communist state and that the United States had undertaken a program of covert action, propaganda, sabotage and assistance to exiles. The paper reported that the present estimate of the Department of Defense was that no program existed at this time which had capability of correcting the situation. The President, according to the document, authorized the continued activities of the Agency, including overflights. The Department of State was instructed to propose actions which could be taken in concert with other countries of the hemisphere, such as Brazil and Colombia. Mr. Dulles read the paper in full and stated it was available at any time to members of the committee. 11.

Mr. Bissell read from a memorandum of the 11 March meeting concerning the status of immediate alternative courses of action: A. Use of force in such a way as to minimize appearance of an invasion, including amphibious infiltrations by night. B. Commit the PM force to a surprise attack, accompanied by use of tactical air force. C. Employ two successive landings—one a diversionary force to be followed by landing of the main force 24 hours later. D. Send the force into an inaccessible area where it could hold the beachhead for considerable time.

“A” and “D” were included because at the 17 February meeting, the President and the Secretary had urged an examination of all possible alternatives. No affirmative decision came out of the 11 March meeting.

12. Mr. Dulles then proceeded to read the statement of action of the meeting of 8 February.See Document 40. (A discussion of the two February dates ensued—8 February and 17 February—with Mr. Bissell conceding that there was no meeting on 17 February, but that the paper had been prepared for a meeting which had been cancelled or postponed.)The meeting scheduled for February 17 was postponed until February 18; see Document 48. Mr. Dulles stated that the President was not present at the 8 February meetingPresident Kennedy was present at the February 8 meeting. but the discussion resulted in a decision by the President to authorize the encouragement of the establishment of an exile Junta and Revolutionary Council and discussion with exile leaders looking toward such a development. No other action pending further word from the President, was authorized. 13.

Mr. Dulles then read from a paper covering the 11 March meeting, noting the President had decided on the following courses of action: (1) Every effort should be made to assist the Cubans to form a political organization. This is to include publicity for the leading political figures. (2) The United States Government should prepare a “White Paper” on Cuba and assist the Cubans to do the same. (3) The Department of State would explore possibilities of a de-marche in the United Nations (?).The question mark in the source text indicates some question as to the accuracy of the statement. According to the available record of the March 11 meeting, the statement is accurate as written. (4) President expects to offer United Statesʼ support for Cubans to return to their homeland. However, best plan for achieving this has not yet been presented. New proposals for action should be submitted.

Gen. Taylor commented that it would appear the President was favorable to the concept but was not satisfied with the proposals to date.

14.

Mr. Bissell then read an account of a 15 March meeting.See Document 65. According to this paper the plan for the Cuban operation submitted on 7 March 1961An apparent reference to the CIA paper of March 11; see Document 58. was unacceptable as it was not a program of infiltration but a World War II type of assault. That in order for a plan to be politically acceptable it must: A. Be an unspectacular landing at night in an area where there was a minimum likelihood of opposition. B. If ultimate success would require tactical air support, it should appear to come from a Cuban air base. Therefore, territory seized should contain a suitable airfield.

The paper contained a brief outline of a second military plan prepared by Col. Hawkins which was approximately the plan later adopted.

15.

Mr. Bissell next read from notes on a meeting held on 16 March,See Document 66. at which time two operations were proposed: A. Trinidad—Probably an opposed landing in daylight with air support required. B. Zapata—Unopposed landing with no tactical air until opposed.

Consequently, as of 16 March, there were two plans still under consideration as indicated above. Between the 16th of March and the end of March another postponement was called due to the visit of Prime Minister Macmillan. The target date for action was postponed to 10 April, later to 15 April and finally to 17 April.

16.

Mr. Bissell then read from a paper covering a meeting held on 12 April.See Document 92. By this time, the plan had crystallized and this covered the concept of the operation: 1. Modification of air plans to provide for air operations limited basis on D-2, and again on D-Day. Shortly after the first strike on D-2, Cuban pilots would land at Miami. Other details not discussed. 2. Diversion or cancellation. Not feasible to halt embarkation but if necessary, ships could be diverted.

Gen. Taylor asked why it was not feasible to halt the embarkation and Mr. Bissell replied that the staging and loading of the troops was already underway. Mr. Bissell said that approval was given on continuing stages but that on April 12, D minus 5, the President still had the power to stop it. Staging started D minus 7 and 2/3s had already been moved from camps and first vessel sailed on D minus 6 and the last on D minus 4. Mr. Kennedy commented that the plan appears to have been approved but the “GO” signal not given. He asked with whom the plan had been coordinated. Mr. Dulles stated that an Internal Departmental Task Force had been set up early in March 1961 and various tasks were assigned to the separate departments. The IDTF was composed of representatives from State, Defense and CIA, specifically, Mr. Braddock, former Charge at Habana representing State, Gen. Gray representing Defense, and Mr. Barnes representing CIA. At the end of the 16 March meeting agreement was reached to set up the IDTF. Mr. Bissell said it was the sense of the 16 March meeting that the Zapata plan was preferable. Admiral Burke commented that the JCS did not agree at that time. Mr. Bissell stated there was a review of the plan by the JCS and that Gen. Gray would later elaborate on that.

17. Mr. Bissell stated that by 12 April the plan had crystallized but we still had no “go ahead” signal, whereupon Mr. Kennedy asked how we came to that conclusion and how was it actually worked out. He asked if anyone formally presented a plan for approval. When actually did the President and others examine the plan and give it their approval? Gen. Gray stated that 16 March was the date. Gen. Taylor asked if it was approved on that date and Mr. Bissell stated it was approved as the plan to be implemented but that no “go ahead” signal was given. Gen. Taylor inquired as to what the JCS had done with respect to the plan and Adm. Burke replied that on 15 March 1961, the JCS was briefed on the alternate plan and that the evaluation concluded that the alternate Zapata plan was considered the most feasible. He then started to discuss the three alternatives when Gen. Gray interrupted with the suggestion that the discussion was getting out of step; that the Trinidad plan should be discussed first and then the three alternative plans. 18. Col. Hawkinsʼ Presentation—Before going into the details of the Trinidad plan, Col. Hawkins said he would like to provide background information showing what factors were available and factors not available in connection with planning of that Project. He stated that when one is confronted with the requirement for non-attributability you introduce tremendous difficulties for a covert plan. For example, in a regular military operation, you know what forces you have, bases, state of training, etc., but in a PM covert plan you donʼt know much of anything. He said that last September when he joined the Project, the question of bases for the strike force and for supplying guerrillas in the mountains was not resolved. The only bases available were two bases in Guatemala. These were training bases, a shelf on the side of a volcano with room for 200 men at most (we ended up with 1400). These were the training facilities—which were very poor. 19. The air base in Guatemala was 750 miles from Central Cuba—too far for supply operations. C-46ʼs could not reach Eastern Cuba with satisfactory loads. C-54ʼs could. The distance was too great for tactical air operations using B-26 or smaller planes. All sorts of studies were made to locate a satisfactory base. The United States was ruled out but Col. Hawkins did not agree with the reasoning therefor. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] Consequently, we had no base from which to conduct satisfactory operations. However, we later learned that President Somoza of Nicaragua would cooperate and we selected Puerto Cabezas as the site since it had an airfield, dock facilities, and other advantages. We were still 500 miles from Central Cuba, still far but feasible. 20. Late in the autumn of 1960 we feared we would lose Guatemala bases and recruiting stopped, and we looked around for other bases. We could never be sure how many troops we could get as the recruiting was often slowed down due to political infighting of exile leaders. 21. Training—We did not have facilities for PM training. Last fall we only had four CIA personnel. On 28 October, Col. Hawkins requested three Special Forces teams—a total of 38 people—for training the forces in Guatemala. Because of political considerations, it was two and a half months, 12 January 1961, before they got there. We were facing amphibious operations, the most difficult of all military operations, and we had no ships. The question was: should we buy ships, recruit crews, or should we charter ships? We finally bought two LCIʼs in Miami, not fitted for landing troops but we modified them, we recruited Cuban crews, it took months (until January 1961) to get the ships to sea. The crews were made up of former Cuban navy personnel. We also recruited American contract personnel for these ships, the two LCIʼs. These two ships could carry only 150 men so this did not answer our problem. We had to charter ships. We contacted a Cuban ship owner named Garcia who had six small freighters of the 1500-2000 ton variety. This man, Garcia, offered the most and asked the least of all the Cubans we were in touch with. He asked that we cover the operating expenses. At first we wanted two ships for our 750-man force. We armed the LCIʼs and kept them as command ships. We also used them for other operations such as the raid on the Santiago refinery. 22. Air Picture—This was a problem in the autumn of 1960. We had few trained crews. There was always the question of whether the Cubans would measure up. We didnʼt know whether the air force was adequate. The covert approach is extremely difficult. PM operations of any size at all cannot be covert. Col. Hawkins commented that we may have to adjust our thinking to the need for coming out in the open as our enemies are doing. 23.

Policy Questions—Policy questions had a bearing on our plans. Some unanswered questions by early January were these: Will a strike be conducted? Will an air operation be permitted? Will American pilots be used? Will Nicaragua be used as a base?

Col. Hawkins then read from a paper dated 4 January 1961,Document 9. which he had prepared. This paper outlined the current status of our operation and set forth policy questions which had to be resolved. (Col. Hawkins provided a copy of this paper for inclusion in the record. Consequently, no attempt is made to reproduce it in these minutes.)

24. From the above mentioned paper, Col. Hawkins outlined the concept of the strike operation: 1. Securing of a small lodgement on Cuban soil by 750-man force. 2. This to be preceded by tactical air strike which would destroy the air force, naval vessels. 3. Following this, other military targets would be attacked, such as tank parks, artillery parks, motor transport, etc. 4. Close air support for strike force on D-Day and thereafter. 5. The initial mission was to seize a small area preferably with an air field and access to the sea, with contingency plans for air drops if field and port not available. 6. Force should try to survive and not break out until time opportune or U.S. intervened. 7. Expected widespread popular support and general uprisings. 8. If this did not develop, there was the possibility that the fighting might bring on assistance from other Latin American countries and the U.S. with the resultant fall of Castro. 9. Plan called for continuation of regular PM operations: sabotage, guerrillas, etc. 10. If driven from the beachhead, the force would continue guerrilla operations. 25. Gen. Taylor stated that this concept raised fundamental questions. What was the magnitude of the air cover you expected and did you expect to stay on shore indefinitely, and if so what size force did you plan to employ? Col. Hawkins said that the force was to have been composed of 750 men and that they expected to have an air force of 15 B-26ʼs, whereupon Gen. Taylor questioned whether 15 B-26ʼs could have done all that was expected. Col. Hawkins explained that the plan was to eliminate the enemy air force. We anticipated that he had twelve operational planes, including six B-26ʼs, 4 T-33ʼs, and from two to four Sea Furies. This turned out to be a fairly accurate estimate. We felt that fifteen B-26ʼs could do the job. 26. Gen. Taylor asked on what intelligence did we base our belief that there would be popular uprisings. Col. Hawkins said that we had our own agents up and down the length of Cuba—some 60 to 70 agents including 25 radio operators—who gave us a picture of large members of people begging for arms in order to fight Castro. We had difficulty supplying the arms via the air drops. The Cuban pilots were not sufficiently qualified for this work. The flights were rarely opposed but the aircraft encountered difficulty in finding the drop zones. (Mr. Esterline commented that at no time were our surface craft interdicted by Cuban navy craft and surface deliveries were much more successful.) 27. Col. Hawkins then quoted other extracts from his paper of January 4, summarizing the size of our air force—ten B-26ʼs but only five pilots; seven C-54ʼs; a few C-46ʼs—with grossly inadequate transport crews. Five hundred Cubans training in Guatemala. FRD (Frente) recruitment not going satisfactorily. Special recruiting teams being sent from camps to Miami to assist. Expect to have 750 men in time but unless Special Forces training they could not be ready before late 1961. All this time, Col. Hawkins said, Castro was building up his military capability and in September we thought he still had 75% of the population behind him, although his popularity was then declining. Gen. Taylor asked in retrospect what would have been the best timing (for the strike to have occurred?) and Col. Hawkins replied early March. 28. Col. Hawkins said at the time of the preparation of his paper of 4 January we did not know whether the new administration would approve the project and this needed to be resolved immediately in order that the operation could be stopped and considerable expense saved. He therefore recommended that the Director of CIA attempt to get a decision from the President-Elect. Col. Hawkins felt that if the decision was made in mid-January the force could be ready to move by the end of February. We were then under pressure from the Guatemalan government. Time was not entirely in our favor. We anticipated that Castro would soon have a jet capability. Heavy equipment was being assembled throughout the country and the establishment of a police state was advancing rapidly. In his paper he recommended that the operation be carried out not later than 1 March 1961. 29. Col. Hawkins terminated reading his paper. Mr. Dulles asked what disposition was made of it and Col. Hawkins said it was directed to Chief of WH/4 (chief of the Cuban operation). Mr. Esterline, C/WH/4, said he directed it to higher authority. Gen. Taylor asked for the identity of the higher authority and was told it went to the Chief of the Division (Col. King), the Assistant Deputy for Plans (Mr. Barnes), and the Deputy for Plans (Mr. Bissell). Mr. Bissell stated that the paper did not go much further than his office, and added that we did eventually get the air crews, the B-26ʼs, etc. Avon Park was readied. American contract pilots were readied. He stated that with respect to the major policy decisions raised by Col. Hawkins, these issues will emerge when limitations on use of the tactical air force are discussed. Mr. Esterline commented that we battled with State for months and we only got watered down more and more for our efforts. 30. Mr. Kennedy asked why, if Col. Hawkinsʼ presumptions and conclusions were correct, and if State and others felt it wasnʼt feasible or desirable, wasnʼt the project called off? Mr. Bissell explained that what actually happened was that Col. Hawkinsʼ position was stated and first there was agreement on air strikes on D minus 2, D minus 1, and D-Day; and then later an absolute minimum calling for strikes on D minus 1 and D-Day. And what finally was called for was a maximum effort on D-Day. 31. Mr. Kennedy asked Col. Hawkins if he would have approved the operation as it ultimately came to occur—that is, would he have or did he approve of the watered down plan? Col. Hawkins replied that he did not approve but must say this with qualifications. He said he always maintained that we must get rid of the opposing air force. He insisted the three major airfields must be attacked. He was not in favor of limiting the number of aircraft (he eventually got the number raised)—he was not satisfied with the limited application of air power and he thought we would have had a satisfactory sweep on D-Day of all the Cuban airfields. Gen. Taylor asked how many planes we had on D-Day and Col. Hawkins stated fifteen. Admiral Burke asked if all the factors raised by Col. Hawkins were ever listed in check off form—and were they checked off as achieved? The reply was that we had no formalized check list but we knew where we stood as we went along. Col. Hawkins said we had the capability on the morning of D-Day with the 15 B-26ʼs but we werenʼt given an opportunity to do the job. 32. Col. Beerli stated that prior to D-Day we had an accurate count of the enemy air force and knew where every craft was kept. He had a total of 36. Col. Beerli described them by category. We estimated 50% of these planes were in flying condition. On the D minus 2 strike we destroyed over 70% of their air power. We had 15 planes left to employ to knock out the remainder. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] showed the enemy planes were concentrated at San Antonio. On D-Day one Sea Fury was knocked out and another fell into the ocean. They were down to three T-33ʼs. Gen. Taylor asked then why did the strike fail? Col. Beerli replied that we had strikes planned for San Antonio, Libertad, and 11 other targets, but were not permitted to carry them out. Gen. Taylor commented that we had done well with our air force and Col. Beerli replied that we had them pinned down and we based this belief on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and photography. He added that every aircraft we lost was due to the T-33ʼs. Mr. Kennedy asked how many aircraft did Castro have on D-Day. Col. Beerli said he had 2 Sea Furies, B-26ʼs and 3 T-33ʼs. Col. Hawkins repeated that we had planned a fifteen plane raid at dawn on D-Day but were not permitted to carry it out. Mr. Dulles asked if subsequent events bore out the correctness of our air O/B and Col. Hawkins replied in the affirmative. 33. Mr. Kennedy asked for information on the report that MIGʼs were in the air. Col. King said that MIGʼs did not appear until the final date. They may have been in crates and quickly assembled. Mr. Dulles commented that aerial photography never picked up any MIGʼs. Mr. Bissell said we had no reports from agents of MIG air flights. Gen. Taylor asked concerning the characteristics of the T-33ʼs and was told they are jet trainers armed with two 50 cal. machine guns. Gen. Gray said that on D plus 1 a request was made of our destroyers to attempt to locate the field. Col. King said the report of MIGʼs in crates indicated San Julian air base. Col. Beerli terminated his remarks by saying that as of D-Day the air picture was in our favor. 34. Trinidad Plan. Col. Hawkins then proceeded to discuss the Trinidad Plan. He utilized charts showing the composition of the strike force and maps of the areas discussed. First he described the composition and organization of the assault force and how it was trained. He said at first there was no one to train the troops so he sent Col. Egan and Capt. Monk with directives to conduct individual training, small unit training, etc., and an 8 week course was provided. With large influx of recruits, concurrent recruit, small unit and combined training had to be conducted. Gen. Taylor asked where they found room in view of Col. Hawkinsʼ previous statement of the small shelf on the volcano side, and Col. Hawkins explained that we finally got permission to use a finca belonging to Mr. Alejos of Guatemala for training purposes. However, firing practice was done in the mountains. 35. Noting that tanks appeared on the chart, Mr. Kennedy asked if tanks did get ashore and if they were camouflaged or disguised. Col. Hawkins said that tanks were put ashore and Gen. Gray added that these were the same type of tanks given to other countries. Col. Hawkins stated that we trained the tank crews at Ft. Knox and we had no trouble whatsoever. The Cubans knew where they were being trained and Col. Hawkins said that was a good example of how our own soil is better suited for training from security and other standpoints. 36. In arriving at the Trinidad plan, Col. Hawkins said that he studied the entire island carefully. He then decided that the Trinidad area with the nearby Escambray mountains was the place. Gen. Taylor asked if he had the benefit of photography in reaching his decision and Col. Hawkins said he had no photography until one flight was flown in November with not too satisfactory results. He then proceeded to describe the Trinidad area—the town of some 18,000 population, the nearby port to the south, named Casilda—with its docks—many good beaches for our purposes—good guerrilla country nearby with hills of 2,500-4,000 feet in which from 600-1,000 guerrillas were reported to be active who had been able to maintain themselves for six months, but were eventually eliminated. Although these were small groups with little equipment and poor supplies, it nevertheless took Castro six months to eliminate them. Therefore in considering the Trinidad plan it was felt that the force could if necessary move to the mountains and could exist in such terrain indefinitely. There were no approaches from the North that Castro could use, only other main road was from Santa Clara—this had a bridge over a river and a railroad bridge—and we were planning to knock out these two bridges. Other approach was from Cienfuegos—with bridges. The area was suitable for isolation. Also there was reason to believe that the Trinidad population was friendly. They had been supporting the guerrillas in the hills. We expected to pick up recruits from the Trinidad civilian population and we planned to bring in arms packs for 4,000 men and rapidly expand our forces. Another advantage if the force succeeded in maintaining itself and eventually breaking out was the possibility that we could have severed Cuba in the middle, creating great problems for Castro. 37. Gen. Taylor inquired as to the date of the plan. Col. Hawkins said it was written in January and the JCS was briefed on the plan on 31 January. He remarked that the JCS, in an independent study, had also selected the Trinidad site as the most suitable for this type of operation. Gen. Taylor asked how did the JCS get into this matter and Gen. Gray replied that the JCS had already been asked to come up with a likely spot and that they had in mind a small invasion force. 38. Col. Hawkins then reviewed the strike plan as follows: D-Day—landing Prior D-Day—destruction air force D-minus 1—attack aircraft on ground—also tank parks, artillery, etc. H minus 6—feinting operation off the West Coast of Pinar del Rio—destroy bridges H Hour—Assault force lands on beaches—seizes high ground—another company moves inland and establishes self on forward slopes—another company on a separate beach—clear Casilda—airborne troops drop in heights over Trinidad. 39. Gen. Taylor inquired as to the known presence of Castro forces in the area. Col. Hawkins said we could never pin down the exact location of his forces. There were some 40,000 militia in the general area—with about 5,000 militia encircling the Escambray mountains. These were not making an aggressive effort to join battle with the guerrillas but would catch them as they came out for food. We evaluated the militia fighting qualities on what they did in the Escambrays and this was very low. He then went on describing the plan by saying that after seizure of the objectives we would enlist and arm civilians, we would use the hospital and other buildings for the force—we would coordinate with local civilian leaders and make contact with local guerrillas. We would use the local airport for resupply—but the airport could not take a B-26. In the event Trinidad could not be held, the plan was for the force to withdraw to the Escambrays where they would be supplied by air drops. This, Col. Hawkins said, was the beauty of the Trinidad Plan—it provided an alternative and safe area to move into if the original phase failed to achieve its objectives. Gen. Cabell commented that the concept called for a dawn landing. Col. Hawkins said the air strike called for attack on three air fields and the Managua military base, which had tanks and equipment which would have easily been destroyed by use of napalm but we were not authorized to use napalm in the operation. Gen. Taylor asked who said napalm could not be employed and Col. Hawkins replied that it was a decision of the National Government. Col. Hawkins listed in detail all the targets which we had selected for air attack—which included in addition to obvious military targets—the Havana power plant, microwave stations, refineries, etc.—and said all these things we wanted to do. Gen. Taylor asked if the air requirement varied with the change of plans and Col. Hawkins replied no. 40. Gen. Taylor asked aside from terrain what else was favorable and Col. Hawkins repeated his references to friendly population, nearby guerrillas, beaches as good as those of Zapata. He said the presence of enemy forces was a disadvantage of this plan as compared with the Zapata Plan. We did not think there was anyone at Zapata. Gen. Gray said that as far as could be determined there was only a police battalion at Trinidad. Admiral Burke commented that the size of the air field at Trinidad was another disadvantage—the field at Zapata being larger. Col. Hawkins reiterated that the principal advantage was being able to fall back into the mountains. At Zapata we presupposed an uprising but the beachhead did not last long enough. At Trinidad we might have had favorable civilian reaction—one agent told us he had 2,500 men wanting arms. 41. Mr. Kennedy asked if we had any communication from the island after D-Day indicating a desire on the part of the people to rise, and Col. Hawkins said yes there were requests for arms but air drops without the use of American pilots had never been successful. Gen. Taylor asked if there was an annex to the plan for supplying arms to anyone who did rise. Mr. Bissell stated that we had airplanes and supplies and were ready to respond to agent calls. We could have responded—there were 19 requests—most of them before D-Day. Mr. Kennedy asked if there were any after D-Day and Col. Hawkins said yes, but we couldnʼt service them since our aircraft were committed to try to deliver supplies to the strike force which had lost its supply ship. 42. Gen. Gray recalled that the Agency had prepared a summary of agent radio communications received—and messages from the beaches—on D plus 2 and asked that a copy of that summary,Not found. which he found quite impressive, be furnished for the record. 43. Mr. Bissell said that we had anticipated domination of the air and therefore could have made daylight deliveries of arms in response to the many calls we had received. As it turned out we did not have the means with which to respond. 44. Mr. Esterline then informed the group that we had on hand one of the American pilots who survived the morning raid, and since he was planning to leave the city tonight, asked if the committee would like to hear his story this afternoon. Gen. Taylor said he would like to hear him after we finish the actual scenario and this should be sometime after lunch. The hour of 4 p.m. was set. 45. Gen. Taylor asked what happened to the Trinidad Plan. Col. Hawkins replied that it was always opposed by the State Department—also the President wanted something that was less like an invasion. Mr. Bissell read from the record of the 15 March meeting which reported that Trinidad was not acceptable since it appeared like a WWII assault operation. Gen. Taylor asked if the plan was rejected on 15 March and Mr. Bissell replied no, on 11 March. Admiral Burke commented that on 3 February the JCS had generally this same plan. Mr. Bissell said that the JCS first evaluated this plan early in February and Admiral Burke said that the JCS had made a number of recommendations aimed at strengthening the plan. 46.

Mr. Bissell stated that we considered a variety of alternatives—one suggestion was that we seize a remote area and build an airfield from which to operate. Col. Hawkins then described the ground rules which had been established for the next plan: 1. It must call for a quiet, night landing operation—nothing that might be viewed as spectacular. 2. It must include seizure of an airfield that would accommodate up to B-26 planes in order that air strikes which were to commence at dawn could be attributed to that field.

Col. Hawkins said we looked all over for an airfield in Oriente province but could find none that could handle a B-26. We built up the concept for an operation at Preston but the field would not support B-26ʼs. We reconsidered the Isle of Pines—but rejected it because there were from 7,500-15,000 troops there and there were no suitable beaches for night landings. We thought of another plan for Trinidad involving landing troops who would go directly into the mountains—but there was no airfield. Finally, through photography, we found what we thought was a usable field—this was in the Zapata area—and this is what led us to this area. The plan was hastily put together. We got started about 15 March—after the 11 March meeting. An error in photographic interpretation had occurred. We believed there were 4,900 usable feet of runway in northern Zapata. One of the disadvantages was the 18 mile bay which meant we would have trouble getting people up there in daylight hours. We found a 4,100 foot field at Playa Giron. We would never have adopted the Zapata Plan if we had known that he had coordinated forces that would close in and fight as they did. The air field requirement was what led us into Zapata.

47. Col. Hawkins then described the moving of the troops from Guatemala to Nicaragua which was accomplished on three successive nights without incident. We were employing four merchant ships and two LCIʼs. They fanned out upon leaving Puerto Cabezas and later rendezvoused at approximately 40 miles off the coast. Col. Hawkins paid tribute to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for his performance in handling the fleet. The ships formed convoy and proceeded to a point 5,000 yards off the beach.

Afternoon Session—24 April 1961.

(Note: This account of the afternoon session is not complete inasmuch as the recording secretary was not present during the first portion of the session, having missed approximately 45 minutes of the meeting. However, the notes prepared by Col. Ingelido, who was present during the entire afternoon session, should cover this missing period.)Colonel Michael J. Ingelido, Deputy Secretary, JCS, also functioned during the deliberations of the Cuba Study Group as General Taylorʼs assistant. Colonel Ingelido was present at the afternoon session of the Study Groupʼs deliberations on April 24, which he noted began at 1:50 p.m. Ingelidoʼs notes on the meeting are more extensive than those prepared by [text not declassified] printed here. According to Ingelidoʼs notes, at the outset of the afternoon session CIA officials gave a resume of the landing operations planned for the Red, Blue, and Green Beaches during the Zapata operation. They also discussed the critical element of the air support planned for the operation, including the possible use of napalm to neutralize enemy forces in the area. General Gray outlined DOD and JCS participation in the planning, which led to a general discussion of the information provided to the President, and the actions approved by the President. (Memorandum for the record by Ingelido; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Cuba, Taylor Report)

48. (Gen. Gray was in the midst of discussing the JCS evaluation of the Trinidad Plan when note taking was resumed.) He said the scheme of maneuver was basically sound. There was a need for civil officer type people to coordinate with the population, etc., and this was done. The original idea was that the guerrillas would join up with the strike force. The JCS thought it best to maintain a corridor and establish a link—he pointed out that one road runs from Santa Clara to the area—and a secure route for moving up into the hills. Without interference from the air, we estimated the Cuban Army could move men and materiel to the scene by D plus 2. At time of assessment there was one regiment of Cuban Army near Santa Clara. We also were told the Cuban Army was not concentrated but spread out. We figured it would take them a day to concentrate and another day to move the 100 miles to the scene. 49. Gen. Gray indicated that the publicity which developed during the final weeks of the project, much of it centering around the Revolutionary Council and its alleged plans, gave Castro notice that something was in the wind and time to mobilize his forces. Mr. Esterline explained that we were given the requirement of establishing a broad based revolutionary council. He said Cubans cannot keep quiet and before you knew it we had a Roman Circus on our hands—leaks to press, etc., both in Miami and New York. Gen. Taylor asked if the Revolutionary Council was aware of the operation. Col. King stated that the first word they had that the operation was going was on the evening of Friday, 14 April. Col. King and Mr. Barnes had gone to New York City to brief Dr. Miro—had met with the group—had dinner—and at midnight Col. King told Dr. Miro that at dawn on the following day some action would take place. Col. King cautioned Dr. Miro that there always seems to be a leak and that in the interests of the sons of some of the members of the Council, including Miro, and other relatives—Col. King told Dr. Miro to keep this information very much to himself. Dr. Miro said he would not even tell Dr. Varona, another member of the Council, and added that he would keep all members of the Council together the entire night. 50. Gen. Taylor said that what was inferred was that all this hoopla made execution of the plan more difficult and Gen. Gray said yes—that this permitted Castro to prepare—but if the target had been the Trinidad area he would not have been ready until the afternoon of D-Day. Mr. Barnes said that there was a great deal in the press—Tad Szulc and others—guessing as to dates—and all this developed during the last week—and this could not have been anticipated. Mr. Esterline commented that one or two of Mr. Restonʼs articles in the New York Times two or three days before the date were not at all helpful. He said that despite this we were able to move people from Guatemala to Nicaragua and the first anyone knew about the invasion was when they hit the beaches. 51. Gen. Gray said that another miscalculation was that the Cuban Army was not coordinated and thus we expected the strike force would be able to resist attack. In this respect Trinidad would have been difficult terrain for launching of attacks. While the Cuban Army could eventually have reduced the beachhead, it was Gen. Grayʼs opinion that the beach could have been held for seven days. In considering the Trinidad Plan it was not considered that U.S. overt intervention would be necessary since the force could get to the hills. The ships were loaded with supplies on D minus 21, but it was always clearly understood that the President could always call off the plan. The ultimate success of the plan depended on political factors—uprisings, possible OAS action, etc. 52. Gen. Taylor asked what provisions, if any, had been made for follow up support. Gen. Gray said that CIA was training additional personnel. He said Mr. Berle had sounded out certain South American countries but got no promise of military support. The plan called for the arming of local volunteers who were expected to join up with the force. Mr. Esterline said we had approximately 300 additional untrained troops—about 167 in Guatemala and the balance in Miami. Gen. Cabell pointed out that the original concept called for a 750 man force but that we actually committed in advance all our 1400 men rather than hold out for follow up. Gen. Gray said the key to the plan was popular uprisings all over the Island—which would pin down the militia in other areas. The militia in this area had proved to be friendly to the guerrillas and for this reason Castro had to bring others in from elsewhere. 53. Gen. Taylor asked Gen. Gray concerning the 30-70 evaluation they had given to the plan. Gen. Gray said this referred to the Trinidad Plan—that the percentages were roughly 30-70 and never ran more than 40-60. He then said that about this time Mr. Berle was appointed coordinator of Latin American affairs and Ambassador Willauer faded out of the picture. He said he had had meetings with the Berle group. Gen. Taylor asked if Mr. Berle got into the military aspects of the plan and Gen. Gray said not to any important degree—that he was mostly concerned with the political aspects. Col. King said that Mr. Berle was given one briefing on the Trinidad Plan. 54. Gen. Gray then stated that on 23 February a JCS evaluation team went to Guatemala to assess the troops and summarized their conclusions as follows: Based on general review of the military portion of the project and evaluation of the combat efficiency of the forces, such forces could attain the initiative—but the ultimate success of the operation would depend on the extent the strike forces served as a catalyst. Gen. Taylor said this new evaluation of the plan expected them to get ashore all right but success depended on their serving as a catalyst to a general uprising. Gen. Gray answered affirmatively. Gen. Gray stated that Col. Tarwater thought the air force was very well prepared but made certain suggestions for improvement. 55. Evaluation of the Zapata Plan. Gen. Gray said that the JCS first saw the Zapata Plan on 15 March and gave it a favorable evaluation as an alternate plan. This, he said, was done hurriedly. The JCS was briefed on the plan on 13 March; prepared its evaluation on the 14th of March, pre-sented it on the 15th March and submitted it to the President on the 16th of March. 56.

Mr. Bissell said three other alternatives were considered: 1. The Isle of Pines 2. The Preston Area 3. Alternative Trinidad Plan—(landing at night, into the hills and at daylight attack backwards to the beachhead).

With respect to No. 3, Col. Hawkins said the plan really was for the force to move into the hills—and not attack backwards—and was a modification of the original Trinidad Plan.

57. Gen. Gray said that of the alternatives mentioned it was considered that the Zapata Plan was the most feasible but not as feasible as the original Trinidad Plan. Zapata depended on control of the air and the ability to secure the exits to make difficult the movement of enemy forces into the area. The plan called for the mining of all approaches but this was not executed. The evaluations were the essential part of the JCS contribution—however, we attended most meetings. Gen. Taylor asked if the evaluation which Gen. Gray had summarized was approved by the JCS and Gen. Gray responded affirmatively. Of the three alternatives the Zapata Plan was the best. 58.

Mr. Kennedy said wouldnʼt you say that the JCS had approved this plan? Admiral Burke responded by saying that the paper does not say so—but in effect the JCS approved this plan—felt it had a reasonable chance of success. Admiral Burke added that the original plan had the area they would have selected—Trinidad. Gen. Gray stated that at no time did the JCS say that the Zapata Plan should not be carried out. Mr. Bissell said that the 16 March meeting summed it up as follows:

Trinidad Plan would provide more decisive results at greater initial risk

Zapata Plan provides less decisive results—and slower results—with less initial risk

Mr. Bissell commented that we felt and hoped the Zapata Plan would be less risky but recognized its limitations—less chance of a build up from friendly population.

59. Gen. Taylor said there appeared to be two points: At no point did the JCS recommend doing it—it merely commented on three alternatives—but where we made our mistake—we should have said—but did not—that this plan was not feasible. We had an opportunity to do more and we were responsible for approving it. Mr. Dulles stated that all the plans were exposed at high level. Admiral Burke commented that one difficulty was that Gen. Lemnitzer was there by himself—then corrected himself to say that Gen. Gray was with Gen. Lemnitzer at the high level meetings. 60. Gen. Gray stated that as we became associated we became more interested in trying to make it go. Mr. Kennedy asked if this wasnʼt the key to the whole thing—this wanting it to go? Mr. Dulles said we had these alternatives—we could carry out the plan or we could demobilize the strike force. Gen. Gray said that if we had ever written a National Concept—we would have had to rewrite it continually. Admiral Burke said that there naturally was confusion during the change of administration. We should have formalized this thing much earlier and in greater detail. The trouble was that only a few people of the Admiralʼs staff knew about it. 61. Gen. Taylor asked if the possibility of uprisings was discussed among all of you and Mr. Dulles answered yes. Mr. Dulles said the first plan was the shock plan—and in this plan we hadnʼt counted on immediate uprisings—this was longer range. He said there were objections on the political side to the shock effects—and we couldnʼt count on it succeeding. 62. Mr. Kennedy asked what the objective was in landing 600-1000 men on the shore. Mr. Dulles said to obtain a beachhead which could be built up. Mr. Kennedy then asked how a beachhead could be held against 300,000 troops—or against even 30,000 or 25,000. Mr. Dulles said the enemy would not have been able to concentrate all his troops on one spot. Mr. Kennedy then said that he thought that uprisings were an essential part of the JCS evaluation. Gen. Gray said that it did not anticipate immediate uprisings—but uprisings on a slower basis. Mr. Kennedy then directed a question to Admiral Burke asking if it was the Admiralʼs understanding that 1400 men could land—and without benefit of uprisings—could maintain their position for several weeks. Admiral Burke said they thought they might be able to hold their position but if they could not, that they would then become guerrillas. Gen. Gray said that we thought the Cuban air force would be knocked out. He said the men demonstrated they could fight effectively at night. Mr. Bissell added that we expected a landing in Pinar del Rio on D plus 7. Col. Hawkins added that we had reports of men wanting to join but reiterated that the real key was control of the air. 63. Gen. Taylor then asked where is the concept? Gen. Gray said it is in the plan. The objective did not change. Here is the mission: To invade island of Cuba—with amphibious force—hold beachhead—provide castalyst for uprising—move in as guerrillas if beachhead not sustained. Gen. Taylor (checking language of mission) read: “—alternative 3 has all the prerequisites necessary and would be able to sustain itself for several weeks but inaccessibility of population would affect support of Cuban population …” Gen. Cabell remarked that we meant joining up forces and not necessarily civilian uprisings. Gen. Taylor stated it still becomes a choice between 3—but with Trinidad preferred. 64. Mr. Bissell stated that the language about sustaining for several weeks indicates a change of thinking—a slower development with less prospect of initial success. If the area could have been held for two weeks there was a good probability of ultimate success—for with no air opposition we could have knocked out his microwave and forced him to voice—we could have learned his plans—we could have reinforced the brigade with another 500 men—the logistic problem would not have been difficult—but we did not knock out his air. Gen. Cabell stated that maritime re-supply would have been a factor—with no air opposition—and would have had an effect on the outcome. 65. Gen. Gray stated that following the decision on 16 March that the Zapata Plan should be pursued, the Inter-Departmental Group on 22 March developed and finalized an agreed list of tasks.See Document 71. For example, the State Department would take care of recognition, etc. This paper served the useful purpose of coordinating our planning. 66. On 28 March the JCS approved letters of instructions to CINC-LANT and CONANT and we implemented the plan to improve the Miami defenses. We tested the plan and had planes, etc., to move in to protect the Miami area. Naval support was carried out by the carrier Essex and 7 destroyers. Destroyers escorted the invading ships—close at night but at a distance during the day. Gen. Taylor asked if they were authorized to engage. They were authorized to engage if attacked but under these circumstances the whole force was to have been diverted—since we were protecting shipping and not assisting an invasion. The rules of engagement changed several times as the operation proceeded. Our job was mostly one of support during two phases: Covert support—D-Day to D minus 3 Logistic support—during build up phase 67. CIA was in a position to double and quadruple the force. We planned logistic supply as part of this build up. If things went well they might have built up in the Cienfuegos area in D plus 30. We provided arms packs for 30,000 men in addition to CIA planning for 5,000 packs. Packs for 15,000 men were actually loaded on ships and headed for the area. Also recoilless rifles, mortars, jeeps, trucks, etc. We were also providing for the overt phase under several conditions. For example, if the U.S. recognized this force (one of the Council members, Capt. Artime, went in with the brigade), State was planning on recognizing the government but no State or diplomatic representative would have been sent in until Havana was taken. We also considered possibility of supporting the force in the event a third country recognized them before we did. In addition we had one Marine hospital to move to Vieques. 68. Gen. Taylor asked about the evacuation plan and Gen. Taylor [Gray?] said it was planned to employ the LCIʼs and planes from the air strip. Gen. Gray said a separate war room was set up in the JCS—the regular war room was cut out. Only a limited number were cut in—this list included Adm. Dennison. Col. Mallard of the Agency was on the Essex. It was a cumbersome type of organization but it worked. There was good commo. There was good liaison. Decisions were implemented quickly. 69. Admiral Burke stated that the trouble was the delays—commo from there to Washington and back was fairly good—but there were always delays—sometimes of several hours—what was needed was a commander on the spot to make decisions. Another thing—although the commo was good from CEF (?) to Washington—there was not enough between the Naval forces and the ships—took a couple of days to find out that two ships were one and the same—that different names were being used for the same ship. 70. Gen. Gray said that there should have been an Inter-Departmental group working on the concept and keeping the President informed in writing. This would have eliminated the fact that up to the last date there was not a meeting of minds. It was not clear whether there was going to be an air strike or not. Mr. Barnes said it could not have been achieved the way it went along—after the Trinidad Plan was scrapped we were forced to come up with new concepts and new approaches to meet objections which were being raised. 71. Admiral Burke said that politically it could not have been done. We made our mistake in not drawing up what we thought the concept was and presenting it to the State Department and CIA. We did not grab it hard enough—partly because we were holding it so tight—therefore Gen. Grayʼs group couldnʼt get advice from the people who could have given it—because they werenʼt cut in. If he had been working under an agreed concept it could have been done better. 72. Mr. Bissell said that what he had read from the April 12 paper came near to this. Many of the suggested acts that came up involved political policy decisions of great import and these had been made in advance. Example, question whether Navy jets in the air would give protection to B-26ʼs giving close ground support. Decision was made that support should be given—this required high level policy and was a reversal of policy re engagement of U.S. forces. We could have had a concept of use of U.S. forces. Gen. Taylor said: You talk of concepts but the concepts didnʼt change. Admiral Burke stated we would have task for example to cover by Naval air—this came very late so that by the time we were supposed to execute this we were at some distance from the area. Gen. Gray said that if we had had an agreed national plan we would have had to face up to the decisions which we got piecemeal—re rules of engagement. It should have been in an overall plan. 73. Gen. Taylor asked how can we do better—about the political restraints—how can we do this. Gen. Gray replied: by putting the political factors into the plan at the beginning. Admiral Burke commented that the President must have been confused by the many different people who were advising him. Gen. Gray said that once we got State in on agreed plans, Mr. Braddock came up with the answers. We should get State into the plan at the outset. 74. Gen. Taylor remarked that after the rejection of the Trinidad Plan we were racing against the clock. Gen. Gray said that he had wanted to war game the plan and that that is what should have been done. Gen. Taylor then asked what were the factors that necessitated speed. Gen. Gray said the rainy season was approaching and this would affect not only ground fighting but flying conditions. There was the problem of the jets which Castro was supposed to be receiving soon. Info that some jet trainees had returned from Czechoslovakia. Col. Hawkins said there were other factors: We were holding 1400 men in impossible conditions. The President of Guatemala was pushing us. Also American newsmen were after the story and some of the troops and airmen were threatening to desert. 75. Interrogation of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. At this juncture [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], a member of the Alabama National Air Guard and a contract flyer who participated in the project, was received by the committee. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that he had drawn up a small resume and that if the committee was agreeable he would half-read and half-comment on that resume. (Presumably the resume will become a part of the record.) Consequently only the questioning will be recorded here. 76. Col. Hawkins asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] what happened to the original plan for D-Day. He replied that he was exposed to the targets. He thought the people were familiar with the original plan. It changed 180 degrees. We were to use maximum effort against air fields, microwave stations, (forcing use of radio voice)—we hoped this chaos—plus propaganda would do the job. Col. Hawkins asked what were the orders. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied that they were ordered to use two aircraft on each target except that only one would be used on air base near Guantanamo. Request was granted late for use of other aircraft. We were pushed for briefing of crews—we didnʼt have time for target study—the whole situation was cramped. After D-Day it was obvious that not all enemy aircraft were destroyed—we thought we knew how many he had but he was turning them around quickly—our turn around time was 7 hours round trip with 30 minutes over the target. 77. Mr. Kennedy asked if these pilots were Americans or Cubans and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied they were both Americans and Cubans. They got along well together and both were motivated by patriotic reasons. 78. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that the first attack (D minus 2) only served to make Castro mad and gave him time to re-group his forces. Some of the flyers saw Navy protection—others did not. At Puerto Cabezas there was uncertainty as to whether they were enemy or friendly. Admiral Burke stated that on D-1 and D plus 1 the Navy fliers were over and that on D plus 2 authority was given for one hour of coverage. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was asked if MIGs were involved. He said that as much as he would like to he canʼt say that MIGs were involved. He said he did not believe they were. He said he debriefed B-26 and other pilots and they saw none. The reports of Navy intervention may have helped in air battles but as far as Cuban personnel were concerned they took it for granted that they had Navy cover. 79. Mr. Kennedy asked if the pilots expected they would have help or assistance. Were they ever told they would not have assistance? [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied that they were not told that they would not have assistance and he did not think they expected military assistance. Mr. Bissell said that on D plus 2 they were briefed to expect Navy cover and protection and beginning at that time they may have expected assistance. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said the news was a great morale booster to people in the Puerto Cabezas area and when it did not materialize morale was affected adversely. Cuban crews aborted and without this assurance of assistance American pilots would not have participated. 80. Gen. Taylor asked what targets they found on the beach. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied that on D plus 1 they caught a large column of trucks. An American pilot “bounced” those trucks and from 15 to 20 Rusians tanks—three B-26ʼs made passes at the trucks and hurt them badly. This was Tuesday afternoon about 1800 hours local time. Col. Hawkins remarked that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] indicated they suffered 1800 casualties. Mr. Kennedy asked if [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was able to tell where the fighting was taking place. He was unable to give a conclusive answer but thought the forces had moved up from Blue and Red Beaches but never very far out. He remarked that the enemy had lots of anti-aircraft fire. Mr. Kennedy asked if they had this on D-Day. Col. Hawkins said that they did not but that they moved it in very fast. Gen. Taylor asked where were they reporting flack and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied: from all over—and with excellent marksmanship. Gen. Taylor asked how the air-ground commo worked and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said the commo gear went down with the ship that was sunk and that there was no commo. 81. Mr. Kennedy asked if the Cuban pilots did well. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said they constantly found excuses for not flying. Gen. Taylor asked what percentage failed and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied that only 35% were “ready to go” and you could count the number of “tigers” on one hand. Col. Beerli took exception to this saying that on D minus 2 we had eight aircraft up and that these made more than one pass over the target. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] observed that at that time the sight of victory was present—but when they got thinking that they were losing it was different. He said that on the morning of D minus [plus?] 2 he had to beg them to go. He observed that they were good until things started going wrong. 82. Mr. Kennedy asked where was the fighting going on at D plus 1 and D plus 2. Admiral Burke said that on D plus 2 Navy recon could find no infantry—they were all apparently in the bush. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said he had no information as to where the fighting was. 83. Mr. Kennedy asked if the Castro forces had come down the road on D plus 1 and Gen. Taylor remarked that he did not see how they could have gotten down there that fast even if they knew where the landing was coming. Col Hawkins said there were tanks in the Red Beach area on D-Day. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] expressed the personal opinion that there was not much fighting done. Gen. Taylor asked if there was any prearranged plan for use of smoke to identify our own people on the ground and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that the air force was concerned exclusively with taking care of the “heavy stuff” and not attacking troops. Mr. Kennedy asked how long the party lasted on Red Beach and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] thought it wasnʼt more than a matter of hours. 84. Mr. Dulles raised the question of the confusion in orders of going after the airfields on D plus 1. Mr. Bissell said that at some point on D-Day we received permission to strike the airfields that night—and then there was some talk of a strike at dusk—but ultimately it was authorized for that night but bad visibility and other factors prevented them carrying it out. Col. Beerli asked [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] if there was a lack of aircraft and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] replied that they were limited to the number of shells on any given target—we were limited to number of aircraft we could use. When we called it off we thought we were losing the war intentionally. This thought was based on the restrictions which had been placed on us. 85. The meeting terminated at approximately 1700 hours. [name not declassified]

175. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Memoranda of Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. The drafter is not listed, but it was probably Colonel Ingelido. The meeting took place at the Central Intelligence Agency at 10 a.m. The participants in the meeting, in addition to Taylor, Kennedy, Dulles, and Burke, were Cabell, Gray, Barnes, Moorhouse, Esterline, Beerli, Hawkins, King, Ingelido, Commander Mitchell, and Lieutenant Colonel Tarwater. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report) Washington, April 25, 1961.

Question: What limitations were placed on CIA with regard to using U.S. military personnel.

Answer: There was no legal limit on the numbers or types of personnel that could be assigned, the only limiting consideration being the problem of disclosure.

Suggestion: It would be helpful if the President was given a memo setting forth the evidences of the direct involvement of Communist personnel in the operation.

Response: CIA agreed to prepare such a memorandum for the President with information copies for the Paramilitary Study Group.

Request: It was requested that a paper and/or map covering a period several months prior to the invasion be prepared indicating all Cubans prepared to revolt.

Response: CIA indicated that a map had been prepared indicating the agents with whom they were in contact and that this would be provided to General Taylor.

Question: Had an attempt been made to have anyone enter the objective area for reconnaissance prior to the operation.

Answer: No. For security reasons and because photographs had given no evidence of any significant activity in the area.

Question: What were the sources of intelligence prior to the operation.

Answer: SpecInt, agent reports and photographs. Photographs were received at least several times a week.

Request: That some of these photographs be made available to the Study Group.

Response: CIA agreed to make these photographs available.

Statement: The point was made that not only U.S. troops were restricted in the action they could take, but we prevented foreigners that we had trained from using their weapons to their maximum capability.

Statement: One of the greatest problems encountered in developing this force was the difficulty in getting the Cubans to sublimate their petty differences for the common good.

Statement: One fact that misled our estimate of the opposition we would meet was that prior to the Zapata Operation there has never been a pitched battle between Cubans.

Request: That all professional military people involved in the operation and in training the force be identified.

Response: CIA indicated this would be provided.

Question: At some point would it be desirable to have the conclusions of all key people involved in the operation.

Answer: Yes.

Request: General Taylor requested a re-briefing on the Air Plan and further information on the reported air ammunition shortage.

Response: CIA indicated this would be provided.

Request: General Taylor requested the reconstitution of the intelligence that influenced the decisions, this to be presented in such form as to indicate the decisions influenced.

At this point Colonel Hawkins briefed on the actual operation. He prefaced his remarks by pointing out that the information on which his report was based was limited and incomplete.

When the 15 April air strikes were originally considered it was suggested that they be conducted for two days without restriction. However, due to political considerations it was decided to conduct limited strikes on D-2 and limited strikes on dawn of D-Day. It was decided to use two B-26 aircraft against each of three airfields on which all Cuban tactical aircraft were based, San Antonio de los Banos, Campo Libertad, and Santiago de Cuba.

Reconnaissance flights on 8, 11 and 13 April indicated the Cubans had 36 combat aircraft although many of these were not operable. Consequently it was decided to increase the aircraft in the air strikes from six to eight with one additional aircraft assigned as a spare.

The D-2 air strikes were planned to destroy Castroʼs combat aircraft on the ground. It now appears that these air strikes destroyed all of Castroʼs tactical aircraft except for two Sea Furies, two B-26s, and three to four T-33s.

Opinions were expressed generally favoring the view that if the D-Day air strikes had been conducted as originally planned all of Castroʼs tactical aircraft would have been destroyed or at least eliminated to the extent that the invasion force could have survived.

It was pointed out that all but eight or nine operable aircraft had been destroyed and that four of these were eliminated on D-Day by the invasion force.

The question was raised as to why the T-33s had not been destroyed. Several possible answers were given, including the restriction against the use of napalm, self-imposed by CIA, and the possibility that the aircraft on one runway had not been attacked.

Question: Were you surprised at the effectiveness of the T-33s.

Answer: Yes.

Question: What led to the decision to conduct air strikes on D-2.

Answer: The strikes were timed to coincide with Nino Diaz landing in the Oriente and it was desired to tie the air strikes in with the defections.

Statement: We knew before the landing that Castro retained operational tactical aircraft.

Question: Why were limitations placed on the air strikes.

Answer: In order to reduce the appearance of a major military operation which would indicate U.S. involvement.

Statement: It is a mistake to focus primary attention on one particular decision. We were operating under the very clear instructions to make this operation appear as one the Cubans could conduct without gross U.S. assistance.

Statement: It was not one decision or one thing that caused failure, but many things.

Statement: In covert operations of this kind political considerations always outweigh the military, with a consequent erosion of the military capability to the point that the operation becomes militarily infeasible.

Statement: This raises one of the vital considerations before this Group, the conflict between the desire for political acceptability and military effectiveness.

Statement: The point was made that political considerations must be given their due weight, but if this results in making the operation militarily infeasible the President should be advised that the plan is no longer feasible. He cannot be expected to remember all the details of a plan nor the significance of one seemingly minor change in a military operation.

Statement: The President had frequent consultations with military representatives.

Statement: The DOD was not consulted in the decision to call off the air strikes.

Statement: It is dangerous to conduct meetings where military advice is required when only one officer from one service is present. This was the case during six or eight meetings.

Question: Were the D-Day air strikes previously approved.

Answer: The paper setting forth the air strikes was passed around at the April 12th meeting.See Document 92. This paper made clear that there would be air strikes, but not an all-out effort. However, this document was only passed around at the meeting, read and considered by some, and collected after the meeting. It is doubtful if the President read it or understood the details.

Question: What led to the cancellation of the air strikes.

Answer: At 1300 Sunday it was understood that the plan, including the air strikes for dawn of D-Day, had been approved. At about 7:00 P.M. CIA representatives were called to Mr. Ruskʼs office. He was concerned over the apparent defection of two rather than one B-26 and an additional cargo plane because he felt these additional defections had caused him to mislead Mr. Stevenson. At 10:30 P.M. the CIA tactical commander was advised that the air strikes had been called off. He most strongly urged that this decision be reconsidered and reversed. In debating the air strikes question and in discussing the action to be taken to strengthen Mr. Stevensonʼs position, the President was contacted. In discussing the air strike question the President said he wasnʼt aware that there were going to be any air strikes on the morning of D-Day. At 2315 D-1 Mr. Rusk announced that there would be no dawn air strikes. At this time the invasion ships were within 5,000 yards of their landing beaches and it was physically impossible to call off the strikes.

Question: Was a strong position on this issue taken with Mr. Rusk.

Answer: Probably not strong enough. It was indicated that the worst would be that the invaders would not have their B-26 support and if the ships were on their way out the force would be denied its resupply capability.

Question: At the 12 April meeting were the air strikes an issue.

Answer: No, the plan appeared to have jelled.

Statement: There were only verbal instructions. These were not written, signed directives and the only papers that were available were fuzzy. The issues were never clearly resolved.

Statement: I understood there was to be one final briefing involving all the participants and setting forth the entire plan. This was never done. Had this briefing been held the ultimate decisions might have been different.

Statement: After cancellation of the air strikes an attempt was made to minimize the probable damage. At 0400 D-Day a CIA representative contacted the State Department to see if the Navyʼs protective CAP could be extended from the 20-mile limit to 15 or preferably a three-mile limit. The State Department objected and the President, in attempting to prevent U.S. attribution, confirmed that the Navyʼs protective CAP limit would not be changed. He did approve, however, EW support. Prior to this Presidential determination an alerting order had been sent to CINC-LANT and he had turned his force around to be in a position to provide CAP and EW support if so ordered.

By the time it became apparent we would not receive air CAP we sent out a message to put the troops ashore and move the ships out to sea.

The brigade troops commenced landing at Blue Beach at 0100.

0300—The Caribe had completed unloading.

0330—The troops unloading from the Alantico were under fire.

0430—Troops landed at Blue Beach.

0600—First LCU ashore.

0630—Enemy air attacks against shipping and Blue Beach commenced.

0640—Friendly aircraft arrived.

1730—Three LCUs had discharged vehicles and tanks.

0825—Castro T-33 shot down by Blagar.

0930—Rio Escondido hit and sunk. Crew members rescued and put aboard Blagar.

[0930]—Brigade reported airstrip ready for use.

1000—Continuous enemy air attacks against withdrawing ships.

1130—Brigade reported only four hours ammunition left.

During the Blue Beach landings the Houston proceeded up the Bay led by the Barbara J. They sent a reconnaissance team ashore and it was immediately attacked from the west flank. Two hundred seventy men did land in the vicinity of Red Beach. However, going ashore they saw lights from what appeared to be a construction project which they had not been previously aware of, and when they got ashore they ran into an enemy force estimated to have 800 troops and 12 tanks.

As the Houston was proceeding out of the Bay it was hit by a bomb and the ship went aground with approximately 130 personnel aboard.

As regards the airborne landing little detailed information is available. However, all the aircraft returned safely reporting that the troops had jumped over their intended landing places. Furthermore, reports indicate some of the airborne personnel were occupying their assigned positions.

During the course of D-Day the decision was made to conduct night air attacks against San Antonio de los Banos and Campo Libertad in an attempt to destroy Castroʼs air capability. The value of these attacks was negligible.

Also during the night of 17-18 April three air drops were made at the landing beaches. One landed in the drop zone, one in the sea, and one drifted inland.

On D+1 at about 0730 the 2d Battalion reported it could not maintain its position without air support for more than 30 minutes.

0824—The Brigade Commander reported that Blue Beach was under attack by 12 tanks and four jet aircraft. The need for ammunition and supplies was repeated.

1010—Red Beach wiped out.

1200—Blue Beach under attack by MIG-15s and T-33s, out of tank ammunition, and almost out of small arms ammunition.

1600—Essex reported long line of tanks and trucks approaching Blue Beach from East.

Enemy air attacks and shortage of ammunition continued to be reported for the rest of the day. Ammunition and food were air-dropped on the airstrip. On the afternoon of D+1 three friendly B-26s intercepted a column of enemy tanks and trucks, causing 1,800 casualties. At this point it was emphasized that the over-all plan had been based on control of the air and this action was cited as evidence of what the B-26s would have been able to accomplish if the air plan had succeeded.

1800–1st Battalion reported under heavy artillery attack.

2000—The Brigade Commander was advised that he would be evacuated after dark. He replied saying, “I will not be evacuated. We will fight to the end here if we have to.”

During the night of 18-19 April Navy CAP was again requested and permission was granted for one hour air CAP between 0630 and 0730. These aircraft were issued instructions to defend the invasion force from enemy air attack, but not to attack ground targets.

When it came time for the friendly forces to launch their air strikes the Cuban air crews were either exhausted or demoralized by the lack of air cover, consequently American crews were dispatched. One American crew was shot down during the period of Navy air cover and another was shot down when air cover was not provided.

At 0600 on the 19th of April enemy air strikes commenced. From 0710 to 1430 the enemy was closing in and the Brigade Commander was sending frantic appeals for air cover. Finally at 1430 he sent his final message saying, “Am destroying all equipment and communications. Tanks are in sight. I have nothing left to fight with. Am taking to woods. I cannot wait for you.”

Question: What sort of anti-tank equipment did the force have?

Answer: A number of 3.5-inch bazookas; five tanks; two 75 mm recoilless rifles; and an undetermined number of anti-tank mines.

Statement: In considering the possible reasons for the shooting down of the B-26 during the period of Navy air CAP it was suggested that the rules of engagement may have unduly restricted the Navy.

Question: What specific intelligence got to the President?

Answer: NIEs, intelligence annexes and briefings.

Statement: It would be desirable to examine the ground rules and determine the price we paid to try and keep within political limitations.

Statement: It appears this operation was simply too big to remain covert.

Colonel Beerli, head of Air Operations for the CIA, briefed on air aspects of the operation. His position for this operation was coordinated with Colonel Hawkins. Lieutenant Colonel Gaines was his chief deputy for this operation. Lieutenant Colonel Gaines had a staff of 14 people working on this operation in Washington. Except for the security, administration and cover people the personnel assigned were members of the Air Force. The actual training site in Guatemala was run primarily by Major Campbell with a force of 20 people.

The point was made that one of the greatest procedural difficulties resulted from the physical separation of the air staff from the rest of the planners under Colonel Hawkins.

Colonel Beerli stated that he had 316 personnel at Puerto Cabezas, of whom 159 were Americans. The Cuban crews were recruited in Miami from 92 personnel that were screened. From these personnel they recruited and/or developed 17 B-26 crews and five C-46 crews. As far as the concept of air operations was concerned the concept varied very little from the beginning. The primary effort was being directed toward eliminating the enemy air force and to provide close support. On the 13th of April the photos indicated that Castroʼs combat aircraft were located on three airfields. On D-2 eight aircraft were committed against these fields with the results previously mentioned. It was pointed out that the B-26s had been the primary concern and the capability of the T-33s hadnʼt been appreciated as it wasnʼt believed that these aircraft were armed.

By late afternoon of D-1 photos indicated that instead of dispersing his aircraft Castro had concentrated them at San Antonio de los Banos.

After the cancellation of the dawn air strikes on D-Day the pilots were briefed to provide close support for the invasion force with at least two aircraft over the beach at all times. Thirteen missions were launched on D-Day in providing close support to the invasion force and in protecting against hostile vessels.

That night six B-26 aircraft were launched against Cuban airfields. However, two aircraft aborted on take-off and the others were not able to identify their targets due to haze.

On D+1 six aircraft were scheduled in support of the beachhead. On the night of D+1 two aircraft got off and struck San Antonio de los Banos. On Wednesday morning two B-26s were committed again and two more were lost.

In summary there were 13 strikes on D-Day, four on D-Day night, six on D+1, and seven on D+2, for a total of 39 air strikes. Seven aircraft were lost in these operations. Furthermore, six, C-54s made air resupply drops and one C-46 landed on the beachhead airstrip on the evening of D-Day.

Statement: It is believed that the Cuban pilots did as well as could be expected and they would have done better in an aura of victory.

Following this the Group were read a paper by Colonel Hawkins in which he set forth his personal opinion as to some of the deficiencies which became apparent during the operation.See Document 173. Among these deficiencies were:

The lack of clear-cut policy directives signed. He does not believe that verbal instructions are sufficient.

The slowness of government machinery in making policy decisions.

Overcentralization of control. This prompted some discussion, resulting in the statement that the CIA doesnʼt have the capability to organize and train paramilitary forces. At this point a message was read from Colonel Hawkins just prior to the invasion in which he indicated that the invasion force was better armed and equipped than some U.S. Infantry units and that Lieutenant Colonel Gaines believed the air unit was as well qualified as the best U.S. Air Force squadron.See Document 98.

Lack of adequate organization and staff. The paramilitary responsibility should go to the DOD.

Training conditions were unsatisfactory. The desirability of using bases on Saipan or in the United States was considered with no conclusions reached.

The meeting adjourned.

176. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. The drafter is not listed, but it was probably Colonel Tarwater. The meeting was the fourth in the series conducted by the Cuba Study Group and took place at the Pentagon for a brief discussion of Indochina and subsequently at the Central Intelligence Agency for the discussion of Cuba. The participants in the meeting, in addition to Taylor, Kennedy, Dulles, and Burke, were Cabell, Gray, Bissell, Mitchell, Tarwater, and General McGarr for the discussion of Indochina. Washington, April 26, 1961.

[Here follows a brief discussion of the problems posed by the Communist insurgency in Indochina.]

Question: How did the President get his intelligence on this operation.Although not identified in the source text, Bissell probably answered most of the questions relating to intelligence and the CIAʼs role, while Gray probably provided the information relating to the briefing of the JCS.

Answer: He received a daily intelligence bulletin which included information on Cuba and intelligence was discussed at all the task force meetings. However, he never received any special intelligence briefings, as such, on this problem.

At this point it was decided that it would be helpful to run through the intelligence information contained in the 11 March paperDocument 58. on the proposed operation against Cuba. This intelligence in essence indicated that despite growing discontent within Cuba time was against us. Castro was increasing his police state controls and his military effectiveness to the extent that unless some outside support, some shock action, was taken within six months, it would probably be militarily infeasible to overthrow Castro with a force composed of Cuban exiles.

Statement: It should be made very clear that the idea that time was running out weighed very heavily in the decision making.

Question: You mentioned the requirement for shock and yet the invasion plan that was finally implemented was purposely limited.

Answer: But the purpose of this, sir, was not to limit the shock on the Cubans, but rather to limit the shock on the rest of the world, making it appear that the invasion was something that the Cubans could do by themselves.

At this point in the meeting the intelligence available to the planners and the tactical commander was discussed. With regard to Castroʼs air force it was stated that the location of all Castro aircraft was known, even to the extent of knowing which aircraft were operational and which were not. They were surprised, however, by the capabilities of the pilots which Castrocommitted against the invasion force. In retrospect it was believed that these aircraft were probably flown by 50 Cuban pilots that had been trained in Czechoslovakia and returned to Cuba a few days before the invasion.

With regard to Castroʼs navy, it was believed that the capability of this force was low and that they would not be inclined to fight. This estimate held good, for only three small vessels were committed, two of which were sunk, while their larger naval units remained at their stations.

The weakest tactical intelligence was on the location of the ground troops. A reason for this was because the militia was not well organized in the sense that no two units were organized exactly the same nor with the same number of personnel. Intelligence was aware, however, of the location of Castroʼs armored units and his military headquarters. In this connection it had been pointed out that Castro had a force of 6,000 troops armed with tanks and artillery which could arrive at the beachhead within 10 hours. Itʼs believed the tanks used against the invaders were part of this force. If the troops fighting the invasion force were militia, then the estimate of the militiaʼs willingness to fight was incorrect. However, if this force was not militia, but rather the force mentioned above spearheaded by foreigners, then the estimates were not wrong.

The possibility that this force was spearheaded by Czechoslovakians was indicated by the report that one of the tanks knocked out had three persons aboard that were not Cuban. Further, another report said that some of the command chatter was in a foreign tongue. With regard to the absence of uprising throughout Cuba during the period of the invasions, it should be pointed out that reports from agents of the numbers of people that were likely to support the invasion had been reduced from 20-30,000 down to 2,500 to 3,000 active guerrillas. It was also stated in the intelligence estimates that there would not be any major uprisings until the Cubans could see visible evidence of the invasion force. Consequently, no major uprisings were anticipated until the invasion force had been able to take towns in the Matanzas Province.

Statement: You are now describing much more than a successful lodgment.

Response: Yes, but we felt that the force had to move out to make the lodgment visible.

Question: Inasmuch as this was a key element in the JCS decision, was it ever made clear to them this degree of success was necessary in the ultimate success of the operation.

Answer: I believe the impression was given that the lodgment should last for at least a week. This would have been a significant factor in influencing potential dissidents.

Statement: It was also hoped that the landings in the Oriente and uprisings in the Pinar del Rio would help create the catalyst necessary to trigger uprisings throughout Cuba.

Statement: One of the factors that made us think that the resistance potential within Cuba was substantial was the fact that we had a backlog of 19 requests from our agents for supplies, arms and ammunition for 8,000 people. These people were crying for supplies. Had we been able to provide this equipment these people would have had something to rise with.

At this point General Taylor requested a brief tabulation of how many reports had been received indicating that people were ready to rise against Castro, and also indicating the number of people that were ready to rise.

Statement: Special Intelligence also gave indication of government concern with dissident activities. These evidences were further substantiated by debriefings of people coming out of Cuba.

Question: At any time did you give an estimate of the resistance potential within Cuba.

Answer: I donʼt believe any numerical estimate was given.

Question: You did expect enough uprisings throughout the country, however, to start the army of liberation.

Answer: Yes.

Question: At no point, however, was any formal estimate of this possibility given.

Answer: I have a paper of 3 MarchNot found. in which it was estimated that between 2,500 and 3,000 were actively engaged against Castro, that 20,000 were potential supporters of the invasion force, and that 25% of the population was opposed to the Castro regime.

Question: Did you ever actually define the degree of success necessary to provoke adequate uprising to permit ultimate success.

Answer: To establish a beachhead and hold it for some time, approximately a week, together with activities by our air units carrying out their scheduled missions.

Question: Do you believe that the impression prevailed that there would be spontaneous uprisings.

Answer: I myself didnʼt believe there would be major uprisings within 24 to 48 hours.

Question: Do you recall what the JCS said on this issue.

Answer: They said the invasion force had a reasonable chance of establishing a lodgment and that ultimate success would depend on uprisings within Cuba.

At this point the JCS Evaluation of the alternate objective area proposals was read.Reference is to JCSM-166-61, March 15, Document 62. Following this the question was raised as to whether JCS had ever acted on the Zapata Plan. The answer was given that the JCS had been advised of the change by General Gray.

Question: Where in the JCS Evaluation of the Zapata Plan does it say that there will be air strikes.

Answer: It doesnʼt.

Statement: At this stage of the game there was no plan—only concepts. There was no time to develop a plan as such.

Statement: At this point General Gray stated that as he remembered, and as his notes indicate, the Joint Chiefs understood that the Zapata Plan included only D-Day strikes and no pre-D-Day strikes.

Question: How much time did the JCS give to this problem.

Answer: About one hour. It should be pointed out, however, that at the time the JCS considered the alternatives, the Trinidad Plan had not been ruled out and so in the evaluation of the alternatives it was stated that Zapata was the best of alternatives, however, the Trinidad Plan still had the best hope of success.

Question: When were the JCS or their representatives first briefed on the original plan.

Answer: On 3 February.

Question: Was a careful study of this plan made at this time.

Answer: Yes

Question: The basic Trinidad Plan did not change prior to March 11 when alternative proposals had been requested.

Answer: This is essentially correct.

Question: Was Mr. Rusk briefed on the Cuba Plan prior to 10 March.

Answer: I believe he was briefed on some elements of the plan, but not on the military details.

Statement: State Department representatives, however, had continued to oppose the plan.

Statement: In attempting to overcome State Department objections, CIA prior to March 11 had agreed to give up the pre-D-Day air strikes.

Statement: The 11 March meeting resulted in two new parameters for the operation. First, a less spectacular landing and, second, possession of an airfield to which the B-26 aircraft could be attributed.

Statement: These decisions led to the hurried search for alternative operational concepts that would meet the new parameters.

Statement: JCS representatives were briefed on these concepts on the 14th of March.

Question: What factors led to the decision to split the force in the Zapata Plan.

Answer: Further investigation had revealed that the airfield at Red Beach was inadequate for our purposes. It also revealed there was an airfield south of Red Beach that was adequate to our needs. Consequently the decision to split the force was made in order to protect the airfield and to protect the defiles into the landing area. Furthermore, we were concerned about the fact that the ships that went to Red Beach had an 18-mile run and might not get out.

Statement: At the 15 March meeting the President indicated that he did not like the dawn landings and directed that this aspect be reconsidered. On the 16th of March the President approved the revised Zapata Plan for progressive implementation, but he retained the ability to cancel.

Question: At the 16 March meeting was the JCS preference for the original Trinidad Plan over the Zapata Plan presented.

Answer: I donʼt think so.

Question: Do you think it was in the Presidentʼs mind that these men could disappear as a guerrilla force if necessary.

Answer: Yes.

Statement: The Zapata area has traditionally been an area for guerrilla operations.

Response: When we went to the State Department we discussed the seriousness of calling off the air strikes. However, I did not say that we would cancel the operation because at this time we did not have the ability to call it off.

Statement: I canʼt believe that if the President had understood how important the air strikes were that he would have called them off.

Response: All members of the Group concurred.

Statement: If the Presidentʼs decision had been made earlier I would have flown out to Glen Ora and discussed the matter with him. However, when the decision was finally made it was too late to do this.

At this point Mr. Bissell gave some of his personal views as to some of the wrong judgments made. First, the underestimation of Castroʼs capability in certain specific respects, mainly his organization ability, speed of movement and will to fight. We also underestimated his air capability. Example, contrary to our opinion, the T-33s were armed and flown with skill, loyalty and determination. In retrospect, some of the reasons for this underestimation may have been the use by Castro of bloc technicians and, if this is so, it is believed that one of their greatest contributions may have been in the staff work. Our second major mistake was our failure to develop an adequate air capability. We should have had at least 50% more B-26 pilots. We should have been able to foresee the need for these pilots. We should have allowed for some attrition, and the two aircraft cover over the beach was understated. Another major mistake was the restriction on the employment of our air capability between D-2 and D-Day. As to the administrative and organizational shortcomings, it is believed that these contributed much to the final failure. Another error was involved in the inevitable conflict between the requirements for military effectiveness and those of disclaimability. In the late stages of this operation I believe unnecessary concessions were made in favor of disclaimability which were unrealistic. Inasmuch as so much of the operation was already common knowledge, our chances of success would have been much greater if we had been allowed to use U.S. soldiers of fortune and to make air strikes from U.S. bases. In any future operations a cold-blooded appraisal should be made of the degree to which it is necessary to make concessions in favor of disclaimability as opposed to military effectiveness.

At this point Mr. Dulles interjected that he was in basic agreement, but he would like to add two additional items. First, he felt that he should have asked the Navy their opinion of what was necessary to assure that the men would get safely ashore with their material during a night landing on an unfamiliar coast. This opinion should have been rendered without concern for political considerations. Another factor was that the President was faced with hurried and difficult decisions. We had made it very clear to him that to call off the operation would have resulted in a very unpleasant situation.

Statement: The odds against any operation of this kind are almost insurmountable until the Government faces up to making sharp decisions promptly.

Question: Did the Government give the CIA an almost impossible job?

Answer: I donʼt believe so. I think we were closer to success than you realize.

Statement: Despite the disaster the U.S. must retain the capability for unofficial military actions. Whenever the U.S. engages in this sort of operation we will again be faced with the same dilemma of disclaima-bility versus military effectiveness. In this connection, I think we should consider changing our overt foreign policy posture for we have a tendency to make our operations extremely difficult by oversanctimonious announcements.

Statement: In the future we must carry out any operations of this type in such manner that the President, who has shown the highest courage, will not have to assume the responsibility.

177. Editorial Note

The rescue operations conducted by the Navy after the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation were discontinued on April 26, 1961. (CTG 81.8 telegram 262004 to CINCLANTFLT, April 26; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) On April 23 Admiral Clark had rescued an additional 24 members of the Cuban Expeditionary Force from the Bay of Pigs area. (CINCLANTFLT telegram 240438Z to COM-SECONDFLT, April 23; ibid.) Admiral Dennison instructed Vice Admiral Ricketts, Commander of the Second Fleet, to support Clarkʼs “humanitarian mission” if it became necessary to protect the U.S. forces involved, and to do so “with our banners flying.” (Ibid.) No conflict with Cuban forces ensued, however, and the search for survivors thereafter proved futile. Ricketts summed up the frustration of the United States Naval forces, which stood off the coast of Cuba during the Bay of Pigs operation, in a cable to Burke and Dennison on April 23: “Beyond my horizon, but not far distant, lie the beaches on which died recently many who had great faith in us. Within my horizon steams the naval power that could have justified that faith. I view it with both pride and anguish.” (COMSECONDFLT telegram 232129Z to CNO and CINC-LANTFLT, April 23; ibid.)

178. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. Washington, April 26, 1961.

JCSM-278-61

SUBJECT Cuba (U) 1. Reference is made to your memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 20 April 1961, subject as above.Document 159. This memorandum with Appendices is responsive to questions posed by you in reference memorandum. 2. Appendix A contains an analysis of courses of action. Appendix D contains a brief outline plan based upon CINCLANT Operation Plan 312-61Not found. which will provide for the overthrow of the Castro government by the application of US military force, the course of action considered best suited to accomplishment of the objective. 3. This plan, with appropriate additional instructions to CINC-LANT as to timing and manner of execution, is responsive to the requirement for a military plan to accomplish the desired objective. The plan is well conceived, has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and will insure quick overthrow of the Castro government. 4. There is a need for a well conceived political program to insure rapid turnover of control of government to designated Cuban authorities and permit the rapid withdrawal of US forces. It is recommended that the Secretary of State be requested to develop guidance in support of this operation. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:Earle G. WheelerWheeler signed for Burke above Burkeʼs typed signature. Appendix A

ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTION

1. The objective as stated by the Secretary of Defense is to overthrow the Castro regime by the application of military force. 2. The analysis which follows has taken into consideration the world reaction to the abortive invasion of Cuba. Most nations apparently believe that the United States was wrong to give any support to this operation, particularly since there was no resultant uprising by the Cuban people. In the United Nations the prestige of the United States has deteriorated, and there are indications that the Latin American nations have lost some confidence in the United States. Within Cuba the incident has probably had the effect of strengthening the control held by the Castro government, instilling confidence and loyalty in the militia and other forces, and demoralizing the dissident elements which remain. 3. Any military effort undertaken by the United States against Cuba will engender strong criticism by most of the world. If a military action or series of actions take appreciable time to accomplish the overthrow of the Castro government, this time can be used to the advantage of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and Castro in strengthening his defenses. More important, world Communism can use this period of time to advantage in building up a massive, world-wide, anti-US propaganda effort against the United States course of action, including introduction of a resolution to the UN. If the United States were to embark on such a course, and then, through the pressure of world opinion be forced to abandon its action, the result would be a severe blow to the prestige, the objectives, and the national interests of the United States. Achieving world-wide surprise in an undertaking like this is extremely important. It seems apparent, therefore, that any military operation undertaken to accomplish the above objective should be swift, sharp, and overwhelming and should present the remainder of the world with a fait accompli. 4. The following alternative programs have been considered: a. Naval and Air Blockade. A blockade could be instituted immediately and could be effective. It would stop the influx of Bloc military equipment and personnel, and would do much to halt the export of Communism from Cuba to Latin America. The Cuban economy, in particular the oil industry, is especially vulnerable to blockade, and it is believed that a blockade, by itself, could reduce the Cuban economy to chaos.McNamara added a marginal handwritten note at this point which reads: “how soon would it force [illegible word] capitulation? However, a blockade would force great hardships on the Cuban people regardless of political belief, and it is likely that their plight would generate strong resentment in all of Latin America. Since a blockade must be time-consuming, world resistance could be skillfully built up by the Bloc, as pointed out previously, and the blockade might have to be abandoned. Since use of blockade would not, by itself, assure the objective it is not recommended as the only course of action. However, blockade should be utilized to complement a military invasion and, if such an invasion is to be delayed for an appreciable period of time, a limited blockade against military supplies and equipment should be instituted to prevent build-up of Cuban military strength. b. Overt Support of Cuban Dissident Forces. This course of action would strengthen the dissident elements both materially and psychologically. The recent defeat of the invading dissident elements has undoubtedly had a demoralizing effect on them, and has probably weakened them in numbers and organization. Reorganizing these groups, and attracting additional numbers in face of current repressive measures taken by Castro will be extremely difficult. Even if sufficient numbers could be organized, their training would take much time, and it seems evident that their quality could never come up to US standards. These factors all seem to indicate that this course of action by itself would give little assurance of accomplishing the objective, and it is therefore not recommended. While support to dissident elements should not be chosen as the main course of action, it should not be abandoned. These elements can be of great assistance in intelligence collection, serve as focal points for uprisings, and assist in military operations and continual harassment of the Castro regime. Some form of support in Cuba is necessary to give encouragement to resistance movements in Cuba and other countries and to impress them with the fact that the United States will not abandon them. The success of a military operation against Cuba, however, should not be made dependent upon the actions of any dissident elements. c. Military Intervention by the Organization of American States. In world opinion, the US has replaced its previous policy of unilateral US action to prevent extra-continental interference in the affairs of this hemisphere, fundamental to the Monroe Doctrine, with a policy of collective action through the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Rio Pact. While instability in Latin America is due fundamentally to the lack of social and economic progress, instability has been increased and intervention by the Sino-Soviets in the affairs of this hemisphere has occurred partly because of the unwillingness of the United States to act unilaterally in the face of its treaty restrictions and the unwillingness of the OAS to act. The unwillingness of the OAS nations to act against Cuba may be attributed to a long-standing fear of intervention by any country (particularly the United States) in their own internal affairs, as well as fear of reaction within their individual countries. Actually, the organization itself is weak. It is a system of 21 sovereign nations, each of which has equal vote. Any decision by the OAS must be a compromise that is acceptable to two-thirds of the member states. OAS military actions would be unlikely unless a majority of the states were convinced that they were faced with a clearly discernible external threat. Communist tactics, however, are subtle and cleverly screened. Although there is a growing awareness among the Latin American nations that the total-itarian Castro government is becoming a threat to their security, they do not yet consider it a clear and present danger. For these reasons OAS military action against Cuba is unlikely for the present. d. Overt US Actions Supported by Latin American Volunteers. Participation by volunteers from Latin America in direct US military action against Cuba would soften the impression that the United States would be taking unilateral action contrary to the spirit of the UN and the OAS. In order to be convincing, it would have to be evident that there was a large number of volunteers coming from a variety of Latin American nations. The assembly and organization of these volunteers would be time-consuming, and all security of the operation would be lost. The success of this course of action seems unlikely and it is not recommended in any form. e. Unilateral US Action (1) Unilateral military action by the United States offers the advantages that there need be no compromise in pursuing US objectives, and that a reasonable degree of surprise can be achieved. Disadvantages are that strong criticism will be voiced by many nations of all political beliefs, and that the Latin American nations may become particularly distrustful of the United States. (2) If the United States could overthrow the Castro government through a swift and decisive action, it is believed that all nations would, even while criticizing, accept a fait accompli, especially since they recognize the inherent danger to the basic security of a nation posed by a hostile regime located in close proximity. There is also a good possibility that a decisive action taken by the United States against Communism would renew the confidence of many in the Free World whose faith in our leadership has been faltering. (3) An overt US action, if taken, must be assured of success. Physical capture and control of the Cuban government and key facilities is the only means of insuring that the objective of overthrowing the Castro government is achieved. CINCLANT Operation Plan 312-61 (Cuba), which has previously been reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides the means of achieving this objective. Implementation of the plan should be in such a manner as to achieve surprise, both world-wide and tactical, and to accomplish the objective in the shortest time possible. (4) Concurrent supporting actions should be taken as required, to assist in the accomplishment of the objective and to insure the establishment in Cuba of a situation satisfactory to the United States following the overthrow of the Castro government. Appropriate agencies of the Federal government should participate in this planning. One action that is recommended is the creation of an incident which will provide justification for the overthrow of the Castro government by the United States. Such an incident must be carefully planned and handled, to insure that it is plausible and that it occurs prior to any indication that the United States has decided to take military action against Cuba. Premature exposure of the fact that the incident was created by the United States could cause a shift in sentiment by the Cuban people against the United States. 5. More deliberate action a. Another alternative to be examined is that of following a more deliberate course, characterized by extensive preparations both military and political. The military forces to be used in the operation could be brought to peak effectiveness at the time desired, and logistic arrangements could be thorough and complete. If the military posture in Cuba continued to improve, requiring additional assault forces to invade Cuba, these forces could be obtained through a selective increase of forces as shown in Annex C to Appendix F.Neither printed. The time of assault could be chosen during a period when world tensions are low, minimizing the risk of having to conduct military operations in more than one place. The chances of achieving tactical surprise might be enhanced by planning the invasion for a time which coincided with routine training exercises. b. With sufficient time available a “Freedom Brigade” composed of Cuban Volunteers inducted into the US Army could form the basis for a flexible organization which could contribute to guerrilla and unconventional operations, the spearhead of any overt military action and post combat reconstruction. Such a force would also have a psychological effect on Cuba and could be used to absorb Cuban manpower in the US and Caribbean area. The unit, as US leadership is replaced by indigenous leadership, could be discharged to be utilized as a purely national force. c. Politically the United States could make a concerted effort to establish world support and acceptance of the necessity for taking action against the Castro government. Advantage could be taken of favorable political situations as they develop. Military action could be planned for a time when international bodies such as the UN and the Organization of American States are not in session, and when nations are preoccupied with other problems. Particular effort could be made to get OAS to propose or support action in Cuba. d. While a more deliberate course of action offers some advantages, past history seems to indicate that time is on the side of Castro. An invasion should not be conducted during the hurricane season, which lasts from August through November. The Castro regime could use this time to strengthen itself militarily and internally to the point that it would require a large-scale effort to overthrow him. Since this course of action would probably require large military effort, and shows little assurance of achieving the implicit political objectives, it is not recommended. 6. From a military point of view, it is recommended that the course of action proposed in paragraph 4 e above, in conjunction with the courses of action discussed in paragraphs 4 a and 4 b, be adopted if it is decided to accomplish the stated objective.

[Here follow Appendix B, “An Appraisal of the Strength of the Cuban Military Forces”, and Appendix C, “An Appraisal of the Probable Behaviour of Cuban Civilian Population During the Period of Military Action”.]

Appendix D

OUTLINE OPLAN

Task Organization (See Annex A Attached)

1. Situation a. Current Intelligence b. Enemy forces are organized Cuban military forces, Cuban militia, para-military groups and mobs, and possibly, pro-Castro “volunteers” from Latin America communist elements. c. Friendly Forces: (1) US Department of State is responsible for evacuation of non-combatants, establishment of “Status of Forces” agreements, provisional local law enforcement agencies, base rights and overflight rights as required; and will provide for logistic support to indigenous personnel after the first five days of the operation. (2) MSTS and MATS will provide augmenting transportation as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (3) Central Intelligence Agency will support the operation. (4) Rio Pact forces and indigenous forces may offer assistance. 2.

Mission

Commander in Chief Atlantic will, when directed, conduct military operations in Cuba in order to accomplish the following: Defend the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay; restore and maintain order; support or reestablish the authority of a Cuban Government friendly to the United States, and support the national policy of the United States.

3. Execution a. In the event that military operations are directed, any or all of the following courses of action may be undertaken by CINCLANT: (1) Reinforce and actively defend the Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay. (2) Interdict Cuban lines of communication. (3) Neutralize Cuban offensive capability by overt attack against military installations. (4) Conduct Naval and air blockade of Cuba. (5) Conduct assault operations to accomplish the mission. b. Concept of Operations (1) Western Cuba. When directed, operations in Western Cuba will be conducted by Army Airborne, Naval Amphibious, and Air Force and Naval Air Forces with the objective of seizing the Havana port and airfield complex, communications and government facilities in order to establish a base for further operations. Thereafter, operations will be expanded as required in order to accomplish the over-all mission. (2) Eastern Cuba. Naval and Marine Forces under command of COMNAVBASE GTMO, will conduct operations to (a) defend the Naval Base at Guantanamo, (b) protect and/or evacuate United States and other designated nationals, (c) maintain a base for further operations. (3) It is essential that operations be conducted with rapidity and decisiveness by a concurrent amphibious and airborne assault in Western Cuba. This will require that the amphibious elements be mounted and sail prior to deployment of airborne elements to the objective area. The combined airborne-amphibious assault and link-up of forces will ensure early availability of medium tanks and artillery in support of the airborne forces. The army seaborne echelon must be loaded out and sail so as to be available to commence off-loading on D-day. (4) Amphibious forces in Western Cuba will be relieved and withdrawn as soon as practicable for further operations in the Eastern Cuban area.McNamara added a handwritten marginal note at this point that reads: “Should not Eastern and Western plans be carried out simultaneously?” (5) By 60-90 days after the initial landing of combat forces it is expected that conditions will permit the utilization of other forces as occupation troops. (6) The “objective areas” are initially the Western Cuba area for Army-Naval-Air Force operations and the Guantanamo area for Naval operations. Other objectives such as the Isle of Pines, specific cities, industrial plants or transportation facilities will be designated, depend-ent upon conditions prevailing at the time. c. Phasing (1) Phase I (a) Activation of operating headquarters. (b) Reinforcement and defense of Naval Base at Guantanamo. (2) Phase II (a) Naval Task Force deploys to objective areas. (b) Army Task Force deploys combat and service units to staging bases, prepared for airborne assault operations; deploys to objective area on order.At the bottom of this page of the Outline Plan McNamara noted: “Too much boiler plate and not enough detailed planning”. (c) Air Force Task Force deploys tactical elements to advanced operating airfields as required and air lifts elements of the Army Task Force to staging bases. (3)

Phase III

Commander Joint Task Force conducts concurrent airborne and amphibious assault operations in the Havana area and supports defensive operations in the Guantanamo area.

(4) Phase IV (a) Commander Joint Task Force conducts amphibious assault and other operations in the Eastern Cuban area to seize Santiago and other objectives as required. (b) Offensive land operations will be subsequently conducted to link up Army Forces, Western Cuba and Marine Forces, Eastern Cuba, if required. 4. Administration and Logistics are normal for Joint Operations and will be based on the anticipation of sustained operations for a period of 60-90 days. 5. Command and Signal matters are normal for Joint Operations. Commander Amphibious Force, US Atlantic Fleet will be alternate Joint Task Force Commander to Commander Second Fleet. Communications will be in accordance with current CINCLANTFLT procedures. Annex A to Appendix D

TASK ORGANIZATION

1. Atlantic Command—CINCLANT a. US Atlantic Fleet—CINCLANTFLT b. Joint Task Force—COMSECONDFLT (1) Naval Task Force—COMSECONDFLT (a) Striking and covering forces which comprise combatant air and naval elements plus underway replenishment group. (b) Amphibious Task Force which comprises amphibious shipping, one command ship, eight destroyers and a landing force (II Marine Expeditionary Force) made up of: Headquarters, II MEF 2nd Marine Division (-) 2nd Marine Air Wing (-) Force troops, Atlantic (2) Army Task ForceIn the margin at this point McNamara posed the question: “Is this enough?” At the bottom of the page he asked for the total number of men involved in the Army Task Force. (a) XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters (b) 82nd Airborne Division (c) 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (d) 4th/68 Tank Battalion (e) 2nd Infantry Brigade (f) 56th Artillery Group (g) Special forces and civil affairs teams (3) Air Force Task Force (a) One Command Headquarters (b) Two Troop Carrier Wings (c) Four Tactical Fighter Squadrons (d) One Tactical Control Element (e) One half Tactical Reconnaissance Sqaudron c. CIA Force Atlantic (when activated) d. Special Operations Task Force Atlantic (when activated) e.

On Call Forces

Additional US forces as designated and directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if required. It is anticipated that “On Call” forces will be the 4th Infantry or 101st Airborne Division, one Armored Combat Command, two additional Tactical Fighter Squadrons and uncommitted forces of the Atlantic Fleet. State of readiness to be determined by JCS.

Augmentation of Air and Surface Lift

MATS and MSTS provide air and surface lift as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Annex B to Appendix D

OPTIMUM TIMING

1. The Castro regime is currently occupied in rounding up those dissident elements which have been exposed or which are in any way under suspicion. Time affords the regime the opportunity of crushing most opposition, imposing tighter control, strengthening its military posture, and propagandizing the public. If time passes without an indication that outside help will be provided to the Cuban resistance movement, the will to resist will be progressively weakened. Time allows world communism to marshall opposition to any move taken by the United States to overthrow Castro. 2. The hurricane season in the Caribbean normally begins in August. A military operation in that area should not be started later than July.A note by McNamara at this point reads: “between 7/15 + 12/1?” 3. National Guard and Reserve Army divisions are brought to active duty for annual training commencing in June. If the Communist Bloc creates incidents in other areas these divisions could remain on active duty and other forces such as the 1st and 2nd US Army divisions released for action in other areas. 4. Subsequent to the overthrow of the Castro government a regime which is satisfactory to US objectives must be established in Cuba. In view of the current disorganization within the Cuban resistance movement, the time required to insure that such a government is prepared to take firm control is unknown. Since the political actions which will follow military operations will probably determine the long-range success or failure of the entire operation, this factor assumes great importance. 5. With no previous warning it will take a period of 18 days from the time preparatory actions are started until the first assault landings can be made in Cuba. Prior warning, permitting preliminary preparation, could reduce this time to ten days without giving advance notice to the rest of the world. Every effort should be made to conceal the purpose of the operation once troop embarkation has commenced. 6. If it is decided to overthrow the Castro government, the operation should be initiated as soon as possible. Annex C to Appendix D

ESTIMATE OF TIME TO ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVES

D-day and A-hour are the day and time of the coordinated airborne and Marine assault on Western Cuba in the Havana area. Specific military actions, in phases, as included in current planning are shown below: Phase Day Events Phase I D-18McNamara noted at this point: “could be cut to D-10 with prior warning”. Decision to implement or prepare to implement plan for US intervention in Cuba. —Alert CINCLANT, CIA, Department of State and other Unified and Specified Commanders. —CINCLANT notifies his component commanders, forces alterted. Joint Task Force Headquarters activated. —Implementing forces prepare for deployment. —Amphibious shipping proceeds to embarkation ports. —Reinforcement of Guantanamo. —Evacuation of dependents from Guantanamo. —Marshalling of supporting MSTS sea lift. —Commander Special Operations Task Force Atlantic reports to Commander Joint Task Force. Phase II —Form and deploy Naval Task Force. —Deploy Army forces to staging bases and loading out ports. Load and deploy on order. —Deploy Air Force tactical elements to advanced airfields and prepare for air operations. Phase III Day: D-5 —Decision to accomplish plan for US intervention in Cuba, if not previously determined. —Departure of Army ground forces via sea lift. —Departure of Marine forces in amphibious shipping. —Diversions, as may be planned by CINC-LANT concerning weather, and cover activ-ities. D-day —Coordinated airborne and Marine assault Western Cuba with supporting air strikes, air reconnaissance and blockade as required.At this point McNamara posed the following question in the margin: “Should not force be expanded to permit simultaneous strikes West and East Cuba?” D+2 to D+4 —Isolation of Havana. D+6 to D+8 —Control of Havana. Phase IV D+17 to D+19 —Control of Santiago De Cuba. D+24 to D+34 —East-West Linkup of US forces. D+30 to D+54 —Cessation of Organized Resistance. D+60 to D+90 —Withdrawal of combat forces.

Annex D to Appendix D

ESTIMATE OF CASUALTIES

1. No reliable estimate of either friendly or enemy losses can be stated at this time. Such losses will be directly related to the intensity of Cuban resistance and inversely related to the speed and effectiveness of the assault by US forces. 2. Assuming that Army forces are committed in both the number and manner envisioned in the current operations plan, Army planners have estimated that ground forces would sustain approximately sixteen (16%) percent casualties.McNamara added a marginal note at this point asking for a specific number of pro-jected casualties. This estimate includes casualties of all types and is based upon a thirty (30) day operation with four (4) days of heavy fighting, the intensity of combat tapering off after that time. 3. In view of the influence of political, psychological, and other similar considerations, the effect of which is unknown at this time, any estimate of Cuban casualties would be so hypothetical as to have little practical value. No estimate of Cuban casualties, therefore, is provided.

[Here follow Appendix E, “Contingencies That the US Should Be Prepared To Face in the Event of Operations in Cuba” and Appendix F, “Residual US Forces”.]

179. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/61-4/61. Secret. The memorandum is a draft and is not initialed; it was not uncommon, however, for such papers to go forward in draft form. Washington, April 26, 1961.

Here are few scattered thoughts on the “Cuba” problem.

Cuba is a threat to the security of the United States in two basic ways: 1. As a direct military menace in the Caribbean, a menace which will be intensified as communist arms shipments continue. However, even this increased danger will be minimal. Our treaty obligations commit us to the defense of any American nation which is attacked directly. Any military moves by Castro could be met immediately by our forces. Similarly we could intervene in case of Castro military aid to guerilla operations in the Americas. 2.

As an exporter of revolution: There is no doubt that Cuba is being used as a base for export of the communist-fidelista revolution. This is done through the actual supply of funds and technical assistance to insurgent elements, through widespread and reasonably effective prop-aganda apparatus including a news service and radio network and through the use of Cuba as an example of the alliance between fidelismo and necessary social reform—identification with the welfare of the people.

This threat is significant—especially in the Caribbean area. However, even here, in the last six months there has been a significant decline in Cuban effectiveness. This has come because of the growing isolation of communist-fidelista elements from the Democratic left as Castroʼs pro-Soviet bent has become more apparent; and as Castro has become increasingly erratic in his personal behavior. There are signs, in fact, that, the communists are looking for another, more stable, hero—perhaps Cardenas of Mexico.

3. While this means a declining influence of fidelismo over popular movements; it does not necessarily lessen the importance of Cuban-Soviet-Chinese material and technical aid to revolutionary movements. It is important to remember that even if Castro were wiped out tomorrow we would not have solved the problem of communist influence in the Americas. In fact, most of the greatest danger spots (e.g. Northeast Brazil, Colombia back-country, communist dominated student movements, etc.) do not owe either their existence or strength to Castro, but to local and independent leadership. This danger has been steadily growing, and would continue to grow if our only anti-communist move were to knock out Castro. These movements will benefit from material assistance, even if they do not look to Cuba for leadership.

Suggested Course of Action:

Action Aimed at Cuba Directly 1. Before acting directly against Castro, in any fashion, we need a complete reassessment of the vulnerability of his regime—the degree of popular support, the probably declining position of the Cuban economy and its impact on the Cuban people, the efficiency of his police state, the possibilities of underground organization, etc. Without such an assessment it is impossible to realistically determine what alternative courses of action are open to us. 2. To meet the military threat we can work out defense agreements with Central American nations along the lines suggested by Professor Berle. 3. We should approach the government of Chile to call an Inter-American arms limitation conference. This conference should deal with methods of stopping external arms shipments in the context of the over-all limitations which are desperately needed in Latin America. We should decide, before this meeting, whether the risks in an OAS blockade of arms shipments to Cuba are outweighed by the dangers involved in halting and searching international shipping. 4. Immediately consult with heads of major nations in Latin America to see how far they are willing to go in terms of collective action. This should be done via a personal emissary. Although we should have a reasonably clear idea of what we want to do, this should be a genuine consultation among allies. All the myriad proposals for OAS action, etc., depend on the reaction of other Latin nations—a reaction as yet undetermined. 5. Underlying all these proposals is the feeling that we should not move quickly in direct action against Cuba. I do not believe that there is any course of direct action which we can wisely take on the basis of current knowledge and conditions.

Attempts to stop direct export of Castroism 1. We should provide Caribbean nations with the technical help (e.g. radar to spot incoming planes) and navy patrol assistance to meet the dangers of arms shipments from Cuba to insurgent elements in those nations. 2. There are two or three real danger spots (e.g. Dominican Republic and Haiti) where we should now be developing democratic alternatives to the present regime—organizing replacement governments. If we do not do this then the inevitable changes in governments may be followed by Castro-type regimes. When Democratic alternatives are organized we should consider means of precipitating the fall of Trujillo and Duvalier and possibly Somoza. In this way we can exert maximum control over the type of replacement government— the timing and initiative should be ours. 3. Help provide counter-propaganda assistance to Latin governments—e.g. radio transmitters. The more we can work through Democratic-liberal forces in Latin America, rather than through USIA alone, the more effective will be our propaganda.

General counter-communist operations

Our long-range strategy in the Americas should have two basic elements: First, the organization of a strong political counter-force. We have a ready instrument in the newly organized League of Democratic Parties. We should assist these parties—financially and technically—to develop progressive political movements (in some cases revolutionary movements, especially in the less progressive countries) through helping them in techniques of organization down to the village level, ideological warfare, etc. U.S. government help should be covert. Second, the Alianza para el progreso. This program with its emphasis on social and economic advance is the real hope of preventing a communist takeover. The Alianza is proceeding about as rapidly as possible given present organization of effort, and the magnitude of available funds. Both of these elements are unsatisfactory. A. Funds: Present plans provide for the allocation of 250-350 million dollars worth of economic assistance to Latin America in fiscal 1962. This is out of a total of 2.4. billion. (This sum does not include the social development fund.) One hundred million of this will go to Brazil to get them over their current financial crisis. I am not clear that any substantial re-allocation could be made given the enormous needs in Asia (especially in India and Pakistan)—although I believe there can be some increase. However, these funds are probably not sufficient to make a real and effective start in economic development. B. Organization: If communist takeover comes in Latin America it probably will not come through guerilla warfare, but through the capture of indigenous revolutionary movements. We cannot meet such a threat effectively—well-organized as it is—when our overseas operations are as diffuse and uncoordinated as they are today. The aid program, the political bureaus of State, the USIA, educational exchange, CIA activities all go, to too great an extent, their own way under separate heads and often in pursuit of separate goals. I believe that diffusion of effort results in great waste of resources and intelligence. We must organize our non-military overseas operation to reflect our basic objective in Latin America—the strengthening of democratic Western-oriented nations and governments so that they have the capacity to resist communist and neutralist attack in all its forms. Those who are charged with the responsiblity for achieving this objective must have control over the instruments which our government provides. Just as we have seen the need for some centralization of command in fighting hot wars—it is needed for effectively waging a cold war. This does not necessaily mean a “Chief of Hemisphere Operations”; but at the very least it means that, within each key country there must be a central operational capacity and authority with direct lines to the levels of action in Washington.

180. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret. This paper was transmitted from the CIA on April 26 to Lieutenant Colonel B.W. Tarwater. Washington, April 26, 1961.

NARRATIVE OF AIR ACTIVITY

1. On 8 April 1961 a briefing was conducted for the Deputy Director (Plans), Acting Chief, WH-4, and Acting Chief, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which outlined the proposed plan of air operations for Project [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Sub-Project [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Targets were as cited in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Air Operations Plan 200-1Not found. with the exception that Targets 1, 2, and 3 were to be struck on D-3 as a portion of Project [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Project [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] involved Target 1, San Antonio de Los Banos, two aircraft; Target 2, Campo Libertad, two aircraft; Target 3, Santiago de Cuba, two aircraft. 2. On 9 April the briefing team departed Washington for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The purpose of this trip was to brief the combat elements of the proposed plan of activities. After two days target study at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a recommendation was submitted to Headquarters which recommended assignment of three aircraft each to Targets 1 and 2. This change was effected. 3. On 15 April Project [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] was implemented with strikes occurring at dawn. A 24 hour delay received 13 April changed air strikes from D-3 to D-2. Results of that strike were believed to have been destruction of 70 to 80 percent of GOCʼs combat air capability. Damages sustained by attacking aircraft were as follows: one aircraft and crew destroyed by anti aircraft fire eventually crashing into the sea approximately 30 miles north of the Cuban coast attempting to reach Boca Chica Naval Air Station. One aircraft landed at Grand Cayman short of fuel. One aircraft landed at Boca Chica Naval Air Station, no battle damage had been incurred. The reason for landing at the Boca Chica Naval Air Station was due to this aircraft attempting to escort a crippled B-26 to Boca Chica which later crashed into the sea. The aircraft which landed at Boca Chica and Grand Cayman were eventually returned to the launch base. 4. On D-1 eleven targets were assigned the B-26 strike force designed to destroy the remainder of GOC operational air capability. Between the hours of 2100 local and 0100 local during the night 16-17 April the target assignment was changed prohibiting air strike of any airfields the morning of D-day. All aircraft were committed to sustain air support over the beachhead area. 5. On D day 5 C-46ʼs and one C-54 successfully dropped the airborne battalion at the appointed DZʼs within the objective area. These aircraft returned to the launch base. B-26 aircraft were rotated over the beachhead throughout the day. The B-26 aircraft reported the sinking of one gun boat, the destruction of one Sea Fury and one B-26, numerous strikes on ground targets and one C-46 aircraft by evasive attack caused an attacking Sea Fury aircraft to crash into the sea. Four B-26 were lost late on D day to enemy T-33 aircraft. One aircraft landed at Grand Cayman with one engine shot out. One aircraft landed at Boca Chica due to pilot fatigue. It should be pointed out that all Cuban air crews had at this point been up 36 to 48 hours without sleep. Thirteen (13) actual combat sorties were flown on D day. All sorties were in support of the amphibious landing on the beachhead. At this point it became clear that enemy air activity utilizing T-33 aircraft could destroy the more obsolete B-26 type aircraft with relative ease and a decision was made to attempt to destroy the remaining GOC aircraft at night on the ground through successful bombing raids. Six aircraft were scheduled to strike the main base of operations in two waves of three each during the night of 17-18 April. The aircraft aborted on take off. Heavy haze and low clouds prevented three aircraft from finding target and one aircraft attacked San Antonio de Los Banos. 6. On D plus 1 it became necessary to utilize American civilian pilots to protect the beachhead area due to the fact the Cubans were either too tired or refused to fly. Six sorties were flown during the afternoon of D plus 1. Reported damage by GOC sources indicated 1800 casualties and destruction of seven tanks. 7. On the morning of D plus 2 American pilots again were pressed into service for protection of the beachhead area for two reasons (1) the reluctance of the Cuban pilots to fly more combat sorties without air to air cover and (2) the Americans were attempting to build morale and develop a will to win. Two American crews were shot down with no survivors in the morning of D plus 2. Both aircraft were lost to T-33 aircraft. All sorties flown on the morning of D plus 2 were scheduled during the one hour period Navy air cover was supposed to have been provided the beachhead area. 8. In the afternoon of D plus 2 a radio message was received from the ground Brigade Commander stating that he was destroying his equipment and “heading for the hills”. Upon receipt of this message all air activities in support of the beachhead area were terminated.

181. Paper Prepared for the National Security Council by the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1961. No classification marking. Prepared in conjunction with the Joint Staff of the JCS. The CIA also prepared a paper for the NSC on April 27 entitled “Bloc Economic Support for the Castro Regime.” (Ibid.) Washington, April 26, 1961. SUBJECT blockade Military Aid to the Castro Regime

The Soviet bloc has supplied large quantities of arms and military equipment to Cuba since major shipments began last September. The value of these arms is estimated at between $50 and $100 million. Thus far bloc military deliveries have consisted almost entirely of land armaments, including medium and heavy tanks, self-propelled assault guns, field and antiaircraft artillery, large numbers of military vehicles, and ample quantities of infantry weapons and ammunition.

Although there are occasional rumors, apparently emanating from Cuban refugees, that naval equipment has been supplied, these rumors cannot be confirmed.

Bloc aircraft delivered to Cuba include helicopters and light piston-engine Czech basic trainers. There are some unconfirmed reports of crates of the size which would hold MIG fighters, but there is no corroborating evidence that these aircraft have been delivered to Cuba. It is highly unlikely that MIGs are presently operational with the Cuban Air Force. Cuban pilots are training in the bloc.

Bloc Military Negotiations With Cuba

The Sino-Soviet bloc maintained a cautious attitude toward the Cuban regime for more than a year after Castroʼs takeover in January 1959. Although intermittent Cuban military contacts were made with the bloc during 1959 and early 1960, these apparently did not result in firm military aid commitments from the bloc until about May 1960. In this period sizable quantities of small arms were procured in Western Europe, primarily in Belgium.

Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyanʼs visit to Cuba in February 1960 signaled the beginning of a series of trade and aid agreements between Cuba and all countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc. As political and economic ties were established, it became clear that Moscow intended to back up its propaganda support for Cuba with a major campaign of material assistance. Following the collapse of the summit and the cancellation of President Eisenhowerʼs trip to the USSR, however, the bloc undertook active military negotiations with the Cuban government which culminated in arms agreements with both the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

By the end of July 1960 Czech small arms and ammunition were in Cuba. Shortly thereafter, the first large group of Cuban military personnel was sent to Czechoslovakia to receive military training.

In September the first large bloc arms delivery was made. Since then military equipment has been regularly supplied to Cuba. In addition, large numbers of military usable vehicles and military-related items have been delivered.

Bloc Military Technicians

A large number of Czech and Soviet technicians currently are working in military capacities for the Cuban government. These technicians are assisting the Cubans in assembling equipment and installing such weapons as antiaircraft batteries. They also are employed as instructors in military courses and as advisers to individual military units. Bloc instructors probably have been participating in flight training being conducted in Cuba on Czech piston trainers.

[Here follow Annex A, a chart illustrating “Bloc Land Armaments and Military Equipment Displayed in Cuba”, and Annex B, a chart illustrating “Bloc Aircraft Supplied to Cuba.”]

182. Paper Prepared for the National Security Council by the Director of the Department of State Operations Center (Achilles)Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Top Secret. According to a note on the source text, the final draft of this paper was prepared by Theodore C. Achilles, but the initial drafts were prepared in ARA in response to a request from Rusk on April 24. (Excerpt from a record of Secretaryʼs staff meeting, April 24; ibid.) The drafts were circulated within the Department for comment by senior concerned officials before the final draft was prepared. (Memorandum from Legal Adviser Chayes to Rusk, April 26; ibid.) A number of other papers were prepared for the April 27 NSC meeting. As a follow-up to the April 22 NSC meeting the Department of State prepared memoranda entitled “Information on Helpful and Unhelpful Governments” and “Strengthening Freedom in the Americas.” It also drafted recommendations proposing invocation of the Trading With the Enemy Act and an assessment of the proposed Caribbean Security Agency. (All ibid., S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 5402-Memoranda) The Department of Defense prepared a paper on the training of Cuban soldiers. (Ibid.) Washington, April 27, 1961.

PLAN FOR CUBA

Problem:

To remove the threat to the United States and to the hemisphere posed by the Soviet-dominated Castro regime in a manner which will advance rather than injure our other hemispheric and world-wide interests.

Among possible future courses of action toward Cuba, two strategic alternatives stand out. We can adopt a short term strategy of eliminating the Castro regime in the relatively near future, or a long term strategy of isolation and containment which might ultimately lead to change of regime, but would in any case make the present one relatively impotent beyond its own borders.

This paper does not elect between the strategies. It recommends that we undertake painstaking intelligence estimates and other studies before making an irrevocable choice. Such choice need not be made in the immediate future, since it is possible for the time being to prepare for the implementation of either strategy. An ultimate choice in favor of the long term strategy could, however, be prejudiced by the style and precipitateness with which we might implement certain of the paperʼs recommendations.

Discussion:

The complete defeat of the volunteer Cuban liberation force which had been encouraged by the United States and covertly assisted with training, equipment, and transportation strengthened Castro internally, weakened the morale of anti-Castro forces in Cuba and elsewhere and gravely damaged United States prestige. Part of the lost ground has been recovered by a declaration of President Kennedy on April 20 to the effect that if it should ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-interference merely concealed or excused a policy on non-action, and if the nations of the Hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside Communist penetration, the United States Government would not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations, which are the security of our nation. The world is now waiting to see what the United States will do.

Action to correct the intolerable Cuban situation—which for practical purposes means the overthrow of the Castro regime—must be taken if communist penetration of the hemisphere and the disastrous drain on United States prestige in the world are to be stemmed. Yet the situation is not so bad but that ill-considered, poorly-timed action would not make it infinitely worse. It could disrupt the OAS. It could turn most of Latin America against us. It could weaken our position in other areas. It could trigger a World War.

Recommendations Concerning Courses of Action:

Whatever decisive measures may in due course be decided upon to bring about the downfall of the Castro regime it is clear that three courses should forthwith be pursued vigorously: 1) Implementation of the Alliance for Progress. 2) Development of a realistic, sound and honest moral posture based upon the Presidentʼs April 20 statement, which must be able to withstand before world opinion and in the U.N., the distortions of an all-out Communist propaganda offensive and provide the justification for progressively more drastic actions against Castro. 3) Develop the fullest and most accurate intelligence possible on the attitude of the Cuban people towards Castro. Such intelligence is essential before deciding upon possible courses of decisive action. If a majority is opposed to Castro, we must find the best means of helping the majority to overthrow him. If a majority support Castro and what he stands for, the problem will be far more difficult and military action would be undesirable as leading to a prolonged occupation of a hostile population with serious consequences elsewhere. If that is the case, slower methods such as quarantine and efforts to change the views of the maximum number of Cubans would be indicated.

Individual consultation with the other American Governments has been in progress since April 23 to ascertain their views towards the best means of removing the menace to hemispheric peace and security caused by the intrusion of extra-continental power into Cuba. The consultation is designed to ascertain whether the other Governments recognize the nature of this menace, whether they recognize the distinction between “intervention” in the internal affairs of another state and defense against a widening area of domination by extra-hemispheric powers, and their attitude toward OAS action or possible narrower collective or unilateral action. Effective action through the OAS if it can be secured would obviously be desirable. Many American Governments, however, while privately expressing the hope that the U.S. will act unilaterally, quickly and decisively to overthrow Castro, continue reluctant to stand up publicly and be counted and would in varying measure publicly criticize such U.S. action. Nevertheless, OAS consideration would be desirable provided that we have a clear view of the results desired and reasonable expectations that we would have the votes to obtain them.

If the recommended approach to the OAS yields nothing in the way of tangible support for us on the Cuba problem, we will still be able to consider moving unilaterally against Castro in support of the Cuban rebels, if that is what we want to do. Other recommended actions insure that the intervening time will not be lost.

Courses of Action:

I. U.S. should unilaterally, without awaiting outcome of other actions: 1. Push ahead energetically with the Alliance for Progress, including, as soon as funds are available, implementation of readied housing and other projects giving visible proof that it is being implemented. 2. Establish a strong moral posture commanding the respect of unbiased opinion everywhere based on steady development of the themes in the Presidentʼs April 20 statement and including the following elements: a. U.S. love of and willingness to fight for “freedom.” b. Recognition that the U.S. faces a world-wide relentless struggle against an expansionist Sino-Soviet bloc, including its use of non-military aggression. c. U.S. has long since abandoned “intervention” in the internal affairs of its neighbors and cannot tolerate the intervention of extra-continental powers such as has occurred in Cuba. d. U.S. objective is to see the Cuban people freed from alien domination and free to choose their own government and forms of economic and social development. 3. Maintain active overt and covert psychological campaign designed to weaken Castro in Cuba and outside. a. Make an official public statement—to which other American Governments could subscribe—setting forth our liberal aspirations for a post-Castro Cuba in the political, economic and social fields. b. Formulate and announce concrete measures which the U.S. contemplates to assist the Cuban people and economy after Cuba is again free. c. See that campaign is fully and continuously coordinated between State,USIA, CIA and DOD. 4.

a. Apply the Trading with the Enemy Act to Cuba.

b. Consider gradual reduction, through amendment of existing regulations, of the export of foods and medicines to Cuba.

5. Continue to give open encouragement to the Cuban liberation movement both in Cuba and outside. 6. Continue to assist Cuban liberation efforts by covertly: a. Training Cuban freedom fighters, especially for guerrilla service in Cuba. (They are the indispensable component for any plan to oust Castro.) b. Arming Cuban freedom fighters inside Cuba. c. Supporting Cuban underground capabilities for intensified sabotage of Cuban economy. d. Encouraging defections. 7. Develop study in depth of vulnerabilities of Castro regime and possible courses of action to exploit them, and of strengths and means of countering them. 8. Develop fullest possible intelligence on: a. Degree of support Castro enjoys among Cuban people and why. b. Castroʼs military strength. 9. Intensify measures to provide assistance to any Latin American country requesting help in defending itself against armed attack or subversion by Castroism. Implement existing programs and accelerate surveys of requirements of governments where this is a particular problem. 10. Establish system of surveillance in Caribbean to identify and frustrate armed assistance to subversive movements in other countries. 11. Deport known non-U.S. Castro agents from U.S. 12. Develop and hold in readiness military plans for forcible overthrow of Castro by: a. Overt U.S. action, whether alone or assisted by Latin American countries. b. Covert support of Cuban action sufficient to accomplish objectives. 13. Should any Latin American country offer to mediate differences between U.S. and Cuba, accept offer but only subject to Cubaʼs severance of relations with Sino-Soviet bloc and agreement to hold OAS-super-vised elections. II. Redefine and reinterpret what constitutes aggression and what constitutes legal governments. We should elaborate a new doctrine in close association with certain Latin Americans and other friendly powers, which would spell out the concepts embodied in the Presidentʼs speech of April 20. Such an interpretation of our obligations under the UN and OAS Charters is needed to enable us to justify publicly the actions which might be necessary to deal with Communist takeovers from within a country. In this connection, we should consider recognizing and mobilizing support for a Cuban Government in exile as an alternative to Castro. III.

1. With all deliberate speed carry on consultations with each Latin American Government regarding a possible Meeting of Foreign Ministers, either under the Rio Treaty or the OAS Charter, to consider a resolution calling on Cuba to: a. Allow free exercise of normal civil rights and prepare for elections under OAS supervision. b. Give effect to its OAS commitments with respect to communism.

2. If result of consultation is reasonably promising, request Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

3. Seek in Meeting of Foreign Ministers as wide agreement as possible on a line of specific sanctions, as follows, designed to quarantine Cuba in the Hemisphere, if Cuba refuses to heed call mentioned in 1 above: a. Breaking of diplomatic relations with Cuba. b. Expel or exclude Castro regime from OAS. c. Economic sanctions. d. Support for armed effort to liberate Cuba if Meeting is willing to [go?] this far.

4. Propose collective OAS quarantine against Dominican Republic similar to that against Cuba on grounds of interventionist activities and manifest suppression of human rights.

IV. If support of collective OAS action under III is insufficient to isolate Cuba in Hemisphere, seek to get informal agreement among as many Latin American countries as possible on course of sanctions mentioned in III-3-a, c, and d. V. Upon completion of III and IV but not before, unless future developments so require, take decision as to whether danger to U.S. security is sufficiently great to resort to force to overthrow Castro in spite of our international commitments, and if so, whether action should be overt or covert. Then carry out action at earliest possible date. VI. All planning and operations under this plan should be examined in the light of the repercussions their implementation would have in the U.N. VII. Keep NATO, or principal NATO allies, informed of major U.S. decisions and actions under I to IV above, and at appropriate time seek their cooperation in the application of economic measures against the Castro regime.

183. Editorial Note

Cuba was discussed under the heading “U.S. Policy Toward Cuba” at the 479th meeting of the National Security Council on April 27, 1961. According to the Record of NSC Actions, approved by the President on April 29, the following decisions were adopted as NSC Action No. 2413: “a. Noted the Presidentʼs view that a decision with respect to trading with Cuba should be deferred pending developments in Cuba during the next week. “b. Noted the Presidentʼs request that the Attorney General should prepare recommendations regarding control of Cubans entering or residing in the United States. “c. Noted the Presidentʼs request that Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze, in consultation with appropriate agencies, should complete the Defense study of the military training of Cubans and coordinate it with further proposals from the Department of State with respect to the broader aspects of the Cuban problem.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, National Security Council Meetings, No. 479)

According to the Record of Actions, the following people, in addition to the President were among the participants in the meeting: Robert Kennedy, Dulles, Bissell, Burke, Gilpatric, Stahr, Connally, Zuckert, Nitze, Murrow, U. Alexis Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, Sorensen, Goodwin, and Taylor. (Ibid.)

184. Notes on the 479th Meeting of the National Security CouncilSource: Yale University, Bowles Papers, Box 392, Folder 154. Personal. Prepared by Bowles who mistakenly dated this NSC meeting as having taken place on April 24. Washington, April 27, 1961.

NOTES ON CUBAN CRISIS

[Here follow 6 pages of Bowlesʼ notes; see Documents 158 and 166.]

The climate is getting considerably better, and the emotional attitudes are falling back into line. If anyone had not attended the previous meetings, he would have thought the NSC meeting this morning had its share of fire and fury. However, it was in far lower key.

Ted Sorensen called me aside to say that he was glad I had said what I did, and Dick Goodwin called me to say I had shown great courage in the last few meetings and he was grateful for it.

At this stage plans continue for all kinds of harassment to punish Castro for the humiliation he has brought to our door. However, the general feeling is that all this should be handled carefully, that there should not be too much publicity, that attitudes of others should be taken into account.

There was a reference of making up a black list of those nations which had voted against us, such as Mexico and Brazil and of finding some means to punish them. I did not take this too seriously.

It was interesting to see a cablegramBowles may have confused the results of the April 22 and the April 27 NSC meetings at this point. The “cablegram” under reference could be Document 171. prepared as a result of the meeting, which misrepresented the entire mood of the meeting. The cablegram was prepared for our ambassadors in Latin America and would have dragged reluctant Latin American governments into a show of power and force against Castro, cutting off diplomatic relations, shutting off trade, and so forth.

I was rather startled when I saw the cable, particularly since it had already been initialed by Dean Rusk. However, I called Dean at home at 8:00 and told him I thought the cable totally misrepresented the meeting. He agreed that this was so, and I proceeded to have a first and last page written which showed the view of the President, asking the ambassadors to show great discretion, not to get any publicity, and that no government should be pushed or pulled into positions it was not prepared to take, and that the ambassadors should use their own judgments, avoiding reckless statements which would create the impression of the United States being a wobbly, uncertain, and vindictive power.

185. Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff MeetingSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.00/4-2861. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Pentagon. The source text is marked: “State draft—not cleared with Department of Defense”. Washington, April 28, 1961, 11 a.m.

[Here follow a list of participants and discussion of Laos.]

II. Cuba

Mr. Achilles reported that there had been established a task force on Cuba to pull together the current intelligence information on that country in order to enable the President to reach an ultimate decision.

General LeMay remarked that we had pretty good estimates on the basis of our recent experience and that he was certain that the longer we wait the worse the situation becomes.

Mr. Johnson observed that there were two aspects to the problem: (1) To what degree and when does Cuba become a military threat to the US; (2) Castroism as a subversive and political threat to the Latin American countries. On the second aspect the process for dealing with the problem has been initiated and been in train for several months. We have received internal security assessments from the Latin American countries and, at the present moment, there is an interagency team visiting most of the countries in the Caribbean area to consult with US officials on the spot on the nature of the problem and the types of assistance needed by the local governments.

General LeMay stated that he did not believe that Cuba per se would ever become a military threat to the US. If the Russians moved in, however, it would be a completely different story. The big problem, as he saw it, was the fact that all of Latin America might go Communist if Castro is not curbed. He felt we should not just sit back and let that process proceed unimpaired.

General Shoup asked what we were going to do if Soviet military weapon systems were moved into Cuba. As he saw it our security required that Cuba be devoid of missiles and aircraft which had the capability of being used against the US.

General LeMay commented that the present situation in Cuba gives the Communists a leg up on getting control of the rest of Latin America a lot quicker. Mr. Achilles noted that our problem with respect to Cuba would be a lot simpler if Soviet missiles were actually present there. Our problem is that Cuba is being used as a subversive base to enable the Communists to get control of the Latin American area. Cuba as a military threat is a threat in terms of its ability to train guerrillas to be used in the other countries rather than as an invasion threat against these countries.

Mr. Johnson noted that the Department had established an Operations Center which would be under Mr. Achilles. It was designed to be a focal point of information and action on what we are doing as well as an intelligence center on what the Communists and others are doing. He hoped that the JCS would help us in getting this activity established and moving and expected that State people would undoubtedly be in touch with theirs.

[Here follows discussion of Algeria.]

186. Paper Prepared in the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files, Cuba Papers, 1961. Secret. This draft of SNIE 85-61 was apparently circulated for comment at least to the Department of Defense. There is nothing on the source text to indicate reaction to the draft or any subsequent revision of the estimate. SNIE 85-61, as finally approved and circulated, has not been found. Washington, April 28, 1961. SUBJECT SNIE 85-61: Outlook for the Castro Regime

The Problem

To assess the internal strengths and weaknesses of the Castro regime in Cuba and to estimate its prospects for survival, over the next six months and over the longer term, assuming that the US continues to encourage opposition to Castro but takes no overt military action against him.

Working Outline

I. Basic Strengths and Weaknesses of the Regime

A. On the eve of the abortive opposition landings in Cuba the Castro regime had changed greatly from that which took power some two years earlier with plaudits of all but small proportion of Cuban population. In its transformation from a liberating movement appealing to all classes to a radical revolutionary regime it had lost many of its initial assets and acquired various liabilities. At the same time it had developed new and important sources of strength. B. Liabilities 1. Progressive alienation of most of those with stake in society, including much of organized labor and students as well as middle and upper classes. Alienation of some of peasantry. Internal and external opposition stirrings. 2. Economic problems and disruptions. 3. Dissipation of initial support in 26th July movement and in military. C. Strengths 1. Continuing importance of Castro as symbol of authority and prophet of reform—appeal of Castro and program to rural and urban poor. 2. Growing strength, experience and self-confidence of Communist and other activists manning the apparatus—increasing going concern value. 3. Increasingly effective controls over all phases of economic and social life and progressive elimination of dissidents. 4. Development of militia as security arm specifically tied to regime—impact of equipment and training. 5. Impact of Bloc economic, military and moral support, both in meeting specific problems and shortages and in bolstering confidence and prestige of regime. 6. Continuing usefulness of US as scapegoat.

II. Repercussions of Defeat of Opposition Landings—Short Term Prospects

A. Assessment of internal advantages gained, with caveats about continuation of grumbling and opposition, reaction to mass arrests, probable misgivings in militia. 1. Likelihood of stepped up military and security preparations. B. Outlook over next six months

III. Longer Term Prospects

A. Over next 1-5 years regime likely to face serious problems in consolidating its position: 1. Regime will probably continue to face at least latent hostility of large proportion of population and has still to reconstitute broad, organized following among peasants and urban poor. Possibility of flareup. 2. Problems of adjustment and deferred maintenance likely to plague economy, increasing sources of discontent. 3. Regime still overly dependent on Castro as individual, though growth of Communist apparatus is likely to reduce this. 4. In time coherence, dedication, freedom from corruption and other distractions among those manning the state apparatus may decline—and at least some possibility of dissension at the top remains. 5. Probable decline in usefulness of US as scapegoat. B. On other hand, Castro regime has important opportunities: 1. In time, economic and social reform program likely to tie well-being of increasing numbers to the state, thus reducing incentives to buck the system. 2. The longer Castro goes on, the more likely the regime is likely to be accepted by Cuban people and rest of hemisphere as a going concern—grumbling (as in Yugoslavia) will not seriously threaten the regime. Impact of indoctrination. 3. Little likelihood of serious slackening in Bloc support. 4. Internal acceptance of exile groups likely to decline. C. The extent to which latent and active opposition will continue to pose serious problems for the regime will probably depend primarily on: 1. The extent to which the regime does in fact provide a tolerable livelihood for the Cuban people. 2. The extent to which hopes of successful (if eventual) overthrow are kept alive: a. Ability of opposition elements to maintain at least symbolic opposition in the mountains. b. Impact of apparent acceptance of regime by its neighbors—whether or not Cuba remains isolated or is accepted by Latin neighbors.

187. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. No drafter is indicated, but it was probably Colonel Tarwater. The meeting was the fifth in the series conducted by the Cuba Study Group and took place at the Pentagon. The participants in the meeting, in addition to Taylor, Kennedy, Dulles, and Burke, included Admiral Dennison, Captain Ferguson, Commander McCauley, King, Mitchell, and Tarwater. Washington, April 28, 1961.

[Here follows testimony from some of the participants in the Bay of Pigs invasion.]

Admiral Dennison

Statement: My first knowledge that something might happen with regard to Cuba goes back to April 1960, when we helped construct facilities on Swan Island. The next indication I had was when the commander of my amphibious force advised me that he had the task of sanitizing some landing craft, as well as transporting these craft in an LSD to Puerto Rico. At this point, I consulted with General Lemnitzer and asked him if the JCS was aware of these activities. General Lemnitzer told me that he knew something of the activities. At that time he called General Cabell and requested that I be informed of the operation. Consequently, a CIA representative came down and briefed me on a portion of the plan. He explained that the planning for the operation was compartmentalized and that no one group knew all about the operation.

Statement: On the 9th of February I had the privilege of talking with the President. I asked him if I would be engaged in any possible bail-out operations. He responded definitely no, that if anything went wrong the force would fade into the hinterland. The JCS Directive of 7 AprilDocument 85. set forth the nature of the naval operation that would be required and directed the mission be executed in such manner that the United States could plausibly deny that we had any part in the operation. On 1 April 1961 I issued my own operation order which set up, among other things, the rules of engagement for surface ships and for the air patrol. (Tab B)Tab B was not found attached. On 1 April I received JSM-365-61,Not printed, but see Document 76. which gave me my basic orders and also indicated that the CIA was responsible for the planning and implementation of the operation with the DOD in a support role.

Statement: As of this date, I have never seen a copy of the Cuban Invasion Plan.Not found. As things turned out, it would have been most helpful if I had. For example, when we observed the Perka we thought it was a ship that had been taken over by the refugees. We had no knowledge of the men aboard the Perka. Furthermore, when we were called upon to start the rescue operation, we didnʼt know how many men were in there, what particular beaches theyʼd be landing on, where they were likely to be, or any information of this sort. I understand that the reason we probably were not informed of the details of the plan was because it was felt that we had no need for it. But as I say, as it turned out, we certainly did have. On the 5th of April I received a dispatch from the JCSJCS telegram 993422 to CINCLANT, April 5. (Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials) which postponed D-Day from 10 April by at least 48 and probably 98 hours. (Tab B) In the dispatch which informed me of the new D-Day of 17 April, I was also informed of a change in the concept of the support that I was to provide.Reference is to CM-179-61, April 7, Document 85. Essentially, this change consisted of the fact that instead of convoying the invasion fleet my forces would be called on to provide area coverage.

Statement: We had a very difficult time communicating with the Cuban invasion force ships. We didnʼt know the communications circuits of the ships, nor did we have other adequate means of communication. If the invasion force had been attacked, weʼd have had a very difficult time communicationwise. At the same time that I received the change in the concept of the support I was to provide, I also received the first major changes in the rules of engagement.Reference is to CM-179-61, April 7, Document 85. (Tab B)

Question: Who made the decision to change the rules of engagement?

After some discussion of this question, it was decided that the JCS memo of record on the change on the rules of engagement7 should be secured.

Statement: We were also informed that it was desired that the chance of aborting the mission be minimized. I was informed that the Cuban invasion force was prepared to take risks to prevent the possibility of aborting the mission by overly anxious intervention.

Statement: I wanted then, and I still want, more comprehensive, current intelligence on Cuba, particularly photographs. I am particularly concerned about Guantanamo. What Castroʼs reaction may be in this connection is a great concern to me.

Statement: I am opposed to the use of DOD personnel in a covert operation. I believe that when U.S. forces go into an operation, they should go in under the cover of their U.S. uniform.

Statement: In view of the extent to which we became involved in the Cuban operation, I believe that it should have been conducted by me, through a special task force. I believe that in an operation of this sort the control has to be centralized, and the control should be military. Even in this covert operation, at some stage it should have been handled by the regular military staff rather than a group restricted in size by security considerations.

It was agreed that Admiral Dennison would forward to the Study Group a copy of his record of the operation.A copy of the chronology of the Bumpy Road Operation maintained by CINCLANT, which was provided to the Cuba Study Group, is in the Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials.

188. Memorandum From the Chief of Naval Operations (Burke) to the Director of the Joint Staff (Wheeler)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret. Washington, April 29, 1961. SUBJ Landing in Cuba on short notice 1. Yesterday the Secretary of Defense was interested in what we could do in Cuba on five days notice. We were giving him a horseback estimate which is not the best way to do it. 2. Have the Joint Staff and/or CINCLANT come up with an outline plan on what we could get into Cuba five days after the President says go, with an indication of what additional forces we could get if we had three more days. This plan should also indicate how fast we could build up our strength after D-Day. Arleigh BurkePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

189. Editorial Note

In a speech at a May Day rally in Havana on May 1, 1961, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro stated that there had been a socialist revolution in Cuba and that Cuba was a socialist country. (The New York Times, May 2, 1961) On May 2 Department of State press spokesman Lincoln White interpreted Castroʼs speech to mean that Cuba had openly become a member of the “Sino-Soviet bloc.” He noted that Castroʼs use of the term socialist was consistent with usage throughout the Communist bloc, where socialism was viewed as a stage in the evolution toward Communism. In fact, White stated, Castroʼs speech made it appear that “Castro considers Cuba further along the communist road than some other countries in the bloc.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 306-307)

Secretary of State Rusk confirmed this interpretation in his replies to questions at a press conference at the Department of State on May 4. Rusk noted that Cuba had become, in Castroʼs own words, “a declared member of the Sino-Soviet bloc.” Rusk described the development as a “setback” for the Western Hemisphere. He stated, “the thing to do now is to draw a deep breath and look over the situation very carefully and consider a wide range of problems involved and possible actions which ought to be taken; and, most of all, to stay on the main road of hemispheric development and hemispheric solidarity.” (Department of State Bulletin, May 22, 1961, page 762)

190. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Joint Chiefs of StaffSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, May 1, 1961. SUBJ Cuban Contingency Plans

On Saturday, 29 April, Admiral Burke and I reviewed with the President Contingency Plan 1Not found. This was an apparent revision of the Outline Plan sent by the Joint Chiefs to McNamara in JCSM-278-61, Document 178. for the invasion of Cuba by U.S. troops. As you will recall, the Plan was designed to minimize U.S. and Cuban casualties, minimize the time required for subjugation of Cuba, and maximize the assurance of a successful operation. The Plan provided for the use of approximately 60,000 troops, excluding naval and air units, and required 25 days between the date of decision and D-Day. It was estimated that complete control of the island could be obtained within 8 days, although it was recognized that guerrilla forces would continue to operate beyond the 8th day in the Escambray Mountains and Oriente Province. The land, sea, and air forces required for the invasion were to be secured from existing forces—no additions to existing forces, with the possible exception of a few merchant ships, would be required prior to D-Day.

The President concurred in the general outline of the Plan.

Please assign to the Joint Staff and CINCLANT the responsibility for preparing the detailed instructions necessary to implement the Plan. These instructions should be designed to minimize the lead time required, and maximize security during the period between the decision and the invasion.

I want to repeat again that work on these plans should not be interpreted as an indication that U.S. military action against Cuba is probable.

Robert S. McNamaraPrinted from a copy that indicates that McNamara signed the original.

191. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball) and the Director of the Operations Center (Achilles)Source: Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Subject Series, Cuba, 1/24/61-12/30/62. No classification marking. Transcribed in Ballʼs office. Washington, May 1, 1961, 5:45 p.m.

Referring to paper on Cuba,Reference is to the paper originally submitted to the NSC on April 27 as the “Plan for Cuba,” Document 182. It was in the process of being revised on May 1 by an interagency Task Force headed by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Nitze. Ball asked what the status was. Achilles said the second draftNot found. has been written. Ball asked if it had been sent out of the Department. Achilles replied that it had gone to Defense. Ball said he is going to a meeting tomorrow which [is] of such critical importance that he would like to have another draft and asked Achilles if he could meet with him to get together to agree on some modifications here. Achilles said the paper was originally drafted in ARA and that he redrafted it. He talked to the Secretary yesterday afternoon but the Secretary has not seen it. Achilles said he told the Secretary it would take a lot of pulling and hauling in all directions. Ball thought the paper was too one-sided. Achilles asked which direction Ball thought it was slanted. Ball replied that it was slanted toward intervention. Achilles said he thought it was slanted the other way. Ball said not the way he read it. Achilles said he tried to meet in the middle and state both positions fairly. Defense definitely thinks it is slanted against intervention. Ball said he didnʼt want to be in a position of attacking a paper State has sent over. Achilles said he would be glad to meet any time with Ball. Ball agreed on 6 p.m.On May 2 Ball discussed the draft Cuba policy paper with Bowles. Ball expressed the concern that the policy review was moving too quickly and was likely to produce a half-digested product. Bowles agreed and wondered whether it might be possible to postpone the NSC discussion of Cuba policy scheduled for May 5. Ball noted that the administration was confronting a major policy decision on Cuba, and Bowles observed that it could not afford any more mistakes. Ball stated, however, that it would not be easy to delay the policy review because Nitze had been given a deadline to produce the paper and he was working hard to blend the contributions he had received from State and Defense. Ball concluded that the end product would not be bad. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, May 2; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Subject Series, Cuba, 1/24/61-12/30/62)

192. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President KennedySource: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, NSC III. No classification marking. Senator Mansfield of Montana was the Majority Leader of the Senate. Washington, May 1, 1961. SUBJECT The Cuban Aftermath

The consequences of the recent incident in Cuba give us some guidelines as to how to proceed in the weeks and months ahead. The principal consequences would appear to be the following: (1) Responsible world opinion was, to say the least, somewhat shocked by this episode. (2) Significant Latin American opinion was hard-put to express a reaction which would not alienate us by criticizing us but, at the same time, would not put the Latin Americans in the position of endorsing our course in this incident. For this restraint on their part, the promise of the Alianza para Progreso deserves full credit. Without that promise, Mexico, Brazil and others might have been vehement in their criticism. (3) The most articulate support at home for our role in the course leading to the episode and the episode itself was Republican and the clamor for further action is largely Republican and, significantly, not the Senate Minority Leader or Governor Rockefeller. (4)

The incident showed Castro solidly entrenched and this was not anticipated. Oddly enough, Castro reacted with comparative mildness to the incident and this was not generally anticipated either. This would suggest that our sensitivity to this personality and to the Cuban people is not what it ought to be. The post-incident reaction of Castro, moreover, suggests that he might have been shocked, at least partially, into a realization of how provocative he had become. The mixed and mild Latin American reaction may have brought home to him the fact that he had alienated some mighty good people in this hemisphere. Finally, he may have been brought to realize how heavily dependent he has become on a far-away country and on a system which has become less and less Cuban and more and more alien.

It should hardly be necessary to add that the above analysis is highly speculative. Nevertheless, it is not an inadmissible hypothesis. The point is that we have not gauged Cuban affairs effectively in the past and we do not now really know the implications of the unexpected Castro reaction. It is highly in our interests to explore this reaction rather than merely to dismiss it curtly.

(5) The Cuban exilesʼ reaction to the incident is one of bitterness and, as might be expected from our well-intentioned but ineffective involvement we are blamed for their frustrations. It will be a long time, if at all, before this same group is likely to prove effective in any movement to unseat the Cuban government, with or without U.S. financial help and with or without strengthening by U.S. guerrilla-type forces.

Responses

Historically, revolutions have been successful in Cuba when a relatively small group of Cubans acting largely with their own blood and fortunes choose that decisive moment when the mass of the Cuban people have had a surfeit of an existing regime. That moment is likely to come for the Castro regime if it continues in its present ways. The small group that will tip the balance will find its own methods. If the circumstances are right, the group will succeed without U.S. help of any significance as, in fact, Castro succeeded and, before him, the revolutionists against Machado.

The problem for us is to face up to the fact that we have made a mistake. If we react in frustrated anger we are likely to intensify the mistake. It will not be easy to face the fact; political pressures at home to the contrary will be applied. Nevertheless, it is the courageous thing to do and the sensible thing to do. For if we yield to the temptation to give vent to our anger at our own failure, we will, ironically, strengthen Castroʼs position with his own people, jeopardize our relations with much of Latin America and do further damage to our position throughout the world.

This does not mean that the use of force on our part is ruled out in all circumstances. Here are specific situations in which its use would probably be acceptable to Latin America and world opinion: (1) Guantanamo—Force as a response to a Cuban effort of force to take over this base is essential even though the base may have little military value and, in other circumstances, its relinquishment through negotiation might be indicated. (2) Force to prevent the establishment of Soviet missile or any other kind of base for Russian forces in Cuba, provided we are seriously re-eval-uating our own base-policies on the rim of the Soviet Union. (3) Force in support of other Latin American nations subject to a military invasion by Cuba.

The key to the effective use of force in these situations, however, is its restraint. It has got to be clear that the force is adjusted in quantity to the specific acceptable objectives involved in each situation and that we are not using the situations merely as an excuse for a general intervention in Cuba. To those who would suggest directly or indirectly that they be so used, these questions might well be put: What if we do intervene directly and succeed in overthrowing Castro? What have we really achieved beyond, perhaps, a certain measure of self-satisfaction that at least we can stop the Communists in Cuba? If the timing of the intervention is bad, we will have a long drawn-out guerrilla war with substantial casualties and great costs. When it is over we will have to install some kind of government in Havana and prop it up with a costly aid program for a long time to come. We will probably have to reinstate the sugar quota. We will have, in short, a devastated Cuba, no closer to freedom and stability than it has been in the past and, brought to that point at enormous cost to ourselves and to the Cuban people.

If we eschew the temptation to strike back in frustrated anger, then the course of policy which suggests itself is this: (1) A gradual disengagement of the U.S. government from anti-Castro revolutionary groups; let them proceed on their own if they wish, without blessing or financial support from the United States. (2) A taciturn resistance to the political blandishments or provocations from those at home who would urge that we act directly in Cuba. (3) A cessation of violent verbal attacks on Castro by officials of the government, as least pending an evaluation by Latin American friends of his somewhat unusual reaction to the incident of the invasion. And in this connection, a little less vehemence in our refusal to countenance his suggestions for talks about our difficulties is clearly indicated. (4) If possible, let the lead on condemning the Castro government in inter-American meetings come from friendly Latin American countries rather than from ourselves. Similarly, let the lead on proposals for a boycott or other acts short of war come from them. We should go along with these attempts to pressure Cuba but we should do so with a minimum of ostentation and we should not lose patience if the pressures cannot be built on a hemispheric basis at this time. (5) For the present, abstain from and stall on but do not condemn in advance, efforts of significant Latin American countries to bring about a partial reconciliation between Cuba and the United States if they feel these efforts are worth making. (6) Push hard and fast with the follow-through on the Alianza para Progreso. Reorganize the relevant Departments and Agencies in the Executive Branch for this purpose. Assign outstanding men from the White House staff and elsewhere to direct the effort. This is the key to our relations with all of Latin America in the next decade, and unless it is turned, Castroism is likely to spread elsehwere in Latin America whether or not Castro remains in power in Cuba. The best prospect of preventing this spread is to render the soil of the balance of Latin America sterile to the growth of this off-spring of mass discontent. The Alianza para Progreso is a sound concept for bringing about the sterilization. The problem now is to act on its premises rapidly and sure-footedly. If it works, there is a good possibility that Castro will either wither on the vine and [or?] be eventually overthrown by the Cubans themselves. Faced with that prospect it is not inconceivable that he may try to lead Cuba back into the House of the Hemisphere or yield to someone who can.A similar memorandum was addressed to Secretary Rusk by Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island on May 5. Like Mansfield, Pell warned against the dangers of direct U.S. military intervention in Cuba, and suggested that when the time was ripe, the Cuban people would depose Castro themselves. He also stressed the importance of the Alliance for Progress initiative. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-561)

193. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. No drafter is indicated but it was probably Colonel Tarwater. The meeting was the seventh in the series conducted by the Cuba Study Group and took place at the Pentagon. The participants in the meeting, in addition to Taylor, Kennedy, Dulles, and Burke, included McGeorge Bundy, Admiral Clark, Captain Crutchfield, Captain Kenscher, Commander McGriffin, Mitchell, and Tarwater. Washington, May 1, 1961.

[Here follows discussion of organizational matters involving a request by Taylor for additional information.]

Admiral Clark

Admiral Clark, the Commander of the Navy Task Group in the operation, was the first person to appear before the Group. In his introductory remarks he made the point that all the orders he had received were good dispatches and clear and that they were all carried out fully; that his evacuation efforts, however, were difficult because he couldnʼt fire back and because the waters in the Bay were restricted.

Question: With regard to the one-hour period when you were flying CAP for the CEF air unit there is some indication that there may have been a misunderstanding on the time. Please describe what happened.

Answer: Yes. We were ordered to fly cover for the CEF bombers from 0630 to 0730 RomeoRomeo is a reference to local time. on the morning of the 19th of April. However, I decided to play this one safe and ordered my people to be on station one-half hour early in the event that the CEF aircraft made the trip quicker than they had anticipated. However, they came over our ship one hour early and consequently we launched our aircraft immediately. We arrived over the beach area forty minutes before 0630 Romeo. However, by that time the CEF aircraft had already made their strikes and left.

At this point Mr. King was requested to check with the CEF air forces and determine what caused the time discrepancy.

Question: Would you describe what you saw on the reconnaissance flights on D+1 and D+2?

Commander McGriffin: On D+1 at approximately 1530 there was lots of traffic moving down the east side of the Bay. There were a number of tanks, trucks and there were six or eight burned-out busses. The tanks were not burned out apparently, however, because while they were stopped on the first flight at 1530, we checked again at 1730 and by that time they had moved. On D+2 we saw some burned-out friendly tanks. The enemy had established a roadblock in an area north of the beachhead. A large number of trucks and forces were converging on the area from all directions. About 1200 on D+2 we saw the CEF all bunched up at the little resort on the beach.

Question: You got the impression that there was a rapid and intensive reaction by Castro?

Answer: Yes, sir.

Question: Admiral Clark, do you have any recommendations that youʼd like to make with regard to the Cuba operation or any future operations of this sort?

Answer: I believe it went better than we had a right to expect. Possibly once the rules of engagement have been established, it would be desirable to give the commander on the spot a freer hand.

Question: What do you think were the reasons for failure?

Answer: One obvious reason was that surprise was not achieved.

Response: All the evidence we have had to date indicates that tactical surprise was achieved.

Answer: Well, the opposition formed awfully fast. I think Castroʼs people saw the CEF force from a lighthouse and they also could have seen them from the air. Another possible reason for failure was that the beach was not as advertised. It was supposed to be a sandy beach, whereas it was coral. Furthermore, the opposition was not as advertised.

Question: Could they have been seen by the lighthouse?

Answer: Yes, sir, they could have seen us very clearly from the lighthouse.

Mr. Dulles: We have no evidence of any reports originating from this lighthouse. Iʼll have to talk to Mr. Lynch.

Statement: With regard to the evacuation of the CEF force, on the last day we couldnʼt have evacuated the force unless were prepared to fight our way in. If weʼd been allowed to use counterforce we could have taken them all out. On D+3 we started our destroyers cruising along the beaches a couple of miles from shore at night and five miles from shore during the days so that the survivors could see us and would come out. A group of refugees of the invasion force did make their way to the keys west of Cochinos Bay and we picked them up. However, we picked up no one on the east side of the Bay. Without using counterforce it was impossible to move in to pick up survivors during the daylight because we were straddled by artillery fire at three miles offshore.

Question: With regard to the possibility of the invasion forces having been sighted from the air, did any aircraft fly over or did you pick up any airliners?

Answer: Yes. Furthermore, since the convoy formed in the daylight, it could have been seen from the air.

Statement: Well, letʼs ask Colonel King to check with the people that planned the naval portion of the operation and determine whether or not this lighthouse had been considered as a factor in the operation, and whether or not the force was supposed to come within sight of the lighthouse.

Lieutenant Colonel Egan

At this point Admiral Clark and the officers of his command left and Lieutenant Colonel Egan appeared before the Group. Colonel Egan stated that he was the operations officer for the project.

Statement: Prior to September the Cubans were being trained as guerrilla teams. I went down on an inspection trip, during which the Guatemalan revolution broke out. We were concerned about the possibility of losing our bases. President Ydigoras requested that we make an airborne landing, which we did. I was in command of the outfit. Washington gave us permission to do this, but I operated under the Mission Chief in Guatemala.

Mr. Dulles: We can give you the facts on this.

Colonel Egan: Following the Guatemalan revolt I was sent down to organize the brigade. On the 20th of November 1960 we had about 420 members in the Cuban force. During this period we were trying to build up our brigade and by the 8th of December we initiated a seven-week training program with approximately 575 to 600 troops.

Question: Who were the trainers?

Answer: At this time I had five American trainers and Cuban officer personnel to assist in the training. However, it must be remembered that we werenʼt dealing with raw recruits.

Question: How did you determine the background and potential leadership capabilities of the various persons in the brigade?

Answer: We had background files on each man. However, the actual selection for leadership positions depended on the performance of the men in the field.

Question: Did you have political problems?

Answer: At first, yes. However, as it became obvious that no one received any special privileges and that all ranks were only temporary, and that if a man selected for a position of leadership couldnʼt handle the position he went back to the ranks, when these factors became evident the political problem subsided.

Question: Tell us something of Pepe.Jose Perez San Roman, commander of the CEF brigade.

Answer: He came from a long line of military officers. His father was a General in the Cuban Army. Pepe was a Captain in the Cuban Army. He had trained at Fort Benning, Georgia. He could work with anyone. He was earnest, proud, self-sacrificing and a natural born leader.

Question: Did you say you had ample leadership and training?

Answer: Adequate leadership and training, yes, but not experience. Twenty per cent of our troops, however, were former soldiers.

Question: Did you have any reservations as to the readiness of this force?

Answer: No. I felt that each week they delayed would bring a retrogression in the force.

Question: Was there ever any discussion of U.S. participation or direct assistance in this operation, militarily speaking?

Answer: Yes, there were rumors, but we carefully pointed out that diplomatic and logistical support would be given, and the lines of communication would be kept open. Beyond this, however, no support could be expected from the United States.

Question: Did they feel betrayed when the United States aircraft didnʼt come in?

Answer: Yes. It was obvious that the enemy was using jets and the United States jets were visible to them and, of course, they couldnʼt understand why they didnʼt come to their assistance.

Question: Then it was a natural reaction rather than their having been told that the United States would enter on their behalf?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Did you think that the United States aircraft would come in and support the force?

Answer: I hoped so, but I didnʼt believe so.

Question: Were instructions given as to what to do if the operation failed?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What?

Answer: There were several contingencies: (1) If we passed the code word they were not to make the landing. (2) If the landing malfunctioned due to heavy surf or enemy opposition they were to disperse according to plan. They were to be evacuated by boat, and as a last resort they were to disperse and continue guerrilla operations in the swamp.

Question: Were any specific areas in the swamp assigned for guerrilla operations?

Answer: No, sir.

Question: Then when they fell back to Blue Beach they were doing what they were supposed to do so that they could be evacuated?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Could a man penetrate and live in the swamp?

Answer: Yes, a man could penetrate, but a unit couldnʼt, and there was enough small game, fish and fresh water in the swamp that men could survive.

Question: If you had to evacuate the men by sea how would you have moved them out?

Answer: By the same boats that brought them in. We had 36 18 1/2-foot aluminum ships. As I recall, I thought he mentioned that the men were searching for and using indigenous boats.

Question: Do we have any evidence that Pepe ever gave the command for the force to become guerrillas?

Answer: No.

Question: Do you believe that some of the men of the force could have come through the swamp?

Answer: Yes.

Colonel Egan: The pilots of the aircraft carrying the airborne troops said that the troops at DZ-1 were attacked by approximately 800 militia.

Question: Do you believe that the landing was a surprise?

Answer: Yes, sir, because the time it took Castro to get tanks and artillery to the beachhead area were the exact times that we thought it would take to move this equipment from known positions.

Question: Did you like the terrain for this operation in the Zapata area?

Answer: On the basis of the restrictions, yes. This would have worked. These boys were good. The only thing they lacked was ammunition.

Statement: Four out of five drops were successful. We donʼt know what happened to one drop over Red Beach.

Question: How many instructors did you end up with?

Answer: Forty-four.

Statement: I didnʼt have one AWOL for three weeks before the landing, and no one failed to go with the force, nor failed to jump with the airborne unit.

Question: Who screened the people assigned to this force?

Mr. Dulles: First the Cubans and then our Counterintelligence people.

Colonel Egan: We had four double agents.

Question: Do you think that agents got word back to Castro as to what you were doing?

Answer: Yes. Retalhuleu had 120 card-carrying Communists, including the Mayor. However, in an attempt to maintain security, I stopped all out-going mail three weeks before the operation, and all incoming mail was stopped for seven days prior to the operation. Of course, these troops had a number of secret channels.

Question: Was your camp adequate?

Answer: It could have been better, but it was adequate.

Question: Why wasnʼt it possible to rehearse the amphibious landing?

Answer: We did have a partial rehearsal, but we couldnʼt bring the vessels to the Pacific side where our camp was for this would have meant bringing them through the Panama Canal.

Question: I want to go back to the guerrillas. Who might have eluded capture?

Answer: A number of men from most of the positions. All these men were given compass and map reading and other guerrilla training.

Statement: To sum up the guerrilla situation then, there was no particular training directed toward it, as such, primarily because you had pretty good guerrillas to start with.

Colonel Egan: Yes, sir.

Statement: Also, for morale reasons you had not briefed the entire force on the possibilities of having to take to the swamps as guerrillas. However, the day before the force left you did brief the commanders on guerrilla operations and the fact that you felt that the primary means of evacuation was seaborne and airborne evacuation, and only if all other things failed would the force attempt to operate as guerrillas.

Answer: Yes, sir.

Question: What would have been the consequences if, just before this invasion was launched, the men had been directed to conduct guerrilla type operations?

Answer: They probably would have revolted.

Question: But I understood that they initially wanted to go in as guerrillas?

Answer: Yes, but we showed them the advantages of mass firepower, and I believe that they were convinced that the shock action against Castroʼs forces in meeting this firepower would cause the militia to break and run, and spark mass defections.

Question: Then while the Cuban exiles originally wanted to conduct guerrilla operations they had been convinced that this was a rather unremunerative approach to the problem?

Answer: Yes, sir.

Question: Where are the refugees being debriefed?

Answer: At Miami, Puerto Cabezas, Norfolk and Vieques.

Statement: While we donʼt want to get into the matter in too much detail here, it seems that for historical reasons it would be a good thing if CIA would prepare an after action report on the over-all operation.

Answer: Yes, we are doing that.

Question: What would have happened if the operation had been called off after the first part of April?

Colonel Egan: It would have depended upon the posture they were in at the time. If it had been called off after they were actually on the way they would have taken over and kept going. I was informed that if the operation was called off they would take over. They said that as a friend we want you to direct all your people not to resist if this comes about, because we donʼt want anybody to get hurt. Consequently I had all our people turn in their side arms. I would say that after the 1st of April it was a go operation.

Statement: With regard to the merchant ships that went into the beachhead area, letʼs determine just what orders were given to the ships and by whom. Also, letʼs look into Lynchʼs story about the fact that they were going to take ammunition into the beachhead area in an LCI, but by the time the operation could be undertaken it would have been daylight before they arrived, so the mission was cancelled.

[Here follows testimony by McGeorge Bundy, which was deleted at Bundyʼs request as not adequately representing his point of view on several points. Bundy replaced this portion of the memorandum for the record with a May 4 letter to Taylor, Document 201.]

194. Report Prepared by a Combined Working Group From the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State and the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that an initial draft of the report was prepared on May 1. Washington, May 2, 1961.

FACTS, ESTIMATES, AND PROJECTIONS

Summary

I. The Present Situation in Cuba

The Armed Forces

The armed forces of the Castro regime number some 250,000, of whom some 200,000 are militia. The regular forces—army, navy, air, and national police—have been shaken by purges of officers and men who previously supported Castro against Batista but later became disillusioned by events in Cuba. Castro distrusts the armed forces and has built up the militia, thereby reducing his dependence on the military.

Bloc arms deliveries and intensive training have increased the military capabilities of the army, but its tactical training is still deficient. The militia is composed of people who generally serve only part-time, subject to call in an emergency, but some full-time militia units are now being formed and trained. The latter are, in effect, units of a second, more politically-reliable army. The air force and navy suffer from a lack of professionally trained and technically qualified personnel.

Control Mechanisms

In little over two years the Castro regime has established a complex of interlocking mechanisms enabling it to control virtually every phase of life in Cuba. This has been accomplished by imposing leadership loyal to the regime on every local and national organization of any importance, by regimenting the economy, by creating an elaborate internal security apparatus, and by seizing all major newspapers and radio and TV stations.

Attitudes of Key Individuals

Every key national figure in Cuban society, with the notable exception of the Catholic hierarchy, is by now either a dedicated supporter of communism and the Castro regime or a non-Communist so deeply committed to the regime as to be unlikely to turn against it.

Class and Regional Attitudes

The upper class has been destroyed as an effective political or economic force in Cuba. The middle class, which has suffered most from deteriorating economic conditions and the increasingly tight controls imposed by the government, provides the principal organized opposition to the Castro regime.

Attitudes of the lower class toward the regime are dependent upon the degree to which Castro has fulfilled his promises, the degree of hope remaining for the future realization of as yet unfulfilled promises, and the extent of psychological identification with the Revolution. It is that part of the newly self-conscious lower class which has already received positive benefits from the Revolution, or still hopes for future improvement in conditions, that now provides the real mass support for the Castro regime. This group of perhaps 25 percent to 30 percent of the total population probably constitutes the poorest segment of the large Cuban lower class.

By no means all of the Cuban lower class can be considered to favor the Castro regime. The failure of the government to carry out many of its earlier promises has led to increasing disappointment and dissatisfaction. This does not mean, however, that there has been an equal increase in willingness to act against the regime.

Economy

The Cuban economy continues to deteriorate both in terms of physical output and in living levels. Output in the industrial sector has been adversely affected by parts and raw material shortages, although sugar production may match or exceed last yearʼs level and the regime is making strenuous efforts to expand agricultural production. Cubaʼs trade has been redirected largely to the Soviet Bloc, whose economic support is vital for the Castro regime.

II. Probable Trends Within Cuba, Assuming No Major US Intervention

Political Prospects

Six Months. The position of the Castro regime has been strengthened by the recent invasion victory. It is probable that there will be no major change in internal political conditions during the next six months. Anti-Castro activity within Cuba will be muted as a result of the defeat of the invasion force. Castro may take advantage of his recent victory to organize a full-scale campaign against anti-Castro forces, or he may use the coming period of relative calm as a means of establishing a reputation for forbearance in the face of armed provocation. Indications are that he will probably follow the latter course. He will, in the immediate future, take advantage of his increased strength within Cuba to seize the Churchʼs educational system, and banish two-thirds of the clergy (the non-Cuban proportion).

One Year. The psychological impact of the recent Castro victory will have worn off and living conditions will not have improved perceptibly. Organized anti-Castro opposition will probably have stepped up its sabotage activities, but morale may be weakened (depending upon the extent of US support) by the apparent hopelessness of the battle against the regime.

Castro will have strengthened his position within the military and extended his control over the Cuban people. Police state methods will have become more effective. The Cuban Communist Party (PSP) will play a more open role in the government, but will not attempt to attain the open exercise of total power.

Five Years. All effective opposition to the regime will probably have been eliminated. Popular attitudes will also have changed. As economic conditions improve, the population will more easily reconcile itself to repugnant political controls. In addition, an extended period in which to indoctrinate the populace will almost certainly result in a significant increase in emotional and psychological identification with the regime.

Governmental controls will have become pervasive and effective. Increased efficiency of control agencies plus an extension of these controls into all aspects of Cuban life will make dissidence almost totally ineffective irrespective of any possible rise in popular antipathy for the regime beyond that foreseen.

Probable Trends in the Armed Forces

With continuing material and technical assistance from the Bloc and with further military training and political indoctrination, under Bloc tutelage, the combat effectiveness of the Cuban armed forces will substantially increase. The Bloc will probably provide some MIG-17ʼs when Cuban pilots training in Czechoslovakia return home. However, the buildup of a sizable jet air force in Cuba will probably be a slow process as compared with the improvement of the army. Nonnuclear air defense missiles may be supplied to Cuba, but the Bloc will not supply offensive type missiles nor nuclear weapons. The solution of the navyʼs immediate problem depends on the pace at which politically reliable personnel can be technically trained with Bloc assistance. That will take time, and it appears that nothing much is being done about it now.

Economic Prospects

Six Months. The economy will deteriorate further, although not sufficiently to jeopardize the regimeʼs stability. The end of the sugar season will mean a general decline in economic activity. Problems in selling sugar in the world market, other than the Bloc, may cause further foreign exchange problems, although the Bloc will move to supply essential requirements.

One Year. Another sugar season and anticipated expansion of industrial plants with Bloc assistance will bolster the economy, although Cuba will still be heavily dependent upon its foreign sugar sales, as yet unpredictable.

Some of the major supply and technical problems will have been overcome, and aggregate production may be on the upswing. Consumer austerity will still be in force, although consumption levels of the lower classes especially the rural population may increase slightly.

Five Years. Cubaʼs natural resources and Bloc economic assistance form the basis to permit Cuba to accomplish much of its five-year plan. This would mean greater economic independence, through increased self-sufficiency, less dependence on sugar, near-full employment, and gradual economic growth.

III. Cuban Vulnerabilities

Economic

Economic vulnerabilities of the Castro regime include its foreign exchange position, spare parts and raw materials shortages, lack of sufficient technical and managerial personnel, declining per capita income, and consumer shortages and the growing black market. Imposition of the Trading with the Enemy Act against Cuba (which would inter alia reduce Cubaʼs foreign exchange earnings from the US and would extend the US export embargo to all products) and a campaign of limited sabotage against Cubaʼs industries and utilities would aggravate these problems, though not sufficiently, by themselves, to jeopardize the regimeʼs stability. The Bloc would act to assist Cuba by providing minimum essentials and possibly supplying some foreign exchange. A program of extensive sabotage or a complete blockade would cause serious economic breakdowns, especially in the urban and industrial sectors. In the case of extensive sabotage the Bloc again could be expected to provide the minimum essentials to maintain the Cuban economy. The possibilities of a direct Soviet-US confrontation in the event of a blockade, and the impact of such action on our international position, are not considered in this paper.

