Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume
XXXI, South and Central America; MexicoForeign Relations of the United States1964–1968Volume XXXISouth and Central America; MexicoDavid C. GeyerDavid H. HerschlerEdward C. KeeferUnited States Government Printing OfficeWashington20041115201607231839780160723186frus1964-68v311964 to 1969This publication contains 4 associated files. For page images, see the
facsimile element.
Released in 2004 as printed book and online at state.gov
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Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: Toll Free (866) 512-1800; DC area
(202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
ISBN 0–16–xxxxxx–x
Preface
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents
the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and
significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian
of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the
preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of
the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of
the General Editor, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the
series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally
accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying
specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series
were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925.
These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.
A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by
Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on
October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the
Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.).
The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be
a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy
decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the
series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation
of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government.
The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary
Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the
principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered
or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has
been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major
importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the
purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the
Foreign Relations series be published not more than
30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume,
which was compiled in 1994–1997, meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly
standards of selection and editing.
Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series
This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign
Relations series that documents the most important issues in the
foreign policy of the 5 years (1964–1968) of the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson. The subseries presents in 34
volumes a documentary record of major
foreign policy decisions and actions of President Johnson’s
administration. This volume documents U.S. policy toward South and Central
America, and Mexico.
Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, Volume XXXI
The editors of the volume sought to include documentation illuminating the
foreign policymaking process of the U.S. Government, emphasizing in particular
the highest level at which policy on a given subject was determined. The
documents selected include memoranda and records of discussions that set forth
policy issues and show decisions or actions taken. The focus is on the
development of U.S. policy and on major aspects and repercussions of its
implementation rather than on the details of policy execution.
The volume features eleven bilateral and two regional compilations, demonstrating
the breadth of the U.S. Government’s relations with the countries of South and
Central America. Many of the bilateral compilations document the
Johnson administration’s responses to a series of
crises: the 1964 Panama Canal flag incident; the 1964 coup d’etat in Brazil; the
1964 Presidential election in Chile; the 1966 coup in Argentina; the 1967 hunt
for Ernesto “Che” Guevara in Bolivia; the 1968 coups in Peru and Panama. The
bilateral compilations also show how the administration tried to address more
fundamental problems: the Panama Canal treaty negotiations; the insurgencies in
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela; the authoritarian regimes in Brazil and Argentina;
the continuation of covert political support in Bolivia and Chile; economic
assistance to Brazil, Colombia and Chile; the protection of American business
interests in Venezuela, Argentina, Peru, and Chile. The Latin America regional
compilation emphasizes the broader themes of the administration’s policy in the
hemisphere: the Alliance for Progress; the threat of Cuban subversion; the Punta
del Este conference. This regional compilation also highlights how personalities
affected policymaking, especially the working relationship between President
Johnson and Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann. The Central America regional
compilation examines how the United States exercised its influence in the
region, from elections in Costa Rica and Guatemala to authoritarian regimes in
Honduras and Nicaragua. Given subsequent events, including the assassination of
Ambassador Gordon Mein in August 1968,
the compilation also emphasizes the U.S. response to the escalation of violence
between the insurgents and the Government in Guatemala.
The volume’s principal focus is on the President, since Lyndon Johnson made the major foreign policy
decisions during his administration. The editors sought to document his role as
far as possible. Although the foreign policy record of the
Johnson administration is voluminous, only the most
important internal discussions between Johnson and his advisers were documented. The record of
Johnson’s involvement as well as that of Secretary of
State Rusk in the policy process often had
to be pieced together from a variety of sources.
Editorial Methodology
The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in
the case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Memoranda of
conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation,
rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.
Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign
Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by
guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text
is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations,
which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed
according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in
the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors
for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and
punctuation are retained as found in the source text, except that obvious
typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the
source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic
type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text
are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in
the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of
each volume.
Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an
unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after
declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not
declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source
text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes
have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and number of
pages not declassified in their chronological place. The amount of material
omitted from this volume because it was unrelated to the subject of the volume,
however, has not been delineated. All brackets that appear in the source text
are so identified by footnotes.
The first footnote to each document indicates the document’s source, original
classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides
the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the
President or his major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been
made to determine if a document has been previously published, and, if so, this
information has been included in the source footnote.
Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not
printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources,
provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes,
describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements
that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from
memoirs and other firsthand accounts has been used when appropriate to
supplement or explicate the official record.
Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation
The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under
the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises,
and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign
Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall
compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of
the preparation and declassification of the series. Although the Advisory
Committee does not attempt to review the contents of individual volumes in the
series, it does monitor the overall process and makes recommendations on
particular problems that come to its attention.
The Advisory Committee has not reviewed this volume.
Declassification Review
The Information Response Branch of the Office of Information Programs and
Services, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the
declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review
was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order
12958 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.
The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information,
subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law
and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the
appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other
concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign
governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The final
declassification review of this volume, which began in 1997 and was completed in
2003, resulted in the decision to withhold 12 documents in full, excise a
paragraph or more in 10 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a
paragraph in 52 documents.
On the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result
of the declassification review process described above, the Office of the
Historian is confident that the documentation and editorial notes presented here
provide a substantially accurate account of the major decisions and actions that
constituted U.S. foreign policy toward South and Central America (and Mexico)
during the Johnson administration.
Acknowledgements
The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Lyndon B.
Johnson Library of the National Archives and Records Administration, especially
Regina Greenwell and Charlaine Burgess, who provided indispensable assistance in
the process of research. The editors also wish to acknowledge the assistance of
historians at the Central Intelligence Agency, especially Gerald Haines. Dallas
Lindgren of the Minnesota Historical Society provided important documentation
from the papers of former Vice President Hubert
Humphrey.
W. Taylor Fain, Jeffrey Soukup, David H. Herschler, and David C. Geyer collected
the documentation for the volume. Under the general supervision of General
Editor Edward C. Keefer, David Herschler selected and edited the documents on
Panama and Bolivia; David Geyer selected and edited the documents in the
remaining compilations. David Geyer also prepared the lists of names, sources,
and abbreviations. Vicki E. Futscher and Rita M. Baker did the copy and
technical editing and Susan C. Weetman coordinated the final declassification
review. Max Franke prepared the index.
Marc J. Susser The HistorianBureau of Public Affairs
August 2004
Johnson Administration Volumes
Following is a list of the volumes in the Foreign
Relations series for the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. The titles of individual
volumes may change. The year of publication is in parentheses.
IVietnam, 1964 (1992)IIVietnam, January–June 1965
(1996)IIIVietnam, July–December 1965
(1996)IVVietnam, 1966 (1998)VVietnam, 1967 (2002)VIVietnam, January–August 1968
(2002)VIIVietnam, September 1968–January 1969
(2003)VIIIInternational Monetary and Trade
Policy (1998)IXInternational Development and Economic
Defense Policy; Commodities (1997)XNational Security Policy
(2002)XIArms Control and Disarmament
(1997)XIIWestern Europe (2001)XIIIWestern Europe Region (1995)XIVSoviet Union (2001)XVGermany and Berlin (1999)XVICyprus; Greece; Turkey (2002)XVIIEastern Europe; Austria; Finland
(1996)XVIIIArab-Israeli Dispute, 1964–1967
(2000)XIXArab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967
(2004)XXArab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968
(2001)XXINear East Region; Arab Peninsula
(2000)XXIIIran (1999)XXIIICongoXXIVAfrica (1999)XXVSouth Asia (2000)XXVIIndonesia; Malaysia-Singapore;
Philippines (2001)XXVIIMainland Southeast Asia; Regional
Affairs (2000)XXVIIILaos (1998)XXIXPart 1, Korea (2000)XXIXPart 2, Japan (2006)XXXChina (1998)XXXISouth and Central America; Mexico
(2004)XXXIIDominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti;
Guyana (2005)XXXIIIOrganization and Management of Foreign
Policy; United Nations (2004)XXXIVEnergy Diplomacy and Global Issues
(1999)
Contents
PrefaceJohnson Administration VolumesSourcesAbbreviationsPersonsSouth and Central America; Mexico RegionalCentral AmericaArgentinaBoliviaBrazilChileColombiaEcuadorMexicoPanamaParaguay and UruguayPeruVenezuelaIndex
Sources
Sources for the Foreign Relations Series
The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published
record in the Foreign Relations series include all
records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign
policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires
that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government
engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the
Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records
pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of
selected records. Many of the sources consulted in the preparation of this
volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National
Archives and Records Administration.
The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete
access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the
central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”)
of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the
Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international
conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders
by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between
the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of
overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department’s indexed central files for
these years have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and
Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. Many of the
Department’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period, which the
National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or
are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to
Archives II.
The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full
access to the papers of President Johnson and other White
House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at
the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign
affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal
agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Department of State historians also have access to records of the Department of
Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants.
Sources for Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, Volume XXXI
In preparing this volume, the editors made extensive use of the most
authoritative source on President Johnson’s policies on
South and Central America: the Presidential papers and other White House records
at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. Within the National Security File, the Agency
Files, including files on the Alliance for Progress, the Country Files, the file
of Memos to the President, the National Security Council Meetings Files, and the
files of Walt Rostow were particularly
useful. The Thomas C. Mann Papers,
especially records of his telephone conversations with
Johnson, were also valuable in revealing the politics
behind the President’s policies.
Due to the efforts of the Johnson Library, Department of State historians have
full access to the audiotapes of President Johnson’s
telephone conversations. Johnson frequently discussed the
details of his foreign policy, including South and Central America, with his key
advisors: Secretary of State Rusk,
Secretary of Defense McNamara, Special
Assistants to the President Bundy and
Rostow, Assistant Secretary of State Mann, and senior members of Congress. As such,
the tape recordings provide an unparalleled perspective on decision-making often
missing in more formal documentation. The editors transcribed numerous tape
recordings specifically for this volume; these transcripts are printed both as
documents and in the annotation.
The records of the Department of State were also indispensable in documenting
President Johnson’s role in South and Central America.
Although the President made the important decisions, the Department of State was
primarily responsible for the development, coordination, and implementation of
the administration’s policy in the region. The editors of this volume relied
heavily upon the Department’s “subject-numeric” central files, which contain the
essential telegrams, memoranda, correspondence, and other records of U.S.
diplomacy. The editors also mined the materials found only in the Department’s
“lot” files, including the office files of Assistant Secretaries Thomas Mann, Lincoln Gordon, and Covey
Oliver, and other records maintained by the Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs. Additional high-level documentation was found in the
files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, including the records of the
Senior Interdepartmental Group, the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), the
conference files, and Secretary Rusk’s
memoranda of telephone conversations.
The Central Intelligence Agency provides Department of State historians access to
intelligence documents from records in its custody and at the Presidential
libraries. The CIA’s History Staff, part of the
Center for the Study of Intelligence, arranged and facilitated the research for
this volume, pursuant to a May 1992 memorandum of understanding.
In compiling this volume, the editors reviewed a wide array of intelligence
materials—both operational and analytical in nature—on South and Central
America. In addition to the sources cited above, these materials included the
files of the Directors of Central Intelligence John
McCone and Richard Helms, the CIA
Registry of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence
Estimates, the Directorate of Plans, and the Western Hemisphere Division. The
editors found important documentation on the meetings of the Special Group/303
Committee in the files of the National Security Council and the Department of
State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The records of the weekly meetings
between representatives of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs and the Central
Intelligence Agency also yielded valuable information on the day-to-day
decision-making on intelligence matters.
Almost all of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of the
agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the
cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration.
The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the
preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National
Archives of these records is in process. Many of the records are already
available for public review at the National Archives.
Unpublished Sources
Department of State, WashingtonCentral Files. See National Archives and
Records Administration below.Lot Files. For other lot files already
transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at
College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, see National Archives and
Records Administration below. INR/IL Historical Files Files of the Office of Intelligence Coordination,
containing records from the 1940s through the 1980s,
maintained by the Office of Intelligence Liaison,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research including:
ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings File,
ARA Country Files,
Latin America Files, LAPC Action Minutes, Special Group Files,
303 Committee Files, 303 Committee Special
FilesNational Archives and Records Administration, College
Park, MarylandRecord Group 59, Department of State RecordsSubject-Numeric Central Files. The
following are the principal files consulted for this volume. AID(AFP): economic assistance
under the Alliance for ProgressAID(AFP) 3 ECOSOC–IA: conferences of the
Inter-American Economic and Social CouncilAID(US) 5: U.S.
economic assistance, laws and regulationsAID(US) ARG: U.S.
economic assistance to ArgentinaAID(US) 7 ARG: U.S.
economic assistance to Argentina, program operation
and terminationAID(US) 8 ARG: U.S.
economic assistance to Argentina, grants and
technical assistanceAID(US) 9 ARG: U.S.
economic assistance to Argentina, loansAID(US) 10 BOL: U.S.
economic assistance to Bolivia, supporting
assistanceAID(US) BRAZ: U.S.
economic assistance to BrazilAID(US) 9 BRAZ: U.S.
economic assistance to Brazil, loansAID(US) CHILE: U.S.
economic assistance to ChileAID(US) 8 CHILE:
U.S. economic assistance to Chile, grants and
technical assistanceAID(US) 9 CHILE:
U.S. economic assistance to Chile, loansAID(US) 9 COL: U.S.
economic assistance to Colombia, loansAID(US) 8–5 ECUADOR:
U.S. economic assistance to Ecuador, health and
sanitationAID(US) 9 ECUADOR:
U.S. economic assistance to Ecuador, loansAID(US) 15–8
ECUADOR: U.S. economic assistance to Ecuador, PL 480 commodity sales for
foreign currencyAID(US) 8–8 GUAT:
U.S. economic assistance to Guatemala, community
development and social welfareAID(US) 9 PERU: U.S.
economic assistance to Peru, loansAID(VEN) VIET S: Venezuelan economic
assistance to South VietnamDEF 9 ARG: Argentine military personnelDEF 1–1 BRAZ: military contingency planning for
BrazilDEF 6 BRAZ: Brazilian armed forcesDEF 12–5 BRAZ–US: procurement and sale of
armaments from the U.S. to BrazilDEF 12 CUBA: Cuban armamentsDEF 6 IA:
inter-American armed forcesDEF 1 LA: military
policy, plans and readiness in Latin AmericaDEF 1–1 PAN: military contingency planning for
PanamaDEF 1 PERU: military policy, plans and readiness
in PeruDEF 12–5 PERU: procurement and sale of armaments
to PeruDEF 11 US: U.S. military research and
developmentDEF 19–8 US–ARG: U.S. military assistance to
Argentina, equipment and suppliesDEF 19–8 US–BRAZ: U.S. military assistance to
Brazil, equipment and suppliesDEF 19 US–PERU: U.S. military assistance to
PeruDEF 19–8 US–PERU: U.S. military assistance to
Peru, equipment and suppliesDEF 19–3 US–VEN: U.S. military assistance to
Venezuela, organizations and conferencesDEF 19–4 US–VEN: U.S. military assistance to
Venezuela, agreementsE 1 BRAZ: general
economic policy, plans and programs in BrazilECIN 3 CACM: Central American Common Market,
organizations and conferencesECIN 3 LA: economic integration in Latin America,
organizations and conferencesECIN 3 LAFTA: Latin American Free Trade Agreement,
organizations and conferencesFN 14 BRAZ: Brazilian servicing of public
debtFN 1 COL: general financial policy and plans in
ColombiaFN 16 COL: Colombian revenue and taxationFN 10 IMF:
International Monetary Fund, foreign exchangeFN 17 PERU: money and currency in PeruFN 10 PERU/IMF:
International Monetary Fund, foreign exchange in
PeruFN 6–1 VEN: bank credit and loans in
VenezuelaFN 10 VEN: foreign exchange in VenezuelaFN 11 VEN: investment guarantees in
VenezuelaFSE 12 BRAZ: electric power in BrazilFT 23 MEX: Mexican customs administrationINCO COPPER 17: copper tradeINCO COPPER CHILE: copper in ChileLAB 11 CHILE: wages, hours and working conditions
in ChileLEG 7 KENNEDY: visits of Senator Robert F. KennedyOAS 5–2:
Organization of American States, charter and
constitutionOAS 8–3:
Organization of American States, secretariatORG 7 ARA: visits
of officials from the Bureau of Inter-American
AffairsORG 7 S: visits of
the Secretary of StateORG 7 VAUGHN: visits of Assistant Secretary
Jack H.
VaughnPER 2–1: personnel, general reports and
statisticsPER Cole, Charles
W.: personnel matters relating to
Ambassador Charles W.
ColePER Mein, John
Gordon: personnel matters relating to
Ambassador John Gordon
MeinPET 15 ARG: industrial organization and control of
petroleum in ArgentinaPET 15–2 ARG: nationalization and expropriation of
petroleum in ArgentinaPET 6 PERU: petroleum companies in PeruPET 15 PERU: industrial organization and control
of petroleum in PeruPET 15–2 PERU: nationalization and expropriation
of petroleum in PeruPET 15 US: industrial organization and control of
petroleum in the U.S.PET 17–2 US: imports of petroleum to the
U.S.PET 1 US–VEN: U.S.-Venezuelan general policy and
plans on petroleumPET 17 US–VEN: U.S.-Venezuelan trade of
petroleumPET 17–2 US–VEN: U.S.-Venezuelan imports of
petroleumPET 2 VEN: general reports and statistics on
petroleum in VenezuelaPET 6 VEN: petroleum companies in VenezuelaPET 12 VEN: production and consumption of
petroleum in VenezuelaPET 15 VEN: industrial organization and control of
petroleum in VenezuelaPET 17–1 VEN: exports of petroleum from
VenezuelaPET 17–2 VEN: imports of petroleum to
VenezuelaPOL ARG: Argentine
political affairsPOL 15 ARG:
Argentine GovernmentPOL 15–1 ARG:
Argentine head of state, executive branchPOL 15–5 ARG:
Argentine constitutionPOL 16 ARG:
recognition of ArgentinaPOL 23–9 ARG:
rebellion and coups in ArgentinaPOL ARG–US:
U.S.-Argentine political relationsPOL 1–1 ARG–US: U.S.
contingency planning and coordination for
ArgentinaPOL 1–1 BOL:
contingency planning and coordination for
BoliviaPOL 7 BOL: visits
and meetings with Bolivian leadersPOL 8 BOL:
neutralism and non-alignment of BoliviaPOL 14 BOL: Bolivian
national electionsPOL 15 BOL: Bolivian
GovernmentPOL 15–1 BOL:
Bolivian head of state, executive branchPOL 16 BOL:
recognition of BoliviaPOL 23 BOL: internal
security and counter-insurgency in BoliviaPOL 23–7 BOL:
infiltration, subversion, and sabotage in
BoliviaPOL 23–9 BOL:
rebellion and coups in BoliviaPOL 30 BOL: Bolivian
defectors and expelleesPOL BOL–US:
U.S.-Bolivian political relationsPOL 1–1 BRAZ:
contingency planning and coordination for
BrazilPOL 2 BRAZ: general
reports and statistics on BrazilPOL 7 BRAZ: visits
and meetings with Brazilian leadersPOL 15 BRAZ:
Brazilian GovernmentPOL 15–1 BRAZ:
Brazilian head of state, executive branchPOL 15–3 BRAZ:
Brazilian judiciaryPOL 23–5 BRAZ:
Brazilian laws and regulationsPOL 23–9 BRAZ:
rebellion and coups in BrazilPOL 29 BRAZ:
political prisoners in BrazilPOL BRAZ–US:
U.S.-Brazilian political relationsPOL 1 BRAZ–US:
general policy and background on U.S.-Brazilian
political relationsPOL 7 BRAZ–US:
visits and meetings between U.S. and Brazilian
leadersPOL 32–1 BR GU–VEN:
territory and boundary disputes between Venezuela
and British GuianaPOL 19 BR HOND:
Colonial Government of British HondurasPOL BR HOND–GUAT:
British Honduran-Guatemalan political
relationsPOL CHILE: Chilean
political affairsPOL 1–1 CHILE:
contingency planning and coordination for
ChilePOL 7 CHILE: visits
and meetings with Chilean leadersPOL 12 CHILE:
Chilean political partiesPOL 12–3 CHILE:
Chilean political parties, meetings and
conferencesPOL 14 CHILE:
Chilean national electionsPOL 15–1 CHILE:
Chilean head of state, executive branchPOL 18–1 CHILE:
Chilean provincial, municipal and state government
electionsPOL 23–9 CHILE:
rebellion and coups in ChilePOL CHILE–US:
U.S.-Chilean political relationsPOL 17 CHILE–US:
Chilean diplomatic and consular representation in
the U.S.POL COL: Colombian
political affairsPOL 14 COL:
Colombian national electionsPOL 23 COL: internal
security and counter-insurgency in ColombiaPOL 7 COSTA RICA:
visits and meetings with Costa Rican leadersPOL 14 COSTA RICA:
Costa Rican national electionsPOL 15 COSTA RICA:
Costa Rican GovernmentPOL 15–1 COSTA RICA:
Costa Rican head of state, executive branchPOL 23–9 COSTA RICA:
rebellion and coups in Costa RicaPOL COSTA RICA–US:
U.S.-Costa Rican political relationsPOL CUBA: Cuban
political affairsPOL 6 CUBA: Cuban
people, biographic dataPOL 23–7 CUBA:
infiltration, subversion and sabotage in CubaPOL 33–3 CZ:
international canals, Panama Canal ZonePOL 15 ECUADOR:
Ecuadorian GovernmentPOL 15–1 ECUADOR:
Ecuadorian head of state, executive branchPOL 17 ECUADOR:
Ecuadorian diplomatic and consular
representationPOL 23–3 ECUADOR:
internal security forces and organizations in
EcuadorPOL 23–9 ECUADOR:
rebellion and coups in EcuadorPOL ECUADOR–US:
U.S.-Ecuadorian political relationsPOL 7 EL SAL: visits
and meetings with Salvadoran leadersPOL GUAT: Guatemalan
political affairsPOL 2 GUAT: general
reports and statistics on GuatemalaPOL 14 GUAT:
Guatemalan national electionsPOL 23 GUAT:
internal security and counter-insurgency in
GuatemalaPOL 23–8 GUAT:
demonstrations, riots and protests in
GuatemalaPOL 23–9 GUAT:
rebellion and coups in GuatemalaPOL 1 GUAT–US:
general policy and background on U.S.-Guatemalan
political relationsPOL 32–1 GUAT–UK: territory and boundary
disputes between the UK and GuatemalaPOL 1–2 HOND: basic
policies, guidelines and directives on
HondurasPOL 12 HOND:
Honduran political partiesPOL 14 HOND:
Honduran national electionsPOL 15–1 HOND:
Honduran head of state, executive branchPOL 18–1 HOND:
Honduran provincial, municipal and state government
electionsPOL 23–9 HOND:
rebellion and coups in HondurasPOL HOND–US:
U.S.-Honduran political relationsPOL 1 HOND–US:
general policy and background on U.S.-Honduran
political relationsPOL 3 IA:
Inter-American organizations and alignmentsPOL 3 IA SUMMIT:
organizations and alignments relating to the
inter-American summit meetingPOL 7 IA: visits and
meetings with inter-American leadersPOL 7 IA SUMMIT:
inter-American summit meetingPOL 1 LA–US: general policy and
background on U.S.-Latin American political
relationsPOL 7 MEX: visits
and meetings with Mexican leadersPOL 15–1 MEX:
Mexican heads of state, executive branchPOL 23–8 MEX:
demonstrations, riots and protests in MexicoPOL MEX–US:
U.S.-Mexican political relationsPOL 33–1 MEX–US:
river boundaries between the U.S. and MexicoPOL 7 NIC: visits
and meetings with Nicaraguan leadersPOL 14 NIC:
Nicaraguan national electionsPOL 15–1 NIC:
Nicaraguan head of state, executive branchPOL 23–8 NIC:
demonstrations, riots and protests in
NicaraguaPOL 23–9 NIC:
rebellion and coups in NicaraguaPOL PAN: Panamanian
political affairsPOL 2 PAN: general
reports and statistics on PanamaPOL 14 PAN:
Panamanian national electionsPOL 15 PAN:
Panamanian GovernmentPOL 15–1 PAN:
Panamanian heads of state, executive branchPOL 23–8 PAN:
demonstrations, riots and protests in PanamaPOL 33–3 PAN:
international canals, PanamaPOL PAN–US:
U.S.-Panamanian political relationsPOL 33–3 PAN–US:
U.S.-Panamanian political relations, Panama
CanalPOL 7 PAR: visits
and meetings with Paraguayan leadersPOL PAR–US:
U.S.-Paraguayan political relationsPOL PERU: Peruvian
political affairsPOL 2 PERU: general
reports and statistics on PeruPOL 15–1 PERU:
Peruvian head of state, executive branchPOL 15–2 PERU:
Peruvian legislaturePOL 16 PERU:
recognition of PeruPOL 23 PERU:
internal security and counter-insurgency in
PeruPOL 23–7 PERU:
infiltration, subversion and sabotage in PeruPOL 23–9 PERU:
rebellion and coups in PeruPOL 23–10 PERU:
travel control in PeruPOL 29 PERU:
political prisoners in PeruPOL 33–4 PERU:
Peruvian territorial watersPOL PERU–US:
U.S.-Peruvian political relationsPOL 12 UR: Uruguayan
political partiesPOL 15 UR: Uruguayan
GovernmentPOL 23–9 UR:
rebellion and coups in UruguayPOL 1 UR–US: general
policy and background on U.S.-Uruguayan political
relationsPOL 1 US: U.S.
general policy and backgroundPOL 7 US: visits and
meetings by U.S. leadersPOL 7 US/HARRIMAN: visits and
meetings by W. Averell
HarrimanPOL 15–1
US/JOHNSON: visits and
meetings by Lyndon B.
JohnsonPOL 17 US–BRAZ:
U.S.-Brazilian diplomatic and consular
representationPOL 17 US–ECUADOR:
U.S.-Ecuadorian diplomatic and consular
representationPOL 17–1 US–ECUADOR:
acceptability and accreditation of U.S.-Ecuadorian
diplomatic and consular representationPOL 17 US–PERU:
U.S.-Peruvian diplomatic and consular
representationPOL US–VEN:
U.S.-Venezuelan political relationsPOL VEN: Venezuelan
political affairsPOL 1 VEN: general
policy and background on VenezuelaPOL 7 VEN: visits
and meetings with Venezuelan leadersPOL 14 VEN:
Venezuelan national electionsPOL 15 VEN:
Venezuelan GovernmentPOL 15–1 VEN:
Venezuelan head of state, executive branchPOL 23 VEN: internal
security and counter-insurgency in VenezuelaPOL 23–8 VEN:
demonstrations, riots and protests in
VenezuelaPOL 23–9 VEN:
rebellion and coups in VenezuelaPOL 33–4 VEN:
Venezuelan territorial watersPOL 33–4 VEN–CUBA:
territorial waters between Cuba and VenezuelaPPB 3: press and publications, organizations and
conferencesPPB 9 BRAZ: press relations and activities in
BrazilSOC 12–1 BRAZ: religion in BrazilTEL PERU: telecommunications in PeruLot FilesARA Files: Lot 68 D
385 Subject and country files of the Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs, 1964–1966, including
minutes and policy documents on the Latin American
Policy Committee, 1964.ARA Files: Lot 70 D
295 Subject and country files of the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, 1965–1967ARA Files: Lot 68 D
93 Files of Lincoln
Gordon: subject files as Ambassador to
Brazil, 1961–1966; subject, country, and
chronological files as Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs, 1966, including
staff assistants’ filesARA Files: Lot 70 D
150 Subject and country files of the Office of
the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs, 1967ARA Files: Lot 72 D
33 Country files and chronological files of the
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 1967–1969ARA Files: Lot 74 D
467 Country files, chronological files, subject
files, and staff assistants’ files for Assistant
Secretaries of State for Inter-American Affairs,
Covey
Oliver and Charles Meyer,
1967–1971ARA/APU/A Files:
Lot 66 D 243 Subject and chronological files of the
Office of Argentine, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan
Affairs on Argentina, 1964, including
correspondence with the Embassy in Buenos
AiresARA/APU/A Files:
Lot 69 D 87 Subject files of the Office of Argentine,
Paraguayan, and Uruguayan Affairs on Argentina,
1964–1967ARA/APU/U Files:
Lot 67 D 468 Subject files of the Office of Argentine,
Paraguayan, and Uruguayan Affairs on Uruguay,
1964ARA/BC/B Files:
Lot 70 D 443 Political subject files of the Office of
Bolivian-Chilean Affairs on Bolivia,
1961–1967ARA/BR Files: Lot
66 D 418 Subject files of the Office of Brazilian
Affairs, 1962–1964ARA/CEN Files:
Lot 69 D 515 General subject files of the Office of
Central American Affairs, 1967ARA/CEN/G Files:
Lot 68 D 464 Subject files of the Office of Central
American Affairs on Guatemala, 1966ARA/CEN/G Files:
Lot 70 D 75 Subject files of the Office of Central
American Affairs on Guatemala, 1967ARA/CEN/H Files:
Lot 67 D 46 Subject and chronological files of the
Office of Central American Affairs on Honduras,
1964ARA/CEN/H Files:
Lot 70 D 59 Subject files of the Office of Central
American Affairs on Honduras, 1967–1968ARA/CEN/ BH
Files: Lot 69 D 528 Subject files of the Office of Central
American Affairs on British Honduras,
1966–1967ARA/CV Files: Lot
67 D 622 Subject and chronological files of the
Office of Colombian-Venezuelan Affairs on
Colombia, 1965ARA/CV/C Files:
Lot 69 D 407 Subject and chronological files of the
Office of Colombian-Venezuelan Affairs on
Colombia, 1966ARA/EP/E Files:
Lot 70 D 247 Political subject files of the Office of
Ecuadorian-Peruvian Affairs on Ecuador,
1967ARA/EP/E Files:
Lot 70 D 478 Political subject files of the Office of
Ecuadorian-Peruvian Affairs on Ecuador,
1968ARA/EP/P Files:
Lot 67 D 566 Subject files of the Office of
Ecuadorian-Peruvian Affairs on Peru,
1955–1964ARA/EP/P Files:
Lot 72 D 101 Subject files of the Office of
Ecuadorian-Peruvian Affairs on Peru,
1959–1968ARA/EP/P Files:
Lot 70 D 139 Subject files of the Office of
Ecuadorian-Peruvian Affairs on Peru,
1966–1967ARA/IRG Files: Lot 70 D 122 Meeting and subject files of the
Interdepartmental Regional Group for
Inter-American Affairs, 1966–1968ARA/IPA Files: Lot
69 D 537 Files of the Office of Inter-American
Political Affairs on the meeting of American
Presidents at Punta del Este in 1967ARA/LA Files: Lot
66 D 65 Country files of Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Mann,
1964ARA/MEX Files:
Lot 69 D 377 Subject files of the Office of Mexican
Affairs, 1966ARA/MEX Files:
Lot 71 D 188 Files of the Office of Mexican Affairs on
Presidential visits and inaugurations,
1958–1967ARA/NC Files: Lot
72 D 235 Official correspondence of the Director of
the Office of North Coast Affairs,
1964–1970ARA/NC/V Files:
Lot 66 D 469 Subject files of the Office of North Coast
Affairs on Venezuela, 1965ARA/NC/V Files:
Lot 69 D 19 Subject files of the Office of North Coast
Affairs on Venezuela, 1968ARA/OAS Files: Lot 70 D 272 Files of the Office of the US Representative
to the Council of the Organization of American
States on the meeting of American Presidents at
Punta del Este in 1967ARA/PAN Files: Lot
66 D 329 Subject files of the Office of Panamanian
Affairs, 1963–1964ARA/PAN Files: Lot
75 D 457 Files of the Office of Panamanian Affairs on
the Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 1964–1973,
including position papers, memoranda, and
correspondence to and from the PresidentARA/SR/PAN Files:
Lot 73 D 216 Files of the Special Representative for
Interoceanic Canal Negotiations; historical
documents on the Panama Canal treaty negotiations,
1961–1968ARA/SR/PAN Files:
Lot 73 D 286 Files of the Special Representative for
Interoceanic Canal Negotiations; historical
documents on the Panama Canal treaty negotiations,
1964–1967Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586 Collection of documentation on international
conferences abroad attended by the President,
Secretary of State, or other U.S. officials,
September 1966–April 1967Conference Files: Lot 68 D 453 Collection of documentation on international
conferences abroad attended by the President,
Secretary of State, or other U.S. officials, May
1967–January 1968Conference Files: Lot 69 D 182 Collection of documentation on international
conferences abroad attended by the President,
Secretary of State, or other U.S. officials,
1968E/OR/FSE Files: Lot 69
D 76 Subject, country, and chronological files of
the Office of Fuels and Energy, Bureau of Economic
Affairs, 1963–1965E/OR/FSE Files: Lot 70
D 54 Subject, country, and chronological files of
the Office of Fuels and Energy, Bureau of Economic
Affairs, 1965–1966Katzenbach Files: Lot 74 D 271 Files of Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach, 1966–1969Lima Embassy Files: Lot 69 F 191 Classified central subject files of the US
Embassy in Lima, 1966Lima Embassy Files: Lot 71 F 154 Subject case files of the US Embassy in Lima
on the International Petroleum Company,
1962–1968Lima Embassy Files: Lot 73 F 100 Classified personal files of Ambassador
J. Wesley
Jones, 1965–1971Official Visit Chronologies: Lot 68 D 475 Collection of documentation on international
conferences abroad attended by the President,
Secretary of State, or other U.S. officials,
1967OPR/FAIM/IS Files: Lot 81 D 121 Files maintained by the Foreign Affairs
Management Center, Information Services Division,
for congressional investigations on Chile, the
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation,
and the Central Intelligence AgencyRusk Files:
Lot 72 D 192 Files of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 1961–1969,
including texts of speeches, miscellaneous
correspondence files, White House correspondence,
chronological files, and memoranda of telephone
conversationsSenior Interdepartmental Group Files: Lot 70 D 263 Master file maintained by the Executive
Secretariat on the meetings and decisions of the
Senior Interdepartmental Group, 1968–1969Special Group (CI)
Files: Lot 70 D 258 Master file maintained by the Executive
Secretariat on the meetings and decisions of
Special Group (Counter-Insurgency),
1963–1966U. Alexis
Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 408 Chronological files of Deputy Under
Secretary of State U.
Alexis Johnson, including his date
books, 1961–1976Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, TexasNational Security File Agency FileCountry FileWalt W. Rostow
FilesIntelligence FileInternational Meetings and Travel FileMemos to the PresidentName FileNational Security Council HistoriesNational Security Council Meetings FileNational Security Action MemorandumsSituation Room FileSpecial Heads of State CorrespondenceSubject File Special FilesPresident’s Daily DiaryRecordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings Personal PapersGeorge Ball
PapersTom Johnson’s Notes of MeetingsJohn McCone
Memoranda of Meetings with the PresidentThomas C. Mann
PapersJohn Wesley Jones PapersDean Rusk Appointment
BooksWhite House Central Files Cabinet PapersConfidential FileSubject FileMinnesota Historical SocietyHubert H. Humphrey Papers Vice Presidential Files, Foreign Affairs General
FilesCentral Intelligence AgencyDCI Files: Job 80–B–01285A Files of the Directors of Central Intelligence John McCone and Richard
Helms including: McCone Memos for the Record, McCone Meetings with
President Johnson, McCone Telephone Calls,
Helms
Chronological File as DDP
and DDCIDO Files: Job 80–01690R, Job 90–1156R Files of the Western Hemisphere Division (Latin America
Division), Directorate of Plans (Directorate of
Operations)DO Files: Job 90–347R Files of the Directorate of PlansDDO/IMS Files: Job 78–03041R, Job 78–5505, Job 78–06423A, Job
88–01415R Files of the Directorate of PlansO/DDI Registry: Job 79–R01012A Files of the Office of the Deputy Director of
IntelligenceNational Security CouncilJohnson Administration Intelligence
Files303 Committee Files MinutesSubject FilesWashington National Records Center, Suitland,
MarylandRecord Group 59, Records of the Department of
StateE/CBA/REP Files: FRC 72 A 6248 Current Economic DevelopmentsRecord Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service
Posts of the United StatesGuatemala City Embassy Files, 1966: FRC 71 A 2420 Subject files of the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala,
1966Santiago Embassy Files, 1964: FRC 69 A 6507 Subject files of the U.S. Embassy in Chile,
1964Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the
Secretary of DefenseOSD Files: FRC 69 A 7425 Decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 1964OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266 Decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 1965OSD Files: FRC 72 A 2468 Decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 1967OSD Files: FRC 73 A 1250 Decimal files of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, 1968OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 7425 Official top secret and secret files of the
Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
and their special assistants, 1964OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306 Secret files of the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs, 1964OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023 Top Secret files of the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs, 1964OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717 Decimal files of the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs, 1965National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington,
D.C.Maxwell Taylor Papers
Published Sources
Ball, George W.The Past Has Another Pattern. New York: W.W. Norton,
1982.Berle, Beatrice Bishop and Travis
Beal Jacob, eds. Navigating the Rapids, 1918–1971: From
the Papers of Adolf A.
Berle. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973.Beschloss, Michael, ed. Taking
Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes,
1963–1964. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997.Bird, Kai.The Chairman: John J. McCloy, the Making of the American
Establishment. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.Califano, Joseph A., Jr. The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon
Johnson: The White House Years. New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1991.Humphrey, Hubert H.The Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics.
Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976.Johnson, Lyndon B.The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency,
1963–1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.Jorden William J. Panama Odyssey. Austin, Texas:
University of Texas Press, 1984.Larsen, Stanley R. and James L. Collins. Allied
Participation in the Vietnam War. Washington, D.C.: Department of
the Army, 1975.Martin, Edward M.Kennedy and Latin America.
Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1994.McPherson, Harry. A Political Education: A Journal of Life with Senators, Generals,
Cabinet Members and Presidents. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972.National Archives and Records Administration. Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower. U.S.
Government Printing Office: Washington. ———. Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: John F. Kennedy. U.S. Government Printing
Office: Washington.———. Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson. U.S. Government Printing Office:
Washington.Ryan, Henry Butterfield.The Fall of Che Guevara: A Story of Soldiers, Spies, and
Diplomats. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. Robert Kennedy and His
Times. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978.U.S. Department of State. American Foreign Policy:
Current Documents. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. ———. Bulletin, 1964–1968. Washington,
1964–1968.United States Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on
Foreign Aid Expenditures. United States Aid in Action: A
Case Study. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1966.Walters, Vernon A.Silent Missions. Garden City, New York: Doubleday,
1978.
Abbreviations
AALAPSO, Afro-Asian-Latin American
Peoples’ Solidarity OrganizationABC, American Broadcasting
CompanyACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament
AgencyAD, Acción Democrática (Democratic
Action), Venezuelan political partyADDP, Assistant Deputy Director for
Plans, Central Intelligence AgencyAFL–CIO, American Federation of
Labor–Congress of Industrial OrganizationsAFP, Alliance for ProgressAID, Agency for International
DevelopmentAID/OPS, Agency for International
Development, Office of Public SafetyAID/W, Agency for International
Development/WashingtonAIFLD, American Institute for Free
Labor DevelopmentAMFORP, American and Foreign Power
CompanyANAPO, Alianza Nacional Popular
(Popular National Alliance), Colombian political partyANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and
the United StatesAP, Associated PressAPRA, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria
Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance), Peruvian political
partyARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
Department of StateARA/APU, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Office of Argentine, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan AffairsARA/BC, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Office of Bolivian-Chilean AffairsARA/BR, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Office of Brazilian AffairsARA/CEN, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Office of Central American AffairsARA/CV, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Office of Colombian-Venezuelan AffairsARA/EP, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Office of Ecuadorian-Peruvian AffairsARA/LA, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Department of State; Bureau for Latin America, Agency for
International DevelopmentARA/MEX, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Office of Mexican AffairsARA/NC, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Office of North Coast AffairsARA/OAP, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Office of Central American and Panamanian AffairsARENA, Aliança Renovadora Nacional
(National Renewal Alliance), Brazilian political partyARMA, Army AttachéAV, aviationBA, Buenos AiresBG, British GuianaBOB, Bureau of the BudgetCA, Central AmericaCABEI, Central American Bank for
Economic IntegrationCACM, Central American Common
MarketCAS, Controlled American SourceCASP, Country Analysis and Strategy
PaperCCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
(Farm Service Agency of the Department of Agriculture)CEA, Council of Economic
AdvisersCGT, Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores
(General Command of Workers), BrazilChicom, Chinese CommunistCI, counter insurgencyCIA, Central Intelligence
AgencyCIAP, Comité Interamericana de la
Alianza para el Progreso (Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for
Progress)CINC, Commander-in-ChiefCINCLANT, Commander-in-Chief,
AtlanticCINCSO, Commander-in-Chief,
Southern CommandCINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief,
Strike ForceCOAS, Council of the Organization of
American StatesCOIN, counter insurgencyCOMIBOL, Corporacion Minera de
Bolivia (Bolivian Mining Corporation)COMUSARSO, Commander, US Army,
Southern CommandCOPEC, Companïá de Petróleos de
Chile (Chilean Petroleum Company)COPEI, Comité de Organización
Politica Electoral Independiente (Committee of Independent Electoral
Political Organization), Venezuelan political partyCORFO, Corporación de Fomento de la
Producción (Production Development Corporation), ChileCOS, Chief of StationCPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet
UnionCS, Clandestine Service (Central
Intelligence Agency); o-chlorobenzalmalononitrile (a dispersal agent or tear
gas)CST, Central Standard TimeCT, Country TeamCY, calendar yearDAO, Defense Attaché OfficeDATT, Defense AttachéDCI, Director of Central
IntelligenceDCM, Deputy Chief of MissionDDCI, Deputy Director of Central
IntelligenceDDP, Deputy Director for Plans,
Central Intelligence AgencyDeptel, Department of State
telegramDF, Frente Democrática (Democratic
Front), Chilean electoral allianceDIA, Defense Intelligence
AgencyDissem, disseminationDOD, Department of DefenseDOD/ISA, Department of Defense,
Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security AffairsDR, Dominican RepublicE, Bureau of Economic Affairs,
Department of State; EscudosEA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Department of StateECOSOC, Economic and Social
CouncilEmb, EmbassyEmbtel, Embassy telegramEsso, Standard Oil of New
JerseyEST, Eastern Standard TimeEUR, Bureau of European and Canadian
Affairs, Department of StateExdis, Exclusive DistributionEximbank, Export-Import Bank of
the United StatesFAA, Foreign Assistance Act of
1961FALN, Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación
Nacional (Armed Forces of National Liberation), VenezuelaFAO, Food and Agriculture
Organization, United NationsFAR, Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (Rebel
Armed Forces), GuatemalaFBI, Federal Bureau of
InvestigationFDP, Fuerza Democrática Popular
(Popular Democratic Force), Venezuelan political partyFND, Frente Nacional Democrático
(Democratic National Front), Venezuelan political partyFonMin, Foreign MinisterFRAP, Frente de Acción Popular
(Popular Action Front), Chilean electoral allianceFSB, Falange Socialista Boliviana
(Bolivian Socialist Falange), BoliviaFTN, Frente Nacional (National Front),
Colombian Government coalitionFY, fiscal yearFYI, for your informationG, Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Political AffairsG/PM, Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Politico-Military AffairsGATT, General Agreement on Tariffs
and TradeGN, Guard NacionaleGNP, Gross National ProductGOA, Government of ArgentinaGOB, Government of Bolivia; Government
of BrazilGOC, Government of Chile; Government
of ColombiaGOCR, Government of Costa RicaGOE, Government of EcuadorGOG, Government of GuatemalaGOH, Government of HondurasGOM, Government of MexicoGON, Government of NicaraguaGOP, Government of Panama; Government
of PeruGOU, Government of UruguayGOV, Government of VenezuelaHEW, Department of Health, Education,
and WelfareIA, Inter-American; Institutional Act
(Ato Institucional)IADB, Inter-American Development
BankIA-ECOSOC, Inter-American
Economic and Social CouncilIAF, Inter-American ForceIAPF, Inter-American Peace
ForceIBRD, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)IBWC, International Boundary and
Water CommissionIDA, International Development
AssociationIDB, Inter-American Development
BankIMF, International Monetary
FundINDAP, Instituto de desarrollo
agropecvario (Institute of Agricultural Development)INR, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of StateINR/DDC, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Deputy Director for CoordinationINR/RAR, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Office of Research and Analysis for American RepublicsIPC, International Petroleum
CompanyIRG, Interdepartmental Regional
GroupIRG/ARA, Interdepartmental Regional
Group for Inter-American AffairsITT, International Telephone and
Telegraph CorporationJBUSMC, Joint Brazil–United States
Military CommissionJCS, Joint Chiefs of StaffL, Office of the Legal Adviser,
Department of StateLA, Latin America; Bureau for Latin
America, Agency for International DevelopmentLAFTA, Latin American Free Trade
AssociationLAPC, Latin American Policy
CommitteeLASO, Latin American Solidarity
OrganizationLBJ, Lyndon Baines JohnsonLDC, less developed countryLimdis, Limited DistributionLME, London Metals ExchangeLSD, landing ship, destroyerM, Under Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs; Under Secretary of State for Political AffairsMAP, Military Assistance
ProgramMAS, Military Assistance SalesMDAP, Mutual Defense Assistance
ProgramMFM, Meeting of Foreign
MinistersMILGP, Military GroupMIR, Movimiento de la Izquierda
Revolucionaria (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), VenezuelaMLN, Movimiento de Liberación Nacional
(National Liberation Movement), GuatemalaMMT, Military Mobile Training
TeamMNR, Movimiento Nacionalista
Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Movement), BoliviaMNRI, Movimiento Naciondista
Revolucionario de Izqierda (Revolutionary Party of the National Left),
BoliviaMOD, Minister of DefenseMOIP, Mandatory Oil Import
ProgramMPC, Moviemento Popular Christiano
(Popular Christian Movement), BoliviaMRL, Movimiento Revolucionario Liberal
(Liberal Revolutionary Movement), ColombiaNATO, North Atlantic Treaty
OrganizationNCG, National Council of Government,
UruguayNCO, non-commissioned officerNIE, National Intelligence
EstimateNIH, National Institutes of
HealthNodis, No DistributionNoforn, No Foreign
DistributionNSA, National Security AgencyNSAM, National Security Action
MemorandumNSC, National Security CouncilNU, National Union Party, PanamaOAS, Organization of American
StatesOARS, other American RepublicsODECA, Organization of Central
American StatesOECD, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and DevelopmentOEO, Office of Economic
OpportunityOEP, Office of Emergency
PlanningOPR/LS, Office of Operations,
Language Services Division, Department of StateOSD, Office of the Secretary of
DefensePCB, Partido Comunista Boliviano
(Bolivian Communist Party)PCB, Partido Comunista Brasileiro
(Brazilian Communist Party)PCV, Partido Comunista Venezolano
(Venezuelan Communist Party)PDC, Partido Democrático Cristiana
(Christian Democratic Party), ChilePetrobrás, Petróleo
Brasileiro, S.A., national petroleum company of BrazilPGT, Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo
(Guatemalan Labor Party)PID, Partido Institucional Democrático
(Democratic Institutional Party), GuatemalaPL, Public LawPLN, Partido Liberacion Nacional
(National Liberation Party), Costa RicaPLN, Partido Liberal Nacionalista
(Nationalist Liberal Party), NicaraguaPOL, petroleum, oil, lubricantsPOLAD, Political AdviserPR, Partido Radical (Radical Party),
ChilePR, Partido Revolucionario
(Revolutionary Party), GuatemalaPRA, Partido Revolucionario Auténtico,
(Authentic Revolutionary Party), BoliviaPRI, Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party), MexicoPRIN, Partido Revolucionario de la
Izquierda Nacional (Revolutionary Party of the Nationalist Left),
BoliviaPSD, Partido Social Democrático
(Social Democratic Party), BrazilPTB, Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro
(Brazilian Labor Party)ref, referencereftel, reference telegramrpt, repeatS, Office of the Secretary of
StateSEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty
OrganizationSecto, series indicator for
telegrams from the Secretary of State while away from Washingtonseptel, separate telegramSIG, Senior Interdepartmental
GroupSNIE, Special National Intelligence
EstimateSPEU, Special Police Emergency Unit,
PeruS/S, Executive Secretariat, Department
of StateS/S–S, Executive Secretariat Staff,
Department of StateSUDENE, Superintency for the
Development of the Northeast, BrazilTDY, temporary dutyTOAID, series indicator for
communications to the Agency for International DevelopmentTosec, series indicator for
telegrams to the Secretary of State while away from WashingtonU, Under Secretary of StateUCRP, Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo
(Peoples’ Radical Civic Union), Argentine political partyUDN, Uniäo Democrática Nacional
(National Democratic Union), Brazilian political partyUK, United KingdomUN, United NationsUNCTAD, United Nations Conference
on Trade and DevelopmentUNGA, United Nations General
AssemblyURD, Unión Republicana Democrática
(Democratic Republican Union), Venezuelan political partyUSCINCSO, Commander-in-Chief,
Southern CommandUSA, United States ArmyUSAID, Agency for International
DevelopmentUSG, United States GovernmentUSIA, United States Information
AgencyUSIS, United States Information
ServiceUSSR, Union of Soviet Socialist
RepublicsUSUN, United States Mission to the
United NationsUTC, Unión de Trabajadores de Colombia
(Union of Colombian Workers)WH, White HouseWHD, Western Hemisphere Division,
Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence AgencyYPFB, Yacimientos petrolíferos
fiscales bolivianos, (Bolivian National Oilfields)
Persons
Ackley, H. Gardner, Chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers November 1964–March 1968Adair, Charles W., Jr.,
Ambassador to Panama from May 6, 1965Adams, Robert W., Chief of the
Political Section of the Embassy in Mexico until February 1964; Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs to March 1965;
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs March
1965– May 1966Agüero Rocha, Fernando, leader
of the Partido Conservador Tradicionalista in Nicaragua; Union Nacional de
Oposición candidate for President, February 1967Ailes, Stephen, Under Secretary
of the Army until January 28, 1964; Secretary of the Army until June 30,
1965Alemán, Roberto, Special
Panamanian Representative, United States–Panama Relations (after April 1965
Inter-Oceanic Canal Negotiations), from November 1964Alessandri Rodríguez, Jorge,
President of Chile until November 4, 1964Allen, Ward P., Director,
Office of Regional Political Affairs (after June 1965 Office of
Inter-American Political Affairs), Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
Department of State, and Alternate U.S. Representative on the Council of the
Organization of American States until October 1967Allende Gossens, Salvador,
Senator (PSP, Chile); FRAP candidate for
President, September 1964; President of the Chilean Senate from December
1966Alsogaray, Alvaro C.,
Argentine Ambassador at Large July–September 1966; Argentine Ambassador to
the United States October 1966–September 1968Alsogaray, Major General Julio
R., (later Lieutenant General), Commander of the First
Army Corps in Argentina in June 1966; Head of the Military Household;
Commander-in-Chief of the Army December 1966–August 1968Anderson, Robert B., Special
U.S. Representative, U.S.–Panama Relations (after April 1965 Inter-Oceanic
Canal Negotiations) from April 1964Arenales Catalán, Emilio,
Foreign Minister of Guatemala from July 1966Arias Espinosa, Ricardo M.,
Panamanian Ambassador to the United States October 1964–January 1968Arias Madrid, Arnulfo, former
President of Panama; leader of the Panameñista Party; Panameñista candidate
for President, May 1964; National Union candidate for President, May 1968;
President of Panama October 1–October 12, 1968Arosemena Gómez, Otto,
President of Ecuador November 16, 1966–September 1,1968Balaguer, Joaquín Videla,
President of the Dominican Republic from July 1, 1966Ball, George W., Under
Secretary of State until September 30, 1966; U.S. Permanent Representative
to the United Nations June 26–September 25, 1968Barall, Milton, special
assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
Deputy U.S. Representative to the Inter-American Economic and Social
Committee, and Alternate U.S. Representative on the Inter-American Committee
on the Alliance for Progress, May 1964–July 1966Barneby, Malcolm R., Deputy
Director, Office of Ecuadorian-Peruvian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Department of State, September 1964–October 1965; Director until
June 1967Barnes, Donald F., interpreter
in the Language Services Division, Office of Operations, Department of
StateBarr, Joseph, Under Secretary
of the Treasury April 29, 1965–December 22, 1968; thereafter Secretary of
the TreasuryBarrientos Ortuño, General
René, Vice President of Bolivia August–November 1964;
leader of the military junta in Bolivia November 5, 1964–May 26, 1965;
Co-President of Bolivia May 26, 1965–January 5, 1966; President of Bolivia
from August 6, 1966Barrios, Gonzalo, Venezuelan
Minister of Interior March 1964–November 1966; thereafter Secretary General
of Acción Democrática; AD candidate for
President December 1968Belaunde Terry, Fernando,
President of Peru until October 3, 1968Belcher, Taylor G., Director,
Office of West Coast Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department
of State, until February 1964Bell, David E., Administrator
of the Agency for International Development until July 31, 1966Bell, John O., Ambassador to
Guatemala until August 26, 1965Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr.,
Ambassador to the Dominican Republic until April 13, 1966Berle, Adolf A., former
Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Brazil; emeritus professor of
law, Columbia University; chairman of the board, Twentieth Century
FundBerlin, Lawrence H., Deputy
Director, Office of Ecuadorian-Peruvian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Department of State, from March 1967Bernbaum, Maurice M.,
Ambassador to Ecuador until January 14, 1965; Ambassador to Venezuela from
February 4, 1965Betancourt, Rómulo, President
of Venezuela until March 11, 1964Bloomfield, Richard J.,
Director, Office of Ecuadorian-Peruvian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Department of State, October 1967–July 1968Bohlen, Charles E., Deputy
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 11, 1968Bosch, Juan, former President
of the Dominican RepublicBoster, Davis E., special
assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
January 1964–April 1965Bowdler, William G., Deputy
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department
of State, until April 1965; member of the National Security Council staff
until September 1968; Ambassador to El Salvador from September 26,
1968Boyd, Aquilino Edgardo,
Panamanian Permanent Representative to the United NationsBreen, John R., Deputy
Director, Office of Development Planning and Programs, Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, January 1967–July 1968;
thereafter Director, Office of Central American AffairsBrewin, Roger C.,
Officer-in-Charge of Bolivian Political Affairs, Office of Bolivian-Chilean
Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, June
1964–August 1966Brezhnev, Leonid I., General
Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union from
October 1964Briz(z)ola, Leonel, former
Governor of Rio Grande do Sul; Congressman (PTB-Guanabara) until April 1964; brother-in-law of President
GoulartBroderick, William D., Deputy
Director, Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Department of State, July 1966–August 1968Broe, William V., Chief of the
Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence
Agency, from June 1965Bronheim, David, Deputy U.S.
Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress July 1965–July 1967Brown, Aaron S., Ambassador to
Nicaragua until May 3, 1967Bulhões, Otávio Gouvéia de,
Brazilian Minister of Finance April 1964–March 1967Bundy, McGeorge, Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until February 28,
1966Bunker, Ellsworth, U.S.