Political

If Fidel Castro were to be eliminated from the scene the regime might collapse for lack of this central rallying point. On the other hand, the bureaucracy may now be so firmly entrenched that it could operate without him.

Popular resentment against the totalitarian controls imposed by the regime has steadily increased. This resentment is open to exploitation through a psychological warfare campaign or a program of reprisals against members of the control apparatus, e.g., informers.

The hold of the regime depends in large part on control of mass communications media. Sabotage of these facilities would deprive the regime of this advantage; sabotage of other communications would impair the effectiveness of police controls.

IV. Relations of Castro With Latin America

Nature and Extent of the Threat Posed by Castro

The threat posed by the Castro regime in Latin America stems from its inherent appeal to the forces of social unrest and anti-Americanism at a time when most of the area is in the throes of a fundamental transformation. Castro and the Communists have made assiduous efforts to capitalize on this situation. Cuba has become the center of a propaganda and subversion campaign of unprecedented proportions in Latin America. Both Castro and the Communists see the Cuban revolution not as an end in itself but as the prototype of a transformation which will eventually sweep over all of Latin America. Given the chaotic stage of Latin American politics pro-Castro elements have a significant capability for stirring up demonstrations and disorders in a number of countries, and in a few an outside chance of gaining power in the next few years.

Present Attitudes Toward Castro

In the aftermath of the recent invasion of Cuba, Latin American attitudes toward Castroism have become more fluid. Ruling groups are temporarily more fearful of the Soviet thrust in the hemisphere and less fearful of popular reaction in support of Castro.

The OAS is now less hostile to US intervention in Cuba than before the invasion, but a majority of its members is still not prepared to intervene in Cuba.

Probable Developments in the Absence of US Intervention

The danger is not so much that subversive apparatus centered in Havana will be able to export the revolution directly as that increasing misery and discontent among the mass of the Latin American people will provide opportunities for pro-Castro elements to act. The Cuban-Communist political warfare apparatus can obviously do much to further the process, however.

In the absence of direct Cuban intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring states, the present fears of Castroism among Latin American ruling groups will wane and the traditional nonintervention policies will be reasserted.

The Soviet Union is expected to counsel Castro to avoid overt actions which would provoke US counteraction or which could be interpreted by other Latin American governments as Cuban intervention in their domestic affairs.

Effect on the US Position

The continued existence of the Castro regime would fundamentally alter the terms of Latin American relations with the US. US restraint would be interpreted by Latin American ruling groups as evidence of weakness.

Aside from its direct effect on US prestige the survival of Castro would profoundly affect Latin American political life. It would set the stage for political struggle in terms long promoted by Communist prop-aganda in the hemisphere, with the issue drawn between “popular” anti-US forces and the ruling groups allied with the US.

The US would have to be prepared to underwrite huge welfare and economic development programs and to involve itself directly in their success, always under some threat of withdrawal of cooperation by the Latin American governments.

On the other hand, if Castro were eliminated, the US would be in a much stronger position to insist upon adoption of a program of moderate, evolutionary change by the ruling groups in Latin America.

The expulsion of Cubaʼs Soviet-controlled regime would deprive the USSR of its bridgehead in the western hemisphere and would remove the model for action by extremist groups. However, the Soviets would still have a multitude of weaknesses to exploit, and would have achieved real gains over their early 1959 position.

[Here follows the 61-page body of the report.]

195. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Air Force (Zuckert) to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw the memorandum. Washington, May 3, 1961.

This is a follow-up to our discussion on Cuba yesterday morning. The Air Staff, in conjunction with the Tactical Air Command, has prepared a plan which would airdrop six Army battle groups plus necessary support (roughly two Airborne Divisions) into Cuba. This operation could start within 28 hours after receipt of the order of execution and would require 114 hours to complete. Fifty-seven squadrons of troop carrier airlift would be used, including 16 squadrons of Reserve Forces C-119ʼs. The use of the Reserve squadrons is consistent with their combat capability and is necessary to preclude stretching out the assault time and thereby reducing surprise and shock effect.

The plan is now in being in outline formNot found. and work is underway in developing the details. It is being coordinated with the Army.

I recommend you consider the type operation envisaged in this plan before any firm Department of Defense decision is made in this regard.

196. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Confidential. Washington, May 3, 1961. SUBJECT Reactions to Cuba in Western Europe 1.

I spent the period April 22-May 3 in Western Europe, first attending a conference of West European political and intellectual figures at Bologna, Italy, and then spending a few days in Paris and in London. I made a special point of trying to check reactions to the Cuban debacle—and also of setting forth (especially to key politicians and journalists) the key facts of the Cuban situation.

In Paris, I had conversations with Pierre Mendes-France; Jean Monnet; Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber (LʼExpress); Raymond Aron; M. Jeanneny, the Minister of Production; M. Baraduc, the chief information officer of the Quai dʼOrsay; as well as with Ambassador Gavin, Ambassador Finletter, Cecil Lyon, and the American correspondents Cy Sulzberger, Joe Alsop, Don Cook and Art Buchwald.

In London, I talked with publishers or editors of the Spectator (Ian Gilmour and Bernard Levin); New Statesman (Paul Johnson and Norman Mackenzie); Economist (Donald Tyerman); Observer (David Astor, John Pringle, Edward Crankshaw and leading staff people); Sunday Times (Frank Giles and Nicholas Carroll); Daily Herald (John Beavan); Daily Telegraph (Michael Berry and Maurice Green); Evening Standard (Charles Wintour): Sunday Telegraph (Peregrine Worsthorne); plus a luncheon with the diplomatic correspondents of the London papers and the Manchester Guardian. Among Labour MPs, I saw Hugh Gaitskell, Denis Healey, Richard Crossman, Roy Jenkins, George Brown, Woodrow Wyatt. Among members of the government, I saw David Ormsby Gore, Ian Macleod, Reginald Maudling, Lord Hailsham, Sir Edward Boyle. I also saw Sir Frank Lee of the Treasury; Bob Boothby, Hartley Shawcross and Gladwyn Jebb, all of whom are now independent members of the House of Lords; Lord Lambton, a right-wing Tory MP; Sir Isaiah Berlin and William Deakin of Oxford; and the American correspondents Drew Middleton (New York Times) and Herman Nickels (Time). I also consulted closely, of course, with Ambassador Bruce and members of his staff.

I list these names to make clear the kind of opinions on which this report is based. I believe that in both Paris and London I saw a fairly representative cross-section of the political community. My impression of sentiment in these countries has been supplemented by my talks in Bologna with people from all over Western Europe and by the reports of American correspondents and diplomats.

I should add that I encountered everywhere what can only be described as a hunger for a rational explanation of the Cuban operation. I found this among left and right alike; among Americans as well as Europeans; among American Embassy officials (and even CIA representatives) as well as among American newspaper correspondents. The available stories had left most people baffled and incredulous. They could not believe that the U.S. Government had been quite so incompetent, irresponsible and stupid as the bare facts of the operation suggested, and they listened sympathetically and gratefully to a more balanced and complete account.

The apparent decision to keep our own diplomatic personnel in ignorance about the background of the Cuban operation seems to me especially unfortunate and unnecessary (though there may be considerations here of which I have no knowledge). The State Department appears to have sent out no instructions to American Embassies how to explain what happened in Cuba. As a consequence, our Ambassadors remain in the dark. If the Foreign Secretary of the state to which they are assigned asks them what really went on, they are forced to mouth official generalities or to confess ignorance or to rely on Scotty Reston or Time. This matter could easily have been remedied, in my judgment, if the State Department had sent out a simple instruction to our Embassies. I attach as Appendix A to this report the copy of a cable I sent to Mr. Rusk on this point from Rome.Appendix A, not printed, was not found attached. A copy is attached to a copy of Schlesingerʼs memorandum ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/61.

Reactions to the debacle: short-term. The first reactions to Cuba were, of course, acute shock and disillusion. For some months nearly everybody in Western Europe, and especially perhaps the democratic left, had been making heavy emotional and political investments in the new American administration. Everything about this administration—the intelligence and vision of the President, the dynamism of his leadership, the scope and generosity of his policies, the freshness of his approach to the cold war—had excited tremendous anticipation and elation. The new American President in three months had reestablished confidence in the maturity of American judgment and the clarity of American purposes. Kennedy was considered the last best hope of the West against communism and for peace.

Now, in a single stroke, all this seemed wiped away. After Cuba, the American Government seemed as self-righteous, trigger-happy and incompetent as it had ever been in the heyday of John Foster Dulles. “Kennedy has lost his magic,” one person said to me. “It will take years before we can accept the leadership of the Kennedy Administration again,” said another. Friends of America warned me not to underestimate the gravity of the damage: “Make sure that our people in Washington understand how much ground we have lost” (Drew Middleton); “It was a terrible blow, and it will take a long, long time for us to recover from it” (Lord Boothby).

I should add that nearly all the reactions I encountered expressed sorrow over the decision to invade rather than over the failure of the invasion. “Why was Cuba such a threat to you? Why couldnʼt you live with Cuba, as the USSR lives with Turkey and Finland?” I had expected to find more people on the right who would complain over our failure to send in the Marines; but I found only one—Lord Lambton, a Tory MP who is a bitter critic of Macmillanʼs, a great friend of Joe Alsopʼs and an advocate of fighting everywhere—in Laos, Kenya, Cuba, etc. Other Tory MPs—Lord Hailsham, for example—said that in their view US intervention would have been a great error and would only have converted Cuba into another Ireland, Cyprus or Algeria. David Ormsby Gore, in making this point, added that British [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] estimates, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] were that the Cuban people were still predominantly behind Castro and that there was no likelihood at this point of mass defections or insurrections.

Reactions to the debacle: long-term. The severity of the original shock should not, however, be allowed to overshadow certain factors on the other side. The fact is that the new administration made an enormously good impression up to Cuba and in so doing built up a fund of good will which, though now somewhat dissipated, is by no means entirely destroyed. One evidence of this is the eagerness of people on the left—Mendes-France, Servan-Schreiber, even Dick Crossman and the New Statesman people—to hear the American side of the case.

Reactions within the British Labour Party are perhaps symptomatic. Hugh Gaitskell was rueful but philosophical. “It was a great blow,” he said. “The right wing of the Labour Party has been basing a good deal of its argument on the claim that things had changed in America. Cuba has made great trouble for us. We shall now have to move toward the left for a bit in order to maintain our position within the Party.” But he asked what he could do to help, suggested people to whom I should talk and even made an appointment himself for me to see the editor of the Daily Herald. Denis Healey, the “shadow” Foreign Secretary, was somewhat more bitter. “Iʼve staked my whole political career on the ability of the Americans to act sensibly,” he said. He felt badly let down by the Administration but again was perfectly ready to listen to an account of how things had actually happened. Farther to the left, Dick Crossman said, “You really have got off very lightly. If this had taken place under Eisenhower, there would have been mass meetings in Trafalgar Square, Dulles would have been burned in effigy, and the Labour Party would have damned you in the most unequivocal terms. But because enough faith still remains in Kennedy, there has been very little popular outcry, and the Labour Party resolutions have been the bare minimum. Youʼve got away with it this time. But one more mistake like this, and you will really be through.”

Conservatives were, on the whole, even more willing to find excuses for the Cuban policy. A number of people, both on the right and the left, remarked consolingly on the shortness of popular memories. Algeria, of course, was immensely helpful in driving Cuba from the front pages.

Over the longer term, in short, I think we have suffered a serious but by no means fatal loss of confidence in our intelligence and responsibility. This can be easily recouped if we seem to return to more intelligent and responsible ways in the future. However, it will all go rather quickly if we embark once more on a course which Europeans regard as ill-considered, impetuous and reckless.

Dangers for the future. To sum up, Cuba is forgivable as an aberration but is greatly feared as forecasting future directions of US policy. It has created, for example, a vague fear in peopleʼs minds that the Kennedy Administration is bent on a course of subversive and paramilitary warfare. This fear has been heightened by what some Europeans regard as an unfolding pattern of events since Cuba, all seeming to foreshadow policies of military or paramilitary intervention: the “our patience is not limitless” speech; the emphasis on training for guerrilla warfare; the appeal to the press not to print stories about US unconventional warfare projects; the rumors of CIA support for the Algiers generals; the Presidential offer to intervene in France; the intimations of possible US intervention in Laos; the huddles with Nixon, Hoover, MacArthur, etc., interpreted in Europe as an effort to gather national support for, at the very least, a US invasion of Cuba. A number of people seriously believe, on the basis of newspaper stories from Washington, that an American invasion of Cuba is a distinct and imminent possibility. An Observer editor said to me, “If Cuba were just an accident, all right. But everything since Cuba suggests that the Kennedy who launched that invasion was the real Kennedy—that all his talk about ‘new methodsʼ of warfare and countering guerrillas represents his real approach to the problems of the cold war—that he thinks the West will beat communism by adopting communist methods and transforming itself into a regimented paramilitary society on the model of the Soviet Union.” Several people said, “Itʼs not Cuba that worries me; itʼs the aftermath.”

The reported Washington obsession with guerrilla warfare has roused particular concern. Press stories have given high quarters in England and France the impression that the U.S. Government suddenly regards counter-guerrilla activity as the key to victory in the cold war. The attached piece from the Times expresses British feeling on this matter.Not found attached. It is not clear which article or editorial in the Times of London is under reference here. Several people elaborately pointed out to me that guerrilla warfare can not be isolated from the political battle; that no force, however trained in counter-guerrilla technique, can clean up a guerrilla situation if the countryside sticks with the guerrillas; that the decisive question therefore is how the peasants feel. I was reminded that the guerrillas have been defeated in only two places since the war—in the Philippines, because Magsaysayʼs reform program won back the countryside; and in Malaya, because the British were able both to mobilize the Malayans against the Chinese and to offer independence—and that these examples show that politics, not combat methods, is the secret of success against guerrilla movements. The new tone of urgency in Washington has a somewhat shrill ring in many European ears. The Europeans to whom I talked believe that the fight against communism is still a matter for the long haul; they are much more impressed by the Alianza para el Progreso than by the training camps for anti-guerrilla warfare; and they hope for a return to the main lines of US foreign policy as set forth in the months before Cuba. I should add that nothing would do more to reestablish confidence in the U.S. Government than a visible shake-up and subordination of CIA. As the Algerian affair showed, CIA is going to be blamed for everything, especially so long as it continues to operate under its present management. People are eager to believe that the President was misled by bad advice in the matter of Cuba, but they are also eager to be reassured that he will not continue to get the same bad advice in the future.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

197. Memorandum From the Assistant to the Deputy Director (Plans) for Covert Action (Barnes) to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba Program, Jan 21, 1961-. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, May 3, 1961. SUBJECT Cuban Paper 1. Attached is a copy of the paper which Dick Bissell sent over to Dick Goodwin of the White House Staff, who was acting as the central drafting point on the Cuban NSC paper being prepared by Paul Nitzeʼs working committee. The attached paper is not to be made a part of the NSC paper nor is a military planning paperNot found. for Cuba. Presumably, both the attached and the military planning paper will be available for perusal by selected individuals. 2. You may quite properly feel that the attached is a rather brief statement but the reason for it is that Messrs. Nitze and Goodwin have had sessions both with Cuban leaders (i.e. Miro, Varona and Ray) as well as with Dick Bissell and myself so that they are pretty well informed on the possibilities. Consequently, a detailed paper did not seem necessary. C. Tracy BarnesPrinted from a copy that indicates Barnes signed the original. Attachment Washington, May 2, 1961.

As indicated by the combined INR/ONE estimate,Not found. anti-Castro activity within Cuba will probably be muted at least for the next several months. Most individuals whose loyalty is in any way suspect have been arrested. A recent report from the Swiss Ambassador indicated that political prisoners now number 100,000. All internal services will continue to work on a theory of repression plus undoubtedly swift and brutal penalties. Consequently, it will be very difficult to carry on any clandestine operations and it is doubtful that such operations can have any significant impact in weakening the Castro regime.

In spite of this, evidence is still available that there is opposition to the regime among individuals still at large and that such opposition is prepared to undertake action despite the risks involved. Moreover, there are still agents distributed through most of the six provinces and communications can still be had either directly or indirectly with these individuals. At the very least these agents can and will continue to collect information and to transmit it to the Agency. In addition, certain of these individuals, plus some additional ones who might be infiltrated, could attempt to carry out some sabotage. Individual acts of sabotage are possible with relatively few men and small amounts of material. Successive acts of sabotage or extensive sabotage operations are more difficult and inevitably more costly in terms of loss of men. Nevertheless, it would be possible, starting in the near future, to attempt limited sabotage with a view to determining its feasibility and with the hope that gradually an increased program might be developed.

A capability also exists for types of maritime operations including infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, landing and caching of arms, under-water sabotage of shipping and small raider operations. Under present circumstances it would seem wrong to attempt these except on a very limited scale and in all likelihood, raider operations should not be attempted until more information regarding feasibility has been obtained.

The Agency also has a small air arm including some transport aircraft (C-54 and C-46 types) plus attack bomber aircraft (B-26). Although it is not absolutely certain, there is reason to suppose that Cuban crews also are available for operational flights. At the moment, air operations should be substantially eliminated with the possible exception of supply flights to support opposition elements unable to survive without such support. Even with respect to such operations, however, it should be remembered that the percentage of successful night drops is extremely limited so that the urgency should be great to justify the risk. B-26 strikes could, of course, be flown against chosen targets (e.g. refineries, power plants, tire plants) and, if successful, might have the effect of extensive sabotage. In view of the risks involved, however, and the poor deniability of U.S. support where aircraft are involved, it is recommended that such operations be avoided at least for the present.

Manolo Ray of the MRP has asserted an independent MRP capability to conduct infiltration, intelligence collection, sabotage and defection operations into Cuba. He recognizes a need for U.S. support but is very firm in his desire to operate as independently as possible of any official U.S. connection. His initial request is for five boats, some materiel and some money. He admits, however, that, looking ahead, additional support such as real estate, some help with training and communications will be required. He offers to share his information with the U.S. Government, seek U.S. advice and, at least for a period of time, be willing to operate with the Revolutionary Council. The Councilʼs views are being canvassed and Ray has been asked to prepare a prospectus giving in some detail his needs for U.S. support for the immediate future and the step-up required over a period of time should his efforts prove successful.

The Ray proposal should certainly be examined and given support within reasonable limits if the relationships proposed both with the Council and with the U.S. are satisfactory.

In addition to the activities described above, propaganda activities such as radio broadcasts and publication of magazines and newspapers can be continued independently by the Agency or in support of Ray or the Revolutionary Council. Moreover, limited political action operations are possible. As to both propaganda and political action, however, the amount of effort and the type of activity undertaken will depend to a large extent on the decisions with respect to the operations described above. Consequently, these will be noted here as mere possibilities.

198. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Cuba Study GroupSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret. Three maps entitled “Planned Disposition of Forces,” “General Disposition of Forces—End of D-Day,” and “General Disposition of Forces—End of D+1” are not printed. Washington, May 3, 1961. SUBJECT Sequence of Events (D-2 to D+2), and Organization and Operation of Command Post REFERENCE Paragraph 4, Memorandum dated 1 May 1961, Subject: Additional Information Desired of CIANot found.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

(D-2 to D+2)

General. The description of events set forth herein is based upon messages and other information received at Headquarters during the operation. Comments are inserted where amplifying information is considered necessary. Later debriefing of personnel who actually participated in the operation has provided more extensive information concerning the action, but the purpose of this paper is to record what was known at Headquarters at the time.

D-2 (15 April 1961).

Air Strikes.

The purpose of these air strikes was to destroy the Castro air capability, located at Campo Libertad, San Antonio de los Banos, and Santiago de Cuba. In conjunction with the air strike, one B-26 with Castro Air Force markings and piloted by a Cuban was to land at Miami with the story that he was a defector from the Castro Air Force. The purpose of the defection flight was to conceal that the air strike was launched from outside Cuba, and to attempt to obtain mass defections in Castroʼs Air Force.

The air strike was carried out as scheduled at dawn D-2 by 8 B-26ʼs, allocated as follows: 3—Campo Libertad 3—San Antonio de los Banos 2—Santiago de Cuba

Initial pilot reports indicated that 50% of Castroʼs offensive air was destroyed at Campo Libertad, 75% to 80% aircraft destruction at San Antonio at los Banos, and that the destruction at Santiago included 2 B-26ʼs, 1 DC-8, 1 Lodestar, and 1 T-33 or Sea Fury. Subsequent photographic studies and interpretations indicated considerably less damage.

Comment: The State Department had consistently objected to any air attacks on Cuban airfields or other targets in Cuba. Conversely, the military planners on this project had realized from the outset that complete domination of the air was vital to the success of any landing attack. Therefore, methods were sought whereby destruction of enemy aircraft could be achieved in a manner acceptable to the State Department. It was within this framework that the defection operation in conjunction with B-26 attacks on Campo Libertad, San Antonio de los Banos, and Santiago was presented to the President of the United States, who approved the proposal. It was also the understanding of the military planners, at the time that the President gave his approval, that the D-2 strikes were to be followed by strikes at dawn D-day on airfields and other military targets. The fact air attacks on D-day were planned was specifically mentioned by the Deputy Director (Plans) when he briefed the President on the contemplated operation.

Diversionary Landing in Oriente.

A landing 30 miles east of Guantanamo by a group of 160 men, led by Nino Diaz, was planned for the night of 14/15 April. The landing had a twofold purpose: (1) to divert attention from the main landing, and (2) to organize guerrilla operations in Oriente Province.

The ship on which the force was embarked (Santa Ana) approached the landing point on schedule without interference. However, the landing was aborted. Reasons given for aborting were as follows: (1) Friendly beach reception party did not appear on beach. (Comment: The leader was never informed that there would be a reception party.) (2) Reconnaissance boat was lost. (3) Two rubber boats were lost.

When it was learned that the operation had not been conducted, instructions were issued to land the following night. The ship remained in the area, retraced its route of the day before, and made its approach without incident. However, the landing again was not conducted. Reasons given this time were as follows: (1) Reconnaissance boat broke down. (2) Too much time lost in retrieving the reconnaissance boat. (3) Friendly beach reception party did not appear on the beach. (4) Enemy activity in area was too great.

Comment: The validity of the reasons given by Diaz for not conducting the landing are questionable. Intelligence sources did not indicate that the force had been discovered by the opposition. It was finally decided at Headquarters that weak leadership on the part of Diaz was responsible for the refusal to land, and on 16 April (D-1) orders were given to this force to proceed to the Zapata area and join the main force. The Diaz group did not arrive at Zapata in time to participate in the main operation.

Brigade En Route to Objective Area.

The ships on which the Brigade was embarked were following widely separated courses to the objective area. According to reports received (later confirmed by debriefings of Grayston Lynch, William Robertson, George Shane, and Sven Rydberg): all ships were proceeding ahead of schedule.

Comment: This was not considered detrimental to the security of the operation at this time because of the distance which separated the ships from the objective area.

About 1000, 15 April the Atlantico reported an automatic weapon accident in which 1 man was killed and 2 men wounded. A U.S. Navy destroyer made pick up after dark that night. Wounded were eventually evacuated to Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.

D-1 (16 April 1961).

Seaborne Movement of Brigade.

The assault shipping continued to move on separate courses toward the objective area. From position reports rendered by the various ships and the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Essex, it was determined that all the ships, except the Rio Escondido, were ahead of schedule. At about 0600, 16 April the ships were ordered to reduce speed in order to arrive at the remainder of reference points in accordance with Ship Movement Schedule (contained in Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex H to the Operation Plan).The CIAʼs detailed Operation Plan has not been found. Subsequent position reports indicated the ships complied with instructions.

The ships made their rendezvous with each other on time at about 1730, 16 April. They proceeded in column and made rendezvous with U.S. Navy LSD (San Marcos) about 5000 yards from Blue Beach. LCU and LCVP aboard the LSD were transferred to Cuban crews without incident between 2300 and 2400, 16 April.

Movement of Airborne Battalion from Base Camp in Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua.

This movement was accomplished during the night of 15/16 April without incident. The troops were moved expeditiously from aircraft to an isolated area near the airfield, where briefings of troops and aircraft crews were conducted until time for takeoff for objective area.

Cancellation of D-day Air Strikes.

The information on the decision to cancel planned D-day air strikes against Cuban airfields and other military targets was received at the Command Post at about 2200, 17 April.

Comment: The late hour at which this information was received made it impossible to cancel the landing, though the PM staff planners recognized the implications of such a decision. The Brigade and assault shipping were advised at this time that all Castro aircraft had not been destroyed. The Blagar (Flagship) was ordered to expedite unloading of troops and essential cargo from the Houston, Caribe, and Atlantico and send them 50 miles to sea at the earliest possible time. The Blagar and Barbara J were ordered to protect the Rio Escondido while it was being unloaded during the day. Friendly B-26ʼs were to fly cover over the beachhead all day. It was realized at the time by the paramilitary staff that loss of ships and military supplies on board was inevitable since it was known that Castro possessed an offensive air capability which had not been destroyed.

D-day (17 April 1961).

Blue Beach.

When it was discovered that resistance was to be met in the landing over this beach, the Blagar moved in close to shore and delivered gunfire support. Brigade troops commenced landing at 0100.

0115—Brigade Commander ashore. 0300—Unloading of troops on Caribe completed. Commenced unloading troops from Atlantico. UDT reported searching for LCU landing point. 0330—Troops from Atlantico landing under fire. 0420—Brigade Commander issued orders to land troops, originally scheduled for Green Beach, over Blue Beach. 0600—First LCU ashore. 0630—Enemy air attacks commence on shipping and Blue Beach. 0640—Friendly air support arrived. (There is no mention henceforth as to what this support accomplished.) 0730—Completed discharging all vehicles and tanks from LCUʼs. 0825—Enemy T-33 shot down by Blagar. 0825—All troops ashore at Blue Beach. 0930—Rio Escondido hit and sunk. Crew members rescued and evacuated to Blagar. 0930—Brigade reported Playa Giron Airstrip ready for use. 1000—Continuous enemy air attacks forces shipping to go to sea. At 1200 Headquarters issued instructions which required sailing south at best possible speed. 1000—As ships withdrew they continued to come under air attack. 1130—Brigade reported had only 4 hours ammunition left. (The Brigade Commander was probably referring only to Blue Beach, because there is nothing to indicate that he was in contact with units at Red Beach or with the airborne units.)

The Blagar went to sea in company with the LCU with the plan to load the LCUʼs and then return after dark to make delivery of supplies and ammunition. However, after loading the LCUʼs, there wasnʼt sufficient time (darkness) remaining to make the run to the Beach, unload the craft, and retire to the seaward.

In response to the Brigade Commanderʼs request for ammunition, at 1300 Headquarters issued instructions to base in Nicaragua to make airdrops at head of Bahia de Cochinos and at Playa Giron. During the night of 17/18 April 1 C-54 drop was made at Red Beach and 3 C-54 drops at Blue Beach. Results of drops are not positively known due to the fact that DZʼs were not lighted.

Red Beach.

Nothing was reported to Headquarters on D-day concerning the landing at Red Beach. On D+1, the following was reported by the Barbara J concerning the D-day landing.

270 men with 6-81mm mortars, 1-75 RR, 2-57mm RR, 1-.50 caliber MG, and 2-60mm mortars were landed. A report from the Barbara J (message dated 221004Z) indicates that these troops were engaged immediately.

The Houston came under air attack at about 170630, and was hit. The ship went aground sometime later (time undetermined) with about 180 men on the west side of Bahia de Cochinos—about 5 miles from the landing beach.

Airborne Landing.

No action reported to Headquarters from the field on D-day. Certain reliable sources outside the objective area indicate the landing took place about 170730R in predesignated drop zones. Debriefing of pilots later confirmed that all landings were made except for one outpost scheduled for DZ-2.

Night Air Attacks.

Orders were issued at 1615 to bomb as many airfields as possible at night with fragmentation bombs. Three B-26ʼs were launched for San Antonio de los Banos for these attacks but failed to find target due to haze and the fact that target was blacked out.

D+1 (18 April 1961).

At about 0730 the 2d Battalion at Red Beach reported for first time in message traffic, saying that its position could not be maintained without air support for more than 30 minutes.

0824—Brigade Commander reported Blue Beach under attack by 12 tanks and 4 jet aircraft. Ammunition and supplies requested. (Soon after the above report, authority to use napalm was granted for use in the beachhead area.) 1010—Red Beach reported wiped out. It was learned later during debriefing of Lynch and Robertson that Deputy Brigade Commander had ordered a withdrawal to Blue Beach, which was executed in an orderly manner. 1200—Blue Beach reported under attack by MIG-15ʼs and T-33ʼs, and out of tank ammunition, and almost all out of small arms ammunition also. 1600—Essex reported long line of tanks and trucks approaching Blue Beach from east.

Enemy air attacks and shortage of ammunition continued to be reported the rest of the day. Three C-54 ammunition and food drops on Playa Giron were reported dropped during the night 18/19 April. One of the drops was completely successful; and the other two doubtful—one landed off the end of the runway at the airfield, and one landed in the water. No report was received as to the amount of the latter that was recovered.

Friendly air attacks using napalm were conducted late in the day, causing undetermined damage. Pilot reports indicate many fires to the west of Blue Beach.

1800–1st Battalion reported under heavy artillery attack. Position indicated at this time was considerably south of the 1st Battalion planned position north and northeast of San Blas. 1800—Brigade Commander continued to request jet air cover, including close support and ammunition.

Comment: By means of a message sent from Headquarters at 2024, the Brigade Commander was informed that a C-46 with ammunition would land at the Playa Giron airfield, and would evacuate wounded. It was also recommended to the Brigade Commander that patrols armed with bazookas search out tanks and knock them out during the night. Brigade Commander was also informed in this message that ships would be sent in on night 19 April for evacuation if he so recommended.

2200—Brigade Commander sent message “I will not be evacuated. We will fight to the end here if we have to.”

During the night many discussions were held concerning the participation of U.S. Navy aircraft over the beachhead area. The final instruction provided for Navy CAP between 0630 and 0730 to defend “CEF against air attack from Castro forces.” The aircraft were issued instructions not to seek air combat but defend CEF forces from air attack, and not to attack ground targets. As a result of these provisions, plans were made to use all available B-26ʼs to support Brigade, while Navy was providing air protection. Later, it was reported that Cuban pilots flying these missions aborted prior to arrival over the beachhead, and two American crews were shot down.

D+2 (19 April 1961).

0600—Enemy air strikes commenced. 0710-1430—Enemy commenced closing in on Brigade elements in Blue Beach sector with tanks and infantry in coordination with air attacks. From the beginning of this period, the Brigade Commander sent many frantic appeals for air cover and support to destroy enemy tanks. 0170-1430—Last message—“Am destroying all equipment and communications. Tanks are in sight. I have nothing left to fight with. Am taking to woods. I cannot wait for you.”

Comment: Commencing early morning of 19 April, serious consideration was given to evacuating Brigade during the night 19/20 April despite the Brigade Commanderʼs assertion that he would not evacuate. Necessary instructions were issued to move shipping closer to the Blue Beach area so that the run to the beach, reembarkation of troops, and withdrawal to sea could be done during hours of darkness. Identification of messages sent are as follows: Hqs. Msg. No. 4835 (OUT 7239)—190820Z 4839 (OUT 7269)—191346Z 4840 (OUT 7271)—191358Z 4844 (OUT 7280)—191434Z 4850 (OUT 7293)—191627ZThese messages, all dated April 19, are in the Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials.

ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES OF COMMAND POST

1. The Command Post functioned in a manner similar to that of a military command post (divisional level). Representatives from the sections comprising the Paramilitary Staff operated on a 24 hour basis. Sections represented were Ground Operations, Air Operations, Maritime Operations, Intelligence, Personnel and Logistics. 2. Contact liaison was maintained with the Joint Chiefs of Staff through Lt. Col. Benjamin Tarwater (JCS Staff representative) who visited the Operations Center twice daily to obtain timely briefing notes in order to prepare and present daily JCS briefings. 3. Telephone and cable contact was maintained with Headquarters CINCLANT. Communications with the Brigade and CEF ships was via CIA communication center at the operation center building (Quarters Eye). 4. Colonel Hawkins, Chief, Paramilitary Staff and Mr. Esterline, the Project Chief, were physically present at the Command Post in Quarters Eye throughout the period of operations. 5. Mr. Bissell and Colonel King were also immediately available for consultation throughout the operation and frequent conferences between these officials, Mr. Esterline and Colonel Hawkins were held. 6. Decisions within the competence of CIA were immediately reached in all cases. Decisions requiring Department of Defense participation were critically delayed due to the necessity for consideration at higher levels of government and political implications. 7. During the final day of the operation, Colonel Hawkins and other key military staff officers posted themselves in the communications center of Quarters Eye and responded to messages coming from the field instantly upon receipt.

199. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. No drafter is indicated but it was probably Colonel Tarwater. The meeting was the ninth in the series conducted by the Cuba Study Group and took place at the Pentagon. The participants in the meeting, in addition to Taylor, Kennedy, Dulles, and Burke, included McNamara, Wheeler, Bonesteel, Kinnard, King, Mitchell, and Tarwater. A note on the source text reads: “The following notes are not a verbatim record, but represent the general substance of the statements made.” Washington, May 3, 1961.

[Here follows discussion of intelligence aspects of the Zapata operation.]

Secretary McNamara

At this point the Group proceeded to Secretary McNamaraʼs office where he was asked a number of questions in an attempt to determine what the picture was as he saw it at his level of decision.

Question: What was the estimate of the probability of success of Zapata?

Secretary McNamara: This should be answered in the time context of the point of no return. Actually the chances of success changed as the days went by as the plan was modified. Initially there was a smaller force, about 800 personnel. Finally there were somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,200. This increase in the strength of the invasion force, of course, increased the chances of success. The increased logistic support also tended to increase the chances of success. On the other hand, the reduced air support, the new landing area, and the reduced sea cover all tended to reduce the chances of success. However, the over-all balance indicated a marginal probability of success. It seemed desirable to go ahead for three reasons: (1) If we didnʼt proceed we would have to bring the invasion force back to the United States. It seemed that the general conclusion that would result from this would be the idea that the United States was unwilling to help others fight against Communism. (2) A feeling that never again would we have a chance to overthrow Castro without utilizing Americans. (3) The failure of the CEF to succeed in their operation as a unified force would not preclude the force from breaking up and continuing guerrilla operations, in which case the operation would not be viewed by the rest of the world as a total defeat.

Statement: One side we are interested in exploring is the side pre-sented by Mr. Mann.

Secretary McNamara: Tom Mann endorsed the plan before the point of no return.

Statement: Our papers indicate that on the 18th of February Mr. Bundy reported to the President that there were two points of view, Mr. Bissellʼs and Mr. Mannʼs.See Document 48. Was Mr. Mann the one who insisted on nonattribution?

Secretary McNamara: The desirability of nonattribution was a general view, almost to be met prior to approval. However, this canʼt be charged to Tom Mann.

Question: Was the question of guerrilla operations in the Zapata area considered?

Secretary McNamara: Yes. However, this was considered to be unlikely because the CEF was believed to be able to control the access routes into the beachhead. If control of the access routes was lost, however, it was believed it would be easier for the invaders to get through the swamps as individuals than it would be for Castroʼs units. Finally, it was believed that if Castro broke through the force could be evacuated by sea.

Question: Was it a major factor that this force could get to the mountains?

Secretary McNamara: Yes, it was certainly in the Presidentʼs mind. It was always considered that the force could be evacuated or go through the swamp into the mountains, in which case the Press wouldnʼt be able to look upon the operation as a total failure.

Question: What was the feeling with regard to the possibility of popular uprisings?

Secretary McNamara: It was understood that there was a substantial possibility of uprisings, possibly on the order of four or five out of ten. This led to the belief that the whole operation was marginal. Uprisings in a police state werenʼt expected to occur fast enough to support the landings.

Question: What was expected to happen if the landing force effected a successful lodgment but there was no uprising?

Secretary McNamara: They would be split up into a guerrilla force and moved into the Escambrays.

Question: What was the understanding of the position of the JCS as to Zapata? Was it appreciated that they favored Trinidad over Zapata?

Secretary McNamara: The JCS had reviewed the plan in early January and while they considered it marginal they still believed it had sufficient chance of success to warrant its implementation. After all the modifications to the original plan were made they still believed the chances of success were marginal, but they still wanted to give it a try. There was one important modification that the Chiefs never knew about and one about which they all felt strongly. This was the decision to cancel some of the D-Day air strikes. This decision was made at the only meeting at which neither I nor the Chiefs participated. It was my understanding that both the CIA and the Chiefs preferred Zapata to Trinidad. For while Trinidad offered the advantage of close proximity to the Escambray or guerrilla territory, Zapata offered an air strip and was likely to be less well protected by Castro, thereby raising the chances of success for the initial landing.

Question: Was it understood that control of the air was essential to the success of the landing?

Secretary McNamara: It was understood that without control of the air the chances of success would be considerably decreased. The understanding of Castroʼs air force was not adequate, particularly in terms of the members and types of aircraft. Furthermore, it was assumed that a large number of his aircraft would be incapacitated. This appears to have been a major error. However, to get back to the question of control of the air, it was certainly understood that it was very important.

Secretary McNamara: It doesnʼt appear that we would have achieved complete control of the air even if we had made the dawn air attack.

Statement: There were some reports that we knocked out approximately two-thirds of Castroʼs combat aircraft.

Secretary McNamara: If we knocked out two-thirds of Castroʼs aircraft they had a greater capability than they were expected to have.

Question: What was the understanding as to the ability of the landing force to pass to a guerrilla status in an emergency?

Secretary McNamara: Quite clear that they could function in a guerrilla status.

Mr. Dulles: Actually this never had a chance to be tested.

Question: What degree of nonattribution was sought and why?

Secretary McNamara: The highest possible degree because the Latin-American countries had indicated they would not support this operation.

Question: Was there any doubt that, globally speaking, this operation would be attributed to the United States?

Secretary McNamara: We felt it would to a degree, but wanted to reduce this to a minimum.

Question: Were the implications of the conflict between operational requirements for success and the need for nonattribution clearly understood?

Secretary McNamara: Not really. As the plan progressed there was a definite trend to reduce the possibilities of attribution. This trend took the shape of a curve and finally the plan was compromised in order to reduce the chances of attribution.

Question: Do you believe that the CIA became advocates of the plan?

Secretary McNamara: It was not a CIA debacle. It was a Government debacle. There wasnʼt any person in the room that didnʼt approve the plan. Bissell in no sense was selling the operation. Colonel Hawkins was eloquent in advocating the plan. However, his presentations were so onesided that he made little influence on my judgment.

Secretary McNamara: This was a marginal operation. It was recognized that if one ship was lost we were in trouble. The feeling never developed, however, that CIA was selling this operation.

Admiral Burke: I had misgivings about the plan, but none that were crucial.

Secretary McNamara: Thatʼs right, it was a gradual erosion of the plan, but not to the extent that it seemed desirable to call off the operation.

Question: You mentioned the requirement for the clarification of responsibilities here in Washington.

Secretary McNamara: CIA should not run such large operations. They simply donʼt have the facilities. We could have used our facilities on a nonattributable basis. It would have been better if we could have handled the operation because we could have planned it on a much larger scale. We could have assured command control. A military operation should never be conducted except under a military man.

Secretary McNamara: We should systematize the decision making process.

Question: How would you do this on a systematic basis?

Secretary McNamara: I wasnʼt thinking so much in terms of this as the fact that I wouldnʼt allow any decisions to be made or actions taken except on the basis of written documents.

Question: Do you believe the absence of written documents was a consequence of security considerations?

Secretary McNamara: Yes.

Question: Going back to the Cuban operation, accepting for the moment that the military should have run the operation, when should they have taken control?

Secretary McNamara: I am not qualified to answer that as I donʼt know enough about the CIA structure.

Secretary McNamara: Another alternative that might be desirable in the case of future Cubas is that the CIA, for example, would conceive the need for certain actions. CIA should then lay out their basic plan and when they reach the point where they feel that they should train and equip troops, the JCS should be brought in to make an evaluation. This should be done even before the President makes his decision. Then at the point when the operation is approved the military commander should take over so he can shape the whole operation. In the case of Cuba, for example, at the point where the Special Force instructors were requested the DOD should have come in.

Secretary McNamara: There is one point that should be emphasized, that is, that all decisions and actions should be written. This would engender responsibility.

Question: How big should a force be before becoming a DOD responsibility?

Secretary McNamara: To answer that question you need a detailed organization study. I believe that someone should make a study and come up with a recommendation.

General Wheeler

At this point the Group returned to General Taylorʼs office and General Wheeler appeared before the Group.

Question: As the Director of the Joint Staff, how did this operation look to you?

Answer: When we got into this in January I put General Gray to work as our representative. Now an interesting aspect was that we attempted to make an evaluation of the plan as it existed at the time we became aware of it and I had J-2 and J-3 make an independent survey to find the optimum landing beach in Cuba, and they came up with Trinidad. Then General Gray, working with a group of officers from all the J Staffs, evaluated the plan, and this evaluation was concluded with the statement that the plan had a fair chance. It was pointed out, however, that our conclusions were based only on hearsay and so we recommended that a team of officers go down to the training area and make an evaluation there. When they returned they wrote their evaluation which indicated several weaknesses, particularly in logistics. As a consequence, we sent Lieutenant Colonel Wall down to help them with their amphibious logistic problems. Thereafter, progressively as the time approached for the implementation of the plan, the plan as originally envisioned was walked away from, particularly the air support aspects. For example, the air strikes were desired on D-Day for maximum effect. The next thing that was bothersome was that we couldnʼt land at Trinidad as we had to find an airstrip from which the B-26s could claim to be operating. Then came the evaluation of the Zapata Plan. If I remember correctly, there were three alternatives to Trinidad that were looked at, and Zapata was the least objectionable. I can recall that when he looked at the Zapata Plan General Lemnitzer asked how the force would get out of that area in the event that the operation didnʼt go well. It was explained that the troops would fade into the swamps and move into the mountains. I felt that this had less than a fair chance of success.

Question: How long did you consider the Zapata Plan?

Answer: It couldnʼt have been for more than 48 hours.

Question: Do you think this was time enough to go into the plan adequately?

Answer: I believe that you could make a fairly good evaluation in that length of time, or even less. Zapata was only a change of the area of landing, not a change of the pattern of the landing.

Question: What about the air plan? Was it really discussed by the Chiefs?

Answer: At every meeting there were pros and cons on how important the first air strikes would be and how important it would be to the success of the operation. I feel that the sense of the Chiefs throughout the meetings was that air support was critical to the success of the operation.

Question: When the Chiefs approved the Zapata Plan, however, was it with the understanding that there would be pre-D-Day strikes or D-Day strikes?

Answer: The matter of the pre-D-Day strike came up after the Zapata Plan was more or less set as the plan to be implemented, if I remember correctly. The plan for the Zapata landing, as I recall it, still called for the D-Day strike, I think at dawn on D-Day. As I say, I could be wrong on that particular point.

Question: Do you have documents that you can refer to that will establish this time?

Answer: Yes, General Gray, I am sure, has these documents.

Statement: The Chiefs were still talking largely in terms of the original plan with the locale moved from Trinidad to Zapata.

Response: That would be more understandable except for the fact that you rejected some of the other alternatives you considered on the basis that they didnʼt have air strikes.

Question: Did anybody study whether or not the guerrillas could operate in the swamp area?

Answer: I understand that they can, that they have been operating in there for a hundred years.

Statement: This has been referred to, as General Wheeler says. However, I have seen no evidence it has been utilized in recent years.

Question: Did anybody study that?

Answer: In that particular area we didnʼt make any particular study of it, no. We were told this was a guerrilla area and I was under the impression that there were even some guerrillas operating in there at this time.

Question: But nobody in the Joint Staff looked into this matter at the time?

Answer: Our people said that this was a guerrilla area and that people could sustain themselves in there.

Question: What I am trying to determine is if a study was made.

Answer: No, no study was made, certainly no detailed study.

Statement: We inquired into this on one occasion and the people at CIA told us that a group of a hundred guerrillas was operating in this area, and there was lots of smaller game.

Statement: Of course, a second point was that while it might have been usable as a guerrilla area at one time, this was before the time of helicopters. It would seem that some of these military experts should have been able to figure this out.

Question: In talking with Colonel Egan, did he point out that the primary evacuation would be by sea, but if this failed they would move into the swamps for their guerrilla operation?

Answer: Yes, that was discussed, sir, and it was recognized that this would be a very sticky and difficult thing to do. In the first place, it was recognized that evacuation by sea is one of the most difficult operations there is. You almost have to have support from the sea in the form of gunfire support or air cover. I thought that if these people were really pressed hard the possibility of evacuation would be much less than their going into a guerrilla operation.

Statement: It would seem that the concept of falling back to the beaches should have been ruled out because it almost ruled out the possibility of guerrilla action as a practical thing.

Question: With regard to the logistics of this thing, would you say that the Joint Staff checked the logistics carefully?

Answer: I believe that the logistic aspects were checked very carefully indeed.

Question: As D-Day approached what plans were there for liaison with the CIA.

Answer: We set up a little war room here which ran on a 24-hour basis. We had constant liaison with CIA, we had liaison officers from the services, and I had taken people from various sections of the Joint Staff. We had a special communications system where all items from CINC-LANT came directly in to General Gray. He was really the disseminator of all messages from the Department of Defense and the other agencies to CINCLANT.

Question: How did you get the messages that came in over at CIA?

Answer: They were transmitted over here.

Question: How were they transmitted?

Answer: We have a teletype here in J-2.

Question: So you had the same messages here as they had in CIA?

Answer: To the best of my belief.

Question: When were you and the Joint Staff aware of the ammunition shortage?

Answer: When we got word that the ship that was at Blue Beach was sunk we learned that a large portion of their reserve ammo was aboard, and then we saw messages from the beach area in which they particularly mentioned that they were running low on tank ammunition.

Question: Once you found out there was an ammunition shortage did you try and get the ships back in there?

Answer: Yes, we did.

Statement: I get the impression that a very careful evaluation was made of the Trinidad Plan and that about all that was done in regard to the Zapata Plan was that it was looked at with the idea that everything set forth in the Trinidad Plan would go with the exception of the adjustments that had to be made at the new beach.

Response: Yes, sir.

Question: Did you have liaison officers over at CIA?

Answer: Yes, sir.

Question: On D+1 they were going to try and make a run into the beach with ammunition. They made an emergency request for air cover. Do you recall whether it was appreciated that this was the only way that they could get that ammunition ashore was with air cover?

Answer: Sir, I wouldnʼt even put it on the basis of ammunition alone. The reports from the beach indicated that the men desperately needed air cover. I definitely knew the situation was desperate at that time, there was no question about it.

Statement: Well, letʼs move out now and have you tell us how you think you could do this a little bit better in the future.

Answer: This is not an original thought. It results from discussions with General Gray and others, and we feel that to properly organize you need to start with a broad national plan prepared by all the agencies of the Government. It should start off in the broad terms of a concept and after the concept is agreed upon and approved by the President each agency should prepare its own part of the plan. We think that in this case CINCLANT should have set up a special operational task force and prepared the detailed plan for the operation. If this plan was prepared, of course, it would be passed up through channels to the President.

Question: How about your other aspects of the plan—the political, the psychological and so on?

Answer: Well, actually these are the special plans that were mentioned earlier with regard to the national plan.

Question: Who would be responsible for success or failure?

Answer: The man in charge of the special task force.

Statement: What we really feel is that we lack this national U.S. plan of action. We feel that there should have been a unified task force commander to really conduct the operation. We feel that you cannot efficiently attempt to conduct operations of this sort from Washington. It is too far removed. People are too immersed in other types of activities. What it results in is that responsible officials are called upon to make rather heavy decisions with very little forewarning and in some cases without perhaps as much information as they should have.

200. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. No drafter is indicated, but it was probably Colonel Tarwater. The meeting was the tenth in the series conducted by the Cuba Study Group. The initial stages of the discussion took place at the Pentagon; the discussion with Rusk took place at the Department of State. The participants in the meeting, in addition to Taylor, Kennedy, Dulles, and Burke, included Rusk, Gray, Bonesteel, Mitchell, and Tarwater. A note on the source text reads: “The following notes are not a verbatim record, but represent the general substance of the statements made.” Washington, May 4, 1961.

The first portion of the meeting was devoted to a consideration of some of the tentative conclusions reached at this point. After a short while it was deemed desirable to recall General Gray for further questioning.

General Gray

Question: We are impressed by the incompleteness of the JCS appraisal of the Zapata Plan. We understand that the incompleteness of the evaluation was due, in part, to the fact that it was based on a concept rather than a completed plan. Is that a fair statement?

Answer: Yes. To a degree the incompleteness was due to that.

Question: Having at least concurred in this concept as being an adequate basis for further planning, why didnʼt the Joint Chiefs, at some point down the road, look at the completed plan or a plan sufficiently detailed so that they could consider some of the points that they had missed?

Answer: One reason the Zapata Plan was brief in comparison with the other one is because most of the factors were exactly the same. The second factor was the limitation of time. We were briefed in the morning and had to get out a paper on which we could brief the Chiefs the following morning. Furthermore, at this time this was not just a consideration of three possible alternatives. The original Trinidad Plan was still in the running. We determined that Zapata was the best of the three alternatives, but we still preferred the original Trinidad Plan.

Question: But you did accept Zapata as the basis for further planning?

Answer: Yes.

Question: At what point did the plan take enough shape that the JCS could have made a detailed evaluation?

Answer: The detailed plan was probably completed on 8 April because thatʼs when Hawkins and Egan went down south. However, we didnʼt get that plan until the operation started.

Question: General Gray, how close were you to this plan?

Answer: I was in on all the meetings that were held at the White House with one exception.

Question: Were you talking with CIA people on this plan?

Answer: Yes. The first change we noticed was when the concept changed from being just at the head of the Bay, and moved south down the eastern side to the Blue Beach area.

Question: How did you get that information?

Answer: By liaison back and forth between officers. I briefed the JCS on that change in concept at one of their meetings. The reason for this change was because a usable airfield was down on the shoulder and that was one of the requirements that had been placed on the plan.

Question: Was the possibility of this force becoming a guerrilla unit considered?

Answer: Not formally by the Joint Chiefs, but we looked at it. It was felt that they could hold this area. However, if they didnʼt get popular support there was no advantage for them to sit there. For even if Castro couldnʼt eliminate them, other people couldnʼt get in to them, so they had to get out of there. It was concluded if they were going to withdraw there were three ways they could do it. One was evacuation by ship. If the decision had been made and planned for we could have withdrawn those people off the bench. The second one was that with air support they could have fought their way out. The third possibility was that part of the force would be evacuated and then later infiltrated back in as guerrillas and the other part of the force would actually remain in that whole Zapata Peninsula area and operate as guerrillas in the expanse to the west. It was always believed they could get out by sea because the CIAʼs sea operations had always been very successful.

Question: Were you aware that the troops were trained and instructed that in the event they couldnʼt hold their lodgment they were to fall back onto the beaches for evacuation, and only if that failed would they operate as guerrilla forces?

Answer: No, we werenʼt. That wasnʼt in the plan and we were not present at the final briefing.

Question: Did you brief the Joint Chiefs on all the parts of the plan?

Answer: Yes, all except the question of the air strikes.

Question: What was your understanding of the air strikes?

Answer: There would be air strikes on D-Day. This D-2 air strike didnʼt come in until the last few days. The air plan consisted of nothing but D-Day strikes. Our understanding of the plan was always that the air strikes would be conducted at dawn from Puerto Cabezas.

Question: Would you look back in your notes and see when you briefed the Chiefs and essentially what was in your briefing so weʼll know what they heard about the plan?

Answer: Yes, sir.

Statement: There were four official papers that the Joint Chiefs considered. The first was the original Trinidad Plan. The second was the Zapata Evaluation. Third was the evaluation of whether or not we could put a small force in the Oriente Province and they could hang on, and fourth was the evaluation of the teamʼs trip to Guatemala.Documents 9, 62, 57, and 56, respectively. They were briefed on these official papers and at their regular meetings I brought them up to date on what was going on. At several of these meetings they were briefed on changes to the plan and they approved them.

Question: Were these briefings for information or to get their decision?

Answer: Generally speaking, when I briefed them it was on some paper or something that they were being asked to approve.

Question: Would you say then that the Chiefs did have all the essential elements of this plan and did consider the plan adequate?

Answer: Yes, sir.

Question: Did you feel you had the option to the guerrilla alternative?

Answer: Yes, Iʼve always thought we had the option to make that decision before the force got pressed right down to the beach.

General Gray: As D-Day approached it seemed to me that popular support was developing and building. We did measure all the military factors we thought were necessary. However, it was very difficult to get an accurate fix on where the militia was.

Question: You and the DOD did consider the logistic problem and took action to strengthen the logistic plan. Is that a fair statement?

Answer: Yes, sir.

Statement: In other words, logistically speaking, you had planned a very heavy back up to insure a successful operation.

Answer: Yes, sir.

Question: Would you say that you saw this plan develop, that you had adequate contact with the CIA so that your group, at least, had full knowledge of the developments and anything that looked doubtful was taken before the Joint Chiefs?

Answer: Thatʼs right.

Question: Is it true that while the Joint Chiefs never had a presentation on the over-all Zapata Plan at one time, they were briefed on all the pieces of the plan, so they could be said to have knowledge of the entire plan?

Answer: Yes, sir.

Question: What concern was expressed over the fact that there were only small boats to unload the Houston off Red Beach?

Answer: I actually didnʼt know that detail.

Question: Did you know that the Atlantico and the Caribe had gone south a hundred or two hundred miles and actually escaped from control for a number of hours?

Answer: Yes, sir.

Question: Do you recall when you discovered that?

Answer: Itʼs in our log. As soon as we become aware of it we told CINCLANT to round them up.

Statement: Our position on all of this was that we would do anything as long as it was approved, and then CIA carried the ball on getting the approval.

General Taylor: After listening to General Grayʼs testimony I now feel that the Joint Chiefs had a more complete appraisal of the plan and consequently gave a more complete approval.

General Gray: I believe there should have been a final briefing on the over-all plan about April 12th. I wrote that into the tasks that were to be followed by the different agencies. I believe this would have permitted a more detailed evaluation of the plan and all the changes that had been made up to that point.

General Gray: Speaking for myself, there could have been a more detailed evaluation, but I donʼt think it would have changed my evaluation that the plans should have gone ahead.

[Here follows discussion with General Bonesteel of organizational changes required to deal with cold war problems.]

At this point the Study Group reconvened in Secretary Ruskʼs office in the State Department. Present were: General Taylor Secretary Rusk Mr. Kennedy Commander Mitchell Mr. Dulles Lt Colonel Tarwater

After a few introductory remarks Secretary Rusk was asked his estimate of the probability of success of the Zapata Plan.

Secretary Rusk: It was in the neighborhood of fifty per cent. It appeared the landing might be followed by further uprisings. If this failed the force could become guerrillas.

Mr. Dulles: I think we all looked upon this as a pretty risky operation.

Secretary Rusk: The risks of the operation were accepted, however, because the importance of success was fully appreciated. Time was running out. It was the last chance in some time to have this job done by Cubans. Otherwise we might have to do this with American personnel and this would be less desirable. Castroʼs police power was increasing and he was also receiving a large inflow of Soviet arms. Further, it should be pointed out that when we talked about the possibility of failure we talked about far more disastrous results than actually occurred. For example, we had discussed the possibility of such things as being ousted from the OAS or censure by the UN, and lively and adverse reaction by our allies in Europe. The results that developed were not as serious as those that we had considered.

Question: What was the feeling of the likelihood of a popular uprising following the landing?

Secretary Rusk: There was a very considerable likelihood of popular uprisings.

Question: How essential was such an uprising regarded for the success of the operation?

Secretary Rusk: It was believed that the uprising was utterly essential to success in terms of ousting Castro. At one point we discussed the possibility of putting these men in as guerrillas. However, this concept was rejected on the basis of the fact that it would not spark an uprising.

Question: What was your understanding of the requirements for sufficient shock to spark uprisings?

Secretary Rusk: The impression existed that 1,200 highly trained men expected to get ashore and run into some militia units and beat the hell out of them. This would be the kind of a bloody nose that would get things moving. The feeling was that there would be no fighting on the beach. It seemed that this area was virtually empty. There was a good chance the invasion force could get well ashore without being discovered.

Question: What was expected to happen if the landing force effected a successful lodgment but there was no uprising?

Secretary Rusk: In that case they would commence guerrilla operations, move into the swamps and then into the hills. This swamp area was stated to be the home of guerrillas.

Question: Was the point made that this area had not been used for guerrilla operations in this century?

Secretary Rusk: I donʼt recall.

Question: Was the possibility of a sea evacuation of the force considered?

Secretary Rusk: I donʼt recall. At least, it didnʼt make an impression on me. Let me point out that there was a minimum of papers.

Question: What was the understanding of the position of the JCS as to Zapata? Was it appreciated that they favored Trinidad over Zapata?

Secretary Rusk: They approved the Trinidad Plan. Trinidad involved a larger scale, more spectacular operation. It didnʼt offer the immediate possibility of an airstrip. It was felt that Zapata had considerably more political advantages and that the JCS approved Zapata.

Statement: The JCS commented that Zapata was the best of the three alternatives they considered, but that they still favored the original Trinidad Plan.

Secretary Rusk: They didnʼt put their view in writing and that didnʼt come through. There was a strong impression that they favored the plan. At one meeting the President went around the room and asked everyone personally their opinion and I believe that I was the only one that didnʼt approve.

Question: Was it understood that control of the air was considered essential to the success of the landing?

Secretary Rusk: Yes, it was understood that it was essential to the success of the landing, but there was an inadequate appreciation of the enemyʼs capability in the air. Furthermore, neither the President nor I was clear that there was a D-2 air strike. We did have it in our minds that there would be a D-Day air strike. Following the D-2 air strike there was considerable confusion. It wasnʼt realized that there was to be more than one air strike in the Havana area. The President was called on this matter and he didnʼt think there should be second strikes in the area unless there were overriding considerations. We talked about the relative importance of the air strikes with Mr. Bissell and General Cabell at the time. However, they indicated that the air strikes would be important, but not critical. I offered to let them call the President, but they indicated they didnʼt think the matter was that important. They said that they preferred not to call the President.

Question: Did you attempt to advise the President as to the importance of the air strikes?

Secretary Rusk: I had talked to him and he had stated that if there werenʼt overriding considerations the second strikes shouldnʼt be made. Since Mr. Bissell and General Cabell didnʼt want to talk to the President on the matter, I felt there were no overriding considerations to advise him of. I didnʼt think they believed the dawn air strikes were too important. I believe that Castro turned out to have more operational air strength than we figured.

Mr. Dulles: I donʼt believe they had any more. However, they turned out to be more efficient.

Question: Do you recall why the question of air strikes was withheld until Sunday evening?

Secretary Rusk: As far as I was concerned, I was caught by surprise with the first air strikes. I was trying to advise Adlai Stevenson at the UN on what was happening and suddenly found out there were additional air strikes coming up. We didnʼt want him to have to lie to the UN.

Question: What was the understanding of the ability of the landing force to pass to a guerrilla status in an emergency?

Secretary Rusk: The impression was that the ability of this force to pass to guerrilla activities presented no difficulty. At the beginning of the second day the President and I discussed the question of whether it was time to move the force out as guerrillas. However, it appears there was a delay in turning to this because they didnʼt have this action in mind.

General Taylor: They were told to fall back to the beaches so that they could be evacuated from the sea.

Secretary Rusk: Guerrilla actions were regarded as far more feasible than they turned out to be. I do regret, however, that consideration was not given to another alternative. I suggested earlier that they land in the eastern portion of Cuba and then get a position with Guantanamo behind them. However, our military friends didnʼt want to spoil the virginity of Guantanamo.

Question: What was the understanding of the ammunition situation at the end of April 18? Was the importance of air cover for the returning ammunition ships understood?

Secretary Rusk: It was apparent that it was critical. The requirement for air cover wasnʼt as apparent as for air drops and getting the ships back in there, particularly in regard to getting them some tank ammunition.

Question: Was it known at your level that two of the ammunition ships had taken off from the beach area and kept going south?

Secretary Rusk: No.

Question: What degree of nonattribution was sought and why? Were the operational disadvantages arising from some of the restrictions imposed by the efforts to achieve nonattribution clearly presented and understood?

Secretary Rusk: We were hoping for the maximum. In retrospect, however, this looks a little naive. The considerations involved in this were that if you have success all the problems solve themselves. However, if you have failure itʼs very nice if the United States is not involved.

Statement: Of course, there are degrees of nonattribution. The most costly restriction was the requirement not to have the air strikes even by Cubans.Taylor wrote an addition to the end of this sentence which reads as follows: “which were out of Cuba.”

Question: To what extent did the CIA operations representatives have to “sell” the operation to the other agencies of government?

Secretary Rusk: You have to draw a distinction between the policy side and the operational side. The policy side we were willing to look at, if it was policy. On the operational side, we were oversold on the operational aspects.

Question: What do you mean by oversold on the operational aspects?

Secretary Rusk: It was presented in too optimistic terms.

Question: Do you have any remarks on the integrated planning and coordination?

Secretary Rusk: This is very important. These covert matters are handled on such a restricted basis that the resources of the departments are not brought to bear.

Secretary Rusk: When you go beyond a few people in an operation of this sort it shouldnʼt be handled by the CIA.

Question: What didnʼt we do that we should have?

Secretary Rusk: Before the President made his decision, CIA and Defense should have spelled out the entire CIA plan in one presentation. While the President had all the factors in his mind, I think this would have helped.

Secretary Rusk: Furthermore, we overemphasized some of the factors. For example, the question of what to do with this 1,200-man force. This question played too large a role because we certainly should have been able to handle these 1,200 men.

Secretary Rusk: If you are not prepared to go all the way you shouldnʼt put 1,200 men ashore.

Secretary Rusk: When you get to the final decision stage the room should be cleared of all those that have formal constitutional responsibility. People looking down the cannonʼs mouth should be in a solemn position and make a solemn decision without having large numbers of people in the room.

Statement: Mr. McNamara stressed the desirability of having written papers and decisions.

Secretary Rusk: That would have been helpful. However, it would have meant 50 or 60 pieces of paper around this town.

Secretary Rusk: One concluding remark. There was no one involved that didnʼt recognize this was a risky business and that failure would be costly. However, we overestimated the international effects of failure, and underestimated the effects of failure on this town.

201. Letter From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to General Maxwell D. TaylorSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Top Secret. Washington, May 4, 1961.

Dear General Taylor: I regret to say that I am not satisfied with the account of our interview which appears in the Memorandum for Record submitted to me today by Colonel Walmsley.Reference is to the memorandum for the record prepared for the Cuba Study Group on May 1. For text, which did not include the draft record of Bundyʼs testimony, see Document 193. Two pages of the draft memorandum, which summarized Bundyʼs testimony (pp. 13-14), are attached to Bundyʼs letter. It seems to me that I can do a better job of presenting my views on this matter by sending you a memorandum covering my position on the points which are discussed in the Memorandum of Record.

The President on his entry into the office was faced with a decision of disbanding or using the Cuban force in Guatemala. He was informed that the force must leave Guatemala within a limited time, and that it could not be held together in the United States for a long period. It would begin to deteriorate; its existence could not be kept quiet; and if it were disbanded within the United States the results would be damaging.

When the Cuba plan was initially presented to the President, he did not like the scheme for an amphibious landing. He requested that a plan be drawn for infiltration of the force so that it might emerge as a Cuban force already on Cuban territory. The report from CIA was that this notion was not likely to be successful, and instead the agency proposed a modified plan for an unopposed landing in a much less populated area. This was the Zapata Plan presented by Mr. Bissell in the middle of March 1961.Document 61. As work on this plan progressed, the gradual impression developed that on balance the CIA preferred this plan to the original Trinidad Plan.

It was clearly understood that the Air battle should be won. The views of the Joint Chiefs were presented in writing, and while there was no clear discussion of the opinion of the Joint Chiefs as to the relative merits of the two plans, I think these two statements are correct: (1) that there was no impression left that the Joint Chiefs as such preferred the Zapata Plan; (2) it was clearly understood that they had approved the plan and favored the operation on this revised basis. I base this statement upon the fact that the President repeatedly asked for the opinion of representatives of the Defense Department including members of the Joint Chiefs, and was invariably informed that the Defense Department favored the operation. I do not think this was merely a matter of “concurrence by attendance.” The military certainly wanted the operation to proceed; I do not think that this was because of a deep conviction that this was the best possible plan—it was rather that in view of the absence of desirable alternatives and the press of time, the military believed that the prospects were sufficiently favorable so that it would be best to go ahead. I would not wish to go further into detailed analysis of the motives or positions taken by the Joint Chiefs.

Success in this operation was always understood to be dependent upon an internal Cuban reaction. The first military phase would have been considered successful if it had established a beachhead that could be supplied effectively from outside and joined from inside by defecting Cubans. I do not think that the President was led to feel that the landing operation depended for its first success on immediate uprisings throughout Cuba. On the other hand, reports were made in the last few weeks that gave some hope that the chances of defections and uprisings were growing.

One of the serious misunderstandings in this operation, in my opinion, was over the practicability and likelihood of a guerrilla operation by the landing force. The President repeatedly indicated his own sense that this option was of great importance, and he was repeatedly assured that the guerrilla option was a real one. As one listening in the same way that he listened to most of the discussion before him, I was left with the clear impression that unless there was a quite unexpected catastrophe in the beaching process itself, a substantial portion of the force would almost certainly be able to survive for a prolonged period in guerrilla operations. I do not think there was any extended discussion of the relative quality of the Zapata Plan as against the Trinidad from a guerrilla standpoint. There was a considerable discussion of the option of a sea evacuation, but I do not recall that there was a clear decision as to which of these secondary alternatives would be preferable. My point is simply that the President steadily insisted that the force have an alternative means of survival, and that he was steadily assured that such an alternative was present. As I recall it, the report of the Joint Staff on the Zapata Plan explicitly included assurances on the guerrilla option.JCSM-166-61, Document 62.

While it was recognized that the invasion force was much smaller than Castroʼs army, let alone his militia, the argument for landing it was that it would have much greater fire power, together with air supremacy, while the enemy would have to come toward the beach along narrow defiles. The invasion force would win the first battle because its soldiers were better fighters, with better equipment. After they had won this first battle, the balance would change; the will to fight of the Castro forces would be reduced; defections would begin; uprisings would occur in other parts of the island, and so on.

One startling omission, in retrospect, is the failure of any of the Presidentʼs advisers to warn of the danger of the T-33s. I suspect that one reason for the later decision not to launch an air strike on the morning of D-Day was that this capability of the Castro air force was never put forward as significant.

While in retrospect I believe that too much attention was given to what General Taylor has called the question of “attribution,” it certainly was believed that it would make a great political difference to have this force essentially Cuban. The Americans were offering moral, political and logistical support, but not battle forces. A question of shading is of course involved. At any rate, on March 29th or April 4th there was a direct statement by the President in a meeting that he wanted all U.S. forces out of the operation, and I recall no word of opposition to this decision at this meeting.For the available records of the meetings with the President on March 29 and April 4, see Documents 74 and 80. Afterwards, there was further discussion, at which I was not present, between the Department of Defense and the CIA, and agreed revisions were worked out. If those responsible for military judgment on the operation felt that the Presidentʼs instructions were unacceptable, it seems to me that there certainly should have been some statements of this view.

In my meeting with General Taylor and his advisory group, I was asked about the decision not to permit an air strike by the Cuban invasion force early on Monday morning. This is a matter which arises from a conversation with the President and the Secretary of State, and I do not believe I am the right man to comment on it. I do have the recollection that during the presentation of the Zapata landings, the impression was conveyed to the President that there would be no strikes on D-Day that could not plausibly come from an airstrip in Cuba.

I have the general impression that all of those concerned with this operation were gradually put into an intrinsically unsound position because of the increasingly critical Cuban situation and the lack of desirable alternatives. Under these pressures the military planners, who had been given instructions by an earlier Administration, became advocates, rather than impartial evaluators of the problem. Moreover, I believe that many people were reticent in their representations to the President.

Mistakes were made in this operation by a lot of people whom the President had every right to trust, as a result of circumstances of all sorts. In the future, any such plan should have much more careful preparation and evaluation, and the President should have intelligence estimates presented to him by others than advocates. In the future also the President should have an explicit White House review, so that he can have an independent judgment, especially on points of interdepartmental responsibility.

I do not concur in any judgment that this operation was “run from the White House.” What happened was rather that as trouble began to develop after D-Day, there was steady pressure on the President for a relaxation of rules which had previously been made, and in the light of changing circumstances some such relaxations were authorized. Only in the case of the decision on SundayApril 16. with respect to the D-Day strike was there an operational modification that restricted, instead of enlarging, the authorizations to the CIA. This, as I have said, is a matter on which others can comment more effectively than I. Nevertheless, I would agree that the rules of action should be more clearly stated in the future, and responsibility delegated within those rules to a man near the scene of action. I regard this as a somewhat academic point, because I doubt very much whether large-scale operations of this sort can or should be “covert.”

I accept as accurate the statement of my views which runs from the middle of page 13 through the middle of page 14,The draft record of Bundyʼs testimony to which he refers largely reiterates a number of the points Bundy made in this letter to Taylor. The concluding point he made in his testimony, as recorded on page 14, was: “I think the men that worked on this got into a world of their own. I donʼt believe the failure was ‘because of the want of a nail.ʼ” and I specifically endorse the comment attributed to me that if the military had said at any time that calling off or modifying the air strikes would cause the operation to fail—or even damage it severely—the President would have reversed any such decision as that on Sunday.

McGeorge Bundy

202. Paper Prepared for the National Security Council by an Interagency Task Force on CubaSource: Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. Top Secret. This paper, and the five attached annexes, were drafted by an interagency task force on Cuba composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice as well as CIA and USIA. Much of the drafting was done in ARA in the Department of State and in ISA in the Department of Defense. Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, had overall responsibility for the final draft. Annex I is an intelligence appraisal. Annex II presented “Considerations Bearing on Major Intervention.” Annex III outlined proposed U.S. policy toward Cuban exiles. Annex IV dealt with psychological and propaganda warfare. Annex V was entitled “A Doctrine to Preserve the Independence of the Latin American Revolution.” None of the attachments is printed. The paper was circulated to the NSC on May 4 under cover of a memorandum from Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC Marion Boggs in advance of the NSC meeting scheduled for May 5. (Ibid.) Washington, May 4, 1961.

CUBA AND COMMUNISM IN THE HEMISPHERE

Before deciding on a Cuba policy, it is essential to evaluate the nature of Cubaʼs threat to the national interests of the United States and the basic strength and vulnerability of the Cuban communist regime.

I. The Nature of the Threat

The Military Threat

Continuing bloc arms shipments to Cuba—while strengthening Castroʼs own ability to withstand attack—will probably not be an important threat to U.S. interests. There is no danger of effective direct attack against the U.S. It is highly unlikely that Castro will overtly attack other nations in the Americas. If he did so, we would be able to intervene pursuant to our Treaty obligations and use the occasion to crush Castro. There is some possibility that Castro would use Cuba as a base for monitoring and harassing U.S. operations, e.g. interfering with communications, etc.

There is the remote possibility of an attempt to convert Cuba into a Russian base for strategic attack on the United States. If this happens, we would have to consider military intervention. (See Sec. B, infra.)An apparent reference to Annex II, not printed.

B. As an exporter of physical aids to revolution—there is no doubt that Cuba is being used as a base for export of the communist-fidelista revolution. This is done through the supply of funds, counsel to subversive activities, and propaganda—mainly through the embassies. It is done through widespread propaganda apparatus of varying effectiveness, including a news service (carried by 24 newspapers) and a radio network. It is done, too, by making a supply of Spanish-speaking agents available for communist subversion and propaganda. At the present time, there is no hard evidence of an actual supply of arms or armed men going from Cuba to other countries to assist indigenous revolutionary movements. There have been allegations of such support being given in Colombia and other countries. There has been some movement of individual armed agents into other countries and some Cuban effort to train the revolutionaries of other countries. The export of physical aid to revolutionary movements, while important, is much less significant than the threat posed by Castroʼs example and general stimulus to these movements. (See C, infra.) C.

As an example and stimulus to communist revolution—Castroʼs basic aim (supported by the Chinese and principally the Soviets) has been to capture indigenous social revolutionary movements for the communists, strengthen existing communist movements, and, by supporting these movements, weaken the fabric of constitutional government throughout the hemisphere.

To some extent he has been successful in identifying his regime with the cause of economic and social progress. And as he moves forward economically his example may become more attractive. He has provided a rallying point and a source of ideological support for communist movements everywhere; and often for left-wing nationalist movements. One of his principal objectives is to identify and unify the nationalist left and the communists. He has provided a working example of a communist state in the Americas, successfully defying the United States. Thus he has appealed to widespread anti-American feeling, a feeling often shared by non-communists. His survival, in the face of persistent U.S. efforts to unseat him, has unquestionably lowered the prestige of the United States and the presence of Castroist extremist elements are often an important obstacle to orderly social and economic reform.

This picture is not all dark however. As Castroʼs Soviet-communist identification has become more apparent the communist-fidelista elements have suffered an increasing isolation from the democratic left. Several leaders of the Democratic left have already condemned him publicly. Castroʼs erratic and often extreme personal behavior has helped to increase this isolation.

There is no doubt that Castroʼs regime adds significant support to communist efforts to take over the hemisphere, and is a source of strength to communist efforts in every country. However, Castro could not hope to succeed without the conditions of social unrest, widespread poverty and general economic discontent on which the Communist Revolution prospers. If the island of Cuba should sink beneath the waves tomorrow, we still would have to face a significant and steadily growing communist threat in the hemisphere. The fall of Castro would be a severe defeat for the Sino-Soviet bloc, but it would not be, by any means, the end of the battle.

II. The Present Situation in Cuba

The Armed Forces

The armed forces of the Castro regime number approximately 250,000, of whom some 200,000 are militia. The regular forces have been shaken by purges of officers and men who previously supported Castro against Batista but later became disillusioned.

Bloc arms deliveries and intensive training have increased the military capabilities of the army, but its tactical training is still deficient. The militia is composed of people who generally serve only part-time, but some full-time units are now being trained. The Air Force and Navy suffer from a lack of trained and qualified personnel.

Control Mechanisms

The Castro regime has established a complex of interlocking mechanisms enabling it to control virtually every phase of life in Cuba.

Class and Regional Attitudes

The upper class has been destroyed as an effective political or economic force in Cuba. The middle class provides the principal organized opposition to the Castro regime. It is that part of the newly self-conscious lower class—perhaps 25-30% of the total population—which has already received positive benefits from the Revolution, or still hopes for future improvement in conditions, that now provides the real mass support for the Castro regime.

Not all of the Cuban lower class can be considered to favor the Castro regime. His major strength is with rural workers, whereas there has been considerable disaffection among the labor unions. The failure of the government to carry out many of its earlier promises has led to increasing disappointment and dissatisfaction. This does not mean, however, an equal increase in willingness to act against the regime.

Economy

The Cuban economy continues to decline both in terms of physical output and in living levels; although basic needs for food and textiles are being met. Output in the industrial sector has been adversely affected by parts and raw material shortages, although sugar production may match or exceed last yearʼs level and the regime is making strenuous efforts to expand agricultural production. Cubaʼs trade has been redirected largely to the Soviet Bloc, whose economic support is vital for the Castro regime.

III. Probable Trends Within Cuba, Assuming No Major U.S. Intervention

Political Prospects

Over the short term there will be no major change in internal political conditions. However, by the end of one year organized anti-Castro opposition will probably have increased its activities, but with Castroʼs intensified controls this will not offer a threat to the stability of the regime. Over the long term (5 years) all effective opposition to the regime will probably have been eliminated. However, such a long-term estimate is based on many variables and is highly contingent. It may be the most probable outcome but many other outcomes—including growing resist-ance—cannot be discounted.

Probable Trends in the Armed Forces

With Bloc assistance the combat effectiveness of the Cuban armed forces will substantially increase.

Economic Prospects

The economy will deteriorate further over the short term, but it will not jeopardize the regimeʼs stability. Within a year the economic situation will have improved slightly, and within five (5) years Cubaʼs natural resources and Bloc economic assistance will permit greater self-sufficiency and gradual economic growth. There is a possibility that the Communists—through an extensive program of aid—might try and make Cuba a showcase of economic progress.

IV. Cuban Vulnerabilities

Economic

Political

Castroʼs elimination from the scene would cause serious problems, but the bureaucracy and apparatus are so firmly entrenched that they could continue to operate without him.

Popular resentment against the totalitarian controls imposed by the regime has steadily increased. This resentment is open to exploitation. The hold of the regime depends in large part on control of mass communications media. Sabotage of these facilities would deprive the regime of this advantage; sabotage of other communications would impair the effectiveness of police controls.

We recommend a study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba (e.g. military, key political figures, labor leaders, etc.) and weaknesses in their relations to each other, assessing discontent, possible disaffection, etc. This would be an anatomy of the Castro regime.

Increased guerrilla operations, effectively supported by the U.S., would disrupt normal activities in Cuba and serve to keep resistance alive against heavier controls and repression.

(For complete Intelligence appraisal see Annex I.)Not printed.

Conclusion:

There is no sure way of overthrowing Castro short of U.S. military intervention. There is a possibility, although a slight possibility that lesser meas-ures—covert and overt—might result in the overthrow of the Castro regime from within. As long as Castro thrives, his major threat—the example and stimulus of a working communist revolution—will persist.

V. The Decision to Intervene with U.S. Forces

The Consequences of Intervention at this time and under present conditions: (1) The Castro regime would be destroyed, but the possibility of protracted guerrilla conflict cannot be discounted. (2) There would be a direct and perhaps substantial loss of life—Cuban and American. (3) General World Reaction to Intervention—Reaction to the use of U.S. force to eliminate Castro would be clearly negative. It would severely impair the general international image of a non-aggressive, non-imperialist nation which we have tried to build over the past fifteen years. It would severely weaken our ideological position by blurring differences with the Soviet Union—differences based on their aggressive nature, imperialistic system etc. It would revive fears, especially in Latin America, about our intention to dominate and direct the affairs of all American States. There would be a general nervousness about the possibility of the conflict spreading—and a loss of confidence in the United States.

However, there would be some favorable response to our firmness in eliminating a nearby communist center. This would come from those governments most closely tied to the United States and which believe that their continued existence depends on the U.S. coming to their support, e.g. Nationalist China. The favorable reaction would be centered in those elements who see security from the communists dependent almost solely on power and the willingness to use it.

The Soviet Union—through propaganda, agitation etc.—would exploit the situation to the fullest. Direct armed support of Castro is unlikely. Acting against Castro on the grounds that we cannot tolorate a communist base 90 miles away would give the Soviet Union a counter-rationale for acting against our own base system, and the possibility of Soviet intervention in Iran could not be ruled out.

There would be at least a temporary setback to the likelihood of progress toward peaceful settlement of important international issues. Traditional points of confrontation—such as Berlin or Quemoy and Matsu—might become more explosive and dangerous.

Latin American reaction would range from support (e.g. Guatemala and Nicaragua) to outright resentment and opposition (e.g. Mexico, Ecuador and Bolivia). Another group might feel relieved, but political conditions would require them to oppose or remain silent. Reactions within the Latin countries would vary from support by the oligarchy to sharp reaction against Yankee imperialism among students, workers, campesinos, and much of the articulate middle class. This reaction would be exploited by the communists, and might endanger vulnerable democratic governments (e.g. Venezuela). (A more extended discussion of world reaction is found in Annex II.)

From the people, parties and press of Europe we could expect a severely censorious reaction—tempered by some restraint in deference to the Alliance. The Kennedy image and prestige in Europe would be severely weakened, perhaps to the extent of weakening U.S. leadership in the Alliance, and the Alliance itself. European governments would generally be neutral or support us. The CENTO and SEATO allies would react more favorably.

Perhaps the most serious reaction would come from the neutral states in Africa, the Near East and Asia. It would intensify our identification with the colonialist powers and tend to increase the tendency to see the U.S. and Russia as having similar ambitions and goals. An intervention would seriously impair and complicate our ability to work through the U.N. on the entire range of problems confronting that body.

Considerations Bearing on a Future Decision to Intervene

A judgment whether to intervene will depend on many factors. (1)

The degree of provocation offered by Cuba or the Soviet Union, and/or the growing intensity of the Cuba threat. Below are listed, in roughly ascending order of seriousness of provocation, a number of conceivable fact situations: (a) Present conditions, following the unsuccessful attempt of Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro, without any essentially new action on the part of Cuba; (b) Upon a unilateral finding by the United States that its own self-defense requires armed intervention in Cuba to terminate the hemispheric threat of Castro-Communism; (c) Direct Castro regime involvement in an attempt at subversive overthrow in another Latin American Republic, the goverment of which requests United States assistance against Cuba; (d) Establishment of a Soviet military base on Cuban soil; (e) Indiscriminate and mass execution by the Castro regime of American citizens in Cuba, without regard to any prohibited activities or claimed offenses on their part; (f) Conditions of widespread unrest against the Castro regime produced not by United States covert operations but by popular Cuban hostility, with a general breakdown of law and order in Cuba, in which at least some local authorities requested United States intervention; (g) The event of the United States being asked for support by an anti-Castro provisional Cuban government which had succeeded on its own (without United States Government assistance) in establishing itself in control of a substantial part of Cuba, had maintained that control for a period of time, and had been recognized by the United States; (h) Systematic or large-scale attacks by the Cuban military establishment on shipping and aircraft of the American Republics on and over the high seas; (i) A decision by the members of the OAS under the Rio treaty to intervene, once that decision had received the United Nations endorsement or authorization required by the United Nations Charter; (j) A major and serious Cuban military effort to force the United States out of the Guantanamo base; (k) An armed attack by Cuba on the United States or another of the American Republics; (l) Retaliation against the Soviet Union for a Soviet action against the free world serious enough to warrant such retaliation.

Under existing international law and our treaty obligations armed intervention would be justified only under (h), (i), (j), and (k).

(2) The swiftness and cleanness of an effective, completed intervention in Cuba. An armed intervention executed quickly and without large casualties on either side would have smaller costs than a prolonged conflict. It is estimated that at the present time United States armed forces might have to engage in long and difficult military operations to bring under control the whole of Cuba—rural and mountain districts as well as the centers of population and lines of communication. The best estimate is that the passage of time will tighten Castroʼs political grip and increase his actual military strength in Cuba. On the other hand, we should not rule out the possibility that the passage of time might see increased popular hostility and resistance toward his regime, and the development of local conditions in which an American armed intervention would be generally welcomed throughout the island. (3) The success obtained by the United States in its over-all Latin American program by the time of U.S. armed intervention. The costs of intervention, at least in Latin America, would be reduced to some extent in proportion as various elements in the United States Latin American program are successful: (a) Economic development and social progress through the Alianza para Progreso: (b) Achievement of a wider understanding in Latin America of the Castro-Communist threat, and the undertaking of measures to defeat internal subversion. (4) The development of a new theory or doctrine of international law justifying U.S. armed intervention in cases of Castro-inspired takeover. Such a doctrine would materially improve the basis for our intervention only if it were generally accepted by the countries of Latin America and elsewhere throughout the free world, and if those countries generally were convinced that the doctrine was applicable to the facts of the Cuban situation.

Conclusion: The Choice of a Policy

The cost of eliminating Castro by military intervention would be substantial at the present time and under present circumstances. These costs might include significant loss of life and other military and civilian casualties, and would severely endanger the U.S. position of leadership in the Free World. It is our judgment that these costs outweigh the advantages of intervention.

In view of these considerations, it is the recommendation of the Task Force that: 1) We should not undertake military intervention now. 2) We should make no statements or take no action that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future. 3) We should work to reduce the Castro threat through measures discussed in the balance of this paper—thus seeking to avoid the need for more drastic and costly action at some time in the future. 4) We should attempt to reduce the costs of intervention should it become necessary. There is not a great deal the United States by itself can do along these lines as a matter of deliberate policy. We can, however, plan for various contingencies so that intervention will be sufficient and more effective. We should strive to develop a creditable doctrine based on self-defense against indirect aggression which would justify more drastic action, and we should seek to have that doctrine generally accepted by world opinion. At the same time, we should seek to continue our efforts to establish a multilateral base for action.

On May 3 the final draft of this paper was circulated for comment. In the Department of State, Achilles reviewed the paper in a memorandum to Rusk and concluded that it “comes up with the right answer.” He felt, however, that while the paper accurately presented the risks of intervention, it did not adequately present the risks of allowing Castro to remain in power or of conveying an impression of weakness or irresolution in dealing with Castro. He drafted two paragraphs that he felt should be added to the paper at this point to strengthen the impression of determination to confront the threat posed by Castro. These paragraphs, which were apparently adopted by the NSC on May 5 for inclusion in the paper (see Document 203) read as follows:

“5) We should keep in mind “(a) the possibility that if the Castro regime remains in power and succeeds all of Latin America may succumb to Soviet-dominated Communism within a relatively few years, and “(b) that the measures recommended in this paper are highly unlikely to cause the regimeʼs fall although they will both cause it difficulties and retard its influence elsewhere.

“6) It should also be borne in mind that as a result of the Presidentʼs April 20 statement the U.S., Latin American and world opinion is looking to the Administration for strong and prudent leadership with respect to Cuba. We cannot afford weakness, irresponsibility or failure.” (Department of State, S/P-NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, Cuba and the Dominican Republic)

In a conversation with Admiral Burke at 8:45 a.m. on May 5, shortly before the NSC discussion of the paper, General Bonesteel said that Achilles had called him the previous night to indicate concern that the paper was not strong enough. Bonesteel noted that Achilles had briefed Rusk on the paper and felt that Rusk would take a pretty strong position in the NSC. Achillesʼ implication, Bonesteel felt, was “for goodness sakes for us to get in there and keep pitching for something stronger.” Burke responded that he had taken the same position in discussing the paper with McNamara the previous evening. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, May 5; Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials)

Measures Short of Armed Intervention

VI. U.S. Policy Toward Cuban Exiles

There are approximately 116,000 Cuban aliens, largely middle class and educated with 23% professionally and semi-professionally trained, who could be an asset, but a diminishing asset to a liberated Cuba. Annex III outlines a detailed plan under which their training could be undertaken. It includes a program for the training of approximately 4,000 military.

Approval of the plan, with the exception of its military component, is recommended by the entire task force.

The following arguments have been advanced for and against the military component.

1. Arguments for: a. Such a contingent would be helpful should an invasion become necessary. It would give Cuban participation and military assistance to the invasion. b. In the event of an overthrow of the Castro regime, whether by invasion or by internal overthrow, it would furnish leadership cadres, counter-guerrilla teams and civil affairs units. c. The military potential of these Cubans will be a rapidly wasting asset if their training is not promptly organized. d. Not to train these men would be taken throughout Latin America as a decision not to intervene in Cuba. 2. Arguments against: a. The United States would be faced with continuing questions in the U.N. and by world opinion as to the purpose of such military training. It would be asserted that such a program implies an intention to intervene in Cuba. b. Should an invasion become necessary, such a contingent would be a useful, but not an essential, element. c. It would be difficult to disband the contingent once organized without a serious morale impact on the Cuban exiles.

VII. Steps To Quarantine and Weaken the Castro Communist Regime

Steps Designed to Isolate Cuba morally and diplomatically in the hemisphere

1. Endeavor to persuade other Latin American governments to take steps aimed at completing Castroʼs isolation—such as withdrawal of Ambassadors, diplomatic breaks, appeals to Cuba to free itself of Sino-Soviet ties, etc. The greatest prospect for success with these measures—among those nations which have not already broken ties—is Venezuela and Colombia, and possibly Argentina. 2. We can apply the Trading with the Enemy Act. There is a difference of task force opinion on this point. This cut-off of trade will not appreciably harm the Cuban economy; although it will intensify their foreign exchange difficulties. It is, however, a political step aimed at increasing isolation and an expression of our intention not to finance, to any extent, the communist revolution in Cuba. It will make more difficult—by emphasizing his isolation from the Western Hemisphere—Castroʼs effort to persuade his people that he can solve his long-run economic problems. This could be a prelude to a blacklist of Cuban commercial activities in Latin America. A large part of the trade is in foodstuffs and medicines. 3. The plan for OAS action, discussed below, would also contribute to the effort to isolate Castro. B. Steps To Weaken Castro 1. Make public statement setting forth our liberal aspirations for a post-Castro Cuba in the political, economic and social fields—our general agreement with the original objectives of the revolution. 2. Formulate and announce concrete measures whereby we intend to assist the Cuban people and economy after Cuba is free. 3. Continue to give open support to the Cuban liberation movement and to the Revolutionary Council. Conduct relations with that body on a more overt basis. 4. Continue understanding with allies that no arms will be shipped to Cuba. 5. See measures discussed below in the plan for OAS action which will make some, although minor, contribution to weakening Castro. C. Steps Designed To Quarantine the Castro Communist Regime 1. Plan to provide assistance to any Latin American country requesting help against Castro inspired subversion or attack. Wherever possible this understanding between us and other governments should be formally incorporated into a bilateral defense treaty. This would be an effective way, within the existing framework of international law, to provide a basis for U.S. action in coming to the defense of any nation threatened by the techniques of subversion, infiltration and/or guerrilla activity. Although a broader doctrinal basis for such action might be thought desirable, and is discussed further on in this paper—such a series of arrangements would provide a basis for action and would, in themselves, signal a new doctrine. 2. Obtain the necessary legislative authorization and budgetary support to enable us to help other countries build up their internal security forces. 3. Offer intelligence liaison and assistance to other Latin American countries to enable them to identify Castro and other communist inspired subversive efforts, discover shipments of arms and funds, cope with subversive political organizations, etc. This means aiding and building-up local intelligence efforts and making our own information available. 4. Encourage Latin governments to bring pressure to stop use of Castro press service in their country. 5.

Attempt to build a Caribbean force within the framework of the OAS. This would be a series of bilateral arrangements within a multilateral framework among the Caribbean nations and the United States.

We would enter into formal bilateral commitments with all Caribbean nations willing to participate to do those things outlined in the first three paragraphs of this section, i.e. provide assistance against subversion and threatened attack. We would pledge armed forces to a Caribbean Security Force in which other member nations would participate. As a step in accomplishing this we would renegotiate the MAP agreements which we now have with five of the proposed member states (Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua and Colombia) to incorporate these commitments and permit MAP trained forces to be deployed against internal as well as external threats, and we would seek to negotiate similar agreements with non-MAP states.

In return the Central American countries would bilaterally (a) accept our assistance in internal security field, (b) earmark forces for a Caribbean security force, and (c) pledge themselves to orderly economic and social development within the framework of country development plans.

This would be coupled with a multilateral agreement which (a) recognized the common threat, (b) set up the Caribbean Security Force, (c) provided for an exchange of information and intelligence on the Castro threat, and (d) contained a commitment on the part of each member to deny its territory to Castro activities aimed at another member.

The agreement, although based on the Caribbean nations, would be open to all OAS members who wished to join.

Aside from its potential effectiveness in dealing with the Castro threat, such an organization could provide an effective legal and international basis for U.S. action where necessary.

6. Either within a Caribbean arrangement or outside it conduct a navy patrol and other feasible surveillance of possible movements of arms and men from Cuba to other nations. Halt these shipments when discovered: even if unilateral action is necessary. It is possible that such a surveillance operation might be approved by the OAS. See below. 7.

OAS Action: To the extent that OAS action can substitute or reinforce the goals of a Caribbean Force it should be used. Therefore the possibilities of OAS should be explored.

The following program to propose for OAS action is deemed feasible, in the sense that all of the measures could be adopted without undue physical strain upon the Latin American governments, and probably would be supported by them once they have made the decision to take a stand in the OAS against Castro. There would be reluctance on the part of certain of them to contribute to a Caribbean surveillance operation, but token assistance for this purpose would be forthcoming from several. The big question now is the extent to which any program will be supported by certain of the major governments, particularly Brazil. We do not have an estimate of likely support on this or any program because we have not had an agreed program to propose, but present indications are that Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Paraguay would support action against Castro. Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Uruguay and Haiti might go along. It is almost certain that Chile, Bolivia and Brazil would oppose forthright OAS action and the position of Mexico and Ecuador is certain to be opposed.

Adoption of such a program would contribute immeasurably to the moral isolation of Castro. Physically, it would contribute to weakening him, but not greatly in addition to steps we might take unilaterally, since Cuba has little trade and direct communication with Latin America. It would eliminate Castro diplomatic and other missions as focal points of propaganda and subversion, and the Committee on Defense of Pan-American Principles could contribute to ferreting out Castro-communist activities, depending on our leadership. It would also provide an important OAS umbrella for actions which we have taken or desire to take. It would put the United States in a stronger position for more forcible measures which might at some time be required.

We should consult individually on the following program for action under the Rio Treaty. (a) A finding that the Castro regime is in violation of basic OAS principles and specifically that its actions are contrary to concepts set forth in the Declaration of CaracasThe Declaration of Caracas was the Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against International Communist Intervention, adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference, Caracas, Venezuela, March 28, 1954. For text, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, pp. 1300-1302. (against communist domination or control); The Declaration of SantiagoThe Declaration of Santiago was approved at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Santiago, Chile, August 18, 1959. For text, see ibid., Current Documents, 1959, pp. 361-363. (calling for respect for human rights); and the Declaration of San JoseThe Declaration of San Jose was approved at the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, San Jose, Costa Rica, August 29, 1960. For text, see ibid., 1960, pp. 219-220. (denouncing extra-continental intervention by Sino-Soviet powers and acceptance of such intervention). (b) Decisions to apply with respect to Cuba the following measures specified in Rio Treaty Article 8:For text of Article 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, p. 228. 1. breaking of diplomatic and consular relations; 2. suspension of trade in all items except medical supplies, and interruption of all other economic relations. (c) Establish a joint naval-aerial patrol of the Caribbean area for surveillance purposes designed to help identify shipment of arms and personnel from Cuba to other countries for the support of subversive activities and insurrectionary movements, and to assist affected states to prevent such intervention. (Plan to be developed by COAS with the advice of the Inter-American Defense Board.) (d) Recreate the Committee for the Political Defense of the Continent for the purpose of identifying Castrista or Sino-Soviet infiltration into American States, devising and recommending techniques and methods to prevent or counteract such infiltration, and recommending parallel action by American governments in dealing with such infiltration. (e) Establish a continuing committee of the OAS to observe compliance with the actions agreed upon and to assist governments to carry them out. Should consultations reveal that required 2/3 or more of the governments are agreed, proceed with OAS action required to formalize that agreement and put steps into effect. If majority not in agreement, press for adoption by individual governments unilaterally of as much of program as they are in a position to carry out. This would include possible establishment of Caribbean surveillance force as discussed above. (f) Should Castro initiate direct or indirect aggression against any other American State, encourage the affected government to invoke the Rio Treaty, support it with military force if armed attack is involved, and to support maximum feasible application of Rio Treaty if aggression has been indirect.

Recommendation:

That quiet negotiation be begun immediately to explore where practicable the willingness of other American nations to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS-wide arrangements of the type discussed throughout this section. Such consultation should accompany or follow the necessary discussions which will precede the IA-ECOSOC meeting in July. A special team should be appointed for this purpose.

8. The Dominican Republic and Haiti are two of the countries most vulnerable to a Castro takeover. In both countries democratic alternatives to the present regimes are not developed; and there is little doubt that Castro hopes for a communist takeover when Trujillo and/or Duvalier go. We recommend the following: (a) That we immediately develop emergency plans for both these nations in case of a blow-up in the next several weeks. These plans should include preparations to send in U.S. troops to maintain order, coupled with an emergency meeting of the OAS to authorize intervention as a preventative to civil strife and bloodshed. We should immediately consult with other nations, especially Venezuela, in an effort to get an advance commitment for joint action. If time allows the meeting should precede the troops. If there is no time troops should land immediately. This would be followed by a provisional government, free elections, etc. (b) We must immediately develop a longer-range program for these nations. This includes the organization of a democratic alternative to Trujillo and Duvalier. Such a group can be formed basically out of exiles since there is little opportunity for opposition or potential opposition to exist within the framework of the Haitian and Dominican regimes, though possibilities appear to exist in the Dominican Republic. When the formation of democratic alternatives is well under way, we should develop and begin to put into effect a plan for accelerating a transition from the regimes of Trujillo and Duvalier. In this way the timing and initiative on replacement will be ours, and we will gain the tremendous propaganda advantage which will accrue to us as a result of participation, however indirect, in an effort to eliminate these dictatorships. The methods whereby this can be accomplished have not yet been explored. (c) In this connection, we should step up our campaign against tyranny in the hemisphere and, wherever possible, couple Trujillo and Castro. 9.

Clarification of Juridical and Political Basis for the Protection of Free Nations against Communist Aggression

The present basis of international law is grounded on the nation state system as it evolved largely in Europe, from the 15th to 19th centuries. The present situation involving the duality between a nation state system and loyalties to a political and organizational system that transcends nations and has worldwide pretensions (the communist system) presents wholly new problems which require the development and exposition of an entirely new juridical basis. Existing international law concepts, be they the rights of belligerents, interference in the internal affairs of another state, the legitimacy and recognition of governments or the definition of armed aggression, play into the hands of the communists while they tie the hands, or lead to confusion in the ranks, of those proposing to assist nations attempting to preserve their freedom.

Recommended Courses of Action: (a) Secretary of State to assemble a group of knowledgeable people in this field to propose a new political rationale and new set of legal principles appropriate to todayʼs realities. (Possible names: Dean Acheson, Herman Phleger, Eric Hager, Arthur Dean, Mike Forrestal, C. B. Marshall.) (b) After U.S. approval of these principles, the State Department to negotiate their acceptance by as wide a group of our NATO allies as possible. (c) Then inform the members of OAS bilaterally that we propose to accept these principles and expect their concurrence; after having obtained concurrence from OAS states bilaterally submit the principles to OAS for ratification.

VIII. Measures Designed to Defeat Communist Subversion and Infiltration Generally—as well as to Quarantine the Castro Communist Regime

Strengthening of the Alliance for Progress

The present status of work on the Alliance for Progress is summarized in Annex III. Favorable Senate action on the $500 million appropriation for the Inter-American Program for Social Progress (Bogota Program), passed by the House of Representatives on April 25, is expected by May 5, so that implementation can begin at once. Planning for the Ministerial meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in July—the next major formal step—is proceeding smoothly.

Action requirements for strengthening the Alliance for Progress are as follows: 1. Rapid implementation of selected social development projects. a. Direct the ICA to negotiate forthwith a number of projects in the fields of education and training and public health assigned to it under the Bogota Program, selecting cases where recipient governments are making the greatest efforts at self-help and institutional reform, and covering a number of countries and a number of types of educational projects. The target for obligation of funds by June 30, 1961, should be a minimum of $25 million and an optimum of $35 to $50 million. b. Direct the U.S. Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to encourage the Bank to take similarly prompt action in its assigned fields, giving priority to aid in the realization of agricultural settlement and land reform measures and to low-cost housing in areas of serious unemployment and social unrest, and emphasizing the readiness to assist governments undertaking the most far-reaching self-help measures for social improvement. c. Direct the USIA to arrange for the maximum informational coverage of the actions in Latin America. 2.

Acceleration of other Latin American aid implementation.>

Direct the DLF and the Export-Import Bank to accelerate implementation of projects already funded, avoiding “policy” obstacles not required by law (e.g., DLF financing of aided self-help housing in Colombia).

Ensure prompt development of affirmative U.S. positions for Inter-American Economic and Social Council.

Direct the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to arrange for the prompt development of clear U.S. positions on Latin American economic integration and on commodity market and foreign exchange income stabilization which will be as responsive as possible to legitimate Latin American aspirations in these fields. These positions should be incorporated into the planning documents for the July meeting of the IA-ECOSOC.

4. Provision of additional resources for Latin American economic and social development. a. Direct the Foreign AID Task Force, after completion of its current work in preparing the foreign aid bill for FY 1962, to review the data on Latin American needs and capital absorption capacity with a view to requesting a supplemental appropriation for development loans later in FY 1962 of approximately $300 million, in addition to the $250-$350 million now contemplated. b. Direct the ICA and the U.S. Executive Director of the IDB to proceed with the obligation of Bogota Program funds as rapidly as projects can be negotiated which are genuinely consistent with the criteria governing that program, with a view to asking Congress for a second installment of social development funds for FY 1963, rather than waiting for the FY 1964 program as hitherto contemplated.

Organization of a Political Counterforce

A number of liberal, democratic Latin American political parties have organized themselves into an informal League of Democratic Parties. Moreover, an Institute for Political Education in Costa Rica to train young men in the techniques of democratic leadership has recently been established. We should support, in every way possible, this very hopeful effort. The Director of the appropriate U.S. agency should be instructed to give financial assistance in all amounts which can be usefully absorbed, to aid this organization in establishing a permanent headquarters and independent information and propaganda apparatus, expand a training institute, call international conferences of democratic parties in the underdeveloped world, etc. We should also assist with counsel and technical assistance where desired.

Given a firm ideological base and efficient organization this group could become a highly effective political counterforce to Castro.

Psychological and Propaganda Warfare

We must develop a firm propaganda line on Cuba and on communism and provide effective means for disseminating that line.

Annex IV describes the general rationale and suggests several themes for propaganda.

We recommend the establishment of radio broadcasting into Cuba on a 24-hour a day basis independent of the now compromised Radio Swan.

Additional methods of dissemination are discussed in Annex IV. The key decision is the decision to engage in propaganda activities on a greatly enlarged scale, and making the means of propaganda (e.g. radio transmitters) available to non-US groups (e.g. League of Democratic Parties, Cuban Revolutionary Council, etc.). If this decision is made then the USIA Director and CIA should be asked to prepare an estimate of costs.

IX. Organization of Effort

A. The key to conduct of Latin American affairs is the immediate appointment of a top-flight Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs—and a Latin America regional director for the new aid agency. If these jobs are to be done effectively it means the centralization of greater authority than that normally afforded to regional Assistant Secretaries vis-a-vis the aid operation and other government agencies.

In the interim the Cuban task force should be continued to keep a watch over those elements of the above plan aimed specifically at Cuba.

203. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, May 1961. Top Secret. Washington, May 5, 1961.

ACTION AT NSC MEETING, FRIDAY, MAY 5

A. The only agenda item is Cuba. Dean Rusk may ask for discussion of Laos, but we should resist any extended debate—we have had too much, and there is still no agreed, reviewed, State-Defense position. Frank Ellis has a brief paper on Civil Defense whose meaning is hard to assess—he will want to speak to you about it, and you will have to decide whether you want to discuss it.

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated item to be discussed at the NSC meeting.]

C. On Cuba, the starting point is the fine report of the Nitze task force.Document 202. The first point to make is that we cannot debate it all—the following are the principal points for your decision. They are stated in each case with three elements: a. The recommended decision b. Who concurs or dissents c. The action agency

Recommended decisions: 1. There should be a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba today—an anatomy of the Castro regime. (cf p. 8, Report) Recommended by: Task Force and White House Action: CIA, with State. 2. There should be no military intervention now, but the U. S. should retain the right to intervene if (a) Castroʼs Cuba should become a direct military threat to the U. S., or (b) if Castro commits aggression against any American republic. Recommended by: White House, adapted from Task Force (cf. p. 15, Report) Action: President 3. While the Castro threat should be reduced, if possible, by other measures, there should be careful contingency planning for sufficient and effective intervention if it should become necessary. (pp. 15-16, Report) Recommended by: White House, adapted from Task Force Action: Department of Defense 4. Cuban exiles in the U.S. should be dealt with in general as outlined in Annex III,Not printed. Task Force Report, except that: a. There will be no separate Cuban military force, but Cuban enlistment in the U.S. armed forces will be encouraged, and the Department of Defense will keep track of such Cubans against the day when they may be needed. b. Exiles will be screened, first, for refugee status and, second, on a selective basis, for immigrant status. Recommended by: White House and Task Force, except that Defense and CIA would prefer a Cuban brigade, while the Task Force did not report on the notion of immigrant status for a few. Action: Defense, HEW, CIA, and Justice. 5. Possible economic sanctions against Castro should be carefully reviewed—it is not clear what their effect would be, or whether they should be applied by the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Battle Act, or a direct embargo. (cf. Report, p. 19) Recommended by: White House (Task Force was split) Action: Department of State (Assistant Secretary Martin) 6. Relations with the Revolutionary Council should be improved, and support should be given to that body insofar as it continues to represent substantial Cuban sentiment. Recommended by: White House, adapted from Task Force Action: Department of State 7. Our commitment to lasting reform and progress in a post-Castro Cuba, as elsewhere, should be reaffirmed, along with our commitment to assist the Cuban people and economy after Cuba is free. (cf. Report, p. 19) Recommended by: White House, adapted from Task Force Action: President, then State and USIA 8.

We should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS-wide arrangements to quarantine Castro. Such negotiation should be separate from preparations now proceeding for the IA-ECOSOC meeting in July, and a special team of negotiators may be needed.

These negotiations should include the following possibilities: a. agreements for mutual support against subversion, infiltration, or guerrilla activity b. increased cooperation in strengthening internal security forces c. increased intelligence and liaison assistance d. cooperative action against Castro press services and other prop-aganda e. a Caribbean security force f. naval patrol against movements of arms and men, within the rules of international law g. censure of Castro by OAS under Declaration of Caracas, Santiago, and/or San Jose h. rupture of diplomatic, consular, and/or trade relations i. creation of appropriate Inter-American committees of enforcement j. invocation of the Rio Treaty, and U.S. support, in the event of aggression. Recommended by: White House, adapted from Task Force Action: Department of State

9. Both emergency and long-range plans should be developed promptly for anti-Communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Recommended by White House and Task Force Action: Department of State (Mr. Berle) 10. The Legal Adviser—with such external consultation as may be appropriate—should consider how far existing concepts of international law play into the hands of communists, and whether a new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action can and should be developed. (Report, pp. 30-31) Recommended by: White House, adapted from Task Force Action: Department of State (Mr. Chayes) 11. The Alliance for Progress should be strengthened on the lines recommended in Section VIII A of the Task Force Report, specifically including a plan for a supplemental appropriation for development loans, later in FY 1962, of the order of $200-$400 million, in addition to the $250-$350 million now contemplated, and including further an expectation that a second installment of social development funds in FY 1963, rather than in FY 1964. (Report, pp. 32-34) 12. We should engage in propaganda activities on a much enlarged scale, and the means of propaganda should be made available to non-U.S. groups. An estimate of costs should be prepared by USIA and CIA. Recommended by: White House and Task Force Action: USIA and CIA 13. An Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs should be appointed. 14. In the interim the Cuban Task Force should be continued under the temporary chairmanship of Richard Goodwin. Recommended by: White House, adapted from Task Force Action: The President

204. Notes of the 483d Meeting of the National Security CouncilSource: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, National Security Council (III). Top Secret. Although there is no drafting information on the source text, these notes were prepared by Howard L. Burris, Vice President Johnsonʼs military aide. Washington, May 5, 1961.

[Here follow 2 paragraphs unrelated to Cuba.]

The President asked Mr. Nitze for a report on the Cuban situation. Nitze replied that the Navy could blockade the island but results would not be immediate but rather long-range, and in the course thereof unfavorable world reaction would probably accrue. Admiral Burke pointed out that only complete interception of all ships approaching Cuba would achieve eventual success, and the job could be done with 24 ships. Mr. Rusk interrupted Admiral Burke to point out that such action would be an act of war and was wholly impracticable.

The President asked about a reported letter from Senator GoldwaterNot further identified. in which the statement is made that the Air Force could resolve the Cuban situation. Admiral Burke replied that there had in fact been an Air Force proposal with which other services had disagreed, especially the Marines. In any case, the Air Force had made the suggestion that the Cuban problem be resolved through rather heavy and perhaps indiscriminate bombardment. The President immediately rejected such an idea, and added further that there would be no Navy blockade. He emphasized the importance of more effective watch committee action on Cuba. He also asked Mr. Dulles what new information was available on foreign equipment going into Cuba. Mr. Dulles replied that we know practically everything about the equipment, but offered no specifics. The President directed that close surveillance be continued including overflight with an American pilot. The President approved flights of a frequency of every two or three days, but suggested extreme caution.

The President suggested that all Americans be urged to leave Cuba and asked Secretary Johnson to study ways and means of exit and transit visas.

Mr. Murrow assessed world-wide reactions to the U.S. position with regard to Cuba. He felt that the departure of the clergy, the reign of terror, and such incidents as the imprisonment in the theater will result in favorable reactions toward the U.S. and tend to considerably offset the unfavorable ones. He felt that world-wide impressions of the United States were improving generally. The President suggested that the Iranian issue might be interpreted abroad as a possible result of the failure of the U.S. to act in Laos. He suggested action by USIA to discount this possible impression. Secretary Rusk suggested the over-riding theme of U.S. rejection of Castro and went on to say that the U.S. must take all measures to precipitate his downfall or face the possibility that all South America will come under Communist influence.

The President asked what specific courses of action we should take to prevent the crippling influence of the Cuban fiasco, assuming that no military action by the U.S. will be taken. At the same time the President asked what circumstances would have to exist before the United States could move unilaterally against Cuba. Rusk stated that action could be taken under Article 51 of the Rio Treaty.Rusk is apparently referring to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter; for text, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, p. 102. He could also be referring to Article 6 of the Rio Treaty; see ibid., p. 228. In this connection the President asked if the U.S. could recognize the Cuban Government in Exile and what might be expected of this group. Rusk replied that such recognition was not possible because of the absence of certain essential elements of a governmental organization, identity and territory. The question then arose as to the status of the Cubans in the United States and Robert Kennedy replied that they should be designated refugees and stated that legislation exists to handle them under this designation. The Department of HEW will begin registering the refugees with the assistance of CIA. The President stated that the United States will invoke the Trading With the Enemy Act across the board as far as Cuba is concerned at such time as some overt act or incident occurs in Cuba. The President gave as an example the shooting of a United States citizen. The President would exempt from the restrictions of the Act some $30 million for food and drugs. At the suggestion of Mr. Fowler, Under Secretary of the Treasury, the drugs should be donated to the Cuban people through the Red Cross. The President suggested the acceptance of the policy to encourage all Latin American states to sever relations with Cuba and to establish a complete economic boycott. The United States however should draw the line on becoming involved in the affairs of another country, such as active participation in the overthrow of Trujillo. Instead, the United States should determine appropriate courses of action in case Trujillo falls. The common danger in Haiti should be included in these considerations.

205. Record of Actions at the 483d Meeting of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, 1961, No. 483, May 5, 1961. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the President approved this record of action on May 16 as Record of Action No. 2422. Washington, May 5, 1961.

The President presided at this meeting. The Acting Secretary of the Treasury and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, participated in the actions below. The Attorney General; the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Deputy Under Secretary of State; Theodore C. Achilles, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Stephen E. Smith, Assistant to Mr. Achilles; the Special Counsel to the President; the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Special Assistant to the President; the Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President; the Assistant to the Vice President; the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA); the Adviser to the President for Para-Military Affairs; the Military Aide to the President; the Deputy Director (Plans), Central Intelligence Agency; the Acting Executive Secretary, NSC; and Bromley Smith, NSC Staff, attended the meeting.

[Here follow NSC Action No. 2420, “U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” and NSC Action No. 2421, “U.S. Policy Toward Korea.”]

2422. U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (NSC Action No. 2413-c;See Document 204. Memo for NSC, same subject, dated May 4, 1961Document 202.)

a. Agreed that U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action. b. Agreed that the United States should not undertake military intervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future. c. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade or attempt an air war against Cuba; it was noted that neither course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. d. Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, especially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet Bloc military assist-ance, so that U.S. capabilities for possible intervention may be maintained at an adequate level. e. Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regime, and to possible political action to end the current terror. f. Noted the Presidentʼs direction that the Central Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba today. g. Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized as a government-in-exile, support should be given to it insofar as it continues to represent substantial Cuban sentiment. h. Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U.S. armed forces under plans to be developed by the Secretary of Defense. i. Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U.S. visitorsʼ visas will be given refugee status and assisted, under a program to be developed and directed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, in carrying on their former occupations. Refugees now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas. Cuban nationals entering the United States will be given refugee status. All refugees will be eligible to apply for travel privileges, and it was understood that they would also be eligible for citizenship. j. Agreed not to impose an immediate trade embargo on Cuba. The Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis of the effects of a U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba in relation to the Battle Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is imposed, it should be as complete as possible, with certain exceptions for Canada and with Red Cross distribution of drugs. k. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro, such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and (7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of international communism by all nations of this hemisphere. l. Agreed that the Alliance for Progress should be strengthened by such measures as (1) rapid implementation of selected social development projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional resources for Latin American economic and social development, including consideration of a supplemental appropriation for development loans of the order of $200-$400 million. m. Agreed that the U.S. Information Agency would expand its existing program in Latin America, but not initiate electronic warfare against the Castro regime; means of propaganda should be made available to non-U.S. groups. n. Agreed that U.S. military officers, under general guidance to be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers. o. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action. p. Agreed that pending appointment of an Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, the Task Force on Cuba should be continued under the chairmanship of Richard N. Goodwin, Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President.

206. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Hold Closely. Prepared by Admiral Burke. Washington, May 5, 1961. SUBJ Debrief of NSC meeting, 5 May 61

[Here follows a brief summary of the discussion of Iran and Korea.]

Cuba

7. Mr. Nitze then discussed his paper on Cuba.Document 202. It was asked whether or not anybody in the room believed that we should intervene militarily in Cuba now. I said perhaps not now, but it must be realized that the longer we delay in intervening in Cuba, the more strength Castro will have, both internally because of his training, and externally because he is representing the anti-United States group of Latin America, and because he is getting away with it. I said that in six months, if Castro were wise, he could have a small, well trained Army, and that within a year he could have a good military machine if he really wanted to put his back to it.

8. It was decided that sooner or later we probably would have to intervene in Cuba, but that now is not the time.

9. A blockade of Cuba was discussed and it was decided that a blockade was not worthwhile, for the reasons given in the talking paper.Document 202.

10. It was asked what was the Air Forceʼs proposal to handle the Cuban situation. Some Congressman had written a letter to the White House stating that if SAC were turned loose, they could handle all of Cuba.Not further identified. The question was asked if the Department of Defense knew of this proposal.

11. Mr. McNamara stated that there had been much discussion on how to land forces in Cuba. The Air Force believed that all the forces should be air landed very quickly, which they thought they could do in 36 hours. All the other Chiefs thought that in addition to air landing of troops, there should be material and other people brought in by ships. Mr. McNamara thought that it was better to use both airborne troops and amphibious troops. If what was meant was bombing of Cuba, it was decided that this should not be done.

12. The question was asked whether or not we were setting up a watch group on Cuba. Mr. Rusk stated that we do have a group which will keep up to date on Cuba. It is a matter of great importance to the White House to know the status of Cuba in detail. For example, the White House will want to know what military equipment the Cubans now have, what military equipment [they] get in the future, and what is the state of training of the Cuban forces.

13. Apparently the White House has received letters indicating that the equipment in the hands of the Militia was better than the equipment available to the CEF forces. Mr. Dulles stated that he knew about all the equipment in the hands of the Cubans and that their equipment was not superior. I seconded his remarks.

14. It was decided to continue the high-level overflights over Cuba, but that we should not fly any more than we have to.

15. A task group for Cuba was again discussed. It was decided that the task group and CIA would both be responsible to determine the Cuban military forces and how fast they were advancing, as well as other Cuban intelligence.

16. The question was then asked whether or not there was really terror in Havana. Several foreign ambassadors had reported that the situation in Havana was worse than they had seen, even in occupied countries. For example, four or five hundred people of many nationalities, but mostly Cubans, were herded into a theater and kept there three or four days without food or water, and without sleeping or bathroom accommodations. The question was asked why the European reporters hold back. They should harden up their articles. Mr. Murrow is to take action and will attempt to get foreign correspondents to get truthful stories from Cuba. We need the support of our NATO allies and the rest of OAS. Good stories from the foreign correspondents would be very helpful.

17. Mr. Rusk said that he would talk with NATO Foreign Ministers in regard to Cuba next week.

18. It was stated that Cuban farmers could not get United States transient visas. State is to act on this fast with Switzerland so that Cubans that want to get out of Cuba can do so on an American visa.

19. [1 line of source text not declassified]

20. It was stated that the troubles in Iran, whatever they may turn out to be, will be charged to our difficulties in Cuba and Laos.

21. Mr. Rusk then read three paragraphs that State wanted to add to the Cuban papers.An apparent reference to the revisions proposed by Achilles in a May 3 memorandum to Rusk; see footnote 3, Document 202. These paragraphs strengthened the paper and no opposition to them was made.

22. There is to be a formal covert annex on the Cuban paper. Mr. Rusk wanted to hold off on covert actions for a little while at least. CIA and the task group will look at all covert proposals for Cuba.

23. The United States policy in regard to Cuban exiles (page 27) was discussed at length. It was agreed that it would be nearly impossible to form a freedom brigade, but that Services should look into possibility of recruiting Cubans. Mr. Ribicoff is to review the nonmilitary part of the recommendations in regard to the Cuban freedom brigade. We should be very careful never to make a commitment to any Cuban group that the United States will intervene in Cuba.

24. Cubans in this country are now on visitors visas, and a lot of them are Castro agents, using the passports to move around the United States freely. We are therefore going to make them refugees, to control some of them and to permit others to work, and to deport some.

25. It was asked what position the government should take in regard to the committee in exile. The answer was that we canʼt recognize it as a government in exile because they are really no government. It is not a pre-established government that has been driven from its territory. Recognition of such a committee would be called political intervention, and it would get no OAS support. It would be a precedent for a future action. There might be lots of such governments in exile in the United States if we established one.

26. The next question was how do we deal with Cuban Legion. The answer was that the Cuban Legion canʼt possibly succeed unless the United States intervenes. We tried the Cuban Legion and it didnʼt work. However, the United States will intervene if the circumstances make intervention desirable. We canʼt tell the Cuban refugee group that we will never intervene for we will under some circumstances, nor can we tell them we will.

27. Mr. Ribicoff is to take charge of the refugee problem. He is going to encourage them to continue their trades. They will become an immigrant group. They will have the right to work; he will watch the labor situation to insure they can continue their old trades if they want to, and that they can expand their skills. Some students will be offered scholarships. We will try to keep the refugees from concentrating in Miami.

28. The Trading With the Enemy Act was discussed as to whether it should be absolute or not. After some discussion on whether to continue trade, Burke made his “Hurt Castro” speech. It was brought out by others that we donʼt want to make Castro a hero but we should hurt Castro every way we know how—in little ways—any way we can, but donʼt make a hero out of him. Sometimes by doing things against Castro, we build him up and make a popular figure out of him. We donʼt want the United States to appear to be a bully pushing Cuba or Castro around, or for the United States image to become weakened because we were unable to successfully overthrow Castro.

29. Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that maybe we would want to cut off United States imports, but permit food exports to Cuba on humanitarian grounds. It was stated that if restrictions on trade were invoked, it should be done on the ground of specific unacceptable actions on the part of Castro, and we should go all the way and not just part of it. He can get anything that he actually needs elsewhere.

30. It was decided that if we do invoke the trade restrictions we will go all the way. We will invoke the restrictions the first time we can hang them on some situation. It may be necessary to induce a situation, although Castro will probably soon create the situation himself.

31. There was then a discussion of the Battle Act, but no conclusions.

32. Mr. Murrow said that we should let medicine go in to Cuba. It was finally agreed to let medicine go in, but not sell it. It will go in free of charge to the Red Cross.

33. There was a discussion on United States subsidiaries in Canada. They will be included in blanket order, but any individual company with a Canadian subsidiary can get a license which will permit him to trade.

Western Hemisphere

34. There was much discussion on bilateral defense treaties. Mr. Rusk finally said that these treaties should not become a big project. If we want bilateral action when the time comes, it will be easier to get agreement then. If and where it is easy to get bilateral agreements, he has no objection. Elsewhere, let it ride for the time being.

35. Mr. Rusk stated that he has been consulting with OAS States and the OAS Organization on Latin-American countries breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba. Eight have suspended diplomatic relations and nine had recalled their Ambassadors without breaking diplomatic relations.

36. It was stated that the instructions to our Ambassadors in Latin America should be reviewed by the White House. The question was asked what do we want our Ambassadors to Latin America to do. Mr. Rusk stated that it would have to be OAS or Rio type action.

37. There was some discussion on whether Brazil would oppose an anti-Castro movement or not.

38. There was some discussion on a Caribbean defense force and it was agreed that this needed more looking at.

39. Mr. Dulles stated that much more could be done in Mexico than was indicated in this paper.

40. It was brought up again that we have got to be sure that our Ambassadors know what is in our minds so we can all work towards the same goal. We must bring others in the program. We must denounce Cuba as a satellite and get other people to ostracize Cuba.

41. The Vice President stated we have got to be tough. He wants to drag our feet on help to those countries that help Castro, and those countries that opposed Castro, we should help quickly. We should do all we can to hurt Castro and we canʼt ignore or reward those who play with the enemy.

42. Mr. Bowles was in favor of going easy. We should not be in too much hurry, and should build up examples of courses of action before action is taken.

43. It was still not clear what we wanted our Ambassadors to do, so the question was again asked. It was then stated that American nations should break diplomatic relations, ostracize Cuba, and increase their own internal security.

44. Burke said that the Services could accomplish a great deal in Latin America through the MAAGʼs and Attaches.

Comment. The JCS should prepare and coordinate with State a paper to provide guidance on such action, which individual Services can use as a source paper for instructions to our people, with copies to CINCARIB, CINCLANT and CINCPAC.

45. It was emphasized that we have got to get all government programs to use all means to weaken Castro.

46. Mr. Murrow stated that it was possible to blanket Cuban radios, and that we could put two naval aircraft in the air to transmit television shows over Cuban channels or we could beef up United States radio and television shows in Spanish to Latin-American countries. It was decided that the latter was the only one to do. Mr. Murrow is going to increase short-wave transmissions and put up some new stations.

[Here follows discussion of the Dominican Republic, British Guiana, and Costa Rica.]

Personnel

51. Mr. Goodwin is to take over Mr. Nitzeʼs Cuban job at least while Mr. Nitze goes with SecState to Oslo.

[Here follows discussion of Thailand and Vietnam.]

207. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to His Special Assistant (Yarmolinsky)Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Secret. Washington, May 5, 1961.

Today at the NSC meeting, the Department of Defense recommended against the formation of a “Cuban Freedom Brigade.” Instead, we proposed, and the President approved, the induction of Cuban volunteers into the U.S. military forces.

I should like to ask you to assume the responsibility for working with each of the Services, ISA, Manpower and the State Department to develop a plan for carrying out this policy. The plan should provide for recruiting the Cubans in such a way as to avoid any implication that they would ever participate in an invasion of Cuba. Instead, they should clearly understand that their role would be the same as that of any other individual accepted into the U.S. forces. The Services should: a. Consider the possibility of associating with the Cuban volunteers, volunteers from other South American and Central American nations. b. Plan to identify the Cuban volunteers in such a way as to permit their consolidation into a Cuban unit, should the need for such a unit ever develop. c. Outline the special type of training to which the Cuban volunteers might be exposed, e.g., “special forces” training. d. State the changes required in our current recruiting regulations to permit the enlistment of foreigners.

I should like to be kept informed of the progress of your work. By what date do you anticipate it will be possible to present a plan to me which has been coordinated with all the parties concerned? Along with the plan, please send to me a brief memorandum to the President outlining what we propose to do.In a separate memorandum to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, McNamara instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to respond to NSC Action No. 2422 by preparing plans for creating a Caribbean security force, and for initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean. He instructed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to work with the Department of State to implement the element of the NSC Action that called for U.S. military officers to be prepared to “discuss the Castro threat to Latin America with Latin American officers.” (Ibid., Cuba 381 (Sensitive))

RMcN

208. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the Political Warfare Subcommittee of the Cuban Task ForceSource: Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Cuba 1961, Box 31. Confidential. The Political Warfare Subcommittee was headed by Schlesinger and was subordinate to the interagency Cuban Task Force, which was chaired after May 5 by Richard Goodwin. Washington, May 8, 1961.

Our mission is to redefine the conflict in Cuba in a way which will transform current opinion not only within this hemisphere but in Europe, Africa and Asia.

A current widespread view (e.g., Manchester Guardian, London Observer, Le Monde, Fair Play for Cuba Committee) is that the conflict is between the Castro regime, which, for all its excesses, is at least dedicated to the welfare of the Cuban people, and a crowd of emigres, whose aim is to bring back the old order to Cuba. Our job is to work out ways and means to combat and destroy this view—to show that the essential conflict in Cuba is nothing more or less than between the totalitarian (or communist) and the libertarian (or social democratic) wings of the Cuban Revolution. This means putting over (a) the true character of the Castro regime and the betrayed revolution; and (b) the progressive character of the Revolutionary Council and its determination to rescue the revolution. Particularly relevant to all this is the terrorism within Cuba in the period since the landings.

The President has expressed an urgent and recurrent interest in this particular phase of the Cuban task force. We should therefore come up with something as concrete and immediate as possible.

We might well start by considering this problem in terms of target areas. For purposes of a first approximation, I would suggest the following targets: (1) Europe, Asia, Africa; (2) Latin America; (3) the United States.

Europe, Asia, Africa. Most of the world outside the hemisphere still regards Castro as essentially a left-wing nationalist, no doubt aggressive and emotional, but still basically a man devoted to national self-assertion and propelled into communism only by the short-sighted and imperialistic policies of the United States. Castro is perceived, in short, as a Latin American Nasser, wildly irritating in the short run but nonetheless the victim of Wall Street and the United Fruit Company, striking out in understandable resentment against ancient enemies. If he has become totalitarian, it is because Washington has left him no alternative. His Cuban opposition consists of middle and upper class businessmen and landowners who object to the whole idea of social revolution.

How do we deal with this? (a) We must refute the notion that American policy drove Castro into the arms of the USSR. This can be done by simple chronology: Castro took the communist turn in the course of 1959; the first trade agreement with the bloc took place in February 1960; the first massive American reprisal—the sugar action—took place in the summer of 1960. (b) We must continue to demonstrate the increasingly communist character of the regime. (c) We must get out as promptly as possible the stories of the post-landings terrorism.

How are these things to be done? There is no particular advantage, I would think, in floating these things through the American press. From the viewpoint of the rest of the world, this would discredit the testimony from the start. The points should be made initially in the foreign press—through the correspondents of foreign newspapers in Washington and also directly through our Embassies to key journalistic figures in London, Paris and elsewhere. Two basic presentations perhaps should be involved: (1) a careful chronology showing that Castroʼs commitment to communism preceded rather than followed US economic retaliation; (2) a compilation of paraphrased reports from neutral embassies in Habana concerning post-landings terrorism. Conceivably there should be a background briefing in Washington developing these points; and London and Paris should be asked to carry the ball locally. This should not be done in the form of public statements, and the case should be made to rest as much as possible on undisputable facts and on neutral reports.

We should also try to send to Europe anti-Castro figures of unchallengeable progressive credentials: for example, Rojas,Sergio Rojas Santamaria. who as Castro Ambassador to Great Britain went around the country in 1959 delivering hot pro-Castro speeches, might now come back to explain the betrayal of the Cuban Revolution. FigueresJose Figueres, former President of Costa Rica. and Haya de la TorreVictor Haya de la Torre, head of the APRA, the Peruvian Social Democratic Movement. could, of course, do powerful jobs in Europe and the underdeveloped world.

Latin America. In Europe our main target is essentially an elite audience—politicians, editors and opinion-makers. In Latin America, most elite opinion is probably pretty well convinced by now of the main propositions; those still unconvinced are probably beyond intellectual persuasion. This means that in Latin America our main targets are popular groups—intellectuals, students, labor, campesinos.

These groups will be particularly resistant to any overt US campaign or, indeed, to official campaigns of almost any sort. The best approach will be through unofficial and indigenous agencies—the League of Democratic Parties, which should be transformed as soon as possible into a serious operation; the San Jose Institute of Political Education; the local offices of the Cuban Revolutionary Council; the labor movement; the universities. The USIA should expand its Latin American activities, but its role should be essentially to supply indigenous groups with necessary material rather than to go into exhortatory and polemical utterances on its own. Radio Swan should be liquidated as soon as possible in its present form.

If the Cuban Revolutionary Council is to be effective, it must end any possible remaining doubt about its commitment to the social and libertarian goals of the Cuban Revolution. This will enrage a lot of rich Cubans in Miami, but their resentment is a burden which will have to be borne. It is far more important to send into circulation throughout Latin America a collection of authentic Cuban progressives who can make clear where it matters that our objection is not to social reform but to the establishment of a Soviet outpost in the hemisphere.

The United States. A job remains to be done here. We should not be lulled into complacency by the Gallup poll showing that the President has achieved new heights of public approval. It is equally important to note that, according to the more recent Gallup poll, the American people are 65-24 percent against armed intervention in Cuba and only 44-41 percent for indirect help to the anti-Castro forces. It would be foolish, I think, to underestimate the recent shock to liberal and church opinion or the potential impact of the Fair Play for Cuba group.

Again official government hand-outs are not going to be effective. What we need is the establishment of a Fair Play for Cubans Committee under liberal sponsorship. Such a committee would have as its main function the redefinition of the conflict; it would spell out exactly what the Castro regime is doing to human freedom in Cuba; and it would support the progressive aims of the Revolutionary Council. In time, it might even serve as a source of funds for the progressive anti-Castro front.

We should also make a particular effort to get the stories of Castro terrorism into the hands, not of the New York Journal American, but of liberal newspapers and columnists. In particular, Manuel Ray should be encouraged to make as many public appearances as possible in liberal, labor and student circles; his recent appearance at Harvard was, I understand, a great success.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

209. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. No drafter is indicated but it was probably Colonel Tarwater. The meeting was the 12th in the series conducted by the Cuba Study Group and was held at the Pentagon. The participants at the meeting, in addition to Taylor, Kennedy, Dulles, and Burke, included General White, General Decker, General Shoup, Bissell, Mitchell, and Tarwater. A note at the top of the source text reads: “The following notes are not a verbatim record, but represent the general substance of the statements made.” Washington, May 8, 1961.

General Shoup

Question: What action was taken on the over-all U.S. plan of action for Cuba developed by the JCS in late January?

General Shoup: It was considered by the JCS, but I donʼt know to whom it was distributed nor what action was taken on it.

General Taylor: At no time after January was there any reconsideration by the JCS of the need for that kind of paper to pull the whole thing together?

General Shoup: To my knowledge there was no reference to it by the Chiefs, but what the Chairman might have done I donʼt know.

Question: What was the JCS view of the military feasibility of Trinidad and Zapata?

General Shoup: Only by having an opportunity to give my feelings on this whole operation can my observations be taken in the proper context. When I first learned that something of this nature was happening as a military man it immediately dawned on me that this was a whole lot more than dropping a few parachutists or running a boat in at a few various places along the island. I went through the NSC papers and discovered that the national policy was the overthrow of the Castro regime. CIA then drew up the Trinidad Plan and asked that the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Staff evaluate it from a military feasibility standpoint. This led to a very careful look at the mission. The mission had nothing to do with the armed forces of Cuba or the militia, with the exception of that necessary to enter Cuba. The personnel of this force were being better trained than the ordinary Cubans. Their task was to get ashore with this tremendous amount of equipment and supplies which was to be made available for distribution to the people who would rise up to assist the operation. They had considered time and space factors available to them, and determined that this organization had sufficient time to get in there, get the materials ashore, and distribute them to the dissidents. The intelligence indicated that there were quite a number of people that were ready to join in the fight against Castro. These people were to come into the beachhead and pick up this material, and then the beachhead would expand and they would very soon have a formidable military organization. Considering this plan and the location of the enemy forces on the basis of the time and space factors, it appeared to me that they could accomplish their objective. Sometime later the Chairman said the President would not approve the Trinidad Plan because it smacked too much of Normandy, which would make it impossible to deny U.S. involvement. Consequently CIA was directed to develop some alternatives. Later Gen. Gray came in and briefed us on some alternate plans and, as I understood it, there was no question about the Trinidad thing. It was out right there as far as doing it in its original form. A new requirement was levied on CIA to make their landing where there was an airfield. It was my personal feeling that the airfield requirement virtually restricted the operation to the Zapata region. The JCS decided that there was no question about it, the Zapata area had the greatest possibility of success of the alternatives we were considering. Following this there was considerable discussion about how many aircraft Castro had, and the best way to eliminate the tanks. There seemed to be no question about being able to destroy Castroʼs aircraft with napalm, strafing and rockets, nor the ability to disrupt the tanks. That brings us to the place where the decision was made to go in and try the Zapata thing. However, one thought was predominant. You must achieve and maintain air superiority or you are not going to be able to get ashore.

Question: Did you feel that Zapata was as good a plan as Trinidad?

General Shoup: No, sir. I questioned the swamp area. However, after considerable thought and discussion, I was satisfied that by dropping parachutists to block the roads and by using anti-tank mines you could accomplish the same objectives in the Zapata area that you could in the Trinidad area. However, there were complications in the distances the people would have to come to get the weapons, the problem of maneuvering would be more difficult, and the possibility of debouching would also be more difficult from the Zapata area.

Question: There was no civilian population in the area at all, was there?

General Shoup: There were about 1,800 people where the landings were made.

Question: You made the point that one of the essential parts of the Trinidad Plan was the fact that they had a population there on which they could base their expansion. Did you consider that possibility existed in Zapata?

General Shoup: Yes, sir. The idea was that time and space factors were favorable. It was my understanding that there were lots of people just waiting for these arms, that they would get them in the same manner as they would have in the Trinidad Plan. However, you were closer to some of Castroʼs army forces and tank forces and you would have more difficulty debouching from this area.

Question: Did you visualize that this landing would attract sizable Castro forces?

General Shoup: Obviously, once he determined the location of the main invasion, Castro was bound to bring in his forces.

Question: How were the dissident Cuban civilians going to get their arms then?

General Shoup: The parachutists and anti-tank mines would block the roadways. Then the whole area would be in a state of revolt. There would be no problem of them coming through. These people would have been much closer to their source of arms than the enemy, because the enemy didnʼt know where they were coming in.

Question: Was there any impression that there was going to be a pre-D-Day message to the population?

General Shoup: My understanding was that the possibilities of uprisings were increasing, that people were just waiting for these arms and equipment, and as soon as they heard where the invasion was that they would be coming after them.

Question: If you were in charge of the defenses in this area couldnʼt you get some artillery in and really give them hell?

General Shoup: It takes time. Itʼs time and space. I didnʼt conceive of them stashing all this stuff on one spot on the beach and waiting until somebody brings artillery down.

Question: What was your opinion of what they were going to do? Get these arms out of there?

General Shoup: Right. And there would be people there to assist them and get the arms. This force, from my understanding, was highly trained in comparison with the militia. They had proper arms, equipment, and leadership to enable them to stand off the armed forces they could expect Castro to commit against them.

Question: How long did you think theyʼd be in the Bay?

General Shoup: One day. I thought theyʼd unload those ships and get out of there. If they didnʼt get unloaded, theyʼd come back after dark, depending upon whether they were actually rushed by the enemy or if they werenʼt, and depending upon where the people were that could use the arms.

Question: Was it your understanding that a lot of people in this area were going to come in and help?

General Shoup: I certainly thought there was going to be a number of them. We werenʼt just talking about the people that had homes in this area. We were talking about the people who wanted to get the help they knew was coming to them with this landing force.

General Shoup: I didnʼt think the militia were going to band together and harm this thing. It would take some elements of the organized force and if the actual time and place of the landing was not known, the enemy could not afford to commit all of his forces because he doesnʼt know where the main thrust will be. It was my opinion that the arms and ammunition they had with them was nowhere near sufficient for the people that wanted them.

Question: The JCS commenting on Trinidad said that it had a fair chance of success. Then I think that the record shows that they viewed the next alternatives and said that Zapata was the best of these three plans, but that they still preferred Trinidad.

General Shoup: Yes, sir, any corporal would have said that.

Question: The Chiefs rated the chances of success for Zapata as something less than fair. What was your appraisal of the chances of success of this operation?

General Shoup: The plan they had should have accomplished the mission in Zapata, if the plan had been brought to fruition.

Question: You did not expect a quick or strong reaction from the Castro forces?

General Shoup: I expected them to react, but not with some of the equipment with which they did react, and I donʼt think they would have if the plans had been carried out.

Question: As you saw this plan develop, the amphibious landing on a hostile shore, did you have any misgivings?

General Shoup: I very frankly made this statement, if this kind of an operation can be done with this kind of a force with this much training and knowledge about it, then we are wasting our time in our divisions, we ought to go on leave for three months out of four.

Mr. Dulles: Do you realize how many military men we had on this task force? Some of your very best officers. We took a great deal of responsibility, but we called on the Defense Department and I looked to them for military judgments. I didnʼt look to our people for military judgments.

Question: General Shoup, isnʼt that statement of yours somewhat in contradiction with your over-all optimism that this plan would work?

General Shoup: No, sir, it is not.

Question: Would you say that you took the same interest in this operation and made the same personal analysis as you would have done had you been in charge?

General Shoup: Iʼll say this. I spent a lot of sleepless hours over this because I worried about the thing because there was no plan for helping these men if there was something unforeseen, an act of God or something, that prevented a successful landing. In my opinion there would be no way to save them. There was no way to guarantee its success, but if the plan was executed, as planned, I believe it would have been successful. I couldnʼt find out all I wanted to about the plan. I knew I wasnʼt supposed to. It wasnʼt my responsibility. Had I been completely responsible I think that I would have known about everything. There were only four people in my headquarters that knew anything about the plan.

Statement: Letʼs go back to this question of military responsibility. Certainly you, as Commandant of the Marine Corps, had no responsibility for it, but as a member of the Joint Chiefs you did have responsibility for this operation.

General Shoup: Thatʼs not my understanding.

Statement: At least the JCS as a corporate body had responsibility for this operation.

General Shoup: Thatʼs not my understanding, only insofar as the Commander in Chief might want to know something about the adequacy of the plan, or the probability of success. Otherwise I donʼt feel that I or the other Joint Chiefs had any responsibility for the success of this plan.

Question: The Joint Chiefs are by law the advisors to the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, and the President. Consequently, would you say that you should volunteer any advice on this subject?

General Shoup: As a member of the Joint Chiefs I donʼt know what the Chairman did. I donʼt know what happened at a lot of meetings at the White House or the State Department but I do know this, that within the corporate body I for one emphasized time after time that we had to have air superiority and we had to help this outfit fend off the force they were going to have opposing them down there.

Admiral Burke: There are three or four things that are the basis of this thing that ought to be clear. One is the responsibility of the Chiefs to comment on the plan. Another is the actual conduct of the operation, which was all in one place and that was in CIA.

Mr. Dulles: But that was done by military personnel.

Admiral Burke: But not under our command structure.

Statement: But as advisors to the President the JCS had a responsibility. The President had the right to look to the Joint Chiefs for advice during the planning or execution phase if they thought they had something important to offer.

General Shoup: Thatʼs true, as limited by their knowledge of all aspects of the plan.

Statement: And in the absence of hearing from the Chiefs he had a right to assume that everything was going satisfactorily.

General Shoup: Yes, to the limit of our knowledge. I want to tell you this right now. Had I as an individual heard that they were going to call off the air strikes Iʼd have asked that the Commander in Chief be informed. Iʼd have called him myself because it was absolutely essential to success. The D-2 affair was only a half effort.

Mr. Dulles: General, may I add this. The D-2 Day was essentially a plot, not a plan. The plan was the D-Day strike.

Question: Do you feel that you had absolute and complete knowledge about this operation?

General Shoup: Absolutely not.

Question: Did you understand that the President and his advisors were looking to you for your military evaluation of this plan?

General Shoup: The thing that we were asked to do was to determine which of the three alternatives was the best.

Question: But then after that, did you understand that during that period of time that the President was looking to you, the JCS, for the military evaluation of the operation?

General Shoup: I would have to presume that in accordance with his title as Commander in Chief he would be thinking about the military part.

Question: But you understand that he wanted to get your advice and ideas also?

General Shoup: That was never stated.

Question: What I am getting at is that if you feel that you didnʼt have full knowledge and information on the plan and at the same time the President was looking to you for advice, it seems to me it would be almost impossible for you to give him the military evaluation.

General Shoup: Well, you had to look at it in the context of what the agency said about the uprisings. I had no possible way to know or evaluate them. That in itself was a particularly important factor.

Statement: There was a general impression that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved this operation. I donʼt think there is any doubt but what they went ahead thinking that you and the other Joint Chiefs had approved the plan, but you now say that you didnʼt have full knowledge and information in order to evaluate the plan. That in itself is of some significance for the future.

General Shoup: One of the main features relating to the ultimate success of this was not whether you could put these ships in here and unload this military equipment, whether the people were properly trained to fend off a reasonable enemy effort.

Statement: Your idea of the plan is entirely different from some other peoplesʼ idea of the plan.

General Shoup: Iʼm telling the truth as I know it.

Statement: I donʼt think there is any doubt about that.

Statement: The idea that the people would land on the beach and then take off into the swamp is a new one to us.

Admiral Burke: There was great emphasis on the uprisings and we spent hours and hours determining how to get additional equipment. We ended up with equipment for 30,000 people. The only slight difference I have with General Shoup is that it was my understanding that this group had to be able to hold a beachhead for some time, for several days.

Statement: Itʼs very significant that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, whom the President of the United States and the Secretary of State thought had approved this plan, had an entirely different idea of what the plan was. It seems that something has gone wrong somewhere along the line.

General Shoup: This whole thing was a function of time.

Statement: But when I asked you, you said they were going to get out of there the same day. They were only going to hold a beachhead long enough to unload the equipment. There wasnʼt any possibility of anybody coming down there. There wasnʼt anybody around there. Their idea was to hold that beachhead. I think it is important that when the President and the Secretary of State think they have your view, that they do have your view.

General Shoup: I donʼt think that the Chairman should go to the President as Commander in Chief on an operation of this kind by himself. There are three people here who are quite knowledgeable. The Chairman undoubtedly has a good grasp, but when you hit something like this, details are important.

Question: During the execution of this operation did you keep informed of what was taking place?

General Shoup: It is a question of degree. I had a liaison officer working for me to keep me advised.

Question: The ammunition situation turns out to be the vital factor that caused the ultimate defeat at the beachhead. Did you have a clear picture of how vitally the beach was hurting for ammunition?

General Shoup: No, with the exception that I was told that the ship that was sunk had arms and tank ammunition.

Question: But at the end of the second dayʼs fighting no one communicated to you the crisis that had arisen as a result of the lack of ammunition?

General Shoup: Yes, to the extent that the ships that were sunk had this vital ammunition. Whether or not the drops had rectified this situation I didnʼt know.

Question: What was your understanding of additional resupply of ammunition by ship?

General Shoup: They had a regular plan drawn up. I canʼt tell you exactly what the plan was. The equipment was for 30,000 people.

Question: Was it reported to you that two of the cargo ships that had reserve ammunition had fled the area and one got as far south as 200 miles?

General Shoup: No, sir.

General Taylor: May I summarize now what my understanding is? That you would say that you as members of the Joint Chiefs first concurred in the feasibility of Trinidad Plan; that with regard to the Zapata Plan you concurred that it was the best of the three alternatives considered, and as you saw the plan develop you still felt it had a reasonable chance of success.

General Shoup: For the mission as I understood it.

General Taylor: You feel that the Joint Chiefs recognized their responsibility for advising the President, but did not make any special comments to him mainly because you thought the plan was going along all right.

General Shoup: I think you have to preface all these remarks by recognizing that I was not consulted as to whether such a thing ought to happen. That wasnʼt my business.

General Taylor: The overthrow of Castro you accepted?

General Shoup: Yes, that was national policy.

General Taylor: Wouldnʼt you say that the Joint Chiefs had every right and responsibility if they didnʼt believe that an amphibious landing of this kind would succeed, to so advise the President?

General Shoup: Absolutely.

General Taylor: Were you satisfied with the plan as being a feasible, reasonable plan?

General Shoup: To accomplish the mission as I understood it, not the destruction of the armed forces.

Question: What was the mission?

General Shoup: The mission was to get some well-trained military people into Cuba, who could gather into their fold and equip all the people that were just waiting for a chance to get at Castro, then these military people could develop a real military organization and increase their strength to the extent that the whole Castro regime would fall apart.

Question: The success of this operation was wholly dependent upon popular support?

General Shoup: Absolutely. Ultimate success.

Statement: Not only ultimate success, but any success really.

Question: Who gave you this information on the uprisings?

General Shoup: I donʼt know. I suppose it was CIA. Well, itʼs obvious we wouldnʼt be taking 30,000 additional rifles if we didnʼt think there was going to be somebody to use them. I donʼt think any military man would ever think that this force could overthrow Castro without support. They could never expect anything but annihilation.

Question: Youʼd say then that they would still be on the beach if the plan had been carried out as conceived and depended upon popular uprisings throughout the island of Cuba? Otherwise they would have been wiped out?

General Shoup: Absolutely. I donʼt think there is any doubt at all. Eventually 1,500 people cannot hold out against many, many thousands.

Question: Would you send 1,200 Marines in there to do that?

General Shoup: No, I wouldnʼt, unless 1,200 Marines are going to be assisted by 30,000 Cubans.

Question: Did somebody tell you thereʼd be 30,000 Cubans?

General Shoup: No, they didnʼt, but we were getting materials ready for them.

Question: Did you ask about the swamp?

General Shoup: Yes, I asked about it on the first briefings. Even in the rainy season parts of it were passable by foot and in the dry season much of it was passable by foot. There were a number of egresses other than the roads. Thatʼs what we were told.

Question: Were you in touch with General Gray during this?

General Shoup: To my knowledge I was personally present each time that General Gray briefed the Joint Chiefs.

Question: But aside from that, did he give you any individual briefings?

General Shoup: No, sir.

Question: If you were going to do this again and there was still the requirement that it be a covert operation, what changes would you make? Anything that would be materially different?

General Shoup: I donʼt think that at this time in 1961 or hereafter you are going to do it covertly.

Question: Did you really think that this could be covert in the sense that it would not be attributed to the United States?

General Shoup: I did not.

210. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. No drafter is indicated but it was probably Colonel Tarwater. The meeting was the 12th in the series conducted by the Cuba Study Group and took place at the Pentagon. The participants in the meeting, in addition to Taylor, Kennedy, Dulles, and Burke, included General White, General Decker, General Shoup, Bissell, Mitchell, and Tarwater. A note on the source text reads: “The following notes are not a verbatim record, but represent the general substance of the statements made.” Washington, May 8, 1961.

General White

Question: What action was taken on the over-all U.S. plan of action for Cuba developed by the JCS in late January?

General White: I donʼt know.

Question: What was the JCS view of the military feasibility of the Trinidad and Zapata plans?

General White: Our evaluation was that the operation had a fair chance of success based on (1) the mission and (2) the intelligence, which indicated that popular uprisings were likely. The next point that weighed heavily in my mind was the probability that this force could escape into the hills to the northwest of the search area and join with guerrillas there if they were unable to enlarge the beachhead. The third point was the importance of surprise, particularly in the air part of the picture. The Zapata plan was briefed at a JCS meeting. I was not there. Curt LeMay was, however, and he filled me in on the three alternatives; and the fact that the Chiefs thought that the Trinidad operation was still the best, but that of the three alternatives presented, Zapata was probably the best.

Question: As you learned more about the Zapata plan, did you ever make an appraisal in your own mind as to the probability of success?

General White: I felt all along that the success or failure of this operation depended almost entirely upon the reaction of the Cuban people. If we were able to establish and enlarge the beachhead somewhat, plus other subsidiary operations, if we did these things, the Cuban people would join in.

Question: Describe your recollection of the beachhead plan. How did you visualize that this force would behave when they got ashore?

General White: Well, the number one thing that I felt was vital was surprise air attacks on the several air fields. While I donʼt have a high regard for the Cuban air force, certainly it is a prerequisite for going ashore that you have air control, and I think the air strikes were the key to it and surprise was the key to the key so to speak. It seemed to me that if the location and timing of the attack were not known, that they would have a very good chance of establishing at least sufficient lodgment to be able to escape without disaster.

Question: Assuming the air strikes?

General White: Yes, and that the air strikes were achieved with surprise.

Question: When the Joint Chiefs commented on Trinidad and as Zapata initially developed to have the only strikes on D Day, did that appear adequate to knock out the Castro force?

General White: It was felt that heavy surprise attack, and if I could have only had one, I would have picked the one on D Day rather than one earlier, for two reasons: (1) I think the early one may have tipped off that this thing was coming, (2) I remember mentioning down there that I was a little bit worried about the relationship between Cuba and Guatemala because it would be obvious that the aircraft were coming from there, and I wasnʼt quite sure what the situation would be. At another point I thought that if we did do the pre-D Day strikes, there was a pretty good chance that world reaction would be such that the thing would be called off, and I had been keen on the United States seeking the initiative in some areas, and I thought that on balance this was a feasible show and I wanted to see it go on.

Question: How did you feel about the final limited plan of eight sorties against the air fields?

General White: In my opinion, it was fatally weak.

Question: Would it have been better not to have had them?

General White: I think the best operation would have been to launch as heavy a strike as we could on the air fields on the day of the attack.

Question: Who was the proponent of the D-2 strikes, Allen? I donʼt recall that point.

Mr. Dulles: I think that it was partly in our shop and partly with Mac Bundy, as I recall. The idea of the defections—this was one of the keys to the idea that the planes that were striking Cuban airfields were operating from Cuba.

Mr. Dulles: I canʼt say whether that limited strike concept was ever brought over here or not. I think it must have been known to General Gray, but I donʼt know whether it was discussed in the Joint Chiefs.

Admiral Burke: It was, but not before it was decided to do it. I think that this was done at the behest of State in order to get a Cuban defector ahead of time, so that it would be believed that Cubans were conducting the air strikes from Cuba.

Statement: Well, weʼll see what Grayʼs record shows on that.

Question: You thought that Zapata looked like a feasible plan?

General White: Yes. However, I felt it was inferior to the Trinidad plan.

Question: Did you feel that you had a reasonable understanding of what the plan amounted to by the time D Day approached?

General White: Yes, I had a reasonable understanding of the plan as it was supposed to go but didnʼt.

Question: Would you say you made a personal study of this, at least of the air elements?

General White: Yes, and I had action officers who were privileged with this information who worked very close with the Joint Staff and with CIA and on appropriate occasions they briefed me on what was going on in addition to the meetings we had formally in the JCS.

Question: Do you recall when you learned about this D-2 plan?

General White: No, I do not. I have no memory of any change. The D-1 strike and the D Day strikes were the ones that I was under the impression would go.

Question: I forgot the D-1 air strikes, Allen. That was discussed I know, but did that ever get going?

Mr. Dulles: Well, that was discussed, but it never went.

General White: May I say I remember very well the discussion of defectors. We got into it because we had the air defense force moving down to Homestead in Florida with its additional radar, and we wanted to get the defectors in and to be on guard in case the Cuban air force made a strike against Florida.

Question: You were in favor of this plan then?

General White: Yes, to the degree that it had a fair chance of success on the basis that the objective was to get a rallying of Cuban people.

Question: Did you make any distinction between Zapata and Trinidad?

General White: In my opinion the Trinidad operation was a better one, but once the decision was made to go into Zapata, we backed it.

Question: You wouldnʼt have backed it if you didnʼt think there would be a chance of success?

General White: I think it also had a fair chance of success, but I think the chances were better in the Trinidad operation.

Question: Viewing this from the point of view of the President, you, of course, felt that the JCS were the primary military advisors. He heard nothing from the Chiefs with regard to any infeasibility of this plan. Is it fair to say that the Chiefs would have volunteered their comment if they really thought that this thing was going badly?

General White: Without any question. The problem was that there were last minute changes of which we did not know.

Question: You refer to the last minute cancellation of the air strikes?

General White: Yes.

Statement: But that was just one factor.

General White: I think that was a very key factor, sir.

Statement: Well, in this operation, I think we would be convinced that the plan wouldnʼt have been any more successful if we had had the air strikes.

General White: Well, I really believe that the Cuban air force had a whale of an effect on the bad outcome. It is difficult to say what an air strike on D Day at dawn would have done, but it might very well have made the difference in my opinion.

Question: In the performance of the T-33s, were you surprised at how effective they were?

General White: I was surprised to find that they were armed.

Question: You did not consider that they were combat aircraft?

General White: We did not.

Question: Well, had you known they were armed?

General White: Well, there again you come back to how effective the air strikes would have been. I certainly would have wanted the T-33s to be one of the main targets of the strike force.

Question: Was it any surprise to you that these T-33s could take out the B-26s?

General White: No, there was no surprise about that. Thatʼs another thing, the B-26s were used as air cover over the beaches. The B-26 is a light bomber.

Statement: Yes, but you knew that was the case—that that was the only cover they would have on the beach.

General White: Yes, but they were supposed to have air strikes which would come first and the B-26s, as I understood it, would be used largely for ground support.

Question: You said that you would have recommended that the T-33s be knocked out?

General White: In planning these strikes for the three airfields, certainly I would have urged that we concentrate strikes on the fields that had the T-33s.

Question: Would you have made a recommendation that they be knocked out?

General White: We didnʼt know that they were armed.

Question: Based on the information you had, then you would never have recommended that they be knocked out?

General White: They would have been included in the over-all plan to knock out Castroʼs air force.

Statement: Yes, but they were on the field on D-2, but they didnʼt knock them out.

General White: Had we known that the T-33s were armed, we might well have highlighted the field where the T-33s were located.

Question: Did you think that the crews they had were sufficient in number? Did that concern you at all?

General White: I think the numbers were adequate. We sent an Air Force officer down as part of a team to make an evaluation. They made quite a complete report. The report was very favorable on the quality of the Cuban pilots.

Question: By the time D Day afternoon came, the crews were exhausted because they had to fly from Nicaragua to Cuba in a seven-hour trip.

Statement: This is a very important point. I think the record shows that they had 17 Cuban pilots and about six American pilots. Now, suppose they had knocked out Castroʼs aircraft and then provided air cover over the beach because the invasion force immediately attracted very heavy forces of the Castro ground units. As I picture it, this would have put a major strain on this little air force.

Admiral Burke: I think some of the pilotsʼ energy was dissipated in sitting up all night waiting to go and they didnʼt go, but this was just as bad as going.

Question: How many pilots would it take to keep two planes over the airfield during daylight?

General White: Do you want me to check it or give you an off-hand answer?

Question: Did that ever occur to you during this time?

General White: Perhaps not specifically, but Iʼm sure I evaluated it in my own mind and my people did.

Question: What was your concept of this plan? What was it intended to do, and how would they go about it?

General White: It was intended to make a lodgment and then fan out to gain as much of the beachhead as possible, expecting that there would be a great many of the guerrilla people and other defectors that would join in, and we had ammunition and equipment to give them as they came in to the fold.

Question: The guerrillas were to come in to the beach?

General White: Yes, wherever they could join in.

Question: Then they would just come down into that area where the landing took place?

General White: I understand that there were leaflets to be dropped and a general call for the people to rise against Castro.

Question: When was the uprising to take place?

General White: I think as soon as it could be generated.

Question: Was it to take place simultaneously or within a short period?

General White: Within a short period, I would say beginning with D Day it ought to snowball.

Question: How did you visualize any great number of these civilians coming in to the beachhead area with Castroʼs forces coming down the same route, in, behind, and along the lines of communication?

General White: I understand there were a good number of defectors who came over even under the circumstances.

Question: Did you think that this group of 1,200 people could hold this beachhead?

General White: There was a fair chance of holding the beachhead if the air was knocked out. We had also anticipated that there would be more uprisings throughout Cuba which would divert the Cuban armed forces elsewhere and they would not be able to concentrate on this one place.

Statement: Just so the record is complete, when we had a briefing from one of the pilots, we asked him about the T-33s and he said they werenʼt aware at the time of the problem or difficulty with the T-33s and they concentrated on the B-26s.

Question: The question of going guerrilla has come up. It was thought that if things went badly, these people could operate as guerrillas. How was this presented to the Joint Chiefs and how did they regard that alternative?

General White: On this particular operation, I cannot say. On the Trinidad operation, Iʼve a very clear memory.

Question: Would you say that the guerrilla phase was specifically studied by the Joint Chiefs?

General White: Only the fact that there were guerrillas in the area and that it was anticipated that the people would join with them.

Question: Was there any thought to evacuating by sea?

General White: Not until later in the game.

Question: How did the Joint Chiefs follow the course of the operation after D Day? Were you kept informed of what was going on?

General White: I was kept informed generally by my action officer.

Question: Did you have liaison with General Grayʼs office?

General White: Yes, sir.

Question: Were you aware of the criticality of the ammunition situation at the end of the second day?

General White: I had heard about it.

Question: But you didnʼt have any realization that the battle would be won or lost the night of D+1-D+2 unless they got ammunition?

General White: No. My impression is that in general we had very little knowledge of what was actually taking place at the beachhead.

Question: How would you define the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this operation?

General White: Number one, we were called on for our views; we gave them to the best of our ability; and once the decision was made to go into Zapata, we supported it any way we could.

Question: Would you say you had the responsibility to volunteer advice to the President and since he received no contrary advice he had a right to assume that all was well?

General White: Yes, except that a number of things took place that I did not know about. I knew nothing about the cancellation of the air strikes.

Question: I am going to ask the same question I asked General Shoup. Do you feel that the JCS studied this plan and gave it that cold hard look which they would have given it had it been their plan?

General White: Certainly they did with the Trinidad plan. I donʼt know about Zapata. I was not there when it was briefed. It was my understanding, however, that the basic over-all considerations were similar. I would say we did not make as detailed an evaluation of the alternatives as we did the Trinidad plan.

Question: Looking back on this thing now with the benefit of experience, how do you feel about the covert nature of the plan? Was it realistic to consider that this could be kept covert—by that I mean a plan that cannot be attributed plausibly to the United States?

General White: I am sure that we could not expect to train a very sizable group of people with aircraft in any part of the world, at least any populated part of the world, without the world knowing. So I am sure that the training base in Guatemala was well known to the Cubans. This is hearsay. I was told that somebody briefed many Latin American governments about this forthcoming operation to get their views and met with almost unanimous disapproval. Iʼd say this alone was enough for a tipoff.

Statement: I believe this was Mr. Berleʼs mission down south.

Question: Do you have any comment on a landing on a hostile shore which is covert?

General White: I donʼt object to the military doing covert things; in fact, this may be a wise way for the future on this sort of thing. But there are certain considerations; I donʼt believe you should have U.S. officers in uniform because this puts them into a different category and they take risks beyond those which are usually expected of them in peace time. As far as covert operations are concerned, I think probably they should be done under the aegis of some agency other than Defense.

Mr. Dulles: The question is, can there be a section in the Department of Defense that has been sheep-dipped or something. How are we going to do this in the future?

General White: I think there should be greater Department of Defense participation; in fact, I think perhaps the responsibility ought to be placed on military professionals, but I believe it still should be under the aegis of some other agency. I would not like to see this type of operation attributable to the Department of Defense.

Statement: It might have been done something like this. The CIA could have done everything up to and including recruiting, assembling, and putting them into a covert training area, and organizing the covert protection around it. Training at that point could have been turned over to the Department of Defense. Planning could have been turned over to the Department of Defense and the execution turned over to the Department of Defense.

General White: Thatʼs all right with me. However, I think that the cover should be with the CIA or some agency other than the DOD.

Mr. Dulles: When you get an operation this big, the cover blows off.

Question: What do you say about the quality of interdepartmental coordination on this plan?

General White: I think it could be improved very much. I donʼt know of a formalized body short of the NSC that takes a problem like this and integrates all the interested Government agencies into a planning group.

Statement: Itʼs been a problem for a long time.

General White: I think not only in this type of thing but in the cold war. After all, in hot war, weʼre certainly organized for it and we hope ready for it. Limited wars—weʼre organized for and we hope prepared for, but this kind of covert operation weʼre talking about now is part of the cold war. The cold war is on every day of our lives and I think we need a similar organization to fight the cold war.

Question: Have you spelled that out?

General White: OCB started this kind of a thing I believe, but it was always kind of loose. The organization we need is not only to oppose Soviet power, but to take the initiative.

Statement: I wish you would give us your thoughts at your leisure.

General White: My staff has prepared a study on this subject which I subscribe to.

General White: Almost every agency in the Government is involved in fighting this cold war.

Question: Are you suggesting that possibly the NSC framework is the place to hang this or are you talking about something separate?

General White: I think the NSC is too high level an organization. I donʼt think it should be an operating organization. I conceive this to be an operational group. They undoubtedly would have to report to the NSC or send it to the President.

Question: Would you give us your views on this thing?

General White: My views will be just what is contained in this study.

Question: Will you send us a copy of the study?

General White: Yes, sir.

Question: Will you go back to the operations for a minute? Do you think that in view of the circumstances, this was given sufficient time and attention by the Joint Staff?

General White: Yes, up to the word “go” but there were a lot of last minute changes.

Question: I understand that, but as of the 15th of March, the “go ahead” signal from a military point of view to the President and to those who were making the decisions was given. Thereafter, there were continuous meetings that took place and nobody came forward and said, this is going to be fatal; we shouldnʼt go ahead. Really considerable support developed from individual members and from the Chairman. The President understood that it was supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In view of all this, do you feel it was given sufficient time and attention by you as an individual and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General White: I will make the single point that General Shoup made. I think there were times when the Chairman was consulted and although he has been extraordinarily conscientious to keep us informed, I think that things took place at levels above the Joint Chiefs of Staff about which we were not fully informed. On those things which we had cognizance of, I believe the Joint Chiefs accomplished their task.

Mr. Kennedy: For instance, as I look at the records, I see that the original Zapata plan plus the alternatives were considered by the JCS for twenty minutes.

General White: I canʼt tell you the times because I wasnʼt there, but I believe by virtue of the study that was made on the Trinidad plan, that it was fairly easy to have a good look at the Zapata plan and come up with a statement that the Trinidad plan was still the best, but that of the three alternatives Zapata was the best.

Question: Then your answer is that you feel that you gave sufficient time, opinion and study.

General White: On an over-all basis, yes, sir.

211. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Posts in Latin AmericaSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-861. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drated by Achilles and W.G. Bowdler of ARA/RPA. Cleared in L by Chayes and Whiteman and by Bowles and in substance by Rusk. Also cleared in Defense by General Polk, and in the White House by Goodwin and in substance by President Kennedy. Repeated to Rusk at Oslo as Tosec 19, to USUN for Stevenson, and to the Consulate at Cuidad Trujillo. Washington, May 8, 1961, 10:52 p.m.

1755. Depcirtel 1661.Document 171. Under Presidentʼs guidance highest officials this Government in past few days have been carefully and deliberately reviewing problems posed by Castro regime.

We have concluded that its complete subservience to Sino-Soviet bloc as evidenced by repeated statements of regime itself culminating in May 1st statement,See Document 189. complete crushing freedom in all aspects of Cuban life, including refusal to permit self-determination through free elections and hundreds of executions without trial, and presence of massive quantities of bloc armaments, leave no doubt that regime has become base in this Hemisphere for extracontinental power and constitutes threat to peace and security of Americas. There is no question of bilateral dispute between Cuba and U.S. U.S. has on contrary shown long restraint but considers that threat to Hemisphere as whole must be reduced and eventually removed. We believe that this requires recognition by all governments in Hemisphere of the danger and appropriate action to reduce and eventually eliminate danger.

While we do not wish to miss currently favorable psychology in Latin America, neither do we wish to give appearance of rash or precipitate action. We also realize differences in situations in each country and wish to leave you maximum discretion in carrying out following instructions. We recognize that governments will require time to consider action proposed and have no thought of requesting meeting of consultation unless assured that sizable majority are agreed upon program of this nature.

Decision has been made to seek as promptly as possible inter-American program to condemn, isolate, and weaken Castro regime and assist other governments to counter its subversive activities. Take earliest occasion to present orally to President or Foreign Minister, pursuant to helpful consultation recently held in your capital and Washington, outline of action set forth below which USG believes Organ of Consultation should adopt as resolution in response threat posed by Castro regime as clearly demonstrated in recent events, particularly continued intervention Sino-Soviet bloc through Cuba in hemispheric affairs and proclamation by Castro placing Cuba clearly in Sino-Soviet bloc.

1. Finding that: a) International communist movement has come to dominate the political institutions of Cuba, extending to this hemisphere the political system of the Sino-Soviet bloc. b) Government of Cuba has surrendered Cuban independence to extracontinental powers of Sino-Soviet bloc. c) Government of Cuba has been carrying on interventionist and subversive activities against other states of hemisphere and has attempted to destroy integrity of inter-American system. d) Foregoing constitutes type of situation denounced by American States in Resolution 93 of Tenth Inter-American ConferenceResolution 93 of the Tenth Inter-American Conference is also known as the Declaration of Caracas of 1954; see footnote 4, Document 202. and Declaration of San Jose.See footnote 6, Document 202. e) Within meaning of Article 6 of Rio TreatyArticle 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, provides that if the inviolability or the integrity of any American state is affected by an aggression that is not an armed attack, or by a situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation will meet immediately to agree on necessary measures to assist the victim of aggression, or to maintain the peace and security of the continent. (A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, p. 228) this constitutes aggression which is not armed attack and a situation endangering peace of America. f) Government of Cuba has violated principles of representative democracy set forth in OAS CharterFor text, see ibid., pp. 230-242. and Declaration of SantiagoSee footnote 5, Document 202. and deprived Cuban people of these rights, creating situation which seriously aggravates international tensions and has become danger to peaceful relationships in hemisphere. g) Foregoing shows that Cuban Government has violated its basic obligations under OAS Charter and deprived Cuban state of its place as respected member of OAS. 2. Condemn Cuban Government for its acts of intervention and subversion against other American states, attempts to destroy integrity of inter-American system and imposition upon Cuban people of a total-itarian regime subservient to extracontinental powers and alien ideologies. 3. Apply following measures to Cuba pursuant to Article 8 of Rio Treaty:See footnote 7, Document 202. a) Breaking of diplomatic and consular relations; b) Suspension of economic relations, including trade in all items except medical supplies. 4. Establish joint naval-air patrol of Caribbean area for surveillance purposes designed to help identify shipments of arms and personnel from Cuba to other countries for support of subversive activities and insurrectionary movements, and assist affected states in preventing such intervention in their territory. COAS, with the advice of Inter-American Defense Board, to prepare immediate plan for organization and coordination of this patrol for implementation by governments. 5. Charge COAS with immediate establishment of an ad hoc committee, composed of representatives of 5 to 7 governments to observe carrying out of measures specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, to assist governments in this connection, to observe development of situation in Cuba, and to keep Council appropriately informed. 6. Establish Committee for Defense of Freedom (in tradition of Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense) to identify techniques used by Castro-communist movement to undermine and destroy principles of inter-American system, to expose such techniques to governments and peoples of American states, and to devise and recommend methods required to counteract them.

You should endeavor find out how much of foregoing action program government to which you are accredited is prepared to support. You should also estimate or discreetly ascertain what would be governmentʼs attitude toward proposing or attending meeting Foreign Ministers to which Cuba and/or Dominican Republic would not be invited. If your government is one which still maintains diplomatic and consular relations with Castro regime and you believe there is any possibility of government severing these relations, in your discretion you should urge that it do so at early opportunity. Castro May 1 address identifying Cuba as part of Sino-Soviet system and dismissing any intention of holding elections appears offer ample justification.

Report reactions promptly.

Department informing Washington and OAS Ambassadors.

For Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, Santiago, La Paz, Quito. Recognizing delicacy of making approach of this nature to government to which you accredited, you should use your discretion in what sections to emphasize, bearing in mind government will know we are consulting all American governments. Advise Dept. of your handling this matter.

Trip mentioned Depcirtel 1735Dated May 5. (Department of State, Central Files, 120.1520/5-561) would be related to situation at time trip made.

Bowles

212. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Secretaryʼs Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Confidential. Drafted by R. N. Magill and approved in S on May 13. The conversation took place at the U.S. Delegation Office. Oslo, May 9, 1961, 2:45 p.m.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

Oslo, May 8-10, 1961

PARTICIPANTS United States The Secretary of State Mr. Kohler Mr. Steeves Mr. Magill Canada The Honorable Howard C. Green, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Mr. G. Ignatieff, Assistant Under Secretary for External Affairs Mr. R. Campbell Mr. J.J. McCardle SUBJECT Cuba

The Secretary said the U.S. had taken the initiative three times recently in attempting negotiations with Cuba, but had been rebuffed each time. He asserted that the U.S. nevertheless remained prepared to negotiate with Cuba on any issue except that of Cubaʼs Sino-Soviet ties, which was not negotiable from the U.S. viewpoint. He cited as one aspect of these ties that there were over 2,000 Soviet and Chinese Communist technicians in Cuba. The Secretary said that the U.S. must work for the downfall of the Castro regime so long as this situation obtains. This objective is in line with traditional U.S. policy based on the Monroe Doctrine and it is also inter-American policy. The U.S. takes this policy very seriously.

Mr. Green observed that last summer Canada had explored the possibility of joining with Mexico and Brazil in an effort to resolve the Cuban problem, but that this had not succeeded. He had the impression that the U.S. did not want outside intervention. The Secretary said that twice last year the U.S. had tried to have the Cuban problem taken up in the Peace Committee of the OAS but that Cuba had spurned these efforts. He expressed the hope that Canada would inform the U.S. if it saw any indications of a possibility of severing Cubaʼs Sino-Soviet ties. Mr. Green said that Canada was not close enough to the Cuban situation to be likely to know of such possibilities if they should develop.

The Secretary emphasized that the U.S. concern regarding Cuba did not arise from Cuban expropriation of U.S. properties. Mr. Green said that if the U.S. intervened directly in Cuba, it would stir up a hornetʼs nest in Latin America and the U.N. and would not settle the problem in the long run. He said that last yearʼs rumors of U.S. intervention had greatly disturbed the Canadians despite the fact that they were more removed from the problem. The Secretary said he could understand some differences in attitude between the U.S. and Canada on Cuba. Canada was more remote geographically, and the U.S. lay between Canada and Cuba. Furthermore, Canada did not have the tradition of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Green said that the Canadian Government was giving serious consideration to the possibility of joining the OAS. However, he had the impression that drastic actions seem to push the Cubans further into the arms of the Communists.

The Secretary said that by January 20 of this year the course had already been set by the U.S. in its handling of the Cuban situation. Mr. Green asked whether U.S. possession of Guantanamo Base strengthened the U.S. position. The Secretary said that if the Cubans attacked Guantanamo Base, supported aggression against other countries in the area, or accepted Soviet missile bases, the U.S. would be faced with a very difficult decision regarding counter action. Mr. Green surmised that such Cuban action would provide the U.S. with a basis for direct intervention. The Secretary said he could not prejudge U.S. action in such circumstances, but it was quite clear that the U.S. could not tolerate having the Soviets operating through a Cuban “cut-out.” Mr. Green said he thought the U.S. had been right in deciding not to use its armed forces against Castro.

Mr. Green said if there was any way in which the U.S. thought Canada might be able to help, he hoped that the U.S. would let Canada know. The Secretary suggested that one possibility for such help might be the need for arranging a rescue service through the International Red Cross. He thought Canada might be able to help with the Europeans in working this out.

Mr. Green asked what in the Secretaryʼs view would be a liquidation of Cubaʼs ties with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The Secretary said Cuba would have to send the Communist technicians home and realign itself with the OAS. Mr. Green said that it was very important that the U.S. should move with the Latin American countries on Cuba. The Secretary observed that covert Latin American support was much stronger than the overt posture because of Communist penetration in many Latin American countries. The Governments of these countries were worried and inhibited by the attitudes of their own people. The U.S. has been moving with the Latin American states although the latter have not been able to say so publicly.

213. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to CGUSCONARC, Ft Monroe, Virginia, and TAC, Langley AFB, Virginia. Washington, May 9, 1961, 12:28 p.m.

JCS 995627. Exclusive for Adm Dennison, Gen Powell, Gen Everest. Subject is Guidance for Development of Operations Plan on Cuba.

1. Submit to the JCS for approval a plan for military assault of Cuba. The plan must: a. Assure overthrow of the Castro government in minimum time. b. Assure necessary control of Cuba following overthrow of Castro government. c. Assure continuous control of the US base at Guantanamo. d. Provide the capability of initiating the assault without prior warning and within five days after the order to execute. e. Be capable of execution at any time during a prolonged period after required forces and equipment are positioned. 2. Forces and equipment will be tailored as necessary to accomplish the plan, and may be repositioned as required. 3. Following Forces may be considered available for planning purposes: a. Army XVIII Airborne Corps Hdqtrs 82nd Airborne Division 101st Airborne Division 3rd Armored Cavalry Regt 4th/68 Tank Bn 2nd Infantry Brig 4 Helicopter Companies 1 Inf Battle Group (-) for helicopter operations Special Forces b. Navy Striking and Covering Forces Combatant Air and Naval Elements as required Underway replenishment group Amphibious Task Force Landing Force II MEF Headquarters, II MEF 2nd Marine Division (-) 2nd Marine Air Wing (-) Force Troops Atlantic c. Air Force 1 Command Hdqtrs Troop Carrier/MATS Wings as required (Reserve units with quick reaction time may be used) 4 Tactical Fighter Wings 2-1/3 Recon Squadrons 1 TAC Control System (Reduced) Aerial Refueling as required d. CIA Force Atlantic e. Special Operations Task Force Atlantic f. On Call Forces (1) Naval: Uncommitted Forces US Atlantic Fleet Amphibious ships and Marine Forces as required, Pacific Command (2)

Army: 4th Infantry Division

CCA, 1st Armored Division

Air and Surface Lift

MATS and MSTS provide air and surface lift as directed by the JCS.

4. Submit initially, on a priority basis, an outline plan and a concept of operations. Include estimate of time required to accomplish 1 a and b above. Concurrently submit requirements for: a. Total forces and equipment. b. Repositioning and/or prepositioning of forces and equipment necessary to obtain required state of readiness. Include estimate of time required to accomplish these actions. 5. Any recommendation you may have as to an alternate solution which will enhance the feasibility of the plan together with its impact on reaction time and total forces required is invited. 6. This guidance should not be interpreted as an indication that US military action against Cuba is probable.

214. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 3, Vol. IV (6). Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, May 9, 1961. SUBJECT Meeting with the DD/P re Cuban Operations PARTICIPANTS Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.—DD/P Mr. C. Tracy Barnes—A/DDP/A Col. J. C. King—C/WHD [name not declassified]—AC/WH/4 Mr. G. Droller—C/WH/4 [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] [name not declassified] 1. Mr. Bissell stated that the President is anxious that family allotments to strike force dependents should continue and that they should not be halted without first consulting with the President. Mr. Bissell said the payments must continue through June at which time we should make appropriate recommendations as to their continuation. He said the concept we used would call for continuation in case of families of prisoners. It is understood that the allotments to families of returnees would be paid through May. It was agreed that the 170 recruits who had never left the country and who were now clamoring for their “bonus” should be paid the “across the board” bonus of $250 inasmuch as most of them had given up their jobs to join the brigade. 2. Mr. Bissell then stated that there has been a round of policymaking sessions—externally with NSC and Mr. Goodwin of the White House—and internally. He said that there is an urgent need to decide what we are going to do next—what people and facilities we are going to use. He asked if there was general agreement (there was) that we start building up our internal assets—FI first; plus planning and carrying out sabotage operations which would call for the use of a minimum number of people; that we should start commo training promptly; also think of training programs for resistance and underground types. He said he had read the papersNot found. prepared by Messrs. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and had found them of interest, but he agreed with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] comment that it was perhaps too elaborate a plan for current policy restrictions and the idea of setting up another headquarters of “agency” in Miami was not practical. Mr. Bissell commissioned [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], with the assist-ance of Mr. Reichhardt, to come up within a weekʼs time, if possible, with an outline proposal for covert action. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] suggested that the best place to start would be with the old operational plan which could be reviewed, updated and “sprinkled with the experience” which we have gained to date. Mr. Barnes promised to provide a copy of a paperNot found. which was recently prepared on this subject. Mr. Barnes, in response to a statement by Mr. Droller that he understood from Dr. Miro that the President was opposed to sabotage operations, said that the White House is expecting a paper from us as to what we propose to do—recommendations for action, unilateral or otherwise, and on the basis of this we could expect to get some policy approval. That sabotage is still open whenever it seems appropriate. Mr. Bissell said we will want to take the paper to the President and also to State and Defense. We will also need the operational outline for our own internal purposes. He asked if there was general agreement to this approach and Col. King said he would like to see included in the plan the use of B-26 aircraft against refineries and other targets but that we could leave the timing open. 3. Mr. Bissell then discussed our position vis-a-vis Dr. Miro and the Revolutionary Council. He said we need a clear affirmation of policy position re relations with the Cubans. He said we are looking to Dr. Miro as the senior official of the opposition and that we must not deal with independent groups without Miroʼs approval. He felt it was important that the Council be strengthened and proposed that Mr. Droller see Dr. Miro to discuss with him the opening of appropriate offices, acquiring a small staff, taking over the welfare and perhaps other functions of the FRD, etc. He said either he or Mr. Barnes would try to check this out first with Mr. Berle but nonetheless Mr. Droller should proceed to make this contact. Mr. Barnes said we would have to come up with our recommendations for Mr. Goodwin re our contacts with the Council. He said that it was not practicable for State to try to handle the day to day problems. Mr. Barnes asked Mr. Droller to work with him on preparation of our recommendations for Mr. Goodwin. He remarked that Mr. Goodwin had suggested that we might lend State an Agency man who could handle the Council for State. Mr. Bissell said it is important that we draw lines as to when they go to State and when they come to us. Mr. Droller presented his ideas with respect to creating a Cuban operations panel. 4.

The question of supporting operations proposed by Manuel Ray was discussed. All agreed that we should have no dealings with Ray or any other independent group unless it has the approval of Dr. Miro. Mr. Bissell said that we should be prepared to work with Ray or any other group, provided Miro agrees, with these provisos: A. They have the necessary assets. B. They employ secure commo. C. They keep us informed of what they are doing.

Mr. Barnes said that Mr. Ray had indicated a willingness to carry out his activities under the aegis of the Council although he naturally will not want to identify precisely his assets, etc. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said the problem might be simplified if Dr. Miro would re-affirm Mr. Ray as “minister in charge of clandestine activities” or some such designation. Mr. Bissell questioned whether Ray would be able to pull all the groups together in view of his somewhat controversial position. At any rate it was agreed that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] should meet with Ray for the purpose of drawing up a prospectus. Once this has been done and we have had an opportunity to study it, etc., and if we decided to support it, we would then see that Dr. Miro was apprised of the plan and we would not go ahead with it unless and until he gave it his approval.

5. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] brought up the problems created for the Branch by the multitudinous requests received from Congressmen, newspaper people, etc., for information and briefings, etc., and wondered if a good part of this couldnʼt be diverted to the State Department so that this pressure could be taken off the Branch. Mr. Bissell agreed that something must be done to relieve the Branch of this burden and maybe the flow could be diverted to State or some of it to the Council office once it is established. [name not declassified]

215. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All PostsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-1061. Secret. Drafted in ARA by F.J. Devine. Cleared in ARA, AF, FE, EUR,NEA, L, USIA, and the White House. Approved for transmission by Achilles. Also sent to the Consulates in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Ciudad Trujillo, and repeated to all other consular posts, and to Bangui, Ouagadougou, and Fort Lamy. Libreville, Niamey, and Cotonou were excluded from the list of recipient posts. Washington, May 10, 1961, 5:31 p.m.

1763. USG following closely all developments fast-moving Cuban situation and has had under continuous study determination this countryʼs policy and posture. Special importance attached Castroʼs May Day declarationSee Document 189. Cuba now “socialist” republic without further need electoral process which clearly indicates full extent to which Castro regime has taken Cuban people down road toward totalitarianism and full membership Sino-Soviet Bloc.

US has been consulting Latin American Governments with respect their reactions and attitudes toward Cuban developments. Although impossible predict this juncture exact course inter-American action likely, US firmly believes time now at hand when OAS members must be asked face up serious problem represented by Sino-Soviet penetration this hemisphere through domination Castro regime and need for clarification and modernization of existing interpretations and applications doctrine non-intervention with reference to legitimate self-defense. Accordingly we are consulting all other OAS members except Cuba and Dominican Republic regarding collective action designed to isolate the Castro regime.

US posts throughout rest of world should give priority to enhancing awareness and full understanding by government officials, public media and all other key target groups of true nature Castro regime, including threat posed for LA by Cuban arms build-up, announced intention to spread revolution and repressive domestic actions against Cubans. You should emphasize theme that suppression of liberty within Cuba has now been confirmed and compounded by Castroʼs rejection any prospects free elections and that sovereign will Cuban people clearly no longer has opportunity for expression. Penetration by Sino-Soviet Bloc in Western Hemisphere is not accomplished fact and members inter-American community have no choice but recognize this and speedily adopt those counter measures mutually agreed to be warranted.

At same time as efforts isolate Castro and as long-range policy far more important, US energetically pushing “Alliance for Progress” program intended to advance social and economic progress in Latin America and thereby contribute correction and elimination fundamental causes social and political unrest. Inter-American meeting for that purpose being called for July 15. It is essential that world opinion recognize and appreciate true US objectives and you should make them clear on every appropriate occasion. Informational material will be supplied by Department on a regular and continuing basis for this purpose.

As inter-American measures are taken, all posts have a responsibility to present them in proper perspective. Significant foreign reactions should be reported promptly.In circular telegram 1764, sent out at the same time to the same posts, the Department provided information on the “repressive inhuman conditions” being imposed on the Cuban people by the “Communist-dominated regime” of Fidel Castro. The country teams receiving this information were instructed to employ their full assets to impress on their host governments the true nature of the Castro government. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-1061)

Bowles

216. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/61. Confidential. Washington, May 13, 1961. SUBJECT Application of the Battle ActThe Battle Act was the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951. (65 Stat. 644) to Cuba

The Problem

The possible invocation of the Trading With the Enemy Act,See Document 12. and other actions under consideration with respect to Cuba raises the question of whether the United States should also invoke the Battle Act.

The terms of the Battle Act provide that it shall be applied with respect to any “nation—threatening the security of the United States, including the USSR and all countries under its domination”. Notwithstanding the large extent to which Cuba appears in fact to be dominated by the USSR, no finding to this effect has yet been made by the Battle Act Administrator (the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs). Such a finding is required in order to bring its provisions into effect with regard to Cuba.

Actions Required Under the Battle Act

The application of the Act would require that we approach foreign aid recipient countries to inform them of the inclusion of Cuba within the Act and to request their cooperation in extending an embargo on shipments of arms and strategic materials to Cuba. It would then be mandatory (except where you wished to exercise your discretionary power or in cases where the Act is waived under Section 451 of the Mutual Security ActMutual Security Act of 1954. (68 Stat. 832, et seq.)) that all foreign aid must be cut off from any country which knowingly fails to cooperate. Of the strategic Battle Act items only quartz crystals from Brazil and borax from Argentina and Chile are produced in Latin America. Neither of those is consumed by Cuba in significant amounts. The Act would have a minimal economic effect on Cuba because that countryʼs demand for strategic items (except for arms which it is now receiving from the Bloc) is very limited.

The Alternatives

Although the effect of application of the Battle Act on Cuba may be minimal, the logic of our other actions and public and Congressional pressures may lead us eventually to invoke the Act. The immediate question is whether we should act now or whether we should delay until a multilateral framework has been established within which this action can take place.

In support of immediate invocation of the Battle Act are the following points: (1) Castro has openly declared his allegiance to the Sino-Soviet Bloc and this action would therefore be logical and generally approved by public and Congressional opinion in the United States. (2) It will probably become increasingly difficult to explain to Congress our failure to invoke this Act, particularly should we invoke the Trading With the Enemy Act.

In support of delay in the invocation of this Act are the following points: (1) Because of the requirement that the United States seek cooperation from aid recipient nations (which might be interpreted as requiring of them a similar policy judgment with regard to Cuba), its immediate application would probably cause some unfavorable response, particularly in Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, Chile and Bolivia. (2) Any harmful effect on Latin American countries would be mitigated if invocation of the Battle Act was part of a multilaterally agreed program on a Hemisphere basis to deal with the Cuban problem. (3) It is probable that certain of the COCOM countries which might occasionally be sources of Battle Act items for Cuba would be much more ready to cooperate if this Act had the apparent support of a majority of the Latin American countries.

Legal Situation

The Executive has a considerable degree of flexibility as to any finding that Cuba is “Soviet-dominated” for the purposes of the Act. Moreover a finding that Cuba is “Soviet-dominated” for the purpose of one Act does not require that it be found “Soviet-dominated” for the purpose of all other Acts. For example, while Poland is considered as a “Soviet-dominated” country for the purpose of the Battle Act, it is not considered “Soviet-dominated” for the purposes of Public Law 480P.L. 480 is the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. (68 Stat. 454, et seq.) or Section 5 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951,65 Stat. 72. even though these latter two Acts use similar language.

Should the Trading With the Enemy Act be invoked against Cuba, there is no legal requirement that the Battle Act must also be invoked.

Recommendations:

1. Because of our commitment to the multilateral approach with regard to Cuba and our interest in making every effort to insure its success, I propose that any finding that the Act is applicable to Cuba be delayed until the chances of obtaining multilateral agreements or actions by the OAS with regard to Cuba have been fully explored. 2. I propose also that we immediately begin discussing with our NATO allies and bilaterally with Japan and other interested countries the probability of this eventual action. Chester BowlesPrinted from a copy that indicates Bowles signed the original.

217. Editorial Note

On May 16, 1961, Brazilian Finance Minister Clemente Mariani called on President Kennedy to express appreciation for U.S. financial assistance to Brazil. During the conversation, President Kennedy stressed the importance of inter-American isolation of Castro, whom he called “for all practical purposes an agent of international communism,” and he pointed out the difficulty of agreement when President Quadros asserted a “strongly divergent view.” After Mariani noted that Quadros had been moving away from his previous position in favor of Castro, he promised to report fully on the conversation to Quadros. The memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Presidentʼs Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. It is printed in full in volume XII, pages 435–436.

218. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Paramilitary Study Group Correspondence. Secret. This record of the meeting is marked as a draft, which apparently means that it was not subsequently cleared with the White House. There is no drafting information to indicate who drafted the memorandum, but internal evidence suggests that it was drafted by General Taylor. Washington, May 16, 1961. SUBJECT Meeting with President on May 16, 1961 PRESENT President Kennedy General Taylor Attorney General Kennedy Admiral Burke Mr. Allen Dulles

The Cuba Study Group met at luncheon with the President to give orally an interim report on their conclusions to date. In the course of the conversation the following points were developed.

There was no formal governmental review after March, 1960 of the necessity for a paramilitary operation to replace the Castro government. Although the President had many doubts with regard to such an operation, the pressure for an affirmative decision arising from the need to use the Cuban Brigade quickly or disband it was a strong factor in causing an affirmative decision. In the Presidentʼs mind there was reasonable hope for a popular uprising following a successful landing as well as the possibility of setting up a free Cuban government in the beachhead after it had been firmly secured.

The President was always reassured by the assumption that the Cuban Brigade in an emergency could pass to a guerrilla status. There was a breakdown in communications some place between the training base in Guatemala and the senior officials in Washington which occasioned the misunderstanding of the feasibility of exercising the guerrilla option.

It was clear to the President that the Trinidad Plan had military advantages over Zapata. However, the choice of the latter overcame many of the political objections raised against Trinidad.

With regard to the cancellation of the D-Day strikes, the President is inclined to think that a special NSC Meeting should have been called to deal with this important matter. However, the CIA officials in charge of the operation did not speak to him directly with regard to the critical nature of the cancellation.

The President was aware of the serious shortage of ammunition in the beachhead at the end of D+1. However, he was never approached for authority to extend the Navy air cover over the ammunition convoy in its movement to Blue Beach.

In connection with paragraph 14 of the Committeeʼs paper “Study of the Anti-Castro Invasion Zapata” dated 11 May 1961,Admiral Burkeʼs copy of this paper, which was an initial version of the final report submitted to the President in June (see Document 230), is in Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. the Chart and paper entitled “A Mechanism for the Planning and Coordination of Cold War Strategy” were discussed. The President encouraged the Group to develop this organizational concept in greater detail for inclusion in their final report. The latter is to be oral, supported by a written memorandum. It was agreed that this final report and the supporting memorandum would not go beyond the President, but the possibility was left open of some sanitized document to set right the past misstatements of the press.

There was some discussion of the desirability of changing the name of CIA in order to reduce its visibility. Mr. Dulles undertook to study the matter and see if he could make a recommendation.

219. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Top Secret; Hold Closely. Prepared by Admiral Burke. Washington, May 16, 1961. SUBJECT Debrief of Luncheon conversation with the President, 16 May 1961 1. I attended a luncheon with the President, in company with General Taylor, Mr. Allen Dulles and Mr. Robert Kennedy. 2. General Taylor presented a question paper entitled “Topics for Tuesday”, copy enclosed.Not found. 3. The Presidentʼs answers to the questions in general were as follows: a.

Question 1. Was there any doubt about the necessity of some such military action against Castro?

He had some doubt about the necessity for military action against Castro and so did some people in State, but there were pressures such as what to do with the forces being trained, the rainy season coming up and the conduct of covert actions in the atmosphere at the time, that led the President to believe that Castro should be overthrown. It was much better, for example, to put the guerrillas on the beach in Cuba and let them fight for Cuba than bring them back to the United States and have them state that the United States would not support their activities. The end result might have been much worse had we done this than it actually was.

Question 2. What was the estimate of the probability of success of Zapata before D-Day?

It was thought that the possibility of some success of the Zapata Plan was fairly good, since if they could not establish a beachhead and hold it, they could go into guerrillas. This was probably the biggest error, as it turned out, but it was thought that they could hold the beachhead for some time and that a Cuban Government could be established on the beachhead which perhaps could be recognized later. He realized that not knocking out the Cuban air precluded this as it turned out.

Question 3. What was the feeling of likelihood of a popular uprising following the landing? How essential was such an uprising regarded for the success of the operation? How rapid a reaction was expected by Castro?

He felt that there was a good chance for a popular uprising following the landing but that the beachhead was not held long enough to permit a popular uprising. Although an uprising would be necessary for the overthrow of Castro, if there was no general uprising the members in the landing party could become guerrillas and they would do more good as guerrillas than they would outside of Cuba. This also answered question 4 which was “What was expected to happen if the landing force effected a successful lodgment but there was no uprising?”

Question 5. What was the understanding of the position of the JCS as to Zapata? Was it appreciated that they favored Trinidad over Zapata? What did the President expect from the Chiefs?

The President understood that the JCS preferred the Trinidad Plan to the Zapata Plan from the military point of view. However, policy implications were overriding in that it would be quite evident in the Trinidad operation that it was a United States operation since control of the air would be required, which could be accomplished only with the assistance of the United States. He thought that the Chiefs could very well have stated that if the Zapata Plan was adopted and there was not absolute control of the air, that it would fail. He felt that this could have been more forcibly said than it was.

Question 6. Was it understood that control of the air was considered essential to the success of the landing?

He did understand that control of the air was important but he did not believe it to be absolutely essential. If he had, then he would have launched the D-Day strikes.

Question 7. What were the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-Day air strikes? How serious was the decision viewed? What was the understanding about pre-landing strikes?

Mr. Rusk had talked with the President in regard to the D-Day strikes and in connection with the activities in the United Nations and the strong recommendations of Mr. Stevenson. He felt, in retrospect, that the decision to cancel the strikes should probably not have been made, but he felt that the case for making the strikes was perhaps not recommended forcibly enough, although he understood why General Cabell would not want to dispute the Secretary of State after the President had made a tentative decision. He was very open minded on this and very fair.

Question 8. What was the understanding as to the ability of the landing force to pass to a guerrilla status in an emergency? To what extent did this factor influence approval of the operations?

He certainly had understood that the landing force could pass to guerrilla status and it greatly influenced his thinking of the whole operation.

Question 9. What was the understanding of the ammunition situation by the end of April 18?

He realized that there was a shortage of ammunition on the 18th of April, but just how acute it was, of course, he did not know. He realized that there was a long delay in communications and that the situation was never clear here as to exactly what was happening. Things were ordered done and it took a long time to find out that they were actually done or whether they were modified.

Question 10. What degree of non-attribution was sought and why? Were the operational disadvantages arising from some of the restrictions imposed by the efforts to achieve non-attribution clearly presented and understood?

Before the operation there was every effort made to keep the situation covert, with no attribution being possible for United States forces. The second part of the question I donʼt think he answered nor did he answer the rest of the questions because the conversation turned to the proposal of General Taylor on the establishment of a Cold War Chairman working group.

[Here follows discussion of the broader implications of organizing paramilitary operations.]

220. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defenseʼs Special Assistant (Yarmolinsky) to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Confidential. Washington, May 18, 1961. SUBJECT Memorandum of Conversation

A meeting was called today at 11:00 A.M. by Mr. Richard Goodwin to consider the status of the Cuban exiles program now being developed. The following were present: Mr. Richard Goodwin, Mr. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., from the White House; Dr. Arturo Morales, Liaison Officer for State with the Cuban Revolutionary Council, Mr. Leon Uhlman from Attorney Generalʼs Office, Commissioner of Social Security, Mr. William Mitchell, from HEW; Mr. James M. Quigley from the Office of Education and Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky and Mr. Maurice Mountain from Defense.

Mr. Goodwin said there were three problems to be considered; first, the general program for exiles; second, relations with the Revolutionary Council and third, what sort of support might be given to any possible covert activities of the exile group. Only the first two items, however, were discussed.

For the time being, Mr. Goodwin says, we are to deal only with the present Revolutionary Council and on an open basis, both because it will simplify our relations with the exiles and because it may have the effect of keeping them somewhat unified. This means we are to work with Miro Cardona and consult with him and his associates before taking any measures affecting the exiles. In this connection the primacy of the Department of State is to be recognized, with Dr. Morales the individual at State through whom we should work. There is no intention of having Dr. Morales handle all details, but it is desired that he be kept informed and his concurrence obtained on any significant actions.

The program outlined by HEW is one of relief and resettlement with language training to be added. It was indicated that funds could be made available either through the foreign aid bill or the HEW budget. A decision on this, Mr. Goodwin indicated, would be reached within a week.

Mr. Quigley reported an estimated cost of $400 to $600.00 per trainee for 8 weeks of intensive English language training. Mr. Mitchell said that any needed subsistence support of the trainees could be tied in with HEWʼs cash assistance program. Although no specific location was determined for conducting such training there were some expressions of disapproval of the idea of using vacant Army facilities. Mr. Mitchell, in particular, stressed the general objection to anything resembling a concentration camp.

In general the Defense presentation indicated that other than for language training and some questions on security which are yet to be resolved there appear to be no obstacles to carrying out a program of accepting volunteers in the armed services.In a note to Yarmolinsky on May 26, General Lansdale warned that past experience indicated that the major obstacle to accepting foreign volunteers into the U.S. armed forces might be the minimum mental and physical qualifications established by the armed forces. (Ibid.)

Defense was asked to provide as expeditiously as possible authoritative information on the methods used and problems encountered in the language training of Puerto Rican volunteers at Fort Buchanan. This information is being obtained now.

Mr. Mountain of Defense will join Dr. Morales tomorrow when he meets with representatives from the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

221. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. No drafter is indicated on the source text, but it was probably Colonel Tarwater. The meeting was the 17th in the series conducted by the Cuba Study Group and was held at the Pentagon. The participants in the meeting included Taylor, Kennedy, Dulles, Burke, and General Lemnitzer. Notes on concluding testimony by two leaders of the Cuban exile community are not printed. A note on the source text reads: “The following notes are not a verbatim record, but represent the general substance of the statements made.” Washington, May 18, 1961.

General Lemnitzer

General Lemnitzer: The thing I would like to say at the very beginning is that I consider the JCS role was one of appraisal, evaluation, offering of constructive criticism, and assisting CIA in looking at the training and detailed plans. Defense participated in the role of support.

Question: What action was taken on the over-all U.S. plan of action for Cuba developed by the JCS in late January?

General Lemnitzer: Well, we prepared a plan of action for Cuba and forwarded it to the Secretary of Defense. Thereʼs some question of what happened to it up in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I did discuss it with Dean Rusk and Mr. Dulles at one of the high level Governmental meetings on the 22nd of January. Several attempts were made by General Gray, at his level, to interest State and CIA in preparing a national plan based on the Trinidad concept. State was pretty receptive, but the people at CIA were not quite as receptive because they were involved in planning this operation and were already pretty well under way, as a result of a previous decision taken way back in March 17, 1960.

Question: What was the JCS view of the military feasibility of Trinidad and Zapata?

General Lemnitzer: Well, Trinidad first. Assuming control of the air, we felt that the landing could be effective against a light opposition which was the most that was anticipated in that area, but like all other considerations, the ultimate effect centered upon the uprisings that would be generated throughout the islands and the reinforcements which would be gravitating toward this particular beachhead.

Question: Control of the air—what did that mean to you?

General Lemnitzer: It meant that the air plan would succeed in knocking out the limited facilities available to Castro.

Question: 100%?

General Lemnitzer: Not 100%, but a great majority of the aircraft.

Question: How could you deal with any remaining aircraft, since you had only B-26s?

General Lemnitzer: It was expected that the initial strikes would be generally successful, since Castroʼs aircraft were concentrated on several fields. Following the initial strike, it would be a matter of matching the aircraft that were allocated to this plan against what remained of Castroʼs aircraft.

Question: In recurring strikes thereafter?

General Lemnitzer: Thatʼs right. We didnʼt intend to stop with just the strike on D-Day.

Question: It seems to me that several times there was a confidence in 100% control of the air and this just never happens.

General Lemnitzer: I never heard of a 100% success. On the other hand, you didnʼt have too many aircraft, and if we did some of the things that were anticipated and one important thing that I havenʼt heard discussed, the question of the diversionary landing has not received the attention that it deserves. Having been involved in this type of operation during the war, we always put great stress on diverting the enemy. This was a very important part of the Cuba plan but, unfortunately, it didnʼt go. When you only have one diversionary attack to attract the enemyʼs attention to another area and it doesnʼt get in, this is very detrimental to the over-all success of the plan.

Statement: There was a feeling that a 100% job would be done on Castroʼs air force, which just doesnʼt happen.

General Lemnitzer: I wouldnʼt go along with the idea that there was a feeling there would be 100% success in any kind of an operation.

Statement: This is Colonel Hawkinsʼ reply to a message: “Since the plan called for the destruction of Castroʼs aircraft, there seemed to be no point in putting anti-aircraft guns on the ships.”

General Lemnitzer: I inquired as to what machine guns, or anti-aircraft equipment they had aboard the ships, and they mentioned the 50 caliber guns, and so on, and this seemed reasonable for the type operation that was envisaged.

Question: Did the Chiefs approve Zapata?

General Lemnitzer: I donʼt regard our actions as approval as such—Iʼd like to make clear that we have supported the thing, but we didnʼt consider that it was within our purview to approve the plan. However, we did believe the plan was feasible, therefore, the plan was all right to go.

Question: Was there any question about the feasibility of the plan in your mind?

General Lemnitzer: The guerrilla aspects of the Trinidad Plan were much more obtainable than the Zapata Plan. We felt that in the Zapata Plan the same importance was attached to the whole air operation to the extent that the landing could be effected and the beachhead held for a period of time, but there again the success of this plan was dependent upon the full gravitation of guerrilla forces to the beach area.

Question: The ultimate success, or were uprisings a pre-condition to getting ashore?

General Lemnitzer: No, not for getting ashore. Ultimate success would be determined by the invasion serving as a catalyst for further action on the part of the anti-Castro guerrillas or elements throughout Cuba.

Question: By ultimate success, do you mean the overthrow of Castro?

General Lemnitzer: Yes. I never did count on an indefinite maintenance of this beachhead. When you get committed to a beach, the question of ultimate success depends on whether you can pump in resources faster than the enemy can build up around you. I think we generally believed that the establishment of the beachhead would constitute a trigger to set off a series of other events. It was never intended that this entire force would lodge themselves on the beach and maintain themselves there indefinitely since there were no reinforcements coming in.

Question: Was it anticipated that the military would be able to land in force on the beachhead and maintain the beachhead for a period of time?

General Lemnitzer: That is correct, and if the enemy forces built up faster than they had planned, they would go into the Escambray Mountains under the Trinidad Plan.

Question: How about Zapata?

General Lemnitzer: It didnʼt stand out so loud and clear, but never-theless the same general type of ultimate action was contemplated. There were three alternatives in Zapata, after they got on the beach, if it looked as though the uprising would not occur. First, we were in a guerrilla type country. Second, the Escambrays were quite a long way away, but they could be used as a guerrilla base. Third, if we succeeded in getting rid of most of the enemy air, the force could have been withdrawn and reassembled for possibly another type of attack somewhere else.

Question: Do you think they could have been withdrawn without overt U.S. support?

General Lemnitzer: I didnʼt regard this as a single beachhead. This particular plan never involved a 36-mile beachhead with 1400 men—that would be absurd. Green Beach and Red Beach and Blue Beach were small lodgments that never involved a continuous perimeter.

Statement: In talking to a lot of the operators I find that they felt that they really had impassable obstacles and that anyone coming into the area had to come down the roads.

General Lemnitzer: That is correct. There was no intention that the beachhead would include this whole area.

Question: With regard to the question of being in guerrilla territory, was any independent study made?

General Lemnitzer: Well, so far as I was concerned, I didnʼt go beyond the information we got from the CIA and from my own staff, that this was an area in which the guerrillas had operated for over 100 years.

Statement: I think this was considered guerrilla territory about 100 years ago and then about 60 years ago, but not recently.

General Lemnitzer: There are few people living in it and few roads, and so on.

Statement: There is no place in which you can maintain yourself in that swamp.

General Lemnitzer: I suppose the same thing could be said about the Escambray Mountains. Iʼd like to make clear that we did not like this area as well as the Trinidad area, and one of the reasons was that it was more difficult to break out of there.

Statement: You mention the preference for Trinidad—Iʼm not sure whether youʼre aware of it, but the Secretary of Defense apparently never appreciated that point. In fact, he had the impression that the Chiefs thought that Zapata was the better of the two plans.

General Lemnitzer: I just donʼt understand how he got that impression. I can show you in my notes on two accounts where I called it to his attention. We also put it in writing that “of the alternate plans, alternative three is considered the most feasible and likely to accomplish the objective. None of the alternates involved are as feasible and likely to accomplish the objectives as the present paramilitary plan.” I donʼt see how you can say it any clearer than that.

Statement: I think itʼs just a question of too many papers and being confused.

General Lemnitzer: Iʼd like to go back to your question about guerrilla territory. This Zapata area is not much different from that in Vietnam, where theyʼre having the devilʼs own time chasing the guerrillas through the swamps.

Statement: There are several problems. First, in comparison with the area in Vietnam, there isnʼt an expanse where these people could move. This is more limited. Furthermore, the towns and villages are on the outside where the invasion forces couldnʼt reach. The second problem is that these people were never trained or told that they were supposed to become guerrillas.

General Lemnitzer: I donʼt agree with that because they were trained as guerrillas for 9 months.

Statement: That was until November, 1960. There were only about 300 of them at that time, but then the great influx of about 1,000 came in after that time, and the great influx never received any instruction in guerrilla training.

General Lemnitzer: It was our understanding of the plan without any doubt that moving into the guerrilla phase was one of the important elements of the plan, and any idea that the Chiefs considered that they were making an indefinite lodgment on the beachhead is not right. Every bit of information that we were able to gather from the CIA was that the guerrilla aspects were always considered as a main element of the plan.

Question: What I canʼt understand is when it was presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, why didnʼt it receive a great deal of attention?

General Lemnitzer: That was regarded as one of the alternatives if they werenʼt successful.

Statement: General, if you look at that area and talk with anybody who has been there, you couldnʼt possibly become guerrillas in that damn place.

General Lemnitzer: I donʼt see why not.

Statement: Where are you going to get the water and the food? Itʼs not like Vietnam. They sent helicopters over and shot all these people down.

General Lemnitzer: In Vietnam, for example, they donʼt get any food. They sustain themselves in an area just like this.

Statement: As I understood it, they did, thatʼs why they put the wire around the villages.

General Lemnitzer: They put the wire around the villages to keep the food in, but there was also the possibility that these fellows would establish themselves as guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains or in the swamps and they would receive air drops.

Admiral Burke: Guerrillas couldnʼt sustain themselves in any of these areas until they got support from the populace. Supplies would have to be carried in to them until they received support from the populace.

Statement: The President had the same impression that you did—that if worst came to worst, this group could become guerrillas, but as weʼve gotten into it, itʼs become obvious that this possibility never really existed.

General Lemnitzer: Then we were badly misinformed.

Statement: Without training and instruction, they would never have gone guerrilla.

Mr. Dulles: I wouldnʼt wholly buy that. These people had a cadre of leaders—20% to 30% would be the leaders. They knew about guerrilla warfare. The guerrillas in World War II never had any training until they got into a guerrilla operation.

General Gray: It was always considered that the most feasible action was withdrawal from the beach by sea. This came up at one White House meeting when Mr. Bissell made the statement, that if we do have to pull out, the best course of action would be to withdraw from the beach.

Statement: But they had no plan to withdraw by sea. They had no capability to withdraw by sea, except as provided by the U.S. Navy.

General Lemnitzer: Well, itʼs a question of the time of withdrawal.

Statement: It still isnʼt clear to me how youʼre going to get them off if you wait until they are buttoned down on the beaches.

General Lemnitzer: Certainly as far as withdrawals are concerned, and I said this many times when the operation was on, the most difficult operation in the world is the withdrawal under enemy pressure from a beachhead. But that was not the kind of withdrawal that was anticipated, as far as I was concerned.

Question: Thatʼs the picture that shaped up and thatʼs one of the unhappy aspects of the picture. Letʼs go back to Trinidad. The JCS said that Trinidad had a fair chance of success. What was your estimate of the feasibility of Zapata?

General Lemnitzer: Still feasible, but less so than Trinidad. We considered Zapata feasible. I could put words together and say that we said that Trinidad had a fair chance and that Zapata had less than a fair chance, but actually we felt that Zapata had a fair chance but of a lower grade than Trinidad.

Question: If the Chiefs had had any question as to feasibility, the Chiefs would have spoken up. Is that a fair statement?

General Lemnitzer: Iʼm sure they would.

Question: To what extent had the Chiefs made a personal study of the final operations plan?

General Lemnitzer: The final operations plan was received two days prior to the final D-Day and it was too late for a personal study. Portions of Zapata were proposed on four occasions and approved on the basis of explanations that we got from the working group.

General Taylor: Is it fair to say that you gave it de facto approval on a piecemeal basis?

General Lemnitzer: No other solution was feasible at that time. The rainy season was approaching and one thing that I would like to mention here was the fact that they had 100 MIG pilots being trained in Czechoslovakia, and we didnʼt know when they were going to be returned, and our thinking was strongly influenced by this fact.

Question: Was any discussion given as to what would happen if a few MIGs appeared?

General Lemnitzer: No, all we could do was to go on the basis of the information we had that the MIGs had not yet arrived. We also felt that if this operation was going to go, it should go before Castro received two Soviet destroyers that we understood were being delivered.

Question: What would have happened if you had had a couple of MIGs there at the time?

General Lemnitzer: Their appearance would have pretty well complicated the operation.

Question: Were any steps taken in order to prepare for that possibility?

General Lemnitzer: None, other than the possibility that you might go to the Navy and ask the Navy for overt support, but that was very unlikely.

Question: What was the Chiefsʼ view on the suitability of the terrain?

General Lemnitzer: We discussed that somewhat. It was considered not as suitable as Trinidad for the reasons that I indicated. Their success depended upon their ability to seize the approaches to the swamp areas. Now the size of the beachhead question was emphasized before. There was a plan to put lodgments in the entry ways into the swamp area. The size of the area was dictated by the necessity of protecting the airfields, and to prevent access to the swamp. The large area wasnʼt considered desirable but acceptable if the approaches were held and control of the air was established.

Statement: When you commented on Zapata the first time, the air plan was for D-Day strikes only, but with no limitations.

General Lemnitzer: Thatʼs correct.

Statement: Later there were limited strikes on D-2 and limited strikes on D-Day. Would you comment on this watering down of the air plan? Were the Chiefs satisfied with this?

General Lemnitzer: The D-2 strikes were added for non-military reasons. We would have preferred to do without the D-2 air strikes. They were never intended to accomplish the destruction of the Castro air force. They were to lend plausibility to the story that the D-Day strikes had been launched from within Cuba.

Question: Did you object to the D-2 air strikes?

General Lemnitzer: No, we did not object. We would have preferred not to have them, but for non-military reasons they were considered to be of great importance and they were approved.

Statement: They could have been quite disastrous because they could have alerted Castro and he could have dispersed his aircraft.

General Lemnitzer: Yes, but he didnʼt.

Statement: Yes, but that was just luck.

General Lemnitzer: Yes, but here again you get into the old battle of getting into an operation of this kind covertly, political and psychological considerations against military considerations. My conclusion here is, which Iʼll explain a little bit later, you have to be very careful about diluting military considerations in order to attain non-attribution and non-association with the United States.

Question: Do you feel that you or the Joint Chiefs were the defenders of the military aspects of the operation, or was CIA?

General Lemnitzer: The defenders of the military parts of the plan were the people who produced it and that was CIA. We were providing assistance, and assuring the feasibility of the plan.

General Taylor: What led to the idea that it was necessary to maintain that all of the air strikes emanated from Cuba?

General Lemnitzer: We were strong for the Trinidad Plan. However, about the middle of March during a meeting at the White House,An apparent reference to the meeting that took place on March 11; see Document 59. Mr. Mann was gravely concerned about the impact throughout the Latin American area of these air strikes coming from outside of Cuba. He hammered at the point repeatedly and wanted to know if there wasnʼt some area in Cuba where they could land on a ready-made area. At the conclusion of this meeting CIA was directed to review the whole idea and come up with alternative landing areas other than Trinidad, because Trinidad didnʼt have the kind of airstrip that was required to provide plausibility to the story that the aircraft had come from within Cuba. This was an important consideration.

Question: Was this approved beyond Mann?

General Lemnitzer: He was the one who expressed the views. I donʼt know how much Secretary Rusk or any of the other people were involved. As a matter of fact, it was a disappointment to me, because I thought we had a plan that had been thoroughly worked out and hated to see another delay and another complete evaluation of the island. It caused some concern both in my own group and in CIA. On March 16, when we had another meetingThe Zapata plan was discussed on March 15 and March 16; see Documents 65 and 66. and were discussing the Zapata Plan, Mr. Mann liked the Zapata Plan because of the airfield and indicated that it provided us with a plausible denial. I indicated that the JCS had gone over the alternatives and didnʼt think that any of them were as good as the original Trinidad Plan, but of the three to be considered, Zapata was the most achievable. Then I said this, that it was not clear to me why Zapata was any more acceptable from the political point of view than the Trinidad Plan. Whereupon Mr. Mann replied that it gave plausible denial to the launching of air operations from outside Cuba. He said we needed a facade behind which we could deny that these attacks came out of the United States, Guatemala, or Nicaragua.

Question: Why were they so sensitive about the fair name of Guatemala and Nicaragua?

General Lemnitzer: Well, his concern was how much this particular operation might upset or antagonize the other Latin American nations by doing violence to one of the members of the OAS. He was deeply worried about the impact of this type operation conducted with our support and assistance which he felt was generally known, and he was especially worried about the air aspects of the plan.

Question: With regard to the D-2 and the D-Day air strikes both of which were to be limited, did the Joint Chiefs feel they had an adequate plan?

General Lemnitzer: I wonʼt say they regarded it as adequate; it was a reasonable air plan. Iʼd like to point out that the D-2 air strike was never expected to wipe out Castroʼs entire force. It was the D-Day strike which was the important one. The D-Day strike involved fragmentation bombs, napalm, 50 caliber machine guns. This was an all-out effort and one of the critical aspects of the whole operation. The air plans for Trinidad and Zapata were the same. They were the same for the reason that the targets were identical. In the examination of the Zapata Plan, we were merely looking at the location of the landing. The same number of aircraft were on the three essential airfields and the air plan was not considered to be affected at all as far as the D-Day strikes were concerned.

Statement: I would like to make two points: First, there were three plans considered and the objection to one of the plans was the fact that the air strip wasnʼt adequate. That same objection was not made in connection with the Zapata Plan. The second thing is that the Zapata Plan as it was originally considered, anticipated capturing this airport and then have the planes take off from the airport.

General Lemnitzer: No, sir. Thatʼs wrong.

Statement: Iʼm just going by what the paperThis briefing paper is not further identified. says.

General Lemnitzer: Are you saying that these aircraft were supposed to fly from Nicaragua and then land and load up and take off and bomb and so on?

Statement: I donʼt know. I wasnʼt there.

General Gray: I think itʼs wrong to base that whole Zapata Plan on one paper because this was just the first cut at the Zapata Plan. After that the Zapata Plan was considered again and again over a period of time, and all this became very clear as it went on.

Statement: Yes, I understand, but weʼre just talking about the beginning. The important thing is that you didnʼt turn one plan down because of the air strike situation, and yet you did turn another plan down because the air strike situation wasnʼt adequate. You didnʼt turn Zapata down because the air strikes werenʼt considered adequate, and yet the air strikes consisted of taking off after dawn.

General Lemnitzer: I didnʼt think there was any material change in the air plan. The targets were the same regardless of where youʼd land. On D-Day the air plan involved going after the Cuban air force; thereafter, they would take under attack any movements of troops to the area and they would attempt to knock out microwave communications stations on which the Cuban national communications were largely dependent.

Question: What did you think would happen if you werenʼt 100% successful and didnʼt get a couple of T-33s?

General Lemnitzer: In war, you never expect 100% success. However, a couple of T-33s are not going to be decisive elements in an operation of this kind.

Question: Were there any comments or discussion about the T-33s in particular?

General Lemnitzer: I think I had information that they were armed, because we had been trying to get some kind of equipment against the Pathet Lao and were considering what the distribution of T-33s was around the world. We saw that some of them had been armed as reconnaissance planes and it was suspected that the Cuban air force had armed theirs—but they werenʼt bombers.

Statement: Yes, but they hit targets.

General Lemnitzer: Yes, but the T-33s didnʼt sink any ships.

Statement: Yes, they did.

Statement: No, not the T-33s. I think they were Sea Furies. A Sea Fury was the one that hit the Rio.

General Lemnitzer: I have a long list of the reasons why we preferred Trinidad to Zapata: It was more distant from Havana, the closeness to the Escambray Mountains, there was only one access road into the area, the nearest Cuban army unit of any size was 100 miles away, and considerable support from dissidents was expected in that area.

Question: What was the understanding of the importance of control of the air?

General Lemnitzer: Absolutely vital to success.

Question: Were the Chiefs satisfied with the plan of pre-D-Day strikes?

General Lemnitzer: We first talked about some strikes on the day before D-Day, but the D-Day strikes were regarded as critical. We were particularly interested in napalm, or I was, because Iʼve seen the effects of napalm on aircraft when theyʼre parked close together; also fragmentation bombs. Of course, elimination of the D-Day strike greatly eliminated the insurance against attack from the Cuban air force.

Question: Were the Joint Chiefs of Staff involved in the cancellation of the D-Day air strikes?

General Lemnitzer: They were not. It came as a surprise to me.

Question: When did you hear about it?

General Lemnitzer: At 2 oʼclock on the morning of the 17th of April when General Gray and General Wheeler came to my quarters on another matter. They said they had received a call from CIA urging that they get air cover for the beachhead on the 17th. It was then that I heard that they had cancelled the D-Day air strikes. On that occasion I strongly supported putting U.S. Naval cover over the beachhead. I directed that Admiral Dennison be prepared to provide this cover. However, I recognized the major political implications involved and directed General Wheeler and General Gray to consult with the Department of State on this matter.

Question: Was the request for air cover an attempt to neutralize some of the effect of the cancellation of the D-Day strikes?

General Lemnitzer: The way it came to me was that it was an urgent call for putting U.S. air cover over the beachhead.

Statement: Maybe General Gray can tell us.

General Gray: At the time I was called over to the CIA, it was about 1 oʼclock in the morning. They informed me then that the air strikes were cancelled. Then General Cabell asked me if I would see what I could do to get air cover from the carrier. We eventually got permission for the Early Warning but not for the air cover.

Question: What was the understanding of the JCS as to the action of the landing force if it effected a lodgment but no uprisings occurred?

General Lemnitzer: Those were the three alternatives. Go guerrilla in the swamps; conduct guerrilla operations from the Escambray; or be withdrawn.

Question: What was the understanding of the ability of the force to go guerrilla?

General Lemnitzer: It might not have been ideal country but it had been used, and it was believed to be feasible guerrilla country.

Question: Did the JCS examine the feasibility of this course of action?

General Lemnitzer: No, no specific study. The Working Group studied the feasibility and presented it to the JCS on several occasions as being feasible.

Question: What did they think of the effect of the swamp on the operation?

General Lemnitzer: We felt that it assisted defense but it was also a double-edged sword—it aided defense but also made it more difficult to break out.

Question: How did the JCS follow the course of the operation?

General Lemnitzer: The Secretary of Defense and I attended briefing sessions held in the special War Room which we set up for this operation. Then Service liaison officers briefed their respective Chiefs with information from the War Room. There was a continual flow of information from the War Room and CIA. It came to our War Room by telephone calls, and messengers from their war room to this one.

Question: There was no electronic gear?

General Gray: Many messages came by teletype and some by phone, and then we had an officer on liaison duty with CIA.

General Lemnitzer: The Joint Staff met on the 17th and 19th of April and considered important action messages. On the 18th, Admiral Burke and I were at the White House for most of the day in conference, and we followed the operations from there. Thatʼs in general how we handled it.

Question: Would you say this was satisfactory?

General Lemnitzer: If we were running the operation, no. But we were in a support role. We were primarily concerned with logistic support. We arranged a rather elaborate extensive logistic support plan. We envisioned arming a hell of a lot of Cubans if the uprisings occurred. Our logistic plan was 4 or 5 times larger than the original. The Secretary of Defense was particularly interested in being sure that they had all the support that they could possibly require.

Question: What was the understanding as to the ammunition situation at the end of D+1?

General Lemnitzer: Our understanding was that it was critical. However, we knew there was ammunition on the LCIs and the LCUs, and there was an air drop planned by CIA on the night of D+1.

Question: There was one on D-Day night and one planned for D+1?

General Lemnitzer: Yes.

Admiral Burke: We also tried to get some C-130s.

General Lemnitzer: That is correct. We had some C-130s over at Kelly Air Force Base but they never got into the action.

Question: Did the Chairman know of the flight of the ships?

General Lemnitzer: I sure did. I knew of all the attempts by CIA and CINCLANT to try and round them up.

Question: What recommendations were made regarding U.S. help after D-Day?

General Lemnitzer: Well, Arleigh and I were over at the White House when the question of using U.S. destroyers to pick up people off the beach was discussed. The feasibility and the need was discussed right there, and the decision was made to order them in.

Admiral Burke: We didnʼt know what was going on at the beach so we asked for reconnaissance, and the reconnaissance was approved.

General Lemnitzer: The afternoon or night of D-Day 4 B-26s were made available which we had been preparing for the Laos operations. Then 4 more were made available on D+1. In addition to that, we offered 5 T-33s and CIA accepted 4. On D+1 action was initiated to use C-130s in dropping ammunition on the beachhead. The aircraft were moved to Kelly, the packing crews were on their way, and the crews were set up for the drops on the night of D+1 but they never went into action.

Question: Why werenʼt the T-33s turned over to CIA on D+1?

Mr. King: I believe it may have been a question of getting pilots. We were short of pilots by D+1.

Question: When did you sense that the beachhead might be going down?

General Lemnitzer: On the morning of D+2, I made a comment to the President that this was the time for this outfit to go guerrilla.

Question: How were your comments received?

General Lemnitzer: I received a surprise when Mr. Bissell said they were not prepared to go guerrilla.

Question: This was the first time youʼd known about that?

General Lemnitzer: Yes.

Question: That being the case, was there any discussion that we were going to lose the war or we were going to have to use the U.S. Navy? Was it realized that they were accepting defeat if that decision wasnʼt made?

General Lemnitzer: Iʼm not sure it was put in quite those terms.

Mr. Kennedy: Could I add something? I donʼt think there was complete information—all the messages showing the critical situation were not transmitted to the President. However, there was general knowledge that there was a shortage of ammunition. We were told on D-Day that the ships had gone out 15 miles and they intended to come back in that night. The President had said that day that heʼd rather be called an aggressor than a bum, so he was prepared to go as far as necessary to assure success, but we were always about 5 or 6 or 7 hours behind on our information. The next morning on D+1 we knew the ships hadnʼt come in for some reason we couldnʼt understand, and there was a serious ammunition shortage. At this time there was no assurance whether it would be possible to hold the beachhead even if the Navy was ordered in. So at one oʼclock Admiral Burke was instructed to send Navy pilots over to reconnoiter and send back a message stating whether they could maintain the beachhead. The message in reply stated there was no fighting going on, so there wasnʼt any point in going in that they could see. The next morning there was a message saying the beach had collapsed and they wanted to evacuate the men, so the President gave the order for the destroyers to go in, but by this time it was impossible to evacuate the men because the beachhead wasnʼt large enough, so then it was too late to do anything.

General Lemnitzer: It wasnʼt just the question of committing U.S. forces and saving the war—it wasnʼt that simple. It was question of whether or not the Navy could save it if you sent them in.

Mr. Kennedy: We didnʼt have any idea what the situation was there. The President said he used to walk around on that White House lawn thinking heʼd like to do something if he knew what was going on.

General Lemnitzer: This is just like all actions. The Commander didnʼt have the kind of information that heʼd like to have had.

Question: What weʼre talking about is the difficulty, in fact, the impossibility of running a military operation from Washington. Was this ever recognized during the preliminary considerations?

General Lemnitzer: The difficulty is that no Commander could have made these decisions down there because these were decisions to commit the U.S., and the only place that decision could be made was right here by the Commander-in-Chief. No matter where you had your command ship, you would still have to get the decision out of Washington because this was a decision to commit U.S. forces.

Statement: Thatʼs very true. But I thought you might have a number of representatives of different Departments on a first-class ship with first-class communications.

General Lemnitzer: But you would still have to rely on communications from the beach.

Statement: The men on the Blagar had a pretty good picture of what was taking place, but that picture never was transmitted up here.

General Lemnitzer: Thatʼs certainly correct.

Question: Were the JCS satisfied to have CIA conduct this operation?

General Lemnitzer: As far as we were concerned, the job was a covert operation and the JCS couldnʼt legally conduct a covert operation.

General Taylor: I couldnʼt find that you or anybody else ever raised the question whether or not CIA should have run this operation.

General Lemnitzer: This thing started back in March of 1960, when this assignment of responsibility was made. I didnʼt get into it until many months after all of this had been decided.

Mr. Dulles: I think some JCS representative was at that meeting at the White House.

General Lemnitzer: I donʼt know. I wasnʼt Chairman at that time. Maybe NateReference is to General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, who preceded Lemnitzer as Chairman of the JCS. was there. I was not there and I didnʼt know a thing about it, but nevertheless there were lots of times when various people indicated that this was something the military ought to run. But again it was a question of the dis-association of the United States.

Question: Well, the JCS could have been just as dis-associated as CIA was?

General Lemnitzer: How could you?

Statement: Didnʼt you turn over the training of these people to people from Defense? The only difference would be the responsibility for the execution of the plan.

General Lemnitzer: Thatʼs one of the things we have to look at in the United States Government right now. Are we going to run this thing on a covert basis—I think we were trapped by words, by covert.

Question: Do you agree that an operation can be covert and still be conducted by Defense?

General Lemnitzer: Yes, we can. Weʼve conducted some. I think you can do it with CIA provided you provide them with the military staff that they need.

Statement: I think they had a lot of staff and they had what they needed.

Mr. Dulles: I thought we did. We had 38 trainers down in Guatemala that you supplied.

General Lemnitzer: Yes, we did.

Question: We would like to get your views on how you think paramilitary operations should be conducted in principle. Should we make the decision that covert operations of this sort be assigned to Defense?

General Lemnitzer: I think the answer to this question depends upon the size, the magnitude of the operation that is involved.

Statement: General Lemnitzer, we would appreciate it if you would take the time to give us your ideas on where the line should be drawn with regard to covert operations.

General Lemnitzer: I donʼt see how you can have covert activities by armed forces. I think itʼs a contradiction in terms. We can have military people that are sheep-dipped and put them in an operation of this kind. But you canʼt just take any officer and say heʼs going to be sheep-dipped unless he volunteers for it. He has family problems. The military would have a hell of a time contracting these people.

Question: But there was no question of transferring it—no suggestion?

General Lemnitzer: No.

Question: What is your view of the accuracy of the evaluation of the effectiveness of Castroʼs force?

General Lemnitzer: The evaluation of the navy was accurate; the air force, fairly accurate—it was inaccurate as to pilotsʼ capabilities, and also regarding the guns on the T-33s; concerning the army, I would say that the information was not accurate. My information was that most of the tanks were up around the Havana area, and how they moved their tanks down there that fast without having some in that area, I donʼt know and I havenʼt been able to get into it because Iʼve been away, but I would say the navy information was accurate; the air force, fairly accurate; and the army and the militia not too accurate in terms of reaction time and capability.

Question: What impression did the JCS have of the likelihood of an uprising?

General Lemnitzer: We had no information. We went on CIAʼs analysis and it was reported that there was a good prospect. I remember Dick Bissell, evaluating this for the President, indicated there was sabotage, bombings, and there were also various groups that were asking or begging for arms and so forth. All they needed were arms and equipment, and the impression that we got was somewhat over-optimistic; particularly in light of measures that Castro took.

Question: Can defeat be properly attributed to any deficiency in the intelligence?

General Lemnitzer: I would say only to a degree. For example, the estimates of the possibility of the population rising up, and I donʼt think we estimated the effectiveness of Castroʼs control of the people.

Question: May I just mention the attitude most of us have on that now. This is related to the fact that no call to rise was given, and that this was withheld until they could be sure that these people had someplace to go for support, so the idea of the uprising was never really tried.

General Lemnitzer: Iʼve seen all kinds of reports about the number of people theyʼve put under arrest, in the stockades and so forth, which would have certainly inhibited any uprising.

Question: How should a paramilitary operation be fitted into Governmental machinery?

General Lemnitzer: I think we ought to have a national plan for any one of these situations like we have for Laos. We have a man now who is Mr. Vietnam. He does the coordinating activities for the Department and much more effectively than was ever done in the past.

Statement: We have developed a little chart of the kind of things that we are considering. Would you like to make a comment on this?

General Lemnitzer: This is about what I have in mind. With a permanent Chairman with no other kind of job, you have the representation from the Departments; knowing the nature of the operation ahead of time and determining which department has the paramount responsibility, the Chairman should be selected accordingly.

Statement: We visualized that this framework would be applicable to any situation.

General Lemnitzer: No, I donʼt think this would be practical. For instance, right now. Weʼre enmeshed in Vietnam, Thailand and Korea. You can be Chairman of just so many things. No more than about one if youʼre going to do the job right. I think youʼd have to have more than just one Chairman.

Statement: This over-all Chairman would get everything all straightened out, say hereʼs your problem and send it to the President to make the decision.

General Lemnitzer: Secretary McNamara has some strong views about this, but I pointed out repeatedly that I had seen this tried and the Chairman can make the decision and then suddenly the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense finds that a big chunk of his resources have been allocated for something when he wants to put them someplace else, particularly when you get into the foreign policy field.

General Taylor: Then you feel it is good in theory but not in practice?

General Lemnitzer: Thatʼs right.

Question: Do you feel that the Chiefs discharged their responsibilities as military advisors to the President in the course of this operation?

General Lemnitzer: Yes, I do feel that the Chiefs discharged their responsibility.

Question: I mean as military advisors?

General Lemnitzer: Yes, I do.

Question: Were the Chiefs ever consulted as to whether or not this operation was really necessary?

General Lemnitzer: This question was resolved way back in the previous administration.

Question: How do you feel situations should be handled when only the Chairman is present at a conference?

General Lemnitzer: Many times the Chairman has to go to an NSC Meeting and questions come up which he has to answer from a military point of view what the Chiefs would have answered if they were in body, but you canʼt have everybody at that level all the time. I think the Chairman has to speak for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, generally speaking. On special occasions, I think all the Chiefs should be present.

222. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Secret. Drafted by Mountain on May 22. Washington, May 19, 1961, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Meeting with Representatives of the Cuban Revolutionary Council

At the request of Dr. Morales Carrion, Dept. of State, a meeting of representatives of several departments of the U.S. Government with representatives of the Cuban Revolutionary Council was held at the Department of State at 4:00 p.m., 19 May 1961.

The participants for the Revolutionary Council were: Mr. Varona—Military Affairs Mr. Hevia—Foreign Affairs Mr. Maceo—Welfare Mr. Carrillo—Finances & Propaganda Mr. Ray—Underground Activities Mr. Aragon—Secretary to Mr. Miro Cardona, who is ill in Miami

On the part of the United States, in addition to Dr. Morales there were several representatives of the Department of State chiefly from the Caribbean area and the following: Mr. James Hennessey—Immigration and Naturalization Service, representing Dept. of Justice Mr. Leon Uhlmann—Office of the Attorney General Mr. James Quigley—Assistant Secretary, Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare Mr. William Mitchell—Commissioner of Social Security Mr. Maurice J. Mountain—Policy Planning Staff, ISA, Dept. of Defense

After introductory remarks by both Dr. Morales and Mr. Hevia to the effect that this was an initial meeting to bring the Council and the United States representatives together in order to see what needs to be and can be done from here on to establish a free and democratic Cuba, Mr. Hevia raised the first problem.

He said that extra planes were needed to get the people out of Cuba who have papers to leave, but who are daily turned away by PanAm because no space is available. PanAm carries out about 100 per day and they are booked up through October of this year. Each day, Mr. Hevia said, as many as 500 are turned away. Mr. Brown of the Department of State was assigned the task of finding out what could be done about the matter.

The second problem was that of obtaining waivers of visas for members of the underground who, for their own safety, should get out of Cuba. These people do not qualify for waivers on ordinary grounds since they have no relatives already in the U.S. When the discussion disclosed that a figure of about 40 people were involved, the problem did not appear to be insuperable to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Mr. James Hennessey agreed to see what could be done.

The third problem was how to get those Cubans who were now living in various Embassies in Havana, where they had sought asylum, to the United States without having them travel first to the country affording them asylum. The Council was aware of the fact that a Cuban granted asylum in, for example, the Argentine Embassy could claim safe-counduct only to Argentina. They wished to know how such people could be brought to the United States without first having to go to Argentina. The Department of State will study the problem.

The fourth problem was how the Council could dispatch its representatives—teachers, workers, etc.—on official missions abroad and be sure that they would be readmitted to the U.S. on their return. The status of the Cubans as refugees and the absence of customary documentation for reentry now makes it technically impossible for them to return to the United States once they leave. Mr. Hennessey and the Department of State will try to find a solution to this problem.

The fifth problem was what to do about those persons who held four-year visas for the United States which are about to expire. Dr. Maceo explained that he personally was in that position since his four-year visa would expire in another five or six weeks. Mr. Hennessey indicated that this was related to the previous problem and that he would seek a solution for both.

The sixth problem was a question of whether the United States would bring before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights or the Organization of American States, or both, the charge against the Castro regime of inhuman treatment of its citizens. A representative of the Department of State suggested that there were a number of reasons why the United States should not bring this charge, and he suggested that the Council work with other Latin American States to have them take the initiative. He assured the Council that the United States would support such a move, provided the initiative came from some other country.

The seventh problem was a question of finances. First, the Council wanted to know about financial support for the refugees as a group; second, the special problem of survivors and families of the invasion force; and third, the financial support needed for future Council activities, particularly in the field of propaganda. They said that members of the invasion force had been paid $175 per month with $25 per month additional for each child. A total of about 2,400 fighters were involved. 1,000 are now prisoners, 200 are dead or missing, and another 1,200 have returned. They felt these payments should be continued so long as, for those who returned, they are not gainfully employed.

The Commissioner of Social Security, Mr. Mitchell, explained that the United States was now supplying cash assistance to the extent of $100 per month per family, and there were several reasons why this would have to remain the maximum. In addition, he pointed out, the United States is providing surplus foodstuffs free, is making available free education, extensive health services, and resettlement costs for those for whom employment can be found. For unaccompanied children all costs for their complete care are assumed by the United States.

In the discussion which followed, there seemed to be some confusion as to who was paying the $175 per month. The Council members said it was CIA, but it was not clear whether these payments had been cut off for all, or were continuing for some, or what their status was. It was clear, however, that both Mr. Quigley and Mr. Mitchell would take up the question of support for the survivors of those killed, missing or captured in the invasion. Mr. Varona estimated that the fighting force and their families together numbered about 10,000 people. In response to a question by Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Varona stated that he was not asking for support for those Cubans, resident in the United States, who travelled, sometimes from as far away as California, to join the invasion army. He had in mind only those Cuban refugees who had no other means of support. At this point in the discussion there was no further reference to support of the Councilʼs activities.

The eighth problem was brought up by Mr. Ray who suggested a program should be set up at once and carried out vigorously to train doctors, engineers, public administration personnel. It became apparent that he was talking about a morale problem and that such training would be a morale booster to the extent that these people would feel they were training for a post-Castro Cuba. Mr. Mitchell responded to this question by pointing out the efforts that were being made to find employment for exiles who wished to utilize their skills and training in the United States. The Council reiterated their belief that a vigorous program to train people of this sort was needed and that it should be promoted in such a way as to improve the morale of the Cuban exiles.

The ninth problem was posed by Mr. Varona and was addressed to the representative of the Department of Defense. Mr. Varona stated that it was the firm purpose of the exile group to continue the fight to free Cuba and to bring about the downfall of the Castro regime. He delivered an increasingly impassioned statement ending it with the following question which, he said, was the most important of all with which they were concerned. In accomplishing their objective of ridding Cuba and the world of the Castro government, what help, when, where and in what form could they expect from the United States?

Mr. Mountain responded by saying that the question Mr. Varona had asked was a most serious one. He said that he believed there was no American who did not share the desire of the Council to see the establishment of a free and democratic Cuba. The answer to Mr. Varonaʼs question, however, could only come from the highest levels of the U.S. Government, by which he meant the President and his principal advisers. He wished to assure Mr. Varona that the Department of Defense would do whatever the President and the high councils of the U.S. Government demanded of it. However, it was not a question which the Department of Defense, alone, could answer.

Mr. Varona replied saying that he did not expect to get an answer, but that he wanted to bring this matter up at this initial meeting to emphasize the importance that they attach to this matter. Mr. Mountain answered that he understood Mr. Varonaʼs purpose and that Mr. Varona could be assured that his question and the seriousness with which he raised it would be made known to the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Mountain then went on to say that the Department of Defense was now working on the development of a program along the lines of Mr. Rayʼs suggestion about further training for Cuban exiles. He explained that for those among the exile group who would like to receive military training, a program by which they could be trained as individuals within the U.S. armed forces was being worked out. Mr. Hevia asked whether the trainees would be separated and scattered or whether they would train as a group. Mr. Mountain replied that it was the view of the Department of Defense that their training would be helped most by being placed within the established units of the U.S. armed forces.On May 26 Yarmolinsky, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, circulated a plan for “Service of Cuban Volunteers in the U.S. Armed Forces” to the various branches of the armed services for comment. The plan was based on the assumption that the Cuban volunteers inducted would be spread throughout the services for training and incorporated into existing military formations. (Ibid.) The Council as a group took a dim view of any arrangement which would tend to split up the exile group. Mr. Ray said that the psychology of the Cuban group was more important than the efficiency of their training. He said it was absolutely necessary to keep them together, to keep their spirits up, to give them hope for the future, and to give some sense of purpose to their pursuits. He was against any program which would split them up. Dr. Morales entered the conversation by saying that we had apparently identified an area where there was an important difference of views and he was glad to see the Council express itself frankly and openly on the matter. He suggested that perhaps this was a matter which, having been identified, could now be taken up in another forum where the alternatives could be explored. The Council agreed. Mr. Varona said that if it was publicity that the Department of Defense was worried about, the same problem would exist if an attempt were made to train Cuban soldiers scattered throughout the U.S. forces.

Mr. Maceo asked if the Defense program could make provision for keeping Cuban officers in training, and Mr. Hevia asked what provision could be made for military personnel in the age group over 26 but perhaps not older than 35 or 36. Mr. Maceo also asked what provision could be made for doctors in the armed forces.

Mr. Mountain said that the problem of training Cuban officers posed some special difficulties which were not easily solved; that the defense program dealt only with the 17 to 26 age group; and as for the training of doctors, that was a problem which was not specifically a Defense matter. If some such program as Mr. Ray had proposed were worked out perhaps the doctors could be trained in that way. Mr. Maceo, however, repeated that it was training in the armed forces for doctors as well that he thought was important. He pointed out that many of them had been soldiers as well as doctors and he felt that training in military medicine or in medicine within a military organization would be highly desirable. Mr. Mountain agreed that Defense would explore these matters further.

Mr. Carrillo then read a prepared paper on the Councilʼs plans for a world-wide propaganda effort. The paper itself was turned over to Dr. Morales. In effect, it proposes to make of the exile group an activist anti-Communist organization which will engage in propaganda, mobilization of public opinion, and popular agitation principally in the Western Hemisphere, but also in Europe and Asia. They will seek the integration of different local groups in each country, principally against Communists, and will employ for the purpose Cuban exiles and people native-born in the country of their operations. They intend to operate not only in South and Central America, but also in the United States and Canada. They visualize this effort not only as directed toward the overthrow of Castro, but also as a movement to destroy communism. They expect within the next two to three months to have committees established in all Latin American countries and to have enlisted some 50,000 people in their work.

The immediate need, however, they said—and all the Council emphatically agreed—was to construct at Key West a long-wave radio station which could overcome the jamming effect of Castroʼs device of having 500 ham radio operators in Cuba go on the air to prevent reception of long-wave radio programs from the U.S. They said he had confiscated all short-wave radios, and it was necessary for the people of Cuba to get encouragement and hope from the exile group, but this was not possible without a radio station which could cut through the Castro jamming system.

Dr. Morales said that he felt this whole area of propaganda activities was an important one, and that it should be taken up in an appropriate forum. The Department of State would be the agency to which the Council should look for further exploration of these possibilities.

One of the Council members mentioned that before the invasion the passports of about 400 of the fighters in the invasion force had been collected, he did not know by whom, but that he would like to have them returned to the individuals to whom they had been issued. A representative of the visa section of the Department of State said he would look into the matter.

Mr. Ray brought up the question of some 13 Cubans still being held in Camp McClelland and wanted to know what could be done about their release. Mr. Uhlmann and Mr. Hennessey promised to look into the matter.

Dr. Morales suggested, and it was agreed, that a similar meeting be scheduled on a regular basis, initially every two weeks in Washington to canvass whatever major and pressing problems existed and to receive reports on progress made in solving them. He suggested that he be kept informed of actions taken, but that the Council consult with the representatives of the Departments on specific matters without clearance through him. This was agreed, but Mr. Mountain noted that the questions addressed to the Department of Defense had implications extending beyond the competence of the Department of Defense. He, therefore, suggested that more fruitful discussion of some of these problems might be possible if Dr. Morales was present at least for the first few meetings with Department of Defense representatives. This was readily agreed to and the Council will, for the present time, contact the Department of Defense through Dr. Morales.

Maurice J. MountainDirector, Policy Planning Staff

223. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity-Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. No drafting information is given, but a note attached to the source text indicates that copies were sent to Dulles, Goodwin, and Berle. A May 24 memorandum from Barnes to Dulles identifies this paper as the covert annex to the policy paper prepared for the NSC on May 4 by the interagency task force chaired by Nitze. (Ibid., Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961) For text of the May 4 policy paper, see Document 202. Washington, May 19, 1961.

PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AIMED AT WEAKENING THE Castro REGIME

I. Introduction

1. The proposals submitted in this recommended program of covert action directed against the Castro regime are based on a realistic appraisal of existing assets, both in and out of Cuba; on potential assets, both inside and outside of Cuba which are capable of development within acceptable time limits; and on certain assumptions with respect to United States policy. 2. For the purpose of this paper it is assumed that United States policy: A. Will not contemplate the use of its armed forces to intervene directly or unilaterally in the absence of an aggressive military action on the part of Cuba directed against the United States or another country of this hemisphere. B. Will not permit the organizing and training of a Cuban exile military force for further action against Cuba. C. Will permit United States covert support of Cuban clandestine activities and the carrying out of covert unilateral operations as described herein, including the use of maritime and air facilities within the United States as the bases for the staging of sabotage, in-exfiltration, supply, raider and propaganda (including leaflet dropping) operations. 3.

The Situation: The position of the Castro regime within Cuba has been significantly strengthened by the failure of the mid-April invasion. This is principally the result of two factors: (a) the psychological effects of the Castro victory on the Cuban people as a whole and the security forces in particular; and (b) a marked decrease in the capabilities of the anti-Castro forces, both in exile and within Cuba. It is probable, therefore, that there will be no major change in internal political conditions during the next six months.

Given the strength of the Castro military machine and the proven effectiveness of its security services, there is only the slightest possibility that the regime can be overthrown from within during the foreseeable future. With the expected arrival of MIG aircraft and the probable acquisition of a small fleet of fast naval cutters, the military capability of the regime will increase. Coupled with this is the fact that the opposition has lost some of its strongest forces; the underground has been badly hurt and will unquestionably take months to rebuild; and confidence in the United States has been shaken.

Background: The failure of the Cuban strike force in April 1961 to achieve its objective requires a careful re-evaluation of the extent of the problem and a re-assessment of the existing and potential assets which could be employed in a covert effort to weaken the Castro regime in order to accelerate its eventual overthrow.

There appears to be general agreement that there is no sure way of overthrowing the Castro regime short of United States military intervention. There is a possibility, albeit slight, that lesser measures—covert and overt—might result in the overthrow of the Castro regime from within. However, as long as Castro thrives, his major threat—the example and stimulus of a working communist revolution—will persist.

In summary, it can be said that Castroʼs position in Cuba is stronger than before the April 1961 invasion attempt, although more isolated in Latin America as a whole. The opposition has lost some of its strongest forces, its factionalism is greater, and its confidence in the United States has been shaken. Castroʼs armed forces and militia were effective to an unexpected degree in defeating the invasion. Increased police repression and terror has almost certainly badly weakened existing opposition and underground forces within Cuba. Castroʼs hard-core supporters are more heavily armed and more enthusiastic in his behalf, and the widespread support he has received abroad has probably increased his stature among many other Cubans. The abortive effort to unseat him will probably provide him with a useful excuse to justify further economic austerity, as well as a lever for additional Soviet aid. In general, unless Castro makes some major mistakes (e.g. direct armed attack on some other Latin American country or prolongation of an extreme reign of terror) or the United States scores some brilliant coup de main, Castro will probably be able to benefit from the fruits of his victory for some time to come.

II. Objective

To plan, implement and sustain a program of covert action designed to exploit the economic, political and psychological vulnerabilities of the Castro regime. It is neither expected nor argued that the successful execution of this covert program will in itself result in the overthrow of the Castro regime. This plan should be viewed only as the covert contribution to an overall national program designed to accelerate the moral and physical disintegration of the Castro government and to hasten the day when a combination of actions and circumstances will make possible its replacement by a democratic government responsive to the needs, the aspirations and the will of the Cuban people.

III. Tasks

1. To achieve these objectives a series of short-term and long-term tasks will be undertaken. Wherever feasible and possible, these activities will be carried out under the aegis of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. However, since this will not always be practicable or desirable, for a variety of reasons, unilateral Agency operations and independent operations by acceptable groups and elements outside the framework of the Council will also be undertaken.

Short Term Tasks

A. Operational Intelligence Collection: Every effort will be made to improve and expand our capabilities for the collection of operational intelligence on Castroʼs plans, intentions and capabilities; on specific industrial, military and communications targets; on candidates for defection; on the morale of the civil population and the extent of its support of and discontent with the Castro regime. This will call for the strengthening of existing internal agent nets; the recruitment of legal travelers; the recruitment, training and infiltration of new agents; liaison with Cuban exile groups and individuals with independent access to targets, and the continuation and intensification of existing special intelligence efforts. B. Sabotage Operations Against Selected Targets: Sabotage operations will be planned and executed against such targets as refineries, power plants, micro wave stations, radio and TV installations, strategic highway bridges and railroad facilities, military and naval installations and equipment, certain industrial plants and sugar refineries. This will first require building up present capabilities through recruitment, training and infiltration of sabotage teams. C. Operations in Support of Guerrilla Activities: Operations will be planned and executed in support of guerrilla bands which exist or may emerge in the hills of Cuba utilizing both air and maritime operations for the delivery of arms and supplies and for the infiltration and exfiltration of personnel. Since we believe that there is little likelihood of significant accomplishments by guerrilla activities for some time to come, we will discourage offensive guerrilla activities at this time in order that the strength of such forces may be preserved for a more propitious moment. Depending on success in building solid, reasonably dependable and reasonably compartmented assets, in establishing communication with them, and equipping them, the scale of sabotage and guerrilla activities will be stepped up. Our first concern is the rebuilding of our internal nets and of our capability for mounting significant operations. D. Operations Directed at Defection of Castro Officials: Operations directed at defection, wherever possible in place, of well-placed officials of the Castro government and armed forces will be planned and executed. The objective is two-fold: (1) in the cases of defections in place, to gain an insight into the intentions, plans and capabilities of the regime, and (2) in the cases of open and publicized defections, to cause embarrassment and loss of prestige for the regime, especially in the rest of Latin America. E. Operations Directed at Destroying the Popular Image of Castro: In the field of psychological warfare, operations will be planned and executed aimed at destroying the image of Castro as a true revolutionary interested in the welfare of his people and the replacement of that image with one of a ruthless dictator who, under the false banners of revolutionary reform, has deprived his people of their basic liberties and turned their country into a Soviet satellite. This will require expansion of existing covert press, radio and other media assets outside of Cuba and the strengthening of clandestine propaganda mechanisms inside of Cuba, including underground printed propaganda, clandestine radio broadcasting stations, radio and TV intrusion operations. Also required will be a re-direction of Radio Swan activities, with the Revolutionary Council playing an important part in the programming of the Cuban propaganda effort. F. Operations Aimed at Strengthening the Prestige and Acceptability of the Revolutionary Council: Through all available propaganda warfare assets and mechanisms an effort will be made to strengthen the prestige of the Revolutionary Council and its programs, as well as the prestige of its individual members, in order to assure its acceptability as a provisional successor to the Castro regime. Through adoption of a program of political action an effort will be made (a) to maintain close and cordial contact with the Revolutionary Council for the purpose of providing unobtrusive guidance and material support for its organizational structure and its clandestine activities; (b) to improve the position of the Council by encouraging support of the Council by acceptable political groups and personalities who are now opposed to or do not recognize the Council as leadership of the opposition; (c) to encourage the Council to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards all acceptable political groups; and (d) to broaden its base to make it more representative of all political thought (with exclusion of extreme left and extreme right) and important social and economic sectors (church, labor, military, students, intellectuals, etc.)

2. Long Term Tasks:

A. Political Action: Develop friendly and close contact with leaders of the Revolutionary Council, and leaders (and/or potential leaders) of all political parties and social and economic sectors (church, labor, military, students, intellectuals, et al) in order to assure friendly and helpful contacts and attitudes towards the United States throughout the entire political and social spectrum during the post-Castro era. B. Intelligence: From existing and potential assets in Cuba and abroad develop and train unilateral agent networks in all walks of life in order to assure the Agency a flow of reliable and significant intelligence during the confused and chaotic period which will exist during the post-Castro era. C. Counter Intelligence: In coordination and cooperation with the Revolutionary Council create, train and support a highly motivated and professionally competent apolitical and career security service which will be dedicated to the preservation of the democratic form of government. Assign carefully selected and qualified Agency personnel to work with the service during the current and post-Castro eras. D. Psychological: Maintain and strengthen the excellent contacts and relations which now exist with exile press and radio entities and personalities in order to assure friendly and helpful contacts and attitudes within mass media circles during the post-Castro era.

IV. Assets Available

The following covert assets are believed to be in existence as of 1 May 1961: 1.

[6½ lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (2½ lines of source text) not declassified]

[9 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not declassified]

[1½ lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4½ lines of source text) not declassified]

4. Political Assets: The primary political assets are the members of the Revolutionary Council with our secondary assets being the other exile Cubans on the periphery of political activities with whom we are or easily can be in contact.

V. Recommendation

It is recommended that the above described program of covert action, designed to exploit any economic, political and psychological vulnerabilities of the Castro regime, be approved.

Annex “A” Washington, May 20, 1961. 1. Practical experience acquired over the past year has taught us certain lessons with respect to security and operational problems in carrying out a covert program of this magnitude. If errors are to be corrected and unwanted publicity avoided, there are certain realities which must be faced at the inception of the Project and certain “ground rules” which must be agreed upon. The more important of these factors are described below briefly but clearly in order that they may be given due consideration at the time this paper is submitted for approval. 2.

Training: Training will have to be provided for relatively small groups. With one exception, we feel this must be accomplished outside the Miami area for security reasons. That one exception relates to the training of singleton communicators (W/T operators). Training of such personnel can be carried out in safe houses. If this is done in the southeast of the United States the training can be tied in with practical work with our major covert communications base in the Miami area.

Small Boat Operations: Secure and suitable areas within the United Stares for training in small boat operations are required. Such training will involve relatively few men at a time. We are exploring the possibility of using a deactivated Navy facility at [1 line of source text not declassified]. Other appropriate sites will be sought in the Florida Keys, the West Coast of Florida, and the Gulf of Mexico area. The point is the training should be carried out in the United States where maximum security can be applied.

Sabotage Training: We propose to train up to thirty men at a time in resistance techniques, including the use of demolitions and other sabotage devices. It will be necessary that a site or sites be selected that are either sufficiently remote from centers of population or of such a nature (military installation) that the use of explosives and demolitions will be plausibly explained. If areas in the United States cannot be found, this type of training might well be carried out in the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] (where we have certain facilities) or on the island of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has a number of separate training sites with capacity for training up to twenty men each in trade craft, resistance techniques (including sabotage). Because of the coral reefs, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] would not be suitable for small boat training.

Radio Operators: In addition to the training of singleton radio operators (which must be closely compartmented), we also propose to train singleton W/T operators and specialist cadres [3½ lines of source text not declassified], although not necessarily in that order of priority.

3. Cuban Air Crews: We propose to maintain control over some Cuban pilots, navigators and ground crews for future operations. They would be placed under commercial air cover (our own proprietary setups) where they will be able to maintain their proficiency and where they will be readily available for operational missions such as re-supply air drops, leaflet raids and, if the need should ever arise, air strikes. 4. American Contract Air and Maritime Personnel: It has been our experience that Cuban pilots do not have the capability of carrying out, with any degree of assured success, night air drops. Most of the deliveries attempted during the past year missed their marks and were either lost or fell into enemy hands. Consequently, if the need arises for extensive air deliveries of arms and supplies to guerrillas in the Cuban mountains, authority must be granted to employ American contract personnel as pilots and navigators in conjunction with Cuban crews. American contract personnel, but to a lesser degree, will also be needed for the successful execution of maritime operations (supply deliveries, infiltration and exfiltration of agents) and, if the need arises, for participation in raider-type sabotage operations. 5. Use of Bases in United States: Geographical reasons, supported by our experience, dictate the need for the use of United States maritime and air facilities for the staging of sabotage, in-exfiltration, supply, raider and propaganda operations. While we may have access to the Nicaraguan base for occasional air deliveries to Cuba, the distance is too great and the political hazards too uncertain for us to place our entire dependency on that one facility, especially if the guerrilla and resistance movements reach such proportions that almost daily re-supply operations are called for.

224. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All PostsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-2061. Official Use Only; Priority. Drafted in ARA by Hurwitch. Cleared in ARA, P, by Achilles, and by Goodwin at the White House. Washington, May 20, 1961, 5:38 p.m.

1840. Castro in May 17 speech offered exchange for 500 bulldozers approximately 1200 prisoners captured during unsuccessful April 17 attempt by Cuban patriots liberate their country. Press reports today Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, and Walter P. Reuther cabled Castro they would assume responsibility raise funds from private non-governmental sources purchase 500 agricultural tractors. They said their proposal not response to demand for political ransom but made out of common humanity.

U.S. Government not sponsoring and in no way connected with this effort prominent American citizens. However for humanitarian reasons we sympathize with this initiative.

In response inquiries Missions may draw upon foregoing but are urged exercise caution and at this stage avoid any expression regarding probable outcome these negotiations. FYI. Castro has laid down number of conditions for exchange which this private group may find difficult to accept or fulfill.These conditions were outlined in a memorandum sent to Goodwin on May 20 by Department of State Executive Secretary Lucius D. Battle. Castro made the offer in a speech on May 17, and expanded on the conditions attached to the offer in a speech on May 19. Battle included extracts from the two speeches in his memorandum to Goodwin, and he summarized the conditions laid down by Castro as follows: “1. Intermediaries such as the Red Cross are not necessary. “2. At the rate that bulldozer tractors are delivered prisoners will be delivered to start with ‘the least important to the more important… Let the tractors come on the ferry and the groups of invaders will go on the ferryʼ. “3. ‘The compensation must be made with all guarantees. And the equipment must be in perfect condition. They must have, for example, replacement parts, of course.ʼ “4. Manuel Artime (a member of the Revolutionary Council) is considered separately. He must be exchanged for Francisco Molina, a Cuban now facing trial in the United States for murder.” (Ibid.) End FYI.

Bowles

225. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Tracy Barnes. Washington, May 24, 1961. SUBJECT Discussion with Mr. Goodwin, 24 May 1961

Mr. Bissell and I discussed Cuba with Mr. Goodwin in his office on 24 May. It was agreed that his associateAn apparent reference to Arthur Schlesinger. does not want to make any definitive decisions regarding action against Cuba prior to his return from his European trip (about 6 or 7 June) and is anxious during the next two weeks to restrict to a minimum activities which might cause disturb-ances or publicity. This latter desire is accentuated by the interest in having the tractor deal negotiations completed with as little interference as possible. With these premises in mind, it was agreed that the following activities would not, if undertaken, cause any difficulty or conflict.

1. Continuation of FI type activities, including efforts to maintain or reconstruct existing nets and to create new nets. 2. Training of radio operators, if done on a truly covert basis, i.e., individual by individual and preferably, though not necessarily, outside of the Miami area. In this connection, for the next two weeks, trainees should be those selected by CIA from its own contacts rather than accept-ance of candidates from, e.g., MRP or the UR. 3. Taking steps to provide employment of selected Cuban pilots and ground crews. 4. Undertake negotiations with Somoza in an effort to achieve working relationships with him which might include a limited, cautious use of Puerto Cabezas. This will probably require at least the transfer of some B-26ʼs to the GON and may in addition involve some training of Nicaraguan pilots. If Somoza insists on the latter, it should not be done by Americans but, perhaps, it could be worked out on contract with some company whose instructors might be Cubans. 5. Initiate no negotiations with the Council or other groups with respect to support of covert operations. If pressed, however, the position in each instance should be that the Council, or group in question, should produce a prospectus along the lines already given to the MRP showing what it is believed can be accomplished, what type of activities will be undertaken, extent of U.S. support required (both immediately and over a period of time) and proposed relationships both with the U.S. and the Council. No commitments are to be made under these prospectuses until proper internal U.S. approval is obtained from the 5412 Group. 6. Carry out necessary internal CIA reorganization with a view to preparing for the future and with particular emphasis on removing from dealings with the Cubans (especially in Miami) those individuals who were connected with the former project. 7. Obtain from the Council, presumably through Miro, a statement of what parts of the Council it is believed should be retained and an estimated budget for the continuation of same. 8. Put in as definitive form as possible plans for future covert activity including all aspects, i.e. FI, CA and PM. This will involve some decision as to what to do with Swan Island, particularly now that USIA has refused to accept it.Barnes sent a copy of this memorandum to Dulles on May 24, with a covering memorandum in which he stated: “Unless the Special Group decides to the contrary, the Agency proposes to undertake the activities listed on the attached and will submit to the Special Group additional recommendations for further activities as soon as they have been prepared.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 67-01083R, Box 1, C.T. Barnes Chrono, Jan-Jul 1961) C. Tracy BarnesPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

226. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret. Although the memorandum does not have a standard to-from heading, it was apparently prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency in response to a request from the Cuba Study Group for additional information relating to the Bay of Pigs operation. Washington, May 31, 1961. SUBJECT What briefing, if any, was given the Brigade or the Brigadeʼs staff on going guerrilla REFERENCE Paragraph F. of Memorandum Dated 22 May 1961Not further identified.

The following is a summation of actions involving preparation and instruction for contingency employment of the 2506 Brigade in the event elements of the Brigade or the unit in total suffered defeat and were forced to operate as guerrillas.

1. All officers and the original cadre (some 375 personnel) which formed the 2506 Brigade received extensive instruction (in excess of 13 weeks) in guerrilla warfare organization, tactics and techniques. It was with considerable difficulty and only after strenuous instruction on conventional operations that the officers of the Brigade were weaned from their marked inclination to guerrilla operations. Many of the unit leaders had in fact operated as guerrillas either with Castro forces in the fight against Batista or in the later operations against Castro after he had seized power. 2. During the evening staff and operations classes conducted during the Brigade training cycle extending from November 1960 through March 1961, several discussions were held on the subject of a conventional force defeated in the field and forced to continue resistance as a guerrilla element. Circumstances and ways of means of organizing and operating in various parts of Cuba were discussed in detail. These discussions did not cover the Zapata area specifically for security reasons, but covered the other feasible areas to include the Escambrays, Pinar del Rio and the Oriente. These discussions were not covered with any specific direction towards the Brigade operation in these locales, but were in the nature of contingency operations planning, i.e., “in the event we suffered defeat and it was physically possible, we would attempt to break contact and retire to a redoubt area where we would initiate guerrilla activities.” The stated mission of the Brigade for which it was organized and trained was to land by sea and air and fight a conventional conflict as an organized military force. At no time did the Brigade once organized receive training to fight as a guerrilla force. To have attempted to conduct such training would have detracted from the purpose for which the Brigade was organized and would have been detrimental to morale. An indigenous force of the size of the Brigade cannot be organized and trained in the time allocated to concurrently accomplish both missions (conventional military role and guerrilla force role) satisfactorily. 4. [sic] During the pre-staging briefings of commanders and key staff officers at the training base in Guatemala (period 25 March to 7 April 1961) the operation plan (less locale and target date) were briefed to the Brigade Commander, Deputy Commander and S-3. Contingency provision in the event of the defeat of the Brigade involving fragmentation of the unit and attempts to initiate guerrilla operations were discussed. It was mutually agreed that these contingency plans would be discussed only down to the level of battalion commanders prior to the landing to avoid defeatist talk and apprehension concerning success of the operation. These discussions covered both the aspects of an element or elements of the Brigade becoming cut off from the main body and attempting to break contact with the enemy, and assume guerrilla posture, as well as the possibility of the Brigade as a whole being cut off from the sea as it advanced inland and the possibility of its assuming a defense in a redoubt area or fragmenting for guerrilla operations. It was mutually agreed that no specific plans for this eventuality could be pre-planned insofar as ground actions were concerned due both to the security provisions prohibiting early briefing of any Cuban personnel as to the specific locale of the landing and the circumstances surrounding the combat action which might lead to an element or the whole of the Brigade to assume such a contingency plan. However, the following general provisions governing such operation were mutually agreed to: a. Resupply to the Brigade would be primarily by air with secondary reliance on clandestine maritime craft. Drop procedures would be provided for in the Operation Plan. b. Communications would be directed to the base control outside the target area by the five RS-1ʼs and seven TPL radios in operation with the Brigade. (Not in the command commo trailer.) c. Tactical integrity would be preserved wherever possible and the operational size of guerrilla units would be dictated by the specific local conditions prevalent in the operation area. d. Command lines would be preserved with the Brigade Commander or his designated representative, preferably a senior unit commander exercising operational control of specific operational areas. e. Local recruits and volunteers would be accepted but the Brigade would maintain the 2506 personnel in command and key positions in all formations. f. Local law and customs would be observed, provisions or resources commandeered would be paid for or receipts given. g. Terrorist operations affecting personnel other than GOC governmental or military personnel would be avoided. 5. At Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, subsequent to briefing on the target area, these contingency provisions were further discussed with the same individuals (Brigade Commander, Deputy Commander and S-3) with further specifics addressed to the terrain of the Zapata area. The following points were covered: a. Red Beach Task Force (2nd Bn, 5th Bn and CO. A of 1st Airborne Bn) would hold Red Beach area in the event Blue Beach was forced to withdraw to the north. Blue Beach Force would withdraw to the north along the coast road. Upon junction with Red Beach Task Force at the head of the bay, the Brigade would withdraw to the south and west into the greater Zapata area, breaking contact with the enemy and assuming guerrilla operational status or preparing for evacuation in increments as feasible. Alternate courses of action (evacuation or guerrilla status) were to be implemented as dictated by the circumstances. b. In the event Red Beach was cut off by the enemy from contact with Blue Beach, the same course of action was to be followed by the Red Beach Force. If, however, the coast road to the Blue Beach area was open and the Blue Beach Force holding, the Red Beach Force was to retire to the south to effect junction with Blue Beach. c. Blue Beach Force, if cut off from Red Beach and capable of breaking out, was to move as appropriate to either or both the following areas bordering Blue Beach and attempt to evade pursuit and initiate guerrilla operations. (1) The area bounded on the north by El Jiqui and the Jaguey Grande Red Beach road to the northeastern edge of the swamp and thence south to the Covadonga/San Blas road and the road southwest to Playa Giron. (2) The area to the east and north of Blue Beach bounded by the Playa Giron, San Blas, Covadonga road on the west thence southeast along the edge of the swamp to the western edge of Cienfuegos Bay. d. It was mutually agreed that this plan might not be feasible if either major force (Red or Blue) were closely pressed by the enemy. Evacuation by sea was deemed undesirable by the three officers concerned who stated that they must fight and win or go down in defeat without recourse to evacuation and that they would not consider or discuss evacuation. 6. The Brigade Commander prior to embarkation stated that he had discussed the details of this contingency plan with the commanders he considered appropriate. He stated that he considered this plan to be particularly suitable for the small airborne contingents dropping on DZʼs 4 and 5 at Jocuma and San Miguel de Pita respectively. This contingency was further discussed with the Airborne Battalion Commander De Valle on the night of 17 April prior to takeoff. 7. In summation it must be stated that little interest or enthusiasm was displayed by the Brigade personnel concerned for any aspect of the plan that involved retreat and defeat, to include this contingency for guerrilla operations plan. It was generally recognized and openly stated by the key officers that any military force involved in an airborne/amphibious landing and subsequent field operations against an enemy defending his homeland would have an extremely difficult time assuming a guerrilla role in any substantive force subsequent to defeat in the field. The defeat itself implied that the enemy in close combat had surrounded or ruptured and destroyed the Brigade as a military force, thus allowing only a fraction of its combat effectives to escape to assume a role as escapees and evaders with a limited potential for later guerrilla operations.

227. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer) to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that McNamaraʼs office received the memorandum on June 9. CM-224-61 Washington, June 8, 1961. SUBJECT Cuba

In response to your request, the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, in consultation with the Central Intelligence Agency, has prepared an estimate of usable guerrilla areas, the political-police control mechanism, key pro-Castro sub-leaders, and possible guerrilla centers in Cuba, enclosed herewith.

L.L. LemnitzerPrinted from a copy that indicates Lemnitzer signed the original.

Enclosure

CUBA

1. Preamble. It is impossible to estimate the amount of really hard-core pro-Castro residual which would remain in Cuba after the overthrow of Castro. Many factors would contribute to increase or decrease the guerrilla potential facing any successor government. Some of these factors are: a. Degree of acceptability of new government to Cuban population. b. Policy of new government with regard to good agrarian reforms instituted by Castro. c. Extent of vindictiveness practiced by new governmental bureaucracy against Castroites. d. Efficiency with which campaign to overthrow Castro was executed and degree of success quickly attained. Almost all factual information on Cuba is old. New information is very fragmentary and mostly laced with gossip, rumor, and propaganda. Current sources are not considered trained intelligence observers and their information is not subject to check or confirmation, hence is of little value. Any estimate on Cuba at this time must necessarily be based on background rather than current information. 2. Pro-Castro Areas of Cuba a. Geographically. Pro-Castro sentiment exists throughout the island. The degree to which a particular area or province should be regarded as pro-Castro or anti-Castro cannot be determined with any precision. Localities which, on the surface, appear mostly pro-Castro might react violently anti-Castro if the political-police control apparatus were removed or if US forces were in the area. We have no reliable evidence upon which to base a precise judgment that certain geographic areas are more or less pro-Castro than others but Havana province and parts of Oriente province are probably the most pro-Castro localities. b. Sociologically. Within the Cuban society, Castroʼs principal support comes from the peasant or campesino group and the underprivileged. Identification of these groups with the Castro regime has given them a sense of importance in the Cuban scene far beyond that which they formerly enjoyed. Continued identification with Castro promises them a far better life than they heretofore had any reason to expect. Many of these people have become so tied to the Castro regime by their own acts that their lives would be forfeit under any successor government. Hence, it is probable that many of them would at least attempt to flee to the hills and continue to fight if Castro was able to gain sanctuary in the mountains. Important Castro strength also exists in the ranks of urban labor and among the students although in both groups considerable anti-Castro sentiment is evident. The Havana Dock Workers Union and the Electrical Trades Union have both exhibited displeasure over working conditions and pay scales under Castro. The students are angry over the loss of autonomy of their institutions of learning, long a Latin American tradition, and there have been some anti-Castro manifestations as a result. However, offsetting factors include the infusion of many rural students by Castro who would otherwise have been unable to attend. c. Governmental. The large governmental bureaucracy which extends into every province, city, town, village, and hamlet on the island can be regarded as staunchly pro-Castro, although defections do occur from time to time. All governmental officials including the rural police owe their jobs to loyalty to and support of Castro. However, it is probable that, faced with the overthrow of Castroʼs government, many of these people would immediately switch sides. 3. Areas Favorable for Guerrilla Activity. (See Appendix “A”)Appendix A, not printed, is a map of Cuba with the areas cited in the text highlighted. Traditionally, the mountainous areas of Cuba have been used for guerrilla activity, and these areas still provide the most favorable areas from which to conduct this type of activity. Suitable areas exist in Pinar del Rio province (Sierra de los Organos and Sierra del Rosario), Las Villas province (Sierra de Trinidad, also known as Sierra de Escambray), and Oriente province (Sierra Maestra, Sierra del Cristal, and Cuchillas de Toar). Historically, the Peninsula de Zapata has also harbored guerrilla bands, but because of the difficulties of egress, especially in the rainy season, has not seen extensive use. 4. Political-Police Control Mechanism a. Provincial Organization. The political-police mechanism in Cuba is based on the provincial organization and all provinces follow the same pattern. Each province has a rural police regiment whose headquarters is located in the provincial capital city. Subordinate to the police regiment are a reserve company and several police squadrons each of approximately 165 officers and men, varying in numbers according to the size of the province and the number of important urban localities in the province. Squadron headquarters are located in the principal towns in the province. Squadrons, in turn, establish police posts (usually 8-10 men each) in the smaller towns and villages, and patrol outlying areas and beaches. Communication is via both police and commercial facilities, including radio communication with patrol vehicles. Under Castro, a system of “block informants” has been established which keeps the police informed of anti-Castro or counter-revolutionary activities. Local part-time militia units are based on the local police post or squadron headquarters where their arms are normally stored and where orders are received. b. National Organization. Rural police regiments are controlled from Havana by the Ministry of Armed Forces. The total strength of the Rural Police (a part of the Army) is 9,600. Within Havana itself, police power is exercised by the National Police, a force of about 9,000 whose current subordination is unknown. The National Police have not heretofore been a part of the Cuban Armed Forces. 5. Key Pro-Castro Sub-Leaders. In view of the paucity of credible information currently coming out of Cuba, any listing of key sub-leaders would necessarily be based on past, rather than current, performance. Further, given Castroʼs penchant for rapidly disposing of “friends” who do not fully agree with him, it may rapidly be outdated. However, the list of personalities at Appendix “B”Not printed. represents some of the key second and third line leaders as nearly as can be determined at this time. Additional names are filed by the intelligence community and are watched as information becomes available. However, it can be assumed that all governmental and military leaders including local mayors, governors, cabinet ministers and sub-ministers could be considered in the key sub-leader category. 6. Possible Guerrilla Centers. As indicated in paragraph 3 supra, certain areas of Cuba lend themselves favorably to guerrilla activity. However, the exact location of guerrilla centers could only be determined after they develop, with one notable exception. In January 1961, a report from a trained observer in Cuba indicated that arms and ammunition were being placed in an abandoned mine in the Sierra Maestra in Oriente province. Since that time, additional reports have indicated that a military camp was under construction at the same place, the remnants of the only parachute-trained unit in the Cuban Army are reported stationed there, and the same area has been used to train Latin American youths invited to Cuba for revolutionary training. Significantly, this area was Fidel Castroʼs base before his successful seizure of power from Batista, and knowing the difficulties he experienced in obtaining arms and ammunition during his stay on the Pico Turquino in the Sierra Maestra, it is a logical place for his stockpiling weapons against the possibility of his overthrow. This location is known as Minas del Frio. It must be noted, however, that there is no evidence of recent date to confirm this analysis. 7. If the Cuban populace failed to support the overthrow of Castro and chose to support pro-Castro guerrilla bands, the following general areas could become guerrilla centers and might possibly support guerrilla populations as noted: Province Area Supportable Guerrilla Population Pinar del Rio Sierra de los Organos 100 Sierra del Rosario 100 Las Villas Sierra de Trinidad 2,000 Oriente Sierra Maestra 5,000 Sierra del Cristal 300 Cuchillas de Toar 200

Guerrillas in these areas would exist by foraging on the local population for food, clothing, and medical supplies.

228. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President KennedySource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Cuba 1961 121-353. Confidential. Drafted by Mountain. Washington, June 8, 1961. SUBJECT Service of Cuban Volunteers in U.S. Armed Forces

In response to your instruction at the NSC meeting of 5 May 1961,See Document 204. the Department of Defense has prepared the attached programNot printed. to enable Cuban volunteers to serve in the U.S. armed forces.

There is at present no census of the Cuban exile population in the United States which accurately reflects the number of males between the military ages of 17 to 26. However, from figures supplied by the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami, out of a total of 25,000 of all ages registered at the center, 17,350 are adults of whom approximately 75% fall within the 35-50 age group. On this basis it appears likely that no more than 3,500 are of military age. If this figure represents the upper limit, the number who would be interested in volunteering for service with the U.S. armed forces will probably be considerably smaller. In the absence of a census, the plan has assumed that the number of volunteers will be not more than 2,000 and may be as few as 800.

There are some legal barriers to the enlistment of aliens in the U.S. armed forces. These barriers, however, do not prevent their voluntary induction if they are between the ages of 18-26. It is therefore planned to make use of the existing mechanisms of the U.S. Selective Service System to provide special quotas for induction into the three services of Cuban volunteers in this age group as they become identified and available. An exception in the law allows the enlistment of aliens up to age 31 in the regular Navy and up to age 28 in the regular Marine Corps. The plan makes use of this provision as well.

Special measures for security screening have been stipulated.

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has agreed to provide and fund any needed English language training prior to actual induction of volunteers. The purpose of this arrangement is to avoid the necessity for assembling Cuban personnel in one place for training under military auspices. With their English language training completed before entry into the armed services, Cubans can be processed and trained as individuals along with U.S. personnel. In addition, this arrangement assures the military services of trainable people from the start, and will tend to cut down attrition rates after induction.

Although the Cuban volunteers will join the armed forces as individuals and will be trained as such along with U.S. personnel, the military services will be given informal instructions to make provisions for readily identifying and locating each of these volunteers should it ever become necessary.

The services will be required to give these volunteers the most advanced individual training possible. However, assignment to training or duty requiring access to classified information will be held to a minimum.

No increase in manpower ceilings is proposed. Once language training has been funded by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, additional costs to the military services for the processing of these volunteers can be handled within present budgets.On July 10 McNamara sent a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force indicating that the President had concurred in the program for the induction of Cuban volunteers into the U.S. armed forces, outlined in thismemorandum. McNamara instructed that the program be implemented by each of the services as quickly as possible. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Cuba 1961 121-353)

Robert S. McNamaraPrinted from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

229. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Secret; Hold Closely. Prepared by Admiral Burke. Washington, June 13, 1961. SUBJECT Meeting with the President and the Taylor Group at 1700, 13 June 1961 PRESENT The President General Taylor The Attorney General Admiral Burke Mr. Allen Dulles 1. General Taylor outlined what we had found in the Cuban matter. He went over the recommendationsSee Document 234. at great length. The President was quite interested in the recommendations on the cold war organization. That is, the Strategic Resources Board, suggested in the first recommendation. General Taylor told him all the advantages of the thing. That they needed such a board, that this would coordinate the activities of State, Defense and Intelligence and other agencies. He gave all the benefits of it. The President was quite taken with it. 2. After General Taylor got through I said that this thing might not work as well as it would seem on the surface. There was great danger in this because if the Man became an assistant President, it would be very difficult to operate with State and Defense. In addition to that if the staff grew, and I thought that it would grow because of the habits of staffs in Washington, then the staff would surely impinge upon the duties of State and Defense and they would quite rightfully become concerned about this new agency taking over their duties. Furthermore, that there was such a thing as passive resistance and that if for any reason people in State or Defense thought that this new agency was taking over, there would be conflict and differences of opinion and the activities would not be well done. In addition to that, if this man started to give military advice there would be difficulties between him and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 3.

This, the President listened to but I think he discounted the difficulties a great deal. In any case, he discussed the advantages at great length but did not discuss the disadvantages except to state that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State should both be briefed very carefully before the idea was suddenly sprung on them. This was to get them acclimated to the idea.

Comment: I still think that the idea has a slight chance of working. It was quite evident that Taylor is to be given the job because during the conversation, the President said that he wanted to speak with Taylor for about half an hour sometime tomorrow, Wednesday.

4. They went over the other recommendations, with which the President agreed. 5. It was decided that there would be two meetings, one on Thursday or Friday morning, which would brief the Cuban affair.No record of this meeting has been found. Present at this meeting would be the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Bissell, other leading people from CIA, Mr. McGeorge Bundy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There would be a second meeting on Monday or Tuesday, which would go over the recommendations with approximately the same group.A record of this meeting, which took place on June 19, is in the Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Before this meeting, however, General Taylor and the rest of us would have to get together with Mr. McNamara and Mr. Rusk. 6. I pointed out to General Taylor that I thought Mr. McNamara, and perhaps others, were going down to a tactical exercise in Camp LeJeune on Friday. This didnʼt seem to have much effect but Taylor said that he would look into it. 7. I also mentioned that I was to go to the hospital and they asked if that could be postponed and I said of course it could, so I may have to postpone my trip to the hospital. 8. It was decided that there would be no report and that the President would make some sort of release that he had received recommendations and was studying them and expected to put some of them into effect. 9. There was considerable discussion as to what might have happened had they had air superiority. It was pointed out that there was a difference of opinion between General Taylor and Bobby Kennedy and Mr. Dulles and myself on that. The President read that. 10. The President seemed to be in pain, but seemed to be satisfied with the report in general. This meeting lasted for about an hour so there was considerable discussion on some of the details, most of which were not too important. I did bring out that General SomozaThe reference is to the President of Nicaragua. had talked with me and that General Somoza wanted to conduct another revolution, which I thought was a good thing but the President said, “here we go again.” Arleigh BurkePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

230. Letter From the Chairman of the Cuba Study Group (Taylor) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret. Washington, June 13, 1961.

Dear Mr. President: By your letter of April 22, 1961,See the source note, Document 169. you charged me in association with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to study our governmental practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla activity which fell short of outright war with a view to strengthening our work in this area. You directed special attention to the lessons which can be learned from the recent events in Cuba.

On May 16, our Cuban Study Group submitted to you an interim oral report of our conclusions as of that date.See Documents 218 and 219. We are now prepared to make our final report to you orally,See Document 229. supported by the following memoranda: Memorandum No. 1 “Narrative of the Anti-Castro Operation Zapata” Memorandum No. 2 “Immediate Causes of Failure of the Operation Zapata” Memorandum No. 3 “Conclusions of the Cuban Study Group” Memorandum No. 4 “Recommendations of the Cuban Study Group”These four memoranda are printed as Documents 231–234.

In your letter of April 22, you invited me to submit an individual report subject to the review and comment of my associates. As we have found no difficulty in reaching a unanimous view on all essential points under consideration, we are submitting this view as a jointly agreed study.

In closing, may I express our view of the great importance of a prompt implementation of our first recommendation to establish a Strategic Resources Group supported by a Cold War Indications Center which will allow our government readily to focus its resources on the objectives which you set in the so-called Cold War. We feel that we are losing today on many fronts and that the trend can be reversed only by a whole-hearted union of effort by all Executive departments and agencies of the Government under your guidance.

Sincerely yours,

Maxwell D. Taylor

231. Memorandum No. 1 From the Cuba Study Group to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. Washington, June 13, 1961.

NARRATIVE OF THE ANTI-Castro CUBAN OPERATION ZAPATA

I. Development of the Concept and Plan

1. Although the Cuban situation had been the subject of serious study in the Special Group,The Special Group, sometimes called the 5412 Committee, consists of a Deputy Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Director, Central Intelligence and the Specia Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and meets weekly to consider covert operations conducted by the CIA under the authority of NSC 5412/2. [Footnote in the source text.] Central Intelligence Agency and other Government agencies since 1958, this study takes as its point of departure the basic policy paper, “A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime,” approved by the President on 17 March 1960. (See Annex 1)The annexes cited in this memorandum were attached but are not printed. Some of the documents included in the annexes are printed, as noted in footnotes below. The March 17, 1960, policy paper cited here is printed in Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. VI, pp. 850–851. This document, developed by the Central Intelligence Agency and indorsed by the Special Group, provided a program divided into four parts to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime by covert means: a. The creation of a responsible and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime located outside of Cuba. b. The development of means for mass communication to the Cuban people as a part of a powerful propaganda offensive. c. The creation and development of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which would be responsive to the orders and directions of the exile opposition. d. The development of a paramilitary force outside of Cuba for future guerrilla action.

2. Since the primary purpose of this study is to examine the paramilitary actions growing out of this program and its successive modifications, the paragraph referring to the paramilitary aspects of the plan is quoted in its entirety;

“d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistics support of covert military operations on the island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the United States so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air supply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.”

3. It is apparent from the above excerpt that at the time of approval of this document the concept of paramilitary action was limited to the recruitment of a cadre of leaders and the training of a number of paramilitary cadres for subsequent use as guerrillas in Cuba.

4. The CIA began at once to implement the decisions contained in the policy paper on 17 March 1960. A target of 300 men was set for the recruitment of guerrillas to be trained covertly outside the United States. Radio SWAN was installed on Swan Island and ready for broadcasting on 17 May 1960. (See Annex 2) Steps were taken to develop the FRD (Frente Revolucionario Democratico) as the Cuban front organization composed of a broad spectrum of Cuban political elements other than Communists and Batistianos. (See Annex 3) On August 18th, a progress report was given to the President and the Cabinet, at which time a budget of some $13 million was approved, as well as the use of Department of Defense personnel and equipment. However, it was specified at this time that no United States military personnel were to be used in a combat status.

5. Sometime in the summer of 1960 the paramilitary concept for the operation began to change. It appears that leaders in the CIA Task Force set up in January 1960 to direct the project were the first to entertain the thought of a Cuban strike force to land on the Cuban coast in supplementation of the guerrilla action contemplated under the March 17, 1960 paper. These CIA officers began to consider the formation of a small force of infantry (200-300 men) for contingency employment in conjunction with other paramilitary operations, and in June began to form a small Cuban tactical air force. Eventually it was decided to equip this force with B-26 aircraft which had been widely distributed to foreign countries including countries in Latin America.

6. There were ample reasons for this new trend of thought. The air drops into Cuba were not proving effective. There were increasingly heavy shipments of Communist arms to Cuba, accompanied by evidence of increasingly effective control of the civilian population by Castro. The Special Group became aware of these adverse factors which were discussed repeatedly in the Committee meetings during the fall of 1960. The minutes of the conferences indicate a declining confidence in the effectiveness of guerrilla efforts alone to overthrow Castro.

7. In this atmosphere the CIA began to implement the new concept, increasing the size of the Cuban force in training and reorienting the training toward preparation for its use as an assault force on the Cuban coast. On November 4th, CIA in Washington dispatched a cable to the project officer in Guatemala describing what was wanted. (See Annex 4) The cable directed a reduction of the guerrilla teams in training to 60 men and the introduction of conventional training for the remainder as an amphibious and airborne assault force. From that time on, the training emphasis was placed on the assault mission and there is no evidence that the members of the assault force received any further preparation for guerrilla-type operations. The men became deeply imbued with the importance of the landing operation and its superiority over any form of guerrilla action to the point that it would have been difficult later to persuade them to return to a guerrilla-type mission. The final training of the Cubans was done by 38 U.S. Army Special Forces personnel under Lt. Colonel David Crowe who arrived on January 13 in the training camp in Guatemala where 400-500 Cubans had been assembled.

8. As mentioned in paragraph 5 above, in order to prepare for this operation, the CIA had been obliged early to organize a task force for planning the operation, and then later was to adjust that organization to the execution phase. (See Annexes 5 & 6) In both phases the task force commander, Mr. J.D. Esterline, reported upward through Mr. R.M. Bissell, Deputy Director, Plans, to General C.P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, Mr. Allen Dulles. The latter, while accepting full responsibility for the operation, generally did not inject himself into military operational matters.

9. During the early months of the development of the plan, the Director,CIA looked to the 5412 Committee (Special Group) for guidance and approval of his covert plans for Cuba. In the period December 10, 1960 to February 8, 1961, former Ambassador Whiting Willauer and Mr. Tracy Barnes of CIA were charged with keeping the President and the Secretary of State informed. By the end of January following the change in administration, the President assisted by a restricted group of advisors from the National Security Council took over the function of approval and the 5412 Committee tended to recede from a position of responsibility. However, the Director of Central Intelligence continued to keep the Committee informed of the covert aspects of the plan.

10. The Director of Central Intelligence briefed the President on the new paramilitary concept on 29 November 1960 and received the indication that the President wished the project expedited. The concept was formally presented to the Special Group on December 8, 1960. At this meeting, Colonel Jack Hawkins, USMC, in charge of the paramilitary section for the Cuba project, described the new concept as one consisting of an amphibious landing on the Cuban coast of 600-750 men equipped with weapons of extraordinarily heavy fire power. The landing would be preceded by preliminary air strikes launched from Nicaragua against military targets. Air strikes as well as supply flights would continue after the landing. The objective would be to seize, hold a limited area in Cuba, maintain a visible presence, and then to draw dissident elements to the landing force, which hopefully would trigger a general uprising. This amphibious landing would not entirely eliminate the previous concept for infiltrating guerrilla teams. It was expected that some 60-80 men would be infiltrated prior to the amphibious landing.

11. The Special Group was also briefed on the quality of the Cuban force in training in Guatemala. Lt. Colonel Frank Egan, the Army officer on duty with CIA in charge of training, described the superior characteristics of the individuals, particularly as to motivation, intelligence, and leadership qualities. He expressed the opinion that such a force would have no difficulty inflicting heavy casualties on a much larger militia force.

12. There is no evidence that the Special Group formally approved this plan at the time but the CIA representatives were encouraged to continue in its development. A comment was made at the meeting that the existence of the U.S.-backed force of Cubans in training was well known throughout Latin America.

13. During this period the CIA Task Force headquarters for the projects was developing a detailed operation plan to support the new concept. It is referred to in this study as Operation Trinidad, named after the Cuban town on the southeast coast which was to be the site of the amphibious landing. On January 11th, Ambassador Willauer representing State and Mr. Barnes of CIA first discussed with representatives of the Joint Staff the over-all problem of effecting the overthrow of Castro. As a result, a working committee including representation of CIA, State, Defense, and the JCS was formed to coordinate future actions in pursuit of this objective. At this meeting the Trinidad Plan as such was not discussed.

14. At about this time, the change in the national administration produced a break in the continuity of the development of the plan. On January 22nd, several members of the new administration including Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Bowles, and Mr. Robert Kennedy were introduced to the Cuba project at a briefing at the State Department. General Lemnitzer and Mr. Dulles were also present. A Joint Staff concept was presented by General Lemnitzer of the U.S. directed or supported actions in ascending order necessary to overthrow Castro.

15. Early in January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that there was need for an over-all United States plan of action for the overthrow of Castro and produced a paper, JCSM-44-61Document 28. (See Annex 7), in which they recommended the institution of an interdepartmental group to consider various courses of action in ascending degree of U.S. involvement, which, after approval by the President, would become an over-all plan to be supported by subordinate plans prepared by the agencies concerned. This recommendation reached the Secretary of Defense, but appears to have been lost in the activities arising out of the change in administration.

16. On November 18, 1960, President-elect Kennedy had first learned of the existence of a plan for the overthrow of Castro through a call on him at Palm Beach by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell. He received his first briefing on the developing plan as President on January 28 at a meeting which included the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretary Mann, Assistant Secretary Nitze, Mr. Tracy Barnes, and Mr. McGeorge Bundy.See Documents 30 and 31. (See Annex 8) After considerable discussion, the President authorized the following: a. A continuation and accentuation of current activities of the CIA, including increased propaganda, increased political action, and increased sabotage. Continued overflights of Cuba were specifically authorized. b. The Defense Department was to review CIA proposals for the active deployment of anti-Castro Cuban forces on Cuban territory and the results of this analysis were to be promptly reported to the CIA. c. The State Department was to prepare a concrete proposal for action with other Latin American countries to isolate the Castro regime and to bring against it the judgment of the Organization of American States. It was expected that this proposal would involve a commitment of the Presidentʼs personal authority behind a special mission or missions to such Latin American leaders as Lleras, Betancourt, and Quadros.

17. Following this meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertook to evaluate Plan Trinidad in the form developed by the CIA up to that point. The Chiefs approved and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 3 February 1961, JCSM-57-61, “Military Evaluation of the CIA Paramilitary Plan—Cuba.”Document 35. (See Annex 9) The evaluation was summarized in paragraphs 1 p and 1 q as follows: “In summary, evaluation of the current plan results in a favorable assessment, modified by the specific conclusions set forth above, of the likelihood of achieving initial military success. It is obvious that ultimate success will depend upon political factors, i.e., a sizable popular uprising or substantial follow-on forces. It should be noted that assessment of the combat worth of assault forces is based upon second-and third-hand reports, and certain logistic aspects of the plan are highly complex and critical to the initial success. For these reasons, an independent evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the invasion force and detailed analysis of logistics plans should be made by a team of Army, Naval and Air Force officers, if this can be done without danger of compromise of the plan. Despite the shortcomings pointed out in the assessment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that timely execution of this plan has a fair chance of ultimate success and, even if it does not achieve immediately the full results desired, could contribute to the eventual overthrow of the Castro regime.”

18. Because of the feeling of lack of direct knowledge expressed by the Chiefs, it was decided to send a team of three officers from the Joint Staff to examine and report on the military effectiveness of the Cuban Expeditionary Force at its Guatemala base. This visit was made in the period 24-27 February and resulted in a report to the Joint Chiefs of StaffJCSM-146-61, Document 56. (See Annex 10) which included the estimate that because of the visibility of activities at Retalhuleu in Guatemala and Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua, the odds against surprise being achieved was about 85 to 15. The JCS air evaluation pointed out that if surprise were not achieved, the attack against Cuba would fail, adding that one Castro aircraft armed with 50 caliber machine guns could sink all or most of the invasion force. The Joint Chiefs in approving this report on 10 March 1961 commented to the Secretary of Defense that, “Based upon a general review of the military portion of the plan, an evaluation of the combat effectiveness of the forces and an analysis of the logistics plan from a military standpoint, since the small invasion force will retain the initiative until the location of the landing is determined, the plan could be expected to achieve initial success. Ultimate success will depend on the extent to which the initial assault serves as a catalyst for further action on the part of anti-Castro elements throughout Cuba.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their forwarding memorandum to the Secretary of Defense recommended that, “A military instructor experienced in the operational logistics be assigned to the training unit immediately for the final phase of the training.” Such an officer, Lt. Colonel Ray Wall, USMC, was dispatched from Washington and remained with the CEF (Cuban Expeditionary Force) for some time, assisting in correcting some of the logistics deficiencies previously noted by the inspection team.

19. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported the Trinidad Plan as one having “a fair chance of success” the plan encountered difficulties in other quarters. From its inception the plan had been developed under the ground rule that it must retain a covert character, that is, it should include no action which, if revealed, could not be plausibly denied by the United States and should look to the world as an operation exclusively conducted by Cubans. This ground rule meant, among other things, that no U.S. military forces or individuals could take part in combat operations. In due course it was extended to exclude pre-D-Day air strikes in support of the landing since such strikes could not have the appearance of being launched from Cuban soil before an airstrip had been seized by the landing force. This effort to treat as covert an operation which in reality could not be concealed or shielded from the presumption of U.S. involvement raised in due course many serious obstacles to the successful conduct of the operation which will be the subject of subsequent comment.

20. The President and his advisors were thoroughly aware of the difficulties of preserving the covert character of an operation as visible as a landing on a hostile shore and from the outset viewed the Trinidad Plan with caution. In particular, the State Department representatives opposed features of the plan because of the difficulty of concealing U.S. participation and also because of their fear of adverse reactions to the United States in Latin American countries and in the United Nations. They objected in particular to the conduct of any tactical air operations unless these aircraft were either actually or ostensibly based on Cuban soil.

21. On the other hand, working to overcome this reluctance to approve the Trinidad Plan was the need to decide quickly what to do with the Cuban Expeditionary Force. The President was informed that this force must leave Guatemala within a limited time and that, further, it could not be held together long in the United States if it were moved there. If the decision were taken to disband the force, that fact would soon become known and would be interpreted as a renunciation by the U.S. of the effort to free Cuba from Castro. Faced with two unattractive alternatives, the President and his advisors asked the CIA to come up with various proposals for the use of this force as alternatives to Trinidad.

22. These proposals were the subject of detailed consideration on March 11th when the President and the National Security Council met to consider the various plans then being entertained for Cuba. Mr. Bissell of CIA presented a paper entitled, “Proposed Operation Against Cuba” which summarized the action to date and presented four alternative courses of action.See Documents 58 and 59. (See Annex 11) It concluded by recommending the Trinidad Plan which he described to be an operation in the form of an assault in force preceded by a diversionary landing as the action having the best chance of achieving the desired result. The assault in force was to consist of an amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air support, to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead had been secured. If initial military operations were successful and especially if there were evidence of spreading disaffection against the Castro regime, the provisional government could be recognized and a legal basis provided for U.S. logistic support.

23. The military plan contemplated the holding of a perimeter around a beachhead area. It was believed that initial attacks by the Castro militia, even if conducted in considerable force, could be successfully resisted. The scale of the operation, a display of professional competence and determination on the part of the assault force would, it was hoped, demoralize the Castro militia, cause defections therefrom, impair the morale of the Castro regime and induce widespread rebellion.

24. After full discussion of this plan the President indicated that he was willing to go ahead with the over-all project, but that he could not indorse a plan so “spectacular” as Trinidad. He directed that the CIA planners come up with other alternative methods of employing the Cuban forces. An acceptable plan should provide for a “quiet” landing, preferably at night, without having the appearance of a World War II type amphibious assault. The State Department requested that any beachhead seized should include an airfield capable of supporting B-26 operations, to which any tactical air operations could be attributed.

25. During the period 13-15 March the paramilitary staff of CIA worked intensively to devise a plan or plans having the desired characteristics, and presented a briefing to the JCS Working Group late in the morning of March 14. They produced for consideration three such alternatives as general concepts. They were based on three possible landing areas: (1) The Preston area on the north coast of Oriente Province; (2) the south coast of las Villas between Trinidad and Cienfuegos; and (3) the eastern Zapata area near Cochinos Bay.

26. On March 14th these three alternatives were referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their evaluation. The Joint Staff prepared this evaluation, the results of which the respective Service action officers presented to their respective Chiefs prior to the JCS meeting on 15 March. At this meeting, following a briefing by the Joint Staff Working Group, the Joint Chiefs approved the evaluation and reported to the Secretary of Defense that of the three, the Zapata concept was considered the most feasible and the most likely to accomplish the objective. They added that none of the alternative concepts were considered as feasible and likely to accomplish the objective as the Trinidad Plan.JCSM-166-61, Document 62. (See Annex 12) This preference for the Trinidad Operation seems to have been overlooked in the subsequent consideration of the plan by some of the senior civilian officials, including the Secretary of Defense to whom the views of the Chiefs were addressed.

27. An important question developed in the course of this study is the extent to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the Zapata Plan as it finally took form. The action on March 15th merely indicated a preference for the Zapata concept as opposed to the two other concepts considered (neither of which was the original Trinidad Plan). However, the record is clear (See Annex 13) that the Chiefs subsequently took active part in considering changes to the plan as it developed into final form, did not oppose the plan and by their acquiescing in it gave others the impression of approval. They considered the plan as a body four times after March 15th while the plan was in the formative stage, but did not review the plan in its final form because of the shortness of time between the submission of the plan to the JCS, April 15, and the actual landing. While individual Chiefs gave it considerably more personal attention than the above record suggests, they did not and probably could not give the plan the same meticulous study which a commander would give to a plan for which he was personally responsible. Also, individual Chiefs had differing views as to important aspects of the operation which in turn differed from those held by senior civilian officials.

28. On the same day as the Chiefsʼ action, March 15th, the President was briefed at the White House on the three alternative course of action which the Chiefs had considered.See Document 65. After full discussion, the President again withheld approval of the plan and directed certain modifications to be considered. The CIA returned on the following day, March 16th, and presented a modification for the landing at Zapata which Mr. Bissell considered on balance more advantageous than the Trinidad Plan, wherein there would be air drops at first light instead of the previous day in the late afternoon, with the landing in the night and all the ships withdrawn from the objective area by dawn without completing the unloading at that time. The President authorized them to proceed with the plan, but still without giving it his formal approval.

29. As the Trinidad Plan developed, the question of air strikes became a matter of extended discussions. On January 4th, Colonel Hawkins wrote a memorandum to the Chief, WH/4 (Mr. Esterline) entitled, “Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of Strike Operations Against Government of Cuba.”Document 9. (See Annex 14) The paper includes the statement, “The Cuban air force and naval vessels capable of opposing our landing must be knocked out or neutralized before our amphibious shipping makes its final run into the beach. If this is not done we will be courting disaster.” The memorandum further recommended that the air preparation commence not later than dawn on D-1 and that a maximum number of aircraft be employed for this purpose. The State Department consistently resisted this kind of air preparation because of its “spectacular” nature and because of the inability to attribute pre-D-Day strikes to airplanes in Cuba. They also opposed the use of jets, although former Ambassador Whiting Willauer, who with Mr. Tracy Barnes monitored the plan in the period December 10-February 8, 1961 at the request of Secretary of State Herter, had pointed out the need for jet cover to protect the landing in discussions of the Special Group in January. It was felt that the range of jets would obviously require them to operate from U.S.-controlled bases and hence could not be brought within the requirements of non-attribution.

30. In the end a compromise was reached with regard to the air plan. Early in April, it was decided to stage limited air strikes on D-2 at the time of diversionary landing of 160 men to be made in eastern Cuba. These strikes were for the purpose of giving the impression of being the action of Cuban pilots defecting from the Cuban Air Force and thus support the fiction that the D-Day landing was receiving its air support from within Cuba. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not favor these D-2 air strikes because of their indecisive nature and the danger of alerting prematurely the Castro force. Mr. Bissell of CIA also later stated at a meeting on April 6 that CIA would prefer to conduct an all-out air strike on the morning of D-Day rather than perform the D-2 defection strikes followed by limited strikes on D-Day. Nevertheless, the political advantages led to their inclusion in the plan but with the realization that main reliance for the destruction of the Castro Air Force must be placed on the D-Day strikes.

31. At the time of the meeting with the President on 16 March,See Document 66. preparations in the field were proceeding on the assumption that the landing would take place. The President agreed to this procedure but reserved the right to call off the plan even up to 24 hours prior to the landing. He approved the establishment of an interdepartmental working group to carry forward the work begun in January (see paragraph 13 above) and to assure closer coordination within the Executive Branch. On 23 March this working group produced a paper containing agreed tasks prepared by the Joint Staff for assignment to the various agencies of the Federal Government.See Document 72. (See Annex 15) This paper was the first successful action to formalize the interdepartmental coordination which up to this point had depended largely upon ad hoc committees and meetings at Presidential level. Because of the high security classification of the operations, few if any records were kept at these meetings and decisions were rarely in written form. Papers bearing on the operation were normally distributed at the start of a meeting and gathered up at the end.

32. Initially, the Zapata Plan had a D-Day of 5 April. By 29 March it was apparent that no such D-Day could be kept and the President on that day advanced it to 10 April. This date later became infeasible for political reasons so that it slipped again to 17 April, the date of the actual landing.

33. On 12 April an important conference took place with the President, the Secretary of State, the JCS, and other NSC officials, in which Mr. Bissell of the CIA presented a paper which outlined the latest changes in the Zapata Operation, including the defections, the air strikes on D-2 and D-DaySee Documents 92 and 93. (See Annex 16), and the following timetable: D-7 Commence staging main force—staging completed night of D-5. D-6 First vessel sails from staging area—last vessel departs early morning D-4. D-2 B-26 defection operation—limited air strikes. D-2 Diversionary landing in Oriente (night of D-3 to D-2). D-Day Main landings (night of D-1 to D)—limited air strikes. Two B-26ʼs and liaison plane land on seized air strip. D to D+1 Vessels return night of D to D+1 to complete discharge of supplies. D+7 Diversionary landing in Pinar del Rio.

The President did not give final approval to the plan at this meeting. However, he was informed that the decision could not be delayed much longer as the no-go time for preliminary operations would be 12 oʼclock Friday, 14 April, and for the main landing, 12 oʼclock Sunday, 16 April.

34. Colonel Jack Hawkins, USMC, went to Puerto Cabezas to attend the final briefing of the Brigade and battalion commanders of the CEF. (See Annex 17) While there, on 13 April he was asked for a final evaluation of the quality and readiness of the Brigade. He replied in most enthusiastic terms (See Annex 18), praising the combat readiness of the Brigade and the Cuban Air Force, and expressing confidence in the success of the project.See Document 98. His views were circulated in Washington and reached the President.

35. Meanwhile, the ships of the invading force were approaching Cuba. The first operational event scheduled to occur was a diversionary landing 30 miles east of Guantanamo by a group of 160 men planned for the night of 14-15 April. The landing failed to take place, probably because of weak leadership on the part of the Cuban officer responsible for the landing. This failure may have had a considerable effect on the main landing as the diversion was intended to draw Castroʼs forces to the east and confuse his command.

36. At dawn on 15 April, the D-2 air strike took place against three Cuban air fields, a total of eight B-26ʼs being employed for the purpose. Initial pilot reports indicated that 50% of Castroʼs offensive air was destroyed at Campo Libertad, 75%-80% aircraft destruction at San Antonio de Los Banos, and that the destruction at Santiago included two B-26ʼs, one DC-3, one Lodestar and one T-33 or Sea Fury. Subsequent photographic studies and interpretation have assessed a greatly reduced estimate of the damage, amounting to five aircraft definitely destroyed and an indeterminable number of other planes suffering some damage. The attacking force lost one aircraft and crew to antiaircraft fire.

37. At about mid-day on D-1, 16 April, the President formally approved the landing plan and the word was passed to all commanders and officials involved in the operation. The frame of mind at that moment of the senior officials responsible for the approval of this operation seems to have been about as follows. It offered what appeared to be a last chance to overthrow Castro by Cubans before the weapons and technicians acquired from the Communists and repressive internal measures would make the task too hard without overt U.S. intervention. It was recognized as marginal and risky, but the Cuban Brigade, if not used quickly, would become a political liability, whereas used in a landing it might achieve important success before Castro became too strong. Even if unable to hold the beachhead, something would have been accomplished as the Brigade could turn guerrilla and provide a strong reinforcement to the resistance movement in the island.

38. CIA authorities had developed an elaborate propaganda program (See Annex 19) to support the military action against Castro. This was based on the use of the clandestine radio SWAN, the programs of 11 CIA controlled radio stations and extensive leaflet drops. The program was executed as planned, except for the D-day leaflet drops for which no means of delivery was available. The plan had been to drop the leaflets from B-26ʼs and other aircraft involved in the support of the landing, but the military situation did not permit the diversion of effort. The content of the propaganda program was developed and approved within CIA.

39. There is no evidence of any effort at any higher level to guide and coordinate the over-all propaganda effort. In particular, the United States Information Agency was left in the dark with regard to the operational plans. On 5 April, Mr. Edward R. Murrow, Director of the United States Information Agency heard from a New York Times reporter that operations were underway for a landing in Cuba, backed and planned by the CIA. The reporter indicated that the Times had a very full story on the operation which, however, they did not intend to print but he did hope to persuade USIA to authorize briefings of the press in Miami following the landing. (See Annex 20)

40. Armed with this information, Mr. Murrow called on the Director of Central Intelligence who informed him that preparations were indeed underway, but did not give him details of the magnitude or the time of the landing which, indeed, had not been determined at that time. Under the terms of the interdepartmental coordination paper referred to in paragraph 31 above, the Department of State undertook to provide policy guidance beginning D-3 to the USIA in support of the plan, but this guidance was apparently not given. Hence, word of the landing received over the wire services on D-Day caught the USIA unprepared and without guidance.

41. In parallel with its propaganda program, the CIA had continued and accentuated activities directed at stimulating political unrest in Cuba and harassing the Castro government. These actions included such things as clandestine broadcasts in Havana utilizing dormant TV channels, the infiltration of small provocateur groups equipped with printing presses and radios, the development of additional agent and guerrilla assets within the island, and the penetration of pro-Castro organizations. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

42. With regard to agent, guerrilla, and dissident assets, the pre-invasion reports differed somewhat but suggested considerable strength. (See Annex 20 A, Cuban Internal Situation 18 May 1961, and Annex 20 B, Map showing agents and assets.) It had been estimated by the CIA that from 2500 to 3000 persons supported by 20,000 sympathizers were actively engaged in resistance in Cuba, and that some 25 per cent of the Cuban populace would actively support a well-organized, well-armed force which was successful in establishing a stronghold on the island. At a CIA briefing on April 3, the view was expressed that the percentage of the Cuban population opposed to Castro at that time was much higher than the foregoing estimate, but that many would probably remain neutral until there was a strong indication of which side was winning.

43. At about 9:30 P.M. on 16 April, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, telephoned General C.P. Cabell of CIA to inform him that the dawn air strikes the following morning should not be launched until they could be conducted from a strip within the beachhead. Mr. Bundy indicated that any further consultation with regard to this matter should be with the Secretary of State.

44. General Cabell, accompanied by Mr. Bissell, went at once to Secretary Ruskʼs office, arriving there about 10:15 P.M.See Document 108. (See Annex 21) There they received a telephone call from Colonel Jack Hawkins who, having learned of the cancellation of the D-Day strikes, called to present his view of the gravity of the decision. General Cabell and Mr. Bissell then tried to persuade the Secretary of State to permit the dawn D-Day strikes. The Secretary indicated that there were policy considerations against air strikes before the beachhead airfield was in the hands of the landing force and completely operational, capable of supporting the raids. The two CIA representatives pointed out the risk of loss to the shipping if the Castro Air Force were not neutralized by the dawn strikes. They also stressed the difficulty which the B-26 airplanes would have in isolating the battlefield after the landing, as well as the heavier scale of air attack to which the disembarked forces would be exposed. The Secretary of State indicated subsequently that their presentation led him to feel that while the air strikes were indeed important, they were not vital. However, he offered them the privilege of telephoning the President in order to present their views to him. They saw no point in speaking personally to the President and so informed the Secretary of State. The order cancelling the D-Day strikes was dispatched to the departure field in Nicaragua, arriving when the pilots were in their cockpits ready for take-off. The Joint Chiefs of Staff learned of the cancellation at varying hours the following morning.

45. Realizing the seriousness of this cancellation, the CIA officials set about to try to offset the damage. The invasion force was informed, warned of likely air attacks and the ships told to expedite unloading and to withdraw from the beach by dawn. A continuous cover of 2 B-26ʼs over the beach was laid on. General Cabell arranged with the JCS to alert the fleet to a possible requirement for air cover and Early Warning destroyers. At 0430, he called on the Secretary of State at his home, reiterated the need to protect the shipping and by telephone made the request to the President. The request for air cover was disapproved but the Early Warning destroyers were authorized, provided they remained at least 30 miles from Cuban territory.

II. The Battle for the Beachhead, D-Day to D+2

(See Annex 22 entitled, “Sequence of Events D-2 to D+2 and Organization and Operation of the Command Post”; Operation Maps 1-3; and Annex 23, Colonel Beerliʼs Memorandum of 26 April 1961)

D-Day

Blue Beach

46. The ships in which the Cuban Expeditionary Force was embarked reached the objective area generally on time in the night of D-1 and the morning of D-Day. At Blue Beach the Brigade Commander, Jose Perez San Roman, went ashore at 0115 and immediately commenced the unloading of troops and supplies. (See Annexes 24, 25 and 26) The landing was discovered at once by local militia, some firing occurred, and the alarm was transmitted to troop and air headquarters throughout the island. In view of the situation, it was decided to give up the planned transshipment of the force earmarked to Green Beach and to put this force ashore at Blue Beach.

47. Castroʼs forces, though tactically surprised, reacted with speed and vigor. At dawn they began air attacks against the shipping and the beaches. In spite of these attacks, all vehicles and tanks at Blue Beach were unloaded from the LCUʼs by 0730, and all troops were ashore by 0825.

48. At 0930 an enemy Sea Fury hit and sank the freighter Rio Escondido, which carried in it 10 daysʼ supply of ammunition for the Brigade and other valuable supplies. All crew members were rescued and transferred to the Blagar.

49. In the face of continuous air attacks, at 10 oʼclock [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the contract skipper in charge of the shipping, radioed CIA Headquarters that if jet air support were not immediately available, the ships would put out to sea. By this time, not only had the Rio been sunk at Blue Beach, but the Houston had been hit at Red Beach.CIA Headquarters approved the movement of the vessels to the south which began at once. The freighters Atlantico and Caribe preceded the two LCIʼs and three LCUʼs which followed the cargo ships at a slower speed imposed by the presence of the LCUʼs

50. After landing, the troops ashore pushed out from the beach as planned. Parachutists of the First Battalion dropped at 0730, seized the important road center of San Blas 10 miles northeast of Blue Beach, and established outposts to the north and east to cover the routes of ingress into the beachhead. They were quickly reinforced by the Third Battalion and a heavy weapons (4.2 mortars) detachment. They made contact with Castro forces in the afternoon which pushed back their outpost situated to the east. Starting at about 1700 and intermittently thereafter, San Blas was under attack from forces coming down the road from the north.

51. Radio communications within Blue Beach were non-existent during the entire operation. In going ashore, the troops had been obliged to wade through fairly deep water with the result that most of the portable radios got wet and never functioned thereafter.

Red Beach

52. The Second Battalion at Red Beach ran into militia units almost immediately upon landing, but cleared them from the beach area. The landing of the Battalion was slowed down by motor trouble with the aluminum shipsʼ boats which were the only landing craft available. Out of nine, only two boats were usable for the 20-minute run from the Houston to the beach. The Fifth Battalion which was to follow the Second never did get ashore, partly because of the boat troubles, partly because of lack of initiative on the part of the Battalion Commander. Very few supplies were got ashore, other than those carried by the Second Battalion while debarking.

53. At daybreak, Red Beach was attacked by enemy aircraft, and at about 0630 the Houston was hit. Somewhat later, the ship went aground on the west shore of the Bahia de Cochinos about five miles from the landing beach. At that time it still had on board about 180 men of the Fifth Battalion who landed but never got into the fight at Red Beach. Later, many worked their way south to be picked up on the swampy keys by the U.S. Navy after the operation. In this air attack, the LCI Barbara J was also damaged by machine gun fire which disabled two of its engines, and a near miss, which caused it to take water. The damage to the Barbara J was not reported to CIA Headquarters until the next day at about 1700.

54. After cleaning up the beach area, the troops of the Second Battalion pushed north about four miles but soon encountered militia forces which prevented them from reaching the southern exit of the road across the swamp which they were to block. Fighting went on astride the road throughout the day, enemy tanks appearing in mid-afternoon and enemy artillery becoming active at about 1800.

Air Action

55. The parachute drops made by 5 C-46ʼs and one C-54 took place at 0730 on D-Day. Indications are that the drops were reasonably accurate but considerable ammunition was lost near San Blas. The parachutists north of Red Beach apparently landed in the presence of the enemy and were not heard from thereafter. A total of 172 parachutists took part in the drops.

56. B-26 aircraft rotated over the beachhead through D-Day, sank one gunboat, and made effective strikes against enemy ground troops at Red Beach, inflicting several hundred casualties, according to report. In all, a total of 13 combat sorties were flown on D-Day, in the course of which 4 B-26ʼs were lost to enemy T-33 action. In the same period, the Castro air force lost 2 Sea Furies and 2 B-26ʼs to antiaircraft fire.

57. Impressed by the ease with which the T-33 aircraft could destroy the obsolete B-26 type aircraft, the CIA leaders decided to attempt, by a bombing attack, to destroy the remaining Castro aircraft at night on the ground. Six aircraft were scheduled to strike San Antonio de los Banos, believed to be the main base of operations, in two waves of three each during the night of 17-18 April. The mission was flown but was unsuccessful because of heavy haze and low clouds over the target.

58. Because of the developing shortage of ammunition in the beachhead at the end of D-Day, an air supply drop was arranged consisting of four C-54ʼs and two C-46ʼs. Of these drops, five were successful, but in one case most of the supplies drifted into the water from which only a part could be salvaged.

D+1

59. During the night of D-Day-D+1, the invasion shipping departing from the landing area for the south proceeded to a point about 50 miles off the Cuban coast. Here the two LCIʼs and three LCUʼs rendezvoused as directed, but the two freighters, the Atlantico and the Caribe continued south without pausing. They did not turn back until intercepted and encouraged to return by the United States Navy, the Atlantico some 110 miles to the south, and the Caribe 218 miles south of the Cuban coast. Thus, the Caribe was never available for resupply operations while the fight on the beach lasted and the Atlantico did not get back to the rendezvous point until 1645 on D+1, 18 April.

Red Beach

60. The troops north of Red Beach came under heavy attack during the early hours of D+1. At 0300 enemy tanks were reported approaching from the north and by 0730 the situation was so difficult that the decision was made to move the force to Blue Beach. This movement began at 0900 and was completed about 1030. By that time, ammunition was low in the Red Beach force, but casualties, about 20, were comparatively light.

61. After reaching Blue Beach, the retreating force was allowed about two hours of rest, after which they were given additional ammunition and ordered back toward Red Beach in order to block the coast road to the movement of the force with which they had been engaged in the Red Beach area. They encountered this force somewhere west of Blue Beach and heavy fighting ensued. Exactly what occurred is not known, but it is assumed that the invaders eventually succumbed to the superior numbers of Castro forces moving down from the north.

Blue Beach

62. Enemy artillery fire began falling on the troops in the San Blas area at 0400 and continued most of the day. In the absence of radio communication, it was necessary to send officer couriers from the San Blas area to Blue Beach in order to communicate with the Brigade Commander who had set up his command post on the beach. At 0730 Roberto San Roman, brother of the Brigade Commander, went back to the beach for this purpose, reporting the situation around San Blas and seeking information. The Brigade Commander at that time indicated that the situation at Red Beach was critical. In order to cover Blue Beach, he had stationed some of his reserve forces to the east blocking the coast road coming from that direction and others to the northwest to cover the approaches from that quarter.

63. During the day artillery fire and enemy pressure on the San Blas forces compelled a gradual contraction of their position around the town. They attempted a counterattack to the north in the afternoon, but it soon bogged down in the face of superior forces.

64. By the end of the day, ammunition was very low throughout the beachhead. Only M-1 ammunition seems to have been reasonably plentiful, although the commander of the Heavy Weapons Company indicates that he was never out of 4.2 mortar ammunition. He indicates, however, that it was necessary to ration it carefully. In spite of the heavy fighting, there appeared to have been surprisingly few casualties among the invaders.

65. In the evening, the Brigade Commander was asked by CIA Headquarters via the Blagar whether he wished evacuation. He replied, “I will not be evacuated. We will fight to the end here if we have to.”

Air Action

66. On D+1 it became necessary to utilize some American civilian contract pilots to protect the beachhead area because some of the Cuban pilots either were too tired to fly or refused to do so. Six sorties were flown during the afternoon of D+1, attacking a long column of tanks and vehicles approaching Blue Beach along the coast road from the north. The attack was reported to have been very successful with an estimated 1800 casualties inflicted on the enemy and the destruction of 7 tanks. Napalm was used in these attacks, as well as bombs and rockets.

D+2

67. As events turned out, the night of D+1/D+2 offered the last opportunity to get ammunition to the beach. The Atlantico had returned from its trek to the south, rendezvousing with the other ships about 50 miles off the coast at 1645 on D+1. It began discharging cargo at once into the LCUʼs, completing the transfer at 2200, at which time [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reported to CIA Headquarters that the LCI Blagar would escort the LCUʼs to Blue Beach unless otherwise advised. He indicated that his estimated time of arrival on the beach would be 0630, that is to say, dawn on D+2.

68. The Blagar began to move northward with the three LCUʼs, reporting to CIA Headquarters, however, that if low jet cover were not furnished by first light, the Captain believed that he would lose all the ships. Prior to this time he had requested the escort of a U.S. Navy destroyer. At 2145 CIA Headquarters wired the Blagar that a destroyer escort was not possible, to which message the Captain replied that if he could not get destroyer escort in and out of Blue Beach, his Cuban crew would mutiny. At CIA Headquarters in Washington these messages were discussed and the critical decision was taken to stop the northern movement of the ammunition ships and direct them to rendezvous some 60 miles south of the Cuban coast.

69. The reasons for this decision appear to have been as follows. The CIA leaders in Washington were aware of the liberal amount of ammunition (3 daysʼ supply) which had been taken ashore on D-Day and also of the air drops on the night of D+1. (See Annex 27) Further, they had ordered additional drops on the night of D+1/D+2. Considering the climate in which this operation had been planned in Washington, the CIA leaders apparently felt that it was hopeless to ask for either destroyer escort or jet cover for the ammunition convoy. Without this overt U.S. support, it was felt that the loss of the ships would be inevitable if they tried to run in in daylight—if, indeed, they could get the Cuban crews to make the attempt. Under these circumstances, they felt justified in calling off the sea resupply effort and made no further attempt beyond an arrangement for another air drop to get in ammunition before the final surrender. Except for one C-46 which landed on the Blue Beach airstrip, the attempt to resupply by air was unsuccessful because of enemy control of the air over the beachhead.

70. Although permission was not sought for jet escort for the ammunition ships, Mr. Bissell of CIA sought and received Presidential authority to have the Navy to fly CAP over the beachhead from 0630 to 0730 on the morning of D+2. The purpose of this mission was to allow the B-26ʼs to provide close support to the troops in the beachhead and cover for air resupply. This CAP was flown but, as indicated below, was of no avail.

71. Within the beachhead, the troops in the San Blas area began a general retreat in the morning of D+2. The last message received from the Brigade Commander by the Blagar at 1432 read: “Am destroying all equipment and communications. I have nothing left to fight with. Am taking to the woods. I canʼt wait for you.” Units and individuals arriving at Blue Beach shortly thereafter found the Brigade Command Post gone and heavy artillery fire falling in the vicinity. Pressure on the beachhead was coming from the north and the northwest. The last known report on the situation indicates that at 1700 Blue Beach was still clear of the enemy. It appears that fighting ceased shortly thereafter and by nightfall resist-ance in the beachhead had ended.