Representative on the Council of the Organization for American States
January 29, 1964–November 7, 1966; Ambassador at Large November 8,
1966–April 11, 1967Burnham, Linden Forbes
Sampson, Prime Minister of British Guiana December
1964–May 1966; thereafter Prime Minister of GuyanaBurrows, Charles R.,
Ambassador to Honduras until June 28, 1965; Director, Office of Central
American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State,
November 1965–July 1968Burton, Ralph J., Director,
Office of Brazilian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of
State, until March 1965Busby, Horace, Jr., Special
Assistant to the President until October 1965Caldera Rodríguez, Rafael,
founder and leader of the Comité de Organización Política Electoral
Independiente, Venezuela; COPEI candidate for President December 1968;
thereafter President-elect of VenezuelaCalifano, Joseph A., Jr.,
General Counsel, Department of the Army, until March 1964; Special Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense until July 1965; thereafter Special Assistant to
the PresidentCalle Restropo, Diego,
Colombian Finance Minister, February 1964–March 1965Campos, Roberto de Oliveira,
former Brazilian Ambassador to the United States; Brazilian Minister of
Planning and Economic Cooperation April 1964–March 1967Carlson, Reynold E.,
Ambassador to Colombia from September 16, 1966Carrillo Flores, Antonio,
Mexican Ambassador to the United States until November 1964; Foreign
Minister of Mexico from December 1, 1964Carter, Albert E., Deputy
Director of Coordination for Intelligence and Research, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until December 1965Carter, Lieutenant General Marshall
S.,USA, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
until April 28, 1965; thereafter Director of the National Security
AgencyCastello Branco, General Humberto de
Alencar, Chief of Staff of the Army in Brazil until
April 1964; President of Brazil April 15, 1964–March 15, 1967Castro, Raul H., Ambassador to
El Salvador October 3, 1964–July 17, 1968; Ambassador to Bolivia from August
1, 1968Castro Ruz, Fidel, Premier of
CubaCater, S. Douglass Jr.,
Special Assistant to the President July 1965–October 1968Chamorro Cardenal, Pedro
Joaquín, owner and publisher of La
Prensa in Nicaragua; coordinator of the Union Nacional de Oposición
during the 1967 Presidential campaignChase, Gordon, member of the
National Security Council staff until January 1966Chayes, Abram J., Legal
Adviser, Department of State, until June 27, 1964Chiari Junior, Roberto
Francisco, President of Panama until October 1,
1964Christian, George E., Special
Assistant and Press Secretary to the President from February 1967Clark, Edward W., Director,
Office of Panamanian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department
of State, August 1964–June 1968Clifford, Clark M., Secretary
of Defense from March 1, 1968Cline, Ray S., Deputy Director
for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, until January 1966;
thereafter Special Assistant to the Director for Central IntelligenceCoerr, Wymberley deR.,
Ambassador to Uruguay until January 22, 1965; Ambassador to Ecuador February
4, 1965–October 7, 1967Cole, Charles W., Ambassador
to Chile until September 27, 1964Collins, V. Lansing, Director,
Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs (after March 12, 1964,
Office of Panamanian Affairs), Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department
of State, until August 1964Costa e Silva, General Arturo
da, Chief of the Brazilian Army Department of Production
and Works until April 1964; Brazilian Minister of War April 1964–June 1966;
ARENA candidate for President, October 1966; President of Brazil from March
15, 1967Costa Méndez, Nicanor, Foreign
Minister of Argentina from July 5, 1966Cottrell, Sterling J., Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until February 1964;
Special Adviser to the Special U.S. Representative, U.S.-Panama Relations,
May 1964–April 1965; Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy in Venezuela, until
April 1967Crimmins, John H., Coordinator
of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State,
until January 1966; Ambassador to the Dominican Republic from June 27,
1966Crowley, John J.. Jr.,
Officer-in-Charge of Venezuelan Affairs, Office of Colombian-Venezuelan
Affairs (after May 1966 Officer-in-Charge of Venezuelan Political Affairs,
Office of North Coast Affairs), Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department
of State, August 1964–August 1966; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission,
Embassy in EcuadorDe Gaulle, Charles, President
of FranceDe la Rosa, Diógenes, Special
Panamanian Representative, U.S.-Panama Relations (after April 1965
Inter-Oceanic Canal Negotiations) from November 1964De Lavalle, Juan Bautista,
Peruvian Representative to the Council of the Organization of American
States until February 1968; also Chairman of the General Committee on the
Council of the Organization of American States until November 1964Delvalle, Max, First Vice
President of Panama October 1964–September 1968; rival President of Panama
March 25–October 1, 1968Denney, George C., Jr., Deputy
Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
StateDentzer, William T., Jr.,
Director, Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, March 1964–August 1965; Director, AID Mission in Peru, until September 1968Díaz Ordaz, Gustavo,PRI candidate for President, July 1964;
President of Mexico from December 1, 1964Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary
of the Treasury until March 31, 1965Dirksen, Everett M., Senator
(Republican–Illinois); Senate Minority LeaderDreyfuss, John T.,
Officer-in-Charge of Argentine Political and Development Affairs, Office of
Argentine, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Department of State, December 1965–August 1968Duke, Angier Biddle, Chief of
Protocol, Department of State, until January 20, 1965Dungan, Ralph A., Special
Assistant to the President until September 1964; Ambassador to Chile
November 24, 1964–August 2, 1967Durán Neumann, Julio, Senator
(PR, Chile); DF candidate for President,
September 1963–March 16, 1964; PR candidate for President from April 5,
1964Eaton, Samuel D., Deputy
Director, Office of Colombian-Venezuelan Affairs (after May 1966 Office of
North Coast Affairs), Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State,
April 1965–July 1966; Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs July 1966–August 1967Echandi Jiménez, Mario, former
President of Costa RicaEisenhower, Dwight D., former
President of the United StatesEisenhower, Milton S.,
President of Johns Hopkins University until June 1967; Special Adviser on
Latin American Affairs from December 1967Eleta Almaran, Fernando,
Foreign Minister of Panama October 1964–September 1968Ensor, Andrew F., Chief, Fuels
and Energy Division, Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic
Affairs, Department of State, later Director, Office of Fuels and Energy, to
1966Evans, Allan, Deputy Director
for Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
StateFigueres Ferrer, José, former
President of Costa RicaFitzGerald, Desmond, Deputy
Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division for Cuban Affairs, Directorate of
Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, until March 1964; Chief of the Western
Hemisphere Division March 1964–June 1965; Deputy Director for Plans until
July 1967Fitzgerald, John F., Deputy
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department
of State, May 1966–July 1967; thereafter CoordinatorFord, Gerald R.,
Representative (Republican–Michigan); House Minority Leader from January
1965Foster, William C., Director
of the Arms Control and Disarmament AgencyFowler, Henry H., Secretary of
the Treasury April 1, 1965–December 23, 1968Fowler, James R., Deputy U.S.
Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress from August 1967Frank, Richard A., Assistant
Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, November
1966–September 1968Freeman, Fulton, Ambassador to
Colombia until February 1964; Ambassador to Mexico from March 4, 1964Freeman, Orville L., Secretary
of AgricultureFrei Montalva, Eduardo,
Senator (PDC, Chile); PDC candidate for President, September 1964;
President of Chile from November 4, 1964Friedman, Alvin, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Far East
and Latin America) 1964–1966Fulbright, J. William, Senator
(Democrat–Arkansas); Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
CommitteeGardner, James R., Deputy
Director of Coordination for Intelligence and Research, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from December 1965Gaud, William S., Deputy
Administrator of the Agency for International Development February
1964–August 2, 1966; thereafter AdministratorGestido, Oscar, President of
Uruguay March 1–December 6, 1967Glaessner, Philip J. W.,
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Capital Development, Bureau for Latin
America, Agency for International Development; from March 12, 1964, also
Director, Office of Capital Development, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
Department of StateGoodpaster, Lieutenant General Andrew
J.,USA, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff until July 1966; Director, Joint Staff, August 1966–March
1967Gordon, A. Lincoln, Ambassador
to Brazil until February 25, 1966; Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress
March 9, 1966–June 30, 1967Goulart, João Belchior
Marques, President of Brazil until April 2, 1964Greenfield, James L., Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until September 1964Gruening, Ernest, Senator
(Democrat–Alaska)Guerrero Gutiérrez, Lorenzo,
President of Nicaragua August 3, 1966–May 1, 1967Guevara de la Serna, Major Ernesto
“Che,” Cuban Minister of Industry until 1965Harriman, W. Averell, former
Governor of New York; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until
March 17, 1965; thereafter Ambassador at LargeHartman, Arthur A., special
assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State and staff director, Senior
Interdepartmental Group, from August 1967Haya de la Torre, Raúl
Víctor, founder and leader of the Alianza Popular
Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) and the
Partido Aprista PeruanoHelms, Richard M., Deputy
Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, until April 28, 1965;
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence April 28, 1965–June 30, 1966;
thereafter Director of Central IntelligenceHenderson, Douglas, Ambassador
to Bolivia until August 7, 1968Herbert, Ray, Deputy Chief of
the Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence
Agency until June 1965Herrera Lane, Felipe,
President of the Inter-American Development BankHickenlooper, Bourke B.,
Senator (Republican–Iowa)Hill, John Calvin, Jr.,
Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy in Venezuela, until April 1965; thereafter
Director, Office of Colombian-Venezuelan Affairs (after May 1966 Office of
North Coast Affairs), Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of
StateHornig, Donald F., Special
Assistant to the President for Science and TechnologyHoyt, Henry A., Director,
Office of Argentine, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan Affairs, Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, January 1964–May 1965;
Ambassador to Uruguay May 6, 1965–December 16, 1967Hughes, Thomas L., Director of
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of StateHumphrey, Hubert H., Senator
(Democrat–Minnesota) and Senate Majority Whip until December 29, 1964; Vice
President of the United States from January 20, 1965; Democratic candidate
for President, November 1968Hurwitch, Robert A., First
Secretary of the Embassy in Chile July–September 1964Illia, Arturo Umberto,
President of Argentina until June 28, 1966Illueca, Jorge E., Special
Panamanian Representative, U.S.–Panama Relations (Panama Canal Treaty
negotiations) April–November 1964Iribarren Borges, Ignacio,
Foreign Minister of Venezuela from March 11, 1964Irwin, John N., II, Special
U.S. Representative for Inter-Oceanic Canal Negotiations April 1965–July
1967Jagan, Cheddi B., Prime
Minister of British Guiana until December 1964Jenkins, Walter W., Special
Assistant to the President until October 1964Jessup, Peter, member of the
National Security Council staff; executive secretary of the 5412 Special
Group (after June 2, 1964, the 303 Committee)Johnson, General Harold K.,USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. ArmyJohnson, Lyndon B., President
of the United StatesJohnson, U. Alexis, Deputy
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until July 12, 1964 and
November 1, 1965–October 9, 1966Johnson, W. Thomas, Jr.,
Assistant Press Secretary to the President September 1966–September 1968;
thereafter Deputy Press Secretary to the PresidentJohnston, James D., staff
assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
January 1964–April 1965; staff assistant to the Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs until September 1966Johnston, James R.,
Officer-in-Charge of Nicaraguan Political and Economic Affairs, Office of
Central American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of
State, June 1966–May 1968; also Officer-in-Charge of British Honduran
Political and Economic Affairs February–December 1966Jones, J. Wesley, Ambassador
to PeruJones, James R., Assistant to
the President February 1965–January 1968; thereafter Deputy Special
Assistant to the PresidentJova, Joseph John, Deputy
Chief of Mission in Chile until May 1965; Ambassador to Honduras from June
7, 1965Karamessines, Thomas, Assistant
Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, until July 1967;
thereafter Deputy Director for PlansKatzenbach, Nicholas deB.,
Attorney General September 4, 1964–September 30, 1966; thereafter Under
Secretary of StateKennedy, Robert F., Attorney
General until September 3, 1964; Senator (Democrat–New York) January
1965–June 6, 1968Khrushchev, Nikita S., Soviet
Premier until October 15, 1964Kilday, Lowell C.,
Officer-in-Charge of Ecuadorian Political Affairs, Office of
Ecuadorian-Peruvian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of
State, August 1967–November 1968Killoran, Thomas F., U.S.
Consul General in San Pedro Sula September 1964–July 1966; Officer-in-Charge
of Guatemalan Political and Economic Affairs, Office of Central American
Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, August
1966–February 1968; thereafter Deputy Director, Office of Central American
AffairsKing, Colonel J. C.,USA (retired), Chief of the Western
Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency,
until March 1964Kitchen, Jeffrey C., Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs until July
1967Kohler, Foy D., Deputy Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs November 29, 1966–December 31,
1967Komer, Robert W., member of
the National Security Council staff until October 1965; Deputy Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs October 1965– March
1966; acting Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, March 1966; thereafter Special Assistant to the President until
January 1967Koren, Henry L. T., Deputy
Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State, September 1965–June 1966Korry, Edward M., Ambassador
to Chile from August 23, 1967Kosygin, Alexei N., Soviet
Premier from October 15, 1964Krebs, Max V., Deputy Chief of
Mission in Guatemala from August 1967Krieg, William L., Director,
Office of Argentine, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan Affairs, Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from May 1965Kruel, General Amaury,
Commander of the Second Army in Brazil until August 1966Kubisch, Jack B., Chief of the
Economic Section, Embassy in Brazil, and Director of the AID Mission until January 1965; Director,
Office of Brazilian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of
State, from March 1965Kubitschek, Juscelino, former
President of BrazilLacerda, Carlos, Governor of
Guanabara, Brazil, until December 1965Lang, William E., Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Africa
and Foreign Military Rights) 1965–1966, then (Africa, Latin America, and
Foreign Military Rights)Leandro Mora, Reinaldo,
Venezuelan Minister of Interior from November 1966Lechín Oquendo, Juan, General
Secretary of the Mine Workers’ Federation in Bolivia until May 1965; also
Vice President of Bolivia until May 1964Leddy, John M., Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs from June 16,
1965Leitão da Cunha, Vasco,
Foreign Minister of Brazil April 1964–December 1965; Brazilian Ambassador to
the United States January 1966–June 1968Leonhardy, Terrence G.,
Director, Office of Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
Department of State, September 1964–December 1967Leoni Otero, Raúl, President
of Venezuela from March 11, 1964Lewis, Samuel W., member of
the National Security Council staff from September 1968Linowitz, Sol M., U.S.
Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States, the
Inter-American Economic and Social Committee, and the Inter-American
Committee on the Alliance for Progress from October 13, 1966Little, Edward S., special
assistant to the Secretary of State until May 1965Lleras Restropo, Carlos,
National Front (Liberal Party) candidate for President, May 1966; President
of Colombia from August 7, 1966López Arellano, Colonel
Oswaldo, later General, leader of the military junta in
Honduras until June 6, 1965; thereafter President of HondurasLópez Mateos, Alfonso,
President of Mexico until December 1, 1964Lord, Peter P.,
Officer-in-Charge of Colombian Affairs, Office of Colombian-Venezuelan
Affairs (after May 1966 Officer-in-Charge of Colombian Political Affairs,
Office of North Coast Affairs), Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department
of State, July 1964–August 1966; Officer-in-Charge of Venezuelan Political
Affairs until June 1967Lowenfeld, Andreas F.,
Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic Affairs, Department of State, until
August 1965; thereafter Deputy Legal AdviserMagalhães Kelly, Juracy
Montenegro, Brazilian Ambassador to the United States
July 1964–September 1965; Brazilian Minister of Justice and the Interior
October 7, 1965–January 14, 1966; Foreign Minister of Brazil until March 15,
1967Magalhães Pinto, José de,
President of the Uniäo Democrática Nacional; Governor of Minas Gerais,
Brazil, until December 1965; Congressman (ARENA-Minas Gerais) from November
1966; Foreign Minister of Brazil from March 15, 1967Manatos, Mike N.,
Administrative Assistant to President JohnsonMann, Thomas C., Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator of the
Alliance for Progress January 3, 1964–March 17, 1965; Under Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs until May 31, 1966; President of the Automobile
Manufacturers Association from 1967Manning, Robert J., Assistant
Secretary of State for Public Affairs to July 31, 1964Mansfield, Michael J., Senator
(Democrat–Montana); Senate Majority LeaderMargolies, Daniel F.,
Director, Office of East Coast Affairs (after March 12, 1964, Office of
Colombian-Venezuelan Affairs), Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department
of State, until May 1965Marks, Leonard H., Director of
the United States Information Agency September 1, 1965–December 6,
1968Martin, Edwin M., Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until January 2, 1964;
Ambassador to Argentina January 29, 1964–January 5, 1968Mayobre, José Antonio,
Venezuelan Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons from January 1967Mazzilli, Pascoal Ranieri,
President of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies until February 1965; Acting
President of Brazil April 2–15, 1964McCone, John A., Director of
Central Intelligence until April 28, 1965McNamara, Robert S.,
Secretary of Defense until February 29, 1968McNaughton, John T.,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs July 1,
1964–July 19, 1967McPherson, Harry C., Jr.,
Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs until August
1964; also Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Civilian
Functions March–August 1964; Assistant Secretary of State for Educational
and Cultural Affairs August 23, 1964–August 14, 1965; thereafter Special
Counsel to the PresidentMeeker, Leonard C., Legal
Adviser of the Department of State from May 18, 1964Mein, John Gordon, Deputy
Chief of Mission, Embassy in Brazil, until August 1965; Ambassador to
Guatemala September 1, 1965–August 28, 1968Méndez Montenegro, Julio
César, PR candidate for President, March 1966; President
of Guatemala from July 1, 1966Mercado Jarrin, Brigadier General
Edgardo, Foreign Minister of Peru from October
1968Meyer, Cord, Jr., Chief,
Covert Action Staff, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency,
until July 1967; thereafter Assistant Deputy Director for PlansMolina Silva, Sergio, Chilean
Minister of Finance from November 1964Mora Otera, José A.,
Secretary General of the Organization of American States until May
1968Moreno, Miguel J., Jr.,
Panamanian Representative to the Council of the Organization of American
States until September 1964; also Panamanian Ambassador to the United States
April–September 1964Morgan, Thomas E.,
Representative (Democrat–Pennsylvania); Chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs CommitteeMorris, Patrick F., Director,
Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
Department of State, November 1965–September 1968Morse, Wayne L., Senator
(Democrat–Oregon); Chairman of the Subcommittee on American Republics
Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations CommitteeMoscoso, Teodoro, U.S.
Representative to the Inter-American Economic and Social Committee and the
Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, and Special Adviser
to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, January–May
1964Moyers, Bill D., Special
Assistant and Press Secretary (from July 1965) to the President to February
1967Nitze, Paul H., Deputy
Secretary of Defense from July 1, 1967Nixon, Richard M., former Vice
President of the United States; President-elect of the United States from
November 5, 1968O’Brien, Lawrence F., Special
Assistant to the President until November 1965Oduber Quirós, Daniel, Foreign
Minister of Costa Rica until January 1965; PLN candidate for President, February 1966Oliver, Covey T., Ambassador
to Colombia May 1, 1964–August 29, 1966; Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress
July 1, 1967–December 31, 1968O’Meara, General Andrew P.,USA, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern
Command, until February 22, 1965Onganía, Lieutenant General Juan
Carlos, Commander-in-Chief of the Army in Argentina
until November 1965; President of Argentina from June 28, 1966Orlich Bolmarcich, Francisco
José, President of Costa Rica until May 8, 1966Ovando Candía, General
Alfredo, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in
Bolivia; Co-President of Bolivia May 26, 1965–January 5, 1966; President of
Bolivia January 5–August 6, 1966Pacheco Areco, Jorge,
President of Uruguay from December 6, 1967Palmer, Donald K., Director,
Office of Regional Economic Policy, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
Department of State, January 1964–August 1965; thereafter Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Economic Policy)Pastor de la Torre, Celso,
Peruvian Ambassador to the United States until October 1968Paz Estenssoro, Victor,
President of Bolivia until November 4, 1964Peralta Azurdia, Colonel
Enrique, President of Guatemala until July 1,
1966Pérez Alfonso, Juan Pablo,
former Venezuelan Minister of Mines and HydrocarbonsPérez Guerrero, Manuel,
Venezuelan Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons until January 1967Perón, Juan Domingo, former
President of ArgentinaPeterson, Lawrence L., Deputy
Director, Office of North Coast Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
Department of State, from August 1968Pinilla Fábrega, Colonel José
María, President of Panama from October 13,
1968Pistarini, Major General Pascual
Angel, later Lieutenant General, Commander-in-Chief
of the Army in Argentina November 1965–December 1966; also Argentine
Minister of Defense July–September 1966Poats, Rutherford M., Deputy
Administrator of the Agency for International Development from May
1967Porter, General Robert W.,
Jr.,USA, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern
Command, from February 22, 1965Pryce, William T., staff
assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
January 1964–April 1965Raborn, Vice Admiral William F.,
Jr., USN (retired), Director of Central Intelligence
April 28, 1965–June 30, 1966Read, Benjamin H., Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary, Department of
StateReedy, George E., Special
Assistant and Press Secretary (from March 1964) to the President until July
1965Resor, Stanley R., Under
Secretary of the Army April 5–July 7, 1965; thereafter Secretary of the
ArmyRibeiro, General Jair Dantas,
Brazilian Minister of War until April 1, 1964Richardson, Ralph W.,
Officer-in-Charge of Chilean Affairs, Office of West Coast Affairs (after
March 12, 1964 Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs), Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Department of State, until September 1964Rielly, John, Assistant to the
Vice President from January 1965Robles Méndez, Marco Aurelio,
National Liberal Party candidate for President, May 1964; President of
Panama October 1, 1964–October 1, 1968Rockefeller, David, President
and Chairman of the Executive Committee of Chase Manhattan Bank; Director of
the Council on Foreign Relations; head of the Business Group for Latin
America (from 1965 the Council for Latin America)Rogers, William D., Deputy
U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress until June 1965Rostow, Eugene V., Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs from October 14, 1966Rostow, Walt W., Counselor and
Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, until March 31,
1966; also U.S. Representative to the Inter-American Economic and Social
Committee and the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress May
1964–March 1966; Special Assistant to the President from April 1,
1966Rowan, Carl T., Director of
the United States Information Agency February 27, 1964–July 10, 1965Rowell, Edward M.,
Officer-in-Charge of Honduran Affairs, Office of Central American and
Panamanian Affairs (after March 12, 1964, Office of Central American
Affairs), Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until April
1964Rusk, Dean, Secretary of
StateRussell, Richard B., Senator
(Democrat–Georgia); Chairman of the Senate Armed Services CommitteeSaccio, Leonard J., Deputy
Chief of Mission, Embassy in Argentina, from July 1965Salans, Carl F., Assistant
Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, June
1965–March 1967; thereafter Deputy Legal AdviserSalinger, Pierre E. G.,
Special Assistant and Press Secretary to the President until March
1964Samudio Avila, David,
Panamanian Minister of Finance October 1964–December 1967; Liberal Party
candidate for President, May 1968Sánchez Gavito, Vicente,
Mexican Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States
until February 1965Sanders, Irving L.,
Officer-in-Charge of Uruguayan Political Affairs, Office of Argentine,
Paraguayan and Uruguayan Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
Department of State, from August 1967Sanders, Terry B., Jr.,
Director, Office of Panamanian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
Department of State, from September 1968Sanjines-Goytia, Colonel
Julio, Bolivian Ambassador to the United States from May
1965Sanz de Santamaría, Carlos,
Chairman of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for ProgressSapena Pastor, Raúl, Foreign
Minister of ParaguaySause, Oliver L., Jr.,
Director, Office of Central American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Department of State, March 1964–November 1965Sayre, Robert M., Director,
Office of Mexican Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of
State, until April 1964; member of the National Security Council staff until
April 1965; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
April 1965–July 1968; Ambassador to Uruguay from July 24, 1968Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr.,
Special Assistant to the President until March 1, 1964Schultze, Charles L., Director
of the Bureau of the Budget June 1, 1965–January 29, 1968Scott, Joseph W., Deputy
Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State, until July 1964Seidenman, Neil A.,
interpreter in the Language Services Division, Office of Operations,
Department of StateSessions, Edson O., Ambassador
to Ecuador from August 1, 1968Sevilla Sacasa, Guillermo,
Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States; also Nicaraguan Representative
to the Council of the Organization of American States; Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps, WashingtonShankle, A. Perry,
Officer-in-Charge of Chilean Political Affairs, Office of Bolivian-Chilean
Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from January
1967Sharp, Frederick D. III,
Deputy Director, Office of Inter-American Security Affairs, Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, August 1966–June 1968;
thereafter DirectorShumate, John P., Jr.,
Officer-in-Charge of Peruvian Political Affairs, Office of
Ecuadorian-Peruvian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of
State, from July 1967Siracusa, Ernest V., Deputy
Chief of Mission, Embassy in PeruSloan, Frank K., Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Regional
Affairs) until 1965Smith, Bromley K., Executive
Secretary of the National Security Council staffSmith, James F.,
Officer-in-Charge of Ecuadorian Development Affairs, Office of
Ecuadorian-Peruvian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of
State, May 1966–April 1968Snow, William P., Ambassador
to Paraguay until June 15, 1967Solís, Galileo, Foreign
Minister of Panama until September 1964Solomon, Anthony M., Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Economic Policy)
until April 1965; Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
April–May 1965; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from June
1, 1965Somoza Debayle, General
Anastasio, Commandant of the National Guard in Nicaragua; PLN candidate for President, February 1967;
President of Nicaragua from May 1, 1967Somoza Debayle, Luis, former
President of NicaraguaSorensen, Theodore C., Special
Counsel to the President until February 29, 1964Sowash, William B., Deputy
Director, Office of Central American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Department of State, July 1964–September 1965Starzel, Robert F., staff
assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
July 1967–July 1968Stedman, William P., Jr.,
Chief of the Economic Section, Embassy in Peru, and Deputy Director, AID Mission, September 1966–July 1968;
thereafter Director, Office of Ecuadorian-Peruvian Affairs, Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs, Department of StateSteins, Kenedon P.,
Officer-in-Charge of Guatemalan Affairs, Office of Central American Affairs,
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, April 1964–August
1966Stevenson, Adlai E., U.S.
Permanent Representative to the United Nations until July 14, 1965Stewart, C. Allen, Ambassador
to Venezuela until November 28, 1964Stoessel, Walter J. Jr.,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs September 1965–July
1968Stroessner, General Alfredo,
President of ParaguaySullivan, Leonor K.,
Representative (Democrat–Missouri); Chairman of the Panama Canal
Subcommittee, House Merchant Marine and Fisheries CommitteeTaylor, General Maxwell D.,USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
until July 1, 1964Taylor, Vice Admiral Rufus
L., USN, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from
October 13, 1966Tejera París, Enrique,
Venezuelan Ambassador to the United States; also Venezuelan Representative
to the Council of the Organization of American States until April 1966;
chairman of the Inter-American Peace Committee (Panama Crisis) January–April
1964Telles, Raymond, Ambassador to
Costa Rica until February 19, 1967Thomas, Charles H., II,
staff assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs May 1965–March 1966Thompson, Llewellyn E.,
Ambassador at Large until December 26, 1966; also Acting Deputy Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs July 1964–October 1965Tomic Romero, Radomiro,
Senator (PDC, Chile); Chilean Ambassador to
the United States April 1965–March 1968Torrijos Herrera, Lieutenant Colonel
Omar, Secretary of the General Staff of the
Panamanian National Guard in October 1968; thereafter Colonel, Chief of
Staff of the National GuardTrejos Fernández, José
Joaquín, National Unification Party candidate for
President, February 1966; President of Costa Rica from May 8, 1966Trueheart, William C. Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State, from June 1967Tuthill, John W., Ambassador
to Brazil from May 27, 1966Tyler, William R., Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs until May 18,
1965Udall, Stewart, Secretary of
InteriorVaky, Viron P., Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs August– December
1968; Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from
January 1969Valdés Subercaseaux, Gabriel,
Chilean Foreign Minister from November 1964Valencia, Guillermo León,
President of Colombia until August 7, 1966Valenti, Jack J., Special
Assistant to the President until May 1966Vallarino, Colonel Bolívar,
later General, Commandant of the Panamanian National Guard until October
1968Vance, Cyrus R. Secretary of the Army until January 20, 1964; Deputy Secretary of
Defense until June 30, 1967Van Reigersberg, Fernando A.,
interpreter in the Language Services Division, Office of Operations,
Department of StateVásquez Salas, Jorge, Foreign
Minister of Peru September 1965–September 1967Vaughn, Jack Hood, Ambassador
to Panama April 8, 1964–February 27, 1965; Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress
March 22, 1965–February 28, 1966; thereafter Director of the Peace
CorpsVelasco Alvarado, General
Juan, Commanding General of the Army and Chief of the
Armed Forces Joint Command in Peru from 1967; President of the Revolutionary
Government of the Armed Forces of Peru from October 4, 1968Velasco Ibarra, José María,
President of Ecuador from September 1, 1968Villeda Morales, Ramón, former
President of HondurasWalters, Colonel Vernon A.,
later Brigadier General, USA, U.S. Army
Attaché in Brazil until June 1967Warner, Leland W., Jr.,
Officer-in-Charge of Honduran Political and Economic Affairs, Office of
Central American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of
State, August 1966–June 1968Warnke, Paul C., Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from August 1,
1967Watson, W. Marvin, Jr.,
Special Assistant to the President February 1965–April 1968Webster, Bethuel M., U.S.
mediator in dispute between Guatemala and the United Kingdom over the status
of British Honduras (Belize) October 1965–September 1968Weissman, H. Andre, Deputy
Director, Office of Brazilian Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
Department of State, until November 1965Wheeler, General Earle G.,USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
from July 3, 1964Whiteman, Marjorie M.,
Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State,
until June 1965Wiggins, Guy A.,
Officer-in-Charge of Guatemalan Political and Economic Affairs, Office of
Central American Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of
State, from February 1968Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs until March 23, 1966Williams, Murat W., Deputy
Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State, September 1964–June 1965Williams, William L. S.,
Deputy Director, Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, July 1964–July 1966Wilson, Donald M., Deputy
Director of the United States Information Agency until August 1, 1965Wilson, Henry H., Jr.,
Administrative Assistant to the President until May 1967Wilson, James Harold, Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom from October 17, 1964Wolfe, Gregory B., Director,
Office of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State, August 1964–August
1968Woodward, Robert F., Special
Adviser, Office of Inter-Oceanic Negotiations, Bureau of Inter-American
Affairs, Department of State, May 1965–July 1967Yerovi Indaburú, Clemente,
President of Ecuador March 29–November 16, 1966Zavala Ortiz, Miguel Ángel,
Foreign Minister of Argentina until June 28, 1966Zúñiga Augustinius, Ricardo,
leader of the Partido Nacional in Honduras; Secretary of Government in
Honduras until June 1965; thereafter Minister of the Presidency
South and Central America; Mexico
Regional
1. Editorial Note
At a White House reception for Latin American representatives on November
26, 1963, President Johnson announced that
relations within the Western Hemisphere would be “among the highest
concerns of my Government.” Acknowledging that the Alliance for Progress
had its share of problems, Johnson pledged to
“improve and strengthen the role of the United States,” thereby making
the program a “living memorial” to the late-President Kennedy. (Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64,
Book I, pages 6–7) In a December 3 memorandum for the President,
Director of Central Intelligence McCone addressed an important aspect of this pledge to
“improve and strengthen” the Alliance: personnel. Citing “our recent
conversations” on the subject, McCone observed that the Alliance had become so “deeply
enmeshed in administrative problems” that no man “could be expected to
take over the responsibilities of directing the program, overcome the
obstacles that would confront him, and give the program the forward
motion you desire.” What the administration needed was a “special
assistant” to the President or a “special deputy to the Secretary of
State,” a man “with the experience to envision the program, the stature
to speak with conviction with all the Latin American countries and who
additionally holds the complete respect of the Congress.” McCone recommended former Secretary of
the Treasury Robert B. Anderson
for the job with Thomas C. Mann,
then Ambassador to Mexico, assuming the role of administrator. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Agency File, Alliance for Progress)
Anderson evidently declined the
appointment, forcing the President to consider other candidates for the
top position, including Mann
himself. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Transcript of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
Robert Anderson, December 5,
1963, 2:14 p.m.) In a telephone call to Mexico City on December 9
Johnson offered Mann the position as “kind of an Undersecretary” of
State for Latin America—an offer that, he suggested, should not be
refused. (Ibid., Transcript of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Thomas
Mann, December 9, 3:30 p.m.) Mann arrived in
the United States on December 10 and met the President at the White
House the following day. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) On December 14
Johnson announced that Mann had agreed to “undertake the
coordination and direction of all policies and programs of the U.S.
government, economic, social, and cultural, relating to Latin America.”
Johnson later announced that Mann would exercise this role not only
as the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs—a
position he had held during the second Eisenhower administration—but
also as Special Assistant to the President and United States Coordinator
of the Alliance for Progress. (Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Lyndon
B. Johnson, 1963–64, Book I, pages 56, 65, 88)
To accommodate Mann’s
appointment, Assistant Secretary Edwin M.
Martin was appointed Ambassador to Argentina, and
Teodoro Moscoso, the former
U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance, was named to represent the United
States on the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress
(CIAP). Mann assumed his new responsibilities on January 3,
1964.
2. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source:
Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
Thomas Mann, Tape F64.13,
Side B, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this
volume. A memorandum of this telephone conversation, prepared in
Mann’s office, is ibid.,
Papers of Thomas C. Mann,
Telephone Conversations with LBJ,
January 4, 1964–April 30, 1965.Washington, February 19, 1964, 11:32
a.m.
President: Tom?
Mann: Yes, sir?
President: Are we going to call
in these Latin American ambassadors for the Alliance for Progress
meeting?
Mann: Yes sir, we have it
tentatively scheduled for about the 15th.
President: About the 15th?
Mann: Of March.
President: That’s the American
ambassadors in this Hemisphere.
Mann: Well, it’s a number of
things. We thought we would have a ceremony at the Pan American Union,
you would—
President: Yeah, but I’m talking
about, we’re inviting to come to Washington the American ambassadors in
this Hemisphere.
Mann: Oh, yeah, the American. I
thought we would do that at the same time.
President: That’s what I’m
saying.
Mann: And combine that—we got a
budgetary problem, but I think we can find the money—and get them all up
here at that time and make a big shindig, and launch your Alliance
program with a good speech.
President: All right. Now what is
that? The anniversary of the Alliance?
Mann: It’s the third anniversary
of Kennedy’s—
President: Announcement of
it?
Mann: Yeah.
President: Third anniversary of
Kennedy’s announcement of the Alliance.
Mann: And it’s also the occasion
for creating the, launching this new CIAP, this inter-American thing with Santamaría.
President: It’s also the occasion
for the launching of this CIAP—
Mann: CIAP thing—
President: Santamaría’s the head of. Colombia.
What do you call that? The Wise Men? Is that what they’re called?
Mann: No, that’s a different
group. I would call this the Inter-American Alliance for Progress
Committee.
President: The Inter-American
Alliance for Progress Committee. That’s made up of five people?
Mann: It’s made up of seven
people, counting Santamaría, the President.
President: Seven, counting
Santamaría, the President.
They raised hell about us not giving him enough attention here. I don’t
know how much more we could give him. We had him in here, and we had
him, had his picture made and everything else. I couldn’t put him on my
knee and bounce him.Carlos Sanz de Santamaría
arrived in Washington on February 3 for consultation with Department
of State and AID officials. No
evidence was found to indicate when Sanz visited the White House or to identify the
newspaper that criticized his reception.
Mann: I think he was happy and I
hadn’t even heard of any criticism on that.
President: Well, I did. I saw the
papers, said that we ignored him, and paid no attention to him and so
forth, didn’t emphasize it enough. Your New York
Times sources over there.
Mann: Well, he had a little press
conference, and I heard him, and after, as he came out of your office.
It was all very complimentary to you personally and to the Alliance,
and—
President: Have you talked to
Admiral today? Has he sawed off any more pipe down there?Admiral John D. Bulkeley, commander of the Guantanamo
Naval Base. For documentation on the Guantanamo water supply
incident, see the compilation on Cuba in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume
XXXII
Mann: [Laughter] I haven’t talked
to him today.
President: Anything, is
everything all right in Guantanamo?
Mann: Everything’s going
fine.
President: Did you read your New York Times State Department on Cuba this
morning? And how you screwed up things good?Reference is to an article by Max Frankel criticizing the
administration’s decision to reduce assistance to 5 of the 19
countries that maintained trade with Cuba. Information on the
decision is ibid.
Mann: Well, I’ll give you some
bright stories. I had an hour and a half yes—
President: The answer is “no,” I
guess, to my question.
Mann: Sir?
President: I guess the answer
is—
Mann: No. [Laughter]
President: All right. Read it on
the second page this morning, ‘cause you have to know what they’re
saying about you.
Mann: I read that. Let me give
you some bright news.
President: All right.
Mann: Yesterday, I spent an hour
and a half before the House Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs. I
think that the Republicans were happy. This morning, I spent another
hour, just at random in the Congress. We talked largely about Panama,
and they asked for additional meetings, and it went very well. So we’re
working hard on the Hill like
you want us to, and I think we’re going to make a lot of progress up
there. I don’t know what you can do with some of these left wing fellows
and two or three newspapers. I think—
President: Why in the hell don’t
you tell that guy that you all leak to over there all the time, the
State Department—you got one named Szulc and one named Raymont, is
it?
Mann: That’s right, and a guy
named Kurzman.
President: —and—that you all work
like a sieve to—why don’t you say: “Now you and Herbert MatthewsNew York Times.The Washington Post. didn’t handle this Cuban
situation in such an excellent fashion yourself. Now for God’s sakes
give me a little chance. I just been here two months. Let me, give me a
little chance to retrieve some of the work you all did”?
Mann: [Laughter] I’ll try that
line on them. Okay, sir.
President: I think that we got to
get something to show that we got better feeling and more respect in the
Hemisphere than ever before. So you better propagandize some folks along
that line. And I guess that we can have a dinner for the ambassadors
from America, the ambassadors from the Hemis—our ambassadors to the
Hemisphere, their ambassadors to us, and probably the OAS ambassadors.
Mann: And the seven people in
CIAP ought to all be there, I
think, and maybe even the ten Wise Men, if we could.
President: Well, what would that
be? 65? 70?
Mann: That would run you close to
70 or 80.
President: Well, but the wives,
you see, 140. Can’t take care of 125. We’ll try to give a dinner like
that for them.
Mann: All right. Wonderful. And
I—
President: I want you to dance
with some of those short, fat women again. Old Mennen Williams was the only guy that
delivered for me last night. Salinger went home.According
to the President’s Daily Diary, Johnson held a
White House reception, February 18, for members of the House of
Representatives. (Johnson Library)
Mann: [Laughter] I’m the worst
dancer, but—
President: Larry O’Brien.
Mann: —I’ll even do that for you,
Mr. President.
President: Well, all right.
Anything else now on Panama?
Mann: No, everything’s quiet down
there. The [unintelligible] aren’t going to do much until we get back
from Los Angeles.Johnson and Mann were in Los Angeles February 20–23 for meetings
with President López Mateos
of Mexico. I had a talk with Sánchez Gavito this morning and
told him to keep everything buttoned down until we got back.
President: I don’t think we’re
going to do anything until after that election down there.
Mann: I doubt it myself.
President: I wouldn’t encourage
them much. I think we’re doing all right. Just let them have that
problem: they did the invading and they did the aggression. And let’s
see how they—I’m not one that believes that a fat Communist is better
than a lean one.
Mann: No, I’m not. I think we’re
going to have to have a lot of steady nerves on some of these
problems.
President: I sure would. And I
would, though, have a planning group awful busy with the World Bank, and
the Export-Import Bank, and the Alliance for Progress, and the health
organizations, and the 480’s. And I see now we’re trying to figure out
how to give Mexico some food. And I saw in one of the briefing papers
that she wanted water, and we might not be able to give her water, but
we could give her food. I don’t know. I don’t want to be giving away,
but I’d damn sure have some things on my Santa Claus list, and
coordinate them and then when I did something, I’d make them, I’d have a
quid pro quo.
Mann: Well, that’s what we’ve
been—
President: I think that you have
turned a flop in Mexico. I think you’ve got them where instead of
confiscating everything now, they’re trying to promote private
enterprise, aren’t they?
Mann: That’s our hope, and
they’re drifting in that direction. They do have a lot of problems, have
to stay with this thing day by day, but I’m not pessimistic about
Mexico. They’ve got a good President coming in, and—
President: What other places in
the Hemisphere have you got problems? Argentina? Brazil?
Mann: Mr. President, this
Hemisphere is in worse shape than I’ve seen it in 20 years. We’ve got
problems in Bolivia right now. The cabinet—Paz is the only man there
that can hold things together—and his whole cabinet is splintering in
all directions because they want to be president four years from
now.
President: Well, can we get in
there and do something to help him before it goes to hell?
Mann: We’re working on that this
morning, and we’re coming up with some ideas on that. We’ve got a
possible revolt and military, against the military fellow in
Honduras.
President: Yeah, Honduras.
Mann: We’re watching that. We got
Peru and Argentina about to expropriate oil properties. Brazil is sick.
Goulart is irresponsible. Nearly everywhere we look we have problems,
but I’m sort of optimistic. I think what we did in Panama and Guantanamo
is going to help us a lot in the Hemisphere. We need time, we need
about—
President: Why don’t you try to
sell this New York Times on the problem that you
need help, and that this thing you picked up, pretty sick, and that you
can’t do it just by being a floor mop and you’ve got to have a little
steel in your spine. If you don’t they’ll shove you to death. They’ll be
like a country dog. And see if you can’t get The
Washington Post and New York Times to
quit taking the line they are.
Mann: I’m going to try it, but
those fellows are basically hostile to everything you believe in, Mr.
President.
President: OK.
Mann: The guys that write the
stories are. You know I spent, I had lunch over with the whole staff of
The Washington Post, and they, in essence,
this same pitch. And I was told later that Mrs. GrahamKatharine M. Graham, president of the Washington Post
Company. after the lunch said that they ought to give us time
to see what we could do. What you have is a half a dozen very far left
wing guys like Kurzman, who are pretty stupid people really. They don’t
know anything about Latin America, they don’t speak the language, never
been there, but they’re full of theories. And these guys are crusaders,
and how you deal with a crusader is, I think, the toughest problem of
all. But I think we’re going to have to work on Mrs. Graham.
President: Mrs. Graham doesn’t
have any authority; she won’t exercise it. She claims she’s the best
friend I got, and they murder me every day. That FriendlyAlfred Friendly, managing editor of The Washington Post. runs that paper.
Mann: Well, let me talk to
Manning and see if we can’t plot something out. I’ll get together with
him, and see if we, do the most effective thing we can.
President: I think you ought to
lay the groundwork and say that now we, we need some help on American
policy, and we don’t think that you’re doing your God-damned country a
bit of good, and we wish you’d try to help us a little.
Mann: All right, sir.
President: OK. Bye.
Mann: Bye.
3. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Cuba, OAS Resolution (Arms Cache),
Vol. II, Memos, 11/63–9/64. Secret; No Distribution. Drafted by
Chase on February 22.Washington, February 19, 1964.
SUBJECT
Cuba Meeting—Wednesday, February 19, 1964On February 18 Rusk called Mann to discuss the upcoming meeting: “The Sec
said he thought Bundy
believed the Cabinet people should be there but the Sec said he
thought it was something which should be worked out beforehand.
The Sec said he thought it should be discussed below the Cabinet
level. He said when you got it to the Cabinet level, it didn’t
lift it to Cabinet level but brought it back into the seminar
business. Mann said he
would talk to Bundy.”
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192,
Telephone Calls 2/11/64–2/29/64)
PARTICIPANTS
The Attorney General; General Taylor;
Director McCone; Ambassador
Bunker; Deputy Secretary
Vance; Under Secretary
Fowler; Deputy Under Secretary
Johnson;Assistant Secretary Mann; Assistant Secretary Behrman;
Acting Director Wilson; Special Assistant Califano; Desmond FitzGerald: John Crimmins; McGeorge Bundy;
Ralph Dungan; Gordon Chase
The group discussed the problem of OAS
action resulting from the Cuban arms cache discovery.On November 28, 1963, the Venezuelan Government
announced it had discovered a large arms cache on the coast of the
Paraguaná Peninsula; that an internal investigation had determined
that the arms were of Cuban origin, intended for use in a guerrilla
operation to seize power in Caracas before the Presidential
elections of December 1; and that evidence against Cuba would be
presented to the OAS, thereby
justifying retaliatory measures under the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, the so-called “Rio Treaty” of 1947. Regarding
the initial response to the discovery of the arms cache, See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XII,
Documents 169–171.
For text of the Rio Treaty, see 4 Bevans 559 or Department of State
Bulletin, September 21, 1947, pp.
565–567. (State’s staff paper of February 19 is
attached.)Attached but not
printed.
Timing and Form—The OAS investigating team is expected to submit its report
to the C/OAS on about February
24.The report was submitted to the
COAS and made public on
February 24. At a news conference on February 27 Rusk said that the report should
lead the OAS to act in such a
way that Castro would
clearly understand that subversion “will not be acceptable in
the hemisphere.” (Department of State Bulletin, March 16, 1964, p. 408) Mr. Mann said that while the
Venezuelans are anxious to get an MFM under way as soon as possible, we want to slow up
the pace. Among other things, we want to give the public some time
to digest the OAS report; also, we
can use the time to work the corridors and have as many OAR’s as
possible on our wave-length by the time of the meeting. Mr.
Mann added that the odds are
presently better than even that we will get involved with either an
extended or a brief MFM.Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine—Mr.
Mann, noting that
Castro is probably going
to be with us for some time, said that we ought to think seriously
about doing something fairly drastic to prevent further Cuban
subversion. He suggested that we add a paragraph to our draft OAS resolution which will warn
Castro that if he
continues with his subversion, we will retaliate with force under
the Rio Treaty. Such a paragraph will do two things: First, it will make clear to the Russians and
Cubans that we regard subversion as “armed aggression.” Given time
to digest this message the Russians may be encouraged to control
Castro. Second, it will provide a juridical umbrella for any
future forceful retaliation we have to take. The group went on to
discuss the Mann proposal at
some length. General Taylor wondered whether this
doctrine could have world-wide application.The Attorney General, in the first instance, expressed
doubt on several scores. First, how
do you define subversion? Second,
subversion is hard to prove even when, on rare occasion, we
have the evidence; for every witness we could find to
support a charge of subversion, Castro would come up with four who would say
there was no subversion. Third,
retaliation by force is no simple matter; our
decision-making experience of October, 1962 made this clear.
Finally, time-lag is a problem; the arms cache occurs and
three months later, after the research is completed, we
retaliate—this is somewhat unrealistic. Alexis
Johnson wondered how we know if a
particular act of subversion is Castro-inspired.Mr. Bundy said
that, generally speaking, the Mann proposal has merit and noted that it
represents a thickening and variation of the “Kennedy Doctrine”,
expressed in President Kennedy’s Miami speech of November 18.On November 18, 1963, in an address
before the Inter-American Press Association in Miami
President Kennedy
announced the so-called Kennedy Doctrine: “The American States
must be ready to come to the aid of any government
requesting aid to prevent a take-over linked to the
policies of foreign communism rather than to an internal
desire for change. My country is prepared to do this. We
in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our
command to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in
this hemisphere.” (Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States: John F.
Kennedy, 1963, pp. 872–877) He added,
however, that we should be careful about how much we thicken
the Doctrine in the context of the arms cache discovery; our
response must be appropriate to the crime. Generally
speaking, we should keep the language of the resolution
general and flexible and not tie ourselves down to a
particular course of action in the event of further
Castro
subversion. But even general and flexible language will be useful; it will
probably serve as a deterrent of sorts and will tend to put
the President in a stronger position if and when we do have
to resort to forceful action. Mr. Bundy added that we should
continue to explore and study the “eye for an eye”
doctrine.The group agreed that we should try to get “warning-type”
language into the OAS
resolution. If we succeed, it will strengthen our juridical
position; if we fail, we lose little and may even gain
politically. The group further agreed that the language
should be cognate to a possible Presidential statement on
the same subject to the U.S. public and to a stern, private
warning to the Russians that Cuban subversion could lead to
a very dangerous situation. In the latter regard, Mr.
Bundy thought
that, if we do the job right, the Russians may well take us
seriously.The Attorney General said that we had to concern ourselves
not only with preventing the export of subversion from Cuba
but also with the problem of responding in the event
“another Cuba” occurs in Latin America. Mr. Bundy said that a study
last spring indicated that it was extremely difficult to
plan for this sort of eventuality which can come in
innumerable shapes and sizes, not all of which clearly call
for a U.S. response. At the request of the group, he agreed
to distribute copies of the study.Reference is presumably to a May 25, 1963, memorandum
from Bundy to the
President printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1962,
volume XII Document 167. Bundy distributed
copies of the memorandum to Robert F. Kennedy et al. on February 21,
1964. (Ibid., Document 168,
footnote 3) Mr. Bundy added that it might
also be worthwhile to study our capabilities to respond
(e.g. a “snuff-out” force).
Surveillance Involving Force—The group
generally did not favor an OAS
resolution which calls for a surveillance system involving the
stopping and searching of selected vessels on the high seas (the
“force” option). The measure would not be very effective and
would probably give us as much trouble as it would give
Castro. On the other
hand, a resolution which calls for a surveillance system
involving the stopping and searching of vessels in territorial
waters (the “non-force” option) appears to be the appropriate
response to the arms cache issue. Also, with such language as an
umbrella, we can work out measures whereby U.S. forces can
assist other OAR’s in their territorial waters.
General Taylor dissented; he favored the
“force” option. It would act as a deterrent to the Cubans and
would give us a reprisal capability.
Cuban Reaction—The group agreed that, in
response to OAS charges, the Cubans
will take the public line that the OAS ought to investigate U.S. overt and covert
aggressions against Cuba. The Cubans have already started peddling
this line.
Proclaimed List—The group agreed that we
should consider laying a basis in the OAS for possible proclaimed list action. Mr.
Bundy noted that it
would be nice if other OAR’s took proclaimed list action also.
It would not only make the measure more effective in impeding
Free World commercial ties with Cuba, but would also demonstrate
to the Free World that the U.S. is not alone in its concern over
Cuba. Mr. Fowler added that the proclaimed
list action should be prospective and should not include the
freezing of assets.
One stumbling block to a proclaimed list is the Soviet Bloc
dimension—i.e. can we blacklist Free World firms which trade
with Cuba while not blacklisting Soviet Bloc organizations which
trade with Cuba? Mr. Johnson and Mr.
Behrman felt that this appeared to be an impossible hurdle.
Messrs. Bundy, Mann, and
Fowler felt that the apparent
inconsistency was bearable; in this regard, Mr.
Fowler noted that we expect more from
our friends than our enemies.
Salability of a Tough OAS Resolution—Mr. Mann felt that with careful
planning and great determination, we may well be able to get a
tough resolution out of the OAS.
The group then discussed the consequences of getting beaten in
the OAS; Mr. Bundy noted that going in tough
and getting licked may not be so unbearable from certain points
of view.
Mr. Bundy pointed out that
we should be under no illusions about the coming OAS action. As tough as our
resolution may be, the chances are very good that we will still
be living with Castro
some time from now and that we might just as well get used to
the idea. At the same time, we should probably continue our
present nasty course; among other things, it makes life a little
tougher for Castro and
raises slightly the poor odds that he will come apart and be
overthrown.
Venezuelan Leadership and Noise-Level—The
group agreed that while the Venezuelans should publicly lead the
fight, we will have to give them plenty of support. In this regard,
USIA is geared up to do an
intensive selling job in Latin America if it is deemed desirable;
the U.S. Government will have to determine the size and shape of the
noise-level to be produced during the period which follows the
submission of the OAS report.GC
4. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Cuba, OAS Resolution (Arms Cache),
Vol. II, Memos, 11/63–9/64. Secret; No Distribution. Drafted by
Chase on February 27.Washington, February 21, 1964.
SUBJECT
Cuba Meeting—Friday, February 21, 1964
PARTICIPANTS
The Attorney General; General Taylor;
Ambassador Bunker; Ambassador
Stewart; Deputy Secretary
Vance; Deputy Under
Secretary Johnson; Special Assistant Califano; Acting Director Wilson;
Ward Allen; John Crimmins; Desmond FitzGerald; McGeorge Bundy; Gordon Chase
The group met to follow up their discussion of February 19 regarding
OAS action resulting from the
Venezuelan arms cache discovery. (Attached is a copy of the discussion
paper.)Attached but not printed.
The Venezuelan Position—After a status report
by Mr. Allen, the group
discussed the Venezuelan position. Ambassador Stewart
said that the Venezuelans are prepared to take very strong
Rio Treaty action, up to and including invasion; they are
especially anxious to quarantine Cuba’s export of
subversion. He went on to admit, however, that the
capability of the Venezuelan Foreign Office to sell a tough
OAS resolution to other
Latin American countries is not great. We will have to do a
major share of the selling.Ambassador Stewart said that the Venezuelans might agree
to a surveillance system whereby U.S. ships could shadow
suspect vessels into Venezuelan waters. He had some doubts
as to whether or not the Venezuelans would allow us to seize
a suspect vessel in territorial waters; they might, if it
were clear that Venezuelan forces could not arrive at the
scene in time to make the seizure themselves.
Surveillance System—With the exception of
General Taylor, the group favored the “non-force” option. Mr.
Vance favored the
“non-force” option because it is a more flexible system. Mr.
FitzGerald noted that the arms shipment
to Venezuela was a deviation from Castro’s normal mode of procedure; he is
unlikely to ship arms in the future. General Taylor commented
that we should be clear that neither the “force” nor the
“non-force” surveillance system will be very effective. He likes
the “force” option because it gives us a reprisal
capability.
The group agreed that the OAS
resolution should include language which will allow us to search
suspect vessels and aircraft for subversives as well as for
arms.
Economic Sanctions and Warning to Castro—The group agreed
that the OAS language should be as
general as possible in encouraging OAS countries to take action against Free World traders
who deal with Cuba. General language is more likely to get OAS approval. The group agreed that, in
warning Cuba that it had better not continue its subversion, the
OAS language should also be
general and flexible.
Noise-Level—The group agreed that a high
noise-level in Latin America will be needed to obtain a tough
OAS resolution. At the same
time, it is desirable to keep the noise-level low in the
U.S.
The general shape of the noise-level we want to get across is
that Cuba is not solely a U.S. problem, but is a genuine
Hemispheric problem. A confident but outraged Hemisphere is
banding together to take further measures against Castro. The arms cache incident
is a grave demonstration of what we have been saying for some
time.
Action Items—The group agreed that a series
of actions should be taken: The State Department should write a fresh draft of the
OAS resolution and send
it to Palm Beach to the Secretary so that the Secretary
might get the President’s approval in principle.Rusk was in Palm
Springs, California, February 20–23 for a meeting
between President Johnson and
President López
Mateos of Mexico.State should explore the problem of how the OAS meeting ties in with the
Alliance for Progress meeting in March. This situation must
be handled carefully.Mr. Chase should
write a paper by February 24 which discusses the action
against Cuba we want the OAS
to take, and the results we expect to achieve by getting the
OAS to take such action.
Mr. Chase should clear
his paper with Mr. Crimmins.USIS Film—The group
watched a USIS film about the arms
cache, which will be shown on TV in Latin America. The general
consensus was that it is a very convincing piece of work.GC
5. Telegram From the Department of State to
Secretary of State Rusk
in Palm Springs, CaliforniaSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 VEN.
Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Crimmins and U. Alexis Johnson, cleared by Allen, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson.Washington, February 22, 1964, 4:15
p.m.
Tosec 13. For the Secretary from Alexis Johnson.
Text working draft OAS Resolution
contained immediately following telegramTelegram Tosec 14 to USDel Palm Springs, February 22.
(Ibid.) represents outcome two White House meetings
chaired by Bundy and attended
by Attorney General, Vance,
General Taylor, State
(Johnson, Bunker and Amb. Stewart), USIA and
CIA. Mann and Commerce and Treasury representatives
participated first meeting.Text developed ad referendum to you and, if you approve, for you
to seek approval of the President to use text as basis for further
discussions with Venezuela with view arriving at agreed text which
they would take as basis for initiating soundings of OARs.Following is background of critical parts of resolution:
Article 2, warning:
We wanted here to seek umbrella for possible future
unilateral action and at same time provide ourselves
maximum flexibility with respect nature our response to
further Castro
actions. Judgment is that it will be most difficult to
get two-thirds vote for this blank check and we would be
prepared negotiate back from this initial position. This
article places emphasis on future action and is not
designed provide basis for response of general OAS concern in instant
case. Concept is also to provide basis of expressed
OAS concern for
considering approaches to Soviet Union urging they
exercise restraint on Castro.
Article 3, surveillance:
We examined closely the question of an alternative which
would permit search and seizure, involving the use of
force, of OAS member
states flag vessels (including Cuba), on the high seas. There was agreement that
this alternative would not do anything more in a
practical sense (i.e., in stopping arms shipments) than
the language in the above draft and would be much more
difficult to get agreement on. Wish to note that under
either method chances actual apprehension of vessels
carrying arms or subversives not good, and in fact it is
doubtful Castro
will revert at least for some time to technique used
exceptionally in Venezuelan operation. Therefore, effect
this article essentially psychological. It would be
viewed as a further tightening measure, and the fact no
further arms shipments occurred could be interpreted as
result establishment surveillance system.
Article 6 on economic measures:
After examining variants, which included recommendation
specifically calling for “proclaimed list” action by
member states, we agreed on generalized formula
presented in draft. This language does not commit us or
others (who we estimate would be reluctant go so far) to
establishment “proclaimed list”, but would provide basis
for such additional action and measures by us and other
OAS countries as we
may decide to take to discourage free-world trade with
Cuba.
White House meetings produced following additional conclusions: Aggrieved party, Venezuela, which is prepared propose
strong measures, should float draft resolution, with US
prepared move in firm support Venezuelan initiative. So long
as possible, US should not be in lead.USIA would proceed with
large-scale effort in Latin America through its Latin
American outlets to publicize Investigating Committee report
(which is to be released 24th). (USIA is distributing dramatic non-attributed TV
show on report.) Decision based conviction that high noise
level effort needed in order develop Latin American support
for even a minimum package.On US domestic side, issue should be placed in low key,
with no major statements coming out of Washington. Basic
theme US public position would be that, as we have
consistently maintained, US itself not threatened by Cuba;
real Cuban threat is subversion directed against Latin
America; therefore problem is one for entire hemisphere,
particularly for the Caribbean basin countries directly
threatened; and action to meet threat must be decided upon
in common.We should withhold decision on whether issue should be
handled in Meeting of Foreign Ministers or in COAS acting provisionally as
Organ Consultation until we have clear idea of Latin
American lineup on action to be taken.
Text conclusions Investigating Committee also being transmitted
septel.Telegram Tosec 15 to USDel Palm
Springs, February 22. (Ibid.)
Foregoing also discussed with George
Ball. I will be available in Dept after 10 a.m. Sunday
for telcon if you desire.Rusk called U. Alexis Johnson on February 23 to
report his decision “to check out the draft resolution further with
the lawyers before he shows it to the President.” (Memorandum from
Chase to Bundy, February 24; Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, OAS Resolution (Arms Cache), Vol. II,
Memos, 11/63–9/64)
Ball
6. Draft Paper Prepared by Gordon
Chase of the National Security Council StaffSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Cuba, OAS Resolution (Arms Cache), Vol. II, Memos,
11/63–9/64. Secret. Chase forwarded the draft paper to Bundy under cover of a February 24
memorandum in which he noted the draft was cleared by John Crimmins and asked if
Bundy wanted it
circulated to the participants of the Friday meeting. No record of
Bundy’s response or a
final version of the paper has been found.Washington, February 24, 1964.