Air Action

72. On the morning of D+2 American pilots were again used for the protection of the beachhead. The morning sorties were directed to arrive over the beachhead in the period 6:30 to 7:30 A.M. to take advantage of the one-hour period of Navy cover. For an undetermined reason, they came in almost an hour early with the result that two B-26ʼs were destroyed by the T-33ʼs. A total of 7 sorties were flown on this occasion with undetermined results.

73. As indicated above, three cargo aircraft tried to fly in ammunition on the morning of D+2 but were turned back by the presence of enemy air. A fourth C-46, succeeding in landing on the Blue Beach airstrip in the hours of darkness, unloaded ammunition and picked up a B-26 pilot who had been shot down, departing at daylight. (See Annex 28)

74. These sorties ended the action of the invasion force which began stand-down activities thereafter with a total of 21 aircraft still in commission. It is difficult to be sure of the losses suffered by the Castro Air Force. The D-2 air strikes positively destroyed 5 Castro aircraft, with undetermined damage to others, and 4 other combat aircraft were destroyed in the beachhead area.

Admiral Burke and Mr. Dulles consider that there is insufficient evidence to support the conjectures in this paragraph. The well motivated, aggressive CEF fought extremely well without air cover and with a shortage of ammunition. They inflicted very severe losses on the less well trained Cuban Militia. Consequently, it is reasonable to believe that if the CEF had had ammunition and air cover, they could have held the beachhead for a much longer time, destroyed much of the enemy artillery and tanks on the roads before they reached the beachhead, prevented observation of the fire of the artillery that might have been placed in position and destroyed many more of the local Militia en route to the area. A local success by the landing party, coupled with CEF aircraft overflying Cuba with visible control of the air, could well have caused a chain reaction of success throughout Cuba with resultant defection of some of the Militia, increasing support from the populace and eventual success of the operation. [Footnote in the source text.] 75. It may be asked how near the landing ever came to success. Had the ammunition shortage been surmounted, which is to say, had the Castro air been neutralized, would the landing force have accomplished its mission? Considering their lack of experience, the Cubans ashore fought well and inflicted considerable losses on the Castro militia while they had ammunition. Contrary to the view held prior to the landing that with control of the air the CEF could have maintained themselves for some time, with the rapid appearance of the vastly superior Castro forces on the scene, the ultimate success of such a small landing force became very unlikely. The limited number of B-26 crews, if forced to continue to operate from Nicaragua, would have been strained to provide continuous daylight air support to the beachhead. An attempt by the landing force to exercise the guerrilla option and take to the hills would have been virtually impossible because of the presence of the encircling Castro forces and of the instructions which the Cuban invasion units had received to fall back on the beaches in case of a penetration of the beachhead. Under the conditions which developed we are inclined to believe that the beachhead could not have survived long without substantial help from the Cuban population or without overt U.S. assistance. Although under these conditions the guerrilla alternative did not exist, with control of the air the CEF might have been able to withdraw wholly or in part by sea.

III. Involvement of the U.S. Navy

(See Annex 29, Subj: Rules of Engagement Operations “Bumpy Road”)A 4-page narrative account of the Rules of Engagement, covering the period March 24-April 20, prepared in CNO by Commander Mitchell.

76. As originally planned, the only involvement of the U.S. Navy in Operation Zapata was the requirement for one destroyer to escort the CEF ships on D-2 and D-1 to the transport area about 3 miles off-shore, and for one LSD to deliver landing craft (3 LCUʼs and 4 LCVPʼs) to the transport area. Also, there was the requirement for U.S. Naval air cover over the CEF ships during the hours of day-light on D-1.

77. As the date for the invasion approached, there were numerous discussions of the rules of engagement which would govern the use of Naval units. In final form, the approved rules of engagement allowed the U.S. Naval forces to open fire only if they or the CEF were attacked while under escort, and the escorting destroyers were not to approach within 20 miles of Cuban territory. If it became necessary for U.S. forces to intervene to protect the CEF ships, the operation would then be automatically cancelled, and the CEF ships would withdraw to a port to be designated by the CIA. Because of concern over the possible abandonment of the operation as the result of U.S. intervention, the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the request of CIA dispatched the following message on April 13 to CINC-LANT, Admiral Dennison: “In summary, hope is that overall operations will not need to be aborted because of U.S. military intervention and to this end CEF prepared to take substantive risks.”See Document 96.

78. With the cancellation of the D-Day air strikes and the subsequent landing and combat on the beach, the requirements placed upon the U.S. Navy progressively increased. The rules of engagement indicated above remained in effect until 0422R, 17 April, when CINCLANT was directed by JCS 994221Document 111. to be prepared to provide CAP for CEF shipping outside territorial waters and Early Warning for CEF ships. This was an anticipatory action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff while the request was being made to the White House for CAP following the cancellation of the D-Day air strikes. Only the employment of an EW vessel was authorized and these instructions were dispatched to CINCLANT at 0550.See footnote 3, Document 111. The rules of engagement for U.S. Naval forces remained the same, except that the EW destroyers were not to close within 30 miles of Cuban territory (i.e., 10 miles farther away than previously authorized).

79. At 1530, 17 April, based upon a CIA request which had Presidential approval, the JCS directed CINCLANTSee Document 115. to establish a safe haven for CEF ships with U.S. Naval air cover over the CEF ships in accordance with the following restrictions: “a. Carrier ship operation no closer than 50 miles from Cuban territory. “b Aircraft shall operate no closer than 15 miles to Cuban territory. “c. No more than 4 aircraft on station at one time.”

Further, CINCLANT was instructed that the rules of engagement were modified as follows: “a. U.S. aircraft shall attack if unfriendly aircraft makes aggressive move by opening bomb bay doors when headed towards ship to be protected or start a strafing run on it. Attacks will not be made by U.S. aircraft under any other condition. “b. No hot pursuit inside the 15 mile line from Cuban territory. “c. U.S. aircraft ship shall not come up close to unfriendly aircraft except when attacking it. “d. If unfriendly aircraft is shot down every effort shall be made to hide the fact that such action has occurred.”

Note that the above rules of engagement still give a tactical advantage to the attacking Cuban aircraft before they can be taken under fire by the U.S. forces.

80. At 1337R, 18 April, based upon a call from Admiral Burke from the White House, the JCS directed CINCLANT to conduct a photo and visual reconnaissance using unmarked naval aircraft as soon as possible to determine the situation on the beach.See Document 122. The aircraft were authorized to protect themselves from attack and were to take all precautions to avoid being identified as U.S.

81. Based upon a call from Admiral Burke at the White House, the JCS at 1449R, 18 April, directed CINCLANT to prepare unmarked naval planes for possible combat use.See Document 123. The number to be left to CINCLANTʼs discretion. CINCLANT was advised in this same message that there was no intention of U.S. intervention. These aircraft were made ready but permission was not given to use them.

82. At 1957R, 18 April, the JCS informed CINCLANT of the possibility that C-130 aircraft with U.S. Air Force markings removed might be used for night drops on Blue Beach the night of 18/19 April.See Document 124. These air drops by C-130 were never conducted because the aircraft would have been unable to reach the beachhead prior to dawn.

83.Upon the request of CIA and with the approval of the President after a conference at the White House, the JCS at 0334R, 19 April directed CINCLANT to furnish air cover of 6 unmarked aircraft over CEF forces during the period 0630 to 0730 local time 19 April to defend the CEF against air attack from Castro planes.See Document 140. He was directed to not seek air combat but to defend CEF forces from air attack. Further to not attack ground targets. (Note: The purpose of this CAP was to provide cover to CEF transport and B-26 type aircraft which were due at the beachhead during this period.) In this same message CINCLANT was directed to be prepared to conduct evacuation from Blue Beach using unmarked amphibious craft with crews in dungarees, and that if the evacuation by U.S. ships were ordered he was to furnish air cover to protect landing craft.

84. At 1157R the JCS confirmed a telephone call to CINCLANT made by Admiral Burke at 1020R upon orders from the White House directing CINCLANT to send two destroyers to a position off Blue Beach to determine possibilities for evacuation.See Document 147.CINCLANT was also directed to fly reconnaissance over the beach to determine the situation. No ground attacks were authorized but active air to air combat was authorized.

85. On 19 April at 1312R, based upon a call from Admiral Burke from the White House, the JCS directed CINCLANT to have destroyers take CEF personnel off the beach and from the water to the limit of their capability; use CEF boats and craft as practicable; provide air cover; if destroyers fired on they are authorized to return the fire to protect themselves while on this humanitarian mission.See Document 151. (Note the reason that amphibious force craft were not used was that Phibron 2 had not yet arrived off the objective area.)

86. At 2052R, 19 April, the JCS informed CINCLANT that existing instructions in respect to air and surface protection for CEF ships remain in effect.See footnote 2, Document 156. This was the safe haven for CEF ships 15 miles or more off-shore. No further requirement for an air CAP in the beachhead area.

87. On 20 April, upon direction of the President to Admiral Burke the JCS at 1946R directed CINCLANT: “a. Take charge of CEF ships and personnel and get them safely to Vieques. Navy on scene Commander can relay message to CEF ships via me. “b. Conduct destroyer patrols off Blue Beach tonight for possible evacuation of survivors and instruct CO he is authorized to ground his ship if it will facilitate mission. Use of amphibious ship and craft author-ized in addition to DD if desired. Repeat patrol tomorrow night approaching area in sight of land but outside gun range prior to darkness. Provide air cover. Rules of Engagement during patrols same as before.”See Document 161. These rules are to open fire only in self-defense.

IV. Exercise of Control in Washington

88. The CIA Command Post for Operation Zapata as well as the communications center was in Quarters Eye on Ohio Drive. (See Annex 30—Communications Net) During the operation, the senior CIA Task Force officials, Mr. Esterline, Colonel Hawkins, USMC, Lt. Colonel Gains (USAF) and Captain Jacob Scapa (U.S. Naval officer on loan to the CIA for use as a staff adviser on naval matters) manned the Command Post around the clock, making those operational decisions which they felt within their authority and seeking higher approval from the Secretary of State or the President for those matters beyond their authority. Mr. Bissell and General Cabell, who were immediately available for consultation, were usually the emissaries sent to obtain this latter kind of approval.

89. There was formal and continuous liaison between the CIA Command Post and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was effected by an exchange of liaison officers between the Command Post and the Joint Staff (General Gray). In addition, the Command Post transmitted messages and selected operational cable traffic to the Joint Staff by telephone and TWX. There was telephone and cable contact with CINCLANT.

90. Within the Pentagon, General Gray had a situation briefing in the Joint Staff at 0730 and 1600 daily which the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS attended. The other Chiefs maintained liaison officers in General Grayʼs section who kept their seniors informed.

91. The technical performance of the CIA communications net was reported to have been excellent. There was an impressive volume of traffic transmitted over it. Nevertheless, the President, the Secretary of State and others had insufficient knowledge of the situation to react in time and to make the needed decisions. This inadequacy resulted from many factors: the loss of important signal equipment in the sinking of the Rio Escondido, the wetting of the portable radios carried ashore and the resulting failure of radio communications within the Brigade net ashore, the lack of information on the part of the Brigade Commander himself, and, most importantly, the absence of an experienced American officer or headquarters in the combat area with the responsibility to summarize and present the changing situation to the authorities in Washington.

92. As a result of these factors, the President and his advisors were generally in the dark about important matters as to the situation ashore and were uninformed of the flight of the cargo ships. To clarify the situation, the U.S. Navy was directed to fly a reconnaissance mission over the beach on the afternoon of D+1, reporting about 1900 that there was no evidence of fighting at Blue Beach where the beachhead apparently had a depth of about 10 miles. This was the last indication of the situation ashore which the President received until the following morning when he received the message that the beachhead had collapsed and that men were fighting in the water.

93. In the urgency to obtain reliable information, it was proposed on the morning of D+2 to send an American observer ashore with a radio and Mr. Robertson on the LCI Barbara J was chosen to go. However, the fall of the beachhead voided the mission.

232. Memorandum No. 2 From the Cuba Study Group to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. Washington, June 13, 1961.

IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF FAILURE OF THE OPERATION ZAPATA

Summary

1. The proximate cause of the failure of the Zapata Operation was shortage of ammunition which developed from the first day of the landing, April 17th, and became increasingly critical until it resulted in the surrender of the landing force about 1400 on April 19th. 2. There were three primary reasons for this shortage of ammunition. The logistical plan for the landing made ample provision for ammunition with the men and in floating reserve. However, upon landing there is evidence that the Cubans wasted their ammunition in excessive firing, displaying the poor ammunition discipline which is common to troops in their first combat. 3. Far more serious was the loss of the freighters Rio Escondido and Houston through air attack at about 0930 on the morning of April 17th. The Rio was a particular loss as it had ten days of reserve ammunition on board, as well as other important supplies. The Houston should have been able to land most of its supplies before being hit, but the unloading was delayed by trouble with the outboard motors of the shipsʼ boats as well as by the apparent lethargy of the Fifth Battalion charged with the unloading. 4. The air attack which sank these ships caused all others in the landing area to put out to sea, as the only available protection in the absence of control of the air, with the order to rendezvous 50 miles off the coast. The freighters Atlantico and Caribe headed south and never stopped until intercepted by the U.S. Navy at points 110 miles and 218 miles, respectively, south of Cuba. 5. The Caribe was so far away that its cargo, principally aviation supplies, was never available for movement to Blue Beach while the fight lasted. The Atlantico, which had considerable ammunition on board, did rejoin the other ships of the expedition at 1816, April 18th, at a point about 50 miles south of the beach and transferred her supplies to the waiting two LCIʼs and three LCUʼs for a night run to the beach. 6. By the time the supplies were transferred and the convoy had started north it was too late to hope to resupply the beach under cover of darkness. The convoy commander asked CIA Operational Headquarters, Washington, for destroyer escort and U.S. Navy jet cover without which he believed that he would lose his ships to air attack the next morning. He added that without U.S. Navy support the Cuban crew would mutiny if sent back to the beach. 7. As a result of these messages, CIA Headquarters, feeling that it would be futile to order these ammunition craft to attempt a daylight unloading, called off the mission and the attempt to get ammunition to the beach by sea ended. The President was not requested for specific authority to extend the air cover to protect the ammunition convoy. 8. These causes for the ammunition shortage rested in turn on others which lay deeper in the plans and organization of this operation and the attitude toward it on the part of Government officials. The effectiveness of the Castro Air Force over the beach resulted from a failure to destroy the airplanes on the ground (particularly the T-33ʼs whose importance was not fully appreciated in advance) before or concurrently with the landing. This failure was a consequence of the restraints put on the anti-Castro Air Force in planning and executing its strikes, primarily for the purpose of protecting the covert character of the operation. These restraints included: the decision to use only the B-26 as a combat aircraft because it had been distributed widely to foreign countries; the limitation of pre-landing strikes to those which could be flown from non-U.S. controlled airfields under the guise of coming from Cuban strips, thus eliminating the possibility of using jet fighters or even T-33 trainers; the inability to use any non-Cuban base within short turn-around distance from the target area (about nine hours were required to turn around a B-26 for a second mission over the target from Nicaragua); prohibition of use of American contract pilots for tactical air operations; restriction on munitions, notably napalm; and the cancellation of the strikes planned at dawn on D-Day. The last mentioned was probably the most serious as it eliminated the last favorable opportunity to destroy the Castro Air Force on the ground. The cancellation seems to have resulted partly from the failure to make the air strike plan entirely clear in advance to the President and the Secretary of State, but, more importantly, by misgivings as to the effect of the air strikes on the position of the United States in the current UN debate on Cuba. Finally, there was the failure to carry the issue to the President when the opportunity was presented and explain to him with proper force the probable military consequences of a last-minute cancellation. 9. The flight of the Caribe and Atlantico might have been prevented had more attention been paid in advance to the control of the ships to include the placing of some Americans aboard. The CIA officer responsible for all the ships involved was a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] who was aboard the LCI Blagar with no means to control the freighters, or, indeed, to locate them after they disappeared. Only the initiative of the U.S. Navy in the vicinity brought them back to the scene of action. The absence of Americans on board these vessels was an application of the general order to keep Americans out of the combat area. This order had been violated in a few cases, but it was apparently not considered important to do so in the case of the freighters. 10. The lack of full appreciation of the ammunition situation at the end of D+1 in the CIA Operational Headquarters was largely the result of the difficulty of keeping abreast of the situation on the beach, and the location and movement of the ships at sea from the distance of Washington. Also, there was a confidence in the supply of the beach by air which turned out to be unjustified. Had there been a command ship in the sea area with an advance CIA command post on board, a more effective control would have been possible. 11. The Executive branch of the Government was not organizationally prepared to cope with this kind of paramilitary operation. There was no single authority short of the President capable of coordinating the actions of CIA, State, Defense, and USIA. Top level direction was given through ad hoc meetings of senior officials without consideration of operational plans in writing and with no arrangement for recording conclusions and decisions reached.

233. Memorandum No. 3 From the Cuba Study Group to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. Washington, June 13, 1961.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE CUBAN STUDY GROUP

1. It is concluded that: a. A paramilitary operation of the magnitude of Zapata could not be prepared and conducted in such a way that all U.S. support of it and connection with it could be plausibly disclaimed. Accordingly, this operation did not fit within the limited scope of NSC 5412/2. By about November 1960, the impossibility of running Zapata as a covert operation under CIA should have been recognized and the situation reviewed. The subsequent decision might then have been made to limit the efforts to attain covertness to the degree and nature of U.S. participation, and to assign responsibility for the amphibious operation to the Department of Defense. In this case, the CIA would have assisted in concealing the participation of Defense. Failing such a reorientation, the project should have been abandoned. b. Once the need for the operation was established, its success should have had the primary consideration of all agencies in the Government. Operational restrictions designed to protect its covert character should have been accepted only if they did not impair the chance of success. As it was, the leaders of the operation were obliged to fit their plan inside changing ground rules laid down for non-military considerations, which often had serious operational disadvantages. c. The leaders of the operation did not always present their case with sufficient force and clarity to the senior officials of the Government to allow the latter to appreciate the consequences of some of their decisions. This remark applies in particular to the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-Day strikes. d. There was a marginal character to the operation which increased with each additional limitation and cast a serious doubt over its ultimate success. The landing force was small in relation to its 36-mile beachhead and to the probable enemy reaction. The air support was short of pilots if the beach was to require cover for a long period. There were no fighters to keep off such Castro airplanes as might escape the initial air strikes. There were few Cuban replacements for the battle losses which were certain to occur on the ground and in the air. It is felt that the approval of so marginal an operation by many officials was influenced by the feeling that the Cuban Brigade was a waning asset which had to be used quickly as time was against us, and that this operation was the best way to realize the most from it. Also, the consequences of demobilizing the Brigade and the return of the trainees to the U.S.A., with its implication that the United States had lost interest in the fight against Castro, played a part in the final decision. e. The Cuban Expeditionary Force achieved tactical surprise in its landing and, as we have said, fought well and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Although there had been considerable evidence of strong pockets of resistance against Castro throughout Cuba, the short life of the beachhead was not sufficient to trigger an immediate popular reaction, and Castroʼs repressive measures following the landing made coordinated uprisings of the populace impossible. The effectiveness of the Castro military forces, as well as that of his police measures, was not entirely anticipated or foreseen. f. In approving the operation, the President and senior officials had been greatly influenced by the understanding that the landing force could pass to guerrilla status, if unable to hold the beachhead. These officials were informed on many occasions that the Zapata area was guerrilla territory, and that the entire force, in an emergency, could operate as guerrillas. With this alternative to fall back on, the view was held that a sudden or disastrous defeat was most improbable. As we have indicated before, the guerrilla alternative as it had been described was not in fact available to this force in the situation which developed. g. The operation suffered from being run from the distance of Washington. At that range and with the limited reporting which was inevitable on the part of field commanders absorbed in combat, it was not possible to have a clear understanding in Washington of events taking place in the field. This was particularly the case on the night of D+1 when an appreciation of the ammunition situation would have resulted in an appeal for U.S. air cover and an all-out effort to supply the beach by all available means. h. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had the important responsibility of examining into the military feasibility of this operation. By acquiescing in the Zapata Plan, they gave the impression to others of approving it although they had expressed their preference for Trinidad at the outset, a point which apparently never reached the senior civilian officials. As a body they reviewed the successive changes of the plan piecemeal and only within a limited context, a procedure which was inadequate for a proper examination of all the military ramifications. Individually, they had differing understandings of important features of the operation apparently arising from oral briefings in the absence of written documents. i. Although the intelligence was not perfect, particularly as to the evaluation of the effectiveness of the T-33ʼs, we do not feel that any failure of intelligence contributed significantly to the defeat. j. The planning and conduct of the operation would have been improved if there had been an initial statement of governmental policy, assigning the mission and setting the guidelines within which it was to develop. Thereafter, there was a need for a formalized procedure for interdepartmental coordination and follow-up with adequate record-keeping of decisions. 2. In the light of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that the preparations and execution of paramilitary operations such as Zapata are a form of Cold War action in which the country must be prepared to engage. If it does so, it must engage in it with a maximum chance of success. Such operations should be planned and executed by a governmental mechanism capable of bringing into play, in addition to military and covert techniques, all other forces, political, economic, ideological, and intelligence, which can contribute to its success. No such mechanism presently exists but should be created to plan, coordinate and further a national Cold War strategy capable of including paramilitary operations.

234. Memorandum No. 4 From the Cuba Study Group to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Taylor Report. Secret; Eyes Only; Ultrasensitive. Washington, June 13, 1961.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CUBAN STUDY GROUP

[Here follow the first five recommendations, which deal with the planning and coordination of cold war strategy and with the restructuring of procedures for carrying out paramilitary operations.]

Recommendation No. 6

In the course of its work, this Group has been exposed to the views on Cuba of many U.S. officials and of individuals, Cuban and U.S., who have been close to the Cuban problem. We have been struck with the general feeling that there can be no long-term living with Castro as a neighbor. His continued presence within the hemispheric community as a dangerously effective exponent of Communism and Anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more of weak Latin American republics. There are only two ways to view this threat; either to hope that time and internal discontent will eventually end it, or to take active measures to force its removal. Unless by “time” we are thinking in terms of years, there is little reason to place reliance on the first course of action as being effective in Castroʼs police state. The second has been made more difficult by the April failure and is now possible only through overt U.S. participation with as much Latin American support as can be raised. Neither alternative is attractive, but no decision is, in effect, a choice of the first.

While inclining personally to a positive course of action against Castro without delay, we recognize the danger of dealing with the Cuban problem outside the context of the world Cold War situation. Action against Castro must be related to the probable course of events in such other places as Southeast Asia and Berlin which may put simultaneous claims on our resources.

It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light of all presently known factors and new guidance be provided for political, military, economic and propaganda action against Castro.

235. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. The source text bears a stamped indication that it was seen by the Secretary of Defense. Washington, June 16, 1961.

JCSM-414-61

SUBJECT Contingency Outline Plan (Cuba) (S) 1. On 1 May 1961, in a memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Document 190. you requested that the Joint Staff and CINCLANT be assigned the responsibility for preparing instructions necessary to implement a Cuban Contingency Plan which would minimize the lead time required and maximize security during the period between the decision and invasion. 2. CINCLANT has developed an outline planNot found. with a 5 day lead time. This plan has been reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The following major considerations are involved: a. Cost—Requirement for shipping and repositioning of units results in an estimated initial cost of $52.4 million and a cost of maintenance on a 30 day basis of $8.2 million. b. Redeployment—The redeployment of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade from PACOM will reduce the capability of CINCPAC to react to contingencies in his area as long as those forces and related shipping are deployed in Atlantic or Gulf Coast waters. c. Training and Morale—A short reaction time requires that units be on a continuing alert status over a long period of time. This adversely affects a unitʼs ability to maintain training efficiency and may affect morale. This could offset the advantages gained by a short reaction time. d. Repositioning—The plan requires the repositioning of two major Army combat units to a presently inactive Army post (Fort Polk, Louisiana) and the possible closing of another (Fort Devens, Massachusetts). This may have serious domestic political implications. e. Security—The required movement to pre-position forces as envisioned in the plan would be impossible to conceal. Accordingly, it is unlikely that any cover plan would hide the intent and purpose of proposed actions. However, deception plans could be designed for the purpose of misleading the Cuban forces as to the specific areas and timing of the assault. 3. CINCLANT has stated that a more economical use of forces can be achieved if more time is allowed between the order to execute and the initial assault. He estimates that he could implement a modification of his current operations plan for Cuba in 18 days from “Execute” to “Assault” and this plan would bring Cuba under control in a relatively short period of time. 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude, therefore, that more leeway must be provided in the reaction time; and that with activation of some additional amphibious shipping CINCLANT will be able to achieve a reaction time within 18 days from “Execute” to “Assault”. This is the course of action recommended. 5. In the event emergency conditions, such as an immediate requirement to succor US citizens whose welfare has been placed in serious and immediate jeopardy, an airborne assault of approximately two divisions could be initiated against the Havana area with a lead time of five to six days. The combat elements of the force could close in 81-1/2 hours. All combat elements and scheduled support units could close in 114 hours. Marine augmentation forces could be air landed at Guantanamo for defense and expansion of control in that area, a Marine BLT could seize a beachhead in the Havana area as a diversionary support of the airborne assault, and follow-on forces would be phased in as rapidly as possible. It is recognized that this course of action is less desirable and is intended to be used if the situation so warrants. 6. As a result of our review, a memorandum has been prepared for dispatch to CINCLANTNot found. giving him additional guidance. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:Arleigh BurkeChief of Naval Operations

236. Informational MemorandumSource: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, A Item 8. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the source text, but it was initialed as seen by General Taylor, indicating that the memorandum may have been prepared in response to the continuing interest of the members of the Cuba Study Group in the subject. The memorandum was apparently drafted in the Central Intelligence Agency. Washington, June 22, 1961. SUBJECT Comments by Fidel Castro 14 and 15 June on the Invasion of 17 April 1961 1. The airborne battalion was dropped in at points too close to the landing beaches. If they had been dropped at a more remote point of the causeways and had cut these, Castro could not have moved in his tanks, motorized artillery and “10,000 rockets”. Apart from lack of air cover, the invadersʼ main errors were this failure to drop the airborne battalion far enough inland and this failure to cut the causeways to Playa Giron and Playa Larga. Also, the paratroopers did not engage the enemy until approximately 0800 on D-Day. Castro was mystified at the delay in entering into action. The invaders did not know of certain special trails by which Castro had been able to infiltrate men (not heavy stuff) into the Cienaga de Zapata. 2. After the Houston was sunk about five miles south of Playa Larga, the Battalion which it was carrying got ashore and bivouacked. Castro could not understand why it did not march to Playa Larga and join the forces which had been landed and were in combat. 3. Castro himself was in the second or third tank that advanced from Australia to Parite (which Castro said should be called “Palite”) and the tank in front of him was knocked out. 4. The invading forces fought very well as long as they thought they had air cover. After it failed, it was an easy matter to get them to surrender. 5. Castro said 15 June that his air force consisted of four T-33ʼs and two Sea Furies and one B-26. 14 June he had said, “We dispersed my T-33ʼs, Sea Furies and F-27ʼs and we dispersed them very well,” with the apparent intended implication that a second strike would not have gotten all of them. He also said 14 June: “I had a few more aircraft than I had pilots, and I had nine pilots and lost two.” Castro said he was mystified that no additional effort was made to get the planes. 6. Castro said the Cienaga de Zapata area was “ideal ground” from the military viewpoint and that if the causeways had been cut the invasion force could have accomplished the mission of holding a piece of Cuban territory long enough to establish a base for ships and air and for proclamation of a provisional government which could be overtly supplied. At Parite (“Palite”) at 1500 on 15 June Castro said: “Right here I would have used four or five of the 75 mm. anti-tank guns if I had been an invader. I also would have used a couple of their 81 mm. (4.2 in.) mortars, and the paratroopers, with the 75 mm. anti-tank guns and the mortars could have controlled this entrance, which is where we came through. I could, in the invadersʼ position, have held the place, and at this particular place it would have been almost impossible for us to flank them.” 7. The invasion had a “good plan, poorly executed”. If the invaders had had good air cover, sent the paratroopers farther inland, and cut the causeways, the story would have been different. 8. Castroʼs air force concentrated on attacking enemy shipping whereas the invasion force planes engaged in ground attacks. 9. Castro knew the time but not the place of the invasion. At first he thought it might be near Baracoa where the U.S. Navy was engaged in simulated operations. 10. On 15 June, on the beach at Playa Giron, Castro said: “Tuesday afternoon 18 April we stood at Playa Giron. We had won after 36 hours of combat.”A note on the source text at this point, in an unknown hand, reads: “He must have been confused as to the date.”

237. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Coerr) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Department of State, S/S-NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95,NSC 5902 Memoranda. Top Secret. Drafted in ARA by Frank J. Devine. Cleared in ARA, INR, and with U. Alexis Johnson. A memorandum for the files attached to the source text indicates that the memorandum, which was marked to be sent to the Secretary through Under Secretary Bowles, never went beyond Bowles. Bowles was “handling a good deal of the covert-type operations on Cuba” and he was deemed by S/S to be the proper recipient. When Bowles initialed the approval lines on the memorandum, he used the initials “DR,” but there is no other indication that he cleared the approvals with Rusk. Washington, June 22, 1961. SUBJECT United States Government Relations with Cuban Exile Groups Discussion Item No. g of the NSC Record of Actions of May 5, 1961:Document 205.

“Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized as a government-in-exile, support should be given to it insofar as it continues to represent substantial Cuban sentiment.”

Dr. Morales-Carrion has been designated as the official point of contact for the Cuban Revolutionary Council within the United States Government. At the suggestion of Mr. Richard Goodwin of the White House Staff, the CRC has now presented its budget to Dr. Morales-Carrion. The fact that funds presently available to the CRC continue only through June 30 faces us with the necessity for early and highly significant decisions. Dr. Morales-Carrion is scheduled to meet with Mr. Goodwin at the White House in the immediate future, and I believe it is essential that he be in a position to reflect the Departmentʼs views with regard to our Governmentʼs relationships—including financial—with Cuban exile groups.

Without at this point entering into an exhaustive discussion of the pertinent details, many of which are already known to you, I would like to call attention to the following points: (1) The Cuban Revolutionary Council no longer has the same composition as it did at the time of the abortive invasion of Cuba or when the above-quoted NSC action was written. Withdrawal of Manolo Ray deprived it of its most liberal—and so far left as to be quite controversial—element and has shifted its center of political gravity appreciably to the right. (2) It is far from certain that the popular acceptance or the political prospects of the CRC in Cuba are such as to make it an ideal group with which too closely to associate and/or identify the US Government. (3) The “military” portion of the CRCʼs budget contemplates continuing financial provisions for veterans, survivors, and dependents of participants in the Bahia de Cochinos invasion effort. Despite the aura of general confession which has come into existence, I consider it completely inappropriate for financing of this sort to be presented to or handled by the Department of State. This merely provides public and official confirmation of US Government complicity in the invasion attempt. (4) The “civil” portion of the CRC budget includes administrative, operating, propaganda and other types of contemplated expenses. They are rather clearly based upon Dr. Miro Cardonaʼs contention that our assistance to anit-Castro groups must be limited to or channelled through the CRC. I am not convinced that we should accept any such limitation or that the Department of State or any other overt agency of the USG should necessarily engage in financing of all the types of activities which are contemplated.

Recommendations:Bowles initialed approval of each recommendation with Ruskʼs initials on June 30.

That in his conversation with Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Morales-Carrion be authorized to present the following views: (1) That in the implementation of item g of the NSC Record of Actions of May 5, the United States should treat the CRC in friendly, sympathetic and a somewhat favored manner but should refrain from agreeing or acting to deal exclusively with that body or to channel its dealings with other exile groups through it. (2) That the Department should not become involved with the military portion of the CRC budget; that payments to surviving relatives of those killed in the invasion attempt should be handled exclusively in a covert manner and with definite terminal cut-off date; that payment to dependents of any invasion captives who continue to be held in Cuba should continue to be funded until their release through covert channels; that all payments to members of the invasion forces who have returned or would return to the United States should be shifted from covert channels into the overt procedures applicable to regular Cuban emigres and funded by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. (3) That financial provision for expenses listed in the “civil” portion of the CRC budget be most carefully reviewed and of those which are approved it be determined precisely which, if any, are appropriate for overt funding by our Government and which must be handled in a covert way in order not to be self-defeating. (4) That future dealing with anti-Castro Cuban groups on a covert basis be made contingent upon more effective cover arrangements and include provision for assistance to all acceptable groups (not including Batistianos) displaying a willingness and a capacity to contribute to agreed upon objectives.

238. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 12, Cuba, Bay of Pigs. Secret. Drafted by Taylor. Taylor and Dulles briefed Eisenhower at President Kennedyʼs request. This was the last task associated with Taylorʼs responsibilities on the Cuba Study Group. On June 26 President Kennedy addressed a letter to Taylor asking him to become Kennedyʼs military adviser in the White House with the title of Military Representative of the President. Taylor accepted and began to exercise his new responsibilities on July 1. (Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 196-197) Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, June 23, 1961. SUBJECT Meeting with General Eisenhower at Gettysburg, June 23, 1961 PRESENT General Eisenhower General Taylor Mr. Allen Dulles 1. The purpose of the visit to Gettysburg was to brief General Eisenhower on the findings of the Cuban Study Group in particular relation to the contents of an article by Stewart Alsop in the Saturday Evening Post of June 24, 1961. In the course of the meeting the following points were discussed and the findings of the Cuban Study Group on these points were explained to General Eisenhower. a.

The Alsop article allegation contained in the following paragraph:

“That plan (the Eisenhower plan), like the final Kennedy plan, was based on the assumption that there would be widespread anti-Castro uprisings and defections. It was hoped that these would make any overt American military intervention unnecessary. But the Eisenhower plan also envisaged American intervention on a ‘contingency basis.ʼ American aircraft would intervene, either openly or in unmarked planes, if necessary to maintain control over the beachhead and prevent destruction of the anti-Castro forces.”

In response to questions, General Eisenhower emphasized that there never had been an operational plan presented to him, hence no “Eisenhower plan” could have existed. He does not believe that he ever knew of the proposal of an amphibious operation, and certainly was not aware of any plan approximating the Trinidad Plan.

b. The role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include their attention to logistics. c. The air strike plan and the circumstances surrounding the cancellation of the D-Day strikes. d. The cause of the ammunition shortage and the effectiveness of the T-33ʼs. e. The loss of communications equipment. General Eisenhower had the impression that all of the communications equipment was in one ship, which was sunk through air attack. It was explained to him that communications equipment was on two ships, and an auxiliary means of communication to Washington existed from the Brigade Commander by way of the landing craft. f. The eleven conclusions reached by the Cuban Study Group. 2. General Eisenhower listened to the presentation, took issue with none of the points raised and appeared to indicate general approval. He observed that the over-all lesson seemed to be the danger of changing an operational plan at the last minute. This observation led him to discuss the pressure placed upon him just prior to D-Day in Normandy to cancel the airborne landings. 3. One reaction on General Eisenhowerʼs part was to suggest the need for a public statement which would correct some of the misapprehensions about the Cuban affair. However, after discussing the difficulties inherent in such an action, he withdrew the suggestion. 4. He recognizes the need for improving governmental machinery for handling complex interdepartmental operations such as the Cuban affair. In the course of discussing this point he expressed some concern over the present status of the National Security Council resulting from the elimination of the Planning Board and the OCB. He agreed that some new agency was probably necessary to fill the gap, and that the 5412 Committee with an expanded charter might provide the vehicle. 5. He commented upon his closeness to the 5412 Committee and the support given him in covert matters by the Presidential Board on Intelligence. 6. The entire discussion was most cordial. I received the impression that General Eisenhower perceives the need of suppressing further public debate of the Cuban operation. He expressed disapproval of the recent TV appearance of Mr. Miller and Senator Clark in which the Cuban operation was argued.

Taylor added a final handwritten paragraph to the typed text that reads:

“7. General Eisenhower expressed the feeling that the U.S. would have to get rid of Castro—preferably using as a reason for intervention some Castro mistake. As the visitors left, he reiterated his appreciation to President Kennedy for arranging the briefing.” The final sentence had been typed as the closing sentence of paragraph 6 before Taylor crossed it out and revised the text.

MDT

239. National Security Action Memorandum No. 54Source: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba—Security, 1961. Confidential. Washington, June 26, 1961. TO The Secretary of Defense SUBJECT Service of Cuban Volunteers in U.S. Armed Forces

The President has noted and concurred in your proposed program to enable Cuban volunteers to serve in the U.S. armed forces, as stated in the attachment to your memorandum of June 8, 1961.Document 227.

It is assumed that you will inform the Departments of State, Justice and Health, Education and Welfare, and the U.S. Information Agency of the part each will play in carrying out this program.

It is requested that after a suitable interval has elapsed the Department of Defense prepare a report on the results of this program for transmittal to the President through this office.

McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that indicates Bundy signed the original.

240. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/61-12/61. No classification marking. Washington, June 28, 1961.

Present trade with Cuba

The first four months of 1961 show that trade with Cuba is running at an annual rate of about $35 million each way. About nine-tenths of our exports are food and medicines, and nearly all of the imports are foods and textile fibers. This level of trade compares with an annual rate of half a billion dollars in normal times (57-59). This trade thus has no strategic significance and very little general economic significance. To invoke the Trading with the Enemy Act at this time would be a gesture with no real significance. The matter is under constant review, however, and if the situation changes a different decision can be made.

McG. B.Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

241. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 2, July 20, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott. Washington, June 29, 1961. SUBJECT Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 June 1961 PRESENT Messrs. Bowles, Gilpatric, Bundy, Dulles

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

2. Cuba

The State Department position on the official attitude that should be adopted vis-a-vis the Cuban Revolutionary Council was agreed to by the Group (i.e. that in effect the CRC not be treated as a U.S. instrument, exclusive channel, or point of approval). It was noted that the other three papersCopies of these papers are ibid., S.G. 1, June 29, 1961. tabled at last weekʼs meeting (covering propaganda, depend-ency payments, and Radio Swan) were agreed between State and CIA, as the Group had requested, with the exception of the overall matter of financing.

It was recognized that the financing problem requires further detailed consideration, but that on the other hand certain activities must continue into the new fiscal year and CIA has no funds budgeted to cover them. It was thus agreed that CIA should continue funding dependency payments and certain essential CRC activities for the next month, using this time to try to work out an eventual solution.

On the subject of the projected 1962 budget for clandestine activities,The budget for clandestine activities considered by the Special Group was outlined in an undated 8-page memorandum prepared for the Special Group by the CIA that detailed a program of covert action. The memorandum was supplemented by a 5-page annex that provided a breakdown of the proposed expenditures. On June 28, Thomas Parrott sent copies to J. Patrick Coyne at the White House, Joseph Scott at the Department of State, and General Lansdale at the Department of Defense, under cover of a memorandum that indicated that the Special Group would discuss the proposed program of covert action against Cuba at its June 29 meeting. (Ibid.) For the revised version of this paper, dated July 17 and considered by the Special Group on July 20, see the Supplement. Mr. Dulles said that he felt some items might be unduly expensive and that he wanted to examine them in further detail, consulting with Defense where appropriate. The Group agreed that the operations proposed in the categories of intelligence, counter-intelligence, covert political action and propaganda appeared to be generally acceptable but that the scope of the proposed paramilitary operations required further study. Mr. Dulles pointed out in the latter connection that although it is not necessary to embark at once on the new recruiting included in the budget, there are some agents on hand who will have to be supported and occupied. It was agreed that a monthʼs advance from the Bureau of the Budget for all these items less paramilitary should be sought at once.

These decisions were made subject to review by General Taylor next week.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. ParrottPrinted from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

242. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-761. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch on July 10. Washington, July 7, 1961. SUBJECT Cuban Revolutionary Council PARTICIPANTS Dr. Antonio de Varona, Revolutionary Council Member Dr. Carlos Piad, Washington Representative, Revolutionary Council Dr. Morales-Carrion, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mr. Robert Hurwitch, Officer in Charge, Cuban Affairs

Dr. Varona expressed his discouragement over the Councilʼs future, the future of Cuba, and said he felt that the U.S. was abandoning Cuba to its fate under Castro.

He continued that Mr. Goodwin had informed Dr. Aragon (Miro Cardonaʼs secretary) that no decision would be reached regarding support for the Council until the Council had broadened its base and achieved greater unity among the exile groups. He said that it would be difficult to include groups such as those led by Sanchez Arango or Marquez Sterling in the Council. Sincere attempts had been made to reach an understanding with the Manolo Ray group; these had failed. He suggested that the U.S. name new Council members.

Varona then turned to the necessity of organizing a new invasionary force. He said that Nicaraguan President Somoza had offered to assist to that end. He urged that all Cuban young men in exile of military age undergo compulsory military training as a first step toward training such a force. When informed that U.S. compulsory military training was for eighteen months, he replied that for his purposes two months were sufficient and that in view of Cubansʼ special refugee status, special arrangements should be made for them under U.S. law. He stated that once trained the force he envisaged would also require sufficient equipment to overcome Castroʼs military power. When asked what basis he had for thinking in these terms, Varona replied that he understood that Cubans were to be recruited in the U.S. armed forces on an individual basis and also that Cuban pilots would be given training. Of what purpose were these steps by the U.S. if not to train a new invasionary force, Varona asked.

When Varona received no encouragement for this line of reasoning, he said that he would insist upon clarification of this point in a meeting that might take place soon between Miro Cardona and the President. As far as he, Varona , was concerned, the struggle against Castro to be successful involved three basic aspects, all inter-related and inter-depend-ent: a massive propaganda campaign, sabotage, and a frontal military attack on Cuba.

243. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-761. Confidential. Drafted by Hurwitch on July 14. Washington, July 7, 1961. SUBJECT Activities in U.S. of Fair Play for Cuba Committee and 26th of July Movement PARTICIPANTS Mr. James McDonnell, SCA Mr. Robert Hurwitch, ARA:CMA/C

I had previously mentioned to Mr. McDonnell ARAʼs concern over the activities in the U.S. of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the 26th of July Movement. I had observed that while these activities appeared to be primarily of internal security concern, there were foreign policy implications as well. Unlimited activity on the part of these groups served to confuse the American public about the true nature of the Castro regime. Further, Cuban exile groups had expressed concern over these activities as counter-productive to their own efforts to impress the American public with the dangerous threat that Castro presented. I had inquired whether the Attorney Generalʼs office was fully aware of the Departmentʼs interest in these groups.

In response to this inquiry, Mr. McDonnell consulted with the Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division. Mr. McDonnell reported that that office was keenly aware of public, Congressional and governmental interest in the activities of these groups. The Internal Security Division is following these activities on a day-to-day basis, compiling evidence with a view toward citing these organizations. The registration of the FPCC had already been solicited by that office and had been refused by the FPCC. The Internal Security Division is now examining its information on the FPCC to determine whether to seek court action to force the FPCC to register.

Comment:

In view of the close and constant attention being paid to both these groups by the Assistant Attorney Generalʼs office and Mr. McDonnellʼs oral transmission of the Departmentʼs interest as well, there does not appear any necessity at this time to stimulate the Attorney Generalʼs office to further action in this regard.

244. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the Presidentʼs Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin)Source: Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Cuba 1961, Box 31. Secret. Washington, July 8, 1961. SUBJECT Cuban Covert PlanAn apparent reference to a preliminary draft of the July 17 program of covert action considered by the Special Group on July 20. (Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 2, July 20, 1961) See the Supplement.

Analysis of this plan shows that it envisages (a) “an island-wide resistance organization responsive to Agency direction”; (b) “support and guidance to those anti-Castro groups who are revealed to have a potential for clandestine operations”; and (c) “primary operations bases” in the US. In short, what is intended is a CIA underground formed on criteria of operational convenience rather than a Cuban underground formed on criteria of building political strength sufficient to overthrow Castro.

Despite the pretense of political impartiality, the effect of these CIA specifications is obviously to favor those groups most willing to accept CIA identification and control, and to discriminate against those groups most eager to control their own operations; i.e., the plan discriminates in favor of mercenaries, reactionaries, etc., and discriminates against men of independence and principle. Thus these criteria eliminate the Manuel Ray group; yet I can find nowhere in the documents any explicit exclusion of pro-Batista people.

Leaving aside the moral merits of this discrimination, the practical effect is to invest our resources in the people least capable of generating broad support within Cuba. The Agency fails to confront the key problem: i.e., that those most capable of rallying popular support against the Castro regime are going to be more independent, more principled and perhaps even more radical than the compliant and manageable types which CIA would prefer for operational purposes.

My recommendation is that you stop this paper in its present form and demand that it be recast to make political sense. The key is the statement that our covert activity “should be viewed only as the covert contribution to any national program designed to bring about the eventual replacement of the Castro government.” This is correct; and there follows from it (a) that our covert activity should encourage the spread of the political sentiments within Cuba most likely to rally support for Castroʼs overthrow (which means, for example, Ray rather than Batista), and (b) that our covert activity should harmonize with our basic national policy of rescuing the Cuban Revolution, as set forth in the White Paper.See Document 79.

It is a fallacy to suppose that clandestine activity can be carried out in a political vacuum.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

245. Report Prepared by a Committee of the United States Intelligence BoardSource: Kennedy Library, Papers of Arthur Schlesinger, Cuba, White Label, Box 31. Secret; Noforn. The report was approved by the USIB on July 11. Washington, July 11, 1961.

THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

A Report Prepared by an Ad Hoc Committee of the United States Intelligence Board

[Here follow a table of contents and a definition of the problem addressed in the report, which reads as follows: “To assess the extent of Sino-Soviet Bloc military collaboration with the Castro regime, and to examine in detail the Cuban military buildup since Castro came to power.”]

Conclusions

1. The Soviet Bloc continues to extend considerable military assist-ance to Cuba in the form of military equipment, training, and technicians and advisers. Thus far, aircraft consisting of MIG-type jets, some helicopters, light transports, piston trainers, and a wide assortment of armaments ranging from small arms through medium artillery and heavy tanks have been positively identified. There are tenuous indications that Cuba may receive some Soviet jet light bombers. An estimate of the total quantities and types of equipment received thus far is shown in Annexes 1. and 2.Not printed. Some military equipment—such as a few Soviet T-54 medium tanks—which probably has been received in Cuba but that has not been positively identified or enumerated is not included in Annex 1. There is no evidence that any nuclear weapons or guided missiles are now in Cuba. Military training of Cubans in the Bloc is continuing and some probably have already returned for duty in Cuba. Soviet Bloc military technicians and probably instructor pilots are in Cuba. No Chinese Communist military personnel have been identified as being in Cuba. 2. There is no evidence that any Sino-Soviet Bloc country has dispatched or is organizing a “volunteer” force for military service in Cuba. 3. The Sino-Soviet Bloc has gone a long way toward identifying itself with the maintenance of the Castro regime. The viability of Cubaʼs economy has become dependent on continued Bloc assistance. The successful Soviet effort to provide Cuba with all its petroleum needs has been at considerable expense and disruption to its normal tanker operations and the Soviet Union has given priority to other Cuban needs even on occasion at the expense of other trading partners. 4. The Sino-Soviet Blocʼs support for the Castro regime is part of its larger efforts to isolate the United States and to weaken and eventually destroy its influence throughout the world. The Soviets desire to establish Cuba as a secure base of operations for furthering their aims throughout Latin America. The Castro regime has already become an effective instrument of the Bloc toward achieving these ends in Latin America and, to a lesser extent, among underdeveloped and emerging nations throughout the world. In short, for most practical purposes, the present Cuban Government can be regarded as Communist, and its military dependence on the Bloc is steadily increasing. Cuba, under the present Communist control, provides a better base of operations for subversion and propaganda throughout Latin America than the Soviets have ever had. The strongly anti-United States and pro-Soviet regime of Castro serves their purposes well; it gives a native color to Communist agitation and limits the risk of a hemisphere-wide reaction against outside Communist intervention. 5. The Soviet Bloc military equipment already shipped to Cuba, as well as prior military purchases by Castro from Western sources, have contributed substantially to a major buildup of ground and air forces there. As a result, the Cuban ground forces are probably now better equipped than those of any other Latin American country. The Cuban military buildup is reflected in the great expansion of personnel in the Cuban military and militia forces. The present Cuban ground forces consist of the Revolutionary Army of approximately 32,000, the Revolutionary National Police of 9,000, and the militia estimated at more than 200,000. The combat effectiveness of the combat elements of the army and the militia has greatly improved since November 1960 and together they must now be considered as constituting one of the most effective ground forces in Latin America. Present capabilities of the Cuban Navy are limited to the patrol of selected portions of the coast. The combat capability of the Cuban Air Force is still low, but it can provide limited support to the ground forces and assist in maintaining internal security. However, with the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of Bloctrained personnel, the capability of the air force will be greatly enhanced over the coming months. If augmented by aircraft of the civil airline, the Cuban Air Force has a fair troop and cargo transport capability. 6. Initially, the purpose of Cubaʼs military buildup was self defense. Anti-Castro guerrillas were active in several areas inside Cuba and exile groups had posed a constant invasion threat. However, the current sharpening and strengthening of all the instruments of police state control suggest that the related motive of tightening the dictatorship is an equal, if not presently the prime, purpose of the military buildup. The regime, which is imposing a thorough socio-economic revolution on the country at a faster pace than almost any other government in history, evidently estimates that its domestic objectives can be achieved only through the regimentation of the Cuban people under a police state. This clearly parallels the objectives of the Cuban Communist Party and thus furthers the aims of the international Communist movement. 7. The militia is a primary instrument of the state in strengthening and extending its control. Drawn from rural and urban lower income groups, a hard core of the militia is well-equipped and is organized with increasing efficiency while a larger portion is undergoing regular part time military training. Some militia units have been assigned to duties normally carried out by the armed forces. The militia provides the government with a substantial armed force with which to control the populace as a whole and subjects a relatively large number of Cubans to military discipline and political indoctrination. At the same time, it contributes toward solving the serious unemployment problem. Communist influence in the militia is extensive. The militia has proven an effective fighting force in the anti-guerrilla campaigns in the Escambray mountains early this year and against the anti-Castro force that landed on 17 April. The effectiveness of the militia reflected an improved state of training, acceptable leadership, and generally good morale as well as the regimeʼs ability to mass large numbers of men in critical areas. 8. The Castro regime is convinced that the Cuban revolution is the vanguard of “the anti-imperialist rebellion” that will inevitably sweep all of Latin America. It is actively encouraging and covertly assisting Communist and Communist-influenced revolutionary groups in other Latin American countries at every opportunity. Its methods include intensive propaganda supported by the Castro-subsidized international news agency that has close working ties with Sino-Soviet Bloc news agencies and reflects the propaganda line of Moscow and Peiping. Cuban diplomatic missions have frequently provided Communist-oriented student and labor groups with propaganda material and financial assistance. The arms buildup in Cuba permits the Cubans to supply weapons to pro-Castro groups in other countries. Receipt of Bloc military equipment permits Cuba to furnish Western-manufactured arms now in their possession for this purpose. 9. Cuban subversion is further supported by the Castro-subsidized travel to Cuba of numerous Latin Americans who are exposed there to further political indoctrination and, according to frequent reports, given military training. During the Havana meeting in May and June 1961 of the executive committee of the Communist-front International Union of Students, it was announced that Cuba plans to offer 1,000 scholarships to Latin American students for study in Cuba.

[Here follow a 22-page Discussion section and 5 supporting annexes.]

246. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-1361. Official Use Only. Drafted by Hurwitch on July 17. Washington, July 13, 1961. SUBJECT Views of Carlos Lechuga, Cuban Ambassador to the OAS PARTICIPANTS Mr. Tad Szulc, New York Times Mr. Robert Hurwitch, ARA:CMA/C

Szulc said that he had recently had a three-hour luncheon conversation with Cuban OAS Ambassador Lechuga whom he had known previous to Castroʼs rise to power. According to Szulc, Lechuga insisted that he was not a Communist. He inquired whether there was any thinking in U.S. Official circles toward resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba which could in turn lead to a general easing of tensions between Cuba and the U.S. He said that he and many others in high places in the Castro regime were becoming increasingly concerned over the degree of Communist influence in Cuba. The bad state of Cuban-U.S. relations left him and his friends no alternative to turning toward the Sino-Soviet Bloc for assistance. A friendlier attitude on the part of the U.S., Lechuga is reported to have said, would assist the non-Communists in Cuba and he felt confident that anti-American propaganda emanating from Cuba would cease. Szulc said he felt Lechuga had a good point and inquired as to my reaction.

I replied that I doubted Lechugaʼs sincerity. It was, I thought, more likely that Lechuga was conducting a campaign for easing tensions in order that Cuba might remain a member in good standing within the inter-American community and at the same time maintain its political-military ties with the Bloc. Accomplishment of this status for Cuba would, from Lechugaʼs standpoint probably constitute success in his mission.

247. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Woodward) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-1861. Confidential. Drafted in ARA/CMA by Robert A. Stevenson and Edwin E. Vallon, and in L/ARA by Marjorie M. Whiteman. Robert F. Woodward was appointed Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs on July 14 and entered on duty on July 17. Washington, July 18, 1961. SUBJECT Congressional Resolution Calling for Recognition of a Cuban Government-in-Exile

Discussion:

From a legal position, there is no precedent or authority to grant recognition to an exile group which does not have or has not had control over territory of the State which it purports to represent. Governments-in-exile recognized during World War II by the United States were refugee governments. The granting of recognition to an exile group having no control, past or present, over any of the territory of the State concerned could have serious consequences as to the legality and practicability of the grant. In the question here considered, for example, subsequent to recognition, the United States would have to look to the new government for the fulfillment of Cuban treaty and other obligations including, of course, Cuban obligations with respect to the Guantanamo Base. Correspondingly, the Castro regime would be relieved of fulfillment of Cuban treaty obligations and could, for example, proceed to harass the Base without accountability as the Government of Cuba. It would also no longer be possible for the Swiss Government to represent United States interests in Cuba, which, of course, includes the protection of United States citizens to the degree possible under Cuban and International Law.

From a political standpoint, it is conceivable that a Cuban Government-in-Exile at some stage might play a positive and helpful role in combatting Castro-Communism and in aiding in Castroʼs downfall. However, to undertake such a development at this time would run counter to our present policy of seeking multilateral action on Cuba within the OAS framework. It would constitute in Latin American eyes an act of unilateral intervention into Cuban affairs. Secondly, there is no indication that the Cuban exile opposition has reconciled its differences or “shaken down” sufficiently to agree upon or pull together in support of a Government-in-Exile. Thirdly, there is no indication that internal opposition groups would support such a move; rather, there is indication that internal opposition is skeptical of all exile opposition efforts.

Conclusion:

It is ARAʼs conclusion that Representative AnfusoʼsRepresentative Victor L. Anfuso (D.-New York). resolution (copy attached)This proposed resolution was not found attached and has not been found in Department of State files. is not appropriate at this time. However, we should stress the Departmentʼs agreement with the “Whereas” clauses which he cites in justification of his resolution. If possible, it should be emphasized to Representative Anfuso that: 1. The act would be lacking in legal justification or legitimacy and would relieve the Castro regime from the responsibility for fulfilling its treaty obligations with the United States; 2. It would no longer be possible for the Swiss to represent United States interests in Cuba, including protection of United States citizens; 3. The United States at this time would very probably be almost alone in recognizing such a government, which would tend to emphasize the lack of support for the United States position from its Latin neighbors and might lend itself to exploitation by Communist propagandists; and that 4. It would not be helpful to the multilateral efforts which are now in progress.

248. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, May 1961-. Secret. Washington, July 19, 1961. SUBJECT U.S. Government Relations with Cuban Revolutionary Council

The Cuban Task Force had agreed that the President should be advised to meet at an early date with Dr. Miro Cardona and tell him, in essence, that U.S. Government support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council would be phased down and possibly out, unless the CRC could produce evidence of broader-based support than it now appears to have.

General Taylor felt that this was such an important matter, and one so closely allied to Cuban covert operations, that the President should have the benefit of consideration of this projected advice, by the Special Group. Accordingly, I suggested to Richard Goodwin that any such action be deferred, if possible, until after the Special Group meeting of July 20th. He intimated that this was not an entirely controllable situation but undertook to try to hold off such a meeting if possible.

In checking with him on July 17th, Goodwin said that Miro Cardona was in town, that the President had previously agreed to see him any time he wanted to, and it might be impossible to avoid such a meeting in the next day or so. General Taylor then took the position that if such a meeting were unavoidable, he would agree to exclude the problem from the Special Group agenda provided that State (Assistant Secretary Woodward) agreed with the Task Force line. General Taylor recognized that this is essentially an overt political decision and, thus, primarily the responsibility of State.

I explained the situation to Mr. Woodward on July 18th, in the presence of his Special Assistant, Mr. Wollum. Mr. Woodward had not been aware of the discussions in the Task Force, which took place before he assumed his present position. Pending a discussion he proposed to have with Goodwin—he saw no particular objection to the proposed line. He did feel that it might be unwise for exile leaders to have continuing access to the President. I pointed out that this particular connection was probably unique, since it grew out of the Presidentʼs meetings with CRC leaders immediately after the collapse of the invasion.

Mr. Goodwin informed me on July 19th that on the previous day the President had telephoned him at 10:00 a.m., directing that an appointment be arranged with Miro Cardona at 11:30. Before this meeting, Goodwin gave the President the Task Force line. In the course of the actual meeting, however, the President told Miro Cardona the U.S. would support the CRC and that he hoped it could be so reorganized as to become a useful body. The President also said that he wanted to continue payments to the dependents of members of the strike force who were either killed or captured; no specific duration for this was mentioned, but he said that another look should be taken at some future time.

The President did not precisely say to Miro Cardona (as he had been advised to do by Goodwin) that the U.S. might have to support exile groups other than the CRC.

Mr. Goodwin proposes to see Miro Cardona on July 19th as a follow-up. He will attempt to make sure that the CRC leader does not go away with inflated ideas of what the President told him. On the other hand, Goodwin recognizes that he cannot go as far as he would have liked (specifically on the matter of support to others) so long as the President did not deal specifically with this.

Thomas A. ParrottPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

249. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-2061. Secret. Drafted by Wollam. Washington, July 20, 1961. SUBJECT Views on Cuban Revolutionary Council PARTICIPANTS Mr. Fernando F. Cabada, Jr.; Hotel Dupont Plaza, Room 519 ARA—Park F. Wollam

Mr. Fernando Cabada was referred to this office by Mr. Devine and Mr. Braddock. His background is well known to them and to various others in the Department with whom he is related.

Mr. Cabada stated that he came unOfficially but that he felt it was most urgent to convey his views to someone in the US Government. Cabada says he is a member of the Unidad Revolucionaria, a Cuban underground movement. He claims that the MRR, MRP, DR, MDC, Rescate and 30th of November movements and the UR as they operate underground in Cuba are now united in a National Revolutionary Council. He claims that the various organizations are fully coordinated and that they have a potential action capability now and for the future. He further asserts that the underground action movements in Cuba have not been subject to the political wrangling going on among exiles outside of Cuba, and that they have been devoted entirely to militant subversive action.

Cabada states that the underground will possibly be sending two representatives of the directorate to the United States in the near future. These two are among some of the group directors who are in asylum in various embassies in Cuba, although most of the others were jailed or eliminated after the April invasion. When and if the two members come to the United States Cabada may join them “Officially”. Until such time, however, he said his representations are unofficial.

Cabada stated that in recent weeks the National Revolutionary Council movement has realized that complete unity is absolutely essential and decided that it might well throw in its lot with the CRC and Dr. Miro Cardona; presumably, some preliminary talks on this subject were held in Miami about June 22 at which time Dr. Cardona supposedly sent $10,000 to each of the action groups with no strings attached as some sort of a gesture. The preliminary talks were generally satisfactory although there were still some details to be arranged. The desire of the UR to achieve unity with the CRC is becoming greater all the time and the possible arrival of the delegates from the Cuban underground is supposed to bring this about, according to Cabada, barring some unforeseen difficulties.

A major factor in the undergroundʼs decision to join forces with Cardonaʼs Council was the belief that Miro Cardonaʼs group had the full confidence of the United States. The united underground would not unify with the CRC unless it was certain of this fact. This is the most important aspect of the situation as described by Cabada.

Cabada states that many of the Cuban underground people do not have the highest regard for Miro Cardona and some of the others in the CRC, but they feel that united they could be effective with US support.

Cabada had heard that Miro Cardona had been in Washington during the past few days and that it had been reported that Miro had visited with President Kennedy. While reports of this visit were conflicting, many Cubans had gotten the impression that President Kennedy expressed dissatisfaction with the CRC or had in some way indicated that the CRC was losing its importance in the eyes of the United States. This, according to Cabada would be a most unfortunate development at a time when it looks as if unification of all the major groups for the single purpose could be achieved. The underground group, which is already feeling some bitterness and disillusion as a result of the April invasion, would be further disheartened if the efforts at unity failed or if it were found that upon achieving unity, the groups no longer had confidence or support of the United States.

Cabada repeated this argument several times to make certain that he left no doubt as to his idea of the importance of the present “crisis” now facing revolutionary groups.

Additional Comments:

Cabada claimed that the exile groups were now feeling the weight and importance of the underground groups in Cuba and were realizing that political figures in exile as such were impotent without the backing of the underground groups. To illustrate this he claimed that Manolo Ray had opposed the desire of the MRP underground to join with the Revolutionary Council. The MRP, finally determined on unity, had ousted Ray. He claims that Ray was ousted by the MRP some two or three days before Ray claims he was forced out by the CIA.

Cabada stated that after the April invasion roundup everyone thought that their covert resources in Cuba had been destroyed. The UR, however, found that it had about 60 percent of its resources left and other groups also have some things remaining. What is needed is a coordinated action plan taking advantage of all these groups and it is the Cuban underground which will continue to carry on the bulk of the fight against Castro. Cabada thought that the achievement of unity among the seven major Cuban underground groups under the banner of the Revolutionary Council and Dr. Miro Cardona was notable in view of the fact that Miro was not liked by many. He repeated numerous times that it was most urgent that the United States remain in support of Miro Cardona in order that unity could be accomplished. He felt that further splintering would be a most serious set-back.

I told Cabada that I was completely new here and not informed on the matters he discussed, but that I would pass his information along.

250. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 3, July 27, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott on July 21. Washington, July 20, 1961. SUBJECT Minutes of Meeting of Special Group, July 20, 1961 PRESENT General Taylor, Messrs. Johnson, Gilpatric, Dulles, Bundy (for items 1 and 2, and part of 3) Mr. Barnes was present for items 1 through 3

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

3.Project to be carried forward to higher authority. [Footnote in the source text.] Cuba—Covert Program

The DCI introduced discussion of this paperDated July 17. (Department of State,INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 2, July 20, 1961) For text, see the Supplement. with the comment that the covert program must be keyed into over-all U.S. policy and that an aggressive set of clandestine actions should not be undertaken until it is clear what the general direction of U.S. policy toward Cuba is going to be. The Group agreed with this. Mr. Johnson expressed his understanding that essentially a stand-by attitude was in effect at the moment. In this connection, reference was made to the recent meeting of top-level authority with Dr. Miro Cardona, which evidently resulted in an understanding that the Revolutionary Council would continue to be supported, for the present at least.

Under Objectives, the Group accepted Mr. Dullesʼ suggestion to reword paragraph 2 a of the paper, to read as follows:

“a. The basic objective is to provide support to a U.S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the U.S.”

Regarding the question of propaganda, Mr. Dulles said that he thought CIA Officials should sit down with USIA to coordinate plans to the extent possible; General Taylor agreed that this would be useful. Mr. Dulles cautioned, however, that USIAʼs appropriations for Latin America had been deeply cut and that, therefore, its capabilities were not very large.

General Taylor then raised a basic question as to where responsibility for approval actually lies, in the case of several possibilities cited under the paramilitary section. After some discussion, it was agreed that any major operations in this field would be subject to further approval by the Special Group.

It was also agreed that sabotage operations, particularly, require a close policy look. In this connection, the second sentence on page 8 of the paper was changed to read: “Actual sabotage operations will be carried out only after policy approval by the Special Group.”

There was then a lengthy discussion on guerrillas, the Group finally agreeing that over-all U.S policy must be more sharply defined on this point. It was the opinion of the Group, however, that supply of existing guerrilla elements, to the extent necessary to avoid dispersion, would be in the U.S. interest. This was interpreted to include such items as ammunition, food and clothing. Mr. Dulles undertook to take a sharp look at the recommendations and plans for guerrillas, with a view to discussing this subject at next weekʼs meeting.

The Special Group approved the budget as presented, with the following provisos: only 50% of each major item would be drawn down in the near future; the large item for boats, under Paramilitary, would be eliminated for the time being, before the 50% figure was applied; expenditures for sabotage and guerrilla operations would be deferred, and both activities would be subject to next weekʼs discussion. The DCI said that the Agency would come back to the Special Group with a progress report, across the board, in less than six months, at which time further authorizations would be considered.

It was the consensus that this whole program should be discussed with highest level authority.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. ParrottPrinted from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

251. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 2, July 20, 1961. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “Seen by Secretary.” Washington, July 22, 1961. SUBJECT Special Group Meeting, July 20, 1961

The following items were taken up at the meeting of the Special Group on July 20.For a record of this meeting, see Document 250.

[Here follows a summary of items unrelated to Cuba.]

3. Cuba—Covert Program for FY 1962

A lengthy paper on this subjectSee footnote 2, Document 250. For text, see the Supplement. was presented by the Agency covering the following activities: (a) intelligence and counter intelligence; (b) political action; (c) propaganda; and (d) paramilitary activities. The budget proposed for FY 1962 to cover these activities totaled $13,778,132. The intelligence and counter intelligence proposals were approved, as were the political action proposals. The objective of the latter is to identify and support opposition groups. The question of how much support and whether it should be provided will be decided at the time of identification. With regard to propaganda, the Group considered the budget high ($4,204,000) and the Group decided to review these activities before fifty per cent of that amount had been spent. In the meanwhile ARA and the Agency will be discussing what USIA can do. With regard to the proposed paramilitary activities the Group agreed that the Agency should continue to plan in this field. In the meanwhile it is understood that policy recommendations should be developed regarding sabotage, terrorist and guerrilla activities. ARA has been asked to take the initiative in this in consultation with Mr. Goodwin of the White House and Mr. Barnes of the Agency. With regard to bases for training purposes it was agreed that nothing would be considered outside U.S. territory. The Agency proposal to purchase ships was deferred.After this item, Johnson wrote “President approved.” He also added a marginal notation that Joseph Scott had informed ARA on July 22 of the decisions reached by the Special Group and approved by the President.

[Here follows a summary of items unrelated to Cuba.]

252. Editorial Note

On July 24, 1961, an Eastern Air Lines plane, en route from Miami to Tampa, Florida, with 33 passengers aboard, was hijacked at gunpoint by one of the passengers, who forced the pilot to fly to Havana. The Cuban Government released 32 of the planeʼs passengers and its 5 crew members on July 25, and they were flown to Miami on a scheduled Pan American Airways flight. The only passenger detained in Cuba was the man who had seized the plane, identified by the FBI as Cuban-born Wilfredo Roman Oquendo. On July 26 Castro offered to return the hijacked plane if the United States would promise to return Cuban planes similarly seized and flown to the United States. Secretary of State Rusk rejected Castroʼs offer on July 27, with the observation that claims relating to seized planes were matters for the courts to decide.

An attempted hijacking on August 3 was foiled when FBI and border patrol officals captured the would-be hijacker, ex-convict Leon Bearden, on the ground at El Paso, Texas, before he could force the pilot to fly a Continental Airlines 707 jet to Havana. On August 9, however, a Pan American Airways flight, en route from Mexico City to Guatemala, was seized by a gunman later identified as Albert Charles Cadon, a Frenchman, and forced to fly to Havana. The plane and passengers, except for Cadon, were returned to the United States the same day.

On August 15 the Eastern Airlines jet that had been seized was released in Havana in return for the release of a Cuban gunboat that had been seized on July 29 by its 3 crewmen, who asked for and received asylum at Key West, Florida. The details of all of these developments were chronicled in The New York Times, July 25-August 16, 1961.

253. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Naval Historical Center, Area Files, Bumpy Road Materials. Confidential. Prepared by Admiral Burke. Washington, July 26, 1961. SUBJ Mtg at White House with the President on 26 Jul 61 prior to my receiving DSM on retirement

1. The President talked about Cuba. He asked me if I thought we would have to go into Cuba. I said yes. He asked would Castro get stronger. I said yes. Castro would increase his power over his people. He asked whether we could take Cuba easily. I said yes, but it was getting more and more difficult. He asked what did I think would happen if we attacked. I said all hell would break loose but that some day we would have to do it. The danger would be that Castro would flee and go to some other country—Russia or Brazil. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

[Here follows discussion of unrelated topics.]

Arleigh BurkePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

254. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 4, August 3, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. This paper condensed for the Presidentʼs consideration a July 25 memorandum prepared in the CIA for the Special Group entitled “Internal Action Operations Against Cuba,” and an August 1 memorandum also prepared in the CIA for the Special Group entitled “Program of Covert Action Directed at the Castro Regime.” (For texts, see the Supplement.) The August 1 memorandum was a revision of the July 17 memorandum on the same subject considered by the Special Group on July 20. (See the Supplement) On August 3, the Special Group considered the condensed set of recommendations and approved them for referral to the President, after reducing the proposed budget to cover 6 months rather than 12 months expenditures. (Memorandum for the files by J.W. Scott, August 4; Minutes of Special Group meeting, August 3; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. V, 4, August 3 1961, and S.G. 5, August 10, 1961, respectively) On August 4, Parrott sent a memorandum to the Special Group indicting that the covert action program for Cuba had received final approval. (Ibid., August 3, 1961) Washington, undated.

Recommendation

It is recommended that the Special Group approve the following covert action program against Cuba:

a) Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Collection of intelligence on the internal Cuban situation and the attitude of the Cuban people, particularly with regard to opposition elements. Improved and expanded collection of operational intelligence on Castroʼs plans, intentions and capabilities. Penetration of Cuban security services and protection of Agency operations against action by these services.

b) Political Action

Foster support for U.S. national policies with respect to Cuba, throughout Latin America. Combat Castroʼs subversive efforts in that area. Assist in strengthening unified opposition to Castro among Cubans, inside and outside of Cuba. Identify and support, if found, any such groups or leaders with real potential for overthrowing and replacing the Castro government.

c) Propaganda

Continue to support propaganda assets, including magazines, newspapers, news letters and radio. Conduct continual review of the effectiveness of these media. Attempt to destroy the popular image of Castro in Cuba, and combat his propaganda efforts throughout Latin America.

d) Paramilitary

Expand present personnel and support aspects inside and outside of Cuba, for use in working with or through Cuban groups in developing an underground organization or organizations. Once such a secure organization is established, engage in infiltration and exfiltration of personnel, supplies and materiel, in intelligence collection and propaganda, and in a low key sabotage and resistance program. Large scale sabotage activities may be planned for, but will not be mounted until approved by the Special Group. Provide modest support, as approved by the Special Group, to those guerrilla elements that might arise in Cuba and which are believed worthy of support. Maintain a limited air capability largely through pilot training.

e) Support

Maintain necessary personnel, forward-operating base on U.S. territory, maritime base, operational or training sites and communications facilities.

A maximum of $12,738,132 is authorized for funding of the above program. Only fifty percent of this total will be withdrawn initially from the Bureau of the Budget, with later withdrawals to be dependent on a review, within six months, of the operational progress made.

Budget breakdown (for 12 months) is as follows: Intelligence and counterintelligence 739,132 Political action 200,000 Propaganda 4,204,000 Paramilitary 3,570,000 Support 4,025,000 [Total] 12,738,132Johnson crossed out the proposed 12-month total of $12,738,132, and wrote in a 6-month total of $5,360,000.

255. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/61-12/61. Top Secret. Prepared by Komer. Another copy of this memorandum has a handwritten notation that indicates the briefing was for President Kennedy, General Taylor, and McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid., Subjects, Guantanamo Base, 8/16/61-10/4/63) Washington, August 16, 1961. SUBJECT JCS Briefing on Cuban Contingency Planning The briefing was given by Captain Hadden USN, with General Dean backing up.

I. Contingency Planning Against Violence at Guantanamo Base

It was stated that this planNone of the plans cited in the memorandum has been further identified. had approval of DOD, State and the President. It calls for response appropriate to character of attack. CINCLANT has interpreted this to include returning fire as appropriate if anyone shoots at US, and extending the base perimeter as required. In other words the Base Commander is now authorized to protect himself to the extent necessary, including going out and silencing guns in the hills if they are shooting at him. He doesnʼt have to check with anybody before he does so. Query—Do we want to leave him this authority? (Wym Coerr says anti-Castro Cubans are reportedly thinking of faking attack on base in order to embroil US.)

Water supply seems well in hand; with austere use local stores could last three weeks. By this time tankers available on short notice could bring in more. There are 3100 non-military personnel, mostly depend-ents, on the base. A Marine BLT (1500) afloat is never more than 48 hours away, and usually closer.

II. Contingency Plan for Response to Cuban Provocation Leading to Open Hostilities

In this case CINCLANT will (a) defend Guantanamo; (b) support or re-establish a Cuban government friendly to US; (c) restore and maintain order. The progression of events would be blockade, then reinforcement of Guantanamo, finally air and amphibious attack.

Force tabs include 15,500 Marines and a 9000-man Marine air wing; 23,000 Army, mainly 18th Airborne Corps (82nd Airborne Division and an infantry brigade); a naval covering force, and an air task force including fighters and troop carrier wings.

III. Alternative Contingency Plan for Larger-scale Action

JCS also have a plan which is based on a concept of generating forces far beyond Cuban capabilities to resist. This plan in effect calls for overthrowing the Castro government by an overwhelming land, sea and air operation. It includes the above forces plus substantial add-ons, e.g. a total of 53,000 Army troops (two airborne divisions plus) and overwhelming air strength. JCS estimate these forces could take all of Cuba within ten days and secure it in five days more (though of course guerrillas in hills would take longer to flush).

Reaction Time Needed. Both plans are now based on 18 days total response time from date of decision. However, some forces can be generated much more rapidly: 4-24 hours—can get a 1500 man BLT to Guantanamo. 24 hours—could drop 2 airborne battle groups supported by 7 DDs and 4 fighter squadrons. 48 hours—11,800 man task force of 4 battle groups, backed by 2 carriers, 36 destroyers, and 8 fighter squadrons. 5 days—2 airborne divisions with 23,000 men. 15-18 days—sealift elements come in. Up to this point the forces dropped lack heavy equipment for offensive punch. It (tanks, etc.) comes in by sea and US forces then move out to occupy Cuba.

Assumptions are that the necessary base rights and overflight clearances have been gotten (one airbase in Bahamas is essential and we are checking with UK on it); forces from Puerto Rico must fly over Haiti and Dominican Republic.

All of the above plans are for unilateral US action. Though the JCS hope there would be some OAS support, the underlying thought behind both plans was to be ready to do something overwhelming soon. In this case sizable OAS forces would only slow us down, though the plans do contemplate token contributions. Query—Shouldnʼt we have alternate plans based on substantial LA contribution, so that in case we want to make it an OAS rather than strictly US operation, weʼll have some idea of how to fair [phase?] the LAʼs in?

Above plans call for only conventional weapons. They are based on immediate neutralization of whatever Cuban air strength exists so no requirement exists for nuclears (it would be a political disaster anyway). There are CIA and military government annexes, but no use of Cuban forces is contemplated. No Soviet reaction is assumed.

One weakness in the plans is that the military will be prepared only to provide five days support for the indigenous personnel, i.e. Cubans in occupied areas. Obviously after five days we will have an awful lot of Cubans to care for. The plan merely says this would be responsibility of the State Department!

R. W. Komer

256. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Secret. Washington, August 22, 1961.

The following is an extremely condensed statement of first thoughts regarding some aspects of our Cuba policy.

The Conference at Punta del EsteA special meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, attended by representatives of all of the American Republics, was held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, August 5-17, to establish the Alliance for Progress. The charter for the Alliance was signed at the conclusion of the meeting on August 17. For text of the charter, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 395-409. adds, I believe, two new factors to our consideration of Cuba policy.

First, is the conversation with Che Guevara which is appended to this paper.Document 257. I believe this conversation—coupled with other evidence which has been accumulating—indicates that Cuba is undergoing severe economic stress, that the Soviet Union is not prepared to undertake the large effort necessary to get them on their feet (a Brazilian told me “you donʼt feed the lamb in the mouth of the lion”), and that Cuba desires an understanding with the U.S. It is worth remembering that Guevara undoubtedly represents the most dedicated communist views of the Cuban government—and if there is room for any spectrum of viewpoint in Cuba there may be other Cuban leaders even more anxious for an accommodation within the U.S. This is only a speculative possibility but it is, I believe, a reasonable speculation. Second, is the emerging fact that any hope for OAS action—along the lines of the Colombian initiativeOn May 6 the Government of Colombia proposed a meeting of Latin American Foreign Ministers to discuss the Cuban problem. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-661) For documentation on this initiative, see vol. XII, pp. 250 ff.—is dead. It is my strong belief that the big countries (Brazil and Mexico especially) are not prepared to buy this, that they feel such action would be a meaningless gesture at great internal political cost to them, and that there is no point on going ahead without the support of the large countries. A numerical majority—led by Nicaragua and Peru—would not be in our interest.

This being so I believe we should consider the following general lines of action.

(A) Pay little public attention to Cuba. Do not allow them to appear as the victims of U.S. aggression. Do not create the impression we are obsessed with Castro—an impression which only strengthens Castroʼs hand in Cuba and encourages anti-American and leftist forces in other countries to rally round the Cuban flag. (B)

Quietly intensify, wherever possible, the economic pressure. This means selectively discouraging those doing business with Castro, aiming sabotage activities at key sectors of the industrial plants such as refineries, invoking the Trading with the Enemy Act upon the first apparent provocation, and focussing some expert attention on the problem of economic warfare.

This also means quiet military pressure—perhaps through frequent unpublicized naval maneuvers off the Cuban coast, Guantanamo buildups, the spread of false intelligence, etc. The object of this is to continue the diversion of important resources into military activities and equipment. This should be done as quietly as possible to avoid adverse propaganda effects as well as an invasion psychology here.

(C) Continue and step up covert activities aimed, in the first instance, at destruction of economic units, and diversion of resources into anti-underground actitivies. This should be done by Cuban members of Cuban groups with political aims and ideologies. (D) Step up propaganda aimed at: 1. Telling the Cuban people how their government is sacrificing their welfare to international communism. 2. Widely publicizing the economic failures of the Castro regime throughout Latin America. (E) Form the Caribbean Security pact strictly as a defensive meas-ure. Aside from the substantive value of such an organization in dealing with the spread of revolution, it will have an adverse impact on the psychology of peaceful coexistence which Castro is now trying to create, and might prove a useful screen for some of our activities. (F) Seek some way of continuing the below ground dialogue which Che has begun. We can thus make it clear that we want to help Cuba and would help Cuba if it would sever communist ties and begin democratization. In this way we can begin to probe for the split in top leadership which might exist. Dick

257. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Secret. Washington, August 22, 1961. SUBJECT Conversation with Commandante Ernesto Guevara of Cuba

The conversation took place the evening of August 17 at 2 A.M. Several members of the Brazilian and Argentine delegations had made efforts—throughout the Punta del Este Conference—to arrange a meeting between me and Che. This was obviously done with Cheʼs approval, if not his urging. I had avoided such a meeting during the Conference. On Thursday we arrived in Montevideo and I was invited to a birthday party for the local Brazilian delegate to the Free Trade area. After I arrived, and had been there for about an hour, one of the Argentines present (who had been on the Argentine delegation) informed me they were inviting Che to the party. He arrived about 2 A.M. and told Edmundo Barbosa DaSilva of Brazil and Horatio Larretta of Argentine that he had something to say to me. The four of us entered a room, and the following is a summary of what took place. (The Argentine and Brazilian alternated as interpreters.)

Che was wearing green fatigues, and his usual overgrown and scraggly beard. Behind the beard his features are quite soft, almost feminine, and his manner is intense. He has a good sense of humor, and there was considerable joking back and forth during the meeting. He seemed very ill at ease when we began to talk, but soon became relaxed and spoke freely. Although he left no doubt of his personal and intense devotion to communism, his conversation was free of propaganda and bombast. He spoke calmly, in a straightforward manner, and with the appearance of detachment and objectivity. He left no doubt, at any time, that he felt completely free to speak for his government and rarely distinguished between his personal observations and the Official position of the Cuban government. I had the definite impression that he had thought out his remarks very carefully—they were extremely well organized. I told him at the outset that I had no authority to negotiate my countryʼs problems, but would report what he said to interested Officials of our government. He said “good” and began.

Guevara began by saying that I must understand the Cuban revolution. They intend to build a Socialist state, and the revolution which they have begun is irreversible. They are also now out of the U.S. sphere of influence, and that too is irreversible. They will establish a single-party system with Fidel as Secretary-General of the party. Their ties with the East stem from natural sympathies, and common beliefs in the proper structure of the Social order. They feel that they have the support of the masses for their revolution, and that that support will grow as time passes.

He said that the United States must not act on the false assumptions that (a) we can rescue Cuba from the claws of communism (he meant by other than direct military action); (b) that Fidel is a moderate surrounded by a bunch of fanatic and aggressive men, and might be moved to the Western side; (c) that the Cuban revolution can be overthrown from within—there is, he said, diminishing support for such an effort and it will never be strong enough.

He spoke of the great strength of the Cuban revolution, and the impact it has had on liberal thought throughout Latin America. For example, he said, all the leftwing forces in Uruguay were joining forces under the banner of Cuba. He said civil war would break out in many countries if Cuba were in danger—and such war might break out in any event. He spoke with great intensity of the impact of Cuba on the continent and the growing strength of its example.

He said that in building a communist state they had not repeated all of the aggressive moves of the East. They did not intend to construct an iron curtain around Cuba but to welcome technicians and visitors from all countries to come and work.

He touched on the matter of the plane thefts.See Document 252. He said he didnʼt know if I knew but they had not been responsible for any hijackings. The first plane was taken by a young fellow who was a good boy but a little wild and who is now in jail. They suspected that the last plane was taken by a provocateur (a CIA agent). He is afraid that if these thefts keep up it will be very dangerous.

He began to discuss the difficulties of the Alliance for Progress. He asked me if I had heard his speech at the closing of the conference. I said I had listened to it closely. He said that it explained his viewpoint on the Alliance for Progress. (In this speech he said the idea of the Alianza was fine, but it would fail. He spoke also of the play of historical forces working on behalf of communism, etc.—that there would be either leftist revolutions or rightist coups leading to leftist takeovers, and there was also a strong chance that the commies would get in through popular election.) He then said he wished to add that there was an intrinsic contradiction in the Alianza—by encouraging the forces of change and the desires of the masses we might set loose forces which were beyond our control, ending in a Cuba style revolution. Never once did he indicate that Cuba might play a more direct role in the march of history.

He then said, now that he had discussed our difficulties he would like to discuss his own problems—and he would like to do so very frankly. There were in Cuba, he said, several basic problems.

1. There was disturbing revolutionary sentiment, armed men and sabotage. 2. The small bourgeoisie were hostile to the revolution or, at best, were lukewarm. 3. The Catholic Church (here he shook his head in dismay). 4. Their factories looked naturally to the U.S. for resources, especially spare parts and at times the shortages of these resources made things very critical. 5. They had accelerated the process of development too rapidly and their hard currency reserves were very low. Thus they were unable to import consumer goods and meet basic needs of the people.

He then said that they didnʼt want an understanding with the U.S., because they know that was impossible. They would like a modus vivendi—at least an interim modus vivendi. Of course, he said, it was difficult to put forth a practical formula for such a modus vivendi—he knew because he had spent a lot of time thinking about it. He thought we should put forth such a formula because we had public opinion to worry about whereas he could accept anything without worrying about public opinion.

I said nothing, and he waited and then said that, in any event, there were some things he had in mind.

1. That they would not give back the expropriated properties—the factories and banks—but they could pay for them in trade. 2. They could agree not to make any political alliance with the East—although this would not affect their natural sympathies. 3. They would have free elections—but only after a period of institutionalizing the revolution had been completed. In response to my question he said that this included the establishment of a one-party system. 4. Of course, they would not attack Guantanamo. (At this point he laughed as if at the absurdly self-evident nature of such a statement.) 5. He indicated, very obliquely, and with evident reluctance because of the company in which we were talking, that they could also discuss the activities of the Cuban revolution in other countries.

He then went on to say that he wanted to thank us very much for the invasion—that it had been a great political victory for them—enabled them to consolidate—and transformed them from an aggrieved little country to an equal.

Guevara said he knew it was difficult to negotiate these things but we could open up some of these issues by beginning to discuss subordinate issues. He suggested discussion of the airplane issue (presumably, we would use the airplane issue as a cover for more serious conversation).

He said they could discuss no formula that would mean giving up the type of society to which they were dedicated.

At close he said that he would tell no one of the substance of this conversation except Fidel. I said I would not publicize it either.

After the conversation was terminated I left to record notes on what had been said. He stayed at the party, and talked with the Brazilian and Argentine.

The Argentine fellow—Larretta—called me the next morning to say that Guevara had thought the conversation quite profitable, and had told him that it was much easier to talk to someone of the “newer generation.”

The above is substantially a complete account of the entire conversation.On August 23 the Department of State summarized in circular telegram 312 to all Latin American posts a statement released by the White House on August 22 in which it was pointed out that the conversation between Goodwin and Guevara at Punta del Este was a casual cocktail party conversation in which Goodwin restricted himself to listening. The posts were authorized to assure their host governments that there had been no change in U.S. policy toward Cuba, as recently defined by President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk in public statements. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-2361)

Dick

258. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/61-12/61. Secret. Another copy of this memorandum is dated September 6. (Ibid., Schlesinger Papers, Box 31, Cuba 1961) Another record of this meeting, drafted by Barnes, is in Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 1, Area Activity-Western Hemisphere-Cuba. Washington, September 1, 1961.

The Cuban Task Force met at the White House on Thursday, August 31. Present were Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Woodward, two members of the ARA Bureau, Dick Bissell, Tracy Barnes and myself.

The following decisions were made: 1.

We would proceed immediately to discuss with other Caribbean governments the possibility of organizing a Caribbean Security Force. This could be organized on the basis of informal understandings within the framework of existing treaty arrangements, as a series of new bilateral treaties, or a formal, multilateral treaty. It was thought that the basis of organization would depend on the judgment of other Caribbean countries as to how they could accomplish the objective of establishing the force without running serious internal political risks. The United States, for its part, would prefer the formal multi-lateral arrangement. Such a Caribbean Security Force would have at least four major aspects: (1) Advance commitment to come to the aid of other signatories threatened by Castro revolutions and, perhaps the designation of specific units for participation in necessary multilateral actions. (2) The establishment of a pool of intelligence information concerning subversive activities with provision for exchange of such information. (3) The establishment of a Caribbean air and sea patrol to watch for suspected infiltration of Castro arms or agents. (4) A training program in combatting subversive tactics, police organization and procedure, etc.

It was conceded that the substantive aspects of this arrangement could, if necessary, be achieved informally. However, the decision to seek a more formal arrangement was primarily arrived at on the basis of internal political considerations in the United States.

2. It was decided that our public posture toward Cuba should be as quiet as possible—trying to ignore Castro and his island. 3. Our covert activities would now be directed toward the destruction of targets important to the economy, e.g., refineries, plants using U.S. equipment, etc. This would be done within the general framework of covert operations—which is based on the principle that para-military activities ought to be carried out through Cuban revolutionary groups which have a potential for establishing an effective political opposition to Castro within Cuba. Within that principle we will do all we can to identify and suggest targets whose destruction will have the maximum economic impact. 4. We will intensify our surveillance of Cuban trade with other countries and especially U.S. subsidiaries in other countries; and then employ informal methods to attempt to divert this trade—depriving Cuba of markets and sources of supply. I understand that we have already had a few successes in this effort. 5. We will establish next week—in the State Department—a psychological warfare group. This will be a full-time group of three or four people charged with the responsibility of assembling all available information on the Sovietization of Cuba, repression of human rights, failure of the Cuban economy, etc.—much of which has been hitherto classified—putting this information into readable, popularized form, and developing methods of disseminating it through Latin America. Such dissemination would not be primarily through USIA channels but would include feeding it to Latin papers for “exclusive” stories, helping to prepare scripts for Latin American broadcasts, perhaps a direct mailing list of intellectuals and government Officials to be handled by a front group, etc. The basic idea is to get this stuff into channels of Latin American communication, instead of treating it as Official U.S. propaganda. We have selected someone to head this effort—Jim OʼDonnell of George Ballʼs office who was a free-lance magazine writer (including work for the Saturday Evening Post) for many years and whom Ball highly recommends. 6. The CIA was asked to come up—within the week—with a precise, covert procedure for continuing the below-ground dialogue with the Cuban government. The object of this dialogue—to explore the possibility of a split within the governmental hierarchy of Cuba and to encourage such a split—was fully detailed in my last memorandum to you.Document 256. This is an effort to find an operational technique.In a telephone conversation with Ball on September 7, Goodwin said that he had gone over the results of the Cuban task force meeting with the President. The President had reviewed the memorandum that Goodwin had prepared concerning the meeting, and had “agreed with all of the things that we are doing.” Goodwin said that the President wanted “to play it very quiet with Castro” because he didnʼt want to give Castro the opportunity to blame the United States for his troubles. President Kennedy asked for a study of the current economic situation in Cuba and a prognosis of future developments. Ball indicated that he would get Hilsman and INR started on such a study. (Kennedy Library, Papers of George W. Ball, Subject Series, Cuba, 1/24/61-12/30/62)

Dick

259. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Woodward) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Ball)Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, August 1961. Secret. Drafted on September 7 in ARA/CMA by Park F. Wollam and Hurwitch. Cleared in CMA by Edwin E. Vallon, in ARA by Daniel M. Braddock, and in the CIA by Bissell. Washington, undated. SUBJECT USG Relationships with Cuban Exile Groups

Problem:

To determine the Departmentʼs position with respect to Dr. Miro Cardonaʼs insistence that all U.S. assistance (other than that provided by HEW) to Cuban exiles and underground resistance groups be channelled through the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

Discussion:

During July 1961 when the question of the USGʼs relationships with Cuban exile groups arose, the Departmentʼs position was that the CRC should be accepted and treated as a leading element among the Cuban exile groups; that the U.S. should refrain from affording to the CRC any direct and overt character as a USG instrument in the campaign against Castro; and that the CRC should not be accorded any status as exclusive channel or required point of approval with respect to dealings and relationships established between this Government and other Cuban groups. As far as I have been able to determine, this position was approved by the White House. ARA believes that this basic framework of our relationships to the CRC should be maintained.

An essential element to this relationship is the budgetary support of the CRC which enables it to remain viable. Withdrawal of this support would probably result in the collapse of the CRC, leaving a clear field in the Cuban exile community to the groups backed by Batista and Prio. While we of course have no objection to the activities of Prio, such a development would deprive the Cuban exile movement of the broad base of support which it now enjoys, and would seriously delay the revolutionary effort. ARA believes that it is in our interest to perpetuate the existence of the CRC at this time.

The basic question is what role in our view should the CRC play in present plans regarding Cuba. Miroʼs contention is that only through a highly centralized operation, fully controlled by the CRC, is it reasonable to hope for eventual success against Castro. A decentralized operation, much of which he maintains is at present kept from CRCʼs knowledge, signifies in his view deepening rather than healing the split among Cuban exiles and a repetition of past errors. He has stated that he would not continue unless the CRC fully participated in plans and operations regarding Cuba. It is possible that he might retreat somewhat from this first position.

It has been generally agreed that an important mistake was made in the past by not taking the anti-Castro Cubans more fully into our confidence. Clearly, we shall have to rely heavily upon Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) to accomplish our objectives. I feel that the U.S. role should be one limited to purveying funds, materiel and know-how to the Cuban opposition groups based upon plans jointly arrived at. The CRC has been requested to broaden its base and from latest reports appears to have achieved some success in this direction. As far as we are able to determine most of the underground groups now organized in Cuba either have some allegiance to the CRC or at the least do not oppose it.

It would appear reasonable, then, that we should agree with Miroʼs point of view as far as dealing centrally through the CRC regarding matters involving CRC affiliated organizations is concerned. Two questions arise: security and effectiveness. With regard to the first, it is my understanding that present operations involve dealing with various Cuban opposition groups, separately. The possibility of some security leaks, but not involving the entire plan, is evident under this arrangement. Dealing centrally with the CRC does incur the risk of disclosure of the entire plan. With regard to the second question, centralization may mean wrangling among CRC members, use of funds for political ends, and an ineffective operation.

ARA believes that in general the stature of the CRC both in the U.S. and abroad should be enhanced. To the extent feasible, Cuban exile prop-aganda programs should emanate from the CRC, so that the Cuban exile community speaks with a single voice. Propaganda programs and propaganda activities based upon the utilization of Cuban exiles should be the result of a coordinated US-CRC effort. The CRC should be covertly supported in these programs.

In essence, the ARA view concerning our future relationship to the CRC is that we should display greater confidence in its ability to carry out most of the major tasks confronting us with respect to Cuba, while we at the same time maintain flexibility vis-a-vis other exile and resistance groups.

Recommendations:Ball initialed his approval of each of the recommendations on September 8.

1. That we inform Miro that the USG will continue covert budgetary support for the CRC for administrative expenses and propaganda work. 2. That we encourage Miro to intensify his efforts to broaden the CRCʼs base. 3. That we inform Miro that with respect to clandestine activities in Cuba involving underground groups not opposed to working with the CRC, U.S. assistance will be coordinated under the strictest terms of secrecy with him, based upon plans mutually agreed upon. 4. That we inform Miro that we must retain freedom to give direct assistance to groups that decline to work with the CRC. 5. That we inform Miro that we plan to keep him generally informed as to our activities regarding groups not represented in the Council. 6. That we inform Miro that in the event of security leaks or ineffectiveness the arrangements described in recommendation 3 and/or 5 would be modified. 7. That we step up the level of U.S. representation to plan and coordinate with the CRC on matters of common interest herein referred to.

260. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 1, Area Activity-Western Hemisphere-Cuba. Secret. Washington, September 9, 1961. SUBJECT Meeting in the White House on 9 September 1961 re Status of the Cuban Revolutionary Council PARTICIPANTS Mr. Richard Goodwin, Assistant to the President for Latin American Affairs Mr. Robert Woodward, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Mr. Park Wollam, Department of State Mr. Robert Hurwitch, Cuban Desk Officer, Department of State 1. Before the meeting with Dr. Miro Cardona, the head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, and his secretary, Mr. Ernesto de Aragon, at 11:30 a.m., there was a preliminary meeting held in the office of Mr. Goodwin with him, Mr. Woodward, Mr. Wollam, and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to reach agreement on the suggested statement to be made to Dr. Miro Cardona as to the United States Governmentʼs relationship to the Revolutionary Council. There is attached hereto a copy of the guidanceNot found attached but printed as Document 261. which was not to be handed to Dr. Miro but to be read to him. The only question that I had was under Section C, Paragraph 2, where it was stated that, where all groups are not willing to work with the Revolutionary Council, Dr. Miro would be kept informed “of these activities.” I suggested that this should be somewhat limited to state that he would be kept informed “in general of these activities.” Mr. Goodwin said that he did not expect to give a copy of this paper to Dr. Miro, and that he thought that we could play it so that Dr. Miro would simply have a general idea of what we were doing, sufficient to neutralize his protests. 2. At the meeting Dr. Miro was given the substance of the attached, which was translated from English as Mr. Goodwin gave it into Spanish by Mr. Aragon. The Spanish translation was followed very carefully by those in attendance who spoke Spanish and several corrections were made, so that an exact translation was the result. 3. Dr. Miro made no comments, but then stated that if he were to be informed of everything that he had one other basic requirement. He pointed out that the President of the United States had said that Cuban exiles would be accepted into the United States Army. He said that he was faced with a dilemma in that in his position he was called upon to encourage Cubans to join the Army. The question in his mind was whether he was simply encouraging them to become professional soldiers or whether they were equipping themselves for an invasion of Cuba. He recognized the fact that the United States, due to the international situation, could not afford to have a unilateral invasion of Cuba. However, he needed to be reassured that these Cubans were being recruited into the American Army for an eventual joint action with other nations and Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro. He felt that for the Cuban Revolutionary Council to participate in propaganda activities and clandestine operations aimed at sabotage within Cuba was not sufficient in itself. Likewise, he felt that he could not encourage young Cubans to enter the Army when they might instead be going to college to prepare themselves to become professional men and residents of a new country. Plus that, he objected strenuously to the fact that CIA and the United States Government would back individual groups of Cubans who refused to deal with the Cuban Revolutionary Council. He insisted that by not centralizing all authority in the Council we were creating di-versified groups, and actual gangs would muddy the future of Cuba even if Fidel Castro were overthrown. 4. Mr. Goodwin showed extreme patience and made what might be described as rather eloquent pleas to Dr. Miroʼs realism and patriotism to understand that the United States could not go so far as to commit itself at this point to armed invasion of Cuba, and to the fact that all Cubans could not be united at this point within the Cuban Revolutionary Council. In spite of these lengthy pleas on the part of Mr. Goodwin, there were rebuttals on the part of Dr. Miro, and Dr. Miro stated that he would not commit himself to continuing as head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. He said that he would retire to Baltimore to meditate until Monday,September 11. when he would make a final decision, but that his belief was that at that point he would write an “eloquent and gracious” letter to the President thanking him for his support but declining his continuance as the director of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Instead he would revert to the status of adviser and common soldier in the resistance to the Communist regime in Cuba. J.D. EsterlinePrinted from a copy that indicates Esterline signed for [text not declassified], Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.

261. Memorandum Prepared by the Presidentʼs Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin)Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, August 1961-. Secret. A typed notation at the top of the source text reads: “Goodwin Memo.” A September 20 memorandum from H. Bartlett Wells of INR/DDC to Deputy Under Secretary Johnson describes the memorandum as Goodwinʼs record of the points made in his conversation with Miro Cardona. (Ibid.) Washington, September 9, 1961.

RELATIONS WITH THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL

1. The United States regards the Revolutionary Council as the central point of contact in its dealing with the Cuban exile and underground activity. Dr. Miro Cardona—as Chairman of that Council—has the complete confidence of the United States Government. The following is a complete outline of the structure of our future relationships with the Council: A.

Budgetary—A basic administrative budget will be allocated. This will be somewhere in the neighborhood of one million dollars per year. There will be considerable flexibility in the use of this money allowed to the Council. Detailed advance justification will not be required, but complete accounting for monies spent will be essential.

All other allocations of money will be on the basis of specific projects submitted by the Council and approved by the United States. In this category will fall most of the propaganda activities and all clandestine activities within Cuba.

B. Composition of Council—The Council will continue to broaden its base, allowing entry to all substantial exile groups which are not identified with Batista or with Communism. C. Underground Activities— 1. All groups willing to work with the Council in connection with their underground activities will be dealt with through Dr. Miro. This means that the operating U.S. Agency will meet jointly with Dr. Miro and with the appropriate representative of the underground group to discuss activities, including the transfer of supplies and money. 2. All groups which are not willing to work in this manner will be dealt with bilaterally (the U.S. and the group involved); but Dr. Miro will be kept informed of these activities. 3. In all contacts with underground groups it is understood that the nature of these contacts and the matters discussed will be held in the strictest secrecy between the United States, Dr. Miro and the group concerned. It is not intended that information of this sort be disseminated to other members of the Council. Where Dr. Miro is informed of clandestine activities it is for his information only, or that of a specially appointed assistant for these matters. It is further understood that if this arrangement proves insecure, i.e., if information is not kept completely secret, it will be terminated. 4. A CIA agent will keep in constant contact with Dr. Miro. D. Council Relationships— 1. All problems arising out of the activities of the Council will be discussed between the Council and the Bureau of ARA of the State Department. However, Dr. Miro will still retain his contact with the White House in such cases where he considers such contact to be urgently necessary.

262. Letter From President Kennedy to the President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (Miro Cardona)Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, August 1961-. Secret. A note on the source text indicates that the letter was seen and approved by Hurwitch, Vallon, Coerr, Woodward, Braddock, and Wollam. Washington, September 14, 1961.

Dear Dr. Miro Cardona: I write to express my confidence in your leadership of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The United States Government deeply admires the distinguished service you have already rendered to the cause of a free Cuba; and I hope you will continue to lead this fight until your country is liberated from the tyranny which has been imposed on it. I am sure that any problems arising from your relationship with the United States can be worked out in the spirit of mutual cooperation and common aspirations which lie behind all our efforts.

Sincerely,

John F. KennedyPrinted from a copy that indicates President Kennedy signed the original.

263. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kennedy and Senator Kubitschek of BrazilSource: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by DeSeabra. Approved in the White House on October 26. Senator Juscelino Kubitschek, former President of Brazil, was visiting Washington as part of a trip that took him to several countries around the world. Washington, September 15, 1961.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

President Kennedy pointed out that even the neutralization of Western Germany could have a definite weakening effect on the rest of Europe. Then the Chief Executive asked Senator Kubitschek for his comments on the Cuban problem and, specifically, what Senator Kubitschek thought the U.S. should do. Senator Kubitschek said that Cuba was a most serious problem for the entire Hemisphere, and it had become another Berlin for the more vocal and articulate left-wing elements in Latin America. One disturbing fact was that many people thought of self-determination only in terms of Cuba, never of Berlin. As for the best line of action to be taken by the U.S., it should be kept in mind that any act or even attitude on the part of the U.S. that could be construed as aggression would immediately bring about a strong anti-U.S. reaction from Latin American left-wing groups. At the same time, it is an obvious fact that Cuba can readily become a dangerous focus of political agitation in the Hemisphere. Senator Kubitschek mentioned next that he was in Europe at the time of the attempted invasion of Cuba and was keeping in close touch with events. He noticed that many Europeans and Latin Americans held the secret hope that Castro would be toppled. Instead his position and that of his supporters were much strengthened by the failure of the invasion. In an effort to forestall expansion of Castro-type movements, is it better to concentrate solely on assistance to underdeveloped countries or is it desirable in addition to contain or somehow blockade Cuba so that its revolutionary ideology cannot be exported to the rest of the Hemisphere?

President Kennedy commented that he realized that direct action by the U.S. or the OAS might easily be regarded as a positive threat to the independence, sovereignty and right to self-determination of nations in the Hemisphere. As for possible lines of action, one would be to stress the present general policy of ignoring Cuba, thus depriving Castro of the publicity on which he flourishes; another, to undertake appropriate political and economic action that would circumvent the danger posed by the Castro regime to the entire Hemisphere.

Senator Kubitschek agreed that any direct military action against Cuba would rouse vast areas of public opinion against the U.S. He himself would favor some form of indirect action. With reference to public opinion in Brazil, Senator Kubitschek pointed out that the Brazilian press was infiltrated by Communist sympathizers, and even in the more conservative dailies there were writers who consistently presented the Cuban regime in a favorable light. He felt that some understanding was needed among nations in the Hemisphere with a view to taking some action with regard to Cuba that would not be construed as an aggression that in turn would build up Castro as a martyr or hero. A small committee could be set up to sound out the Latin American governments on what to do about Castro. He went on to add that there was no serious Communist threat in Brazil. Out of a population of 70 million, there were 20 million voters, and no more than 500,000 Communists or Communist sympathizers, which are at worst an active minority. In his view, the bulk of the population is anti-Communist and essentially friendly to the U.S. Therefore, a well-thought-out plan of indirect action would probably receive a good measure of popular support, even though Dr. Goulart has taken a stand favoring Cuba. Senator Kubitschek mentioned in passing his talks with Prado of Peru and Frondizi of Argentina on the need for discreet action to isolate Cuba.

President Kennedy indicated that Colombia was also concerned about the Cuban situation. All in all, it was a difficult choice to make regarding the course to be followed because even indirect action might precipitate a reaction that would rouse Castro to hurl more challenges at the U.S. The crux of the problem is to limit Castroʼs influence while avoiding direct controversy. It will be necessary therefore to weigh in the balance the advantages to be gained by direct action, as contrasted to the disadvantages that would ensue if Castro were put in a position where he would be the voice of revolution and independence, all of it aimed against the United States.

Senator Kubitschek commented that President Kennedy had stated the issues in very clear terms. He felt that even the most indirect and discreet action called for the greatest care. He then went on to review the recent events in Brazil, asserting that Quadros was a man of great nervous instability—as shown by his sudden resignation—who had been moving ever closer to Cuba. Under Quadrosʼ administration Cuba gained prominence in headlines. There was a growing reluctance to accept his pro-Communist and pro-Cuban policies on the part of the military, the whole situation coming to a head with the much-publicized decoration of Che Guevara. The present administration is fully aware of the militaryʼs attitude and is expected to move warily, even taking a few steps backward from the extreme positions reached by Quadros. He added that in Brazil the situation had definitely taken a turn for the better. In conclusion, he said that he had been most happy to have had this opportunity to meet President Kennedy, whom he knew through his books and his brilliant career, and for whom he had the greatest admiration. He voiced the conviction that President Kennedy, with his youth, vigor and intelligence, would provide sustained leadership in the defense of the ideals of the Western World.

[Here follows discussion of other matters.]

264. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kennedy and President FrondiziSource: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 149. Confidential. Drafted by Barnes and approved in the White House on November 3. The conversation took place at the Hotel Carlyle in New York. President Kennedy and Argentine President Arturo Frondizi were in New York for the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly. New York, September 26, 1961, 9 a.m.

[Here follows discussion of matters unrelated to Cuba.]

Referring to the Cuban problem, President Kennedy said that it was important that it be understood that it was not a question of the United States versus Cuba, or of Castro versus Kennedy, because a debate of this kind would only enhance Castroʼs prestige. He said that it was necessary to isolate Cuba and increase its economic problems, which were already serious. He said that it was important not to leave the impression of the United States, great imperialist power from the North, attacking poor, brave Cuba, which is the impression Castro wants to give.

President Frondizi said that he believed that the basic action to be undertaken with regard to Cuba was to accelerate the launching of the Alliance for Progress, and that he did not believe that another invasion of Cuba should be attempted. He said that it was necessary to show that with democratic methods, with American support for the Latin American people, it was possible to achieve the conditions Castro was seeking in his own country.

President Kennedy said that there were Cubans in all of these countries trying to influence liberals, leftists, and labor movements, and that it was important to take action to discredit the Cuban revolution, identifying it as foreign, alien, and anti-Christian, and not permitting it to be considered as a revolution that was trying to improve the living conditions of the Cuban people. He said that it was necessary to show that Castro and company were subversives in the hemisphere, and that it was not a problem of the United States against Cuba.

President Kennedy asked whether President Frondizi saw any merit in the Colombian proposal to try to call a meeting of Foreign Ministers, in order to declare that Cuba is a Soviet satellite and that therefore, according to the terms of the Rio Treaty, can no longer be considered a member of the American family. He also asked whether President Frondizi considered that it might be possible, or advisable for Argentina, on the basis of the Cuban documents or for any other reasons, to break relations with Cuba, and if it did so, whether this would create internal problems in the country. He added that any action taken by the United States had to have the support of Argentina.

President Frondizi said that the solution to the problem must be found within the framework of the OAS. On the basis of his conversations with other Latin American Presidents, he believed that it was indispensable to proceed vigorously with the Alliance for Progress, and on this platform later take decisions within the OAS. Then a meeting of the OAS might be called, in which the Colombian proposal would be a good working tool.

President Kennedy said that some time would be required to get the Alliance for Progress organized, and asked as to the possible date for such a meeting of consultation.

President Frondizi said that it might be the beginning of 1962.

President Kennedy said that with regard to this problem he was somewhat concerned about the position of Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, and to a certain degree, Ecuador. As to Brazil, certain doubts existed as to the position to be taken by President Goulart. He said that in his opinion, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina were the key countries, and from the American viewpoint, nothing could be done without Argentina.

President Kennedy said that it was necessary to do something so that Castro, as a Communist, should not be appealing to the Latin American people, and that it was necessary to isolate Cuba, pointing it out as a stranger in the house, so that it would not be so appealing to non-Communist leftists.

President Frondizi said that he was planning on stopping by in Brazil later on in the year to speak with President Goulart, and that the latter had requested him to tell him about the results of his conversations with President Kennedy. He said that if Brazil and Argentina worked together, it would be possible to make progress in Latin America.

265. National Security Action Memorandum No. 100Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381 (Sensitive). Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and Richard Goodwin, as Director of the Cuban Task Force. Washington, October 5, 1961. TO The Secretary of State SUBJECT Contingency Planning for CubaFor the nature of the contingency planning required, see Document 266.

In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency in Cuba.

McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

266. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/61-12/61. Secret. Prepared by Thomas A. Parrott. Washington, October 5, 1961. SUBJECT Cuba

In accordance with General Taylorʼs instructions, I talked to Assist-ant Secretary Woodward yesterday about the requirement for the preparation of a contingency plan. He told me on the telephone he would be leaving for two weeks and, therefore, his Deputy, Wymberley Coerr, would have to take this project on.

I then met with Mr. Coerr and outlined the requirement to him. I said that what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene. I said that my understanding was the terms of reference governing this plan should be quite broad; we agreed, for example, that the presence and positions of Raul and Che Guevara must be taken into account. We agreed that this was an exercise that should be under the direction of State with participation by Defense and CIA. I also pointed out to Mr. Coerr that Mr. Goodwin had been aware of this requirement.

Mr. Coerr said he would get his people started on this right away. As to timing, I said that I did not understand that this was a crash program but that it should proceed with reasonable speed. He then set Monday as a target date for a first draft.

I had mentioned to Mr. Woodward the Presidentʼs interest in this matter, before General Taylor had told me he preferred this not be done. Therefore, I felt it necessary to tell Mr. Coerr, on the assumption that Mr. Woodward would have already told him. I asked that this aspect be kept completely out of the picture. He understood this fully and volunteered that it could be presented as an exercise emanating from his own office. I said I would leave this up to him but it was perfectly all right to attribute it to General Taylor.

On the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned. I asked that this be related to the broad plan that was approved by the Special Group and by higher authority in August. I did not tell Mr. Barnes of Presidential interest. However, during the time that I had been trying to reach him, he had seen Mr. Goodwin who had told him about this requirement.On October 6 Barnes sent a memorandum to Esterline instructing Branch 4 of the Western Hemisphere Division to prepare a contingency plan based on the assumption of the unexpected removal of Castro from power. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 1, Area Activity-Western Hemisphere-Cuba) See the Supplement. A memorandum produced in Branch 4 on October 6, entitled “What Would Happen If Castro Died?,” is ibid., DDO/WH Files: Job 73-00853R, Box 1, WH Division Liaison with Dept of State. See the Supplement.

TAP

267. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Coerr) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 15, October 20, 1961. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch on October 18 and cleared by Wollam on October 19. Sent through Wells in INR/DDC. Washington, undated. SUBJECT U.S. Relations with the Cuban Revolutionary Council

Problem

To determine the desirability of obtaining compliance with the recent inter-agency and White House agreement, pursuant to an NSC decision of May 5, 1961, regarding the means of improving and making more open U.S. relations with the CRC, headed by Dr. Miro Cardona.

Discussion

The Cuban Exile Community Situation.

A power struggle has developed between Miro Cardona and ex-President Prio Socorras. Miro is generally regarded by Cubans as: anti-Batista, anti-Prio, anti-Communist, having been briefly associated with the Castro regime, and personally a man of honor. Prio is generally regarded by Cubans as: anti-Batista, anti-Communist, having remained in Cuba under Castro an inexplicably long time, as having headed a corrupt regime and therefore a symbol of Cubaʼs past ills which led to Batista and in turn Castro, and opportunistic. Dr. Miro is known in the exile community to have the confidence of the White House. Dr. Prio (who is wealthy) has undertaken a campaign to discredit Miro and to gain the ascendancy in the community. The key organized groups in the community (students, labor, women, legal profession, among others) hold the balance of power, and are financed directly by CIA. As long as this method of financing pertains, these groups will probably remain independent of both Miro and Prio control, although there is clear indication that part of one group (the magistrates) has already been seduced by Prio.

If this situation is permitted to continue, Prio may emerge as the principal spokesman of Cubans in exile. To limit this possibility Miro has repeatedly expressed the desire that these key organized groups be financed by CIA through the CRC as the major means of enhancing his own power position in the community.

ARA believes that if Miroʼs desire in this were granted, most of the members of these key organized groups would join the CRC.

The Underground Attitude Toward the Exile Community.

The Ambassador of Italy at Habana, who of the friendly diplomats is widely regarded as a keen and most knowledgeable observer of the Cuban scene, personally gave ARA the following assessment two days ago:

Although the underground is disdainful of Cubans who live in the security of the U.S., it recognizes the necessity for an exile organization. Miro is the only prominent exile acceptable to the underground. Prio is entirely unacceptable.

The underground expects to have the principal say in any post-Castro government.

The foregoing supports ARAʼs assessment obtained from a variety of other sources.

U.S. Relations with Miro.

Several months ago the White House asked Miro to broaden the CRC base. (As indicated above, CIA direct financial support of the key organized exile groups makes Miroʼs task in this regard virtually impossible.)

During the first half of September, the White House reaffirmed its confidence in Miroʼs leadership. He was, however, informed that his requests for a U.S. commitment to invade Cuba and for CRC exclusive jurisdiction over all underground groups were denied. He was at the same time offered the following working arrangement which he accepted: 1. a basic administrative budget of approximately one million dollars per year 2. provision for supplementary budget on a case basis 3. expansion of CRC base 4. underground groups willing to work with Miro to be dealt with through Miro 5. maintenance of secrecy

In addition, he was assured that his additional requests (which the White House considered of secondary importance), including financing of the key organized exile groups through the CRC, would not present insurmountable problems.

The President, to prevent Miroʼs resignation taking effect, addressed a letter to Dr. MiroDocument 262. confirming his confidence in Miroʼs leadership. This letter was delivered by the Department with oral confirmation of all the above points.

Little of the working arrangement has been put into practice, nor is that little functioning satisfactorily. None of Miroʼs secondary requests have been granted. Miro is consequently seriously dispirited and the Departmentʼs relations with him may become precarious. He plans to arrive in the Department today. Unless ARA can offer him something concrete, he will probably ask for a White House appointment. If the White House is unable to reassure him, he will probably resign. Under the emotional strain of the imprisonment of his son in Cuba combined with the six months (since April 17) of delay by the United States in fully clarifying his position, he may feel forced to break his word and make the Presidentʼs letter public.

Recommendation:The source text is not marked to indicate Johnsonʼs response to the recommendations. On November 13, Joseph Scott of INR/DDC sent a memorandum to Johnson to inform him that “in accordance with the Presidentʼs wish and your instructions” Miro Cardona had been dissuaded from resigning as President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Cuba, August 1961-)

1. That you request as soon as possible a report from CIA on its implementation of our commitments to Miro. 2. That, through the Special Group or otherwise, you obtain an agreed line of action by all interested agencies to implement our commitments to Miro in line with our basic objective of seeking the most effective methods of contributing to Castroʼs downfall.

268. Memorandum From the Assistant to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Parrott) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group l Group meeting: Washington, October 20, 1961. SUBJECT Special Group meeting, Friday, October 20, 1961

The following are things that you will want to follow up on as a result of todayʼs Special Group meeting:

[Here follows consideration of topics unrelated to Cuba.]

5. Cuba: Summary of Covert Program. After you left, it developed that there was some difference of opinion between ARA in State and the Agency on the most desirable US posture toward Dr. Miro Cardona. This came as a surprise to Johnson, Dulles and myself. It was agreed that the presentation of this summary to Higher Authority should be deferred until there is agreement. It was felt that, if agreement can be reached, then there might be some usefulness in Mr. Dulles and Mr. Johnson going along with you at some appropriate time so as to get this matter straightened out. (In case this is more than usually obscure, see the last three paragraphs of the attached summary.)

The attached summary is entitled “Cuban Covert Program Report,” October 13. It summarizes an October 12 memorandum for the Special Group entitled “Cuban Program Report.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 15, October 20, 1961) See the Supplement. The first part of the summary deals with operational details. The final three paragraphs read as follows:

“The position of Dr. Miro Cardona presents something of a problem. His organization—the Cuban Revolutionary Council—and portions of the Frente now allied with the CRC, are being subsidized at about $90,000 per month. Miro expects this to continue at least until 29 June 1962.

“Some, but very little, operational benefit is realized. Miro has used the funds to support individuals of his choosing and has not devoted attention to strengthening internal Cuban opposition. Other exile leaders interpret this support as evidence of U.S. selection of Miro as leader of a post-Castro government.

“Since this situation is inconsistent with present U.S. policy, possible solutions are being sought under the leadership of the State Department.”

Suggested Action: None, until State and CIA are ready to move. One or the other will be in touch with you at that time.

T.A.P.Print

269. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Top Secret; Eyes Only for the President. Washington, November 1, 1961.

I believe that the concept of a “command operation” for Cuba, as discussed with you by the Attorney General, is the only effective way to handle an all-out attack on the Cuban problem. Since I understand you are favorably disposed toward the idea I will not discuss why the present disorganized and uncoordinated operation cannot do the job effectively.

The beauty of such an operation over the next few months is that we cannot lose. If the best happens we will unseat Castro. If not, then at least we will emerge with a stronger underground, better propaganda and a far clearer idea of the dimensions of the problems which affect us.

The question then is who should head this operation. I know of no one currently in Cuban affairs at the State Department who can do it. Nor is it a very good idea to get the State Department involved in depth in such covert activities. I do not think it should be centered in the CIA. Even if the CIA can find someone of sufficient force and stature, one of the major problems will be to revamp CIA operations and thinking—and this will be very hard to do from the inside.

I believe that the Attorney General would be the most effective commander of such an operation. Either I or someone else should be assigned to him as Deputy for this activity, since he obviously will not be able to devote full time to it. The one danger here is that he might become too closely identified with what might not be a successful operation. Indeed, chances of success are very speculative. There are a few answers to this: (1) Everyone knowledgeable in these affairs—in and out of government—is aware that the United States is already helping the underground. The precise manner of aid may be unknown but the fact of aid is common knowledge. We will be blamed for not winning Cuba back whether or not we have a “command operation” and whether or not the Attorney General heads it. (2) His role should be told to only a few people at the very top with most of the contact work in carrying out his decisions being left to his deputy. If that deputy is someone already closely identified with the conduct of Cuban affairs then it would appear as if normal channels are being followed except that decisive attention would be given to the decisions which came through those channels. There are probably three or four people who could fulfill this criterion.

This still leaves a substantial danger of identifying the Attorney General as the fellow in charge. This danger must be weighed against the increased effectiveness of an operation under his command.

RNG

270. Editorial Note

At a meeting in the White House on November 3, 1961, President Kennedy authorized the development of a new program designed to undermine the Castro government in Cuba. The program was codenamed Operation Mongoose. The meeting that the President called to consider the program convened at noon and lasted until 12:55 p.m. According to the Presidentʼs Appointment Book the meeting was attended, in addition to the President, by Attorney General Robert Kennedy; by Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, Wymberley Coerr, and Robert Hurwitch from the Department of State; by Cabell, Bissell, Amory, and King from the CIA; and by McGeorge Bundy and Goodwin from the White House staff. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) Robert Kennedyʼs handwritten notes on the meeting, which suggest that McNamara, Nitze, and General Edward Lansdale also attended, read as follows: “McNamara, Dick Bissell, Alexis Johnson, Paul Nitze, Lansdale (the Ugly American). McN said he would make latter available for me—I assigned him to make survey of situation in Cuba—the problem and our assets. My idea is to stir things up on island with espionage, sabotage, general disorder, run & operated by Cubans themselves with every group but Batistaites & Communists. Do not know if we will be successful in overthrowing Castro but we have nothing to lose in my estimate.” (Kennedy Library, Papers of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General Papers, Handwritten Notes, 11/7/61)

No other record of this meeting has been found, but the decisions that were taken during and following the meeting are summarized in Document 278.

On November 6 Goodwin discussed the meeting in a telephone conversation with Ball:

“Goodwin said the Cuban thing discussed on Friday is moving ahead. Ball said Alex had given him a report on Saturday. Goodwin said it was moderating and toning down and assuming a more logical approach to it. The Lansdale problem with CIA will be worked out. Goodwin talked to Bissell and asked he appoint someone to work with Lansdale. On the over-all thing there are two things: the economic part which is non-covert and the diplomatic relations status. Goodwin asked if a memo could be prepared on what has been done and how it is being handled, since it is non-covert. Then he and Ball should talk with them and decide how to work it in the over-all thing. Ball said he would get the work started on this right away. Goodwin asked that it be done in the next couple of days.” (Kennedy Library, Papers of George W. Ball, Subject Series, Cuba, 1/24/61-12/30/62)

According to subsequent testimony before a Senate Select Committee chaired by Senator Frank Church, Lansdale prepared a report, in response to Robert Kennedyʼs instruction, in which he observed that Castro enjoyed considerable popular support in Cuba. Lansdale concluded that if the United States sought to undermine the Castro government, it should adopt a different approach from the “harassment” operations that had been directed against Castro up to that time. In contrast to operations conceived and led by CIA Officials, Lansdale proposed a program in which the United States would work with Cuban exiles who had been opposed to Batista and later became disillusioned with Castro. The objective of Lansdaleʼs proposed program was to have “the people themselves overthrow the Castro regime rather than U.S. engineered efforts from outside Cuba.” Lansdaleʼs concept for Operation Mongoose envisioned the development of leadership elements among Cubans opposed to Castro. At the same time he proposed to develop “means to infiltrate Cuba successfully” and to organize opposition “cells and activities” inside Cuba. Lansdale testified that his plan was designed so as not to “arouse premature actions, not to bring great reprisals on the people there and abort any eventual success.” (Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate (Washington, 1975), pages 140-141)

Lansdaleʼs recommendations became the conceptual basis for the Mongoose operation, knowledge of which was carefully controlled and limited. Overall control of the operation was entrusted to a new group established for the purpose, called the Special Group (Augmented), a slightly expanded version of the NSC 5412 Special Group, which oversaw covert operations. The Special Group (Augmented) consisted of the regular Special Group members, McGeorge Bundy, U. Alexis Johnson, Roswell Gilpatric, John McCone, and General Lyman LemNitzer, augmented by Robert Kennedy and General Maxwell Taylor. Although Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara were not regular members of the group, they occasionally attended meetings. President Kennedy appointed Taylor as chairman of the group, but Robert Kennedy was the principal motive force within the group and the informal link between the group and the President. General Lansdale was appointed Chief of Operations and coordinated the CIAʼs Mongoose operations with those of the Departments of State and Defense. Within the CIA, the Mongoose operation was run by Task Force W, under the direction of William Harvey, with overall guidance from Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented). The CIA developed an operational force of approximately 400 people at CIA headquarters and at its Miami Station, and had primary responsibility for the implementation of the Mongoose operation. (Ibid., page 140)

271. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of Central Intelligence DullesSource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Secret. President Kennedy expressed a desire for an assessment of the situation in Cuba in a conversation with Goodwin on September 7; see footnote 2, Document 258. On October 31 McGeorge Bundy told Ball in a telephone conversation that President Kennedy wanted an assessment prepared by the CIA in conjunction with a meeting on Cuba that the President had scheduled for November 3. (Kennedy Library, Papers of George W. Ball, Subject Series, Cuba, 1/24/61-12/30/62) The assessment was subsequently issued on November 28, under the same title but in a slightly expanded format, as NIE 85-61. (Central Intelligence Agency, ODDI Registry of NIEs and SNIEs: Job 79-R01012A) Major General Richard Collins, Director for Intelligence of the Joint Staff, sent a brief of NIE 85-61 to Secretary of Defense McNamara on November 28. (Memorandum from Collins to McNamara, J2DM-455-61; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, Cuba, 1961, 121–353) Washington, November 3, 1961. SUBJECT The Situation and Prospects in Cuba

Summary

1. The Castro regime has sufficient popular support and repressive capabilities to cope with any internal threat likely to develop within the foreseeable future. The regime faces serious, but not insurmountable, economic difficulties. The contrast between its roseate promises and the grim actuality is producing disillusionment and apathy. Some specially motivated elements have recently dared to demonstrate their disapproval. The bulk of the population, however still accepts the Castro regime, or is at least resigned to it, and substantial numbers still support it with enthusiasm. At the same time, the regimeʼs capabilities for repression are increasing more rapidly than are the potentialities for active resistance.

The Economic Situation and Prospects

2. The Cuban economy is now feeling the impact of three revolutionary changes: (a) the loss of most of its experienced middle and upper level managerial talent; (b) the imposition of elaborate state controls; and (c) a drastic shift in the trading pattern, from primary dependence on the US to primary dependence on the Soviet Bloc. The US embargo has produced some economic difficulties through the denial of spare parts for previously acquired equipment, almost all of which was of US origin. Nevertheless, the production of sugar, the principal export crop, has been increased, and the production of tobacco and tropical fruit, the other leading exports, has been maintained. Although Cubaʼs free world trade and foreign exchange reserves have declined sharply, the Bloc is taking enough exports and returning enough consumer goods and machinery to keep the economy going.

3. The domestic production of foodstuffs and other consumer goods, and the imports obtained from the Bloc and elsewhere, are together not sufficient to compensate for the loss of former imports from the US. Personal consumption has declined, especially in the cities, and most drastically in the case of the upper and middle classes. In some rural areas, however, especially in centers of sugar production, living conditions have been substantially improved, particularly in terms of housing and sanitation. These examples of the tangible benefits received by some keep alive the hopes of many others.

4. In addition to trade, the Bloc has extended to Cuba some $357 million in credits for industrial development. However, only a few of these development projects are yet underway, nor is much likely to be accomplished for another year or more.

5. In general, the Cuban economy is characterized by major shortages and a high degree of disorganization. This state of affairs will continue for some time to come, and may indeed get somewhat worse. In view of the availability of Bloc assistance, however, we do not believe that the economy will deteriorate so far as to bring about Castroʼs overthrow, or force him to make basic changes in his policy. On the contrary, the situation will probably begin to improve within a year or so, as the new Communist-type organization takes hold, managerial experience increases, and foreign trade is adjusted to new channels.

Popular Acceptance of the Regime

6. Initially, almost all Cubans hailed the triumph of the Revolution with enthusiam. Disillusionment, however, came quickly to the urban middle class, urban organized labor, and the landed gentry. It has since spread to small peasant proprietors and even to humbler folk, who are beginning to appear in significant numbers in the flow of refugees from Cuba.

7. The severe internal repression which accompanied the defeat of the April invasion stilled, for a time, all manifestations of opposition within the country. By September, however, this effect had worn off sufficiently for Catholic crowds in Havana and other cities to dare to defy the regimeʼs prohibition of certain public religious observances. This was the first occasion on which the regime had been forced to use gunfire to disperse hostile public demonstrations. It was therefore indicative of a significant change in the psychological situation.

8. There have also been some increase in small-scale guerrilla and sabotage activity and a considerable increase in such passive forms of resistance as absenteeism. However, most disaffected Cubans now think primarily in terms of escape. In mid-September, some 15,000 had completed legal arrangements to leave the country which were then cancelled by the government, and some 500 were in asylum in the several Latin American embassies in Havana. Illegal departures occur almost daily.

9. Despite these manifestations of disaffection, the great bulk of the population still accepts the regime and substantial number still support it with enthusiasm. The sprawling revolutionary bureaucracy now embodies a new class with a very definite personal stake in the regime.

Castroist Political Organization

10. The regime is now in the process of a complete reorganization of the form of government in Cuba, and of the organization of a new total-itarian political party to operate and control it. The Communist model is apparent in both instances.

11. The traditional provincial and municipal governments are being replaced by juntas (Soviets) for “coordination, execution, and inspection” (JUCEI). Already established in each province of Cuba, the JUCEIs consist of a “provincial congress,” representative of all major economic entities in the territory, which meets occasionally; a “plenum” of the congress, which meets every few months; and several smaller bodies which meet frequently and actually direct the provincial administration. The primary function of all JUCEIs is the local implementation of plans received from higher authority.

12. The new totalitarian political machine is to be the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution, a merger of the amorphous 26 of July Movement (or what is left of it) with the well organized Communist Party. Although Castro is of course to be the supreme head of this party, the man who is pushing the project is Blas Roca, the Communist Secretary General. Party membership is to be limited to the elite of the revolutionary struggle and prerequisite to appointment to any important political or economic position.

13. A significant arm of the Castroist political organization is the paramilitary Association of Rebel Youth (AJR), derived from the previous Communist youth organization. These teenagers, of the type that would be found in juvenile gangs, are a terror to their parents, their schoolmates, and the general public. They have charge of indoctrination in the schools and have been active in the formation of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (see paragraph 22). Active participation in the AJR is to be prerequisite to educational and eventually political advancement.

The Castroist Security Apparatus

14. The forces now available to the regime to suppress insurrection or repel invasion are: a. The Rebel Army (32,000) b. The Rural Police (9,600) c. The Rebel Air Force (2,000) d. The Navy (2,000) e. The Militia (250,000, including 83,000 women) f. The Rebel Youth (150,000, including 10,000 girls) g. The National Police (9,000) h. The Maritime Police

15. The administrative and command structure of these forces is extremely loose; the improvisation of ad hoc commands including disparate elements is the common practice. Confusion and lack of coordination are therefore likely in any emergency situation.

16. The army has been strengthened by the receipt of Bloc arms and is being instructed in their use by Bloc personnel. However, it has had little or no combined arms or field training. It displayed great tactical ineptitude at the time of the April landing.

17. About a fifth of the army are veterans of Castroʼs guerrilla struggle against Batista. The remainder are early adherents. In time, however, Castro came to doubt, with reason, their loyalty to the course the Revolution had taken on achieving power. The militia were therefore established as an alternative armed support for the regime. The original units were composed of Castroʼs most ardent followers. In time, however, the militia was so greatly expanded by recruitment under pressure that its revolutionary zeal was considerably diluted. Castro has therefore transferred his favor and reliance to the newly organized Rebel Youth, who are now his most fanatical followers.

18. In general, the militia and the Rebel Youth, both part-time forces, have only light arms which are issued to them only on occasion. They are not capable of sustained combat, but are effective for controlling and coercing the general public. In addition, some selected units of the militia and the Rebel Youth are specially armed and trained and are, in effect, army units specially dedicated to Fidel Castro.

19. The capabilities of the air force have been greatly enhanced by the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of personnel from training in the Bloc. There are now about 35 MIG-15ʼs and MIG-19ʼs operational in Cuba.

20. The navy is unreliable and distrusted; most of its personnel were taken into custody at the time of the April landing. Mutinies, defections, and purges have left it few professionally trained and technically qualified men.

21. Recently, the professional security agencies of the government—Army G-2 (the Secret Police), the National Police, and the Maritime Police—were transferred from the Ministry of the Armed Forces to a newly created Ministry of the Interior. This change is likely to enhance their effectiveness. It does not indicate a reduction of Raul Castroʼs power, since Ramiro Valdes, the new Minister of the Interior, is one of his close associates. Valdes is a Communist, formerly head of Army G-2.

22. A network of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution is being established to provide an additional agency for political surveillance and control. What these committees lack in professional competence, they make up for in pervasiveness and zeal. The Rebel Youth have been particularly active in promoting their formation. The announced goal is 100,000 committees with over a million members covering every community in Cuba.

If Castro Were to Die

23. Fidel Castroʼs personal prestige and popularity were indispensable to the regime in the earlier stages of its development. None of his lieutenants could have inherited the personal authority which he then exercised. His loss now, by assassination or by natural causes, would certainly have an unsettling effect, but would probably not prove fatal. The revolution is by now well institutionalized; the regime has firm control of the country; its principal surviving leaders would probably rally together in the face of a common danger. Indeed, a dead Castro, incapable of impulsive personal interventions in the orderly administration of affairs, might be more valuable to them as a martyr than he is now.

24. The fact remains that Castro has had to control tensions, jealous-ies, and conflicts of interest and purpose among his principal lieutenants: Raul Castro, the head of the armed forces; “Che” Guevara, the director of industrial development; Nunez Jimenez, the director of agrarian reform. There could be a falling out among them at Castroʼs funeral. There would almost certainly be a struggle for power among them afterward, which might break into the open.

25. A coordinated estimate of the Cuban situation and prospects, NIE 85-62, “The Situation in Cuba,” is scheduled for USIB consideration in January.

For the Board of National Estimates:Sherman KentPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature with an illegible signature above it.

272. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity-Cuba. Secret. Prepared by Bissell on November 5. Washington, November 4, 1961. SUBJECT Meeting on Cuba, 1400 Hours, 4 November 1961 1. Pursuant to the Presidentʼs instructions at a meeting on 3 November, a further meeting on Cuba was held in the Cabinet Room on 4 November. It was attended by the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Paul Nitze, General Lansdale, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Richard Goodwin and the undersigned. 2. Mr. Goodwin had tabled a paperGoodwinʼs paper is apparently the unsigned paper dated November 4 which is ibid. For text, see the Supplement. on a proposed organization for an accelerated build up of resistance to Castro. The suggestions in this paper were not, however, discussed at the meeting. The Attorney General mentioned that he had not seen the paper until the meeting, which I believe to have been the case with other participants. On the matter of organization, however, there seemed to be tacit but general acceptance of views that had been expressed the preceding day to the effect: (a) that there was a need for close operational coordination of all arms of the U.S. Government that could contribute to the operation, and (b) that responsibility for its direction should be lodged in a task force, conceived of at the minimum as a committee and at the maximum as a separate office, partly for the express purpose of making possible denial that this was another exclusively CIA undertaking. 3. I gave some further account of the kinds of operations we are now preparing and of what we believe to be the state of resistance within Cuba. In summary, I endeavored to make the following points: (a) Our approach to date has been to build up competent CIA controlled and independent Cuban capabilities and to set as their first priority task the creation of one or more competent resistance organizations within the Island. This is necessarily a rather slow business unlikely to begin to yield spectacular results for some time. Meanwhile, however, we are encouraging minor sabotage and planning for larger scale action. (b) In the pursuit of this course we have been in touch with numerous Cuban groups and are trying to bring them along to a point where they can do sound operational planning and hopefully will be able before long to mount infiltration, exfiltration and sabotage operations in a reasonably professional manner. (c) A different approach to the problem would be one which would offer maximum support to any and all politically acceptable elements who wish to infiltrate men and arms into the country or to undertake externally based commando type activities. We have a number of plans before us submitted by Cuban groups for such action. If we adopt the policy of encouraging the promptest possible action on the largest possible scale, it must be understood that sizeable losses will be involved because this implies launching operations before there is an internal organization ready and able to cooperate, before training has been completed, and without taking the time required for the observance of maximum security and counter-espionage precautions. (d) If we are prepared to accept the losses implied in this different approach, the two approaches can be pursued simultaneously with some hope that they will be mutually reinforcing. As we are successful in building a competent resistance organization, it will be in a position to give invaluable help to cruder and larger scale operations. At the same time, if some of these operations are successful they will contribute immeasurably to the climate in which a professionally organized resistance can be built up. 4. The Attorney General urged as the main action to be taken that there was needed an impartial survey of the operational situation and opportunities by someone who had not been close to the operation. It was agreed that this would be undertaken by General Lansdale. I said there could be no objection to such a survey provided (a) it would not interfere with on-going operations and (b) those employed on it were competent in clandestine operations. In connection with the latter reservation, I emphasized we are not now and will for some time not be at a stage in which there is large scale guerrilla fighting; rather the kinds of things that will need to be done for some little time are typical covert operations and an understanding of them requires knowledge of and experience in such operations. 5. In connection with on-going activities, I said I took it to be the consensus of the meeting, without waiting for the outcome of the survey, that their pace should be stepped up as rapidly as possible, including what has been referred to as large scale sabotage if feasible against really strategic targets. It was agreed that this was the sense of the meeting. 6. After the meeting broke up I had a brief conversation with the Attorney General. I emphasized to him (a) that the Agency personnel now active in operations against Cuba were a completely new group and that he should not be under the impression that people physically and emotionally tired from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] were those upon whom we were relying for new activities, (b) that if he had any criticism of the Agencyʼs organization or approach I hoped he would state them directly to us, and (c) that I specifically disagree with certain of Goodwinʼs organizational proposals especially that which would place responsibility for underground and guerrilla activities in a Department of Defense designee. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.Deputy Director (Plans)

273. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. This paper was apparently prepared in response to the requirement to examine existing programs and options in conjunction with the establishment of Operation Mongoose. Washington, November 8, 1961.

TYPES OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE Castro REGIME

1. Non-Sensitive Activities: A variety of non-sensitive political warfare and propaganda activities are being conducted outside Cuba. These include: (a) working with the Cuban Revolutionary Council and the number of other Cuban groups in Miami in an effort to improve their competence to undertake action on their own and also to minimize the effects of disunity among the Cubans; (b) efforts to induce the defection of prominent Cubans from the Castro regime; (c) black operations with the objective of having Castroʼs diplomats declared PNG or having additional countries break diplomatic relations with Cuba; (d) speaking tours by teachers, student, labor, jurists and womenʼs groups throughout the hemisphere; (e) support of publications and distribution of pamphlets; (f) the support of anti-Castro radio programs on some 60 Latin America stations and 3 stations in Florida; (g) the operation of Radio Swan; (h) the use of a broadcasting ship for intruding radio broadcasts on Cuba t.v. channels. There is believed to be little risk that these activities will give rise to political embarrassment, except for that resulting from the jealousy of various Cuban groups and criticism by one of alleged support to another. The following paragraphs constitute a list of politically more sensitive types of activities in progress or contemplated. 2. Agent Training: There are currently some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Cubans already trained or now in training as activists who can be infiltrated to organize the resistance and to develop sabotage activities. In addition there are some [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Cuban students in training for infiltration to conduct Agit/Prop activities. For the most part the training is being done in Florida. The men are trained in compartmented small groups; the largest single unit, already trained, numbers [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. No subsequent group will be as large. The candidates are of course volunteers and are from a number of the political groups with which we are in contact. 3. Infiltration/Exfiltration: We maintain and employ for training and operational purposes a fleet of some 7 craft. They are used primarily for the infiltration and exfiltration of individuals and, if and when feasible, of arms. Currently, infiltrations are apt to involve no more than 3 to 5 individuals at a time but larger groups (up to 15 or 20) may be infiltrated in the future if and when this becomes feasible. No Americans are allowed on any craft that is going within the 12-mile limit around Cuba. Many infiltration/exfiltration operations involve a meet-at-sea with a Cuban fisherman or a Cuban craft. 4. Building an Intelligence and Resistance Organization: Contact is still maintained, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] agents in Cuba. Their present function is restricted to the furnishing of intelligence and in some cases the maintenance of communication with internal resistance leaders. Every effort will be made to infiltrate additional trained agents and communicators as rapidly as possible for the purpose of building an internal resistance organization and establishing effective secure communication with internal resistance leaders. The objective will be to develop one or more nets of dependable sympathizers and the means of communication both among themselves and to the outside. In the first instance such internal assets, to the extent to which they are subject to control from outside, will be used for intelligence collection, further clandestine recruiting, assisting in infil/exfiltration operations, and mounting low risk sabotage operations. They will be deliberately restrained in this phase from exposing themselves by operations involving high risk or the assembly in one operation of any sizeable number of the resistance. 5. Accelerated Resistance Activities: In parallel with the necessarily time consuming effort to build a secure underground organization, it is now planned to support in the next few months larger scale infiltrations of men and arms for sabotage and perhaps ultimately guerrilla activities when well-conceived operations are proposed by reputable opposition leaders now outside the country or are requested by the resistance leadership from within. In most cases the sponsorship and ultimate responsibility for such operations will rest with Cubans and the Agencyʼs role will be that of furnishing support in the form of funds, training, equipment, communications, frequently the facilities to conduct the actual infiltration itself, and resupply following infiltration if required and feasible. These will necessarily be higher risk operations in which some casualties must be anticipated. It will be impossible to conceal U.S. geographical origin but every effort will be made not only possibly to forestall identification of U.S. Government support but also to avoid any appearance of U.S. Government control or ultimate responsibility. What will be impossible to disprove is that the Cubans responsible obtain help in the U.S. 6. Air Operations: If the internal resistance grows, it will be desirable at some point to undertake air resupply missions. These would be conducted by Cuban crews using common types of commercial aircraft. They will be night missions and would be undertaken only if reception parties had been identified and were in possession of agent radio sets and, hopefully, beacons so that resupply could be carried out with reasonable efficiency. Aside from such air activity, proposals have been received for both leaflet drops and bombing raids. One successful leaflet mission was recently conducted by Cubans from Florida entirely on their own after Agency support had been refused. Such operations rather infrequently carried out may have a useful morale effect. Up to the present time it has been felt that air bombing, quite aside from international repercussions, would be contraproductive in its effect on the Cubans.

274. Inter-Agency Staff StudySource: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Inter-Agency Staff Study. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text is undated, but a draft of the study, found in the same file, is dated November 9. No additional drafting information is given on the source text, but Robert Hurwitch of ARA/CMA is listed as the drafter on the preliminary draft, and the other agencies listed to receive copies, and presumably to comment, were Defense and CIA. The study was apparently prepared in conjunction with the planning exercise initiated with the establishment of Operation Mongoose on November 3. The annexes cited in the study were not found attached to the source text. Washington, undated.

PLAN FOR CUBA

This study has as its purpose to determine the courses of action which the U.S. would follow with reference to Cuba in the event of Fidel Castroʼs death in order to insure the replacement of the Castro regime with a friendly government.

A. Background of Present Situation in Cuba.

Castro Cuba, dominated by the Sino-Soviet Bloc, poses a serious threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. Within Cuba, the Castro regime is encountering currently serious economic difficulties . If the regime maintains its present firm political control of the island, however, and if there is a continued high level of Bloc assistance, conditions could begin to improve after 1962. (See Annex A.)

Nine Latin American nations no longer maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. The more important Latin American nations, however, maintain relations and are for a variety of reasons still reluctant to break relations with or join in collective action against Cuba. (See Annex B.)

Destruction of the Castro regime and of the Communist apparatus is in the U.S. national interest.

Sino-Soviet Bloc provides political and economic and military support to the Castro regime to promote Bloc objectives in Latin America. We do not believe the Sino-Soviet Bloc would defend Cuba militarily, although they have the capability to do so.

Asian and African neutrals are generally split on the Castro issue while NATO and SEATO allies share U.S. evaluation of the problem but regard it as a U.S. responsibility.

B. Contingency: The Death of Fidel Castro or Other Elimination of Castro, and the Existence of Certain Minimum Military-Political Conditions.

Assumptions:

The courses of action which follow are based upon the assumption that in the event of Castroʼs death the Communist Party in Cuba would maintain control. Dorticos would probably continue as President and Raul Castro would probably assume the Premiership. The Cuban militia, the largest and most effective armed force in Cuba, would respond promptly to Raulʼs orders and would exterminate whatever scattered outbreaks of resistance may have occurred. The subsequent reign of terror would quickly establish the successor regime in control and would crush any hope of effective U.S. intervention short of a massive assault. The defense of Cuba under Raul would probably be ruthless and pushed to even greater extremes than under Fidel. The successor regime would, regardless of U.S. action, blame the U.S. for Castroʼs death and would launch a violent anti-U.S. propaganda campaign. There would not be an attack against Guantanamo. (See Annex C.)

Latin American Governments and public opinion would generally believe that the U.S. was responsible for Castroʼs death. Latin American Governments and important sectors of the population would nevertheless not publicly challenge our statement of innocence. Communist and pro-Communist elements as well as extreme nationalists and opportunistic political opponents of the existing governments would undoubtedly launch anti-American campaigns, with anti-Government overtones. These campaigns would probably include demonstrations and attacks against U.S. official installations. There would be no significant changes in the number of nations which do not maintain relations with Cuba. (See Annex D.)

Meanwhile in the U.S. the popular desire for vigorous action against Cuba would increase as a result of the Cuban regimeʼs likely actions following Castroʼs death. The Sino-Soviet Bloc would increase the propaganda campaign against the U.S. possibly including threats of military support which the Bloc would not supply. Insofar as the rest of the world is concerned the Communist inspired propaganda campaign would probably be echoed by a majority of neutralist nations. The U.S. would be widely blamed for Castroʼs death.

Courses of Action:

The courses of action which we would pursue fall into four principal categories: 1. Upon news of the death or other elimination of Castro from Cuban scene we would order that the U.S. armed forces prepare immediately for armed intervention in Cuba in a manner that these preparations are kept from public knowledge and are subject to immediate halt. 2. Before intervening in Cuba we would determine on the basis of reliable intelligence whether the minimum desirable political conditions in Cuba exist, namely: (a) that events stemming from Castroʼs death have created a chaotic situation where (1) the successor government would perpetrate widespread atrocities against its own people; (2) resistance would be open and widespread; (3) dissidents would take and appear in a position to hold for several days some Cuban territory; and (4) a substantial group of dissidents would call for outside assist-ance. (b) that Latin American Governments would be in a position to resist internal pressures to undertake significant anti-U.S. measures both domestic and/or in the OAS. (c) that the Sino-Soviet Bloc, according to the best intelligence estimates at the time, would not engage in major military action. (d) that remaining friendly governments would be in a position to resist internal pressures to undertake significant anti-U.S. measures both domestic and/or in the U.N. (e) that U.S. Congressional and public opinion would generally support the Presidentʼs action. The armed forces would have five days notice before being ordered to intervene in order to assemble the requisite forces to accomplish its mission. 3. If it is determined that the minimum desirable political conditions exist in Cuba as above enumerated we would review the international situation and determine whether the danger posed by the Castro regime to the U.S. national security is of such an order of magnitude as to justify intervention in Cuba of U.S. forces, which would be contrary to international law including the UN Charter and OAS commitments. 4. If after reviewing the international situation we determine that armed intervention in Cuba is in the overall national interest we would order intervention in Cuba with the use of U.S. armed forces.

C. Conclusions.

Reaction to U.S. Invasion:

In the event of the invasion of Cuba by the U.S. we have concluded the successor regime would mobilize all its forces and would attempt to rally public support. Most of the people would passively wait to see what happens. Many persons would defect from the Castro forces and the underground would become more active. The elements committed to the regime would fight and numerous individuals and groups would resist until physically eliminated.

Although many Latin American Governments and important segments of the population would privately welcome the elimination of communism from Cuba, they would publicly decry U.S. military action as intervention and consequently a flagrant violation of U.S. commitments in the OAS (for these commitments, see Annex E). The Communist and pro-Castro elements, as well as extreme nationalist and opportunistic political opponents of the existing governments would intensify their anti-American campaigns and would succeed to the extent of seriously threatening the stability of some governments and/or obtaining public denunciation of the U.S. followed in some instances by measures against U.S. national interests in those countries, including private American investments and the Alliance for Progress program. One or more Latin American nations might propose OAS action adverse to U.S. interests, which the U.S. could probably delay.

The Sino-Soviet Bloc would not use military force in Cuba but might apply pressure in other areas. Communist propaganda apparatus would attack U.S. on world-wide basis. The Bloc would introduce or support in the UN a resolution condemning the U.S.

A majority of the neutral nations as well as important sectors of the population would publicly condemn the U.S. Most of the neutrals would support a Bloc-inspired UN resolution charging the U.S. with having violated its commitments to the UN. (For these commitments, see Annex F.)

The political penalties which the U.S. will suffer as a result of having invaded Cuba in violation of U.S. international commitments, including those to the UN and OAS, are severe, but can be borne. The serious criticism of the U.S. which will be aroused by this illegal and interventionist act will be offset by the reservoir of good will which the U.S. enjoys throughout the Free World. Although the U.S. cannot defend this action as justified under international law, we can stress the morality of the action on the basis that a chaotic, near civil war situation exists off our shores where millions of Cubans are seeking freedom by throwing off the Communist yoke and have requested our assistance.

The disappearance of Castro from the Cuban political scene under widely-known conditions of chaos and open resistance to his regime will help destroy the Castro myth and the appeal his regime has had for the peoples of many underdeveloped nations.

The destruction of a Communist regime and its replacement by a friendly government will remove a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere and will weaken the belief that the Communist Bloc is the eventual winner of the world struggle and should therefore be placated rather than opposed.

Our relations with friendly nations will remain good, after perhaps a slight deterioration in certain instances. American investments will suffer less in the long run than they would if Castro-Communism continued and spread throughout the hemisphere. The Alliance for Progress program will not encounter serious obstacles as a result of this action. If the operation is quickly and successfully accomplished, the political damage will be correspondingly reduced.

Widespread organized Communist disturbances will occur immediately but the more quickly the Castro regime is crushed the greater the difficulty the Communists will encounter in maintaining existing disturbances and in mounting further disturbances. A successful invasion may strengthen the will of Latin American Governments to destroy the Communist menace in their own countries.

The Congress and the people of the U.S. will applaud the action.

Suitability and Feasibility of Plan:

The U.S. steps proposed above are suitable for the quick eradication of the Castro regime and its replacement by a friendly government. We can foresee no way other than invasion to accomplish the objective as stated in the problem.

The proposed steps are feasible. The logistics problem is simplified because of the proximity of Cuba to the U.S. and its great distance from the Bloc. We have the preponderance of military and economic power to carry out the task quickly.

Cuba is not believed to be important enough to the Soviet Union to justify the risk of a major war. Moreover, the USSR cannot supply a significant force over long sea distances against the hostile navy. Therefore, the USSR will not intervene militarily. The USSR may increase its pressure in Berlin, Laos or other parts of the world, but will stop short of a direct major confrontation with the U.S.

Acceptability as to Cost:

Castroʼs armed forces now have the ability to inflict significant losses upon an invading force. We believe, however, that losses would be acceptable given the size and power of the forces we plan to bring against Cuba. Our forces in other parts of the world must be prepared to handle increased brush-fire actions generated by the Soviet Bloc.

The Nationʼs economy can sustain any armed intervention in Cuba and the subsequent program of rehabilitation in Cuba.

D. Contingency Check List.

1. U.S. Resources to Accomplish Objective of Replacing Castro Regime with Friendly Government: (a) U.S. military (b) Cuban exiles (c) Cuban underground (d) Diplomatic influence (e) Economic resources to assist friendly government (f) Psychological warfare (g) Favorable minority of Latin American countries (h) Favorable minority in rest of world (i) Possible but improbable token military support from L.A. 2. Resources of Cuba and Sino-Soviet Bloc to Prevent Accomplishment of Objective: (a) Cuban forces, Cuban Communist apparatus, and partial public support (b) Communist international apparatus (apart from military intervention in Cuba) (c) Possible world-wide military and paramilitary pressure (d) Denunciation in international organizations of U.S. intervention (e) Communist-inspired demonstrations in Latin America against Americans and against anti-Communist governments 3. U.S. Steps to Accomplish Objective: Pre-Invasion (a)

Create the above-described minimum desirable conditions in Cuba (see 2(c), page 5 above)

Action: CIA, DOD, State-USIA

(b)

Make known world-wide the creation of the minimum desirable conditions as they occur, as well as progress toward them.

Action: State-USIA, CIA

(c)

Sound out the Chiefs of State of two countries regarding possible use of token forces with due regard for security. (Annex G)

Action: State

(d)

Evaluate and designate among Cuban exiles and underground groups those individuals who could best participate in the formation of an initial Cuban national, provincial, and municipal government.

Action: State (exiles), CIA (underground)

(e)

Review and improve as necessary existing structure for liaison and coordination within the Executive Department to insure that CINC-LANT is kept aware of all aspects of the political and military situation. Augment CINCLANTʼs staff, as necessary.

Action: State, Defense, CIA

(f)

Lay groundwork for psychological warfare and press information programs for invasion support.

Action: State-USIA

(g)

Keep key members of Congress progressively informed regarding general situation in Cuba.

Action: State

Invasion Period (a)

Invade Cuba with U.S. forces under CINCLANT.

Action: DOD

(b)

Inform L.A. Governments that invasion is underway and warn them they can shortly expect Communist-directed violence in their countries. Invite their support and offer them assistance.

Action: State

(c)

Organize participation of anti-Castro forces and coordinate their activities with CINCLANT.

Action: DOD, CIA, State

(d)

Launch all-out psychological warfare and propaganda campaign for all sectors, stressing the morality of the intervention.

Action: State-USIA, CIA and DOD

(e)

Use diplomatic action to reduce criticism of U.S. action insofar as possible.

Action: State

(f)

Organize civil government with participation of designated Cubans.

Action: DOD, State, CIA

(g)

Provide program for immediate emergency assistance to civil populace.

Action: DOD, State

(h)

Arrange for participation and support by other L.A. forces which may be induced to join.

Action: DOD, State

Post Invasion Phase (a)

Seek out and eliminate pro-Communist resistance.

Action: DOD, CIA

(b)

Continue occupation in force and replace, as feasible, military government installed during invasion with provisional Cuban government.

Action: State, CIA, DOD

(c)

Provide plan for long-range economic assistance. (See Annex K)

Action: State, AID

(d)

Take measures to control entry into Cuba.

Action: State

(e)

Re-establish a U.S. Country Team in Habana.

Action: State

275. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5,DCI (McCone), Caribbean Survey Group. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. Washington, November 22, 1961.

Monday, November 20, 1961, 7:00 pm, President Kennedy called personally and asked that I meet with him and Attorney General Robert Kennedy at 4:30 pm the following day.

The meeting was held for the purpose of discussing all possible courses of action in Cuba. Present were: The President Robert Kennedy General Lansdale Mr. Goodwin of the White House staff.

The President explained that General Lansdale had been engaging in a study of possible action in Cuba, acting under the direction of the Attorney General, and he, the President, desired an immediate plan of action which could be submitted to him within two weeks.

The Attorney General expressed grave concern over Cuba, the necessity for immediate dynamic action, indicating that such action would embody a variety of covert operations, propaganda, all possible actions that would create dissensions within Cuba and would discredit the Castro regime, and political action with members of the OAS in support of the action. He proposed that the Lansdale committee be made up of representatives of CIA, State, USIA and DOD (Lansdale) and that it be organized so that this committee could “cut across” organization channels within the agencies.

McConeʼs views were solicited and he stated: a) That he observed that the Agency and indeed the Administration appeared to be in a condition of “shock” as a result of the happenings in Cuba and, therefore, were doing very little. He supported dynamic action but emphasized that action should not be reckless. b) He supported the Lansdale committee concept. c) This committee should report to the “5412” group, which he stated was properly organized, met regularly, had senior representation, and was a proper unit to give political guidance to the Lansdale committee and also to evaluate action proposals of the committee. d) He proposed that the facilities of all Departments of Government and the CIA be made available to the extent needed, but these facilities be maintained “in place” and that under no circumstances should an attempt be made to “lift” elements of departments or agencies out of their “in place” position and placed under the Lansdale group. He explained that the resources or assets of the departments and the CIA were most extensive and depended upon support, logistics, communications, etc. which were an integral part of the departments and agencies, and if an attempt was made to “lift” certain activities, these activities could not properly function because of lack of support and communication.

The above points seemed to be generally agreed, and it was decided that Robert Kennedy would attend the “5412” committee on Wednesday, November 22nd, to discuss the plan.

McCone advised Robert Kennedy his plans to leave Washington for a few days and offered to revise his travel plans if necessary, but Kennedy felt this not necessary.

The above was discussed in considerably more detail between General Lansdale and McCone in the Presidentʼs office after the meeting. Lansdale confirmed the possibility that he would be required to go to South Viet Nam as a Special Advisor to President Diem and, therefore, might be available for only two or three weeks. It was therefore obvious that he must be backed up by a very able officer who can take over if Lansdale leaves.

Lansdale then proposed that Mr. James Critchfield be the CIA man on his committee, indicating that Critchfield was a most able and experienced officer.

On Wednesday, November 22nd, all of the above was reviewed at a meeting in Mr. Dullesʼ office, attended by Mr. Dulles, General Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Helms, Mr. Kirkpatrick and Mr. McCone. There was general agreement on all the points mentioned above. Mr. Bissell proposed alternate names to Critchfield, feeling Critchfield could not easily be spared from his present responsibilities.

McCone urged that the most able man available be placed at Lansdaleʼs disposal, even at some inconvenience to other operations because in all probability this man, if he won the confidence of the “5412” committee, the Attorney General and the President, would have to fill Lansdaleʼs responsibilities when Lansdale left. McCone left the meeting with the question of the individual unresolved.

276. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2,DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 29 November 1961-5 April 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. Washington, November 29, 1961, 9–10:20 a.m.

Discussion with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 9:00 to 10:20 a.m., November 29, 1961.

(1) Cuba.

K. reviewed briefly Cuban experience stating his report to the PresidentNot found. was written in a single copy which would be given to me today for reading and return—highly critical of CIA and JCS, particularly critical of Bissell for statements made to President that operation would succeed, or at best substantial guerrilla complement be landed in Cuba for future operations—criticized Bissell because Pigs Bay area not guerrilla country and surveys establishing area as guerrilla country had been made in 1895—criticized JCS for having spent only twenty minutes on operation prior first reporting to President endorsing operation.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

(12) Activities of the Lansdale group were discussed. Lansdale will probably not go to South Vietnam; he will head an inter-agency group. Kennedy resented CIA resistance to this idea, hoped that we would appoint the most able man to the Lansdale committee (not J.C. King) and agreed without reservation that the Lansdale committee must operate under the 5412 Committee.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director

277. Memorandum From General Edward Lansdale to Attorney General KennedySource: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Cuban Project-1962. Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the source text indicates that a copy was sent to Goodwin. Washington, November 30, 1961.

FridayDecember 1. is apparently the “day of decision” for your special project. General Taylorʼs group has it scheduled as the main item for discussion.

A special Intelligence EstimateSNIE 85-61; see Document 271. seems to be the major evidence to be used to oppose your project. Copies have just been made available this afternoon, and one is attached.Not found attached. I have underlined key conclusions.

I suggest two points: 1. The intelligence which supports conclusions about the internal situation is far from adequate. 2. The conclusion on page 4, paragraph 9, concerning the possibility of an uprising being fomented is a “conclusion of fact” quite outside the area of intelligence. The key factor in such a conclusion must be our own ability to take action. It is the heart of our proposal that we can take effective action, if proper management is provided.

278. Memorandum From President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1961. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Internal evidence indicates that the memorandum was apparently drafted by McGeorge Bundy. An earlier version of this memorandum was sent to the same seven people on November 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-2261) The most significant difference between the two memoranda was that the responsibilities assigned to General Lansdale under point 2 in the November 30 memorandum had been assigned to Attorney General Kennedy in the November 22 memorandum, with Lansdale in a subordinate role as the Attorney Generalʼs Chief of Operations. Point 4 in the November 22 memorandum reads “The NSC 5412 group will be informed of activities.” The Attorney General was included under point 6 in the November 22 memorandum among those listed as controlling dissemination of knowledge of the operation. Washington, November 30, 1961.