OAS Action on Venezuelan Arms
Cache—U.S. Objectives and Expectations
The following is a discussion of the action against Cuba we want the
OAS to take as a result of the
discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela. It is also a discussion
of the results we expect to achieve by getting the OAS to take such action.
U.S. Cuban Policy in General—The bare
minimum objective of our Cuba policy is a Cuba which poses no
threat to its neighbors and which is not a Soviet satellite. In
moving towards this objective we have rejected the options of
unprovoked U.S. military intervention in Cuba and of an
effective, total blockade around Cuba—primarily because they
would risk another US/USSR
confrontation. Instead, we are engaged in a variety of
unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions and pressures,
both offensive (e.g. economic denial and covert programs) and
defensive (e.g. counter-subversion program) which stop short of
invasion or blockade.
It is not at all clear that these measures short of military
intervention/blockade will lead to our minimum objective. About
the most that can be said is that we appear to be moving in the
right direction. A tough, nasty, but no invasion/blockade
policy, as opposed to a softer policy, is most likely to protect
the Hemisphere from Castro’s aggressive intentions and probably lays
the best groundwork for bringing about any of the eventualities
which would constitute a removal of the Soviet satellite from
the Hemisphere—such as an overthrow of the Castro regime or a Soviet
decision to quit Cuba. From a domestic political viewpoint, a
tough but no invasion/blockade policy, fortuitously, is one
policy which the American people appear prepared to support at
this time.
The Opportunity Afforded by the Arms Cache
Discovery—While the discovery, four months ago, of
three tons of Cuban arms is not considered to be sufficiently
provocative to lead us to risk a US/USSR confrontation and to
take decisive action against Cuba via military
intervention/blockade, the discovery of the arms cache does
provide us with an excellent opportunity to make further
progress in tightening up and extending our present policy
towards Cuba. In working towards this end we must be careful to
move in those areas where we want to move, and not necessarily
in those areas where false logic would appear to dictate that we
move. For example, since the crime is a matter of arms, it does
not necessarily follow that we must do something flashy and
expensive (politically and financially) about arms, especially
since our best estimate is that the likelihood of further
significant arms shipments from Cuba is small.
In taking advantage of the arms cache discovery and the
concomitant OAS attention, there
are two areas in which we can profitably move with energy in the
shoring up and extension of our isolation policy and in the
strengthening of our anti-subversion program.
Further OAS Action
to Isolate Cuba—Appropriate OAS action on the arms cache issue can take us a long
way in our effort to shore up and extend our present isolation
policy. Specifically, the following is what we want:
We want the OAS
resolution, in flexible and general language, to provide
a basis for possible unilateral U.S. action to reduce
Cuban/Free World commercial relations (e.g. the drastic
measure of a proclaimed list); more importantly, we want
the resolution to encourage as many OAR’s as possible to
join us in our effort. At present, one of the major
obstacles to our efforts in the field of economic denial
is the non-OAS Free
World argument that the U.S. is the only country in the
Western Hemisphere which is really concerned about Cuba.
To counter this argument, we must demonstrate clearly
that the Hemisphere regards Cuba as a threat, that the
Hemisphere supports the isolation policy, that the
Hemisphere looks with disfavor upon traders who do
business with Castro, and that the Hemisphere intends
to take appropriate action against such traders.
If we fail in this effort to get OAS support, we will probably be faced with
a continuation of the serious deterioration which has
already begun with respect to our economic denial
program. On the other hand, if we succeed in our effort,
the chances are considerably enhanced that we will be
able to break the growing Cuban/Free World commercial
ties. Assuming we can get appropriate OAS language and follow up,
it is conceivable that the U.S., Colombia, Venezuela,
Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Paraguay,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Ecuador will all
take some kind of action (not necessarily the same in
each country) which will make it clear to Free World
traders that they can’t have it both ways and that they
must choose between Cuba, with a population of
6,000,000, and selected OAS countries whose
populations total about 230,000,000. In selling this
proposal to the OAR’s we will point out, inter alia,
that they will not be forced to sacrifice much in real
terms since there will be relatively few Free World
traders who will ultimately choose the Cuban market in
such circumstances. Indeed, only Cuba will be seriously
hurt.
Assuming the OAS passes a
resolution which meets this problem, we will be in a
position to follow it up immediately by proposing to
willing OAR’s that they meet with us to devise means of
implementing the OAS
decision—e.g. the circulation of lists of Free World
Cuban traders among OAS
countries.
We want the OAS resolution
to encourage further steps within the Hemisphere to isolate
Cuba. First, we want the remaining five OAS countries which maintain
diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba to sever such
relations. Such a step will be dramatic evidence of Cuba’s
isolation and to some extent will hinder Cuba’s subversive
operations by denying Cuba the use of its overseas missions
for this purpose. Importantly, it will be a clear sign to
other Free World countries that the Hemisphere, expressing
itself through the OAS,
feels strongly about Cuba. It will also be a heavy
psychological blow to Castro who has tried persistently and
energetically in the past several months to establish
“normal” relations with many Free World countries. Second,
we want the suspension of all trade (except food and
medicines) between Cuba and the OAR’s. While trade between
Cuba and the OAR’s is small, such action will again
demonstrate Cuba’s isolation and OAS solidarity on the matter of Free World
trade with Cuba. Third, we want a general call to Free World
countries to cooperate with us in our effort.Further OAS Action
to Counter Castro/Communist Subversion— Appropriate OAS action on the arms cache issue can
also take us a long way in our effort to strengthen our
counter-subversion program. Specifically, the following is what we
want: We want the OAS
resolution, in flexible and general language, to warn
Castro that the
OAS will not stand by
idly if he continues his subversive efforts. This resolution
will be cognate with a possible Presidential statement along
similar lines to the U.S. public and with a stern, private
warning to the Russians that Cuban subversion is leading to
a highly dangerous situation. Hopefully, such a resolution
will have two main results. First, it will deter Castro from further
subversive actions; among other things, the Russians may
find it in their interest to control Castro more closely.
Second, it will provide a juridical umbrella for and
pre-position the OAS and/or
the U.S., to use force against Cuba in the future if it is
deemed desirable to do so.We want the OAS resolution
to call for the establishment of a surveillance system which
will permit the stopping and searching in territorial waters of all
vessels suspected of carrying arms and subversives; a
similar air surveillance system will also be established.
While there are some negative aspects to such a resolution
(few, if any, arms will be found), there are good reasons
for having it. First, since an arms cache is involved, we
must, at a minimum make a bow towards the problem of
controlling arms shipments. Also, the resolution will be
viewed as a tightening measure, and the fact that no further
arms shipments occur can be interpreted as a result of the
establishment of a surveillance system. Second, it will
possibly deter Castro
somewhat from sending men and arms to Latin America. Third,
it will provide a peg on which to hang closer and more
effective bilateral cooperation which may be called for in
the future. For example, the U.S. and Venezuela may want to
work out an arrangement whereby U.S. vessels can enter
Venezuelan waters to assist in the seizure of a suspect
vessel. Fourth, while it will give us an instrument to
harass Castro
marginally, it has no significant escalation
implications.We want the OAS resolution
to call for the suspension of all air and sea communications
between Cuba and OAS
countries—ie. that ships and aircraft of OAS countries will not go to
Cuba, that Cuban aircraft and ships will not be permitted in
OAS country ports or
airfields and that ships and aircraft of non-OAS countries will not be
allowed to stop at an OAS
country port or airfield if proceeding enroute to or from
Cuba. This action will have some most desirable effects. It
will considerably increase Cuba’s difficulties in exporting
subversives, especially if the Cuba/Mexico air-link is cut.
In addition, it will probably be effective in reducing even
further the number of Free World ships which still call at
Cuban ports.We want the OAS resolution
to encourage further steps within the Hemisphere to counter
Castro/Communist
subversion. We want a condemnation of the Castro regime for its
aggressive acts against Venezuela. Also, we want a renewed
call for alert against Castro/Communist subversion and an
endorsement of the Lavalle Committee recommendations
outlining specific measures on control of travel, funds, and
propaganda for subversive purposes.
Priority Listing of U.S. Objectives—The following is a summary
listing of the major actions we want. They are listed in order
of their importance in furthering the objectives of present U.S.
policy towards Cuba. OAS words and action to
stop the rapid deterioration in our economic denial
program.Warning to Castro regarding future subversive
action, with the threat of meaningful
retaliation.Breaking of air and sea communications with
Cuba.Breaking of diplomatic and consular relations.Establishment of a surveillance system.
It should be noted that the actions most important to us may not
be the most difficult to get. For example, the economic
sanctions may not be as difficult to get as the breaking of
diplomatic relations.
Tactics—It is impossible to predict how
many of the above mentioned actions we will get until we have an
opportunity to publicize the arms cache issue and to reconnoiter
the OAS landscape. Our general
objective is to obtain as much of the total package as possible.
To this end, our tactics will include the following elements. To the extent possible, we will keep Venezuela in the
lead. We will be close behind the Venezuelans, however,
supporting them with great determination and
energy.A high noise-level will be needed in Latin America to
obtain our objective. To this end, the USIA will proceed with a
large scale effort to publicize the investigating
committee’s report.A fairly high noise-level will be desirable in
non-OAS Free World
countries to gain their acceptance of OAS decisions, particularly
in the economic field. The general theme we will convey
is that a confident but outraged Hemisphere is banding
together to take further measures against Cuba. We have
been telling the truth all along about the Cuban threat
to Latin America and the arms cache discovery proves it.
As appropriate, we will distribute the USIS film to non-OAS Free World
countries.Domestically, the arms cache issue will be played in
low-key. The general theme will be that the U.S. is not
directly threatened and the real Cuban threat is
subversion directed against Latin America. While we
intend to aid the Hemisphere as much as possible in the
fight against Cuban subversion, the control of
subversives is and must necessarily be primarily the
responsibility of the target countries.
A low-key posture in the U.S. will be very difficult to maintain
if an MFM is scheduled in
Washington. Therefore, if an MFM
is to be held, we will consider carefully whether or not it
should be held elsewhere.
Practical Results—Assuming we are entirely
successful in obtaining all the OAS
action we want, we must be clear as to what the practical results
will be, and what they will not be. There will not be an immediate overthrow of the Castro regime and an
immediate and complete cessation of Castro/Communist subversion
in Latin America.There will be a juridical umbrella for the use of force
against Cuba in the future, if deemed desirable.There will be, at a minimum, a delay in an upswing of the
Cuban economy.There will be an increased burden placed on the Soviets to
support the Cuban economy.There will be a further political isolation of Castro. Psychologically,
this will wound Castro deeply.There will be a substantial impediment put in the way of
Castro/Communist
subversive activities in Latin America.Gordon ChasePrinted from a copy that bears
this typed signature.
7. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA Files, 1964: Lot 66 D 65,
Venezuelan Arms Cache. Limited Official Use. Copies were sent to
Dungan, Sorensen, Chayes, Whiteman, Bunker, Allen, and Crimmins.Washington, February 25, 1964.
I would like a re-examination of paragraph two of the draft resolution
with a view to determining whether the lawyers can strengthen this
paragraph under either of the two following separate theories:
UN Article 51 says in
substance that nothing in the Charter affects the right of
individual or collective self-defense in the case of armed
attack.
I recall that in the past some people have construed this
article to limit the right of self-defense to cases in which
there has been an armed attack. I seem to recall that there
is respectable authority (McDougal of Yale)Myres S. McDougal, professor of law at
Yale University. which takes the opposite view,
i.e., that the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense is not so limited. If the second line of
authorities are followed we could simply have the resolution
declare in substance that in the event of a situation
comparable to the Venezuela one, the American States would
have the right to resort to the use of armed force,
individually or collectively, in the exercise of their
inherent right of self-defense.
Why can’t we capitalize on the fact that there has been an
aggression by Cuba against Venezuela which falls within the
purview of Article 6 of the Rio Treaty? More specifically,
why can’t we have this paragraph invoke the sanctions of
Article 8 of the Rio Treaty (which include the use of armed force) and then
suspend the actual use of armed force— suspend the pushing
of the button—on some theory such as, for example, the
repetition of the same kind of aggression against another
country? If the answer to the second question is that we
cannot make the future employment of armed force dependent
on some future event, then why can’t we invoke and simply
suspend in an effort to give the United States a clear right
to act in the future without specifying future
contingencies?
The trouble with paragraph 2 of the present draft is that it
adds nothing to our existing legal rights to act in the
future—nothing to our existing rights under the Rio Treaty.
What we should be seeking is to capitalize on the Venezuelan
situation so as to improve our legal posture.Chase explained in
a February 26 memorandum to Bundy that “the Secretary and Tom Mann
want the wording strong enough so that it gives the U.S.
a release in order to act unilaterally, if necessary.
Abe Chayes,
however, takes the position that the present wording
(which will be tough enough to sell in the OAS) does not give us that
release.” (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Cuba, OAS
Resolution (Arms Cache), Vol. II, Memos, 11/63–9/64)
Chayes
offered new language for the second paragraph in a
February 28 memorandum to Mann that “would provide a firmer legal
basis for future individual or collective action against
Cuba than the present draft.” (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA Files, 1964: Lot 66 D 65, Venezuelan
Arms Cache)
8. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs (Mann) to
Secretary of State RuskSource:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA Files, 1964: Lot 66 D 65, Cuba
1964. Secret. Drafted by Mann
and cleared by Chayes subject
to several points concerning the second paragraph of the draft
resolution. In a March 2 memorandum to Mann, Chayes
warned that “legal arguments will be made by the opponents of the
paragraph, both in and out of the OAS, against my view that this paragraph provides a
legal basis for future individual or collective action.” He also
emphasized “the risks in using substantial international political
capital to obtain approval of this paragraph when the result may be
both to expose a major division within the OAS and to stimulate immediate demands for U.S. armed
intervention against Cuba.” (Ibid.)Washington, March 2, 1964.
SUBJECT
Draft OAS Resolution Re Cuban
Aggression Against Venezuela
Attached for your approval is a draft OAS
resolution dealing with the recent aggression by Cuba against
Venezuela.Attached but not
printed. If, as we anticipate, this draft is acceptable to Venezuela, it would be
presented as a Venezuelan rather than a United States initiative. We
would, however, have to support it strongly in order to obtain the
necessary two-thirds majority.
The draft resolution would do the following: (1) condemn Cuba for its
aggression against Venezuela; (2) authorize in advance the taking of
necessary measures individually and collectively, including the use of
force, against Cuba if it commits aggression of comparable gravity
against another American state; (3) recommend that the American
governments cooperate in establishing systems of air, sea and land
surveillance to prevent clandestine shipment of arms and men from Cuba
to their countries; (4) require break in diplomatic and consular
relations, suspension of all trade except in food and medicines, and
suspension of all air and sea transportation except for humanitarian
reasons; (5) provide an umbrella for unilateral action to further the
trade embargo; (6) call upon free-world countries to take measures to
help the American governments in their efforts to isolate Cuba; and (7)
reaffirm the COAS recommendations on
measures to counteract Castro-communist subversion. By far the most meaningful part
of the resolution is paragraph 2.
Even if we succeed in getting the two-thirds majority for the resolution
as a whole there is a possibility that both Mexico and Brazil, perhaps
joined by others, would refuse to go along. By committing ourselves to
strong support of this resolution we would be accepting not only the
risk of a division in the OAS family but
the possibility that the countries opposing would refuse to be bound by
the two-thirds majority. To some extent these risks can be minimized by
working quietly with Venezuela, in advance of setting a date for the
OAS meeting, to obtain firm
agreement with 13 countries to support a particular resolution. This
preliminary work should be done so that we can know in advance what will
come out of the OAS meeting.
There is a good chance—provided we take in the beginning strong and
decisive leadership in favor of a resolution of this kind—of obtaining
the thirteen votes needed for a two-thirds majority under the Rio
Treaty.
The critical problem involves paragraph 2 of the resolution. This
paragraph in effect says that in the event there should be another
aggression by Cuba against an American Republic similar to the recent
aggression against Venezuela, the United States would have advance Rio
Treaty authorization to move militarily against Cuba itself without the
need for calling another OAS meeting. On
the other hand, it would, however, leave the United States free to make
this decision in the light of all the circumstances existing at the
time. It should be noted, of course, that if evidence comes to light of
further Cuban aggression and
intervention in other American states, the paragraph will give strong
impetus to those seeking prompt, decisive military action against the
Castro regime. Pressures for
action can be expected to be all the greater during an election
year.
We should not support this kind of provision unless we are prepared to
follow through. The hope is that the risk of escalation in case of
United States military action against Cuba would be decreased by saying
to the USSR, in essence, immediately
after the proposed OAS action, that they
should either take the necessary steps to prevent Castro from engaging in further
adventures of a subversive character in other American Republics or, if
they cannot control Castro, to
disengage. Obviously, others are better able than I to judge this aspect
of the problem.
The other operative paragraphs in the draft resolution will by themselves
have significant beneficial effects, but it is not expected that they
will be decisive in bringing about an overthrow of Castro in the foreseeable future. They
may, however, constitute good trading material for getting a two-thirds
vote on paragraph 2.
If the draft resolution is satisfactory, I recommend that we try to meet
with the President today or tomorrow to obtain his approval. Then we
will be in a position to send it to President Betancourt who is awaiting our views on the measures
which should be taken before initiating consultations.According to Rusk’s Appointment Book he met Mann and Chayes on March 3, at 9:37 a.m.
(Johnson Library) Although no substantive record of the meeting was
found, a notation on this memorandum indicates that the draft was
“overtaken.” On March 2 Rusk
briefed the President on the draft resolution: “Our big problem
there is how far to go in relation to the number of votes we’ll get,
but we got a good strong resolution, and we think [if] the
Venezuelans float that, we can do work in capitals, and come up with
a pretty good result on that.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Dean
Rusk, March 2, 1964, 11:35 a.m., Tape F64.15, Side B,
PNO 1) An uncorrected transcript of the conversation is ibid.
9. Summary Record of the 523rd Meeting of the National Security
CouncilSource: Johnson
Library, National Security File, NSC
Meetings, Vol. 1, Tab 4. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The time of the
meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) The
first item of record, “Secretary McNamara’s Trip to South Vietnam,” is printed in
Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I,
Document 71. FitzGerald also drafted
an account of the meeting, portions of which are cited in footnotes
below.Washington, March 5, 1964, 4:55–5:30 p.m.
Secretary McNamara’s Mission to Vietnam; OAS Action on Venezuelan Arms
Cache
[Omitted here is discussion of Secretary McNamara’s trip to South
Vietnam.]
2. OAS Action on
Venezuelan Arms Cache
Secretary Rusk said that as a
result of the proof of Cuban efforts to subvert the government of
Venezuela by shipping arms into that country, we must take stronger
action against Cuba than any we have taken so far. He summarized the
attached paper, “OAS Action Against
Cuba,” and the draft resolution which it contains.Attached but not printed. He made two points: There is some question as to whether we can get a two-thirds
vote in the OAS for the
resolution. Venezuela will not be voting.Paragraph 2 of the resolution is a warning to Cuba. It does
not mean that if another incident such as the Venezuelan arms
cache occurred, we would be forced to act against Cuba.According to
FitzGerald: “He [Rusk] said that paragraph 2
as drafted is designed as a blank check for OAS or individual member action
in the event of further Cuban aggression; that it does not
require U.S. action but does constitute a solemn warning
both to Castro and
the Soviet Union. He pointed out that if we go all out to
get this resolution and fail it will have unfortunate
effects.” (Memorandum for the Record, March 6; Central
Intelligence Agency, DCI
(McCone) Files,
Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with President
Johnson)
Assistant Secretary Mann commented
that the Latin American states go along with us, as they did in the
missile crisis, when the U.S. appears ready to use military measures,
but there is strong domestic pressure in the various Latin American
countries opposing lesser actions against Cuba. Elections in the various
Latin American countries make this problem more difficult. Unless we
find out by prior questioning that the Latin American states will
support a meaningful OAS resolution, we
should oppose the convening of the OAS
on this issue.On this point,
FitzGerald wrote: “The Secretary of State
pointed out that Venezuela is taking a very hard position, i.e.
talking about an invasion of Cuba. The President said that it seemed
to him that this would only stir things up.”
The President said we should begin now to find out how the Latin American
states feel toward this resolution and then decide what we should do.
Let the Venezuelans begin the sounding out, we will support them, and
when we know who would support us, we could make a firm decision.
Secretary Dillon expressed his
concern about paragraph 2 which he felt was very strong and might force
us to act. He suggested that the draft resolution be changed from
“should be taken” to “authorizes the member states to take action” in
the event that the government of Cuba continues its aggression against
other American states.FitzGerald’s memorandum reads: “Mr. Bundy agreed with Secretary
Dillon’s point. Governor
Stevenson asked whether
under this resolution, in the event of new aggressions by Castro, a meeting of the OAS would have to be held prior to
action. He was advised that, although a meeting would be held,
action could be taken at once without recourse to such a
meeting.” The President agreed to the suggested change.
Mr. Mann said that paragraph 2
gives us jurisdictional authority to move troops in the event of further
Cuban subversion actions without going back to the OAS for approval. Secretary Rusk doubted that the OAS would give us this kind of a blank
check.
Mr. Mann said we would have to
twist arms to get the required thirteen votes for the resolution. What
we are looking for is authority in advance from the OAS to act quickly and unilaterally. The
issue today is not armed warfare but subversion. The UN Charter talks only of armed aggression,
and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty defines aggression somewhat broadly.
What we need to meet the existing situation is authority such as stated
in paragraph 2.
The President agreed that we should try to get advance authority so that
we do not have to go back to the OAS in
the event of another action by Castro.
In response to Mr. Bundy’s
question, Mr. Chayes, as the
State Department Legal Adviser, pointed out the legal differences
between the statement approved at Punta del EsteReference is to paragraph 3, Resolution II, Final Act
of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Punta del Este, Uruguay, January 22–31, 1962. (Department
of State Bulletin, February 19, 1962, pp.
278–282) Documentation on the meeting is in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XII
Documents 136–145. and paragraph 2 of the resolution.
The President suggested that we say this is what we did at Punta del Este
and this is what we should now have authority to do so that we can act
in an emergency. We should find out how far the Latin American states
will go.
Ambassador Thompson said the
resolution created a problem. The Russians would read the resolution to
mean that we are no longer committed not to invade Cuba if there is a
repetition of an act such as the shipment of arms to Venezuela by
Cuba.FitzGerald wrote: “Mr. Bundy pointed out that this pledge
was always subject to Cuba’s good behavior and that we would indeed
expect the Soviets to help in maintaining that good
behavior.”
Mr. Mann pointed out that our
technique would involve convincing Venezuela to accept our draft as
their own and do the sounding out with the other Latin American states
as if it were their resolution. The Speaker asked what we would do if we
failed to sell the resolution. Mr. Mann repeated his view that we should not call an OAS meeting if we could obtain approval of
only a mushy resolution.
Mr. Bundy called attention to the
problem involved in paragraph 4 of the resolution calling for the
suspension of trade and the suggestion that U.S. shipments of lard to
Cuba be allowed. The President saw nothing inconsistent.
Mr. Bundy expressed grave doubts
about the wisdom of obtaining support of about thirteen small states if
the six large states opposed the resolution. Secretary Rusk said the small countries threatened
by Castro are important. The big
Latin American states are far away from the threat, and, therefore,
consider the threat less important, but we have a responsibility to
protect the small nearby threatened countries.
Mr. Mann summarized his
understanding that he was authorized to proceed to find out what
countries would support the draft resolution.On this point FitzGerald wrote: “The President
said to move ahead with the present resolutions and to have the
State Department canvass OAS members
concerning the acceptability of these resolutions and report back to
him.” (Ibid.)
Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears
this typed signature.
10. Editorial Note
On March 16, 1964, the Johnson administration began
a concerted effort to reaffirm the ideals of the Alliance for Progress
while establishing its own policy on Latin America. At noon that day the
President delivered a major address before an audience of U.S. and Latin
American diplomats. The ceremony, held at the Pan American Union, marked the third anniversary of
the Alliance as well as the inauguration of the Inter-American Committee
on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP).
Although Johnson noted that the program owed much
to the “vision” of his predecessor, he vowed that U.S. support for the
Alliance would not diminish in the wake of Kennedy’s assassination. As a sign of his personal
interest, the President declared that the recent appointment of
Thomas C. Mann “reflects my
complete determination to meet all the commitments of the United States
to the Alliance.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1963–64, Book I, pages 381–384) The
same day the Department of State announced that Mann would assume direct responsibility
for economic assistance to Latin America as an Assistant Administrator
of the Agency for International Development. To allow Mann the freedom to exercise full
authority in Latin American affairs, the relevant operations in both
agencies would be reorganized, merging the Bureau for Latin America
(AID) with the Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs (State). (Department of State Bulletin, April 6, 1964, page 540)
March 16 was also the first of a 3-day conference for U.S. Ambassadors
and AID mission directors in Latin
America. Mann had summoned these
officials to Washington for consultation on the administration’s policy,
in particular, the Alliance for Progress. Most of the conference, which
included sessions on regional as well as bilateral affairs, was
considered off-the-record. Nevertheless, the day after the conference
ended, The New York Times published an account of
a closed session in which Mann
allegedly suggested abandoning Kennedy’s policy to deter Latin American dictators. The
article, written by Tad Szulc, reported that Mann had emphasized the difficulty in classifying
political leaders as either “good” or “bad,” citing, for example, such
authoritarian presidents as Adolfo López Mateos of Mexico, Víctor
Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia,
and Alfredo Stroessner of
Paraguay. According to Szulc, Mann argued that the administration should be guided by
practical not moral considerations: promoting economic growth while
protecting U.S. business interests; and avoiding intervention in
internal affairs while continuing to oppose communism. Senators
Hubert H. Humphrey
(D–Minnesota) and Wayne Morse
(D–Oregon) were reported to have reacted to Mann’s remarks by insisting that the United States
“fight for the preservation of democracy in Latin America as part of the
Alliance.” (The New York Times, March 19,
1964)
The Johnson administration reacted swiftly to The New York Times article. In a telephone
conversation with Mann and
President Johnson the morning of March 19,
McGeorge Bundy mentioned “the
trouble about that Szulc piece.” The discussion continued as follows:
“Mann: Well, I’m going to
do something on that.
“Bundy: I assumed you
would be going to.
“Mann: Yeah, we’re going
to do something on that. This is also very distorted.
“Bundy: I have no doubt of
it. [Laughter] That I—the time Szulc writes a straight story
will be the news.
“Mann: I talked both to
[Senator Ernest] Gruening and to Morse this morning and they’re
not worried about it.
“Bundy: Good. Well, I
guess that—just a moment—anything else, sir?
“President: Do we have some Ambassador you reckon is talking to
Szulc or do you have enough Departmental people in there doing
it?
“Mann: I think a lot of
this—I think this came from, probably from somebody in the
AID side of the Department,
but I can’t be sure. We had a big group and you don’t get—If you
don’t talk about these things and you don’t have any
coordination, the Bureau doesn’t function. You talk, then they
distort. But this is a gross distortion of what I said on— I
said essentially the same thing that Morse said: that we were in
favor of democracy—
“President: I hope you let him know that before he makes a
speech.
“Mann: I’ve already called
him. I’ve already called him, and he said he does know that. I
called Gruening too. They’re both not worried about it. I’m
going to have a talk about the whole problem, which is a very
complex problem, but this is just a [unintelligible] job as I’ve
ever—slanted, distorted—
“President: OK, my friend.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation among President
Johnson, Thomas Mann, and McGeorge Bundy, March 19, 1964, 11:27 a.m., Tape
F64.18, Side A, PNO 4) The portion of the conversation printed
here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically
for this volume.
Later that afternoon Richard I. Phillips, press spokesman for the
Department, issued the following statement: “United States devotion to
the principles of democracy is an historical fact. United States policy
toward unconstitutional governments will as in the past be guided by the
national interest and the circumstances peculiar to each situation as it
arises.” (Circular telegram 1730, March 19; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 US) In spite of this denial, the
position attributed to Mann by
The New York Times soon became known in the
press as the “Mann Doctrine.”
11. National Security Action Memorandum No. 297Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. II, 6/64–8/64.
Confidential.Washington, April 22, 1964.
TO
The Secretary of StateThe Secretary of DefenseThe Administrator, Agency for International Development
SUBJECT
Latin American Military Aid
The President has today approved determinations with regard to military
aid to Latin America.
In administering these funds and planning future programs, the President
wishes to insure that our policies, MAP
and otherwise, are directed toward the following general objectives: Military expenditures by the host country which are consistent
with and proportionate to expenditures for social and economic
development.The maintenance of a military establishment in the host
country which is realistic in terms of our estimate of its
potential missions.The establishment of elite units which might be used in U.N.
peace-keeping assignments.Continued emphasis on civic action and internal security
missions, the latter to be realistically defined.Definition of a clear relationship between military internal
security missions and police functions and a rational pattern of
U.S. funding for same.Emphasis in training and by other means on the role of the
military in a modern democratic society.Avoidance of sophisticated and expensive prestige equipment in
our grant or sale programs except where specifically justified.
In this connection, host country purchase from other sources of
non-essential prestige equipment is to be actively
discouraged.
The President desires, by 1 August 1964, a brief analysis and report on
the military situation in each country and the changes, if any, to which
our policies are being directed. These reports should measure the
existing situation against the above general objectives and other relevant factors. The reports
should be prepared under the general direction of the Assistant
Secretary for Latin American Affairs with the cooperation of other
agencies.In a July 28 memorandum to
Bundy, Sayre explained that the reports
had encountered difficulty within the bureaucracy, and suggested
extending the deadline to September 1. Bundy agreed. (Ibid.)
McGeorge Bundy
12. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source:
Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
Thomas Mann, Tape F64.26,
Side A, PNO 4 &5. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this
volume. An informal memorandum of the conversation, prepared in
ARA, is ibid., Papers of
Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, January 4,
1964–April 30, 1965.Washington, May 5, 1964, 6:45 p.m.
[Omitted here is discussion of a proposal to send Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy to
Chile.]
President: What do you think
about the Szulc article this morning?The
article reported that Teodoro
Moscoso had resigned from the Inter-American
Committee on the Alliance for Progress in order to return to private
life in Puerto Rico. Szulc wrote: “His resignation comes at a time
of growing disillusionment in Latin America and among Latin-American
officials of the Alliance in Washington over present conduct of the
program by the United States. The consensus in those quarters is
that the program as conceived by President Kennedy no longer exists, and that
Washington seems to have returned to its unilateral approach to
problems of the hemisphere.” (The New York
Times, May 5)
Mann: [Laughter] Those fellas are
really on a vendetta, you know. They’ve got their knives out, and it’s
the most biased reporting I’ve ever seen. If I were outside of
government—the American election and so forth—I would answer in proper
Texan style. But I’m not in a position to get into a donnybrook right
now, because I think it might be disruptive.
President: How are we doing—
Mann: What do you think I should
be doing about this?
President: How are we doing in
Latin America in your judgment?
Mann: Oh, I think we’re making
good progress. We’re making good progress, better than I think anybody
could have hoped for. The Brazilian development. Colombia’s going well—I
just got a report today from [unintelligible]: everybody’s happy, the
President’s very delighted, happy the way everything’s going. The
Mexicans are happy— I got a message today from López Mateos. Central America’s going
good. Chile and Brazil have problems. But this is the bleeding-heart,
left wing group; they’re just mad.
President: Well, now what are we
doing to hurt them?
Mann: I don’t know, but any
[laughter]—Well, I think it’s pretty hard to figure out a way to hurt
them effectively. I think we’re getting a broader base with the press, a
better understanding, but these two New York
Times twins are [unintelligible]. I don’t think they like
anything that’s happened since November 22nd. And it’s pretty hard to
convince them. I haven’t figured out a way to gag them yet.
President: Do they ever come talk
to you?
Mann: Oh, I see them
occasionally. I haven’t seen them lately. I’m not sure it’s a good idea
to see them because you start to talk, they’ve made up their mind.
President: Where do they get
their stuff? Schlesinger?
Mann: I would think so. I would
think there and in this club of left-wing reporters.
President: Do you have any people
leaking it on you over in the Department?
Mann: Well, I—Yes, we’ve had two
or three that we think are out now and we’ve got only one left, and I
think maybe Moscoso. I only have one guy that I don’t trust, and I think
he—
Mann: Well, this I don’t know. I
had a very friendly telegram from him today saying that he didn’t expect
this news to break so soon, he had expected to talk to me and to you—but
I don’t really trust him myself. I’m not sure what he hopes to—
President: OK.
Mann: OK.
President: You call me in the
morning.
Mann: I’ll call.According to the President’s Daily Diary Mann attended an afternoon meeting
on May 6 between the President and the Panamanian Ambassador.
(Johnson Library) No record has been found, however, to indicate
whether Mann telephoned
Johnson in the morning—or later in the
day.
13. Memorandum for RecordSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File,
Alliance for Progress. Secret. No drafting information appears on
the memorandum. Bundy wrote
“OK” on it. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.Washington, May 11, 1964, 4:45 p.m.
SUBJECT
Memorandum of Conversation in the Cabinet Room Monday, May 11,
4:45 p.m.
PRESENT WERE
The PresidentAmbassadors or Chargé d’Affaires of the Latin American
RepublicsDr. Carlos Sanz de
Santamaria (head of CIAP)Acting Secretary George
BallAmbassador DukeMr. McGeorge Bundy[Assistant Secretary Mann]
The President opened the meeting by offering a welcome to the Ambassadors
who were seated around the Cabinet table. He said that this group of
advisers might well be more effective than his regular Cabinet, and he
then read or paraphrased the attached statement.Not found. During a telephone conversation
Johnson had asked Mann to prepare a “page” for the
meeting. Mann replied: “All
right. I think the scenario is that you’re going to open up with a
couple of things. We’ve primed two or three of them to set the right
tone.” Both men agreed that this might avoid a “gripe session,”
which would inevitably leak to the press. (Ibid., Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Thomas Mann, May 11, 12:50 p.m., Tape F64.26, Side
B, PNO 3) At the close of his statement the President
announced that he was proposing the appointment of The Honorable
Walt W. Rostow to replace Mr.
Teodoro Moscoso as the
American Representative on CIAP. The
President initially asked that this announcement be kept private, because he had not had a chance
to discuss it with Mr. Rostow, who was airborne—but
while he was making the announcement, Acting Secretary Ball was called
to the telephone and reported that Mr. Rostow had
accepted the President’s proposal. The announcement was greeted with
obvious pleasure by the Ambassadors.
The first reply to the President’s remarks came from Dr. Sanz de Santamaria, who described his
recent swing through Central America. He said that he conceived of
CIAP as a political motor for the
promotion of the Alliance. He had found a very affirmative response in
every country from Mexico to Panama. All were trying to do their part.
He particularly praised the efforts of coordination of the Central
American nations. He believed that they had made great progress in
integration, and that their effort compared favorably with the
achievement of the European nations over a similar period of time.
Dr. Sanz said that he made it a
practice to emphasize that the Alliance for Progress was not simply
another name for AID, and that AID was merely one agency for the work of
the Alliance, and that indeed the Alliance must never be conceived of as
an effort by the U.S. alone.
Dr. Sanz reported that in some
countries he found that the people were not yet interested in the
Alliance. The Governments and the larger business interests were
actively engaged, but the Alliance had a need for the people as a whole
and for political action.
Dr. Sanz reported that he had
repeatedly been asked whether he himself believed in the Alliance for
Progress and that his standard answer had been a strong “Yes.” He has
explained that he had talked to President Johnson,
Secretary Rusk, and Secretary
Mann, and he knew of their
own personal commitment to the Alliance, commitments reemphasized again
by this meeting.
Dr. Sanz praised the appointment
of Walt Rostow. He said that this
was a very intelligent appointment which would be received with favor in
Latin America and he emphasized the importance of this appointment in
the light of the very great service which Teodoro Moscoso had rendered to the Alliance.
Dr. Sanz said that it was his
practice to discuss needed improvements frankly both with the U.S.
officials and with officials in Latin America. He was proud that in
Mexico he had been invited to speak as if he were a Mexican. He had done
so, and he believed that much could be accomplished in both directions
by this kind of candor. He believed that in the case of the U.S. there
was a need for the reduction of red tape, and for an ability to make
decisions promptly even if the decision was negative.
The President asked if Mr. Mann
found it difficult to say “No,” and Mr. Mann promptly defended himself, while agreeing that the
criticism offered by Dr. Sanz was
justified.
Dr. Sanz said in conclusion that
he was asked in Latin America why the U.S. insisted on a development
program when the U.S. itself had never had such a program. Dr. Sanz said that his answer was that it
was not the United States but the Latin American countries themselves
which had requested such programs, and that when resources were limited
and choice was necessary, it was entirely natural that a lending or
granting agency would need to know how a given proposal fitted into the
general program of the country concerned.
The President said that Dr. Sanz
had made a very constructive statement. We agreed with it, and the
President could say that however long he was in the White House, he was
going to be at work on the Alliance. There was not a man living that
cared more than he did, and no one more competent to work for the
Alliance than Tom Mann. The President agreed that there was too much red
tape and he believed it could be cut down. We were going to act for the
Alliance and we were glad to have the help in this work of such men as
Dr. Sanz.
The next speaker was Dr. Francisco R. Lima of El Salvador. He spoke
briefly and made four points: (1) that at Geneva there was a significant
difference between the hopes of the Latin American countries and the
position of the United States delegation; his Government hoped that the
U.S. could take a more sympathetic position;Reference is to the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), which met
in Geneva, March 23–June 16. (2) that the assignment of sugar
quotas was a matter of the greatest importance to Latin American
countries, and that his Government hoped for part of the Cuban quota.
The President interjected that his Government was not alone. (3) That
coffee prices should go up, and that the housewife should be brought to
accept the need for higher coffee prices. The President interjected that
producers always had believed in high prices, but that consumers were
not so easily persuaded. (4) That concern with the U.S. balance of
payments was interfering with relations between the U.S. and countries
of the Hemisphere.
At the President’s request, Ambassador Mann replied briefly to Ambassador Lima saying that
sugar quotas were under careful review, that the U.S. expected to pass
legislation supporting the coffee agreement, and that in cases where
transactions having a very minor effect on the balance of payments were
impeded by restrictions growing out of this problem, it should be
possible to make arrangements that would prevent delay or obstruction on
this account.
Ambassador Correa of Ecuador emphasized the concern of his country with
the fate of the IDA legislation.Reference is to a bill authorizing an increase
in the U.S. contribution to the International Development
Association, a World Bank affiliate. The House approved the
legislation on May 13; the President signed the bill into law on May
26. (78 Stat. 200) The President responded by saying that
this was one of the many great problems we have this year, that we were
working very hard on it and that we were worried about it too, and that
he proposed to discuss it with the Legislative Leadership. The President
telephoned on the spot to Mr. Lawrence
O’Brien and asked for an up-to-date report on the
legislative account. A little later in the meeting he received a
telephone answer from O’Brien’s
office and reported to the meeting that the current estimate was that
there would be 215 votes in the House for the measure, which would
probably be just enough.
The Ambassador of Uruguay remarked that trade also was very important,
that we should work at the increase of trade as a part of the whole
program, and that we were not yet working on it as we should.
Acting Secretary Ball, in
response, emphasized the concern of the U.S. with the expansion of trade
and, with a reference back to the earlier comments of Ambassador Lima,
he remarked that there was real hope for progress in the UNCTAD meeting in Geneva during the last
five weeks of hard work. He himself hoped that there would be answers
that would not be too disappointing to the assembled group.
Mr. Ball pointed out that we face
a real problem in framing our policy on tariff preferences. This was a
problem on which we ought to work together. The U.S. has to trade with
all the world, and if the U.S. should introduce tariff preferences
specifically for Latin America, we would be one step further along on
the road toward the creation of a series of closed trading systems, in
place of the traditional target of a single world-wide open system.
The President said that we ought to list some of our common interests and
work on them some more. He reemphasized his conviction that the Latin
American future was the American future, that “your welfare is our
welfare.”
The Ambassador of Chile remarked that some of the criticism which the
Alliance for Progress was now receiving was the result of understandable
impatience. In order to launch the Alliance for Progress we had set it
at a very high pitch, and the things said at the beginning may have made
the overall task seem easier than in fact it is.
The President entirely agreed with this point and said that in his view
we had indeed started off on a very high pitch and that we must now show
leadership in getting the real difficulties better understood.
The Ambassador of Chile continued that we had nevertheless accomplished a
good deal, although there was a natural tendency for each of us to
suppose that he was doing everything and that the other fellow wasn’t
doing enough. The President agreed, remarking that is his experience the
other fellow always thought it was the President of the United States
who wasn’t doing his part. The Ambassador of Chile replied that in the
U.S. press it always appeared that it was the U.S. that was doing the
work and no one else was doing enough. The Ambassador recognized that we
all had bureaucratic problems. He thought that CIAP was a good way of meeting responsibility, but that it
had taken too long to get organized. Nevertheless, most of our countries
had prepared or were preparing development programs, and programs for
tax reform and agrarian reform, and while we should not relax, we need
not feel frustrated either. The Latin American countries were doing
better. The weakest point was in the private sector. The conditions for
a perfectly stable private sector were very complex, and in his judgment
only two countries in the world could meet all the desired standards:
the U.S. and Switzerland. He did not think Latin American countries
could turn Swiss overnight. The Ambassador felt that Latin America faced
a heavy requirement for political and social reform, and such programs
commit governments and they have to go on forward with them.
The Ambassador pointed out that annual debate of public funds available
for the Alliance put the whole case in suspense and created an element
of doubt and concern.
The Ambassador of Venezuela conveyed the apologies of President
Betancourt.Bundy inserted the following
phrase by hand: “for his inability to attend the meeting in response
to the President’s invitation.”
The President concluded the meeting by emphasizing the need for optimism
and enthusiasm in supporting the Alliance. He remarked that if you want
to lose an election all you have to do is predict that you will lose it.
If you want to lose a baseball game, all you have to do is announce your
doubts. The President believed that we had come a long way and we should
emphasize our success and do all that we can to create the appearance of
success as well, since the appearance would reinforce the reality. The
President reemphasized his complete confidence in Secretary Mann, who was going to be the one
“Jefe” here in Washington for the Alliance. The Ambassadors should think
of him as a friend, that if they would work with us we would keep at the
improvement of the Alliance. But if we should predict its failure, the
Congress would make it a failure. The program was surrounded by
outsiders who liked to criticize and editors who looked for diplomats
whom they might quote in a
critical vein, and the President believed it of great importance that we
should do our best to build up the Alliance, not tear it down.After the meeting the President invited the
participants to the East Room, where he delivered an address and
signed 12 loan agreements under the Alliance for Progress. Earlier
that afternoon Johnson discussed the address
with Mann: “I think we need
some facts in there about what we’ve done the last 6 months. We
ought to know if we’ve done anything worthwhile, in the
achievements, and we ought to point them out, not defensively but
rather positively, so that we can show that we haven’t been asleep,
and—This damn Schlesinger is
going all over the world denouncing us. I saw a cable yesterday, it
had been circularized to everybody, about how our whole policy on
Latin America had changed, and how we’d abandoned the Alliance. And
so I think we ought to answer him by saying: ‘We’re building this
big waterworks here, and we’re doing this road here, and we’re doing
this here—all this has been done in the last 90 days.’” (Johnson
Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
Thomas Mann, May 11,
12:19 p.m., Tape F64.26, Side B, PNO 2) For text of
Johnson’s remarks, see
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson,
1963–64, Book I, pp. 677–681.
14. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President JohnsonSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL CUBA. Secret. Drafted by Allen and approved by Bunker.Washington, May 19, 1964.
SUBJECT
OAS Action Against Cuba
Recommendation:
With reference to the NSC decision of
March 5 to seek support for a resolution which, inter alia, would
authorize future use of force against Cuba in the event of further
subversion, I recommend that you now authorize the Department to agree
to the milder alternative along the lines of the enclosed,Attached but not printed. in view of the
impossibility of obtaining the necessary two-thirds’ support for a
stronger text and in view of the desirability of obtaining as broad support as possible for any
action to be taken.A note on the memorandum
indicates this recommendation was “approved by the President at
lunch with Secretary 5/19/64.” According to the President’s Daily
Diary Johnson met his Tuesday Luncheon
group—Rusk, McNamara, and Bundy—on May 19 at 1 p.m. (Johnson
Library) No substantive record of the meeting has been found. The
Department circulated the revised text of the draft resolution on
May 21, pending Venezuelan approval. (Circular telegram 2171;
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 23–8 VEN) The Venezuelan Government subsequently agreed
to the proposed revision, but continued to insist on taking action
at a meeting of Foreign Ministers rather than the OAS Council. (Circular Telegram 2214,
May 28; ibid.)
Discussion:
Consultations undertaken by the Venezuelans and ourselves with the other
American Republics on the March 5 text have shown considerable
opposition to the “blank check” concept in paragraph 2 under which, as
you recall, the OAS would not authorize
the use of force against Cuba at any time in the future without going
back to the OAS, should there be a
repetition elsewhere of the type of subversive campaign Castro undertook against Venezuela last
fall. From the point of view of public opinion both at home and abroad,
it seems to us highly desirable that there be as broad support as
possible for some meaningful action against Cuba, including, if
possible, Mexico’s vote. Therefore we believe it desirable to revise the
basis of the idea involving the possible use of force to one of
individual and collective self-defense and embody this concept in a
separate resolution on which we have some hope for virtually unanimous
agreement. The other provisions of the March 5 draft concerning
surveillance around Cuba, severance of diplomatic and economic
relations, suspension of air and surface transportation and appeal to
other free world countries for cooperation, would then be put in one or
more separate resolutions, but would be in the form of recommendations
rather than as binding decisions as provided in the earlier draft.
The revised draft would still offer the advantages of clearly
establishing the doctrine that Castro-type subversive activities constitute
“aggression” and that, under the right of self-defense, some action
could be taken by us in support of an aggrieved state at its request in
the future without awaiting recourse to the OAS.
Dean RuskPrinted from a copy that
indicates Rusk signed the
original.
15. Telephone Conversation Between President
Johnson and the Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source:
Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
Thomas Mann, Tape F64.27,
Side A, PNO 6. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this
volume. An informal memorandum of this conversation, prepared in
ARA, is ibid., Papers of
Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, January 4, 1964–April 30, 1965.Washington, May 26, 1964, 1:00 p.m.
President: Tom?
Mann: Yes, sir?
President: I have been looking at
the amount obligated by the Alliance program and it’s quite disturbing.
It’s only about 60 percent of what they’ve appropriated.
Mann: Uh huh.
President: And I thought that I
better talk to you and the Director of the Budget and see if we can’t
get something done that will get that money obligated, because you
don’t, Passman’sCongressman Otto E. Passman
(D–Louisiana), chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of
the House Appropriations Committee. just going to take it
away from us.
Mann: Well, I think—We testified
up there the other day where we’re going to have it all obligated by the
end of the fiscal year, but I’ll check on it again to make sure.
President: Well, they estimate
that they’re going to do it faster, but I just think you ought to call
in some people there and approve some loans.
Mann: Well, we’ll do that.
President: You know what you got
now? You got May the 15th, 59 percent of the Alliance loans
obligated.
Mann: Well, I think it may be
higher than that right now.
President: Well, this was May the
15th, 59 percent.
Mann: Yeah.
President: April the 30th, you
only had 45 percent.
Mann: Yeah, we got a slow
start.
President: Now, they estimate
that they’re going to get up there, maybe 90 some-odd percent. But if
you get it the last month, he’s going to start hearings on it in the
next few days and he’s going to look at what you got now. And everyday
that you wait you just cost you
money. And I’m not going to fight for it if they don’t go on spending
when they got it.
Mann: All right. I got it. We’ll
spend it. I’ll make sure we get it all obligated.
President: Let’s get another
ceremony and sign some more and let’s get those ambassadors in here in
another month.
Mann: All right.
President: Get them back. You get
with Rostow and you all get some plan and some new
ideas and some new programs that we can announce for some of the rest of
them. And sometime in the next 30 days let’s get them back in.
Mann: Will do.
President: All right.
Mann: OK.Mann forwarded a memorandum
to the President on June 15 in which he reported that 80 percent of
the funds appropriated for the Alliance for Progress had already
been obligated; the remainder would be committed within 1 month.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Alliance for
Progress, Vol. I) No evidence has been found that
Johnson invited the Latin American
Ambassadors to the White House for a second signing ceremony for the
Alliance.
16. Telephone Conversation Between President
Johnson and the Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source:
Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
Thomas Mann, Tape F64.31,
Side B, PNO 5 and Tape F64.32, Side A, PNO 1 & 2. No
classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office
of the Historian specifically for this volume. Although the
President’s Daily Diary indicates that Johnson
placed the call, the tape does not include a salutation. (Johnson
Library) The recording otherwise appears to document the entire
conversation. An informal memorandum of the conversation, prepared
in ARA, and incorrectly dated June
12, is ibid., Papers of Thomas C.
Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, January 4, 1964–April 30,
1965.Washington, June 11, 1964, 7:05 p.m.
Mann: I just got back from the
Hill talking to Cooley about
sugar with Charlie Murphy.Representative
Harold D. Cooley (D–North Carolina) and Charles S. Murphy, Under
Secretary of Agriculture.
President: What are our problems
now? You got the Kubitschek
problem in Brazil. What are the hot ones? You got an election in
Chile.
Mann: We got an election in Chile
in September.
President: All right.
Mann: We got this Foreign
Ministers meeting which will probably take place in July on this Cuban,
Venezuelan accusation against Cuba.
President: Are you, have you got
that worked out where you’re going to get the kind of resolution that
you want?
Mann: Well, we’re going to get, I
think, a fairly good one. We’re having trouble with Mexico; Chile,
because of its elections in September, probably going to vote against
it; but we think that Brazil and Argentina will come along. We’ve been
working on, haggling over words. Bunker’s working on it almost full time. I was talking,
when you called, with the Mexican about it. Trying to get him to—
President: Who do you talk to?
Who do you mean, the Mexican?
Mann: Sánchez Gavito.
President: Yeah.
Mann: He’s their OAS ambassador.
President: Is he pretty
difficult?
Mann: No, he’s on our side, but
he’s having trouble at home because of politics down there. Their basic
problem is Lombardo Toledano and Cárdenas and trying to keep the party
from splitting.Vicente Lombardo Toledano,
founder and leader of the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), and
Lázaro Cárdenas, former President of Mexico (1934–1940), who
remained active on the left wing of the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI). It’s an
internal problem with them. They’re fiddling with words that everybody
can live with and—
President: When does that come
up?
Mann: We think the first, within
the first—it will be after the elections which in Mexico, which I
believe are, it’s on a Sunday, I think the 6th of July, the 5th of
July.
President: Any question about the
Mexican election?
Mann: No, no, there’s no question
at all there. They’ve had some disturbances—you know the Commies are
growing up in Mexicali, that’s a serious problem for us, Mr.
President—but I think we’re making progress.
President: How—Did you get
HaydenSenator Carl T. Hayden
(D–Arizona). to agree to what you want to do on that
water?
Mann: We’re still waiting for
word from him, but the Secretary is going to see him again tomorrow.
President: He told me, Hayden
told me, yesterday that he had agreed to go along with the State
Department.
Mann: Well, I think what he’s
doing is waiting on some kind of a political commitment from your office
about the central Arizona project.
President: That’s right, but he
told me he’d agreed to go along with you all on the other one. I want to
be sure it’s satisfactory before I agree with him.
Mann: Well, I think maybe that’s
where we are, that’s the last word I had at noon today, that—I’ll talk
to the Secretary about it in the morning if I may—
President: You be positive about
that and tell him that he already told me he’d go with the Secretary.
The Secretary ought to tell him that the President says that “you told
him you’re going with us.”
Mann: I think he may infer back:
“Yes, but this is a package deal, and whereas—”
President: He never has made it
conditional that way, never has put it on that basis. He’s just said:
“I’ve already helped you, now you help me.”
Mann: All right. Well let me—I’ll
see the Secretary in the morning. I’ll tell him that it’s not
conditional and—
President: No. No, that’s right.
I’m trying to—
Mann: We have a lot of potential
problems. For example, Uruguay has five presidents, as you know, and
they’re just in a hell of a mess because they can’t manage their affairs
very well; their growth rate is now down below their birth rate. The
Kubitschek thing is bad. We’ll get some flak on that for two weeks, but
the general trend, we think— after June 15 they can no longer do this,
the law, their power to designate new people, expires then. We are
urging them to set up an appeals procedure for Kubitschek and all of the
others, so they’ll have a chance to be, for their day in court, to be
heard. There’ll be charges against them and so forth—I don’t think it
will get anywhere—but I would think the Brazilian thing would get better
starting in about two weeks. I think it will look pretty good in thirty
days.
President: You got any more hot
spots?
Mann: We’ve got lots of
headaches.
President: What’s happening in
the Dominican Republic?
Mann: Well, they just reached an
agreement with the Monetary Fund, and we’re now negotiating with them on
trying to get them to take the self help measures that they have to
take. They’ve got lots of problems. It takes them 7 cents—which is
absurd—to produce sugar, and the
world price is now around 5 and futures are about 4.5. So they have to
fire a lot of people, and get more efficient, and increase agricultural
production. And they’ve got to find a way to hold elections. And we’ve
come to—some of them are really, Mr. President, are, you wonder
sometimes whether they’re capable of governing themselves. But things
are moving along pretty well. We’ve got problems nearly everywhere.
Costa Rica’s in trouble. Their, they claim there’s a 35 percent loss of
foreign exchange in their coffee exports and, I think it’s sugar, and
we’re going to work on that because the President will be up here to see
you and we’ll fill you in on that before he gets here. Panama is rocking
along. They haven’t started talking yet but they will resume the next
week. Illueca,Jorge Illueca, principal
Panamanian representative in the negotiations to revise the Panama
Canal Treaty. I think, is coming in on Monday back from
Panama.
President: What do we hear from
our Ambassador down there?Jack Hood Vaughn. Is
he doing all right?
Mann: think he’s done a fine job,
and you made a good selection, I say that without qualification. He’s
exercised good judgment, he’s been calm, and he’s been tough when he had
to be tough. He’ll be up this week. By the way—early next week—we’ll
have about seven ambassadors. You said you wanted to meet with them. Any
time next week you’re ready, we’ll send about seven over there.
President: Yeah. All right. You
just stay after Jack, make him give you a date, just hound him every
day, ‘cause we just—The ones that raise the most hell get the most
sugar.
Mann: All right. [laughter] I’ll
stay on the phone—
President: You’re too good and
too nice. So you just, you just give him hell. Just tell him every day,
you got to call him the next day and get your date so you’ll know what
you’re doing—
Mann: All right, will do.
President: And then you get me a
briefing paper so I can tell me what I can say to them. And—what can I
say that we’ve done in this Hemisphere now that’s improved the
situation? What have we got that we can point to with pride besides
pointing to with alarm?
Mann: Well, we’re going to send
you over a memo with, it’s in preparation now, on the Alliance
side.See footnote
3, Document 15. Where we’re weaker than any other
place, Mr. President, is on trade. AID
thing is going good, as you know, thanks to you. We’ll hear more
complaints, I think, on trade,
about sugar and coffee and things that they need to live, to sell in
order to live. But I think on the whole that—
President: Can we say that these
6 months are better than the last 6 months before we came in?
Mann: I think we can. I
believe—
President: Well, how or why are
they better? How are they better now than they were—
Mann: Let me give you about
twelve points on the AID side, and we’ll
scratch around and find some other general points on—
President: From March though, if
you’re just making a general statement, from March to November, the
period in November to now, what’s the difference?
Mann: All right. Let us think
about that.
President: I guess we’ll say
Brazil, Brazil, say that’s the best thing, isn’t it?
Mann: No, I was thinking of
things you could say.
President: No, no, I’m just
talking about in my own mind.
Mann: Oh, well, the Panama thing
went very well, Mr. President. The Guantanamo thing has gone well. The
whole Cuban thing, in my opinion, has gone well.
President: The Brazil thing went
all right.
Mann: Brazil is the most
important thing outside of Cuba that’s happened in the last 20 years in
Latin America—in spite of the difficulties, in spite of the excesses,
and there have been excesses, stupidities, the pendulum swung too far
back and now we’ve got to push it back toward the center. We’re going to
win this election in Chile, things look good, we’ve done a hell of a lot
of work on that. And—
President: Now, what have you
got? A Communist running?
Mann: Well, we have a socialist
running with Communist support, but the Communists are stronger than the
socialists, and if he wins we think the Commies, he’ll be a prisoner of
the Commies, cause they’re much, much better organized and much more
disciplined.
President: What about our
candidate? He’s not the incumbent is he?
Mann: No, our can—the candidate
we hope will win is a Christian Democrat, and he’s being supported by
the conservatives, the liberals, and, of course, the Christian
Democrats, which is a new party. We’re not telling anybody this, but
we’ve been taking polls, and even allowing for inaccuracies, the margin
of inaccuracies, it looks pretty good. Frei, the Christian Democrat,
comes up with 52 percent; Allende, the Communist-socialist candidate, with 36; and a
third candidate, who represents the Radical Party—which is not radical
at all, but it’s more
anti-clerical, which we’re keeping in the race so, because we think all
of his votes would go to Allende—he’s running about 7 percent; and the other 5, I
think it’s 5 remaining, 5 or 6 percent undecided. So we’re not doing
bad, we’ve picked up a lot of steam in the last, a lot of support for
Frei in the last 6 weeks.
President: What are our danger
spots?
Mann: Well, that’s the—
President: Chile election?
Mann: That’s the biggest one, I
would say, with the fact of the Communist element in it.
President: And the Dominican—
Mann: The overflights over
Cuba.
President: What in the world can
we do to minimize that? We can’t go around them. We can’t circle the
island. We got to go over it. And—
Mann: I think we’ll get, I’m
hoping we’ll get some good resolutions, which would be very helpful on
the domestic front, and also of real value to us.
President: Is trade going up much
between the British and the Cubans?
Mann: Well, it has in terms of
British exports to Cuba, and French exports.
President: They told me when they
were here that they’d been 55 million, they’d cut them to five, but
they’d be up on account of the buses. Now what, how much are they up
to?
Mann: Well, what really happened,
I don’t have the figures in my head, but I know it’s up quite a bit, Mr.
President, because they’ve been buying all this sugar, and they’ve got
these, Cuba’s got the convertible currencies to buy anything they want.
I think it’s about two hundred million dollars a year that Castro made last year, and we expect
him to make about the same this year as a result of the increased price
of sugar. Now sugar prices are dropping, this is a very temporary
phenomenon, sugar prices are dropping and he’s just, he’s not going to
have the money to buy this kind of stuff much longer. So I don’t think
that the prognosis, the medium and long term prognosis, is bad. It’s
good.
President: You getting any
reports of the things inside Cuba? What’s happening?
Mann: Well, not really anything
new that—
President: Is there any
dissatisfaction?
Mann: Yes, we figure about 25
percent of the people—the job holders, the office holders, especially
the young people in the country who are better off than they ever were
before—are totally in favor of Castro. We think
he can count on about 25 to 30 percent of the people. We think there are
about 25 to 30 percent of the people who are opposed to him, and the
middle ground there, the 40 to 50 percent, are just sort of apathetic.
And that’s the way it’s been for the last year or so, and there isn’t
much change in that, because his hard core of support is built around
the people who hold jobs.
President: Would you say that our
economic isolation policy has been a complete failure?
Mann: No, sir. I think it’s been
largely successful. I—
President: How? When the French
and British are all trading with him?
Mann: Well, he’s had these
dollars and they’ve sold him some things, and that’s hurt us. But on
the, if—the alternative would be to let the bars down and let them
extend credits and that sort of thing. And we’ve been very successful in
keeping this limited to a number of isolated transactions. And this is a
hell of a lot better than taking him into our bosom.
President: How are we going to
get rid of him?
Mann: It’s going to take some
time.
President: Well—
Mann: I think it’s going to have
to come from—I really don’t think that, unless somebody kills Castro, or he dies, or the army is
split in the very top command where they turn on him, the army
especially, that the people themselves can get rid of him. As long as
that army is loyal to him, he’s going to be there until he dies. And
when he dies, nobody knows what’s going to happen, because he’s got the
same power to mesmerize people that Hitler had, and we doubt that
anybody else has got, can project this same kind of image. The only
other way to knock him off would be to go in there with force from the
outside, and this could happen, either as a result of our reactions to
his shooting at our planes that are doing this photographic stuff, or as
a result of collective action which we’re working on in this Venezuelan
thing, whereby he tries again what he did in Venezuela, and if at that
time you decide you want authority, the legal basis to go in, and you
want to go in, I think we could get it. The main objective we hope to
get out of this meeting is to say that subversion, communist subversion,
is an aggression which is not an armed attack within the meaning of
article six of the Rio Treaty, get them to accept that, so that if we
have another act of subversion, we’ll have a good legal basis of going
to the OAS and saying now you agreed
that this was the law, and here are the facts, and this is what we ought
to do. Because the biggest problem, as you know, that we had in the Bay
of Pigs, was this doubt on the part of the lawyers and others that we
had any right in international
law to do anything, and we hope to clear that up considerably.
President: So that for the
subversion by importing arms to other countries to be considered
aggression, that would justify our moving.
Mann: That’s what we—if he does
it again. But we would have to go to the OAS and prove the facts. They didn’t want to give us a
blank check.
President: Well, you’ve got a
statement there, say I ought to say at a press conference that I don’t
intend to invade Cuba, just as Kennedy didn’t.
Mann: Well, sir, if I were you, I
wouldn’t make a statement like that, because who can tell what’s going
to happen tomorrow? Suppose he shoots tomorrow and—
President: Well they say
Khrushchev is saying that he hadn’t seen us repeat Kennedy’s pledge and we ought to do
it.
Mann: Well, I would send, I
wouldn’t make a public statement, I’d have the Secretary of State say
that if he behaves himself, doesn’t commit any aggressive acts against
other Republics, and doesn’t shoot at any of our planes, or doesn’t give
us cause to do anything, that everything’s going to be all right in
terms of war and peace.
President: You tell, in the
morning you call Mac Bundy, he’s
not here, but you call him, and tell him I was talking to you last
night, and you’d like to know what he’d propose to say in that statement
and then you tell him why you don’t think it ought to be done.
Mann: All right.
President: Now, what’s the
problem in Uruguay?
Mann: Well, Uruguay. They have
this silly political system, Mr. President, where they’ve got five
presidents of the country and, I think, it’s seven mayors of Montevideo,
the capital city, and it’s a little tiny place, and graft and corruption
is growing. They have an executive that’s almost paralyzed because there
isn’t any one president. The people are beginning to talk about the need
for strong leadership, but nobody’s done anything about it yet. And in
the meantime their expenses are too high, they’re paying too much,
they’re spending more than they’re earning on social security and a
number of other things, and just having a hell of time making ends meet.
And the result of this is a deterioration in confidence, the private
sector is not investing in job-producing industries, and production is
not going up. They actually had a slight decrease in their national
GNP rate last year as compared with
a fairly high birth rate, I think about two and a half per cent. And we
are going to—[1 second sanitized by the Johnson
Library under the donor’s deed of gift]—a skull session to see
what it is we can do—because I
see this one coming in some months ahead—and what it is we can do to get
that economy rolling again. But when you have to work with five heads, a
five-headed animal, a government, it isn’t always very easy to do,
because they don’t, they fight like cats and dogs between themselves,
they can’t agree on anything. That’s a major problem. We’ve got these,
the possibilities of oil expropriations in Argentina and in Peru, but we
think we’ve got those dampened down in Peru. We may have trouble in
Argentina though, and it may come this month.
President: What are they going to
do? Expropriate some of our oil companies?
Mann: It won’t be an
expropriation. It will be a compensation for the amount of money they
put in, which will satisfy some of the companies. Those that invested a
lot of money and didn’t find oil, near as I can find out, they would be
happy to get their money back. Then you have other companies like
Standard of Indiana and Tennessee Gas and, I think, Cities Service,
those three, made an investment and hit it pretty big, and they’re not
about to think about, they’re not about to be satisfied with just
getting their money back. So I told the Minister of Defense of Argentina
the other day that we would not buy that, we thought the Hickenlooper
Amendment would apply, and his reply was that they could not renegotiate
those contracts. I suggested they might sit down and do whatever’s fair
and reasonable. He said they couldn’t do that, it was too hot a
political issue, but they could go through a procedure of opening this
to bids, putting the concessions, the oil fields, up for bids, and then
making the terms and conditions so that the same companies that own them
now would end up owning them. Now this looks like to me it’s gonna be
hard to do, and we decided this morning that I would call in these three
companies and talk to them directly, and get their ideas, the ones who
would be hurt the worst. I think Standard of Jersey and that crowd are
going to be happy about it, but the others are not, and I think you
can’t, can’t, without those guys.
President: Who’s that? Standard
and Tennessee Gas?
Mann: I think Tennessee Gas,
Cities Service and Standard Oil of Indiana are the ones who would be
hurt the worst if they didn’t get—if they tried just to return their
investments with interest. And I don’t think we can buy that, because if
you apply that formula to Venezuela, where we have four billion dollars
in assets, they’ll try to go back and say: “Well, you’ve already
recovered your initial investment, so you ought to get out.” We have to
be very careful about the precedent.
President: These damn coal men
are really murdering me, because we don’t give them some of this
substantial increase. They think that we ought to quit adding, importing that Venezuela
oil all the time. Can we do anything like that?
Mann: Mr. President, I think
there’s too much oil coming in from Canada. Their production—I worked
out this exemption, overland exemption thing, about 4 years ago.Mann was Assistant Secretary
of State for Economic Affairs in April 1959 when the United States
agreed to give Canada and Mexico an “overland exemption” to the oil
import program. For documentation on that program, Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, volume
IV, pp. 579–594, 608–609. We had a deal with them
at that time that they would ship us in about 50,000 barrels a day
mostly in the Pugent Sound area, and they’re now up to over 300,000
barrels a day or around there, especially in Humphrey’s state. I have to
talk to MarlinMarlin E. Sandlin, chairman of
the Pan American Sulphur Company, Houston, Texas. about this.
The Venezuelans are getting awfully nervous about this. The Ambassador
was in to see me yesterday protesting.
President: What am I going to do
about coal though if you and Marlin take all the God-damned oil that
Canada and Venezuela produce? I’ve got all my people here that’s
starving in these coal areas?
Mann: Well, we’ll have a look at
the coal industry. I think they’re doing pretty good. I’d like to look
at the figures, I—
President: No, they’re not.
They’re in here this week, all of them, and just saying “you cost us
4,000 jobs by raising the oil quota on residuals.”The Johnson administration
amended the oil import regulation on March 6, raising the maximum
level for residual fuel oil to the eastern United States (District
I). (29 F.R. 3200, 3207) The President attended a National Coal
Policy meeting on June 5 to discuss the concerns of the coal
industry, including representatives from management, labor, and
transportation. (President’s Daily Diary; Johnson Library)
And I’m going to appoint a committee, put you on it with McNamara, and
make them redo it and do something for coal. We ought to help some of
the people of West Virginia and Pennsylvania and Illinois, as well as
help the people of Venezuela and Canada. I don’t mean just help them to
the exclusion but give them some help.
Mann: Well, I’d rather give them
help any place except at Venezuela’s cost. Maybe we can do, maybe we can
find something in the Near East or something. Let us look at it, and see
what we can do.
President: OK. All right.
Bye.
Mann: Thank you.
17. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. V. No classification marking.Washington, June 16, 1964.
SUBJECT
Staff Assistance in Latin America
Walter Jenkins has told me of
your quite proper concern over the Sunday Star
story about Bob Sayre joining my
staff.The article reported that
Sayre had assumed
responsibility for Latin American affairs at the NSC and suggested that he would be
“much more closely oriented to the State Department view of events”
than Dungan and Richard M.
Goodwin had been under President Kennedy. (Washington Star,
June 14, 1964) The story, which must have come from some
State Department gossip, is a damaging distortion of a move which was
made to deal with a real problem. That problem is that Ralph Dungan and Tom Mann really have
not communicated easily together, so that Latin American business has
kept coming through my desk.Bundy also raised the
communication problem with the President on April 14, citing
criticism that would result if Dungan left, i.e. “another good White House man goes
west.” Johnson replied that his standing in the
public opinion polls was such that “Ralph’s
leaving me wouldn’t hurt me really politically.” (Johnson Library,
Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation
between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, April 14, 1964,
12:50 p.m., Tape F64.23, Side B, PNO 1) In an April 28 memorandum to
Bundy, Chase warned of a
possible consequence if Dungan departed: “I, for one, do not favor Tom
Mann’s implied proposal that White House/State contact take place
solely or substantially through his office (it probably bothers Tom
somewhat that he does not now control everything that ARA says to the White House).” (Ibid.,
National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. I,
11/63–6/64) I was either doing things myself or playing
liaison officer between the two of them. This I just did not have time
enough to do without help, so about six weeks ago I told Ralph that I
thought we ought to add to the NSC staff
a relatively junior officer (like Dave Klein for European affairs) who
would be available to us here, and who would be acceptable to Tom Mann,
too. I should add in candor that both Ralph and I
knew that this arrangement would in fact reduce his direct involvement
in Latin American affairs, although I told him that I for one would be
glad to have him continue to keep a hand in when he felt like it.
Sayre was recommended by
CrockettWilliam J. Crockett, Deputy
Under Secretary of State for Administration. and Mann for this job, and while I was wary
at first, I found him very good in our interview, and I found that
Ralph had a very high opinion of him. He has
been over here for several weeks
now, and he has already proved his value in a number of ways. The most
conspicuous example is Tom Mann’s speech on our recognition policy.Mann delivered the speech,
“The Democratic Ideal in Our Policy Toward Latin America,” on June 7
at the University of Notre Dame. (Department of State Bulletin, June
29, 1964, pp. 995–1000) Because of his friendly relations
with Mann and his own sensitive
eye for the politics of the matter, Sayre was able to get amendments made which made that
speech entirely safe at home and successful in Latin America.
I have spoken to Ralph about this unsatisfactory
story, and neither he nor I think it is something we should make an
issue over, since it was way on the inside of a Sunday paper. Of course,
Tom Mann himself is a Special Assistant to the President, but de facto
he is now working with our staff in the same way that other Assistant
Secretaries do.
Unfortunately, there does exist a real—but manageable—problem of
Ralph’s own state of mind. I have told
Walter Jenkins that in my own
judgment the best thing we can do for Ralph is to
make it clear to him that he will be in line for one of the jobs he
wants after the election, if all goes well. The two things which he has
in mind are the Ambassadorship to Chile and a relatively senior U.S.
appointment at the World Bank.Dungan was eventually
appointed Ambassador to Chile; see Document
271. He is highly qualified for either one, in my judgment.
Meanwhile, I am doing all that I can to keep in good harness with him,
given the difficult fact that as long as Tom Mann
is No. 1 on Latin America, it simply will not be practicable for
Ralph to play the role there which he had in
the last administration.
McG. B.
18. Memorandum From Robert
M.Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. II, 6/64–8/64.
Confidential. According to the President’s Daily Diary the meeting
was held in the Cabinet Room, June 18, 12:10–1:10 p.m. The attendees
included: the President, Lincoln
Gordon, Jack
Vaughn, W. Tapley
Bennett, Aaron
Brown, Covey
Oliver, John
Bell, Tom Mann, Ralph
Dungan, Robert
Adams, Anthony
Solomon, and William
Rogers. (Johnson Library)Washington, June 23, 1964.
SUBJECT
Meeting with President and U.S. Ambassadors to Latin
America
Mr. Mann believes the meeting
between the President and six of our Ambassadors in Latin America went
well because: The group includes two or three of our best Ambassadors in
Latin America andThe Ambassadors were prepared to discuss general trends and prospects, and raised specific
country problems to illustrate the general trend.
I would add a third point—that in three of the countries (Brazil, Panama,
and the Dominican Republic), there are active and serious issues in
which our own interests and security are deeply involved.
The President received in his night reading material before the meeting a
brief status report on the Alliance, a few lines of biography on the
Ambassadors with whom he was not well-acquainted, and three or four
sentences on the current situation in each of the six countries
concerned.A report prepared by Sayre that fits this description
was forwarded to Bundy under
cover of a June 18 memorandum. (Ibid., National Security File,
Country File, Latin America, Vol. II, 6/64–8/64) During the
meeting, the President asked each Ambassador what he regarded as the key
problems in his country and the Hemisphere, and what he thought should
be done about them. Most of the talking from the Ambassadors’ side was
done by Lincoln Gordon (Brazil),
Jack Vaughn (Panama), and
W. Tapley Bennett (Dominican
Republic), in each of whose country we have some pretty tough
problems.
The President had an oral briefing by Mr. Mann on the Alliance for Progress a few days before the
meeting.Evidently a reference to the
telephone conversation between Johnson and
Mann on June 11; see Document 16. The extent to which this
may have contributed to the meeting with the Ambassadors is hard to
say.
Although no specific effort was made to brief either the President or the
Ambassadors concerned, each had fairly well in mind the general problems
in the area. The Department has just completed an intensive review of
Brazil’s debt situation, and the requirements for financial assistance
in which Ambassador Gordon
participated fully. The same is true in Panama and the Dominican
Republic, although we are not as far along in either country toward
decisions as we are in Brazil.
RMS
19. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Cuba, OAS Resolution
(Arms Cache), Vol. II, Memos, 11/63–9/64. Confidential. According to
a June 25 memorandum from Chase to Bundy this information memorandum was drafted by
Chase. (Ibid.)Washington, June 26, 1964.
SUBJECT
OAS Resolution on the Cuban Arms
Cache in VenezuelaA meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers
(MFM), probably lasting three or
four days will start in Washington on July 21 to consider action
against Cuba on the Venezuelan arms cache issue. The following is
meant to bring you up to date.The OAS countries are likely to
discuss and take action on the following three resolutions when they
meet on July 21.
Resolution I recommends that
member states cooperate in surveillance to detect the
subversive movements of men and arms between Cuba and
Latin America. The resolution also recommends that OAS countries, which still maintain
diplomatic and air relations with Cuba, break such
relations. It goes on to require
member states to suspend all sea and commercial
relations (except food and medicines) with Cuba.
We can live with this resolution and there is a very good
chance that it can be passed with a strong majority; at
present, only Chile and Mexico, both of which have domestic
political problems, are opposed. It is quite possible,
moreover, that, by the date of the MFM, Mexico may change its
mind and decide to abstain or, conceivably, to vote
favorably.
Resolution II issues the warning
and establishes the principle that the OAS regards subversion as
aggression and that future acts of Cuban subversion will
trigger an immediate OAS
meeting to agree on measures to be taken against the
guilty party. The resolution goes on to say that the
above OAS procedure does
not limit the right of the victim of such aggression and
the right of other states, at the victim’s request, to
take appropriate measures inherent in the right of
individual or collective self-defense.
As the resolution now stands, we can live with it and can
probably get a substantial majority to vote favorably
(e.g. all but Chile and probably Mexico). However, we
may get some heat at the MFM to weaken the resolution in two ways.
First, most of the OAR’s would like to generalize the
warning language so that it pertains to subversion by
both the left and right. We
prefer the language to pertain more sharply to Cuba—so
Cuba will feel the heat directly and unequivocally and
so there will be no chance (although already unlikely)
that the resolution will be turned against us because of
our own “rightist” subversive activities against Cuba.
Second, Chile would like to
limit the right of individual and collective
self-defense in the event of subversive aggression. We
and most other OAR’s oppose the Chilean position.
Resolution III urges non-OAS Free World countries to
cooperate with the OAS in
its economic denial program against Cuba. It also recommends
that OAS countries take
necessary measures to achieve non-OAS Free World cooperation in this area. This
resolution should pass easily. At present, there seems to be
little opposition.If we get the three resolutions as they now stand, with the
majorities which we now estimate, we will have done fairly well.
While we will not be able to point to an imminent overthrow of the
Castro regime and to a
complete cessation of Castro–Communist subversion in Latin America, we will be
able to point to some movement towards a number of intermediate
objectives, achieved without excessively straining the unity of the
OAS.
First, Cuba will be further isolated. The break
in the remaining commercial and sea relations and further possible
diplomatic breaks, at a minimum, will hurt Castro psychologically. Second,
the spread of Cuban subversion will be impeded. The warning resolution
might inhibit Castro’s will to
spread subversion while the establishment of a surveillance system and
the isolation measures will make it physically somewhat more difficult
to move subversive men, funds, and arms between Cuba and Latin America. Third, the warning resolution will give us some juridical
basis for and pre-position the OAS to
use force against future Cuban subversion, if it is deemed desirable to
do so. Fourth, Cuba’s economic difficulties will
be increased marginally by the break in commercial and sea relations
with the OAS. To the extent we decide to
use Resolution III as a lever, multilaterally if possible, on non-OAS Free World countries to reduce
commercial relations with Cuba, Cuba’s economic difficulties will be
further increased. Fifth, the economic burden to
the Soviet Union will be increased marginally—to the extent that we can
continue to force Cuban commercial activities into abnormal, uneconomic
channels.
McG. B.
20. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 3 IA. Confidential. Drafted by Margolies and approved in S on July 29. The time of the meeting is taken from
Rusk’s Appointment Book.
(Johnson Library)Washington, July 25, 1964, 6:50 p.m.
SUBJECT
Prospects for Adoption of Venezuelan Resolution at OAS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting
PARTICIPANTS
The SecretaryAssistant Secretary MannAmbassador BunkerMr. Daniel Margolies
(ARA:CV)Dr. Iribarren, Venezuelan Foreign MinisterAmbassador Tejera-Paris, Venezuelan Ambassador
1. Position of Mexico and Chile
The Foreign Minister expressed the intention to modify the first
resolution by making certain measures, e.g. breaking of diplomatic
relations and severance of air traffic, mandatory rather than
discretionary.
The Secretary said that there were two questions involved: first, whether
there were enough votes for the adoption of the resolution with the
mandatory provisions and second, whether the consequences of adopting the resolution as
proposed by the Foreign Minister would be in the best interest of the
hemisphere.
The Secretary said, and Mr. Mann
confirmed, that both Chile and Mexico were adamantly opposed to the
Venezuelan proposal for mandatory language. It appeared likely that
their strategy would be to take the resolution up paragraph by
paragraph, registering their opposition to the points which they
opposed, which would without any doubt include the requirement for the
break in diplomatic relations. There was a possibility that Mexico, at
any rate, would abstain when the entire resolution was voted on.
The Secretary said that if the resolution were adopted with mandatory
language, this would confront Mexico and Chile with the necessity of
complying with the resolution, or of taking issue with the OAS. Given the depth of feeling on this
issue in both countries, it was possible that this could lead to an open
break between them and the rest of the American system.
The Secretary said that he thought that it would be desirable to weigh
carefully the consequences that might ensue from such a development,
both with respect to the future of the American system and with respect
to the impact on opinion at home.
Mr. Mann said that he thought that
the mandatory language proposed by the Foreign Minister would be well
received in the United States. He added that his experience with Mexico
had persuaded him that the Mexicans did not respond well to pressure,
but were open to reason. He thought it very possible that if left to
their own discretion the Mexican Government would voluntarily break
relations with Cuba, as the Brazilians have recently done, after the new
President took office at the end of the year.
The Secretary said that his principal concern was the situation in Chile.
He would have been able to face the risks with equanimity last January.
However, with the Chilean elections so close, it was possible that the
OAS action could play into the hands
of the Communists in Chile and damage the election prospects of Frei. He
thought that this required very careful consideration.
The Secretary said that he thought it would be well for both to talk with
the Chilean Foreign Minister and the Mexican delegation. He planned to
ask the Chileans whether they might take some constructive step toward
accomplishing the objective sought, such as downgrading the level of
their representation.
The Venezuelan Foreign Minister said that Venezuela had a serious
domestic problem that he would like to emphasize. His government was
committed publicly to seeking mandatory language in the resolution. If
they backed down, it would be regarded at home as retreat. The
Communists had recently renewed their terrorist campaign of bombing and shootings in Venezuela
because of the OAS meeting. If the
Venezuelan Government appeared to retreat before such conduct, it would
invite further terrorist conduct.
The Venezuelans expected the OAS to do
something about Cuban aggression. If the OAS failed to take effective action, this would discredit
the Leoni administration and
discredit the OAS in Venezuela.
The Secretary said that he felt that the OAS had made much progress on the Cuban issue since 1960.
He thought that the resolution, even if certain sanctions were
recommended rather than required, would represent further progress. He
noted in particular that the second resolution would be a major advance
in dealing with Cuban aggression in the future and would have a
deterrent effect.
The Foreign Minister said that he did not share the Secretary’s view on
the second resolution. Assistant Secretary Mann said that he would explain our position in detail
at a later time.
The Secretary said that a possibility to be considered was that of taking
action in two stages. At the current meeting, certain sanctions could be
recommended, and the OAS Council could
be instructed to review compliance and to report to the Foreign
Ministers at a subsequent meeting at which time mandatory language could
be approved if considered appropriate. This would allow for an interval
of several months during which the Chilean election would be over and
the new Mexican Administration would take office. He said this was not
advanced as a U.S. Government position but as an idea to be
considered.
2. Line Up of Votes
The Foreign Minister said that he considered fourteen votes necessary to
satisfy the two-thirds requirement. Ambassador Bunker said the
precedents supported the view that only thirteen were required, and
promised to furnish the Foreign Minister with a memorandum explaining
the position.
The Foreign Minister said that he thought there were at least thirteen
votes in favor of his position for mandatory requirements: GuatemalaHondurasCosta RicaPanamaEl SalvadorNicaraguaDominican RepublicEcuadorColombiaBoliviaPeruParaguayBrazil
Assistant Secretary Mann said that
our information on Bolivia was different and Bolivia appeared to be
opposed. The Foreign Minister said his report on Brazil was based on the
Brazilian Foreign Minister’s recent statement to the press.
3. Publicity
The Secretary said that he favored keeping the meeting of the Foreign
Ministers private, without the press and television, so that they could
better arrive at a satisfactory solution. The Foreign Minister
agreed.
4. Conclusion
The Secretary congratulated the Foreign Minister on Venezuela’s
impressive showing of courage and support of the democratic process in
the December elections.
He said that he believed it would be useful to reflect further on what
had been discussed, to take further soundings and meet again soon to
continue the discussion.The Secretary met
Iribarren on July 20. Iribarren reported that his government could
not budge on mandatory sanctions and President Leoni had instructed him to ask
that the United States support Venezuela on this issue. Rusk said
that Iribarren “could rest assured that the United States Government
would support the Venezuelan position.” (Memorandum of conversation,
July 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 3 IA)
21. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Cuba, OAS Resolution
(9th MFM), Vol. V, 7/64–8/64.
Confidential. According to a July 14 memorandum from Sayre to Bundy this memorandum was drafted
by Sayre. (Ibid., Latin
America, Vol. II, 6/64–12/64)Washington, July 20, 1964.
SUBJECT
Your meeting July 21, 6 p.m., with heads of Latin American
delegations
You are receiving the heads of the Latin American delegations to the
Foreign Ministers meeting on Cuba on July 21 at 6 p.m. All of these
delegations are headed by Foreign Ministers, except Mexico and the Dominican Republic, which will
be represented by their OAS Ambassadors.
We have discouraged the Dominican Foreign Minister, Donald Reid Cabral,
because he is a Chief of State, and we would have had to treat him
accordingly. The Mexican Foreign Minister, Jose Gorostiza, is not coming
because Mexico has been in a minority and he didn’t want to take a
public beating in his first international meeting.
The meeting will also include Secretary Rusk, Tom Mann, Ambassadors Bunker and Duke,
Senators Morse and Hickenlooper, Congressmen Selden and
Mailliard, Secretary General of the OASMora, and myself.
Our suggestion is that during this reception you should talk informally
with the Foreign Ministers in somewhat the way that you have with the
Latin American Ambassadors. The group has been kept small for this
purpose. Since you already talked on Latin American problems, our
suggestion is that you might give them a general review of the world
situation, and Horace Busby is putting some suggested remarks into final
form.The remarks prepared by Busby have
not been found. The experts think that such a review would be
welcomed by the Foreign Ministers, and that they would find it
flattering to hear your views on the world. If you agree, the prepared
remarks could be made available to the press through George Reedy, together with some
background comment.
These prepared remarks do not contain any argumentation on Cuba because
we think the Foreign Ministers would regard this as undue pressure
before they begin their deliberations. At the same time, it is entirely
proper that you should informally state your own views in a private
session, and we would plan to make it clear in back-grounding that you
had done so, since we do not want the Republicans to be able to claim
that you are uninterested in the resolution. In such informal remarks we
suggest that you may want to make the following points which Tom Mann
and Dean Rusk are already making
in their discussions with the delegates: Venezuela has been the victim of aggression and we should
support her.We should not do anything at this meeting that would give Cuba
or the Soviet Union an impression that we have lessened our
resolve to defend the Hemisphere against aggression.Therefore we should adopt a strong and substantial
resolution.
The present line-up on the Cuban resolution is reasonably hopeful. The
Venezuelans are insisting on a mandatory break in relations and air
service with Cuba, and eleven other Latin American countries share this
view. Both on the merits and for political reasons we do not want to be
against the Venezuelans, who are very firm on this issue.
Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia are debating this issue of mandatory
sanctions, but we think they will probably agree. That would give us 15
votes in favor of a resolution on Cuba at least as strong as the one you
have already reviewed.
The Mexicans, however, are said to be bitter about the possibility of
being forced to suspend relations and air service. They regard this move
as a sanction against Mexico, not Cuba, and they are likely to carry
Chile and perhaps Uruguay with them.
Haiti will try to blackmail us, but will probably vote on our side
because we have two-thirds without her.
This picture is not perfect, and Tom Mann had hoped in particular for a
less troublesome Mexican reaction, but I do not think we should try to
second-guess him from the White House at this stage. I will try to have
an up-to-the-minute account for you tomorrow before the meeting.Although no substantive record of the meeting
has been found, according to a memorandum for the record by W.Y.
Smith it was discussed at the daily White House staff meeting on
July 22: “At the soiree between the President and certain Latin
American ambassadors yesterday the Mexican ambassador [to the OAS, Vicente Sánchez Gavito] misbehaved
a bit. There was informal agreement before him that nothing would be
said on the OAS resolution on Cuba,
now under discussion by the OAS
Foreign Ministers. The Mexican ambassador, however, made an
impassioned plea for a resolution that the Mexicans could live with.
The President handled the matter expertly, making some bland reply.
Secretary Rusk stepped in and
said that the resolution was the subject for discussion later, not
at the meeting then underway.” (Memorandum for the record, National
Defense University, Maxwell
Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, Box 25)
McG. B.Printed from a copy that
bears these typed initials.
22. Memorandum From Robert M.
Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Cuba, OAS Resolution, Vol. V (9th MFM), 7/64–8/64. Confidential.Washington, July 23, 1964.
At the OAS meeting this morning,
Argentina came out strongly against Cuba, but at the same time said that
the action taken should be a
matter of conviction with each American Republic. The Foreign Minister
said Argentina had already resolved what it would do—it has broken
relations, etc., but did not want to vote a resolution that would give
other countries troubles. How Argentina will come out is hard to say;
its position this morning was not helpful. The military members of the
Argentine delegation are most unhappy with their Government’s position.
State’s Director Argentine AffairsHenry A. Hoyt.
continues of the view that the Argentine Government will have to get in
line or face the prospect of being tossed out by the military as it was
in 1962, when it failed to agree at Punta del Este.
Haiti said it would vote with the majority on sanctions, but a
double-cross is possible. The Haitian Foreign Office put the heat on
Ambassador Timmons to get approval of an export license for T–28’s in
the same conversation about Haiti’s support on Cuba.
Brazil is working with our delegation, and is ready to go down the line
with us. Counting Haiti, there are 13 votes lined up with us. Rusk
discussed with the President at lunch, a telegram to President Paz to
get Paz to instruct his Foreign Minister to vote with us.Although no substantive record of this discussion
has been found, the President approved the telegram to Paz.
(Telegram 49 to La Paz, July 23; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 VEN) Rusk also called Ambassador to
Bolivia Douglas Henderson to emphasize the importance of Bolivia’s
vote: “Sec asked what time he [Henderson] would see Pres Paz and Henderson said 4:15. Sec asked him
to do his very best; this could make quite a lot of difference. Sec
said we could get very good result if Henderson was successful. Sec. asked the Amb to
phone us after his interview.” (Rusk to Henderson, July 24, 2:50 p.m.; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone
Calls 7/1/64–8/5/64) No record of a return call from Henderson has been found. The
subsequent reply from Paz was
non-committal. (Telegram 121 from La Paz, July 25; ibid., Central
Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 VEN)
Peru says it will vote with the majority, but it is also still talking
like Argentina.
Chile, Mexico and Uruguay are opposed to sanctions, and unlikely to
change their minds.
RMS
23. Summary Record of the 536th Meeting of the National Security
CouncilSource: Johnson
Library, National Security File, NSC
Meetings, Vol. 2, Tab 9, 7/28/64. Top Secret. The time of the
meeting is from a memorandum dictated by McCone on July 29. According to
McCone, Rusk “forecast that the resolution
will have an important effect on Castro and intimated, but did not express, the
thought that there would be a change in Castro’s attitude as a result of the resolution. He
[Rusk] seemed highly
satisfied with the resolution.” (Ibid., John McCone Memoranda, Meetings with the President,
1/4/64–4/28/65) President Johnson, who joined
the discussion at 12:46 p.m., may have missed the Secretary’s report
on the OAS resolution, which was
first on the agenda. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary)Washington, July 28, 1964, 12:15
p.m.
Ninth Foreign Ministers Meeting; Cyprus, Mainland
China
Secretary Rusk reported on the
recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American
States, which was convened to deal with Cuban subversion in this
Hemisphere, especially the shipment by Cuba of arms to Venezuela.
Secretary Rusk summarized the
Resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers. The major advance is the
agreed definition of “subversion” as “aggression”. Secretary Rusk made the following points: The United States did not press Mexico to break its air link
to Cuba because this is the last remaining airline operating
between Havana and the mainland.The clause in the Resolution calling on non-OAS States to join with States in
the Hemisphere in taking measures against Cuba is of major
importance.Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia may comply with the Resolution and
break relations with Cuba. What Mexico will do remains in
doubt.Although Mexico refused to
sever its ties to Cuba, the other countries later announced
suspension of relations in accordance with the OAS resolution: Chile (August
11), Bolivia (August 21), and Uruguay (September 8).An important achievement was to handle discussion in the
meeting so that it did not become a United States versus Latin
America contest. Emphasis was kept on the threat to Venezuela
arising out of the shipment of arms by Cuba.The United States avoided arm-twisting.We hope the message contained in the Resolution will get
through to Castro, as the Punte del Este Resolution did
not.The meeting was a success from our point of view. It was
impossible to obtain unanimous agreement on the Resolution but
Brazil, contrary to earlier meetings, played a constructive
role.The final act of the
meeting of Foreign Ministers, including the text of the
OAS resolution, is in
Department of State Bulletin, August
10, 1964, pp. 179–184.
[Omitted here is discussion on Cyprus and Laos.]
Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
24. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,
O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on
the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the NSA and FBI. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in
this estimate on August 19.NIE 80/90–64Washington, August 19, 1964.
COMMUNIST POTENTIALITIES IN LATIN AMERICA
Foreword
The purpose of this estimate is to review, with respect to each Latin
American country:Excluding Cuba, but
including British Guiana and Surinam. The current estimate with
respect to Cuba is NIE 85–64,
“Situation and Prospects in Cuba,” dated 5 August 1964. [Footnote in
the source text; for text of NIE
85–64, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, Vol. XXXII,
Document 281.]
The internal conditions which favor or hinder Communist political
or subversive activities.The strengths, capabilities, and policies of indigenous Communist
elements, and the policies of their overseas patrons (the USSR, Communist China, or
Cuba).The strengths and capabilities of the internal security
forces.
These matters are reviewed in 21 annexes, each relating to one of the
countries under consideration. These annexes are introduced by a summary
estimate in general terms.
The Estimate
Each of the 21 countries under consideration has its own
distinctive character and internal situation. Each is exceptional in
some respect. The appropriate annex should therefore be consulted as
regards the situation in any particular country.
As an indication of the range of variation within the region,
consider the following extreme cases:
Area (sq. mi.): Brazil, 3,300,000; El Salvador, 8,000.
Population: Brazil, 78,000,000; Surinam, 335,000. Density:
Haiti, 420 per sq. mi.; Surinam, 6. Literacy: Uruguay, 88
percent; Haiti, 10 percent. GNP: Brazil, $14.4 billion;
Surinam, $101 million. Per capita: Chile and Venezuela, over
$700; Haiti, $71.
Three countries have predominantly white populations: Costa
Rica (98%), Argentina (97%), and Uruguay (90%). Nine are
predominantly mestizo: Paraguay
(95%), Honduras (90%), Chile (88%), El Salvador (78%),
Panama and Venezuela (70%), Nicaragua (68%), Colombia (57%),
and Mexico (55%). Five have large, generally unassimilated
Indian populations: Bolivia (55%), Guatemala (54%), Peru
(50%), Ecuador (40%), and Mexico (30%). The Dominican
Republic is predominantly mulatto (70%); Haiti is almost
100% Negro. The populations of Brazil, British Guiana, and
Surinam are too variegated to permit classification in these
terms. [Footnote in the source text.]
Throughout Latin America there is a rising popular demand for
radical change in existing conditions—economic, social, and
political. The intensity of this demand varies from country to
country and within most countries. Backwardness is not in itself a
spur to revolution, but rising consciousness of deprivation is.
Nowhere as yet is this demand explosive, but the longer it is
frustrated and suppressed the more likely it is to become so. The
direction that political change may take remains open. It could as
well be democratic or PeronistThat is,
an authoritarian regime catering to nationalistic and working
class interests. [Footnote in the source text.] as
Communist. But everywhere the rising demand for change is
accompanied by an intensification of nationalistic emotions. Because
the predominent foreign presence in the region is that of the US,
Latin America ultranationalism has a predominantly anti-Yankee
character.This situation manifestly offers a fertile field for Communist
political and subversive activity. Communists have been working to
exploit it for about 40 years. Their efforts have been hindered by
countervailing factors, most notably by the ignorance and apathy of
the masses, by the existence of strong non-Communist leftist
movements in some countries, and by the strongly anti-Communist
attitude of the military, who still exercise ultimate political
authority in almost all countries.The
anti-Communist attitude and effectiveness of the military have
been most recently demonstrated in Venezuela and Brazil. But
there is another side to this coin. In times not long past, such
military figures as Arbenz, Batista, and Pérez Jiménez found it
convenient to use known Communists in order to undermine
democratic opposition, in some cases to longterm Communist
advantage. [Footnote in the source text.] But the rising
demand for revolutionary change, only partly a result of Communist agitation, will operate
to ultimate Communist advantage—unless the Communists are
forestalled by fundamental reforms carried out by strong and stable
non-Communist regimes.We doubt that present efforts to reform Latin American society
will have any fundamental effect over the short run in most
countries. Rapid population growth will continue to press upon the
limited resources available for consumption and capital investment.
Thus the pace of economic and social development is not likely to be
rapid enough to satisfy the rising expectations of the masses. The
unwillingness or inability of traditional political parties and
institutions to provide effective remedies will continue to enhance
the appeal of charismatic leaders disdainful of the slow pace of
evolutionary reform, and will afford the Communists recurrent
opportunities to associate themselves with popular political and
revolutionary movements.Communism in Latin America is preponderantly an urban phenomenon.
The Communists have made little impression on the rural masses, the
bulk of the population, principally for want of contact and
opportunity. In recent years, however, they have begun to make
special efforts to reach and organize the peasantry, notably in
Mexico, Peru, Chile, and Brazil.Among the urban Communists there are two sorts with generally
different characteristics: i.e., labor leaders and intellectuals.
The Communist leaders with labor backgrounds tend to be older men,
pragmatic, calculating (i.e., “opportunistic”), predisposed toward
political organization and action reinforced by
politically-motivated strikes and mass demonstrations. The Communist
intellectuals, on the other hand, tend to be doctrinaire
revolutionaries, at least verbally addicted to revolutionary
violence, although they have little or no contact with the masses
whom they would lead to revolution. This last consideration hardly
deters the student element in this category, who tend to be highly
“adventuristic.”In Latin America organized labor is composed largely of skilled
workmen who enjoy a privileged status and are more interested in
differentiating themselves from the masses than in leading the
masses to revolution. This factor has limited the appeal of
communism among industrial workers. By and large, the Communists
have not been successful in their efforts to gain control of
organized labor. Nevertheless, they have been able to gain strong
influence or control in some unions, and to use this labor
leadership to exert political influence, or to make expedient deals
with power seekers or power holders. Often, however, Communist
“control” of important labor organizations reflects only their skill
in political machinations. In such cases they cannot rely on the
rank-and-file to follow their lead when a direct economic interest
is not evident.The Communists’ most striking success has been among middle class
students and intellectuals. These are the people most acutely aware
of the shortcomings of the societies in which they live and most
impatient to transform them. They are well aware of the powers of
resistance of the vested interests and consider existing democratic
institutions ineffectual as a means of achieving rapid and radical
reform. They are attracted to communism by its promise to cut this
Gordian Knot, and by the expectation of being able to play an
important role in the new dispensation. Even the non-Communist
intellectuals tend to think in terms of a Marxist analysis of the
situation—i.e., to attribute national shortcomings to “federal”
class rule and to “Yankee imperialism.”In many Latin American countries the Communists are much divided
amongst themselves, by personal factionalism, ideological
sectarianism, and disputes over tactics. From the beginning there
has been a general division between those who would pursue a “hard”
line—immediate revolutionary violence—and those who prefer a more
expedient “soft” line—patient organization and agitation in
preparation for an eventual revolution. A generation ago this
difference was expressed in terms of Trotskyism and Stalinism.
Trotskyist elements still survive in many Latin American countries.
Nowadays, however, essentially the same difference tends to be
defined in terms of the Sino-Soviet controversy, or of the influence
of Fidel Castro.For purposes of analysis, it is possible to distinguish between
the attitudes of the USSR,
Communist China, and Castroist Cuba toward revolution in Latin
America, but the reservation must be made in advance that these
distinctions are blurred in practice and are not universally
applicable. The essential point is that Communist action in Latin
America depends on the willingness of indigenous individuals to act,
at whatever personal risk they are disposed to accept, and
consequently on their own tactical and doctrinal predilections. The
USSR, Communist China, and Cuba
can incite, encourage, advise, and render some degree of clandestine
aid from the outside; the decision to act, and in what manner, is
local and personal. The CPSU does
exercise a measure of control over the established Communist party
organizations, but the “Chinese” and “Cuban” factions are merely
obtaining ideological justification and material support where they
can find it, for actions which they are moved to take for their own
reasons. They are not under Chinese or Cuban control.The Soviet leaders, and the Communist parties responsive to them,
certainly desire to exploit every opportunity to impair US interests
in Latin America and to reduce US influence there. To those ends
they have worked to stimulate already existing tendencies toward
anti-US nationalism and to identify the US with the unsatisfactory
status quo. But the
Soviets almost certainly regard the Latin American Communist parties
as presently incapable of seizing and holding power in their
respective countries—and as not surely subject to Soviet control if
they should do so. Thus, in the Soviet view, Communist seizure of
power in Latin America remains a distant objective, not a present
potentiality. An intermediate Soviet objective is to facilitate the
coming to power of nationalistic regimes disposed to turn to local
Communists and to the USSR for
support in their defiance of “Yankee imperialism.”The Soviets generally prefer to pursue their objectives in Latin
America by political means. On the international plane, this means
Soviet cultivation of good relations with selected incumbent
governments through offers of trade and aid, and Soviet
encouragement of an independence in foreign policy verging toward
neutralism. In domestic politics, it means Communist party pursuit
of legal recognition and of collaboration with other parties in
popular fronts, as in Chile. But the Soviets and local Communists
also consider it imperative to prevent the success of any democratic
reform movement in Latin America. To this end, the Communists have
collaborated on occasion with the most ruthless dictatorships and
have sought by violence to frustrate democratic reformist regimes,
as in Venezuela.The Chinese and their ideological adherents scorn Soviet
“opportunism” in Latin America and hold that revolutionary ends can
be achieved only by revolutionary violence. But the Chinese are not
“adventuristic.” They too recognize that the Communist revolution in
Latin America is a distant objective, to be patiently prepared for,
not an immediate potentiality. As a practical matter, the Chinese
are more interested in gaining the adherence of the Latin American
Communist parties for their own immediate purposes in their present
struggle with the Soviets for the leadership of the international
Communist movement. But the Latin American enthusiasts for the
Chinese line are considerably less sophisticated about this matter
than are the Chinese. They take their Chinese texts literally
because they are themselves motivated toward early violent
action.The Cubans, like the Chinese, advocate violent revolution, but
they are more “adventuristic.” They hold that their own experience
proves that even a premature and abortive revolutionary attempt
would be a positive contribution to the cause, in that it would
provoke regressive measures which would arouse the population
against the government and so hasten the day of the successful
revolution. This idea has appeal for undisciplined and
“adventuristic” elements who want immediate action. Castro’s efforts to foment
revolutionary action in Latin America have suffered severe setbacks
during the past year— e.g., the reverses suffered by the FALN in Venezuela and by Leonel
Brizola in Brazil. Nevertheless, he will continue to provide
training and other aid to
potential revolutionaries in anticipation of future
opportunities.In 1963 about 4,600
Latin Americans visited Cuba, of whom most presumably received
some formal indoctrination. Several hundred probably received
training in the techniques of guerrilla warfare and urban
terrorism. [Footnote in the source text.]Factional conflicts among pro-Soviet, pro-Chinese, and pro-Cuban
elements have tended to disrupt and discredit the Communist movement
in Latin America. Nevertheless, all seek in one way or another to
destroy the position of the US in Latin America and eventually to
revolutionize the continent. All three Communist lines can be
pursued simultaneously in a given country, thus catering to diverse
disaffected elements. Moreover, these distinctions do not always
apply. The USSR approves of violent
resistance operations in countries in which political action is
impossible, as has been the case in Venezuela, although Cuba is the
active agent in such cases. (The USSR has a strong presence in the Cuban agency charged
with fomenting and supporting such operations.) On the other hand,
Communist China and Cuba pursue a primarily political approach in
countries such as Mexico, where that is obviously the more expedient
course.On the basis of a country by country review, the Communists’
chances for gaining control of any Latin American country in the
foreseeable future seem slight.Possible
exceptions are British Guiana and Chile. If the Jagan regime is
still in power when British Guiana becomes independent, the
Communists would be likely to gain control of that country. The
forthcoming election on the basis of proportional representation
is designed to unseat Jagan, but the possibility of his winning
cannot be excluded. If FRAP
should win the presidential election to be held in Chile in
September 1964, which is at least possible, the Communists would
gain great influence in the government, but not immediate
control of it. [Footnote in the source text.] Yet the
same could validly have been said of Cuba in 1957. There is a real
danger inherent in the situation, and that danger will persist for
at least a generation.The danger in Latin America results less from the Communists’
ability to convert people to communism than from the ability of a
few dedicated Communists to exploit for their own purposes the
widespread tendency toward anti-US nationalism. Both the traditional
order and the potential democratic order are under sharp attack by
radical ultranationalists as well as by Communists. Many of these
ultranationalists also seek dictatorial power, for the gratification
of personal ambitions, but also in order to transform their
societies without hindrance by vested interests. By their appeal to
nationalistic emotions, they can gain a wider acceptance in Latin
America than can the Communists. But an ultranationalist regime
could become Communist through dependence on the aid of local
Communists and of the USSR in its defiance of “Yankee
imperialism.” This is in some part the explanation of what happened
in Guatemala under Arbenz and in Cuba under Castro. The significance of the
local Communist parties in this context is that they provide a
continuity of organization and purpose unusual in Latin American
political life and a link with the USSR as a world power believed to be able to provide
aid and protection in the event of a hostile confrontation with the
US.
[Omitted here are Annexes A through U.]
25. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library,
National Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM No. 297. Secret.Washington, October 26, 1964.
MEMORANDUM FOR
Secretary of StateSecretary of DefenseAdministrator, Agency for International Development
SUBJECT
Study of U.S. Policy Toward Latin American Military Forces
The report of September 2, 1964 on NSAM
297 has been reviewed.The report, prepared
by the Department of State, is ibid. Bundy evidently chaired an interagency meeting to
review the report on October 19. In an October 19 memorandum
Sayre briefed Bundy on the meeting, explaining
that the agencies could not agree on the proper use of military
assistance for internal security. (Ibid.) No substantive record of
the meeting has been found. The Department of Defense is
requested to undertake to draft a new U.S. strategy for dealing with
Latin American military forces.
Specific proposals should be studied for such changes in U.S. policies
and programs of military assistance and other military-associated
programs, projected over the next five years, as may be necessary to
carry out the new strategy. The basic strategy objective should be the
restructuring of Latin American military establishments to relate
country force levels, defense budgets and military capabilities as
closely as possible to the domestic resources available for military
purposes and to realistic
current and potential security threats, with dominant emphasis on the
internal security threat. The study should assess the political
feasibility of achieving any such restructure in the context of the
Latin American political scene and the possible contribution which might
be made to achieving the strategy objectives by regional institutions,
such as the OAS or IADB.
The study should include, but not be limited to, an examination of the
following points: A critical analysis of how Latin American military forces
should be restructured in order to provide them with an
increased capability to respond more effectively to internal
security threats.Whether, and the extent to which, the concept of hemispheric
defense remains valid as a mission for Latin American forces and
as a basis for U.S. military assistance in Latin America.The current role of Latin American military forces in civic
action with a view to determining whether military or civilian
organizations provide the better channel for socially and
economically desirable projects.The utility of the Latin American military conscription system
as a means of providing security forces and of absorbing excess
labor.How to identify, develop, equip, train and insure the
availability of select units for OAS/UN peacekeeping
assignments.The proper balance between the roles of military and police
units in maintaining internal security.The feasibility of a shift in U.S. military assistance to
increasing reliance upon credit sales instead of grants.The feasibility of developing cooperative logistic
arrangements and common-use training facilities on either a
bi-lateral or regional basis among Latin American countries,
including possible U.S. participation.The contribution of U.S. military training programs to the
education of Latin American military officers on the role of the
military in a democratic society, on the effect of military
expenditures on economic and social programs of the country, and
on the need for continuing adjustment and reorganizations of
military forces to meet current security threats.
The study should analyze disproportionate military expenditures,
identified in the report of September 2, 1964 on NSAM 297, and the reasons for them, and
propose specific measures for their reduction which are likely both to
be politically feasible and to increase the effective utilization of
available resources.
It is requested that the study and your recommendations, which should be
drawn up in consultation with the Department of State and the NSC staff, be submitted by 1 February
1965.DOD submitted a draft report on
January 12, 1965. (Washington National Records Center, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 330 70 A 3717, Latin
America 1965, 320.2) Sayre
later explained that there was disagreement on the utility of the
draft report. According to Sayre, the report was “directed at how our military
policy should be financed and not at what the military policy should
be,” leading JCS and State to take
“sharp issue” with its conclusions. Rostow
considered the report a “pedestrian” effort. While trying to remain
neutral, Sayre insisted that
the NSC “wanted a study which
outlined a policy, not a financing arrangement.” (Memorandum from
Sayre to Bundy, March 8, 1965; Johnson
Library, National Security File, Name File, Sayre Memos) For a summary of the
final report, see Document 29.
McGeorge Bundy
26. Circular Telegram From the Department of
State to Certain American Republic
PostsSource:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 3 IA. Confidential;
Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Mann;
cleared by Sayre, Adams,
Weismann, Read, and Chief of Protocol Lloyd N. Hand; and approved by
Mann. Sent for action to the Embassies in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.Washington, February 12, 1965, 1:47
p.m.
1479. In late 1964 President Castello
Branco invited President Johnson to
visit Rio de Janeiro. Subsequently other Latin American Chiefs of State
have also extended invitations to President
Johnson.
President Johnson has suggested to President
Castello Branco that in
view of pressures on time of all Presidents, this might be good
opportunity for all ten Presidents of South America and President
Johnson to have informal meeting without agenda
under circumstances which would permit each President to exchange views
with every other President. GOB has
welcomed this suggestion and has requested US to inform governments of
nine South American republics of US proposal.
Precedents for group meetings of this kind include meeting of all Chiefs
of State of Inter-American system in Panama in 1956 and President
Kennedy’s meeting with
Presidents of Panama and five Central American countries in 1963.
Plans are that Presidents would arrive Rio April 28 or early morning
29th. April 29 and April 30 would be used for informal conversations
without agenda by each President with other Presidents present on any
topics of hemisphere or world interest which Presidents wished to
discuss. Purpose of meeting would be to permit Presidents to become
better personally acquainted with each other and with each other’s views
rather than to have more formalized type of meeting. All discussions
would be off the record.
Our thoughts are that similar meeting could be held with Chiefs of State
in Middle America later this year or in 1966.
We hope other Presidents will share our view that such a meeting would be
useful and have been authorized by GOB
to state that invitations will be extended by President Castello Branco to all South American
Chiefs of State who wish to attend.
Please inform President or Foreign Minister of foregoing and report
reaction soonest.
Information addressees should take no action at this time.On February 24 Mann raised the proposed trip with the President,
particularly in light of unauthorized newspaper accounts. Mann suspected that the leak had
come from “Latin American diplomats in Washington who were always
anxious to talk to the press.” The President wondered if the trip
could be postponed; “the more he thought about it the more he felt
it would be taking a lot of chances and not accomplishing much.”
Johnson suggested “that the Secret Service
could say that they did not think now was a good time for the
President to be traveling around. He did not think it would be good
for a doctor to make the statement, but he thought that the Secret
Service could.” (Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, January 14,
1964–April 30, 1965) On March 7 the Department reported that “new
developments in the international scene, particularly in Viet Nam,
have made it necessary for President Johnson to
defer consideration of possible visits to this hemisphere.”
(Telegram 836 to Buenos Aires, et al., March 7; National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 3 IA) At 8 p.m. the same day two
Marine Battalion Landing Teams, the first American combat troops in
Vietnam, arrived to defend the air base at Danang.
Ball
27. Editorial Note
On February 19, 1965, President Johnson nominated
Thomas C. Mann as Under
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and Jack Hood Vaughn as Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs. In recommending his successor, Mann told the President that Vaughn had done a “superior job” as
Ambassador to Panama and had enough of a “liberal image” that “he might
even be able to convert Schlesinger.” Mann also said that Secretary of State Rusk had given “no objection” to the
appointment. (Memorandum of telephone conversation, January 26; Johnson
Library, Papers of Thomas C.
Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, January 14, 1964–April 30, 1965) Mann later told the President that “we
had to build up Vaughn to the
Latin American Ambassadors so they will think of him as the boss and let
Mr. Mann work behind the scenes.”
(Memorandum of conversation, February 24; ibid.) In a meeting with
Rusk on March 18, Director of
Central Intelligence McCone
criticized the choice, warning that “much of the good work accomplished
in the last year or year and a half would be undone by Vaughn unless he was given very strong
supervision and guidance by Rusk,
Ball and Mann.” According to McCone: “Rusk indicated he had nothing to do with the
appointment, inferred, but not mentioned, that the appointment was made
by the President.” (Memorandum for the record, Central Intelligence
Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Memos
for the Record) Vaughn was
confirmed by the Senate on March 9 and assumed his new responsibilities
on March 22. For additional documentation on the Vaughn and Mann appointments, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume
XXXIII.
28. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Special Group (CI) Files: Lot 70 D
258, 3/18/65–4/15/65. Secret. Drafted by C.G. Moody, Jr., Executive
Secretary of the Special Group (CI).Washington, April 8, 1965.
SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group (CI) 2:00 p.m., Thursday, April 8,
1965
PRESENT
Governor Harriman, Mr.
McCone, General Wheeler,
Mr. Komer, Mr. Gaud vice Mr.
Bell, Mr. Wilson vice Mr. Rowan, Mr. Friedman vice Mr.
Vance
General Anthis, Messrs. Adams, FitzGerald, Engle and Maechling were
present for the meeting
1. Counterinsurgency Intelligence Summary
Special CIA Review of
Latin America:
Mr. McCone began by saying that
he wished to express as emphatically as possible the dangers in Latin
America that require positive, concerted and prompt action. He reviewed
the Latin American section in the summaryReference is to a CIA Intelligence
Memorandum, “Developments in Countries on the Counterinsurgency
List,” April 7. (Ibid.) and called the attention of the Group
to recent statements out of Moscow for increased activity in Latin
America naming the countries Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras,
Paraguay and Haiti as immediate targets for wars of liberation.Reference is to the Conference of
Representatives of Latin American Communist Parties, which met in
Havana, November 1964; the communiqué of the conference was
published in Pravda, January 19, 1965. The
Conference endorsed a number of proposals in the struggle against
“imperialism,” including: “To render active support to those who are
at present being subjected to brutal reprisals, such as, for
instance, the Venezuelan, Colombian, Guatemalan, Honduran,
Paraguayan and Haitian fighters.” (Current Digest
of the Soviet Press, Vol. XVII, No. 3, February 10, 1965,
pp. 15–16) He said that there is evidence that a policy
decision has been made to conduct a more aggressive campaign not only in
Latin America, but everywhere, though he only wished to address the
Latin American situation today.
Mr. McCone then briefed the Group
on background information on this evidence and said that increased
activity in certain designated target areas would be difficult if not
impossible for some of the governments to handle. He stated that he is
of the opinion that the Communist’s planning in most Latin American
countries is still in an embryonic stage and might be handled by small
but skillfully trained organizations. He said that plans in each country
must be developed to fit particular situations. He asked Mr. Desmond FitzGerald to outline a
suggested approach to the problem.
Mr. FitzGerald explained that the counterinsurgency
problem can be broken down into the three following phases: Phase 1. In the earliest stages of insurgency, the subversion
phase, the use of basic intelligence from successful
penetrations to gain information, frustrate or hamper.Phase 2. In the later and more violent terrorist stage, the
use of intelligence in conjunction with local police forces who
are trained to use the information. In this connection, security
within police forces poses the greatest problem in Latin America
in utilization of sensitive data.Phase 3. In the more overt guerrilla and terrorist stage, the
employment of military forces plus all other capabilities,
especially communications and intelligence to permit rapid
response by security forces.
To bridge the gap between Phase 2 and Phase 3 a small strike force must
be provided which can be broken into small groups. Preferably this
should be police. Such a force has been recommended for Peru and it will
be air transportable. Mr. FitzGerald said that the
Peruvians need air support for this plan and it probably will have to be
provided by the U.S. Mr. McCone
pointed out that this Special Police unit will be trained in
counterinsurgency.
In response to the Chairman, Mr. FitzGerald said
that the plan has been discussed with Peruvian officials, but would be
raised again upon Ambassador Jones’ return this
weekend because the Peruvians have a new Chief of Staff who was not in
on the previous discussions. AID has
agreed to finance this particular plan.