MEMORANDUM TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Director of CIA

The Attorney General

General Taylor

General Lansdale

Richard Goodwin

The following is a summary of the major decisions which have been made in regard to the Cuba Operation.

1. We will use our available assets to go ahead with the discussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow the communist regime. 2. This program will be conducted under the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Operations. It will be conducted by him through the appropriate regular organizations and Departments of the government. 3. The program will be reviewed in two weeks in order to determine whether General Lansdale will continue as Chief of Operations. 4. The NSC 5412 group will be kept closely informed of activities and be available for advice and recommendation. 5. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency will appoint senior officers of their department as personal representatives to assist the Chief of Operations as required. These senior officers should be able to exercise—either themselves or through the Secretaries and Director—effective operational control over all aspects of their Departmentʼs operations dealing with Cuba. 6. Knowledge of the existence of this operation should be restricted to the recipients of this memorandum, members of the 5412 group and the representatives appointed by the Secretaries and the Director. Any further dissemination of this knowledge will be only with the authority of the Secretaries of State or Defense or the Chief of Operations.

279. Editorial Note

On December 1, 1961, President Kennedy issued a proclamation, under the provisions of section 408 (b) of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, in which he established that the sugar quota for Cuba, for the first 6 months of 1962, would be zero. (Proclamation No. 3440, 26 Federal Register 11714, also printed in Department of State Bulletin, January 1, 1962, page 34)

In a speech to the Cuban people the same day, Prime Minister Castro stated: “I am a Marxist-Leninist and I will continue to be a Marxist-Len-inist until the last day of my life.” (The translated text of Castroʼs speech is printed in The New York Times, December 3, 1961) United States Representative deLesseps Morrison seized upon Castroʼs December 1 speech as an admission of his true Communist colors, and in a statement made before the Council of the Organization of American States on December 4, Morrison called upon the governments of the organization to protect the peoples of the hemisphere from “any extension of the treachery of Fidelismo.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pages 320-323)

The Department of State reinforced Morrisonʼs statement in circular telegram 1065 to all Latin American posts on December 6 instructing the posts to assess the local reaction to Castroʼs speech, and determine whether Castroʼs admission would help establish the basis for stronger measures to isolate Cuba in Latin America. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-661)

280. Draft Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 410. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. The memorandum reports on the December 1 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). A note attached to a copy of this memorandum in CIA files suggests that it was drafted by Parrott. (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/DDP Files: Job 78-01450R, Box 5, Area Activity—Cuba) Washington, December 1, 1961.

Cuba

The Attorney General told the Group about a series of meetings which had been held recently with higher authority. Out of these had come a decision that higher priority should be given to Cuba. General Lansdale had been designated as “Chief of Operations,” with authority to call on all appropriate Government agencies for assistance, including the assignment of senior representatives from State, Defense and CIA. General Lansdale is to keep the Special Group informed of his progress, but is authorized to take actions now which are clearly desirable to strengthen operations and facilities now in being. In making this appointment, the need for General Landsdale in the Far East had been recognized but it had been decided that for the time being his responsibility would be Cuba.

After some discussion, it was agreed that General Lansdale should develop a long-range program which would be reviewed by the Special Group and then presented for approval to higher authority. At that time, formal language would be proposed to record the decision to pursue a new or revised Cuba policy. General Lansdale will meet with the Special Group next week to report progress and actions required.

General Lansdale then gave his appreciation of the situation. He said that, bearing in mind the objective of fomenting eventual revolution within Cuba, he had surveyed all resources available. He had concluded that there are a sizeable number of latent as well as active resources, but that there is a very difficult job ahead. He stressed also the necessity of coming to an agreement at some early date as to the future of Cuba after the Castro government is overthrown, so that appeals to potential resist-ance elements can be geared to a positive long-range program. General Lansdale also thought it important to obtain cooperation and assistance from selected Latin American countries, preferably those not previously involved with U.S. anti-Castro activities.

General Lansdale then said that he has looked at the proposed operation designed to sabotage a power plant. He had concluded that the conception and planning of this project has been very well done by CIA; on the other hand, he feels that it would be unwise to mount the operation in the immediate future because it would tend to increase Cuban security measures and thereby make it more difficult to get on with building up resistance elements. The Group agreed that, considering all these circumstances, the sabotage operation should be postponed. In this connection, Mr. Bissell, although not disagreeing with the decision, said that he thought it should be noted that a cancellation of plans for early December would almost certainly mean a delay of at least two months, taking into consideration the impending weather conditions as well as moon phases.

Mr. Bissell also said that he thought it desirable to proceed at once with building up the Agencyʼs maritime capability and providing ECM equipment for two C-54ʼs. It was agreed that these measures are consist-ent with the new approach and should be pursued.

Finally, in answer to the Chairmanʼs question as to the significance of the two weeks review which had been elsewhere alluded to, the Attorney General said that this was intended to mean a review by the Special Group, with subsequent reference to higher authority.

281. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5, DCI (McCone), Caribbean Survey Group. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, December 7, 1961.

MEMORANDUM FOR

General Taylor

Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. McCone

SUBJECT Cuba

This is to inform you, as the NSC 5412 group, of activities to date on the Cuba project, within the strict security requirements of the project directed by the President.

Policy. The Presidentʼs memorandum of 30 November 1961,Document 278. which was read to the Special Group at its last meeting, stated that it had been decided that the United States will use all available assets in a project to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime.

Concept. The decision stated above was made after consideration of a concept of how to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime. The regime is to be overthrown by a popular movement of Cubans from within Cuba. The movement is to have the end objective of establishing a free Cuba, of, by, and for Cubans, with the overthrow of the Communist regime a necessary step towards this end. The U.S. will help establish a Cuban nucleus within Cuba, which will work for activating a genuine popular movement to overthrow the regime, and the U.S. will help generate supporting actions for the growth of the movement, particularly in encouraging other nations of the Western Hemisphere to do likewise.

Actions. A working group has been formed by the projectʼs Chief of Operations, with the personal representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, as well as a selected staff. The Chief of Operations is representing the Secretary of Defense, pro tem. It is planned to employ personal representatives of the Directors of the FBI and USIA, when required. The initial work of the group has been to sharply re-orient the U.S. effort, from being simply an unintegrated series of harassment activities to become a program designed to help Cubans build a popular movement within Cuba, which can (with outside help) take effective actions deposing the Communist regime.

CIA. CIA was found to have important contacts and operational capabilities for use in achieving the policy goal set by the President. It is noted, also, that there is an impressive potential for increasing the CIAʼs capability. The orientation of planning and programming, however, was definitely out of phase with the objective of establishing a popular movement from within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the Communist regime. In the main, CIA thinking has been to apply militant force covertly (such as action teams for “smash and grab” raids on up to armed resistance groups), in the hope that a popular uprising would possibly harass the regime. The early task, then, has been to re-orient this 180#, with militant (sabotage, etc.) actions to be considered as part of the support of the popular movement we are generating. The basic strategy of building our action upon a genuine internal popular movement is underlined; this will apply the major lesson to be learned from earlier operations in Indonesia and Cuba.

The tasks assigned to the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence are: a. The CIA organization directed towards Cuba is to be tightened and re-oriented with a hard look at operational effectiveness, especially the management and programs of the field station in Florida. b. A nucleus for a popular Cuban movement will be formed and positioned within Cuba. This will include the development of a team from Cubans in the U.S., and the development of similar teams under local auspices from Caribbean countries. c. A program for this Cuban nucleus to use will be developed. Basic intelligence concerning several initial operational points has been requested. There will be a sharp definition of incentives and of a platform for political polarization, for use with the Cuban nucleus. Further, ideas will be developed for local actions that will help generate the national movement required to force the regime out. d. Special support projects will be readied for use on call. These projects (such as operations to scuttle shipping and otherwise hamper the regime) will be timed to support actions by the movement and to permit the movement to take credit for them. Support in terms of psychological warfare materiel (such as clandestine broadcast transmitters inside Cuba) are to be brought to a practical stand-by capability.

At the same time, the special project team is working on bold new actions to help the popular movement for CIA executive follow through. These include: 1. Enlisting the cooperation of the Church to bring the women of Cuba into actions which will undermine the Communist control system, harass the regimeʼs economic program, and encourage a wave of non-cooperation in all segments of the population. 2. Exploiting the potential of the underworld in Cuban cities to harass and bleed the Communist control apparatus. This effort may, on a very sensitive basis, enlist the assistance of American links to the Cuban underworld. While this would be a CIA project, close cooperation of the FBI is imperative. 3. Labor, students, and other special groups are being considered for practical operational capabilities, for operations which must be mounted quite outside the framework of the existing U.S. programs which aim to match the activities of Communist fronts. This effort is to come mainly from activities in other OAS countries, and suitable Latin American case officers to undertake such positive actions are being considered on a priority basis. 4. Powerful Cuban personalities, with existing capabilities for action within Cuba and who propose a military-type of overthrow, are being assessed for a role in actions which would help generate the popular, anti-regime movement.

State. The Department of Stateʼs actions have been essentially at the formal diplomatic level, and thus quite passive or reactive. State must develop and use its dynamic possibilities in political and economic warfare which will be crucial for the success of a popular movement within Cuba.

The representative of the Secretary of State has been tasked with: a. The possibilities for strong and effective OAS encouragement of the Cuban people in a popular movement will be exploited, particularly noting the Presidentʼs forthcoming visit to Latin America and the Secretary of Stateʼs actions with the OAS in January. b. State will help with the nucleus for a popular Cuban movement, particularly in the development of a political platform and in the continuing development and public support of leadership (noting necessary consideration of existing Cuban emigre groups and their future cooperation with the internal Cuban movement). c. Certain supporting actions will be undertaken by State, notably: 1). Appropriately enlisting the initiative of Latin American countries separately in action programs which encourage the popular movement within Cuba. This is being closely coordinated with a similar task assigned to CIA. 2). Making available the names of American returnees from Cuba, for screening in conjunction with CIA for possible leads to operational contacts. d. Develop, in consultation with top State officials, a practical plan for economic warfare which fully applies the U.S. capability to frustrate the Communist economic program for Cuba. Definite and decisive actions by other U.S. organizations (including Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture) are to be enlisted under the direction of the Department of State.

Defense. The main Department of Defense role is indicated as one of contingency support in later phases of the popular movementʼs development. To this end, improved arrangements for training, personnel, and military hardware support of covert operations is under active study. However, immediate support of State and CIA actions is being activated, particularly in the field of intelligence and in consideration of maritime and air needs in readiness for the time when CIA operations require such support. Planning for overt U.S. military operations is not envisioned under this policy.

USIA. The U.S. Information Agencyʼs role in providing open support for developing the popular movement within Cuba is an important one, but must be correctly timed with the actual commencement of the movement. The U.S. will be identified as being in sympathy with the just and true aspirations of the Cuban people, aspirations which are being killed by a Communist dictatorship. Discussion with a designated USIA representative is being scheduled.

Justice. Support from the Department of Justice, particularly the security and investigative capabilities of the FBI and the INS, is being planned through a special representative of the Attorney General.

HEW, Other U.S. Agencies. The support capabilities of other U.S. organizations are being considered and will be brought into the project as appears most practical.

EG LansdaleBrigadier General, USAF

282. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 22, December 14, 1961. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott. Washington, December 8, 1961. SUBJECT Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 December 1961 PRESENT General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Cabell General Lansdale attended for items 1 and 2

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

2. Cuba

General Lansdale presented the outline of a programSee Document 281. designed to overthrow the Castro government. This program is centered around the selection and eventual introduction into Cuba of a nucleus of anti-Castro Cubans; once they are in the country and in a position to operate, then a number of collateral supporting actions would be undertaken.

It was agreed that the immediate requirement was for the selection of a suitable group which could agree on a platform for an eventual new government, and which is willing and capable of carrying out the proposed tasks inside the country. When a selection has been made the program will be discussed further with higher authority.

It was noted that General Lansdale would report periodically to the Special Group on progress he is making.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. ParrottPrinted from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

283. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5,DCI (McCone), Caribbean Survey Group. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by J.S. Earman, McConeʼs Executive Assistant. Washington, December 14, 1961. PRESENT Mr. McCone, General Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Mr. Amory, Mr. Helms, Mr. Sheldon, Mr. Kent, Mr. Bross, Mr. Montague, Mr. Earman 1. Mr. McCone stated that the purpose of this meeting was to discuss and make known to those present U.S. policy toward successfully overthrowing the Castro regime. At this point the Director read a memorandum, which had been approved by the President, establishing a group composed of Brig. General Edward Lansdale, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, as the Chief of Operations and representatives from State, Defense, and CIA, and USIA and the Department of Justice (FBI) as required, for the purpose of carrying out of the above-stated policy.Apparent reference to Document 278. He commented that the President had discussed Cuba with the Attorney General who in turn had brought Lansdale into the program. The Director said he wanted to make it clear that the basic policy as approved by the President is to assist the Cubans in overthrowing the Communist regime in Cuba. Mr. McCone also noted that the last sentence of the memorandum referred to above provided that only the Secretaries of State and Defense or the Chief of Operations could approve the information contained therein being made available to other than those represented on the group and stated this had been amended to allow the DCI the same authority. The Director said that when he had been approached for comments on the above-mentioned memo, he had indicated that (1) he favored the establishment of the group, (2) it should be responsible to the Special Group (5412), and (3) the internal organization and facilities of the participating agencies should be utilized and there should not be created a separate and outside entity. 2. The Director then read the memorandum from General Lansdale addressed to the members of the 5412 Group outlining activities to date on this project,Document 281. and noted his intention of obtaining permission to have copies made and circulated on a strict need-to-know basis. In this connection, the Director said that knowledge of this project must be held to an absolute minimum; however, he did not intend to skip any echelons in the Agency in obtaining advice and support. He said it was perfectly clear from the Lansdale memorandum that the whole action is by and large that of CIA and that the President and the Attorney General had directed him (DCI) to keep in close personal contact with all activities and operations relating to this project. He noted that Lansdale had initially suggested that Mr. Helms be designated as the CIA representative and report only to the DCI. Mr. McCone said he had refused this concept and made it clear that this refusal was not based on any misgivings about Mr. Helmsʼ capabilities but, rather, is based on his policy of obtaining the advice and support of other senior officers also. He remarked that, as he sees it, this is a community project within the strict security limitations imposed by the President, with action, however, at the Helms level. He stated that the Agency will of course provide Lansdale with all support and assistance following the guidelines laid down by the Special Group. 3. The Director noted that in addition to actions taken, he desires that there be provided a continuous evaluation of the probabilities of success and that these evaluations by and large will be carried out by DD/I. In response to a query from the Director, Mr. Amory stated it would not be necessary for more than about five or six people in his area to be knowledgeable of this program, i.e., Messrs. Amory, Kent, Sheldon, Montague, and Brown. The Director again emphasized that while it is his desire to keep knowledge of this program narrow, he does not wish to skip any echelons that might contribute to its success. 4. The Director commented that Lansdale had criticized the April 1961 Cuban operation by stating that CIA had “jumped” at paramilitary operations, sabotage, etc., without creating a political climate within Cuba to accept such activities. The Director also said that Lansdale had made a similar comment about the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] operation. 5.

Referring back to the Lansdale memorandum, the DCI emphasized the following actions taken and findings to date by the Lansdale group:

[Here follows a summary of General Lansdaleʼs memorandum, Document 281.]

6. With regard to the use of Cubans, the Director said he desires that every possible security check be made and, in connection with current authorized operations directed against Cuba, he desires that each one be examined to ensure that they are within the bounds of the U.S. policy toward Cuba as previously indicated. Mr. Bissell commented that there are certain low-level types of sabotage operations now planned to show that resistance is still in fact alive and that General Lansdale has concurred that they be carried out. He also noted that one of our highest priorities is to build a resistance net and every effort is being made to hold down the natural desire to carry out sabotage actions willy-nilly. Mr. Bissell also said it is necessary to move people in and out of Cuba and he considers this type of activity as falling within the terms of reference of the Presidentʼs policy. Mr. Bissell remarked that in following the doctrine of preparing the proper political climate as outlined by Lansdale, he wanted to point out that it is not easy to start a mass political movement in a police state. This he said was made abundantly clear during the April 1961 operations when the Cubans used the militia and even families for reporting on anyone opposed to Castro. He stated that the mass movement envisaged for Cuba must be developed by political sentiment. Mr. McCone noted this agreement and remarked that this can be accomplished by getting to the dissidents, the mothers, the man on the street and in the field, etc. It was noted that such action can best be accomplished by a small clandestine organization rather than a large group trying to cover the waterfront. 7. Mr. Sheldon asked whether it is planned that the nets now established in Cuba will be assigned to covert intelligence collection and Mr. Bissell advised that this is a first priority. 8. Mr. Amory pointed out that the plan for Cuba as outlined in this discussion in his opinion is a very long-range problem, and commented that no authoritarian regime has been overthrown in the 20th Century by popular uprising from within without some kind of support—war or otherwise. 9. General Cabell commented that we must be careful to keep our records straight and that he too agreed that this is a long-range problem. He pointed out that Lansdale is often inclined to commit and promise that CIA can do more than we are capable. He said we must not allow anyone to commit the Agency to a task it cannot fulfill. The Director commented that he fully agreed and directed that careful memoranda for the record be prepared on all actions directed, taken, or refused. 10. Mr. Amory suggested that a review be made of the question as to whether or not Guantanamo should be used as a base of operations. He said if the answer is in the affirmative and Castro attempts to throw the U.S. out, then the U.S. would be faced with formulating a new policy toward Cuba. Mr. Amory also commented that in connection with infiltration of agents and supplies by sea, he would suggest that DD/P consider getting in touch with the Stevens Brothers who are, in his opinion, the foremost experts on small boat operations. The Director concurred. 11. In connection with the article appearing in the Washington Post of 14 December 1961 regarding Operation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], the Director stated it appeared to him that the breakdown was caused by improper and/or inadequate maintenance of equipment. He directed that in future maritime operations, and all others insofar as feasible, a system of checks and double checks be established, and necessary dry runs be made or back-up craft be readied and, where warranted, participate in the actual operation. Mr. Bross commented that the new Chief of Station for the DD/P installation in Florida had been instructed to review all maritime equipment and operations as the first matter of business upon reporting to the Station today. J.S. EarmanExecutive Officer

284. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 24, January 5, 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott on December 22. Washington, December 21, 1961. SUBJECT Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 21 December 1961 PRESENT General Taylor; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric and General Lemnitzer; Mr. McCone and Mr. Bissell

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

2. Cuba

General Lansdale gave a brief progress report. He stressed the fact that the proposed operation is primarily a political one, and that economic and paramilitary aspects are secondary to the political. Steps have been taken to increase intelligence coverage and to begin preparations for economic warfare.

General Lansdale felt that by perhaps the first week in January he would be in a position to present certain proposals to the Special Group for policy decision, or for transmission to higher authority.Johnsonʼs debriefing notes on the meeting, prepared at the Department of State, indicate that the President wanted Cuba to be given high priority. According to the notes, McCone remarked that Cuba would be a long-term job. (Ibid.) It was noted that if the necessity for quick policy decisions should arise before the next meeting, arrangements could be made to secure concurrence of members of the Group individually.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. ParrottPrinted from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

285. Memorandum for the FileSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2,DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 29 November 1961-5 April 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. Washington, December 27, 1961, 2:45 p.m. SUBJECT Discussion with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, 2:45 P.M., 27 December 1961

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

5. With regard to the Lansdale operation, McCone advised Mr. Kennedy substantially along the lines of his statement to the Special Group as covered by a memorandum attached to the minutes of last Thursdayʼs meeting, December 21.The memorandum cited has not been found. For a record of the December 21 meeting, see Document 284. McCone also stated that CIA was preparing for consideration by Lansdale a series of actions each of which would fit into the policy guidance established by Lansdale. Both McCone and Helms (who was present at this part of the discussion) pointed out the very great difficulty of creating an effective internal political resistance to a well-organized, authoritarian regime equipped with a substantial military force and an effective internal security police. As an example McCone stated that of the 27 or 28 agents CIA now has in Cuba, only 12 are in communication and these communications are infrequent. A team of 7 that were infiltrated December 19th were captured and two of them were on TV in a “confession show” last Saturday night, December 23rd.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

286. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott. Washington, January 11, 1962. SUBJECT Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 11 January 1962 PRESENT General Taylor; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer (Items 2-5); Mr. McCone (Items 1-3) and Mr. Bissell The Attorney General (Item 1 and part of 2) Mr. Richard Helms (Item 1) General E.G. Lansdale (Item 1)

1. Progress Report on Cuba

General Lansdale summarized progress to date, identifying four major broad programs. He emphasized that the current bottleneck is the procurement of suitable Cubans to accomplish the initial task of infiltration. He also touched on other activities which are being undertaken while this problem is being solved, including such things as covert prop-aganda actions in connection with the OAS meeting of 22 January and selective harassment of the Cuban Government in the form of limited sabotage, etc.

Several members of the Group noted the difficulty of the task ahead, with Mr. McCone calling attention to the fact that the prevailing spirit within Cuba appears to be one of apathy rather than resistance, and that a fanatical pro-Castro minority exists along with an efficient police mechanism.

It was noted that the prevailing policy on sabotage is still in effect, i.e., that no actions which would be dangerous to the population will be undertaken, nor will major demolitions be done at this stage. It was agreed that whenever this policy appears to require change, the matter will be discussed with the Special Group.

It was noted that CIA is proceeding to set up an interrogation center for Cuban refugees in the Miami area and that this will be carefully examined to insure that it will be adequately staffed to produce the optimum amount of intelligence on conditions inside Cuba.

The Group agreed that maritime capabilities for infiltration should be clearly sufficient for any foreseeable tasks of this nature. The need for isolated and uncontaminated real estate was also brought out.

General Lansdale was asked to produce for next weekʼs meeting a consolidated summary of progress to date and an overall plan showing departmental tasks and responsibilities, along with timing of implementation. This plan would then be shown to higher authority.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. ParrottPrinted from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

287. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2,DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 29 November 1961-5 April 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by J.S. Earman. Washington, January 12, 1962.

The Director met with the Attorney General on 11 January 1962 and discussed the following subjects:

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

3. Cuban operation

The Attorney General asked the Director for his frank and personal opinion of General Lansdale and the Cuban effort. The Director pointed out that (a) an operation of this type, as presently planned, has never been attempted before, (b) it will be extremely difficult to accomplish, (c) the CIA and the U.S. Government are short on assets to carry out the proposed program, and (d) the Agency, however, is lending every effort and all-out support.

JSEExecutive Officer

288. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Gen. Agency Report. Secret. Approved in ARA by Goodwin and Woodward. Washington, January 16, 1962. SUBJECT Diplomatic, Political and Economic Action With Respect to Cuba

As requested at your meeting of January 12, 1962,No other record of this meeting has been found. there is attached a description of the principal causes of action in the diplomatic, political and economic fields with respect to Cuba which the Department of State is prepared to undertake. While the Department will push ahead vigorously with this program right after the OAS MFM,The reference is to the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, January 22-31, 1962. Documentation relating to this meeting, which focused on the “Communist Offensive in America,” and led to the formal exclusion of Cuba from participation in the Inter-American system, is printed in vol. XII, pp. 250 ff. For text of the Final Act, signed at the conclusion of the meeting on January 31, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 320-331. further details with respect to timing must await results of our initial efforts.

Attachment

Diplomatic and Political Action

1. The Department of State is engaging in continuous discussions and negotiations with the other OAS member nations with a view toward reaching wide agreement at the forthcoming MFM on resolutions which would condemn Cuba and in effect isolate it from the rest of the Hemisphere. 2. At the same time, we expect that publicity emanating from the MFM will result in arousing the sympathy of the rest of the Hemisphere for the plight of the Cuban people, oppressed by the Castro-Communist dictatorship. 3. If the MFM does not result in mandatory sanctions against Cuba and it probably will not result in such sanctions, we would continue our efforts on a bilateral basis to persuade appropriate Latin American governments to take steps designed to isolate Cuba. 4. To maintain the momentum against Cuba stemming from the MFM, the Department of State will right after the MFM send guidance to U.S. Embassies in Latin America instructing them to exploit every available opportunity with such local groups as students, labor organizations, rural organizations, and businessmenʼs groups to gain sympathy for the Cuban people, and increase hostility to the Cuban regime. 5. As U.S. plans crystallize with respect to a peopleʼs movement in Cuba, the Department would be prepared to explore with Latin American nations such as Venezuela the feasibility of obtaining cooperation where required and of stimulating them to undertake a similar program of their own. 6. The Department of State will initiate action to obtain from our Embassies an inventory of operational assets in the Caribbean area.

Economic Action

1. The outcome of the forthcoming OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting will have a direct bearing on economic actions which the United States may undertake with respect to Cuba. Assuming that as a minimum the Meeting results in agreement to condemn Cuba as an accomplice of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and in general adopts language to the effect that Cuba presents a threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere, the Department of State would be prepared to recommend to the President that remaining trade between the United States and Cuba be barred. 2. In imposing the embargo, the Department, in collaboration with other appropriate U.S. agencies, would continue to ensure that U.S. controls are as effective as possible.Specific measures to this end have been already proposed by the Department and have been incorporated in the basic paper. These proposals are under active study as to their feasibility and we expect action on many, if not all, these suggestions in the near future. [Footnote in the source text. Reference to a “basic paper” is an apparent reference to Document 291.] 3. If the United States embargoes remaining trade with Cuba as a result of the OAS MFM, the Department would be prepared to undertake a determined effort with our NATO allies (bilaterally and in the NATO forum, as appropriate) in order to persuade these nations to take steps to isolate Cuba from the West. We would undertake similar steps with Japan, which engages in comparatively significant trade with Cuba. 4. If the United States embargoes remaining trade with Cuba, appropriate U.S. agencies would be in an enhanced position to explore discreetly the desirability and feasibility of enlisting the cooperation of U.S. private sectors to join the U.S. Government in its efforts to isolate Cuba economically from the West. The AFL-CIO, the International Transport Federation, and the National Foreign Trade Council, among others, would appear to be promising possibilities in this regard. 5. With respect to timing, the Department of State will push ahead vigorously on the economic front immediately after the OAS MFM. While a specific timetable cannot otherwise be presented, all opportunities to isolate Cuba economically will be thoroughly explored and exploited where feasible. 6. The Department of State has explored with negative results the feasibility of a program of preclusive buying of essential items entering the Cuban trade as well as pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters. Other than major sabotage efforts, the foregoing suggested causes of action would appear to be the principal economic measures that might be undertaken against Cuba.

289. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan. 63. Secret. A covering note indicates that this estimate, submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared by CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and NSA. All members of the USIB concurred on January 17 except the representatives of the AEC and the FBI who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside their jurisdiction. SNIE 80-62 Washington, January 17, 1962.

THE THREAT TO US SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA

The Problem

To estimate the threat to US security interests in the Caribbean area over the next two decades.

The Estimate

1. US security interests in the Caribbean relate principally to the maintenance of independent and friendly states in the Western Hemisphere. The Caribbean is not only the basin around which are located a large number of American republics, but it is the link between the US and the larger American republics in the southern continent. In addition, the US is concerned with keeping its southern flank free of hostile military power, and with maintaining the unrestricted operation of the Panama Canal and of other US installations. 2. Threats to US interests could arise from a variety of sources: the vulnerability of the area to attack from outside the hemisphere; the establishment of a military presence within the area by hostile powers; attempts by the Communist powers, with the help of the present Cuban Government, to spread Communist revolution to other parts of the area by military action or subversion; the growth of indigenous radical nationalism; and instability rising from attempts by governments in the area to interfere in the affairs of their neighbors or to impose their will upon them. A discussion of each of these threats follows in the paragraphs below. 3. Vulnerability to outside attack. The area of the Caribbean is within range of Soviet ICBMs and long-range bombers, and cities, canals, and military installations could also be attacked by missile-carrying submarines. In the event of general war, some US installations, such as the canal and air and naval bases, probably would be subjected to Soviet attack. 4. Establishment of a hostile military presence. Cuba and any other Caribbean state which fell under Communist control could be used by the USSR as areas in which to establish missile, submarine, or air bases, designed to bring North America under attack or to add to the deterrents to any conceivable US military action in the Caribbean or elsewhere. On the whole, we believe the establishment of such Soviet bases is unlikely for some time to come. Their military and psychological value, in Soviet eyes, would probably not be great enough to override the risks involved. 5. The Soviet leaders would be concerned lest steps toward the establishment of such bases would provoke the US to overthrow the Castro regime before bases could become operational and would generally heighten the risk of war. Moreover, Soviet bases in Cuba could involve the USSR in difficult political and control problems with the Cuban Government; the Soviets have been very careful to retain control over situations which involve them in any serious degree of risk, and they would be mindful of the danger that Cuban initiatives could expose the USSR to serious risks of general war. Finally, the Soviet leaders, for the present at least, appear to prefer not to make their presence too obvious or apparent, lest they discourage rather than encourage the spread of communism to other Latin American countries. Since their essential aim in Latin America is not military conquest but Communist revolution, we believe they will prefer to use Cuba as a symbol of spontaneous popular revolution and as a base for subversive operations. 6. Nevertheless, the USSR can and probably will augment its naval, air, and communications capabilities in the area by the development of arrangements or facilities not openly identifiable as Soviet military bases. For example, the improvement of Cuban naval and air installations would provide facilities suitable for Soviet use, and special installations and arrangements could be set up for intelligence collection or subversive purposes. 7. This reluctance to establish military bases might not extend over the entire period under review. If communism spread to other countries in the area, and if the US appeared to be weakening in world power and national will, the Soviet leaders might be emboldened to buttress their gains by openly establishing Soviet military bases in the area, with the object of further weakening US prestige and further strengthening and protecting their local satraps. If such bases were established, the first step might be the establishment of jointly-operated submarine or air bases, on the theory that the establishment of such bases would be less likely to incur risk of a US reaction than would the establishment of missile bases, while at the same time constituting a demonstration of Soviet presence and protection. 8. Possibilities of the spread of communism in the area. The area of the Caribbean presents a picture of great variety, in terms of social structure, economic organization, and political direction. A few states have had or are passing through full-fledged social revolutions; in others the pressures for revolution are building up. Some states have very backward economies, while others are moving toward modern industrial societies. Many are single crop or commodity exporters; others are moving toward more balanced economies. In each country there are groups seeking to overthrow the existing order; even Mexico, which can be considered to have completed its revolution, harbors groups who believe that the revolution has been arrested and that a new leftward movement should be set in train. Some of these revolutionary groups are Communist led; some are not. 9. It appears to us very likely that during the next decade or two the Communist element among the revolutionary forces will grow in size, although its growth in influence would not necessarily be proportionate to the growth in size. The important question is not whether communism grows, but whether the non-Communist revolutionary forces can grow more rapidly, can control the revolutionary movement, and can achieve an acceptable level of momentum and progress in social, economic, and political change. This question cannot be answered at this stage of Latin American history; much depends upon such factors as the degree of success of the Alliance for Progress in achieving real social change, the skill and determination of local non-Communist leaders, and the activities and achievements of Castroʼs Cuba and of the local Communists in exploiting and subverting revolutionary unrest. 10. We believe that Castroʼs Cuba will continue to do what it can to export its revolution. It has to some degree handicapped itself by openly espousing Marxism-Leninism, but to the extent that it can capitalize on the failure of non-Communists to achieve real reform, it may yet succeed in bringing sympathetic forces to power elsewhere. For some of these countries, Venezuela for example, the critical choice between communism and non-communism may come within the years immediately ahead. For some of the others it may come later. During the next two decades, all could escape communism, but some may fall under Communist control. Local factors of an unforeseeable character, such as the quality of emerging leadership, may prove more decisive than existing political trends or degree of backwardness. In addition, factors external to the area, such as Communist successes or reverses in other underdeveloped countries, developments within the Communist Bloc itself, or changes in the appreciation of the general power balance between the Communist Bloc and the Free World will play a part. 11. Growth of indigenous, non-Communist, radical nationalism. Those states which experience a profound social, economic, and political transformation without coming under Communist control will almost certainly develop a greater sense of national identity and a stronger impulse to assert political independence. As broad-based political movements replace military or personal rule, there will develop a much stronger feeling that the Latin American states can be masters of their own destinies, and the new political leaders will be obliged to stress their devotion to national sovereignty and especially their independence of US policy. In some instances national sovereignty may come to mean that anything can be attempted with little concern or US reaction. 12. This is not to say that the growth of nationalism will necessarily be accompanied by a rise of anti-US attitudes. To the extent the US succeeds, it will tend to reduce the antagonism toward the US among the broad mass of the people, but at the same time it will win the enmity of established elites. In any event, the very emergence of new forces, and the identification—rightly or wrongly—of the old order with the US, will tend to promote suspicion of US motives and policies and will encourage the new leaders at least to strike a pose of independence and self-determination. As a consequence, the US role in the control and operation of canals or other US installations will almost certainly come under heavy attack, and the US freedom of action will probably become increasingly restricted. In the event of open differences with the US, an opportunity might be presented for hostile extra-hemispheric powers to gain a meas-ure of influence. 13. Such a trend toward radical nationalism appears to us to be unavoidable, although it will probably move at a variable and indeterminable pace. In some countries it probably will gather force more slowly than in others. In Panama today, where the Canal Zone offers a visible target for agitation, it appears to be particularly strong; in some of the more isolated countries of the area it may mature only after major reforms have occurred and a new sense of self-confidence develops. 14. Rivalries and tensions within the area. Historically, the Caribbean area has been rife with personal feuds and petty tensions between states. Conspiracies and revolts against some leaders or countries have been organized, armed, and initiated on the soil of others. Combinations and alignments have been developed among groups of countries or leaders against others. We believe this kind of activity will continue in the years ahead, although it may take a somewhat different form than in the past. The pace of social, economic, and political change will not be uniform. Oligarchs cut off from power in one state may move to others and may receive aid and comfort in their plots to reassume control at home. Similarly, frustrated revolutionists will, as in the past few years, use asylum in sympathetic countries to organize and plan revolutions in their home countries. While the form may be the same as in the past, the ultimate stakes will not be personal power so much as the social and economic structure of the nation itself.

290. Editorial Note

During the course of his summary remarks to the National Security Council on January 18, 1962, concerning the problems affecting the foreign policy and national interests of the United States, President Kennedy referred briefly to Cuba as follows:

“We hope that Castro can be effectively isolated at the coming meeting at Punta del Este, but we expect this to continue to be a very large problem on which further action might be necessary. The time has not yet come when we must force a solution to the Cuban problem.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings 1962, No. 496, 1/18/62)

291. Program Review by the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-2062. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 14 copies of the program review were prepared. Copies were sent to the President, Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Rusk for Johnson, McNamara for Gilpatric, McCone, Murrow, Woodward for Hurwitch, General Craig for the JCS, Helms, and Wilson. Three copies were kept by Lansdale. Washington, January 18, 1962.

THE CUBA PROJECT

I. Objective

The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

II. Concept of Operation

Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban people. The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement established within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction towards the object, and to capitalize on the climactic moment. The political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure of the Communist regime to supply Cubaʼs economic needs, psychological operations to turn the peoplesʼ resentment increasingly against the regime, and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.

The failure of the U.S.-sponsored operation in April 1961 so shook the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in supporting a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American countries. Further, the foreignness (Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actions to defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion. Such an anger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movement within Cuba to other Latin Americans especially.

The preparation phase must result in a political action organization in being in key localities inside Cuba, with its own means for internal communications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its own action arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc.). It must have the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make this fact known to the outside world. (It is reported that the majority of Cubans are not for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towards what appears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status.)

The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction of the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A major goal of the Project must be to bring this about.) The popular movement will capitalize on this climactic moment by initiating an open revolt. Areas will be taken and held. If necessary, the popular movement will appeal for help to the free nations of the Western Hemisphere. The United States, if possible in concert with other Western Hemisphere nations, will then give open support to the Cuban peoplesʼ revolt. Such support will include military force, as necessary.

III. Estimate of the Situation

Our planning requires sound intelligence estimates of the situation re Cuba. The latest National Estimate (SNIE 85-61) of 28 November 1961See Document 271. contains operational conclusions not based on hard fact, in addition to its intelligence conclusions; this is a repetition of an error in the planning for the unsuccessful operation of last April.

The planning indicated herein will be revised, as necessary, based on the hard intelligence estimate of the situation by the U.S. Intelligence community. A new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-62 on Cuba), due on 23 January, apparently has been postponed until 7 February.Not issued until March 21. See Document 315.

It is recognized that one result of the Project, so far, has been to start the collection of Intelligence on Cuba in depth, to provide facts on which to base firm estimates and operations.

IV. Initial Phase (30 Nov 61-81 Jan 62)

A. Establish a U.S. mechanism for the project

Status: The Presidentʼs directive of 30 November 1961Document 278. was implemented by creating a U.S. operations team, with Brig. Gen. Lansdale as Chief of Operations, and with tasks promptly assigned. His immediate staff are Mr. Hand and Major Patchell. Representatives of Secretaries and Agency Directors are: State—Woodward (Goodwin, Hurwitch) CIA—Helms Defense—Brig. Gen. Craig USIA—Wilson

B. Intelligence Support

Status: CIA made a special survey of U.S. capabilities to interrogate Cuban refugees in the USA (1,700-2,000 arriving per month) and on 16 January approved a program increasing the staff at the Opa Locka Interrogation Center in Florida from the present 2 people to 34. CIA will build up agent assets (positive intelligence assets inside Cuba are very limited and it has no counter-intelligence assets inside). Special intelligence assets will be exploited more fully. The Cuba Project needs far more hard intelligence in depth than is presently available. CIA will require further assistance from Defense and other U.S. organizations in this intelligence effort, and is submitting specific qualifications for personnel on 19 January.

C. Political platform for peoplesʼ movement inside Cuba.

Status: State has sketched in a broad outline.An apparent reference to Document 288.CIA is to produce the firm platform statement of aims for which the Cubans who will operate inside Cuba are willing to risk their lives, and upon which popular support can be generated.

D. Nucleus for popular movement

Status: To date, CIA has been unable to produce the necessary political action agents for this purpose. Upon re-evaluation of its capabilities, CIA now hopes to complete spotting and assessing eight to ten Cuban political action agents by 15 February, from among Cubans available in the United States. The minimum need for the Project to be effective is 30 such political action Cubans and CIA is tasked to make a priority search for them among Cubans in the U.S. and Caribbean area.

E. Deployment of nucleus

Status: CIA is tasked to select 20 localities within Cuba where political action groups can be established. Initial selection and plans for establishing these action groups are now due 1 February. Havana, and localities in the provinces of Camaguey and Las Villas will receive priority consideration, according to present intelligence. Planning on this must be adjusted as firmer intelligence is acquired.

F. Diplomatic actions

Status: State is concentrating on the OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which opens 22 January, hoping to get wide Western Hemisphere support for OAS resolutions condemning Cuba and isolating it from the rest of the Hemisphere. A companion resolution, to offer OAS relief directly to the suffering Cuban people (similar to U.S. relief to Russia, 1919-20) is being considered, as a means to reach the Cuban people sympathetically without going through their Communist government. The OAS meeting is to be supported by public demonstrations in Latin America, generated by CIA, and a psychological campaign assisted by USIA.

The major task for our diplomatic capability is to encourage Latin American leaders to develop independent operations similar to this Project, seeking an internal revolt of the Cuban people against the Communist regime. This is yet to be initiated by State and must be vigorously pressed.

G. Economic warfare

Status: This critical key to our political action Project is still in the planning stage under State leadership. State is basing future economic actions, including plans for an embargo on Cuban trade, on the outcome of the forthcoming OAS meeting. Meanwhile, State has chaired an Economic action group, which agreed on developing 13 actions. 15 February is set for a report on implementing plans, so that actions can be initiated. CIA was unable to undertake action to sabotage the sugar harvest, which commences about 15 January, and upon which Cubaʼs one-crop sugar economy depends. (Sabotage of transport, mills, sugar sacking and cane fields was explored.)

H. TV intrusion

Status: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts has been reactivated on a small vessel under CIA control. CIA plans to attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castroʼs forthcoming speech and parade demonstrations.

I. Special sabotage support

Status: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility of pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc shipments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms). CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stoppage of some Cuban transport) are not expected until mid-1962. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

J. Military actions

Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S. help when their revolt starts making headway. This contingency plan will permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions, and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor in a peoplesʼ revolt, even more than as a possible military action. Defense also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments of Defense men, money, and materiel are required.

K. Major elements of the population

Status: Both State and CIA are continuing to explore their capabilities (with results largely negative to date) for mounting special group operations inside Cuba focused upon dynamic elements of the population, particularly [1 line of source text not declassified] through Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements include enlistment of the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration is to be given to doing this through Latin American operational contacts. This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when CIA can put it into place.

L. Outlook

Status: As reported to the Special Group last week, there has been a period of a realistic second look at CIA capabilities to mount the required clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in “tooling up.” After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overt action. This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of the Cuba Projectʼs goals. CIA must take yet another hard look at its potential capabilities, in the light of the following tasking, to determine if it cannot make the greater effort required.

V. Target Schedule

A. Intelligence

Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CIA). Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made an effective operation for collection and processing of intelligence (CIA with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI). Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban refugees elsewhere than Miami area. CIA to survey other refugee points ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] etc.) and on a priority basis to ensure maximum coverage of all such source points. 15 February target date. Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets, with priority on agents inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 February. Also included is coverage of intelligence through third country sources, particularly those having diplomatic relations with Cuba.

B. Political

Task 5: CIA to submit plan by 1 February for defection of top Cuban government officials, to fracture the regime from within. The effort must be imaginative and bold enough to consider a “name” defector to be worth at least a million U.S. dollars. This can be the key to our political action goal and must be mounted without delay as a major CIA project. Task 6: CIA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Deception actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense, State and FBI are to collaborate on this. Task 7: By 1 February, CIA to submit operations schedule for initiating popular movement within Cuba. This must include localities selected inside Cuba, assessment of selected Cubans, their infiltration, activity assignments, and political platform. One section must deal with the “underground,” assess its true status and plans to use it. Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S. Embassies in Latin America exploit all opportunities to enlist local sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility towards the Communist regime in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed. Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of local governments or groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve the Projectʼs goals. Plans for early use of such capabilities are due by 19 February. Task 10: CIA to submit operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Projectʼs political action goals. The objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February.

C. Economic

Task 11: State to prepare recommendations to the President on U.S. trade with Cuba, as follow-up to OAS meeting. (If the minimum result of the meeting is an agreement to condemn Cuba as an accomplice of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and adoption of a general statement that Cuba presents a threat to the peace and security of the Hemisphere, State is prepared to recommend to the President that remaining trade between the U.S. and Cuba be barred.) Task 12: State to plan, with Commerce and other U.S. agencies, on how to halt the diversion of vital items in the Cuban trade. Due date 15 February. Cooperation of other OAS nations, particularly Canada and Mexico, is to be explored by State. Task 13: State with Commerce and others involved, to plan on how to make “positive list” items to Latin America be subject to the same licensing procedures as applied to such shipments to other parts of the free world. Due 15 February. Task 14: State to obtain from Commerce proposal to amend present export controls of technical data (petrochemical, communications equipment) so that Cuba is treated the same as the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Due 15 February. Task 15: State by 15 February to submit recommendations on issuance of transportation order (T-3) under authority of the Defense Production Act of 1950Enacted September 8, 1950. (64 Stat. 798, et seq.) forbidding U.S.-owned vessels to engage in trade with Cuba. Task 16: State plan due 15 February on feasible extension of U.S. port treatment now given to Bloc and Cuban vessels to charter vessels of Bloc and Cuba (Treasury to advise on this). Task 17: State to report by 15 February on feasibility of harassing Bloc shipping by refusing entry into U.S. ports (statedly for security reasons), if vessels have called or will call at Cuban ports. Task 18: [2½ lines of source text not declassified] Task 19: State to report by 15 February on possibilities for obtaining the discreet cooperation of the National Foreign Trade Council to urge U.S. shippers to refuse to ship on vessels which call at Cuban ports. (Commerce to assist on this.) Task 20: State to report by 15 February on possibilities to obtain the discreet cooperation of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers to influence U.S. firms having subsidiaries abroad to adhere to the spirit of U.S. economic sanctions. (Commerce to assist on this.) Task 21: CIA to submit plan by 15 February for inducing failures in food crops in Cuba. [1 line of source text not declassified] Task 22: State to report by 15 February on status of plans to gain cooperation of NATO allies (bilaterally and in the NATO forum, as appropriate). Objective is to persuade these nations to take steps to isolate Cuba from the West. Task 23: State to report by 15 February on status of actions undertaken with Japan, which has comparatively significant trade with Cuba, along lines similar to those with NATO nations. Task 24: CIA to submit plan by February on disruption of the supply of Cuban nickel to the Soviet Union. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

D. Psychological

Task 25: USIA to submit plan by 15 February for the most effective psychological exploitation of actions undertaken in the Project, towards the end result of awakening world sympathy for the Cuban people (as a David) battling against the Communist regime (as a Goliath) and towards stimulating Cubans inside Cuba to join “the cause.” Task 26: CIA to submit by 15 February its operational schedule for a psychological campaign to provoke a relaxing of police state control within Cuba. This is to include effective means of publicly indicting “peoplesʼ criminals” for justice after liberation of Cuba (not only individual top officials, but members of the Vigilancia, etc.). Task 27: CIA and USIA will report on progress as of 15 February in developing identification of the popular movement inside Cuba, as with songs, symbols, propaganda themes. Task 28: By 15 February CIA will report on plans and actions for propaganda support of the popular movement inside Cuba. Included will be exactly what is planned for use by the movement inside Cuba, and feasibility of using smuggled food packets (such as the “I Shall Return” cigarette packets to Philippine guerrillas in World War II) as morale boosters in generating the popular movement.

E. Military Action

Task 29: Defense to submit contingency plan for use of U.S. military force to support the Cuban popular movement, including a statement of conditions under which Defense believes such action would be required to win the Projectʼs goal and believes such action would not necessarily lead to general war. Due 28 February. Task 30: CIA to submit by 15 February its operational schedule for sabotage actions inside Cuba, including timing proposed for the actions and how they affect the generation and support of a popular movement, to achieve the Project goals. Task 31: CIA to submit specific requests to Defense for required support by Defense as early as possible after its plans firm up. Requests for all major needs are expected by 23 February. Task 32: Defense will submit plan for “special operations” use of Cubans enlisted in the U.S. armed forces. Due 28 February.

VI. Future Plans

By 20 February, it is expected that sufficient realistic plans for individual tasks will have been received, and initial actions started, to permit a firm time-table to be constructed. Since the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the Project through the appropriate organizations and Departments of the Government, and since these U.S. organizations are mainly in the initial inventory and development of capabilities phase concerning assigned tasks, a precise operations timetable as of today would be too speculative to be useful.

CIA has alerted Defense that it will require considerable military support (including two submarines, PT boats, Coast Guard type cutters, Special Forces trainers, C-54 aircraft, F-86 aircraft, amphibian aircraft, helio-couriers, Army leaflet battalion, and Guantanamo as a base for submarine operations). Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular movement, illusory and actual, which will create a political climate which can provide a framework of plausible excuse for armed intervention. This is not in conformity with the Presidential directive now governing Project tasking. Actually, the role of creating the political climate and plausible excuse for armed intervention would be more properly that of State and Defense, if such an objective becomes desirable.

292. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations in the Deputy Directorate for Plans (Helms) to Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5, DCI (McCone), Caribbean Survey Group. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, January 19, 1962. SUBJECT Meeting with the Attorney General of the United States Concerning Cuba 1. I attended a meeting on Cuba at 11:00 A.M. today chaired by the Attorney General. Others present were: Brig. General E.G. Lansdale (OSD) Major James Patchell (OSD) Brig. General William H. Craig (JCS) Mr. [name not declassified] (CIA) Mr. George McManus (CIA) (The Department of State was not represented although invited.) 2. The Attorney General outlined to us “How it all started”, findings as they developed, and the general framework within which the United States Government should now attack the Cuban problem. Briefly, these were the main points: (a) After failure of the invasion, the United States Government became less active on the theory “better to lay low.” (b) Over the months the complexion of the refugee flow changed (i.e. upper classes out first, then middle classes—dropping to lower middle class, etc.) which, he stated, indicated a strong feeling of opposition to Castro within Cuba. (c) Progress in Cuba toward a police and Communist state was more rapid during this period than that made by any country in Eastern Europe in an equivalent period of time. Because of the rapidity of advance, immediate action on the part of the United States Government was necessary. (d) With these factors in mind, the Attorney General had a discussion at the White House during the autumn of 1961 with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and General Lansdale. The Secretary of Defense assigned General Lansdale to survey the Cuban problem, and he (Lansdale) reported to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General (in late November) concluding: (1) Overthrow of Castro regime was possible (2) Sugar crop should be attacked at once (3)

Action to be taken to keep Castro so busy with internal problems (economic, political and social) that Castro would have no time for meddling abroad especially in Latin America.

Detail: United States Government was precluded from destroying the current sugar crop (1) we were late and overly optimistic and (b) “the assets of the United States Government were not as great as we were led to believe”.

(e) Accordingly, a solution to the Cuban problem today carries “The top priority in the United States Government—all else is secondary—no time, money, effort, or manpower is to be spared. There can be no misunderstanding on the involvement of the agencies concerned nor on their responsibility to carry out this job. The agency heads understand that you are to have full backing on what you need.” (f) Yesterday (18 January 1962), the President indicated to the Attorney General that “the final chapter on Cuba has not been written”—itʼs got to be done and will be done. (g) Therefore, the Attorney General directed those in attendance at the meeting to address themselves to the “32 tasks” unfailingly (see program review—The Cuba Project dated 18 January 1962Document 291.). He said, “It is not only General Lansdaleʼs job to put the tasks, but yours to carry out with every resource at your command.” 3. The Attorney General inquired about the progress in establishing a refugee interrogation center at Miami and was informed that this would be in operation by 15 February 1962—the target date. With respect to interrogating the back-log of Cubans in the U.S.A., we agreed that we would attack this problem by getting at the more recent arrivals first. The Attorney General was informed that one could not relate, in time, the establishment of an interrogation facility with the placing of agents in Cuba—in other words, a body of information would have to be developed by intensive interrogation of many sources over a period of time. 4. It was General Lansdaleʼs view that there were several tasks among the “32” outlined upon which action could be taken without awaiting this detailed intelligence information. He noted, for example, the defection of top Cubans as being within the immediate capabilities of the CIA. rh

293. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Members of the Caribbean Survey GroupSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-2062. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attachment to the memorandum indicates that the Caribbean Survey Group was composed of the Project Officers within the Departments of State and Defense, CIA, and USIA who had day-to-day responsibility for the management of Operation Mongoose, under the oversight of the agency principals represented on the Special Group (Augmented). The distribution list for this memorandum indicates that copy 1 went to Assistant Secretary Woodward at State for Goodwin and Hurwitch as well, copy 2 went to Brigadier General Craig at Defense, copy 3 went to Helms at CIA, and copy 4 went to Wilson at USIA. Washington, January 20, 1962.

At yesterdayʼs meeting,See Document 292. the Attorney General underscored with emphasis that it is your responsibility to develop and apply the maximum effort of your Department (Agency) to win the goal of the Cuba Project.

As he so adequately tasked us, there will be no acceptable alibi. If the capability must be developed, then we must acquire it on a priority basis. It seems clear that the matter of funds and authority offers absolutely no defense for losing time or for doing less than the very best possible effort in your tasks.

In reviewing our program, I appreciate the difficult problems inherent in getting bureaucratic procedures and personnel aroused to do the dynamic thinking and actions demanded by this project. However, I also am very clear about the unreserved requirement laid upon us. You should be equally clear about this. As the Attorney General said, it is untenable to say that the United States is unable to achieve its vital national security and foreign policy goal re Cuba. Castro and his Communist henchmen have many difficult problems to meet in maintaining even a status quo, and we have all the men, money, material, and spiritual assets of this most powerful nation on earth.

It is our job to put the American genius to work on this project, quickly and effectively. This demands a change from business-as-usual and a hard facing of the fact that we are in a combat situation—where we have been given full command.

It is my firm intention to avoid impeding your thinking and actions, except where coordination and constructive direction in the overall interest are involved. In turn, it is your responsibility to keep me informed adequately of your plans and progress. As the Attorney General made plain, you are to call on me, as the Chief of Operations for the Project, at any time for advice and help. He offered the same for himself.

In the meantime, we must believe that you are getting fully into action on your assigned tasks, and are working towards additional tasks you can come up with to win the Project goal. You were given dead-line dates in the tasks listed in my 18 January paper to the President.Document 291. I trust that you are not merely attempting to just meet those dates, but are making your own time-table and making it with shorter dead-lines. The urgency and importance of our Project must be reflected in the thinking and actions of the U.S. government people who are to help us win—and that is up to you.

294. Memorandum for the FileSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2,DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 29 November-5 April 1962. Secret. Prepared by McCone on January 22. Washington, January 20, 1962.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE OF DISCUSSION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT KENNEDY, SATURDAY, JANUARY 20, 1962, 3:00 TO 4:00 P.M.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

4. McCone brought up the Lansdale paper of January 18th,Document 291. pointing out that the paper was extreme in some regards, most particularly its criticism of the estimate of the Cuban situation. McCone stated that since his estimate was an official DCI paper he would request General Lansdale to support his criticism; McCone also questioned the conclusions in the final paragraph of the paper under Future Plans. No comment was made on the 32 tasks, however, McCone stated that from quick reading he questioned whether many of them could be done in the time schedule, and some of them probably not at all. However, comments on the paper were being prepared and would be submitted.

It was agreed that General Taylor was to call a special meeting of the 5412 committee to be attended by Lansdale and the AG for the specific purpose of discussing this paper. The meeting would be held in all probability on Saturday, January 27.The meeting was held on January 25. See Document 296. Action: McCone should discuss this meeting with General Taylor and the Agencyʼs position on the Lansdale paper prepared well in advance of the meeting and circulated to the appropriate parties concerned.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

295. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Special GroupSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5,DCI (McCone), Caribbean Survey Group. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, January 24, 1962. SUBJECT The Cuba Project

I—Objective

In accordance with the objectives of the Cuba project program review presented to the President and the Special Group by Brig. Gen. E.G. Lansdale on 18 January 1962,Document 291.CIA will collect and process intelligence and counterintelligence, conduct covert propaganda and political action operations, and develop a covert resistance movement to help the Cubans overthrow the Castroite-Communist regime.

II—Concept of Operation

Fully recognizing the urgency and necessity of achieving our objective in this grave undertaking, CIA will use all available assets to develop a resistance organization inside Cuba to assist in bringing about a revolt of the Cuban people. Because of the present severity of Communist and police controls inside Cuba, it is not likely that we can make the resist-ance groups self-sustaining as is envisaged in General Lansdaleʼs “Concept of Operation” section (p.1). External support will be essential to their survival. Except for the results of sabotage which will become known during the development of the movement and intended uprisings at the climactic moment, the movement will be primarily underground and clandestine. Since the movement will be clandestine, it will have to be highly compartmented and secure, thus limiting the size of the unit in each area where agents will be established. Open and significant political action by members of the movement would result in the destruction of these elements of the resistance. CIA will, however, create and expand a resistance movement which will help develop a political climate in which a large scale uprising may be possible. If the movement develops an impetus of its own, we shall not be able to control it from start to finish and at any time it may be sparked suddenly and prematurely into an uprising. It should be recognized that an uprising of this kind, which might result from our plan of action or from causes which we do not control, constitutes a serious danger. Because of this danger we must enlarge the “Concept of Operation” to include plans for this contingency in order that the United States Government will be ready with sufficient military assistance to guarantee the success of any uprising within the framework of our objective. If our efforts achieve the optimum result of generating an uprising of significant size, the U.S. Government will probably wish to support it by military action because the alternative would be to see the revolt fail. If a revolt does not develop of its own momentum, then consideration should be given to provoking an uprising and supporting it with military action. The consequences of a ruthlessly suppressed uprising encouraged even remotely by the United States could spell the end to any deniable efforts to unseat the Castro government and the end of Cuban faith in the United States and the practical end of resistance inside Cuba.

III—Estimate of the Situation

Although CIA will act on the basis of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 85-62 on Cuba, scheduled for completion in February 1962,Document 315. our operational plans and actions will require significantly additional basic intelligence. To acquire this information, we are now urgently expanding our intelligence collection facilities.

Our collection, covert action and resistance activities will have to overcome the repressive Cuban police controls of the population based on refinements introduced by experts from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The pervasive informant system, efficient propaganda machine, and military and civil suppression are supported by jet fighter, radar, patrol boats, and communications capabilities far beyond the level of April 1961.

Internal purges and escapes from Cuba have seriously diminished those groups from which leadership could be expected and the failure of the invasion has lessened our current recruitment capability inside and dampened the will to resist. Nevertheless, the deteriorating economic situation provides a climate in which opposition is more likely than in a rising economy. We believe, however, that the Soviet Bloc will seek to maintain its Cuban foothold in the Western Hemisphere, thus challenging the Monroe Doctrine, by extending economic aid to Cuba to help offset losses which will result from our actions. Our efforts must be concentrated within this period of economic difficulty to prevent improvement which might hinder the resistance movement from taking firm roots. We must recognize that our efforts to destroy the Cuban economy by sabotage, sanctions, and other measures of economic warfare will run a major risk of attribution to the U.S. and of Cuban propaganda exploitation. In addition, sabotage actions will inevitably result in a considerable attrition of resistance potential and assets.

IV—Initial Phase

In the initial period of three to four months this Agency will move toward the completion of assigned tasks. Although all CIA assets are now being directed to meet target deadlines, clandestine operations are ill-suited to rigid scheduling. The timetable for clandestine operations depends step by step upon the introduction of more and more concealed assets inside Cuba plus an increasing flow of information from Cuba. As our assets and knowledge grow, we shall move with greater speed. If we were to adhere to all the elements of the proposed Cuba Project timetable, we should be forced to act on the basis of extremely inadequate information. CIA will attempt, therefore, to adhere to or improve upon assigned deadlines but with full cognizance that the imposition of arbitrary scheduling upon clandestine operations can be used only to prod the participants but not to predetermine results.

Tab “A” of this paper discusses the tasks currently assigned to CIA, progress to date, and reporting deadlines.

Tab A SUBJECT Tasks Assigned to CIA in General Lansdaleʼs Program Review

A. Tasks

Part V, pp. 5-8, of General Lansdaleʼs program review of the Cuba Project, dated 18 January 1962, assigns 32 specific tasks to elements of the U.S. Government. Of these, 16 are assigned to CIA solely or jointly. The tasks have been reviewed by this Agency, and it has been determined that substantially all reporting and planning deadlines can be met. Work on all tasks, with and without assigned dates for completion, is in progress. The following detailed observations are keyed to General Lansdaleʼs paper.

1. Task 1, p. 5. The intelligence community is hard at work on NIE 85-62 and is attempting to meet the deadline of 7 February. As was agreed in a conversation of 23 January 1962 with General Lansdale, a short extension may be necessary. 2. Task 2, p. 5. The Opa-Locka Interrogation Center in Florida will be in operation on 15 February—the deadline date. 3. Task 3, p. 5. The survey is in progress and will be completed on the stipulated date. On the basis of the information obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation points will be determined. 4. Task 4, p. 5. An operational assessment of the stay-behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline of 15 February. Because communication with singleton agents is by SW, not W/T, it is unlikely that assessment can be completed by the date stipulated; an extension to 28 February may be necessary, although every effort is being made to complete the work before that date. [3 lines of source text not declassified] A progress report on the status of this program will be made by 15 February, although this Agency cannot be sure that the cooperation of all intended participants will have been obtained by that date. CIA has also taken the following additional steps in respect to Task 4. a. A cable has been sent to field stations to give added impetus to the search for assets and the development of both unilateral and joint operations. Progress reports have been required by 1 March. b. A survey of the Cuban Chinese community and of operational access to it is under way. Target date: end of February. c. An assessment of more than one hundred persons to determine their suitability for return to Cuba as agents in the guise of students is also being conducted. Target date: end of February. 5. Task 5, p. 5. The 1 February deadline will be met, and by that date we shall also have begun the search for suitable intermediaries. [10 lines of source text not declassified] 6. Task 6, p. 5. By the assigned date we shall complete and submit a coordinated plan. We shall also have begun action on cover and deception operations by that date. 7. Task 7, p. 5. By 1 February CIA will submit an operational schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance movement inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities selected and the assessment of some candidates. A full assessment will be completed in accordance with the schedule listed in para. 4, above, in conformance with Task 4. It should be noted, however, that this operational schedule (like the schedules called for in Tasks 10, 26, and 30) will necessarily be tentative and subject to later revision as the number of assets inside Cuba increases and as the flow of intelligence is augmented. Moreover, the development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable, so that operational timetables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions. 8. Task 10, p. 5. CIA has on hand both propaganda and political action assets in the Caribbean area and elsewhere in Latin America. It is planned to use those assets both to support the Project inside Cuba and to generate and mobilize public and official opinion against Castro outside Cuba. The operational schedule will be submitted on the stated date. 9. Task 18, p. 6. Discussions with the appropriate AFL-CIO officials have been conducted and a report of developments will be submitted by 15 February. 10. Task 21, p. 7. Plans for inducing the failure of crops will be submitted by 15 February. [4 lines of source text not declassified] 11. Task 24, p. 7. This deadline will also be met. Primary methods of disrupting the supply of Cuban nickel to the USSR could, if approved, [11 lines of source text not declassified]. It is suggested that consideration be given to assigning to the economic action group, chaired by the Department of State, responsibility for overt action designed to deny Canadian nickel to the USSR. 12. Task 26, p. 7. Together with Tasks 27 and 28, Task 26 constitutes an outline of a plan for a psychological warfare operation. These tasks are so closely interrelated that CIA proposes to submit by 15 February a single plan dealing with all three tasks. 13. Task 27, p. 7. See preceding paragraph. 14. Task 28, p. 7. See paragraph 12. 15. Task 30, p. 7. By 15 February CIA will submit an operational schedule dealing with the sabotage of (1) shipping in Cuban waters and harbors, (2) Cuban transport facilities, (3) communications facilities, (4) equipment for the refining of petroleum, (5) facilities for producing and distributing power, (6) industry, (7) food supplies, (8) key military and police installations and materiel. The schedule will also include the disruption of military and police communications and harassment of military and police training and personnel. 16. Task 31, p. 8. This deadline will be met.

B. Additional Undertakings

The following comments are keyed to Sections D through K, Part IV (pp. 3 and 4) of the program review.

17. Section D, p. 3. Six men, to form the initial nucleus, have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates inside and outside Cuba is in progress, and it is expected that ten of these will be recruited by 15 February. 18. Section E, p. 3. To date fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers of resistance because of (1) the presence there of groups among which there is patent or incipient unrest, (2) the presence of strategic and tactical targets for use or deactivation, and (3) proximity to potential unconventional warfare areas. [4 lines of source text not declassified] 19. Section F, p. 3. In support of Stateʼs efforts CIA has conducted propaganda operations, including a number of mass demonstrations, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. 20. Section H, p. 4. One TV intrusion operation has been conducted, on 16 January. Plans for an intrusion during the scheduled parade and demonstration in Havana are being formulated. 21. Section K, p. 4. Groups with which CIA has exploitable access or entree include women, labor, students, teachers, jurists, and other professional classes. International contacts [1 line of source text not declassified] will also be utilized.

296. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 28, February 1, 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott. Washington, January 25, 1962. SUBJECT Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 January 1962 PRESENT General Taylor; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer; Mr. McCone and Mr. Bissell Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Helms and General Lansdale were present for Item 1

1. Cuba

The Group considered General Lansdaleʼs paper “Cuba Project,” 19 January 1962;For text of Lansdaleʼs program review, dated January 18, see Document 291. his paper “Task 33,” 19 January 1962;Not found. and the CIA paper “Cuba Project,” 24 January 1962.Document 295. In addition General Lansdale circulated, but retained, copies of a paper on actions taken to gain popular support for the U.S. position in connection with the OAS meeting, and another outlining actions taken on the spot, in Punta del Este.Neither paper has been found.

After a lengthy discussion, all agencies currently involved (State, Defense, Joint Staff, CIA) agreed that they accept the tasks assigned to them. In the case of State, this is subject to concurrence by the Secretary upon his return. February 20th is recognized as a target date to take a searching look at progress up to that point and to recommend new lines of policy if appropriate.

General Lansdale commented that it appears that some clarification might be in order as to exactly what is intended in the planning papers. He emphasized that there is agreement that external support of internal operations should be provided for and that it is recognized there might be an internal revolt which could lead to a Cuban groupʼs requesting U.S. intervention. He also said he had met with the JCS and that the latter had responded strongly to the idea of preparing for external action. Additionally, he had met with the intelligence estimators and it had been noted there will be some delay in the NIEAn apparent reference to NIE 85-62, Document 315. because of the need to acquire more intelligence and to digest a sizeable input from the State Department.

Mr. Johnson then pointed out that before the establishment of the Lansdale group, higher authority had directed State and Defense to prepare a plan for military intervention in the event of the removal of Castro from the Cuban scene. He said a great deal of work has been done along these lines and that this should now be directed into the channel of an integrated politico-military plan to cover any contingency.

Mr. McCone made several points: (a) The NIE of November 28,See Document 271. which was commented on in General Lansdaleʼs paper, was based on all available intelligence and dealt with certain operational aspects. The latter had been done at Mr. McConeʼs direction. (b) Clandestine operations are not susceptible to rigid scheduling and must be approached on a step-by-step basis. Therefore, schedules will have to be reexamined periodically. (c) Sabotage, sanctions and economic warfare can all be attributed to the United States. The Special Group should recognize this as a possible consequence. (d) A popular uprising within Cuba could be brutally suppressed in the manner of Hungary. In such an event, unless the U.S. is prepared to give overt assistance, future opportunities to unseat the Castro government would be lost.

In commenting on Mr. McConeʼs last point, General Taylor noted that the CIA paper of the 24th appears to question the feasibility of the basic objective of overthrowing the Castro regime without overt U.S. military intervention, and that it suggests the need to accept in advance of implementing the Project the definite possibility of having to use U.S. forces. He said that in his view more than contingency plans are required and that, so far as possible, authority should be obtained in advance to undertake major moves which might be required as circumstances develop. He conceded that it may be impossible to get such a firm determination very far in advance. The Group agreed, however, that every effort should be made to line up various situations that might arise, and to formulate recommended policy to capitalize on these situations at the proper time. It was agreed that no action should be taken before February 20th which could have possibilities of involving the U.S. in charges of overt aggression.

General Lemnitzer noted that military contingency plans now in being provide enough American strength to accomplish the job without internal help. He said that while these plans are up-to-date, it will be necessary to build up a number of them based on varying assumptions. He also warned that planning for operations of this kind should not involve a firm commitment to a time schedule, as was the case in the earlier unsuccessful operation.

Finally, General Lansdale noted that task number 33 (a) has been withdrawn. The others under 33 will not be put into execution until future examination and approval.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. ParrottPrinted from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

297. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-2662. Top Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Attorney General Kennedy, Taylor, Gilpatric, Johnson, and McCone. Washington, January 26, 1962. MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Hurwitch, State General Craig, Defense SUBJECT Tasks 29 and 33, Cuba ProjectTask 29 is listed in the section under “Military Action” in the Program Review prepared by Lansdale on January 18. (Document 291) There were only 32 tasks listed in that review. Task 33 apparently was assigned to the Department of Defense in the January 19 memorandum that Lansdale cites in the memorandum printed here. The January 19 memorandum has not been found.

It is desired that there be an early determination of U.S. policy about the possible use of U.S. military force in the Cuba project. The policy determination will require a clear presentation of the factors to be considered. State and Defense are tasked with making the required presentation, under my guidance. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric of Defense and Deputy Under Secretary Johnson of State have agreed that each of the addressees will represent his Department for this purpose.

The presentation of factors to be considered will include a clear statement of the situations under which U.S. military force would be needed and a clear statement of the proposed use of U.S. military force to meet the needs of each situation. The paper presented for a policy determination on possible military intervention in Laos, known as the Plan 5 paper,Reference is to SEATO Plan 5/61. provides general guidance for the presentation desired. The considerations noted in paragraph J, page 4, of my 18 January program review, need to be included.

Separate presentations will be made for the use of U.S. military force visualized in Task 29 of my 18 January program review and the use of the U.S. military in Task 33b, for which Defense was asked to develop plans in my 19 January memorandum.

298. Telegram From the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic to the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic FleetSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 1/11/62-1/29/62. Top Secret; Priority. Also sent to CJTF 122, CG USARLANT Ft Bragg, CG USARLANT Seymore-JohnsonAFB NC. Repeated for information to JCS, CINCSTRIKE, CG CONARC, and COMTAC. Norfolk, Virginia, January 29, 1962, 8:20 p.m.

292020Z. Cuban Contingency Plans. A. CINCLANTOPLAN 314-61 (change 2). B. CINCLANTOPLAN 316-61.Neither of these operations plans has been found.

1. SecDef has expressed dissatisfaction with reaction times envisaged in references A and B. 2. Fast application of US air power against Cuban airfields, aircraft, missile and radar installations is required as first priority. The selective disruption of communications and transportation facilities is second priority with the limitation of avoiding destruction of populated areas. Air strikes against troop and armor concentrations is third priority. Reaction times from a condition of no warning are six hours, twelve hours and twenty-four hours. Armament is limited to conventional weapons only. Naval and Air Force tactical air will be employed. Additionally it is desired to reduce reaction times to 4 days for ref A and to 2 days for ref B. 3. In order to achieve the required air strike capability it will be necessary to: A. Activate JTF 122. B. Require COMAFTASKFOR and COMNAVTASKFOR to be prepared to conduct tactical air strikes against designated targets as directed by CJTF 122. 4. From previous studies of the subject it is known that the required reaction times for refs A and B can be achieved only by accomplishing certain of the alert and prepositioning of forces set forth in phases I and II of the referenced plans. Deployment of PACOM amphibious forces and some LANTCOM seaborne forces will be necessary. 5. From previous studies in which adees and their staffs participated in CINCLANT is aware of the magnitude of effort required to realize and maintain the readiness goals set forth above. However, the Cuban military capability and the direct threat presented to the US and Latin America are rapidly increasing. 6. CINCLANT desires action adees review their plans supporting refs A and B with the above in mind and comment by message at their earliest convenience. Specific information desired: A. Estimate of TAC aircraft required to achieve air strike capability described in para 2 above west of longitude 79W. B. Estimate of Naval aircraft required to achieve air strike capability described in para 2 above east of longitude 79W. C. Prepositioning requirements for 6A and B above. D. Alert and prepositioning requirements (related to phases I and II) to achieve a 4 day reaction time for ref A and a 2 day reaction time for ref B. E. Estimates of length of time ready posture can be maintained. F. Estimates of costs, and impact on other major plans and programs of achieving: (1) Reaction time of six, twelve, and twenty-four hours for air strikes. (2) The reduced reaction times of four days for ref A and two days for ref B.In CINCLANT telegram 312156Z to CINCSTRIKE, Dennison cited CINCLANT telegram 292020Z and stated that the studies to be conducted in accordance with his instructions in that telegram “will, among other things, be concerned with the provision of combat-ready air force and army forces to this command.” He added: “The degree of readiness of these forces, and the speed with which they can move to or be assembled” at stated transfer points were matters of mutual concern. Accordingly, Dennison asked for CINCSTRIKE comments on CINCLANT telegram 292020Z, with particular reference to subparagraphs 6 D, E, and F. (Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historianʼs Office, Cable Files, Cuba, Jan-Aug 1962) 7. Replies are desired by 5 Feb. based on best estimates available. Action adees should continue to study the problem and be prepared to participate in planning conference in near future.

299. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President KennedySource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba, 342.18 (31 Jan 1962). Confidential. The memorandum was drafted in DOD/ISA and was forwarded by Assistant Secretary Paul H. Nitze on January 30 for Secretary McNamaraʼs signature. Gilpatric signed for McNamara. In his January 30 covering memorandum Nitze noted that the recommendation to terminate the recruitment policy as of June 30 had the concurrence of the Departments of State and Health, Education and Welfare, as well as that of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, and the respective Armed Services. (Ibid.) Washington, January 31, 1962. SUBJECT Service of Cuban Volunteers in U.S. Armed Forces

In accordance with instructions contained in National Security Action Memorandum No. 54 dated June 26, 1961,Document 239. the Department of Defense, in coordination with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the U.S. Selective Service System, instituted a program to offer qualified Cuban exiles career opportunities for service in the U.S. Armed Forces on a volunteer basis, with the clear understanding that they were not being prepared as a combat force.

A suitable interval has now elapsed since the initiation of this program in August 1961 to report on its program. Through the period ending 15 January 1962, 3,504 Cubans who expressed an interest in the program have been interviewed at the Cuban refugee center in Miami. Of this number 920 were determined to be eligible and had sufficient interest in the program to register with the local Selective Service Board.

Of this number 817 reported and were processed at the Armed Forces Examining Station in Miami. On the basis of mental, medical and security examinations, 441 were rejected as not meeting minimum U.S. service standards.

Of the remaining 376 otherwise qualified, 101 demonstrated an adequate level of English language ability, while 275 did not.

Of the former group, 59 entered the U.S. military services. A special school which, for international political reasons, operates under the auspices of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, has provided English language training for volunteers otherwise eligible and qualified. As of 15 January 1962, 29 graduates of this training had entered the U.S. Armed Forces. Out of the total of 376, 194 individuals are currently being processed and 94 have dropped out.

In sum, during the five-month period ending 15 January 1962, the program has resulted in 88 individual Cubans entering the U.S. Armed Services, 11 in the Army, 18 in the Navy, 18 in the Marine Corps and 41 in the Air Force. These modest results when compared to the number of Cubans initially expressing interest in the program are attributable to the following factors: 1. By far the largest drop in numbers occurs after the first interview with those Cubans expressing an interest in the program. Apart from those determined to be ineligible by reason of age or some obvious physical limitation, most who drop out at this stage appear to do so as a result of learning that it is actually volunteer service in the U.S. Armed Forces and not in a new invasion force which is being offered. There is some evidence that many do not accept this explanation and continue in the program only to drop out at some later stage when they become convinced that it is not, as they seem disposed to believe, a cover operation for building a new Cuban combat force. 2. The next point in the processing where a major drop-out occurs is in the medical, mental and security examinations stage. Of the total of 441 rejected, 190 were for mental and medical reasons and almost all of the remaining 251 were found unacceptable on the basis of admitted sexual deviations. 3. Among the 376 who passed the mental, medical and security tests, 77 voluntarily dropped out of the program at one point or another for unexplained reasons, while 17 were unable to qualify in English tests after having completed language training.

This attrition rate, while high, is not surprising when compared to our experience with some groups of U.S. citizens where the rate of rejection for service in the U.S. Armed Forces has been 1 out of 2 and there is no language barrier to be overcome. Nevertheless, to the extent that this program is intended to assist Cuban exiles now in the United States to maintain themselves and to usefully employ and further develop their individual skills and abilities, it cannot be regarded as a marked success. The cost, particularly in the case of the language training funded by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, when compared to the numbers who ultimately qualify and enter the U.S. Armed Services, suggests that this is a somewhat expensive process for the results obtained.

There is little likelihood that our experience with this program will be appreciably different in the months ahead. Interest in it among the Cuban exile population continues but is not great.

I recommend that this program be terminated by 30 June 1962 unless a review by the Department of State should determine that there are sufficient reasons to justify its continuance.

Roswell L. GilpatricPrinted from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.

300. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Woodward)Source: Department of Stare, Central Files, 737.00/1-2062. Top Secret. Washington, February 1, 1962. SUBJECT “Cuba Project”

Attached for your urgent consideration is the latest version of the basic paper relating to the “Cuban Project.”Document 291. There is also attached a memorandum to each member of the group from General Lansdale.Document 293. A number of tasks listed in the basic paper have been assigned to the Department. Although I have done a little preliminary work on some of these tasks, I have been reluctant until now to proceed very far both because of uncertainty as to the final outcome of the Punta del Este meeting and in the absence of your guidance.

I shall appreciate an early opportunity, in view of the deadlines imposed, to discuss the paper with you and obtain your views as to the best manner of proceeding, particularly with regard to Task #9 (page 5).Woodward responded, in a handwritten note on the memorandum, directed to Hurwitch and Goodwin: “I believe we can now forge ahead on all items feasibly attainable.”

301. Memorandum From the Deputy Legal Adviser (Meeker) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/62-8/62. Confidential. On February 8, Rusk sent this memorandum to McGeorge Bundy for the President with a covering memorandum that reads: “I believe the President might be interested in the attached legal comment on our position in Guantanamo. The political aspects are also being studied.” (Ibid.) Washington, February 2, 1962. SUBJECT Guantanamo Base

Problem

What are the rights and legal position of the United States in the event of a Cuban denunciation of the Guantanamo Base arrangements?

Conclusions

If Cuba were to denounce and repudiate the arrangements by which the United States has a base at Guantanamo, the United States would be on strong ground to assert (1) that the Cuban denunciation and repudiation were ineffective; (2) that we retained our base rights; and (3) that we would be justified in resisting with force any attempt to evict our armed forces from the base. These conclusions stem from the following considerations: (a) The right of the United States in Guantanamo is more than a right to maintain a base on territory under the sovereignty of Cuba and governed by Cuban law; by international agreement and treaty the United States obtained the lease of a defined area and received from Cuba the right of “complete jurisdiction and control” in that area. (b) No date was set for the termination of these rights, and the relevant international instruments specify that they are to continue until modified or abrogated by agreement between the United States and Cuba.

Background

In February 1903 the President of Cuba and President Theodore Roosevelt signed an “Agreement for the Lease to the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations”.See footnote 2, Document 6. This included a lease covering the Guantanamo base, whose boundaries were described in Article I of the Agreement. Article II stated: “While on the one hand the United States recognizes the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above described areas of land and water, on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents that during the period of the occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms of this agreement the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and within said areas … .” The Agreement contained no terminal date and no provision for termination.

The Treaty of Relations with Cuba which was signed in May 1903For text of the treaty signed by the United States and Cuba on May 22, 1903, see 6 TIAS 1116-1119. (and ratified the following year) stated in Article VII:

“That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations, at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.”

On the basis of the February 1903 Agreement for Lease and the above-quoted Article VII in the 1903 Treaty of Relations, a lease was signed July 2, 1903See footnote 2, Document 6. and ratified later that year. The lease specified a rental, and contained certain other provisions in pursuance of the February Agreement.

In 1934 a new Treaty of Relations was signed with Cuba in May and brought into force June 9 of that year.See footnote 3, Document 6. The 1934 Treaty expressly abrogated the Treaty of Relations signed May 22, 1903. However, Article III of the 1934 Treaty contained the following provision on Guantanamo:

“Until the two contracting parties agree to the modification or abrogation of the stipulations of the agreement in regard to the lease to the United States of America of lands in Cuba for coaling and naval stations signed by the President of the Republic of Cuba on February 16, 1903, and by the President of the United States of America on the 23d day of the same month and year, the stipulations of that agreement with regard to the naval station of Guantanamo shall continue in effect. The supplementary agreement in regard to naval and coaling stations signed between the two Governments on July 2, 1903, also shall continue in effect in the same form and on the same conditions with respect to the naval station at Guantanamo. So long as the United States of America shall not abandon the said naval station of Guantanamo or the two Governments shall not agree to a modification of its present limits, the station shall continue to have the territorial area that it now has, with the limits that it has on the date of the signature of the present Treaty.”

As to the Isle of Pines, the 1903 Treaty of Relations had provided as follows in Article VI:

“That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba, the title thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty.”

In March 1904 the United States and Cuba signed a TreatyFor text of this treaty, signed on March 2, 1904, see 6 TIAS 1124-1125. by which the United States relinquished in favor of Cuba “all claim of title to the Island of Pines.” Article II of this treaty provided:

“This relinquishment, on the part of the United States of America, of claim of title to the said Island of Pines, is in consideration of the grants of coaling and naval stations in the Island of Cuba heretofore made in the United States of America by the Republic of Cuba.”

The treaty was ratified and entered into force 21 years later, in March 1925.The treaty was ratified by the Senate on March 13, 1925, and entered into force with an exchange of notes on March 17. (6 TIAS 1125-1127)

Discussion

The United States presence in Guantanamo rests upon international agreements containing no termination date and making no provision for unilateral termination. Our rights subsist “until the two contracting parties agree to the modification or abrogation” of the Guantanamo lease arrangements.

These arrangements differ from the military base agreements concluded in recent years, since the United States is given a right of “complete jurisdiction and control” in a defined base area. The Guantanamo arrangement more nearly resembles the arrangements with Panama concerning the Canal Zone than the military base agreements concluded by the United States with NATO allies and others during the last 12 years. In the case of the Canal Zone, the United States was granted “in perpetuity the use, occupation and control” of the Zone. The grant covered “all the rights, power, and authority within the Zone … which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory.” Another analogy is Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan,Signed on September 8, 1951; for text, see 3 UST (pt 3) 3169. under which the United States received “the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants” of the Ryukyu Islands, pending the placing of these islands under trusteeship. It has been recognized that Japan retains residual sovereignty.

A declaration by Cuba that it denounced, repudiated, or abrogated the Guantanamo Base arrangements would be legally ineffective. Those arrangements are to continue, according to their terms, until agreed otherwise between the United States and Cuba. An allegation of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus (changed circumstances) as a ground for unilateral termination would not be well founded. Application of the doctrine has never been upheld by an international judicial tribunal. The leading writers on international law state that the doctrine may be applied only by agreement of the parties or through the decision of a tribunal.

Thus, if Cuba should claim that unilateral statements or actions on its part operated to deprive the United States of its Guantanamo base rights, we would be on strong legal ground in refuting this contention, and in using the necessary force to defend the base at Guantanamo and maintain our position there.

The treaty stipulations regarding the Isle of Pines, made in the Treaty of Relations of 1903 and the separate 1904 treaty ratified in 1925, do not affect the status of the Guantanamo Base. The latter treaty merely stated that the transfer of the Isle of Pines was in consideration of the “grants of coaling and naval stations … heretofore made” (i.e., Guantanamo). United States rights in the base were fixed by the terms of those grants and are not affected by any political connection with the transfer of the Isle of Pines.

[1 paragraph (13 lines of source text) not declassified]

302. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Goodwin) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meetings: Lot 70 D 328. Official Use Only. Drafting information on the source text indicates that the memorandum was drafted in ARA/RPA by W.G. Bowdler on February 8. Washington, undated. SUBJECT Accomplishments of the 8th Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, Punta del Este, Uruguay, January 22-31, 1962See footnote 2, Document 288.

United States Objectives

The essential objective of the United States at the Meeting was to achieve maximum agreement by the Members of the Organization of American States upon a program of action which would, in the most effective manner possible, (1) isolate and consequently weaken the Castro-communist regimeʼs position in this Hemisphere, and (2) strengthen the determination and capability of the Member States to act individually and collectively to defend their political independence against the continuing Castro-communist efforts to undermine and overthrow their governments.

Negotiating Situation

During the preparatory stage for the Meeting, there was one group of governments, made up mostly of States bordering on the Caribbean including the United States, which believed that the most effective way of achieving the over-all objective was to approve an obligatory break in diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba. The second group, consisting of governments most of whom were somewhat farther removed from the immediate source of Castro-communist infection, were clearly opposed to any such obligatory break. They expressed their opposition in terms of doubts about the juridical bases for taking such action, particularly the applicability of the Rio Treaty to the situation as it was described in the convocation of the Meeting.

During the early stages of the Meeting, there developed a unanimity of opinion that the point of major importance to the OAS was the clear incompatibility between the Marxist-Leninist nature of the Castro regime and the principles and objectives of the inter-American system. The issue then became what action should be taken as a result of this incompatibility. The group which had favored obligatory sanctions came out in support of an immediate decision to exclude the present Cuban Government from the system, leaving implementation of the decision to the various organs and agencies of the system. The other group argued that exclusion could not be decided on immediately and that this matter should be studied to determine the proper juridical basis. The negotiations which followed centered upon this basic difference. The efforts of the United States were directed toward finding a formula to exclude the present Government of Cuba from participation in the organs and agencies of the inter-American system which would command the widest possible support. In the end, it was not possible to bridge the gap between the two points of view.

Resolutions Approved

The clear and unequivocal decision contained in Resolution VI that Cubaʼs adherence to Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with the inter-American system and that Cubaʼs alignment with the communist bloc breaks the unity and solidarity of the Hemisphere represents the most significant outcome of the Meeting. It was approved unanimously, with the exception of Cuba. The accompanying decision that this incompatibility “excludes the present Government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system” received the support of 14 countries (Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, United States and Venezuela). Cuba voted against and 6 countries abstained (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Ecuador). These two points constitute the principal action taken by the Meeting and paved the way for the adoption of other Resolutions which further contributed to the achievement of our objectives.

The Meeting approved five additional Resolutions directed specifically at the Cuban problem by unanimous (except for Cuba) or close to unanimous votes. They include: (1) a declaration and warning of the true nature of the communist offensive in America and the means to combat it—Resolution I, “Communist Offensive in America”, adopted 20-1 (Cuba); (2) the creation of a Special Consultative Committee on Security to advise the OAS and member governments on problems of communist aggression and intervention and which also calls upon the member governments to cooperate in the measures needed to anticipate and prevent communist intervention—Resolution II, “Special Consultative Committee on Security against the Subversive Action of International Communism”, approved 19-1 with 1 abstention (Bolivia); (3) a strong reiteration of the importance of the Alliance for Progress—Resolution V, approved unanimously (without Cuba); (4) the immediate exclusion of Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board—Resolution VII, “Inter-American Defense Board”, approved unanimously (without Cuba); (5) the suspension of trade in arms and implements of war with Cuba and a directive to the Council of the OAS to study and recommend the extension of such suspension of trade to other items, particularly those of strategic importance—Resolution VIII, “Economic Relations”, approved 16-1 with 4 abstentions (Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico).

The Meeting also adopted Resolutions on the importance of free elections—Resolution IV; on the principles of nonintervention and self-determination—Resolution III; and on strengthening the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights—Resolution IX. Only Cuba voted in the negative.

These actions mark a significant step forward by the OAS in dealing with the communist threat which confronts the system and the member countries. The exclusion of Cuba and other defensive measures agreed upon at Punta del Este will place the OAS and the member governments in a vastly improved position to anticipate and counteract the existing and future efforts of international communism, with the cooperation of the Castro regime, to destroy the political independence of each of the other American Republics.

303. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-1862. Top Secret. Washington, February 16, 1962. SUBJECT Status Report on Cuba Project REF Your memorandum dated January 18, 1962Document 291.

Re paragraph F. Diplomatic Actions

Resolution adopted at the OAS Meeting of Foreign MinistersSee footnote 2, Document 288. resulted in condemning Cuba and isolating it from the rest of the Hemisphere. The substance of the meeting and the degree of unanimity were gratifyingly beyond that which had been initially expected. The Department of State is vigorously pressing for rapid implementation of the resolutions adopted. On February 14, 1962 the Cuban Government was by vote excluded from the OAS Council. Similar actions will be sought in other OAS organs. The early departure from the U.S. of the Cuban delegation to the OAS is anticipated.

Implementation of Resolution II (Special Consultative Committee on Security) is underway through an inter-Departmental committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Rostow. It is envisaged that the work of the Special Consultative Committee will complement U.S. unilateral and bilateral efforts in this field.

The feasibility of encouraging Latin American governments to develop independent operations leading to an internal revolt of the Cuban people is being scrutinized. Consideration is being given to sending a person down to explore this question with one or two of the Latin American Presidents.

The Department has sent cable instruction to all posts in Latin America to exploit all opportunities to enlist local sympathy for the Cuban people and increase hostility towards the Communist regime in Cuba. (Task 8)

Re para 6. Economic Warfare

The outcome of the OAS meeting provided excellent political basis in a multilateral context for a U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba. Upon termination of the MFM the Department re-iterated its previous recommendation that an embargo be imposed. The President took this action on February 3, 1962.On February 3 the White House released a statement by President Kennedy announcing an embargo on trade between the United States and Cuba. The President stated that the embargo was to be total, with the exception of certain foodstuffs, medicines, and medical supplies, which would be excepted on humanitarian grounds. He noted that the embargo was being imposed in accordance with the decisions of the recent meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Inter-American system at Punta del Este. The intent of the embargo, the President stated, was to reduce the economic capacity of the Castro government to engage in acts of aggression, subversion, or other activities endangering the security of the United States and other nations of the hemisphere. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 106) (Task 11)

The Secretary has designated Mr. Rostow to make the presentation of the U.S. view of the Cuban problem and seek NATO cooperation. This presentation is scheduled to take place in Paris on February 20, 1962 at a NATO Council meeting especially called for this purpose. (Japan will be represented) (Tasks 22 and 23)

Mexico has adopted improved procedures for halting diversion to Cuba of U.S. origin products. Canada, whose controls have been generally effective, has been impressed with U.S. keen interest in this area. (Task 12)

The Department of Commerce is examining the question of licensing “positive list” items to Latin America. (Task 13)

Cuba is treated the same as the Sino-Soviet Bloc with respect to export controls of technical data. (Task 14)

State is terminating the staff work and the draft letter to Commerce recommending the issuance of transportation order T-3. (Task 15)

Bloc and Cuban chartered vessels are subject to port security regulations. (Task 16) Tasks 17, 19, and 20 do not appear to be feasible.

Task 18 is yet to be fully explored.

Re paragraph K. Major Elements of the Population

The Department has appointed a labor specialist to fill a newly created position for the purpose of invigorating and strengthening the non-communist Latin American labor movement.

Under the direction of Mr. McGhee, the Department is preparing instructions to go out next week to inventory all youth (under 35) assets. In addition, the Department is actively searching for an appropriate person to chair a special committee to be established for the purpose of influencing and using Latin American intellectual groups in support of the democratic cause. (Task 9)

304. Program Review by the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 2/62-4/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 12 copies of the program review were prepared. Copies were sent to the President through Bundy, Robert Kennedy, and Taylor; to Rusk through Johnson; to McNamara through Gilpatric; to McCone through Helms; to Murrow through Wilson, Goodwin, Craig for the JCS, and Harvey. Two copies were kept by Lansdale. In a covering memorandum to the same addressees, also dated February 20, Lansdale noted that the attached action plan had been developed in response to a request from the Special Group (Augmented) for such a plan. (Ibid.) For text of the action plan, see the Supplement. Washington, February 20, 1962.

THE CUBA PROJECT

The Goal. In keeping with the spirit of the Presidential memorandum of 30 November 1961,Document 278. the United States will help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

The Situation. We still know too little about the real situation inside Cuba, although we are taking energetic steps to learn more. However, some salient facts are known. It is known that the Communist regime is an active Sino-Soviet spearhead in our Hemisphere and that Communist controls inside Cuba are severe. Also, there is evidence that the repressive measures of the Communists, together with disappointments in Castroʼs economic dependency on the Communist formula, have resulted in an anti-regime atmosphere among the Cuban people which makes a resistance program a distinct and present possibility.

Time is running against us. The Cuban people feel helpless and are losing hope fast. They need symbols of inside resistance and of outside interest soon. They need something they can join with the hope of starting to work surely towards overthrowing the regime. Since late November, we have been working hard to re-orient the operational concepts within the U.S. government and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assets required for success in our task.

The next National Intelligence Estimate on Cuba (NIE 85-62)Document 315. promises to be a useful document dealing with our practical needs and with due recognition of the sparsity of hard facts. The needs of the Cuba project, as it goes into operation, plus the increasing U.S. capability for intelligence collection, should permit more frequent estimates for our guidance. These will be prepared on a periodic basis.

Premise of Action. Americans once ran a successful revolution. It was run from within, and succeeded because there was timely and strong political, economic, and military help by nations outside who supported our cause. Using this same concept of revolution from within, we must now help the Cuban people to stamp out tyranny and gain their liberty.

On 18 January, the Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two tasks to Departments and Agencies of the U.S. government, in order to provide a realistic assessment and preparation of U.S. capabilities.See Document 291. The Attorney General and the Special Group were apprised of this action. The answers received on 15 February provided the basis for planning a realistic course of action. The answers also revealed that the course of action must contain continuing coordination and firm overall guidance.

The course of action set forth herein is realistic within present operational estimates and intelligence. Actually, it represents the maximum target timing which the operational people jointly considered feasible. It aims for a revolt which can take place in Cuba by October 1962. It is a series of target actions and dates, not a rigid time-table. The target dates are timed as follows: Phase I, Action, March 1962. Start moving in. Phase II, Build-up, April-July 1962. Activating the necessary operations inside Cuba for revolution and concurrently applying the vital political, economic, and military-type support from outside Cuba. Phase III, Readiness, 1 August 1962, check for final policy decision. Phase IV, Resistance, August-September 1962, move into guerrilla operations. Phase V, Revolt, first two weeks of October 1962. Open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime. Phase VI, Final, during month of October 1962. Establishment of new government.

Plan of Action. Attached is an operational plan for the overthrow of the Communist regime in Cuba, by Cubans from within Cuba, with outside help from the U.S. and elsewhere. Since this is an operation to prompt and support a revolt by the people in a Communist police state, flexibility is a must for success. Decisions on operational flexibility rest with the Chief of Operations, with consultation in the Special Group when policy matters are involved. Target actions and dates are detailed in the attached operational plans, which cover: A. Basic Action Plan Inside Cuba B. Political Support Plan C. Economic Support Plan D. Psychological Support Plan E. Military Support Plan F. Sabotage Support Plan G. Intelligence Support Plan

Early Policy Decisions. The operational plan for clandestine U.S. support of a Cuban movement inside Cuba to overthrow the Communist regime is within policy limits already set by the President. A vital decision, still to be made, is on the use of open U.S. force to aid the Cuban people in winning their liberty. If conditions and assets permitting a revolt are achieved in Cuba, and if U.S. help is required to sustain this condition, will the U.S. respond promptly with military force to aid the Cuban revolt? The contingencies under which such military deployment would be needed, and recommended U.S. responses, are detailed in a memorandum being prepared by the Secretaries of State and of Defense. An early decision is required, prior to deep involvement of the Cubans in this program.

[Here follows the 39-page action plan. For text, see the Supplement.]

305. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 31, February 21, 1962. Top Secret. Washington, February 20, 1962. SUBJECT The Cuba Project

Although I am not familiar with the context in which the paper dated 18 January 1962Document 291. has been discussed and developed, I think it may be useful for you to have a few observations on it from a bystanderʼs viewpoint.

1. I believe that the Objective as stated is sound and desirable. 2. With regard to the Concept of Operations, I have serious misgivings. The concept appears to depend in large measure on building up an internal political action organization in Cuba which would enjoy the support of the majority of the Cuban people. Presumably, it would be primarily CIAʼs job to build such an organization. I have seen no hard intelligence which would lead me to suppose that there exists, or that the Agency has assets for bringing into existence in the near future, an internal political action organization which would assure the support of the majority of the Cuban people against the Castro regime. On the contrary, the evidence we have points toward the present regimeʼs tightening its controls. This leads me to conclude, as others have, that unless a popular uprising in Cuba is promptly supported by overt U.S. military action, it would probably lead to another Hungary. Briefly, I do not believe we can unseat the present regime in Havana by anything short of outright military intervention. 3. There exist, of course, contingency plans for taking Cuba over in a matter of days. What does not exist, to my knowledge, is any agreement (a) to carry out such an intervention, (b) on a means of provoking it, or (c) an analysis of the possible consequences of intervention. I think we should bite the bullet and address ourselves to these points. Unless we are at least willing seriously to consider such a course of action, I am afraid we may be heading for a fiasco that could be worse for us than the ill-fated operation of last year. In a word, on the basis of the information available to me on the Lansdale approach, which is fragmentary to say the least, I tend to agree with the position taken by John McCone in the Special Group as reflected in the minutes of the meeting of January 25See Document 296. (copy attached).

306. Telegram From the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic to the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic FleetSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 2/4/62-7/10/62. Top Secret; Priority. Also sent to CG USCONARC, COMTAC, CGUSARLANT, CG USAFLANT, CJTF 122, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCSTRIKE. Repeated to JCS. The White House copy of this telegram indicates that it was seen by McGeorge Bundy and General Taylor. Norfolk, Virginia, February 24, 1962, 3:54 p.m.

241554Z. CINCLANTOPLANs 314/316-61.Neither of these operations plans has been found.

A. JCS 3385 DTG 220013 Feb 1962.Not found.

1. Ref A contains planning direction for development of quick reaction capabilities in connection with subject plans. The criteria set forth in ref A were discussed at a conference conducted at this Headquarters on 7 and 8 February. For your information, a summary of the conference is contained in paragraph 4. 2. In accordance with the directive contained in ref A, it is desired that: A. Plans supporting CINCLANTOPLAN 314-61 be completed as expeditiously as possible. B. In view of the information contained in ref A, adees review the info contained in the appended report and submit additional information required to CINCLANT. 3. As noted in Part II of the report contained in para 4 below, CINC-LANT believes that further development of plans supporting CINC-LANT OPLAN 316-61 may be unnecessary. In connection with submission of the information required by ref A, CINCLANT will re-open this question with the JCS. In the interim, OPLAN 314-61 takes precedence. 4. There follows a report in two parts entitled, “Planning Considerations for Reduction in Reaction Times.” “Part One—Fast Application of U.S. Airpower 1. Concept. A. Naval and Air Force forces designated for CINCLANTOPLAN 314 will maintain a posture of readiness to conduct air strikes against Cuba within six, twelve or twenty-four hours from the time of receipt of an execution order. B.

The following order of priority for the selection of targets will apply: Priority I: Cuban airfields, aircraft, missile and radar installations. Priority II: Selective disruption of communication and transportation facilities limited by avoiding unnecessary destruction of populated areas. Priority III: Troops and armor concentrations.

Air strikes will be concentrated on Priority I and II targets for the first twelve daylight hours.

C. The primary purpose for the fast application of U.S. airpower will be to eliminate the capability of Cuban Air Force to conduct air warfare, and to reduce the capability of Cuban ground forces to wage war. D. Marine forces at Guantanamo will, in coordination with the execution of air strikes, break out and obtain surrounding high ground in order to assure permanent retention and use of this U.S. base and its airfields. E. Coordination between CINCLANT and CINCONAD will be effected by CINCLANT in order to assure the air defense of forces located in CONUS. 2. Assumptions. A. Required prepositioning of Air Force and Naval forces will be authorized. B. The airborne/amphibious assaults against Cuba will not begin earlier than four days following the day initial air strikes commence. (This limitation does not apply if forces are prepositioned for a four or two day reaction time for CINCLANTOPLAN 314 as discussed in Part II.) C. Cuban forces will attack the U.S. naval base, Guantanamo, immediately after commencement of U.S. air strikes on Cuban soil. (Provided such an attack, prior to the utilization of U.S. air power, is not the cause for initiation of hostilities.) 3. Requirements. A. Army forces: Assume increased readiness posture at home bases. B. Naval forces: Consideration for the defense of Guantanamo is essential and must be included in prepositioning requirements for the fast application of U.S. air power as set forth below: (1) One CVA for general participation in air strikes in eastern Cuba. (2) One Marine Air Group (MAG) located in Mayaguana to provide air cover and close air support for Marine forces at Guantanamo. If unable to obtain base rights for use of the Mayaguana airfield and associated facilities or equally suitable airfield, a second CVA will be necessary. (3) One MAG located at Key West, available for support of Air Force forces with air attacks on western Cuba and to augment CONAD forces in southern Florida. (4) Class V (A) ammunition available to support this concept is extremely limited. Air strikes in support of the fast application of air power will have to be curtailed to insure that sufficient stocks remain for execution of CINCLANTOPLAN 314. (5) One Marine RLT headquarters and two reinforced battalions at Guantanamo in addition to present base defense forces. The Caribbean ready battalion and one air lifted battalion plus sea tail could be prepositioned on short notice. This would release amphibious vessels of the ready group, creating a relief in Naval assault shipping. (6) Evacuate dependents from Guantanamo. (7) It is imperative that the reinforcement of Guantanamo and evacuation of dependents be undertaken prior to the initiation of air strikes. C. Air Force forces: (1) Prepositioning requirement for tactical units are: (a) 8 tactical fighter squadrons at Homestead AFB, Florida. (b) One tactical fighter squadron and one tactical reconnaissance squadron at Opalocka Airfield, Florida. (c) One tactical fighter squadron at NAS Key West, Florida. (d) One air refueling squadron at MacDill AFB, Florida. (2) Prepositioning requirements for control and support forces are: (a) Activation of AFTF 126 and subordinate headquarters. (b) Activation of Opalocka Airfield with a group and facilities sufficient for initial prepositioning of tactical squadrons and additional squadrons arriving after order to execute strikes is given. (c) Establishment of necessary communications and control facilities. (d) Distribution of POL and ordnance required for prepositioned units. (3) Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations. (a) Reduces availability of air refueling aircraft for other operations. (b) Reduces reaction capability for other contingencies. (c) Limits forces available for exercises. (d) Reduces operational and training activities at bases providing support items and personnel to operating bases. (4) This posture can be maintained for an indefinite period of time. Part Two—Reduction of Reaction Times of CINCLANTOPLANs 314 and 316 to Four and Two Days Respectively 1.

Concept.

Execute those portions of CINCLANTOPLAN 314 which will produce a readiness posture in all forces equivalent to that necessary for D-2 or D-4 and suspend action at either one of these points. This will require execution of selected portions of Phases I, II, and III. Due to the continual growth and the estimated current strength of the Cuban armed forces the concept of operations set forth in CINCLANTOPLAN 316 may no longer be adequate to cope with the threat. Any major operations contemplated should be based upon CINCLANTOPLAN 314. Coordination between CINCLANT and CINCONAD will be effected by CINCLANT in order to assure the air defense of forces located in CONUS.

2. Army Forces. A. Requirements. (1) Entire air echelon of TF 125 to be prepositioned at staging base in Florida. (2) Initial surface echelon of TF 125 to be embarked. (3) Air and surface echelons to be placed in DEFCON 2. (4) Up-to-date vertical photography of drop zones and other critical areas is necessary, placing a requirement for the removal of overflight restrictions. Current vertical photographic intelligence is urgently required for all other forces as well as for Army forces. (5) Prestockage at home installations of operational maps will be required for surface movement units. This is now being done for airborne echelon only. (6) There is a requirement for one aircraft carrier for lift and operation of army helicopters and light aircraft. Provision from presently assigned CINCLANTFLT forces will dangerously reduce ASW effort. CINCLANT is developing a more satisfactory solution which will be forwarded separately to the JCS. B. Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations. (1) If troops are placed in full ready to launch status, combat effectiveness will begin to decrease after two weeks. After sixty days the combat effectiveness of all units will become very questionable. (2) These forces are earmarked for use in other contingency plans in support of CINCNELM, CINCPAC and other CINCLANT plans. While in the advance readiness conditions they would be geographically oriented for rapid deployment to Middle East, Europe or Africa. (3) Numerous programmed training exercises would have to be canceled. (4)

The following is an initial U.S. CONARC cost estimate for prepositioning only, of certain combat units in the air and surface echelon. It does not represent the total cost that would be involved: Unit Move To 1 ABN DIV (Ft. Campbell, Ky.) Florida 1 ABN DIV (Ft. Bragg, N.C.) Florida INF BDE (Ft. Benning, Ga.) Ft. Jackson, S.C. Tank Bn (Ft. Benning, Ga.) Ft. Stewart, Ga. Armd Cav Regt capability (Ft. Hood, Tex.) Ft. Stewart, Ga. 3 FA bns (Ft. Sill, Okla.) (surface echelon) Ft. Polk, La. 1 FA bn (Ft. Sill. Okla.) (air echelon) Florida 1 FA bn (Ft. Knox, Ky.) (surface echelon) Ft. Stewart, Ga. 1 FA bn (Ft. Campbell, Ky.) (air echelon) Florida

Other miscellaneous support units (5,000 personnel) at various installations. The following includes movement of units, opening costs at Ft. Stewart and Ft. Polk, and packing and crating etc. Costs w/o Per Diem 1. Movement A. Equipment $2,697,540 B. Personnel (one-way, surface elements to surface staging area) 210,000 C. Fill personnel and equipment shortages 1,497,000 2. Per diem 58,000 3. Opening cost 365,240 4. Installation support costs 95,500 per day 5. Packing and crating 1,767,500 6. Cost of continued operations at prepositioning staging areas, not computed. 7. No MATS reinbursement is computed. Total $6,537,280 153,500 per day

3. Naval forces. A. Requirements. (1) The entire Naval Task Force, as set forth in 314, will have to be almost wholly loaded and ready for sea in order to meet the four day reaction time. Forces to be employed in western Cuba could be in south eastern coast ports and those earmarked for eastern Cuba could be in Caribbean ports. This applies to MSTS shipping also. (2) To meet the two day reaction time, the Naval Task Force must be at sea, or in port within required steaming time. (3) The LANTCOM Marine division (-) to be earmarked. (4) PACOM forces to be earmarked and deployed to the Caribbean, could be in port in Vieques or Panama depending upon the required reaction time. (5) One MAG to be prepositioned at Mayaguana. Base rights for use of the airfield, unloading site, ammunition and POL facilities must be obtained. It is estimated that the MAG would be operational thereon in about 16 days, utilizing short airfield for tactical support (SATS) equipment while construction forces pave present graded runway for jet operations. The MAG would provide close air support and air defense for defense of Guantanamo and for the eastern attack group in the Santiago/Guantanamo area. If base rights are unobtainable for Mayaguana or suitable alternate Caribbean airfield cannot be obtained, a CVA can be used to provide this support. (6) One Marine air group to be prepositioned at Key West to provide air support to western Marine assault forces. This unit will be available in support of Air Force Task Force and CONAD prior to asst landings. (7) A Marine RLT headquarters and two reinforced battalions to be prepositioned in Guantanamo in addition to present defense forces. (8) Evacuate dependents from Guantanamo. (9) The four preceding requirements, 5, 6, 7, and 8 above, are considered essential for both concepts set forth herein and should be implemented without delay. B. Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations. (1) It is estimated that a four or two day readiness posture can be attained in fourteen and sixteen days respectively. (2) This posture could be maintained for a maximum of 60 days. If the requirement for reaction time is changed to five days, which would permit minor exercises to be conducted ashore and allow more leeway in sailing distance, a longer period could be held. Troop readiness could be maintained at a higher level. (3) The readiness condition of most Naval surface and air units will be improved by deployment and by the opportunity for minor training while in an advanced state of readiness. (4) Naval and Marine forces, less MAGs and Guantanamo reinforcements could be easily shifted in the event they are required in execution of other CINCLANT contingency plans for general war, until committed. (5) The strike fleet general war posture will be degraded by units thereof being well south of planned positions. This will be emphasized particularly if a third CVA is required in place of a MAG at Mayaguana. (6) Project Mercury support will be considerably reduced although some flexibility will exist depending upon the time prepositioning commences and the readiness time imposed. (7) Use of the 5th MEB will have the following impact on PACOM plans: (a) Withdrawal of PACOMLSD and LPH support for planned atomic tests by JTF-8 will be required. (b) A reduction in earmarked forces for defense of SE Asia will be necessary. (c) Capability to react to PACOM contingencies will be reduced. (d) Relief of deployed amphibious forces will be hampered. (e) Curtailment of certain amphibious exercises including support of army training requirements will be necessary. (8) A comprehensive dollar cost has not been computed, however, some major considerations for costs, chargeable solely to attaining an increased readiness posture, are set forth below: (a) Pre-loaded MSTS shipping for Marine forces (6 TAP, 20 TAK, 2 TAO), 4 million dollars per month. (b) Deferred upkeep of ships will result in expensive breakdowns. (c) There will be a considerable increase in expenditure of POL. (d) Increased stevedoring and shipping costs will be incurred. (e) A large increase in TAD funds will be necessary. (f) Construction costs at Mayaguana Airfield must be funded. An alternative to paving the runway would be to use SATS airfield matting at an estimated cost of 1.8 million dollars. (g) The cost of prepositioning MAG in Key West with resultant displacement of normal Key West units must be considered. 4. Air Force forces. A. Prepositioning and alerting requirements for four day reaction: (1) Prepositioning requirements for tactical units are: (a) 2 TFS at Homestead AFB. (b) 1 TFS at Opalocka Airfield. (c) 2 TFS at Palm Beach International Airfield. (d) 1 TFS at Key West NAS. (e) 1-1/3 TRS at Opalocka. (f) 1 ARS at MacDill AFB. (g) 1 AEW&C Det at McCoy AFB, Florida. (h) 1 Air Search and Rescue Detachment, Key West. (2) Alerting of units at home base requirements: (a) 4 TFS 6 hours (b) 7 TFS 12 hours (c) 1 TRS 24 hours (d) 3 TCS C-130 12 hours (e) 2 TCS C-130 24 hours (f) 5 TCS C-123 24 hours (g) 14 TCS C-119 recall to active duty within 24 hours. (h) 6 ATS MATS 12 hours (i) 6 ATS MATS 24 hours (j) 1 Search and Rescue Detachment at MacDill 24 hours

(3) Prepositioning of control and support forces required is as contained in paragraph 3C(2) in Part I plus activation of Palm Beach International Airport for use by tactical air forces. (4) Prepositioning of required tactical air forces at Homestead AFB will necessitate the evacuation of certain SAC forces from that base. (5) Prepositioning of Army forces at MacDill AFB, McCoy AFB and Patrick AFB will require priority for use of ground handling equipment and airfield space facilities necessary to the troop carrier airlift operation. B. Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations. (1) Same as paragraph 3C(3) in Part I plus increased impact on bases providing logistical support. (2) SAC will be denied the use of Homestead AFB for air operations and operations from McCoy AFB and MacDill AFB will be limited. (3) Air research and development command air operations from Patrick AFB will be limited. C. Requirements for two day reaction: (1) Prepositioning of all tactical and support forces at operating bases in Florida will be required. (2) Other requirements as listed in para 4A(4) and (5). D. Cost, impact on plans and programs and other considerations. (1) Practically all other TAC operations will have to be deferred. (2) Others as in para 4B(2) and (3). E. The Air Force forces can maintain either the four or two day posture for an indefinite period of time with costs and impacts as stated. 5. Joint Task Force 122 Headquarters. A. It will be necessary to activate and fully staff the Headquarters of JTF 122 as a pre-requisite to prepositioning of forces for any increased capability of contingency forces. B. For a two day reaction time the JTF 122 Joint Staff must be embarked and the flagship in port or offshore south of latitude 31 degrees N. For a four day reaction time the Joint Staff can be ashore in the Norfolk area ready to embark and sail in the flagship.”

307. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)Source: Department of State, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 410. Top Secret. Washington, February 26, 1962. SUBJECT Cuba Project

There is attached the working level draft regarding the use of U.S. military forces in support of the Cuba project. When approved, the paper would, of course, assume the form of a joint memorandum to the President from the Secretaries of State and Defense. Neither Mr. Woodward nor Mr. Goodwin have seen this as yet.On March 1 Hurwitch sent a copy of the working draft relating to the use of U.S. military force to Woodward, through Goodwin. Hurwitch noted that this draft, which was not found attached, “represents considerably wider agreement than appeared possible from earlier conversations and drafts in which DOD entered into second-guessing the world political situation.” (Ibid., Central Files, 737.00/3-162) Woodward responded with a brief memorandum to Goodwin and Hurwitch, also on March 1, in which he observed that he felt it might prove possible to make good use of the OAS Special Consultative Committee on Security to organize moral, and perhaps military support for U.S. contingency military action against Cuba. He felt, on the other hand, that it might be a mistake to operate on the assumption that “Time favors consolidation of the political and military powers of the Communist regime.” Woodward concluded: “I think we should examine the trends very carefully and analytically to see whether we may not gain steadily increasing advantage by not being in too much of a hurry, now.” (Ibid.)

I feel that the significant area of agreement lies in paragraph 3, page 2. The disagreement shown in paragraph 2, page 2 stems from my reluctance to agree to language which is speculative or alarmist. The disagreement shown in paragraph 8, page 8 stems from my belief that reprisals by the Cuban government (even before the revolt began) would not provide politically feasible circumstances for the use of military force. Further, paragraph 8 is inconsistent with the substance of paragraph 3 a. (page 2).

A somewhat more detailed breakdown of paragraph 6, Enemy Capabilities might be useful (we have tried to keep the paper brief).

DOD has been reluctant to provide detail regarding Force Involvement. Paragraph 7 reflects as much as the DOD representative (Col. Seamens) felt at liberty to provide. I understand that military intervention would take place in several areas of Cuba simultaneously, with the preponderance of force focussed in the vicinity of (but not on) Habana.

The DOD representative intimated by telephone today that the JCS was unhappy about the draft—apparently feeling that he had conceded too much to Stateʼs position.

AttachmentTop Secret; Noforn; Special Handling.

USE OF US MILITARY FORCE, CUBA PROJECT

1. Scope and Purpose

The objective of the Cuban Project is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace. The US has the maximum to gain in the East-West struggle if the Cuban people can accomplish this task without overt US military assistance. As the project matures and a genuine revolt occurs, the Cuban people may fall short of their objective and require external military assistance. The purpose of this paper is to determine the minimum desirable political-military conditions under which military intervention in Cuba by US forces in support of a revolt by the Cuban people would be feasible from both the international political and military standpoint. A policy decision with respect to the political and military conditions under which US military intervention should be undertaken in this context not only is desirable for contingency planning purposes, but also could serve as an added stimulus to the Cuban people to revolt, if the decision were favorable and were to be discreetly made known.McGeorge Bundyʼs handwritten notes on a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on February 26 read, at one point, as follows: “Lansdale Project: Consensus is that we are in no position to say when U.S. commitment.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 2/62-4/62)

In addition, the Communist regimeʼs reaction to incipient internal revolt may be such as to justify US military intervention in Cuba under existing international law and our treaty obligations.

2. General

a. The Marxist-Leninist government of Cuba presents a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. The US can not tolerate permanently the existence of such a government which provides the Sino-Soviet Bloc with a stepping stone for subversion of other Latin American states. State Defense and which may become a military base at close range, increasing our national vulnerability and defense costs as US forces are developed or shifted to meet this threat.

Time favors consolidation of the political and military powers of the Communist regime in Cuba. Almost all aspects of the problem of overthrowing the government continue to increase in difficulty and complexity. Sino-Soviet Bloc material, moral, political, military and financial assistance contributes toward strengthening the Communist regime. State Defense There is a potential threat of Soviet military bases in Cuba equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles.

The Cuba Project, therefore should be developed and executed as rapidly as prudence may permit.

c. Military intervention in Cuba by US forces should be considered when it is clearly apparent to the world that such action is justified by international law, treaty commitments, or on moral grounds as support for a revolt by the Cuban people as contemplated in the Cuba Project. Such situations are described in Appendix hereto.

3. Circumstances of Recognition of the New Cuban Government and Initiation of US Military Intervention

Cuba

The Cuba Project has created a chaotic internal situation in Cuba where: (1) The revolution is open and seriously threatens the Communist regime; (2) Areas are taken and held by the revolutionaries, and; (3) Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow the government or sustain the revolution, requests assistance from the United States and/or the Organization of American States (OAS).

Latin America

Latin American Governments are in a reasonable position to resist internal pressures aimed at significant anti-US measures domestically and/or in the OAS.

Sino-Soviet Bloc

While the threat of general war resulting from US military intervention appears to be remote, an assessment of Sino-Soviet Bloc reaction should be undertaken by the USIB on a first priority basis.

Rest of the World

Remaining friendly governments are in a reasonable position to resist internal pressures aimed at significant anti-US measures domestically and/or in the United Nations.

US Congress

US Military forces have sufficient hard intelligence upon which to base the maintenance of a readiness posture providing the capability of adequate US military reaction in response to the situation in Cuba.

4. Political-Military Objectives

a. We should intervene militarily in Cuba under circumstances and in a manner which would ensure that the overthrow of the Communist Cuban Government and its replacement by a government with which we can live in peace results in increasing the security of the US and does not result in a net Sino-Soviet Bloc gain in the cold war elsewhere in the world. The leadership position of the US in the free world as a consistent advocate of peaceful solutions to international problems, the stability of friendly governments in the hemisphere, and the future of the Alliance for Progress program are among the significant factors to be considered in this regard. Additional significant factors to be considered include retention of US bases in the hemisphere, sources of strategic raw materials, and US control of the Panama Canal. Military intervention on the basis of international law or our treaty commitments would of course diminish the political risk. b. To accomplish our objective with respect to the Cuba Project we would make clear to the world that we are responding to an appeal for assistance from a government representative of the people; that we are intervening for the purpose of restoring order and holding free elections; and that we will withdraw as soon as the new government advises that our assistance is no longer required. c. We would conduct the military operation with sufficient force to overcome the Castro forces as quickly as possible while minimizing indiscriminate destruction, especially in populated areas. To this end DOD would keep close track of the state and location of Cuban forces and would coordinate with CIA in matters pertaining to covert programs in order to provide military assistance as required to hard-pressed elements of the revolt and to avoid inadvertent targeting of friendly forces or installations.

5. Contingencies World Wide

The United States must weigh the effect that the need for ready forces in support of the Cuba Project may have on the over-all US force posture to face contingency situations in other parts of the world. Once the revolt begins, Communist Bloc military and para-military diversions could be expected anywhere. Embassies and unified and specified commands should be alerted to such possibilities.

6. Enemy Capabilities

a. Cuban ground forces including regular forces, the ready reserve and the home guard are estimated at 275,000. b. Significant aircraft of the Cuban Air Force are estimated at 35 MIG-15s and 10 MIG-19s. Personnel strength is unknown. c. The Cuban Navy is capable of moderately effective patrol operations along selected portions of the Cuban coast. Combat capabilities are negligible. 4 PT and 3 PC type vessels have been received. d. In addition to normal combat forces indicated above, extensive military preparations have been undertaken such as the organization of large arms depots, tunneling, fortification of large gun emplacements around Havana, construction of beach defenses and installations of fire control and surveillance radar.

7. Force Involvement

a. The application of US force in Cuba will be accomplished by the execution of prepared contingency plans by employing Army, Navy, and Air Force forces under the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command (CINCLANT). In brief, US forces employed will be two Army Airborne Divisions, two Marine Division Wing Teams, tailored supporting forces to improve armor and artillery capabilities, Naval airpower and gunfire support and Air Force tactical air units as required. One additional Army division will be designated as ready reserve in the United States. b. It is not feasible to define limitations to the application of US force under each separate situation which requires US military intervention since enemy resistance will probably be the same in each situation. US military plans, however, provide a degree of selective application of force to primarily military objectives and resistance areas. Basically it is the DOD position that the operation be conducted as rapidly as possible, quickly confronting enemy forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, with the view toward early capitulation of Cuban units and avoidance of needless loss of life. Appendix ATop Secret; Noforn; Special Handling.

CONTINGENCY SITUATIONS UNDER WHICH THE USE OF US MILITARY FORCE WOULD BE NEEDED

1. The Cuban Project has created a chaotic internal situation in Cuba where: a. The revolution is open and seriously threatens the Communist regime; b. Areas are taken and held by the revolutionaries, and; c. Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow the government or sustain the revolution, requests assistance from the United States and/or the Organization of American States. 2. An attack on the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. Such attack, however, must be more than simply a threat or demonstration. It should be a serious physical attempt—chemical, biological or force of arms—to oust the United States from the base. 3. An armed attack by Cuba against territory, people, or the land, sea or air forces of the United States or another American republic. 4. A decision by the members of the OAS under Article 8 of the Rio Treaty that armed force should be used, once the UN Charter requirement of UNSC authorization of “enforcement action” has been discharged. 5. Open Soviet military assistance to the Communist Cuban regime at any stage after initiation of the revolt. 6. Significant and/or repeated attack by the Cuban military establishment on commercial shipping or aircraft of the United States or another American republic on or over the high seas. 7. Significant sabotage or attack by the Communist Cuban government, of US military or naval installations. State Defense 8. Reprisals by the Communist Cuban government against counter-revolutionary forces which include those Cuban nationals friendly to the United States and who are closely associated with the US inspired resist-ance movement. This situation would require rapid action by the United States in an effort to preserve the lives of those Cubans who must be available to form the new government. Extermination of a limited group of counter-revolutionaries that are not connected with the over-all US plan would be con-sidered insufficient provocation for US force employment unless requested by the primary group or groups of Cuban insurgents.

308. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/2-2762. Secret. Drafted by G.H. Summ (ARA/CMA) on March 13. Washington, February 27, 1962. SUBJECT Cuban Revolutionary Council Spokesmen Stress Need for Military Action to Eliminate Castro Regime PARTICIPATION Jose Miro Cardona, Chairman, Cuban Revolutionary Council Manuel Antonio de Varona, Cuban Revolutionary Council Arturo Morales Carrion, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Robert A. Hurwitch, Deputy Director, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs

During the course of two interviews, first with Mr. Hurwitch and later with both Mr. Morales and Mr. Hurwitch, Messrs. Miro and Varona stressed the need for military action as the only way to get rid of Castro and the threat of communism to the hemisphere. They said that now that the Meeting of Foreign Ministers was over, Cuban exiles were insistently raising the question as to what came next. According to Miro and Varona , neither the deteriorating economic situation, nor sabotage, nor commando raids, nor propaganda could succeed in overthrowing the Castro regime, and therefore the only possible solution was military, involving either U.S. forces, or U.S. plus Cuban forces, or Cuban forces supported by the U.S., or Cuban plus Latin American forces, or some combination of the above. They said that the exile community was becoming increasingly impatient over the need for action, and that if they could not get an encouraging reply from us, they would probably have to resign from the Council. They could not go on any longer promising and deluding the exiles, they said, unless they had some encouragement that there was some plan underway to help them along military lines.

Mr. Morales made the following points: (1) Action of the kind requested might bring on Soviet retaliation, either in Cuba or elsewhere in the world. Miro and Varona perhaps had not been giving sufficient attention to this serious Cold War aspect of the problem. (2) The results of Punta del Este, and the change which it revealed in the attitudes of Latin American governments toward the problem of Cuba since the 7th Meeting of Foreign Ministers in San Jose, Costa Rica, were reasons for moderate optimism. Several Latin American countries are very disturbed about the threat Castro poses for their survival. In time they may be willing to take stronger steps. Punta del Este was a way station, not the end of the line. (3) At the first Punta del Este meeting in August 1961 the Cubans were accepted and even popular to a degree. At the second meeting they were completely ostracized. (4) There was considerable respect for Miro at Punta del Este. (5) A look at the internal situation in Cuba indicates that things are not going well there. Economic failures and the ascension of Communists to key posts have probably met with the disapproval of the Cuban people. (6) The recent debate in the UN reveals that the Cuban regime is almost hysterical at the way things are going. (7) If the Castro regime were to disappear tomorrow, the Communist threat in Latin America would still exist. (8) The Council must continue working on hemispheric public opinion. They should stress the point that Castro is a star being eclipsed by the Communists.

309. Program ReviewSource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Lansdale. An attached distribution list indicates that eight copies of the program review were prepared and copies were sent to Attorney General Kennedy, Taylor, Rusk through Johnson, McNamara through Gilpatric, McCone through Helms and Harvey, and Craig for the JCS. Two copies were kept by Lansdale. Washington, March 2, 1962.

THE CUBA PROJECT

The Goal: The United States will help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

Developments:

30 November 1961: The above goal was set for the United States, with Brig. Gen. Lansdale as Chief of Operations and with operational lieutenants appointed as direct representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director, Central Intelligence. The Special Group (NSC 5412) was to be kept informed and be available for advice and recommendation.

December-January. Decisive effort was made to re-orient the operational concepts within the U.S. government and to develop the hard intelligence and operational assets required for success. A joint effort was mounted to obtain intelligence in depth from refugees at Opa-Locka, Florida, and to provide more thorough access to operational assets. At the same time, reports from significant population groups, including religious and labor groups, indicated that the spirit of the Cuban people was dying under the Communist police-state controls and that some evidence on which to base hope for a better future was needed promptly to prevent this death of spirit. A review of operational assets dictated that the U.S. was powerless to hamper the sugar harvest, without U.S. attribution.

18 January 1962. The Chief of Operations assigned thirty-two tasks to Departments and Agencies, for a realistic assessment and preparation of U.S. capabilities.See Document 291.

15 February 1962. Detailed staff papers were received from Departments and Agencies, responding to assigned tasks. A basic action plan was then made, for the step-by-step development of an internal revolution, by the Chief of Operations with joint consideration and approval by the operational representatives (CIA, State, Defense, and USIA).

20 February 1962. Completed basic plan for paced operations inside Cuba, and support plans for political, economic, psychological, military sabotage, and intelligence actions.Document 304. The outlined concept would develop assets inside Cuba for a popular revolution in October (judged to be the earliest possible date by those responsible for operations), with U.S. and Latin American help from the outside. Each step would be taken as operationally feasible, collecting intelligence, building revolutionary assets, and taking advantage of targets of opportunity.

21 February 1962. Plan was discussed by Special Group (NSC 5412) and decision was made to meet again on it the following Monday, with Secretary McNamara.

26 February 1962. Special Group (NSC 5412) met with Secretary McNamara. Chief of Operations was asked to submit a plan for an initial intelligence collection program only.

1 March 1962. Special Group (NSC 5412) agreed that the immediate objective of the U.S. during March, April, and May will be the acquisition of intelligence, and that other U.S. actions must be inconspicuous and consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. At the end of May, the situation will be reviewed and a decision made as to the next phase. The Chief of Operations is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress.

Intelligence Plan

As requested by the Special Group (NSC 5412), a plan for basic intelligence collection, upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro, is submitted herewith.Not found attached. In view of the new requirement for a comprehensive and definitive intelligence finding concerning the Cuban population vis-a-vis the regime,CIA requested that the initial period be extended through July 1962. This practical realism is reflected in the plan. Also, responsible CIA operational officers noted that at least 6 months should be added to the timing of phases set forth in the original basic action plan, if a decision to seek an internal revolution is deferred until the end of the collection and reporting period.

The attached plan reflects the Special Groupʼs desire to collect definitive intelligence inside Cuba prior to a decision, while being consistent with giving the impression that the U.S. effort is to isolate Castro and to neutralize his influence in the Western Hemisphere. The plan gives maximal commitments of U.S. assets for intelligence collection in the periods shown.

310. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Goodwin)Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, March 6, 1962.

At the 5 March meeting chaired by Secretary Rusk, on our favorite subject, the Secretary spoke of “other tracks” which might be opened for the U.S. to achieve its objective. He mentioned proof of “their” plots in Latin America, as an example. Also, there was joking reference to a “Bay of Pigs” in, perhaps, Guatemala, as a notional clandestine action for which “they” could be blamed.

General Taylor has asked me to report on these alternate “tracks,” among other things, to the Special Group he chairs. I intend to complete this report on Friday, 9 March. Thus, request that you provide me the section on alternate “tracks” Secretary Rusk sees as possibly open to the U.S., by Thursday, 8 March. I plan to include this, as the State response, in my report. Alexis Johnson was present when Secretary Rusk mentioned this, and perhaps could be of assistance.

Along these same lines, and in response to direction, I am asking the Defense representative (Gen. Craig) to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention. I would appreciate it if you could provide a companion statement, a brief but precise description of pretexts which the State Department believes desirable in connection with any such direct military intervention.

311. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 2/62-4/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared and copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Rusk through Johnson, McNamara through Gilpatric, Lemnitzer through Craig, and McCone through Helms and Harvey. One copy was kept by Lansdale. Washington, March 12, 1962. SUBJECT Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose

As Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase I, a number of policy questions have started to arise. Current problems, needing resolution, are listed below. It is requested that the Special Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency.

Use of U.S. military installations. CIA desires to train small groups of Cuban nationals on the U.S. Air Force Bombing Range, Avon Park, Florida, immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security problem and a departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S. Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees. Capture and interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure (in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should be trained on U.S. Government installations.

There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which CIA would like to use for similar training and operational purposes in the future. The same policy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S. Government properties for training and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert infiltration into Cuba.

2. Arming of Cuban guerrillas. CIA needs a policy determination on the supplying of arms and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as they are located, assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting to surface, as the intelligence-collection effort is increased, and it is logical that the number of requests will increase as the operation proceeds. There is a need for clearly defining the limits of arming guerrillas (for self-defense, for training, for purposes short of open actions in revolt), to permit operational judgment to be used by designated operations officers, in Phase I. 3. Use of U.S. military personnel and equipment. CIA has requested Defense assistance in air and sea capabilities, including supplying equipment and supplying U.S. military crews to operate the equipment. Included in these requests are 2 LSDʼs (or similar ships) to lie off the coast in support of CIA maritime operations, with U.S. Navy crews of 200-300 depending upon the missions, 3 USAF cargo aircraft with “sheep-dipped” USAF crews for air re-supply, 2 amphibious aircraft with “sheep-dipped” USAF crews, and 2 submarines for black broadcast operations. (This is in addition to CIA requests for 6 PT type boats, 3 Helio aircraft, 2 82-foot Coast Guard cutters, and arms, communications equipment, etc.). Again, where U.S. military personnel and equipment are involved in Phase I, there is need for a policy determination which will permit operational judgment to be used by designated operations officers, as well as a need for rules of engagement.

312. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 10 copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Rusk through Johnson, McNamara through Gilpatric, Lemnitzer through Craig, McCone through Helms and Harvey, and Murrow through Wilson. Two copies were kept by Lansdale. For text of the attached action plan, marked with asterisks to indicate those items approved by the Special Group (Augmented) on March 5, see the Supplement. Washington, March 13, 1962. SUBJECT Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose

As desired by General Taylor on 12 March, the planning for Operation Mongoose is now prepared on a format of separate planning for each Department and Agency involved. Revised planning along this line is submitted herewith.

Activities already approved are marked with an asterisk. Further planning must await determination of policy questions raised in my 12 March 1962 memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented).Document 311.

Planning transmitted to you by my memorandum of 10 March 1962Not found. should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security.

[Here follows the 22-page action plan. For text, see the Supplement.]

313. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 1962, 121-373.5. Official Use Only. Drafted in DOD/ISA by Mountain. Also sent to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs, Manpower, and Public Affairs, the General Counsel, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the Secretary for Legislative Affairs. Washington, March 13, 1962. REFERENCE (a) SecDef Multi-Addee ltr of 10 Jul 1961—Subj: Service of Cuban Volunteers in U.S. Armed ForcesNot found. SUBJECT Service of Cuban Volunteers in U.S. Armed Forces

On January 31, 1962 the Department of Defense reported to the President on the status of the program to offer Cuban exiles opportunities to volunteer for service in the U.S. Armed Forces.Document 299. In view of the fact that the program has not succeeded in bringing any considerable number of Cubans into the U.S. Armed Forces, the Department of Defense recommended that the program be terminated by June 30, 1962.

By a memorandum dated February 21, 1962 from Mr. McGeorge Bundy,Not found. copy of which is attached, this recommendation was approved.

It is therefore directed that appropriate measures be undertaken to terminate this operation by June 30, 1962. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) will be responsible for necessary coordination.

Roswell L. GilpatricPrinted from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.

314. Guidelines for Operation Mongoose

Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Preliminary drafts of this paper indicate that it was drafted on March 5 by General Taylor, and was revised slightly in response to suggestions made by McGeorge Bundy and McCone. (Ibid., and Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 2/62-4/62) The copy of the guidelines found in Department of State files is attached to a handwritten covering memorandum by U. Alexis Johnson, dated March 16, which reads:

“Discussed with the President today—McCone, Gen. Taylor, Gilpatric, Attorney General, Mac Bundy, & Gen. Lemnitzer present.

“The President expressed general approval on the understanding there will be further examination of use of Americans for airdrops etc. during first phase when risk estimates are completed.

“The President also expressed skepticism that in so far as can now be foreseen circumstances will arise that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action. It was clearly understood no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed.” (Department of State, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 410)

Also attached in Department of State files is a copy of the planning schedule of activities for Operation Mongoose, Document 312. It is not clear from Johnsonʼs covering note whether the President approved only the attached guidelines, or also approved some or all of Lansdaleʼs planning schedule.

Washington, March 14, 1962. 1. Operation Mongoose will be developed on the following assumptions: a. In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target government, the U.S. will make maximum use of indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognizes that final success will require decisive U.S. military intervention. b. Such indigenous resources as are developed will be used to prepare for and justify this intervention, and thereafter to facilitate and support it. 2. The immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts during the coming months will be the acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area. Concurrently, all other political, economic and covert actions will be undertaken short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area, or other development which would require U.S. armed intervention. These actions, insofar as possible, will be consistent with overt policies of isolating the local leader and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere, and will be taken in such a way as to permit disengagement with minimum losses in assets and U.S. prestige. The JCS will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U.S. military capability for intervention. At the end of this first period, or earlier if conditions permit, the situation will be reviewed and a decision taken as to the next phase of the program. 3. In order to get the covert phase of this program in motion, it will be necessary at the outset to use U.S. personnel, bases and equipment for the support of operations inside the target area. However, the CIA will concurrently expedite the development of non-attributable resources in order to reduce or eliminate this dependence should it become necessary after the initial phase. 4. During this period, General Lansdale will continue as chief of operations, calling directly on the participating departments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks. The heads of these departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal command channels to higher authority. General Lansdale is responsible for coordinating combined planning and execution, reporting to higher authority through the Special Group (5412), augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS. The Special Group (5412 augmented) is responsible for providing policy guidance to the project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress.

315. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan. 63. Secret. A covering note indicates that this estimate, submitted by McCone, was prepared by CIA, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, the Joint Staff, and NSA. All members of the USIB concurred on March 21 except the representative of the AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside his jurisdiction. NIE 85-62 Washington, March 21, 1962.

THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

The Problem

To analyze the situation in Cuba and the relationships of the Castro regime with both the Soviet Bloc and the Latin American republics, and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so.

Foreword

Cuba is now, in effect, surrounded by an iron curtain. Our information on internal developments is not as complete or as reliable as we could wish. On some important matters, it is seriously inadequate. These deficiencies are expressly noted where applicable in the text of this estimate: e.g., paragraphs 19, 30, 106, and 111. In general, the information available is sufficient to support the estimate. The estimate will be under continuing review as additional information is obtained.

Summary and Conclusions

1. The pattern of events in Cuba clearly reveals the historical step by step Communist procedure for attaining complete control of a country. During the past year Cuba has, in effect, gone behind an iron curtain. The regime has thoroughly reorganized its political, economic, police, and military systems in the classic Communist ideological fashion. It has also sought to identify itself with the Soviet Bloc in terms that would obligate the USSR to protect it. The Bloc, however, has avoided any explicit military commitment to defend Cuba. (Paras. 17-29) 2. In Cuba there is in process of development a single party organization essentially Communist in character. It is designed to be the means of directing and controlling the operations of the government, the economy, and the mass organizations through which revolutionary indoctrination and leadership are transmitted to the people. Fidel Castro will presumably be the titular head of this organization, but the real political power in Cuba is likely to be vested in a collective leadership including Castro but dominated by a group of veteran Communists. Some degree of friction is probable in this relationship, but an open conflict is highly unlikely. (Paras. 30-37, 133) 3. The regime has sought to commit the Cuban people to positive personal identification with it through propaganda, indoctrination, and mass organizations. At the same time, it has developed a pervasive system of surveillance and police control. (Paras. 38-53) 4. The forces available to the regime to suppress insurrection or repel invasion have been and are being greatly improved, with substantial Bloc assistance through the provision of materiel and instruction. Cuban military capabilities, however, are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with strategic weapon systems or with air and naval capabilities suitable for major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. This attitude would not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors, and service personnel, the provision of such defensive weapons and equipment as surface-to-air missiles and radars, and such improvement of Cuban naval and air facilities as would enable them to service Soviet units. (Paras. 54-69) 5. The state has taken over the direct control of all important economic activities in Cuba, and has developed a more elaborate organization for economic management. (Paras. 70-77) 6. Cuba is now faced with an economic crisis attributable in large part to an acute shortage of the convertible foreign exchange required to finance greatly needed imports of foodstuffs and of replacement parts for machinery and equipment of US origin. The Bloc provides a guaranteed market for Cuban sugar and minerals, and supplies foodstuffs, other consumersʼ goods, and industrial raw materials in return, but not in sufficient quantity to meet Cubaʼs needs. The Bloc has also extended credits for Cuban industrial development, but the actual implementation of these projects is slow. Castro has now told the Cuban people that they face years of privation. (Paras. 78-94) 7. The initial popular enthusiasm for the revolution has steadily waned. Many men who fought against Batista have been alienated by the even more dictatorial character of the Castro regime and its increasingly Communist complexion. The vaunted agrarian reform has done little to improve the lot of the peasants. Moreover, people are becoming fed up with the privations, exactions, and regimentation that characterize life in Castroʼs Cuba. (Paras. 95-103) 8. Nevertheless, Fidel Castro and the Revolution retain the positive support of at least a quarter of the population. The hard core of this support consists principally of those who now have a vested interest in the regime: the new managerial class and the Communists. These are reinforced by the substantial numbers of Cubans, especially those in the mass organizations, who are still under the spell of Castroʼs charismatic leadership or are convinced the Revolution has been to their advantage. (Para. 104) 9. There is active resistance in Cuba, but it is limited, uncoordinated, unsupported, and desperate. The regime, with all the power of repression at its disposal, has shown that it can contain the present level of resistance activity. (Paras. 107-114) 10. The majority of the Cuban people neither support the regime nor resist it, in any active sense. They are grumbling and resentful, but apparently hopeless and passive, resigned to acceptance of the present regime as the effective government in being with which they must learn to live for lack of a feasible alternative. (Para. 106) 11. The next year or two will be a critical period for the Castro regime. The 1962 sugar crop will be the smallest in years; the difficulty of acquiring convertible foreign exchange will be greater than ever. Want of convertible exchange will limit Cubaʼs ability to purchase foodstuffs and other needed supplies in the Free World. No substantial increase in the supplies provided by the Bloc is likely during 1962. In these circumstances it is unlikely that the total output of the Cuban economy in 1962 can rise above the 1961 level. Under consequent privations, the Cuban people are likely to become more restive. Much will depend on whether the regime succeeds in directing their resentment toward the US, or whether it comes to focus on the regime. (Paras. 92, 94, 106, 129) 12. The regimeʼs apparatus for surveillance and repression should be able to cope with any popular tendency toward active resistance. Any impulse toward widespread revolt is inhibited by the fear which this apparatus inspires, and also by the lack of dynamic leadership and of any expectation of liberation within the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, increasing antagonism toward the regime is likely to produce only a manageable increase in isolated acts of sabotage or of open defiance on the part of a few desperate men. A sequence of disaffection-repression-resistance could conceivably be set in motion, but would be unlikely to cause major difficulties for the regime in the absence of considerable external support. (Paras. 114, 132) 13. The overriding concern of Cuban foreign policy is to obtain external support and protection against the hostility of the US. The USSR and other Bloc states will continue to render such aid and support to the Castro regime as they consider necessary. If the overthrow of the regime should be seriously threatened by either external or internal forces, the USSR would almost certainly not intervene directly with its own forces. However, interpreting even an internal threat as US intervention, the USSR would seek to deter the US by vigorous political action, including threats of retaliation on the periphery of the Bloc as well as ambiguous references to Soviet nuclear power. Nevertheless, the USSR would almost certainly never intend to hazard its own safety for the sake of Cuba. (Paras. 23-27, 122, 130, 134) 14. By the end of 1960, Castro had few admirers left among politically active Latin Americans, except the Communists, extremist splinter groups broken off from the established social revolutionary parties, and certain student and labor elements. (Para. 116) 15. At Punta del Este the OAS unanimously condemned communism in Cuba as incompatible with the inter-American system and laid the groundwork for increased efforts to combat Castro-Communist subversion. However, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador abstained on the operative resolution excluding the Castro regime from the organs of the OAS. The Castro regime will seek to cultivate those Latin American governments which have shown reluctance to support measures against it and will probably refrain from flagrant acts which could provide the occasion for US or OAS intervention in Cuba. (Paras. 115-120, 128) 16. The Castro-Communist threat in Latin America results from the ability of a well-organized subversive movement centered in Cuba to exploit the natural tendency of entrenched oligarchies to resist the growing demand for radical social reform. What is seen by radical revolutionary elements in Latin America is that, while others have talked of social reform, Fidel Castro has actually accomplished a radical social revolution in Cuba, and has done so in defiance of the Yankees with the support of an apparently more powerful patron. Relatively moderate reformist regimes are now ascendant in most Latin American countries, but, if the Alliance for Progress should fail to produce its intended social reforms in time to meet rising popular demands, the conviction will grow that Castroʼs way is the only way to get timely and positive results. Thus, despite Castroʼs alienation of the moderate reformists, there remains a danger that the Cuban example will set the pattern of the impending social revolution in Latin America. (Paras. 66-69, 115-118, 120-121)

[Here follows the 21-page Discussion section of the estimate.]

316. Notes on Special Group MeetingSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. Washington, March 22, 1962.

Operation Mongoose: General Lansdale and Air Force reported on aerial resupply problems indicating high degree of safety although possibility of loss with consequent attribution could not be dismissed. Attorney General considered this most serious, as resulting public opinion would probably cause stand-down of all other operations. Resupply plan with one C-54 and one C-46 now being sanitized. Initial operation 30 days, probable rate between 6 and 15 per month. Following questions which I wish to discuss with Helms, Harvey and others were raised: 1. Is it not possible to conduct immediate intense training of a few Cuban pilots and have them available for these missions? Noted some Cuban airline pilots are now in Florida. As an alternative, could other nations (such as Turks) be readied for these missions? 2. Can we procure unattributable aircraft? Is it possible to buy from third countries and use Soviet aircraft for this purpose? Reported that American manufacturer had stated he could produce and deliver Russian-type MIGs or Russian-type IL 14ʼs in 90 days. Has this matter been explored and if so should such equipment be available for covert operations in various parts of the world? 3. What evidence do we have of Cuban supply of arms to insurgent groups in the Caribbean, Central or Latin America? 4. Clandestine operations. 5. Could we now develop a policy for action if missile bases are placed on Cuban soil?

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director

317. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/3-2962. Secret. Drafted on March 13 by Hurwitch. Washington, March 29, 1962. SUBJECT Cuba PARTICIPANTS Dr. Jose Miro Cardona—Chairman, Cuban Revolutionary Council Dr. Antonio Varona—Cuban Revolutionary Council member Dr. Ernesto Aragon—Cuban Revolutionary Council member Dr. Carlos Piad—Cuban Revolutionary Council member Mr. McGeorge Bundy—The White House Mr. Hurwitch—Deputy Director,CMA

Mr. Bundy regretted that due to his heavy responsibilities the President had been unable personally to receive Dr. Miro and the members of the CRC at this time. He assured Dr. Miro, however, that whenever he had a matter of a most urgent and crucial nature, the President would be pleased to see him.

Cuban Invasion Prisoners

Mr. Bundy expressed the Presidentʼs deep personal concern over the prisonersʼ fate and said that the U.S. would continue its diplomatic efforts on behalf of the prisoners.

U.S. Cuban Policy

Dr. Miro and Dr. Varona urged that the CRC be given the wherewithal to invade Cuba and overthrow the Castro regime. Mr. Bundy replied that the U.S. was determined that, if the U.S. were to support any military action against Castro, such action must be decisive and complete. In view of the military state of Cuba, it did not appear that decisive action could be accomplished without the open involvement of U.S. armed forces. This would mean open war against Cuba which in the U.S. judgment was not advisable in the present international situation.

Future of the CRC

Dr. Miro said that present U.S. policy drastically limited the CRCʼs sphere of activity. Mr. Bundy acknowledged that inactivity placed a revolutionary group such as the CRC in a very difficult position. Dr. Miro stated that the CRC would either have to be permitted to organize and conduct commando raids, sabotage operations, or similar activities, or disband. Mr. Bundy replied that he was not in a position to decide this question, but that the matter would be carefully studied and Dr. Miro given a reply reasonably soon.

318. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. The memorandum, which is dated March 30, was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, but no other drafting information appears on the source text. Washington, March 29, 1962. SUBJECT Discussion of Operation Mongoose on 29 March 1962

It was the consensus of the meetingThe meeting is not further identified. that some attempt should be made to arrange an exchange of food for the Cuban prisoners. (Bill Harvey and General Lansdale opposed.) This effort is to be explored with heavy emphasis on the humanitarian angle. In a discussion of handling this problem, through a third country approach, the Department of State proposed Canada. Mr. McCone was opposed. The DCI suggested France, and State was opposed. It was decided that the Department of State should choose a third country and carry through with the approach. The Attorney General is to make an exhaustive study of the legal ramifications of Public Law 480For text, see 68 Stat. 454. in connection with this idea.

The meeting decided that we would have to proceed on the assumption that the Communists have penetrated and will continue to influence refugees in southern Florida. This provides a fertile field for Communist tactics including demonstrations and riots. The Agency, the FBI, and the local police will have to watch this problem very closely.

319. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2,DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 29 November 1961-5 April 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. Washington, April 5, 1962.

MEMORANDUM ON SPECIAL GROUP-MONGOOSE PROJECT

1. CIA should be familiar with General Thomas Whiteʼs responsibilities and activities as a member of the Latin American Subcommittee on Security which apparently is a part of the OAS. Mr. Wym Coerr, of State Department, is familiar with details. 2. Alexis Johnson reported that discussion between [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Cord Meyer having to do with the possible escape of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] from the Isle of Pines. 3. Protracted discussion of entire Cuban operation at which time McCone expressed the following points of view: A. He had given serious consideration to suggesting immediate military action to bring back the prisoners now concentrated in Havana but had withdrawn suggestion because of possibility of exchange of food for prisoners. B. Thought we were not making sufficient progress with Cuban problem and expressed discouragement over possibility of success because our national policy was too cautious. C. Questioned very much whether the military strength of Castro government was as large and effective as reported and noted that aerial photography did not reveal military installations sufficient to house, support, train and supply a force ranging from 100,000 to 300,000 men. D. Intelligence gathered from various sources indicated Castro may be having extreme difficulty and therefore we should take a good look at our policy. E. Finally, stated that if one or two hundred prisoners were shot, we would probably have very serious problems with the 100,000 Cuban refugees in Florida.

For all of these reasons, McCone recommended that we review our policy and perhaps decide upon more aggressive action including direct military intervention. Johnson raised question of loss of friends and support of other South American countries. McCone stated maybe a show of strength would assist us to win friends rather than lose them.

It was decided to have a Special Meeting for the purpose of discuss-ing Cuban Policy on Wednesday, April 11, at 2:00 p.m.,See Document 325. to be attended by Special Group and Sec/State and Sec/Defense, Joint Chiefs and others.

The following was requested for the meeting: 1. Detailed analysis of Castroʼs military posture from all available photographic interpretations. 2. A summary of current appraisal of internal conditions gained from debriefing of agents recently exfiltrated, results from Opa-Laka Center and all other intelligence sources. 3. Any other information available on conditions in Cuba.

Question of weekly CIA progress and operational reports was brought up and it was concluded that CIA should issue these reports regularly every Tuesday, and that General Lansdale, reporting to the Special Group augmented, would summarize them as he did on 3 April.

This memorandum is to be used by Mr. Helms on an “Eyes Only” basis in preparation for the CIA actions necessary for the Wednesday meeting.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director

320. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Secret. Washington, April 6, 1962. SUBJECT The Internal Situation in Cuba REFERENCES A. NIE 85-62, “The Situation and Prospects in Cuba,” dated 21 March 1962Document 315. B. Memorandum for the Director, “Comment on Tad Szulcʼs New York Times Article on Castroʼs 26 March Speech,” dated 5 April 1962Szulcʼs article appeared in The New York Times on page 1 on April 4 rather than April 5. Szulc analyzed a televised speech by Castro on March 26, in which Castro severely criticized Cuban Communist Party leader Anibal Escalante and other Communist “militants” whom Castro accused of trying to dominate the Cuban Government. Szulc reported that analysts in Washington had concluded that “the split between Premier Castro and the orthodox Communist leadership could result in a cooling of Cubaʼs relations with the Soviet bloc.” 1. At the request of the Chief, Task Force “W” we have reviewed the conclusions of NIE 85-62 relating to the internal situation in Cuba in the light of more recent information. We perceive no reason to modify those conclusions except insofar as the Escalante affair enables us to speak more positively on the subject of Castroʼs present relations with the veteran Cuban Communists. 2. The salient conclusions of NIE 85-62, which we now reaffirm, are: a. The initial popular enthusiasm for the Revolution has steadily waned. Nevertheless, Fidel Castro retains the positive support of at least a quarter of the population. There is some active resistance in Cuba, but it is limited, uncoordinated, unsupported, and desperate. The majority of the Cuban people neither support the regime nor resist it, in any active sense. (Paras. 7-10) b. Cuba is now faced with an economic crisis attributable in large part to an acute shortage of the convertible foreign exchange required to finance greatly needed imports of foodstuffs and of replacement parts for machinery and equipment of US origin. The next year or two will be a critical period for the Castro regime. Nevertheless, the regimeʼs apparatus for surveillance and repression should be able to cope with any popular tendency toward active resistance. In the circumstances, increasing antagonism toward the regime is likely to produce only a manageable increase in isolated acts of sabotage or of open defiance on the part of a few desperate men. (Paras. 6, 11-12) 3. In NIE 85-62 we discussed at length Castroʼs relations with the veteran Communists of the PSP, the prerevolutionary Communist party, and the prospect that the latter would eventually gain control of Cuba through working control of the ORI, the prototype of the more inclusive Communist party now in process of organization. (Paras. 30-37, 133) The Escalante affair sheds new light on this subject and requires modification of our conclusion that, while Castro would remain the titular leader, the real power in Cuba would probably come to be vested in a collective leadership dominated by the veteran Communists. (Para. 2) 4. Castro himself has now confirmed our estimate of tension within the ruling group, between the “old” and the “new” Communists. Escalante was purged precisely because he was working toward the end which we judged to be likely on the basis of the information available through mid-March. It is evident, however, that Castro has now checked the trend toward old-line Communist control of the ORI and has reasserted his personal leadership of Cuban communism. 5. It would be a mistake, however, to interpret this development as a revulsion by Castro from communism, or as an open split between Castro and the veteran Cuban Communists. Castroʼs dramatic expulsion of Escalante was almost certainly intended as a warning to other old-line Communists against distinguishing between themselves and the new Communists, but, in deploring such tendencies, Castro called for unity within the new party organization. Blas Roca responded by echoing Castroʼs denunciation of Escalante, making Escalante the scapegoat for the old Communist group. 6. Tension and mutual distrust between the “old” and the “new” Cuban Communists will probably continue, but Castroʼs goal is still the communization of Cuba—with the collaboration of the old Communists and the support of the USSR, but under his own leadership and control. Castro has now reasserted his authority and the old-line Communists will take care to avoid provoking him further. However, their covert struggle for power within the regime will probably continue. For the Board of National EstimatesSherman Kent

321. Editorial Note

On April 8, 1962, a Cuban Military Tribunal announced a verdict in the trial of the 1,179 prisoners captured following the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion. Ignoring pleas for clemency from the Organization of American States and a number of Latin American governments, the Tribunal sentenced the prisoners to 30 years hard labor for treason, and set ransom at $62 million. At a press conference on April 11, President Kennedy responded to a question concerning the ransom demand by observing: “I think Mr. Castro knows that the United States Government cannot engage in a negotiation like that, and he knows very well that the families cannot raise these millions of dollars.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, page 360)

322. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret. Washington, April 10, 1962. SUBJECT Probable Reactions to a US Military Intervention in Cuba

1. For the purposes of this estimate, we assume that: a. The US military intervention in Cuba would be made in sufficient force to overcome, within a few days, the frontal resistance of the Cuban armed forces and to consolidate US control of the principal governmental centers and the primary means of transportation and communications. b. The US would declare its intention to turn over the control of Cuba, as soon as possible, to a Cuban government responsible to the Cuban people, committed to social reform, and dedicated to the preservation of Cuban national independence within the inter-American community of nations.

Reactions Within Cuba

2. The Castro regime has made extensive preparations to resist a US military intervention. It apparently plans for both a strong initial defense against invasion and protracted warfare in the interior. A portion of the armed forces would be destroyed in the initial battle. Many of the remainder would probably surrender or desert when they realized the strength of the invasion and the hopelessness of further resistance. Substantial numbers, however, would continue a guerrilla resistance in the interior, according to plan. Their operations would be facilitated by caches of arms and supplies already established in relatively inaccessible areas.

3. Some Cubans would welcome the US military intervention as a liberation. At least as many more would regard it as designed to reimpose upon the Cuban people the yoke of “Yankee imperialism” and would accordingly be disposed to resist insofar as they were able. The great majority would be primarily concerned to keep out of harmʼs way and to avoid exposing themselves to retribution by either side in the continuing conflict.

4. The establishment of a representative and accepted Cuban government would be greatly hindered by the persistence of terroristic underground resistance in the cities, and by continuing guerrilla resist-ance in outlying areas. Out of fear as well as sympathy, most Cubans would probably be disposed to cooperate at least passively with the resistance, unless convincingly assured of effective US protection. Although the overthrow of the present regime might be quickly accomplished, the pacification of the country, to the extent necessary to permit the development of a credible representative alternative regime, might be long delayed.

5. In these circumstances, a prolonged US military occupation of Cuba would probably be necessary. Resistance elements would deliberately seek to provoke the occupying forces to take such arbitrary meas-ures against the general population as would tend to confirm Cuban suspicions that the US intervention was anti-Cuban rather than anti-Castro, to the further detriment of the prospects for a satisfactory political solution.

6. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Cuban people would desire the restoration of peace, order, and national self-government, and the relief of economic distress. If the US was able eventually to establish reasonable security in most of the country, the inhabitants of the pacified areas would probably cooperate in the establishment of a new and more representative Cuban government, in part as the only effective means of obtaining the withdrawal of US military government. In this phase, however, the establishment of such a government would be hindered by the personal factionalism characteristic of Cuban leaders and the desire of all with political ambition to demonstrate their determination to protect Cuban national sovereignty against Yankee domination.

The International Reaction

7. The USSR would have no means to intervene effectively in Cuba with its own forces, and almost certainly would not resort to general war for the sake of the Castro regime. However, the USSR would exert every means of political and psychological pressure at its disposal to procure a universal condemnation of US aggression against Cuba and, if possible, a restoration of the status quo ante. To this end, it might make threatening references to Soviet missile power. Communist China and the other Bloc states would support these Soviet efforts. In the circumstances, there would probably be a first-class war scare, with panic among the neutralists and a high state of alarm in NATO.

8. Latin American political opinion generally would be shocked by a US military intervention in Cuba, regardless of sympathy or antagonism toward the Castro regime. Most Latin American governments would be glad to see Castro effectively disposed of, but would be constrained by domestic opinion to deplore publicly the US action. If forced to vote in the UN, virtually all would probably feel compelled to vote against the US. However, they might seek to forestall that embarrassment by proposing an OAS political intervention designed to get the US out of Cuba as quickly as possible, and at the same time to provide for the establishment of a democratic government in that country.

9. NATO governments would deplore the US action. Remembering Suez and other occasions, they would feel justified in voting to condemn the US. At the same time, however, they would work to find a political solution of the crisis, in order to reduce the risk of general war.

10. The Afro-Asian neutralist states would condemn the US military intervention in Cuba, and would therefore be disposed to support Soviet initiatives against the US in the UN, where their numbers count. At the same time, however, apprehension of the danger of general war might influence the more responsible neutralist governments to work for a political solution of the crisis.

For the Board of National EstimatesAbbot SmithSmith signed for Kent above Kentʼs typed signature.