Mr. Friedman suggested that this
concept should be used in all Latin American countries. Mr.
FitzGerald replied that country-by-country
treatment was preferable since each country had special internal
political problems which affected their capabilities. Mr. McCone said that if we do decide to go
forward with this plan, Peru could be used as the pilot plan. In
replying to a question on funding, Mr. Gaud answered that there should be no problem, but each
country would have to be studied separately to determine what is
needed.
Mr. McCone suggested an action
memorandum from the Chairman of the Special Group (CI), or an NSAM may ultimately be desirable. He emphasized that
everyone’s support is needed. Mr. Komer stated that there is no doubt that the evidence
indicates widespread activity and preventive measures should be taken
now because the price is cheaper early in the game. The Chairman and Mr.
FitzGerald both offered examples showing that
few people in these countries including high government officials are
aware of the Havana Conference of November 1964 or the Pravda statements, and suggested that psychological warfare is
not receiving proper attention. Mr. FitzGerald
pointed out that one of the main problems in creating security forces is
that whenever a regime is toppled, the security forces are the first to
be thrown out; this has had the effect of requiring constant retraining.
General Wheeler stated he was in agreement with what had been said but
felt we may be neglecting the source of much of the infection, Cuba
itself. The Chairman agreed and asked Mr. Komer to advise Mr. McGeorge
Bundy of the feelings of the Special Group on this
score.
Mr. FitzGerald pointed out to the Group that U.S.
military personnel in Venezuela are not permitted to accompany local
forces into combat areas. This limits their capability to observe and
take corrective action. The Group discussed the advisability of a
high-level approach to the Venezuelan Government on the seriousness of
this limitation.
After hearing Director McCone’s
presentation on new Communist insurgency effort in Latin America, the Special Group (CI)
called for a full-scale review of this problem by the agencies
concerned. To this end the Group proposed that the Latin American Ad
Hoc Working Group analyze: (a) the intensified threat arising out of
decisions at Havana Conference in November 1964; (b) the
effectiveness of current CI programs
addressed to this problem— intelligence, police, military aid,
economic aid, psychological warfare and counter-propaganda, and (c)
ways of stepping up U.S. and local efforts to cope with the threat
on a country-by-country basis. The Latin American Working Group
should report to CI Group by 1 June
1965, but may do so earlier on a country-by-country basis.No evidence was found that the Latin American
Ad Hoc Working Group completed a full-scale review of
counterinsurgency.
The Group also endorsed the CIA/AID proposal for a
special airborne police unit to be tried out on an experimental
basis in Peru and asked that the Latin American Working Group
comment as soon as possible on the feasibility of this proposal for
other Latin American countries.Regarding
the airborne unit, the so-called Special Police Emergency Unit
(SPEU), see Document 471. It was further agreed that
USIA would be represented on
the Ad Hoc Working Group.
[Omitted here is discussion of a report on Public Safety Programs.]
C. G. Moody, Jr.Executive SecretarySpecial Group (CI)
29. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President’s Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source:
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin
America, Vol. III, 1/65–6/65. Secret.Washington, June 11, 1965.
SUBJECT
Study of U.S. Policy Toward Latin American Military Forces
In response to your memorandum of October 26, 1964 on the above
subject,Document 25. I am forwarding
herewith a study prepared in the Department of Defense proposing a new strategy for dealing
with Latin American military forces.Dated
February 25; attached but not printed.
The basic recommendations of the study are: (1) to initiate in FY 67 a gradual, selective and controlled
phasedown of MAP matériel grants
extending over two three-year periods: (a) FY 67–69— maintenance, overhaul items; (b) FY 69–71—investment items, and (2)
concurrently to place increasing emphasis on credit sales, local defense
production and better budgetary planning and programming by Latin
American military establishments in a major effort to bring their forces
more into line with domestic resources and with a realistic appraisal of
the security threat. The proposal would include provision of matériel
grants for emergency purposes to meet foreign exchange inadequacies or
for political reasons on an ad hoc basis when specifically
justified.
The views of the Department of State, AID
and the JCS have been sought and fully
considered in drawing up this paper. However, it has not been possible
to reconcile the differing views with the result that not all of the
conclusions and recommendations of the study are concurred in by other
agencies.
The principal objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are: (1) to the
threat analysis, which they believe understates the insurgency problem,
and (2) to the relatively minor military importance the study attaches
to the future anti-submarine warfare requirements in South American
waters. An extract of their views is enclosed as a separate
memorandum.Undated; attached but not
printed.
The views of the Department of State are also enclosed in a separate
memorandum.Reference is to a letter from
Vaughn to McNaughton, March 29, attached but
not printed. While the Department of State accepts most of
the conclusions of the study, they reject the above basic action
recommendations. They acknowledge that the proposals are sound in
principle and desirable of attainment, but believe that action should be
delayed until some indefinite time in the future. Their fundamental
reason is that to embark on such a course of action would be disruptive
of U.S. influence in these countries and might tend to alienate the
military forces on whom the Alliance for Progress must depend to
maintain stability in the area.
In the light of these comments, I recommend that the new strategy
proposed in this study be regarded as a long-term goal, but one which
must be approached without a rigid time frame.
Under our present MAP guidance we have
been undertaking: A systematic effort to induce Latin American MAP recipients, to the extent
feasible, to gradually assume the maintenance burden, e.g. spare
parts and overhaul, now being borne by the MAP, andThe development of integrated grant-credit packages of
military assistance designed to provide maximum leverage in (a)
holding down external military procurement of the Latin American
armed forces to agreed upon levels and (b) directing their
procurement toward realistic security requirements.
I believe that our best course of action is to continue these efforts,
concentrating on prudent management of the MAP rather than upon the initiation of a new strategy.
In the meanwhile, the enclosed study provides a useful basis upon which
to measure our progress toward accomplishment of the long-range goals of
our Military Assistance Program in Latin America.For additional discussion of U.S. policy toward
Latin American military forces, see Document
65.
Robert S. McNamara
30. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, AID(AFP). Confidential. No drafting
information appears on the memorandum.Washington, August 4, 1965.
SUBJECT
Celebration of Fourth Anniversary of Charter of Punta del Este
(Alliance forProgress) August 17, 1965
We have previously avoided a major celebration of the anniversary of the
Charter of Punta del Este because the statistics provided no basis for
celebration. The figures for 1964 are good, however, and prospects for
1965 are as good or better. But more important, the Alliance needs a
psychological shot-in-the-arm and the personal imprint of the President.
It is erroneously charged that we are neglecting the social aspects of the Alliance. Some Latins
assert the Alliance died with Kennedy; others that our Dominican policy overshadows
it.On April 27 the President sent U.S.
Marines to the Dominican Republic to protect American lives in the
midst of civil war. He later claimed that action was necessary to
prevent the establishment of a Communist dictatorship. In response
to criticism that he had acted unilaterally, the President
dispatched Ambassador at Large Harriman and a team of high-level officials to Latin
America for consultation.
Mr. Sayre discussed this problem
with the President on July 23 when he accompanied Ambassador Dungan. The President asked Mr.
Sayre to send over a
proposal.According to the President’s
Daily Diary Johnson met Dungan and Sayre on July 23, 2:55–3:43 p.m.
(Johnson Library) Although no substantive record of the meeting has
been found, a note attached to this memorandum reports that the
President asked the two men “for ideas on how to revitalize the
Alliance.” (Note from Read to Rusk, August 4; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID(AFP))
We assume we could not get the President to make a trip to Latin America
now because of Vietnam. In any event, I would be reluctant to recommend
it, because of the security problems associated with it.
The President should kick if off in Washington. He has already taken the
first step by the loan signing ceremony at the White House on July 29
with the Central Americans.Reference is to a
$35 million AID loan to the Central
American Bank for Economic Integration. For text of the President’s
remarks upon signing the agreement, see Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965,
Book II, pp. 809–811. We have in mind a “social justice”
address at the White House. The President has offered a trip on the
Sequoia. After thinking this over, I have concluded that a boat trip
does not do what we want, but would take as much of the President’s
time. The Sequoia cannot accommodate the 33
OAS and White House Ambassadors.
Moreover, we get little, if any, publicity. If a White House ceremony
does not appeal to the President, we might consider something as unique
as a luncheon at Monticello, Jefferson’s home. Jefferson was the
exponent for all the things we want the President to
emphasize—individual liberty, social justice, higher education,
modernization of agriculture, etc.
Recommendation:
That you sign the memorandum (Tab B) to the President.There is no indication of Rusk’s approval on the memorandum, but a copy of the
signed memorandum to the President is in the National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID(AFP). During the signing ceremony on August 17 at the White
House Johnson emphasized several elements to
strengthen the Alliance, including: stabilizing the price of such
basic commodities as coffee, cocoa, and sugar; and promoting
economic integration in the region by reducing tariff barriers. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 884–889)
31. Memorandum of Telephone ConversationSource: Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, May 2,
1965–June 2, 1966. No classification marking. Drafted by Viola
Emrich (M).Washington, August 27, 1965, 1:30
p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. MannThe President
The President called and said he wanted a real good announcement written
this afternoon he can put out on MondayAugust 30. 3 Eisenhower agreed to this
arrangement earlier that afternoon. (Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Milton
Eisenhower, August 27, 12:25 p.m., Tape
6508.10, PNO 7) which would say that he has been devoting a
good deal of personal interest and attention to our relations with our
good neighbors in this Hemisphere; that since he became President he has
consulted with not only the people in the State Department that are
experienced in this field but with the Congressional leaders and with
the private sector and labor leaders and with the educators and former
officials—Burley [Berle],
Eisenhower and others who have served in
official functions; that he has exchanged views and visits with some of
the Presidents and officials of the nation and the Hemisphere, but the
heavy workload has kept him from seeing them as much as he likes. He has
met all the Ambassadors, OAS and Latin
America, and that he has asked Dr. Milton
Eisenhower, President of Johns Hopkins, who has served
the Government for many years with distinction, an authority in this
field, has written in this field and travelled in Latin America and
advised him on this matter, to plan some visits to Latin America, and
that he would hope that in the next few days that he would make his
first one—his itinerary would be announced later, and a somewhat longer
visit made in the next few weeks and perhaps others.Eisenhower agreed to this arrangement earlier that
afternoon. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording
of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Milton Eisenhower, August 27,
12:25 p.m., Tape 6508.10, PNO7) That
he will be accompanied by a staff of experts in the economic and
political fields—get out of military angles as much as possible—and that
he will be consulting regularly with the Department officials in the
next few days. Be sure to bring in when he says expert some of his ideas
and dreams that went into the Act of Bogota, subsequently reaffirmed and
implemented in the Alliance, but give him some good credits for his
ideas and dreams. Also that his stuff was copied by the Kennedys and he
had no recognition, this means more to us than to them.
The President said to build him as a real patriot. He asked Mr. Mann to touch base with Morse, say that
earlier in the year he asked Eisenhower, Fulbright
went to Brazil, asked Vaughn to
visit some places;Fulbright headed the
Senate delegation that accompanied high-level U.S. officials on a
trip to Brazil in early August. (Department of State Bulletin, August 23, 1965, p. 332) Vaughn left on August 20 for a
2-week trip to Latin America, including stops in Mexico, El
Salvador, Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, and Peru. For Vaughn’s report to the President on
the trip, see ibid., October 4, 1965, pp. 548–549. he said he
had told Morse on two or three
occasions to visit any countries he wanted. He said to ask Dr. Morgan and Selden,Congressmen Thomas E.
Morgan (D–Pennsylvania), Chairman of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Armistead I. Selden, Jr.
(D–Alabama). touch base with them and say we want them to go
if they want to; don’t tell him just ask. In the past, off-the-record,
has asked Eisenhower to go and asked them to go,
not on the same trips but individually to any countries they want to. He
said to make it a good announcement and get WatsonW. Marvin Watson, Jr. to put it on his wire tomorrow.
Mr. Mann asked when would he want
to make it. The President said the Secretary is coming down for dinner
tomorrow night and Mr. Mann can
send it by him, he will leave by Noon. He said he thought he would make
it Sunday, quick as he can before Bobby is on every front page.
The President said to say in the announcement that he has asked Fulbright
and other members of the Latin American Committees, he has Secretary
Vaughn down there now, and
give him the biggest title— Ambassador at Large if need be. Make a good
announcement that will make the Latins happy. He said he wants to go to
Mexico first, and told Mr. Mann
he would call FloresAntonio Carrillo Flores,
Mexican Foreign Minister. and tell him that the President is
sending an emissary and turn out for him and talk up everything for
Mexico, sugar and everything else and put on a big show for him. The
President said he would check it with his President and by Tuesday or
Wednesday of next we would hear from him.
The President said we didn’t want to get to Brazil, we are out of Brazil,
he would say Mexico or two others. He said Mr. Mann could talk to Flores pretty quick
and see if he likes it, while the Sugar Bill is up would be a good time.
He said that Milton Eisenhower
could have a good welcome and show good relations and could reflect it
in this country.
Mr. Mann asked if Flores would be
too many, and the President said no, should be at least three days on
the plane, one place a day. Mr. Mann suggested perhaps one in Central America and one in
Panama.
The President said to make it sound good and mention his ideas and
dreams, Act of Bogota, and talk to him this afternoon and select the
countries. He said to get Oliver
in, and to get it to him without question, he wants it tomorrow. He said
to salute it big.The President left
Washington on August 27, his 58th birthday, to spend the weekend at
his Ranch in Texas. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary)
Before Rusk arrived the
following afternoon, The New York Times
reported that Senator Robert F.
Kennedy was planning to visit South America in
November. (The New York Times, August 28,
1965) The Johnson administration apparently
decided against announcing its own plans for Milton Eisenhower. No evidence has
been found that Eisenhower visited Latin
America as the President’s personal emissary in 1965.
32. Memorandum of Telephone ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA Files,
1965–67: Lot 70 D 295, Inner Office Memoranda, November 1965. No
classification or drafting information appears on the memorandum. A
copy was sent to Sayre.Washington, November 4, 1965, 4:45
p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. VaughnGovernor Harriman
Governor Harriman said that he had
talked to Bobby Kennedy about a couple of things before he left and he
had mentioned having a good talk with JV, and seemed quite happy about
it. JV said that Kennedy had
seemed quite rough.For an account of the
meeting between Kennedy and
Vaughn, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His
Times, pp. 693–694. In reply Harriman stated that Kennedy was a wonderful fellow but it
was hard for him to get readjusted—that he felt things were just not as
good as they used to be. JV mentioned that Kennedy had three specific points, which bother him and
on which he felt he must speak out— D.R. (Harriman
interupted to say that he thought Kennedy wrong in his views on the D.R. and had
told him so)Policy in Peru—andRecent developments in Brazil.
On the last point JV mentioned that Kennedy thought we should stop aid and Harriman remarked that this was
“crazy.” Harriman then explained
that Kennedy had asked him to
keep in touch and he (Harriman) felt that Dungan and Linc Gordon could do Kennedy some good. Continuing, Governor Harriman said that his interest was to
be sure Kennedy was
constructive—rather than destructive—because he “has so much steam,” and
asked if there was anything he could do in the way of communicating with
him. JV and Harriman discussed
further the things Kennedy would
probably say in LA—he will probably say that we were wrong in the D.R.
but that he is willing to forget the past and talk about the future. It
was agreed that Kennedy was not
as bad as Fulbright but that he would talk and would “raise this hell in
Brazil” (Harriman). The Governor
asked what Kennedy planned to do
in Argentina and JV said that he wouldn’t do anything since we are so
far on the way of resolving the oil problem. Chile?—he wouldn’t say
anything. Venezuela?—no, the main problem there is oil and he feels it
is too complicated for him to go into. Harriman asked if Kennedy really planned to talk against our policy in
Peru and JV replied that he would express his view that we should stick
to the Alliance for Progress objectives and not work with the oil
companies. Harriman expressed
hope that Linc Gordon could get
to him on Brazil but JV said most likely Kennedy would be asked about Brazil before he gets
there.
Going to another subject, Governor Harriman asked if Chile was going to show up at Rio and
JV said that chances are that they will be going—the question mark being
Venezuela. Harriman said that he
thought Venezuela would follow Chile—JV said no, that they would not go
because they did not have diplomatic relations.Although a Chilean delegation attended the Rio
conference, Venezuela refused to send a delegation; in accordance
with the Betancourt doctrine, the Leoni administration had suspended diplomatic
relations with Brazil after the coup d’état of March–April
1964. As to U.S. policy on the Brazilian situation JV stated
that the Second Institutional Act contained 32 different authoritarian
steps the President could take and we felt it best to wait and see what
he chose to do before making any statement of condemnation. Harriman said that it was his
understanding that Castello
Branco took these steps to appease his military and JV
said “yes, he did.”
Returning to the subject of Kennedy’s trip Harriman asked JV if he planned to write to any of the
Ambassadors and JV said he was going to discuss this with the Secretary.
Harriman suggested that a
letter be sent Linc Gordon and
Ralph Dungan—Dungan and Kennedy are friends and this might be helpful. Thought
it advisable to let the Ambassadors know the mood Kennedy was in. Governor Harriman again stated that he would do
anything he could to help in corralling Kennedy and asked JV to mention this to the
Secretary.According to the Secretary’s
Appointment Book Vaughn met
Rusk on November 8 (10:40
a.m.); the two men also attended a briefing session for the Rio
Conference on November 9 (3 p.m.). (Johnson Library) No substantive
record of either meeting was found.
33. Memorandum From William G.
Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. IV,
3/65–8/66. Secret.Washington, November 17, 1965, 5:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Visits by Secretary Rusk and
Senator Robert Kennedy to
Latin America
The main developments in our Latin American relations this past week have
centered on the visits of Secretary Rusk and Senator Robert
Kennedy to several Latin American countries. Ellsworth Bunker brought you up-to-date
on the Dominican picture yesterday.According
to the President’s Daily Diary Johnson met
Bunker twice on November
16. (Johnson Library) For a memorandum from Bunker to the President, November
15, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXII,
Document 144. The only other significant
development is that of President Frei’s reported decision to put an end to the copper
strike, now in its fourth week. This may involve military intervention
in the mines.
Secretary Rusk’s
trip. Secretary Rusk’s
brief visits to Venezuela, Argentina and Uruguay, on his way to the Rio
Conference, went very well.The Secretary’s
itinerary in South America was: Venezuela (November 13–14);
Argentina (November 15–16); Uruguay (November 16); Brazil (November
16–24); and Paraguay (November 24). Rusk was chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the
Second Special Inter-American Conference, which met in Rio de
Janeiro, November 17–30. The Communists and extreme leftists
carried out some of their usual propaganda and pyrotechnic stunts but
these did not directly affect the Secretary, except for one incident in
Montevideo.
In Venezuela, the Secretary had a useful talk with President Leoni on the world situation. Leoni gave him a full airing of
Venezuela’s complaints over our oil import restrictions. This was to be
expected. As we told you last night, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister
misread part of their conversation as an invitation by you to President
Leoni to visit the United
States. This may have been a deliberate attempt to display U.S. support
for Venezuela, despite its decision not to attend the Rio meeting.
The visit with the Argentines was particularly cordial. President
Illia showed special interest
in the Vietnam problem and expressed support for our position. He
stressed the necessity for the Latin American countries to promote the
objectives of the Alliance for Progress and to rely on self-help
measures. He reported that he had already spoken to the Chilean and
Uruguayan Presidents about the Alliance along these lines, and planned
to continue the dialogue with other Presidents. Secretary Rusk compared notes with the Argentine
Foreign Minister on key issues
at the Rio meeting and found a large measure of agreement. Secretary
Rusk was so encouraged by his
talks with the Argentine President and Foreign Minister and by what his
economic team found on Argentine self-help measures, that he has asked
that we consider moving ahead with some assistance projects being held
in abeyance pending Argentine self-help performance and satisfactory
settlement of the termination of the oil company contracts.
Secretary Rusk was in Montevideo
for only three hours. An otherwise productive round of talks with
President Beltran and Foreign Minister Vidal Zaglio was marred by an
incident at an unscheduled wreath-laying ceremony. A 25-year old man
broke through police lines and managed to get close enough to the
Secretary to spit at him, but did not hit him.
Senator Kennedy’s trip. Senator Kennedy has visited Peru, and today completes his tour
in Chile.Kennedy’s itinerary in South
America was: Peru (November 10–13); Chile (November 13–18);
Argentina (November 18–20); Brazil (November 20–30); and Venezuela
(November 30–December 1). From press and Embassy reports, the
Peruvian visit was quite successful. Large, enthusiastic crowds turned
out to meet him, and he was not the target of any anti-U.S.
demonstrations. On the touchy issue of nationalization of the
International Petroleum Company (IPC),
he took a correct public position, despite his sharp disagreement with
the Administration’s position on the handling of the IPC case with the Peruvian Government. He
said that this is a matter for the Peruvian people to decide. He also
acknowledged that under international law, a country is within its right
to expropriate foreign property, provided it makes prompt, adequate and
effective compensation.
After his departure from Lima, two pro-nationalization magazines carried
accounts of what he is alleged to have said on the IPC case at a private party. No one from
the Embassy was present, so we do not have an official account. The
thrust of these stories is that he, in effect, encouraged
nationalization, pointing out that other Latin American countries had
done this before without any significant long-term damage to their
relations with the U.S. He is also alleged to have made some
unflattering references to the Rockefeller family (IPC is an ESSO holding) and to have said that the Peruvian Ambassador
in Washington advised him not to mention the IPC problem. This latter remark is already causing the
Ambassador some trouble at home.
Ambassador Jones brought these stories to Kennedy’s attention in Santiago and he
has authorized a statement reaffirming his public position on
expropriation and describing the use of remarks he made in a private
conversation as “an irresponsible distortion of my position.” The text
of the statement is at Tab A.Attached but
not printed.
So far we have only press reports on Kennedy’s five-day visit to Chile. He seems to have
received a warm public reception, without incident, except in his
speaking engagements with university groups. The themes he has
stressed—e.g., the importance of the Alliance for Progress, praise for
Frei’s revolution-in-liberty
program, the vital role which young people have to play—have gone over
well and created no problems for him or for us.
He seems to have been adroit in handling questions about the Bay of Pigs
and our action in the Dominican Republic. The press reports that he
described our Dominican intervention as a mistake, but he has taken
strong issue with questioners who cast our intervention as “American
imperialism”. The press has him saying more than he should about changes
in his program in Brazil resulting from recent events there. The
Brazilian Embassy has informally protested to State over his alleged
remarks.
At the University in Santiago, a group of extremists tried to prevent him
from speaking. Opposing students shouted them down. At Concepcion, he
ran into stronger opposition as “pro-Communist” students used eggs and
stones and saliva to disrupt his talk. The larger projectiles reportedly
did not hit him, but he was spat upon.
We will have a more complete and accurate report of the Chilean leg of
the journey as soon as the Embassy reports are received.The Embassy reports on Kennedy’s trip were transmitted in: telegram 751
from Lima, November 11; telegram 761 from Lima, November 13;
telegram 670 from Santiago, November 19; telegram 747 from Buenos
Aires, November 23; telegram 1351 from Rio de Janeiro, December 2;
and telegram 602 from Caracas, December 1. (All in National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, LEG 7
KENNEDY)
WGB
34. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 3 IA. Confidential; Immediate;
Limdis. Passed to the White House.Rio de Janeiro, November 30, 1965,
2315Z.
1329. For the Secretary from Harriman.
The Final Act of the Conference was signed today with considerable
enthusiasm.The text of the first two
resolutions of the Final Act, a proposal to amend the OAS Charter and the Economic and Social
Act, are in Department of State Bulletin,
December 20, 1965, pp. 996–1001. The full text of the Final Act,
which included 30 resolutions, is in The OAS Chronicle, February 1966,
pp. 5–29. Carrillo Flores spoke for the conference members,
underlining progress in the social and economic fields. Throughout the
conference he has been far more cooperative than previous Mexican
ministers.
Chairman Leitao concluded the session with a brief, businesslike speech
summarizing the real achievements of the conference. In addition, he
returned to Castello Branco’s
theme of collective security and the need to equip the OAS with means for dealing with the new
kind of threat we face today, namely, aggression by subversion. He
handled skillfully the question of new members by expressing the hope
that Canada, Trinidad, and Jamaica would soon join the organization and
suggested that they be welcomed by acclamation. All, including the
Guatemalan, clapped enthusiastically. This I believe satisfies the
assurances you gave to the Jamaica and Trinidad representatives who can
now report to their governments that conference expressed unanimous
welcome if they indicated desire to join.All
three countries eventually joined the OAS: Trinidad and Tobago (1967), Jamaica (1969), Canada
(1990).
The Economic and Social Act was approved without a dissenting voice. The
Latinos agreed to a series of actions which they themselves are to take
to promote development by self help and particularly by mutual
assistance. They were not looking solely towards Uncle Sam, but with new emphasis on self help
and particularly mutual aid among Latin Americans. Jack Vaughn and Walt Rostow deserve much credit in
helping to hammer out the principles agreed to. Recalling the
inestimable value of mutual assistance in Europe in Marshall Plan days,
all this appeals to me as being a major forward step.
On the political side, the guidelines to the preparatory committee for
the amendment of the charter on organization went along without much
hitch except for the paragraph on the responsibilities that might be assigned to the council
“relative to the maintenance of peace and the peaceful settlement of
disputes”, a phrase proposed by Guatemala and passed by split vote in
committee one. Our delegation felt since it had been included we should
stick to those who had supported it, and not give in to the soft group.
After some rather heated discussion, the paragraph was approved 12 to 1
with 6 abstentions. Some appeared to be afraid that “maintenance of
peace” was a first step to a peace force. Nevertheless, the whole
section was unanimously approved.
There have been, however, a few reservations attached to the final
document.
The resolution on human rights was constructive and the resolution on
consultation prior to recognition of governments resulting from coups
was innocuous.
Old hands here say that there was greater consensus and less argument
than usual, and a good spirit of confidence in the progressive steps
taken, particularly those relating to integration, mutual aid and area
development.
The discordant note was the rigidities of countries such as Peru, Chile,
Uruguay in the field of peaceful settlements. The majority, however,
recognized that the long-festering disputes must be got out of the way
if there is to be real economic integration and mutual aid. Peru’s
failure to get Lima as a conference site was a lesson to the conference,
and the conference was profoundly impressed by our recent settlements
with Panama and Mexico.
President Johnson’s proposal to extend the duration
of the Alliance has been warmly received and was frequently referred to
with appreciation.Rusk read the President’s
message to the delegates, including the following passage:
“Recognizing that fulfillment of our goals will require the
continuation of the joint effort beyond 1971, I wish to inform the
Conference—and through you, your respective governments—that the
United States will be prepared to extend mutual commitments beyond
the time period foreseen in the charter of Punta del Este.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp. 1123–1124) The text
of the Secretary’s address to the conference, November 22, is in
Department of State Bulletin, December 20,
1965, pp. 985–995. There is no doubt your own week of
consultation here had a highly salutary influence and your parting
statement set the tone for the conference. The effective teamwork of the
delegation could not have been better and the assistance of efficient
Embassy was invaluable.
Gordon
35. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (Koren) to the Director (Hughes)
Washington, January 11, 1966.[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA–CIA
Weekly Meetings, 1966–1967. Secret. 4 pages of source text not
declassified.]
36. Editorial Note
[text not declassified]
37. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann)Source: Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2, 1965–June 2, 1966. No
classification or drafting information appears on the
memorandum.Washington, January 17, 1966, 11:05
a.m.
The President said that they had been giving a lot of thought to making
Jack Vaughn the Peace Corps
Administrator to succeed Shriver.R. Sargent
Shriver was also Director of the Office of Economic
Opportunity. He did not know whether Vaughn would be interested, but what
would we do if he were?
Mr. Mann said he did not know. The
President said we needed someone with a liberal image who could get rid
of this crowd. Mr. Mann said he
thought it would be a good move for Jack and good
for the President, because Mr. Mann thought Bobby K. had his knife sharpened for Mr.
Vaughn and perhaps Morse and a couple of others also. Mr.
Mann said he thought they
fully intended to cut Vaughn down
in 66. The President agreed and
asked about Ambassador Gordon.
Mr. Mann said he thought he would
be as good as the President could get. He has some lines out to the
left—he belonged to the left three years ago. He came in with Kennedy. Mr. Mann said he thought that Berle and Gordon had been on an advisory committee to the
PresidentAdolf A. Berle served as the
chairman of two task forces on Latin America, November 1960–July
1961; Gordon was a member of
both. and had had a lot to do with the Alliance and the
liberal image, so presumably this would stand him in good stead. Mr.
Mann said on the other hand,
Gordon is a determined guy,
but all good people are. He has his own views and he sticks to them.
The President asked about his loyalties. Mr. Mann said he did not think he had any strong ones to
Kennedy but that he did not
consider Kennedy his enemy. The
President asked what Ambassador Gordon had reported about the Kennedy visit down there and Mr.
Mann said he would have to
look this up.See footnote 6, Document 33.
The President asked if Mr. Mann
thought that Vaughn would go for
this. Mr. Mann said he did not
know but he thought he could help talk him into it. The President asked
who we would put in Brazil and Mr. Mann said he did not know. The President mentioned
Berle, but Mr. Mann said no, he was too old, too
contentious and too arrogant. He thought he would talk down to the
Brazilians.
The President told Mr. Mann to
think about who we could put in there. He asked if Oliver would do it instead of coming
home. Mr. Mann said Oliver was a Spanish type. He said he
would think about it and call the President back. The President said to
call him back in an hour.In that telephone
conversation with the President, at 12:10 p.m., Mann reported that “he had done a
little looking around and he thought that the choice of Gordon for ARA would be the best the President could do.”
Mann expected that
Vaughn would agree to the
proposed change; he also suggested several candidates to replace
Gordon in Rio. (Johnson
Library, Papers of Thomas C.
Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2, 1965–June 2 1966)
Johnson called Vaughn at 1:50 p.m. and received a call at 3:14 p.m.
from Gordon in Cambridge,
Massachusetts. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) One hour later the
President announced that Vaughn would replace Shriver as Director of the
Peace Corps. (Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 24–25) After
meeting Gordon the next
morning Johnson announced his nomination as
Assistant Secretary. (Ibid., p. 26) Gordon took office on March 9. On May 22 John W. Tuthill was appointed to
succeed Gordon as Ambassador
to Brazil.
38. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,
O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on
the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on February 17. The estimate supplements
NIE 80/90–64 (Document 24).NIE 80/90–66Washington, February 17, 1966.
INSURGENCY IN LATIN AMERICAExcluding Cuba, for which the current estimate is NIE 85–65, dated 19 August 1965.
[Footnote in the source text; for text of NIE 85–65, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXII,
Document 305.]
The Problem
To estimate the character of the insurgency threat in Latin America, and
the prospects over the next few years.By
insurgency we mean the systematic use of violence to overthrow or
undermine the established political and social order. We exclude
military coups d’état, endemic banditry, and spontaneous disorder.
[Footnote in the source text.]
Conclusions
There has been a rash of insurgencies in Latin America since
Castro’s triumph in Cuba
in 1959, but only a few have developed much virulence. The more
active ones, in Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia, have
either lost ground or gained little over the past year.The growth of Latin American insurgencies has been hindered by the
disunity of extremist groups, the want of willing martyrs, and the
failure to attract much popular support. It has also been contained
by the counteraction undertaken by the governments involved, with
substantial US support.Insurgencies tend to prosper along one of two lines: the largely
unhampered expansion of a guerrilla campaign, as in Cuba, or the
exploitation of a sudden upheaval, as in the Dominican Republic in
1965. Thus the prospects for a particular insurgency are likely to
depend less on its initial strength than on the disabilities of the
government which may prevent effective counteraction. The danger of
insurgency is probably greater in some chronically unstable
countries not now plagued by insurgent activity, such as Bolivia or
Haiti, than in a country like Venezuela, where the government is
moving effectively against an active insurgency and, to an extent,
against the underlying social tensions.In this context, the inherently unstable political situations in
the following countries render them vulnerable to the rapid
development of insurgency: Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Panama.
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]
39. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, Walt W.
Rostow, Vol. 2. Confidential. No drafting information
appears on the memorandum. Rostow forwarded the
memorandum to the President on May 4.Washington, May 3, 1966.
SUBJECT
OAS Charter Amendments
Background
At the OAS Conference in Rio last
November, it was unanimously agreed that the Charter of the OAS should be amended in three
respects: To improve the structure of the organization by holding
annual meetings of Foreign Ministers and in other
respects;To strengthen the capacity of the organization to assist
in the peaceful settlement of disputes among member
countries; andTo incorporate as treaty obligations the basic principles
of the Alliance for Progress, including self-help and mutual
assistance to accelerate economic and social progress. It
was made clear that mutual assistance included actions by
the Latin Americans for one another as well as actions by
the United States.A special OAS Committee met in
Panama in late February and March of this year to draft Charter
amendments in accordance with the decisions of Rio. Substantial
agreement was reached on the matters of structure and peaceful
settlement of disputes, but there was disagreement between the Latin
American and United States delegations regarding the economic and
social chapters. We believed that the Latin American proposals were
unnecessarily elaborate, and that they might involve treaty
commitments to aid and trade policies which would be opposed by the Senate as an unacceptable
infringement on Congressional prerogatives. We, therefore, reserved
our position, indicating that further consultations were required
with the Senate on the basis of which we would offer
counter-proposals. We stated, however, that the United States
Government stands by the basic principles of the Economic and Social
Act of Rio, and that our differences related only to the appropriate
form for incorporation of these principles into treaty
language.After Assistant Secretary Gordon returned from Buenos Aires in early
April,Gordon went to Buenos
Aires in late-March for the fourth annual meeting of the
Inter-American Economic and Social Council. For text of his
remarks before the Council, March 29, see Department of State
Bulletin, May 9, 1966, pp. 738–746.
Gordon’s report on
the outcome of the meeting is in telegram 1470 from Buenos
Aires, April 2. (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID (AFP) 3
ECOSOC–IA) a revised draft was prepared and presented to
the Latin American Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was discussed at length on
April 25 with about 12 members of Senator Morse’s subcommittee. Senator
Fulbright participated as Chairman of the full Committee.On Monday afternoon, May 2, Senators Fulbright and Morse, together with Senators McCarthy, Aiken and
Carlson met again with
Assistant Secretary Gordon.
Senator Morse, speaking for
the group stated that it was the Committee’s considered opinion that
commitments to mutual assistance, even with the safeguards contained
in the State Department’s draft, should not be incorporated into
treaty obligations, but should be left to normal legislative action.
The Senators recognized that Article 26 of the present Charter
(adopted in 1948) does include a broad commitment to economic
cooperation. The discussion made it clear that their objection to
going further is related to concerns arising from the Vietnamese
situation and generally from concern about the breadth of
international commitments of the United States. All efforts to
persuade them that the Western Hemisphere situation differs from
others, in view of our long-standing special relations within this
Hemisphere and the collective security engagements under the
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio treaty) of 1947,
proved unavailing.We have prepared a revised draft of the relevant articles which
removes the qualified undertaking “to extend mutual assistance”,
thereby meeting the central objection of the Committee. In an effort
to keep faith with the understandings of Rio and to avoid a
potential major setback in the climate of inter-American relations,
we have drawn from the present Article 26 and then tied the use of
resources under that Article to the self-help commitments and other
provisions of the Alliance
for Progress. Even this proposal will probably be regarded by the
Latin Americans as a significant retreat from the Rio agreements;
but we believe that it might barely suffice to bridge the gap.
Anything less would not do so.Enclosure 1Both enclosures are
attached but not printed. contains in parallel columns
(1) the “Panama Draft” on mutual assistance as approved by all the
Latin American Delegations, (2) the draft submitted to the Senate
Committee and opposed by them, and (3) the new proposed draft, the
first article of which is identical with Article 26 of the present
Charter.Enclosure 2 contains in parallel columns the entire chapter on
economic standards (1) as approved by the Latin American Delegations
at Panama, and (2) as contained in the United States
counterproposals submitted to the Senate Committee.The problem of timing is very tight. The Buenos Aires conference
of Foreign Ministers to approve Charter amendments is now scheduled
for July 30. To meet this date the OAS Council must submit its report by May 31. We do not
want to maintain the present Buenos Aires schedule unless agreement
on assistance among all the Member Governments can be reached before
May 31. Assistant Secretary Gordon leaves Friday morning for Central America and
Chile and hopes to discuss this matter on his trip. Any significant
slippage in the Buenos Aires schedule would affect adversely the
proposed Presidential Summit Meeting.
Alternative Courses of Action
(Linc Gordon and I would welcome
the opportunity of a few minutes’ discussion with you on these
alternatives at your earliest convenience.)No decisions are recorded on the memorandum. According to the
President’s Daily Diary Johnson met Rusk and Gordon on May 5 to discuss the proposed amendments
to the OAS charter. (Johnson
Library) Although no substantive record of the meeting has been
found, the administration apparently proceeded on the basis of the
first alternative.
We can proceed to negotiate the revised language without further
consultation with the Senate. In this case, we should inform them
that we have taken their basic point into account and are seeking to
negotiate the new language which would be given to them.We could take the revised proposals back for further discussions
with the Senate Committee at the State Department level. In the
present frame of mind of key members, this would run the risk that
they would object on the ground that the proposed Article 7 gives a
broader construction to
the existing obligation under Article 6, and constitutes in spirit,
if not in form, a commitment to mutual assistance.The new proposals (or a return to something stronger) could be
discussed with the Senators with your own participation.Dean Rusk
40. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM No. 349. Confidential.Washington, May 27, 1966.
SUBJECT
Frontiers of South America
On January 31, 1966, you requested that I undertake urgently a
preliminary assessment of the potentialities of developing the frontiers
of South America.
I attach a summary report and seven appendixes.The report was prepared by the Department’s Policy
Planning Council in May 1966; attached but not printed.
Rostow was chairman of the Council until
April 1, when he succeeded Bundy as Special Assistant to the President.
In addition, there is included a special report developed by the
Department of the Army’s Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories.Dated February 14; attached but not
printed.
These represent the present state of thought and knowledge in the town.
They have been assembled to provide a foundation for future systematic
work. None can be regarded as definitive.
In compiling the data and writing the report, I have received the
whole-hearted support of every element in the government with interest
in and knowledge of the problem: Agency for International DevelopmentDepartment of AgricultureDepartment of CommerceDepartment of InteriorDepartment of the ArmyNational Aeronautics and Space Agency.
This is, I believe, the first time this problem has been systematically
examined in our government. It is evident that there is much more for us
all to learn; and my first recommendation is that, under Linc Gordon’s leadership, work on this
problem be made a continuing account and that the various agencies
capable of making a contribution continue to expand and refine their
knowledge on a coordinated basis. A working party operating under the
Latin American IRG might perform this
function.
In addition, CIAP should set up a
working group that would regularly engage the IBRD, IDB, AID, and the OAS in this field.
What emerges of substance may be briskly summarized as follows: South America is at a stage of historical evolution where the
further development of its frontiers can contribute to food
production, a widening of markets, regional integration, and the
settlement of various bilateral disputes.A rational program for exploiting these frontiers must be
geared to other aspects of South American development, with
careful attention to the comparative benefits to be derived from
intensive investment in existing areas as opposed to extensive
investment in expanding the frontiers. The opening of the South
American frontiers has an important role to play in the region’s
future; but it is not a panacea.
There are four major complexes which comprise the bulk of the
frontier regions of South America capable of rational
economic exploitation from the present forward. —The Darien Gap area of Panama and
Colombia;—The Andean Piedmont, running in an irregular
narrow belt for 3,000 miles from the Venezuelan
border through Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, to the Santa
Cruz region of Bolivia;—The Campo Cerrado area, east and south of the
Amazon basin;—The Gran Chaco and Gran Pantanal region covering
portions of Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil and
Argentina.
There are special further potentialities in the tropical
flood plains of the Amazon; the Guayana region of Venezuela
and British Guiana; the linking of Buenos Aires to the whole
region south of Rio–Sao Paulo; and the River Plate drainage
system.
The character of all these regions are briefly sketched in
the report.
There is little prospect in sight for the economic
exploitation of the vast Amazon–Orinoco basin unless the
proposal for making it a lake (by damming the rivers) should
prove feasible.As the survey of seventy-four projects under way or envisaged
indicates (Appendix I), there is now a great deal of activity
focused on the opening up of the frontiers; and it is generally
following a rational
pattern. The task for policy in Latin America is to make the
expansion of the frontiers more effective and purposeful.A political point of some importance: the opening up of these
frontier regions could, in a number of South American countries,
strengthen the sense of nationhood and contribute to political
and social stability. Moreover, notably in the Andean Piedmont,
but elsewhere as well, the laying out of roads and organized
settlements is a significant element in preventing the
possibilities of Communist insurgency.Detailed recommendations are set out in Part Four of the
attached summary report. Briefly, they are: —The Darien Gap complex be urgently examined as a
whole, notably in the light of our Panamanian
negotiations. Its various elements have been hitherto
treated separately.—We maintain a policy of selective but continued
support for road-building in each of the four countries
engaged in opening up the Andean Piedmont. (The report
isolates the road segments judged most rational for the
next phase.)—We assign specific responsibility to Linc Gordon quietly to
explore the possibility of exploiting work on
multinational projects to ease or settle the major
outstanding bilateral quarrels in South America.—We clarify our minds on the economics of frontier
settlement in the light of recent experience and
establish Alliance for Progress policies based on this
review. No serious agreed guidelines now exist.—We examine urgently on an interdepartmental basis,
perhaps under the aegis of the SIG, the security and other problems
involved in a systematic use of orbital remote-sensor
measurement of land and geological formations in South
America, providing you with a report. These methods
could accelerate rapidly mineral discovery and
exploitation, notably in the Andes.—We intensify our support for your proposal, via
CIAP, for
accelerated development of chemical fertilizer
production in Latin America.—We set up both within the CIAP framework and within the U.S.
Government continuing systematic work on the development
of the South American frontiers.—CIAP should consider
this summer (after the report on multinational projects
by the Development and Resources Corporation, headed by
David Lilienthal) the publication of materials that
would dramatize what is going forward in this field and
its potentialities for Latin American development and
integration.—We re-examine (with full attention to our balance of
payments position) our present policy on local cost
financing of development projects with a view to
permitting financing of local costs of certain
infrastructure projects as part of an over-all program
for opening frontier areas.
If further detailed examination of this study makes sense to you, I
recommend that an NSAM be issued
assigning responsibility for the
task to State—specifically to Linc
Gordon. A suggested draft NSAM for your approval is at Tab A.Attached but not printed. In NSAM No. 349, May 31, the President
instructed the Department to report on development of the South
American frontier. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM No. 349) Progress reports, dated February 14,
1967, July 2, 1967, and March 25, 1968, are ibid.
You may wish to weave into your statements on Latin America passages
indicating an awareness of the frontier development going forward, its
potentialities, and your support for it. A possible draft is at Tab
B.Attached but not printed. The
President approved the draft statement. In a speech marking the
fifth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, August 17,
Johnson referred to development of the
inner frontier: “The eastern slopes of the Andes, the water systems
of the Gran Pantanal River Plate, and Orinoco, the barely touched
areas of Central America and of Panama—these are just a few of the
frontiers, which, this morning, beckon to us.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966,
Book I, pp. 824–829)
Should you (or the Vice President) visit Latin America, you may wish to
visit certain selected frontier areas as well as the conventional
cities.A handwritten note by the
President at the end of the memorandum reads: “Good. L”
Walt
41. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 14. Secret. A copy was sent to
Moyers.Washington, October 15, 1966, 12:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Our Program for the OAS
Summit
Secretary Rusk in the attached
memorandumMemorandum from Rusk to the President, undated;
attached but not printed. A copy, dated October 14, is in the
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 7 IA SUMMIT.
requests your approval of general guidelines for our negotiators on
Summit preparations.
The guidelines are based on a Summit program which has
substantial inter-agency concurrence except for the budgetary
implications. Because of the difference, Secretary Rusk is not asking that you make a
decision on this aspect until you can review the Summit price tag in the
light of the total aid request for FY
1968.
These guidelines provide adequate interim direction for the preliminary
multilateral preparatory work which will take place during the next 6–8
weeks.
The Summit Deal
We are asking the Latins to: —integrate their economies and sharply reduce tariffs.—revamp their antiquated agricultural and educational
systems.—work with us in promoting private investment.
It will take courage for the Latin American Presidents to take their
countries down this uncharted path.
To induce them to step off into the dark and break past the obstacles, a
substantial U.S. “carrot” will help. Expanded economic assistance is our
part of the deal.
The guidelines will enable our negotiators to explore: —how far the Latins are prepared to go.—how much inducement must we offer to make them take the
jump.
Based on their findings, you can decide on the specific proposals.
Our Present Summit Program
It is designed to begin meeting now serious social and
political problems we see coming in the decade ahead from
population increase, growing urban unemployment and continued
backwardness of agriculture. The main elements are:
1. Latin American Economic Integration
The broadened, more competitive market that can result from more rapid
economic integration is the single, most promising move that Latin
America can take to accelerate growth and reduce future foreign aid
needs.
We would expect the Latin Americas to agree to a concrete plan for
automatic reduction of intra-zonal tariffs and non-tariff barriers; a
commitment to adopt reasonable external tariffs, declining as their
economies strengthen; competitive investment and internal trade
policies; and reasonable access to the region for foreign
investment.
You, in turn, would announce at the Summit our
readiness to support this effort by expanding our
contribution to the Inter-American Bank’s Fund for Special Operations (IDB/FSO). This would involve increasing the
U.S. contribution in the three fiscal years 1968–70 from the present
level of $250 million per year to $300 million, with an indication that
if additional funds are required, we would consider further
replenishment of the FSO.
The IDBwould agree to set aside a stated amount of the new
resources to: finance sound multinational projects in
support of economic integration and development of “inner
frontiers” (e.g., roads, flood control, hydroelectric power,
irrigation, communications).assist countries with temporary adjustment
problems resulting from rapid integration (e.g.,
balance of payment difficulties, affected industries and
workers, export financing for intra-Latin American
trade).
2. Higher Alliance Targets: Primarily Agricultural
and Education
Annual per capita growth rates in Latin America
should increase from the 2.5% level realized in 1964 and 1965 to 4–6%.
Economic integration will help. But also basic to the
objective are more dynamic agricultural sectors and broader access
to higher quality education.
The type of across-the-board programs and self-help we have in mind are
described in the guidelines paper (Enclosure 1 of the Rusk memo).Attached but not printed. In addition to remedial measures
for the more common deficiencies, the programs include some exciting new
ideas such as establishing two or three regional centers of excellence
in science and engineering in Latin America.
At the Summit you would announce an increase in
AID bilateral assistance in these
two fields of up to $200 million per year for 5
years.
3. Stimulate Private Investment
There are two proposals for increasing U.S. investment in Latin America
under favorable conditions which State has advanced but on which full inter-agency agreement has not been
reached. They are: an imaginative idea for expansion of AID risk guarantees
developed by Tony Solomon.the negotiation with the Latin Americans of an agreed investment code to encourage use of
modern technology and provide for coordination of foreign
investment with development plans.
Budgetary Implications of the Package (Linc Gordon’s estimates not concurred
in by AID or BOB)
For FY 1968 the implications are
AppropriationExpenditure(in millions)Economic Integration (replenishment of the IDB/FSO over the planned level
of $250 million)$50$5Increased Bilateral Aid for Agriculture and
Education$200$50Total$250$55
For the four-year period beyond FY 1968:—Replenishment of the FSO will continue for 2 years at $50
million per year.—Requirements for bilateral assistance in agriculture and
education will not exceed $200 million per year and may be less,
depending upon allocation of IDA
funds to Latin America.
The Original Package
Linc Gordon’s original Summit
proposalsAs contained in a draft
memorandum to the President, undated; attached but not
printed. had three elements which have been deleted or
diluted. They added a zest to the program which is now lacking.
1. Separate Integration Fund
As an inducement to the Latin Americans to take the plunge on integration
he proposed a separate Latin American Integration
Fund to handle adjustment assistance and a Multinational Projects window
at the IDB to finance such projects. We
would contribute up to $300 million to the fund and $500 million to the
IDB for multinational projects, both
over a five-year period.
Joe Fowler took sharp exception to these proposals and countered with the
idea of using the Bank’s FSO and increasing our contemplated annual
contribution to the FSO by $50 million for the next three years. Linc
reluctantly went along with this.
I think the Treasury formula dilutes the “carrot” aspect of the proposals
to such a degree that much of its value as an inducement for prompt
Latin American action is lost. We need more flexibility in negotiating
with the Latins on integration.
2. Expanded Risk Guarantee Program
The Solomon proposal is to: —expand the program in six basic fields: iron and steel,
chemicals, fertilizers, pulp and paper, petro-chemicals,
automobiles.—cover up to the legal maximum of 75% of each investment, and
relax the 100% tieing requirement.—require the U.S. investor to offer for sale up to 51% of the
stock of his company to Latin American purchasers within a fixed
number of years after the start of the project (e.g., 15–20
years) and reinvest a percentage of his profits while he still
held a controlling interest.
The proposal is encountering heavy going in Treasury and Commerce on
balance of payments grounds and the advisability of conditioning
guarantees to the mandatory offer of stock sales after a fixed period
and to required profit reinvestment. I am not convinced by: —the balance of payments argument because Latin America does
not leak to Europe, or—the preoccupation with conditioning of guarantees since the
investor is free to decide whether or not he wants to accept
them.
3. Limited Untieing of Procurement
To accommodate Latin American criticism to “tied” aid, Linc proposed
extending procurement eligibility for Alliance financing to include
Latin America. It would apply, in effect, to manufactured products,
mostly capital goods. This is largely a gesture—but symbolically a
meaningful one for the Latin Americans—because they produce few such
goods on competitive terms. State estimates that over an initial
three-year period the procurement might reach $15 million.
The Treasury objection is on balance of payments grounds. Since the
proposal is largely cosmetic, Linc dropped it from the package. I think
it bears closer examination.
My Reaction to the Program
It goes to the heart of what the Latins must do and only Presidents can
take the political decisions required. It is, therefore, of Presidential
stature.
If the Latins are willing to start down the track we propose, the bargain
to help them financially is a good one.
The portions of Linc’s original package which have not prospered are
“carrot” which we may have to use to get the Latins to accept the deal.
They should be held in reserve.
Recommendation
That you approve the guidelines proposed by Secretary Rusk, with the understanding that you
wish to review at a later date each of the three aspects of Linc
Gordon’s original proposals not adequately covered in the
Summit program as it now stands.Although the
memorandum does not record the decision, Bromley Smith subsequently reported that the
President approved this recommendation—“with the understanding that
no decisions or commitments are to be made with respect to
additional United States assistance without prior referral to him
along with a firm indication of what the Latin Americans are
prepared to do.” (Memorandum from Smith to
Rusk, October 19; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
POL 7 IA SUMMIT)
Walt
Approve
Disapprove
Speak to me
42. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 15. Confidential. The President
was at his ranch, November 19–December 9 and December 16–January
2.Washington, November 30, 1966, 9:30
a.m.
Mr. President:
This broad agenda on Latin America was drafted yesterday by Gordon, Linowitz, and Bill Bowdler. It is worth reading as a
quick summary of the Latin American situation.
For your talks on Saturday,December 3; the
meeting was evidently held aboard Air Force One during a brief trip
on December 3 to Ciudad Acuña, Mexico, where
Johnson inspected construction of the
Amistad Dam and met informally with President Diaz Ordaz. According
to the President’s Daily Diary Johnson “went to
a back cabin of the plane and was not seen in the front again until
after landing.” (Johnson Library) Passengers on the flight included
Rusk, Gordon, Linowitz, and Rostow.
Tom Johnson reported that “the President
spent much of the flight in conversation with Secretary Rusk.” (Memorandum from
Johnson to Marie Fehmer, December 3; ibid.)
No substantive record of the meeting was found. I suggest the
following simpler agenda.
Linowitz’s trip to Central America.
(Linowitz)Preparations and Prospects for the Summit
meeting. (Gordon)Implications of the Summit for U.S. Policy.
(Gordon)
For your information, Latin Americans’ preparations for the Summit are
now going rather well. We have put ourselves in the position where we do
not have to decide what add-ons to the Alliance for Progress we shall
make until we can see how seriously the Latin Americans are prepared to
move forward. Our Latin American experts are thinking in terms of an
add-on of perhaps $200,000, partially through the IDB, which would put additional resources
into international projects and integration, on the one hand,
agriculture and education, on the other.
W. W. RostowPrinted from a copy that bears this typed
signature.
Attachment
AGENDA
For Gordon–Linowitz–Rostow Talks
With the President
1. General Political Situation
1966 has been a banner election year: Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Brazil, Peru,
Uruguay.Except for the Argentine setback, representative democracy has
been considerably strengthened through the electoral process and
with it the promise of greater political stability.Soft spots continue to be: Haiti, Ecuador, Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, Panama.So-called “arms race” centering around recent subsonic
aircraft purchases by Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela is a
real—but exaggerated—problem.
2. General Economic Situation
Most encouraging trend is that the hemisphere is moving out of
the economic crisis stage and can now increasingly devote its
attention and energies to development. —All the major countries have passed the economic
crisis stage; the ones still caught in it are small
countries: Ecuador, Uruguay, Haiti, Dominican Republic,
Panama.—The new political and economic stability is
fostering:—institutional reform;—steady increase in tax revenues;—greater attention to development planning;—more diversification;—increase in important private investment
projects;—movement toward Latin American economic
integration.But the base for this progress is still fragile: —problems of inadequate exports;—inflationary pressures remain;—rise in population;—impact of any deflationary trend in the US and
Europe;—growing urban unemployment;—backwardness of agriculture.The Alliance for Progress at a crossroads: —has had another year of solid accomplishments,
although we will fall short of 2.5% GNP per capita;—but economic and social progress must be accelerated
if the present gains are to be consolidated;—Alliance goals and requirements which the President
will wish to keep in mind as he reviews the FY 1968 budget.
3. Special Issues
Summit Preparations:—Status of OAS
work;—Status of our preparations;—Linowitz trip to Central America;—Projected Gordon–Linowitz trip to South America,
following which they wish to report to the President on
Summit prospects and obtain his approval of time and
place for the Summit and of our program and its budget
implications.Gordon and
Linowitz
toured Latin America for consultation on the OAS summit and reported
to the President on December 19. (Johnson Library,
President’s Daily Diary) The President gave Senator
Mike Mansfield (D–Montana) the following account of
the meeting: “They’ve covered most of the
countries—I think all but a couple of them, Ecuador
and Bolivia—and they’re pleased with the situation
generally. They’re particularly pleased with
Carrillo
Flores and Diaz Ordaz and what they
said to them and so forth. They think that the
summit’s going to come off in good shape. They
pretty well got an agenda, pretty well agreed upon,
pretty well decided that it’s not going to be a
place to express your envies or jealousies or to
demagogue or campaign.” (Ibid., Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation
between President Johnson and
Mike Mansfield, December 20, 12:16 p.m., Tape
F6612.05, Side A, PNO 4)Dominican Republic—Political polarization process and what we propose to
do to arrest it.—Present economic situation and outlook for
1967.Haiti—Duvalier has weathered another crisis, but the
situation remains explosive.—Status of our contingency planning.Panama Negotiations—Status of the negotiations.—Outlook for negotiations of satisfactory treaties
with the Robles Government.Visits by Latin Americans—President Frei.—President-elect Costa e Silva.Amistad Dam Visit—Scenario.—Themes for remarks.
43. Memorandum From William G.
Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)Source:
Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, Alliance for
Progress, 9/1/66 (1 of 2). Secret.Washington, January 17, 1967.
Walt—
Hal HendrixHarold V. Hendrix was Latin
American correspondent with the Scripps Howard Newspaper
Alliance. is right about the Presidential image in Latin
America, although I think he may overstate it.
Goodness knows, the President has paid more personal attention to Latin
America than probably any other President—the record of speeches,
ceremonies, lunches, dinners, visits, boat rides, special delegations,
personal letters, congratulatory messages, funeral planes, etc., is
ample evidence.
These are his principal image problems: —He does not project the sparkling intellectual image of
Kennedy—young,
scholar, pretty wife, small children, Catholic, etc.— which so
appeals to the Latins.—He had the distasteful—but necessary—job of sending troops
into the DR and of fighting the nasty war in Vietnam with all
the “egghead” criticism that it has brought.—A very personal observation—I have for some time detected a
growing cynicism among AID and
USIA personnel toward the
Alliance and the President which translates itself into lack of
drive and imagination.
What I would do about it: —The Summit meeting and the trip is the single most important
thing the President can do.—A trip by Lynda later on this year would project an image of
youth, charm, good looks and stylishness.—One or more taped television interviews with carefully
chosen, well-known Latin American newsmen in the President’s
office, with a trip around the White House; the same might be
done on the distaff side. (Len Marks should be able to arrange
these.)—A Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress separate from the
Assistant Secretary of State, but who will naturally work
closely with him. The Alliance needs a figure of prestige who is
close to the President and who can devote time travelling around
visiting projects, conferring with Latin officials and
instilling enthusiasm into our rank and file. The Assistant
Secretary is too busy running the show back here to do the
necessary missionary work the Alliance requires. The economics
of the Alliance is in good hands—what it needs is a spiritual
leader who will mirror the President. The change of the guard in
ARA provides the opportunity
to do this.Reference is to the
upcoming departure of Gordon, who had accepted the presidency of
Johns Hopkins University. On January 20
Johnson called Senator Fulbright to
discuss Gordon’s
replacement: “I want to get a good man that can move forward
and be progressive; and I have nobody to reward, as you
know, in the State Department and never have had; and I’ve
just looked at them, and I’m telling you the Foreign Service
from the Latin American standpoint is awfully weak. As a
matter of fact, it’s weak everywhere, Bill.” (Johnson
Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson
and J. William
Fulbright, January 20, 5:30 p.m., Tape
F67.03, Side A, PNO 1) On May 24
Johnson announced the nomination of
Covey T. Oliver,
Ambassador to Colombia, to be Assistant Secretary. Oliver was confirmed by the
Senate on June 8 and took office on July 1.—Len Marks needs to get the word to his staff in Latin America
not to miss a chance to weave in the LBJ image in their operations.—It might be useful to have the AID and USIA
directors in the South American countries congregate in
Venezuela at the end of the President’s trip for him to give
them a pep talk.Rostow wrote the following instructions
to Bowdler on the memorandum: “Go and have a talk with Len
Marks about this problem & your suggestions.” Bowdler
noted on March 4 that this was “done.”