323. Memorandum From the Chief of Task Force W (Harvey) to Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent to McCone through Deputy Director for Plans Helms. Washington, April 10, 1962. SUBJECT Operation Mongoose—Appraisal of Effectiveness and Results which can be Expected from Implementing the Operational Plan Approved at the Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on 16 March 1962Regarding the March 16 meeting, see the source note, Document 314. No other record of the meeting has been found. The Operational Plan referenced here is apparently the plan submitted to the Special Group (Augmented) by Lansdale on March 13, Document 312. 1. Action: This memorandum contains the conclusions reached as a result of the reassessment of the Mongoose operational plan, conducted pursuant to your oral instructions to Mr. Helms on 5 April 1962.See Document 319. The recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph 11 below. 2. Under the Mongoose operational plan as approved, CIA is authorized and directed between now and 31 July 1962 to mount a concentrated operational program to collect intelligence concerning Cuba and to develop, insofar as possible, clandestine resistance cadres inside Cuba. This plan permits intelligence, political, economic, and covert actions, short of those reasonably calculated to inspire revolt within the target area, or other developments which would require U.S. armed intervention. These actions, insofar as possible, will be consistent with overt policies of isolating Castro and of neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere and will be taken in such a way as to permit disengagement with minimum losses in assets and United States prestige. The plan provides that major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence be approved in advance by the Special Group. The plan does not provide for maximum, or even extensive, use of U.S. military personnel, bases, and facilities. No decision has been made that U.S. Military Forces will be committed at any time to support a revolt within Cuba or to intervene for any other cause. 3. Barring unforeseen difficulties, CIA can substantially fulfill the requirements of the present operational plan. However, this plan does not provide for a maximum intelligence and covert action program against Cuba. It probably does represent the maximum such program that can effectively be created within the current policy and other limitations. Fully effective implementation of the present program may require some limited use of U.S. military facilities, particularly training areas and submarines for agent infiltration and exfiltration. If a more intensive effort is to be undertaken, maximum use must be made of U.S. military facilities, personnel, and bases. 4. Under the present program, by August 1962 we will have far better hard intelligence coverage of Cuba, but it is doubtful if we will have achieved fully effective penetration of the top hierarchy of Cuban leadership. During the same period, we will have materially increased the clandestine resistance potential controlled by us in Cuba, but it will not be possible for us to field, activate, and keep alive large resistance groups. Our assets will consist of a number of small clandestine teams with limited supplies and possessing varying degrees of resistance and revolt potential. The teams will not be knit together into any central organization within Cuba. It is unlikely that by this time we will have developed any viable long term political leadership for a new Cuba. Such leadership does not exist in the emigration and it is doubtful if it can be developed within Cuba at any time prior to the forceful overthrow of the Castro regime, although some potential leaders of promise possibly can be developed. 5. Given the anticipated success in carrying out the currently approved plan, we should be able by August 1962 or within a reasonable time thereafter, provided policy approval is given, to begin to prepare these assets for an organized revolt of substantial proportions. This additional time will be required since under existing limitations we are not permitted to prepare the teams or cadres from their inception for any concerted revolt nor, in fact, give them any assurance of ultimate U.S. assistance which would support and preserve such revolt. 6. Any revolt we are able to generate within a reasonable time after the expiration of Phase I of the current plan, although possibly substantial in size, could not be considered a really full scale revolt in the sense that it alone could overthrow the regime. In the face of Cuban counteraction, the revolt could only be kept alive for a few days unless supported by active U.S. military intervention. 7. The increased operational activity of the present program will attract some attention, may raise the Cuban and U.S. “noise level”, and could lead to some public criticism and an increase in Cuban propaganda play. Any intelligence or covert action which is surfaced will, of course, be charged to the United States and specifically to CIA. If a maximum program is undertaken it will inevitably attract more attention and possibly lead to more intense criticism. The level of activity envisaged by the present plan is not likely to convince the Castro regime or the Cubans themselves that the United States is seriously contemplating either invading Cuba or intervening to assist any planned revolt. 8. There is substantial dissatisfaction in Cuba and a considerable latent resistance potential which is disorganized and dispirited at the present time. Internal Cuban conditions, including the availability of food and the general state of the economy, will probably deteriorate during the next several months. Basically, however, time is running against us and Cuba is likely to be tougher nut to crack a year from today than it is now. The effective communization of the Cuban State, the increasing effectiveness of its security and control apparatus, the increased discouragement of the populace, including a measurable loss of hope and lessening of sporadic spontaneous resistance can only lead to this conclusion. We cannot completely rule out the possibility of a spontaneous uprising of greater or lesser proportions, but the possibilities of this are not believed great and, in any event, unless the United States is at the time of any such spontaneous uprising prepared to and does intervene, this uprising will be ruthlessly and rapidly crushed. Even if the Cuban economy continues to deteriorate, it will in our opinion be bolstered to the extent necessary to preserve the status quo by the Soviet Bloc which cannot afford to lose the Cuban bridgehead in the Western Hemisphere. The Castro regime will not fall as a result of such deterioration or such economic counteraction as we can take. In fact, after a period of deterioration, it is entirely possible that the economic situation may gradually improve. There are some possibilities that the Castro regime may be seriously threatened by a power split at the top level or by a palace guard revolt. These possibilities do not appear at the present time great and certainly any such development is insufficiently probable to count on, although efforts are being made to develop and exploit any opportunities to this end. In any event, even if such opportunities develop and can be exploited, this is likely to be a long and involved operation with marginal chances of complete success. 9. Even if the current operational plan attains maximum success, it is our firm conclusion that it will not lead to the overthrow of the Castro regime and that if that overthrow is a serious objective of the U.S. Government, it will be necessary at the conclusion of the present plan to face the decision of military intervention, then prepare for it and intensify the preparation for any necessary revolt or provocation upon which it is based. This will require additional time and will be more difficult to do some months from now than it will be if it is commenced now. 10. Conclusions: Based on the reassessment that has been made and following the above comments, set out below are our conclusions: a. The current plan does not constitute and does not permit a maximum intelligence and covert action program against Cuba. The plan is not likely to result in the overthrow of the Castro regime unless followed by extensive additional preparation and action based on a firm decision to use U.S. Military Forces at the appropriate point to destroy the regime. b. If a maximum effort is to be mounted, the decision to use military force must be made now and the planning must go forward in phase to permit a concentrated and planned uprising with the immediate support of military forces to prevent its destruction. In addition, in preparing for the necessary revolt and/or provocation endangering U.S. lives and property, maximum use must be made not only of CIA assets and capabilities, but of the assets and capabilities of the respective military serv-ices. c. To permit requisite flexibility and professionalism for a maximum operational effort against Cuba, the tight controls exercised by the Special Group and the present time-consuming coordination and briefing procedures should, if at all possible, be made less restrictive and less stultifying. d. The planning for the use of U.S. Military Forces must contemplate minimum reaction time and sufficient pre-positioning to permit the most rapid possible elimination of organized opposition within Cuba. If at all possible, the military intervention should be so planned and prepared that from the time of decision to intervene until the elimination of organized military opposition is only a few days, preferably not more than four or six. It is believed that this is extremely important in order to cut down the time available to the USSR and the Bloc to react and take counteraction elsewhere using Cuba as a pretext, and also to cut down the available time for a coalescing of intense domestic and foreign political press and propaganda opposition to this action. If the U.S. Forces to be committed can be pre-positioned in such a way that a landing in force takes place rapidly, it is believed that a substantial number of Cubans, including those in the militia and the armed forces, will give up quickly. The United States must, however, be prepared to cope with at least some substantial prolonged hard core resistance. In addition, the U.S. Government must be prepared with plans and resources to establish a military government within Cuba and maintain it for an appreciable period, probably at least a year, until the situation can be stabilized, political parties, movements, and leadership developed, and free elections insured. 11. Action:There is no indication on the source text that McCone or Helms approved these actions. A. If you concur with the above conclusions, it is recommended that you propose to the Special Group (Augmented) at its meeting on 11 April 1962 that it approve and propose for the approval of higher authority a plan of operations against Cuba requiring decision now to: (1) Make maximum use of CIA and military resources to create a revolt in Cuba and/or provocation endangering U.S. lives and property, and (2) Upon the activation of this revolt and/or provocation intervene immediately with sufficient military strength to eliminate organized military opposition within Cuba at the earliest practicable time. B. If such a plan is not approved, or if the decisions to take the actions necessary to ensure the overthrow of the Castro regime are indefinitely delayed, it is believed that you should give careful consideration as to whether, in the face of other heavy demands and commitments, the Clandestine Service can long continue to afford the present level of effort against Cuba and the heavy expenditure of funds and manpower involved in the operation of Task Force W, which comprises a substantial percentage of the overall assets of the DD/P. William K. HarveyPrinted from a copythat bears this typed signature.

324. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 5, DCI (McCone), Caribbean Study Group. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, undated.

MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION AT SPECIAL GROUPMEETING, 2:00 P.M. WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1962The meeting was held at the Department of State. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) See Document 325.

1. Program approved. Can be implemented on the approximate timetable, although some slippage exists at the present time, but there is also some prospect to make up the lost time. 2. The program falls short of: (a) Gathering all possible intelligence, and (b) Representing maximum effort to create internal dissension within the country. 3. Therefore probable that even though the program as outlined is accomplished, the results attained by July-August will be disappointing. 4. Size of effort has grown substantially—[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] CIA personnel engaged and probably equal number from other departments. The question is raised whether with this large effort a more aggressive program should not be authorized. 5. A review of U-2 photography indicates military capabilities most recently estimated are the very maximum and probably military force less formidable because of absence of adequate support facilities, logistics, transportation, training facilities, etc., which do not appear in the photography. 6. Monolithic structure at the top seems to be fractionated. 7. We therefore recommend: (a) More aggressive action. (b) Large-scale training at U.S. installations. (c) Preparation for the introduction of guerrilla forces and their subsequent support, in addition to the authorized espionage teams. (d) Preparation now for necessary military action. 8. Acceptance on the part of the United States of possible attribution for the program. John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

325. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. The memorandum apparently comprises McConeʼs notes on the April 11 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) at the Department of State; see Document 324. Washington, April 12, 1962.

MEMORANDUM ON OPERATION MONGOOSE

General discussion of WednesdayʼsApril 11. meeting at State. General [Taylor] reviewed the guide lines approved by the President.See Document 314. It was agreed that actions in addition to those now approved could be taken within the guide lines and therefore the group decided not to revise the guide lines but to ask for suggestions as to additional actions. McCone pointed out that original concept was to have a situation within Cuba developed by August, and that present plan of action would not bring this about; therefore it was decided to eliminate the August date but not to eliminate the original intention of the effort.

Questions were asked concerning additional actions. McCone suggested (a) more intense training and proposed that Defense modify regulations under which Cubans could be brought into military for training purposes as part of special forces but not as Cuban units; (b) guerrilla action indicated in addition to espionage teams; (c) probably necessary to supply arms to dissident groups which now have been identified; (d) we must be prepared to take a high level of noise and if we are to continue the present level of activity or increase it the noise level will increase materially. All of this was recognized.

Question of manufacturing MIG-type planes brought up. McCone said he would explore.

JCS paperNot found. on pretext or provocative actions was discussed. We should have and review this paper as it is considered to be a very thoughtful and useful document.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director

326. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in BrazilSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1462. Top Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Drafted by Martin and cleared in S/S. Washington, April 14, 1962, 6:48 p.m.

2979. For Ambassador Gordon from Martin. In private conversation ThursdayApril 12. On April 10, however, McCone and Rusk discussed this same conversation, which was between Rusk and Dantas. (Memorandum of discussion by McCone, April 11; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2, DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 7 April-21 August 1962) See the Supplement. The conversation between Rusk and Dantas apparently took place on April 10 rather than April 12. with Foreign Minister Dantas I told him that the two points which were nonnegotiable in our relations with Castro were his political-military ties to the Soviet bloc and his subversive activities in this Hemisphere.

Reporting on his conversations in Mexico City with his Ambassador in Havana he said his Ambassador felt that a serious struggle for power was going on between the Castroites and the old line Communists.

It was agreed that he would ask his Ambassador to seek an appointment to see Castro alone and inquire whether Brazil could be of any assistance in freeing Castro from the pressure of the old line Communists.On April 15 the Department sent another telegram to Ambassador Gordon, drafted in the Secretaryʼs office and cleared by Rusk, to clarify that the conversation referred to in telegram 2979 took place between Rusk and Dantas, not Martin and Dantas. The telegram noted that Dantas informed Rusk that he would ask his Ambassador to seek an appointment with Castro, but there was no agreement between Dantas and Rusk on this point. (Telegram 2987 to Rio de Janeiro; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1562)

I told Dantas that you had a special line of communication to me personally and that he should report to you any results of this initiative. Send your messages this subject eyes only for me.

I cannot emphasize too much the importance of limiting this whole matter to your personal knowledge only.On April 27 Martin sent an eyes only telegram to Gordon instructing him to inquire of Dantas if there had been any further developments concerning the proposed Brazilian initiative. (Telegram 3113 to Rio de Janeiro; ibid., 737.00/4-2762)

Rusk

327. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President KennedySource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-1862. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch on April 17. Washington, April 18, 1962. SUBJECT Cuban Prisoner Exchange

I understand that representatives of the Families Committee for Liberation who recently returned from attempting to negotiate the liberation of the prisoners with Fidel Castro may be calling upon the State Department within the course of the week to secure our further advice. By the end of the week I hope to have suggestions to you on the Governmentʼs position.

This memorandum contains the most complete information we now have on the discussions leading up to the recent Cuban prisoner exchange.

Dr. Ernesto Freyre, one of the four members of the Families Committee who went to Habana to negotiate terms of release of the April 17 prisoners, reported the following results of two interviews with Fidel Castro.

First Interview

1. They offered Castro some $26 million worth of food in exchange for all of the prisoners; an offer which he rejected on the grounds that it was contrary to the tribunalʼs decision. The only basis for negotiation he would accept was the sentences passed by the tribunal. 2. Castro offered to release the sick and wounded for the price the tribunal had set, a price which “they could pay whenever they had the money.” 3. The Committee membersʼ request to discuss this proposition with the Brigade leaders was granted. The Brigade leaders told the Committee members to accept the offer.

Second Interview

1. The Committee members told Castro they would accept the sick and wounded and would try to raise the approximately $2.5 million involved. 2. The question of an exchange based on foodstuffs was again broached. Castro replied that he would probably find acceptable a formula for releasing the remaining prisoners based on $26 million in foodstuffs and medicines and the balance of the $62 million in cash (he talked about $10 million in medicines, and the remainder of the $26 million in cereals, cattle feed, etc.). Castro told the Committee not to be discouraged; that he was confident something could be worked out within ninety days. 3. Castro agreed that the prisoners would not be placed at hard labor as long as the possibility of negotiations remained open. 4. Castro promised that the prisonersʼ food would be improved. He also agreed to permit them books and other reading matter. 5. Castro suggested that they return to Habana and he would receive them whenever they had something further to discuss regarding the negotiations.

Dr. Carlos Piad, Washington CRC representative, informed the Department that one of the returning prisoners told Dr. Miro that on or about April 11 Castro visited the prisoners and told them that he had nothing against them (they had only been misguided) but that his anger was directed against the President of the United States. Castro allegedly said that the President had called him a “pirate” whereas in reality the President was the “pirate” for having launched the invasion. Castro reportedly told the prisoners that he was confident they would be released within three months, intimating that the United States would pay the $62 million.

Dean RuskPrinted from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

328. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared and copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and McCone. One copy was kept by Lansdale. Washington, April 19, 1962. SUBJECT Operation Mongoose, 13-19 April

The following are the significant highlights of Operation Mongoose for the past week:

Tasks. All tasks agreed to at the 11 April meeting in Secretary Ruskʼs office and the 12 April Special Group meetingFor a record of the April 11 meeting, see Documents 324 and 325. No other record of the April 12 meeting has been found. have been assigned by the Chief of Operations to Departments and Agencies concerned. The State Department, through Assistant Secretary Ed Martin, requested revision of the “total blockade” tasking to be limited to a CIA estimate of the effects on Cuba of a blockade; the tasking was so changed. Status of these tasks will be included in my report to the Special Group next week, when I plan to attend the meeting.

Prisoner Ransom. The Chief of Operations met with State and CIA representatives to work on problems arising from Castroʼs proposed $62 million ransom deal for prisoners. State agreed to contact James Fusca, the New York public relations advisor to the Cuban Families Committee, so that consideration is afforded the propaganda impact of public appearances for Brigade fund raising, suggesting that the theme be in terms of the fight for recapturing human freedom and national independence rather than in terms of disabled Cubans to whom the U.S. owes a debt of guilt.

A more serious problem is the dissension and splintering of Cuban refugee groups. Attention is called to the 18 April CIA Daily Summary (on Cuba), page 2.Not found. It reports the threat of Jose Lasaga, of the MRR, to withdraw from the CRC—unless the CRC publishes that it is against “peaceful co-existence” and that the ransom payment is the first step towards peaceful co-existence. This sentiment and criticism is growing among Cuban refugees in Florida. (USIA reports that local reaction in 11 Latin American countries is strongly negative to a deal with Castro, with the consensus that the U.S. government should ignore Castroʼs efforts to “sell human beings.”)

The threat of splintering refugee groups over the purpose of their organization, in turn, raises the problem of what the U.S. desires the CRC to be: a central refugee organization with mainly non-political goals, or a central organization of Cuban political-military actionists for liberating their homeland.

Reports of New “Invaders.” The New York Times this morning reported a group of Cubans training in the U.S. for guerrilla operations.The New York Times reported on April 19 that: “A compact guerrilla force built around former officers of Premier Fidel Castroʼs army is being organized in Florida and Puerto Rico for eventual action against the Cuban regime.” This is one of several news stories published recently and is an expected outcome of the restlessness of Cuban refugee groups. CIA cited a Chattanooga news item along the same line in its weekly summary. (CIA can report on the facts and meaning of this verbally to the Group.)

Agent Actions. Upon the return of Mr. Harvey from his current field visit, more specific information on the status of agent training and operations should be available. The CIA Progress Report this weekNot found. notes that maritime actions to infiltrate two agent teams into Cuba and exfiltrate one team were unsuccessful.

329. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cuban Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-2062. Secret. Sent to Martin through John H. Crimmins, Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs. Washington, April 19, 1962. SUBJECT The Cuban Exile Community, the Cuban Revolutionary Council, and Dr. Miro Cardona

The Cuban exile community is experiencing a deep sense of frustration and impatience over what it considers “inactivity” regarding the overthrow of the Castro regime. The steps taken at Punta del Este to isolate Cuba and our imposing the trade embargo have stimulated widespread expectations that the “next logical step”, i.e., some sort of military action against Cuba, would soon follow. During the intervening weeks the CRC and Dr. Miro Cardona have become the objects of considerable criticism for having failed to convince the United States to embark on a military operations program. Two member organizations have already left the CRC and a third will probably do so within the next few days. The CRC and Dr. Miro are consequently finding themselves in an increasingly precarious position.

Dr. Miro is striving to keep the CRC together. Motivated largely by ambition to be the main instrument of Castroʼs overthrow (and perhaps his successor), Dr. Miro is also deeply impressed by the Presidentʼs recent urging that he remain at his post. In a lengthy telephone conversation with him today, however, I gained the impression that he would cease his efforts, resign gracefully and permit the CRC to disintegrate if the Department indicated such a course were desirable. He suggested that he quietly come to Washington in the near future and discuss the matter personally with me.

During a recent meeting, representatives of another Agency indicated that it might be timely to review our relationship with the CRC and Dr. Miro. They are concerned, I believe, that our present relationship presents security and control hazards for their operational requirements.

I view the CRC as of declining usefulness to us as long as the factionalism continues, and see little prospect of the present conflicts abating.

Recommendations:In an April 20 covering memorandum to Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Martin indicated that, based on earlier conversations with Johnson and Ralph Dungan, Martin had approved Hurwitchʼs recommendations. On April 30, however, Hurwitch sent a note to Goodwin in which he observed that the CIA seemed to have had a change of heart concerning Miro Cardona and the CRC. [text not declassified] In light of those developments, Hurwitch felt that it would be “prudent to go slow for the time being about discouraging Miro and the CRC” until the CIA attitude on the issue was clearer. (Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations)

1. That you authorize me to initiate discussions at the working level with appropriate officers of another Agency with a view toward withdrawing U.S. covert support of the CRC. 2. That you authorize me to discourage Dr. Miro tactfully, on appropriate occasions, from his efforts to hold the CRC together and from continuing as its head.

330. Current Intelligence MemorandumSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1/62-9/62. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA. A handwritten note on the source text indicates the memorandum was sent to McGeorge Bundy and President Kennedy on April 26. OCI 1265/62 Washington, April 25, 1962. SUBJECT The Economic Situation in Cuba 1. The economic section, (see attached Annex),Not printed. of NIE 85-62, “The Situation and Prospects in Cuba,” 21 March 1962,Document 315. remains valid. In these paragraphs we said that, despite record exports of 6.4 million metric tons of sugar, 1961 was a year of economic decline in Cuba. The reasons for this were complex, but among the most important were the fact that lower prices and the shift of the largest proportion of sales from the US to the Bloc brought no more returns than a normal crop and the lowest amount of convertible exchange in modern Cuban history. Cuba obtained some foodstuffs and other consumersʼ goods from the Bloc, but not in the quantity or of the quality of those previously imported from the US. During the first half of 1961 there was an acute shortage of industrial raw materials, but much more serious was the accelerated depreciation of the Cuban industrial plant, including transportation facilities, for want of replacement parts. Bloc credits promised—$357 million for new industrial plants—have thus far had little effect on the economy. The Soviet credits, which make up $200 million of the total, are mainly for industrial and mineral processing plants which are not expected to become operational until 1964-1965. In addition, of course, there have been dislocations due to the reorganization of the economy and the shortage of managerial talent. None of these adverse factors have been or are likely soon to be corrected. 2. We estimated in NIE 85-62 that the Cuban economy would continue to face problems in 1962 like those which caused the decline in 1961. Evidence continues to come in in support of this judgment. Indications are that the sugar cane harvest—still not completed—will be about 4.5 million metric tons, as compared with 6.6 in 1961 and an annual average of 5.6 million tons in the period 1957-1960. Cuba is curtailing its commitments to export to the Bloc in order to maintain the level of sales to the Free World. We believe it unlikely that Cubaʼs earnings of convertible exchange from all sources will be sufficient to prevent a net worsening of its convertible exchange position during 1962. This and other restrictions on Cubaʼs capacity to import will seriously hamper the Cuban economy during 1962, and it is likely that the total output of the Cuban economy in 1962 will be below the 1961 level. 3. Castroʼs recent offer to release the Bay of Pigs prisoners for ransom was probably motivated by his interest in finding additional foreign exchange, as well as by reasons of propaganda. 4. Beyond 1962, the development of the Cuban economy will depend not only on the rate at which capital goods are made available under Bloc credits, but also on the success of the regimeʼs efforts to expand and diversify agricultural production. We believe that Bloc economic commitments to Cuba were seriously made and that the flow of capital goods from the Bloc is likely to increase substantially by the end of 1962. We think it likely that the industrial area of the Cuban economy will begin to expand in 1963, although these sectors most reliant on US replacement parts may continue to deteriorate. In any event, the rate of expansion is likely to be limited by poor production in agriculture. Such expansion will not, however, affect the welfare of the individual Cuban for some time. At any time, of course, the Bloc could take more extensive action to raise Cubaʼs levels of consumption, but there is no evidence that this is going to happen. 5. The prospect is for two or three years during which the Cuban people will be on short rations, both as to foodstuffs and other common consumer goods. Acknowledgement by Castro and other regime leaders of the countryʼs economic difficulties and the imposition of stringent food rationing in March are indicators of the seriousness of the problem. We believe that we can expect continued efforts to blame the deprivation which Cubans are subjected to upon the US. Castroʼs success in dealing with the political implications of the economic situation will be limited. Economic dislocations and deprivations are unlikely to affect the attitudes of pro-and anti-Castro groups, but they will probably make the bulk of the population less well disposed to the regime. Still, we do not foresee an economic situation in Cuba during the next two or three years which will be the critical factor in the ability of the Castro/Communist regime to maintain control of the country.

331. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. The memorandum apparently records a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). Washington, April 26, 1962. SUBJECT Cuba 1. General Lansdale reported on the activities as per the attached report.Not found attached. An apparent reference to Document 328. McCone expressed dissatisfaction with progress; stated nothing had been accomplished in putting Cubans in the Army for training and that no actions had been taken on matters decided two weeks ago. (In other words, I was very disagreeable.) McCone finally recommended more action; acceptance of attribution if necessary; establishment of training facilities; training of guerrillas and a more dynamic effort in the infiltration of both agents and guerrillas.

Action: A meeting should be arranged between McCone, Lansdale, and Harvey, immediately upon Harveyʼs return.

2. The Attorney General requested copies of the Daily Reports on the Opa Laka interrogation. General Taylor instructed Lansdale to prepare a summary of the reports, paying particular attention to specific items of information on complaints which were recurring in successive interviews. 3. General Taylor requested that Mr. Harvey attend the next meeting and report on agent activities. 4. General Taylor suggested that McCone review the memorandum summarizing “Communist Indoctrination of Latin America”Not found. with the President at the earliest opportunity. 5. NPIC made a most interesting presentation of the last Corona flight.

Action: McCone agreed to arrange briefing for the President at the earliest convenient time; also briefing for Macmillan when he is here, at a convenient time.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director

332. Memorandum From the Director of the Joint Staff (Riley) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations. Top Secret; Special Handling; Noforn. DJSM-572-62 Washington, May 1, 1962. SUBJECT Blockade of Cuba in reprisal for Soviet Actions in Berlin (S) 1. This paper is submitted in response to a request by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to determine the forces that would be required for an effective blockade of Cuba. Such a blockade might be ordered separately or in reprisal for Soviet actions in Berlin. 2. In view of the geographic location and insular nature of Cuba, together with the paucity of pro-Bloc air bases and effective resupply air routes, it is considered that a blockade which would preclude the export and import of the vital commodities necessary to the Cuban economy could be accomplished by maritime forces. Therefore, if directed to institute a blockade of Cuba, CINCLANT would initially put twelve (12) destroyers on perimeter patrol stations or eleven (11) destroyers on blockade stations for the control of specific harbors. These would be augmented by two (2) surveillance aircraft on air patrol stations. Fighter aircraft would be on call at Key West and Guantanamo and available to proceed to the assistance of the surveillance aircraft or destroyers in the event that the blockading forces were attacked by Cuban aircraft. 3. Detailed plans and instructions for the conduct of a blockade of Cuba are in existence. A sketch of the basic concept of the perimeter blockade stations is appended for information.Not printed. It is considered that an effective blockade can be readily accomplished with existing naval forces. (See Tab A for force totals.) Herbert D. RileyPrinted from a copy that indicates Admiral Riley signed the original.Vice Admiral, USN Tab A Blockade Forces Station Backup for Sustained Effort Total forces required: (For sustained effort) 12 Destroyers Perimeter Patrol 12 Destroyers for rotation 24 Destroyers 2 Surveillance Aircraft Air Patrol 10 Surveillance Aircraft 12 Surveillance Aircraft 1 Fighter Squadron On call at Key West (existing) None required 2 Fighter Squadrons 1 Fighter Squadron On call at Guantanamo (existing) None required

333. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and McCone. One copy was kept by Lansdale. Washington, May 3, 1962. SUBJECT Operation Mongoose, 27 April-3 May

The following are the significant highlights of Operation Mongoose for the week:

CIA. Mr. William Harvey has returned from his field trip and is to give his report directly to the Special Group.

In taking measure of where we stand on our tasks, I believe it pertinent to note that CIA now has largely solved its difficult organizational and personnel staffing problems which impeded sound planning and actions as the project was launched. CIA is now moving ahead with the intelligence collection needed to construct appropriate political, psychological and resistance operations to win our goal. In my opinion, CIA deserves to be commended for this difficult regrouping and “re-tooling”; the somewhat disappointing score in attempted operations during this period should consider this.

Now that CIA is ready to move into the fuller operational phase we require, we must recognize that there is inevitably the risk of visibility and audibility. CIA must undertake practical projects, such as paramilitary training, on a more intensive scale, as basic to fulfilling assignments inside Cuba. Such projects must be backed with firmness from the policy level, in the face of possible adverse events of times, if we are to succeed. Also, such projects are going to require further help from Defense; the Defense staff is awaiting definite requests from CIA.

Brigade Prisoners. State reports that the Families Committee has decided to work for the release of the prisoners as a body instead of in small groups or individuals and has signed a three-months contract with John Price Jones to try to raise the $62-million ransom. James Fusca remains as a personal advisor to the Committee chairman.

Studies. The series of planning papers noted in my report last week are nearing completion by the several Departments and Agencies; for example, Defense has just completed its part of the Blockade study.Document 332. I plan to collate these papers and forward to the Special Group (Augmented) as each series is completed.

334. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Central Intelligence Agency DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting was apparently a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). Washington, May 4, 1962.

MEMORANDUM ON OPERATION MONGOOSE, MEETING HELD THURSDAY, MAY 3, 1962

General Lansdale reported in writing, as per the attached.Not found attached. An apparent reference to Lansdaleʼs May 3 report, Document 333. Harvey made a long oral report, summarizing all actions taken. No additional actions were authorized at this time.

Defense was questioned about taking Cubans into the army and advised that efforts to do this should be accelerated. Harvey reported on two television intrusions into Cuba and the purpose of this was questioned by the group.

Action: This should be examined and an explanation made as to (a) exactly how it is done, and (b) the value from the standpoint of our purpose.

Lansdale and Harvey were questioned re possible contact with top people in the Cuban government. There is a growing feeling that we should find a way to make such contacts to determine the possibility of a schism existing between various factions in the Castro regime.

Action: McCone should discuss with Helms and Harvey to see what positive steps can be taken in this direction.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

335. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/5-362. Top Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Rio de Janeiro, May 3, 1962, noon.

2577. Eyes only Secretary and Martin. Reference: Deptel 2979.Document 326. After some delay because his and my travels Brasilia and Rio, finally able discuss reference telegram subject privately with Foreign Minister Dantas May 2. He reports that Ambassador Bastile Pinto saw Fidel privately immediately after Easter. Following Dantasʼ instructions, he said that GOB had followed closely apparent internal crisis between Barbudos and old line communist party group. Said that GOB had taken well known line at Punta del Este because it envisaged possibility of Cuban evolution direction of nationalist socialism not linked to Soviets, and thought Fidel likely leader that direction. Whole idea GOB proposal statute of limitations was to leave such an alternative open to Cuba instead of Soviet Bloc as only option. GOB therefore wanted to know whether and how Brazil might be useful, since the only significant channel left for Cuba to West.

Fidelʼs response was a statement of cordial appreciation of the conversation. He admitted increasing dificulties between him and party group. He welcomed opportunity for this discussion with Ambassador and would present concrete suggestions soon.

Above completes report on Havana conversation. Dantas commented that Fidel would have difficulty in formulating precise suggestions, and he could not tell from report whether and when something would be forthcoming. He reemphasized what he had told Secretary concerning impossibility return to pre-revolutionary status quo based on Miami refugees but barely possible evolution toward nationalist type of socialism cut off from Soviet bloc in which some ex-Fidelist refugees might be willing participate.

Gordon

336. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 December 1961-30 June 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Filed with materials relating to McConeʼs meetings with the President, which suggests that he used the memorandum to brief President Kennedy on Operation Mongoose. Washington, May 7, 1962. SUBJECT Operation Mongoose 1. Three controlled resistance teams equipped with communications equipment now in Cuba. 2. Five or six additional teams are expected to be infiltrated during May. 3. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] 4. Extensive penetrations into Cuban-Latin American activities. Legal travelers into Cuba from innumerable Western European and Latin American countries are being used. 5. [3 lines of source text not declassified] In addition the Opa Laka interrogation center is producing about 200 intelligence reports each week which are of value and some 300 Cuban agents in Miami are assembling substantial quantities of important intelligence from the refugee colony. 6. Regular U-2 missions are run over Cuba. 90% to 95% of all Cuban territory has been photographed. 14,000 frames have been carefully studied by the interpretation center during the past three weeks to verify Order of Battle information. Every report of construction, armament locations, gossip about missiles, etc., is immediately studied and, if necessary, new photographs taken to verify our dispute. John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

337. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 11,DCI (Helms) Chrono, Jan-July 1967. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Sheffield Edwards, CIA Director of Security. The memorandum was sent to Attorney General Kennedy on May 15 under cover of a memorandum from Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel of the CIA, in which Houston noted that the memorandum printed here was prepared at Kennedyʼs request, and set forth the facts on which Edwards and Houston had briefed the Attorney General on May 7. A handwritten note by Richard Helms on the copy of the covering memorandum found in CIA files reads: “Sen. Kennedy read this on 8 March ʼ67.” An August 16, 1963, memorandum from Helms, then Deputy Director for Plans, to McCone concerning Sam Giancana concluded that the May 14 memorandum prepared by Edwards was the only written information available on the CIA relationship with Giancana. (Ibid.) Washington, May 14, 1962. SUBJECT Arthur James Balletti et al—Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications 1. This memorandum for the record is prepared at the request of the Attorney General of the United States following a complete oral briefing of him relative to a sensitive CIA operation conducted during the period approximately August 1960 to May 1961.

The sensitive operation referred to was described more explicitly in a report prepared by the Inspector General of the CIA on April 25, 1967. According to the report, “CIA twice (first in early 1961 and again in early 1962) supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate members working on behalf of CIA in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro.” (Ibid., DCI Files: Job 85-00664R, Box 8, HS/CSG2679, Project Amlash) The body of the report, which was based largely upon interviews with CIA officials with knowledge of these abortive attempts to assassinate Castro, indicates in fact that three such attempts were made, the first in late February-early March, a second in late March-early April, and a third attempt in April-June 1962. The Inspector Generalʼs report on these attempts to assassinate Castro was supplied in 1975 to the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities and the details are summarized and supplemented by additional testimony taken by the committee in the interim report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, published by the committee in November 1975, pp. 79-85. Documentation generated by the committee in the course of its investigations is in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 233, JFK Collection.

The JFK Collection also contains a record of a conversation on November 9, 1961, between President Kennedy and Tad Szulc of The New York Times during which Szulc reported that President Kennedy asked him: “What would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated?” Szulc indicated that he felt that would be a terrible idea and Kennedy responded, “Iʼm glad you feel the same way.” (Ibid.; see the Supplement)

In August 1960 the undersigned was approached by Mr. Richard Bissell then Deputy Director for Plans of CIA to explore the possibility of mounting this sensitive operation against Fidel Castro. It was thought that certain gambling interests which had formerly been active in Cuba might be willing and able to assist and further, might have both intelligence assets in Cuba and communications between Miami, Florida and Cuba. Accordingly, Mr. Robert Maheu, a private investigator of the firm of Maheu and King was approached by the undersigned and asked to establish contact with a member or members of the gambling syndicate to explore their capabilities. Mr. Maheu was known to have accounts with several prominent business men and organizations in the United States. Maheu was to make his approach to the syndicate as appearing to represent big business organizations which wished to protect their interests in Cuba. Mr. Maheu accordingly met and established contact with one John Rosselli of Los Angeles. Mr. Rosselli showed interest in the possibility and indicated he had some contacts in Miami that he might use. Maheu reported that John Rosselli said he was not interested in any remuneration but would seek to establish capabilities in Cuba to perform the desired project. Towards the end of September Mr. Maheu and Mr. Rosselli proceeded to Miami where, as reported, Maheu was introduced to Sam Giancana of Chicago. Sam Giancana arranged for Maheu and Rosselli to meet with a “courier” who was going back and forth to Havana. From information received back by the courier the proposed operation appeared to be feasible and it was decided to obtain an official Agency approval in this regard. A figure of one hundred fifty thousand dollars was set by the Agency as a payment to be made on completion of the operation and to be paid only to the principal or principals who would conduct the operation in Cuba. Maheu reported that Rosselli and Giancana emphatically stated that they wished no part of any payment. The undersigned then briefed the proper senior officials of this Agency on the proposal. Knowledge of this project during its life was kept to a total of six persons and never became a part of the project current at the time for the invasion of Cuba and there were no memoranda on the project nor were there other written documents or agreements. The project was duly orally approved by the said senior officials of the Agency. 2. Rosselli and Maheu spent considerable time in Miami talking with the courier. Sam Giancana was present during parts of these meetings. Several months after this period Maheu told me that Sam Giancana had asked him to put a listening device in the room of one Phyllis McGuire, reported to be the mistress of Giancana. At that time it was reported to me that Maheu passed the matter over to one Edward Du Boise, another private investigator. It appears that Arthur James Balletti was discovered in the act of installing the listening device and was arrested by the Sheriff in Las Vegas, Nevada. Maheu reported to me that he had referred the matter to Edward Du Boise on behalf of Sam Giancana. At the time of the incident neither this Agency nor the undersigned knew of the proposed technical installation. Maheu stated that Sam Giancana thought that Phyllis McGuire might know of the proposed operation and might pass on the information to one Dan Rowan, another friend of McGuireʼs. At the time that Maheu reported this to the undersigned he reported he was under surveillance by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who, he thought, were exploring his association with John Rosselli and Sam Giancana incident to the project. I told Maheu that if he was formally approached by the FBI, he could refer them to me to be briefed that he was engaged in an intelligence operation directed at Cuba. 3. During the period from September on through April efforts were continued by Rosselli and Maheu to proceed with the operation. The first principal in Cuba withdrew and another principal was selected as has been briefed to The Attorney General. Ten thousand dollars was passed for expenses to the second principal. He was further furnished with approximately one thousand dollars worth of communications equipment to establish communications between his headquarters in Miami and assets in Cuba. No monies were ever paid to Rosselli and Giancana. Maheu was paid part of his expense money during the periods that he was in Miami. After the failure of the invasion of Cuba word was sent through Maheu to Rosselli to call off the operation and Rosselli was told to tell his principal that the proposal to pay one hundred fifty thousand dollars for completion of the operation had been definitely withdrawn. 4. In all this period it has been definitely established from other sources that the Cuban principals involved never discovered or believed that there was other than business and syndicate interest in the project. To the knowledge of the undersigned there were no “leaks” of any information concerning the project in the Cuban community in Miami or in Cuba. 5. I have no proof but it is my conclusion that Rosselli and Giancana guessed or assumed that CIA was behind the project. I never met either of them. 6. Throughout the entire period of the project John Rosselli was the dominant figure in directing action to the Cuban principals. Reasonable monitoring of his activities indicated that he gave his best efforts to carrying out the project without requiring any commitments for himself, financial or otherwise. 7. In view of the extreme sensitivity of the information set forth above, only one additional copy of this memorandum has been made and will be retained by the Agency. Sheffield EdwardsPrinted from a copy that indicates Edwards signed the original.

338. Priority Operations Schedule for Operation Mongoose

Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose, Phase I. Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling. Prepared by Lansdale. No covering memorandum indicating distribution has been found. The document is stamped to indicate that 12 copies were prepared. A handwritten notation indicates that the source text was Martinʼs copy. According to a brief memorandum prepared by McCone, the Special Group (Augmented) accepted the schedule on May 17 “for review, study and decision at the meeting on Thursday, May 24.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers) See the Supplement. No record of the May 24 meeting has been found.

A May 30 memorandum from Martin to Johnson, prepared by Hurwitch, establishes that the schedule of assigned tasks in the schedule printed here was distributed to the concerned agencies, but it was not discussed in advance by the operations group of project officers, such as Hurwitch and Craig. Martin felt that a number of the tasks assigned to the Department were “too vague,” and he added that “in the absence of specifics it is not possible to calculate the risk and the cost to the United States of a particular action.” He made reference to task #1, calling for action to be stimulated within the OAS. Such action, he noted, “could well place an intolerable strain upon the inter-American machinery, and could thus result in a net advantage for Castro.” Martin concluded that assigned tasks should be thoroughly discussed within the operations group before submission for policy consideration to the Special Group (Augmented). (Ibid.)

Washington, May 17, 1962.

OPERATION MONGOOSE PRIORITY OPERATIONS SCHEDULE

21 May-30 June 1962

Task Purpose Considerations Political 1. Obtain some special and significant action within the OAS organization against the Castro-Communist regime. (State) To produce material for psychological impact on Cuba. Members of OAS need to be inspired to push some special action through. Current events offer a number of opportunities for exploitation through such OAS bodies as the Commission on Human Rights, the Peace Committee, the Council of Jurists, and the Childrenʼs Institute, as well as the Special Consultative Committee on Security. 2. Activate key public leaders in Latin America to make timely and strong statements about the Castro-Communist threat to the Hemisphere, the failures of the regime towards Cuban workers, students, farmers, and freedom. (State) To produce material for psychological impact on Cuba. Under the Ambassadorʼs initiative, each Country Team by now has the means to generate more open and active commitment of Latin American political, intellectual, labor, youth, religious, and military leaders. One significant action in each Latin American country, for hard impact on Cuba, is a minimum need. 3. [6½ lines of source text not declassified] To produce material for major psychological impact on Cuba, undermining the power and prestige of the hierarchy of the Castro regime. [1 paragraph (24 lines of source text) not declassified] 4. Develop a suggested platform of Cuban political-economic objectives for possible adoption by Cubans in freeing their country. (State) For the guidance of Operation Mongoose personnel, particularly in the selection and readying of agents to ensure that they are committed to acceptable political beliefs before introduction into Cuba. There are a number of statements of Cuban political objectives, including drafts by State and CIA. What is needed now, and promptly, is a single working document for the guidance of U.S. operational staffs. 5. Assure that optimum values are obtained from the CRC and Cuban refugee groups in the U.S. (CIA) These Cuban external groups have a vital role for propaganda impact inside Cuba. We must have purposeful, singleness of guidance and monitoring of their activities to support the project. CIA and State both have had roles with the CRC and others. Cuban leaders also make contact at a number of high offices of the U.S. government. For the good of the U.S., the Cuban refugees, and our project, there must be coordinated management. The Director, Central Intelligence, should have this responsibility, particularly with leaders of the stature of Dr. Jose Miro Cardona. Psychological 6. Steer psychological-propaganda Working Group for day-to-day Cuba operations. (State) To assure full consideration of material, as collected, in terms of special psychological-propaganda use against the Cuban regime, and to inform the public. This has been a normal State-chaired working group. It needs to be sharply geared to the projectʼs operations, including consideration of declassifying material for operational use. Defense should be added to the membership. It is possible that USIA should assume leadership. 7. Make strong, repetitive theme on radio broadcasts to Cuba of the overwhelming disapproval throughout the Western Hemisphere of the Castro-Communist regime, along with sympathy for the captive Cubans. (USIA) To undermine Castroʼs psychological basis of control over the Cuban people and the lower echelons of the regimeʼs bureaucracy. This is to make full use of material produced by actions in the Western Hemisphere. 8. Give fullest play into Cuba (and the Western Hemisphere) of Cuban refugees and defectors as dramatic witness against the Castro-Communist regime. (USIA) To undermine Castroʼs psychological basis of control and to build the tone for anti-Castro actions in the Western Hemisphere. Note the inclusion of defectors in this task; it is still a CIA task to produce the defectors. Also, this task includes exploitation of Dr. Miro Cardonaʼs intensely moving statement at the end of the Armstrong Circle Theater drama “Anatomy of Betrayal.” 9. Ready the “Voice of Cuba” for radio broadcast. (CIA) To provide a ready capability for giving a “voice” to encourage resistance elements inside Cuba and to undermine the morale of the Castro regime. Initially, this would be for brief news broadcasts of local events inside Cuba, simulating a location in Cuba, but actually located off-shore. A plan of how best to do this, with the proposed program format, is needed to obtain policy decision. 10. Ready a propaganda action, for balloon delivery. (CIA) To provide a ready capability for low-risk propaganda dissemination inside Cuba. A plan of how to do this, including types of propaganda content (with thought given for delivery of symbolic gifts, such as scarce foods or medicines, as well as leaflets), is required for decision. It is noted that USIA has a brief recording of Castroʼs broadcasts, sharply contrasting his promises when he took power with what he said when he admitted his Communist affiliation; these could be put on cheap plastic discs and into leaflets. 11. Deliver copies of Time magazine, with Blas Roca cover story, into Cuba. (CIA) To make the truth available to the Cuban people about the Communist regime. This is seen as smuggling in copies, for passing from hand-to-hand. The smuggling could be done by third-nationals. 12. Intensify psychological effort at Guantanamo. (Defense) To make fullest possible use of the existing Cuban labor population on the base. Activities include sports broadcasts, in Spanish, over the base radio station on ball games, news broadcasts using regular wire service news, and making Spanish-language periodicals and literature available for reading on base. USIA has a number of selected titles, published in Mexico and Rio, for stocking base libraries. Also, USIA has a number of VOA “backgrounders” and refugee interviews on tape which could be used for radio broadcasts to Cuban employees on the base. 13. Create musical and visual symbols to express anti-regime sentiments. (USIA) To provide catchy expressions of popular resistance against the Communist regime. New words to a favorite song, a new tune, a visual symbol for wall-painting, a hand symbol as easy to do as “V for Victory,” are the types of expressions sought. USIA should call on CIA for assistance, since some thought has been given to this already. 14. Select a sabotage operation. (CIA) To make a psychological impact upon the regime and public, which symbolizes popular resistance to the regime and which causes talk encouraging to resistance. CIA should select a feasible sabotage operation, a “showy” one against the regime, but not against the people, and present a specific proposal for approval. Intelligence 15. Make a special effort to step-up the infiltration of teams. (CIA) To exploit recent experience in order to ensure that there is adequate coverage inside Cuba to permit the firm end-of-July intelligence estimate required for further decisions. Feasibility depends on CIAʼs judgment, both operationally and for depth of intelligence required. The schedule was for 14 teams, 2 singleton agents, 14 third-country residents, and 20 third-country legal travellers by the end of May. 16. Intensify use of third-country collection for specific psychological information which can be exploited in propaganda. (CIA) To provide material for operations putting pressure on the Castro regime inside Cuba, and for use on the OAS-UN opinion stage. Really current “inside” news tips can do most to undermine the regimeʼs morale and interest the Cuban public. Classification may be a problem but this use must be pressed as a priority. 17. Intensify the exploitation of the intelligence potential which exists on the base at Guantanamo. (Defense) To take the fullest possible advantage of this open U.S. “listening post” on Cuban soil. ONI can call upon CIA for assistance. A communication link to Miami would permit use of extensive CIA background information available there and leads for further exploitation, not only for positive intelligence, but also for counter-intelligence. A number of further steps are possible. 18. Get ready for air re-supply missions. (CIA) To have a ready capability for re-supply of agent teams inside Cuba when needed. Since the Air Force has readied a capability for this task and since it is still desired that CIA mount such operations with Cuban or Latin American personnel, an acceptable means must be found promptly. CIA, with Defense assistance, as a priority will review feasible means of mounting these operations, and recommend the most practical method for a policy decision. Military 19. Develop a real dual-purpose capability of intelligence teams in building up the agent pool for infiltration. (CIA) To assure that skills needed for guerrilla operations are present inside Cuba, so that paramilitary actions can be initiated when the decision is made. While CIA is currently carrying out this task, it is worth CIA taking a further hard look at its training program to anticipate needs. If larger groups of action types are to be trained for possible introduction in September, it is known that at least 3 months “lead time” is required for minimum selection and training. That means now. It is possible that Defense can be of far more help than called upon at present. Also, it is possible that further policy guidance might be required. 20. Induct Cubans into the U.S. Armed Forces for training. (Defense) To fulfill Cuba exile leadership desires and to build up a potential reserve for possible future military action inside Cuba. Economic 21. Tighten effect of sanctions by increased effort to enlist further participation by NATO nations, Mexico, Japan, and others. (State) To further restrict Cubaʼs economy. Penetrate black market operations in Cuba for economic sabotage. (CIA) To worsen Cubaʼs economic situation. For instance, gangster elements should offer a possible means to accomplish this task, particularly in Cuban cities. This could be a test mission for alleged resistance cells, without undue risk to “noise level.” [4 lines of source text not declassified] To obtain policy approval for creating economic chaos inside Cuba. Cubaʼs economy is the Castro-Communist regimeʼs greatest vulnerability and is open to much greater exploitation.

339. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Goodwin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Cuban Project-1962. Top Secret. Washington, May 24, 1962. SUBJECT Cuba

The growing evidence of strains within the internal power structure of Cuba seems to me to offer an opportunity for a tentative probe designed to test the possibility of splitting the Castro revolutionaries from the old line communists (those who did not participate in the early stages of the revolution).

I will not bother to summarize the intelligence information which you have seen. My judgment of that information is that there is strain between the revolutionaries and the old-line communists; a strain based much more on rivalry for power than on ideological differences. The key figures in this struggle are probably Raul Castro and possibly Che Guevara, although Che is very much behind the scene. I would guess that these people fear that the old-line communists, with tacit Moscow-backing, are trying to moderate the power of Fidel and consequently of their group, and that they have transmitted these fears to Fidel.

Although it would be foolish to speculate that these relations are at the breaking point, I have always felt that putting an end to Soviet control in Cuba would more probably come (if it comes at all) from a split in the top leadership than from a popular revolution. Of course, the greatest obstacle to this is the complete dependence of Cuba on the Soviet Union for subsistence and the undoubted feeling that were the Soviet Union to be antagonized Cuba would have no place to go for support.

Therefore, I would suggest an approach to Castro along the following lines: that whatever our past policies we are sympathetic to the original stated aims of the Cuban revolution—social reform and an end to dictatorship—and we are confident that the questions of property which emerged from the revolution can be amicably negotiated; that the reason for our concern is and has been the Soviet control over Cuba which we have always believed is inimical to Castroʼs own desires and to the aims of the revolution; that were Castro to disengage himself from the communists we would be willing to re-establish normal commercial relations with his revolutionary government and welcome participation in Inter-American efforts including the Alliance for Progress.

This is a brief summary of the sort of approach I believe we should consider. There are two critical items in this proposal: 1. The content of the approach: It must be moderate and face-saving for Castro. It must work to eliminate all fears that we would try to throw out Castro and his revolutionaries or would insist on return of properties, etc. It must offer a way to disengage with dignity and with minimum fear of the consequences. This deserves a great deal of thought including the possibility of some multi-nation guarantee offered to Castro. Once he has broken we would, of course, reconsider this policy. 2. The method of approach: The best method, I believe, would be through a European embassy or through the Cuban Ambassador to the UN, who we have reason to believe is loyal to Fidel and not to communism. Of course, the Cubans should not be able to prove a US initiative but the contact must have credibility. I like the UN idea because of our capacity to monitor communications between New York and Havana.

I strongly believe that our contacts should not be through other Latin American nations. The temptation to play internal politics with such a “mediation” role now or in the future will be enormous. In addition, Latin American sincerity and concepts of security are notoriously poor. I believe we would be really asking for trouble, in the form of future exposure, were we to rely on Latins for this project; especially the Brazilians.

340. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose, Phase I. Top Secret; Sensitive; Noforn; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and McCone, and one copy was kept by Lansdale. Washington, May 31, 1962.

[Here follow operational details relating to intelligence, economic pressure, propaganda, and an incident at Guantanamo.]

Fracturing the Regime has been given priority attention by CIA. A senior case officer has been assigned full-time to this specific action, and has preferential use of CIA assets. Of 24 desirable defection targets,CIA has found several who seem vulnerable [1 line of source text not declassified].

Priority Operations Schedule of 21 May,Document 338. seeking some positive actions in behalf of our project during the next several weeks, has brought a very healthy response from CIA and USIA. The CIA determination to meet the challenge has surfaced four policy-type questions which I note for you on behalf of CIA:This copy of the memorandum, which is marked as Johnsonʼs copy, was annotated by Johnson in the margin as follows: after item 1), relating to Task 7: “OK State”; after item 2), relating to Task 10: “No” and an illegible word; after item 3), relating to Task 19: “further planning” and Johnson wrote in “about 10” in place of the word “some” in the first line of the text; and after item 4), relating to Task 23: “submit plan.” 1) Task 7, “Voice of Free Cuba,” is almost immediately feasible, if the Group will approve CIA arranging with Navy for use of a submarine. CIA has firm plans for worrying the Communist regime through broadcasts which would appear to come from local dissident groups actively planning to harass the regime. 2) Task 10, CIA is prepared to disseminate leaflets on Castroʼs failure to the Cuban population via balloon with a view of increasing instability of the Communist machine. The technique is tested and CIA has plans to operate from a surface ship in international waters. The Group is asked to approve the idea, including Navy support. This could be operating in time to exploit the 26 July anniversary of Castroʼs attack upon government forces at Santiago de Cuba in 1953, for “the revolution” he has now betrayed. 3) Task 19, CIA believes it can recruit some 20-man teams for possible use in beefing up resistance groups within Cuba. Group approval is asked for Defense support in training, holding, logistics. The “noise level” hazard is noted, but this special project could be almost unnoticed if timed with proposed U.S. military enlistment of Cubans. 4) [4 lines of source text not declassified]

Other Tasks.

I note here that CIA does not feel it has the operational means to undertake Task No. 22, black-market activities, at this time. Further that Task No. 11, Time magazine dissemination, would require operational facilities not now available. I accept indefinite deferral of Task No. 22 and scrubbing of Task No. 11 on this basis.

The Department of State reaction, to my effort to get the U.S. into priority actions towards our projectʼs goals, has been disappointing to me thus far. Apparently, my schedule of targets for special efforts is accepted only as it may fit into long-range, existing programs already under way. If this is the theory of our project, I believe that the project then becomes only a special reporting device and not a special U.S. effort to win the goal of helping the Cubans recapture their country from a gang of Communists.

341. Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose. Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling. No drafting information appears on the source text, but internal evidence suggests that the memorandum was prepared by Lansdale, as Chief of Operations. Washington, May 31, 1962. SUBJECT US Policy in the Event USSR Establishes a Base(s) in Cuba 1. At the 22 March meeting, Mr. Robert Kennedy asked the Special Group (Augmented)—what would be an appropriate course of action for the United States to take in the event that the Soviets establish a military base in Cuba. 2. The Department of Defense is most desirous that a considered response to this question be prepared by each agency concerned, for the establishment of a Soviet military base(s) of any kind in Cuba would increase our national vulnerability and defense costs as forces would have to be developed or shifted to meet this threat from the South.CIA Information Report no. K-3,216,423, dated May 31, circulated a report of a possible Soviet submarine base being built on the coast of Cuba in Oriente Province. (Ibid.) At the same time, it is logical to assume that a Soviet military base in Cuba would result in further economic, managerial and technical assistance for Cuba which would virtually assure, for the foreseeable future, the continuation of the Cuban-Communist base of operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion throughout the entire Western Hemisphere. 3. Since the Special Group (Augmented) has assumed that overt US military force will have to be used to end Communist control of Cuba, Mr. Kennedyʼs question is particularly pertinent. For should the Soviets choose to exercise their option of establishing a military base under a Soviet flag in Cuba, it is possible that this would act to prevent any future US decision to intervene with US military force, just as the Soviets have refrained from applying military force against countries on which US bases are established. 4. Furthermore, establishment of a military base(s) in Cuba would cost the Soviets very little in terms of world public opinion. For example, they could explain that they were simply taking a page from our book, and would remove their base(s) from Cuba if we would remove ours from Berlin, Turkey or Formosa. 5. Consequently, I believe national security considerations require that all participating agencies prepare a written response to Mr. Robert Kennedyʼs question. I recommend that these responses be prepared in time for presentation at our next meeting.

342. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Anderson) to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba 342.18. Top Secret. Washington, June 5, 1962.

JCSM-426-62

SUBJECT Cubans in the US Armed Forces (U) 1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 21 May 1962,Not found. on the above subject, in which it was requested that the necessary detailed plans be developed to implement the Presidentʼs instructions that selected Cuban refugees be inducted into the US Armed Forces. 2. The attached plan,Not printed. which follows the basic planning guidance provided, has been developed. The plan requires the lowering of current induction standards to permit induction of those individuals who have dependents and who do not possess the required facility in the English language. These individuals will be organized into Cuban units through basic and advanced individual training and at the end of that time will either be selected for further special forces type training, integrated into regular units or separated for the convenience of the government.The attached plan envisioned that approximately 3,000 Cuban refugees in the 17-35 age bracket would volunteer for induction and training, and that 1,500 of that total would meet the reduced standards for induction. 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the success of the plan is dependent upon overcoming the difficulties previously encountered. Although the lowering of induction standards will permit many to serve who otherwise would be ineligible and the Cuban unit type organization with special forces training may serve to stimulate greater interest, there still remains the problem of motivation for service in the US Armed Forces. Since no definitive objective for utilization of trained Cuban personnel has been established, it is anticipated that there still will be a distinct loss of interest when these personnel come to the full realization that they are not being trained specifically for return to Cuba. 4. Implementation of the attached plan will entail expenditure of funds which have not been budgeted for the coming fiscal year. The training of the Cuban refugees is considered an additional mission and, as such, will not contribute to the accomplishment of prior missions for which Service manpower ceilings have been authorized. It is, therefore, requested that necessary funds and personnel spaces be provided to implement the program, and that those Cubans inducted under this plan not be charged against current Service ceilings. Since the Army is best equipped to provide the type training envisioned, it is anticipated that primary responsibility for implementation of the plan will be placed with that Service.A June 6 covering memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Sam Wilson (USA) to Brigadier General George S. Brown, Military Assistant to Secretary McNamara, indicates that Lansdale had already discussed the plan with Gilpatric. The status of the project, Wilson noted, would be reported to General Taylor in the Special Group on June 7, and Taylor would then pass the information to the President “in view of latterʼs strong personal interest in this undertaking.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba 342.18) For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:GW Anderson

343. Notes on an Operations Group MeetingSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/6-762. Secret. Prepared by Hurwitch. Washington, June 7, 1962. 1. Lansdale accepted procedure of holding similar meetings for purpose of discussing plans and projects before submission Special Group. 2. Lansdale and to greater extent General Craig harbor notion that we can order other nations do our bidding. When we point out reluctance certain governments follow our lead, they urge a major psychological and political campaign within the country among labor, student and political groups to “force” the government to change its mind. 3. General Craig, particularly, remains convinced that Department is emphasizing “long range goals in the hemisphere” as compared to “priority for Cuba.” (Craig has just been promoted to Major General and will probably be transferred next month.) 4. Task 19For the tasks cited in the notes, see Document 338.—guerilla training of intelligence teams—requires careful consideration, with the Secretary, before reaching a decision. 5. Task 5—U.S. relations with the CRC—remains a State responsibility, reversing Lansdaleʼs original proposal. 6. Unconfirmed rumors brought by four recently-arrived Cuban refugees tell of a mid-June uprising in Cuba. To safe-guard against a premature uprising on the off-chance that there may be some truth in the stories, Dr. Miro plans to make a declarationA handwritten addition by Hurwitch at this point reads: “from Costa Rica”. characterizing the reports as rumors, urging the Cuban populace to be patient and await the day of liberation resulting from unified action.DOD is reviewing its contingency planning and reaction time in the event an uprising occurred. We have informed Lansdale that on the basis of information to date there appeared little likelihood of an uprising of proportions that might make U.S. military intervention politically feasible; i.e. a nation-wide revolt that seriously threatened the regime, where the opposition held areas and called for assistance.

344. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Walter Elder, McConeʼs Executive Assistant. Elderʼs memorandum apparently records the June 7 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). Washington, June 8, 1962.

Mongoose

General Lansdale made an oral report on this subject. He also, with certain support from the Attorney General, requested more active participation by the Department of State. The meeting agreed that the Department would furnish real support, appoint a full-time senior officer, and present action proposals.

There was also some discussion of contingency planning against the possibility of widespread revolt in Cuba. General Craig, on behalf of the Department of Defense, said that there were contingency plans for use of US forces.

WElder

345. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations. Top Secret; Sensitive; Noforn; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and McCone. One copy was kept by Lansdale. Washington, June 8, 1962. SUBJECT Status of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose

At your 26 April meeting, I noted that several studies were in preparation, as had been requested in connection with Operation Mongoose. The following is a report on the status of each study.

Blockade of Cuba.

Defense was asked to determine how a blockade could be imposed on Cuba, if it were decided to do so. CIA was asked to estimate the effects of such a blockade on Cuba.

The Defense and CIA studies have been completed and are attached hereto.Not found attached. The CIA study has not been found. For text of the Department of Defense response, see Document 332. The Defense representative notes that the blockade study was submitted in response to a stated problem, and that it is neither a Defense nor JCS recommendation for the United States to undertake this course of action. If such a course of action were decided upon, it would be an act of war.

Cubans in the U.S. Armed Forces.

The Defense plan for taking Cubans into the U.S. Armed Forces,See Document 342. on a more liberal basis than in the past, is being submitted separately, through appropriate channels.

List of Cuban Anti-Castro Organizations.An apparent reference to the memorandum listing principal organizations and personalities within the Cuban exile movement sent on May 3 by McCone to General Taylor. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Exiles 1/62-10/62)

Task completed. The Director, Central Intelligence, provided copies to members.

Security Committee, OAS.

A continuing task, in which the Department of State has noted that it will keep Operation Mongoose informed of significant developments as they occur. The Special Consultative Committee on Security submitted its initial General Report to the Council of the OAS (COAS), 1 May.For text of the initial report of the Special Consultative Committee, submitted to the Council of the OAS on April 30, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 361-366. The COAS distributed copies to OAS member governments, with a request for observations within forty-five (45) days.

Evidence on Supporting Military Facilities in Cuba.

This task arose during a discussion of the reported construction of underground hangars, storage sites, etc., in Cuba. Defense and CIA were tasked with undertaking joint analysis of all such reports. The joint analysis was initiated promptly and continues. Results are reflected in the daily and weekly summaries published by CIA for Operation Mongoose.

Census of Hemisphere Travellers to Cuba.

In progress. Action has been taken to stimulate and systematize reporting; one of CIAʼs Operation Mongoose officers made a field trip to all Central American countries, Colombia, and Venezuela for this purpose; remaining Latin American visits are in progress. CIA is collecting and assessing information for a meaningful report.

“Patrol Posts” in Caribbean, with Particular Reference to Haiti and Dominican Republic.

Completed. Based upon Cuban capabilities, the likely nature of the threat, actions taken by the U.S. to offer assistance, and status of U.S. forces in the Caribbean, Defense recommends no further action at this time to establish “Patrol Posts.” Defense points out that the requirement for a facility in Haiti, presented to State of 6 March 1962,Letter from Gilpatric to Rusk, March 6. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Haiti 370.02) would facilitate the establishment of a “patrol post.” In an interim reply of 20 March 1962Letter from Johnson to Gilpatric, March 20. (Ibid.) State indicated the underlying problems with respect to U.S. policy toward the Duvalier regime. Defense reports that State is conducting an analysis of this policy question.

U.S. Policy in the Event USSR Establishes a Base in Cuba.

As noted at the 7 June meeting, this is still open. Mr. Gilpatric asked that the Defense paper,Document 342. reminding the members of the question raised by Mr. Robert Kennedy 22 March, be distributed. The Defense paper is transmitted herewith.

346. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Inter-Agency Staff Study. Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling. A copy was sent to General Taylor. Washington, June 14, 1962. MEMORANDUM FOR Edwin Martin, State General Craig, Defense William Harvey, CIA Donald Wilson, USIA SUBJECT Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning

This confirms the oral assignment of tasks for further contingency planning.

The Defense operational representative is responsible for the preparation of a contingency plan for U.S. actions in a situation of open, wide-spread revolt in Cuba. This contingency is seen as a non-U.S.-initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being activated for mid-June 1962. U.S. actions are seen as including the use of U.S. military force.

The State operational representative is responsible for the preparation of a contingency plan for U.S. actions in a situation of open revolt in one or a few localities in Cuba. This contingency is seen as a non-U.S.-initiated situation where the people in one Cuban locality (or several neighboring localities) openly defy the Communist regime, are being suppressed with force, and U.S. help is requested (by the Cuban revolters or Latin American opinion).

All U.S. Departments and Agencies participating in Operation Mongoose will assist in the preparation of these plans, as required. Plans should include a description of the assumed contingency situation, specific actions to be taken and by whom, timing required, and an indication of post-action requirements.

Although current operations take priority, it is expected that working drafts of these contingency plans will be ready by 16 July. A working meeting of operational representatives will then ready these plans for submission to the Special Group (Augmented).

EG LansdaleBrigadier General, USAF

347. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations. Top Secret; Sensitive; Noforn; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and McCone. One copy was kept by Lansdale. Washington, June 14, 1962. SUBJECT Progress, Operation Mongoose

Political Actions. At its 7 June meeting,See Document 343. the Group desired that my 17 May list of suggested priority actionsDocument 338. be re-issued, to include agreed-upon tasks for State. Completion of this is awaiting the appointment of a representative for the Department of State who can devote full time to Operation Mongoose, as agreed upon. When the appointment is announced to the Special Group, it is my plan to hold a meeting promptly with him and other representatives to work on the schedule of special-effort activities. Meanwhile, we are working on the accepted tasks. State reports that briefing papers have been given to Secretary Rusk on Cuba-European trade, for his forthcoming trip to West Europe and that the Directing Council of the Pan-American Institute of History and Geography has voted to exclude Cuban delegates from meetings.

Cuban Recruits in U.S. Armed Forces. Concept approved and directive issued by the Secretary of Defense.Not found.

Outstanding Studies (including Blockade). My 8 June memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented)Document 345. reported on the current status of all outstanding studies. The desired Defense and CIA papers on the means required for and possible effects of a blockade of Cuba were transmitted with this memorandum.

Also transmitted by my 8 June memorandum was a Defense reminder of the Attorney Generalʼs question about U.S. actions in case the Soviets established bases in Cuba. Mongoose representatives were alerted to the last paragraph of the Defense paper, which asked for comments by the 14 June Group meeting.

Possible Contingency. The rumored uprising of the Cuban people in mid-June continues to be watched closely. The CIA coverage inside Cuba has not confirmed this uprising from resistance organizations there, and still concludes that this is an attempt by the Castro regime to get opponents to come out into the open, where they can be dealt with. It is believed worth some extra intelligence effort to keep a close eye on possible developments in Cuba in this period, and the Group is being asked separately to approve means for doing so. Meanwhile, Dr. Miro Cardona issued a warning (while in Costa Rica) to Cubans not to revolt prematurely; this was picked up by press services and played back into Cuba by VOA and other information means.

In response to the Groupʼs desire for ready plans in case of similar contingencies in the future, Defense has been tasked with developing a plan in case of a surprise wide-spread revolt and State has been tasked with developing a companion plan in case of a localized revolt (in a provincial city, etc.).See Document 346. The Group will be informed of these plans, when completed.

“Voice of Cuba.” On the planned broadcasts from a submarine, simulating a small radio station for the resistance inside Cuba, details have been firmed to start these by the end of June. CIA and State have been brought together on content themes and programming. Navy has reaffirmed the low risk factor, after working out operational details with CIA. Broadcasts are designed to be brief (the longest, 5 minutes) at the start, and build up credibility slowly. A brief monitorʼs report will be surfaced, through a U.S. news service, after the broadcasts are established.

Cuban Defector. Pedro Roig Ortega, representative in Mexico of the Cuban Ministry of Commerce, has defected in Mexico City. CIA and State are working on means to exploit this action, especially noting value of impact within both Cuba and Mexico.

Cuban Subversion Through Key Population Groups. CIA has completed a summary analysis of the travel and activities of Cuban student, labor, and cultural organizations, which will be distributed to Group members separately.Not found. The analysis reports that this Cuban effort is being pushed aggressively in Latin America, in the pattern of familiar Soviet subversion activities through international organizations.

Information. VOA exploited current vulnerabilities: Moscow news of agricultural problems and price rises, the Cuban disastrous season of sugar production, and Castroʼs discouraging comment that it would be ten to twelve years before living conditions improve in Cuba. Orders from Latin America for the latest comic book on Cuban children have reached 1,235,000.

USIA Participation. Although the Director of USIA is not a member of the Special Group (Augmented), both Ed Murrow and Don Wilson have ensured vigorous USIA participation in Operation Mongoose, and have a definite need to be kept informed on matters which the Mongoose team report to the Special Group (Augmented). The simplest way to do so would be for me to give an information copy to Murrow/Wilson (“eyes only”) of such reports to the Special Group (Augmented). Request approval to do so.

348. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch. Washington, June 27, 1962. SUBJECT Priorities Schedule for Cuba

There is attached for your information the list of the Departmentʼs courses of action with regard to Cuba which I had shown to you and was subsequently provided General Lansdale.

General Lansdale indicated that he thought this was a good start, although he was, of course, disappointed that the list contained no dramatic event that could be accomplished before the review.

Attachment

LIST PRIORITIES SCHEDULE FOR CUBA

1. Attempt to organize impressive pro-Kennedy and pro-United States manifestations in Mexico in connection with Presidential visit.President Kennedy made a State visit to Mexico June 29-30. Feed this back into Cuba to give impression of Mexico-United States solidarity thus undermining one of Cubaʼs most important sources of hemispheric support—the goodwill of Mexico. 2. Make effort to elect pro-United States, anti-Castro candidates in the Brazilian congressional election. At the same time, encourage formation of non-Communist campesino leagues to offset the work of Juliao. Encourage anti-Cuban editorials and stories in Brazilian newspapers. 3. Work toward the election of a moderate democratic government in the Dominican government and the defeat of left extreme forces in the Dominican Republic supporting Castro. 4. Encourage Christian democratic student groups in Venezuela and elsewhere to make anti-Castro statements and resist election of pro-Castro student leaders. In this connection it is important to work with the forthcoming youth festival in Helsinki (where there will be 2000 Latin American students) to take the festival away from the Communists and ensure a good amount of anti-Communist propaganda emanating from this support. 5. Increase support to Cuban exiles for travel throughout Latin America making well publicized anti-Castro speeches. 6. In Chile work to splinter popular front support of Communist candidates. 7. Attempt to secure anti-Castro statements by conservative members of MNR in Bolivia as well as political action designed to lessen strength of extremists in the MNR and in minersʼ unions. 8. Secure statements of determination to defeat Castro communism by members of Venezuelan government and military. In addition, secure public charges of Cuban involvement in efforts to unseat the liberal democratic government of Betancourt. 9. Encourage Latin American nations to review their passport procedures and take other measures designed to prevent travel to Cuba. Encourage the SCCS to take an active interest in this as well. 10. Pursue vigorously the program of isolating the Castro regime from hemispheric organizations.

349. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1962. Secret. Washington, July 3, 1962.

CUBAN SITUATION

I. The Castro regime is well along in the process of reorganizing its political, economic, military, and police system in the Soviet pattern. A. In Communist terminology, Cuba is in the stage of “building socialism,” and differences in the developing Cuban institutions from those of the Soviet Bloc are either transitory or relatively minor expressions of national individuality. B. Cubaʼs main difference from the Soviet satellites lies in the absence of an explicit Soviet commitment to defend Cuba militarily. 1. Soviet statements in this sense have thus far been vague and general. II. A single political machine, avowedly based on Marxist-Leninist principles and interlocking in its functions and leadership with the organs of the state, is being formed at local, provincial, and national levels. A. Called the Integrated Revolutionary Organization (ORI), it is to become the United Party of the Socialist Revolution at such time as the leaders determine that it has become sufficiently well organized and entrenched to perform the role of the single party in a Communist state. B. It is governed by a 24-man National Directorate. The Directorate in turn is dominated by a six-man secretariat headed by Fidel and Raul Castro as first and second secretaries. 1. Raul Castro is also Deputy Premier, making him second to Fidel in both the party and government hierarchies. C. Since last August, major government decrees have been issued in the names of both the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and the national leadership of the ORI. III. The split in the ORI leadership between Fidel Castro and a group of veteran Communists led by Anibal Escalante, which came into the open with Castroʼs bitter public blast against Escalante on 26 March, appears to have been not over ideological issues, but over the means and tactics for reaching agreed goals. A. The Escalante group had been moving rapidly to secure control of the countryʼs political and governmental institutions to the exclusion of Castro followers; Castroʼs 26 March speech and the maneuvering which preceded it leave no doubt as to his position of primacy in the leadership of the revolution. 1. Escalante was expelled from the ORI National Directorate, the membership of which had been announced less than three weeks earlier, and left for Czechoslovakia. B. Castro in his 26 March and subsequent speeches on the issue charged Escalante with “sectarianism” and with attempting to build his own power machine “divorced from the masses.” These machinations, he charged, had alienated the “masses” and threatened, by undermining public confidence in the revolution, to destroy it. 1. Escalante has subsequently become, along with “imperialism,” one of the chief whipping boys for the regimeʼs difficulties. C. Other veteran Cuban Communists have dutifully followed Castroʼs lead in condemning Escalante, but try to imply that Escalanteʼs “harmful activities” were the result of personal faults. They are now dutifully praising Castro as “our great Marxist-Leninist leader.” D. Castro himself has left no doubt that his objective is the construction of a Communist society in Cuba and has frequently appealed for an end to any differences between the “old” and the “new” Communists. E. Veteran Communists hold nine of the 24 seats on the ORI National Directorate, as well as numerous key administrative jobs such as President of the Agrarian Reform Institute and Minister of Domestic Trade. 1. Blas Roca, the ranking Cuban Communist for more than 25 years, is a member of the key six-man Secretariat of the ORI National Directorate, and director of the ORI newspaper Hoy. F. Blas Roca, in an article in Pravda on 13 June, said Escalanteʼs “harmful activities” had done such damage to the construction of a Marxist-Leninist party in Cuba, that “now we have to rebuild … and begin again from scratch.” 1. Since March, the provincial ORI directorates in at least two provinces—Matanzas and Oriente—have been thoroughly reorganized. Veteran Communists in top provincial party positions have been replaced by “new” Communists associated with the Castro brothers. Similar changes are apparently underway in municipal party units. G. Whether or not the rivalries between the “old” and the “new” Communists will result in new top-level purges and crises cannot be clearly predicted. 1. Moscow, while probably sympathetic to the veteran Communists and distrustful of Castroʼs emotionalism and his unpredictability, has publicly supported him and condemned Escalanteʼs tactics. It has also granted Cuba important new economic support since Escalanteʼs ouster. 2. Communist veterans such as Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, President of the Agrarian Reform Institute, probably recognize that they have no substitute for Castro in his unique ability to rouse the people. IV. A plethora of “mass organizations” have been organized during the past year to foster popular identification with the objectives of the regime, to transmit political indoctrination, and to exercise control and surveillance over the membership. A. The Union of Young Communists, formed last April from the former Association of Rebel Youth, is described as “the political organization of all Cuban youth.” 1. It claims a membership of more than 100,000 and is charged, among other things, with “helping” the Union of Cuban Pioneers, an organization for children between six and 13 years old. B. The Federation of Cuban Women, headed by Raul Castroʼs wife, claims a membership of more than 160,000 members. C. The Central Organization of Workers of Revolutionary Cuba, built on the foundations of the powerful pre-Castro labor confederation, is an instrument of the state for control of organized labor. D. The militia and the Revolutionary Defense Committees (block warden informant system) are also effective as mass organizations. E. Other groups, such as the National Institute for Sports and Recreation, the Institute for Friendship with Peoples, and the National Tourist Industry (which arranges vacations for “superior” Cuban workers) also serve the standard purposes of Communist mass organizations. V. There is widespread discontent in Cuba, particularly over consumer goods shortages, and resentment over the regimeʼs regimentation of the people and its authoritarianism. Active resistance is, however, confined to a few small groups and the most common attitude is hopelessness and apathy. The regime is in no danger of being toppled at this time. A. Perhaps only a quarter of the population remains positive in its support for the regime. 1. Many of Castroʼs original followers have become disillusioned and are now in exile or in prison; some have been executed. B. The regimeʼs large and pervasive security machinery has intimidated most of the people. C. Active resistance is confined to small, scattered groups of guerrillas in the mountains and to more important clandestine groups in the cities, where sporadic acts of sabotage have been increasing in recent months. D. In Matanzas province on 13 June food shortages touched off public demonstrations which led the regime on 16 June to stage an unusual show of military force in the city of Cardenas. Troops, tanks, artillery and MIG jet fighters participated in the show of force, following which President Dorticos addressed a rally. 1. These events were broadcast and televised throughout Cuba and were apparently designed to make an example of Cardenas for the rest of the country. VI. Cuba now faces an economic crisis attributable to the confusions and dislocations caused by the drastic and rapid changeover of the economy to state control, to poor management in many enterprises, and to the sudden shift in foreign trade, formerly almost exclusively with the West, but now almost exclusively with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. A. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, writing in a Soviet publication late last year, claimed that 80 percent of agricultural production in Cuba is now accounted for by farms operated by or under the close control of the state and that a similar percentage of industrial production comes from state-owned plants. B. This yearʼs just completed sugar harvest, the keystone of the Cuban economy, is not quite 5 million tons— the lowest in many years. 1. An internal Cuban government memo on the prospects for the sugar industry states that Cuba will have only about 1.4 million tons this year to export to “the capitalist market” for convertible currencies; the rest is committed to the bloc and to domestic consumption. This will not only exhaust stocks carried over from last year but there will be no carry-over to next year. 2. The memo, sent by the director of Cubaʼs Consolidated Sugar Enterprise to Minister of Industries Che Guevara, predicts poor crops for 1963 and 1964. 3. The poor sugar prospects highlight what has been one of the most immediate economic problems—the shortage of foreign exchange to finance needed imports from the Free World of foodstuffs and replacement parts for Western-made machinery. Cubaʼs main source of foreign exchange is now the 20% of the value of sugar sold to the USSR which is paid for in convertible currency, amounting to about $50 million per year. C. The Soviet Bloc has demonstrated its willingness to extend itself considerably to help the Cuban government ease its more pressing problems. 1. On 14 May a supplementary protocol to the Cuban-Soviet trade agreement was signed, increasing total trade between the two countries for this year to $750 million—about $50 million above the level called for in the protocol signed in January.On January 9 the Soviet Union and Cuba signed a prococol in Havana relating to reciprocal goods deliveries that provided for a substantial increase in trade between the two countries as compared to 1961. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 315) 2. Since Cuba has reduced export capabilities, the increase probably involves mainly an increase in Soviet shipments of needed consumer goods to Cuba, probably financed by commodity credits. D. The Sino-Soviet Bloc is also giving considerable support to Cubaʼs long-term economic development plans. 1. Sino-Soviet Bloc long-term credits to Cuba for industrial development total at least $357 million and there are strong indications that the USSR granted Cuba an additional $100 million credit in May. 2. A $100 million Soviet credit given Cuba in June of last year was specifically for the development of Cubaʼs nickel industry. Soviet technicians have been active, though thus far apparently with only partial success, in the two Cuban nickel plants confiscated by the Castro regime in 1960, one of them, at Nicaro, US-government owned. 3. Except for light industrial plants set up by Czechoslovakia, most of the bloc projects in Cuba are not expected to become operational before 1963 or 1964 and have thus far had little impact on the economy. E. In recent weeks Cuban leaders have repeatedly warned the Cuban people that they face a long period of austerity and hard work in the drive to “build socialism”; they note their gratitude for “the generous assistance” provided by the Soviet Bloc, but emphasize that the future depends on the Cubans themselves. 1. Castro announced on 31 May that it will take ten years to solve Cubaʼs housing problems. 2. Numerous sessions of “criticism and self-criticism” have resulted in frank admissions by Cuban leaders for past shortcomings in economic management and in assurances to the people that these “errors” are being overcome “on all fronts.” VII. For the past three and a half years, the Castro regime has been engaged in a massive military buildup, supported by more than 30 major shipments of bloc military equipment bringing in some 70,000 tons of material for the ground and air forces. A. The ground forces now total about 75,000. 1. The regular ground forces are supported by a large ready-reserve force of about 100,000. B. Bloc military deliveries have included field and anti-aircraft artillery, heavy and medium tanks, rocket launchers, and thousands of modern small arms as well as military vehicles. C. Aircraft delivered have included at least 40 MIG jet fighters, at least 20 helicopters, 12 prop trainers, and 12 transports. D. This year the Cuban navy has received its first bloc equipment in the form of six Khronstadt-class submarine chasers and 12 motor torpedo boats. E. Introduction of bloc equipment has made it necessary to send numerous Cubans to the bloc for training, and to bring Soviet and Czech military personnel to Cuba to supervise assembly and instruction. F. The capabilities of the Cuban armed forces have increased steadily, and now probably surpass those of any other Latin American country. 1. During 1961, the armed forces were subjected to a thorough reorganization, as units of the former civilian militia merged with regular army units to form a more centralized body. 2. The Cuban armed forces, however, still have little offensive capability outside Cuba, and the equipment sent them by the bloc has not included some items, such as bombers, required for offensive capability. G. The Soviet Union is not believed to have sent to Cuba any guided missiles or nuclear weapons; it is possible that some surface-to-air missiles are to be delivered to Cuba, but none are believed to have arrived thus far. On 2 July Raul Castro, who is Minister of Armed Forces, arrived in Moscow, probably seeking additional weapons. VIII. Czech police technicians took part in the reorganization of the Cuban governmentʼs police machinery. A. The Department of State Security within the Ministry of Interior is now the instrument for domestic control. B. The most pervasive arm of the security apparatus is the network of Revolutionary Defense Committees. According to regime leaders, more than 100,000 of these informant groups have been organized throughout the country. IX. Cuban foreign policies are dictated by the governmentʼs dependence on the Soviet Union. A. Wherever possible, the Cubans have sought to avoid confronting the issue of Sino-Soviet rivalry; when pressed, however, they have adopted the Soviet position. B. Cubaʼs voting record in the UN General Assembly clearly demonstrates its adherence to the Soviet positions. 1. On 37 roll-call votes during the first half of the 16th session of the General Assembly, Cuba voted with the Soviet Bloc 33 times; in the other four cases, one or the other abstained. On five important issues, including the vote appealing to the Soviet Union not to explode a 50-megaton bomb, Cuba was the only country voting with the ten formal members of the Soviet Bloc. C. Cuba maintains diplomatic relations at the embassy level with all Sino-Soviet Bloc countries except East Germany; it exchanges “missions” not designated as embassies with the latter to avoid a complete rupture with Bonn. 1. The new Soviet ambassador in Havana, Aleksandr Alexseyev, appointed on 11 June, has been in Soviet intelligence work for a number of years. 2. Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki has just concluded a six-day visit to Cuba. X. Cuba is still attempting to maintain good relations with “non-aligned” governments. A. Cuba is to attend the Cairo meeting in July of “non-aligned” nations; its conduct at previous meetings of this group in Belgrade and in Cairo was so violently anti-US and so clearly pro-Soviet as to annoy Tito, Nasser, and Nehru. XI. The Cuban leaders have repeatedly stated that the US holds the naval base at Guantanamo Bay illegally, and that the base will at some time revert to Cuban control. A. The Cubans maintain that they will never use force against the base but will “at the appropriate time” demand that an “international body” rule that the base be returned to Cuba. B. The Cuban government still obtains about $10 million annually in foreign exchange from the wages and salaries of Cubans working on the base. C. These workers are systematically harassed by the authorities, and the area around the base has been converted into a military defense zone. XII. The Castro regime considers that Cuba is setting the “example” which other Latin American peoples will eventually follow in destroying the “imperialist-controlled regimes” which now “oppress” them. A. The Castro regime has provided covert financial assistance and perhaps other types of material aid to Communist or pro-Communist opposition groups in other Latin American countries. B. It has also provided hundreds of “scholarships” annually to Latin American students for study in Cuba, and has become a leading transit point for Latin American travel to the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In addition, frequent international gatherings in Havana bring delegates from Latin America and other parts of the world to Cuba. C. Castroʼs influence in other Latin American countries has declined steadily since he came to power. 1. The Eighth Meeting of American Foreign Ministers in Punta del Este last January effectively excluded the Castro regime from participating in the Organization of American States and subsidiary organs of the inter-American system. 2. Only five Latin American countries still maintain diplomatic relations with the Castro regime. These are: Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia. Bolivia does not have any mission in Havana, but there is a Cuban mission in La Paz.On an otherwise blank page attached to a copy of this memorandum in the Kennedy Library, President Kennedy wrote: “Summaries of underdeveloped world. We are getting richer—Commodity prices going down—getting poorer.” (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files)

350. Memorandum of DiscussionSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2,DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 7 April-21 August 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. Washington, July 3, 1962.

MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL, TUESDAY, JULY 3, 1962

Met with the Attorney General for about an hour this morning; following was covered:

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

3. DCI brought up the question of the Cuba ransom committee, which had been discussed earlier by the AG with Mr. James Donovan.Reference is to James Donovan, an attorney who became involved in renewed negotiations with the Cuban Government concerning the possible release of the prisoners held in Cuba who were captured during the Bay of Pigs invasion. AG indicated sympathetic attitude but did not indicate that we should at this time seek covert means of supporting or contributing to the fund raising effort of the ransom committee. AG raised the question of possibility of negotiating a “lower price”, the need for negotiation by an independent negotiator whose relatives were not in prison, the possibility of meeting part of the demand with food and medicine and some money (he mentioned four or five million dollars).

DCI stated that on the one hand, from the humanitarian standpoint and the preserving of the goodwill and support of the 1400 prisoners and their several thousand relatives and followers, it appeared important to secure their early release as the group would be a very valuable asset at some future time when the Castro regime collapsed. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that the payment of either money or food would probably prolong the existence of the Castro regime possibly for such an extended period that the regime would become permanent in Cuba. Subject was left for further discussion; however, it was agreed that this question would be compartmented and would not be discussed with others in CIA, DOD, or State who are active in Cuban operations.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

351. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive; Noforn; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and McCone. One copy was kept by Lansdale. Washington, July 5, 1962. SUBJECT Progress, Operation Mongoose

President in Mexico. State reported that President Kennedyʼs visit to Mexico greatly enhanced U.S. good-will in Mexico, was marked by the absence of pro-Castro propaganda, and fulfilled U.S. plans to impress upon Castro that Mexico, upon whom the Castro regime counts as an ally, is solidly with the United States and the West. In discussions about Cuba, President Lopez Mateos expressed the Mexican view that Castro was in trouble and that his regime would fall of its own weight. President Kennedy expounded the U.S. view of the Cuban problem; State believes this should ease the way for future discussions about Cuba with the Mexicans.

Joint Communiqué. The joint communique issued by President Kennedy and President Lopez Mateos,For text of the joint communique, issued on June 30, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 477-479. included a topic of interest to Operation Mongoose: “Both presidents reaffirmed the dedication of their countries to the ideals of individual liberty and personal dignity which constitute the foundation of a civilization which they share in common. In consonance with their dedication to these ideals and acting always as sovereign and independent countries, which decide their own policies and their own courses of action, they propose to respect and maintain the principles of non-intervention—whether this intervention may come from a continental or extra-continental state—and of self-determination of peoples.”

The UPI reported that the Mexican press and political observers hailed this joint message as evidence of President Kennedy having “surrendered” to Mexicoʼs policy of “hands off Cuba.” In response to my query, the Department of State said: “There were no developments resulting from the Presidentʼs trip to Mexico, including the text of the joint United States-Mexico Communique, which alter the basic guidelines governing the Cuba project.”

Operations. My visit to the Miami area included discussions with the operations staff of the CIA station, which carries the brunt of current work on Operation Mongoose. I was pleased to note that CIA has built a team which has a number of people experienced in operations into Communist-controlled areas (Europe and Asia), whose know-how strengthens the operations of people with Latin American experience. They have some problems, most of which are being resolved on the operating level. Some problems involve policy matters, which are being staffed for presentation to you.

Overall, this is a splendid effort by CIA within present guidelines. On intelligence-collection, the magnitude of the special emphasis given the operation is indicated by the presence of 45 agents now in the Habana area alone (a rather remarkable accomplishment in a Communist capital where there is no official U.S. presence). In addition, there are agents and teams in the provinces; efforts are being made to complete the provincial coverage at an early date, since there are some areas insufficiently covered now.

“Voice of Cuba.” The separate CIA weekly report noted the successful initial broadcasts [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the U.S. publication of the fact that such broadcasts were heard in the U.S., and the replay of this news back into Cuba for the general public. It is noted that UPI carried this news item, but spiced it up with added stories of Castroʼs use of militia against guerrillas in Matanzas. The two stories put together by UPI have no relationship in reality, and the “Voice of Cuba” broadcasts are being closely directed to fit in with other operations and to keep within Mongoose guidelines.

Diplomatic. State reports that diplomatic efforts are being made to block Cubaʼs application for accreditation to the European Economic Community. Similarly, efforts are being made to exclude Cuba from the proposed Latin American Free Trade area.

Contingency Planning. Rumors in mid-June of a Cuban uprising led to my tasking Defense for further contingency planning, including an inter-departmental plan. Defense reports this planning is progressing well. As an interim report, Defense notes that while the 18-day reaction time is still basic, a 9-day reaction time is feasible under certain pre-positioning and a 5-day reaction time can be undertaken with certain risks. You will be informed, when this planning is completed.

Defense Intelligence. Defense is reviewing actively its responsibilities for intelligence collection in Cuba, with a view of strengthening the effort considerably, particularly those activities under [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Voice of America. USIA reported that VOA concentrated mostly on the Presidentʼs trip to Mexico. Other telling news items were a Costa Rican labor union condemnation of the Castro tyranny, interviews with Cubans who had escaped from a concentration camp and who gave minute details of the terrible conditions, a quote from Castroʼs own press about chaotic administration (367 days to answer a letter from a Cuban asking permission to acquire industrial equipment), the story of Cuban students disappointed with Russian agricultural schools (VOA pointed out that Russia, with its own agricultural failures, was not in a position to teach others), and an interview with a person from Cardenas where the recent hunger demonstration led to a big Castro military show of force.

352. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6,DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Elder. Washington, July 14, 1962.

The following is taken from DCI notes used at the meeting on 12 July of the Special Group (Augmented):

We know a lot about Cuba and the following are the essential elements in our assessment of the present situation: 1. Cuba belongs to Castro. 2. Castro is apparently strengthening his military forces, and photography and other intelligence have added to our knowledge of the size, composition and deployment of his forces. 3. Police security appears to be good. 4. Popular support for Castro has been substantially diminished. 5. Castro has a number of serious problems including, general economic situation, food, spare parts and lack of competent management of industries and agriculture. 6. No splits are apparent in the top leadership. 7. We have no penetration at the top.

WElderExecutive Assistant/DCI

353. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-1962. Top Secret. Also addressed to Goodwin. Washington, July 18, 1962. SUBJECT Future Courses of Action with respect to Cuba

The members of the Mongoose Operations Group have been requested to submit by July 20 the factors they think should be considered by the Special Group with respect to each of the following four possible future courses of action regarding Cuba: a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it or b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment, or c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end, or d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force.

General Lansdale plans to submit a composite of these factors (including, I presume, his own views) to the Special Group. He has informed me that General Taylor intends to invite Secretaries Rusk and McNamara to attend the Special Group meeting when these courses of action are to be discussed. Final recommendations would then, presumably, be submitted to the President.

Preliminary discussion of these courses of action in the Operations Group reveals that the CIA and Defense representatives favor prior commitment to employ U.S. military force; General Lansdale appears to waver, although I believe he feels his task would be greatly simplified if such a commitment could be obtained; the USIA representative thinks it important that a decision be made regarding use of military force, although he has not indicated his preference.

In my opinion, the concentration of attention upon the employment of U.S. military force against Cuba runs counter to the basic concept of Mongoose which is to bring down the Castro regime from within. In the Department, we have recognized the contingency that U.S. military force may be required, and perhaps could be feasibly employed from a political standpoint if a virtual civil war situation existed in Cuba, where anti-Castro forces held substantial territory, appealed for U.S. assistance, and we recognized these forces as the Government of Cuba.

Mr. Harvey (CIA) at the last Operation Group meeting expressed as his considered judgment that a revolt could eventually be mounted in Cuba. By revolt, however, he meant an assault upon a number of Cuban Government installations, including some in the provinces. He did not think that such assaults could be organized in a fashion where anti-Castro forces held territory for any length of time or could overthrow the regime without outside military assistance.

There is clearly a gap between the present CIA estimate of what it can accomplish and what we feel should be the minimum condition in Cuba where we might consider using U.S. military force. Nevertheless, the situation in Cuba is volatile and unpredictable and CIA may be more successful than it presently estimates to be the case. If, or as we proceed with Operation Mongoose, we should recognize that the pressure within the Executive to employ U.S. military force will become increasingly intense.

I could recommend that the course of action we follow for the indefinite future be the following modification of (b) above:

“Exert all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other pressures to overthrow the Castro regime without prior commitment to employ U.S. military forces overtly, recognizing however that contingencies may arise where employment of U.S. military force might be considered.”

There is attached for appropriate approval, the Departmentʼs contribution that I would propose be included in the Operation Groupʼs paper regarding the four courses of action.

Attachment

Memorandum

a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it.

Comment

Cuba will probably be mis-managed for the next year or two, even if we did nothing to exacerbate the situation. The spectacle of a mis-managed Cuba with a discontented population would damage the Soviet, communist, and Castro images in the Hemisphere and elsewhere. Cuba would remain an economic and to some extent political burden for the Bloc. If course (a) were adopted, the U.S. could seek to accommodate itself to the presence in the Hemisphere of a nation closely aligned with the Bloc, at the same time attempt to persuade the regime to adopt a more neutralist course without necessarily altering its internal structure.

If this course were adopted, it should be recognized that 1) the Castro regime would be enabled to consolidate its internal position at its own pace; eventually to improve its economic situation with Bloc and perhaps other assistance, thereby enhancing its image; and to continue to engage in and eventually increase its subversive activity in the Hemisphere, which we would probably not be able to control effectively; 2) Cuba may become a base of military operations against the U.S.; 3) the morale of anti-Castro Cubans, both in and out of Cuba, would be destroyed; and 4) the possibility of the Castro regime being replaced in the foreseeable future by one less hostile to the U.S. would be very remote.

b. Exert all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without prior U.S. military commitment.

Comment

If this course were adopted, the Castro regime would be kept off balance and forced to employ some of its resources defensively. The economic situation would probably continue to deteriorate and popular discontent would probably mount. Isolated anti-Castro manifestations would occur and be repressed. Cuba under these circumstances would be an unattractive model.

Constant pressure upon the regime might produce sufficiently broad popular disaffection, active resistance and intrigue at top governmental levels to cause a change in the regime or possibly bring about a situation of virtual civil war under circumstances in which it might prove politically feasible for the U.S. to intervene with force.

If this course were adopted, it should be recognized that 1) this could be a long term program in which the overthrow of the Castro regime would not be guaranteed; 2) barring the unforeseen, further overt U.S. diplomatic and economic actions against Cuba are limited in scope; 3) Cuban recruits are reluctant to risk their lives in fomenting disorders without a commitment that U.S. military force will be employed if necessary; and 4) Cuba could still act against the Hemisphere although its effectiveness would be continually reduced.

c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end.

Comment

If this course were adopted, the overthrow of the Castro regime could probably be brought about.

If this course were adopted, it should be recognized that 1) employment of U.S. military force in Cuba under circumstances that are considered unjustified under international law would constitute intervention, would place us in violation of the UN and OAS charters, would cause grave adverse repercussions in the Hemisphere, would probably jeopardize the Alliance for Progress program and could make us the object of Rio Treaty Article 6 action; 2) the world situation may be such that it would be politically and military unfeasible for us to fulfill a commitment to employ U.S. military force; 3) such a commitment to Cuban exiles would become quickly and widely known and this could seriously complicate our relations with a number of friendly nations; 4) such a commitment could enable the Cuban exiles to “call the tune” and place the U.S. in an untenable position; 5) knowledge of a commitment to employ U.S. military force would solidify internal support for Castro at least in the short term; 6) if U.S. military force is employed, the Bloc would probably exert strong pressure in areas of the world important to the U.S. national interest and where U.S. military force may have to be made available; 7) as the phases progress, the “noise level” would increase substantially and the U.S. must be prepared to defend convincingly in international forums against charges of plotting to overthrow another government.

d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force.

Comment

Without a description of the provocation, it is not possible to comment intelligently. It should be noted that with respect to the employment of U.S. military force many of the considerations described in (c) above are applicable, only more so.On July 19 Martin passed on Hurwitchʼs memorandum to Johnson, with a covering memorandum indicating that Martin had approved the Hurwitch memorandum as the Department of State contribution to the requested policy review. Martin noted that, in his opinion: “The suggested re-statement of course (b) contained in the attached memorandum is good, I think, and ARA would hope that there might emerge from the Phase I review a policy statement such as that.” He asked Johnson to look over the Hurwitch memorandum before it was submitted to General Lansdale. (Ibid.)

354. Memorandum of DiscussionSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2,DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 7 April-21 August 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone on July 19. Washington, July 18, 1962.

MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION AT DINNER ON THE EVENING OF WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 1962, WITH MR. ROBERT KENNEDY

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

3. The Cuban situation was reviewed in considerable detail, AG expressing the opinion that the last six monthsʼ effort had been worthwhile inasmuch as we had gained a very substantial amount of intelligence which was lacking, but that the effort was disappointing inasmuch as the program had not advanced to the point we had hoped. He urged intensified effort but seemed inclined to let the situation “worsen” before recommending drastic action. We discussed several leaders such as [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] however, there was no specific recommendation as to whom we should support or who represented the most dynamic leadership of the Cuban group. 4. Cuban ransoms. The pros and cons of this proposal were discussed in some considerable detail. We both agreed that the sixty two million dollar figure must be negotiated downward and that we should offer our sympathetic interest in the idea of seeking release of the prisoners. I pointed out the injunctions placed upon us by Congress and stated it would be impossible to use CIA funds until these injunctions were removed. The AG brought up the question of Robert Anderson chairing the committee reported on June 27th, and he stated that unless Anderson agreed to chair the committee he thought there would be little interest on the part of the Cubans in pursuing this effort. I pointed out the studies indicated that substantial financial contributions for ransom would perpetuate the Castro regime. Nevertheless we both felt that it was desirable to secure the release of the prisoners if possible. It was decided that I would talk with Anderson and try to get him to accept the chairmanship of the committee, would indicate sympathetic interest in the movement and a desire to help, but would make no commitment of either financial help or help with food. If Anderson accepted then I would discuss the subject with the President and with the appropriate people on the Hill, seek removal of the commitment made last year which enjoins us from financial assistance of such actions to secure prisoner release. In the meantime Anderson (assuming that he assumes the chairmanship) would seek to reduce the figures set by Castro and then we would decide upon a course of action.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

355. Memorandum From the Department of State Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Hurwitch) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 7/62. Top Secret. None of the annexes is printed. Washington, July 19, 1962.

I. What we hoped to accomplish in Phase I

A —Increase U.S. intelligence with respect to Cuba and Cuban activ-ities in the Hemisphere. B —Undertake as many political, economic, psychological and other actions as feasible, designed to weaken the Castro regime and isolate it from the rest of the Hemisphere.

II. What was accomplished in Phase I

A —With reference to A above, the following were accomplished: 1. An increased number of reports from friendly embassies in Habana and improved mechanism for distribution of these reports to agencies concerned. 2. Greater vigilance on the part of our embassies and improved reporting on Cuban activities throughout the world. 3. Regular de-briefing of U.S. and foreign newsmen as well as foreign diplomats who have visited or are posted in Cuba. 4. An improved program of acquisition of Cuban newspapers and other publications. 5. Provision of a list of U.S. citizens now in the U.S. who have lived in Cuba, as possible sources of intelligence information. 6. Publication and dissemination of several intelligence reports covering Cuba (as well as contributions to USIB reports). B —With respect to B above, the following were accomplished: 1. Political a. As a result of the major U.S. effort at the Punta del Este meeting, Cuba was excluded from the OAS, and two Special Committees were established to deal with Cuban-Communist subversion. (For the actions taken to implement the Punta del Este decisions, please see Annex #1.) b. Fifteen American republics no longer maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. c. Overwhelming defeat in the UN of Cuban sponsored resolutions charging U.S. with planning an invasion of Cuba. d. As a result of efforts by the Secretary and Mr. Rostow, NATO has become more aware of U.S. concern over Cuba. No significant actions that might materially affect the situation in Cuba are expected from NATO in the near future, however, since NATO continues generally to regard Cuba as a U.S. problem. e. A wide variety of conversations held both by Embassy officers throughout the Hemisphere and by Departmental officers in Washington with government officials, politicians, labor, student and other groups have constituted an important factor in their greater awareness of Castro-Communist subversive techniques as well as their increasingly low opinion of Castro and Castroism. These conversations have contributed to influencing the policies of the governments concerned and stimulating a large number of anti-Castro statements throughout the Hemisphere which were then exploited for their propaganda value (for a sampling of such statements, please see Annex #2). f. The Presidentʼs trip to Mexico which demonstrated dramatically for the Castro regime the close relationship between the peoples and governments of the two nations. g. Special reference to the plight of the Cuban people by Latin American clergy during religious services. h. Examples of labor activity include a symbolic work stoppage in Costa Rica on 7 January 1962 designed to call attention to the plight of Cuban laborers. The Archbishop instructed priests to toll church bells at the beginning and end of the five-minute period. On 3 June 1962 in Venezuela, Jose Gonzalez Navarro, President of the Venezuelan Federation of Labor, decried conditions in Cuba and organized demonstrations in support of President Betancourt. In July 1962 a Chilean labor leader, recently returned from Cuba, spoke of the disillusionment in Cuba. During February 1962, seventeen Secretaries General of Campesino Unions in La Paz approved a resolution against Cuba. In March the La Paz Federation of Teachers chastised the Bolivian National Federation for its pro-Castro attitude. In January 1962 the Venezuelan Labor Confederation adopted a resolution condemning the Communist dictatorship in Cuba and, finding the Cuban CTC not a free labor movement, abrogated its mutual assistance pact of 1960. In April 1962 the National Congress of Bolivian Railroad Workers rejected a resolution supporting the Castro regime. A number of other actions, initiated outside this project, are designed to assist Latin American Unions and will contribute indirectly to this project. i. Instructions to all posts emphasizing the importance of developing youth assets in the cold war struggle and urging the inclusion of student and other leaders in the exchange of persons program. j. Instructions to block Cuban accreditation to the ECE. k. Instructions to deny Cuban participation in the ILO. l. Instructions to block Cuban entry into the proposed Latin American Free Trade Area. m. Examples of actions initiated outside of the project which contribute indirectly include arrangements for sending eight U.S. coaches to thirteen Latin American countries for a period of three weeks in each country to assist in training for the Caribbean games and world-wide guidance on the Helsinki Youth Conference, to which the Cubans reportedly plan to send a large delegation. 2. Economic a. U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba. b. General decline of trade between the free world and Cuba. (While a variety of factors have contributed to this situation, U.S. Embassy activities in this field have made a substantial contribution to the decline in trade. For a list of specific actions taken, please see Annex #3.) c. Tightening of transshipment controls, particularly in Canada and Mexico. d. Extension of technical data controls to include Cuba. e. Extension of U.S. Customs control procedures to U.S. ports in addition to Miami for the purpose of guarding against transshipment of U.S. goods to Cuba. f. Application to Cuban or Cuban-chartered vessels of port security measures in force for Soviet Bloc vessels. g. Denial of bunkering facilities at U.S. ports to vessel under Sino-Soviet Bloc charter carrying cargo between Cuba and Bloc ports. h. In the early stages of the project an inter-agency committee consisting of representatives of State, Commerce, Treasury and CIA met to explore further possibilities of economic action against Cuba. As a result of following up with the individual members, the above listed actions were accomplished. Mention should be made of the thorough study undertaken to determine the feasibility of entering the tanker charter market. The results of this study indicated that since there was an over-supply of tankers, preclusive action on our part would prove very expensive without compensatory effect. It is difficult to predict when opportunities might arise in the Cuban situation in which economic warfare would be effective. If Cubaʼs convertible currency position continues to deteriorate (and the poor sugar crop would so augur), we can look for a continued decline in trade between Cuba and the free world, thus reducing the opportunities (and perhaps necessity) for economic warfare. Nonetheless, we should develop this capability in advance, so that opportunities, when and if they arise, can be exploited. 3.

Psychological

(The Department chairs a working-level inter-agency psychological warfare committee which supports the Cuba project, although it is not an organic part of the operation. The Committee coordinates the propaganda activities of the agencies involved, determines themes for exploitation and assigns operational responsibility.)

The principal themes that have been emphasized are: a. the failures and betrayed promises of the Castro regime; b. the suppression of human rights, economic deterioration and social injustice in Cuba; c. Cubaʼs domination by Communism and alignment with the Sino-Soviet Bloc; d. Cuban subversive attempts elsewhere in the Hemisphere; e. Cubaʼs isolation from the rest of the Hemisphere; f. opposition to Cuba at international conferences; g. activities of democratic anti-Castro groups; h. the Castro regime is not permanent.

The Committee has had a role in bringing about the following accomplishments: a. Indictment of the Prensa Latina representative in New York. b. Exposure of author Waldo Frankʼs acceptance of money from the Cuban Government. c. Exploitation of the poor quality of Soviet Bloc medicines in Cuba. d. Widely distributed pamphlet on the subversion of the University of Habana. e. Effective anti-Castro activity at the UNESCO-ECLA conference on education in Santiago, Chile, March 1962. f. Exposure of the Cuban “troika” attempt to appear pro-Western, neutralist and pro-Communist at the same time. g. Publicized Cuban charge declared Persona Non Grata by Philippine Government in October 1961. h. Dissemination of reports on Cuban attempts to subvert a peaceful solution of the Dominican problem after Trujilloʼs assassination. i. Establishment of a program under which U.S. Embassies in Latin America forward clippings from all available publications, which indicate anti-Castro attitudes. j. Compilation of material for magazine length article on Cuba in all languages by Readers Digest. k. U.S. television programs on Cuba.

4. Refugee Matters a. Cuban Groups—Since the adoption of the policy of open liaison with the CRC and other exile groups, the Department has been the focal point of innumerable visits from Cuban exiles who raise a wide variety of problems. The Department uses these visits to re-assure exiles that Cuba has not been abandoned and to resolve policy problems as they arise. Constant liaison is maintained with HEW. At present, the Department is assisting in the arrangements for the training of a small group of exile military officers at advanced US military schools. b. Pan-American Airways is seeking financial assistance through the Department to ameliorate the loss PAA sustains from its Miami-Habana-Miami run. PAA reports it has 2,500,000 pesos in Habana which it is unable to convert and that this sum is increasing at the rate of approximately 900,000 pesos annually. In addition, PAA maintains it loses approximately $1,000 a day operationally, since their aircraft fly to Habana virtually empty. PAA appears reluctant to continue the service indefinitely without US assistance. The Department believes that since the PAA flights are the main avenue of escape for anti-Castro Cubans, the US has an interest in seeing that the flights are maintained both from the standpoint of our public posture and of intelligence collection. Investigation of the availability of funds for this purpose, including discussions with the CAB, have not proved fruitful to date. c. Prisoner Exchange—The Department has assisted the Cuban Families Committee to the extent possible in the Committeeʼs efforts to obtain the release of the Brigade prisoners. Tax deductibility was arranged and official public statements favoring its efforts were stimulated. During the trials public statements from a number of Latin American Presidents and from the Prime Minister of Canada urging humanitarian treatment were arranged and were probably largely responsible for the fact that no death sentences were passed. Indirect efforts to obtain the prisonersʼ release in exchange for food were attempted through the Cuban UN Ambassador and through the Families Committee.

III. Operational Estimates

Political and Economic

Given the present attitude toward the Cuban problem of friendly nations in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, and barring the unforseen, the potential for accomplishing significant and effective, new, overt political and economic measures against Cuba (unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally) appears limited. In the economic field, there may arise opportunities when we might covertly engage in economic warfare with good effect. The present unavailability of funds specifically designed for economic warfare purposes would prevent us from taking advantage of such opportunities.

Robert A. HurwitchPrinted from a copy that indicates Hurwitch signed the original.

356. Memorandum From the United States Information Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Wilson) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 7/62. Top Secret. Washington, July 20, 1962.

The following information is supplied for inclusion in your report on Phase I, Operation Mongoose.

Our objectives during this period were: (1) to utilize all media in mobilizing public opinion in the other countries of Latin America against the Castro/Communist domination of the Cuban people by demonstrating its failure to satisfy the aspirations of the people, by its totalitarian nature and by its subservience to Sino/Soviet policy dictates, and (2) to utilize short wave radio directed at Cuba in order to maintain overt communications with the Cuban people and to assist in undermining their support for and confidence in their Castro/Communist rulers.

Specific tasks assigned to USIA within the general framework of the two principal objectives included those of exploiting Castro defectors and children refugees, examining and reporting on medium wave broadcast and stratovision possibilities and research on musical and visual symbols.

Accomplishments during Phase I.

During this phase reporting from our field posts and limited public opinion surveys indicate a continuing decline of Castroʼs public prestige among the general public in Latin America. However, this does not mean that we feel there is any general repudiation of Castro and, much less, that there is any strong upsurge in public support for the need for action against Castro. The present general attitude might best be described as “negatively apathetic.” (A subsequent memorandum from USIANot found. indicates that these surveys are based on broad samplings in seven Latin American countries. The usual scientific sampling technique was applied, as in the Dominican Republic where 814 persons were contacted.)

We assigned a full-time representative to Opa Locka. His duties have been to identify and develop the most exploitable material from the refugees who go through that center. He has also made a continuing appraisal of VOA programing and reception.

The principal themes upon which we concentrated during this phase were: A. Economic. Our heaviest continuing output has concentrated on the deteriorating economic situation and the consequent failure of the Castro regime to satisfy the needs of the Cuban people. Media content has relied heavily on our Miami office which has supplied a constant flow of interviews with arriving refugees. Particular emphasis has been placed on the bungling management by the Cuban Communists. Parallels with agricultural failures in the Soviet Union and famine conditions in Red China have also been utilized in order to pin Cuban failures on the Communist system. The power struggle between Castro and the old line Communists has also been treated, not as an ideological struggle, but rather as another cause of economic chaos and inefficiency in running the government. B. Refugees. The refugee situation received heavy play by our Press Service and the Voice of America. Several interviews per week were used, stressing chaotic economic conditions, rising unemployment and food shortages. Special attention was given to the fact that the refugee groups now include growing numbers of negroes and persons from the lower income groups—people on whom Castro had depended for his initial support. C. Labor. We have stressed in our general media output the repression of the labor movement under the Castro regime with specific emphasis on lower pay, longer hours and growing unemployment in Cuba. On this theme we have been particularly successful in Venezuela where the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (COV) is distributing our materials on the Cuban situation. D. Students & Intellectuals. This has been the most difficult target group to work on. Paradoxically, this group appears to be the least susceptible to logical and reasoned appeal. The Castro problem is so highly charged emotionally that no broad avenue of approach has yet been found. The themes which have been helpful in building a negative attitude in the general public—revulsion at mass executions, immediate, concrete economic hardships, attacks on the Church and the social structure, regimentation of labor and other infringements of individual liberties—have not proved particularly effective with this group. Castroʼs Messianic appeal to this group elicits an emotional response which so far has proven most difficult to overcome. Nevertheless, we are working very hard on developing materials capitalizing on his takeover of the university and attacks on individual liberties. E. Media products developed in support of the Operation (in addition to the usual daily and weekly output in our normal operations) have included: (1) Books. (Spanish) (a)

Lequerica Velez—600 dias con Fidel (1,000 copies)

An account of the Castro regime as seen by the author during his two years as Colombian Ambassador in Havana.

(b)

Baeza Flores—Las Cadinas vienen de lejos (20,000 copies)

An account of the inner workings of the Castro regime and its takeover by the Communists by a Chilean journalist who worked closely with Castro in the early days of the Revolution and who later escaped to Mexico.

(c)

Gilbert—El Infidel Castro (Castro lʼInfidele) (6,000 copies)

A French newsmanʼs very unfavorable commentary on Castroʼs Cuba as he saw it in a 1961 visit.

(d) James—Cuba, 1st Soviet Satellite in America (6,000 copies)—(A Portuguese edition is now under way) (2)

In English we also distributed widely in Latin America both the James book (d above) and Theodore Draperʼs Castroʼs Revolution.

Cartoon Books. During the period we have had in production and/or distribution throughout Latin America a total of 5 million copies of the following six cartoon books: La Estafa—(Castroʼs takeover of the universities) La Punalada—(Castroʼs attack on the Church) Los Secuestradores— (Brainwashing of children) La Mordaza—(Takeover of the press and radio) El Despertar—(Betrayal of the land reform) La Traicion—(Takeover of the labor movement)

Films. The Agency produced one film on Cuba during this period:

La Tierra Prometida (10 minute animated on economic failure in Cuba)—Shown in commercial theatres throughout Latin America, also by mobile film units.

Two more similar films are now in production. Exact titles are not yet available but they will cover Castro mistreatment of organized labor and children.

We also supplied newsreel clips on Cuban refugees, Ecuadorʼs break with Cuba, the COSAC Meeting, and the Punta del Este MFM.

Radio. (a)

Broadcasts to Cuba:

Opa Locka reports indicate listenership to be high at least among this group. Short wave is, of course, always somewhat limited as we indicated in our detailed memoranda on this subject. Nevertheless, it does give us a direct channel to certain sectors of Cuban society.

Of 1370 refugees interviewed at Opa Locka in the past two months, 625 said they listened to the Voice of America and were able to identify at least one program on the Voice.

Three of the daily nine hours of Spanish broadcast by the VOA are aimed directly at Cuba. Fourteen different programs make up this package. These include news, commentary, dramatic, sports, Cuban news, agricultural, and historical features, all carrying some freight for our objectives.

(b)

Broadcasts to Latin America. For radio coverage of the rest of Latin America, we depend to some extent on local retransmission of VOA shortwave feeds and, principally, on local transmission of VOA taped shows, and shows produced by our field posts. Our placement record is good and we have access to the large majority of radio listeners in the area by these means. News and commentary shows together with serialized anti-Castro and anti-Communist dramatizations are our best outlet in this medium.

Listenership surveys show our soap opera, La Garra Escondida (The Hidden Claw) to have a very high rating throughout the area. Pitched to the urban working class audience, the program is built around family life in a suburban area and the villain of all episodes is the Communist Party or Fidelista front groups.

TV. We have acquired the rights for the Armstrong Circle Theatre show—Anatomy of a Broken Promise—which is now in Spanish and Portuguese production and should be on the air throughout the area in from 30 to 60 days.

We have also acquired the rights to a half-hour West German newsreel on Cuba which is now being put into Spanish and will be circulating in a very short time.

Cuban material has also been included regularly on our fifteen minute show—Panorama Panamericano—shown weekly to 15 million people throughout the area.

Medium Wave Broadcast and Stratovision

Our evaluations of medium wave broadcasting and stratovision wave were presented to the special groups with negative recommendations for strategic, overt U.S. Government utilization. However, tactical utilization was not ruled out.

On visual symbols, in collaboration with CIA we examined a series of possibilities and concluded the worm (gusano) is the best and most widely accepted symbol for an anti-Castro campaign. CIA is now implementing this project. In an effort to develop musical themes identifiable with the resistance, we have been less fortunate. Several possibilities have been researched with all results negative thus far.

Potential for psychological operations.

In all psychological planning special attention should be given to avoiding, insofar as is practical, any indications which might be construed as plans to return to the status quo ante. All information output should be pointed toward reassuring the populace that the anti-Castro movement is designed to carry forward programs supporting the social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people.

Particular attention should be given to the tactical utilization of medium wave radio prior to and during any operations. Short wave radio broadcasting would also be stepped up in support of operations. Propaganda leaflets should also receive a high priority.

[4.] Immediate food distribution and medical attention programs should also be given priority because of their psychological value in enlisting local populous support for the liberating forces. 5.

We do not consider items a and d feasible at this time and therefore limit our presentation to b and c.See Document 353 for a listing of the four possible future courses of action regarding Cuba upon which the Mongoose Operations Group was requested to comment.

Factors worth consideration in deciding on a future course: b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment. 1. Positive factors supporting this course of action would include: i. This would be a Cuban operation directed for and by Cubans, thus making for possibly wider acceptance from the bulk of the Cuban people. ii. There would be minimum static at the UN and OAS on “intervention” charges. iii. There would be a minimum propaganda base for exploitation of ever-present anti-Yankee sentiment in the rest of Latin America. iv. This operation would have a psychological advantage in forcing the various Cuban anti-Castro factions to come to a working agreement with each other rather than separate arrangements with CIA. This should provide a better psychological base for long-range political development in a free Cuba. v. This option would provide the new GDC with a better psychological base for developing policies more responsive to the demands and aspirations of the Cuban people. (I.e., operations with overt GUS support would probably result in strong pressures from U.S. business firms and Batistianos for significant action pointing towards a return to the status quo ante.) 2. Negative factors include: i. Failure of this operation due to U.S. nonintervention would have disastrous effects on the morale of all opposition groups in and out of Cuba. ii. Failure would also have very negative effects on U.S. prestige and stature in the hemisphere and probably damage our position of power in regional and other international organizations. iii. Less chance of strong moral and material support from U.S. business interests, vital to rebuilding process. iv. Less chance of effective U.S. guidance of information media during and immediately after landings. v. Much more difficult to control information media support in time and space after landings. c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end. 1. Positive factors. i. With a better chance of a short struggle and a cleancut victory, psychological operations would be more easily handled and controlled. ii. The U.S. power position and prestige in Latin America and probably the rest of the world would be greatly enhanced. iii. U.S. guidance and direction of media content during and immediately after the operations would be facilitated. iv. These operations would serve as a strong warning to leftist, non-communist parties in Latin America that the U.S. will not tolerate alliances with Communists. This could be effective in Bolivia, Chile and Colombia. 2. Negative factors. i. Much more difficult to justify to world opinion in terms of traditional U.S. policy of nonintervention and respect for the rule of law. ii. There would be a much higher noise level on intervention at the UN and OAS. iii. It would provide the Sino-Soviets a good propaganda base for possible operations in Berlin, Laos, Quemoy, etc. iv. It would provide a strong propaganda base for indigenous Communist group actions against pro-U.S., anti-Castro governments in neighboring countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Ecuador). v. Greater difficulty in evolving a post-overthrow political ideology suitable to all elements involved. (I.e. U.S. leadership during the operation will be strongest factor holding diverse groups together and will thus probably have to combine after overthrow.) vi. Possibility of remaining guerrilla-type operations acting on the propaganda base of anti-foreign invaders.

Donald M. WilsonPrinted from a copy that indicates Wilson signed the original.Deputy Director

357. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts in the American RepublicsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-2162. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch and cleared in ARA by Martin, in CIA by Harvey, in DOD by Gilpatric, and at the White House by Bundy. Approved for transmission by Johnson. Sent to Bogot#, Caracas, Guatemala City, Panama City, San Jose, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, and Tegucigalpa, and repeated to Asuncion, Buenos Aires, La Paz, Lima, Managua, Mexico City, Montevideo, Port-au-Prince, Quito, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, and USUN. On July 20 Lansdale had complained, in a memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson, that the proposed draft of this telegram had not been cleared properly with him, before it was presented by the Department of State representative to the Special Group (Augmented) on July 19 as having been cleared with Lansdale, as well as with the other agencies represented in the group. Lansdale noted: “We want to guide and direct the actions of exile groups, but not ‘cut them off at the anklesʼ as proposed in this message.” From the details of the proposed message discussed by Lansdale, which has not been found, it is clear that the circular telegram was revised in the light of his complaints. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose) Washington, July 21, 1962, 1:59 p.m.

109. Increasing number reports reaching Department indicate some Cuban exiles contemplating destruction major Cuban installations, primarily oil refineries, through bombing raids. These exiles apparently convinced Castro regime tottering, internal anti-Castro resistance well organized and time therefore ripe for such bombing raids which in their judgment would, if successful, provide necessary element increase resistance to point of overthrowing Castro regime. One such group headed by ex-Cuban pilot Matias Farias who claims group has access several bombers and he under heavy pressure from exile Cuban pilot friends “do something.”

Combination reports of Castro regime difficulties and exile frustration could possibly lead some action such as bombing raids.

Department estimates destruction major Cuban installations at this time, particularly if accomplished by external means, would probably: (1) arouse Cuban nationalism and rally support for regime; (2) result intensified repression internal opposition; (3) gain sympathy for regime in many sectors world opinion on basis such raids arranged by “powerful US against helpless island;” and (4) as premature and uncoordinated effort prove ineffective as means overthrowing Castro regime.

Accordingly, Department has sought discourage Cuban exiles from such actions and taking all feasible actions prevent any bombing raids originating US territory. Since some reports indicate such raids may emanate country bordering Caribbean, action addressee posts should promptly report any developments this subject. If questioned by officials host government or local press re US attitude possible bombing raids Cuba by exiles, you should adopt line such raids as uncoordinated effort probably premature be effective overthrow Castro regime; US not involved organizing such raids; we remain nevertheless seriously concerned over threat peace and security hemisphere posed by Castro-communist regime.

Ball

358. Memorandum From the Department of Defense Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harris) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 7/62. Top Secret. Washington, July 23, 1962. SUBJECT End of Phase I

In response to the questions posed in your memorandum of 11 July 1962, subject: End of Phase I,Not found. I have prepared 5 paragraphs each of which is directly responsive to your questions: 1. Statement of What DOD Hoped to Accomplish During Phase I. a. DOD hoped to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose during Phase I. b. DOD hoped to accomplish all the planning and essential preliminary actions necessary to establishing a decisive capability for US Military intervention in Cuba. 2. Accomplishments in Phase I. a. Establishment of a DOD Working Group. A Brigadier General was appointed to full time duty as the DOD/JCS Representative to handle Mongoose affairs. Each of the Services, JCS Directorates and DIA appointed full time representative to serve on the Working Group. Each of these representatives has direct access to his Chief or, in the case of the Services, the Operation Deputies as well. Office space cleared for Top Secret information was established in the Joint Staff area, and secretarial help was assigned. b. Establishment and Operation of an Interrogation Center at Opa Locka, Florida, on 15 February 1962. DOD assisted CIA in the initial planning for and the establishment of the Interrogation Center. Since the inception of the Center, the DOD has provided personnel support to the Center by furnishing 26 personnel (15 officers and 11 enlisted men) out of a total of 37 personnel manning the Center. c. PT Boats. DOD reconditioned a PT boat for possible use by CIA. In addition, DOD obtained certain data on characteristics and costs of PT boats manufactured by other countries. d. Voice Radio Broadcasts from a Submarine. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] available to CIA for the conduct of voice radio broadcasts near Cuba by the CIA. e. Overflights of Cuba. DOD has conducted several reconnaissance and photographic missions over Cuba for the CIA. f. Utilization of Avon-Park, Florida, by CIA as a Base for the Training of Cuban Refugees. DOD investigated the feasibility of using certain facilities at Avon-Park for the training of Cuban refugees in guerrilla warfare. g. [1 line of source text not declassified] h. Detail of an Officer to CIA. DOD detailed an officer to duty with CIA [1 line of source text not declassified]. i. Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention in Cuba. In order to insure a decisive US military capability for overt military intervention in Cuba, CINCLANTʼs regular contingency plan for Cuba has been updated. Attempts are being made to reduce the reaction time required for implementation of this plan, without piecemeal commitment of US forces. j. Alternate Contingency Plan for Overt US Military Intervention in Cuba.CINCLANT developed an alternate plan which accomplished a reduction in reaction time but requires piecemeal commitment of forces. In order to reduce the risk inherent in such an operation CINCLANT is seeking means for reduction of the reaction time without piecemeal commitment. k. Cover and Deception Plan. This plan has been developed for the purpose of [3½ lines of source text not declassified]. l. Air Strikes Against Cuba. A plan has been developed for the use of airpower only following a national policy decision, to suppress and/or neutralize Cuban forces pending the execution of an assault or to be executed in support of an internal revolt. m. Air and Sea Blockade of Cuba. A plan has been developed for the complete air and sea blockade of Cuba within 48 hours after decision. n. Civil Affairs and Military Government. An outline plan providing guidance for the conduct of civil affairs and for a provisional military government for Cuba has been prepared. o. DODʼs Position as to its Stake and Proposed Role in the Removal of the Communist Regime from Cuba. This paper included a statement of conditions under which Defense believes that overt military intervention in Cuba could be accomplished without leading to general war and without serious offense to public opinion. p. [2 lines of source text not declassified] q. Air Re-supply. Four aircraft and crews have been readied for air re-supply missions over Cuba. r. Risk Estimate. An estimate was prepared concerning the risk involved in air re-supply missions over Cuba. s. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] t. Military Intelligence. A detailed list of Essential Elements of Information was prepared in February 1962 covering the requirements of the Caribbean Survey Group and CINCLANT and was levied on the Intelligence Community for fulfillment. Reconnaissance activities consisting of overhead reconnaissance, air patrols, electronic collection and special operations were implemented. Specific intelligence requirements to be used in the interrogation of knowledgeable refugees covering items of military, political and economic interest were provided to the Caribbean Admission Center, Opa Locka, Florida. All information obtained from these sources was processed through the Intelligence Communityʼs channels. The flow of information concerning Cuba has been greatly improved as a result of these efforts. However, gaps still exist, particularly in details of military order of battle. Increased efforts are being made to fill these gaps. u. Utilization of US Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for Joint Navy/CIA Intelligence Operations. DOD investigated the possibility of using Guantanamo as a base of operations for the collection of national level intelligence, in light of the present policy limitations and possible policy changes in the future. v. Establishment of “Patrol Posts” in the Caribbean. In response to a request from the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, DOD examined the possibility of establishing “patrol posts” in the Caribbean. w. Psychological Operations: A survey was conducted in an attempt to increase Naval Base Guantanamoʼs role in psychological operations. As a result special OSD funds were made available for special baseball sportscasts over the base radio station. 3. Operational Estimate of the Potential for Intelligence Collection. a. Reconnaissance—a summary of the Cuban reconnaissance operation is given below: Completed Vehicle Code Word Frequency WV-2Q Melrose 13 A3D-2P/2Q Fitbolt 4 USS Moale Operation 19 Mar-12 Apr 62 RB 47 1 May 62 Submarine/UDU 5-6 May 62 Continuing F3D-2Q Call Money 6-11 per month AD-5Q Sleepwalker 2 per month C-130 Quick Fox 10 per month A3D-2P 6-8 per month Navy DD daily Navy P-2V twice daily

In addition to these, there are two special operations per month. The results of all this reconnaissance are satisfactory as far as producing air and navy order of battle information. However, against ground order of battle, they are not able to contribute too much.

b. Refugee Interrogation—Although the quantity of refugees proc-essed at Opa Locka has not diminished, the quality of the information that they have available is not as good as in the past. Particularly in the area of military intelligence, very few refugees can make major contributions. Occasionally, they do fill some gaps in military intelligence and they make considerable contribution in other areas. Therefore, this effort should be continued. c. Electronic Intelligence—The existing program is producing limited information; however, it is suffering from not only the insufficiency of the effort but also from the recent shift to more sophisticated communication systems by the Cubans. The approved new program should overcome these difficulties and provide increased information in the following areas: Organization and deployment of Cuban Army, Navy, Air Force and Militia. Troop, ship and air movements. Tactics and training Cuban armed forces. Patrolling and policing information on locations, installation or equipment. Materiel employed by Armed Forces. Evidence of Sino-Soviet Bloc technical support, training, volunteers and of the presence of Sino-Soviet military materiel (vessels) or aircraft. Activities of Department of State security. Evidences of GOC interception of Cuban resistance forces communications. Clandestine operations of Cuban government in the United States and other American Republics. Information on sabotage, dissident activity and defection of Cuban ships and/or personnel. Restrictive or punitive policies to be applied to Cuban nationals or their property in Cuba. Strikes, slow-downs and labor problems. Location and movements of principal Cuban government, military and para-military personalities. Plots against prominent figures. Reactions to probes, special activities and reconnaissance flights. Surveillance of the possible operations against Naval Base at Guantanamo. Organization, deployment and capability of Cuban communications. d.

Clandestine—The Intelligence Community has put considerable effort into improving their clandestine collection capabilities against the target island. However, these operations suffer from the lack of a definite target date and objective. With an open-end operation, such as Project Mongoose, specific military order of battle information is largely perishable especially when the Armed Forces are in a constant state of reorganization, re-groupment and redeployment. About 25 per cent of all reports on Cuba received from clandestine sources prove to be of definite value.

Collection of information through third-country sources varies widely as to quality. The number and competence of observers and the specific collection requirement levied on the third-country source determine the value of the information obtained. Some very valuable information on specific items has resulted from this effort and this source should continue to be exploited.

e. Summary—Our knowledge of Cuban military order of battle, especially ground order of battle, has dropped off considerably in recent weeks. Changes in unit organization and in the numbering system as well as the militia nature of the organization itself make OB material perishable. Until such time as a definite target date and objective is set making it possible to inject a sufficient quantity of trained observers into the area with specific targets, this situation will probably continue. 4. Estimate of the Potential for Military Operations within Cuba—Should a policy decision be made to militarily intervene in Cuba, the U.S. could: a. With 18 days of preparation, execute a coordinated airborne-amphibious assault which it is anticipated would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties. b.

Should the situation demand, a piecemeal commitment of US forces could be made with reaction times approximately as follows: 2 Airborne Divisions—5 days (para-drop units only) 4 Marine BLTs—7-8 days Following Forces—15-18 days

(This operation would involve a dangerous element of risk.)

c. [4½ lines of source text not declassified] d. Air strikes could be conducted against selected targets in Cuba within 6, 12 or 24 hours; the time dependent upon aircraft availability and desired intensity of attack. e. Air-sea blockade can be initiated within 24 hours with effectiveness increasing to a complete blockade within approximately 48 hours. 5. Factors Worth Considering in Deciding on One of the Following Four Courses of Action for the United States to Follow in Relation to Cuba: a.

Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it.

Advantages (1) This would be temporarily economical in terms of funds, equipment and allocation of forces. (2) It would demonstrate the US devotion to the principle of non-intervention.

Disadvantages (1) This would be an acceptance of a Communist bridgehead in the Western Hemisphere and an admission that there was nothing that the United States could or would do about it. (2) This would be damaging to the prestige of the United States and would weaken the will to resist or fight against communism in Cuba, Latin America and elsewhere. (3) It would increase the probability of the establishment of Soviet military base(s) in Cuba which could ultimately prove to be an unacceptable threat to the security of the United States. (4) It would become increasing difficult to protect the United States or the Western Hemisphere as Cuban military force capabilities increase. (5) It would prevent the United States from assuming a posture which would permit exploitation of any “breaks” that may develop within Cuba. (6) It would permit the Castro Communist regime to consolidate its gains and become even more firmly entrenched. (7) It might encourage the Communist regime to become even more bold in exporting communism to Latin America. (8) It would permit the Castro regime to prepare at its own pace the exportation of their revolution of other Latin American countries. (9) It could eventually cost billions of dollars as US defense forces would have to be developed or shifted to meet the increasing threat from the South. (10) It would virtually assure the permanent existence of a Communist base for subversion and espionage throughout the Western Hemisphere.

Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other pressures to overthrow the Castro Communist regime without overt US military commitment.

Advantages (1) Would demonstrate US devotion to the principle of non-intervention. (2) Would be in accord with the UN charter and stated US policy regarding the non-use of military force in settling disputes. (3) Depending upon the success of the pressures, in the short term, it would conserve US military forces and resources.

Disadvantages (1) Except in matter of degree, this has essentially been the US policy since the severance of relations on 3 January 1962, and it has not been successful. (2) This would give the Soviets time to develop Cuba as a base for operations throughout the Western Hemisphere. (3) It would give the Communists further time to develop military bases which could cost the United States billions of dollars in developing appropriate defenses. (4) This would require that US military resources and forces be tied up indefinitely to protect the Hemisphere against the continuing Communist threat. (5) This would permit the continued indoctrination of Cuban Youth and the progressive strengthening of the internal police state and military forces. These would combine to make the threat to internal revolt more remote and the price of US intervention more costly.

Commit the United States to help the Cubans to overthrow the Castro Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of US military force if required.

Advantages (1) Would permit the United States to control the timing of operations against Cuba and permit a progressive build-up which could be modified or terminated as circumstances require. (2) It would eventually show that we are willing to back anti-communist efforts and it would reaffirm the Monroe Doctrine. (3) US action against Cuba would be more acceptable to world opinion as it would cast the United States in the role of aiding Cuban freedom fighters. (4) Widespread revolution would simplify some of the problems of military intervention. (5) Revolution could produce leaders from within Cuba who could constitute the new Cuban government. (6) It would furnish new hope and incentive to anti-communist elements inside and outside of Cuba. (7) It would be economical in terms of military resources and forces by obtaining maximum support from the Cubans. (8) It would assure the eventual ousting of the Castro Communist regime.

Disadvantages (1) The time involved in this course permits additional Cubans to be indoctrinated thereby creating more problems during the invasion and after. (2) Contains the danger of “telegraphing the punch” and thereby putting Castro and the Soviets on notice, which could result in counter-action and possible escalation if the Sino Soviet Bloc provides open assistance. Furthermore, the longer US intervention is delayed, the higher the cost will be in American lives. (3) This course would further antagonize die-hard non-intervention elements within Latin America. (4) This would require the United States to establish, control, support and manipulate front organizations, develop Cuban leadership and run covert training and operations which carry the risk of extreme national embarrassment.

Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro Communist regime by US military forces.

Advantages (1) Would permit the United States to take action against Cuba at a time and place of our own choosing. (2) Chances of premature disclosure and compromise, compared with other courses of action, would be reduced. (3) It would demonstrate to anti-communists throughout the world the US determination to oppose communism. (4) It would reaffirm our adherence to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. (5) It would stop further communist indoctrination of Cubans. (6) It would eliminate the possibility of Soviet bases being established in Cuba. (7) It would eliminate the utilization of Cuba as a base of subversion throughout the Western Hemisphere. (8) It would eliminate the possible requirement for a major outlay of funds in preparing to meet in increasing threat from Cuba.

Disadvantages (1) Without a truly plausible provocative act, the United States would pay a very considerable price in terms of world opinion. (2) It could inspire Soviet counter-action in other areas. (3) This course of action is contrary to the UN charter and the non-intervention doctrine enunciated at the Bogota Conference.

Benjamin T. HarrisPrinted from a copy that indicates General Harris signed the original.Brig General, USADOD/JCS RepresentativeCaribbean Survey Group

359. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 7/62. Top Secret; Noforn; Continued Control; Sensitive. Washington, July 24, 1962. SUBJECT Operation Mongoose—End of Phase I REFERENCE Your Memorandum dated 11 July 1962, Subject as AboveNot found. 1. Pursuant to reference memorandum and in accordance with our previous discussions, set out below are comments for inclusion in your overall report to the Special Group (Augmented) at the conclusion of the first phase of Operation Mongoose, 31 July 1962. In preparing these comments it was found necessary to defer finalizing them until we had an opportunity to review and check them against the 23 July 1962 draft of NIE 85-2-62,This draft has not been found. For text of NIE 85-2-62, see Document 363. a copy of which is available to you. 2. Background, Purpose, and Accomplishments—Phase I: a. On 16 March 1962, the Special Group (Augmented) approved Phase I of Operation Mongoose authorizing and directing that between that date and 31 July 1962, CIA mount a concentrated operational program to collect intelligence concerning Cuba and to develop, insofar as possible, clandestine resistance cadres inside Cuba. This plan authorized intelligence—political, economic, and covert actions, short of those reasonably calculated to inspire revolt within the target area or otherwise require U.S. armed intervention. The plan required that actions taken during Phase I should be consistent with overt policies of isolating Castro in the Western Hemisphere and be undertaken in such a way as to permit U.S. disengagement with minimum losses of assets and prestige. Major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence have required approval in advance by the Special Group (Augmented). b. Phase I of Operation Mongoose did not provide for a maximum operational program against Cuba and did not authorize any extensive use of U.S. military personnel, bases, and facilities. No decision was made to undertake a phased operation to provoke a revolt with the commitment that such revolt would be supported by U.S. military forces. c. Within the policy limitations of Phase I, it was hoped that the following would be accomplished: (1) The development of an effective functioning operational unit for the conduct of intelligence, psychological warfare and covert actions against Cuba. (2) The development in depth of hard intelligence coverage of Cuba. (3) The establishment of limited resistance cadres inside Cuba and an adequate assessment of the resistance potential, as well as operational conditions affecting the possibilities of organizing and inciting a major revolt. (4) Keep alive, insofar as possible, the spirit of resistance inside Cuba and exploit any possibilities that appeared for the development of future Cuban leadership and revolutionary doctrine. (5) Determine the possibilities of and, if possible, take action toward splitting the top Cuban leadership. d. During Phase I the following has been accomplished: (1) An effective operational unit for the conduct of multi-purpose operations against Cuba has been established and is functioning well. As of 23 July, 477 CIA staff personnel are devoting full time to this effort. In addition, a very large number of additional personnel are devoting part-time efforts to Operation Mongoose. (2) Point c(2) above has been accomplished. Hard intelligence coverage of Cuba at the present time exists in depth and has increased substantially since the inception of Phase I. Through this coverage we now have an excellent understanding of military, political, economic and resistance conditions and activities inside Cuba as reflected [not] only by numerous individual intelligence disseminations, but by the intelligence reflected in summation in the forthcoming NIE 85-2-62. The plan for Phase I of Operation Mongoose contemplated that we would have established inside Cuba by 31 July 1962, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] controlled reporting intelligence agents, including legal travelers. In fact, we have at the present time inside Cuba [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] controlled Cuban agents and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] third country controlled agents, a total of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] agents inside the target area. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] third country controlled agents, reporting substantially on Cuba, are located outside Cuba. A substantial number of these will in the near future be dispatched on missions inside Cuba. In addition, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] independent support agents are producing intermittent intelligence reports with some frequency concerning Cuba. The above figures do not include the extensive reporting from the Opa-Locka Intelligence Center, which is now totaling approximately 800 reports a month. (3) With regard to Point c(3), we have been less successful. The original maximal planning under Phase I contemplated that we would have infiltrated into Cuba by 31 July 1962 at least 23 illegal intelligence reporting and resistance cadre teams. By the conclusion of this phase, we will have actually infiltrated no more than eleven such teams. In addition, four caching operations and one 1,500 pound re-supply operation will have been completed. During August 1962, barring presently unforeseen operational failures or aborts, five more teams should have been infiltrated into Cuba, as well as two additional cache operations and one 3,000 pound re-supply operation. Our failure to meet the original schedule of team infiltrations primarily was due to two factors: (a) lack of policy approval by higher authority to make any extensive utilization of Department of Defense personnel and support, and (b) a series of operational failures and aborts due to weather, enemy action, failure of inside agents to keep rendezvous and, in a few instances, missions aborted by the Cuban agents involved for various reasons, including their dissatisfaction with U.S. lack of aggressiveness against Cuba. Since 1 April 1962, in addition to the operations involved above, 19 maritime operations have aborted or failed due to one or more of the factors listed immediately above. Had we been permitted to mount a more intensive and aggressive effort, the original infiltration schedule probably would have been met, possibly exceeded. You will recall that it was pointed out to the Special Group in March 1962 that the full implementation of the operational plan for infiltration would require use of Defense facilities which were not subsequently, as a matter of policy, forthcoming. The speed with which and the extent to which we can in the future infiltrate black teams for resistance purposes into Cuba will of course depend upon policy approvals by higher authority and the amount of support we can count on thereunder. Although we have had losses in connection with the teams infiltrated, Phase I has demonstrated that we can successfully infiltrate such teams and that, given proper policy approval and sufficient support, we can greatly increase the resistance cadres and activities inside Cuba. (4) With regard to Point c(4) above, our activities, we believe, have had a substantial effect in supporting a spirit of resistance inside Cuba. This effect has not of course been as great as it would have been had we been able to mount a maximum covert action, paramilitary and psychological warfare operation. We have not been successful in developing an effective revolutionary movement or leadership around which a Cuban revolt inside Cuba could be rallied at the present time. (5) With regard to Point c(5) above, we have developed a number of promising leads to the top Cuban leadership, but no immediate current possibility of splitting it. 3. Operational Estimate: a. The operational estimate of conditions and possibilities inside Cuba is well reflected in the forthcoming NIE 85-2-62. In summation, based on the intelligence collected and our operational experience during Phase I, it is our conclusion that there is a sufficiently substantial resistance potential inside Cuba which, given a maximum operational effort, could be organized and incited into open revolt provided the Cubans could be assured that if they themselves revolted their revolt would be supported by U.S. intervention and that the U.S. would not permit it to be crushed by Castroʼs military and police counteraction. It is our opinion that there is an excellent chance such a revolt could be incited by late 1963 if we embark on a maximum operational program now. Possible dissatisfaction with the Cuban regime inside Cuba has materially increased over the past several months and is likely to continue to increase for some time. It is not likely to result in spontaneous revolt or in major widespread resistance without organized assistance and support from the U.S. The Military/Security/Police apparatus of the Castro regime is effective and its effectiveness can be expected to increase. It is and will remain, in our opinion, for the foreseeable future, capable of containing and eventually destroying the bulk of any unorganized, unsupported resistance or revolt which may arise in Cuba. If a revolt in Cuba is organized and incited, it will be destroyed at best within a matter of a few days if it is not supported by substantial military force. b. With regard to the influence of Castro and Cuba elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere, the appeal of Castroism as such has dimmed appreciably in other Latin American states during the past several months, although there are many indications that Castroʼs Cuba is still active in subversive activities elsewhere in the Hemisphere, including firm evidence that Cuba provided $10,000 to the 13th of November Guatemalan revolutionary group in Mexico City. It cannot be overstressed, however, that the Cuban regime has proven that violent social revolution and a break with the U.S. is possible in Latin America and will be supported by the Soviet Bloc without the USSR necessarily insisting on complete traditional communist control. The appeal of the Cuban example will increase in other Latin American states if reform lags and if hopes and promises remain unfulfilled. Cuba also represents and will continue to represent a danger because its subversive activities might at any time provide the spark that would set off explosions in unsettled countries, for example, Venezuela and Guatemala. In addition, Cuba represents of course the dangerous example of a communist regime within the Western Hemisphere in defiance of the United States and breaching hemispheric solidarity. 4.

Future Courses of Action:

Set out below are comments on the four possible future courses of action outlined in Paragraph 5 of reference memorandum: “a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect hemisphere from it:” If this course of action is adopted by higher authority, it will not result in the overthrow or probably in any material change in the Castro regime in the foreseeable future. If this course of action is adopted, the extent of effort currently being devoted by CIA and other agencies to Operation Mongoose should be reviewed and reconsidered and probably seriously curtailed. If this course of action is adopted, the U.S. Government will of course receive increased pressure from the multitudinous Cuban exile groups and will be faced with an increasing level of irresponsible unilateral Cuban actions based in and from the U.S. “b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment:” This course of action, which is very close to that undertaken in Phase I of Operation Mongoose, is not likely to result in the overthrow of the Castro regime in the foreseeable future and unless it is intensified to the point of substantially raising the “noise level” inside and outside the U.S., its effectiveness is likely to be limited to the collection of intelligence and to the containing of Cuba at about the present level. If this course of action is adopted, certain portions of the present CIA effort probably should be terminated, particularly the infiltration of black resistance teams, since without some phased plan for action these teams are being jeopardized to little purpose. “c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end:” This is, in effect, the original operational proposal presented to the Special Group (Augmented) and disapproved in favor of Phase I on 16 March 1962. If this course of action is adopted, and if we are permitted thereunder in the immediate future to mount an all-out maximum operational effort to establish and support resistance inside Cuba with full covert use of military facilities and personnel, there is an excellent chance of inciting a revolt inside Cuba by late 1963. This would require maximal effort keyed to a phased plan and would require decision now to commit U.S. Forces to support such a revolt since, even if incited, such a revolt cannot be kept alive more than a few days in the face of Cuban military and security counteraction unless the revolt is supported by substantial military forces. This phasing is necessary too since, unless we can assure the Cubans that if they are able to revolt they will be supported, our chances of inducing them to engage in resistance and revolt to a sufficient extent to constitute more than an irritant to the Castro regime are remote. Details and specifics of the necessary actions to implement this course of action have been discussed with you on a number of occasions. Basic to successful implementation of such a course of action, and particularly the clandestine operational phases thereof, are a series of policy decisions by higher authority at the inception which would permit the operational units sufficient flexibility and freedom of action and decision within clearly understood policy parameters to effectively implement the operations involved on a phased basis. “d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force:” This course of action involves a policy decision by higher authority beyond the purview of CIA. If higher authority decides on this course of action, CIA is of course prepared to assist in developing the necessary provocation to justify such intervention and to assist in implementing this course of action with full intelligence and covert assets.

5. It is hoped that the above comments will be of some assistance to you in preparing your overall report on Phase I of Operation Mongoose to the Special Group (Augmented). It would be most appreciated if you would make available to us copies of your report to the Special Group in order that we may comment as appropriate. If any further details or comments from us would be helpful, please let me know. William K. HarveyPrinted from a copy that indicates Harvey signed the original.

360. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 7/62. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. An attached distribution list indicates that 11 copies of the memorandum were prepared and copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. One copy was kept by Lansdale. Washington, July 25, 1962. SUBJECT Review of Operation Mongoose

This is the Operations report at the end of Phase I. It has been compiled to assist you in reviewing Operation Mongoose thus far and in determining the best course of U.S. action for the future.

This Operations report contains the contribution of each major participant, on objectives, on the planning and operational activity to win these objectives, and on future possibilities to be governed by the policy framework. A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-2-62)Document 363. is being submitted separately for consideration in connection with this report.

As Chief of Operations, I am indicating in this covering memorandum what I consider to be the most significant aspects of our policy and program picture. The full report of each major participant is appended,The appendices consisted of the reports made to Lansdale by the Operations Officers of the Department of State, USIA, the Department of Defense, and CIA, which are printed as Documents 355, 356, 358, and 359. to ensure that you have access to the exact reporting as submitted.

Objectives

As desired by higher authority on 30 November 1961, the U.S. undertook a special effort “in order to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime.” After a review of operational planning and programming concepts, the Special Group (Augmented) provided guidelines on 14 March 1962 for Phase I, Operation Mongoose (roughly until the end of July 1962).Document 314. The main objectives were seen as: a. The acquisition of hard intelligence on the target area. b. Undertaking all other political, economic, and covert actions, short of inspiring a revolt in Cuba or developing the need for U.S. armed intervention. c. Be consistent with U.S. overt policy, and remain in position to disengage with minimum loss in assets and U.S. prestige. d. Continue JCS planning and essential preliminary actions for a decisive U.S. capability for intervention.

Accomplishment

Elements of the U.S. government were organized to reach the goals set for Phase I. My assessment of where we are on each objective is noted under appropriate sub-headings below. In general, this has been a remarkably quiet operation, well within the “noise” and “visibility” limits imposed.

Higher authority has been kept informed of progress through the Special Group (Augmented), by frequent reports. The Special Group has provided policy guidance, as required, in Phase I.

The Chief of Operations has coordinated the efforts of participating departments and agencies, through meetings of the Operational Representatives and by constant review of progress. The Operational Representative of each major U.S. participant in Operation Mongoose are William Harvey (CIA), Robert Hurwitch (State), Brig. Gen. Benjamin Harris (Defense), and Don Wilson (USIA).

My assessment of the organization, planning, and actions to reach the goals in Phase I:

Intelligence. CIA had the main assignment to acquire the “hard-intelligence” desired. The headquarters and field staff of CIA are now well organized for a major effort for this aspect of Operation Mongoose, being strengthened by a number of CIA officers experienced in “denied area” operations elsewhere in the world. Planning and actions rate superior, in a professional sense of intelligence collection.

CIA established the Caribbean Admission Center at Opa-Locka, Florida [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It undertook a priority plan to collect information on the target from third country areas in Latin America and Europe. Inside Cuba, the recruitment and placement of third country nationals and initiation of Cuban collection nets, particularly in urban centers, has made Operation Mongoose numerically the largest U.S. intelligence agent effort inside a Communist state. However, the effort in more remote provincial areas of Cuba, where guerrilla resist-ance was expected to be spotted, recruited, and organized, was short of the hoped-for goal; this was due to the regimeʼs security precautions and, to some degree, to policy limitations on the risks to be assumed.

Defense contributed the majority of personnel to staff the Caribbean Admission Center, stepped-up SIGINT collection under NSA despite changes and improved sophistication of Cuban communication procedures, and brought into play the available assets of Service intelligence organizations, in coordination with CIA. State stepped up its information collection from diplomatic and refugee organization sources. Justice (FBI and INS) and USIA provided significant support to the Caribbean Admission Center.

Political. State appointed a representative to devote full-time to Operation Mongoose and to develop the required political actions. During Phase I, the Punta del Este conference was a major U.S. political action to isolate Castro and neutralize his influence in the Hemisphere, but was not developed within the context of Operation Mongoose. The successful visit of President Kennedy to Mexico was another major U.S. political action, with a potential impact upon our special goals, but was not developed within the context of Operation Mongoose. Two Operation Mongoose efforts in political action were attempted in Phase I: to counter Castro-Communist propaganda exploitation of May Day and to arouse strong Hemisphere reaction to Cuban military suppression of the hunger demonstration at Cardenas, in June. Ambassadors in Latin America were asked to undertake a special effort, as possible, with the help of their Country Teams; political action results in both instances were mostly negative, due to lack of capability and the local attitude in Latin American countries.

State is responsible for refugee political policy matters, assisted by CIA in daily liaison. This is an area of major interest to Operation Mongoose, since the Cuban refugees have an open objective of overthrowing the Communist regime in Havana and recapturing their homeland. They are given open U.S. assistance to remain in this country, yet are participating in covert actions in a limited way. Only a fractional opening has been made to release the frustrated energy of these refugees in freeing their homeland and in creating a favorable political climate in Latin America for the liberation of Cuba. Policy limitations of “audibility” and “visibility” apply directly in considering the handling and use of this dynamic refugee potential.

As a working document for U.S. operational guidance, State developed a definition of a political program for a free Cuba, with the understanding that any real political program must be developed by the Cubans themselves.

Psychological. Psychological activities for Operation Mongoose make use of existing assignments of responsibilities within the U.S. government: State, having the policy role, chairs an inter-agency Cuba Psychological Operations Group which meets weekly; USIA disseminates any U.S. government information (VOA and Press Service) and generates “gray” or non-official information (5 million cartoon books and thousands of Spanish books on Cuba disseminated in Latin America); CIA passes information appropriate for “gray” and covert psychological channels (radio, mailings to Cuba, and dissemination inside Cuba).

Conditions and events in Cuba have provided many effective themes, which have been promptly and sharply exploited by available means in the Western Hemisphere. However, the U.S. still lacks the capability of effectively getting information to the majority of the Cuban people. Our short-wave broadcasts are highly regarded by the Cuban people, but short-wave receiver sets are limited inside Cuba. Our medium-wave broadcasts compete against stronger Cuban signals; it was felt that greater U.S. competition in medium-wave broadcasts could lead to Cuban interference of U.S. commercial broadcasts over a fairly wide area of the U.S. Clandestine broadcasts from a submarine (appearing as broadcasts by Cuban guerrillas inside Cuba) have been initiated; they are in their infancy, and have a long way to develop before their messages are believed and get passed among Cubans by word-of-mouth. Dissemination of leaflets and propaganda inside Cuba by balloon or aircraft has not received policy approval.

Economic. State has the main responsibility for developing economic actions. State has chaired an inter-agency working group, which generated the U.S. trade embargo, denial of bunkering facilities, increased port security, and control procedures on transshipment, technical data, and customs inspection. Diplomatic means were used to frustrate Cuban trade negotiations in Israel, Jordan, Iran, Greece, and possibly Japan. Under Resolution VIII adopted at Punta del Este, the OAS has established a special committee to study “the feasibility and desirability of extending the suspension of trade with Cuba to other items (than arms),” State has prepared a program to be submitted to this OAS committee in the future.

The evidence is that Cubaʼs economy is suffering. Trade with the Communist Bloc and others has kept it limping along, despite scarcity of U.S. goods, the bad drought limiting agrarian crops, increased worker non-cooperation and the regimeʼs bungling of economic control meas-ures. Critical spare parts still arrive in Cuba, including shipments from British and Canadian firms. Chartered shipping from Free World sources still plays a major role in Cubaʼs trade, and the U.S. has little hope of cutting this life-line to Castro.

Guerrilla. CIA had the main responsibility for assessing resistance potential inside Cuba and to start quietly organizing such resistance as feasible. The CIA plan has been to set about doing this through introducing small teams into the Cuban countryside, “over the beach” from boats. Each team is tasked first to stay alive, while getting established in an area. Once able to live in an area, it then starts a cautious survey of potential recruits for a resistance group. Names of such recruits are sent to CIA for checking. As recruits join, they are trained on the ground by the team, and then continue the survey. This is slow and dangerous work.

CIA reports that 11 teams will have been infiltrated by the end of July and that 19 maritime operations have aborted. Of the teams in, the most successful is the one in Pinar del Rio in western Cuba; its success was helped greatly by a maritime re-supply of arms and equipment; the fact that it is a “going concern” and receives help from outside has attracted recruits. Its potential has been estimated at about 250, which is a sizable guerrilla force. With equally large guerrilla forces in other Cuban provinces, guerrilla warfare could be activated with a good chance of success, if assisted properly. However, the teams in other provinces have not been so successful; our best hope is that we will have viable teams in all the potential resistance areas by early October. Bad weather, high seas, and increased security patrols will make the infiltration of teams and their re-supply from small boats a hard task.

Sabotage has not taken place, on a U.S.-sponsored basis. Planning for such action by CIA has been thorough, including detailed study of the structures and vulnerabilities of key targets. Sophisticated actions, such as the contamination of POL has been frustrated by lack of cooperation of nations where POL would be vulnerable to action. Commando type raids would take maritime means which now have priority use in support of CIA teams being infiltrated inside to survey and create a guerrilla potential. CIA has reported that there is now some capability inside Cuba for sabotage action, that target selection has been under further careful review, and that a proposal is forthcoming to be submitted for policy approval.

Intervention Planning. The JCS were given the responsibility for planning and undertaking essential preliminary actions for a decisive U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba. This “Guidelines” objective has been met, fully. Also, U.S. military readiness for intervention in Cuba has been under continuing review within Defense, being improved wherever feasible. In addition, rumors during June of a possible uprising inside Cuba led to further planning for a contingency where a non-U.S. inspired revolt might start inside Cuba; inter-agency staffing of U.S. planning for such a Cuban contingency is being completed, under Defense leadership.

Assets. Whatever we decide to do in the future depends, to a large degree, on the assets available to us. Our own U.S. assets in organization, personnel, and equipment are sufficient to liberate Cuba, given the decision to do so. Assets among the Cubans, to liberate themselves, are capable of a greater effectiveness once a firm decision is made by the U.S. to provide maximum support of Cubans to liberate Cuba, and the Cubans start being helped towards that goal by the U.S. There are enough able-bodied and properly motivated Cubans inside Cuba and in exile to do the job. There is wide-spread disaffection in Cuba, with strong indications that economic distress and demoralization of population is causing real concern and strain for the regimeʼs control officials. Firm U.S. intention to help free Cuba is the key factor in assessing the Cubans themselves as an operational asset for Operation Mongoose.

At the close of Phase I, my concern is strong that time is running out for the U.S. to make a free choice on Cuba, based largely on what is happening to the will of the Cuban people. Rightly or wrongly, the Cubans have looked and are looking to the U.S. for guidance on what to aspire to and do next. They wonder if we are not merely watching Cuba closely, as a matter of our own security, undertaking some economic proscription, and isolating the Castro/Communist gang from contaminating the Hemisphere. Along with recognition of our humanitarian sympathies, this seems to be the fear among Cuban refugees, although they are still hopeful.

If Cubans become convinced that the U.S. is not going to do more than watch and talk, I believe they will make other plans for the future. The bulk of Cuban refugees in the U.S. are most likely to start getting serious about settling down for life in the U.S., dulling their desire to return home with personal risk involved. The bulk of disaffected people inside Cuba will lose hope and incentive for futile protests against the regime and start accepting their status as captives of the Communists. Some Cuban activists will not accept the loss of their homeland so easily and may seek release from frustration by liberation operations outside U.S. territory and control. The recent wildcat Cuban scheme to bomb Habana from Central America is an example.

Our probes of the guerrilla potential inside Cuba have been hampered by similar morale factors. Cubans sent to risk their lives on missions inside Cuba feel very much alone, except for their communications link back to the U.S. They are unable to recruit freedom fighters aggressively by the time-proven method of starting an active resistance and thus attracting recruits; U.S. guidelines to keep this short of a revolt have made the intention behind the operation suspect to local Cubans. The evidence of some intent is seen in the recent maritime re-supply of the team in Pinar del Rio. We brought in extra weapons, for which there were immediate recruits; if we were to exploit the evident guerrilla potential in this province, it appears likely that we would have to furnish supplies by air and probably open the U.S. to strong charges of furnishing such support to Cuban resistance elements.

Therefore, we have been unable to surface the Cuban resistance potential to a point where we can measure it realistically. The only way this can be done, accurately, is when resistance actually has a rallying point of freedom fighters who appear to the Cuban people to have some chance of winning, and that means at least an implication that the U.S. is in support. Word-of-mouth information that such a freedom movement is afoot could cause the majority of the Cuban people to choose sides. It would be the first real opportunity for them to do so since Castro and the Communists came to power. There was little opportunity for the Cuban people to join an active resistance in April 1961; there is less opportunity today. If the Cuban people are to feel they have a real opportunity, they must have something which they can join with some belief in its success.

Projection (Phase II).

As a help towards the making of a U.S. decision on a future course of action, the Operational Representatives developed working statements of four possibilities; at my request they have commented on the positive and negative factors worth considering for each possible course, and it is suggested that these thoughtful statements are worth reading in full. The working statements of the choices open to the U.S. are as follows: a. Cancel operational plans; treat Cuba as a Bloc nation; protect Hemisphere from it, or b.This copy of this memorandum, which was presumably General Taylorʼs, was marked by McGeorge Bundy at this point with an arrow pointing to option b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt employment of U.S. military, or c. Commit U.S. to help Cubans overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, with a step-by-step phasing to ensure success, including the use of U.S. military force if required at the end, or d. Use a provocation and overthrow the Castro-Communist regime by U.S. military force.

Recommendation

It is recommended that this review of Phase I be considered by the Special Group as providing the operational basis for guidelines and objectives for Phase II. It is a matter of urgency that these be arrived at by the Special Group, to permit developing specific plans and schedules for Phase II.

361. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose—Phase I. Top Secret. Washington, July 26, 1962.

Mr. Martin: Attached is the combined report on Phase I.See Document 360. Mr. Johnson has a copy.

I do not find Lansdaleʼs covering memo particularly enlightening. The comments of DOD and the other agencies on the “four courses of action” are worth noting. You will be interested to read that DOD would like to see the Monroe Doctrine re-affirmed.

I think the essence of the positions lies in the following: 1. CIA believes that if assurances were given of US intervention, a revolt could be mounted by late 1963, but would be destroyed at best within a matter of a few days if it is not supported by substantial military force. No mention is made of the nature or magnitude of the revolt. 2. Defense states it needs eighteen (or perhaps twelve) days of preparation, although some units might be available in as soon as five days. 3. State believes it needs a virtual civil war situation in Cuba before intervention in Cuba with US military force might be considered politically feasible.

These three conditions do not appear to be easily reconciled.

Bob

362. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/7-3162. Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that 11 copies of the memorandum were prepared and copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Murrow/Wilson. One copy was kept by Lansdale. Washington, July 31, 1962. SUBJECT Contingency Plan

Transmitted herewith is a copy of “United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S),” which is submitted for your consideration. The plan has been approved by the Secretary of Defense and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This plan was developed as a result of reports in mid-June 1962 that the Cuban people were about to revolt against the Castro-Communist regime, without U.S. sponsorship, and the desire expressed by the Special Group that the U.S. be ready for such a contingency. The DOD/JCS representative was tasked by me to develop a plan with the assistance of Operation Mongoose representatives from participating departments and agencies. The DOD/JCS representative did so, and the attached plan is the result.

Attachment

UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)

REFERENCE Memorandum for Representatives of State, Defense, CIA and USIA, from Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: “Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning”, dated 14 June 1962Document 347.

TASK AGENCIES

Department of State

Department of Defense

Central Intelligence Agency

US Information Agency

1. Situation.

a. The purpose of this plan is to define the courses of action to be pursued by affected agencies of the US Government in the event that a decision is made that the United States undertake military intervention in Cuba. b. The assumed situation in Cuba is open, wide-spread revolt. This contingency may be a non-US initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being activated for mid-June 1962. US actions to exploit the situation include the use of US military force. c. It is assumed that this plan would be implemented under the following conditions, and would be considered for implementation under situations less severe. An internal revolt has created a chaotic situation in Cuba where: (1) The revolution is open and threatens the Communist regime; (2) Areas are taken and held by the revolutionaries, and; (3) Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow the government or sustain the revolution indefinitely requests assistance from the United States and/or the Organization of American States (OAS). d. The United States may, or may not, be able to determine that a rebellion is imminent before actual outbreak. However, it is unlikely that the assumed situation will occur all at once and without notice. More probably it will evolve from a localized revolt which will provide some advance notice and the opportunity to initiate necessary diplomatic, propaganda, covert and military preparations. e. The strength, morale, disposition and equipage of unfriendly forces will be assumed to be as described in current estimates of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

2. Mission.

The United States will support and sustain the rebellion in Cuba through all its resources including the use of US military force to assure replacement of the Communist regime with a new Cuban government acceptable to the United States.