WGB
44. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, International Meetings and Travel File,
Inter-American Summit Meeting, Vol. III. Secret. A notation on the
memorandum indicates the President saw it.Washington, February 10, 1967.
SUBJECT
Your 6:00 p.m. Appointment with Secretary Rusk on OAS Summit Preparations
Secretary Rusk wishes to discuss
what he should say about the Summit meeting at Buenos Aires in view of
the wide inter-agency disagreement on what our part of the Summit deal
should be.
The Summit Deal
We are asking the Latin Americans to: —take the plunge on economic integration;—modernize their agricultural and educational systems;—forego expensive military equipment.
These steps involve tough political decisions. What we are prepared to do
to help is critical to their willingness to take the decisions. The
success of the Summit hinges on this interplay.
Linc Gordon and Sol Linowitz have recommended this
package as our part of the deal: Express willingness to ask Congress for up to $300 million for
Latin American integration adjustment assistance, to be
contributed over a period of years and on a matching basis after
the Latin American Common Market treaty is negotiated.Approve asking Congress in this session for an authorization and appropriation in FY 1968 of $300 million for
replenishment of the Inter-American Development Bank Fund for
Special Operations, i.e., $50 million more than you have already
approved for authorizing legislation for
FY 1968.Indicate an intention to ask Congress to increase our Alliance
for Progress assistance for education and agriculture by $100
million in FY 1968 (it is already
in the budget) and (an average of $200 million for the following
four years, dependent on demonstrated need and adequate self
help).Consider modifying tying arrangements for our capital project
loans (but not program loans) to permit hemisphere-wide
procurement after the Latin Americans negotiate a Common Market
Treaty. This would shift the tying from the present individual
country basis to a regional basis. The balance of payments
effects would not be appreciable.
A table on how the costs of this package would be spread out over the
next five years is at Tab A.Not attached,
but the table is attached to another copy of this memorandum.
(Ibid.)
Views of Other Agencies
Treasury—Joe Fowler opposes Recommendations 1 and
4 of the package. I don’t believe he is sympathetic toward economic
integration. He feels that if integration adjustment assistance is
necessary, the Inter-American Bank should handle it, and by increasing
our contribution (as per Recommendation 2) we would meet our
responsibilities. On Recommendation 4, he agrees that the balance of
payments effect will probably be small, but he fears adverse
psychological effects on our balance of payments posture.
AID—Bill Gaud is
strongly opposed to Recommendation 3. He fears that an increase of this
dimension in the Alliance will most likely result in the Congress
granting it at the expense of other areas.
BOB—Charlie
Schultze prefers not to mention a specific amount for
integration adjustment assistance in Recommendation 1. On paragraph 2,
he favors seeking authorization only in this session, leaving the issue
of whether to seek a supplemental appropriation this year or next
January to be decided later.
My Views and Recommendation
Latin America stands at a crossroads. Over the next few years population
increase, growing urban unemployment and agricultural backwardness could, at present rates of
modest growth, lead to new social crises and political extremism. If the
Latin American Presidents are willing to establish a Common Market and
make a major effort to boost agriculture and improve education, the
region during the 1970’s could attain a level of “take-off” for
self-sustained growth which would promote social and political stability
and dependence on US public financing.
The issue boils down to whether you wish to exploit this historic moment
to get the Latin Americans to move boldly on integration, and thereby
put your stamp on it, or whether you prefer to let nature take its
course. The pressure of events can be expected to move the Latins
gradually toward integration over the next 15–20 years. And we can take
our chances on the present rate of growth under the Alliance keeping the
hemisphere a step ahead of social and political troubles.
I favor the Gordon–Linowitz package because: —I believe you should take advantage of the historic
moment.—If we make our part of the deal any less, I doubt whether the
Latins will be willing to make the commitments we want.—The package is so structured that financial commitments on
integration and the untying of aid will not come into play for
another 18–24 months after the Latins have negotiated their
Common Market Treaty.—The FY 1968 budget already
provides for the $100 million for agriculture and education for
the coming fiscal year. By the time FY 1969 rolls around, the Vietnam situation
hopefully will not represent the current drain and permit a
further modest increase in the Alliance for Progress
assistance.According to the
President’s Daily Diary the meeting on OAS summit preparations was
evidently rescheduled for February 11 (Johnson Library);
see Document 45.
Walt
45. Memorandum of MeetingSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, OAS Summit Meeting 4/67, Chron. 4/1/66–3/13/67. Secret.
Drafted by Bowdler. A copy
was sent to Rostow. The memorandum indicates
the meeting began “at approximately 1:00 p.m.” and was held in the
President’s office.Washington, February 11, 1967.
PARTICIPANTS
The PresidentSecretary RuskAssistant Secretary of State Lincoln
GordonU.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States Sol LinowitzMr. Walt RostowMr. William Bowdler
Secretary Rusk opened the meeting
by explaining the nature of the two conferences he would be attending in
Buenos Aires,Reference is to the Third
Special Inter-American Conference and the Eleventh Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
Republics, held in Buenos Aires, February 15–27 and February 16–26,
respectively. Documentation on both is in the National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–72: Lot 67 D
586, CF 122 through CF 133; and the Johnson Library, National
Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Third Special
IAC and Eleventh MFM Bilateral
Papers, 2/67. Also see Document 46.
i.e., approval and signature of OAS
Charter amendments and preparation for the OAS
On the Summit meeting he described what we expected the Latin Americans
to do in negotiating a Common Market. We would help them by contributing
$300 million over a period of years for integration adjustment
assistance after they negotiated a treaty. The Secretary mentioned that
the Europeans might be persuaded to contribute the remaining $125
million which we made available to the European Monetary Agreement
members.
Mr. Gordon pointed out that the
$123.5 million left was being considered for possible use in supporting
a world-wide agricultural diversification fund. We need a decision on
which project it should be used for, assuming we can get the Europeans
to relinquish their claim. The President asked Secretary Rusk and Mr. Rostow where the $125 million should be put. They both
recommended the Latin American Common Market. The President told them to
proceed on this basis.
Secretary Rusk next brought up the
replenishment of the IDB/FSO
(Inter-American Development Bank Fund for Special Operations). The
President asked whether any or all of the $300 million contemplated was in the FY 1968 budget. A quick check with Budget
Bureau Director Schultze revealed that none had been included. Following
further discussion of the amounts required by our Summit package and the
inter-agency disagreement on its elements, the President said that he
wanted Congressional approval before he made a commitment of the
magnitude contemplated. He directed that a joint resolution be prepared,
separate from the AID bill, which would
place the Congress behind the Summit offer. Secretary Rusk could test the willingness of the
Latin Americans at Buenos Aires to assume the commitments we want. If he
finds a basis for the Summit, then we can use the time between the
Buenos Aires meeting and the Summit to put the joint resolution
through.
WGB
46. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 3 IA. Secret; Nodis.Buenos Aires, February 19, 1967,
0312Z.
3192/Secto 26. Eyes Only for the President and Acting Secretary from
Secretary.
We have now reached the point where the opinions of all countries are in
and it is possible to report general agreement that there should be a
summit conference and, indeed, that a failure to hold one would have a
very negative effect throughout the hemisphere. I have seen all the
FonMins personally and have
encountered only the friendliest reactions to you and to the US. There
is general understanding of the burdens we are carrying these days and
real appreciation for the personal attention which you have given to
Latin American affairs and to the Alliance for Progress despite your
many other problems.
As far as the ministers are concerned the fact that I am remaining over
the weekend has been accepted as a compliment contrasted with the notion
that my departure before the end of the conference is somehow a “walk
out.”Rusk headed the U.S.
delegation in Buenos Aires until February 21, when he was replaced
by Ambassador at Large Ellsworth
Bunker.
I have tried to be very realistic with my Latin colleagues about what
they should expect from the US. On the subject of integration I have
insisted that this is their decision. I have emphasized that if they
were to move toward integration because of the possibility of modest
amounts of help from the US they would move for the wrong reasons and
integration efforts could not succeed. They understand fully that we
must consult with the Congress before making commitments and that, in
such consultations, we must have specific information on what our
friends in Latin America really intend to do. We cannot have them come
up with some meaningless phrases involving the word “integration” and
expect that we will come forward with substantial additional assistance.
It would take the Congress only ten minutes to prick any such bubble and
ask for specifics. Somewhat to my surprise, I am beginning to feel
(after a full day’s discussion today) that they really are quite serious
about integration. They seem to recognize that rapid modernization will
pass them by unless they enlarge their markets among themselves and open
up the possibilities provided by the internal American market for US and
the enlarged European Common Market.
Again in the direction of realism I have stated quite simply that they
must compete with the rest of the world for private investment, that
private investment cannot be commanded by US or anyone else but must be
attracted by them, and that if they fail to attract it they cannot
expect the same investments to come through the public sector at the
taxpayer’s expense.
I have also tried, in personal conversations with ministers, to remind
them that a meeting of Presidents is an informal meeting at the highest
political level and is not an occasion to resolve every trivial issue
which twenty governments might have in mind. Some of the nervousness
about the need for “adequate preparation” arises from an unrealistic
view of what Presidents will do when they get together. You will not
wade through stacks of black boots but will share your political and
other problems with each other and give direction to the grand strategy
of the hemisphere. My impression is that the FonMins will greatly simplify the recommendations they make
to their Presidents. From our own point of view, it seems to me that the
principal benefit to come from a summit meeting is the enlistment of
public interest in the hemisphere, in the successes and prospects of the
Alliance for Progress and in your own personal commitment to what
happens to ordinary men and women. Our own people have been hearing
almost nothing else but Viet-Nam, President de Gaulle and China, and
hemispheric affairs have dropped somewhat into the background. We will
need this public attention as a defense against Congressional assaults
on the Alliance for Progress.
Outstanding among the FonMins have
been Mexican, Chilean, Argentine, Brazilian and Colombian colleagues. It
is a great relief to find Chile in a cooperative mood and I have no
doubt this reflects the growing personal relations between you and
President Frei. Tony Carrillo has been a stalwart friend.
I have emphasized in talks that we are not pressing for a summit meeting
if there is any reluctance on their part. Their response has been one of
alarm that we might lose interest. I think they realize that they are
competing for the attention of the American people with many other
problems and that it is in their interest to find a way to dramatize
hemispheric cooperation.
I have tried to keep our Congressional delegation involved as much as
possible although private meetings of ministers have limited their
participation. They came, understandably enough, with considerable
skepticism about whether the Latin Americans really mean business on
integration. It is a skepticism which I myself shared. But if our Latin
friends demonstrate that they mean business and are prepared to take
some additional tangible steps, I think our Congressional friends will
be both surprised and impressed.
We have had press backgrounders every day since my arrival and I will try
to have a wrap up with them before I depart for Washington.For texts of the resolution of the Eleventh Meeting
of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
Republics and the final act of the Third Special Inter-American
Conference, see Department of State Bulletin,
March 20, 1967, pp. 473–476. The amendment of the OAS Charter—the so-called Protocol of
Buenos Aires—was adopted on February 27, becoming effective 3 years
later upon ratification of two-thirds of the member states.
Rusk
47. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson in
TexasSource: Johnson
Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel
File, Inter-American Summit Meeting, Vol. II. Confidential. The
memorandum is an uninitialed copy; a handwritten note indicates that
it was “sent via wire to Ranch.” According to the President’s Daily
Diary, Johnson was at his Ranch in Texas, March
2–6. (Ibid.)Washington, March 6, 1967.
SUBJECT
Meeting the Latin American Experts on the Summit
I met yesterday at my home for lunch with Milton Eisenhower, Adolf
Berle, Tom Mann, Jack
Vaughn, Linc
Gordon and Sol
Linowitz to discuss the Latin American Summit.
We had a useful three-and-a-half hour session reviewing the Summit
package and joint resolution, discussing the focus of your speech at the
Summit and examining some new ideas which you might advance.
These are the highlights: —All thought that the Summit package was well structured to
get at the root of Latin America’s basic development
problems.—All agreed that time was running short in Latin America and
the moment for decisive action was now. The Summit offered a
historic opportunity for the Latin Americans to make the
necessary political commitments and for you to redefine US
policy.—All agreed that we should encourage the Latin Americans to
move rapidly down the path of economic integration as the
single, most important step they can take to speed up the
development process and transform economic and social
situations. Our help should be closely geared to their
performance.—Milton Eisenhower
stressed that the Summit gave you the chance to dramatize at the
highest level that our relation with the Latin Americans is that
of junior partner and that while money is important and we will
help, it can only be a supplement to their own commitment and
action.—Adolf Berle focused on
the trade issue, pointing out that if meaningful help for the
LDC’s does not come from the
Kennedy Round
negotiations, we may have to think in terms of extending
regional preferences for Latin America.—Jack Vaughn observed
the need to come to grips with the birth rate and the urban slum
problem, but all recognized the difficulties in doing anything
meaningful at the Summit in these two areas.
On themes for your Summit speech: —Milton Eisenhower
suggested that in emphasizing economic integration you point to
the dramatic shift in policy which this represents for us.
Historically, we have discouraged it. Only in the last ten years
has our thinking shifted. You would be the first President to
give it a major thrust forward.—Adolf Berle said you
should point to the progress made in recent years in
strengthening democracy and getting governments to work for the
people as never before.—Both Eisenhower and Berle urged that you stress
that the US is not in the business of building empires but wants
to help others in this hemisphere, and elsewhere, to build up
themselves. Berle had an excellent quote from Seneca about there
being no possibility of lasting friendship except between
equals.
In the realm of new ideas, the group thought we should examine these
areas: —speeding up a satellite communications system for Latin
America;—help in promoting educational TV;—development of research libraries on microfilm;—cooperation in development of “food from sea”
resources;—development of protein concentrates for child-feeding
programs; and—computerized access to information, perhaps drawing on NIH’s
development of an electronic library in medicine.
48. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
NSC Histories, OAS Summit Meeting, Chron.
4/1/66–3/13/67. Confidential.Washington, March 7, 1967.
MEMORANDUM FOR
Secretary RuskUnder Secretary of the Treasury BarrAID Administrator GaudBudget Director Schultze
SUBJECT
Meeting with the President on OAS
Summit Preparations on March 1, 1967According to the President’s Daily Diary,
Johnson held a meeting on March 1,
5:42–6:50 p.m., “to discuss plans for Latin American Summit
meeting.” The attendees included Rusk, Sayre, Linowitz, Gaud, Rostow, Bowdler, Under Secretary of the
Treasury Joseph W. Barr, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for International Affairs Winthrop Knowlton. (Ibid.) No
other record of the meeting was found.
So that the participants in the meeting will have the same understanding
of the decisions made by the President, I recapitulate them as
follows:
1. Standby resources for integration adjustment
assistance
The President approved obtaining Congressional support for the United
States providing standby resources through the IDB to be matched by the Latin Americans for integration
adjustment assistance to facilitate the transition to a fully
functioning Latin American Common Market once appropriate steps have
been taken by the Latin Americans toward progressive establishment of
such a Market. The President agreed that in discussions with Congress an
order of magnitude figure of ¼ and ½ billion dollars, to be furnished
over a period of years (probably not beginning until 1970), could be
used.
Under Secretary Barr observed that
Congressman Reuss is not in favor of economic integration and can be
expected to oppose adjustment assistance. The President asked Secretary
Barr and Ambassador Linowitz to speak with Congressman
Reuss in the light of the Buenos Aires meeting decisions.
2. Replenishment of the IDB/FSO
The President directed that authorization for 3 years and appropriation
of $300 million for the first year be sought during the current session
of Congress.
3. Additional Alliance for Progress assistance for
education and agriculture
The President agreed to increase Alliance for Progress assistance for
education and agriculture by $100 million in FY 1968 (it is already in the budget) and an average of
$200 million for the following four years, dependent on demonstrated
need and self-help.
He expressed a preference for obtaining a specific Congressional
commitment for the full amount, but agreed to be guided by what
Congressional leaders think should be done about the Summit package
price tag in the Joint Resolution. (See paragraph no 5.)
In response to Budget Director Schultze’s observation that a substantial
portion of the increase for education and agriculture would necessarily be for projects
with a high local cost component, the President said that he understood
this and wanted the funds to be made available for sound projects in the
two sectors with this understanding.
4. Modification of tying arrangements for capital
project loans to permit hemisphere-wide procurement
The President agreed to modify tying arrangements in our loan policy
toward Latin America with respect to project, but not program or local
cost, lending to permit hemisphere-wide procurement after the Latin
Americans begin major steps toward a Common Market and with subsequent
tying to the US through the Special Letter of Credit procedure.
Under Secretary Barr asked that
Treasury’s opposition to the modification be recorded.
5. Joint Resolution on the Summit
The President reviewed and approved the Joint Resolution (copy
attached)Attached but not
printed. and directed that consultation on the Resolution
begin right away. The process should be started with the Congressional
delegation that went to the Buenos Aires meeting: Senators Smathers and
Hickenlooper, and Congressmen
Selden and Mailliard. Senator Mansfield should be contacted next. Further action will
depend on the advice obtained from these contacts. The President is
prepared to meet with the Congressional leadership if this is desirable
and necessary.
The President also directed that State brief the Council for Latin
America on the resolution and get them to sell it to key Congressional
members such as Dirksen,
Hickenlooper and Ford. In response to Ambassador
Linowitz’s inquiry as to
whether he would be willing to receive the Council for Latin America
group when they meet in Washington next week, the President replied that
he would if he were in town.
With respect to the text of the draft joint resolution, the President
accepted Secretary Rusk’s
recommendation that the paragraph on Europe be deleted.
The President expressed a preference for including a global cost figure
for the Summit package in the final operative paragraph. He thought the
Congress would also want to specify what it was agreeing to and would
not be satisfied with amounts expressed only in hearings. But he agreed
that Congressional leaders should be sounded out on this point. He is
prepared to go the way they recommend.
WR
49. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the
Representative to the Council of the Organization of American States
(Linowitz)Source: Johnson Library,
Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation
between President Johnson and Sol Linowitz, Tape F67.11, Side A,
PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in
the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.Washington, April 4, 1967, 8:35 a.m.
President: Sol, how are you?
Linowitz: I’m fine, Mr.
President.
President: I was talking to Morse
this morning. I think the best way now that we’ve got this thing in
shape where we ask the Congress to consult with us and to give us their
views on what we should do in regard to this program that we brought
back from the Foreign Ministers meeting. The House has expressed
themselves and the Senate has said that they do not want to do anything
that would go beyond saying that they would consider considering it.
That’s about the best way I can read that resolution. It just says we’ll
give consideration to consideration.In a
special message to Congress on March 13, President
Johnson presented a proposal to increase
support to the Alliance for Progress and asked Congress to show its
support by approving a joint resolution before the Punta del Este
conference. (Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 318–324. Although
the House approved a modified version, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected the resolution on
April 3, opting instead for its own resolution by a vote of 9–0. A
spokesman for the administration subsequently called the Senate
resolution “worse than useless.” The President went to Punta del
Este without a formal expression of Congressional support. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1967, pp.
331–333)
Linowitz: Yes, sir. There were
only nine men in that Senate who said that.
President: Yeah, but they’re the ones that are leading it, and they have
more—We couldn’t get anything but a zero on our end of it. They wouldn’t
either stand up or—So I told Morse that I thought that he ought to talk to Mansfield
who is out in Montana and hold it up until he comes back.
Linowitz: Yes. He’s not due back
till the end of the week though.
President: And I had much rather see it just—I don’t see anything to be
gained by bringing it out and having a mean debate. I don’t think
that—
Linowitz: I agree.
President: I don’t think that you can get anywhere that way. And I think
then we—It will destroy our ability to make any real commitment, but we
can see how far they want to go.
Linowitz: Yes, sir. The only
question, sir: there was talk of the possibility of getting the
committee to reconsider. Do you think that—
President: I don’t believe they’ll do that. Fulbright’s an adamant man
and I do not believe we can beat the chairman of the committee any more
than you can beat the President on who he’s going to appoint as his
appointments secretary. He’s just got that authority, and he’s got that
position, he’s got that power. And this is a gesture to the Congress
that a President would ask them to express themselves. Most Presidents
don’t ask them—they’ve done it two or three times—but it’s generally
they go on and make a commitment and treaty and send it up and negotiate
without any resolutions or anything. Now if they don’t want to be
consulted, I think our public position can be: we sought to consult
them, we were ready to put on our hearings. We’ll know next time if we
submit something, we ought to submit it by putting the amount in it and
asking just for an authorization. And I thought that if we’d bring Tom
Mann and Jack Vaughn and Adolph
Berle and Milton Eisenhower and
David Rockefeller and all
these folks in for the hearings that we’ve been having up there—just
arguing back and forth, and they could give the positive aspects of it—I
would have thought that it would have been better, but our people didn’t
think so. So—
Linowitz: Did you know that I put
that actually to both Morse and
Hickenlooper and both of them
said that it would be a mistake.
President: Yes. Well—
Linowitz: So—I think they were
wrong. I agree with you, sir, that it would have been helpful to build
us a stronger record.
President: Yeah, then they could have—Fulbright couldn’t have said that
we hadn’t had a hearing and we didn’t, we hadn’t presented our case.
Well anyway, I don’t want us to get crossways, so I have told Mike Manatos to try to talk to
Mansfield, so you ought, you
and MacomberWilliam B. Macomber, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.
ought, to get with Mike. I think
the best thing to do is leave it in the committee and just say: “Well
the House acted on it; the Senate chose not to go further than to say
that they’d give us consideration.” Now we don’t need a resolution for
that.
Linowitz: That’s right.
President: If they pass it, it won’t have any more effect on the
conference or on me than it would to just stay in the committee and then
it would have to go to conference committee. 3
Linowitz: At the press conference
yesterday I read the latter part of your message in which you talked
about your having the executive authority to do this but you wanted to
go having first consulted with the Congress—and that’s exactly what you
did.
President: Yeah. Well, now we’ve done that.
Linowitz: The record is
clear.
President: We’ve done it. So I would try then to get a hold of our
friends or talk to Morse and
anyone else on the committee that would be friendly, I guess Hickenlooper—
Linowitz: Yes, sir.
President: And just say: “Now it appears to us we don’t have the votes
without a big fight. The President wanted to consult with the Congress.
He has. They’ve had a chance to express themselves, the committee’s
expressed itself, and it says in effect it doesn’t want to do anything.”
So we’ll just leave it there. We’ll go on to the conference, if they
don’t bomb us out down there. I’ve been very concerned about that. I
don’t like these intelligence reports I read about them.A recent intelligence assessment judged that “the
risk to President Johnson during the course of
this trip will be slight—though greater than was the case with his
visit to Mexico a year ago.” (SNIE
98–67, “Security Conditions in Uruguay,” March 23; Central
Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry)
Linowitz: Well, you know, sir,
that we’ve been in close touch and— On the assumption that you’ll be
arriving at 11 in the morning: there isn’t any problem that anybody can
foresee before you get out of Montevideo and to Punta del Este. I agree
with you that this action they’ve taken—you notice they did that to the
Brazilians too. It’s just troublemakers who are hoping, I think, exactly
what is happening will happen: that is people will begin to get a little
worried about it. I think these, the people there don’t, the Communists
there don’t want to have this conference. They think it’s not going to
do them any good, and I think they’ve—We probably will get more of this,
a few here and there. But from what I can gather—and I’ve been in touch
with Hoyt down in Montevideo and I’ve talked to the Uruguayans here on a
regular basis—if we work it as we are now planning, arriving around
11—because I guess Frei is coming in at noon and you’re coming in at 11—
we’ll be out of there and into Punta del Este before the lunch hour and
before any of these people are even around. So I think that’s going to
work out all right. We’re at least keeping an eye on it, sir.
President: Good. I would do that. I told them to take whatever people
they needed. They want to borrow some military people to [wear] civilian
clothes over there. And I sure think we ought to watch that very, very
carefully.
Linowitz: Yes, sir, I agree.
President: I think that they can cause a Nixon incidentReference is
to Richard M. Nixon’s trip to
South America, April–May 1958, when demonstrators in Lima and
Caracas showered the Vice President with spit and stones. For
documentation on the trip, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol.
V, pp. 222–248. very easy. And I heard a lot of
ambassadors—I don’t know, at least their personal opinion, but I heard a
lot of them at the Ranch this weekOn April 1
Johnson hosted a barbecue at his Texas
Ranch for Latin American Ambassadors to the United States and the
OAS, and other guests. (Johnson
Library, President’s Daily Diary) say awful nice things about
what you’re doing, and you evidently have a very good rapport with them
and understanding with them.
Linowitz: Well, I do. I wish I
had done better for you up at the Senate.
President: Well, we just can’t do that. That’s not you; that’s not you
and I don’t think it’s me. I think Fulbright is very unhappy because he
wasn’t Secretary of State, and he was this way with President Kennedy, and I had to nurse him all
during the Bay of Pigs. I had him down and worked with him because he
couldn’t, and then he took the position that we ought to bomb Cuba out,
just the opposite of what he’s doing now.
Linowitz: Well, I can’t help the
feeling that I let you down there, sir.
President: No, no. Not at all. No, we just haven’t got that situation.
And I think that this will have rather serious repercussions on our
whole aid program. My judgment is they just don’t have the votes there
for aid this year. That’s what I’m afraid of. I think yours is the most
popular of all, and if you can’t get them to commit on yours, why I
don’t know what’s going to happen with the others.
Linowitz: I think that’s true.
There’s one other thing, sir. I do, upon reflection, I do believe that
Fulbright has chosen the worst possible place at which to take his
stand.
President: Yes, I do too.
Linowitz: I just think that this
was—if we could have picked a battleground, an issue on which we could
say “this is how we ought to proceed, this is what we’ve done, this is a
case we can make”—I don’t think we could have picked it better than this
one, and that’s the one he chose to make an issue on.
President: That’s right. Now how do we get that line drawn over the
country?
Linowitz: Well, I’m meeting with
Max Frankel of The New York Times in about 20
minutes. What I’m trying to do is, I’ve been doing constantly is, at least getting to these
people. I know that Walt talked to The New York
Times yesterday. I was on the phone yesterday with Punch
Sulzberger,Arthur O. Sulzberger,
publisher and president of The New York
Times. and the editorial today is pretty good—not as
good as it ought to be, but it’s pretty good. And I’m just trying to get
this around to the news people so that they see this in the context. I
had a good chance to talk to Scotty RestonJames B. Reston, associate editor of The New York
Times. before he took off. I hoped he was going to
do a piece on consultation, but this is exactly what these people up on
the Hill have been talking about
and that no President has ever done more to give advance consultation
for a meeting than what you did in this case, and for that you get
blamed. I’ve been trying to do this with the people across. [sic] I was going to go on “Meet the Press” this
Sunday, but I can’t, of course, because they’re going to have this
strike again, but I’m trying it anyway, sir.
President: Well, I think that’s very good and I think that’s quite
important. I think you ought to point out to Frankel that this barbecue
thing was not a great elaborate deal that he pictured yesterday. He said
five hundred people, four or five hundred people: we had a hundred and
four, I think.
Linowitz: Hell, he was down
there. I saw him at the press briefing yesterday and I said: “where did
you get your nose count?”
President: [Laughter] And he had it very elaborate, and very outlandish,
almost like a bribe, and then winding up, I thought, that way,
slap-happy stuff. I thought it was a little ugly, his article. But
anyway, I think that we ought to say that we have tried to consult with
them, the House has given us their opinion, and Fulbright and his group
have said in effect that they don’t want us to make any overtures to
Latin America in this regard at this time until the Latin Americans act
and then they want to take a look at it in the light of their action.
Now that’s the effect of what they’ve said. So we will go, and we will
listen, and that was what I told Walt to say in his backgrounder. He
did, but didn’t quite get it over. I read it. The impression we’ve got
to leave is to play this thing down as much as we can. We did that with
Guam and we did it with Manila.Reference is
to two conferences on Vietnam in Manila (October 1966), and Guam
(March 1967). But they play it up, and they boost it, and
they say “Great Big Elaborate Conference.” Then when nothing really
shocking comes out of it, then they say it’s a failure. Now that’s what
they’ll do again, so you better start Frankel off and say: “Now I want
you to keep these notes, so when the conference is over, you won’t say
we misled you. We’re going there as we did in the Manila Conference, not to run it, not to ram
something down their throat. The future of Latin America depends largely
upon the Latins themselves; and we’re going to be an interested brother,
sitting there, hearing their reports, and getting their recommendations;
and we’re not going to try to force anything down them. We’re not going
to try to press anything upon them. We would have liked to have been
able to have said that ‘if you will do these various things that you
talk about doing, then we will support you to this extent.’ But the
Congress doesn’t want to do that, and we’re not going to be angry about
it, not going to fight about it, not going to get into any personal
brawls about it, not going to mention anybody’s name. We’re just going
to make it clear that we can’t say what we want to say, what we had
intended to say, but we will come back, and we will point out what they
say, and then submit our recommendations again.” But let’s play it down
just as much as we possibly can, and say to him that we’re just going to
be a good listener.
Linowitz: May I just say, sir,
two things. First, if I might suggest, I think it’s awful important not
to convey the suggestion that you didn’t have, and that you don’t have,
full authority to speak as President on what you would like to do when
you get there, and that this isn’t interfering at all with that. What
you had hoped to do was to go down there and say “not only I but the
Congress gives you this assurance.” That all you can do now is say “this
is what I would like to have accomplished, but, of course, I’ll have to
go back and see if Congress will go along with me.” Is that appropriate
to say that that’s the difference in the two?
President: Yes. Yes. Yes.
Linowitz: Because it seems to me,
that one of the things that the aginners may now try to do is say this
has cut off, or tried to cut off, your own executive authority, which is
nonsense. And that’s the other side that troubles me a little bit, that
the “worse than useless” phrase has created the impression that it’s
really put a damper onto your authority to go there and do whatever you
think is right. And I just think that would be inconsistent too.
President: OK. All right.
Linowitz: OK, sir.
50. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 IA–SUMMIT. Confidential. Drafted
by Seidenman and approved in
the White House on April 28. The memorandum of conversation is part
3 of 3; for parts 1 and 2, see Documents
540 and 541. According to
George Christian, the
meeting was held at Leoni’s
residence in Punta del Este. (Press statement, April 11; Johnson
Library, President’s Daily Diary) President
Johnson attended the Punta del Este
Conference April 11–April 14.US/MC–14Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 11, 1967, 6 p.m.
SUBJECT
Cuban Subversion in Venezuela
PARTICIPANTS
United StatesPresident JohnsonMr. Walt RostowAssistant Secretary GordonAssistant Secretary SolomonMr. Neil A.
Seidenman, InterpreterVenezuelaPresident LeoniSr. Ignacio Iribarren Borges, Foreign Minister of
Venezuela
The President assured President Leoni that we are equally concerned with Venezuela about
the matter of communist aggression. We have been gratified by
Venezuela’s actions against Cuba. We support Venezuela’s position
against Cuba in the OAS. We believe that
measures against Cuba by the OAS need
even more tightening up. We would also hope that Venezuela will have
suggestions for further moves in this direction. We will welcome all the
noise that Venezuela can make about Cuba in the OAS.
President Leoni mentioned the
assassination of the brother of Minister Iribarren Borges.Dr. Julio Iribarren Borges, former Director of
Social Security, was assassinated on March 3. He said that
Venezuela has evidence that points to Cuban responsibility for this act,
including material that has come to them in print from Havana. Venezuela
intends to make a case against Cuba on this score in the OAS. Before initiating this action,
Venezuela is carefully examining all of the details involved, inasmuch
as it wishes to gather sufficient and convincing evidence and consult
with President Johnson and the State Department as
well as with the governments of other member countries. Venezuela wants
to proceed in this way, so that whatever decision is taken—and Venezuela
itself will not be asking for
any specific decision—it will be on a unanimous basis, if this is
possible.
The President reiterated his desire to cooperate with the Venezuelans in
the work of facing the trials they are going through. He reiterated our
support for Venezuela’s cause in the OAS
against Cuba, which he said he hoped they would pursue with
aggressiveness; we want to be of help in the matter of military
equipment if we can—because we don’t want Venezuela to have to wait one
minute to chase the communists.For further
discussion of this matter, see Document
541.
51. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 US. Confidential. Drafted by
Reigersberg and Fisher on April 18 and approved in the White House
on April 26. The memorandum is part 4 of 4. The full text of all
four parts is in telegram 182377 to Quito, April 26. (Ibid.)Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 13, 1967, 1 p.m.
SUBJECT
U.S. Policy Regarding the Alliance for Progress
PARTICIPANTS
United States President Lyndon B.
JohnsonAssistant Secretary GordonAssistant Secretary SolomonDeputy U.S. Coordinator David BronheimMr. Fernando A. Van Reigersberg, InterpreterEcuador President Otto
ArosemenaMinister of Industries and Commerce Galo Pico
MantillaMinister of Finance Jose Federico Intriago Arrata
Responding to a question by Arosemena as to why the suggestions he had
proposed in his speech before the Presidents at the Plenary Session that afternoonArosemena suggested that the Alliance for Progress
must adjust to meet the economic realities of 1967; the terms
required for assistance were unacceptable—the borrowing country was
forced to contribute funds “above its capacity.” Arosemena also
questioned why the United States “should be so concerned with
democracy in a noble but distant country such as Viet Nam,” when
democracy was so obviously in need of support in Latin America. An
English translation of Arosemena’s address is ibid., ARA/EP/E Files: Lot 70 D 247, POL 3 Summit Conference. had not
been approved and accepted, President Johnson
stated that he had not wanted to get into the debate himself, since he
felt that the Summit Conference document had been sufficiently
well-prepared in advance and therefore satisfactory to all. He felt that
the Latin Americans themselves should express their own views and that
the American President should listen to their comments without actively
participating in the debate. He assured President Arosemena that he
would do everything possible to help the Latin American countries, but
that his own position and internal problems should be understood by
everybody. One difficulty is to try to convince people in the lower
income brackets in the U.S. that they must contribute to foreign aid.
Once this is achieved, it becomes very difficult to convince them that
they should continue supporting assistance to Latin America when one of
its presidents says that loans from the United States are tendered under
unacceptable conditions. American taxpayers communicate frequently with
their Congressional representatives, and if dissatisfied, make their
views known in no uncertain terms. At the present time, the Foreign Aid
Bill is the most unpopular piece of legislation facing the Congress.
The President said he had hope that the Latin American presidents would
give him arguments which he could use to convince members of Congress of
the importance of aid to Latin America. In his own speech, he had
promised assistance in such fields as educational television, marine
research, research on production of fish concentrates for food, and
promotion of science and technology. The United States had increased its
contribution to the Alliance for Progress by 35% in the last three
years, but a recent request for additional funds had been turned down in
Congressional Committee. He repeated that he needed arguments to try to
change the views held by some United States Senators who appeared to be
as difficult to convince as was the President of Ecuador, but that
tonight he had fewer arguments to get the Foreign Aid Bill passed than
he had twenty-four hours ago. U.S. press headlines tonight would
probably make things more difficult and would probably compel the
President of the United States to go back to his country able only to
tell his people that in spite of everything it is still a moral
obligation to support foreign aid.
The President discussed the historical background of the Summit
Conference, indicating that while initially he had been reluctant to
attend, he felt that his presence here would give new thrust to the
Alliance for Progress. What really disappointed him was that, after
being told in Washington that he was trying to do too much for the Latin
Americans, in Punta del Este some had said that he was doing too
little.
President Arosemena stated that he was very pleased to have met President
Johnson personally, and that he felt that he
was a different man from the kind of person Latin America thinks he is.
He had felt that the President was a very human, practical, and
compassionate man who faced many problems and many difficulties. It was
not Ecuador’s intention to cause any difficulties for anyone. He
suggested that Latin Americans must get to know President
Johnson as he had and that many American
Senators, including Senator Fulbright, should come to Latin America so
that they could share the burden which was now carried solely by
President Johnson. He further stated that people in
the United States erroneously feel that Latin Americans do not pay
enough taxes, while the Ecuadorean Government collects as many taxes as
possible; if it collected any more, it might destroy the country.
After referring to the cost of the war in Viet Nam, to the increase in
Alliance for Progress funds, and to his attempt to get more public and
private funds channelled toward Latin America, the President emphasized
that both he and the Ecuadorean President really worked for the same
objectives, namely, to help the poor and hungry people.
President Arosemena said that he wanted to help, but that he had to face
problems in his own country. He stated that he wanted President
Johnson to go back to the United States with
the support and backing of 300 million Latin Americans, and that this
could be achieved easily by just adding two or three sentences to the
Presidential Declaration. He stated that no U.S. monetary commitments
would be necessary, and that the inclusion of these two or three phrases
would give President Johnson the unanimous support
of Latin America. He added that the Latin American presidents were
really on his side, although they did not have the courage to come out
and say so. He felt that, if he would sign the present Declaration, he
would not be able to go back to Ecuador because his people consider the
document a step backward from the Punta del Este Charter. While
President Johnson had proved to him that the
Alliance for Progress had been more vigorous in the last three years and
had provided more funds than in any previous period, unfortunately,
Latin America was not aware of this; the people did not know this, and
they should be told.
President Arosemena asked President Johnson to help
gain approval for adding a couple of sentences to the document so that
he too could defend the Declaration as a worthwhile document. He
suggested that the President
could justify these additions before United States Senators by pointing
out the advantages of preventing a popular upheaval rather than have to
put one down after it got started, and also by the fact that United
States loans are not really gifts, but rather down payments on an
insurance policy aimed at protecting the hemisphere against communism
and avoiding having the United States face a “gigantic Cuba” south of
its borders.
The President once more referred to the highlights of his speech and to
his personal pledge to assist the Latin American countries. He noted
that the schools, classrooms, roads, highways and bridges that have been
built are physical evidence that much is being done.
Assistant Secretary Gordon stated
that every President and Foreign Minister attending the meeting agreed
that the program for the future was a step forward and not a step
backward from the Alliance.
The President said he could not understand how the programs which he had
outlined in his speech could be interpreted as stagnation. He suggested
that the President of Ecuador should consider a hypothetical situation
in which Ecuador would have to assist the poor people of the United
States, and in which after taxing humble Ecuadoreans heavily to obtain
the assistance to send to the United States, the Americans would express
their dissatisfaction and their President would say in a public meeting
that assistance from Ecuador was insufficient, was slow because of red
tape, and therefore was unacceptable.
President Arosemena stated that all he wanted was a slight change in the
document and asked the President whether two sentences from his speech
to the Summit Conference could be included in the final Declaration.
This would satisfy Ecuador’s requirements and provide for unanimity.
The President answered that he did not know whether the other Presidents
would agree to such a procedure, and since the pertinent sentences were
not then available, the matter should be discussed further between
President Arosemena and Assistant Secretaries Gordon and Solomon. Assistant Secretary Gordon said he would be unavailable due to a conflicting
meeting and it was agreed Assistant Secretary Solomon would meet President Arosemena
later.According to an attached
handwritten note, much of the last paragraph was inserted by
Solomon, reflecting his
“annoyance at having been saddled by LG[ordon] with the dirty work.”
(Fitzgibbons to Carroll Brown, April 24; ibid.) No record of
Solomon’s meeting with
Arosemena has been found.
52. Circular Telegram From the Department of
State to All American Republic
PostsSource:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files,
1967–69, POL 7 IA SUMMIT.
Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Eaton, cleared by Sayre, and approved by Gordon.Washington, April 17, 1967, 7:44
p.m.
176889. Subject: Summit Assessment. From Gordon.
Following is our summary assessment of Summit outcome. We will
send you full sets of Summit documentsThe documentary record of the Punta del Este Conference is
ibid., Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 67 D 586, CF 151 through
CF 162; Washington National Records Center, RG 59, ARA/IPA Files, FRC 71 A 6682, Item
31, Meeting of American Presidents— 1967; ibid., ARA/OAS Files, FRC 71 A 6682, Item 50, Meeting of
American Presidents— 1967; and Johnson Library, National
Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Punta del
Este, 4/12–14/67. as soon as possible.Ultimate results of Summit decisions will not be known for number
of years and will depend upon degree of implementation of actions
agreed at Summit. However, we consider Summit meeting and
Declaration signed there definite successes. Our reasons follow. When President Johnson agreed a year
ago to join with Latin American leaders to explore proposed
Summit meeting, we saw meeting as opportunity for: Agreement on a few significant, concrete actions
which, building on experience and achievements of
first years of Alliance for Progress, could result
in needed accelerated economic and social advances
in future.Re-emphasis on cooperative approach, under which
Latin American initiative and self-help would be
stressed at same time that U.S. would reassure Latin
America on its concern and assistance.Strengthening of personal relations among leaders
of Hemisphere.Substantive content of Declaration of Presidents of
America signed at Punta del Este,For text of the declaration, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1967, pp. 673–685, or Department of State Bulletin, May 8, 1967, pp.
712–721. Arosemena refused to sign the declaration, the
only attending Latin American head of state to so
refuse. which is result of long and painstaking
preparatory process in which every signatory government
(except Trinidad and Tobago) was deeply involved, goes
beyond what might reasonably have been expected a year ago.
It includes: A stronger, broader, and much more specific Latin
American commitment to a Common Market than seemed
likely when process began.Increased attention to multinational projects
which will facilitate integration.Increased emphasis and better focus on two lagging
but key sectors of the development
process—agriculture and education.A special emphasis on science and technology which
grew stronger as the preparatory process progressed,
and culminated in a commitment to an Inter-American
Science Program including several specific
points.A useful (although not as strong as we had hoped
for at one stage) statement on limitation of
military expenditures.From the U.S., most importantly, (a) agreement to
increased assistance in support of the greater Latin
American efforts; and (b) in a major new trade
policy departure, willingness to consult carefully
within the U.S. and with other industrialized
countries on generalized trade preferences, for
limited time periods, by all industrialized
countries in favor of all developing
countries.As stated above, all signatory governments (except
Trinidad and Tobago) were deeply involved in preparatory
process and final Declaration is truly inter-American
document.Personal relationships developed among Presidents during
Summit were in almost all cases very satisfactory and should
be helpful in future.While reactions of other delegations to Summit varied in degree,
all but Ecuador seemed agree that meeting had on balance been clear
success. President Frei was most categorical and emphatic in so
stating. President Diaz Ordaz made statement which probably most
nearly expressed consensus when he said that while all might have
wanted more from Summit, negotiators had achieved what was possible,
and what they had achieved was a substantial advance. Arosemena’s
negative position was not supported by any other Latin American
President.Press reaction to the Summit from within the U.S. has been
strikingly and almost uniformly favorable. From reports we have had
thus far, press reaction from Latin America has been uneven, perhaps
reflecting to considerable extent lack of understanding of full
meaning of decisions reached at Summit. In particular, many Latin
journalists apparently failed to appreciate significance President
Johnson’s statement on point 2(b)(6)
above.The job now before all the OAS
Members is to follow up on the Summit decisions with sustained
action. In some fields, notably economic integration, the lead must
be taken by Latin America. In others, such as trade and the regional
science and technology efforts, we shall be working jointly with
them or, as in the case of preferences, following up ourselves with
the other industrialized countries. In the expanded programs in
agriculture, education, and health, the next steps should come from
the national Latin American authorities concerned. The same is true
on elimination of unnecessary military expenditures. In the whole process of
implementation, we should maintain the attitude of urgency set forth
in the President’s April 13 speech,For
text of the speech, see Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp.
446–449. For other statements made during the conference, see
ibid., pp. 442–446 and 449–451. and make clear that we
view the Summit objectives as serious undertakings.You may draw on the foregoing assessment as you deem useful in
both official and private contacts.Rusk
53. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Vol. III, 12/66–12/68.
Secret.Washington, May 12, 1967.
Mr. President:
The Venezuelan security forces report that they have captured a guerrilla
infiltration force coming from Cuba. They claim 12 prisoners (4 of whom
are Cuban), the boat and outboard motor in which they landed, US $10,000
in 50 dollar bills, and quantities of ammunition and other supplies.
Interrogation of the prisoners reveals that another landing from Cuba
can be expected in the next few days.
CIA is trying to verify these reports.
If the information is fully borne out, there will be a strong—if not
stronger case—for OAS action against
Cuba than there was following the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in
Venezuela in 1963. The 1963 incident led to the Meeting of Foreign
Ministers in July 1964 which applied diplomatic and economic sanctions
against Castro.
The resolution of the Foreign Ministers also contained this warning:
“To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in
carrying out acts that possess characteristics of aggression and
intervention against one or more of the member states of the
Organization, the member states shall preserve their essential
rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either
individual or collective form, which could go so far as resort
to armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to
guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere.”For full text of the resolution, see American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents, 1964, pp. 328–334, or Department of
State Bulletin, August 10, 1964, pp.
181–182.
If the case is an airtight one, we may find the Venezuelans moving in the
OAS for action pursuant to this
warning.The President wrote the
following instruction at the bottom of the memorandum: “Why don’t we
provide leadership quietly now. L”
Walt
54. Memorandum From William G.
Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)Source:
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Bowdler
File, Vol. II, 2/66–7/67. Confidential.Washington, May 15, 1967.
Walt—
I met this morning with State and CIA to
review the latest information on the Cuban landing in Venezuela and to
see how we can provide some “quiet leadership”.
The facts in the case are as I described them in staff meeting this
morning, except that CIA thinks the
second rubber raft foundered and did not make it back to the mother
ship.
The Embassy reports that the Venezuelans are more aroused over this
incident than during the arms cache in 1963.In telegram 6016 from Caracas, May 14. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 CUBA) All major
Venezuelan parties have publicly condemned the Cubans and called for a
vigorous response. Only a small centrist party and the far left have
withheld comment. The incident must be acutely embarrassing to the
Venezuelan Communist Party which has been trying to resume the “via
pacifica” line.
As of this afternoon, the Venezuelan OAS
Delegation had taken no action to call for a meeting of the OAS Council to ask for collective action.
This probably means that the Venezuelans are still debating whether to
move in the OAS or the UN.
In considering the forum for OAS action
and the measures which might be taken, the group concluded: The only forum where meaningful obligatory action could be
taken is a Meeting of Foreign Ministers under the Rio Treaty.
This was the body which acted in 1963–64.The OAS Council, under the
special authority given to it by the 1962 MFM, could investigate the incident
and make recommendations to governments. But this is an untried
authority and it is doubtful whether the governments would want
to use it in this case.Use of armed force against Cuba—to blockade Cuban ports, to
intercept and search Cuban ships on the high seas, or to
overthrow Castro—is out of the
question.The measures which might be considered are: —to condemn the Castro regime for
its continued intervention.—to establish a blacklist (OAS would do this) of trading and shipping
entities and vessels which engage in significant new
transactions with Cuba and agree that: no governmental contracts be awarded to listed
entities;listed vessels be denied governmental or
government-financed cargos;OAS member
countries apply any other restrictions against the
listed entities and vessels which their laws
permit, andrequire commercial concerns in OAS member countries to
observe the blacklist in their operations.—to call to the attention of those governments
supporting AALAPSO
Cuba’s aggressive activities and ask them to withdraw
their support of the Organization.—to press Mexico to break all ties with
Castro.
State is putting the foregoing into a memo for Secretary RuskBowdler
forwarded the Department memorandum to Rostow on May 16, noting that “it parallels what I
put in my memo to you yesterday.” (Memorandum from Bowdler to
Rostow, May 16; Johnson
Library, National Security File, Venezuela, Vol. III,
12/66–12/68) to get his reaction and views on how to proceed.
The Secretary may bring this subject up at the Tuesday luncheon.May 16; no substantive record of the meeting
has been found.
WGB
55. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Vol. III, 12/66–12/68.
Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw
it.Washington, May 17, 1967.
SUBJECT
Venezuelan Case Against Cuba
The Venezuelan Foreign Minister yesterday announced President Leoni’s decision to call for a Meeting
of Foreign Ministers (MFM) to consider
the problem of Cuban support for guerrilla movements in the hemisphere.
The Venezuelans have as yet taken no formal action in the OAS. Their OAS Ambassador has been recalled to Caracas. We assume that
he will return with orders to ask the OAS Council to convoke an MFM.
Yesterday Ambassador Bernbaum
spoke with President Leoni and
Foreign Minister Iribarren. He found them both concerned over what
further meaningful action can be taken to punish Castro short of use of armed force
against Cuban territory. Bernbaum’s reports are attached.Transmitted in telegrams 6069 and 6070 from Caracas,
May 16 and 17; attached but not printed. Also in the National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
OAS 5–2 and POL 23–7 CUBA, respectively.
You will recall that the 1964 MFM
approved mandatory sanctions: break in diplomatic relations and
suspension of trade and sea transportation. All have complied except
Mexico.
State is taking a look at possible additional measures:
Through the MFM
A strong condemnation of the Castro regime.An OAS blacklist of trading and
shipping entities and vessels which engage in significant
transactions with Cuba.Authorization for OAS member
states, acting individually and collectively, to stop and search
Cuban flag ships (or ships without flag) in the Caribbean suspected
of acting as mother ships for Cuban-sponsored infiltration
teams.
Outside the MFM
Prevail upon Mexico to comply with the 1964 MFM decision and break all diplomatic
and economic ties with Cuba.The United States and Latin American countries having relations
with the Soviet Union to impress upon the Soviets the gravity of
continued promotion of subversion by Castro.
The blacklist and stop-and-search measures raise many serious problems
which need careful analysis before we sign on. State is engaged in this
analysis.
In the meantime—as you will see from Bernbaum’s cable—we continue to help
the Venezuelans as you promised President Leoni we would.
Walt
56. Memorandum From William G.
Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)Source:
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Venezuela,
Vol. III, 12/66–12/68. Secret.Washington, May 31, 1967.
SUBJECT
Venezuelan Case Against Cuba
Yesterday I learned that the Venezuelans were about to make a formal
request for an MFM to consider the Cuban
case.
In checking with ARA I found that they
still had not sorted out where they wanted to go because of differences
inside the Bureau and with E and EUR. I told Sol Linowitz and BobSayre that they had better alert Foy Kohler—whom the Secretary had tapped to
follow up on this one—and ask him to resolve the differences. Getting
the Secretary into an MFM without
knowing where we are headed is a helluva situation.
Kohler met this morning with
Solomon, Stoessel, Covey Oliver, Linowitz, Sayre
and Bernbaum.Kohler convened the meeting “as a follow-up to the
Secretary’s instruction” that “he [Kohler] work out a coordinated Department position.”
(Memorandum for file, May 31; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA Files,
1967–69: Lot 72 D 33, Venezuelan Complaint (Cuba)) I
participated.
These are the highlights of the meeting: Sol reported that the Venezuelans are determined to proceed
with a call for an MFM under
Art. 39 of the OAS
Charter—probably
today. They claim practically unanimous support for the
convocation, but do not have the faintest idea where they want
to come out beyond appointing a group to collect all the
evidence on Cuban intervention.Kohler noted that we are
now committed to an MFM and must
proceed on this basis.It was agreed that we could support these measures in the
MFM which would find
generally wide acceptance among the Latin Americans: Condemnation of Cuba for its aggressive
activity.Better enforcement of existing OAS sanctions approved in July 1964.A renewed appeal for cooperation by friendly
non-member countries in restricting trade and shipping
with Cuba, and a call on countries actively supporting
Cuba (the Soviets, etc.) to reassess their position in
the light of Cuban subversion.Action by all OAS
Members to deny bunkers and government cargoes to ships
in the Cuban trade. The US is already taking this
action.Improvement of surveillance and intercept especially
in the Caribbean, search, and seizure of suspicious
Cuban and unidentified vessels within a 12-mile zone,
permitted under international convention, and search and
seizure of such vessels outside the 12-mile zone if
there is specific information of subversive intent
warranting such action.A sixth measure was discussed at great length: an OAS blacklist of firms trading with
Cuba to which OAS member
governments would deny government contracts. Tony Solomon was
strongly opposed on general trade policy grounds and the
ineffectiveness of the measure. EUR endorsed this view. Covey Oliver favored the measure in the form of
an MFM recommendation (not
mandatory) as symbolic support for Venezuela. Kohler took it under advisement
and to discuss with Secretary Rusk.Kohler reached a
decision before meeting Rusk: “I have mulled this matter over since
that [May 31] meeting, trying to lean over backwards to
understand the frustrations of ARA and of the Latin American countries.
However, I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the
proposed economic sanction is not feasible.” (Memorandum of
record, June 1; ibid., ARA
Files, 1967: Lot 70 D 150, Cuba, 1967)Kohler made a strong
point of the need for the Latin Americans to take the initiative
in convincing the Europeans that they should restrict trade with
Cuba. It was agreed that one action the MFM might take is to select 3 or 4 prominent and
effective Latin American Foreign Ministers to go to Europe to
discuss the Latin American concern over mounting Cuban
intervention and the desire of the OAS for the European governments to curtail their
assistance to Castro,
particularly in credit guarantees and Iberia’s flights to Cuba.
If the Europeans responded to this initiative, fine. If not, the
OAS might consider a
recommendatory blacklist.As things now stand, this seems to be the sequence of
contemplated action: Venezuela will ask that the MFM be convoked initially at the ambassadorial level to appoint a
committee to make a study of Cuban intervention in
Venezuela, and other places (e.g., DR, Colombia,
Bolivia, Guatemala) if the governments so
request.The study when completed would be presented to the
MFM at the
ministerial level.The MFM would: —denounce Cuba for its continued
intervention.—call upon the Europeans to cooperate with the
measures approved by the MFM against Cuba in 1964.—appoint a committee of Foreign Ministers to
go to Europe to explain OAS concern and OAS desire for their cooperation in
restricting assistance to Castro as long as he
continues to promote subversion.Depending upon the response of the Europeans, the
MFM would reconvene.
If their response is affirmative, no additional OAS action would be taken.
If negative, the MFM
might: —apply the blacklist.—deny bunkering facilities to ships calling at
Cuba.
WGB
57. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Vol. III, 12/66–12/68.
Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President
saw it.Washington, June 1, 1967.
SUBJECT
Venezuelan Case Against Cuba
The Venezuelans today asked for an early Meeting of Foreign Ministers
(MFM) to consider their complaint
against Cuba.
The convocation is under the OAS Charter
rather than Rio Treaty. The essential difference is that a Charter
MFM is limited to recommendations, while a Rio Treaty MFM normally takes mandatory
measures.
Venezuela chose the OAS Charter track
because it can count on almost unanimous support for convocation. This
is not the case if they moved under the Rio Treaty.
The OAS Council meets on Monday, June 5,
to act on the Venezuelan request. The first step will be to convoke the
MFM at the ambassadorial level. A
Committee will then be appointed to go to Venezuela (and other countries
which have cases against Cuba) to examine all the evidence. The MFM at the ministerial level will meet
after the Committee completes its report.
Venezuela has no clear picture of what it wants the MFM to recommend. Part of its difficulty is
that there is little more that can be done against Castro of an effective nature short of
armed force, which is out of the question. Another problem is the
general unwillingness of the larger Latin American countries to apply
additional economic pressure against countries trading with Cuba.
State is still sorting out what meaningful collective action can be
taken. What is needed is a keener sense by the Latin Americans that
Cuban subversion is a common problem and that they should be taking the lead in: (1) publicizing Cuban
interventionist activities, (2) bringing pressure on the Western
Europeans to curtail their trade with Cuba; (3) forcing the Soviet bloc
to define its position and (4) strengthening their internal security
forces to liquidate the guerrillas at the incipient stage. What is
called for, in effect, is a collective security self-help effort by the
Latins.
We will be trying to move them in this direction, making clear that they
can count on our shield against overt Cuban military action and our
support in developing their security capabilities.
Walt
58. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 CUBA. Confidential. Drafted by
Bernbaum and approved in
S on June 5.Washington, June 2, 1967, 10 a.m.
SUBJECT
Cuban Intervention in Venezuelan Affairs—OAS
PARTICIPANTS
The SecretaryMr. Foy D. Kohler—GMr. Anthony M.
Solomon—EAmbassador Maurice M.
Bernbaum
Following a discussion of Venezuela’s petroleum problem, the Secretary
turned to the question of the U.S. position in the OAS on Venezuela’s complaint against
Cuba.
Mr. Kohler said that he had come
to the conclusion that the idea presented by ARA for the establishment of a list of firms doing business
with Cuba to be utilized by the member states of the OAS in denying government contracts to such
firms was not feasible. It was his impression based on Mr. Solomon’s views that the potential
costs to U.S. policy and U.S. interests were too great to justify the
limited benefits which might be derived.
The Secretary then asked whether this would apply to the blacklisting of
vessels touching at Cuban ports. Mr. Solomon said this was not a point at issue since such
action was already taken by the USG and
would merely represent a generalization of our policy. He explained that
our policy involved the denial to such vessels of bunkering facilities
in U.S. ports as well as government cargoes.