3. Execution.

a. Concept of Operations. (1) When the likelihood or emergence of a Cuban revolt becomes apparent to the US intelligence community it will be immediately brought to the attention of the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) through the Officer of the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose. Evaluation of the situation by the Special Group will determine whether or not the Presidentʼs decision should be sought to implement this plan. (2) The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt will be supported by the United States through propaganda, covert operations and other actions as necessary, but maintaining the appearance of non-US involvement should the revolt fail. In the event that the revolt spreads as a popular movement against the Communist regime, the United States should be capable of rapid military action to forestall a concerted and drastic reprisal program in the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan. (3) US Military Reaction. (a) With no prior warning and with eighteen (18) days of preparation a coordinated airborne-amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within ten (10) days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties. (b) A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. Under this circumstance the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. [8 lines of source text not declassified] (4) Execution of this plan will be in two (2) phases: (a) Phase I. After Presidential decision, this phase will be undertaken by the Department of Defense supported by other agencies of the government. It will be initiated by overt US military assault on Cuba under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and will be terminated at such time as essential military control is gained over the island. The operation is to be conducted as rapidly as possible, quickly to confront Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond enemy capability to resist and to reduce risk to US units initially deployed, with a view toward early capitulation of Cuban military units and avoidance of needless loss of life. (b) Phase II. Following the establishment of essential US military control of the island, this phase will be primarily concerned with the restoration of law and order and the establishment of a new Cuban government friendly to the US. US military efforts will be directed primarily to matters of civil affairs and military government in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. Military operations essential for the elimination of small pockets of resistance and restoration of law and order throughout the island will continue. Major US combat forces will be withdrawn as early as security may permit. Operational responsibility of the Department of Defense will cease at the time the Department of State assumes responsibility for civil administration of Cuba. b. Department of Defense Operations. (1) When directed by higher authority, or as the situation demands, the Department of Defense will initiate preparatory actions for US military intervention in Cuba. These actions may include pre-positioning forces and equipment by execution of current cover and deception plans. (2) Upon final decision of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will direct execution of military intervention plans for Cuba. (3) In concept, initial military operations commence with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordinated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and anti-air capability. (a) [12½ lines of source text not declassified] (b)

[6 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (7½ lines of source text) not declassified]

(5) At such time as essential US military control is gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and military government will be given priority and undertaken in accordance with policy established by the Department of State. This includes provision for a provisional military government prepared to assume full legislative, executive, and judicial control until such functions can be turned over to other authority on direction in an expeditious and orderly manner. Remaining resistance elements of the Communist Cuban government, armed forces or other groups will be isolated, contained and destroyed or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat units will be scheduled for early return to the United States consistent with security considerations. c. Department of State Operations. (1) Phase I. The Department of State will seek to place the United States action in as broad a multilateral context as possible. (a) Immediately sound out Latin American Governments to determine whether the United States can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing the use of military forces under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. (b) If 2/3 majority is available, request the Council of the Organization of American States to convoke immediately a meeting of foreign ministers under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and obtain Organization of American States (OAS) decision authorizing use of force. (c) Seek agreement from at least two Latin American nations (preferably not Nicaragua or Guatemala) to provide token forces to join United States forces. (d) If 2/3 majority cannot be mustered, recognize the anti-Castro forces as the Government of Cuba and, in response to its appeal for help, come to its assistance with United States military forces and whatever foreign token forces have been made available. (e) Keep key members of Congress informed of significant developments. (f) Inform all friendly governments of our actions and the reasons therefor; obtain public expressions of their support and of their sympathy for the anti-Castro forces. Warn them to expect communist directed violence and offer them assistance. (g) Notify the OAS and the United Nations (as appropriate) of our actions and be prepared to defend them in these international bodies. (h) Engage in all-out psychological warfare and propaganda stress-ing the morality of United States action designed to assist the Cuban people throw off the bonds of communist enslavement. (2) Phase II—(Post Invasion) (a) Provide immediate emergency economic and other assistance to the civil populace. (b) Turn over as rapidly as possible to the Cuban Government for administration the territory taken by United States troops and assist that government to the extent feasible as it requests. (c) Make preparations to provide the Cuban Government with long range economic assistance. (d) Take measures to assist the Cuban Government to control entry into and exit from Cuba. (e) Re-establish the United States country team in Havana. d. Central Intelligence Agency Operations. (1) CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by a component of CIA Headquarters, Washington. Operational elements are located in the vicinity of Miami, Florida, with sub elements at other Florida locations. (2) In the event of localized revolt, CIA will give covert support to the revolt through introduction of communications, arms, equipment and trained personnel as appropriate and feasible. (3) When US Military intervention is directed and contingency plans are implemented, CIA will fully support the military actions in accordance with the JCS/CIA Command Relationship Agreement,Not found. whether it is implemented or not. (4) Liaison and communications will be established prior to implementation of CINCLANT and subordinate plans. (5) CIA will support military operations by clandestine intelligence, counter intelligence, propaganda, political and paramilitary operations. (6) After the initial assault and during the subsequent consolidation and occupation phase, CIA will designate selected personnel from CIA Headquarters and/or CIA operations base, Florida, to proceed to Cuba and conduct clandestine operations in support of US forces and objectives. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] e. United States Information Agency Operations. (1) The Agency will provide complete, but strictly factual and impartial informational coverage to a spontaneous revolt in its initial phase. The purpose of such coverage will be to keep the people of Cuba, and of the hemisphere, fully informed of developments, and to set the stage for possible subsequent courses of action. Extreme caution will be taken to avoid the appearance of US involvement during this phase so as to nullify possible later charges of US intervention (by Cuba or other Latin American governments) should the revolt fail. In this context, the Agency during this phase must carefully refrain from a type or tone of coverage that might be construed as incitement to riot. (2) In the event of direct US involvement, the Agency will: (a) Assign informational specialists to work with Defense Psywar units during combat operations. (b) Staff up a regular USIS unit to move into Havana with the Department of State contingent at the time and place to be decided on by the Department. (c) Prepare for immediate shipment all physical equipment and resources necessary to support a USIS operation in Cuba. (3) Basic considerations in Agency informational support of direct US military action: (a) Medium wave radio should receive priority attention for any overt combat operation in Cuba. Immediately upon securing any beachhead or other enclave on the island, and perhaps immediately prior to or concurrent with such action, massive medium wave broadcasting should begin. A beefed-up Guantanamo transmitter, leased U.S. Florida facilities, floating transmitters and, as soon as possible, captured Cuban station(s) should be assigned to this task. Short wave facilities will also be increased to provide necessary backup. (b) The messages of this initial phase should be simple and direct, reassuring the people of their personal safety and the protection of their individual rights, instructions on the maintenance of public order, the distribution of food and medical attention, all done hopefully in a Cuban context and with only the minimum of reference to US military forces and power necessary to maintain order and to assure credibility of the inevitability of Castroʼs rapid and complete defeat. (c) Care must be exercised, particularly with the anti-Castro Cubans, to avoid alienating possible support by immediate talk of vengeance, or of indications of possible loss of any gains (housing, land, social benefits) which might have accrued to the peasant and worker groups during the Castro regime. (d) Given the relatively high rate of literacy in Cuba, wall posters and leaflets reiterating the themes of the broadcasts should also be available and utilized as soon as practical, the leaflets by air drop ahead of military action where deemed advisable. (e) Any provisional military government must also have a news bulletin for factual news summaries and instructions to the civilian population. (f) In all psychological planning, special attention should be given to avoiding in so far as possible any indications of plans to return to the status quo ante, all information output should be designed to reassure the populace that the US supported movement is designed to carry forward the realization of the social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people. f.

Department of the Treasury Department of Justice Department of Health, Education and Welfare Department of Agriculture Federal Aviation Agency Bureau of the Budget

Supporting functions will be undertaken to assist, expedite and promote the efforts of Task Agencies: a. As requested by Task Agencies, prior to plan implementation, and b. As requested by Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.

4. Coordinating Instructions.

a. Implementation of this plan will be as directed by the President. b. Military operations, including clandestine and paramilitary activities, will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration of military government activities in Cuba will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State. c. Political, psychological and economic operations will be accomplished in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State. d. Supporting plans are required from all Task Agencies. Direct coordination between agencies should be effected for planning purposes. One copy of supporting plans is to be provided Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, and maintained in current status. e. During implementation of the plan the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, will act as the coordinator for the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency activities. The coordinating office will be established in the Pentagon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 B 913, telephone extension 59710.

363. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan. 63. Secret. A covering note indicates that this estimate, submitted by McCone, was prepared by CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on August 1, except the representative of the AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside his jurisdiction. NIE 85-2-62 Washington, August 1, 1962.

THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBAThis estimate is designed to bring up-to-date NIE 85-62, “The Situation and Prospects in Cuba,” dated 21 March 1962. The background information contained in that document remains generally valid. [Footnote in the source text. For NIE 85-62, see Document 315.]

The Problem

To analyze the situation in Cuba and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so, with particular reference to Castroʼs relations with the Communists and to the potential for resistance to his regime.

Conclusions

A. Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban communism; the “old” Communists have had to accommodate themselves to this fact, as has the USSR. Further strains may develop in these relationships, but they are unlikely to break the ties of mutual interest between Castro and the “old” Communists and between Cuba and the USSR. (Paras. 1-10) B. By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR, however, has avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingencies. (Para. 11) C. The Cuban armed forces are loyal to the personal leadership of the Castro brothers. Their capabilities have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Blocʼs provision of military equipment and instruction. Cuban military capabilities, however, are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. (Paras. 12-19) D. The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insurrection likely to develop in present circumstances. They are probably capable of containing and controlling any threat to the regime through guerrilla action and of repelling any invasion short of a direct US military intervention in strength. (Paras. 22-23) E. The Cuban economy is in deep trouble, in part because of the US embargo and a consequent shortage of convertible foreign exchange, in part because of agricultural and industrial mismanagement. Despite remedial measures, it is unlikely that agricultural and industrial production can be significantly increased within the next year or so. The expected increase in capital imports from the Bloc is unlikely to produce a net growth of the economy before the end of 1963. (Paras. 30-35) F. The Castro regime retains the positive support of about 20 percent of the population, but disaffection is increasing. This trend is manifested in growing passive resistance and in occasional open demonstrations of resentment. Few, however, dare to accept the risks of organized active resistance in present circumstances, for fear of the regimeʼs massive apparatus for surveillance and repression. (Paras. 36-41) G. If arms and supplies became available and if confidence were created in the likelihood of outside support for a major Cuban uprising, resistance activity and potential would increase. Even so it is unlikely that the regime could be overthrown unless events had already shaken the regime and brought into doubt its capacity for survival, and unless substantial outside support for the insurgents were forthcoming. (Paras. 42-51) H. The Castro regime still seeks to lead the “inevitable” revolution throughout Latin America, but its preoccupation with domestic problems tends to limit its activity in this respect. In Latin America there is widespread disillusionment regarding the Cuban revolution. Nevertheless, militant pro-Castro groups exist in several countries, and Cuban subversive activity could prove effective in certain unstable situations: e.g., in Guatemala or Venezuela. The appeal of the Cuban example will increase in Latin America if reform lags there and hopes and promises remain unfulfilled. (Paras. 52-59)

[Here follows the Discussion section of the Estimate. For text, see the Supplement.]

364. Paper by the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor)Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Rusk, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, Johnson, Gilpatric, McCone, Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Lansdale. Washington, August 1, 1962.

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR MONGOOSE MEETING, 10 AUGUST 1962See Document 371.

Responsible Agency A. Consideration of special NIE on Cuba.Document 363. CIA *B. Discussion of the effects of the existence of the Castro Government during the past year on the United States, Latin America, and the USSR. State C. Explanation of the distinction between the four proposed courses of action.See Document 360. Responsible Agency: General Lansdale *D. Discussion of a possible stepped up Course B as to content, implication and difference from present course of action. General Lansdale E. Pros and Cons of the precommitment proposed in Course C. State, Defense, USIA *F. Consequences of military intervention to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustainedoccupation, the level of national mobilizationrequired, and Cuban counteraction. DOD, JCS G. Future courses of action to be recommended to higher authority. All

*It is requested the responsible agencies for the topics marked with asterisks above circulate papers to the members of the Special Group (Augmented) by 8 August.

MDTPrinted from a copy that bears these typed initials.

365. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, August 6, 1962. SUBJECT Operation Mongoose “Gusano Libre,” Symbol of Cuban Resistance 1. The term “Gusano” (worm) was first applied by Fidel Castro to counter-revolutionaries. Since then it has been used proudly as a symbol by the opposition to the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba. CIA plans a coordinated campaign to popularize, exploit and encourage the use of “Gusano Libre” as the symbol of resistance to the Cuban regime. So as to give the impression that adoption of the symbol is a spontaneous internal development and not an exile one, CIA controlled outlets will refer to instances of use of the symbol inside Cuba rather than calling on Cubans to adopt the symbol. 2. We intend to use the occasion of the next “Voice of Free Cuba” submarine operation planned for mid-August 1962 to announce that the “Gusano Libre” has become the symbol of popular resistance against the Castro regime, calling upon the people of Cuba to show their defiance of the government by scrawling this symbol in public places. The “Gusano Libre” campaign will expand upon this broadcast. 3. In order to give meaning to the symbol a declaration of principles will be announced.A marginal note at this point, in an unknown hand, reads: “This declaration will not be made.” The declaration will cover such points as what the “Gusano Libre” stands for: a. Defeat of Castroism and Communism. b. Establishment of a truly democratic government based on the Constitution of 1940. c. A system of agrarian reform carried out under provisions of fair compensation to former land owners. d. The private ownership of property. e. A free trade union movement with the right of the worker to engage in collective bargaining with his employer. f. A minimum wage law, unemployment compensation, a social security system which ensures workers the prospects of a tranquil retirement. g. Social justice in which every individual has the right to obtain an education and work. 4. The general declarations will be followed by more specific pronouncements as to what the “Gusano Libre” stands for and says. In addition to publicizing “El Gusano Libre” through the use of radios, newspapers, and mailing operations, actions will be taken to provide the people in Cuba with pictures of “El Gusano Libre” as well as instructions on how to draw “El Gusano Libre” on walls and other public places. A small bulletin titled “El Gusano Libre” will be prepared for inside distribution. Gusano Libre pins, armbands, seals, pencils, balloons, etc. can also be produced for inside distribution via mail, legal travelers and propaganda balloons. 5. Once the “Gusano Libre” symbol is established “Gusano Libre” actions will be broadened to include such targets as the G-2 and Soviet/Satellite personalities. 6. Much of the “Gusano Libre” propaganda cartoons, and related material is already developed and will be put into production and distributed following the “Voice of Free Cuba” broadcast announcing the adoption of the “Gusano Libre” as the symbol of Cuban Resistance. William K. HarveyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

366. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Noforn; Special Handling. Washington, August 6, 1962. SUBJECT CIA Draft Operational Plan B+See Document 367.

As requested by you in our meeting Monday afternoon, I have read your draft operational plan. In reading it in the light of making recommendations to higher authority, I found little basis to say that these were either additional or possible within the context of contributing to the mission as stated. The policy level must have proposals which have been assessed as do-able in the current state of foreign affairs and likely to contribute to the desired goal.

Rather than go down point by point and page by page, let me point out three items you list as appropriate possibilities: a. III A 1, paragraph 1 on page 2: Helping State with use of OAS for Mongoose goals. In the first place, you know that State sees little hope of further use of OAS for our goals, so why be “pie-in-the-sky”? One of our original aims, as you know, was to activate operations from individual Latin American countries. [1 line of source text not declassified] Why is this not proposed as desirable and do-able? b. Item III B 3 on page 2: You note an economic blow by causing the diversion of Cuban resources from production. If it is possible, why isnʼt this being done now? It needs no new policy approval to my knowledge. c. IV B on page 6: You suggest that raising the noise level is needed for you to generate strikes inside Cuba. Can CIA actually hope to generate such strikes? I recall discussions on this very point when you felt that it was impossible to get to the action groups, such as labor unions, to obtain such results. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] If we have no assets inside Cuba, then why is this now called a possibility?

For my use, the most helpful thing as I make proposals to higher authority would be to have you initial each of the items in your paper which you, as the DCIʼs representative in this field, believe is really possible (do-able and sensible). I would appreciate such an indication from you by noon today, since I plan to pull together the team proposals this afternoon, for your further comments and suggestions.On August 7 Lansdale sent a handwritten note to McGeorge Bundy relating to the Mongoose planning exercise in which he wrote, in part: “Itʼs no easy thing to make the big organizations come up with practical answers, although Iʼll keep trying.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62)

367. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 16 copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Murrow, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. Two copies were kept by Lansdale. Washington, August 8, 1962. SUBJECT Stepped Up Course B

You requested a paper on “a possible stepped up Course B as to content, implication and difference from present course of action.”

Course B was described in our 25 July team review of Operation Mongoose, as a course of action possible under present U.S. policy. It read: “b. Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military.” The major difference from Phase I of Operation Mongoose would be in removing the restriction, in the 14 March policy guidelines,Document 314. which kept our actions “short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area.”

As a practical way of getting a meaningful paper to you, for consideration prior to the policy meeting, I held working sessions with the Operational Representatives: Mr. Hurwitch (State), Gen. Harris (Defense), Mr. Harvey (CIA), and Mr. Wilson (USIA). After benefit of discussion, each was tasked with writing a specific section of this paper. The thinking reflects those of responsible representatives, rather than completely staffed positions from participating departments and agencies.

The papers from each representative are attached. The major contribution is from CIA, since CIA would have the main burden in a stepped up Course B. The State, Defense, and USIA papers are essentially reflective of companion roles to CIAʼs covert activities. USIA has added a “think piece” on anticipated world-wide psychological reaction to a stepped up Course B.

Considerations

In our Operational Representatives discussions, it was generally acknowledged that a widespread revolt of the Cuban people against the regime might well lead to an open appeal by Cubans for help by U.S. military forces, as the regimeʼs security forces attempt to crush the revolt. The CIA operational people, who would implement a stepped up Course B as Phase II of Operation Mongoose, do not believe this course of action by itself would bring the overthrow of the regime in Cuba; they believe that the use of U.S. military force in the final stage must be anticipated, for success.

At the close of the attached CIA section on “covert activities,” there is a list of policy approvals deemed required. It is suggested that this be read in context with the CIA operational suggestions as outlined in the section. It is noted that authority would be required for overflights (resupply, leaflet drops, infiltration, exfiltration), use of U.S. submarines for infiltration and exfiltration, major sabotage operations, stepped up psychological actions (including propaganda balloons and establishing a medium-wave Radio Free Cuba), training Cubans on U.S. bases, some operational use of Guantanamo, and more flexibility in the composition of paramilitary groups (selection of Cubans in U.S. forces and strengthening with non-Cubans).

In the “covert activities” section, it is noted that CIA would support State in any feasible action to develop individual Latin American country support and would provide covert support to the CRC and appropriate Cuban groups, to assist in the achievement of the goal of Operation Mongoose.

My own comment is to urge that you give the fullest possible consideration to the concept of actions by Cuban groups, and actions from and by Latin American countries, to achieve the goal of Operation Mongoose. Consideration of this concept is urged, since it alone could offer making the responsibility for initiative and actions reside in groups and countries other than the U.S. If a support concept is possible which would permit U.S. assets to assist such non-U.S. operations, with reasonable assurance of mutual objectives and methods, then this would be the most desirable concept for winning our goal.

AttachmentTop Secret; Sensitive. Washington, August 7, 1962.

COVERT ACTIVITIES

William K. Harvey, CIA Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

I. Situation:

A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action which would be required by the Central Intelligence Agency to fully implement course of action “b” in General Lansdaleʼs memorandum to the Special Group (Augmented) dated 25 July 1962.Document 360. B. The intelligence estimate for the period of this plan is contained in the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62.Document 363. C. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made: 1. Conclusion #D of the National Intelligence Estimate 85-2-62 is invalid. (This assumption is not in our opinion valid, but this operational plan is not a valid plan for the overthrow of the Castro-Communist government unless this assumption is made.) 2. Soviet troops will not be present in Cuba in force. 3. Passive resistance can be changed to active resistance through aggressive, provocative propaganda plus aggressive small-scale open resistance and through fortuitous circumstances existing at the time. It cannot be manipulated on a “time table” basis.

II. Mission:

“Exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime without overt U.S. military commitment”

III. Tasks:

A. Political: 1. Assist and support State in any feasible action to develop active OAS and individual Latin American country support for the overthrow of Castro. 2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups. 3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate. 4. Develop contacts in the “power centers” of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime. 5. Induce the population to engage in militant mass action such as demonstrations, slow-downs, work stoppages, and sabotage. B. Economic: 1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution. 2. Conduct maximum possible sabotage of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants, and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such. At the present time, and for the predictable future, major sabotage at least in part probably would have to be conducted by raider type teams using hit and run tactics. 3. By aggressive deception and other operations, cause the diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes. 4. Induce the population to conduct continuing widespread minor acts of sabotage. C. Resistance: 1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance and revolt in the general population. 2. Recruit, train, and supply small clandestine resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba. 3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in maximum feasible amounts, in areas accessible to the resistance cells and in potential resistance areas. 4. Be prepared to provide covert liaison and communications with leadership elements to any significant internal uprising. 5. Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising. 6. Harass local elements of the Cuban government by hit and run raids against selected targets such as local G-2 offices, militia posts, telephone centrals, etc. 7. If feasible and authorized, initiate an internal uprising. D. Psychological: 1. Strengthen, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-Communism. 2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere, and elsewhere. E. Intelligence: 1. Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following: a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government. b. Activities of Cuban G-2. c. Soviet activities in Cuba. d. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population. e. Militia morale. f. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the “power centers” in the Cuban government.

IV. Implementation:

To undertake the above listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop and carry out the following program (which constitutes a substantial expansion of the current program, particularly in fields other than intelligence).

Intelligence (FI):

The current build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The following types of actions will be maximized: 1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase. 2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba. 3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information. 4. Expansion of communications intelligence, particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA problem.)

Psychological Warfare (CA):

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population. It will have to provide aggressive and provocative propaganda as well as the milder themes. Clear authority to engage in “high noise level” types of propaganda operations calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance is required.

The following psychological warfare activities are considered essential: 1. The establishment of a sufficiently powerful Radio Free Cuba located in Southern Florida or other appropriate area. When this is in operation, the Swan Island operation will be terminated. Policy approval to establish this is required. 2. A maritime propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations. 3. Policy approval and authorization to conduct aircraft leaflet dropping operations using U.S. and other contract crews. 4. Intrusion on live Cuban TV channels with video and audio transmissions from airborne and seaborne platforms. Policy approval is required. 5. Continuation and expansion of the “Voice of Cuba” submarine broadcasting operations in collaboration with the Navy. 6. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers. 7. Intensify propaganda activities utilizing political, professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.

Paramilitary:

To date, the paramilitary program against Cuba has been limited. Experience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining “black teams” in the target country for an indefinite period, nor has any method yet been devised by which infiltrated “black teams” can be effectively legalized with adequate documentation. Therefore, the PM program must increasingly emphasize team infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original teams. This must be paralleled by an aggressive psychological warfare program which will maintain the will to resist and revolt and will provide “the spark of hope.” Without this, it will be impossible to recruit and train the necessary legal residents.

To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support is considered essential: 1. Commando/Raider Teams—Ten to fifteen such teams of approximately twelve men each should be available for unilateral caching operations, selected major sabotage operations, and hit and run commando raids. Authority should be granted to strengthen these teams with non-Cuban contract personnel. Ultimately, when an internal uprising of strength develops they could be landed either as a diversionary effort or for augmentation of selected pockets of resistance. These teams should be trained primarily for hit and run commando raids. It is believed specialized Marine Corps training would be especially appropriate for them. If this is not possible, then Army Ranger type training should be given. It is estimated that ten to fifteen 12 to 15 man teams would be the maximum that could be recruited, trained and utilized during the foreseeable period. They should have a minimum of four-months training, for which Department of Defense facilities and instructor personnel are required. Policy approval is required for the use of non-Cuban contract personnel and DOD facilities and personnel. 2. Urban Resistance Cells—Two to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small “legal” compartmented resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if endangered or if its continued presence jeopardizes the “legal” residents. Initially these cells should be intelligence producers with the secondary mission of selecting, casing, and formulating plans for sabotage of key targets. (The sabotage to be done either by other individuals or at the time of any major uprising.) A third mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of major uprising. It is estimated that within a year at least twelve urban cells could be established. At least 25% of these probably will be lost due to enemy counteraction or from other causes. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the teams to infiltrate can be accomplished within Agency facilities and existing policy approvals. 3. Rural Resistance Cells—Three to five man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small “legal” compartmented resistance cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are endangered or pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. It is estimated that twelve to fifteen such teams could be in place within a year. Forces lost due to attrition are estimated at 25%. Selection and training of the infiltration teams can be accomplished by Agency facilities, but they should be augmented with DOD Special Forces instructors. 4. Guerrilla—Five to eight man teams equipped with W/T communications would be infiltrated into rural areas to live black, recruit, train, and lead (or participate in) “hit and run” guerrilla bands and/or remnants thereof. These groups will require both maritime and aerial re-supply. Attrition will be high. The psychological warfare program in support of this effort must be aggressive and hard-hitting if recruits are to keep flowing to the guerrillas. It is estimated that within a year twenty small groups of guerrillas can be activated. It is not possible to predict what the rate of attrition will be, but approximately 50% appears probable. The teams to be infiltrated should have at least four months Special Forces type training at DOD sites with Special Forces instructors. The trainees could be handled in groups of fifty with two groups in training at a given time. 5. Cuban Exile Forces—The recruitment and training of Cuban exiles by the U.S. Armed Forces should be pressed to the maximum. Upon completion of their training, arrangements should exist to permit the separation of selected individuals or groups to permit the formation of a “Cuban Freedom Fight” under responsible exile leadership which can quickly be used to augment any significant internal uprising. Non-Cuban, U.S., and other contract personnel should be permitted within the “Cuban Freedom Fighter” groups. Additional policy approval is required. 6. Infiltration/Exfiltration—The increased Cuban defensive capabilities plus the above outlined aggressive resistance program requires freedom to utilize all possible infiltration/exfiltration tactics as required, including: a. Present and planned commercial/private maritime capability. b. Submarines and other naval craft. c. Aerial overflight with contract or USAF crews and aircraft.

Additional policy approval is required.

V. Support Required From Other Agencies:

A. From Department of Defense: 1. Ground Support: Three separate training facilities including all instruction and support. a.

Site A—commando/raider training

Provide a four-month training course on a repetitive basis for approximately 100 men.

Site B—Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

Site C—Special Forces type training

Provide four-month course on a repetitive basis. Fifty men per course.

2. Naval Support: a. Submarine infiltration/exfiltration missions. Estimate maximum five per month first three months increasing to ten per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 the requirement could be substantially higher. b. Submarine radio broadcasts—“Voice of Free Cuba”. c. Naval surface craft support may be required at a later date but cannot be predicted now. d. Installation CIA supply base at or in proximity to Boca Chica Naval Air Station. e. Use of Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes, including infiltration and exfiltration of agents, support for clandestine maritime operations, operational reconnaissance, and holding and interrogation of Cuban agents and suspects. 3. Air Support: a. Use of USAF crews and sterile aircraft in lieu of or to supplement U.S. contract crews, provide crews and aircraft for aerial re-supply, infiltration, and leaflet flights. Initially estimate five per month increasing to fifteen per month by January 1963. By the end of 1963 this requirement could substantially increase. b. Support for CIA air program per existing arrangements. 4.

Personnel:

Limited numbers of qualified personnel may be required to provide specialized instruction in CIA training programs, specialized support in connection with the CIA maritime program, and to provide communications support.

From USIA and Federal Communications Commission:

Assistance in the establishment of the Radio Free Cuba transmitter.

VI. Policy Approvals Required:

The following policy approvals are required to implement the foregoing program: A. Authority to initiate and conduct aggressive psychological warfare operations including calling for work stoppages, slow-downs, sabotage, and other forms of militant mass action and widespread overt resistance. B. Authority to establish and operate a medium wave transmitter by Radio Free Cuba. C. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching. D. Authority to conduct overflights of Cuba for leaflet dropping. E. Authority to conduct major sabotage operations targeting against Cuban industry and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications. F. Authority to use U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration. G. Authority to use non-Cuban contract personnel to strengthen teams being infiltrated. H. Authority to train CIA recruited Cubans on DOD bases using DOD instructors and support facilities. I. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration missions using U.S. contract air crews or USAF crews. J. Authority to separate trained Cuban officers and enlisted men from the U.S. Armed Services to permit them to join an exile sponsored group of “Cuban Freedom Fighters.” K. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for operational purposes.

VII. Estimated Cost to CIA:

A. The total number of CIA personnel assigned full-time to Operation Mongoose would have to be increased to at least 600. B. Estimated Budget: Fiscal Year 1963—$40,000,000 Fiscal Year 1964—$60,000,000 (exclusive of reimbursement for DOD support which it is felt should be on a non-reimbursable basis) AttachmentTop Secret. Washington, August 7, 1962.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

Robert A. Hurwitch, Department of State Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

It should be recognized at the outset that short of the employment of U.S. military force the programs and actions of the U.S. aimed at the downfall of the Castro Government will probably be only marginal as compared to the policies and actions of the Castro Government itself and those of the USSR. Despite the preponderance of power presently at the disposal of the Castro Government, however, the deteriorating and mis-managed Cuban economy coupled with a generally discontented and volatile people whose lives are becoming increasingly regimented provide some of the ingredients of an uprising against the regime. U.S. actions may be in this unstable situation provide the necessary spark; they may not. Since there are no scientific means of determining which actions offer assurances of success, we can only probe and experiment. In so doing, however, we should avoid engaging U.S. prestige openly in operations, the success of which may be doubtful.

The present course of action with respect to Cuba involves the exercise of all feasible political, economic and psychological pressures, as well as limited covert activities within Cuba, designed to make the Castro Governmentʼs survival more difficult and to isolate Cuba from the Hemisphere, thereby detracting from its value to the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and reducing its capability to threaten the peace and security of the Hemisphere. This course of action has undoubtedly contributed to an advance toward these objectives over the past year.

Under a stepped up Course B, the actions that might feasibly be undertaken by the Department of State are limited in scope. The Department would continue to invest political capital in courses of action designed to weaken, isolate and eventually effect the downfall of the Castro Government whenever it reasonably appeared that the benefits from each course of action would outweigh the losses for the free world.

A stepped up Course B would appear to involve primarily an increase in covert activities which might stimulate the creation of organized internal resistance to the Castro Government. Of the variety of such covert activities a program of systematic sabotage warrants serious consideration. (Added note on page 4.)The note is at the end of Hurwitchʼs paper.

It may be reasonably argued that a program of sabotage should not be undertaken until an organized base of political opposition already exists in Cuba. It may be equally persuasively argued, however, that a program of sabotage may contribute significantly to the creation of such a base of political opposition. Since organized political opposition does not now exist in Cuba, a program of sabotage may prove to be the means of developing one. This program is visualized as three-fold: supply of sabotage materiel to Cubans in Cuba who are not under U.S. control; supply of sabotage materiel and instructions as to targets to Cubans in Cuba under our control; and sabotage of targets by Cubans under our control who arrive in Cuba, destroy the target, and withdraw from Cuba. Priority should be given to targets of economic importance, the destruction of which would result in the minimum possible loss of life. Terroristic acts of sabotage should be ruled out.

A second area of covert activities which might contribute to the formation of organized opposition to the Castro Government is that of improved techniques of propaganda beamed to the Cuban people. Consideration should be given to seeking the establishment of a powerful, medium wave radio station in a friendly country on the Caribbean perimeter, operated by selected Cuban refugees.

There follow a list of overt political and economic actions which the Department of State might undertake under a stepped up Course B, with advantages and disadvantages briefly noted where pertinent:

Political

A. Be prepared to initiate action or support another American Republicʼs initiative against Cuba in the OAS or subordinate inter-American organization, as the appropriate occasion arises. Advantage: Such action would continue to place the Cuban problem in a multilateral context, thereby advancing the “Hemisphere versus Cuba” impression. Disadvantage: If poor judgment were exercised and an inappropriate occasion chosen for OAS action, such action could place on public display sharp division among the OAS member states and could serve to weaken the inter-American system. B. Continue and intensify, where possible and necessary, the diplomatic and political campaign to inform free world governments and peoples of the nature and activities of the Castro Government and urge them, as appropriate, to undertake all feasible actions which would undermine the Castro Government and demonstrate solidarity with the Cuban people. Advantage: Continuance of this campaign, where successful, would serve to isolate and weaken further the Castro Government. Disadvantage: If overdone, such a campaign could result in other nations and peoples regarding the U.S. as immature and neurotic with respect to the subject of Cuba, since, in many instances, they do not regard the existence of the Castro Government with the same degree of concern as does the U.S. C. Encourage Latin American Governments to take steps to prevent their nationals from traveling to Cuba. Advantage: This action would contribute to isolating Cuba and reducing its capability of subversive activities in the Hemisphere. Disadvantage: Most Latin American nations do not have legislation which provides for control over travel of its nationals to specific countries. Attempts to obtain such legislation with respect to travel to Cuba could create serious local political problems. D. Be prepared to exploit by diplomatic and other means, any indication of a split in the regime from which there may emerge significant anti-Castro-communist elements. E. Continue and intensify where possible and necessary, U.S. efforts to strengthen the democratic sectors in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress program in order to improve their capabilities of countering Castro-communist threats to political stability and orderly economic and social development. F. Continue the program of seeking hard evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere. G. Exploit all feasible opportunities for denying markets in the free world for Cuban exports. Advantage: This action, where successful, would exacerbate Cubaʼs already precarious foreign exchange position and further reduce its ability to purchase vital equipment in the free world. Disadvantage: In some instances, Cuban exports are less expensive than are similar products from alternate sources. Under these circumstances, the U.S. might be compelled to subsidize the alternate sources, an operation for which funds are not currently available. H.

Exploit all feasible opportunities for preventing the shipment of critical spare parts and equipment from free world sources to Cuba.

Added note on sabotage

Distinction should be made between major and dramatic sabotage acts and those that might be characterized as irritants or harassment: for example, complete destruction of oil refineries or power plants as compared to temporary impairment of sugar refineries or cutting of power lines. With respect to the first category, such acts should not be isolated events but rather should be accompanied by other actions in Cuba which might have resulted from the particular act of sabotage or of which the act of sabotage might have been the result. Acts of sabotage of the second category might be isolated events.

AttachmentTop Secret. Washington, August 7, 1962.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

Donald M. Wilson, USIA Representative for Operation Mongoose, states:

Under stepped-up Course B there would be two psychological tasks: 1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba, exposing the weaknesses and perfidies of the Castro/Communist regime. 2. Improve the informational capability throughout Latin America to “isolate” Castro/Communism and build up support for pro-democratic Cuban elements.

1. Increase the flow of information to Cuba.

Where other access is denied us, radio is the best means to reach the Cuban people. It is USIAʼs new view that our short wave capability (VOA) is operating at the most efficient technical level, with nine hours of broadcasting a day in Spanish. Three of the nine hours are devoted specifically to Cuba, while the other six concern themselves with the rest of Latin America. All are heard clearly in Cuba and will be heard much more clearly in December, 1962, when our new transmitter in Greenville, North Carolina, goes on the air.

The establishment of a medium wave capability would be desirable. It is indeed possible to broadcast a strong signal into Cuba, and USIA has made a study of ten possible sites to locate transmitters (reported separately). Our study also shows, however, that Castro has the ready capability to jam our effort with an extraordinarily high percentage of success. Faced with Castroʼs capability, should the U.S. undertake construction of a powerful broadcasting facility at an estimated cost of eight million dollars and an estimated building time of fifteen months? It is always possible that Castro would not utilize his jamming capability and the U.S. would therefore have a successful medium-wave operation into Cuba. Should an uprising occur, the opportunities presented by such a U.S. medium-wave capability would be great. Should there be an ultimate military action by the United States, the opportunities of such a capability would also be great. However, if none of these contingencies occur, we will have an expensive operation on our hands with small listenership to show for it.

b. Balloon deliveries. This capability under CIA direction has been discussed at a meeting of the Special Group and not acted upon. If activated, USIA would participate in the preparation of the propaganda material. c. Aircraft deliveries. Also a CIA project.USIA would participate in the preparation of propaganda material. d. Smuggling of printed materials. As the U.S. capability within Cuba increases, there is an improving possibility of making propaganda material available to the population. The desirability of this would have to be first determined on the basis of security to the personnel involved. An increase of printed material exposing weaknesses of the Castro regime would be desirable, and USIA would participate in the preparation of that material. e. The greatest possible circulation to the “worm” (gusano libre) theme within Cuba should be implemented. This is a CIA project. However if it gains momentum, USIA will be able to pick it up for VOA exploitation into Cuba and the rest of Latin America. f. We would continue to attempt to find a suitable musical theme that might stir the resistance forces in Cuba.

2. Improve the information capability throughout Latin America.

Our capability will depend on the availability of funds. The Latin American program was stepped-up 32 percent in Fiscal Year ʼ62 and it will be stepped-up 26 percent more in Fiscal Year ʼ63, so the availability of even more funds is a real problem.

Here are examples of current programming which could be augmented: 1) Radio. We could step up our production of packaged radio programs for placement on radio stations throughout Latin America. 2) Cartoon Books. The Agency has done six anti-Castro cartoon books (5 million copies) having a widespread impact over the area. This program could be stepped-up. 3) Motion Pictures. The Agency has produced an animated film on Cuban land reform theme and has two more films in the pipeline. An increased production of films, although expensive, could be instituted. 4) Television. Television reaches a growing audience in Latin America. The Agency has done one TV “Special” on Castro, and has acquired others from commercial producers. Currently the Agency is doing an anti-Communist TV series which will document the methods and results of Castroism. Vast new opportunities are available in this medium. For example, we could do a puppet series to poke fun at Castro, a device with vast appeal to Latinos. 5) Books. Our book program has several good anti-Castro titles although the circulation is small. We have already asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation to distribute five million books next year in Latin America. Some of these will have an anti-Castro theme. 6) Refugees. We could make an even greater use of the Cuban refugee story through all media. For example, we could do more TV shorts on Cuban refugees at work (in garages, driving taxis, clerking, and so on). We could more fully exploit the Negro defectors.

Following are some possibilities for new programming: 1. Contract for anti-Castro supplements to be printed and placed regularly in Latin American newspapers. 2. Subsidize a troupe of Cuban dancers, musicals, singers in one big show to tour Latin America. Ample talent is available among the refugees. Program content can be worked into the performance, or there could be a statement on the Cuban plight at intermission. 3. Organize a show by Cuban painters, cartoonists, sculptors on one theme—perhaps the executions—to be sent around Latin America. 4. Develop a speakersʼ bureau throughout Latin America to send lecturers before all types of groups. Provide these lecturers with anti-Castro giveaway materials and film slides. 5. Develop a series of hard-hitting exhibits on various anti-Castro themes, and get them displayed in key locations all over Latin America.

It is USIAʼs view that the most effective information program in Latin America must have a position theme. That is why the majority of our output is still devoted to support of the Alliance for Progress. Our anti-Castro output, being essentially negative in nature, still is relegated to a less important position. We believe this accent on the positive to be most desirable and should there be an increase in anti-Castro material we would believe it necessary to similarly increase our positive support material for the Alliance for Progress.

Advantages of Stepped-Up Course B: a. It would raise the hopes of the anti-Castro Cubans and check their tendency to grow complacent and settle into U.S. ways. b. It would tend to bring together the various Cuban anti-Castro factions. c. It would call forth the heightened attention of the rest of Latin America to the Castro/Communist regime.

Disadvantages: a. World opinion, particularly in Europe, would become suspicious of “intervention.” b. A higher noise level will be accompanied by a higher risk of exposure of the program.

Anticipated Reaction to Stepped-Up Course B

World reaction to a heightened propaganda-political action campaign against Castro would be significantly influenced by (a) the pace of the intensification, (b) the degree of overt identification with the U.S., and (c) the intensity of the Soviet propaganda response.

Assuming such a campaign were skillfully handled, however, we believe public reaction abroad would not be damaging to U.S. interests in any significant degree.

Latin America

There has been increasing disenchantment with Castro throughout Latin America since early 1961. There would not be widespread negative reaction if our campaign were closely identified with a Cuban liberation movement and directed solely at Cuba, not throughout the area generally.

An overt, clearly U.S.-inspired campaign would bring varied reactions. Mexico, with its legalistic, moralistic approach to Castro, might react strongly to any implied violation of Cuban sovereignty. The press, however, would be less critical than the government. Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and possibly Ecuador, would deplore our action. Again, however, the press and public would be less critical than their governments.

Argentina is less predictable; probably the present regime would be less critical than Frondizi would be.

Governmental and public opinion of the smaller countries in and near the Caribbean would be with us. They feel the heat from Castro most, and are most eager to see him out of the way. In this category are Guatemala, Honduras, Dominican Republic, and to a lesser degree Panama, Nicaragua and Salvador. Colombia would be sympathetic to us. The Betancourt regime in Venezuela is, of course, openly anti-Castro; there would be hostility on the far left, however.

Western Europe

Assuming no sudden or dramatic moves which might alarm a war-wary public opinion, European reaction would be mostly sympathetic. The U.K., Germany, the Benelux, and center and right-wing elements in France and Italy would be particularly sympathetic. Enthusiasm would be restrained by the fact that European nations have benefited economically by the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba. They would dislike losing the market, which would be inevitable to some degree if Castro fell.

Spain and Portugal, which feel a Latin affinity with Cuba no matter who is in power there, would be critical despite their lack of ideological sympathy with Castro. Public opinion in Sweden and Austria might be moderately critical on moral grounds. The anti-Communist Finnish public would be favorable, though the government would straddle.

Communists and fellow-travelers would be sharply critical. It is unlikely, however, that they would stage demonstrations or make much noise except perhaps in Italy.

Canada

Canada, which has profited economically by U.S.-Cuban estrangement, would be critical, pegging its criticism on lofty moral grounds.

Eastern Europe-Communist China

The Communist Bloc and Yugoslavia would, of course, be sharply critical. There might be mass meetings; possibly some “demonstrations” outside American embassies. There would be an intensification of pro-Castro, anti-U.S. propaganda, and probably new assurances of Soviet support to Castro in the event of hostilities.

Near East and South Asia

The most serious repercussions in this area would be in India where Krishna Menon and his ilk would publicly condemn the U.S. and exploit the situation as further justification for their general anti-American line and the MIG purchases.

The extent of Indian reaction would depend in large measure on the intensity of the Soviet reaction. If the latter were sufficiently severe, U.S.-Indian relations could be damaged.

Reaction in Ceylon and Iraq would be similar to that of India.

There would be criticism by the pro-Nasser press in Egypt and throughout the Arab world, but the UAR Government—pleased with its improved relations with the U.S.—probably would remain silent. The Pakistani press, unhappy about our aid to India, might use Cuban developments as a peg for attacks on the U.S. despite their lack of ideological sympathy for Castro.

What little reaction might develop in Greece, Turkey and Iran would be mostly favorable.

Africa

Africa, like India, is particularly sensitive to any heating up of the Cold War. If Moscowʼs response is particularly vigorous, African political and opinion leaders are likely to become more skittish with a resulting slowdown in the pursuit of U.S. objectives in Africa.

The hostile neutrals (Casablanca Powers) would lead the negative reaction. It is unlikely we would suffer much except in Guinea (where Sekou Toureʼs disillusionment with the Communists might be slowed) and Ghana. Even in these countries, however, it is not probable that U.S. interests would be seriously damaged.

The independent and pro-Western nations (Monrovia Powers) would be neutral or quietly sympathetic except in the case of Nigeria where we might expect some hostility.

Far East

Except for the Philippines, Far Eastern nations have little interest in Cuba. The Philippines, with their historic and cultural ties with Cuba, would take note of events but not unsympathetically; they donʼt like Castro. Little notice would be taken in neutral Cambodia and Burma. The Sukarno regime might criticize us, but the Indonesian public would be indifferent. Communists and fellow-travelers might stage demonstrations in Indonesia and Japan, but with little effect.

Communist China, North Korea and North Viet Nam would, of course, exploit the situation in their broadcasting, but the impact would be little different than that caused by their current anti-U.S. propaganda.

AttachmentTop Secret. Washington, August 7, 1962.

MILITARY

General Benjamin T. Harris, DOD/JCS Representative for Operation Mongoose, states: 1. Support: Within its capabilities DOD is prepared to provide all required support to CIA, State and USIA necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives of Operation Mongoose. 2. Military Readiness: If there is a decision to use US military force, execution of our military contingency plans for Cuba will be undertaken as rapidly as the posture of our forces will allow at the time the decision is made. a. With no prior warning and with 18 days of preparation a coordinated airborne/amphibious assault could be executed which, it is anticipated, would gain control of key military installations and the principal centers of population of Cuba within 10 days and result in minimum US and Cuban casualties. This plan provides for confronting Cuban forces with sufficient strength to be clearly beyond Cuban capability to resist, to induce early capitulation of their units and to avoid needless loss of life. b. A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-assault period would necessitate incremental commitment of US forces as they could be assembled and employed. Under this plan the time required to gain essential US military control of Cuba could be appreciably extended. However, reduction of US military reaction time may be of overriding importance. In such case, air and naval forces could attack with little delay from the time the decision is made. An air assault could be initiated within 8 hours; an airborne assault could be initiated within 5 days; and a Navy/Marine amphibious force could be committed 3 days later with a build up of the full scale effort to follow. c. In concept, initial military operations commence with an air and naval blockade, concentrated air strikes, and coordinated naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy airpower and to neutralize and destroy as much as possible of the enemy armor, artillery and anti-air capability. d. We are continuing our efforts to reduce reaction time through plans for the prepositioning of forces and materiel. In this connection, we have developed a Cover and Deception Plan which permits a certain amount of prepositioning under the guise of training exercises and places US forces involved in an advantageous position without endangering security to an unacceptable degree.

368. Memorandum From the Department of Defense Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Craig) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling. On August 8 Lansdale sent a copy of this memorandum to McGeorge Bundy under a covering note that indicated it was a paper to be discussed at an August 10 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). (Ibid.) Washington, August 8, 1962. SUBJECT Consequences of US Military Intervention in Cuba 1. On 2 August 1962 the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation Mongoose, to prepare a paper for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1962. The specific requirement is to set forth “Consequences of (US) Military Intervention (in Cuba) to include cost (personnel, units and equipment), effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction.” Pursuant to this request, the requirement has been divided into its separate parts. 2. Requirements (personnel, units and equipment). a. [3½ lines of source text not declassified] b. [3½ lines of source text not declassified] c. Major units involved in the initial assault include: Two Army airborne divisions, an infantry brigade, and an armored combat command; one and one-third Marine division/wing teams; a Navy Striking and Covering force together with an amphibious task force; and 17 USAF tactical fighter squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport squadrons. d. Principal equipment includes: (1) Army—Artillery units and armor (including about 275 tanks) (2) Marines—[1½ lines of source text not declassified] (3) Navy—[2 lines of source text not declassified] (4) Air Force—[2 lines of source text not declassified] 3. Level of National Mobilization Required. a. Army—None. In lieu of mobilizing Civil Affairs units from the active reserve, tactical forces, though not trained for this mission, will be employed to conduct Civil Affairs/Military Government operations. b. Navy—For troop and cargo sealift, no rise in mobilization level would be required beyond the present authority held by the Maritime Administration to charter shipping. c. Air Force—In order to land the maximum number of airborne troops in the minimum time, [2 lines of source text not declassified] however, CINCLANT and USAF have been requested to prepare alternate plans not involving any mobilization prior to D-day. d. Marines—None. e. Further mobilization would be required if a concurrent political or military situation exists which would make such a precaution desirable in order to assure US military responsiveness to additional demands. 4. Effect on World-Wide Ability to React—The present basic contingency plan anticipates achieving control of key strategic areas in Cuba within [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] days. Subsequent to gaining such control of the island there will be a progressive withdrawal of forces as the situation permits. a. [3½ lines of source text not declassified] It is estimated that the Army Airborne two division force would be available for other operations [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] after withdrawal from Cuba. Substantial Army forces from the on-call echelon will relieve the assault forces and remain on the island to perform counterguerrilla operations and conduct military government activities. This force will be progressively withdrawn as the new Cuban government increases in effectiveness. b. [5 lines of source text not declassified] It is anticipated that most of these ships will be available for other commitments [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. About [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the Pacific amphibious troop lift capability will be employed in the landings in the eastern end of Cuba. These ships would be available for other operations in the Pacific [1 line of source text not declassified]. In addition to the amphibious troop lift capability the initial requirements for sealift will include MSTS ships obtained through the Maritime Administration. Over-all requirements for shipping will diminish after the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of the operation. c. [4 lines of source text not declassified] d. For approximately ten days, CONUSMATS airlift would be fully committed. e. CONAD air defense capabilities in southeast United States will be augmented by the additional Naval and Air Force forces brought into the area for this operation. Therefore, no redeployment of CONAD forces from other areas is anticipated. 5. Castro-Cuban Counteraction. a. The military reaction will be determined in large measure by the will of the Cuban armed forces to resist, as well as by the weapons available to them and their proficiency in their use, at the time of US military intervention. b. The military capabilities of Cuba are oriented primarily toward defensive activities. Cuban plans are believed to contemplate a strong initial resistance, followed by a determined defense of preselected keypoints, and finally by protracted guerrilla warfare. c. Cuba has about 50 MIG fighters, some of which may be configured for carrying light bombs. Any of these that survive the US air strikes could be used offensively against targets in Florida. Also they have 11 B-26 aircraft some of which, if they survive the air strikes by US forces, could attempt to attack targets in the southeastern United States. All forces engaged in the operation, as well as the Continental Air Defense forces, however, would be alert to guard against any such attempts at retaliation. d. In the future the Castro-Cuban capability for counteraction will improve if Soviets continue to provide the Cubans with additional military equipment and training. Thus, the urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castroʼs constantly increasing capabilities. 6. Possibility of a Requirement for a Sustained Occupation. a. The duration of a US military presence in Cuba is contingent upon such factors as the will of Castro-Cuban forces to resist invasion, the degree of popular support a defeated Castro might receive for the conduct of residual guerrilla operations, and time required to reconstitute an effective friendly Cuban government. b. Following the establishment of essential military control of the island, a substantial US military commitment may be required in Cuba for a significant period of time. Post assault tasks will include restoration of law and order and the conduct of counterguerrilla operations. c. To achieve the objectives of subparagraph b above, it is planned that the post assault military presence initially will consist of substantial Army follow-on forces with such other sea and air support as may be required. This will be reduced gradually in size as the effectiveness of the new Cuban government increases. Thereafter, a lengthy period of providing military assistance is anticipated.

369. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 14 copies of the memorandum were prepared and sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. Four copies were kept by Lansdale. Washington, August 8, 1962. SUBJECT Medium-Wave Broadcasting to Cuba

At a meeting with the operational representatives of Operation Mongoose, 1 August, General Taylor and the Attorney General asked about the possibility of strong medium-wave broadcasts into Cuba. In response, Don Wilson of USIA has sent me some thoughtful studies on this subject, after collaboration with State and CIA at the operating level, and noting an earlier memorandum from Ed Murrow about broadcasts from the U.S. (which Mr. Murrow discussed with the Special Group). These studies are attached,Not printed. for your information.

The conclusions reached are: a. Medium-wave broadcasts from stations in the U.S. are a possibility for short term tactical purposes. They would be illegal in terms of international agreement and could bring serious reprisals (Cuban interference with medium-wave broadcasts over wide areas of the United States). b. Although it was believed that Swan Island broadcasts could be strengthened and possibly undergo a character change (becoming similar to Radio Free Europe) to gain Cuban listeners, further study concludes that no new medium-wave capability should be developed from Radio Swan (difficult and expensive logistic problems, coupled with April 1961 reputation). c. A thousand kilowatt transmitter is in storage in the U.S. It is estimated that it would take about 15 months, at a cost of about $8 million, to install a transmitter of this power as rapidly as possible. d. Ten locations around the Caribbean were studied as possible sites for a powerful transmitter, considering technical and political feasibility. Venezuela ranked first politically, tenth for technical reasons. The Dominican Republic would appear to present the best prospects from a political standpoint and ranks second technically. The political feasibility of establishing a transmitter on foreign soil in the other locations stud-ied appears remote. e. Cuba could negate our medium-wave effort, if Castro so desired, by using surplus transmitters in Cuba to broadcast locally on the same frequency. (It is more difficult to jam short-wave broadcasts, due to the capability for simultaneous broadcasts on multiple frequencies.)

370. Paper Prepared in the Department of StateSource: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations. Top Secret. The drafter of this paper is not identified on the source text. It is evident from internal evidence, however, that it was prepared in the Department of State. The only representatives of the Department of State who were privy to Mongoose planning were Rusk, Ball, Johnson, Martin, Goodwin, and Hurwitch. Since Rusk and Johnson are cited in the third person in the text, the paper was apparently drafted by Ball, Goodwin, Martin, or Hurwitch. The style suggests that of Hurwitch and the paper was probably sent to Martin. Washington, August 10, 1962.

THOUGHTS FOR 2:30 MEETINGReference is to the August 10 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented); see Document 371.

1. Dirty Tricks

I believe the Agency is under the impression that under present policy, it is not permitted to engage in such. This is not my reading of present policy. Although the Secretary indicated he thought he ought not to mention this subject, I think the question should be clarified—along the lines of Alexʼs distinction on sabotage, with the Agency given a free hand on the irritant, harassment type. In this connection, the Agency is prone to select individual exiles whom it controls and exclusively supply them with sabotage materiel. Control, security, and a sense of professionalism probably account for this practice. I should think that for this low-level type of sabotage, every exile group (except the Batistianos) that we have reason to believe has followers in Cuba, should be given a supply of materiel and turned loose. I should be inclined to give priority to the CRC but certainly not a monopoly.

2. Secretaryʼs Approach

If the Secretaryʼs suggested approach is adopted, we could undertake, together with the Agency, a careful scrutiny of all the “new” communists in the ORI directorate (who outnumber the veteran communists) in an effort to determine who among them have significant influence on Castro. Perhaps in working with Manolo Ray and other MRP leaders (the MRP is virtually the 26th July in exile) methods of approach to the selected directorate members could be evolved. This would of course have to be very discreet, with cut-outs, etc. I am not sanguine about success, but see this as an additional approach to those discussed yesterday.Secretary Rusk met off-the-record with Goodwin, Hurwitch, and Martin on August 9 at 5:11 p.m. to discuss the August 10 2:30 meeting. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book)

If the Secretaryʼs approach is adopted, I should think we would continue operations at about the present level: actions short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt. In this connection, the question of resistance symbols and declarations arises. The Agency is pushing ahead with its “Gusano Libre” theme (see attached).Not found attached. An apparent reference to Document 365. I doubt whether “worms of the world unite” will cause people to revolt; I should put it in the nuisance category at this stage. However, as indicated in the attached paper, the program may escalate considerably, and it is extremely difficult to know where to draw the line. The “Gusano Libre” theme will be carried on the submarine radio next week, and Castroʼs 26th of July declaration that overthrow of the despotism is legitimate will be quoted. I have approved the script, primarily on the basis that this radio broadcast has little listenership as yet.

3. Soviet Base in Cuba

General Lansdale called this morning to inquire whether we had done a paper on policy toward the establishment of a Soviet Base in Cuba. I told him not yet. He may bring this up. You will recall that it was decided that the possibility was too remote to waste time on. General Craig was supposed to bring in new evidence. The only “evidence” that General Lansdale circulated is the photostated intelligence reportNot found attached. in the attached package. Paragraph 3 of the report speaks of a rumored submarine base.

371. Editorial Note

On August 10, 1962, a meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) was held in Secretary Ruskʼs conference room in the Department of State. The meeting was chaired by Secretary Rusk and attended by Secretary of Defense McNamara, as well as the regular members of the Special Group (Augmented). The agenda for the meeting was circulated by General Taylor on August 1; see Document 364. Only fragmentary records of the discussion at this key meeting have been found. According to a chronology of the positions McCone took concerning Cuba, prepared for him on October 21, McCone maintained at the meeting that the Soviet Union had in Cuba an asset of such importance that “the Soviets will not let Cuba fail.” To prevent such a failure McCone expected that the Soviet Union would supplement economic, technical, and conventional military aid with medium-range ballistic missiles, which they would justify by reference to U.S. missile bases in Italy and Turkey. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers) McCone confirmed that aspect of the discussion in a memorandum for the record he prepared on October 31, 1963. (Ibid.)

Memoranda prepared by McCone and William Harvey also indicate that the issue of the assassination of Cuban political leaders came up during the discussion. According to an August 14 memorandum from Harvey to Richard Helms, the issue was raised during the meeting by McNamara. Harvey recorded: “It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record.” Harvey added that he took careful notes on the comments made at the meeting on this issue, “and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.” (Ibid.) See the Supplement. On April 14, 1967, McCone sent a memorandum from his retirement to Helms, who had become Director of Central Intelligence, in which he wrote of the discussion at the August 10 meeting: “I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds.” McCone added that immediately after the meeting, he called on McNamara and reemphasized his position on the issue. He noted that McNamara “heartily agreed.” (Central Intelligence Agency,DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers)

Harveyʼs August 14 memorandum to Helms bears out McConeʼs recollection that it was the sense of the meeting that no discussion of the assassination of Cuban leaders should be put in writing. Harvey wrote that in light of the discussion at the August 10 meeting, he called General Lansdaleʼs office and pointed out the “inadmissibility and stupidity” of including the words “including liquidation of leaders” in an August 13 memorandum discussing Alternate Course B that Lansdale circulated to Harvey and other action officers for Operation Mongoose. Harvey noted that he had strongly urged that the phrase be deleted from all existing copies of the memorandum. Lansdaleʼs August 13 memorandum, with the requested excision, is printed as Document 372.

372. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-1362. Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling. General Benjamin Harris replaced General Craig as Department of Defense Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose following Craigʼs reassignment. Washington, August 13, 1962. MEMORANDUM FOR William Harvey, CIA Robert Hurwitch, State Gen. Benjamin Harris, Defense Don Wilson, USIA SUBJECT Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper “Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)”An apparent reference to the CIA attachment to Document 367. will be used as the starting basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

373. Memorandum From the Department of State Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Hurwitch) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-1362. Top Secret. Washington, August 13, 1962. SUBJECT Alternate Course B REFERENCE Your memorandum—August 13, 1962Document 372.

I—Statement of Objectives:

A. The ultimate objective of the United States with respect to Cuba is the overthrow of the Castro Government and its replacement by one which shares the objectives of the free world. B. As steps toward the ultimate objective, the following intermediate objectives have been established for Phase II (which should be attained as rapidly as feasibility, prudence and a comparatively low noise level dictate): (1) Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations. (2) Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere. (3) Maintain maximum [moderate]Bracketed portions contain original Agency language. Unbracketed language (except for item 6) reflect the Agencyʼs interpretation of the sense of the policy meeting. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.] economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources. [Conduct limited, secure, viable covert resistance and action operations.] (4) Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements. (5)

Take steps to inspire a split in Cuban leadership and a split in Cuban/Bloc relationships and be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising.

[Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuba leadership, or split in Cuban-Bloc relationships.]

(6) Be prepared to exert special pressures on Cuba in the event of a Berlin blockade.

II—Comments and Courses of Action:

A. “Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.” (1) State would carry out those actions described in the Departmentʼs contribution to General Lansdaleʼs August 8, 1962 memorandum.Document 367. (2) As an additional means of isolation, covert attempts to intefere with important Cubans who travel in the Hemisphere might be undertaken. Specific policy approval in each instance would be required. B. “Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.” (1) Emphasis should be placed upon discreditation in the Hemisphere as part of the isolation process. The more we succeed in discrediting the Castro Government in the Hemisphere, the less likely are we to experience adverse reaction in the Hemisphere to the regimeʼs disappearance. Inside Cuba, the people will support or oppose the regime, primarily depending upon actual conditions, not upon United States or exile propaganda. To the extent we can covertly effect deterioration of conditions and/or stimulate overt acts of opposition, however, such actions would serve to discredit the regime both in Cuba and abroad. C. “Maintain maximum economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuban economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.” (1) The two main Cuban exports to the USSR are sugar and nickel. Disruption of the sugar industry (for internal reasons as well) and the Nicaro nickel plant should, therefore, be among the high priority targets. Policy approval would be required for each sabotage operation. (2) Sabotage materiel should be made available to any Cuban exile group (except Batistianos) that has assets inside Cuba and desires such materiel. Although the CRC should be given priority, it should not be given a monopoly. General policy approval would be required. D.

“Maintain maximum coverage of intelligence requirements with respect to Cuba.”

No comment.

E. “Take steps to inspire a split in Cuban leadership and a split in Cuban Bloc relationships and be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising.” (1) A thorough study of the backgrounds of the ORI Directorate members who were formerly with the 26th of July should be undertaken to determine who among them have the most influence on Castro. Through the MRP leaders (who probably retain some influence among the 26th of July leaders) we should seek to influence selected ORI Directorate members toward splitting Cuba from the Bloc. (2) We would investigate the possibility of enlisting the assistance of a friendly government to attempt to entice Cuba away from the Bloc. F.

“Be prepared to exert special pressures on Cuba in the event of a Berlin blockade.”

State would initiate a plan for this contingency.

374. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached distribution list indicates that 16 copies of the memorandum were prepared and sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Murrow, Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. Two copies were kept by Lansdale. Washington, August 14, 1962. SUBJECT Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, the Operational Representatives have worked out the attached outline of an Alternative Course B, for your consideration. More detailed planning can be undertaken when guidelines are firmed for future activities.

Attachment

ALTERNATE COURSE B

I. Objectives

National objectives for the purpose of this planning are assumed to be: a. Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations. b. Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere. c. Maintain maximum economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources. d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements. e. Take steps to inspire splits in Cuban leadership or split in Cuban/Bloc relationships. f. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising.

II. Mission

The mission will be to accomplish the above objectives as rapidly as feasible through a balanced program of overt and covert activities. Accomplishment probably will raise the noise level above that in Phase I of Operation Mongoose. It should be recognized that the activities described in this outline are not in themselves designed to overthrow the Castro/Communist regime.

III. Activities

Intelligence

Tasks

Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following: 1. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro government. 2. Activities of Cuban G-2. 3. Soviet activities in Cuba. 4. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population. 5. Military and militia order of battle and morale. 6. Locus of power and/or stress and strain among the “power centers” in the Cuban government. 7. Economic. 8. Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

Implementation

The past build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. No additional policy approvals are needed. The following types of actions will be maximized. 1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban government posts abroad. Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase. 2. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba. 3. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information. 4. Expansion of communications intelligence coverage particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets.

Political

Tasks 1. Continue and intensify active OAS and Latin American country support for the containment and undermining of Castro/Communist regime. 2. Develop post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups. 3. Support the CRC and such other Cuban political groups as appropriate. 4. Develop contacts in the “power centers” of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime. 5. Investigate the possibility of enlisting assistance of a friendly government to attempt to entice Cuba away from the Bloc.

Implementation 1. Be prepared to initiate action or support another American Republicʼs initiative against Cuba in the OAS or subordinate inter-American organization, as the appropriate occasion arises. 2. Continue and intensify, where possible and necessary, the diplomatic and political campaign to inform free world governments and peoples of the nature and activities of the Castro Government and urge them, as appropriate, to undertake all feasible actions which would undermine the Castro Government and demonstrate solidarity with the Cuban people. 3. Encourage Latin American Governments to take steps to prevent their nationals from traveling to Cuba. 4. Be prepared to exploit by diplomatic and other means, any indication of a split in the regime from which there may emerge significant anti-Castro/Communist elements. 5. Continue and intensify where possible and necessary, U.S. efforts to strengthen the democratic sectors in Latin America under the Alliance for Progress program in order to improve their capabilities of countering Castro-Communist threats to political stability and orderly economic and social development. 6. Continue the program of seeking hard evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the Hemisphere.

Economic

Tasks 1. Encourage minor acts of sabotage throughout Cuba. 2. To the extent practicable, cause the diversion of Cuban resources from productive purposes. 3. Conduct selected sabotage principally of major Cuban industries and public utilities with priority attention being given to transportation, communications, power plants and utilities. No sabotage would be undertaken against food supplies, medical facilities, or directly against the population of Cuba as such. 4. Exploit all feasible opportunities for denying markets in the free world for Cuban exports. 5. Exploit all feasible opportunities for preventing the shipment of critical spare parts and equipment from free world sources to Cuba.

Implementation 1. Use covert psychological media to induce mass Cuban undertakings in minor sabotage (nails in road, sugar in gas tanks). 2. Commando/Sabotage Teams: A pool of 20 to 50 most carefully selected men highly trained in commando-sabotage tactics should be maintained. From this group, especially constituted sabotage teams will be selected for specific sabotage assignments per para. III.C.3 above. Except for occasional specialized training (such as possibly parachute), all spotting, recruiting and training can be done by CIA facilities.

Psychological

Tasks 1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism. 2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.

Implementation

Operations on these objectives will be divided first into two general categories—overt, i.e., those activities which are attributed or attributable to the U.S. Government and which are the primary responsibility of the U.S. Information Agency; and covert, those activities which cannot or should not be attributed to the U.S. Government and which would thus be under the primary control of the Central Intelligence Agency. These two categories must be subdivided according to whether the operations are primarily directed at target groups within Cuba or at groups outside Cuba, either in the hemisphere or elsewhere.

Concerning operations in all these categories care should be exercised to avoid overplaying purely psychological or informational operations. Information programs can be effective only so long as they accompany and support political and/or material action. They should never be allowed to become substitutes for action and they should not anticipate or prejudice policy.

It is also important to avoid over-emphasis on the purely anti-Castro or anti-Communist aspect of the program. Wholly negative programs of any sort do not wear well with any audience. The Alliance for Progress as the real promise of fulfillment of the aspirations of the common people of the Americas must remain as the keystone of our general Latin American information policy. And a positive approach must also be included in a substantial portion of our materials pointed directly at the Cuban people. This should include material which will provide a basis for reassurance and hope for a new Cuba after the fall of Castro, a Cuba which will truly provide for a realization of the reforms and a fulfillment of the aspirations which motivated the Cuban revolution.

Note: USIA concurs with CIAʼs conclusion that the expense of establishing and operating a medium-wave broadcasting facility is not justified under the present plan. As previously pointed out, the facility would cost approximately 8 million dollars and take 15 months to build and there are very serious obstacles (notably an extensive Cuban jamming capability) to its success. State and USIA recommend that CIA continue the Swan Island operation at its present level.

Overt—To Cuba:

Short wave radio must continue as our principal medium of communication with the Cuban people. Nine hours of daily broadcasting in Spanish with three hours specifically beamed at the Cuban audience will continue to be the basis of this. In December USIAʼs new Greenville facility will be operational with a resulting substantial increase in signal strength. Programs will continue to be built around hard news and commentary, dramatic, historical, sports, and agricultural features and Cuban local happenings, particularly items not carried in the Castro/Communist media. All of these programs carry in some form or other material supporting our objectives.

Particular attention is recommended to a project to plan a well spaced series of moderate statements by U.S. officials and other U.S. non-official spokesmen which would support policy objectives of developing and maintaining the will to resist within Cuba without leading to over-optimism or too inflated hopes.

At the same time carefully documented programs on the failures of the Castro/Communist system must be stepped up to help maintain a firm and material subjective basis for disaffection among the Cuban people.

Strong emphasis will also be given to programming which points up negative reactions to, or repudiation of the Castro/Communist regime in other parts of the hemisphere.

Once the “gusano libre” theme has been established through Cuban or other non-U.S. assets, USIA programming could give it special and continuing play, maintaining, of course, strong emphasis on its Cuban origin.

Overt—To the hemisphere and other free world targets:

All media can and will be utilized in support of Operation Mongoose, although USIA has very difficult budgetary problems. Monetary support from other USG sources might well be necessary for full implementation of some of these projects.

Specific program adjustments made in support of Mongoose include: 1)

Radio

There will be increased production and distribution of packaged programs particularly soap operas and commentaries stressing anti-Castro themes.

Cartoon Books

USIAʼs six book series (5 million copies) has been widely distributed and accepted. More could be projected with special stress on Mongoose themes with a minimum delay. Funds here also might be a limiting factor. The new ones would not necessarily be factual but rather the “thriller-killer” type with a Cuban background.

Photo-novels

This is unique to Latin America. It is a book utilizing specially-posed photographs with captions to tell a fictional story. A medium of particular importance in reaching the adult, blue-collar worker and housewife neo-and semi-literate groups, this is a field which we have not yet entered. Development of a USIA potential in this field is under consideration and anti-Castro materials would have a priority in any production.

Motion Pictures

An animated film on the failures of Cuban land reform has been produced and distributed and two more films on children and labor are now in the pipeline. Contingent on the availability of funds, further productions of this nature could be arranged. More emphasis can be given to providing film clips on Mongoose themes to indigenous newsreels.

A medium of rapidly growing importance in Latin Americaʼs urban areas which we have not utilized too widely yet in support of Mongoose objectives.USIA has access to some excellent producers of commercial puppet shows (such as the producer of the Wilkins Coffee commercials) and satirical anti-Castro materials could be easily developed for area use. Further exploitation of the Cuban refugee talent available in the Miami area could also be arranged.

Books

Larger scale editions of books already used and of other similar materials might be arranged in order to provide rebuttals to the pro-Castro volumes already circulating widely in the area. Particular emphasis should be placed on the development of books by non-U.S. authors.

Exhibits

This is one field we have not developed well in support of our Cuban exhibits. USIA could develop and produce quantity paper exhibits of a two-dimensional nature which could be widely distributed in Latin America.

Covert

The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population, the political and military power centers and selected individuals inside Cuba. Its purpose will be to maintain morale and increase the will to resist. Initially the following themes and general guidance will be emphasized: 1) Expose the betrayal of the original aims of the Revolution. 2) Expose the contradictions between past and current promises and performance of the Castro regime. 3) Expose the encroachment of Bloc Communists into the domestic affairs of Cuba and increasing foreign domination of Cuba by Soviet imperialism. 4) Stimulate disaffection in the leadership and ranks of the supporters of the Castro regime, principally among the militia, the government bureaucracy, organized labor, youth and students, farmers. 5) Inspire tensions between Cuban leaders and Bloc representatives.

The following psychological/political warfare activities are considered compatible with and essential to the operational plan: 1) Stimulate and guide the propaganda and political action activities of the Cuban exile political, professional, student, cultural and other groups and individuals which have an existing or potential capability for communicating with and influencing the behavior of their counterparts inside Cuba. Also utilize these groups and individuals for propaganda activities in Latin America and other critical areas. 2) Continue and expand operations involving the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers or controlled couriers. 3) Establish a propaganda balloon launching capability with appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations. (CIA proposal, questioned by State and USIA) 4) Continue and expand the “Voice of Free Cuba” submarine deception broadcasts in collaboration with the Navy.

Paramilitary

Tasks 1. Strengthen and maintain an atmosphere of resistance in the general population. 2. Recruit, train, and supply small resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba. 3. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in areas accessible to the resistance cells and in potential resistance areas. 4. Be prepared to covertly provide personnel and logistics support to any significant internal resistance group or uprising.

Implementation

The program will aim primarily for the development of controlled intelligence sources and small resistance cells for use in the event of any significant uprising. Experience plus continually tightening security controls has demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and maintaining individuals or “black teams” in the target country for an indefinite period. Nor has any method been devised by which infiltrees can become “legalized.” Therefore, the PM program must increasingly emphasize infiltrations, spotting, recruiting, and training legal residents, caching and exfiltration of the original infiltrees. The program will be developed to the extent that proves feasible and possible in the light of existing circumstances, including Cuban security controls, morale and motivation of agent material, and the Cuban populationʼs willingness to support infiltrees. To accomplish the required tasks, the following program and support are considered essential: 1. Urban Cells: Two-to five-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the major Cuban cities to recruit and train small “legal” compartmented intelligence and/or resistance cells. Upon the completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if it is seriously endangered or its continued presence jeopardizes the “legal” residents. Primarily, these cells will be intelligence producers. A second mission would be to establish small caches of arms and supplies for use in the event of a major uprising. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the infiltrees can be accomplished within CIA facilities and existing policy approvals. 2. Rural Cells: Three-to five-man teams equipped with W/T communications should be infiltrated into the rural areas to recruit, train, and arm small “legal” compartmented cells. The infiltrated trainers will be withdrawn if they are seriously endangered or if they pose a threat to the security of the resident rural cell. These resident rural cells would have limited intelligence functions until called into action in the event of an uprising. Spotting, recruiting, and training of the infiltrees can be accomplished within CIA facilities and existing policy approvals. 3. Commando/Sabotage Teams: (Described in the Economic section above.)

F. Military 1. DOD continue to develop and refine contingency plans in order to take advantage of any unforeseen breaks. 2. DOD continue to support CIA and other agencies to the full extent of DOD capability as required.

IV. Policy Implications

The policy implications of the activities outlined above include: A. Authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching (State and USIA questioned). B. Authority to use U.S. Navy submarines for infiltration/exfiltration. C. Authority to overfly Cuba for re-supply/infiltration/exfiltration missions using CIA aircraft with U.S. or other contract crews. D. Authority to conduct selected sabotage principally against major Cuban industries and public utilities, i.e., refineries, power plants, transportation, and communications. E. Authority to utilize Guantanamo Naval Base for limited covert operational purposes including agent infiltration/exfiltration, support for clandestine maritime operations, and for holding and interrogating Cuban agents and suspects who enter the base. (The scope of the proposed operational use of Guantanamo would not provide the Cuban government with additional issues to enable them to increase their already existing or planned pressure on the U.S. retention of Guantan-amo.) State and Defense representatives disagreed to CIA proposal. F. Authority to occasionally utilize DOD facilities to provide specialized training for the commando/sabotage teams when such training cannot be duplicated at CIA facilities.

375. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (Hurwitch) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin)Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret. Martin passed this memorandum to Johnson on August 15, under cover of a note in which he stated that it might prove useful background information for the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) scheduled for August 16. (Ibid.) Washington, August 15, 1962. SUBJECT Observations on Operational Potential with respect to Cuba

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize my impressions gained from discussions in the Operations Group of what we can reasonably expect might be accomplished covertly in Cuba under Course B or any other course which is conditioned upon a comparatively low noise level.

Propaganda Media

Radio to date has proved of limited value. Short-wave does not reach many people because of shortage of receivers. Medium-wave broadcasting from Swan Island has a small audience, due in part to the low power of the facility.CIA recommends that these broadcasts cease. USIA and we prefer that they continue. None feel that the investment entailed in a more powerful facility would be justified. Enlargement of the Swan Island facility or establishment of a new powerful facility elsewhere would, of course, attract a great deal of attention. The submarine radio will probably improve somewhat, although its approximate 25 mile range is a basic limitation.

Dissemination of propaganda to Cuba through the open mails is underway and will probably improve, unless the Cuban Governmentʼs censorship tightens.

Infiltration of Cubans with some propaganda materiel is accomplished, although the maritime operations appear to be increasingly difficult. I have inquired about the possibility of infiltrating small portable presses for underground publications—CIA says that they are looking into this possibility.

Other means of communication, i.e., dropping propaganda from balloons or aircraft would probably be attributed to the U.S. rather noisily.

Conclusion

Our means of communicating with the Cuban people are limited and will probably remain so.

Sabotage

The limited state of communications directly affects the success of sabotage operations. Reports indicate that some, apparently very limited, nuisance sabotage (sugar in gas tanks, etc.) does occur. Our ability to persuade the Cuban people to engage in more widespread activities of this nature is handicapped by our limited ability to communicate and the difficulty in landing and distributing sabotage materiel, such as plastic explosives, incendiary fountain pens and similar devices. The Agencyʼs reaction to turning such materiel over to exile groups that are known to have organized resistance groups in Cuba (as stated in the NIE)Document 363. is: whenever a reasonable plan is presented by an exile group, the Agency has provided such assistance and is prepared to continue to do so. A complicating factor appears to be that unless such materiel remains under Agency control until the last minute, its existence in the hands of exiles becomes known to the FBI which then, apparently, becomes unhappy. Further, the Agency is fearful that supplying materiel to selected exile groups in blanket fashion and not based on exile plans which the Agency approves, may result in the sabotage of major installations, thereby raising the noise level considerably above that which the Agency understands to be desirable, since the U.S. would be charged by the Cuban and Bloc Governments with complicity and responsibility.

Conclusion:

A significant amount of sabotage in Cuba during the next year appears unlikely, unless approval is given for the destruction of major installations by carefully selected and trained Cuban teams infiltrated for such purpose and for the noise level to be raised substantially.

Air and Sea Support of Infiltrated Teams

While maritime means, including the use of submarines if necessary, would continue to be the primary means of infiltration/exfiltration/re-supply, occasions may arise where re-supply can only be accomplished effectively by air and with U.S. citizen crews. Teams that have moved inland may find that only with considerable danger can they reach the coast again for re-supply. Agency experience with Cuban pilots on air re-supply missions has not been good (they are not accurate) and U.S. citizen personnel may have to be used.

376. Letter From the Director of Central Intelligenceʼs Executive Assistant (Elder) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) Washington, August 15, 1962. [Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret. 3 pages of source text (including 2-page attached memorandum) not declassified.]

377. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Taylor, Bundy, and Hurwitch. Lansdale sent a handwritten covering note with the copy to Bundy, in which he wrote: “I am really pressing on this one, because I feel we have been settling for an institutional answer which may not be justified. I will need your very strong support in this, if we are to get the fresh and full try that is demanded. If appropriate, a word to John McCone would be timely, since his management officers will be keys to the new effort.” (Ibid.) An attached typewritten August 17 note, drafter unknown, reads: “General Taylor asked that action be withheld on this until further word from him.” (Ibid.) Washington, August 16, 1962. SUBJECT Actions by Cuban Refugees

At the Special Group (Augmented) meeting this afternoon, it was specified that the program for Phase II of Operation Mongoose should afford full attention to the desirability of the Cubans liberating Cuba with our help. This is distinguished from the concept of our employing the Cubans in programs where we are seeking to liberate Cuba. Mr. Bundy requested that this field of effort be made a part of the guidelines for Phase II.

This desire on the part of the policy level will require consideration of a new orientation to some degree from the existing approach to the Cuban refugees, as I see it. I suggest that you designate your deputy, Mr. Bruce Cheever, to be responsible for action by CIA on this. This will require an imaginative and bold approach to the whole concept of the management, use, and potential values in the Cuban exiles in the U.S. and other countries. State, Defense, and USIA, along with myself, will afford a top priority to Mr. Cheever if he is assigned this responsibility.

Please advise me on this as a priority matter.

378. Memorandum of MeetingSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. Washington, August 16, 1962.

MEMORANDUM ON MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP, AUGMENTED, TO DISCUSS MONGOOSE—16 AUGUST 1962

1. General Lansdale presented his paper of 15 AugustReference is to the memorandum Lansdale circulated to the Special Group (Augmented) on August 14, Document 374. expressing the caveats that the program (a) did not place us in a position to take advantage of internal uprisings and (b) the program made no reference to the use of third country assets. The paper was approved subject to the submission by General Lansdale of detailed actions. 2. The meeting was generally unsatisfactory from my standpoint. In the first place, the reservations of General Lansdale seem to indicate a difference between Lansdale and CIA growing out of the position that I took on his Plan B Augmented. Secondly, the policy implications were not acted upon: strong opposition to utilization of Guantanamo was expressed by Lemnitzer, and McCone stated that he too was concerned about the use of Guantanamo and he felt that the operation should be planned so that Guantanamo would not be used. Bundy expressed strong reservations concerning use of Navy submarines and some reservations concerning overflights. Alexis Johnson questioned the level of sabotage operations, Taylor favoring approval by the Group of each important sabotage action and Johnson favoring modest rather than violent acts of sabotage. McCone stated that proposal involved substantial sabotage actions and that the Lansdale Task Force should be permitted to proceed without further reference to the Special Group. DCI stated he did not feel we could sit in judgment on each sabotage operation and expect Lansdale with his supporting staff of 500 or 1,000 people to work effectively. Bundy brought up the question of the “noise level”. McCone stated that operations anticipated would raise the noise level very substantially and there would be a very considerable attribution. In general the meeting was unsatisfactory, lacked both purpose and direction and left me with a feeling that very considerable reservation exists as to just where we are going with Operation Mongoose.

Action: A detailed plan of operation specifying the acts of sabotage, planned infiltrations, propaganda effort, etc., should be presented by Lansdale at the earliest moment. Any differences between Lansdale and CIA should be straightened out by Harvey with the assistance of Helms or others. McCone should discuss this subject privately with the Attorney General.

3. The attached memorandum to the President and the guidelines on Phase II, dated August 16th,The memorandum and guidelines were sent to the President on August 17; see Document 380. was approved with only modest modification. John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director

379. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) and the Acting Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Smith) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-1762. Secret. Copies were sent to Hurwitch, Harris, and Wilson. Washington, August 17, 1962. SUBJECT Operation Mongoose—The Soviet Stake in Cuba

For your information, set out below is the substance of a memorandum dated 15 August 1962 prepared by the Board of National Estimates for the information and assistance of the DCI.

The Soviet Stake in Cuba

1. The USSRʼs primary stake in Cuba is political. The Soviets regard Castroʼs revolution, and his subsequent alignment with the Communists, as one of the most telling blows to the prestige of the US which has occurred in the entire postwar period. In their eyes, it is a compelling demonstration of a major thesis which they are urging upon the underdeveloped countries everywhere: that the “colonial” peoples can throw off the “imperialist yoke” and, with the indispensable help of the USSR, successfully maintain their independence against their former masters. 2. In specific application to Latin America, the Soviets value the Cuban example as showing: a. That a small but dedicated revolutionary group, with the sympathy and support of the oppressed masses, can prevail against the military power of a ruthless dictatorship supported by the Yankee imperialists. b. That the Bloc will provide such a revolutionary regime with the economic aid required to offset anticipated US economic warfare and to develop the country. c. That Soviet support, and especially Soviet missile power, will deter the US from military intervention to overthrow the revolutionaries. d. That Latin American radicals can safely cooperate with local Communists, who will facilitate the securing of Soviet support without insisting upon seizing the leadership of the revolution for themselves. 3. Cuba is also of value to the USSR as an operational base from which the revolution in Latin America can be furthered by propaganda, the indoctrination and training of militants, gun-running, and other clandestine operations. For the Soviets, however, this use is incidental and auxiliary to the political impact of the Cuban revolutionary example. 4. With the passage of time, the Soviet stake in Cuba has come to be defensive as well as offensive. The USSRʼs prestige has become involved with Castroʼs fortunes, and Moscowʼs political commitment to the survival and success of the Cuban revolution is deepening. In the past year the Soviets have reluctantly acquiesced in several moves—Castroʼs proclamation that he is a Communist, his attack upon Moscow-oriented Communists seeking to undermine his leadership—which have considerably reduced their freedom of maneuver. They have done this in large part because they are not prepared to accept the setback to their policies which would result from a breach with Castro. 5. Cuba could be used by the USSR as a military base from which to threaten the US. With the growth of Soviet strategic capabilities, however, installations on Cuba would add little to the weight of attack which the Soviets could direct against the US. The USSRʼs chief motive for the establishment of, for example, a medium-range missile base on Cuba would therefore be to deter an anticipated US military intervention against Castro. 6. The USSR almost certainly recognizes, however, that such an undertaking would be as likely to provoke as to deter American intervention. Further, the Soviets would either have to share control of such a base with the Cubans, in which case the risks of war would pass beyond their exclusive control, or affront Cuban sovereignty by denying Havana any role at all. Most important of all, by such an act the Soviets would firmly commit themselves to the military protection of Cuba, a step which they have thus far refrained from taking and which, we believe, they will continue to avoid. In this connection, it is notable that Soviet military aid to Cuba, while heavy, has thus far been confined to the development of essentially defensive capabilities. 7. In sum, we believe that the Sovietsʼ stake in Castro, composed of both the great hopes they place in his revolution and the heavy loss of prestige which they would suffer upon its downfall, is high. They would probably be willing to accept further assertions of Cuban independence, and to increase the scale of their aid if this were necessary to insure the viability of the Castro regime. If its existence were threatened, the Soviets would deploy all the political weapons at their command in its defense. But we think it highly unlikely that they would undertake actions on Cubaʼs behalf which, in their view, involved any considerable risk of war with the US. Instead, we believe that they would try to make the regimeʼs downfall as costly as possible, in political terms, to the US, and at the same time seek to repair their prestige rapidly with some visible triumph elsewhere in the world. For the Board of National Estimates:Abbot SmithPrinted from a copy that bears these typed signatures.Acting ChairmanWilliam K. Harvey

380. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Taylor) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that copies were circulated by Taylor to Johnson, Gilpatric, McCone, Robert Kennedy, Lemnitzer, Bundy, Murrow, and Lansdale. In a brief covering memorandum, dated August 20 and attached to this memorandum and accompanying guidelines in the Kennedy Library, Taylor wrote: “The attached papers were read and approved by higher authority [President Kennedy] today, 20 August 1962, and are transmitted to you for information.” (Ibid.) Washington, August 17, 1962.

The Special Group (Augmented) has reviewed the results achieved in Phase I (March to August, 1962) of the Mongoose program. The priority objective in this period was the acquisition of hard intelligence bearing on the internal situation, accompanied by political, economic and covert actions short of those calculated to inspire a revolt in the target area.

The responsible agencies have worked vigorously to accomplish this objective, generating the largest intelligence effort directed at any Soviet Bloc country and attacking the target country broadly across the political, economic and psychological fronts. However, in spite of some progress in intelligence collection, the Special Group (Augmented) does not feel that the information obtained has been adequate to assess accurately the internal conditions. Nevertheless, from what we know we perceive no likelihood of an overthrow of the government by internal means and without the direct use of U.S. military force.

As we look ahead in the Mongoose program, we have considered several alternative courses of action. We have ruled out those which would commit us to deliberate military intervention although we recognize that an unanticipated revolt might at any time force a decision for or against the support of such a revolt by U.S. forces. For the coming period, we favor a somewhat more aggressive program than the one carried on in Phase I, wherein we continue to press for intelligence, attempt to hurt the local regime as much as possible on the economic front and work further to discredit the regime locally and abroad.

We have approved an outline plan drawn up under the direction of General Lansdale, which is designed to carry out this concept. General Lansdale will work with the Special Group (Augmented) as he has during Phase I, submitting to us for approval schedules of specific actions based on the outline plan. While we believe that this new course of action will create added difficulties for the regime and will increase the visibility of its failures, there is no reason to hope that it will cause the overthrow of the regime from within. Also, the “noise level” of Mongoose operations will probably rise in the course of the new phase and there will always be the chance that the participation of some U.S. citizens may become known. However, the Special Group (Augmented) considers that these are tolerable risks which they will seek to control by close attention to the implementation of the program.

Attached hereto are revised guidelines for Phase II which, with your concurrence, we propose to promulgate for the guidance of General Lansdale and his associates.

Maxwell D. TaylorPrinted from a copy that indicates Taylor signed the original. Attachment

GUIDELINES FOR OPERATION MONGOOSE, PHASE II

(August 1, 1962 until_____________)

Terminal date to be set later

1. While retaining as its eventual objective the overthrow of the target government, the objective of the Mongoose program during Phase II will be the further containment, undermining and discrediting of the target regime while isolating it from other Hemisphere nations. 2. In view of the growing weakness of the economy of the country, special efforts will be directed at accentuating the difficulties in this sector, and at increasing the demands on Bloc resources. Sabotage will be employed for this purpose on a selective basis. 3. Continued priority will be given to the intelligence collection program, with renewed emphasis on the establishment of viable agent assets inside the target country. 4. Efforts will be increased to inspire frictions and schisms both within the target regime and between its leaders and the Bloc. 5. Consideration will be given to assisting Cuban exile groups and other Latin American governments to perform actions and operations in support of the Mongoose program. 6. It is recognized that this program may cause the “noise level” to rise; however, the importance of maintaining non-attributability remains unchanged. 7. While a revolt is not sought at this time, we must be prepared to exploit it should one unexpectedly occur. The JCS will maintain plans for U.S. military intervention. 8. General Lansdale will continue as Chief of Operations during Phase II, following the procedures which have been worked out during Phase I.

381. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to Attorney General KennedySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret. Washington, August 21, 1962.

On August 14th I had a long discussion with Mr. Donovan concerning the ransom of Cuban prisoners. Donovan advised that he had made contact with the Cuban delegate to the UN and had received a response from a Castro confidant that Castro would receive him, Donovan, in Havana at any time.

Donovan is prepared to go to Havana in the interests of: (a) Reducing the Castro asking price now set at $62,000,000, and (b) Determining whether all or a substantial part of the final price can be paid for in food and medicine.

Donovan will not go to Havana unless he has an indication of the United States Government position in this matter, as he feels that there is a very definite risk involved in this negotiation if he is not prepared to “come to terms” if a final negotiation appears possible. The dangers, in his mind, are that Castro will probably attack him, and more particularly the United States Government, for a lack of sincerity, and this will have a most serious damaging effect on the Cuban community in Miami and elsewhere in the United States.

In a telephone call this morning Donovan stated that Castro has indicated that he, Donovan, must be in Havana prior to August 30th; that he is prepared to go if the above conditions are met, and that he would be available in Washington for a discussion with Mr. Hurwitch of State and the Attorney General on Thursday morning, August 23rd.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

382. Memorandum for the FileSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 2,DCI (McCone) Memo for the Record, 7 April-21 August 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. Washington, August 21, 1962.

DISCUSSION IN SECRETARY RUSKʼS OFFICE AT 12 OʼCLOCK, 21 AUGUST 1962

IN ATTENDANCE Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Alexis Johnson, the Attorney General,DCI, General Taylor, General Lemnitzer and McGeorge Bundy SUBJECT Cuba

McCone stated that the purpose of the meeting was to again review the situation in Cuba in light of the most recent intelligence findings.

DCI recalled that in the August 10th Meeting he had reported such information as was then available on the accelerated Soviet supply of personnel and materiel to Cuba. However, information available to the Agency since August 10th indicated that the extent of the Soviet supply operations was much greater than had been reported on August 10th; furthermore, there were indications that construction work was undertaken by Soviet personnel, technicians with newly delivered Soviet equipment and while the nature of the construction was not known, it was probably either highly sophisticated electronic installations or COMINT and ELINT and possible electro-countermeasure efforts or missile sites, probably ground-to-air.

DCI then stated that on August 10th in discussing the arguments for and against the so-called stepped-up Plan B, or alternatively the modified Plan B, he had stated that if it was decided to accept the modified Plan B and such a course is pursued, it is the opinion of the DCI that continuing Soviet aid and technical assistance will present the United States with a more formidable problem in the future than it now confronts or has confronted in the past. McCone then stated that conclusive evidence indicated such a stepped-up Soviet effort.

DCI then read 21 August paper entitled, “Recent Soviet Military Aid to Cuba”Printed as an attachment to Document 383. as prepared by DD/I. He then referred to 21 August paper of the Office of National Estimates, subject, “Soviet View of the Cuban Economy”Not found. emphasizing the conclusion that under energetic Soviet direction, the potential of the Cuban agricultural, industrial and natural resources could be so developed that the economy would be reasonably viable and over a decade might even earn sufficiently from export surpluses to repay credits and advances already made to Cuba by the Soviet Union. Therefore, the CIAʼs conclusion that Soviet economists in analyzing Cuba would conclude that in supporting Cuba the Soviets were not involving themselves with a permanent liability; furthermore, there was an opportunity of creating a viable and reasonably prosperous economy which, while not a showcase, would always be an annoyance to the United States and a model for all dissident groups in Latin America.

DCI then referred to the 15th August paper of the Board of National Estimates, subject, “The Soviet Stake in Cuba”Document 379. and read the summary of this paper which is in numbered paragraph 7, page 3.

In support of the above DCI then briefly reviewed a chronology of unevaluated reports on recent Soviet military aid to Cuba, 21 August, and noted my reference to maps; location of the reported activities.

There was general agreement that the situation was critical and that the most dynamic action was indicated.

There was discussion of various courses of action open to us in case the Soviets place MRBM missiles on Cuban territory. There was also discussion of blockades of Soviet and Bloc shipping into Cuba or alternatively a total blockade of Cuba.

Throughout these discussions, it was abundantly clear that in the minds of State, and Mr. Bundy, speaking for the White House, there is a very definite inter-relationship between Cuba and other trouble spots, such as Berlin. It was felt that a blockade of Cuba would automatically bring about a blockade of Berlin; that drastic action on a missile site or other military installation of the Soviets in Cuba would bring about similar action by the Soviets with respect to our bases and numerous missile sites, particularly Turkey and southern Italy. Also, there is a reluctance, as previously, to the commitment of military forces because of the task involved and also because of retaliatory actions of the Soviets elsewhere throughout the world.

McNamara expressed strong feelings that we should take every possible aggressive action in the fields of intelligence, sabotage and guerrilla warfare, utilizing Cubans and do such other things as might be indicated to divide the Castro regime. McCone pointed out that all of these things could be done. Efforts to date with agent teams had been disappointing. Sabotage activities were planned on a priority basis and in all probability, we would witness more failures than successes. To date we had experienced a very tight internal security situation and probably this would become more so in the future.

The Attorney General queried the meeting as to what other aggressive steps could be taken, questioning the feasibility of provoking an action against Guantanamo which would permit us to retaliate, or involving a third country in some way.

It was Mr. Bundyʼs opinion that all overt actions would involve serious consequences throughout the world and therefore our operations must be covert at this time, although we should expect a high degree of attribution.

The meeting was inconclusive with respect to any particular course of action. It was felt that the President should be informed on the evolving situation and the DCI agreed to brief him at the Meeting on Wednesday, August 22nd at 6 oʼclock.

We further agreed that the entire matter should be reviewed with the President by Rusk, McNamara, Bundy and McCone. Mr. Bundy undertook to arrange for this meeting following the Special Meeting scheduled for ten oʼclock on Thursday, August 23rd.

Following this discussion, there was a brief discussion of the Donovan matter as covered in DCIʼs memorandum to Rusk and the Attorney General, copy of which is attached.Document 381. It was agreed that Mr. Hurwitch would meet with Mr. Donovan on Thursday, together with the Attorney General, and determine the extent of the commitment we would make for the government which would permit Mr. Donovan to engage in the prisoner release negotiations. DCI made it abundantly clear that the existing commitments to Committees of the Congress prevented CIA from using covert resources for this purpose.

McCone stated that in view of these commitments to the Congress he did not feel that he should meet with Mr. Donovan. Furthermore, McCone stated that he felt that if a reasonable deal could be made for the release of the prisoners, the Committees of Congress would change the view expressed a year ago at the time of the tractor negotiation.

JAM

383. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1/62-9/62. Secret. Washington, August 22, 1962.

The attached paper sums up the evidence which suggests a striking change in Soviet policy toward Cuba.

Until recently, it had been supposed that the USSR regarded Cuba as a poor field for investment, presumably on the ground that it was too vulnerable to the U.S.

Raul Castro visited Moscow a few weeks ago. No communique was issued, and our intelligence people concluded that his mission had failed. It now appears that Raul succeeded and that the USSR may have decided to make a major investment in Cuba.

Any military construction will probably be defensive in function; a launching pad directed against the U.S. would be too blatant a provocation. Probably they want to listen in on Canaveral—or to shoot down a U-2.

Mr. McCone is going to take this up with the President this afternoon.

Arthur Attachment OCI No. 3047/62 Washington, August 22, 1962.

Current Intelligence Memorandum

SUBJECT Recent Soviet Military Aid to Cuba 1. Intelligence on recent Soviet military assistance to Cuba indicates that an unusually large number of Soviet ships have delivered military cargoes to Cuba since late July and that some form of military construction is underway at several locations in Cuba by Soviet bloc personnel who arrived on some of these ships and are utilizing material delivered by the vessels. During the period at least 1,500 passengers have debarked from four ships under security conditions suggesting that their mission is related to the construction and military activity; another 1,500 arrived during the period and were greeted with considerable publicity as economic specialists and students. Some still unconfirmed reports suggest that recently arrived Soviet bloc personnel number as many as 5,000. The speed and magnitude of this influx of bloc personnel and equipment into a non-bloc country is unprecedented in Soviet military aid activities; clearly something new and different is taking place. As yet limited evidence suggests that present activities may include the augmentation of Cubaʼs air defense system, possibly including the establishment of surface-to-air missile sites or the setting up of facilities for electronic and communications intelligence. 2. As many as 20 Soviet vessels may have already arrived in Cuba since late July with military cargoes. Five more Soviet vessels have left Black Sea ports under conditions suggesting that they are en route to Cuba with additional military equipment. Most reports on these shipments have referred to large quantities of transportation, electronic, and construction equipment, such as communications and radar vans, trucks of many varieties, mobile generator units, tracked and wheeled prime movers, cranes, trailers, and fuel tanks. Eyewitnesses who saw the material being transported from the port areas report that much of the transportation was done at night and even that town street lights were turned off as the convoys passed through. 3. Personnel who arrived on the four Soviet passenger vessels—each of which has a normal passenger capacity of 340, though one of them declared 365 passengers when leaving the Black Sea—have been described variously by Cubans who have seen them. Most agree that they were obviously non-Cuban in appearance and were dressed in civilian clothing. A number of independent sources report that the foreign personnel were dressed in dirty, dusty, slept-in, red-checkered shirts and faded blue trousers. The foreign personnel unloaded the vessels themselves; usually Cuban militiamen have been charged with this work even when it was a military cargo. There is no hard evidence that any of these people are in combat military units. There is strong evidence that their mission is related to unidentified military construction. 4. At least a dozen refugees from the area of Matanzas have reported independently on military construction at two sites near that north coast city. Two and possibly more ships arrived in the port of Matanzas and unloaded cargoes under tight security precautions. Cargoes were taken to at least two general areas where construction is underway. Initial construction, according to one of the eyewitnesses, involved the grading and leveling of a naturally level portion of the western slope of a hill by Soviet personnel using heavy equipment. This was taking place at a site just east of Matanzas at a place called El Bongo. Other sources confirmed that material was leaving the docks in the direction of El Bongo. Another source, who left Cuba more recently, reported that by 4 August foreign personnel were assembling what appeared to be a prefabricated curved-roofed structure at El Bongo. The other site of construction activity near Matanzas is apparently just across the provincial border in Havana province at Santa Cruz del Norte, near the former Hershey sugar mill. In this place, too, construction activity initially involved the leveling of a portion of a hill near the coast. Cuban residents had been cleared from the area. 5. There are as yet no confirmed reports of construction activity underway in other parts of Cuba. However, there is considerable reason to presume that such activity is underway or is to be initiated shortly in a number of other locations in Cuba, ranging from Oriente province in the east to Pinar del Rio in the west. A refugee from the port of Antilla in Oriente province reported that a Soviet ship unloaded in late July at nearby Nicaro. The material unloaded, including electronic vans, tracked prime movers, and trailers, was moved through Antilla toward the Peninsula de Ramon, an area where he reported construction work had been underway for some time. Another ship is reported to have discharged a similar cargo as well as foreign personnel in the port of Casilda, in southern Las Villas province. In northern Las Villas, Cayo Esquivel, an island off the coast, has reportedly been evacuated. In the area just south of Havana city, we have numerous independent reports that a number of farms have been evacuated and that the boysʼ reformatory at nearby Torrens has been converted for living quarters for numbers of foreign personnel. Information from individuals who live near the reformatory indicate that the numerous Soviet personnel who moved in early this month wore “casual, dirty, civilian clothes.” Other reports indicate that quantities of equipment such as has been reported elsewhere have been seen on the confiscated farms near the reformatory. Other reports from other parts of the island indicate that Cuban families have been evacuated from an island near Mariel, the port in Pinar del Rio province where much of the equipment was unloaded, and from a farming area near Guatana, Pinar del Rio province. 6. What the construction activity involves is not yet known. The activity in the Matanzas area could be the initial phases of construction of a SAM-equipped air defense system, erection of electronic and communications intelligence facilities aimed at Canaveral and other US installations, or an ECM system aimed at US space, missile, and/or other operational electronic systems. The kinds of equipment described could fit with any of these objectives; the evidence thus far, as well as Soviet practice in other countries receiving bloc military assistance, would suggest, at least tentatively, construction of an air defense system based on the Guideline missile. Information to confirm or refute this should become available within a week. 7. The step-up in military shipments and the construction activity once again provide strong evidence of the magnitude of the USSRʼs support for the Castro regime. Together with the extraordinary Soviet bloc economic commitments made to Cuba in recent months, these developments amount to the most extensive campaign to bolster a non-bloc country ever undertaken by the USSR.

384. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented) Washington, August 22, 1962. [Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

385. Memorandum of Meeting With President KennedySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. On August 22 McCone briefed President Kennedy on the meeting in Ruskʼs office on the previous day; see Document 382. The President expressed concern about developments in Cuba and agreed that policy considerations growing out of those developments would be discussed at the meeting at the White House scheduled for August 23. (Ibid.) Washington, August 23, 1962. ATTENDED BY Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, General Taylor, Messrs. Bundy, McCone SUBJECT Cuba 1.

McCone advised that President had been briefed on the Cuban situation but added the information given [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

Rusk advocated informing Canadians and all NATO allies of growing seriousness of situation; also advocated removal of restrictions on use of Guantanamo by the Lansdale group.

Action: This point not cleared and should be pursued as strongly opposed by Chiefs.

The President requested a continuing analysis of the number and type of Soviet and Oriental personnel imported into Cuba; quantity and type of equipment and its probable use; all construction—particularly anxious to know whether construction involving SAM sites might differ from the ground sites. McCone stated we probably could not differentiate between surface-to-air and 350 mile ground-to-ground offensive missiles. McNamara observed portable ground missiles could not be located under any circumstances.

Action: DDCI should have Board of National Estimates working continuously on this analysis.

President requested analysis of the danger to the United States and the effect on Latin America of missile installations.

Action: DDCI should arrange for preparation of such estimates.

President raised the question of whether we should make a statement in advance of our position, should the Soviets install missiles and the alternative actions open to us in such event. In the course of the discussion, apparent many in the room related action in Cuba to Soviet actions in Turkey, Greece, Berlin, Far East and elsewhere. McCone questioned value of Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy. McNamara agreed they were useless but difficult politically to remove them.

Action: He agreed to study this possibility.

5. President raised question of what we could do against Soviet missile sites in Cuba. Could we take them out by air or would a ground offensive be necessary or alternatively could they be destroyed by a substantial guerrilla effort. 6. President raised question of what we should do in Cuba if Soviets precipitated a Berlin crisis. This is the alternative to the proposition of what Soviets would do in Berlin if we moved in Cuba. 7. During the conversation I raised substance of my plan of action as outlined in the attached paper. There was no disagreement that we must solve the Cuban problem. However, we should not start the political action and propaganda effort now until we had decided on the policy of following through to the complete solution of the Cuban problem. 8. After the meeting in a private conversation with Robert Kennedy, I stated that I felt Cuba was our most serious problem; [4 lines of source text not declassified]. I also added, in my opinion, Cuba was the key to all of Latin America; if Cuba succeeds, we can expect most of Latin America to fall. John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature. Attachment Washington, August 21, 1962.

Memorandum

Proposed plan of action for Cuba in the light of: (a) The arrival of four to five thousand Soviet/Bloc technicians and possibly military personnel during July-August. (b) Arrival of many ship loads of equipment and materiel during July and August. (c) The conclusion that stepped up plan (b) will not, in the opinion of the National Board of Estimates, accomplish the stated purpose of overthrowing Castro from within, and moreover will be attributable to the United States and cause loss of face by the United States, and (d) Modified plan (b) will contribute importantly to our intelligence gathering and will impede Castro regimeʼs economic progress but will not be sufficient to frustrate the regimeʼs progress in view of the evidences of substantial Soviet technical assistance.

The above all lead to the conclusion that with the passage of time, it is possible there will evolve in Cuba a stronger rather than a weaker Castro dominated communist state, fully oriented to Moscow, to serve on the one hand as a model for similar actions by disciplined groups throughout Latin America, and on the other as a bridgehead for Soviet subversive activities in Central and South America. Being dominated by Moscow, such a Cuba would also serve as a possible location for MRBMs, for COMINT and ELINT facilities targeted against United States activities, most particularly Canaveral, and finally as an ECM station which might adversely affect our space and missile work.

Therefore it seems to me a more aggressive action is indicated than any heretofore considered, and should be patterned along the following lines: (1)

An immediate continuing aggressive political action designed to awaken and alarm all of Latin America and all of the free world as to the extreme dangers inherent in the present Cuban situation.

Appropriate actions should be taken through domestic and foreign press media to inform and alarm the people, through the United Nations, through the Organization of American States and its subcommittees, by contact with each free world country at the level of head of state, foreign minister and ambassador, and through semi-public or private organizations such as labor, church, farm cooperatives, youth groups, et cetera.

(2) [5 lines of source text not declassified] (3) The instantaneous commitment of sufficient armed forces to occupy the country, destroy the regime, free the people, and establish in Cuba a peaceful country which will be a member of the community of American states.

It is possible, though in my opinion improbable, that actions taken under (1) above would in themselves be sufficient to cause destruction of the Castro regime from dissension and disaffections within the regime itself which would obviate steps (2) or (3).

Alternatively, actions under (1) above might cause internal strife of sufficient proportion to prompt the action outlined under (3) above with no further provocation.

Concurrently with this plan, we should go forward with all possible activities called for under plan (b).

J.A.M.Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

386. National Security Action Memorandum No. 181Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (A). Top Secret; Sensitive. A typewritten note at the top of the source text reads: “Individual items to be reproduced for further assignment only by personal decision of addressees—full reproduction prohbited.” Washington, August 23, 1962. TO Secretary of State Secretary of Defense Attorney General Acting Director, CIA General Taylor

The President has directed that the following actions and studies be undertaken in the light of evidence of new bloc activity in Cuba.

1. What action can be taken to get Jupiter missiles out of Turkey? (Action: Department of Defense) 2. What information should be made available in the U.S. and abroad with respect to these new bloc activities in Cuba? (Action: Department of State, in consultation with USIA and CIA) 3. There should be an organized effort to bring home to governments of our NATO allies in particular the meaning of this new evidence of Castroʼs subservience to the Soviets, and the urgency of action on their part to limit their economic cooperation with Cuba. (Action: Department of State) 4. The line of activity projected for Operation Mongoose Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed. (Action: General Taylor) 5. An analysis should be prepared of the probable military, political and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the U.S. (Action: White House, in consultation with Department of State, Department of Defense, and CIA) 6. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of making a statement that the U.S. would not tolerate the establishment of military forces (missile or air, or both?) which might launch a nuclear attack from Cuba against the U.S. (Action: Department of State, in consultation with Department of Defense with respect to the study in item 7 below) 7. A study should be made of the various military alternatives which might be adopted in executing a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U.S. What would be the pros and cons, for example, of pinpoint attack, general counter-force attack, and outright invasion? (Action: Department of Defense) 8. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other action beyond Mongoose B plus, in the context of an aggravated Berlin crisis. (Action: Department of State, in consultation with Department of Defense)

To facilitate coordination of these efforts, I should like to receive an immediate report from action Departments indicating which officer of the Department will be directly responsible for items in which action is assigned to that Department. Insofar as practicable, except for item 1, item 3, and item 5, these assignments should be made from among senior officers already informed of Mongoose.

There will be a further meeting with the President about September 1 to review progress on all these items. In the event of important new information, an earlier meeting will be called.

The President emphasizes again the sensitive character of these instructions.

McGeorge Bundy

387. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-2462. Secret. Drafted by Ivan B. White and approved in S on August 28. Secretary Rusk was in Ottawa August 24-26 for meetings with Canadian officials. Ottawa, August 24, 1962. SUBJECT Cuba PARTICIPANTS Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker Secretary of State for External Affairs Green Defence Minister Harkness Secretary of State Rusk United States Charge dʼAffaires ad interim White

The Secretary opened the conversation on Cuba by saying that the United States Government greatly appreciated the assistance given by Canada in prohibiting trans-shipments of United States goods to Cuba and in its prohibition of shipments of strategic materials. This perform-ance had not been emulated by the other NATO countries. In view of the fact that it was important to put Castro into a position where he has before him clear alternatives, NATO as a whole should be interested in helping with the Cuban problem. The assistance of Canada in developing a more positive attitude within the NATO group would be greatly appreciated by the United States.

In discussing the recent unusual movement of Soviet ships to Cuba, the Secretary said that four of the vessels carried an estimated 340 Soviet personnel each who were disembarked secretly; that it was thought that some of these were for the purpose of assisting in agriculture and some were connected with military installations. Prime Minister Diefenbaker inquired as to the nature of the installations. The Secretary replied that not enough time had elapsed for an intelligence appraisal, but it was known that radar equipment and other communications intelligence equipment were involved. Substantial areas had been cleared of all Cuban personnel. With reference to missile sites, it would be important to know whether they were ground to ground or ground to air. The Secretary pointed out that in United States policy towards Cuba there were only two problems which were clearly non-negotiable: 1) the domination of Castro by the International Communist Movement and, 2) Cuban intervention in the affairs of countries in the Alliance for Progress area.

388. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Secret. Washington, August 24, 1962. SUBJECT Mr. Paulʼs Meeting with Dr. Jose Miro CardonaNorman S. Paul was an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

At 4:00 p.m. this date, Mr. Paul met with Dr. Cardona to discuss certain matters relative to the enlistment of Cubans into the Armed Forces of the U.S. He considered this a most urgent problem, primarily because of the recent introduction into Cuba of at least 5,000 individuals whom he called soldiers. He was desirous of expediting this training to be completed within the next six months. He considered the latter time figure as very critical.

He desired increased recruiting of enlisted. He desired recruiting officers and recruiting offices to be placed in New York City and Puerto Rico, and he wanted the officers school to be increased in numbers of officers attending. He wanted the length of the school to be reduced. I understood that eighteen weeks was the maximum length for the school, and that he desired to have 120 officers trained—divided 1/3 Army, 1/3 aviators and 1/3 to be miscellaneous young officers. He estimated that by increasing recruiting pressure that approximately 5,000 to 6,000 would join up.

Dr. Cardona was interested in being able to make a statement to the effect that Cubans are being trained by the Armed Forces to fight in Cuba. This type of statement would bring the recruits in. I understood him to be agreeable to a statement to the effect that the Cubans were being trained to fight communism anywhere. If the above former statement was not made, the program would not be satisfactory according to Dr. Cardona.

Mr. Paul provided the following information—that a new program to be announced within the next two or three weeks should increase the number of Cubans interested. Among other things, this program would permit Spanish speaking individuals to be enlisted, and that all instruction would be in Spanish. He advised that the standards were being lowered, and that more would be permitted to be trained in units. He further advised that additional recruiting offices would be opened in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and others. He told Dr. Cardona that he would look into the idea of opening one up in Puerto Rico. Mr. Paul indicated that he was not certain as to the exact number of officers being trained and did not commit himself or the Defense Department to the training of additional officers.

As a result of Dr. Cardonaʼs meeting with Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Paul advises that Mr. Gilpatric desires that the implementation of the program be expedited.

Two items of interest were mentioned regarding the past program: (1) They noted that the recruiting offices were turning men down when they had more than one dependent. (2) Two Cubans had been sent to Germany for duty.

They were concerned about both of the above and both merit attention.

With regard to Dr. Cardonaʼs desire to make a statement that Cubans are being trained to fight in Cuba, Mr. Paul stated that this was a matter that could not be decided by the Defense Department.

Dr. Cardona also stated, at the present time they have 125 pilots, mostly commercial, among the refugees. None of them are qualified in jets.

Mr. Paul prefaced his remarks at the outset of the meeting that the substance of his remarks were not for publication and were for Dr. Cardonaʼs information only. He reiterated this comment in Mr. Gilpatricʼs office.

Melvin D. HendersonPrinted from a copy that indicates Henderson signed the original.Military Assistant

389. Telegram From the Chief of Naval Operations (Anderson) to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-2562. Secret; Priority. Also sent to ACSI, AFCIN, DIA, DIRNSA, CMC, CINCARIB, and CIA. Washington, August 24, 1962, 9:07 p.m.

250207Z. Military activity and foreign personnel in Cuba.

1. Following received from COMNAVBASE GTMO: A. Persistent reports from numerous sources indicates extensive military construction is in progress in restricted area defined below. B. The restricted area is reported to extend in general from Gibara (UU820340), Tacajo (VU015055), Guaro (VT185870), to the coast just northeast of Sagua de Tanamo, Cayo Mambi (VT775915). C. Numerous reports state that approximately 1000 Russian and Czech military personnel and technicians are constructing a rocket and/or missile site somewhere east of Banes (VU250189) between Playa de Puerto Rico (VU365155) and Lucrecia (VU384285). D. All Cuban army/militia personnel have been withdrawn from this area (para. C) and only high ranking officials are permitted access. E. Reports further indicate that between 1-4 Aug between 18-50 rockets and/or missiles described as being 20ft-21ft in length and 18 inch in diameter, red in color with yellow nose cones, were off loaded in Nicaro and transferred primarily over secondary roads to Puerto Rico (VU3518). The roads were heavily guarded by army/militia troops. In addition to the rockets/missiles off loaded—aluminum piping, train rails and angle iron were also part of ships cargo off loaded. F. An undetermined number of Chinese and Soviet nationals performed entire off loading operation. Cuban nationals whether military or civilian were not allowed near the pier and dock facilities in Nicaro during the four day unloading operations. G. The material was reported to be on two Soviet ships. H. One report states that approx. 1000 armed personnel described as Orientals were disembarked at landing facilities in Nicaro during same period. I. On 3 Aug 62, a large number of Orientals in civilian clothes and unarmed were observed at the railroad junction in vicinity of Guardo (VT191857). This group later described by Nicaro radio station broadcasts as rice workers from China to assist in the Cuban rice harvest. Comment: Personnel described in paragraph H could very likely be those indicated as civilian rice workers (para. I). J. One report is that 2500 Russian military are billeted at Los Pacitos, just west of Lucrecia, they wear dark gray colored uniforms and can be seen frequently swimming in the nude at Punta Gorda beaches. K. Eggs, meat, and milk are collected in the areas of Antilla, Banes and Puerto Rico to feed the Russian troops stationed at Los Pacitos. Comment: Additional info has been requested from all informants. The present reports are mixed, varied in details and lack precise location of the alleged site. Certain informants have stated that missiles were taken to Mayari Arriba, however, vast majority of informants indicate that the site or sites under construction is located in area mentioned paragraph C. Most reports state that the Chinese troops seen in this area were not disembarked at Nicaro, but disembarked at port in Bahia de Nipe. Therefore two groups—one the Chinese rice workers and the other an armed battalion could have arrived at different locations during same period. Considering reports from all sources involved an overall (B-3) evaluation is given to some extraordinary undertaking in which non-Cuban bloc personnel are engaged.

390. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Acting Secretary of State BallSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (A). Secret; Noforn. The source text is marked with a handwritten indication that it was sent to McGeorge Bundy. RSB-149 Washington, August 25, 1962. SUBJECT Soviet Military Shipments to Cuba

We have examined available evidence on the unusually heavy Soviet shipments to Cuba during the past month.

Conclusions

A large part, possibly half, of the shipments have involved military hardware and Soviet military technicians.

The most likely explanation of Moscowʼs stepped up military assist-ance is that it is designed to enhance the Cuban regimeʼs defense capabilities against an external threat, and increase the effectiveness of the military establishment for possible internal use.

Because of the lead times involved, the Soviet deliveries to Cuba probably could not have been planned to coincide with the latest Berlin developments. Nevertheless the Soviets may now calculate that US attention to Berlin will be diluted by Soviet activity in Cuba, and that in an atmosphere of generally heightened tension pressures for Western concessions will be enhanced.

Size and Nature of the Shipments. Since the last week in July, in addition to the normal tanker and cargo vessel movements, it is estimated that Soviet ship arrivals to the present, plus ships now enroute, total at least 26 including 5 passenger ships. The shipments are known to contain both military and economic goods and personnel. But information is limited on exactly how the volume is divided between the two; the following breakdown is at best a rough guess based upon available intelligence and some observation by reliable sources.

About one dozen of the cargo ships are believed to be carrying military equipment—electronic equipment such as radar, motor transport, construction equipment, and tracked vehicles—some of which has been observed in Cuba. Information on construction sites in Cuba suggests that surface-to-air missiles may have been included in the military equipment delivered. But there is no hard evidence on this score.

Regarding the personnel on the five passenger ships, 1500 from one vessel landed at the Mariel naval base and are thought to be Bloc technicians and/or Cuban naval personnel returning from courses in the USSR. No breakdown is available. There is less certainty about the numbers and types of additional personnel that may have been debarked or are still on the way. A total of as high as 5,000 bloc personnel—both military and technical, though the proportions are unknown—may be involved.

The remainder of the Soviet shipments, roughly one-half, consist of deliveries—already behind schedule—of equipment and technical assistance personnel under aid and trade agreements.

In sum, while the exact quantities of Soviet material and personnel which have arrived in Cuba are not known, it appears almost certainly to be of such magnitude as to significantly increase Soviet direct military involvement in Cuba.

Soviet Motivation. The most likely Soviet motivation in providing military assistance and personnel to Cuba is to enhance the Cuban regimeʼs defense capabilities against an external threat and increase the effectiveness of the military establishment for possible internal use. The Soviets doubtless recognize that the contributions this level of Soviet military presence makes to Cuban defense capabilities would be of scant aid to Cuba were the United States to decide upon direct military intervention to Cuba. However, by raising the Cuban defense capability the Soviets are raising the military effort required to intervene. Hence, they may calculate that by increasing Cuban defense capabilities in this way they are strengthening the deterrent factors which would enter into US consideration of possible military intervention. Moreover, the Soviets doubtless believe that their military assistance will serve to deter any intervention not overtly involving US forces.

The Soviets have acquired a growing stake in the survival of the Castro regime. After initial hesitations, they viewed the Cuban leaderʼs consolidation of power with elation; and they have been unstinting in proclaiming the Cuban regime as a model for successful, Moscow-supported “national liberation-struggle.” In so doing, they have become increasingly committed to the preservation and advancement of the Castro regime. Economic aid designed to keep the Castro regime afloat has been expanded by emergency shipments of consumer goods and the first signs of development projects. Even more important, the Soviets have officially endorsed Castroʼs claims to communist affiliation and now address him as “Comrade.”

It is fairly certain that the Cuban regime fears more than anything else an attack by the US, or other forces strongly, if indirectly, supported by the US. Combined with this concern, and reinforcing it, is the difficult domestic situation presently confronting the Cuban leaders. Active support for the Castro regime has been estimated to include only about 20 percent of the population, with attitudes among the remaining four-fifths of the population ranging from apathy to passive and active resist-ance.

The Soviets may well share the Cuban regimeʼs concern over external and internal threats to its security. They are certainly aware of the regimeʼs domestic economic difficulties. In any event, they would find it difficult to deny Castroʼs requests for military-economic assistance even if they did not fully share his appraisal of the need. The scale of the current Soviet effort thus reflects the seriousness of the problem faced by the Castro regime, and is renewed proof of Moscowʼs determination to go to considerable lengths to assure that regimeʼs survival.

It seems likely, at the same time, that the Soviets have undertaken a sizeable military buildup in Cuba with some reluctance. And they would probably like to minimize the extent of their military presence in Cuba. To establish a large and publicly acknowledged Soviet military presence in Cuba would have distinct disadvantages for the USSR.

First, and most important, it would heighten Moscowʼs commitment to underwrite the Cuban regimeʼs security in circumstances unfavorable to the USSR. Second, it would heighten the threat to that regimeʼs security by giving the US, alone or in conjunction with other American states, added motivation to move against the Castro regime.

It is probably because of these factors that Soviet support is being rendered in the relative absence of bluster and ballyhoo. Also the Soviets would presumably prefer not to be overly “provocative” toward the US. Likewise the Soviets would no doubt be concerned to restrain Castro, at least for some time to come, from direct provocations of the US or other countries. We believe that this restraint will apply also to possible Cuban designs on Guantanamo, though it would not exclude increased harassments and verbal attacks on the US presence there.

Relationship to Possible Moves Against Guantanamo. It continues to be unlikely that the Castro regime will make any direct military move against the Guantanamo Base. However, they may well adopt a more belligerent posture toward the US presence there. Since the beginning of July the Cuban press and other propaganda media have been giving new and extensive coverage to government allegations (over 100) of US air and sea incursions into Cuban territory and to alleged provocations by the US naval base at Guantanamo. The harassment of marine sentries at the base has increased in the same period.

There is a possibility that the regime intends this publicity as part of an overall campaign to impress world opinion with alleged US disregard for Cuban sovereignty. In addition to providing justification for the new Soviet aid and the further militarization of the island it may also be the principal point of attack in a combined Cuban-Bloc move aimed at Guantanamo at the next session of the UN General Assembly.

Cuba and Berlin. We doubt that the immediate timing of the Soviet deliveries to Cuba is specifically related to the latest Soviet moves in Berlin. Because of the lead time necessary to get such shipments en route, the decision to send them must have been made several months ago. We do, however, think that there may be a broad relationship: the Soviets may believe that US attention to Berlin will be diluted by evidence of Soviet activity in another sensitive region and they may calculate that in an atmosphere of generally heightened tension pressures for Western concessions can be stimulated.

We do not believe that the Soviets are toying with some form of quid pro quo gambit involving Western concessions in Berlin in exchange for curtailment of Soviet activities in Cuba. Moscow undoubtedly regards its positions in both these areas as sufficiently strong to make it unnecessary and undesirable to use one as a bargaining counter for the other. In short, Moscow probably believes it can reduce the Western position in Berlin while simultaneously strengthening its own position (and Castroʼs) in Cuba.

391. Telegram 984 From the Embassy in France to the Department of State Paris, August 26, 1962, 11 a.m. [Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-2662. Secret; Niact. 2 pages of source text not declassified.]

392. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (Cardona)Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba, 1962, 121-373.5. The letter was addressed to Dr. Cardona in Miami Beach, Florida. Washington, August 28, 1962.

Dear Dr. Cardona: It was a great pleasure to meet with you last Friday to discuss the Department of Defense program for the enlistment of Cuban refugees in the United States Armed Forces. As you know, we are anxious to provide opportunities for training and service to these men, many of whom have already distinguished themselves in the serv-ice of freedom.

I am writing now to confirm the steps we have taken to revamp our Cuban refugee program so that we shall be better able to take advantage of the skills of Cuban refugees.

As Mr. Paul told you, the new program for enlisted training, which should be announced within the next two or three weeks, will permit the recruitment of Spanish speaking individuals who will receive their basic training in the Spanish language and in units made up primarily, if not exclusively, of their fellow countrymen. We will be able to accept applications for this program in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and New Orleans, as well as in Miami, and we are looking into the possibility of accepting applications in Puerto Rico. Under the new program, the fact that a man has several dependents will not be a bar to enlistment, and applicants will be informed that their training will prepare them specifically for combat-type assignments.

You will recall that in the former program several enlistees claimed they had understood they were being recruited for action against Cuba, although they had been clearly informed to the contrary by U.S. authorities. In order to avoid this kind of unfortunate misunderstanding, every applicant in the new program, as a part of his regular processing, will receive specific briefing on this point, explaining also that he will be given the same opportunity to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces as is provided U.S. citizens, including service overseas and, if necessary, in combat.

In the matter of training for former Cuban officers, we are, as you know, making plans for the assignment of twelve former officers to serv-ice schools. We are planning to provide these officers two consecutive 18-week training courses at Army and Air Force schools. At some future time we may want to consider increasing the number of such officer assignments.

I look forward to our continued cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Roswell Gilpatric

393. Extract From a Paper Sent to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) Washington, August 29, 1962. [Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

394. Memorandum From the Legal Adviser (Chayes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball Washington, August 29, 1962. [Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Secret. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

395. Editorial Note

Photographs obtained from a U-2 reconnaissance mission flown over Cuba on August 29, 1962, revealed that surface-to-air missile sites were under construction on the island. The photographs were interpreted on August 30, and Acting Director of Central Intelligence Marshall Carter conveyed the information on August 31 to McGeorge Bundy at the White House and General Lyman Lemnitzer at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to a memorandum prepared by Carter on September 7, President Kennedy called him on the afternoon of August 31 and instructed him to limit access to the information to a minimum. “The President said to put it back in the box and nail it tight.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop)

396. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United KingdomSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 7/12/62-9/7/62. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Hurwitch and Martin and cleared with EUR/SOV and EUR. Also sent to Paris as telegram 1301, to Bonn as telegram 590, and to Rome as telegram 470. Repeated to Copenhagen, Lisbon, Oslo, Athens, Brussels, The Hague, Luxembourg, Ankara, Moscow, and USRO. Washington, August 30, 1962, 7:22 p.m.

1205. Since late July Soviet ship arrivals Cuba in addition normal tanker and cargo vessel movements are estimated total at least 26 including vessels now en route. Six passenger vessels have debarked and four more reported en route.

Cargo vessels known carried both military and economic goods, with high proportion former. Information to date indicates military goods consist large quantities transportation, electronic and construction equipment such as communications and radar vans, trucks, mobile generator units, tracked and wheeled prime movers, cranes, trailers and fuel tanks. Possible limited quantity weapons. Such equipment points to probable establishment sophisticated communications and radar net, possibly surface to air missile sites and installations.

Passenger vessels arrived or now en route estimated will have carried some 5,500 passengers. At least about 1,500 are believed to be economic technicians. Composition remainder unknown but are thought to include additional civilian as well as large number military technicians (including possibly military construction and engineer crews). No evidence presence Bloc combat units. Since debarkations, equipment and personnel reported concentrated eight areas in Cuba primarily coastal regions. Construction activity of as yet undetermined nature underway some these areas.

While the US realizes that there have been earlier shipments of munitions to Cuba in substantial volume, accompanied by military technicians, and that there have been even larger bloc shipments of munitions to other countries (FYI—such as Indonesia—end FYI) nevertheless this sudden and major increase in movement of military goods and personnel to Cuba cannot help but arouse great apprehension throughout the Western Hemisphere. The volume of arrivals is exceedingly great for such a short period of time. The aggressive activities and intentions of the Castro regime backed by the Soviet bloc toward the countries of Latin America and particularly the small, relatively weak, countries of the Caribbean have been all too evident ever since Castro came to power in Cuba. Castro regime has built up and is supporting with money, literature, and extensive training in Cuba, including training in street and guerilla warfare, revolutionary elements who are a threat to democratic and peaceful governments.

Castro is an emotional, irresponsible and dynamic leader, faced with difficult domestic economic problems and increasing unrest at home, and equipped with what is now the strongest military force in the whole Caribbean area, and in some elements, in any Latin American country. US not concerned about utilization of this force in overt agression. US would deal with that situation immediately within Hemisphere system. However, this amount military force in Castro hands creates psychological pressures and opens up possibilities for illicit trade or supply of arms for subversive elements. Thus such force is a power to be reckoned with in the struggles, increasingly vigorous, of Latin American political forces.

This renewed evidence of Soviet willingness to make sacrifices on behalf of Cuban strength is also significant of Soviet interest and willingness to invest scarce resources, not only in Cuba, but also in an attempt to expand its influence in other areas of Latin America. Cuba is in no position to pay for these items and will not be for some time to come. These deliveries therefore represent a significant Soviet policy decision to strengthen Cuba.

The US believes that its NATO allies with whom we are so closely engaged in other areas in combatting the spread of Soviet power will be concerned with this new development and will wish to join with us in examining what more can be done to limit the capacity of the Soviets and their agent, Castro, from further extending their power in the Western Hemisphere and to make it more difficult for the Communists to maintain their control of the future of Cuba. While it is in no sense an immediate prospect, a failure of Communism here where it has been so openly backed by the Soviets would represent a major loss of prestige with impacts far wider than the Western Hemisphere and of a nature which could only be beneficial to the interests of the free world.

Attention is called to the fact that Canada has managed quietly but effectively to maintain a close embargo over shipment of items to Cuba which originate in the US and over those which are under COCOM control. It is hoped that other NATO countries will reexamine their situation ensure that they are doing at least this much to avoid assisting and strengthening economic and military potential of Cuban regime.

It would also seem desirable to ensure that Castro is not able to meet his present needs by borrowing against future repayment prospects. These do not presently appear very great outside of his trade with Soviet bloc. For both commercial and political reasons it would seem desirable that we all continue to refrain from extending government credit for purchases by Cuba.FYI. It would also be helpful if at early stage special report by NATO countries on extension of credits to Cuba, as agreed in NAC, could be submitted. We recognize this has mainly psychological significance but believe it would exercise certain pressure on countries re surveillance of trade with Cuba. End FYI.

The US recognizes that a more complex and difficult question is involved in the question of availability of ships to maintain the flow of goods to Cuba. Nevertheless we feel that it behooves the NATO countries in the light of these new moves to reexamine with care their position in order to determine if there is any way in which they can make it more difficult for the Soviets to meet the needs of their partner at the end of this long line of communications. Since the effectiveness of any such moves is greatly diminished in view of the surplus of ships available for charter, unless most of the principal maritime countries concur, this is perhaps a subject which might be discussed in an appropriate NATO forum.

Department desires action addressees drawing on foregoing inform host government at high level US concern over this most recent evidence of increased Soviet military involvement this Hemisphere and urge reexamination its policy toward Cuba. Department may send additional instructions this subject info addressee posts.

For USRO. You should discreetly and informally undertake parallel action with delegates of countries action addressees, and inform SecGen Stikker. Would also appreciate your personal assessment desirability and feasibility having subject introduced agenda one of upcoming NAC meetings.

Rusk

397. Memorandum Prepared by Acting Director of Central Intelligence CarterSource: Central Intelligence Agency,DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop. No classification marking. Washington, August 30, 1962. 1.

Special Group Meeting—General Lemnitzer stated that Mr. McCone (sic)According to an undated memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence from Executive Director Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, it was Acting Director Carter who called General Lemnitzer on August 27 to discuss low-level photography over Cuba, not McCone. (Ibid., Box 17, Mongoose, Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights) had called him and posed a possible requirement for low-level photography of critical Cuban targets. General Lemnitzer said that from the military point of view this was feasible, utilizing either RF 101 or F8U aircraft flown by US pilots from various bases or carriers in the Caribbean area. The use of Cuban pilots would involve a delay of some months due to the precise training required.

I pointed out that we are accused daily of overflights in any case and that the possibility of Cuban protests should not dissuade us from making these flights if they are necessary. It was pointed out that other types of photography, while useful in pinpointing critical targets, do not give sufficient detail for precise identification of certain types of equipment. After some discussion, the Group agreed to take cognizance of this matter and requested that it be reopened at an appropriate time when specific targets and information needs could be identified. (Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 30 August 1962)A copy of the minutes of this meeting is in Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files.

2. Also mentioned that there might be an additional requirement for flights over Cuba. (Draft Rept. to PFIAB)Not found.

398. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of StateSource: Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historianʼs Office, Cable Files, Cuba, Jan.-Aug. 1962. Secret. Moscow, August 31, 1962, 6 p.m.

561. Department telegram 501.Telegram 1205 to London, Document 396, was repeated to Moscow as 501. In the absence unmistakable clear and official indication from US of seriousness with which unusually large shipments of heavy military goods is viewed, see no reason why Soviets should not continue increasingly provide such materials to Cuba. Preparations for present shipments must have been underway for long time and presumably were keyed to Soviet belief that American comments on the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine signified serious intent to mount full scale and overwhelming invasion. There is little doubt (viz Hungary) that in an equivalent situation the Soviet Union would have undertaken immediate measures to resolve the problem in terms of sheer force. Thus present shipments appear explainable apart from any intended psychological effect in the rest of Latin America.

Soviet press play of so-called “cannonading” of Havana gives no indication that armament of attacking ships was no greater than 20MM capacity.Reference is to an incident that occurred on the night of August 24, when two motorboats armed with .20 calibre guns and piloted by a group of young Cuban exiles penetrated Havana harbor to within a kilometer of shore and opened fire on several buildings in the Miramar section of the city for several minutes before escaping out to sea. Cuba protested the attack to the United Nations as an instance of U.S.-sponsored aggression. (Telegram 633 from USUN, August 30; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/8-3062) Within the senior levels of the Kennedy administration a debate developed involving President Kennedy, the Attorney General, and Under Secretary of State Ball, and others, over whether to arrest and prosecute the Cuban exiles involved after they returned to Florida. President Kennedy decided to issue a statement deploring such “spur-of-the-moment” raids as counter-productive, and warning against any future raids. Memoranda of a number of telephone conversations on August 25 involved in this debate are in the Kennedy Library, Papers of George W. Ball, Subject Series, Cuba, 1/24/61-12/30/62. Soviet people therefore, should they learn of the extent of Soviet military materiel shipments, would have no reason to think Cuba is not, in fact, in danger of early all-out invasion.

Suggest desirability of early unpublicized demarche to Soviet Government—possibly Dobrynin would be best channel—expressing active and serious concern U.S. Government over penetrating Soviet military equipment accompanied by large numbers of at least technical personnel in area practically impinging on U.S. frontier. It might be indicated that our concern is necessarily based on what may be not entirely accurate information and that we would welcome a statement by the Soviet Government of the kinds of aid being given which would remove these doubts. In the absence of such clarification, we can only assume that the Soviet Government is, for reasons of its own, putting in the hands of what they as well as we know to be an unstable dictator, equipment which, if improperly used, could ignite a conflagration which would extend far beyond the Caribbean.

It would further appear helpful in our approach to allies for cooperation (reftel) if US itself had taken further direct step vis-a-vis USSR.

McSweeney

399. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 8/62. Top Secret; Sensitive; Noforn; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that 21 copies of the memorandum were prepared and sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, Bundy, Rusk, McNamara, Murrow, Hurwitch, General Johnson, Harvey, and Wilson. Lansdale kept seven copies. Washington, August 31, 1962. SUBJECT Phase II, Operation Mongoose

Pursuant to your instructions, transmitted herewith is a proposed projection of actions to be undertaken as Phase II, Operation Mongoose. This projection incorporates the suggestions of the operations team designated by the major departments and agencies charged with Mongoose planning and implementation.

The format employed is responsive to the 16 August 1962 guidelines for Phase II, Operation Mongoose,See Document 380. and to your comments at recent meetings. The projection is divided into each objective contained in the 16 August guidelines, and then lists proposed actions to attain that objective. The guideline objectives have been given short titles as follows: A. Discredit and isolate the regime B. Harass the economy C. Intensify intelligence collection D. Split regime leadership and relations with Bloc E. Assist Cuban exile groups and Latin American governments to take actions F. Be prepared to exploit a revolt

In preparing this projection of actions for Phase II, Operation Mongoose, an effort was made to restrict proposals to the “B plus” frame of reference provided and to assume that a broader frame of programming under the NSAMReference is to NSAM No. 181, Document 386. would supplement Mongoose by separate planning.

PHASE II

(1 August 1962 until ____)

Objective A: Discredit and Isolate the Regime

Activity Purpose Considerations Political 1. Encourage Latin American nations, bilaterally and through the OAS Special Consultative Committee (SCCS), to establish controls over the travel of their nationals to Cuba. (State, with CIA support) To diminish travel by Latin American nationals to Cuba and to facilitate the collection of intelligence on persons travelling. Most Latin American nations have constitutional provisions regarding freedom of travel. 2. Encourage Latin American nations, bilaterally and through the SCCS, to limit or prohibit entry of Cuban propaganda. (State, with CIA and USIA support) To diminish the influx of Cuban propaganda into Latin America. Many Latin American countries have legal bars against admitting foreign publications. 3. Provide intelligence of arms smuggling from Cuba to other Hemisphere nations. (CIA, State, Defense) To obtain and exploit hard evidence of Cuban subversion in the Hemisphere. Commanders requested to develop and encourage Latins to develop alerting systems, to include anti-infiltration training. 4. As opportune, initiate action or support another nationʼs initiative in the OAS with respect to countering the Communist regime in Cuba. (State, with CIA support) To maintain the multilateral hemispheric context of the Cuban problem. Deep division within the Hemisphere over the Cuban issue may be surfaced. As an example of this activity, the current Dominican initiative in the OAS should be supported and exploited. 5. Continue the program of excluding Cuba from Hemisphere organizations. (State, with CIA support) To strengthen the isolation of Cuba. Possible exceptions, such as in public health, should be examined to determine U.S. national interest. 6. Stimulate manifestations critical of the Castro/Communist regime by Latin American political, labor, religious, and student and other significant impact groups. (State, with CIA and USIA support) To demonstrate that Latin America has rejected Cuba as a model to be imitated. To be productive, such demonstrations should stem naturally out of Cuban events, as they happen. “Events” could include Cuban refugee publication of substantive facts on what is happening to students, workers, etc. inside Cuba. 7. Encourage and exploit the defection of Cuban diplomats, officials, and delegates abroad. (CIA) To make utmost political use of revelations by Cuban “insiders.” Although keeping defectors “in place” can be more valuable, it is not always so, and if they cannot be recruited in place, then exploiting the defection fully for propaganda is important. Note items 45 and 46. 8. Keep friendly nations fully informed of the nature of the Castro/Communist regime and of U.S. policy with respect to it. (State, with CIA and USIA support) To provide for coordinated action. Psychological 9. Beamed to Cuba, initiate a planned series of statements by U.S. and other free world official and non-official spokesmen which support developing and maintaining the will to resist within Cuba. (USIA, with State and CIA support) To maintain resistance morale within Cuba. Moderation must be the keynote. Some unfavorable comment from Cuban refugee groups should be expected, demanding a harder line. 10. Continue Voice of America short-wave broadcasts to Cuba. (USIA) To maintain regular, overt communication with the Cuban people. The activity is based on nine hours of daily broadcasting in Spanish, with three hours daily specifically programmed for Cuba. Carefully documented programs of the failures of the Castro/Communist system will be increased, to maintain a subjective basis for Cuban disaffection. Emphasis will be given to repudiations of the Castro/Communist regime elsewhere, particularly the Western Hemisphere. 11. Continue U.S. broadcasting to the Western Hemisphere. (USIA) To keep the people of the Hemisphere awake to the Cuban situation. This activity now includes both VOA shortwave broadcasts. Renewed efforts will be made to enlist support from Inter-American Broadcasters Association members and other groups. “Soap operas” and special commentaries on anti-Castro themes will be included. 12. Produce propaganda cartoon books. (USIA) To build and reinforce a negative image of Castro/Communism among youth, labor, and other groups in Latin America. Themes can be updated quickly (agrarian reform problems, prisoner treatment, Soviet technicians, guerrillas, etc). Final Congressional action on USIAʼs FY 63 budget will determine if additional funds will have to be sought. 13. Produce photo-novels carrying the propaganda story. (USIA) Same as 12 above. An anti-Castro pilot model is under development. These novels would complement the cartoon books (in 12 above), particularly in urban working groups. 14. Supply TV outlets in Latin America with materials. (USIA) Same as 12 above, plus impact on key leader audiences. In addition to supplying documentaries and news clips, a series of one-minute puppet shorts will be tried. Commercial TV now covers all major cities in Latin America except Santiago and Valparaiso, Chile, and La Paz, Bolivia. 15. Produce short films for commercial outlets and impact groups in Latin America. (USIA) Same as 12 above. Government censorship of all films in Latin America presents a potential problem. 16. Produce propaganda exhibits (“before” and “after”) for public and organizational display. (USIA) Same as 12 above. Three such exhibits are now being developed. The first one contrasts Castroʼs promises with his actions. An electric motor turns the slats on a venetian blind exhibit, changing the picture. 17. Publish books in Spanish and Portuguese, with distribution through commercial sales and presentation. (USIA and CIA) Same as 12 above, plus impact on intellectuals and other opinion leaders. Volume will depend in part on results of USIAʼs request for supplemental funds for the Latin American book program, now pending before Congress. Several new books are now in the pipeline. 18. Special propaganda exploitation of U.S. information about the agricultural, labor, and public health situation in Cuba. (State, with CIA and USIA support) To make full use of the factual basis for propaganda actions exposing true conditions inside Cuba. Current research on Cuba by U.S. departments and agencies, outside Mongoose, should be maintained and then be passed into Mongoose channels for use in the project. This includes Department of Agriculture, Department of Labor, and the Public Health Service. 19. Expand the delivery of propaganda material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travellers, and controlled couriers. (CIA) To disaffect the Cuban people and to help maintain the will to resist. The “Gusano Libre” theme deserves much wider exploitation, since this is a theme created by resistance within Cuba itself. 20. Develop specific proposal for use of balloons to deliver propaganda. (CIA) To provide a means of distributing propaganda inside Cuba. This distribution technique must appear as a genuine Cuban refugee project. It must consider risks of injuring population or being exploited along that line by the Castro/Communist regime to the detriment of Mongoose objectives. 21. Direct propaganda at Soviet and other Bloc personnel in Cuba. (CIA) To make them disaffected with their role in Cuba. 22. “Voice of Free Cuba” broadcasts from submarine. (CIA, with Defense support) To have a “voice” for resistance inside Cuba. The initial broadcasts indicated that this can be made into an effective medium, at small risk. In strengthening the effectiveness, full use should be made of talents in the Cuban refugee community. CIA will coordinate this activity closely with State and USIA. 23. Continue “Radio Americas” broadcasts from Swan Island as appropriate. (CIA) To provide an irritant to the Castro/Communist regime. 24. Make available to the International Narcotics Commission documented evidence of Cuban exportation/importation of narcotics. (State) To create increased awareness in Latin America of Cuban subversive activities. Documented evidence available or obtainable should be fully exploited for impact upon hemisphere and world opinion. 25. [4 lines of source text not declassified] To sow and increase distrust in Latin America of the Castro/Communist regime. This activity will be undertaken only on a spot basis, coordinated with U.S. objectives in the specific country.

Objective B: Harass the Economy

Activity Purpose Considerations 26. Encourage the Cuban people, as appropriate, to engage in minor acts of sabotage. (CIA) To cause breakdowns of communications, power, and transport facilities; to reduce availability of raw materials; to encourage the spirit of resistance, even in a limited way.

“Minor acts of sabotage” include such actions as excessive use of electricity or short-circuiting of telephone equipment, immobilizing vehicles (stealing parts, puncturing tires, contaminating gas tanks), material spoilage, and crop burning.

All forms of media, non-US government attributable, will be used to get the message to the Cuban people; however, unless a method of mass distribution of leaflets is used, it is probable that this activity will be minor and spotty.

27. Conduct selected major sabotage operations against key Cuban industries and public utilities, with priority attention being given to transportation, communication, power plants, and utilities. (CIA) To reduce available economic supplies and services.

Depending upon circumstances, the sabotage will be conducted either by especially trained, carefully selected commando/ sabotage teams infiltrated especially for the operation and exfiltrated at the completion of the operation, or by internal assets if such can be developed with the necessary access to the target. The following are currently selected targets: Matahambre Mine-Santa Lucia Texaco Refinery-Santiago Shell/Esso Refinery-Habana Regla Steam Electric Plant-Habana Matanzas Steam Electric Plant-Mantanzas [1 line of source text not declassified] Moa Bay Nickel Plant Paper Mill—Cardenas Micro Wave Towers

Each operation entails risk, not only physical risk for the saboteurs, but also risk of attribution to the U.S. in case of capture. Care will be taken to give these actions the appearance of being done by internal resistance groups, and in isolating team members from press sources upon return. The U.S. handling of information, in case of contingency, will be established by CIA in coordination with USIA and State.

28. Sabotage Cuban assets outside Cuba as targets of opportunity, provided this does not unduly affect food and medical supplies, or the Cuban people, as such. (CIA) To cripple Cuban commerce and place strain upon regime security forces. Things, not people, are the targets. This activity requires a capability to act quickly on spot intelligence. Targets are seen mostly as shipments of products into or from Cuba. Sabotage would be to cause undue delay of shipment, using additives to spoil a commodity, fire or water damage, etc. A recent example was reported, post-action, on a shipment to the USSR. 29. Inspire labor groups outside Cuba to obstruct free world trade with Cuba. (CIA and State) To force the use of more Bloc resources, including shipping. This is an activity mostly in third countries. 30. Discourage free world trade with Cuba. (State, supported by CIA) To force the use of more Bloc resources, to deny Cuba hard currency earnings, and to hasten deterioration of Cubaʼs essentially free world equipped industrial plant. Most free world trading nations are opposed to imposing necessary trade controls. Importers might be dissuaded from using Cuba as a source of supply, such as the example of Japan recently. Preclusive buying and other forms of economic warfare deserve hard consideration. 31. Encourage the OAS Special Committee to recommend further trade measures against Cuba by Latin American countries. (State) To provide a basis for renewed pressures upon NATO to recommend trade controls to NATO members. OAS Special Committee action should be geared to SCCS reports or other developments in the Hemisphere which might provide a good basis for Special Committee action. 32. Reduce production of export agricultural commodities in Cuba, by covert means. (CIA) To cripple Cuban commerce vital to the regimeʼs domestic economic program. The main export commodities are sugar, tobacco, tropicals, and coffee. Activities would include [1½ lines of source text not declassified], hampering of harvests by work slow-downs, destruction of bags, cartons, and other shipping containers, sabotage of sugar mill machinery, etc. 33. [2 lines of source text not declassified] To sabotage Cubaʼs transportation and defense capability. The operational difficulties in this activity are recognized. However, a priority alert for this is warranted.

Objective C: Intensify Intelligence Collection

34. Spot, recruit, and train legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban Government Posts abroad. (CIA, supported by State and Defense)

The purpose of all activities under this objective is to provide maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following: a. Capabilities and intentions of the Castro Government. b. Soviet activities in Cuba including details of Soviet military personnel, units, locations, capabilities, et al. c. Activities of Cuban G-2. d. Military and militia order of battle and morale. e. State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population. f. Focus of power and/or stress and strain among the “Power Centers” in the Cuban Government. g. Evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the hemisphere.

In addition to meeting the above cited intelligence objectives, operational intelligence, and recruitment leads as well as agent material result from the Opa-locka [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] operations. In addition to meeting basic intelligence requirements above, timely operational intelligence is vital to CIA current operations.

When possible they will be recruited and trained while visiting outside Cuba; however when necessary recruitment and training will be done inside Cuba either by established agents or by agents infiltrated especially for the task. Whether this is done unilaterally or jointly with a third country intelligence organization is determined on a case by case basis.

In some cases the travel as generated specifically by CIA; in other cases the travels can be utilized to meet intelligence requirements.

35. Spot, recruit, and train third country nationals resident in Cuba. (CIA, supported by State and Defense) See 34 above. 36. Spot, recruit and train legal travellers who have potential access to significant information. (CIA, supported by State and Defense) See 34 above. 37. Continue Caribbean Admissions Center, Opa-locka, Florida. (CIA, with Defense,USIA, and other support) See 34 above. The continuation of the refugee flow and the selective debriefing of refugees provide the most significant source of intelligence. Follow up debriefing of selected refugees after departure from Opa-locka will continue. 38. [2 lines of source text not declassified] See 34 above. [6 lines of source text not declassified] 39. Maintain PAA service between the U.S. and Cuba. (State, with CIA support) [2 lines of source text not declassified] to continue the exodus of skilled manpower from Cuba. PAA requires financial assistance to continue this activity. 40. [3½ lines of source text not declassified] See 34 above. [3 lines of source text not declassified] 41. Continue monitoring overt Cuban broadcasts. (CIA) To obtain intelligence and propaganda material. This is done on a regular basis by FBIS. 42. [4 lines of source text not declassified] See 34 above. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] 43. [3 lines of source text not declassified] See 34 above. [3½ lines of source text not declassified] 44. Establish program of periodic reports from U.S. Embassies in Hemisphere analyzing the effects of existence of the target area regime on host country. (State) To maintain a reasonably current estimate of the impact of the target area regime on the Hemisphere.

Objective D: Split Regime Leadership and Relations With Bloc

45. Collect personality information on key Cuban individuals, their personalities, their attitudes, their associations, and their influences. (CIA and others) To identify channels to key individuals and to identify frictions between the individuals. This is a long term continuing program. The degree to which these channels can be developed depends on basic professional work plus the “breaks of the game.” The exploitation of the channel or of any splits in the regime will be determined in the light of existing circumstances at the time the channel is effectively established or the split is detected. 46. Develop channels of communications to selected key individual and “power centers” of the regime. (CIA) To permit exploitation of the key individuals. 47. Conduct psychological and political action. (CIA and State) To attain the objective. Activity will include: a. By public and private comment, to stimulate distrust and disaffection in the leadership and ranks of the supporters of the Castro regime, principally among the militia, the government bureaucracy, by organized labor, youth and students, farmers. b. [8 lines of source text not declassified] c. Provoke incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel to exacerbate tensions.

Objective E: Assist Cuban Exile Groups and Latin American Governments to Undertake Actions

48. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political activities of all Cuban exile groups and individuals offering useful impact inside Cuba and upon world opinion. (CIA, with State and USIA support) To encourage and maintain the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communist rule. To provide an articulate, meaningful symbol and voice of free Cuba to inform and influence public and official opinion outside Cuba. Major popular impact groups can be most effective in production and dissemination of propaganda that reports on the true state of Cubaʼs enslavement and misery under Communist dictatorship. Cubans speaking for Cuba are the most credible witnesses possible. Groups such as a “Free Cuban Judicial Committee” could publicize and openly prepare for eventual punishment of those committing “crimes against the people of Cuba.” This program of support for exiles should consider exiles in hemisphere countries and Spain as well as those in the USA. As possible, the exiles should manage and lead in this effort, with U.S. assisting and advising. 49. Provide covert support to the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC). (CIA) To provide a degree of cohesion within the exile community and to provide a cover and funding mechanism for the invasion survivors and prisoners. In addition some funding of constituent exile grops is handled thru CRC. To support and guide CRC propaganda activities directed at Latin America and Cuba itself. In spite of its many inadequacies, the CRC performs a variety of useful functions which, if it were to be disbanded, would have to be handled by possibly less efficient means. 50. Encourage and support other governments in the hemisphere to undertake programs for Cuba along lines of our own effort. (State, CIA) To develop a multi-national program with common goals and timing, upon a separate-but-collective basis. To direct attention and effort toward initiative of Latin American countries instead of placing focus mainly on the U.S. This will require the highest order of overt and covert U.S. actions, to stir and support initiative in other national leaders. Reasonable but not prohibitive criteria for consultation and coordination is involved, with recognition that the U.S. is helping not employing the third nation efforts.

Objective F: Be Prepared To Exploit a Revolt

51. Continue to develop and refine contingency plans. (Defense) To assure maximum readiness from the standpoint of military planning for military intervention if directed. These plans are well advanced. 52. Continue planning with Defense and the various sub-commanders for the participation of others in military contingency plans for Cuba. (State, CIA and USIA) To provide support to the military in the event of execution of military contingency plans. 53. Establish and maintain in being the necessary communication and crypto links between CIA and Defense, including various subcommands. (CIA) To provide the communication capability to support the military contingency plans. These links have been or are in the process of being established. 54. Develop post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups. (State, with support of others) To provide a focal point for anti-Castro resistance elements and to facilitate the transition of a post-Castro government in the event of a successful overthrow of Castro/Communism. This is a matter which will require continuing study and which may be subject to substantial change due to circumstances which exist at the time. 55. Cache arms, ammunition, and other supplies in areas of Cuba accessible to known resistance elements and in potential resistance areas. (CIA) To have available in Cuba a reserve of arms and ammunition. This will require extensive maritime infiltration/exfiltration operations. It is considered likely that Cuban maritime patrolling will be such that in the near future if the job is to be done, submarines must be used in lieu of surface craft. 56. Recruit, train, and supply small resistance cells in the major cities and in other selected areas of Cuba. (CIA) To provide controlled intelligence sources and to be available in the event of an uprising. Experience and continually tightening security controls have demonstrated the difficulty of infiltrating and monitoring individuals or “Black Teams” in the target country for an indefinite period. Nor has any method yet been devised by which infiltrees can become “legalized.” Therefore, two to five man teams will be infiltrated to recruit and train small “legal” compartmented intelligence and/or resistance cells. Upon completion of training, the infiltrated team will be withdrawn if it is seriously endangered or if its continued presence jeopardizes the “legal” residents. The program will be developed to the extent that proves feasible and possible in the light of existing circumstances, including Cuban security controls, morale and motivation of agent material and the willingness of the Cuban population to support infiltrees. Increased Cuban defensive capabilities may require the utilization of submarines or aircraft as a means of infiltration and/or exfiltration in lieu of surface maritime facilities.

400. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (A). Top Secret; Sensitive. Rostow added by hand the word “only” after Bundyʼs name at the top of the memorandum. Washington, August 31, 1962.

Initial questions raised by reading Cuba folder.It is not clear which papers were in the folder Rostow was reading.

1. It may be crucial to any set of moves that we make that we establish a clear legal basis for our action. This seems to me necessary because we will be inhibited from bringing to bear such forces as may be required at some stage, by our own inhibitions, unless such a basis exists. The optimum legal basis is not the raw Monroe Doctrine. I think we should look hard at the Rio Treaty and the Punta del Este resolutions which bear on indirect aggression. 2. A political basis within the hemisphere and within NATO is, to a degree, necessary; but if we have a legal basis satisfying to ourselves, a certain degree of unilateral, of “High Noon” action is probably acceptable. 3. As the papers note, it may be extremely important within the hemisphere to distinguish defensive from offensive installations, downplaying what has already apparently been delivered by references to Indonesia, Iraq, etc. The embarrassment here is mainly to our covert operations and therefore need not enter into the psychological impact of the deliveries. 4. As the paper suggests we should consider very seriously drawing a line which we would not only state publicly but to Moscow and Havana as well. This line should assert unacceptability to us of nuclear delivery capabilities within the hemisphere either on land or submarine-based. Here is where the legal foundation for our position is important. The Soviets may argue that we have emplaced nuclear weapons close to their borders. Our response should be that this hemisphere has set up its own regional security arrangements; that the U.S. is part of this hemisphere; and that we intend by our own force and with those allies who read the hemispheric documents as we do to enforce those regulations. 5. Against this background we should consider informing Moscow that among the actions we may take in response to any interference with Berlin access is a Cuban blockade. They have increased their pressure on us in Cuba, but they also have given hostages to fortune by this commitment. This is of course a deterrent with respect to Berlin, not a matter of Cuban policy itself. 6. In the light of these Soviet moves, we should be able to get NATO and the Latin Americans to reduce their trade with Cuba—and increase the Soviet bill for this operation; but only if we put much more diplomatic muscle into the effort than we have thus far. 7. The occasion is also propitious for our trying to tighten up from the relatively low level but still disruptive Cuban efforts at subversion in Latin America. As I understand it this effort now mainly consists in withdrawing training and reinfiltrating agents, disbursing money and disseminating propaganda. On a bilateral basis we should put more muscle into interfering with this game as well as underlining our willingness to bring the Punta del Este resolutions to bear.At the end of point 7, Rostow made the following handwritten addition: “i.e., those relating to indirect aggression.” He also added, in his own hand, points 8. “Commando raids,” and 9. “A Caribbean Security agreement?”

401. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (A). Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, August 31, 1962. SUBJECT Cuba

I attach at Tab A a first element in the reports on Cuba which will be coming in first thing next week. I have also started Walt Rostow on an intensive personal review of the problem and his thoughts will be available on Tuesday.September 4. What Rostow and I both think as a first reaction is that we have two problems here which should be kept separate. The first is our reaction to the current step, and the second is our preparations to react against something which would require or make possible a major military operation against Cuba. The present actions in Cuba do not justify such action.

If this distinction is correct, we probably should make it plain during next week that while the activities in Cuba are further evidence of Castroʼs sell-out to the Soviets, they do not pose any new active threat to us or to the hemisphere. We should distinguish these activities from any form of aggressive action, or any activity which could aggressively threaten us or any other American state. We should make it plain that we know exactly what is going on and will continue to be able to watch it from inside and outside Cuba. We might also indicate that we expect the Cuban people to show their own opinion of this Soviet intrusion—and Walt suggests that Lansdaleʼs operation might well be enlarged to include harassing actions by Cubans against bloc personnel.

Meanwhile, we should of course do what we can to intensify Castroʼs isolation from our allies. There is not a great deal to be done here, because trade is already very small and is limited mainly by Castroʼs own shortage of foreign exchange. Shipping is very hard to control because of the number of different flags under which there is excess cargo capacity, mainly managed by owners who would trade with anybody and passionately resist political guidance.

In the longer run, we need to clarify both here and abroad the grounds on which aggressive action or offensive capability would call us into action.

This is less a matter of the Monroe Doctrine than one of elemental national security. It is not the same as missiles in Turkey. It is like the Soviet attitude toward the Black Sea or the Baltic states. In domestic politics, again, we need to draw this same sharp distinction between what is now going on and what we would not tolerate. This will require a careful exposition from you, and it is the only reason for thinking that a press conference toward the end of next week may be important. I myself believe that if we make it clear that short of war we have done everything we can and that war is not justified by antiaircraft installations, we shall be on fairly solid ground.

McG. B.Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials. Tab A

Probable military, political, and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the U.S.

1. Soviet missile possibilities in Cuba

The most probable present Soviet missile activity would be the introduction of SA-2 missiles. Preliminary but highly indicative photographic interpretation shows 7 sites which have all the earmarks of such installations in the early stages of construction. The SA-2 is a modern first-line antiaircraft missile, with an engagement range of 30 miles and a high reliability at altitudes from 2500 to 60,000 feet, and with limited effectiveness up to 80,000 feet. Missiles of this sort have been introduced in Indonesia and are on order by the UAR and Iraq.

The SA-2 is probably capable of use with a nuclear warhead, but there is no evidence that the Soviet government has ever provided nuclear warheads to any other state, on any terms. It seems unlikely that such a move is currently planned—but there is also little reason to suppose that the Soviets would refuse to introduce such weapons if the move could be controlled in the Soviet interest.