The Secretary then referred to OAS action
involving the search of suspicious vessels outside territorial waters.
He suggested in this connection the desirability of establishing a
Caribbean Security Committee made up of countries bordering the
Caribbean Sea. He thought that this would involve specifically the
countries directly threatened by Cuban intervention without involving
the South American countries more remote from the scene as well as
Mexico. It was agreed in the ensuing discussion that this would have the
great advantage of creating an organization which could facilitate and
implement search procedures.
Ambassador Bernbaum then outlined
a program which had been discussed the previous evening by Ambassador
Linowitz, Ward Allen and others interested in the
problem and which had been described earlier in the morning to Robert Sayre. This provided for the
following measures: An OAS denunciation of Cuban
aggression in strong language.Strong criticism of Soviet responsibility through assistance
to Cuba making its actions possible and appealing to the Soviet
Union to assist in solving this problem.An appeal to friendly countries to assist in the efforts of
the OAS countries to protect
themselves against Cuban aggression by not encouraging or
facilitating trade with that country.The establishment of a high level committee, possibly made up
of a selected group of foreign ministers to visit the European
countries concerned and possibly the Soviet Union to make known
the Latin American concern over the problem and to request
collaboration. The results of this trip would be reported back
to the MFM. In addition there
might be behind the scenes agreement on the action by all OAS Chiefs of State to call in the
Ambassadors of the European countries, Soviet Union, Canada and
Japan to emphasize the appeal made in the OAS Resolution.
Further steps to be taken by the OAS
would be applied in the event of the failure of the mission during its
talks in Europe and other areas and would be the subject of further
action by the OAS upon the submittal of
their report. At that time there would be taken up various punitive
measures such as (1) Generalization of U.S. policy toward vessels
touching at Cuban ports to the other OAS
countries; (2) The pressure on Spain to discontinue its air services to
Cuba; and (3) Other appropriate and feasible measures.
Mr. Kohler said that he agreed
with this program, particularly in the sense of making known to the
Soviet Union the concerted feeling of the OAS countries. He felt that the Latin Americans had been
far too weak and delicate in their approaches to the Soviet Union which
he thought would be far more sensitive to such pressure than they
apparently thought. He also agreed on the desirability of a widespread
publicity campaign to make known the Latin American position.
The Secretary thought that this kind of program including the
establishment of a Caribbean Security Committee would be useful. He did
not, however, want the OAS action to be
of such a nature as to create the impression that the United States was
about to embark on an important punitive program against Cuba. He
thought that we already had too many problems in our basket at the
present time for such a policy to be adopted now. It seemed to him that
a policy of this nature could be envisaged after a few more crises
involving Cuba. The Secretary also wanted to know whether the proposed
action by the Chiefs of State would be mentioned in the Resolution.
Ambassador Bernbaum said that
this might best be done behind the scenes. The Secretary agreed. He then
asked whether the Ambassadors concerned would be called in by the
Presidents en masse or individually. Ambassador Bernbaum thought that this might best
be done individually. The Secretary then said that since a decision of
this kind would involve President Johnson he
thought it best for him to consult with the President before giving the
green light. He wondered whether it might be possible for President
Johnson to be exempted from this requirement by
utilizing language such as “the highest feasible levels”. Ambassador
Bernbaum said that Foreign
Ministers in Latin America did not have the prestige and weight of the
Secretary of State and that it might therefore be desirable to arrange
for the Chiefs of State in Latin America to do the job leaving the way
open for the Secretary of State to do it in Washington. This produced
some laughter and was left at that.
59. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson in
TexasSource: Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol.
VI, 6/67–9/67. Secret.Washington, June 24, 1967,
1939Z.
CAP 67582. As you requested, I had a good meeting this morning with
CIA, State and DOD on the whole guerrilla problem in Latin
America.
This is the boxscore:
Country by Degree of UrgencyNumber of Active GuerrillasHard Evidence of Cuban InvolvementBolivia60–100Yes: Cuban military officers among ranks, arms and
training.Guatemala300Yes: Arms deliveries via Mexico.Venezuela400Yes: Arms, training, Cuban military personnel captured during
infiltration mission, Cuban admission of operation.Colombia800Yes: But only training in Cuba.Dominican RepublicdormantYes: Training, funds and special agents.EcuadordormantYes: But only training in Cuba.PerudormantYes: But only training in Cuba.
To understand these figures it is necessary to appreciate that each
organized guerrilla can tie up 10–20 government soldiers. We do better
in Viet-Nam only because of airpower, mobility, firepower, etc.
These are some further insights into the situation in each country:
Bolivia:
We have put Bolivia on top of the list more because of the fragility of
the political situation and the weakness of the armed forces than the
size and effectiveness of the guerrilla movement. The active band
numbers probably 50–60 but may run up to 100. CIA believes that “Che”
Guevara has been with this group. There are indications
that six other bands, totalling 100–200 men may be organizing in other
parts of the country. President Barrientos is hard pressed in coping
with the active band. If other fronts were successfully opened, the
situation could get out of hand. The 17-man mobile training team we have
in Bolivia expects to have another ranger battalion trained by September
1.
The active movement has 8 top Bolivian Communist Party leaders in it who
were trained in the Soviet Union. The owner of the farm which the
guerrillas used as their training camp belongs to a man
(Roberto Peredo) who visited Moscow in 1966. We
know of six Cuban military officers in this band. We also know that they
have radio contact with Cuba using the same procedures taught by the
Soviets.
Guatemala:
The guerrillas are divided into two organizations. The FAR—250 men—has the backing of Castro. Last summer when President
Mendez Montenegro took over, the guerrillas were making steady progress.
With the death of FAR leader Turcios and
strong pressure by the Guatemalan military. The guerrillas have been
scattered and are on the defensive.
In September 1966, Mexican authorities uncovered an arms smuggling
channel to Guatemalan insurgents. Documents found showed that over 4000
weapons had been sent. A Cuban Embassy officer was caught red handed
passing money to the smugglers.
Venezuela:
This is Cuba’s primary target. After 1963 the guerrilla movement came to
a virtual standstill while the Venezuelan Communist Party debated
whether to pursue the peaceful or violent approach. The party split and
Douglas Bravo led the activist faction into resumed guerrilla activity.
Since mid-1966 his group (150–250 men) and the MIR group (100 men) have stepped up their campaign. Leoni
responded by organizing 9 new ranger battalions which we are helping to
train and equip.
Soviet-manufactured AK–13 weapons have been captured in Venezuela from
guerrillas known to have landed from Cuba in July 1966. The boat and motors used are known
to have come from Cuba. In May 1967 a Cuban/Venezuelan group landed from
a Cuban fishing vessel. The Venezuelans escaped into the mountains, but
two Cubans were captured and two killed.
Colombia:
There are two guerrilla units operating, one responsive to Cuba and the
other to the USSR. After a long
inactive period, they resumed operations last February. So far the
operations have consisted of sporadic hit-and-run raids. The Colombian
armed forces, which are well-trained and disciplined, are putting
pressure on them. President Lleras has moved quickly to improve
intelligence collection, strengthen coordination between services and
mount social programs in guerrilla areas. There is no Cuban presence in
Colombia, but there is hard evidence of Colombians being trained in
Cuba. The guerrillas do not represent an immediate threat to Lleras.
Dominican Republic:
There are no active guerrillas although there are indications that the
Communist MPD and 14th of June Movement would like to open a front. The
Dominican armed forces are keeping a close watch on their activities.
Balaguer has given strong
support to our efforts to help him develop special anti-guerrilla units.
In recent months Dominican authorities have obtained documents from
Cuban-trained agents showing that Cuba is furnishing money and training
for guerrilla activities.
Ecuador and Peru:
Cuba tried to start guerrilla activities in these two countries about two
years ago. The movements were quickly put down, but they remain as
potential trouble spots. Cuba continues to train nationals from both
countries.
I have collected a full folder of background material which you may want
to review.
I told my working group to make a careful review of what we were now
doing in each country and meet with me again in one week to discuss
additional measures which we might take to strengthen the anti-guerrilla
capabilities of these countries.According to
a June 24 note, the President told Jim Jones to “hold this, I want
to talk to him [Rostow] about
this tomorrow.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, ARA Files, 1967: Lot 70 D 150,
Latin America Miscellaneous 1967) Rostow was in
the delegation that met Johnson on June 25 for
the second Glassboro meeting with Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin. (Johnson
Library, President’s Daily Diary) No evidence was found indicating
whether Johnson talked to
Rostow about Cuban
subversion at Glassboro.
W.W.R.
60. Editorial Note
President Johnson raised the issue of Cuban
subversion in Latin America at the Glassboro Summit with Soviet Premier
Alexei N. Kosygin. According
to the official record of the afternoon session on June 25, 1967, the
President said “he wished to inform Mr. Kosygin of an extremely important matter. He said we had
direct evidence of Cuba’s encouragement of guerrilla operations in seven
Latin American countries. This was a form of aggression and was
dangerous to peace in the Hemisphere as well as in the world at large.
He pointed out that Soviet-manufactured arms coming from Cuba had been
seized in Venezuela in July 1966 and in May 1967, with seven Cubans
having been captured in this latter incident. He also wished to point
out that on March 13 of this year, Castro openly stated his support for this type of
activity. The Government of Venezuela had stated its determination to
put an end to such operations. Our Ambassador to the OAS and some of his colleagues from the
Organization were now investigating in Venezuela the evidence of those
activities. The President emphasized that he therefore strongly felt
that Castro should be convinced
to stop what he was doing. Mr. Kosygin did not comment on this statement.” (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
POL 7 US) For the complete
memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XIV,
Document 235.
That evening Johnson gave former President
Eisenhower the following account of this
discussion with Kosygin: “[I]
told him there were 6 or 7 hot spots; that they’re using Soviet
material, Cuba was; that we caught a bunch of them the other day in
Venezuela; that they were giving us hell in the Dominican Republic, and
Haiti, and Bolivia, and half a dozen places; that this is a very serious
matter, Soviet equipment and Castro-trained people.” Johnson
said Kosygin “ought to realize
that we thought this was very serious and we were going to have to take
action—the OAS was going to take
action.” The President then asked Kosygin for a response. According to
Johnson’s account, Kosygin “said he couldn’t comment now, but he was
leaving for Cuba tomorrow, and he would bear these things in mind in
talking to them. Acted like he was a little upset with Castro. Didn’t say so.” (Johnson
Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation
between President Johnson and Dwight D. Eisenhower, June 25, 1967,
9:44 p.m., Tape F67.13, Side A, PNO 1) An uncorrected transcript of the
conversation is ibid.
61. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VI, 6/67–9/67.
Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw
it.Washington, July 6, 1967.
Mr. President:
I had another good round yesterday with Covey
Oliver and other members of the inter-agency working
group on Cuban subversion in Latin America.A
memorandum of the meeting, drafted by Bowdler, is ibid.
This time we examined the adequacy of current DOD, CIA and AID/Public Safety (police) programs in the
seven countries with active or potential insurgency movements.
Our conclusions were:
Bolivia
This is our most serious problem, not because of the size of the
guerrilla movement, but the weakness of the security forces and
fragility of the political situation. Given Bolivia’s limited capacity
to assimilate our assistance, we should for now: —press forward with the training of a second Ranger Battalion,
and develop an intelligence unit to work with the
Battalion.—expand our police program in rural areas.—start contingency planning for dealing with a situation which
Barrientos can no longer control.
Colombia
President Lleras Camargo is concerned and working for better coordination
and action by his security services. We have good on-going military,
intelligence and police programs. We agreed that: —DOD would review equipment
needs of the armed forces in the light of CINCSO’s recommendations.—Covey Oliver would consider a modest expansion of the rural
police program.
Dominican Republic
With the full cooperation of Balaguer and the armed forces, we have made good
progress in our internal security programs. No additional measures by us
are necessary. It would help if Balaguer got rid of his thuggish Chief of Police.
Covey Oliver will ask
John Crimmins to make the
pitch.
Ecuador
There is no active insurgency, but this is a good time to help the
Ecuadoreans improve their grossly deficient rural police. Covey Oliver will work out an expanded
program with AID/Public Safety.
Guatemala
Covey Oliver will pursue
this.
Peru
There is no active insurgency. The security forces have demonstrated
their ability to handle insurgent bands in the past. Our current
programs are adequate.
Venezuela
We have done what Leoni asked you for at Punta del Este: to expedite
delivery of equipment for 9 new Ranger battalions. [1½
lines of source text not declassified] Additional support for
the National Guard (police) in rural areas is needed and Covey Oliver will work this out with
AID/Public Safety.
Another decision reached by the group is that henceforth Covey Oliver will organize a group
(probably the same people who attended yesterday)Documentation on the IRG/ARA Counter-Insurgency Subgroup is in the National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IRG/ARA, 1966–68: Files: Lot 70 D
122. which will meet on a regular basis to: —keep a close watch over Cuban insurgency trends throughout
the hemisphere.—review individual country situations and requirements.—expedite decisions on increased assistance, as
necessary.
As a starter Covey Oliver will
write each Ambassador to impress upon him the importance which you
attach to alertness to internal security requirements and communicating
needs to Washington in a timely way.Copies
of the letter and subsequent replies are ibid., ARA Files, 1967–69: Lot 72 D 33,
Military/Security Policy.
From the review which I have made, I am convinced that at the present
level of insurgency in Latin America, the important elements of the
equation are: For the most part, the institutional base for internal
security in Latin America is primitive. The opportunities we
have to build it up
vary with the local officials in power. We must be alert to
every chance given us to advance the building process.If the President of the country is concerned over the problem
and willing to act, the armed forces will back him and, with our
assistance, they can produce impressive results. This has been
the case in Guatemala. We hope to repeat it in Bolivia.The cost to us in furnishing “preventive medicine” assistance
is small, but our Ambassadors and their country teams must
understand the key importance of “preventive medicine” and
exploit every opportunity which presents itself.The “Establishment” in Washington must be geared to keeping a
continuous review of the problem and acting quickly on
assistance requirements.
Walt
62. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Paraguay, Vol. I, 1/64–8/68.
Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President
saw it.Washington, September 7, 1967, 11:30
a.m.
SUBJECT
Asuncion Meeting on Latin American Economic IntegrationA joint meeting of the Latin American Free Trade
Association and the Central American Common Market was held in
Asuncion August 28–September 2. Additional documentation on the
meeting is in the National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ECIN 3 LA, ECIN 3 LAFTA,
and ECIN 3 CACM.
Covey Oliver and his Latin
American Common Market experts to review the results of the Asuncion
meeting which the press has reported as a failure.
Two things emerged: —until we have a fuller picture of what took place at the
LAFTA (South American
countries, plus Mexico) session, where we do not have observer
status, it is premature to draw conclusions about the lack of
success at Asuncion and what country was responsible.—despite inability of LAFTA
to reach agreement on the first try on certain key issues,
interest in the economic integration movement has not
slackened and the timetable agreed at Punta del Este has not been irretrievably upset.
The Asuncion Goals
We had hoped the Asuncion meeting would agree on three major issues: —programmed tariff reductions among LAFTA members.—preparations by LAFTA
members for a common external tariff.—mechanism for joint LAFTA–CACM
exploration of gradual merger into a Latin American Common
Market.
Up until the last two days of the meeting, it seemed that agreement would
be reached on the first two points based on a compromise formula which
would give the poorest countries (Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay) free
access to the markets of all the other LAFTA members in five years.
At the last moment, Peru asked to receive similar treatment as the poor
countries. The other LAFTA members
balked, and Peru’s continued refusal to drop its request worked as a
veto. This, in turn, seems to have triggered a veto by Paraguay of other
decisions relating to programmed tariff cuts and preparations for a
common external tariff.
We do not know why Peru took this inflexible position. It had not been
enthusiastic about a common market from the start, and recent financial
problems probably compounded its fears about competition from other
countries. Significantly, none of the big three—Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico—opposed the concession to the poor countries. They would have
been harder to turn around than Peru.
The Asuncion Round in Perspective
Disappointing as the results were, it is important to look at the
Asuncion round in perspective: —the meeting showed that most of the LAFTA countries are prepared to move rapidly toward
a common market.—LAFTA gave its blessing to
the formation of an Andean subregional group (Venezuela,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile) which plans to
reduce trade barriers among themselves at a faster pace than
provided in the President’s timetable.—at the joint LAFTA–CACM meeting the Foreign Ministers
agreed to recommend annual meetings to consider acceleration of
execution of the Punta del Este decisions and decided to
establish a Coordinating Committee to study on a priority basis
five key aspects of the merger of the two groups.—the Meeting of Presidents envisaged an 18-month period or
more for the Latin Americans to negotiate all the specific
arrangements leading toward a common market.—LAFTA members, while
disappointed at the inability to reach agreement on all issues,
do not look upon the meeting as a failure. This is reflected in
public statements by the Argentine and Colombian Foreign
Ministers.—the European economic integration movement faced several
complex negotiating sessions before basic obstacles were
removed.
What Needs to be Done
To keep the momentum of the movement going, two things must be done: —get Peru turned around.—have the LAFTA Foreign
Ministers renew negotiations as rapidly as possible, preferably
before the second quarter of 1968 which they have set for their
next meeting.
Among the opportunities we will have to use our influence with the LAFTA group are: —the Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Washington on September
22–23 to consider Venezuela’s complaint against Cuba.—the World Bank and Fund meetings in Rio de Janeiro in
mid-September. Tony Solomon and Don Palmer (Covey Oliver’s Common Market
man) will attend.—a special CIAP meeting in
Rio at the end of September to consider the financial aspects of
economic integration.—Tony Solomon is going to Peru after the
Rio Bank–IMF meeting to address
a group of Peruvian businessmen. He will speak on the advantage
of economic integration. He will also be able to talk to
Belaunde about the Peruvian attitude.—We may help Peru overcome its integration fears by supporting
the Andean subregional group, with necessary adjustment
assistance if they take specific action cutting tariffs among
themselves.
Before deciding how to use these opportunities, we need a full reading of
what took place at the LAFTA meeting.
State has asked our Embassies for this assessment.The President wrote the following instructions on
the memorandum: “Let’s follow these carefully & keep me
informed. L”
Walt
63. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson in
TexasSource: Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol.
VI, 6/67–9/67. Secret. James R.
Jones, Assistant to the President, wrote the
following note on the telegram: “9–7–67. Sent copy to Christian
& he might leak it.”Washington, September 7, 1967,
2151Z.
CAP 67764. This lively memorandum to me from Covey Oliver on counterinsurgency developments in Latin
America will give you some satisfaction.
“As you know, we and the Latinos have our ups and downs in the
counterinsurgency business. But I want to call to your attention an
unusual series of successes which have taken place in three Latin
American countries during the past few weeks. They are particularly
significant in that they follow close on the heels of the militant and
optimistic pronouncements by Castro and his fellow Latin American revolutionaries at
the recent Havana meeting of the Latin American Solidarity Organization
(LASO).
Bolivia: An important cache of passports, signal plans and other
documents was discovered by a Bolivian Army element. Inter
alia, the documents provide solid evidence that Che Guevara earlier this
year was in Bolivia operating with the guerrillas.On August 31, a Bolivian Army patrol executed an
imaginative and sophisticated ambush of the guerrilla
rearguard, killing several key Cubans and Bolivians, and
taking prisoner a knowledgeable Bolivian who is cooperating
well under interrogation.Documentation on the subsequent capture and death of
Ernesto “Che” Guevara
de la Serna is in Documents 170–173.
Venezuela:
In early August, Venezuelan police learned that the principal
action arm of the Communist subversives in Caracas was a 50-man
terrorist unit called Strategic Sabotage Command. Since that
time, the unit has been ‘decapitated.’ The commander was
captured and his four lieu-tenants killed in a series of police
raids. A roundup of the lower echelons is now underway.
Nicaragua:
On August 12 the Guardia Nacional began a sweep of an area of
north central Nicaragua on the basis of fragmentary reports of
guerrilla training camps. Insurgent basecamps were located and
we estimate that in a subsequent series of firefights at least
14 Castro-oriented guerrillas were wiped
out. The survivors are reported fleeing the area on an
‘every-man-for-himself’ basis.
The situation in Guatemala continues to improve, while in
Colombia there have been no significant contacts between
government forces and insurgents recently.
All in all, while one swallow doesn’t make a summer, August 1967
has been a vintage month for the COIN forces in Latin America.”
64. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Subject File, Organization of American States, Vol.
II. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw
it.Washington, September 25, 1967, 4
p.m.
SUBJECT
OAS Meeting of Foreign
MinistersThe final plenary sessions
of the Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States were held
in Washington September 22–24. Documentation on the meeting is
ibid., International Meetings and Travel File, Ministers of
Foreign Affairs, 9/22–24/67; and National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 68 D
453, CF 212 and CF 213.
On all counts, the OAS Meeting of Foreign
Ministers went well, within the limits of what we thought possible.
The basic resolution was approved 20 to 0, with Mexico abstaining.
The resolution has all the points which the Venezuelans and we originally
sought (copy attached):Attached but not
printed. For an excerpt of the Final Act, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp.
648–652; the text of the final act of the meeting, including the
“basic resolution,” is in Department of State Bulletin, October 16, 1967, pp. 493–498.
—a strong condemnation of Cuba for acts of aggression in Venezuela
and Bolivia.—a request to free world countries to restrict their trade with
Cuba and a recommendation to OAS
members that they press this request individually or
collectively.—an expression of serious concern to the Communist countries that
their support of Castro
stimulates his subversive activities, and a recommendation to OAS members that they make joint or
individual representations to manifest this concern.—a call upon governments supporting the Afro-Asian-Latin American
People’s Solidarity Organization to withdraw their support of the
organization because it fosters subversion.—a recommendation to OAS
Governments not to use ships in the Cuban trade and deny them
bunkering facilities.—a call on OAS Governments for
tighter controls over subversive activities.
At Congressman Selden’s request, Secretary Rusk tried to get in the notion of the OAS Secretariat keeping a list of private
firms trading with Cuba, but this did not prosper.
In the separate resolution, sponsored by Chile, Venezuela and Colombia,
it was agreed to call attention in the UN
to Cuba’s subversive activities. Mexico went along with this
decision.
The resolutions will not topple Castro but they
provide OAS-sanctioned levers for
pressuring our European friends and Soviet bloc countries to put the
heat on him. Now we must get the Latins to pull these levers. Covey Oliver is working on this.
The resolutions also give Venezuela strong moral support which will be
helpful to President Leoni
domestically. To the extent that Cuba becomes a political issue here
over the next 13 months, the resolution will help to show that we have
been active in mobilizing additional collective action to squeeze
Castro.
We may well find that Castro will persist in his
guerrilla activities, despite getting his fingers burned. This raises
the question of what further action can be taken to deter
Castro. Bill Bowdler and I
were discussing this over the weekend. We concluded that the next step
might be measured retaliation by the aggrieved state against Cuba. There
is authority for this in the 1964 resolution. Many aspects need to be
sorted out. We plan to use the IRG–SIG mechanism to assess
the advisability of this course.
Walt
65. Record of Discussion and Decisions of 22nd Meeting of the Senior
Interdepartmental GroupSource:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S–SIG
Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/RA #22,
10/2/67, Future Agenda Suggestions. Secret.Washington, September 28, 1967.
PRESENT
Under Secretary of State, ChairmanDeputy Secretary of DefenseGeneral Johnson for the Chairman, JCSAdmiral Taylor for the Director of Central
IntelligenceDirector, United States Information AgencyAdministrator, Agency for International DevelopmentUnder Secretary of the TreasuryUnder Secretary of AgricultureThe Special Assistant to the President, Mr. Walt W. RostowThe Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political AffairsThe Staff DirectorAmbassador Foster, ACDAMr. Oliver, Chairman IRG/ARAGeneral Orwat, JCSMr. Lang, ISA
[Omitted here is discussion of future agenda suggestions and the status
of talks on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.]
3. US Regional Policy Toward Latin American Security
Forces
A. Summary of Discussion
The Chairman of IRG/ARA introduced the
subject with a brief review of the report itself and its current
status.The report, approved by IRG/ARA on September 20, recommended
that the United States carry out its “commitment to cooperate with
the larger South American countries in obtaining jet fighter
aircraft of the F–5 type in 1969–70 to replace jet fighter aircraft
in existing inventory. It is recognized that air combat support
could be performed by less sophisticated jets but that for primarily
political reasons we are prepared to see the five large South
American countries receive these aircraft.” (Ibid., SIG Agenda: #22—9/28/67) He
mentioned the ACDA dissent and the fact
that, owing to time pressures, staffing by the Services had not yet been
completed.In a September 23 memorandum
to the SIG Acting ACDA Director Alexander argued that
the United States “should continue to resist pressure from the Latin
American countries for supplying supersonic military aircraft.”
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, 22nd Meeting, 9/28/67, Vol. 2) In
an October 20 memorandum to Katzenbach, Chairman Wheeler reported that, subject to several
reservations, the JCS generally
supported the paper, including the proposal to provide F–5 aircraft
to the larger South American countries. (Ibid.) He listed the
main reappraisals and
reformulations of policies contained in the report. He noted that the
Navy wished to give further consideration to the specific lines of
action (page 20) suggested for navies in the area. On the sale of F–5s,
to which the ACDA dissent was
addressed, he pointed out that this kind of question had been raised at
each of the previous plateaus of air force re-equipment—T–5 to 600 mph
and now to near supersonic.
The Chairman stated his view that this policy paper should be considered
a general re-statement of our present policies with some new emphasis,
but that SIG should not give approval to
the paper in all its details. Gen. Johnson summed
up his view that the general thrust of the policy was good and a simple
adjustment would probably meet the one criticism noted. (He mentioned
that a paper 36 months in preparationIn a
September 28 memorandum to Oliver, Sayre
explained that the report was a late response to NSAM No. 297: “One of the first things
I did when assigned to the White House in 1964 was to get McGeorge Bundy to ask for a study
and an agreed U.S. security policy for Latin America. Defense and
State appointed a study group which worked for six months. It
produced a study which DOD/ISA
considered satisfactory, but State, JCS and CINCSO
refused to accept it. It was finally sent to the White House for
information. Primarily because of the Dominican crisis, but also
because DOD/ISA preferred the ad
hoc system which it controlled, we have made progress slowly.”
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/IG Files: Lot 70 D 122, U.S.
Regional Policy Toward L.A. Security Forces—1967) should not
have to be staffed in five days.)
Mr. Barr explained his difficulty
in presenting the case for arms sales to Latin America in his recent
Congressional appearances. He welcomed the detailed statement and
reasoning behind US objectives and thought these would be useful to him
in the future, although he foresaw continued opposition on the Hill. Some important and influential
leaders saw our activities in this field as only aiding military
dictatorships. Others on the SIG thought
opinion was less opposed in the Armed Services and Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees.
Mr. Gaud thought that, leaving the
F–5 problem aside, the other policies would win support in the Congress.
Gen. Johnson suggested that Gen. Porter had good relations on the
Hill and would be willing to
help with any Congressman who might benefit from a first hand view of
the practical problems in this area.
Mr. Rostow summed up the case to be made as follows:
the military play an important role in the countries which is not well
understood; they can be a force for progress; and we do have some
leverage through equipment modernization. Therefore, we should aim to
guide the military leadership toward support of democratic institutions,
toward the right military tasks, toward a reduced share of GNP for military purposes and toward
keeping the modernization impulse in line with US interest as against outsiders (e.g., the
French). A strong case can be made using such examples as Venezuela and
Peru.
Mr. Foster agreed that the policy
paper was a good one but maintained that the F–5 sales were contrary to
it. He queried whether the “commitments” mentioned in the paper
circulated by Mr. Oliver were in
fact definitive. Mr. Rostow cited the letter to the
Brazilian President and Ambassador Tuthill’s authorized oral remarks.See Document 230.
Gen. Johnson said he had no knowledge of the letter
but on his recent trip to Brazil he was left in no doubt by his
Brazilian hosts that they considered we had a commitment to sell F–5s
and that they expected the authorization for talks with Northrop to come
shortly after October 1. Mr. Foster also recalled the Punta del Este recommendation
on arms limitation but Mr. Nitze
thought the Latin Americans would consider F–5 purchases as “necessary
expenditure” in the terms of the resolution.
Mr. Foster thought the Foreign Relations Committee particularly would
take the line that we aren’t holding down the appetites. Mr. Oliver thought a good case could be
made that we are. On a comparative basis Latin America’s military
expenditures were smaller than those of other areas on military
expenditure and of those sums only a small part went for matèriel. The
Latin American forces were in many cases used more as CCC-type camps and, said Gen.
Johnson, for vocational training. The Chairman
said that the comparative element should be added to the IRG/ARA paper.
The Chairman thought we had delayed the sale as long as feasible but we
were now faced with imminent Mirage sales. Gen.
Johnson pointed out that F–5 deliveries would
not be made before 1969, whereas the Mirage was available now.
Mr. Gaud described the special
case of Peru, where we must make a decision on a program loan with
conditions—no Mirage purchases, sound economic policies, no higher
defense expenditure, but agreement to F–5 purchases. He concluded, as
did Mr. Rostow, that a Peruvian purchase of Mirage
aircraft could result in Congressional retaliation on the Alliance for
Progress. Mr. Rostow stressed the importance of
President Belaunde’s position and
the consequences for him of our failure to comply with the request for
F–5s. If pressed too far by us and by his military, Belaunde might denounce AID entirely, to the great damage of the
Alliance, to American policy, and to the President of the United
States.
Mr. Gaud and others stated their
firm belief that the matter had to be discussed with Congressional
leaders before action is taken or we would run a serious risk of equally
strong reaction against our sale of F–5s.
B. Decisions and Next Steps
The Chairman summarized the general agreement of members to
continued development and implementation of the following guidelines
for US action: Increasing Latin American military role in internal
defense;Attempting to enhance OAS/UN
peacekeeping role of L.A. military forces;Continued “go slow” on more sophisticated equipment;
andRe-examining US military presence.SIG agreed that the “general thrust”
of the policy was good and its objectives were generally approved
subject to possible changes as the JCS complete their staffing.SIG further agreed that the
State–Defense Study Group should not consider themselves bound in
any way by this document but should be free to reexamine these
policies in their review of broader area policies.On the F–5 sales, SIG agreed that
we must proceed but that it was essential to inform Congressional
leaders prior to final action with the Latin American countries. The
Chairman of IRG/ARA was requested
to prepare a detailed, step-by-step plan for dealing with the sales
of F–5s to all the countries in question and including the tactics
to be used domestically.
C. Suggestions for Further Follow-Up
Should we study the actual influence of the Latin American
military and also analyze what groups are represented in forces
today? (IRG/ARA—Admiral
Taylor suggested Major Gen. Roland del Mar
would be a good person to conduct such a study. The Chairman also
suggested the Rand Corporation.)The Chairman asked that the projected State–Defense study on Latin
America consider the following: Multilateral programs to influence Latin American
military;Possible pooling of sophisticated equipment (helicopters,
interceptor boats) (General Johnson
mentioned the Army Regional Assistance Command);Mr. Gaud’s
suggestion to relate aid to increasing use of resources on
economic development as an indirect way to hold down defense
expenditure.In April 1968
Ambassador Edwin M.
Martin submitted the joint State–Defense
study, entitled “Latin America: A Recommended U.S.
National Strategy.” The SIG discussed the Martin study at its
meetings on May 2 and June 13. At the latter meeting,
Katzenbach
directed that the Country Teams consider the study “in
their policy/program planning and development.”
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
S/S–SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263,
SIG/RA #41, 6/26/68,
Chairman’s Summary at Discussion and Decision)Gen. Johnson requested preparation of a
SIG discussion on how to give
useful guidance to American military officers in their contacts with
Latin American military leaders (State–G/PM to prepare paper for
SIG discussion and
action).AA Hartman Staff Director
66. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Agency File, SIG, 29th Meeting,
1/9/68, Vol. 3. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this
estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the
participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments
of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. The United
States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on January 29.
Hartman circulated copies
of the estimate to SIG members on
January 29. (Ibid.)SNIE 80/90–2–68Washington, January 29, 1968.
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF A REFUSAL BY THE US TO SELL F–5
AIRCRAFT IN LATIN AMERICA
The Problem
To estimate how US interests in Latin America would be affected by a US
refusal to sell F–5s to certain Latin American countries.
Note
Recent US foreign aid legislation (the Conte–Long and Symington
amendments)Reference is to two
amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended), one
sponsored by Representatives Silvio O. Conte (R–Massachusetts) and
Clarence Long (D–Maryland), the other by Senator Stuart Symington
(D–Missouri). The Conte–Long amendment required the President to
withhold economic assistance to any “under-developed country” that
used military assistance to acquire sophisticated weapons systems.
The provision did not apply to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, Taiwan,
the Philippines, and Korea, or to any country that the President
specifically exempted on the basis of national security. (81 Stat.
937 and 81 Stat. 940) The Symington amendment stipulated that the
President terminate development loans and PL–480 assistance to any country that made military
expenditures “to a degree which materially interferes with its
development.” (81 Stat. 459) directs the President (a) to
deny grants or credits to certain countries for the purchase of
“sophisticated weapons systems;” (b) to withhold economic aid from such
countries in an amount equivalent to the cost of such equipment
purchased by them; (c) to terminate economic aid to such countries if unnecessary
military expenditures are materially interfering with economic
development; (d) to use the US voting power in the Inter-American
Development Bank to deny any loan which might assist in the acquisition
of “sophisticated or heavy” military equipment.The SIG discussed
the impact of the Conte–Long and Symington amendments on foreign
assistance to Latin America at its meeting on January 9, and
Katzenbach approved the
suggestion for further consultation with Congress. He also asked
Helms to prepare “an
assessment of the political costs in Latin America of a withdrawal
of the F–5 offer.” (Record of discussion, January 18; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S–SIG Files: Lot 70 D
263, SIG/RA #29, 1/1/68, Strategy
for Cyprus Settlement) The full text of these amendments is
set forth in the Annex.
For the purposes of this estimate, we have assumed a determination that
such weapons as the F–5 and Mirage 5 jet aircraft are “sophisticated
weapons systems” within the meaning of the Acts.
Conclusions
A number of Latin American countries, having put off replacement
of obsolescent military equipment for some years, are determined to
undertake early procurement of particular items. They see an
especially urgent requirement for jet aircraft, and the governments
of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela have received
recent assurances from US officials that the F–5 will be made
available. If the US now refuses to provide F–5s, resentment in
these countries will be strong. Some or all of them would almost
certainly decide to acquire Mirage jets. They would also shift to
greater reliance on European countries for the supply of other types
of military equipment, and perhaps for military training as
well.Denial of the F–5s would be regarded in Latin America as but one
part of a change in US policy—a change centered on the use of
economic aid as a lever to restrict military expenditures. Most
Latin Americans would consider this an affront to their national
pride and an unwarranted interference by the US in their internal
affairs; their reactions would be intense and adverse. US relations
with the governments and the military establishments of major Latin
American countries would suffer. The US would encounter increasing
difficulty in obtaining cooperation under the Alliance for Progress
and in the Organization of American States.The loosening of ties with the Latin American military would
endanger joint programs in specialized training and
counterinsurgency, sharply increase US problems in carrying out
contingency planning, and
make it more difficult and expensive for the US to maintain
facilities for space ventures and nuclear detection.Mr. Thomas L.
Hughes, The Director of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State, believes that this paragraph
overstates both the existing advantages of our Latin American
military relationships and the potential jeopardy to them.
[Footnote in the source text.]Those Latin American governments which responded to the denial of
F–5s by arranging to purchase Mirages or other “sophisticated” jet
aircraft would then run the risk of curtailment or termination of US
developmental aid. In this event, the effect on their economies
would vary considerably: in Argentina and Venezuela, for example,
they would not be severe; in Brazil, Chile, and Peru they would be
more serious. In several of the major countries, there would be
internal political effects, reenforcing existing tendencies toward
more assertive nationalism and sharper anti-US attitudes.Damage to US relations with Latin America from such developments
would be severe and would persist for some time. How long relations
remained clouded, and how widely such effects would spread through
Latin America, would depend on many broader political and economic
factors and on the general world situation.The implementation of the Conte–Long and
Symington amendments, particularly in Latin America, was
discussed at SIG meetings on
January 25 and February 15. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, S/S–SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/RA #30 & SIG/RA #31) The subject was also
discussed at an NSC meeting on
February 7 in which the President agreed to send Oliver to Latin America,
including a stop in Peru to raise the F–5 issue with President
Belaùnde. A record of
the NSC meeting is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol.
IX, Document 73.
[Omitted here are the Discussion section and Annex of the estimate.]
67. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VII,
1/68–2/68. Secret.Washington, February 5, 1968, 5 p.m.
SUBJECT
Measures to Invigorate the Form and Substance of Our Activities in
Latin America
You asked for ideas to dramatize our Latin American policy. I suggest the
following:
Measures Demonstrating High-level US Interest
Special Message to the Inter-American Cultural
Council. Dr. Eisenhower and Dr.
Hornig leave for
Venezuela on February 13 to attend a special meeting of the
Inter-American Cultural Council. The Council will pass on
programs for carrying out the OAS Summit decisions in education and science and
technology. I suggest you send a special message, with emphasis
on the possibilities of satellite ETV. I have asked Dr.
Hornig and Doug Cater
to prepare a draft.
ApproveThe President
approved the first five measures, adding the handwritten
instructions noted in footnotes below.
Disapprove
Call me
Trip by the Vice President. To
demonstrate our interest in economic integration and in opening
the inner frontiers of South America, the Vice President could
make a 3-week tour, visiting primarily projects related to
development of the heartland of the continent: road building,
hydroelectric plants, colonization, community development,
cooperatives. Covey
Oliver, Bill Gaud (who hasn’t been to Latin
America except to Punta del Este) and perhaps some Congressman
should go with him. They would dramatize these two distinctly
Johnsonian dimensions of the Alliance for Progress: integration
and multinational projects.
ApproveJohnson wrote: “check Pickets, Parades
etc.” Rostow later explained the
instruction as a “careful check of the security aspects.”
(Memorandum from Rostow to Read, February 7; Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin
America, Vol. VII, 1/68–2/68) Humphrey left for Latin America on March 31
and was in Mexico City that evening when
Johnson announced that he would
neither seek nor accept the nomination of the Democratic
Party for reelection. (Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson,
1968–69, Book I, pp. 469–476) After signing
Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Humphrey returned to the
United States on April 1. (Hubert H. Humphrey, The
Education of a Public Man, pp. 358–360) The Treaty
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was
signed by 14 Latin American countries at Tlatelolco on
February 14, 1967; see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968,
vol. XI, Document 226.
Disapprove
Call me
Invite Presidents to the Opening of
Hemisfair. Hemisfair officials could invite the
Presidents of participating countries to the opening of the
Fair. As part of their visit to San Antonio, you could invite
them to the Ranch.
Approve
Disapprove
Call me
Visits of Latin American Presidents. You
have the President of Paraguay, Alfredo Stroessner, scheduled
for March. For the remainder of the year you could have:
President Leoni of Venezuela. He was invited for
January but could not make it. State is proposing July.
President Lleras of Colombia. He is going
to Europe this spring and would like to stop in the US.
President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic. He
will have finished half of his term on July 1.
The Amistad Dam will be ready for dedication in September. You
could join President Diaz Ordaz for that ceremony.
ApproveJohnson wrote: “plus 2 or 3 others.”
The following Latin American Presidents visited the United
States in 1968: Stroessner of Paraguay (March), Trejos Fernandez of Costa
Rica (June), Barrientos Ortuño of Bolivia (July), and Diaz
Ordaz of Mexico (December).
Disapprove
Call me
Interview with Selected Latin American
Newsmen. An interview with a group of carefully
selected, prominent Latin American reporters would give you good
exposure in Latin America. You could make it an informal,
personal affair by having the interview in your office and
taking the newsmen on a tour of the White House. This could be
filmed by USIA for the newsmen
and played all over Latin America. You could use the interview
to project your vision of an economically integrated Latin
America with the benefits that this would bring to the
entrepreneur as well as the average citizen. State and USIA have developed a plan for
bringing such a group of newsmen to the US, using Hemisfair as
the cover.
Approve
Disapprove
Call me
More Direct Contact by Covey Oliver with Latin
Americans. Covey
has just finished a highly successful, two-week swing through
Central America and Panama. He plans to travel to Peru, Chile,
and Brazil, starting this week. A Taveras Dam loan signing
ceremony in the Dominican Republic in March is another
possibility. On these trips he tries to reach the people through
TV, press conferences and public appearances in places outside
the capital. His mastery of Spanish and natural empathy are a
great asset.Johnson underlined the last two
sentences of this paragraph and wrote: “good give us all he
can take.”
Our OAS–CIAP man should also be doing some missionary work
of this nature, but he lacks the language and substantive
knowledge of country problems and what CIAP might do to dramatize the Alliance.
Nevertheless, if you reject proposal 2 above, he could tour the
inner frontiers and be photographed on the modern roads, at
dams, gas pipelines, etc. in the interior.
Measures to Give New Thrust to the Alliance for
Progress
Restructure CIAP. CIAP is not giving leadership to the Alliance. The
Chairman tends too much towards private diplomacy and does not
exert enough firm, imaginative, public leadership. Our man is
not feeding him ideas and pushing him for action behind the
scenes. There is a serious structural weakness—7 part-time members cannot do the job of
policy direction, country review, and performance follow-up that
is required. It is politically impossible to replace the present
members, but a few more full-time members
with imagination and drive could be added. The new men are
needed to translate the Summit directives into specific courses
of action, determine priorities and, through close personal
contact, persuade governments to move accordingly. Bill Bowdler
has prepared a proposal for restructuring CIAP which he is taking up with
Covey and Sol. We are
shooting to get this done at the Inter-American Economic and
Social Council meeting in June.
We can also expect more dynamism from a new OAS Secretary General if Galo Plaza
is elected.
New US Executive Director on the IDB. Related to our
leadership in CIAP is
leadership in the Inter-American Bank. The Bank is assuming a
larger role in the Alliance. Last year annual investments by the
Bank reached the half billion mark. It did more dollar lending
than our entire AID program in
Latin America. My hunch is that the Congress will increasingly
want to funnel assistance through the multilateral lending
institutions, so the IDB’s role
in the Alliance is likely to increase. This makes it most
important that we have a top-flight pro as US Executive Director
who knows how to
work with Latins while protecting our interests—especially since
our top man on the Bank management is not effective. I know you
are considering this matter. You have in
Ray Sternfeld—the present US
alternate—the man who can do that kind of job. I strongly
recommend that you name him. (Tom Mann and Joe Barr agree.)
Approve
DisapproveThis
option is checked.
Call me
Modernize our Military and Security Relations with
Latin America. The pattern of these relationships was
established during World War II and the years immediately
thereafter. They are outdated. There is too much emphasis on
bilateral programs with us and an excessive paternalism on our part.
As we have done in the economic field, we should get the Latins to
think more of military and security policy in collective terms and
in relationship to economic and social goals. New instruments of
inter-American cooperation are needed to replace the present
antiquated—and stigmatized—ones. Bob Sayre has prepared a strategy for doing this which
Nick Katzenbach has approved and is now awaiting the concurrence of
Secretary McNamara.Three Additional Measures Contingent on Future
Developments. These measures of high impact for Latin
America are contingent on future developments: Untying of AID for the Western Hemisphere, when
our balance of payments situation permits.Granting of Trade Preferences to Latin
America, if the Europeans continue their
preferences for Africa and do not go along with further
temporary worldwide tariff cuts for the LDCs.The President checked measures 4b and
4c.A New Program to Open South America’s
Inner Frontiers More Rapidly, after the heavy
expenditures in Vietnam decrease.Walt
68. Memorandum From William G.
Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Latin America, Vol. VI, 10/67–4/68.
Confidential. According to telegram CAP 80618 from
Rostow to the President, March 1, the
President saw the memorandum. (Ibid., Name File, Bowdler Memos)Washington, March 1, 1968.
SUBJECT
Covey Oliver’s Trip to
Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Colombia
The trip was a highly successful venture from the standpoint of public
relations and personal contacts. On the substantive side, Covey achieved a considerable measure
of understanding of the need for cooperative action to meet a crisis
situation in Haiti and for a new mechanism for discussing and defining
Latin America’s military role and equipment needs. Covey was unable, however, to get
President Belaunde to reduce
military expenditures by any meaningful amount or to postpone purchase
of unnecessary military equipment. Covey will be sending you a full report.Rostow forwarded Oliver’s report to the President on March 5. (Ibid.,
Country File, Latin America, Vol. VI, 10/67–4/68) Here are
the highlights:
Inter-American Cultural Conference
The meeting approved programs to carry out the Summit directives in
education, science and technology. The Latin Americans pledged
sufficient funds to finance, with our matching contribution, a
$16-million effort the first year.
Venezuela
President Leoni would like to
visit Washington, but it seems doubtful that he can do so this year.
The security forces have made great strides in the past four years with
our help. I visited the police Central Command Center and the Armed
Forces Joint Operations Center and was impressed by their organization
and skill. The ten Venezuelan Ranger Battalions, for which you
authorized fast delivery of equipment, are all in the field. Insurgency
has not been eliminated but is at one of its lowest points in years.
Bolivia
The visit gave President Barrientos a boost and us the opportunity to
examine Bolivia’s economic situation at first hand. The economic outlook
is generally good, but Barrientos faces a temporary budget problem resulting largely from
increased expenditures from the counter-guerrilla effort and the drop in
tin prices. He is prepared to trim his budget and impose new revenue
measures but still needs modest assistance from us.
Liquidation of the Guevara
guerrillas has given the Bolivians pride and much needed
self-confidence. The security situation looks reasonably good. I was
impressed by dedication and quality of our country team in La Paz. The
AID Mission is particularly
impressive.
Peru
Covey did not get very far with
President Belaunde on reducing
the share of the budget for military expenditures or postponing the
acquisition of additional military equipment. Belaunde is the prisoner of a
strong-minded military, an opposition-controlled Congress bent on
currying the military’s favor and his own weakness as a political
leader. Peru is one case where the Symington–Conte–Long amendments
clearly apply. But this would probably provoke a crisis of confidence in
Peru which would end up with the military ousting Belaunde. Rather than make a formal
finding of applicability, it is better to turn the faucet on bilateral
assistance to a trickle.
Despite our problems on aid, it is evident that there is vitality in the
Peruvian economy. Control of insurgency is good. These factors make
Peruvians pass off our curtailment of aid with a shrug of the
shoulders.
Colombia
President Lleras was pleased to get your invitation to make a visit. He
accepts, leaving the dates to be worked out. From his conversation with
Covey Oliver and what we know
of Lleras’ performance during the past 18 months, it is clear that
Lleras is a rare combination—for Latin America—of good executive, smart
politician, knowledgeable economist, and statesman with a broad grasp of
hemispheric and world problems. He is getting the Colombian economy back
on its feet. With a smart mix of force and economic assistance he is
making steady headway in curbing insurgency.
WGB
69. Memorandum of the 583rd Meeting of the National Security
CouncilSource: Johnson
Library, National Security File, NSC
Meetings, Vol. V, 3/6/68, Inter-American Objectives and Problems.
Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The
meeting took place in the Cabinet Room, and according to the
President’s Daily Diary it began at 12:46 p.m. (Johnson
Library)Washington, March 6, 1968,
noon.
THOSE PRESENT
The PresidentThe Vice PresidentStateSecretary RuskDeputy Under Secretary BohlenAssistant Secretary OliverDeputy Assistant Secretary SayreDefenseSecretary CliffordUnder Secretary NitzeJCSGeneral WheelerTreasurySecretary FowlerCIADirector HelmsUSIADirector MarksWHW. W. RostowB. K. SmithTom JohnsonW. G. Bowdler
Assistant Secretary Oliver opened
the discussion on Latin America by reporting on his appearance this
morning before Senator Morse’s
Latin American Subcommittee. He said he had been “well and tolerantly”
received with no grilling on the arms buildup in Latin America.
On the Latin American paper before the NSC,A copy of the paper is
attached to a memorandum from Paul C.
Warnke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, to McNamara, March 5. (Washington National Records
Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A
1250, Latin America 1968, 0–092) Assistant Secretary
Oliver singled out three
issues: the problem of keeping up the momentum of the Alliance for
Progress if the Alliance appropriation were cut a second year in
a row.the drop in Latin American trade in 1967 which amounted to 6%,
or $600 million.some—though exaggerated—backsliding on economic integration
since the Summit.
Reporting on his trips to Central America and four South American
countries, Mr. Oliver made these
points: The Central American Common Market (CACM) is going through a difficult adjustment
period. The members are considering restrictive measures which
would undo the progress made by CACM. We should shift the emphasis of our
assistance away from bilateral aid and toward adjustment
assistance tied to the strengthening of CACM institutions.As the Mexican Foreign Minister has suggested, we should place
more emphasis on physical integration to encourage economic
integration.During the South American tour, he launched the idea of a
periodic meeting of Ministers of Defense as a way of getting the
Latin Americans to focus more realistically on their military
requirements.In his conversation with Belaunde, he achieved limited success
in getting the promise of a memorandum explaining projected
military expenses for 1968, but he received no assurances with
respect to postponement of additional military equipment.
The President gave these directives: that a task force be established to make a detailed study of
existing national road systems in Latin America and how they
might be linked up. He indicated a willingness to give his
support to findings of the task force.The President subsequently said that the
study might be expanded to include air transportation and
communications. [Footnote in the source text.] On April 5
Johnson approved a State Department
plan to promote the task force proposal in Latin America.
(Memorandum from Rusk
to the President, April 4; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 3 IA SUMMIT)that top level officers responsible for managing our Latin
American affairs make a special effort to visit Latin America
and engage in other activities demonstrating our continued,
high-level interest in the area.
[Omitted here is discussion of other subjects.]
70. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,
O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this
estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the
participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments
of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. The United
States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on March 28.
The estimate superseded NIEs
80/90–64 and 80/90–66 (Documents 24 and
38).NIE 80/90–68Washington, March 28, 1968.
THE POTENTIAL FOR REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA
Note
This estimate treats the question of revolutionary development in Latin
America more broadly and over a longer period of time than has been
customary in previous estimates.
There are many defensible definitions of the word revolution, and many traditional applications of that word to
events in Latin America, where in the past 40 years there have been more
than a hundred successful golpes, insurrections,
and other violent or irregular changes of government. Our subject here
is not simply the sudden overthrow of regimes but the pressures in Latin
America for fundamental change. In an effort to assess the potential
effects of those pressures, we define revolution as a
series of developments which, in a relatively short time, produces
profound and lasting change in a nation’s political, economic, and
social institutions. Among other movements to bring about such
change, we survey the current status and future prospects of the several
Communist insurgencies.
Some of the judgments we reach in this paper are quite specific and apply
to the next year or two. Some, considerably more general, pertain to the
next four or five years. Still others describe emerging trends which
will be felt in the area over more than a decade.
Conclusions
The focus of attention in most discussions of this subject has
been on insurgency movements supported by Castro. Such movements are still
active in three countries: Colombia, Guatemala, and Venezuela. In
all three cases they are relatively small, have attracted little
sympathy among the local populace, and are encountering strong
responses by the security forces. In no case do insurgencies pose a
serious short-run threat to take over a government, though they are
troublesome, difficult to deal with, and likely to remain an
unsettling factor on the political scene.Even over a much longer period, we do not believe that these, or
similar insurgencies which may become active, will be the main
engine of revolution in Latin America. The factors and forces which
bring revolutions will be more complicated and will vary widely from
country to country in form and character.Because discontent has not yet become organized and acute, and
because there is a lack of appealing radical leadership, revolution
seems unlikely in most Latin American countries within the next few
years. Over a longer period, however—certainly within the next
decade—we see conditions developing throughout the area which will
be much more conducive to revolution. Whether and when these
conditions actually produce revolutionary changes will depend upon
fortuitous combinations of factors within individual
countries.The establishments which now control the seven largest Latin
American countries (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Peru,
Venezuela, and Chile) are much stronger than any proponents of
revolutionary violence. Though the government of such a country
might be displaced during the next year or two, the change almost
certainly would not be revolutionary. In Chile, the government which
comes to power in 1970 may follow revolutionary policies. In a
number of the smaller countries, there is greater likelihood of a
sudden overthrow of government and also more chance that a
revolutionary government might come to power. (See Annex B for a
discussion of six smaller countries which are particularly lacking
in stability.)Elements on the political left will be in the forefront of most
future revolutionary movements, but we do not believe that the
Communist organizations in Latin America have, or will develop, the
strength to play the central role. We do not rule out the
possibility that they might attempt on their own to seize power in
one or more countries, but we think it far more likely that they
would make common cause with other stronger revolutionary elements,
settling temporarily for an influential voice in a new government
and hoping to progress from there.While we do not conclude that Castro-style insurgency is of no importance, we do
believe that the forces which undertake future revolutions will
develop and operate primarily in the cities. They will require—or
wish to have—mass support, and such support will be more readily
obtainable in the cities than in the countryside. The influx of
people from countryside to city in Latin America is striking, and
most of it swells the population of the slums. In 1940, there were
five Latin American metropolitan areas with more than one million
residents; in 1960, there were nine. We estimate that in 1970 there
will be 18, and in 1980, 26.The inhabitants of these urban slums—and particularly the young
people born in them—will, we think, provide a key source of revolutionary raw
material. The source of revolutionary leadership will vary from
country to country; the personal qualities of the individuals will
be of much more importance than the class or profession they
represent. Some may be from the military—perhaps younger officers or
noncommissioned officers; others from the Catholic priesthood;
others from the university-intellectual community; and still others
from new versions of existing political parties.Varied as they may be in other respects, we believe that
revolutionary movements will have one important common feature: a
nationalistic, independent attitude with strong overtones of anti-US
sentiment.
[Omitted here are the Discussion section, Annex A, and Annex B of the
estimate.]
71. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VIII,
9/68–10/68, 2 of 2. Confidential.Washington, June 6, 1968, 2:15 p.m.
SUBJECT
Offer of Integration Adjustment Assistance to the Andean
Subregional Group
In the memorandum at Tab A,Tab A is a May 29
memorandum from Katzenbach to
the President; attached but not printed. Under Secretary
Katzenbach requests
authorization to explore with the governments of the Andean Subregional
Group (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) a United
States loan of up to $25 million for adjustment assistance to industries
affected by formation of an Andean Common Market.
This group of six middle-size countries is now considering a treaty
establishing a common market. The private sector in three (Venezuela,
Ecuador and Peru) is nervous about adverse effects of rapid integration
and are pressuring their governments to delay the treaty.
A year after Punta del Este it is clear the Latin American Common Market
is more likely to come through a series of subregional groups than the
merger of the Central American (CACM)
and South American (LAFTA) blocs, as contemplated at Punta
del Este. That is why the action of the Andean Group is the most
promising development on economic integration since the Summit.
The last-minute opposition of the private sector in some Andean countries
threatens establishment of this subregional common market. By offering
to join in establishing adjustment assistance, we may help the
governments overcome this resistance. No loan would be made unless this
objective is assured.
The key issue in making an adjustment loan offer is the tying
arrangement. State argues that we will maximize our chances of getting
governments to move if we follow the formula we use in the
Inter-American Bank—our dollars could be used only to purchase goods and
services in the United States, in the country of the user, or from other
members of the Andean Group. This is also the formula we use in our
loans to the Central American Integration Bank. (We allow this
flexibility in Latin America because a large proportion of Latin foreign
exchange eventually comes back to the US, even if it is not directly
tied to US purchases.)
Secretary Fowler raises three
issues on the State proposal (Tab B):Tab
B is a June 1 memorandum from Fowler to the
President; attached but not printed.
He takes sharp exception to the tying
formula. He wants the dollars tied to 100% US procurement, as
we do in our bilateral aid loans. To do otherwise, he says, would
undermine your January 1 balance-of-payments program and subsequent
directive to AID to tighten up on
balance-of-payments aspects of its operations.He questions the wisdom of immobilizing $25
million of scarce FY 1969
funds. He thinks $25 million should be an upper limit and
it should be used for adjustment assistance and capital financing.He wants the Inter-American Bank to be associated
with integration lending proposals. He recalls that in
considering adjustment assistance for the Latin American Common
Market prior to the Summit, Treasury took the line that the IDB should manage the adjustment
fund.
These are my comments on Secretary
Fowler’s points:The State tying formula would be a significant sweetener which
would improve the odds on moving the proposal forward. The
balance-of-payments impact would be minimal and at least a year
in the future. The State tying arrangement would not weaken your
January 1 programReference is to the
President’s statement on January 1 outlining a “Program on
Action to Deal with the Balance of Payments Problem.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1968–69, Book I, pp.
8–13) because it would not cause substantial outflow
nor introduce a new
principle in balance-of-payments policy. AID’s ability to achieve its new outflow targets
would not be impaired. The targets will still be met.AID would not automatically
immobilize $25 million of FY 1969
funds. AID wants to talk to the
Andean group about our joining with them in setting up an
adjustment fund. The $25 million is only a ballpark figure.
There would be no obligation of funds until a concrete loan
proposal is worked out—based on the Andean Common Market coming
into operation on terms satisfactory to us—and your approval
under the new commitments procedure obtained.Inter-American Bank Association with the Andean group can be
explored when we discuss the loan with the Andean governments. I
would not make the IDB
association an absolute condition.
I recommend you decide this one in favor of State, in the understanding
that the amount of our loan offer will be flexible and participation of
the Inter-American Bank will be examined further if the Andean countries
are interested in the proposal.