Other missiles which could be introduced now or later are surface-to-surface missiles of ranges varying from 150 miles to the 2,000 miles of the Soviet MRBM; such missiles would be of little value without nuclear warheads. Longer-range surface-to-surface missiles would require relatively substantial installations; shorter-range missiles of this sort could be introduced very quickly and mounted without elaborate construction.

As missile capabilities increase in the remainder of the 1960ʼs, it will become progressively easier for the Soviet Union to install in Cuba lightweight mobile missiles with increasing range and destructive power against aircraft and against targets in the U.S.

2. Military impact of the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba

Surface-to-air missiles

If surface-to-air missiles are introduced in Cuba they will substantially increase Communist defensive capabilities there. Currently the Communist air defense depends largely on MIGʼs which are effective only against planes of medium speed and medium altitudes; additional air defense is also provided by antiaircraft artillery of uncertain effectiveness at low and medium altitudes. Extensive deployment of SA-2ʼs would make reconnaissance overflight and other clandestine air operations difficult and dangerous and would substantially increase the problem of neutralizing air defense capabilities in the event of open conflict. There is no level of SA-2 deployment which would be able to withstand a determined U.S. attack.

SA-2 missiles would not require any significant redeployment of U.S. forces for defensive purposes, since neither these missiles nor the MIGʼs under their protection would carry any increased direct threat to the safety of the U.S. mainland. Operations at Guantanamo could be interdicted, except for low approaches and departures, but such action would be a strong ground for U.S. reprisal.

Surface-to-surface missiles

Surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads would constitute a very significant military threat to the continental U.S. Even short-range missiles would be able to reach important population centers and military installations, and missiles of longer range would give the Soviets a capability of attacking substantial numbers of our most important military installations. Such attacks would have very short warning times, and this capability would be a particular threat to SAC-manned aircraft which now rely on BMEWS warning. It appears probable that on military grounds alone, the establishment of such a capability would be unacceptable.

Surface-to-surface missiles without nuclear warheads would constitute no significant military threat to the U.S. On military grounds, indeed, it may be that the introduction of nuclear warheads into Cuba is a more significant dividing line than the introduction of any given class of missiles as such. But the covert introduction of nuclear warheads would be very hard to detect.

It is believed that attention should be given also to the possibility that the Soviets may attempt to establish a submarine missile base in Cuba. The Soviet submarine fleet is greatly hindered in its operations near the U.S. by the absence of forward bases. Cuban-based missile submarines would be most useful to the Soviets, and the nuclear missiles could be kept under tight Soviet control. The announcement that Soviet trawlers will use Cuban ports may mark a precedent-setting step to this more dangerous use.

3. Political and psychological impact of Soviet missile establishment in Cuba

There is no technical means of making an exact estimate on this subject. In the small group which has reviewed this problem in response to NSAM 181, the general opinion was that the political and psychological impact of any substantial Soviet-provided missile force will be great: in the United States, in Cuba itself, and in the rest of the Western hemisphere.

The Soviet Union, in making a decision to supply the Cubans with missiles of any sort, is obviously staking a claim to a large-scale military foothold in the Western hemisphere. It can be argued that this claim was already staked when MIGʼs were delivered a year ago, and it is worth noting that the MIGʼs did not cause great disturbance to American or hemispheric opinion. But missiles are something else again, and we cannot expect that the public mind will serenely distinguish between antiaircraft missiles and a direct threat of missile attack on the U.S.

Any missile deployment in Cuba will strengthen critics of the Administrationʼs “softness” on Cuba. This effect can be somewhat mitigated by words and actions being considered in other responses to NSAM 181, but it cannot be prevented while the missiles remain in place.

Nevertheless there will be a distinct difference in impact between missiles for defensive use against aircraft and missiles capable of use against the United States. The impact of antiaircraft missiles would be less in the U.S. and in the hemisphere—and international acceptance of action against defensive installations would be lower than in the case of action against missiles posing a direct nuclear threat to the U.S.

In Latin America the psychological and political effect of missile installations in Cuba would be substantial, and it would not matter much which kind of missiles were installed. The missile sites would be seen as proof of strong Soviet support for Cuba, and in the absence of prompt and effective U.S. counteraction, it would be judged that Castro is here to stay. In the Caribbean this would lead to heavy pressure for more effective U.S. support against Castroʼs subversion; outside the area Latin American states would be more inclined than ever to accommodate to Cuba as she is. This divergence of reaction would accentuate existing inter-American strains.

Summary

In sum, the expectation is that any missiles will have a substantial political and psychological impact, while surface-to-surface missiles would create a condition of great alarm, even in the absence of proof that nuclear warheads were arriving with them.

McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

402. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the Presidentʼs Military Aide (Clifton)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (B). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only for General Clifton for the President. The attachments were apparently prepared for Gilpatric in DOD/ISA and responded to items numbered 1 and 6 in NSAM No. 181. (See Document 386.) The package also included a draft response, not printed, to item 5 in NSAM No. 181, which was redrafted with additional analysis by McGeorge Bundy and submitted to the President on August 31 in Document 401. A note attached to the source text indicates that President Kennedy saw the attached items. Washington, September 1, 1962.

Ted: Here is some stuff that Secretary Gilpatric had prepared specially. The Joint Chiefs responded directly to a Presidential request as transmitted through Secretary Gilpatric.See Document 403. In my judgment, there is no urgency in showing the President this; however, he may ask for it, and I am accordingly sending it to you.

Carl AttachmentTop Secret.

Item 1

[17 paragraphs (3½ pages of source text) not declassified]

Item 6

“Advantages and disadvantages of making a statement that the U.S. would not tolerate establishment of military forces (missile or air, or both?) which might launch a nuclear attack from Cuba against the U.S.”

1. It should first be noted that the character of Soviet military aid to Cuba thus far does not indicate the building of Cuban military capabilities designed for attack on the U.S. The nature of arms and equipment being furnished to Cuba, so far as known at present, seems primarily aimed at improving defensive—particularly air defense—capabilities. The main line of propaganda accompanying Soviet Bloc military aid, to the extent that a definite line is discernible, focuses on Cubaʼs right to defend itself against “aggression” from an “imperialist” USA. With respect to nuclear weapons, it would mark a very significant change in Soviet policy to date if nuclear weapons were to be turned over to the Cubans, or even deployed to Cuba under Soviet custody. 2. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that Soviet policy may shift, and that the creation of a nuclear threat on the U.S. “doorstep” might appeal to the Soviets as an appropriate counter to U.S. deployment of an alleged nuclear threat close to the Bloc periphery. 3. Final judgment on a proposed warning statement by the U.S. would seem to call for better evidence than presently available that a recognizable nuclear threat to the U.S. is being fashioned in Cuba. Pending evidence that elements of such a threat are coming into being, the pros and cons of a warning statement are discussed below. 4. Advantages a. A strong U.S. statement warning against the establishment of nuclear-capable forces in Cuba would serve clear notice to the Soviets that we are reaching the limits of patience on their military intervention in the Western Hemisphere. To the extent that the Soviets are probing to see how far they can go, a firm commitment of U.S. prestige to stopping the build-up of a nuclear military threat in Cuba could cause the Soviets to weigh the risks of provoking us into action in a part of the world where we hold all the geographic advantages. b. A U.S. declaration would pave the way for taking firmer sanctions. If the Soviets continued to support a Cuban buildup, we could take the position that their actions threatened the security of the U.S. and of the hemisphere, and that we therefore considered ourselves justified in taking necessary measures to cut off the flow of arms, such as interception and turning back of Bloc shipping. (The critical point would be to establish the “nuclear threat” aspects of the Cuban buildup. There might be no clear-cut proof, in which case we would have to establish the threat by our own definition.) Needless to say if we intend to make declaratory statements at all, we will have to be prepared to back them with some sort of action or take a damaging prestige setback. c. In many parts of the world the U.S. image would be improved by statements and action showing determination of purpose and a clear concept of vital national interest. In Latin America, reactions would probably be mixed. There would be propaganda charges by Communist and left wing extremists that the U.S. was preparing to intervene by force in Cuba. This would probably be echoed to some extent by non-Communist liberal elements, particularly in Uruguay. However, in the key countries of Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, and Colombia the statement should tend to hearten anti-Communist and pro-U.S. sectors of opinion. This is especially important in Brazil, where these elements are being hard pressed by pro-Communist supporters of President Goulart; in Venezuela, where the extreme left has recently made two unsuccessful attempts to overthrow President Betancourtʼs Government by force and in Chile, where a left wing popular front movement is being formed for the next elections. On balance, although there would be criticism, it should be offset by the psychological lift which the opponents of Communism and of Castro could be expected to derive from the U.S. position. d. A warning statement keyed to the nuclear threat would have the advantage also in some quarters of underscoring U.S. tolerance and patience, even to the point of permitting a Communist state on the very doorstep of the U.S. until the unacceptable condition of a nuclear threat from that state came into the picture. 5. Disadvantages a. If it is granted that the unequivocal existence of Cuban-based nuclear weapons would be unacceptable from the standpoint of U.S. security—and that we would therefore take action to neutralize the threat—then consideration of disadvantages from a declaratory warning hinges mainly on the effects accruing from a warning made in advance of clear establishment of a nuclear threat. b. An advance warning confined to the nuclear threat would have the disadvantage of casting U.S. policy in a rigid mold. It could be inferred that the U.S. intended to do nothing unless Cuba actually established a nuclear capability, which would tend to increase Castroʼs freedom of action in other matters and lower the morale of Cuban resistance elements. Unless accompanied by supporting indications of U.S. firmness and unanimity, an advance declaration would probably have a questionable deterrent effect on Soviet efforts to enlarge a military foothold in Cuba. c. An advance declaration would give the Soviets legalistic propaganda leverage to argue that in view of U.S.-controlled nuclear bases ringing the Bloc, the U.S. was in no moral or political position to proscribe the establishment of a modest nuclear counter-force on the periphery of North America. Thus, a statement might very well have a reverse effect and help provide the justification for establishment of a nuclear capability in Cuba. d. In the case of either an advance declaration or one made while indications of a nuclear capability were still highly uncertain, the U.S. would be vulnerable to a large-scale propaganda counter from the Communist side to the effect that Soviet aid to Cuba was only for purposes of defense against American aggression and interference in the affairs of a free and independent country. 6. Conclusions a. The disadvantages of an advance declaration concerned with a nuclear threat only would appear to outweigh the advantages. b. A declaration made after the existence of nuclear forces had been determined would be useful to the extent that it was followed up by action to eliminate the threat. c. Making introduction of a nuclear capability the criterion for U.S. action has the inherent disadvantage that it allows time for further strengthening of Cuban armed forces, air defense capability, naval installations and possibly bases for submarines, so that any eventual military operations that might prove necessary against Cuba would become more difficult and costly. d. The final conclusion which emerges is that any declaratory warning issued by the U.S. should not be confined only to the nuclear aspect of a Cuban military buildup, and should not be made at all unless the U.S. is prepared to take action to thwart the buildup.

403. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (B). Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling. Copies were sent to Rusk and Kaysen. Washington, September 1, 1962. SUBJECT Cuba

Attached are answers prepared by the Joint Staff to a series of questions which I put to them yesterday after our telephone conversation.

By the time of your return Tuesday,September 4. Defense and the CIA will be prepared to give you an analysis of the recently acquired intelligence on Cuba, and we will also have ready for submission to you a proposal for further intelligence.

Roswell Gilpatric Attachment Washington, September 1, 1962. SUBJECT Response to Questions Pertaining to Cuba 1. In compliance with your oral request to Brigadier General Harris on 31 August 1962 for a response to specific questions concerning recent intelligence on Cuba, the attached staff paper is submitted. 2. The responses highlight the recent increase in Cuban offensive/defensive capability but obviously do not constitute a detailed analysis of the overall military threat posed by the Cuban/Soviet build-up. Current US contingency plans and force structure are capable now of meeting this new threat, however, there are additional risks involved which were not present six weeks ago. A projection of the current build-up indicates that the risks will increase in the future and that US involvement in an operation to rid Cuba of communism will become progressively more costly in terms of time, personnel and equipment. John M. ReynoldsMajor General USAFVice Director Enclosure

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO CUBA IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT INTELLIGENCE

1. What was the military capability of the Cubans for attacks against the United States prior to receipt of equipment recently?

a. Approximately 25 operational MIG aircraft capable of carrying two 500 pound bombs, in addition to their 20 and 37 MM cannon. These MIGs could attack targets as far north as Tampa and, on a one-way mission, they could attack targets stretching between New Orleans and Savannah. b. Approximately eight operational B-26 aircraft, each capable of carrying five 500 pound bombs and attacking targets on round trip missions in an arc between Mobile and Savannah and, on one-way missions, they could attack targets stretching from San Antonio in the west, Cleveland to the north and New York in the east. c. Approximately 15 small craft including 12 Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) which could make nuisance raids against southeastern coastal cities and lines of communication.

2. What is the effect of the acquisition of missiles and missile carrying torpedo boats?

a. Extensive deployment of surface-to-air missiles (SA-2ʼs) will make reconnaissance more hazardous. It will increase the problem and costs involved in neutralizing air defense capabilities in the event of open conflict. b. Missile carrying torpedo boats greatly enhance Cubaʼs coastal defense. Offensively, these boats can be used against shipping, coastal cities and industrial complexes in southeastern United States consistent with the following capabilities: KOMAR class boats are capable of a sustained maximum speed of 45 knots for over 500 miles or a 1400 mile range at 22 knots. Each carries two Mach-1 missiles with a range of 10-15 NM carrying a 2000 pound warhead.

3. How much more secure are they for launching attacks against the United States?

The SA-2 is a modern, first-line anti-aircraft missile, with an engagement range of 30 miles and a high reliability at altitudes from 2,500 to 60,000 feet and with limited effectiveness up to 80,000 feet. The presence of these missiles in Cuba is an added hazard to our air reconnaissance and will make it more difficult for us to determine that offensive preparations are underway.

4. What was required for the United States to deal with the situation before the latest acquisition?

Contingency plans envisioned the seizure of key strategic areas in Cuba within 10-15 days after landing with the minimum of casualties to both sides. Plans are based on the premise that an adequate amount of time will be allocated for pre-assault preparations. Major units involved in the initial assault include: two Army airborne divisions, an Infantry brigade, an Armored combat command, one and one-third Marine Division/Wing Teams, a Navy Striking and Covering Force together with an amphibious task force, 17 USAF tactical fighter squadrons and 53 troop carrier or transport squadrons.

5. How much more difficult is it for the United States to deal with the situation now?

The strengthening of Cuban military capabilities will increase the resistance which must be overcome in the event of US operations in Cuba. It may take somewhat longer to achieve the same degree of neutralization, since it will be necessary to neutralize the SA-2 installations and MTBs before major airborne and amphibious operations can begin. There also exists the possibility that the opportunity of obtaining strategic and tactical surprise may be prejudiced because of the increased period of time required for preliminary operations against these targets.

6. What added forces would be involved? This to be in terms of armaments currently known to be available to the Cubans.

None. Those US forces committed in current US contingency plans are considered sufficient.

7. What damage can the torpedo boats do to the United States?

These boats can be used effectively in high speed day or night hit-and-run raids against shipping and against coastal cities and industrial complexes in southeastern United States consistent with the following capabilities:KOMAR class boats are capable of a speed of 45 knots for a 500 nautical mile range or a 1400 NM range at the economical speed of 22 knots; each carries two Mach-1 surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 10-15 NM carrying a 2000 pound warhead, as well as four 25 MM AA guns. The missile warheads have a reported CEP of 100 feet.

8. What damage can aircraft do to the United States?

a. Approximately 25 operational MIG aircraft capable of carrying two 500 pound bombs, in addition to their 20 and 37 MM cannon. These MIGs could attack targets as far north as Tampa and, on a one-way mission, they could attack targets stretching between New Orleans and Savannah. b. Approximately eight operational B-26 aircraft, each capable of carrying five 500 pound bombs and attacking targets on round trip missions from the tip of Florida in an arc between Mobile and Savannah and, on one-way missions, they could attack targets stretching from San Antonio in the west, Cleveland to the north and New York in the east.

9. Added Comment

In addition to the foregoing, the military, psychological and political impact on other countries of the Caribbean littoral should not be overlooked. The recently acquired missile carrying torpedo boats could be used effectively in offensive operations against Latin American countries in the support of communist-oriented insurgency. Also, attacks could be made on industrial complexes such as the vulnerable oil refineries of Venezuela. The MTBʼs would be particularly effective in the harassment of shipping in the Windward Passage or in an attack on the Panama Canal.

404. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (B). Secret; Noforn. Washington, September 1, 1962. SUBJECT The Meaning of Increased Soviet Aid to Cuba

This paper attempts to analyze both the Soviet and Cuban motives behind the recent Soviet economic and military shipments to Cuba.

Conclusions

1. The recent increased Soviet economic and military commitment to Cuba is new and significant evidence of the value Moscow places on the Castro regime as a serious threat to US prestige and position in this Hemisphere. 2. Cuban leaders have sought this assistance eagerly, believing that it will enable them to improve internal and external security and restore forward momentum to their revolution. 3. The Soviet decision to give more help came at at time when economic deterioration and growing popular discontent raised fears of failure, and of invasion, among Castro supporters. 4. In addition to training and arming Castroʼs force, the Soviets may be establishing some kind of overt military presence with Soviet-manned installations in Cuba. But we believe that at present such activities are likely to be limited to the setting up of unacknowledged intelligence collection and defensive facilities. They will attempt to derive propaganda advantage by comparing their “peaceful” presence in Cuba with US bases in Turkey and Iran. 5. Current Soviet moves in Cuba do not appear to be synchronized with Soviet moves in Berlin, but they have a common root in Moscowʼs growing sense of power, and Moscow may hope that increased tensions in one area will lead to Western concessions in the other. 6. It is not likely that this assistance presages a direct military move against Guantanamo.

I. Cuban Needs and Soviet Involvement

The present Soviet economic and military shipments to Cuba are probably the outcome of Soviet-Cuban agreements made last Spring. At that time there were two compelling factors favoring such agreements: (1) The Cuban economy was in deepening trouble with no breakthrough in sight. The pervasive disruption which had been evident earlier in industry and transportation showed up in the agricultural sector as well, most conspicuously in the sugar industry, the very heart of the economy. Food shortages produced rising discontent. These circumstances apparently produced a crisis of confidence during which regime leaders probably calculated that the inter-related threats of internal revolt and external attack were increasing to a dangerous degree. The regime increasingly warned the people of the danger of US-supported invasion. Cuban demands for Soviet economic and military assistance probably became insistent at this time. (2) The Soviet interest in, and commitment to, the Cuban regime had significantly increased by last March. The Soviet leaders had always valued the Castro regime as a symbol in strategically important Latin America of anti-US forces they have been encouraging throughout the world. Moscowʼs commitment to Cuba increased considerably when it acquiesced (with some reluctance) in Castroʼs attempt to push into full membership in the communist fraternity by proclaiming his affiliation with international communism last December and forcefully putting himself at the head of the Cuban communists last March. The Soviet Union thus became more susceptible to Cuban demands for economic and military assistance.

While these two factors laid the groundwork for concluding the agreements for the present Soviet shipments to Cuba, the agreements were very likely not achieved without Soviet-Cuban friction. In exchange for their increased economic assistance, the Soviets probably insisted on a greater role in direction of the Cuban economy than the Cubans wanted to give them. The risks involved for the Soviets in a military buildup in Cuba probably made them reluctant to meet Cuban demands for military assistance, although Moscow probably calculates that the risk of a direct US intervention in Cuba is not high.

II. The Soviet Game in Cuba

General Outlook and Policy

Moscowʼs policy toward Cuba must be considered within the context of its view of Latin America. It is clear that for at least the last half decade the post-Stalin leaders have viewed Latin America—with its unstable military dictatorship, depressed standards of living, economic difficulties, social malaise, and widespread resentment (real or imagined) against overlordship of the “big brother” to the North—as a most promising area in which to pursue their policies of exploiting grievances to the detriment of the West, and especially the US. In addition, the Soviets are undoubtedly eager to penetrate Latin America because of that regionʼs great strategic significance vis-a-vis the US. The major difficulty was that the Soviets had almost no entree to the area. The communist parties were small and weak and diplomatic relations were confined to a handful of the Latin American countries.

Developments in Cuba significantly changed this situation. The Castro regime provided the Soviets with a beachhead in Latin America, and a pro-Soviet, anti-US example which Moscow hoped other Latin American countries would emulate. The Soviets responded to developments in Cuba with approval and support.

However, the Castro regimeʼs claims to communist status raised problems for Moscow. The Soviets originally did not want a full-blown communist regime in Cuba. They wanted a regime with a nationalist facade, but tolerant of and amenable to local communist influence. They invented a special name for such a regime in their Marxist eschatology: “national democracy.” Moscowʼs hope was that this regime would be almost as amenable to Soviet influence as a purely communist one, while its nationalist facade would enhance its attractiveness to other Latin American countries. Soviet recognition of Castroʼs claim to communist affiliation meant modification of these plans and, more significantly, a deeper Soviet involvement with the highly volatile and impulsive Castro. Moscow nevertheless recognized Castroʼs claims to communist status, probably because a new communist regime is always welcome as a sign of the onward march of world communism, and partly from a feeling that there was little choice. The Soviet leaders now refer to Castro as “Comrade.” The Soviet commitment to sustain him has deepened accordingly.

A further Soviet objective in Cuba is the development of an economically and politically viable internal system that will provide an example of militant, dynamic progress for other Latin American countries. Although the Soviet Union has made a sizeable contribution to keeping the Castro regime afloat economically, until quite recently it has been conspicuously niggardly about providing economic development assistance that would turn the Castro regime into the attractive example we think the Soviets want it to be. This is probably due to a variety of reasons, which include traditional Soviet caution about expending resources abroad, Cubaʼs deteriorating economic situation, and Soviet-Cuban disagreement over what to do about it.

On the latter point, there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the departure from Cuba last spring of Soviet Ambassador S. Kudryav-tsev was directly connected with, and probably a result of, Soviet-Cuban disagreements over management of the Cuban economy. Reliable reports indicate that Soviet-Cuban frictions also arose as a result of Cuban resentment at Moscowʼs effort to dictate policies, and Soviet resentment of Cuban assistance demands which Moscow thought exorbitant.

However, developments since the Spring of this year suggest that Soviet-Cuban agreement has been reached on Moscowʼs role in Cuba, and that the USSR is implementing policies designed to ensure the security and domestic development of its Latin American beachhead.

On May 14, after one-and-a-half monthʼs negotiations in Moscow, a Soviet-Cuban supplementary trade protocol for 1962 was signed which provided for increased Soviet economic deliveries, including consumer goods, to Cuba. In early June a Soviet delegation headed by Uzbek Party leader Rashidov made an on-the-spot investigation of the Cuban economic situation which may have cleared away Soviet-Cuban disagreements over Cuban domestic problems and indicated an enhanced Soviet role in Cuban developments. Finally, Raul Castro during his visit to Moscow the first half of July also was reported to have taken up economic-military assistance with the Soviets, although the visit could hardly have planned the increased Soviet military-economic shipments to Cuba that took place shortly thereafter in late July and August. Cuban leader Che Guevara is presently in Moscow, reportedly to discuss Soviet construction in Cuba of a steel mill with an annual capacity of 1.3 million tons, which would give Cuba the largest steel producing capacity of any Latin American country.

There are very definite limits to any Soviet effort to build up Cuba as a “showcase” for other Latin American countries. To build Cuba into a truly prosperous country with a high standard of living would contrast it starkly with most countries of the communist bloc, including the Soviet Union itself. Furthermore, the communist system appears to have built-in obstacles of a political and economic nature to the establishment of a society with widespread prosperity. Within these limitations, however, the Soviet Union may hope to contribute to an economic progress and viability in Cuba that will serve to impress visitors from less fortunate Latin American areas.

In summary, we believe the current heavy Soviet shipments of military and economic material to Cuba are basically the culmination of a logical sequence of developments which took place within the framework of Soviet outlook and policy toward Cuba and Latin America, specific Cuban developments, and growing Soviet-Cuban interdependence despite friction between the two countries.

Secondary Objectives

Apart from the specific objective of strengthening the Cuban regime, Moscow undoubtedly looks for more general benefits from its activities.

Discredit Monroe Doctrine. One of the collateral purposes of Soviet penetration in Cuba, and particularly the military build-up even though the latter is not publicly acknowledged, has been to discredit the Monroe Doctrine and to assert Moscowʼs right to intervene anywhere on the globe where it feels Soviet interests are involved, including Latin America. The Soviets have taken direct issue with US reassertion of the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine with specific relation to Cuban developments. For example, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko issued a statement on August 30, 1960, in answer to Secretary Herterʼs August 25, 1960, speech to the OAS ConferenceFor text of Secretary Herterʼs speech at the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, at San Jose, Costa Rica on August 24, 1960, see Department of State Bulletin, September 12, 1960, pp. 395-400. which referred to the “rotten corpse of the Monroe Doctrine” and contested the allegedly claimed US right to do what it wants in Latin America “while others have no right to fulfill their direct duty as members of the United Nations with regard to the Western Hemisphere, even if events are taking place there which touch upon the interests of insuring peace over the whole of our planet.” To the extent that Moscow establishes a recognized presence, particularly of a military nature, in Cuba, the effectiveness and validity of the Monroe Doctrine appears called in question.

Establishment of Military Installations under Purely Soviet Control. Cubaʼs strategic location and its proximity to the US have undoubtedly led the Soviets to consider the desirability of setting up various kinds of military installations there. In weighing the pros and cons, the chief disadvantage of a major, identifiable Soviet installation is its ultimate vulnerability to US attack and Soviet inability to reinforce or otherwise support such an installation rapidly.

The advantages of a Soviet-manned base or other form of overt military presence would be that it (1) would in their view thoroughly discredit the Monroe Doctrine, and put into serious question US resolve, prestige and capabilities in the eyes of the Latin Americans and the world generally, and (2) would be useful in efforts to intimidate adjacent countries including, conceivably, the US. In this latter connection Moscow might seek to use its military presence in Cuba as a bargaining counter for liquidating the US military presence in countries around the Soviet periphery—a long sought Soviet objective.

Weighing the risks and advantages of a military presence, Moscow is probably now prepared, in addition to training activities and installing military facilities for the Cubans, to install covertly various kinds of Soviet-manned intelligence collection facilities and defensive installations (such as anti-aircraft artillery and missiles and coastal defense systems). Moscow would feel that such installations, which might eventually be turned over to the Cubans, could be plausibly justified in any case because of alleged aggressive US plans and would be difficult for the US to attack without provocation.

More risky, and politically less justifiable, would be demonstrably offensive installations, such as bomber bases or pads for missiles capable of reaching adjacent countries. We believe that the Soviets would rule out this type of military presence for the foreseeable future.

In sum, we think there is some possibility that intelligence and defensive installations may be set up at least temporarily under purely Soviet control, while offensive installations would not be likely, certainly for a considerable time.

It should be noted in this connection that presently available information makes it extremely difficult to assess Soviet intentions in this field and that a harder estimate must await more clearcut evidence.

USSR in Cuba vs. US in Turkey. The Soviets are also attempting to derive propaganda advantage by comparing their “peaceful” presence in Cuba with US military bases on the Soviet periphery. In his September 1961 interview with New York Times correspondent Sulzberger, Khru-shchev compared the US-backed invasion of Cuba the previous April with a Soviet right to intervene in Turkey or Greece, whose regimes are allied with the US and “unfriendly” toward the Soviet Union. This theme has reappeared in Soviet propaganda in connection with the current Cuban invasion scare. It is not likely that the Soviets hope, or would be willing, to trade their presence in Cuba for US withdrawal from areas on the Soviet periphery; but they obviously hope to make propaganda mileage out of the situation.

Relationship to Berlin. The mounting Soviet involvement in Cuba has no doubt served in the Soviet view to underscore the change in the world “correlation of forces” which, the Soviets argue, makes an end of the “abnormal” situation in Berlin overdue. In this general sense there is a relationship between Soviet conduct and objectives in this hemisphere (and, indeed, throughout the world) and in Berlin. Moreover, the Soviets presumably feel that to the extent that tensions and anxieties are stimulated over Cuba (up to a point, at least), pressures for new efforts at conciliation, including over the Berlin issue, will be generated in the West.

In view of the relatively long lead time involved in planning the current Soviet deliveries to Cuba, it is extremely unlikely that there could have been a close synchronization of Soviet moves in Cuba and Berlin. Nonetheless, even though fortuitous, the coincidence of recent events in Berlin and Cuba is almost certainly judged by the Soviets to be advantageous as long as present levels of tension are not greatly exceeded. Moscow probably does recognize that at some point a brazen challenge of Western interests and prestige will lead to a reaction which could start a chain of events involving uncontrollable, or hard-to-control risks.

As already indicated, the Soviets view their advances in Cuba and their efforts to make advances in Berlin as the logical concomitant of fundamental forces at work in the world. They probably believe that barring a rash act (either by the US or by Castro) the Soviet position in Cuba and the stability of the regime there is bound to gain in strength. Likewise, the Soviets appear to be confident that over time the Western position in Berlin will inevitably undergo diminution. Based on these expectations it would appear to be unlikely that Moscow would consider offering some sort of quid-pro-quo gambit whereby the USSR would halt or drastically curtail its role in Cuba in exchange for a Western withdrawal from Berlin. This is not to say that if some arrangement deemed advantageous by the USSR were worked out in Berlin, Moscow might not be willing, tacitly, to dampen down its more brazen involvement in Cuba. Indeed, Moscow might calculate that politically it would be feasible for the US to accept a new Berlin arrangement only under conditions of relative communist quiescence elsewhere in the world where Western interests are directly involved. But Soviet restraint based on such calculations would be likely to be transitory and in Cuba, at any rate, the momentum of Soviet involvement could be expected to be resumed in short order.

III. The Cuban Role

Motivations and Intentions

The increased Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba is undoubtedly being received with relief and satisfaction by the regimeʼs leaders who in recent months have made little effort to hide Cubaʼs increasing economic, administrative and political problems. Cubaʼs sugar crop, still the mainstay of the Cuban economy, dropped drastically in 1962. With respect to other agricultural products Cuba has clearly not achieved the much needed expansion called for under the regimeʼs plans. Meanwhile, in the industrial sector the deterioration of plants, equipment shortages, poor quality of raw materials, and gross mismanagement continued. Because of the US embargo and the shortage of foreign exchange, the Cubans have not been able to find adequate sources for the machinery and parts formerly imported from the US. The selection of management personnel chiefly on the basis of political reliability rather than technical qualifications continued to be the rule.

The leaders calculated that they needed expanded Soviet assistance both in a material and psychological sense to revive the economy, to overawe internal opposition, discourage any external invasion, stiffen the backs of supporters in and out of the armed forces, and restore Cubaʼs waning prestige in the Hemisphere. The prospect of sizeable numbers of Soviet military technicians and more sophisticated armament was probably welcomed as a demonstration of Soviet involvement, a possible deterrent to an invasion, a potential forerunner of an all-purpose Soviet defense commitment, and an addition to the fighting capability of the Cuban forces. There is little reason to doubt that Castroʼs intentions are to arm in such a way as to (in Castroʼs own words) “be in a position to repulse any imperialistic attack.”

The Castro armed forces are primarily organized around missions of internal security and external defense, although it is doubtful that the regime draws much of a distinction between the two requirements. The internal oppositionists draw encouragement—when not material aid—from the fact of US power near at hand. Similarly, the likelihood of that powerʼs being used is affected by the degree of internal unrest in Cuba. Finally, coastal incursions by Cuban exiles pose a challenge to both external defense and internal security forces.

It has always been difficult to discern how much of the regimeʼs invasion talk stems from serious fears of attack and how much is a cynical tool for whipping up nationalistic fervor. It is likely that regime leaders themselves have reached the point where they cannot separate out their own motives. As Caribbeans, the Cubans have undoubtedly feared retaliation from the United States for their behavior since 1959. At the same time, they have acknowledged privately that invasion scares are most useful in maintaining support for the revolution. Scare talk also sets the stage for popular acceptance of greatly expanded numbers of Soviet military personnel.

In considering a new military buildup with the Soviets, Cuban leaders must have been aware of the adverse reaction it would cause in some sectors of Latin American opinion and perhaps in the OAS itself. However, when confronted with similar decisions in the past, the regime has opted for closer involvement with the bloc, preferring the course which would offer tangible support for its security and enhance its reputation for dynamism and defiance. It is probable that Castro, despite his independent nature and pride in Cubaʼs “unique revolution” has had little trouble concluding that the increased Soviet assistance will serve to strengthen his position and control of the situation.

In dealing with the bloc for arms since 1960 the Cubans have probably displayed almost open-ended desires. While financial considerations were probably important in the earliest deals (financial details on bloc arms remain a mystery but under current circumstances almost certainly are credit or grant), it was probably Soviet, rather than Cuban, desires which determined the final composition of military assistance to Cuba. It is probable that in the latest round of negotiations, in late spring or early summer, the Cubans again expressed an open-ended desire for hardware and tried to push the Soviets into a firm commitment to come to their defense in all contingencies.

The regimeʼs leaders are expected to say little about the Soviet military contribution in public pronouncements. This behavior will probably stem not so much from the fear of provoking the United States as from a desire to emphasize for the internal public the Cuban-ness of the military effort. Effusive praise for bloc economic aid by regime spokesmen has always contrasted sharply with near silence on bloc military aid, although the latter has in fact been more prompt and extensive.

Because of a sensitivity to acknowledging dependence on the Soviets for the actual territorial defense of Cuba, the regime has probably not desired the establishment of full-fledged Soviet military base on Cuban soil. In future, if the leaders believe their security again in imminent danger, they could come to welcome such a base, although they would still prefer a promise of thermonuclear retaliation. In the meantime, their attitude will not preclude acceptance of specialized Soviet units in such fields as intelligence and communications, nor will it limit their desire for growing numbers of Soviet technicians and advisors.

Possible Moves Against Guantanamo. It continues to be unlikely that the Castro regime, fearing US retaliation, will make any direct military move against the Guantanamo Base. However, they may well adopt a more belligerent posture toward the United States presence there. Since the beginning of July the Cuban press and other propaganda media have been giving new and extensive coverage to government allegations (over 150) of US air and sea incursions into Cuban territory and to alleged provocations by the US naval base at Guantanamo. The harassment of marine sentries at the base has increased in the same period.

405. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 181, Cuba (B). Top Secret; Sensitive. A covering note from Kaysen to Clifton reads: “The attached is a partial response to some questions the President asked Gilpatric, Shepard and me before leaving yesterday.” Kaysen added a handwritten postscript indicating he was also attaching a copy of CINCLANT telegram 10152Z to JCS, September 1, which confirmed that CINCLANTFLT had issued instructions to conform with the new rules of engagement. (Ibid.) Washington, September 1, 1962.

Mr. President:

1. Attached is a memorandum on Rules of Engagement for Aircraft in the area of Cuba. It comes from the Joint Staff via Max Taylorʼs office. 2. The other review you asked for of all our reconnaissance operations in the neighborhood of Cuba is proceeding. Ros Gilpatric will see that we donʼt do anything this weekend that might lead to another incident. The whole schedule will be available to you for review on Tuesday.September 4. The salient facts are these. All the aircraft we run on regular reconnaissance missions are unarmed. The nature of their equipment and the kind of aircraft involved makes it useless to arm them. However, they are all carefully watched by radar. Fighters are on the alert at Key West and Guantanamo ready to be scrambled if there is any indication of hostile fighter action against the reconnaissance planes. All the flights are well without the range of antiaircraft capability. One mission is possibly within the range of Cuban based missiles. This is now operating at the margin of its capability. If it is moved further out, the mission, an electronic intelligence one, might as well be abandoned. The next flights are scheduled on September 4th. They have both been carefully reviewed and neither of them presents any hazard. 3. In addition to these flights, which are directed by the Joint Chiefs, there are the routine patrol missions run by commands subordinate to CINCLANT. The flight that was shot at ThursdayAugust 30. was one of those. From everything we have been able to find out the pilot behaved properly and according to his orders. A low level reconnaissance of shipping is a routine part of antisubmarine operations, and does not contravene accepted international law. We have been looking over Russian trawlers in this way for some time without any shooting incidents. We are now in process of examining the orders under which such flights operate in considering the extent to which they are useful and should be run in similar aircraft. Carl Attachment

Memorandum for President Kennedy

SUBJECT Rules of Engagement

In General Taylorʼs absence and at Mr. Bundyʼs request, I am forwarding a paper on Rules of Engagement, particularly in the vicinity of Cuba, which has been furnished to us by the Joint Staff.Not found.

The paper, which is quite clear, can be summarized as follows: a. Reconnaissance or other flights near Cuba will be conducted in a non-provocative manner, which is interpreted as generally flying parallel to the coast. In the event that it is necessary to close in on a ship or aircraft to effect identification, this will be done carefully. Such ships or aircraft will not be harassed. b. In the event that one of our craft is harassed or attacked, unarmed U.S. craft will take evasive action. Armed craft may counter attack if they have actually been fired upon. c. Hot pursuit into Cuban air space is authorized, but it may not be prolonged. (This is clearly authorized by international law.) However, commanders will not organize a pursuing force. d. In the event of harassment by Cuban aircraft, U.S. armed craft will attempt to shoulder them off and shepherd them back into Cuban air space or waters.

These Rules of Engagement, which were extracted from an NSC paper,The reference is unclear. seem to be quite carefully balanced while still reserving the fundamental right of self-defense.

Julian J. EwellColonel, USAExecutive Assistant to the Military Representative of the President

406. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Security, 1962. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, September 3, 1962.

At your request, I have reviewed the Cuban position over the week end. Herewith my reflections. You will understand, of course, that I have not been following the matter closely over recent months.

WR Attachment

Situation and Problem.

On the basis of existing intelligence the Soviet military deliveries to Cuba do not constitute a substantial threat to U.S. security. They do constitute a deterrent to certain types of surveillance and a means for improving certain types of Soviet intelligence. They also constitute evidence that Moscow, having been frustrated in certain directions, is in a mood to double its bet rather than cut its losses, at least on a selective basis. In this case, Moscow has moved strongly but defensively to meet Castroʼs anxieties about overflights and other intrusions, and to shore up his flagrantly weak economy.

These deliveries constitute, further: 1. A psychological move of some power in the Caribbean (where the fear of Cuba is authentic) and in the rest of Latin America (where the move could be regarded as the extension of a challenge to U.S. military hegemony in the Hemisphere). 2. A psychological move likely to heighten U.S. domestic anxiety with respect to Cuba. 3. A testing thrust by Moscow, which, at considerable financial cost and further commitment of prestige, places before us the question of where and how we should draw the line with respect to unacceptable action and behavior by the Communists in Cuba and the Hemisphere.

We face, therefore, a problem of both formulating a reaction and articulating it in ways designed to: diminish the political costs under 1 and 2, above; minimize the likelihood of any further extension of Cuban capabilities or Soviet capabilities emplaced in Cuba; and provide the legal and policy basis, under certain contingent circumstances, for the liquidation of communism in Cuba by force.

The following memorandum outlines the possible elements of both policy and exposition designed to meet the circumstances.

Policy.

A. Drawing the line. The ambiguities in the public mind, here and abroad, about the military meaning of the Soviet deliveries require not merely that we explain what they are and why—up to a point—we are prepared to regard them as acceptable, but that we also clarify the kinds of installations and capabilities emplaced in Cuba which we would regard as unacceptable. The President must consider going beyond his statement of April 20, 1961: “I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our Nation!”Reference is to the speech President Kennedy made concerning Cuba to the American Society of Newspaper Editors. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 304-306. These deliveries, rightly or wrongly, raise the question in the public mind of the security of the Nation; and it may, therefore, be appropriate to indicate what we would not be prepared to accept without direct military riposte. In general, that line should be drawn at the installation in Cuba or in Cuban waters of nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles, sea or land based. There may be other types of aggressive instruments that we would wish to include in this definition. In addition, this may be an appropriate occasion to underline our willingness to act with others in the Hemisphere against Cuba should Castro undertake direct or indirect aggression against other Latin American nations. B.

Legal basis for the line. If we are to put ourselves in a position at home and abroad to back this line effectively with the full weight of U.S. force and commitment, the line should be carefully grounded in law. Although the Monroe Doctrine is emotionally acceptable to most Americans as a legal basis for U.S. military action, it is not acceptable to our allies, either in the Hemisphere or abroad. On the other hand, various Hemispheric documents recognize the special status in this Hemisphere of “extra-continental” intervention (including the Rio Treaty of 1947); and Resolution II of the Punta del Este conference of January 1962 includes as paragraph 3 the following: “To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this Hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.”

I am not an expert on Latin American law and agreement; but I believe it is possible and essential for us to establish our position in terms of our interpretation of those commitments. Having had a direct hand in drafting and negotiating the paragraph quoted above, I can attest that it was designed to provide two types of flexibility: with respect to various types of aggressive threats from Havana; and with respect to various possible groupings of Latin American states which might be prepared, under varying circumstances, to operate with us.

The Communist position will, undoubtedly, be that we have established on the Eurasian land mass military installations proximate to their borders, including nuclear delivery capabilities. Our reply must be and can be that by regional security action, provided for under the Charter of the United Nations, this Hemisphere operates under a different set of rules than the Eurasian land mass. In this context it should be noted that we would be playing directly into Moscowʼs hands to use the occasion of pressure on us in Cuba to withdraw Thors from Turkey. There is no clear stopping place for Communist activities based in Cuba unless we hold fast to the special status in Hemispheric law and agreement of “extra-continental” intervention.

C. Heightening deterrence to indirect aggression. In association with those Latin American states willing to work with us on a bilateral or other basis, we should examine much more intensively than we have thus far the exact nature of the subversive activities operating out of Havana into Latin America. I understand that these are probably now at a relatively low level, involving the training and infiltration of agents; the passage of funds; and various forms of propaganda. We should heighten our efforts to interfere with these activities for two reasons: to strengthen the sense of confidence of the Caribbean countries; and to try to surface some firm evidence of this activity so that we have, in legal reserve, the right to invoke the collective security provisions of the Punta del Este conference of 1962. We need to prepare a “Jorden Report”Reference is to a two-part report entitled “A Threat to the Peace: North Viet-Namʼs Effort To Conquer South Viet-Nam,” which was issued by the Department of State on December 8, 1961. The report was based upon a fact-finding trip to Vietnam undertaken by William J. Jorden, a member of the Departmentʼs Policy Planning Council, and it was referred to informally within the government as the Jorden Report. on the Communist operation in Latin America. I am fully conscious of the difficulties of accumulating hard evidence. But I am not convinced a determined and professional effort has been made. D. Increased economic pressure. These new Soviet deliveries give us the occasion to increase somewhat the economic pressure on Cuba and the cost to the Communist bloc of maintaining Cuba by diminishing Cuban trade with the Free World. That trade is not large and is not, at its present level, a major strategic variable in the fate of Cuba. We should not, therefore, expend an excessive amount of diplomatic capital trying to reduce it drastically. On the other hand, it is essential that our allies understand that we take seriously this new Soviet commitment to Cuba; that we are committing ourselves to the drawing of a line; and that they would be well advised to contract their trade with Cuba. This should be a quiet, determined, sustained campaign, not a one-shot effort at the level of the North Atlantic Council. Our NATO allies must come to understand that we are not prepared to accept symmetry between the Allied position on the Eurasian land mass and the Communist presence in this Hemisphere; and that a condition for understanding with Washington is their recognition of the seriousness of this matter to us. E. Communications with Moscow. In addition to explaining diplomatically to the Soviet Union the character and seriousness of the line we have drawn, we might consider suggesting that, given our world responsibilities, stretching from Berlin to Viet Nam, we would have to consider whether we were prepared to accept the continued existence of a Communist state in Cuba should Communist initiatives elsewhere lead to a heightening of tension. If they argue they are only doing in Cuba what we do in Turkey, West Germany, etc., we must underline very hard with them these two points: first, the security arrangements of the Hemisphere have a long history which, by common agreement, places the intrusion of extra-continental military power outside the law; second, the crises in the world—for example, in West Berlin and in South Viet Nam—derive from Communist expansionist initiatives, beyond the legal limits of Communist power. We are now bearing a unique responsibility for meeting those aggressive thrusts throughout the Free World; and we have the right and duty to calculate whether we are prepared to accept the Cuban annoyance on our flank, if their aggressive ventures continue or expand, in Berlin, Viet Nam, or elsewhere. F.

Collective action: Hemispheric or Caribbean? We should consider carefully whether we shall wish to organize in the next several months either a Hemispheric or Caribbean meeting (or both) to consider collectively the problem posed by the present situation in Cuba. We do not wish to have a Hemispheric meeting which results in extended conflict and debate between those who are worried and those who are not particularly worried about the Cuban threat. On a Hemispheric basis it may emerge, however, that the line proposed here would be accepted; that is, the development of an offensive Communist capability in the Hemisphere would be judged unacceptable. In that case the area of security understanding in the Hemisphere would have been clarified and the bases for possible subsequent action would be strengthened. If we should find that no useful Hemispheric meeting can be held—or, perhaps, in any case—it may well be helpful for us to meet with the Caribbean nations who share our interest and anxiety, as a sub-regional grouping of the OAS. The language of Article 3 of Resolution II of the Punta del Este conference of January 1962, quoted above (paragraph B), provides a flexibility which might permit within the OAS a meeting of interested members. This involves certain risks of splitting the OAS; but these might be mitigated if such a meeting reported its findings to the Council. In any case, the heightened situation in Cuba dramatizes further the split between the Caribbean nations and the rest. A great deal of OAS maneuvering has been designed to limit the possibility of unilateral U.S. intervention in other Latin American countries. We must make clear that, while we are prepared to accept that inhibition, we are a Caribbean as well as a Hemisphere nation; there are others who share our anxiety about the Cuban situation; and we cannot permit the less interested members of the OAS preventing the more interested nations from protecting their vital interests centered in the Caribbean.

In facing this issue we should be conscious of the following possibility: the whole Hemisphere may agree with the line we draw with respect to offensive and defensive arms in Cuba; only the Caribbean nations (plus a few others) may be willing to act with respect to indirect aggression or cooperate with us in covert operations against Cuba. This distinction could pull the Hemisphere apart; or, with skillful diplomacy, it might be turned to our advantage.

Covert action. As I understand it, our position with respect to covert action against Cuba is determined by three situations. 1. We command a limited, U.S.-dominated, professional covert capability against Cuba. It promises, at most, certain acts of sabotage, annoyance, propaganda, etc. These have a small—but very small—chance of triggering a larger political result favorable to our interests. They do not promise a broadly-based political movement capable of challenging the Castro regimeʼs control system. 2. The Castro control system is massive—not as efficient as that operating in Eastern Europe, but a quite different, more substantial, and more effective affair than any hitherto seen in Latin America. 3. Castroʼs popular support has diminished to the point where it embraces perhaps 20% of the population, mainly those directly involved in his apparatus; there is sporadic, scattered, and ill-organized resistance within Cuba; there is a will among a reasonable proportion of the Cuban refugees to involve themselves more deeply in serious efforts to liberate their country, but they have real reservations about recruitment, in effect, into our clandestine service for the type of action under 1, above.

I believe we should consider the possibility of a Two-Track covert operation.

Track One would consist of a heightened effort to move along the present Mongoose lines. The minimum objective here would be harassment: the maximum objective would be the triggering of a situation where there might be conflict at the top of the Cuban regime leading, hopefully, to its change or overthrow by some group within Cuba commanding arms.

Track Two would consist of an effort to engage Cubans more deeply, both within Cuba and abroad, in efforts for their own liberation. This requires an operation with the following characteristics: a. Authentic Cuban leadership with a considerable range of freedom to implement ideas and to assume risk. b. Minimal U.S. direct participation: ideally, one truly wise U.S. adviser—available, but laying back; equipped to provide finance, but not monitoring every move; capable of earning their respect rather than commanding it by his control over money or equipment. c. Basing outside the United States. d. A link-up with the scattered and sporadic groups and operations now going forward of their own momentum in Cuba. e. A plan of operation which aims at the overthrow of Castro primarily from within rather than by invasion from without. f. A long enough time horizon to build the operation carefully and soundly.

In suggesting that Tract Two be studied—and sharply distinguished from Track One—I am, of course, wholly conscious of our failure of last year. But, as I read that failure in retrospect, its root lay in: U.S. bureaucratic domination; the lack of a Cuban political and organizational base; and a plan of operation that hinged on a type of overt invasion by a fixed date rather than the patient build-up of a true movement of national liberation. Iʼm sure it would be easy to argue that such a movement could not be generated against a Communist control system; that the Cuban refugees lack the capacity to play their part in such an enterprise with skill and minimal security; etc. And I am in no position to reply with confidence to such argument. On the other hand, Cuba is not located in Eastern Europe; and, presumably, some Cubans have learned something from last yearʼs failure, too.

On balance, I am prepared to recommend that Track Two be sympathetically studied and that General Lansdale be asked to formulate a design for it.

Contingencies. Evidently the contingencies suggested for planning in NSAM 181Document 386. deserve urgent attention. Among the tactical possibilities not listed in that memorandum might be included, under circumstances of heightened tension (but short of justification for blockade, invasion, or counterforce air strike), the possibility of commando landings (with quick withdrawal) to destroy the Soviet installations. The political track and diplomatic track covering each contingency deserve attention equal to the military track. We may be required to apply U.S. force against Cuba in the following circumstances at least: the established presence of a Soviet nuclear capability; solid evidence of indirect aggression, mounted from Havana, against Latin America; heightened tension in Berlin or elsewhere; attack on Guantanamo; the climactic phase of a degenerative political situation in Cuba, emerging from the dynamics of Cuban politics. Each requires a different legal, diplomatic, and political rationale.

These should now be prepared and the contingent military operations should be related, in each case, to the relevant rationale.

I. Policy conclusions. To sum up, I propose that you consider that we: —expose the reasons why the recent shipments do not constitute a threat to national security sufficient to justify our destroying communism in Cuba with our own arms; —draw the line on the basis of Hemispheric agreements on which we would go to war; —use the occasion to underline the illegitimacy of indirect aggression in the Hemisphere, on the basis of Hemispheric agreements, and heighten our efforts to develop hard evidence which might be the basis for later collective action against Cuba on such grounds; —use the occasion to move our NATO allies towards a deeper understanding of our concern and gradually press them towards a reduction of their trade with Cuba; —communicate to Moscow the possible unacceptability of communism in Cuba under protracted or increased tension initiated by Communist thrusts into the Free World; —consider whether Hemispheric, Caribbean, or two-level collaboration is feasible or desirable in reinforcing our position; —press forward with Mongoose, but consider Track Two; —prepare and relate intimately military and political contingency plans for the full spectrum of possible occasions when the direct application of U.S. force may be appropriate. J. Articulation. 1. The public articulation of our reaction—if policy should assume something like the form suggested here—might well involve two major statements: one by the President; the other, a substantial speech by Secretary Rusk. Since we do not propose to bring U.S. force to bear now, it would be inappropriate for the President to go to the country with a major address. But, since we may wish to draw a line, with rather complex contingent consequences, underlining its relation to Hemispheric agreements, a more spacious exposition by the Secretary of State may well be appropriate. 2. What follows is an outline for a speech by Mr. Rusk. Some of its major themes might constitute also the substance of a prior statement by the President at, say, a Press conference. 3.

Outline of speech by the Secretary of State.

Note: The general tone of the speech should be low key, factual, somewhat legalistic, confident, with its warning to Moscow and Havana and its seriousness for our allies and our own people unmistakable. a. Recall Castro history and takeover as part of 1957-61 Communist offensive embracing Southeast Asia, Berlin, Congo, as well as Cuba. Describe what has happened to that offensive. b. Describe degeneration of Cuba and relate to degeneration in East Germany, China, etc. c. Describe Soviet moves in some detail, emphasizing their character as a shoring up operation on the economic side. Comment on bleak prospects for Cuban agriculture under collectivization. d. On military side, emphasize the defensive character of new installations and equipment. Recall Presidentʼs April 20, 1961 reservation with respect to national security; and characterize new installations as not now constituting a threat to national security. Reference Indonesia, Iraq, U.S. ability to cope should a crisis come. e. Draw the line, with extensive references to mutual commitments in the Hemisphere going back at least to 1947. f. Recall Castroʼs earlier activities against Caribbean nations; recall Punta del Este Resolutions; issue sharper warning than ever before on indirect aggression, perhaps in context of Castroʼs December 2, 1961 references to guerrilla warfare being “the match thrown into the haystack.” Describe our efforts with Latin American states to deter and deal with such efforts. g. Reaffirm our intent to hold the frontiers of freedom on a world basis, from Berlin to Viet Nam, adding, perhaps: “We do not intend to permit communism in Cuba to distract us or to interfere with us in the conduct of this mission.” h. Express confidence that Cubans, in old Latin American tradition, will find ways to rid themselves of this dictatorship. i. Close with references to Alliance for Progress; beginnings of serious movement forward (first DAC meeting on Colombia scheduled for second week in September); confidence that Latin America will carry through Alliance for Progress successfully; and assert that we shall not only contribute to Alliance for Progress but, if necessary, assure, by our combined action in the Hemisphere, backed by total U.S. capabilities, that communism shall not disrupt this decade of constructive effort.

407. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Intelligence (Cline) to Acting Director of Central Intelligence CarterSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files: Job 89-T01385R, Box 1, Cuba Crisis (cont.). Top Secret. Washington, September 3, 1962. SUBJECT Recent Soviet Military Activities in Cuba 1. U-2 photography of 29 August confirms extensive Soviet military deliveries to Cuba in recent weeks. Surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, guided missile boats, and additional land armaments were observed. 2. The photography shows eight SAM sites being set up. One probable assembly area has been identified and SAM equipment has been located at one additional site. A. The small amount of permanent construction at these sites and the speed of the work indicate the program is proceeding on a crash basis. B. Some of these sites could be operational within a week or two. C. A minimum of 125 technically trained personnel will be required to operate each site.a 1. This figure excludes security and support personnel. 2. No indications that Cubans are trained for SAMs. Soviet personnel doubtless will man the sites for at least the 9 to 12 months while Cubans are being trained. 3. Additional SAM sites probably will be set up in the near future. A. All sites now confirmed are in the Western one-third of the island. 1. The one area of SAM activity in Oriente province probably will be followed by several others in the vicinity. 2. Defector and clandestine reports from Las Villas province indicate that at least two sites will be located there, but no confirmation or definite locations thus far. B. The pattern now emerging suggests as many as 24 sites may eventually be set up—enough to blanket the entire island. 4. At least 8 Komar-class missile boats have been delivered to Cuba in recent weeks. A. These PT-like boats carry two missile launchers each, with the radar guided missile effective against surface targets to ranges of between 15 and 17 miles. The missile carries a 2,000 lb. HE warhead. B. Some Cuban naval personnel have received training in the USSR, but it is not known if this included Komar training. C. These boats are in addition to 13 or more torpedo boats and 6 submarine chasers delivered by the USSR earlier this year. 5. The photography shows that current deliveries to Cuba also contain land armaments, including tanks and possibly self-propelled guns. A. Reports indicate other shipments have contained artillery, tanks, and possibly combat aircraft, but these are not confirmed. B. The photography of 29 August turned up the highest number of MIG aircraft yet noted, some 37. 1. We believe Cubaʼs aircraft inventory includes approximately 60 MIG jet fighters, including at least a dozen MIG-19s. 2. No MIG-21s or any type of bomber have been noted. 6. Soviet shipments of military equipment and personnel to Cuba show no sign of letting up. A. About 16 Soviet dry-cargo ships are now en route to Cuba, of which at least 10 probably are carrying military equipment. 1. Total number of military or military-related shipments to Cuba since the current deliveries began in mid-July may be as high as 65. 2. Routine Soviet deliveries of economic aid and trade goods are being made largely on Western ships. B. At least 1,700 Soviet military technicians arrived in Cuba in late July and early August in connection with these military activities. 1. Most of these Soviets appear to be involved in setting up SAM facilities but thus far we cannot conclude that this is their only objective. C. At least 1,300 more Soviets are arriving unannounced this week; no reports on their activities so far. 1. Still additional bloc personnel probably have arrived on some of the cargo ships. Ray S. ClinePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

408. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defenseʼs Military Assistant (Brown) to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962 (McN Working Papers). Top Secret. A stamped note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw the memorandum. Washington, September 4, 1962. SUBJECT Facts and Estimates Concerning Cuba

Attached for your information is a memorandum for the record of Captain Haddenʼs conversation with Secretary Rusk concerning Cuba,The attached memorandum by Captain M.A. Hadden, USN, recorded a conversation on September 3 in which Hadden briefed Rusk, at Ruskʼs request, concerning the defenses of the Guantanamo base. Rusk indicated that it might be wise to consider the desirability of reinforcing and augmenting the Guantanamo defenses. (Ibid.) together with a fact sheet on the SSN-2 Soviet missile corrected in pencil to agree with the NIE, and a fact sheet on the Komar boat.Reference is to NIE 85-2-62, Document 363. The fact sheets cited have not been found.

I am informed that in Oriente Province there is estimated to be approximately 40,000 organized military troops including regular and militia. In the immediate Guantanamo area there are estimated to be 7 battalions at a strength of 300-1,000 men per battalion. The troop strength in the Guantanamo area has varied since January 1962 from “a few hundred” up to 5,000-6,000. There are estimated to be 30-50 tanks and artillery of all types. There is a prepared antitank defensive line north of the Base which is being extended south to the west of the Base. There are many prepared artillery positions in the hills and in the rain forest to the east, north and west of the Base.

The current U.S. strength at Guantanamo is: Enlisted Officer Marine 754 36 Naval Ships Complement 1627 152 MCB4 437 11 Total 2818 199 —3017

A paper on capability of U.S. destroyer against the Komar boatIn a memorandum to McNamara, also dated September 4, General Benjamin T. Harris outlined the capabilities of U.S. destroyers if confronted in combat by the missile-equipped Komar class patrol boat being supplied to Cuba by the Soviet Union. Harris noted that the information was being provided in response to questions posed by President Kennedy. Briefly, Harris concluded that World War II vintage destroyers might be at a disadvantage in such a confrontation, but that with post-World War II destroyers with missile capability, “the outcome would be in our favor.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962 (McN Working Papers)) should be in my hands by 5:30 this afternoon. I can give you the essentials of the paper briefly should you need them prior to that time.

GSB

409. Memorandum From the Department of Defense Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harris) to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, 22 Oct-27 Oct 1962. Top Secret; Special Handling; Noforn. Washington, September 4, 1962. SUBJECT Air Defense in Southeast US Area 1. Pursuant to oral instructions, the following represents a brief statement of the facilities and aircraft involved in the defense of the Southeastern US. 2. Prime radar installations exist at Naval Air Station, Key West (an Air Force installation operated on a full time basis and with a full crew; also used for training of Navy operators), and at Miami (FAA operated but with a full time military crew). These prime installations have a capability of about 160 NM against small targets, such as MIG type aircraft. Additionally, there is one picket ship station and one AEW aircraft station off the Southern Tip of Florida. These provide low and high intercept cover respectively. Three gap filler radar installations (unmanned automatic stations) are being installed in the Southern Florida area to provide additional low altitude coverage. These should be operational in October at which time the picket ship station will be removed. 3. Current aircraft devoted to the defense of the Southern Tip area include a detachment of eight F4D Navy fighters at Key West and four F-102 Air Force fighters at Homestead. These aircraft are in a continual alert status. 4. Backup defense-in-depth can be provided by Naval fighters in the Jacksonville area; the aircraft carrier(s) normally in the Mayport area; the F-101, F-102 and F-106 (a total of 59) Air Defense Command augmentation aircraft at Tyndal AFB, Florida; one F-102 ANG squadron at Jacksonville; one F-101 squadron at Charleston, S.C.; one F-102 squadron at Seymour Johnson AFB, N.C.; etc. 5. Additionally, CINCONAD has been authorized to request that CINCSTRIKE provide from his own resources a second AEW station and SAM units on a contingency basis. Air Force is currently studying means of aircraft augmentation for Southern Tip. Benjamin T. HarrisPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Brig General, USADOD/JCS RepresentativeCaribbean Survey Group

410. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 9/62. Top Secret; Special Handling; Noforn. A copy was sent to Parrott. Washington, September 4, 1962. SUBJECT Phase II, Operation Mongoose

Pursuant to our telephone conversation this afternoon, it would seem worthwhile to get the consensus of the Groupʼs views as to the type and timing of the actions in Phase II. The reaction of the Group to any or all of this can be worked on quickly by the operations team, in terms of additions or deletions.

In my opinion, the following numbered activitiesThe numbered activities cited by Lansdale relate to the proposed program of actions listed in Document 399. may pose possible policy questions: 20 (balloons), 23 (Swan Is.), 27 (sabotage), [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] 40 (COMINT), 48-49-50 (Cuban exiles, Carib. nations), 54 (post-Castro).

411. Editorial Note

On September 4, 1962, the White House released a statement by President Kennedy relating to the flow of weapons from the Soviet Union to Cuba. The President noted that the United States had evidence that this build-up included antiaircraft defense missiles with slant range of 25 miles, and motor torpedo boats equipped with ship-to-ship guided missiles. He indicated that some 3,500 Soviet technicians were thought to be in Cuba or en route to support the establishment and use of this equipment. He added, however, that there was no evidence of organized Soviet combat forces in Cuba, nor any evidence of military bases provided to the Soviet Union, nor the presence of weapons with an offensive capability, such as ground-to-ground missiles. “Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise.” The statement concluded:

“It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere. The United States, in conjunction with other hemisphere countries, will make sure that while increased Cuban armaments will be a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba themselves, they will be nothing more.” The statement was read to the White House press corps by Press Secretary Pierre Salinger. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 24, 1962, page 450.

412. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9-562. Confidential. Drafted by Allen and approved in the Secretaryʼs office on September 18. Washington, September 5, 1962, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Cuban Developments; Possible Informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers PARTICIPANTS List of participating Ambassadors is attached.Not printed. The list indicates that the Ambassadors from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela attended the meeting. Departmental Personnel: Dean Rusk, Secretary of State Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State (ARA) Ward P. Allen, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs John H. Crimmins, Office of Caribbean and Mexican Affairs (ARA) John W. Fisher, Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs (ARA) Harvey R. Wellman, Office of East Coast Affairs (ARA) Herbert B. Thompson, Office of West Coast Affairs (ARA)

Cuba

1. After expressing appreciation for the attendance of the Ambassadors on such short notice, the Secretary initiated a discussion of the Cuban problem by calling attention to the Presidentʼs statement of September 4,See Document 411. copies of which were before the Ambassadors. He elaborated on the factual information contained in the first three paragraphs, pointing out that on the basis of such verified information as we have so far been able to obtain, the USSR, based on decisions taken some time previously, have materially stepped up their shipment of defensive military hardware, including antiaircraft missiles and ship-to-ship missiles—both of quite limited range. Apparently it is planned to station the antiaircraft missiles at 10 sites known to us, eight of which are on the northeast coast, one near Habana, and one elsewhere. Much of the equipment, particularly the accompanying radar and electronic guidance mechanisms, is fairly sophisticated and, so far as present information indicates, the number of Russian technicians present or en route is not disproportionate to the number reasonably required to assist in installation and train Cubans in the handling of the equipment.

The Secretary called particular attention to the fourth paragraph of the Presidentʼs statement as containing a clear warning to the USSR as well as to Castro of the types of possible future action which the U.S. would not tolerate. The fifth paragraph of the statement was intended, said the Secretary, as a reminder, partly to the U.S. public, that the Cuban problem cannot be viewed in isolation, but rather within the framework of the cold war. The U.S. has more than a million men overseas helping to defend the free world security and in Berlin and elsewhere there is a major confrontation of forces with the USSR. In reaching any decisions on the Cuban situation, prudence, wisdom and necessity require that we take the larger picture into account. The last paragraph of the Presidentʼs statement is a renewed pledge of U.S. policy in preventing Castro from employing force against any other part of the hemisphere.

When, after raising the points discussed below, the Secretary invited comment on the foregoing, Ambassador Carrillo Flores, Mexico, asked for an estimate of Soviet intentions or reactions to the U.S. position. The Secretary replied that, although trying to guess Soviet thinking is always a hazardous exercise, it is our present impression that the USSR does not at present desire to develop Cuba as a Soviet base in this hemisphere. Under considerable pressure from Cuba and to serve their own purposes, they are stepping up their economic and military assistance; but they have so far been extremely careful to avoid making an unlimited security commitment to Castro. The Soviet position could, of course, change, but the present chances are that the USSR is not prepared to be as highly provocative as to take any of the steps indicated in paragraph four of the Presidentʼs statement.

Ambassador Campos (Brazil), characterizing the language of paragraph four as indicating the “maximum limits of tolerance”, inquired whether if the USSR should take any of those or similar steps, the U.S. plans for response envisage unilateral action or whether multilateral action would be expected and prior consultation with the other American Republics could be anticipated. The Secretary replied that in such matters the U.S. Government, as well as all other Governments, must necessarily start from the premise that its own elementary national security needs are basic; this is a responsibility which no government can abdicate. On the other hand, the U.S. regards its obligations under the Rio Treaty and other Inter-American instruments as also fundamental and to us hemisphere solidarity is highly important. We would, therefore, certainly expect to consult. Moreover, as the threat would be one to the hemisphere—to other countries of the hemisphere—we would hope for action on a hemisphere basis. However, he concluded, this does not mean that we would or could abandon the ultimate responsibility which each government has for its own national security.

2. Turning to the problem of Cuban activities in other hemisphere countries, the Secretary indicated that since the Punta del Este Meeting, the U.S., with the help of many of the governments represented here, has been seeking to perfect its information on this subject. So far, despite a number of reports and rumors, we do not have properly verified evidence that Cuba is engaged in any substantial smuggling of arms and ammunition into the other Republics. This may in part be due to the fact that this is not necessary. Rather, the principal Cuban effort is taking the form of introducing into the other American Republics considerable amounts of money, and quantities of propaganda together with a systematic campaign of training of students and youth from the other American Republics in Cuba (and through Cuba in the USSR) who are then returned to their own countries for subversive purposes. The U.S. is concerned about these forms of interference and is confident the other Republics are also. In our view we think it would be advisable for the SCCS to look into this matter and to consider what possible steps the various countries might take to interrupt this flow of travel.

Informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers

3. The Secretary then referred to the suggestion made by several Governments in the last few days that it is time for the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics to take a fresh look at the whole Cuban problem as it is developing. He also mentioned recent proposals by several governments that there be a Meeting of Foreign Ministers to consider the problem of governments coming into power as a result of coups dʼetat. In the light of these suggestions and in view of the fact that many Foreign Ministers are planning to attend the forthcoming session of the UNGA, the Secretary broached the idea that it might be desirable to hold a short, informal, closed meeting of himself and his colleagues in New York to discuss these two matters and, perhaps, other matters. For example, he stated he would take advantage of the occasion to discuss with his colleagues certain global matters, such as Berlin. He indicated we have in mind a consultation, perhaps following a lunch or dinner, in New York around the end of September or first of October, with no formal agenda, no voting and no resolutions. We would, however, hope to come out with a certain consensus of views on possible steps that might be taken on the problems discussed.

During later discussion of possible discussion topics, Assistant Secretary Martin (following the Secretaryʼs departure) indicated we think the Foreign Ministers might also want to discuss the matter of the postponed XI Inter-American Conference, scheduled for Quito, including the possibility of rationalizing and streamlining its overladen agenda. He also mentioned the question of the admission of new members to the OAS, provided our present considerations have progressed sufficiently to warrant it.

The Secretary suggested that in order to determine the most generally convenient date, it would be desirable to know how many Foreign Ministers are planning to attend the GA and the exact dates of their attendance. In response to a question, the Mexican Ambassador indicated the Mexican Foreign Minister is not planning to attend the GA and is scheduled to leave for a tour of the Far East with the President October 4th. Ambassador Arango (Panama) volunteered the view that it would be highly preferable to hold the meeting in Washington rather than New York. Ambassador Muller (Chile) on the other hand was inclined to favor New York as the site. The Secretary stressed that in suggesting New York, he had in mind only that it would be more convenient, and that no question of principle was involved. He sought to make clear that we are simply broaching the idea of a meeting in order to obtain the views of others; that his remarks should not be construed as an invitation and that he is anxious that the other Foreign Ministers not receive the impression from the press that todayʼs talk constitutes a decision to hold the meeting.

Cuban Internal Situation

4. When the Mexican Ambassador requested comments on the Cuban internal economic situation the Secretary requested Mr. Martin to discuss it. Mr. Martin in a brief survey of the state of Cuban economy, stated we understand their situation is serious but not desperate. Their crisis is due in part to the disruption of their natural markets and sources of supply, in part because of beaureaucratic inefficiency, in part because of their poor sugar crop. There is not much prospect of early improvement. On the other hand, there is so far no hard evidence that an economic breakdown is likely, nor does any serious rebellion against the regime appear in the offing because of the economic situation.

Note: At this point the Secretary excused himself to keep an appointment with the President and asked Mr. Martin to chair the meeting.

NATO Shipping

Ambassador Berckemeyer (Peru) pointed out that a large portion of the bloc shipments to Cuba are being carried on the ships of NATO countries. He wondered what the U.S. attitude is toward this problem. Mr. Martin responded that we are, of course, concerned and that we have from time to time been in touch with our NATO allies. There are, however, he pointed out, a number of practical factors which operate to limit what can be done. For example, most of the free world shipping used by the USSR is chartered to them under “bare boat charters”—i.e., the Soviet Union hires the ships for a fixed period of time, with no indication of their use and no way for the owners to restrict their use to certain ports or certain cargo. Secondly, shipping is, so to speak, a fungible item in that even if the free world charterers were to deny use of their ships in the Cuba trade, the USSR could shift these ships to other runs and use their own in sending goods to Cuba. In view of the present surplus of shipping, it is out of the question from a practical point of view to try to persuade other countries to deny all shipping to the USSR. Moreover, for some countries, this might not be possible under their constitutions in peacetime.

413. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 9/62. Secret. Washington, September 5, 1962. SUBJECT Cuba

I know very little about the present state of our Cuban policy. However, as an old Cuba hand, it seems to me that there are exceedingly dangerous potentialities in the existing situation—particularly when I read intelligence reports describing plans for an uprising inside Cuba in the next few weeks.Schlesinger did not specify which intelligence reports he had seen. President Kennedy responded to this memorandum with a note to Schlesinger on September 5 that reads: “I read your memorandum of September 5th on Cuba. I know of no planned ‘uprisings inside Cuba within the next few weeks.ʼ Would you send me the intelligence reports to which you refer. In any case, I will discuss the matter with the CIA.” (Ibid.)

It is bad enough for the Soviet Union to be moving into Cuba in force. But we can live with this for a time, especially as we begin to devise visible countermeasures. But, if an internal uprising of Cuban patriots should take place in the next few weeks against the Castro regime, then the United States will be confronted with the immediate choice of (a) going to its support, or (b) of not going to its support.

If such an internal uprising took place and we went to its support, we would find ourselves in a difficult war in which, so far as we can presently tell, the majority of Cubans (and very likely the majority of the nations of the world) would be against us. Cuba would become our Algeria.

If we did not go to its support, we would be charged with betraying our friends and letting them be slaughtered by a brutal dictatorship; our world prestige would suffer a terrific blow. Our failure to act in Cuba would be far worse than our failure to act in Hungary in 1956.

It need hardly be pointed out that the fall campaign vastly heightens the pressures and emotions surrounding the Cuban issue. Alternative (b) would be particularly hard to defend in a campaign atmosphere.

All this points to the absolute importance of making sure that there is no premature insurrection in Cuba. I would therefore hope that CIA be given the clearcut and definite responsibility to make sure that no such premature insurrection takes place. I think that the instruction should be issued in these terms, so that the top leadership of CIA will feel impelled to check the situation all the way down the line. One of the most shocking things which emerged after the last Cuban episode was the weakness of top-level CIA control—the discrepancy between what high CIA officials thought their operatives were saying and doing in the field, and what these operatives were actually saying and doing. It is indispensable to be sure that no one down the line is encouraging the Cubans into rash action. Such action would not only confront the government with an intolerable political choice but would expose and condemn brave Cubans, give Castro a pretext for drastic internal repression, and very likely set back the chances of successful action for months or years.

Arthur

414. Memorandum From the Assistant to the Presidentʼs Military Representative (Parrott) to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 9/62. Top Secret. Washington, September 6, 1962. SUBJECT Phase II, Operation Mongoose

It seems to me that General Lansdaleʼs paper of 31 August,Document 399. on the above subject, is responsive to the guidelines and subsequent comments. Lansdale has noted in his 4 September memo to you,Document 410. certain numbered activities which he considers might pose possible policy problems. There are 20, 23, 27, 32, 40, 48-50, and 54. I would tend to agree with Lansdale that all or most of these might pose some policy problems in their implementation. A possible exception would be the Swan Radio. On this, USIA at one time said that this Radio had been “discredited”; however, in later papersThe reference is unclear.USIA reversed this position.

I think there are other numbered activities, in addition to the above, which raise some policy problems. (This is not to say that they should not all be pursued.) These are: 19 (delivery of propaganda into Cuba), 39 (maintenance of PAA service), 55 and 56 (possible use of submarines or aircraft for caching and infiltration/exfiltration).

I would suggest a couple of additional activities: (a) under number 25, calling for the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Bloc arms in Latin American countries, this could be extended to include [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] propaganda materials and perhaps sabotage materials; (b) the possibility of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] incidents which could lead to the breaking of diplomatic relations by selected countries. (This, of course, would have to be carefully considered in the sense of weighing the intelligence advantages of continued diplomatic representation against the political/psychological gain from severance.)

Obviously our current diplomatic moves, kicked off by the Secretary of Stateʼs conference yesterday,See Document 412. will result in the political section of this operation being expanded somewhat.

TAP

415. Memorandum for the FilesSource: Kennedy Library, Papers of Theodore C. Sorensen, Classified Subject Files, 1961-64, Cuba, General, 1962. Drafted by Sorensen who sent copies to Bundy and Tyler. Washington, September 6, 1962. SUBJECT Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin—#2

In response to his repeated telephone requests, I saw Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at the Embassy today from 12:30 to 1:00 P.M. He told me that he had sent a report of our “informal conversation” on August 23Sorensen lunched with Dobrynin on August 23 at Dobryninʼs invitation. In a memorandum for the record concerning the lunch, which he prepared that day, Sorensen described the conversation with Dobrynin as “largely general,” representing more of a “get acquainted” session than a significant exchange of views. The issue of Cuba did not come up in the discussion, and Sorensen noted that Dobrynin did not discuss current U.S.-Soviet problems to any extent. Sorensen added, however, that the Soviet Ambassador indicated “agreement and understanding” when Sorensen made the point that President Kennedy “could not possibly lay himself open to Republican charges of appeasement in his response to any buildup in Berlin pressures between now and November 6.” (Ibid.) to Moscow and that (somewhat to his own surprise, I gathered) he had received a personal message from Chairman Khrushchev directing him to make known directly to me the following: 1. First, “nothing will be undertaken before the American Congressional elections that could complicate the international situation or aggravate the tension in the relations between our two countries. We shall follow this course, provided there are no actions taken on the other side which would change the situation. This includes a German peace settlement and West Berlin.” (The quotation is approximately, although not precisely, correct, inasmuch as the Ambassador urged me to take notes as he read from his own message.) 2. Chairman Khrushchev is definitely not coming to the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. “If the necessity arises for him to speak” this would be possible “only in the second half of November” and therefore not before the election. The Chairman does not wish to become involved in our internal political affairs.

I told the Ambassador that I appreciate his conveying the message to us; but that he should understand the Presidentʼs feeling that the recent Soviet actions in Cuba had already caused considerable political turmoil—that this was a far more difficult problem for the administration politically because of the frustration felt by many Americans over the Cuban situation—and that the Chairmanʼs message therefore seemed both hollow and tardy. (Dobrynin demurred at this point that he had tried to reach me with the message a week ago, before the Cuban issue became so hot.) The President, I said, had understood that the Chairman would not want to offer any grounds for attack to our political opponents—he regarded the Cuban action, therefore, as something of a deliberate and personal affront—and, given the current situation in Berlin and elsewhere, the President could hardly be expected to take a very accommodating attitude in the months ahead. (I also mentioned the Presidentʼs indignation over the nasty comment on the U-2 note, with which the President had taken special pains to demonstrate candor, good faith and conciliation. Dobrynin said that he had seen no report—that at most there had been only an editorial in a Soviet newspaper, and we all know how the press is—and that judgment should be reserved until there was an official reply.)

With respect to Cuba, Dobrynin said that he would report this conversation in full to the Chairman and that he was aware himself of the political and press excitement regarding this matter. He repeated several times, however, that they had done nothing new or extraordinary in Cuba—that the events causing all the excitement had been taking place somewhat gradually and quietly over a long period of time—and that he stood by his assurances that all of these steps were defensive in nature and did not represent any threat to the security of the United States. He neither contradicted nor confirmed my reference to large numbers of Soviet military personnel, electronic equipment and missile preparations.

[Here follows discussion on outer space.]

Theodore C. SorensenPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Special Counsel to the President

416. Editorial Note

During a visit to the Soviet Union to consult on matters relating to the development of natural resources, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall met with Premier Khrushchev on September 6, 1962, at Khrushchevʼs villa at Petsunda, Georgia. The conversation ranged over Udallʼs impressions of his visit and included an important discussion of the Berlin question, in which Khrushchev offered an assurance to President Kennedy that he would do nothing to precipitate a crisis over Berlin before the November Congressional elections in the United States. According to Udallʼs transcript the conversation also dealt in part with Cuba:

“U: The President is the commander of the military in our country, just as you are in the Soviet Union.

“K: It is true that irresponsible actions occasionally take place. Itʼs up to me to make the decision on going to war, but fools in airplanes do exist, I realize. Now as to Cuba—here is an area that could really lead to some unexpected consequences. I have been reading what some irresponsible Senators have been saying on this. A lot of people are making a big fuss because we are giving aid to Cuba. But you are giving aid to Japan. Just recently I was reading that you have placed atomic warheads on Japanese territory, and surely this is not something the Japanese need. So when Castro comes to us for aid, we give him what he needs for defense. He hasnʼt much modern military equipment, so he asked us to supply some. But only for defense. However, if you attack Cuba, that would create an entirely different situation. And it is unthinkable, of course, that a tiny nation like Cuba would ever attack the United States.

“U: The responsible people prevail in our country unless intolerable provocations occur.

“K: You have surrounded us with military bases. If you attack Cuba, then we will attack one of the countries next to us where you have placed your bases.

“U: The President has made his position on Cuba clear. A few people in Congress may call for an invasion, but the President makes the policy.

“K: These Congressmen do not see with their eyes, but with their asses. All they can see is whatʼs behind them. Yesterdayʼs events are not todayʼs realities. I remember Gorky recounting in his memoirs how he had a conversation with Tolstoy. Tolstoy asked him how he got along with women, and then ventured his own opinion. ‘Men are poorly designed. When theyʼre young, they can satisfy their sexual desires. But as they grow old, the ability to reap this satisfaction disappears. The desires, however, do not.ʼ So it is with your Congressmen. They do not have power, but they still have the same old desires.

“U: Nevertheless, most Congressmen are responsible. I used to be a Congressman myself. But there are only a few who are irresponsible.

“K: Iʼm speaking of the latter. America is no longer the strongest nation in the world. The President knows and understands this. Relations between countries must be built on political and economic realities. If your Congressmen want to attack Cuba, they are like Tolstoyʼs aging man. I have stated that we could support Cuba even from our own territory. So this shows that some of your Congressmen are stronger in their asses than their heads.

“U: The irresponsible people have a right to speak out but they do not control policy. For example, one of the noisiest Senators is Goldwater from my own state of Arizona. Heʼs a Republican, while Iʼm a Democrat. He doesnʼt understand modern times. But the President does, and he makes our policies on foreign relations.” (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163)

Udall summarized this conversation in telegram 616 from Moscow, September 7, printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume V.

417. Notes Prepared by Acting Director of Central Intelligence CarterSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop. No classification marking. Washington, September 6, 1962. 1. NSC Meeting, White House, at 1030. 2. Emphasized at Special Group Meeting continuing necessity for prompt notification of Group members in the event of untoward incidents. This followed Colonel Steakleyʼs briefing of the Group on what had occurred in the Sakhalin incident. (Special Group Minutes)Not found. 3. Informed President and Secretaries of State and Defense that more detailed readout of 29 August missionSee Document 395. led our analysts to suspect the presence of another kind of missile site—possible surface-to-surface—at Banes. Since no similar weapon had ever been identified in U-2 photography of the USSR, programs were set in motion to acquire characteristics and range of the missiles. (Lehman Report p. 10, Para. 21, and Calendar Sheet)Neither found.

White House put complete freeze on information but Bundy gave OK to put the analysts to work on providing information to the policy-makers on a need-to-know basis but without normal distribution.

418. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba 342.18 (31 Jan 1962). Secret. A stamped note on the source text indicates that McNamara saw the memorandum. An unsigned copy of this memorandum is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 9/62. Washington, September 7, 1962.

I would appreciate an up-to-date brief report on the number of Cubans who joined the U.S. armed forces as a result of our interest in this matter last year, and an idea of how many applied who were not acceptable.

I would also like your reaction and the reaction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the formation of a Cuban brigade in which we would enlist Cuban nationals for a period of six to nine months for training, with no guarantee, of course, that they would be returned to Cuba, but a promise that if the need arose, a Cuban brigade would be used. It is my understanding that to make a success of this brigade we would have to alter the present physical standards for Army service so that a greater number of Cubans who might want to participate could be included.

John F. Kennedy

419. Telegram From the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 760.551/9-762. Secret; Limited Distribution. Also sent to COMCARIBSEAFRON, CINCLANTFLT, CINCARIB, DIO FIFTEEN, JCS, DIA, NAVAIDE, and CIA. A copy of this telegram in the Kennedy Library is marked to indicate that it was sent to Bundy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 7/12/62-9/7/62) Washington, September 7, 1962, 1:07 p.m.

071807Z. COMNAVBASE GTMO has reported the following info: 1. A reliable source reports that Russian, Czech, Chinese and Po-lish troops have been disembarked at Mariel, Cabanas and Bahia Honda in Pinar del Rio province; Havana in Havana province; Matanzas in Matanzas province; and Casilda in Las Villas province. (B-3) 2. The foreign troops in Pinar del Rio province are reported quartered in Malas Aguas (near Santa Lucia), San Julian base on Mendoza road municipality of Guane, and in place known as the firing range of La Guatana on road to La Coloma. (B-3) 3. It is further reported that contingents of foreign soldiers have taken charge of all coastal artillery from Santa Fe to Esperanza and from San Galletano to Cabanas. The source estimates that several thousand troops are located in places mentioned in para. 2 & 3. (B-3) 4. A reliable source indicates that the troops that disembarked at Mariel arrived aboard bloc ships Ltgov, Sretensk, Levasagor, and Baltijsk. (B-3) 5. It is reported that bloc troops in Havana province are located at San Antonio de los Banos A/F, Torrens reformatory two and one half miles on the road to San Pedro from Havana, Managua Camp in Bejucal, and at an unlocated place on the road from Caimito del Guayabal to San Antonio de los Banos. Several thousand foreign troops are estimated in these areas. (B-3) 6. Although the present location of foreign troops disembarked at Port of Matanzas is unknown, it is reported that their arrival is common gossip, and a harbor pilot estimated several thousand were disembarked from two bloc ships. (B-3) 7. It is reported that eleven hundred foreign troops were disembarked through the Port of Casilda, but their present location is unknown. (B-3) 8. According to the source the information related para. 1 through 7 is in conjunction with the unloading of war material and equipment from the middle of July thru 11 Aug 1962. The equipment has generally accompanied the troops to the military base which they have been assigned. All the places that have been named are important military bases and camps and, invariably, upon the arrival of the foreign soldiers, the Cuban militia has abandoned the place leaving the establishment under the absolute control of the foreign soldiers. The visit of Raul Castro to the Soviet Union had the principal objective of obtaining help from the Soviet Government and because of that, it is reported that Soviets agreed to send a total of 15,000 Chinese and 15,000 Russians to Cuba. (B-3) 9. It is reported that the area southeast of Banes from Embarcado de Banes VU285135 to the coast at mouth of Bahia de Banes has been evac-uated of all Cuban families, and construction of a naval base has begun. This area is south of missile site reported under construction. One Kron-stadt class PC and two PT boats were reported now operating in this general area. (B-3) 10. Reliable source reports that a Soviet ship arrived in Santiago de Cuba on 29 Aug with cargo and passengers. Upon arrival, orders were given for all Cuban personnel to leave the dock area. Two railroad cars were brought on the pier to take undetermined cargo from the ship. Soviet shipboard personnel actually performed the unloading operation. 11. The unloading of cargo off three bloc ships was completed on 25 Aug in Nicaro. This cargo was loaded on trailers and moved to Banes. Boxes the length of the lowboy trailer were observed on numerous trailers. Cement blocks approx. 8 feet by 4 feet by one foot were also unloaded from the ships and put on trailers. Several hundred trips were made from Nicaro to Banes by the (unknown number) trailers involved to complete this haul. (B-2) 12. On 28 Aug 1962, an undetermined number of tanks were reported on maneuvers near La Maya (VT325300). (B-3) 13. At two schools in Santiago de Cuba, it is reported that foreign students are allegedly there on scholarships. The school of arts in Santiago has 300 Russian, Chinese and New Guineans. Sagrado Corazon college has 200 Chinese “end”. Comment: Informant states that all students are well above academic age, the Chinese appear to be polished professionals and are fine physical specimens. 14. On night of 27 Aug 1962, twenty-four flat bed rail cars each containing a AVMG A T-34 tank was observed on a rail siding in San Luis VT115321. Also approx. 100 men in uniform believed to be Soviets or Czechs were with this tank convoy. Cuban nationals present were ordered to leave the area. (B-2) Comment: Possibly same tanks reported in para. 12.

420. Editorial Note

Director of Central Intelligence John McCone was on a honeymoon holiday in France when the August 29, 1962, U-2 mission established that surface-to-air missile sites were under construction in Cuba. The discovery, which was reported to McCone in the daily briefing cables sent to him by Deputy Director Marshall Carter, reinforced McConeʼs concern that the Soviet military build-up in Cuba presaged the introduction of medium-range ballistic missiles. He concluded that the development of a costly surface-to-air defense system in Cuba could only be explained if it were designed to mask and protect the introduction of ballistic missiles. In a series of cables sent to Carter [text not declassified], McCone pressed his concerns and supported an expanded program of reconnaissance flights over Cuba. Return cables from Carter indicated that CIA analysts had considered McConeʼs concerns but concluded that the Soviet Union would not run the risk of provoking a military reaction from the United States.

In a cable dated September 7, McCone urged frequent reconnaissance operations and added: “My hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable type in Cuba which could command important targets of Southeast United States and possibly Latin American Caribbean areas.”

On September 10 he argued in a cable that the costly defenses being prepared in Cuba were difficult to rationalize unless they were “for purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMs to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights.”

On September 11 Carter cabled that the CIAʼs Board of National Estimates was still persuaded that the costly crash program to install SA-2s in Cuba was more reasonably explained by reasons other than a desire to hide the introduction of ballistic missiles.

On September 13 McCone reiterated his concern about the establishment of an offensive weapons capability in Cuba.

On September 16 he urged that “we must carefully study the prospect of secret importation and placement of several Soviet MRBMs which could not be detected by us if Cuban defenses deny overflight.”

On September 19 Carter cabled to McCone the conclusions from SNIE 85-3-62, which was issued that day to assess the military build-up in Cuba (Document 433). The estimate concluded that a decision to introduce ballistic missiles into Cuba “would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far.”

In the final cable in the series [text not declassified], September 20, McCone took exception to the conclusion drawn in SNIE 85-3-62. He argued that “an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take unexpected risks to establish such a position.”

The cables exchanged between Carter and McCone are in the Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80-B01285A, Box 4,DCI-DDCI Cables-Cuba, 4 Sept-21 Sept 1962, and ibid., Job 80-B01676R, Box 17, Mongoose-Cuban Reconnaissance/Overflights. The relevant portions of these cables are in the Supplement.

421. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Executive DirectorSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files: Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop. No classification marking. Prepared on February 28, 1963. Washington, September 10, 1962. SUBJECT Genesis of White House Meeting on 10 SeptemberThe only other record of this September 10 meeting which has been found is a brief, one-paragraph summary prepared by General Carter on September 10. Carter noted that the meeting was generated by Secretary Ruskʼs concern over Cuban overflights and his desire to avoid any incidents. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. 1. Mr. McGeorge Bundy called a meeting in his office at approximately 5:45 on 10 September to allow the Secretary of State to express his concern over the Agencyʼs overflight program for Cuba. Attending were Secretary Rusk, the Attorney General, Mr. Bundy, General Carter, General Lansdale, Dr. Scoville, Mr. Reber, and Mr. Cunningham. 2. Mr. Bundy opened the meeting by turning to the Secretary and saying, “Dean has some points he wants to raise because of the incidents” (the 30 August SAC-U2 overflight of Sakhalin Island, which the USSR protested on 4 September, and the loss of Mission GRC-127 over Communist China). Secretary Rusk, nodding toward General Carter, half joshingly said, “Pat, donʼt you ever let me up? How do you expect me to negotiate on Berlin with all these incidents?” The Attorney Generalʼs riposte: “Whatʼs the matter, Dean, no guts!” 3. Secretary Rusk quickly went into the risk standpoint of the Agencyʼs proposal for two extended overflights covering the remainder of the island not covered in the 29 August and 5 September missions. He asserted that although we need this information we must minimize the risk element and avoid a third incident. He insisted that photographic coverage should be designed so that peripheral flights over international waters would not be combined with overflights of Cuban territory. To meet his wishes, the program was divided into four flights—two overflights and two peripheral—all geared for maximum safety. 4. General Carter cautioned that this program, while satisfactory for the moment, was not enough and added, “I want to put you people on notice that it remains our intention to fly right up over those SAMs to see what is there.” To this, there was no response—positive or negative. With adjournment of the meeting implied and with the attendees starting for the doors, General Carter is reported to have said, “There they all go again and no decisions.” 5. The above information was provided by Messrs. Reber and Cunningham and to some extent the Lehman report. Dr. Scoville, who was on the Coast, was not reached. Ernest deM. Berkaw, Jr.Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

422. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence AgencySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 1/62-9/62. Secret. Washington, September 12, 1962.

OCI No. 3196/62

SUBJECT Soviet Statement on Cuba 1. Moscowʼs statement of 11 September on CubaIn a statement issued on September 11 through the Soviet news agency TASS, the Soviet Union warned that any attack by the United States on Cuba or upon Soviet ships bound for Cuba would lead to war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The statement accused President Kennedy of preparing for “an act of aggression” against Cuba when he asked Congress on September 7 for stand-by authority to order 150,000 military reservists to active duty. The statement cited Soviet nuclear capability and warned that no aggressor could expect to be “free from punishment.” The text of the Soviet statement was reprinted in The New York Times, September 12, p. 16. appears to be designed to further a variety of Soviet objectives, foremost among them being to deter the US from active intervention in Cuba. 2. The statement does not significantly alter the nature of the USSRʼs commitment to defend the Castro regime. The Soviets have once again used deliberately vague and ambiguous language to avoid a clear cut obligation of military support for Cuba in the event of an American invasion. They carefully refrain from spelling out their precise reactions to any attack on Cuba. In some respects, the statement is less specific than previous Soviet warnings, such as that contained in Khrushchevʼs letter of 18 April 1961 to President Kennedy.See Document 117. As before, however, Moscow attempts to create the impression that Cuba is under the protection of the full range of Soviet nuclear and missile power. The statement is also calculated to enable the USSR to claim full credit for having protected Cuba if no US invasion or interference with Soviet shipping materializes. 3. The statement displays great sensitivity to the implications of the Presidentʼs request for authorization to call up reserves. The Soviets probably felt that they had no choice but to respond with a strong statement of their support for Castro. Thus, while avoiding a definite commitment to defend Cuba, Moscow has further engaged its prestige in ensuring the survival of the Cuban Government. 4. In addition to its deterrent effect, the Soviet statement is intended to check growing alarm in the US and Latin America over Soviet intentions in Cuba. It stresses the defensive nature of Soviet military equipment being furnished the Cubans and implicitly denies any Soviet intention to establish military bases in Cuba. The statement, moreover, conveys an indirect assurance that Moscow will not confront the US with simultaneous challenges in both Cuba and Berlin. 5. At the same time, however, Moscow strongly advances the argument that the USSR has a right to provide military assistance to Cuba, citing the existence of US military alliances and bases on the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc and the presence of American fleets in the Mediterranean and the Taiwan Strait. The statement reflects the Soviet leadersʼ long-standing desire to “settle old accounts” with the US by establishing a military and political presence close to the US in an area which traditionally has been an American sphere of influence. Moscowʼs policy toward Cuba has been strongly influenced by this desire to establish the USSRʼs claim to great power equality with the US. 6. The statement can be characterized as brusque and strong regarding Cuba but moderate on Berlin. We anticipate that the Soviets will launch a strong attack on US policy at the UN, and we think that they recognize that these tactics will rule out any progress in the Berlin talks for the time being. The statement tacitly acknowledges this by noting that a “pause now has been reached” in these talks and by observing that it is “difficult” for the US to negotiate during an election campaign. It reiterates the usual line that the USSR favors the “earliest conclusion” of a German peace treaty and a Berlin settlement. 7. The Soviet leaders probably do not wish to break off diplomatic contacts altogether and envisage a resumption of high level talks on Berlin late this year or early next year. They may feel that, in the meantime, propaganda denunciations of US “aggressive actions” will enable them to further delay a separate peace treaty with East Germany without appearing to retreat. Such a delay would permit them to assess the impact on the Westʼs negotiating position of this offensive as well as of probable maneuvers on their part to involve the UN in a Berlin settlement.

423. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 9/62. Top Secret; Noforn; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that six copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, McCone, and Bundy. Washington, September 12, 1962. SUBJECT Phase II, Operation Mongoose

At the Special Group meeting of 6 September,See Document 417. several activities listed in the 31 August projection of Phase IIDocument 399. were noted for further clarification. Appropriate changes are reflected in the attached addendum to the 31 August projection.

Request your approval for the Mongoose Operation team to proceed with Phase II as indicated.

Attachment

ADDENDUM, PHASE II OPERATION MONGOOSE

As noted by the Special Group, clarifications are given below on numbered activities listed in the 31 August projection of Phase II:

10. (Broadcasts). USIA was asked to take a further hard look at the capabilities for radio and TV broadcasts to Cuba.USIA has done so, with the help of State and CIA. The study is attached.The attachment was an eight-page USIA memorandum from Wilson to Lansdale entitled “Broadcasting to Cuba.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 9/62)USIA concludes that improvement would result by raising Key West station WKWF to 50 kw, that medium wave and TV operations must be tied to short term tactical operations, and that it does not favor the U.S. engaging in all-out electronic warfare with Cuba at this time.

20. (Balloons). CIA plans to present details of this proposal, including content of material to be delivered by balloon, to the Special Group for the 20 September meeting. Suggest that consideration of this item be deferred until then.

21. Note change, as underscored:Printed here as italics. “Direct propaganda at Soviet and other Bloc personnel in Cuba. (CIA and USIA).”

25. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]

28. (Sabotage Cuban assets outside Cuba, as targets of opportunity.) Note change of purpose: “To cripple harass Cuban commerce and place strain upon regime security forces.”

32. (Sabotage agriculture.) Delete the suggestive details in the “Considerations.” If and when specific proposals are developed, appropriate policy approval will be requested.

47. (Actions against Bloc personnel.) As a means of emphasizing such activity, as desired, delete item 47c and add a new item (numbered 57) to read:

Activity: Cause actions by Cubans against Bloc personnel in Cuba. (CIA)

Purpose: To make the mission of Bloc personnel in Cuba as difficult as possible.

Considerations: In addition to aggressive propaganda fostering Cuban action against Bloc personnel, exile groups will be encouraged to exploit their internal contacts to provoke incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel. Minor acts of sabotage by Cubans against Bloc equipment and facilities will be encouraged. Consideration will be given to provoking and conducting physical attacks on Bloc personnel.

48. Note change: “Stimulate, support, and guide covertly the propaganda and political activities of all selected Cuban exile groups and individuals offering useful impact inside Cuba and upon world opinion. (CIA, with State and USIA support.)”

424. Memorandum From the Department of State Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Hurwitch) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose, Phase I. Top Secret. Washington, September 12, 1962. SUBJECT Task 54See Document 399.—Develop post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups

Post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups must emerge from the dynamics of exile politics and internal developments in Cuba. We do not intend to impose concepts, select leaders or form political groups.

The broad limits of political concepts acceptable to the United States have already been provided. As to leaders, Dr. Miro Cardona has, as you know, considerable backing from the United States. Other leaders may emerge who, in our judgment, merit support as well. We do not intend to create them, however. To the extent we support them, we shall have contributed to their development. I believe we should compile a list of the more qualified anti-Castro Cubans both in exile and inside Cuba, together with their biographic data.

We are considering the advisability of a high level United States statement at the appropriate time regarding “not turning back the clock in Cuba” post-Castro.

We are giving more thought to the subject. The items listed in the “Considerations” of this task are highly pertinent.

425. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Department of State Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Hurwitch)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose, Phase II. Top Secret. Washington, September 13, 1962. SUBJECT Activity 54, Phase II

Your 12 September memorandumDocument 424. regarding Activity 54 (post-Castro) suggests some further development of information and planning without loss of time.

The idea of listing qualified anti-Castro Cubans and of compiling all available data for assessing their leadership potential is very much to the point. Request that you take the necessary steps to do this, in conjunction with CIA and the FBI, and keep me advised on a continuing basis.

The proposal concerning a high-level statement regarding a post-Castro era is one for priority attention, but should not be restricted to the single theme of “not turning back the clock.” This is an actionable idea and follows our earlier discussions on developing a sound frame of reference for anti-regime activities by Cubans and their friends.

Incidentally, your statement that we develop leadership to the extent that we support them leads me to request that you prepare a paper for me indicating the “who and why” of such support.

426. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President KennedySource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Secret. Washington, September 13, 1962.

This memorandum is in response to your request for a report on the program to enlist Cubans in the US Armed Forces,See Document 418. which terminated last June, and on my reaction and the reaction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the formation of a Cuban Brigade at the present time.

Under the previous program, only 142 Cuban nationals joined the US Armed Forces between 29 July 1961 and 31 July 1962, and of these, 30 have already been discharged for the convenience of the government. Of some 4,000 who expressed interest in the program, only 1,000 were registered by the Selective Service local boards as volunteers for military serv-ice. This attrition occurred either because the men were disqualified by reason of age and number of dependents, or because they lost interest when informed that they would not serve in Cuban units. Of the remaining group, more than two-thirds were disqualified at the Armed Forces Examining Station. The largest number of disqualifications (half of the total) was based on “moral and security” grounds. Substantially all of these disqualifications occurred when the volunteers were given lie detector tests (required procedure in the absence of the usual background investigation data) and admitted histories of sexual deviation. Only 135 failed to qualify on medical grounds. Additional drop-outs along the way, particularly in the English language training phase of the program, reduced the number of inductees to 142.

At the direction of the Special Group (Counterinsurgency), the Joint Chiefs of Staff have prepared a planJCS memorandum JCSM-713-62 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, September 12, 1962. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba 432.18 (31 Jan 1962)) for a new Cuban volunteer program which should overcome some, if not all, of the difficulties that arose in the previous program. We are proposing to train Cuban nationals in all-Cuban units, the training to be conducted in Spanish. Volunteers would not be excluded as they were in the previous program, by reason of number of dependents or the inability to speak and understand English. Voluntary induction would be for a minimum of two years, as required by present law. After completion of 20 weeks of basic and advanced individual training, the volunteer may be discharged, transferred to reserve status, or retained on active duty and integrated into a regular military unit. Those who meet requisite standards would be permitted to enter Special Forces training, within available quotas.

Individuals who are placed on reserve status would be organized into separate reserve units, where residence permits. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the possibility of organizing such reserve units with a brigade or similar organization as suggested. It is their opinion that an organization of this nature may, at this time, be premature; however, should experience indicate that there are sufficient volunteers and qualified officer and non-commissioned officer personnel from among the Cuban refugees to support such an organization, further consideration may well be warranted.

The over-all plan has been discussed in some detail within the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) and with Dr. Miro-Cardona. I understand Dr. Cardona feels that it would be adequate to stimulate recruiting of qualified Cuban refugees. Because of the experience gained from last yearʼs program, I am still somewhat skeptical as to the number of Cubans who will volunteer and qualify. The prospective establishment of all-Cuban reserve units should assist in attracting additional volunteers for the program. Further, it could also provide means of long-term control over personnel who have received at least 20 weeks of active duty training.

On the other hand, I do not believe that the possible additional recruiting value of an active duty Cuban brigade would offset the numerous additional problems of a political and administrative nature that such an organization might produce.

We expect to put the plan into operation in the very near future, after we have reached agreement with the Department of State on the timing and nature of a public announcement.

As indicated above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted in the preparation of this reply.

Robert S. McNamaraPrinted from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.

427. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Department of State Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Hurwitch)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose, Phase II. Top Secret. Also sent to Harvey, Wilson, and James Symington. Washington, September 13, 1962. SUBJECT Contingency Facilities

As noted in our meeting Tuesday, 11 September, with Mr. McGeorge Bundy and General Lemnitzer on contingency planning, each of you was to inform me of what facilities you will require in the Joint Staff area to permit your organization to be closely linked in with U.S. operations in case of a contingency. Let me know by 17 September.

Your information on this should include the number of persons you would expect to position in the Joint Staff area, either full or part time, your need for secure communications, and your need for secure filing space.

While this will help to ready the physical accommodations in proximity to the Joint War Room, it is noted further that your own readiness should include planning for contingency operations within your own organization, so that they can be undertaken without loss of time or security. Let me know also by 17 September the status of such internal planning.On September 17 Hurwitch responded in a memorandum to Lansdale that present planning called for the continuous presence, if required, of one Department of State officer in the Joint Staff area, with secure communications to the area of the Operations Center in the Department of State, which had been “earmarked for work on Mongoose when the need arises.” (Ibid.)

To assure necessary security clearances of personnel for this highly sensitive area, it is desired that you indicate by name officials to undertake this assignment.

428. Current Intelligence MemorandumSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files: Job 80-R01386R, Box 1, Cuba, Top Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. SC-09347/62 Washington, September 13, 1962. SUBJECT Analysis of the Suspect Missile Site at Banes, Cuba 1. A review of all available evidence leads us to conclude it is highly likely that the suspect missile site near Banes, Cuba is a facility for launching cruise missiles against ship targets at fairly close ranges. 2. The site, which is located about 300 feet above sea level and 3.5 nm from the sea is oriented in a general easterly (seaward) direction. It consists of two 30 foot rail launchers in revetments, each connected by cable to a Soviet Whiff tracking radar. Ground support equipment consists of eight canvas-covered, missile-type trailers, two probable generators and electronic vans, and other general purpose vehicles. The area is being fenced, and the personnel are housed in tents. The site configuration and the equipment observed are compatible with a cruise missile system and not compatible with surface-to-air or ballistic systems. 3. Although our knowledge of Soviet cruise missiles is incomplete, we know of three systems which could fit those facilities observed at Banes. We have eliminated other operational Soviet cruise missile systems, with ranges from 1000 to 4000 nm, because their missiles probably would be too large for the Banes facility. A 600 nm cruise missile has had a test range firing in the USSR, but it too would be too large for the Banes site. 4. The three remaining possibilities are: a. SS-N-1—a destroyer-launched cruise anti-ship homing missile launched from 30 foot inclined rails. With destroyer radar, the effective system range is 20 to 30 nm. With the assistance of an air controller, the system range can be extended to 130 nm. This system could be installed at a shore site. b. SS-N-2—a Komar class patrol craft-launched cruise anti-ship homing missile, launched from inclined rails 25 to 30 feet long. With the Komar radar, the effective system range is 10 to 15 nm. This system could also be installed at a shore site. Eight Komars have been transferred to Cuba. c. SS-C-1—the “missile-in-a-bottle”, first shown in the 1961 Moscow 7 November parade. This missile is launched from an inclined ramp within a tube mounted on a large four axle truck. We know nothing of its guidance system. The missile probably has a range of about 150 nm, but possibly it could be as much as 300 nm. This system could be installed at a fixed site. 5. Although none of the known Soviet cruise missile systems precisely fit the facility at Banes, we believe it is more likely that the site is for a short range 25-30 nm missile system. The Whiff radar seen at the site has not been noted with known cruise missile systems but could be used for target acquisition in this installation. If the missile has an inertial guidance system and a means of target acquisition, the range of the missile at the Banes site could be extended to a range of about 130 nm. 6. There are several items of circumstantial evidence which tend to support the conclusion that the Banes site is for relatively short range coastal defense cruise missiles. The fact that the site is near the coast suggests that the range of its missile is short; otherwise it could be located inland in a less vulnerable area. It is located where short-range missiles could defend against seaborne assault on deep water ports in Nipe Bay south of Banes.Cubaʼs two nickel plants are in this general area. Their output is being sent to the Soviet Bloc and is equivalent to 20 percent of Soviet production. The more important of these two plants is on the bay protected by the Banes site. [Footnote in the source text.] Thus far, the Soviets apparently have not given Cuba any weapons which provide them a long range striking capability, suggesting that their policy is to provide for Cubaʼs defense only. Because neither the SS-N-1 nor the SS-C-1 has sufficient range to hit any target in the United States, such missiles would fit this policy pattern. 7. If the analysis that the Banes missile site is a coastal defense installation is correct, it would follow that similar facilities may be set up at a number of other locations favorable for protecting beaches against amphibious attack. 8. We doubt that Cubans have been given sufficient training in the use of such missiles to allow them to have operational control over the sites. It seems likely that Soviet technical training personnel would be needed for some time to come and would be available for operating the installation in time of crisis.

429. Editorial Note

At a press conference at the Department of State on September 13, 1962, President Kennedy made a statement concerning the situation in Cuba. He noted that there had been a good deal of speculation, prompted by statements made in Moscow and Havana, concerning the possibility of an imminent invasion of Cuba by United States forces. The President dismissed the speculation as a “frantic effort” by Castro to bolster a troubled regime. Military action by the United States against Cuba would be triggered, Kennedy stated, only if Cuba posed a threat to any other nation in the hemisphere, or if Cuba became an offensive military base for the Soviet Union. The President noted that, despite the increasing flow of Soviet arms and military personnel to Cuba, conditions had not reached the point that would justify military action against Cuba. He made it clear, however, that the United States would not hesitate to act if threatening conditions developed:

“If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.”

He added, with respect to the military build-up occurring in Cuba:

“If the United States ever should find it necessary to take military action against communism in Cuba, all of Castroʼs Communist-supplied weapons and technicians would not change the result or significantly extend the time required to achieve that result.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pages 674-675)

430. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 60, September 27, 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Parrott. Washington, September 14, 1962. SUBJECT Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 14 Sept. 1962 PRESENT Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Nitze, General Lemnitzer, General Carter The Attorney General was present for Item 1. Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1 through 3. Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 4 and 5.

1. Reconnaissance, Cuba

Colonel Steakley outlined the capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the Secretary of Defense does not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area are available. Further consideration was thus deferred until next weekʼs meeting.

General Carter said that special efforts will be required to identify certain installations the nature of which is not clear at present.

Colonel Steakley distributed charts for the monthly book,Not found. on supplementary ELINT coverage of Cuba, which has begun today. The Group had no objection to these missions.

It was agreed that the Joint Reconnaissance Center should keep an eye on all military flights in the Cuban area.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. ParrottPrinted from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.

431. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 91-00741R, Box 1, Mongoose Papers. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Elder. Washington, September 14, 1962.

MONGOOSE MEETING OF 14 SEPTEMBER 1962

The Acting DCI informed the meeting of our firmer identification of the site at Banes.According to another record of the meeting, prepared by Carter, the missile site at Banes had been tentatively, rather than conclusively, identified as a cruise missile site. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

The 12 September addendum to the Phase Two Mongoose OperationSee Document 423. was discussed and the entire Phase Two was approved in principle as a platform from which to proceed. Activities which may be especially sensitive are to be brought before the Group, and this body wishes to be kept generally advised on progress.

General Lansdale indicated that papers on a “blockade” are being generated outside Mongoose channels. (Elder talked to George Carroll on Saturday who identified such papers as part of the DOD contingency planning exercise and indicated that there is very little interest or steam in them.)

[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

CIA Headquarters and all WH stations are to be especially alert for any shipments of arms or other subversive material from Cuba to other Latin American countries. (Chief, Task Force W says this alert has been laid on and is in force.)

There was some discussion of a State-JCS meeting with McGeorge Bundy on contingency plans for Cuba.

Bruce Cheever attended for the Agency. He reports that no decisions were made, no new ideas were brought up, and nothing useful emerged from the meeting.

It was generally agreed that we should make an effort to get Pan American to continue some flights to Cuba. We are not to accept PAA prices, but to continue negotiations, try to get a lower figure, and to make no commitments at this time. A status report is to be furnished to the Special Group (Augmented) on this subject.

The Attorney General expressed concern that activities by certain Cuban exiles are reaching the point where the Government may be forced to take action against them rather than to simply state that “we are investigating.” The Agency is requested to see what it can do to help reduce the noise level of these activities.

Walter ElderPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.

432. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Policy—1959, 1961, 1962. Top Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch. Washington, September 19, 1962. SUBJECT Policy Recommendation with respect to Cuba

The coming 18 months are likely to prove the most gruelling that the Cuban people will have to endure. The nadir of the Cuban economy will probably be reached during this period. The western equipped sectors of the economy will continue to deteriorate for lack of foreign exchange to purchase spare parts and equipment, while the Soviet capital equipment will not have begun to produce. Managerial and administrative personnel trained in the complexity of running a state controlled economy will continue to be lacking. At the same time, the Castro regime, under heavy Soviet pressure and with Soviet assistance, will probably undertake harsh measures to keep the economy from floundering. Experience in other Communist countries would indicate that there is approaching one of the most dangerous periods (from the Communist standpoint) in the process of transition toward a complete “socialist” state. This process will probably be accompanied by severe regimentation and perhaps terror.

We can, therefore, reasonably look for the highest point of Cuban popular dissatisfaction toward the Castro regime during this period. Three factors favor the Castro regimeʼs ability to survive this critical period: (1) the charisma of Fidel Castro; (2) the State security apparatus supported by Soviet involvement; (3) the absence of organized resistance with a political base in Cuba confident of United States support during the Castro regime and afterward. The presence of the third of these factors together with the absence of the first, could place in doubt the survival of Cuban-Marxist-Leninist government.

While we have been moderately successful in infiltrating some Cubans, we have been singularly unsuccessful in creating a political base of internal opposition. Our failure stems primarily from our practice of “controlling” or “managing” the Cuban exiles as individuals. We have not taken advantage of them as groups—as political entities with assets in Cuba. In effect, we have sought to make this a “U.S. show” using Cubans. To this extent, we are probably repeating past mistakes.

To create an opposition with a political base in Cuba, we should adopt a policy of giving assistance to Cuban groups without establishing rigid rules of planning or controlling. Our criteria for assistance (which should consist primarily of sabotage materiel, arms, radio equipment and transport) should be: 1. that the groups have assets in Cuba (cf., NIE August 1, 1962).Document 363. 2. that the groups will undertake only those actions against the Castro regime which can be reasonably believed to have been accomplished from inside Cuba. 3. that the groups agree to maintain a high degree of security.

This program would be supplemental to rather than a replacement for existing programs using refugees. The United States role would be primarily that of purveyor of materiel, financial assistance and technical know-how. Under this policy, we should be prepared for a number of failures and probably a fair amount of publicity. On the other hand, the student or other groups will probably continue to embarass the U.S. with their improvised schemes for attracting attention to the Cuban cause. We would hope, although we cannot be certain, that by providing exile groups that have assets inside Cuba the wherewithal for an internal struggle against Cuba, political opposition would be created and nurtured and that a minimum of external attacks on Cuba by refugees would recur.

RecommendationNo indication of Johnsonʼs approval appears on the source text.

That you advance the foregoing view for policy approval at the next Special Group meeting. (We would prefer to by-pass the Lansdale group this time for the sake of speed.)

433. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, McNamara Briefing Notebooks, 12 Jan. 63. Secret. A covering note indicates that this estimate, submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared by CIA, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on September 19, except the representative of the AEC, who abstained on the grounds that the topic was outside his jurisdiction. SNIE 85-3-62 Washington, September 19, 1962.

THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

The Problem

To assess the strategic and political significance of the recent military buildup in Cuba and of the possible future development of additional military capabilities there.

Conclusions

A. We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it, and consequently that the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castroʼs defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose. (Paras. 1-11) B. In terms of military significance, the current Soviet deliveries are substantially improving air defense and coastal defense capabilities in Cuba. Their political significance is that, in conjunction with the Soviet statement of 11 SeptemberSee Document 422. they are likely to be regarded as ensuring the continuation of the Castro regime in power, with consequent discouragement to the opposition at home and in exile. The threat inherent in these developments is that, to the extent that the Castro regime thereby gains a sense of security at home, it will be emboldened to become more aggressive in fomenting revolutionary activity in Latin America. (Paras. 18-21) C. As the buildup continues, the USSR may be tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive in purpose, but of a more “offensive” character: e.g., light bombers, submarines, and additional types of short-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). A decision to provide such weapons will continue to depend heavily on the Soviet estimate as to whether they could be introduced without provoking a US military reaction. (Paras. 22-28) D. The USSR could derive considerable military advantage from the establishment of Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the establishment of a Soviet submarine base there. As between these two, the establishment of a submarine base would be the more likely. Either development, however, would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far, and consequently would have important policy implications with respect to other areas and other problems in East-West relations. (Paras. 29-33) E. The Latin American reaction will be the evidence of an increased Soviet commitment to Cuba, rather than to the technical implications of the military buildup. Many Latin Americans will fear and resent a Soviet military intrusion into the Hemisphere, but will regard the problem as one to be met by the US and not their responsibility. We estimate the chances are better now than they were at Punta del Este to obtain the necessary two-thirds OAS majority for sanctions and other steps of direct military action aimed at Cuba. If it became clear that the USSR was establishing an “offensive” base in Cuba, most Latin American governments would expect the US to eliminate it, by whatever means were necessary, but many of them would still seek to avoid direct involvement. (Paras. 34-37)

Discussion

I. Considerations Underlying Soviet Policy in Cuba

1. We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it, and that the main purpose of the present military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castroʼs defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose. 2. The Soviets consider that the Cuban Revolution and their association with it have severely damaged the prestige of the US and greatly enhanced that of the USSR, throughout the world. They see in the case of Cuba an effective demonstration that, anywhere in the world, a “colonial” people can throw off the “imperialist yoke” and, with the indispensable aid and protection of the USSR, successfully maintain its independence against “imperialist” counteraction. They especially value the effect of this demonstration in Latin America and also value Cuba as an advanced base for the support of radical revolutionary elements in Latin America. 3. Although initially the Soviets were guarded in their relations with the Castro regime, in the past year both they and Castro have undertaken moves which make their ties much closer. Thus Moscowʼs commitment to the survival and success of the Cuban Revolution is deepening. The Soviets have apparently concluded that they must invest more heavily to protect their stake in Cuba. 4. Because of heightening Soviet concern over the state of the Cuban economy, Moscow last spring agreed substantially to expand and liberalize its economic assistance program to Cuba. Indeed, Soviet economic aid to Cuba now involves an extensive program planned to sustain and gradually to develop the economy. The Soviets have thus clearly demonstrated their belief that Cuba, with Soviet support, can achieve sufficient progress to serve as a stimulus for revolutionaries elsewhere in Latin America. 5. During roughly the same period (last spring), the Soviets also apparently concluded that the Castro regime would have to be provided with accelerated military aid. Castro almost certainly had long demanded a much more substantial Soviet program. More important, however, we believe the decision reflected Soviet concern that its expanding role in Cuba might be terminated by a US move to overthrow the Castro regime. The rapid military buildup in Cuba was thus intended in large part to impress the US with the increased costs and risks of any attempt to overthrow the Cuban regime by force. 6. In line with this objective, the Soviet statement of 11 September was in part designed to dissuade the US from making any decision to intervene in Cuba. By stressing the “defensive” nature of the Cuban buildup, it sought to convince the US (and the world at large) that the military buildup in Cuba does not constitute a threat. At the same time, however, by raising the spectre of general war, it stressed the gravity of the risks involved in US intervention. The statement as a whole is probably a substitute for the guarantees which the Castro regime almost certainly has demanded. While it carefully avoids an explicit commitment to defend Cuba in the event of US attack, it does further engage Soviet prestige to ensuring the survival of the Castro regime. 7. The absence of such an explicit commitment reflects the Sovietsʼ basic disinclination to hazard their own safety for the sake of Cuba. They are willing, indeed anxious, to deflate US prestige and power in Latin American opinion and to provide the Cubans with the economic instruments of survival and progress, but they remain wary of provoking the US—or of allowing Castro to provoke the US—by going too far and too fast with a military buildup. In their 11 September statement they sought to undercut speculation about Soviet missile bases in Cuba for possible use against the US by, inter alia, stressing the defensive nature of armaments supplied Cuba and by denying any military need for such bases in view of their capability to attack the US from their own territory. 8. While Soviet policies in Cuba may have initially been devised almost entirely in terms of Cuba and Latin America, Moscow now also views the situation in terms of the broader East-West struggle. They relish the demonstration that Soviet power can be extended to an area adjacent to the US, and are using the strong US reaction to justify their own resentment of the “offensive” US bases on the Soviet periphery. Further, in their 11 September statement, the Soviets implied that US action against Cuba would be countered by Bloc moves elsewhere in the world and for the first time publicly linked the Berlin and Cuban crises. The Soviets are also aware that a drastic heightening of tension over Cuba is an important factor in their general relations with the US and has an impact on various other issues. Thus developments in the Cuban situation probably influenced the recent Soviet decision to let the Berlin situation simmer, rather than boil, for the time being. 9. The current Soviet buildup marks a dramatic change of pace in Soviet operations, probably occasioned by a reappraisal of policies and increased determination to insure the survival of the Castro regime. However, we believe that the military buildup which began in July does not reflect a radically new Soviet policy toward Cuba, either in terms of military commitments or of the role of Cuba in overall Soviet strategy. Without changing the essentially defensive character of the military buildup in Cuba and without making an open pledge to protect Cuba under all circumstances, the Soviets have enhanced Cuban military capabilities, repeated in stronger terms their warnings to the US, and tied the Cuban situation to the general question of the East-West confrontation. 10. The Soviets themselves are probably still uncertain about their future military program for Cuba. Indeed, they probably intend to test US and Latin American reactions as they proceed. At the same time they are obliged to tailor their policy to minimize risks of confrontation with the US, avoid friction with Castro, and maintain the best possible propaganda stance in the eyes of Latin America and the world in general. 11. The analysis of Soviet policy toward Cuba given here is based on an overall evaluation of Soviet interests and intentions and on evidence of Soviet actions in and with respect to Cuba to date. While it is our judgment that, even in the light of recent developments, Soviet policy remains fundamentally unaltered, we cannot exclude the possibility that Moscow is at least considering a change in this policy. Consequently, in the sections which follow, we examine in some detail not only the Soviet military buildup in Cuba to date and possible developments in that buildup which might follow, but also the nature and implications of military assistance which the Soviets could provide Cuba in the event of a major change of policy.

II. The Buildup To Date

12. In the first phase of the provision of military supplies, from 1960 to early 1962, the Soviets concentrated on substantial amounts of conventional combat weapons for the ground forces. A number of Bloc technicians were supplied and a training program for Cuban military personnel was inaugurated. The buildup proceeded at a deliberate pace and eventually, after some training of Cuban pilots, about 60 jet fighter aircraft were supplied to Cuba. In addition, some submarine-chasers and motor torpedo boats were delivered. This phase was largely completed by February 1962 with the result that Cuban forces were much better prepared to handle incursions upon their territory. 13. In July the Soviets began a rapid effort to strengthen Cuban defenses against air attack and major seaborne invasion. Between mid-July and early September some 70 ships have delivered various types of military supplies and construction equipment, and more ships are en route. These new shipments have consisted in part of further deliveries of types of weapons already available to Cuban forces. More tanks, self-propelled guns and other ground force equipment have been supplied. But the bulk of the material delivered is related to the establishment of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), which will form the basis for a new air defense system. 14. Thus far, 12 SA-2 SAM sites have been installed in the western half of the island. It is likely that similar coverage will be provided in the eastern half. Some missile sites could now be operational. The Soviets are also providing a number of more advanced jet interceptors; about a dozen MIG-21ʼs may have been delivered. The standard armament for this type of aircraft includes two infrared homing air-to-air missiles (AAMs). It is likely that such missiles have accompanied the MIG-21ʼs to Cuba. 15. The current buildup also reflects an effort to improve Cubaʼs coastal defenses. For this purpose, the Soviets have provided the “Komar” class guided-missile patrol boats which carry two short-range (10-15 n.m.) cruise-type missiles, primarily for use against shipping. This boat has a range of about 650 n.m., but is designed primarily for use in coastal waters. Eight “Komar” class boats have already been delivered and other similar craft may be on the way. In addition, a land-based cruise-type missile installation has been observed near Banes. [2 lines of source text not declassified] its range is likely to be limited to 20-35 n.m. by its radar horizon. This range might be extended by installing the radar on a height, or by employing ships or aircraft for forward observation. We believe that this will prove to be a coast defense installation and that others of this type will be deployed, but we cannot estimate at present the ultimate size of this program. 16. Equally important, particularly in terms of overall Soviet involvement, is the substantial increase in the number of Soviet military specialists in Cuba, from about 350 early this year to the current level of about 4,000. We anticipate that a large proportion of this group will remain in Cuba for some time. Six months to a year would be required before the SA-2 and other sites could be operated solely by Cuban personnel. 17. Because of the extent and rapidity of current deliveries and limitations in our intelligence coverage, we cannot yet identify all of the new equipment which has been introduced. Recent shipments include a great deal of electronic gear, with many vans, crates, and large boxes which could contain various types of this equipment. There is tenuous evidence of the presence of air defense ECM equipment. Although we have no specific evidence of it, we cannot exclude the possibility that COMINT and ELINT equipment is also now present in Cuba.

Implications of the Current Buildup

18. In terms of their military significance, the current Soviet deliveries are substantially improving capabilities in Cuba for air and coastal defense and defensive surface naval operations. When operational, the SAMs will assure that interception can be attempted under any weather condition, at altitudes up to 60,000 feet, with more limited effectiveness up to 80,000 feet. The system is probably not effective below about 3,000 feet. The MIG-21 has generally better performance characteristics than the earlier MIG models, and will considerably augment defenses against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes.[Footnote in the source text (5 lines) not declassified] 19. The large number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba will provide the technical assistance and training necessary to bring the newer weapons to operational readiness in the near future. If necessary, Soviet personnel could be employed to operate them before Cuban personnel are fully prepared to do so. It is likely that training and experience have already raised the proficiency of Cuban Air Force personnel somewhat above the low level noted in NIE 85-2-62,Document 363. “The Situation and Prospects in Cuba,” dated 1 August 1962 (paragraph 24). Soviet guidance and training will continue to raise the combat effectiveness of all branches of the Cuban military establishment. 20. Some of the new weapons in Cuba could be used for offensive as well as defensive purposes. MIG fighters can be equipped for ground attack operations and antiship missiles can be employed against well-defined land targets. Indirectly, the presence of SAMs could release some fighter aircraft for ground attack missions. Nevertheless, the pattern of Soviet military aid to date appears clearly designed to strengthen the defenses of the island, thereby protecting the Communist political beachhead in the Western Hemisphere and raising the price the US would have to pay to eliminate it by military action. The overall composition of the Cuban military establishment remains essentially defensive in character; it has not yet been provided with a significant strike capability. Moreover, the Cuban armed forces still lack the air and sealift necessary for military operations on any significant scale in neighboring territories. 21. Limited as the offensive capabilities of the forces in Cuba are, an increased sense of security instilled by Soviet public statements and by the presence of new weapons may encourage the Cuban regime to engage in small scale filibustering expeditions. It might also encourage them to make new demands on the US regarding the naval base at Guantanamo and to engage in a program of harassment of the base.

III. Possibilities for Expansion of the Buildup

22. The Soviets could expand the present buildup to include additional types of weapons. However, they are well aware that the question of offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a major political issue. Their recent statement indicates that they believe a strong political case can be sustained for supplying “defensive” weapons in Cuba. Conversely they seem to realize that to provide certain other types of weapons to Cuba would pose a challenge to which the US might forcefully respond. 23. Among the weapons which the Soviets might believe they could add to the Cuban arsenal without creating the appearance of an open defiance of US warnings on offensive weapons, are a low altitude SAM defense system and jet interceptors more advanced than the MIG-21ʼs. However, both of these are believed to be in short supply within the USSR itself, where they are in the early stages of deployment. Moreover, the military potential of these weapons can be fully realized only in conjunction with the USSRʼs closely integrated system of air defense warning, communications, and control. 24. Apart from such examples, however, the distinction between defensive and offensive weapons is ambiguous. The Soviets might consider supplying Beagle (IL-28) light bombers, for example, which they have already provided to several non-Bloc states. These aircraft can be represented by the Soviets as “defensive” weapons, particularly if present only in small numbers. On the other hand, the IL-28 could reach targets in the southeastern part of the US and could carry nuclear weapons. If these aircraft appeared in Cuba, the US would have to decide whether or not they were to be taken as representing a serious “offensive” capability. On the whole we believe the Soviets might calculate that a modest number of IL-28ʼs could be supplied to Cuba without serious risk of US counteraction. 25. Badger (TU-16) medium bombers might also be supplied to Cuba, ostensibly for such “defensive” uses as armed reconnaissance against invasion shipping, but the offensive capabilities of these aircraft are considerably more obvious than in the case of IL-28ʼs. We believe the Soviets would not supply them to Cuba. 26. It is possible that the Soviets would consider placing other short-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) in Cuba. The SS-1, a ballistic missile with a range of 150 n.m., would not threaten US territory other than Key West, but the 350 n.m. range of the SS-2 ballistic missile would extend to Cape Canaveral. The Soviets also have a 350 n.m. cruise-type missile available. These weapons could employ conventional or nuclear warheads. It is possible that the Soviets would believe that some SS-2ʼs would be tolerated by the US. On the other hand, any real military usefulness they might have to the Cuban defense establishment would be marginal, and the Soviets could not exclude that the US would react very strongly to their presence. 27. Another possibility is the provision of submarines and destroyers. We believe this may eventually be done. Some conventional submarines have already been supplied to non-Bloc countries, but the Soviets certainly realize that such action in Cuba could be interpreted by the US as violating their stated intention of limiting supplies to defensive purposes. However, the level of Soviet naval supply to Cuba will probably remain relatively high in coming months. Soviet merchant ships and trawlers will continue their frequent calls. The Soviets could test the US reaction to visits by Soviet naval ships to Cuban ports. Depending on US reactions over a period of time, the Soviets might then consider whether to turn over some destroyers and submarines to Cuba. 28. Thus the Soviets may experiment with a number of further steps in the military buildup. They may feel that some of these are necessary, if only to demonstrate their continuing support to Castro and refusal to be deterred by the US. The SA-2 defense system will provide a new degree of protection and secrecy for masking additional supplies. But the Soviets would be proceeding over uncertain ground and could not be sure of US knowledge of or reaction to each new move, or that the gains of each further step would be commensurate with the risks. They would also have to consider that Bloc personnel would be required to operate many of the additional weapons. Thus a decision to provide such weapons as bombers, submarines, or additional types of short-range missiles depends greatly on whether the Soviets estimate that these weapons can be introduced without precipitating a US intervention. They will realize that the nature of the US reaction will depend not only on types and numbers of weapons, but also on the offensive capability of the total military establishment in Cuba.

Use of Cuba as a Soviet Strategic Missile Base

29. The establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which could be used against the US would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far, and this would have important policy implications in other areas. However, Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the Soviet strategic posture and, in that connection, the feasibility and utility of deploying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. Therefore this contingency must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy. 30. Soviet planners might see some utility in deploying MRBMs and IRBMs to Cuba in order to supplement the limited number of ICBMs now believed to be operational in the USSR and to reach targets beyond the range of submarine-launched missiles. Cuban-based MRBMs with a range of 1,100 n.m. could reach targets as far north as Philadelphia and Cleveland and as far west as Oklahoma City; the 2,200 n.m. IRBMs could reach all US targets except some points in the Pacific Northwest. All of these targets can now be covered by ICBMs launched from the USSR. However, MRBMs or IRBMs deployed in Cuba would permit nuclear blows at an increased number of targets and would increase the total weight of the attack which could be delivered against the US in the event of general war. 31. The establishment on Cuban soil of a significant strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp departure from Soviet practice, since such weapons have so far not been installed even in Satellite territory. Serious problems of command and control would arise. There would also have to be a conspicuously larger number of Soviet personnel in Cuba, which, at least initially, would be a political liability in Latin America. The Soviets might think that the political effect of defying the US by stationing Soviet nuclear striking power in so menacing a position would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it. However, they would almost certainly estimate that this could not be done without provoking a dangerous US reaction. 32. A Soviet submarine base in Cuba could be of considerable military value to the USSR. Submarines operating from a Cuban base could be maintained on station off the US coast for much longer periods than can now be sustained in operations from Northern Fleet bases. Such a forward base would permit Soviet missile and torpedo attack submarines, both conventional and nuclear-powered, more readily to conduct routine patrols off the US coast. It is possible that the Soviets might seek to establish such a base in connection with the provision of some submarines to the Cubans. They might reason that even when Soviet use became apparent, the US, with naval bases at Holy Loch and Guantanamo, would be in a poor position to protest. In terms of both feasibility and utility, the establishment of a Soviet submarine base appears more likely than the deployment of Soviet nuclear-armed missile forces to Cuban soil. Even so, the Soviets would probably calculate the risk of US intervention as too great for such an undertaking at the present time. 33. Although the Soviets may see some military advantages in Cuba as a strategic strike base, the risks would be great and the political implications would run counter to the kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America. They do not propose to win the region for communism by military conquest. They count instead on a process of political action which will build a mass following for Communist or Communist-allied leaders who would then be capable of replacing existing governments.

IV. Latin American Reaction and Its Implications

34. Much of the Latin American public will react to the military buildup in Cuba and to evidences of Soviet intent to protect Castro without taking account of the particular weapons involved or of their capabilities and without reading between the lines of Soviet statements. Most of these Latin Americans will consider this intrusion of an extra-continental power to be a bad thing in itself, but at the same time will regard the problem as one to be met by the US and not their responsibility. Any disposition on the part of the Latin American governments to do something about it would depend greatly upon the lead given by the US, and this disposition would tend to fade if the US failed to come up with feasible courses of action. Some Latin Americans, of course, will be quick to note that the Soviets had intruded into the Hemisphere and will infer that the US had failed to rebuff this intrusion because it lacked the power or the will to do so. 35. In the Caribbean states there will be a much more pronounced tendency than elsewhere to interpret the military buildup in Cuba as a direct threat. They are not likely to expect that missiles will be fired at them, but that Soviet weapons and Soviet support will encourage Castro to intervene in their countries on behalf of radical revolutionists. 36. Among Latin American governments there are wide differences of opinion as to the role they as individual governments and as members of the OAS should play in the current situation. We estimate the chances are better now than they were at Punta del Este to obtain the two-thirds majority in the OAS required for sanctions and other steps short of direct military action aimed at Cuba. If it became clear that the Soviets were establishing an offensive base in Cuba most Latin American governments would expect the US to intervene and eliminate it, but many of them would still seek to avoid direct involvement. 37. In the longer run, if the Castro regime remains securely in power and the Cuban economy is developed substantially with Soviet help, the cohesion of the inter-American system will probably weaken further. Several countries would probably assume an “independent” position like that of Brazil. They would thereby position themselves for a closer accommodation with the Soviet Bloc, if and when desired, and would attempt to obtain assistance from both sides, in the manner of India and Indonesia.

434. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, 22 Oct-27 Oct 1962. Top Secret. A stamped note on the source text indicates McNamara saw the memorandum. Washington, September 21, 1962.

At the meeting with you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Friday, 14 September,The President held an off-the-record meeting with the Joint Chiefs and McGeorge Bundy at 11:40 a.m. on September 14. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) there seemed to be lack of unanimity between General LeMay and Admiral Anderson as to losses our aircraft would incur in attacking an SA2 missile site.

Would it be useful to build a model of such a site for exercises to be observed by an objective and disinterested party? Judgement as to losses to be incurred should include those that would result from the addition of anti-aircraft guns to protect the site. If you believe such a program would be useful, would you provide me with an estimate as to its cost.

Would you assure that contingency plans with relation to Cuba are kept up-to-date, taking into account the additions to their armaments resulting from the continuous influx of Soviet equipment and technicians.

John Kennedy

435. Telegram From the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic to the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic FleetSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Cables, 9/9/62-9/21/62. Top Secret; Priority. Also sent to COMJTF 122, COMANTDEFCOM, and CINCSTRIKE. Repeated for information to JCS, CNO, AJCC Ft. Richie, COM 19th AF, COMCARIBSEAFRON, and ALTCOMLANT. Norfolk, September 21, 1962, 4:36 p.m.

212136Z. Planning Directive CINCLANT No. 118-62.None of the references in this telegram has been found. For brief summaries of CINCLANT Operations Plans 314-61, 316-61, and 312-62, see Document 439.

A. COMJTF 122 OPLAN 314-62 B. COMJTF 122 OPLAN 316-61 C. CINCLANTOPLAN 314-61 D. CINCLANTOPLAN 316-61 1. Situation: A. General: A blockade of Cuba could bring Cuban economy to standstill in relatively short time. Effect on Cuban economy would be particularly disastrous with respect to POL. CINCLANT forces will be prepared to conduct a naval and air blockade of Cuba in accordance with provisions of this planning directive and other guidance received by higher authority. When this plan is executed, steps must be taken to ensure rapid execution of CINCLANTOPLAN 312-61, or 312-62. All commands should be alert to execute plans ordered in event action escalates to involve Soviet bloc military forces. B. Friendly forces: Commander in Chief, U.S. Strike Command: (1) Provides USSTRICOM forces as directed by JCS. (2) Designates, or assures designation of, commander to serve as JTF 122 Air Force Task Force Commander for planning and execution of this directive. (3) Provides, or arranges for provision of, Air Force personnel to augment the staff of JTF 122 upon execution of this directive. 2. Mission: CINCLANT will, when directed, conduct a naval and air blockade of Cuba in order to bring about a collapse of the Communist economy of Cuba. 3.

Execution and operations: If blockade of Cuba is declared, operations will be conducted as presently provided for in Annexes I to references A and B. A. Joint Task Force, JTF 122 (1) When directed, assume operational control of assigned forces, establish and conduct a naval and air blockade of Cuba. Provide for defense of blockading forces from enemy air, surface, and subsurface forces. B. CINCLANTFLT (1) Provide a Commander Naval Task Force and naval forces with their logistic support, as directed, to COMJTF 122. C. COMANTDEFCOM (1) Direct defense of the naval base at GTMO, when blockade is declared.

Coordinating instructions: This directive is effective for planning upon receipt. It will be effective for operations when directed. Annexes I to references A and B are considered to be sufficient to support this directive. Additional plans are not required from subordinates.

4. Logistics: In accordance with CINCLANT OPORDER 1-61 and appropriate portions of Annexes J to references C and D. 5. Command and signal: Command relations are in accordance with appropriate portions of Annexes C of references C and D. Communications in accordance Annex K of reference C.

436. Editorial Note

According to a chronology prepared on February 18, 1963, by the Defense Intelligence Agency for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Taylor, a report of the arrival of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba was received on September 21, 1962. The report involved a first-hand sighting on September 12 of a convoy of 20 objects 65 to 70 feet long which resembled large missiles. The objects were carried on long trailers, and the convoy turned into an airport on the southwest edge of Havana. The report was subsequently accepted as the first definite report of MRBMs in Cuba. In view of the fact that many other ostensibly tangible reports of a similar nature had been received and pursued with negative results, however, the September 21 report was assessed by intelligence analysts on September 22 as “potentially significant,” and was earmarked for special analytical attention.

The chronology indicates that during the period September 23-September 28, “available photography was checked, reports collated with previous and incoming information, new information was plotted on maps, reports received were analyzed and discussed with other analysts and the pattern formed by confirmed SA-2 sites was examined. This led to the development of a hypothesis that MRBM sites were under preparation in Pinar del Rio province.”

On September 28 the Vice Director of the Joint Staff was advised of the emerging hypothesis concerning the Soviet MRBMs. He made arrangements to include the hypothesis and supporting data in a pro-jected briefing on Cuba during the scheduled meeting between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Monday, October 1. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 16, Cuba, Congression-al Testimony, Misc. Back-up)

437. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the Presidentʼs Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 9/62. No classification marking. Washington, September 24, 1962. SUBJECT Cuban Documents

On reflection, I began to think less well of Memorandum #2 (Caribbean Security Arrangements).There is no indication which series of memoranda Schlesinger is referring to. The memorandum on Caribbean Security Arrangements was apparently an advance copy of the memorandum sent to the White House on September 25, under cover of a note from Executive Secretary Brubeck. See Document 438. This memorandum calls for (1) the establishment of a system of air-sea surveillance around Cuba; (2) control of travel, funds and propaganda to and from Cuba; and (3) issuance of a joint declaration by governments of the Caribbean area to take all necessary measures to prevent both Cuban aggression and the development of a military capability to endanger Caribbean security.

The first obvious point is that these measures are addressed to the threat of aggressive action by Castro in the Caribbean. Since this is a remote threat, unless the Cubans take leave of their senses, and since Castro has engaged in very little aggressive action since 1960, the meas-ures proposed (with an exception noted below) are essentially symbolic. The relevant question then is the effects of this symbolism.

Within the United States, the effect will no doubt be excellent. In Latin America it will be mixed—very favorable in Central America (except for Mexico) and northern South America; less favorable perhaps elsewhere. In Europe it will confirm the impression that we are far too excited about Cuba; the predominant view there, as you know, is what are we so scared about and why donʼt we learn to live with Castro as Khrushchev has learned to live with American bases in Turkey. The Soviet Union will doubtless understand that the measures are symbolic and will be unmoved by them, except as they lend themselves to propaganda exploitation.

The exception is the suggestion that the joint declaration should pledge action “to prevent in Cuba the creation … of an externally-supported military capability endangering the security of countries in the area.” Do we really mean this? How do we determine the peril point? Are we prepared to follow through when the peril point is reached? I would think that this provision would require the closest possible consideration before we tie ourselves to it.

There is, however, a substantial point in this memorandum—that is, the effort to distinguish the Caribbean problem from the hemisphere problem and to confer special responsibilities for defense on the states closest to Cuba. In a sense, this will represent a movement toward weakening the OAS. But the OAS has demonstrated its ineffectiveness anyway; and the regional arrangement can certainly be rationalized as a means of strengthening the OAS and giving effect to the Rio Treaty.

My own present recommendation would be along the following lines: an announcement that the MFM, after appropriate citations of the Castro threat and appropriate warnings to Havana and Moscow, proposes the establishment within the OAS of a Caribbean Security Organization composed of all states near the Caribbean which feel themselves menaced by the extra-continental penetration of Cuba. These nations have a special interest in adopting defensive measures to prevent the clandestine shipment of men and material from Cuba to their countries for subversive purposes. The other Latin American republics can then hail the Caribbean Security Organization as a legitimate action of self-defense within the Rio Treaty and as a source of strength for the OAS. President Betancourt will invite the Ministers of Defense and Interior of the interested countries to a meeting in Venezuela in mid-October to consider the special measures to be taken.

I would favor a simple and strong statement of this sort, uncluttered by detail about air-sea surveillance, etc. Such detail, beside answering a threat which does not exist, may unnecessarily alarm all-out anti-interventionists in Latin America, as it will excite a certain amount of derision in Europe. A two-stage approach—i.e., announcement of detail after the October meeting—would suggest a greater degree of Latin American initiative and a steady crystallization of hemisphere purpose.

The question remains: what can be done to stop the real threat involved in Cuba—which is not the threat of aggression against the hemisphere, but the threat of international political defeat involved in the extension of Soviet power (even for defensive purposes) into the western hemisphere.

The answer to this question lies in my judgment in pressures directed against the Soviet Union rather than against Cuba. I continue to think that the Secretary should make a tough and cold statement to the Soviet Ambassador saying that Soviet persistence in the arming of Cuba will (a) cause a surge of indignation in the United States which will color every other issue between ourselves and the USSR and preclude the resolution of any outstanding disagreement, (b) require us to increase our defense budget, and (c) may in the end force us to take action to eliminate Castro and his regime. This having been said, the Soviet Ambassador should be brusquely dismissed.

If NATO shipping constitutes a real, and not a symbolic, problem, similar representations should be made privately to the offending countries.

Let us not deceive ourselves about the measures proposed in the memorandum: they constitute a partial answer to the problem of domestic politics but a most inadequate answer to the real problem.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

438. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the Presidentʼs Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9-2562. Confidential. Drafted in ARA/RPA by W. G. Bowdler. Also sent to Ralph Dungan. Sent through McGeorge Bundy. Washington, September 25, 1962. SUBJECT Caribbean Security Arrangements

At the request of Assistant Secretary Martin I am enclosing a copy of a paper containing suggested courses of action which the countries bordering on the Caribbean could take to demonstrate their determination to work collectively to resist any attempt of direct or indirect aggression by the Castro regime.

This paper has been prepared pursuant to a request made by the President at a meeting with Secretary Rusk and Mr. Martin on September 19.The President met off-the-record with Rusk, Martin, Hurwitch, and McGeorge Bundy at 6:03 p.m. on September 19. (Kennedy Library, Presidentʼs Appointment Book) The paper has been discussed with Mr. Sloan of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have raised no substantive objection to the courses of action outlined.

E. S. LittleLittle signed for Brubeck above Brubeckʼs typed signature. Enclosure

CARIBBEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

There are three courses of action which the countries bordering on the Caribbean can take to demonstrate their determination to work collectively to resist any attempts at direct or indirect aggression by the Castro regime. These courses of action are: 1. Establishment of a system of air-sea surveillance around Cuba and along the coasts of the Caribbean countries. This surveillance would serve to inhibit the Castro regime from trying to send clandestine shipments of arms and men to other countries of the area and would strengthen the capabilities of those countries to intercept any such shipments. We would assume primary responsibility for the Cuban patrol, while the other countries would join with us in coverage of their own coasts. Our conducting the Cuban patrol would not rule out, however, contributions by other Caribbean countries. These contributions would probably take the form of naval units or support facilities for such units (e.g., refueling and provisioning facilities in the Dominican Republic for Venezuelan or Colombian frigates). 2. Intensification of efforts to counter Castro-communist subversion. This would include control of travel to and from Cuba, shipment of subversive propaganda material from Cuba, and transfer of funds from Cuban sources for subversive purposes. The governments could also agree on a system for exchanging information on Castro-communist subversive activities. This exchange would probably best be handled through bilateral channels, although consideration might be given to establishing a centralized system. 3. Issuance by governments of the Caribbean area, including the United States, of a joint declaration that the extension by the Castro regime of its Marxist-Leninist system by force or threat of force to any part of the Caribbean area or the creation or use of a Soviet-supported offensive military capability endangering the security of any country in the area, will call for the taking of any necessary measures to protect the security of the countries concerned. This declaration would be accompanied by an announcement that discussions will be held at a military level to plan for defensive measures for meeting these contingencies.

With regard to the timing and forum for adopting these courses of action, the following steps are recommended: 1. At the informal Meeting of Foreign Ministers we would seek to have several of the Caribbean countries propose inclusion in the final communique of a paragraph recognizing that the Caribbean is the area most immediately vulnerable to aggression or subversion from Cuba and that consequently governments of the area, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Resolution II of the Eighth MFM,

In paragraph 3 of Resolution II adopted at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics at Punta del Este on January 31, 1962, the Ministers resolved:

“3. To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 323)

have a special interest in adopting defensive measures to prevent the clandestine shipment of men and material from Cuba to their countries for subversive purposes. Such a paragraph would give a hemispheric blessing to the Caribbean countries taking special defense measures and thus serve to minimize criticism that the Rio Treaty is being bypassed, or that the inter-American system is being fractionized. 2.

Based on this paragraph, we would seek to have President Betancourt (President Valencia or President Orlich are other possibilities) invite the Ministers of Defense and Interior of the Caribbean countries to a meeting during the second or third week of October to consider the special measures which should be taken. The courses of action outlined above could constitute the program to be approved. The inclusion of Interior Ministers (which in Latin America generally have jurisdiction over police and intelligence forces) would emphasize that the problem of dealing with the Castro-communist threat is not purely external, but one in which internal measures are equally important.

The foregoing plan presents certain problems. One is the participation of Haiti and Mexico, which for different reasons may refuse to join in the action contemplated. Another is that the agreement on patrol activities will probably give rise to requests for assistance in servicing the surface craft used in the Cuban patrol, and in those cases where a country does not have any, or inadequate, capabilities to patrol its own coast, we can expect requests to furnish patrol boats. Neither of these problems is believed to present insurmountable difficulties.

439. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to the Presidentʼs Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 9/62. Top Secret. Washington, September 25, 1962. SUBJECT Cuban Blockade Contingency Planning

Planning Directive CINCLANT No. 118-62See Document 435. contains no new authorizations or directives beyond those contained in the basic Cuban Contingency Plans, all of which have been approved by the JCS. These plans are summarized in the attachment.

This planning directive was issued to: (1) focus subordinate commandersʼ attention on this contingency and the applicable portions of existing OPLANS. (2) inform coordinate commanders of the possibility of their having to provide forces to support such an operation. (3) tie together the paperwork and provide a basis for issuing a specific operation order for a Cuban blockade, if one should be ordered.Wiesner added a handwritten note at the end that reads: “Capt. Shepard has read and concurs with this information.”

Gerry Attachment

CUBAN CONTINGENCY PLANS

I. CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 is the basic contingency plan for operations in Cuba. It provides for (1) simultaneous airborne and amphibious assault in the vicinity of Havana; (2) reinforcement of Guantanamo; (3) mop-up operations in eastern Cuba. The time schedule for this plan calls for the first U.S. landings on the 18th day after receipt of the order to execute. II. CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61 is the quick reaction plan for operations against Cuba. It uses the same forces as OPLAN 314-61 but commits them in increments. The airborne assault occurs 5 days after receipt of the order to execute; the amphibious assault occurs 3 days thereafter. Reaction time can be reduced to 2 days if advance warning permits pre-positioning of forces. III. CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 provides for the fast application of U.S. air power to Cuba in time increments of 6, 12, and 24 hours from a no warning condition. Target priorities are: (1) aircraft, anti-aircraft and radar installations, and air fields; (2) selective disruption of communication and transportation facilities; (3) troops and armor concentration, artillery, and naval vessels.

440. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9-2662. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Sent to the Department with instructions to repeat to all Latin American posts, except Trinidad and Jamaica, and to POLADs CINCLANT and CINCARIB. The Secretary and the Latin American Foreign Ministers were in New York for the opening of the Seventeenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly. New York, September 26, 1962, midnight.

Secto 21. Informal MFM. Following based on uncleared memcon:A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., Secretaryʼs Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.

Secy met Sept 25 informally with FonMins Bolivia, CR, Dom Rep, Guat, Nic and Panama for discussion Cuban problem in preparation informal MFM next week. He briefly reviewed situation, pointing out while recent Sov shipments supplied at Castroʼs urging have neither increased power of Cuba as offensive military threat nor increased Castroʼs ability control own people, do represent increased Sov involvement. Secy repeated unequivocal assurances US will under no circumstances permit any raids or attacks of any kind by Cuba on LA countries and stated so far Castro acting cautiously in this area. Recent Sov bluster still gives no indication Soviets contemplating actions of type President warned against in press statement.

Secy made clear US not prepared to accept Cuban situation as permanent. Although military action remains eventual possibility, we must think of ways to solve problem without recourse to arms. Objective should be actions which increasingly isolate Cuba so as make abundantly clear to Soviets Cuba is unprofitable enterprise for them, either in itself or as basis Communist penetration other ARs.

Such steps, which worthy discussion informal MFM, would include review of minimal trade relationships with and shipping to Cuba (this matter we also discussing with our NATO Allies); measures to control flow of small arms, propaganda, money, agents from Cuba and movement of groups of Latin nationals to Cuba for training in subversion; measures of increased surveillance Carib area; and measures control Commies in each country.

In making clear our determination isolate Cuba, we naturally hope for complete hemisphere solidarity, at least on general approach. In addition we prepared move on more intensive steps tightened surveillance and controls with those ARs willing do so, particularly Caribbean nations whose special right take extra measures was recognized at Punta del Este (para 3 res 11).See footnote 3, Document 438.

In ensuing discussion (Bolivia and El Salvador silent) Central Americans expressed agreement Secyʼs approach; showed real interest in moving forward in Carib concert, but did not suggest any radical or belligerent action. They showed general concern (to which Secy agreed) that one serious impact in their countries of recent Cuban buildup has been to increase confidence and insolence local Commie groups who intensifying their subversive nibbling tactics. Guatemalan suggested all should urge those ARs still maintaining relations with Cuba to break them. Considerable emphasis placed by Latins on importance of intensive combined efforts educate peoples OARs on actual conditions Cuban people to counteract heavy Castro propaganda.

Separate meeting of Central American and Caribbean FonMins (excluding Mexico) held 3 pm September 26 with Martin for more concrete exploration possible steps. Secy met 5 pm same day with FonMins South American Reps present for similar initial review of situation.See Document 441.

Rusk

441. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/9-2762. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro for the immediate attention of the Ambassador. Sent to the Department with instructions to repeat to all Latin American posts, except Trinidad and Jamaica, and to POLADs CINCLANT and CINCARIB. New York, September 27, 1962, 7 p.m.

Secto 28. I. Secretary met September 26 with Foreign Ministers Chile, Haiti, Peru, Venezuela and ex-Foreign Minister Arinos of Brazil. Reviewed Cuban situation along lines reported Secto 21,Document 440. amplifying following points:A memorandum of this conversation is in Department of State, Secretaryʼs Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. 1. Re Soviet military build-up. If it should be necessary US take military action, only 3-4 hours preparation would be required reduce effectiveness of material so far received since July. If should be necessary use force, US would employ maximum, non-nuclear violence order minimize time and casualties, but we most anxious avoid this course since would leave long-lasting wounds in Cuba and elsewhere. 2. This is why we pursuing objective of making Soviet involvement in Cuba as expensive and unprofitable as possible for USSR by measures which will further isolate Cuba and exert maximum pressure on USSR. 3. Made clear US not objecting to whatever type social or economic system Cuban people may freely choose, but only to Soviet intervention there and Soviet-Cuban intervention OARs. Stressed US unwilling negotiate Cuban problem with USSR. Due special IA relationships and agreement, Cuban situation no way comparable to or linkable with situations elsewhere, i.e., Berlin or US MAP relations with other free world countries such as Turkey. Stressed US not seeking import cold war into hemisphere or drag OARs into problems not their responsibilities. Cold war direct result Soviet efforts subvert true independence national states. It they who have now brought cold war to hemisphere through Cuba. 4. Also pointed out intense preoccupation American people with Cuban problem is political fact that must be taken into account—as must public opinion situation OARs as well.

II. Venezuelan Foreign Minister, agreeing Secretaryʼs approach, pointed out fight against Castro-Communist gangsterism OARs closely related promotion democracy. In Venezuelan own experience Communists gained strength under dictatorships. Peruvian Foreign Minister, though agreeing desirability meeting on Cuban problem, opposed distracting attention by reference other issues and stated if any their problems (i.e., coups dʼetat) discussed, Peru would not attend.

Secretary responded by stressing informal nature meeting outside institutional framework OAS. US thought has been take advantage presence Foreign Ministers in US (originally preferring New York as locus) to talk about problems hemisphere interest, foremost among which, in US view, is Cuba. All realize are various problems within family, such as US-Panama differences re Canal to which Panamanian Foreign Minister referred in GA, and US-Mexican border problem. One country not participating OAS meetings due differences with another. Upcoming Brazilian elections may complicate Brazilian discussion certain matters. However, view our common interests, obligations and objectives, US strongly hopes will be possible Foreign Ministers can gather to talk without regard for various problems within hemisphere and without raising the difficult and divisive question of what we must formally discuss.

While in situation of complete informality it not possible impose conditions on what any Foreign Minister might mention or call any one to order, this should not pose real problem if we all relatively relaxed and not try give institutional effect to an agenda when there is no agenda.

Chilean and Brazilian made mildly helpful statements re general desirability of meeting. Arinos stated Brazilian information confirms Secretaryʼs description Soviet build-up, but little evidence indicate Castro-directed efforts infiltrate Brazil. Indicated some concern re how reach and express conclusions of meeting, referring to possible press communique. Secretary gave impression probably will be communique but stated at moment US has no flat suggestions re content.

III. We intend follow up this and previous meeting with further talks New York and Washington, exploring more concretely ideas contained Department Circular telegram 508.Not found.

View absence or late arrival in US Foreign Ministers of Ecuador, Honduras, Paraguay and Uruguay Embassies those countries requested consult Foreign Ministers soonest, drawing on background presentation of problem by Secretary reported above and in Secto 21 and stressing US desire discuss at meeting steps indicated paragraph three Secto 21. Unless Department perceives objection recommend Department author-ize other addressees utilize information both telegrams for discussion Foreign Offices as appropriate.

Rusk

442. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 9/62. Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Kaysen. Washington, September 27, 1962. 1. The Attorney General and Mr. McCone met with the President twice on matters related to Cuba: Tuesday at 4 PM and Wednesday at 6:15.September 25 and 26. On Tuesday Mr. McCone presented the Donovan situation and indicated that it was his recommendation that we go ahead with emphasis on medicines and that we give Donovan whatever support he needed. After some discussion the President agreed and suggested that Mr. McCone discuss the matter with General Eisenhower preparatory to briefing the appropriate Members of Congress. 2. [3 lines of source text not declassified] 3. In the second meeting Mr. McCone reported General Eisenhowerʼs views which were broadly favorable. The President suggested that we do the best we can to avoid a clear turn-down now if we didnʼt get immediate favorable response. 4. [6 lines of source text not declassified] 5. The Attorney General and Mr. McCone had a private conversation with the President for ten or fifteen minutes. CKPrinted from a copy that bears these typed initials.

443. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Subjects, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. III-B, 9/15/62-10/24/62. No classification marking. The letter was delivered through the Soviet Embassy in Washington. The full text of this letter is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VI, pp. 152–161. Moscow, September 28, 1962.

[Here follow the first 10 pages of the letter, which deal with topics unrelated to Cuba.]

Recently I had a talk with your Secretary of the Interior Mr. S. Udall. He made a good impression on me. Our conversation was friendly. And I never expected that at the time I talked with him you would take a decision to request from the Congress an authority to call up 150.000 reservists.See footnote 1, Document 422. Motivating that step of yours you referred to the red-hot state of international atmosphere and to a necessity for you in that connection to react promptly to the dangers that may arise in any part of “the free world”. Everybody understands that when the President of the U.S. demands an increase in armed forces and explains that demand by an aggravation of the situation, it means that he considers that the situation is aggravated by the other side, that is by us, the Soviet Union. But we havenʼt done anything that could give a pretext for that. We did not carry out any mobilization, and did not make any threats.

I must tell you straightforwardly, Mr. President, that your statement with threats against CubaAn apparent reference to the statement made by President Kennedy on September 13; see Document 429. is just an inconceivable step. Under present circumstances, when there exist thermonuclear weapons, your request to the Congress for an authority to call up 150.000 reservists is not only a step making the atmosphere red-hot, it is already a dangerous sign that you want to pour oil in the flame, to extinguish that red-hot glow by mobilizing new military contingents. And that, naturally, forces the other side to respond in kind. What could it lead to, all the more that you consider that the U.S. has right to attack Cuba whenever it wishes? But nowadays is not the Middle Ages, though even at the time it was considered brigandage, and measures were taken against such actions. And in our time such actions are absolutely unthinkable. That is what made us to come out with the TASS statementSee Document 422. and later at the session of the UN General Assembly to qualify your act, to remind of the norms of international law and to say about West Berlin.

If there were not statement by you on Cuba, we, naturally, as Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Udall were told, would not say anything on West Berlin. Your statement forced us to do so.

We regret that this dangerous line is being continued in the United States now. What is going on, for example, in the U.S. Congress. How can one, for example, fail to notice the decision of the House of Representatives to stop giving U.S. aid to any country that trades with Cuba or whose ships are used for trading with Cuba. Isnʼt that an act of an unpermissible arbitrariness against freedom of international trade, an act of crude interference into domestic affairs of other countries?

Very serious consequences may have the resolution adopted by the U.S. Senate on the Cuban question. The contents of that resolution gives ground to draw a conclusion that the U.S. is evidently ready to assume responsibility for unleashing thermonuclear war. We consider that if what is written in that resolution were actually carried out it would mean the beginning of war because no country can agree with such interpretation of rights, with such arbitrariness. Then there would be no UN, everything would collapse and roll into abyss as it happened once when the League of Nations collapsed. Who wrecked it then? Japan and Hitler, who quit the League of Nations to untie their hands and start war. And they did start it. Could it be that the US wants to embark on such road?

We would greatly regret if it were so. We still do not lose hope that we will be able to normalize our relations. But this can be achieved only when the United States and its allies will strictly adhere to the generally recognized norms of international law and will not interfere into the domestic affairs of other states, will not threaten other countries. This is the main thing. And this is the coexistence of which we spoke more than once. You spoke of it too. But what kind of coexistence is this if the United States would attack countries whose government or socio-political system are not to its liking? In our time the world has split into two camps—capitalist and socialist: you have neighbours whom, as you say, you do not like while we have neighbours whom we do not like, but they are your friends and allies. How can one, especially under these circumstances, consider it to be oneʼs right to attack another country merely because its government and internal order are not to your liking? If we conduct such a policy, where this will lead to—to world war.

[Here follow the concluding 4 pages of the 17-page letter. There was one other brief reference to Cuba in the concluding section of the letter. It reads as follows: “It has just become known that the Puerto-Rican but actually American authorities detained a British ship and arrested the Soviet cargo aboard that ship—sugar that we have bought in Cuba. If such arbitrariness is not stopped, you yourself realize what it can lead to.”]