Walt
Authorize offering Andean Group adjustment assistance loan up
to $25 million
Yes
No
Call meThe
President checked this option. No indication of the
President’s subsequent decision appears on this
memorandum. In an October 23 memorandum to the President
Rostow noted:
“Last June you authorized State to explore with the six
governments a possible AID loan of as much as $25 million for
‘adjustment assistance’.” Johnson subsequently approved a proposal
to proceed with the loan, even though several countries,
including Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador, appeared
reluctant to join the subregional group. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin
America, Vol. VIII, 9/68–10/68, 2 of 2)
On the tying formula, approve:
the formula we use with IDB
the restrictive formula recommended by
Secretary Fowler
Central America
72. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs (Harriman)Source: National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CEN/H Files, 1964: Lot 67 D 46, POL 1, General Policy. Secret; Noforn. Drafted by Rowell.Washington, February 6, 1964.
SUBJECT
Honduras—Possible Coup
REF
Agenda for Special Group (CI) for
Friday, February 7Not found.
Pressure in Honduras for removal of Ricardo Zùñiga A., Secretary General
to Chief of Government Col. Lopez, has grown so rapidly in the past
month, that unless he leaves the scene peacefully, there could be a
counter-coup within the next two weeks.
Lopez depends completely on Zúñiga who runs the government. Zúñiga, as
Lopez’ personal adviser since 1956, has engineered Lopez’ career to the
present point in which Lopez hopes to become constitutional president.
Lopez will not let Zúñiga go unless forced to by a united demand from
the Army.
Today only the last Infantry Battalion and the newly formed Special
Tactical Force (each numbering about 600 men and located just outside
Tegucigalpa) stand between Lopez and a counter-coup. Lopez personally
commands the Special Tactical Force through an executive officer whose
support for Zùñiga is increasingly questionable. The commander of the
1st Battalion, Maj. Juan Melgar, is supposedly fanatically loyal to
Lopez and has supported Zùñiga. However, Zùñiga secretly came to the
United States in the last week of January, and in the last four days
there have been reports that Melgar may be weakening in his resistance
to pleas from his military colleagues to join them in evicting
Zùñiga.
If Zùñiga leaves the government, Lopez would almost certainly be replaced
by a civilian-military junta, though if the change were accomplished
through a palace coup rather than an open revolt, Lopez might remain as
head of the junta.
Without Zùñiga, Lopez probably would lose some of his presidential
ambition, and those persons who oppose a military candidacy would have
more influence. Opponents of a Lopez candidacy include a number of
military officers as well as the Liberal Party (deposed in last
October’s coup) and major elements of the Nationalist Party (principal
civilian allies of the present military government). The armed forces
will almost certainly take a preconstitutional non-partisan attitude
once Lopez is no longer a serious presidential contender.
Although much of the Army’s antagonism toward Zùñiga is a spontaneous
response to Zùñiga’s high-handed operations, the Liberal Party,
especially Jorge Bueso Arias, has contributed substantially to the
plotting. Bueso is very competent, anti-communist, and was Finance
Minister under deposed President Villeda Morales.
The leader of the military plotters is Defense Minister, Chief of Air
Force, Lt. Col. Armando Escalon. Escalon is very competent and
anticommunist, but his was one of the bitterest anti-U.S. voices during
the period of non-recognition last fall (October 3 to December 14,
1963).Villeda Morales on October 3,
1963. The Kennedy
administration initially refused to recognize the new government,
choosing instead to recall Ambassador Burrows on October 6 for “consultation,” thereby
suspending normal diplomatic relations. For documentation on the
coup in Honduras and the initial U.S. response, see Foreign
Relations, 1961–1963, American Republics, Microfiche
Supplement, Honduras. The Johnson
administration agreed to recognize the new government on December
14, 1963, but only after receiving “public assurances of respect for
civil liberties, freedom of action for political parties, and that
international obligations will be fulfilled.” By that time, the
Lòpez administration had also announced that elections for a
constituent assembly would be held in February 1965. (Department of
State Bulletin, December 30, 1963, p. 624)
For a detailed account of these events, see Edward M. Martin, Kennedy and Latin
America, pp. 125–141.
The communists would welcome any change away from the present military
government, though they are not involved in the present Liberal-Army
scheming. The communists have begun to seize control of the MIL, an
uncoordinated group of lower-level Liberal terrorists not countenanced
by the Liberal leaders. The MIL began to function in December, 1963.
A junta government probably would have much more Liberal participation
than does the present government, and thus would receive broader labor
and Liberal backing. This would reduce the strength of the MIL. Thus,
chances of a peaceful transition to generally accepted civilian
representative government in 1965 are much better under a junta,
especially if military partisanship declines. The increased civilian
participation would improve the efficiency of the transition government
as well.
The anti-Zùñiga forces now believe they have gone too far to quit. As
long as Zùñiga stays out of Honduras, there is a good chance that there
will be only a palace coup. This would avoid bloodshed or extremism, and
would add to the possibility that Lopez and the junta would resolve the
conflict by exiling both Escalon and Zùñiga as ambassadors. Many of the
military officers who are working against Zùñiga do not like the
prospect of having Escalon as the new head of the junta.
If Zùñiga returns to Honduras soon, the plotters probably will resort to
open revolt. Whether they win or lose, there will be some bloodshed and
new openings for communist subversion. If they win, the United States
will be faced with a not-too-friendly Escalon. If they lose, there
probably will be a series of jailings and other repressive measures
which will force large numbers of Liberal Party members and organized
laborers into open alliance with the communists in the MIL.
Conclusions:United States interests are best served by the earliest
possible removal of Ricardo Zùñiga from his present influential
position in Honduras.A palace coup is much more to our interest than an open revolt
in Honduras.Therefore, the Honduran situation is most favorable to the
United States the longer Zùñiga stays out of Honduras.In a memorandum to Mann, February 4, Collins
suggested that the Special Group (CI) consider detaining Zùñiga in the United
States “to improve the chances for a peaceful alteration of
government in Honduras.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA/CEN/H Files, 1964: Lot 67 D 46, General
Policy) The minutes of the Special Group meeting have not
been found. The Latin American Policy Committee also met to
discuss the situation in Honduras, in particular, ways in
which to “effect a non-violent transition to representative
civilian government.” On February 6 the LAPC approved a plan of action
for the remainder of 1964, including the following proposal:
“Seek ways to reduce the influence of Ricardo Zùñiga A.”
(Airgram CA–7933 to
Tegucigalpa, February 10; ibid., Central Files 1964–66,
POL 1 LA–US) In a telephone
conversation with President Johnson,
February 19, Mann
mentioned the possibility of a another coup in Honduras; see
Document 2.
73. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL COSTA RICA–US. Secret. Drafted by
Mann and approved by the
White House on July 11.Washington, June 30, 1964, 11:30
a.m.
SUBJECT
U.S.–Costa Rican Relations
PARTICIPANTS
U.S. SideThe PresidentAssistant Secretary MannAmbassador TellesCosta Rican SideFrancisco Orlich,
President of Costa RicaDaniel Oduber Quiròs,
Minister of Foreign AffairsAmbassador Gonzalo J. FacioMario Quirós Sasso, Minister of the PresidencyMr. Eduardo Lizano, Economic AdvisorMr. Fidel Tristan, Economic Advisor
After speaking privately together, President Johnson
and President Orlich joined
members of the United States and Costa Rican delegations in the Cabinet
Room. President Johnson said that President
Orlich had raised two
matters, first, a ten million dollar commitment which President
Kennedy made during his visit
to Costa RicaPresident Kennedy visited Costa Rica in March
1963 to attend a conference of the Central American Presidents. In a
meeting at the Embassy on March 20 Orlich asked Kennedy for financial aid,
including budgetary assistance. No evidence was found to suggest
that Kennedy gave any
commitment other than an assurance “that he would look into this
matter.” A memorandum of the conversation is in Foreign
Relations, 1961–1963, American Republics, Microfiche
Supplement, Costa Rica. and, second, the attitude
of the United States towards the activities in Costa Rica of the two
Cuban exile groups headed respectively by Mr. Ray
and Mr. Artime. The President asked Mr. Mann to comment on these two points.
Mr. Mann indicated that he was not
aware of any unfulfilled ten million dollar commitment to Costa Rica but
he would look into this and
speak with the Costa Rican officials later on.In a July 1 memorandum for Rusk, Mann confirmed that Kennedy had “made no such commitment.” “It was clear
yesterday,” Mann explained,
“that President Orlich
himself did not know what he would ask of President
Johnson when he walked into the meeting.”
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 7 COSTARICA) Orlich discussed the issue of
financial assistance in meetings with Rusk on July 1 at 10 a.m. and Mann immediately thereafter.
Memoranda of conversation for the two meetings are ibid., POL 15–1 COSTAPOL 7 COSTA He said that it was understood that Costa Rica, because of the
volcano and the drop in the production of coffee and other export crops,
might need help. We would be glad to look into this on the basis of
concrete projects as we wished to be cooperative. Regarding
Ray and Artime, Mr. Mann stated that since last September no raids had been
staged from U.S. territory because of President Kennedy’s decision to avoid the risks
of having Cuban exiles attack, from a U.S. base, ships of various
nationalities. Mr. Mann stated
that the United States was not participating in the activities of Mr.
Artime and Mr. Ray which might be based in other
countries. Mr. Mann said that he
did not know a great deal about the activities of these two exile groups
but he gathered that Mr. Artime might be somewhat more responsible than
Mr. Ray. President Orlich ventured the opinion that the more responsible of
the two was Mr. Ray. Mr. Mann indicated that we did recognize
that the two Cuban exile leaders were trying to help Cuba return to
freedom and we sympathized with their objective.
President Orlich in reply to a
question by President Johnson said that the
Alliance for Progress had been working more efficiently during the last
few months. Mr. Mann explained
some of the administrative steps that had been taken to make the
Alliance machinery operate more speedily.
74. Editorial Note
On October 13, 1964, Ambassador Burrows recommended a plan for political action in
Honduras to February 1965, the month scheduled for elections to the
constituent assembly. Burrows
suggested that the United States identify candidates “with the necessary
qualifications” for the Honduran presidency, while diminishing the
influence of such “irreconcilables” as Ricardo Zùñiga. (Telegram 177
from Tegucigalpa; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 HOND) On October 17 Assistant
Secretary Mann indicated “general
agreement” with the proposal, but with a cautionary note: “We do not
think it would be wise for the Embassy to become identified with any
particular candidate or candidacy nor do we believe that Embassy should
oppose any particular candidate.” (Telegram 137 to Tegucigalpa; ibid.)
The Latin American Policy Committee (LAPC) tried to resolve the issue at its meeting on November
4, when it approved a revised plan of action for Honduras. Although
avoiding direct support for specific candidates, the committee
recommended that the U.S. “use every influence available, both to the
Country Team and to Washington, to reduce the influence of Ricardo
Zuniga.” (Airgram CA–4918, November 5;
ibid., POL 1–2 HOND)
On December 23 Mann and Deputy
Assistant Secretary Adams
discussed the Zùñiga problem with Desmond
FitzGerald, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of
the Central Intelligence Agency. According to a record of the meeting:
“FitzGerald referred to the Honduran Government
as possibly the worst in Honduras’ history and [1 line
of source text not declassified]. Agreeing the Government is
bad, Adams doubted that President
Lopez would ‘become a sort of Cincinnatus and retire.’ Also he wondered
whether it was worthwhile at this late date to try to get rid of Zuniga.
He said he would consult with the desk officer and report back.”
(Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, December 23; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA–CIA
Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965)
On February 16 Zùñiga and the Nationalist Party won a majority of the
seats to the Constituent Assembly. According to Adolf A. Berle, who served as an
official observer, the elections were “very suavely stolen.” (Letter
from Berle to Mann, March 3; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 HOND) Three months later, Assistant
Secretary Vaughan approved a proposal to reduce Zùñiga’s influence,
although a final decision was delayed to allow the Ambassador-designate,
Joseph John Jova, time to
discuss the issue further with other Embassy officials. (Memorandum from
Broe to Vaughan, June 5;
Department of State, INR/IL Historical
Files, Latin America Files, 1965) No evidence has been found to indicate
whether the proposal was, in fact, implemented. The policy to “reduce
the influence of Ricardo Zuniga,” however, was retained in the
subsequent plan of action for Honduras, which was approved by the LAPC in September 1965. (Airgram CA–2964 to Tegucigalpa, September 14;
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 1 HOND–US)
75. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Sayre) to the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy)Source:
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Latin
America, Vol. III, 1/65–6/65. Secret.Washington, June 12, 1965.
As you know the President asked for task force reports on Guatemala,
Bolivia and Colombia.The President asked
Mann on June 5 to set up
a task force “to develop plans for what we do in Guatemala, Colombia
and Bolivia.” “We should have a special task force on top of it with
the best names,” Johnson said, “and be prepared
in advance instead of waiting until they are shooting at us.”
(Memorandum of conversation, June 5, 12:10 p.m.; ibid., Papers of
Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, May 2,
1965–June 2, 1966)
As I mentioned in a meeting at the White House while I was still on your
staff,Sayre returned to ARA in May 1965 after serving 1 year as
the Latin American expert on the National Security Council
staff.ARA had set up a committee to study the
counterinsurgency problem in several countries. When I returned to
ARA, the first country I tackled was
Guatemala. We had three or four meetings with Defense, CIA, USIA
and State participating. The actions outlined on page 6 are essentially
those proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee, but they have been brought up to
date.
The assessment is current.
As I understand it what the President wants to know is the current
situation and what the United States should be doing to help maintain
and improve the situation. I believe the attached paper provides this
information but would appreciate your reaction as to whether you
consider it adequate.
Mr. Vance thought we should also
go into all the contingencies should the present Peralta government fall. I would agree
that we should do this if we thought that the government would fall
within the immediate future. However, the situation in Guatemala is such
that we do not anticipate any sudden or violent change down there in the
near future, that is, the next 60 or 90 days. Accordingly, my own
feeling is that an attempt to determine contingencies at this time would
not be a very profitable exercise. We have, however, asked CIA to come up with a list of all of the
leading personalities in the political arena in Guatemala with an
indication of their political complexion. As soon as this is done and
discussed with us here in State, it would become an annex to the
attached paper.
Colombia and Bolivia are slightly different stories. On Colombia
especially, I think we will want to give serious consideration to
contingencies. We are working on those papers and hopefully will have
them to you next week.
In the meantime, after you have looked over the Guatemala paper I would
appreciate an indication from you that we are heading in the right
direction.According to a June 22
memorandum from Vaughn to the
Secretary, Bundy advised the
Department on June 18 that the report on Guatemala would satisfy
“current requirements provided biographic data were included.”
Vaughn also wrote: “In
general, Ambassador Bell regards the situation
in Guatemala as reasonably satisfactory over the short term (the
next two to three months). We are not as optimistic about Guatemala
as the Ambassador, but we do not regard the situation so serious as
to require contingency planning.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23 GUAT) The Department officially
forwarded the report to Bundy
on June 18, noting that the biographical information would be sent
at a later date. (Memorandum from Read to Bundy, June 18; ibid., POL 2 GUAT)
RMS
REPORT ON GUATEMALA
Assessment of Current Situation
A. Political
The present regime began governing after the overthrow of Ydigoras
with a fairly broad degree of public support. It was avowedly an
interim government and announced that it would return to
constitutionality and free elections as soon as feasible. In 1964, a
time table was announced which called for the promulgation of a
constitution in March 1965 and elections to be held within six
months from that date. A Constituent Assembly was formed consisting
of most important middle-of-the-road parties. The regime inspired
confidence among the business community for a considerable period
and was helped in this regard by a fairly vigorous campaign to
reduce the grosser aspects of corruption so evident in the Ydigoras
government.
Over the past twelve months, however, the regime has gradually lost a
part of its original support. This loss has been caused primarily by
Peralta’s failure to
adhere to the original time-table for return to constitutional
government and uncertainty over his intentions. The promised
constitution was not promulgated in March, and until recently there
had been growing indications that Peralta intended to seek to perpetuate his regime
until at least 1967. In this atmosphere, an important left-of-center
political party (PR, headed by MarioPID and the right-of-center MLN, was participating in the
Constituent Assembly, has resigned in a bloc from the Assembly and
is now in full opposition, because the Assembly refused to prohibit
leaders of past coups from being presidential candidates.
There have been severe strains within the two parties remaining in
the Constituent Assembly because of political maneuvering by several
potential presidential candidates attempting to get Peralta’s official sanction as the
government candidate for future elections. The resulting progressive
deterioration has given rise to fears that splits within the
middle-of-the-road parties, and within the military itself, might
even lead to civil war, creating a vacuum which could be exploited
by trained communist minorities.
The situation has been ameliorated by a resolution passed by the
Constituent Assembly on June 9. This resolution has fixed the
following timetable for the country’s return to constitutional rule:
1) promulgation of the constitution on September 15; 2) convocation
of presidential and congressional elections on October 1, with the
elections to be held within six months from that date; 3)
installation of the new congress on June 1, 1966; 4) inauguration of
the new president, vice president and supreme court justices on July
1, 1966. Shortly before this resolution, Peralta was quoted in a press
interview with the New York Times to the
effect that he would not seek to be elected President, but he has
not made a public statement to this effect.According to The New York
Times, June 3, Peralta said: “I will absolutely not be a
candidate for the Presidency.”
Even though this new timetable differs substantially from that
originally set forth, it probably will have the immediate effect of
reducing current tensions. It will not, however, eliminate the
political maneuverings among the two major parties and may still
result in dissatisfaction among other moderate parties if, for
example, it becomes clear that Peralta will not permit the PR to conduct an
electoral campaign, or if he excludes other moderate left-of-center
parties, such as the Christian Democrats, from participation in the
electoral process. The government’s intentions in this regard,
however, can only be determined over the next several months.
Taking advantage of the political uncertainties which have prevailed,
there have been several rumors of coups and one serious attempt at a
coup against the Peralta
government by non-communist elements. The most serious was one
planned by Roberto Alejos, a strong supporter of former President
Ydigoras. Alejos, presently in exile in Miami, claimed to have a
number of supporters among the military in Guatemala, planned to
transport arms and Cuban mercenaries from Miami to Guatemala during May. His plans were
thwarted due to close coverage of his activities by Customs and
other U.S. enforcement agencies and the sizeable quantity of arms he
accumulated were seized by U.S. enforcement officials.The initiative in this matter evidently came
from Ambassador Bell, who urged the U.S.
Government to move quickly against Alejos. (Telegram 965 from
Guatemala City, May 27; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL GUAT)
B. Economic
Indecision in the political field has been matched by indecision in
the business of government. The Peralta regime, despite its effectiveness in
reducing corruption, has been unable to take any affirmative
decisions in the economic and social fields which would have
contributed to progress and to reduction of counter-insurgency
problems. Government investment programs have stagnated. No AID loans of any consequence have been
completed since installation of the Peralta government two years ago. Several loans have
been authorized by AID and one loan
from the Export-Import Bank has been approved for negotiation, but
U.S. representatives have, up to date, been unable to penetrate the
suspicion and apathy of Guatemalan officials and complete
negotiations on these loans. Neither the AID loans nor the proposed EXIM loan differ in their
provisions from loans which have been concluded with all the other
countries in Latin America.
This inability to come to terms on international loans in support of
the government investment program is not a problem unique with U.S.
agencies, and the Guatemalan attitude cannot be attributed solely to
suspicion of North American motives. The Inter-American Development
Bank has also had its difficulties in working with the GOG. Although the IDB has concluded negotiations on
several loans, the rates of disbursement on these loans have been
abnormally slow due to GOG inaction.
It seems clear that lack of action in the economic field
fundamentally results from the unwillingness or inability on the
part of some members of the government to make effective
decisions.
Fortunately, the governmental shortcomings have been somewhat offset
by a vigorously expanding private sector. Exports have continued to
climb significantly and there has been a substantial shifting away
from dependence on coffee over the last three years due to the
emergence of cotton as an important export commodity. There has also
been a substantial increase in exports to Guatemala’s partners in
the C.A. Common Market, consisting primarily of light manufactures
and processed agricultural products. Under the impetus of increasing
exports and private investment activity, Guatemalan GNP has risen by over 6% per year over the last 2
years. Current prospects are that it will continue to increase at
this rate.
Despite improved exports, rapidly rising imports have resulted in a
continued deficit on current account. Since much of the increase in
imports has been financed by supplier credits from the U.S.,
Guatemalan foreign exchange reserves have continued to rise.
Immediate foreign exchange difficulties have thus far been avoided,
but repayment of supplier credits and short-term debts contracted
with private banks in the U.S. will all create a strain over a
somewhat longer period.
The major determinant of Guatemala’s immediate economic future
however is whether or not the business sector will continue to have
confidence in the stability of the government. In the absence of
confidence in the future, foreign exchange reserves could rapidly
disappear, as they did immediately before the overthrow of
Ydigoras.
Guatemalan inability to maintain an effective public investment
program has also seriously affected the ability of economic
assistance programs to focus on some of the social problems and
basic causes of the country’s backwardness. A phenomenon of this
backwardness is the sprawling city slums in Guatemala City on which
urban terrorism feeds. Community development efforts in the
countryside although given lip service by the government are almost
non-existent or couched in such grandiose terms as to be impossible
of fulfillment. The government appears to feel no need for urgent
action in areas of social reform.
C. Internal Defense
For the past several years there have been small bands of guerrillas
in Guatemalan eastern hill country which have engaged in isolated
raids and occasional political assassinations. The Government has
been unable to eliminate these groups although sporadically
aggressive patrol activity by the military has succeeded in keeping
them somewhat off balance. The guerrillas, headed by Yon Sosa,
former Guatemalan army officer, are financed from Cuba and have been
conducting their activities independently of the regular Guatemalan
Communist Party structure (PGT).
In recent months there have been reports of attempts to coordinate
terrorist activities between the PGT
and the Yon Sosa guerrillas and turn the attention of both groups to
urban rather than rural activities. The extent to which this
coordination of efforts has been achieved is uncertain but in any
event there has been a significant increase in urban terrorism.
In January there was an attempted assassination of the Chief of the
U.S. Army Mission and the USAID
motor pool in Guatemala City was burned to the ground. In February, terrorists in Guatemala
City, who had intended to assassinate Peralta, threw grenades at a crowd of people and
into a Guatemalan Army truck causing several casualties. As an
immediate effect of this action, a state of siege was imposed by the
Peralta government.
Since imposition of the state of siege, terrorists on March 20
assassinated a police officer who had a reputation as a terrorist,
on March 25 threw a grenade at an Army truck which bounced off in
the street and killed a girl, and on March 31 machine-gunned a
Guatemalan Army building and planted bombs around the city causing
several casualties.
On May 2, the U.S. Consulate was sprayed with machine-gun fire and
bombs were thrown elsewhere in the city. At noon, May 21, the Vice
Minister of Defense was assassinated near his home. On June 7,
approximately 7 bombs were exploded in different parts of the city,
including the residences of the Brazilian and Nicaraguan
Ambassadors, the latter in an apparent protest against the action of
these two countries in sending troops to the Dominican Republic.
CAS reports have continued to give
strong indication of communist intentions to take direct action
against U.S. personnel and installations. As a result of this,
security in U.S. Government installations has been increased
sharply. The Marine Corps complement in the Embassy has been more
than doubled and emergency radio and telephone communications
facilities have been installed to increase the alert capability.
The Guatemalan military forces have sufficient training and equipment
to counter isolated hit-and-run raids by guerrillas in the rural
areas. There are several units in a fair state of readiness,
including an airborne infantry company which could be airlifted to
severe trouble spots should actions develop beyond the capability of
local military commanders. One reason the Guatemalan military forces
are not more effective against the guerrillas is the inadequacy of
their information and patrol systems. More coordinated effort
between police and military efforts should be sought. Another reason
is the general attitude of the rural population as a result of the
military tendency to behave like an army of occupation in the areas
they visit.
In an effort to change their image, the military have engaged in
active and fairly successful civic action programs throughout the
country. Unfortunately, very few of these programs have been located
in areas of rural guerrilla activity.
The qualified success of the military in the rural areas is not
matched by security force capabilities within the city. There are
substantial elements of the national police force located in
Guatemala City but their training and equipment are relatively poor.
More importantly there has
been no clear definition of the roles of the police and military in
counter-insurgency operations either in the cities or in rural
areas.
Efforts to improve the police have been hampered by the same lack of
GOG ability to make decisions
evident in political and economic fields. Current levels of
assistance to the police through AID/OPS programs amount to $276,000 of which $100,000
is for U.S. technical advisors. The current level of MAP financing for support of military
forces is $1.3 million. Despite indications that the U.S. was
prepared to consider increased assistance to the police, the
Government of Guatemala has so far not responded affirmatively.
The existence of urban terrorism and guerrilla activities will not in
themselves cause the overthrow of the Peralta government if there is no major
deterioration of the political and economic situation. Nevertheless,
the evidence of increasingly coordinated efforts among the two
extremist groups, and the increasing number of urban terrorist
actions indicate that an effective organization is being created.
Vigorous measures are required to reduce its potential for damage
and to weaken its ability to seize on a deteriorating situation
should one develop.
Action Recommendations
The Latin American Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Counter-Insurgency
has been reviewing in detail the situation described above. It has
come to the obvious conclusion that one of the key impediments to
the development of a counter-insurgency program in Guatemala is
ineffective government leadership and the unwillingness of the
Peralta government to
make decisions involving the economic, political and social
development of the country.
The actions set forth below, which the group has sent as an
instruction to the Country Team,Airgram
CA–12888 to Guatemala City,
June 2. (Ibid., POL 23
GUAT) will be inhibited by this overriding problem. To
the extent that the Country Team can move forward on such action,
however, the following steps should be taken:
I. Political
Undertake to convince Peralta, other members of his government and
responsible leaders of the moderate, nonextremist political
parties that it is in Guatemalan interests for the government to
press forward now with a broad range of programs directed
towards national progress and development.In low key, undertake in various ways, including direct
personal conduct, to make known to Peralta the U.S. view that early return to constitutional
government is essential and emphasizing the U.S. concern that
failure to move in this direction enhances the possibility of
subversion or civil war.Encourage Peralta to
permit all “middle-of-the-road” political parties to present
candidates for the presidency.Discreetly strengthen moderate political parties by all
feasible means.Discreetly support selected moderate politicians as a
potential leadership resource in the event of a breakdown or
sharp deterioration of the present situation.
II. Economic
Complete negotiations on outstanding AID loans as soon as possible waiving minor
provisions which the present Government of Guatemala can use as
an excuse for its inability to make decisions.Consider the possibility of financing slum clearance and
related projects in Guatemala City in an attempt to reduce the
major subversion potential represented by urban
discontent.Explore the possibility of U.S. financing of additional mobile
health units to be concentrated in guerrilla-threatened rural
areas.Consider the possibility of initiating community development
programs, particularly in guerrilla-threatened areas.
III. Internal Defense
Continue to push for an expanded Public Safety program to
enable the police to deal more effectively with insurgency
problems, with primary emphasis on urban areas but also
including rural activities.Consider the creation of a special group within the police
force to deal with counter-insurgency.Urge that there be a clear definition of the roles of the
police and military in counter-insurgency operations.Examine the attitudes of the rural population toward
Guatemalan security forces and the possibility of more effective
training of such forces to improve civilian/security-forces
relationships.To the extent feasible, urge the expansion of civic action
programs in threatened areas coordinating with AID programs which may be
developed.
76. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 GUAT–UK. Confidential. Drafted by Steins on July 21; cleared by
Shullaw, Reis, and Salans.
Sayre initialed for
Vaughn. Another copy
indicates that the memorandum was also cleared by Leonhardy and Sause. (Ibid.)Washington, July 22, 1965.
SUBJECT
U.S. Position on Mediation Request in British Honduras
Dispute
Discussion
The Governments of Guatemala and the United Kingdom formally requested
the United States Government on July 6, 1965 to move beyond its role of
good offices in the UK–Guatemala dispute
over British Honduras and to serve as a mediator in the dispute either
solely or in conjunction with other governments to be mutually agreed
upon. This request was the outcome of informal talks held in London
during the last week of June between representatives of the Governments
of Guatemala, the United Kingdom, and British Honduras. These talks, as
well as the round of talks which preceded them in May in Miami, were
arranged through the good offices which the U.S. Government has been
extending to the U.K. and Guatemala since 1963, shortly after the
long-standing dispute over British Honduras (or Belize) led to the
rupture of diplomatic relations between those two governments. Having
received informal notice from both sides that the London talks would
probably lead to a request for U.S. Government mediation, the Department
unsuccessfully attempted to ward off such a request by informing both
sides, prior to the London talks, that the USGovt would prefer not to
mediate but would be willing, on request, to suggest prominent foreign
(non-U.S.) private citizens as mediators. Our position was dictated by
our desire to avoid the onus of a settlement which is bound to be
unpopular with one side or the other and particularly so with Guatemala.
The possible adverse reaction to direct USG mediation by Mexico, which also has a claim to part of
British Honduras, has been another consideration.
Following receipt of the request for U.S. Government mediation, Embassy
Guatemala strongly urged the Department to accede (Embtel 13, July 6, Tab A).Not attached. (Ibid., POL BRHOND–GUAT) AmConsul Belize endorsed
Embassy Guatemala’s
recommendation (Belize No. 3 of July 13, Tab B).Not attached. (Ibid., POL 32–1 GUAT–UK)
The British Government is believed to desire a favorable U.S. response
primarily to ensure continuation of the search for a solution which will
enable it to withdraw from British Honduras. Embassy Mexico recommended
that, if the USGovt were to undertake the mediation, prior consultation
should be carried out with the GOM
because of Mexico’s own historic claim to part of British Honduras
(Embtel 63, July 7, Tab C).Not attached. (Ibid., POL BRHOND–GUAT) Embassy Mexico believes GOM would not object to mediation by a
prominent U.S. private citizen, but recommends that announcement of the
appointment of a mediator be made, not by the U.S. Government, but by
the UK and the GOG, to minimize the appearance of official U.S.
participation (Embtel 143, July 15,
Tab D).Not attached. Reference should be to
telegram 142 from Mexico. (Ibid.) Mr. Meeker, in a memorandum of July 12
(copy attached, Tab E)Not attached.
Reference is in error; the memorandum from Meeker to Vaughn and Leddy is dated July 13. (Ibid.,
POL 32–1 GUAT–UK) suggested that the Department
be responsive to the request but attempt, at least for the time being,
to keep to a minimum the U.S. Government association with the mediation
by offering to suggest a prominent U.S. private citizen or citizens as
mediator(s).
Recommendation
With the concurrence of EUR and of L, I
recommend that the Department reply to the UK and GOG request by
offering to suggest to them a prominent U.S. private citizen or citizens
to serve as mediator. I further recommend that, if the answer of the
UK and GOG to this offer is affirmative, ARA and L be authorized together to begin discreet,
informal exploratory soundings with appropriate U.S. private
citizens.Ball approved this
recommendation on July 24.
77. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 GUAT–UK. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Passed to the White House.Guatemala City, August 2, 1965,
1508Z.
64. For the Secretary from Ambassador. I am very much concerned that we
appear to be on point rejecting request made jointly on July 6, 1965 by
Governments of Guatemala and Great Britain to extend our good offices
further in matter of Belize-British Honduras dispute and accept function
of mediator either alone or (if we prefer) in association with other
states. Deptel 48 of July 30 indicates that this is likely.Not printed. (Ibid.) Only reason for such
refusal known to me is set forth Deptel 23 July 13Not printed. (Ibid., POL BRHOND–GUAT) where indicated: “We remain
reluctant assume direct responsibility for settlement which likely be
unpopular, at least with GOG.”
I have sought in several messages to point out reasons why I thought in
our interests to respond affirmatively to the request. (Embtels 13 July 6, 26 July 15Neither printed. (Ibid., and POL 32–1 GUAT–UK,
respectively) and 53 July 29.Telegram 53 from Guatemala City is dated July 28. (Ibid.))
For past two years Guatemalan Govt has sought find way out this
political problem which has been source both trouble and political
exploitation for nearly a century. British Govt which two yeas ago had
no confidence in Guatemalan sincerity is now persuaded thereof. No
comparable opportunity to reach peaceful solution has existed during
last hundred years. If not seized upon and cultivated not likely again
to recur.
I have reluctantly come to conclusion that GOG will conclude it cannot accept mediation through
private citizens; thus if we refuse to serve as mediators we may find
that effort will collapse or be abandoned. GOG has gone very far in effort to demonstrate its
readiness to work to solve its political problem but it feels it needs
the help and reassurance that having USG
as USG can give and which private
citizens cannot. This reflects fact that however much USG is criticized from time to time GOG believes and believes that its citizens
believe in basic fairness of US and that chances getting adequate
face-saving formulas out of mediation are better with prestige and moral
influence of USG involved. This may not
be entirely reasonable and I may not explain it very clearly but I am
convinced that with USG acceptance of
role we have excellent chance resolving problem in manner safeguarding
interests of all, and that if we turn down request, we face likelihood that such action
will destroy or negate progress so painfully made over past two years.
Responsibility for this undesirable result would be ours.
Obviously fact of GOG desire for USG as USG
implies that we would have to accept some responsibility for results of
mediation. As I have pointed out, it could not be exclusive since the
GOG would have to have freely
accepted any proposals, but it is true that we might be faced with share
of any onus that arose out of mediation. If we assume this was
considerable, (which I do not believe it would be) would this be a very
big price to pay for a successful resolution of dispute? If mediation
fails, we are only where we began.
We do not shirk our responsibilities when they have reached points of
critical danger, as in Viet-Nam and in Dominican Republic, and certainly
our investments and our risks there are major. What is required in
Belize is a minor investment of brain power employment and lots of
patience and determination. If we turn down request and Belize becomes
the focus of infection later as it could very well become, we will
surely regret having been timid.
I do not understand how we can justify denial of joint request of two
allied powers to serve as friendly mediator in effort to solve dispute
between them. I respectfully urge that this matter be reconsidered at
highest level.
Bell
78. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Sayre) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1
GUAT–UK. Confidential. Drafted by
Sowash on August 5 and
cleared by Leddy and
Meeker. A notation on the
memorandum indicates that Rusk
saw it.Washington, August 6, 1965.
SUBJECT
Mediation of British Honduras Dispute
Discussion
We have endeavored to avoid a direct role in the United Kingdom–Guatemala
talks on Belize because of our desire to avoid the onus of a settlement which may well be
unpopular, particularly in Guatemala, where the weakness of the
Government’s claim is in inverse proportion to the emotional appeal of
the issue. The possible adverse reaction to direct USG mediation from Mexico, which also has a
claim to part of British Honduras, has been another consideration. The
British and Guatemalan Governments, however, formally requested direct
U.S. Government mediation on July 6 either solely or in conjunction with
other Governments to be mutually agreed upon.
On July 24, the Under Secretary approved a proposal that the USG adopt a more responsive attitude by
offering to suggest the name of a prominent U.S. private citizen or
citizens to serve as mediator(s) (Tab A).Document 76. Apprised of this
position informally, Ambassador Bell requested that
you review this decision (Tab B—Emb. Guatemala telegram 64).Document 77. He urges direct U.S.
Government mediation.
It has been the position of ARA that the
U.S. should avoid pursuing a role in which we would be charged in
Guatemala with responsibility for the loss of Belize. We have explored
the possibility of a tripartite governmental mediation but the Legal
Adviser’s Office believes this procedure to be unwieldy and we are
inclined to agree. Moreover, under such a procedure we might well have
the U.S. representative casting the decisive vote on questions on which
the other two mediators were divided and thus reap as much onus as if we
had undertaken the mediation by ourselves.
We see advantages in suggesting a prominent American citizen as mediator
in a private capacity, although we recognize that, in practice, the
distinction between an American acting in a private capacity or in a
governmental capacity may not be great. The onus for an unpopular
settlement in either case may rest on the USG. Despite this risk, we recognize that an opportunity
now exists to settle the long-standing dispute. On balance therefore, we
believe that we should respond to the British and Guatemalan requests,
in the sense that we are prepared to arrange for a mediation effort by
suggesting the names of a prominent American citizen or citizens to
serve as the mediator but leaving open the question of the private or
governmental character of the mediator. We would be prepared in
subsequent discussions with the UK and
Guatemala to agree to direct USG
mediation if we find this to be necessary to get the mediation underway.
EUR and L concur.
Recommendations:Although
the memorandum does not record the decision, the Secretary
evidently approved both recommendations. Rusk authorized the delivery of
diplomatic notes in Guatemala and London indicating his
“readiness to propose the name of a prominent and distinguished
citizen or citizens of the United States to undertake the
mediation of this dispute.” (Telegram 75 to Guatemala City and
London, August 18; National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 GUAT–UK)
The Department subsequently conceded the issue of direct
mediation by appointing Bethuel M.
Webster, a New York City lawyer and former member
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, as mediator with
ambassadorial rank. (Telegram 174 to Guatemala City, October 20;
ibid.)
That you authorize a reply to the United Kingdom and Guatemalan
Governments’ request which offers to suggest the name of a prominent
U.S. citizen or citizens to undertake the mediation.
That you authorize direct mediation by the U.S. Government in the event
this is required.
79. Memorandum From the Assistant to the Vice President (Rielly) to Vice President
HumphreySource: Minnesota Historical Society,
Hubert H. Humphrey
Papers, Vice Presidential Files, Foreign Affairs General Files,
Meeting with Daniel Oduber,
September 15, 1965. Secret; Sensitive. Oduber also met Humphrey on April 15 to discuss, among other issues,
“the Presidential campaign in Costa Rica next year.” (Memorandum
from Rielly to Humphrey, April 14; ibid., Meeting
with Daniel Oduber and Amb.
Facio of Costa Rica, 4/15/65) No substantive record of the meeting
has been found.Washington, September 14, 1965.
SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Daniel
Oduber
Daniel Oduber is making his final
trip to Washington before the Presidential election scheduled to take
place on February 6, 1966. He is here to mobilize all possible outside
support for the government and to the extent possible for the party
during this critical election period.
The electoral race in Costa Rica has changed considerably since his last
visit and his left of center Populista party now faces the opposition of
a united conservative front. Our independent assessments indicate that
though he will have strong competition, he is still expected to win. The current estimate
is that he will carry about 54 percent of the vote, although an
estimated swing vote of 100,000 votes could alter this outcome.
Oduber contends that it is not
sufficient merely to win the election but to win by a sufficiently large
majority so that the new president will have in the Assembly a working
majority sufficiently large to put through the needed constitutional
changes. This would require getting about 60 percent of the vote, as
constitutional amendments require approval by two-thirds vote of the
legislature. To effect basic structural reforms in the economy and the
society it is necessary to change the constitution.
The government is encountering economic problems which could have a
direct bearing on the election. A two million dollar repayment to the
Ex-Im Bank falls due sometime late this year. The Costa Rican Government
would like to get it rolled over for six months or so so they can have
that money available for other purposes during this period. Secondly,
the government must raise electricity rates by 12 percent before the
election if it is to meet requirements set down by a previous World Bank
loan. It is doubtful that the World Bank will consider delaying this.
However, the Ex-Im loan repayment could easily be rolled over if it is
considered important to do so here in Washington.
The Costa Ricans are also seeking to expedite the disbursements under a
7½ million dollar project loan approved earlier. They would like to have
part of the remaining 4 million dollars disbursed ahead of schedule so
as to permit them to have funds to meet the government payroll for the
rest of the year. Apparently there is some possibility they will default
on the government payroll unless they get some external assistance—which
would be disastrous politically.
I believe the Costa Ricans may be operating under the assumption that
external funds might be available for the election
campaign itself. They argue that much of the 1.5 million
dollars that is being spent by the conservative opposition comes from
outside the country, namely from the Somozas in nearby Nicaragua.
Therefore they consider it legitimate for them to accept funds from
outside of the country. A check with the appropriate people here reveals
great reluctance to get involved in this contest, as it does not involve
any left-wing threat. Most everyone in Washington agrees that it is
desirable from the U.S. point-of-view for Oduber to win, but it is not
considered appropriate to actively intervene as the conservative
opposition is not considered a threat to U.S. interests.
As a practical matter, I believe you could say something to Dean
Rusk, who is a friend and a
great admirer of Oduber, about
the U.S. Government doing all it can to help him. Rusk could pass the word both to Ex-Im
and to AID to do everything they can to
cooperate with the Costa Rican
Government. With a word from Rusk both Ex-Im and AID would grant the roll-overs and the advance
disbursements.Although no evidence has
been found that he spoke to Rusk, Humphrey evidently asked the Export-Import Bank to
refinance construction of the Pan-American Highway in Costa Rica. In
an October 12 telephone conversation Vaughn discussed the project with president of the
Bank, Harold Linder, complaining of a “rather exotic process trying
to pin down what the White House wants on Costa Rica.” Linder
explained that the loan had been refinanced three times, but thought
that “something could be arranged to get at what the White House had
in mind.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
ARA Files, 1965–67: Lot 70 D
295, Inner Office Memoranda, October 1965)
Whether you would want to raise with Rusk the question of additional aid, I am not sure. It
would take a strong push from the White House to get final approval on
this. On the basis of his knowledge of previous elections in the
hemisphere (Venezuela, Chile, Dominican Republic), I believe Daniel may
be making some false deductions about what is available.Humphrey met Oduber on
September 15. According to a draft memorandum of conversation,
Oduber said that he
needed outside assistance “for his campaign to be really
successful,” charging that his opponent had already received support
from the Somoza family and a
local television station owned by the American Broadcasting Company.
Humphrey maintained that
“liberal people up here should have an interest in the outcome of
this election,” and agreed to enlist “some labor friends of his.”
The Vice President promised that “he would have his lawyer and
confidante, Max Kampelman, look into this matter and see what the
possibilities are.” Humphrey
also said that he would ask Kampelman to “get word to the ABC people that they are discriminating
against a candidate whose program is favorable to the United
States.” (Minnesota Historical Society, Hubert H. Humphrey Papers, Vice Presidential Files,
Foreign Affairs General Files, Meeting with Daniel Oduber, September 15,
1965)
80. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 COSTARICA. Confidential. Drafted
by Willis and Sedgwick. The meeting was held at the home of Edmundo
Gerli. Forwarded as an enclosure to airgram A–151 from San Josè,
September 28.San Josè, September
21, 1965.
SUBJECT
Current Presidential Campaign
PARTICIPANTS
Josè Joaquin Trejos
Fernandez, Presidential Candidate, National
Unification PartyMario Echandi, Former
President of Costa RicaAmbassador Telles
Echandi started off a discussion
of the election campaign by remarking that he was seriously concerned by
the increasing amount of violence at campaign rallies and stated that
during his Presidency (1958–1962) there had been no such problem. At the
same time, Echandi also made it
clear to me that he sees no likelihood of an attempted golpe, although
he remarked that one could never predict the behavior of “irresponsible”
elements in Costa Rica. Likewise he did not seem concerned that campaign
violence might lead to a possible assassination attempt, planned or
otherwise, on either candidate saying that it was out of keeping with
the Costa Rican character.
Echandi mentioned again to me a
favorite grievance of his regarding the U.S.—the fact that President
Kennedy, during his original
speech on the Alliance for Progress, had mentioned Josè Figueres.Reference is to President Kennedy’s address at a White House
reception for members of the Diplomatic Corps from Latin American
Republics on March 13, 1961, in which he formally announced the
formation of the Alliance for Progress. The speech included the
line: “In the words of Jose
Figueres, ‘once dormant peoples are struggling upward
toward the sun, toward a better life.’” (Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F.
Kennedy, 1961, p. 172) Both Trejos and Echandi alleged that the U.S. Government through “bad
advisors in Washington”, and PLN
candidate Daniel Oduber, as a
deliberate effort, have tried to create the impression that the Alliance
in Costa Rica is somehow the property of the National Liberation Party
and that the benefits which Costa Rica receives from the Alliance are
due to PLN efforts. Echandi asserted that Vice President
Humphrey has befriended
Oduber and that the latter is
conveying the impression that without a PLN Government, the Alliance would not operate in Costa
Rica. Trejos and Echandi both suggested that this
impression could be countered by a public statement from me to the
effect that the Alliance is politically neutral.
I replied that no political party in Costa Rica (or in any other Latin
American country) has a monopoly on the Alliance, which is politically
neutral, and that the U.S. is ready to cooperate with any freely elected
government in this country. I recalled that during the Echandi Government, the U.S. had
provided a great deal of assistance. I said that our only interest is
that the 1966 elections be carried out in the best Costa Rican
democratic tradition and assured them that once the Costa Rican people
have elected a government we will support it. I also reminded Echandi that I had taken various steps
to help ensure free elections in 1962 and told him how I had insisted
then and have now on the strict neutrality of all Embassy personnel. As
for Oduber’s relationship with
Mr. Humphrey, I commented that
Oduber has probably made a considerable effort to cultivate Mr.
Humphrey, but that Mr.
Humphrey would certainly not assist in
Oduber’s campaign and further
neither the Vice President nor any other U.S. Government official will
extend any financial interest to either candidate. Regarding a public
statement, I countered that any such statement would have to be
carefully thought out, especially as to context and timing, but that I
would be glad to consider it.
Referring to Trejos’ recent
speech in which he had alleged U.S. Government favoritism toward the
PLN, I said that, given the widespread pro-U.S. attitudes in Costa Rica,
any statement which might be construed by the Costa Rican public as
being anti-U.S. might well prove to be counterproductive. Echandi replied, rather heatedly, that
“Costa Ricans would never tolerate U.S. involvement in Costa Rican
affairs”. I quickly made the point that the U.S. was not involving
itself in the Costa Rican elections and that it was apparent that we
were not doing so. Both Echandi
and Trejos agreed with me.
Trejos then stated that he
regards himself as a great friend of the U.S., but that he still had the
impression that Embassy was attempting to “seek out” and “consult”
Oduber. I said that the
source of Trejos’
misunderstanding should not be difficult to dispel, since it must have
arisen when two AID technicians were
invited to attend a recent meeting at the Planning Office at which
Oduber was also present; a fact of which they had no knowledge before
the meeting. I said that this, of course, had placed the AID people in an awkward position, but that
there was nothing they could do about it except to proceed with their
presentation of facts; there was, of course, no “consultation” with
Oduber. I then told Trejos that
we would be glad to give him a full briefing on the AID program, or on any other U.S. program
that might interest him at any time, as we had “absolutely nothing to
hide.” I assured him that if he should ever be disturbed about any
aspect of U.S. policy that I would attempt to explain it to him and if
it should prove that the Embassy or I were in the wrong that I would do
my best to correct it. Trejos seemed pleased at the invitation and said
he would take up my offer at the first opportunity.
The conversation turned to other matters and I brought up the subject of
the CIAP tax mission and asked
Trejos his opinion of this
effort to achieve an improved system of taxation in Costa Rica. The
candidate replied that he was fully aware of the mission and thought
that it would be “helpful”, and was in favor of technical assistance in
connection with the Costa Rican tax program.
81. Memorandum From William G.
Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Costa Rica, Vol. I, 4/64–10/68. Secret;
Sensitive. Bundy wrote the
following note on the memorandum: “Bill: Good, this makes sense to me.”Washington, November 18, 1965.
SUBJECT
Costa Rican Election
At your request I have looked into the Costa Rican electoral picture.
This is what I have found:
1. Essential Facts
The election is scheduled to take place on February 6, 1966. It is a
general election, covering the Presidency, Legislative Assembly and
Municipal Councils.
The principal candidates are Daniel Oduber
Quiros of the Partido Liberacion Nacional (the party now
in power) and Jose Trejos
Fernandez, representing a coalition of opposition groups
(Partido Republicano, Partido de Union Nacional, and Partido Union
Republicana Autentica).
The Presidential inauguration is scheduled for May 8, 1966.
2. The Candidates
Full, up-to-date biographic sketches of the two Presidential candidates
are at Tab A.Attached but not
printed. They are staunch democrats. Both are friendly to the
United States and can be expected to work closely with us. Both have the
right orientation on the communist threat, although Oduber’s views are better known because
of his role in the OAS on this issue.
The principal difference seems to be one of background and political
outlook. Trejos comes from a prominent and well-to-do family. He is
described as a “moderate conservative”. Oduber comes from a modest background and is clearly
left of center.
3. The Outlook
The campaign is just beginning to get under way in earnest. The reporting
is scanty, so it is hard to get a very clear picture of issues and
trends. This is being corrected.
The Embassy last month expressed the view that Oduber had a “reasonable edge” over
Trejos, but declined making
any firm prediction on the
probable outcome.In airgram A–179 from San
Josè, October 12. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14
COSTARICA) Ambassador Telles in a recent letter reported that Oduber was still favored to win.Not found.
State/INR last August did a roundup on
the elections (Tab B).Dated August 16;
attached but not printed. Their estimate was that the race
would be close but that Oduber had an edge. The INR Costa Rican analyst has recently come back from a trip
to Costa Rica. He states that the August estimate is still valid, with
Oduber’s chances slightly
improved. He found Trejos to be
a lackluster campaigner and Oduber the same old spell-binder.
4. Degree of U.S. Assistance
No USG assistance has been given to
Trejos.
[1 paragraph (7 lines of source text) not
declassified]
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
Oduber has been in touch with
AFL–CIO leaders. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
Oduber has informed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
that Victor and Walter Reuther invited [1 line of
source text not declassified], to go to Detroit about November
1 to pick up funds for the political campaign. We have no further
details on this.
5. My Recommendation
I think we can live quite comfortably with either candidate. Our
interests would be better served, however, by an Oduber victory. He would give Costa
Rica progressive, left-of-center leadership more closely attuned to the
aims of the Alliance for Progress. He would have the support of a single
party. Trejos would be leader of an unstable coalition, with all the
problems that this could bring.
I do not think that we should choose sides to the extent of bankrolling
Oduber. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] He knows
that we are pulling for him—Jack
Vaughn told him so, and I imagine the Vice President
conveyed the same impression. The AFL–CIO seems to be helping him out. [3½
lines of source text not declassified]
WGB
82. Memorandum From William G.
Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, December 9, 1965.[Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Costa Rica, Vol. I, 4/64–10/68. Secret;
Sensitive. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
83. Memorandum From William G.
Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)
Washington, December 15, 1965.[Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Costa Rica, Vol. I, 4/64–10/68. Secret;
Sensitive. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
84. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. XVII. Secret. A notation on the
memorandum indicates the President saw it.Washington, December 17, 1965, 3:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Deepening Crisis in GuatemalaRecent reports from our Embassy and CIA sources in Guatemala indicate that President
Peralta’s position has
deteriorated and that a military coup may be attempted prior to
December 20.As reported in CIA Intelligence Memorandum, [text not declassified]; ibid., Country
File, Guatemala, Vol. I, 3/64–1/66. A memorandum from Vaughn to Rusk, December 10, closely
following the language of the CIA memorandum, is in the National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 GUAT.The leader of the coup is Col. Miguel Angel Ponciano, candidate
for President of the minority, rightist Movement for National
Liberation (MLN). Ponciano suspects
that Peralta is working to
insure the election of another candidate. The elections are
scheduled for March 6, 1966. Ponciano is trying to develop enough
support among military commanders to overthrow Peralta.Embassy officers met with Ponciano on Tuesday and told him that we
strongly favor return to constitutionality via the scheduled
elections. He made quite clear that the issue is Peralta’s suspected support of
another candidate. He said in effect that either Peralta stops interfering in the
elections, or he must go. He claims that he would remove only
Peralta and his cousin
and that elections would be held on schedule. What is clear is that
Ponciano wants to count the ballots on March 6.As reported in telegram 373 from Guatemala City,
December 14. (Ibid., POL 23–8
GUAT)The danger in this situation is that an attempted coup may split
the military, lead to protracted fighting and play into the hands of
the Communists. We have instructed Ambassador Mein to convey a strong warning
against a coup to Ponciano.Instructions
transmitted in telegram 279 to Guatemala City, December 15.
(Ibid., POL 23–9 GUAT) At
the same time, we want him to urge Peralta, in his own interest, to request OAS supervision of the elections with a
visit now by OAS Secretary General
Mora or OAS
Council Chairman Penna Marinho (Brazil).As suggested in telegram 277 to Guatemala City, December 15.
(Ibid., POL 23–8 GUAT)
Such a proposal might give Peralta some insurance and could not do any of us
any harm. He is seeing Peralta today and will afterwards lean hard on
Ponciano.This is not at present a Dominican Republic
situation, but it may easily require some energetic diplomatic
pressures in order to prevent real deterioration via military civil
war.We are following developments closely. State, DOD and CIA are doing some contingency planning.The Department forwarded a report on its
contingency plans in a December 27 memorandum to Bundy. The report reflected the
recommendations of the LAPC,
and considered a number of contingencies, including Situation A,
in which Guatemala continues “more or less as it is from now to
the elections.” In this event, the Department recommended that
the U.S. maintain its course of: a) providing assistance for the
counterinsurgency effort; b) keeping in touch with presidential
candidates and other leaders; and c) “making clear at every
opportune moment to Peralta and to all conspirators that we favor
not a coup but elections on schedule.” (Ibid., POL 2 GUAT)McG. B.
85. Memorandum From William G.
Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Guatemala, Vol. I, 3/64–1/66.
Confidential.Washington, December 21, 1965.
SUBJECT
Guatemalan Situation
The December 20 target date passed with no coup in Guatemala. According
to [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] reports,None
found. the new date is December 22.
Ambassador Mein saw President
Peralta last Friday (Tab
A).Tab A, telegram 380 from Guatemala
City, December 18, is attached but not printed. Another copy is in
the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1964–66, POL 14 GUAT.
He found him relaxed and confident that he could deal with any coup
attempt. He seemed fully aware of Col. Ponciano’s doings and completely
uninterested in our approaches to Ponciano. Mein seems to share a good deal of Peralta’s confidence—more than I think
he should. Much to my annoyance, Mein did not raise with Peralta the desirability of an OAS presence. He believes it would be a mistake to suggest
it. (Tab B)Tab B, telegram 377 from
Guatemala City, December 16, is attached but not printed. In the
telegram Mein argued that the
suggestion would “only cause resentment,” since Peralta had repeatedly maintained
that the elections would be free, i.e. without interference from
either the government or the army. (Also ibid.)Peralta in his present frame of
mind would probably have said “no,” but it would be interesting to sound
him out and start him thinking along these lines. Mein is scheduled to see coup leader
Ponciano tomorrow.In his account of the
meeting, Mein reported that
Ponciano was “not as vehement in his comments on Peralta,” but had warned “that
there would be serious trouble in Guatemala if March elections are
not free.” (Telegram 391 from Guatemala City, December 22; ibid.,
POL 23–9 GUAT)
Our approaches to President Schick and “Tachito” Somoza in Nicaragua seem to have paid
off. Latest CIA reports indicate
Somoza has stopped supporting
plotters working for the overthrow of Peralta and Echandi in Costa Rica.Echandi was a former
President of Costa Rica; the current President was Francisco Orlich Bolmarich.
Documentation on U.S. efforts to discourage General Somoza from interfering in Costa
Rica and Guatemala is ibid., POL
23–9 COSTARICA. A handwritten note by McBundy on the memorandum reads: “Thanks.”
WGB
86. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PER 2–1. Secret. Also
in Washington National Records Center, RG 84: FRC 71 A 2420,
Guatemala Embassy Files, 1966, POL
Guatemala, Jan–June 1966.Guatemala City, January 4, 1966, 2:50
p.m.
412. For the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Vaughn.
This message is in response to Secretary’s request, when I called
on him in September prior to my departure for Guatemala,According to Rusk’s Appointment Book, Rusk briefly met Mein on August 31, 1965, the
day before Mein received
his nomination. (Johnson Library) No substantive record of the
meeting was found. for reports every 3 or 4 months on
local situation. Beginning of new year and completion of third month
since presentation credentials (September 22) would seem good time
for such review.Principal factors in present situation are: Elections of President, Vice President, entire Congress,
and all municipal authorities are scheduled for March 6, and
the electoral campaign is expected to get into full swing
this month;Terrorist activities have increased in last two months.
There have been four known kidnappings of leading
businessmen, with over $250,000 paid in ransom, several
other threats and extortion efforts by the terrorists and
possibly others taking advantage of the situation, and
several murders.The regime’s failure to solve some of the country’s
problems, the three-year period in return to
constitutionality, and the regime’s apparent inability to
deal with the terrorist threat, have led to general loss of
confidence in the government and to a deterioration of
Peralta’s
personal standing and prestige.The military appear to be divided not only in their
support of Peralta,
but, which could be more serious in the long run, between
the younger and older officers since the former see the
latter standing in their way of further advancement.There are several groups, both civilian and military,
plotting against the regime, and a general expectancy that a
coup will be staged before March. The reasons for feeling a
coup might be necessary vary, depending on the plotters,
from those who sincerely feel Peralta no longer capable of handling the
situation to those who simply would like to get into power
and some military who enjoy the status quo and would like to
see it continued.The economic situation has deteriorated during the last
few months, with the prospect of an economic crisis during
the first half of the year if remedial steps are not taken.
The terrorist activities have resulted in the flight of some
capital, but more importantly is the almost complete
cessation of new investments and a general slow-down in
business. The business and industrial groups have panicked
as a result of terrorist activities, and this of course is
having its effect on the economy.In this situation Peralta’s attitude and thinking is of key importance.
All indications, as reflected in his public statements and to me in
private, are that he believes he has complete control of the
situation, that the military are united in support of the
government, and that the elections will be held as scheduled and the
timetable for return to constitutionality adhered to. He says the
military are prepared to cope with any situation that might arise,
and he therefore tends to minimize the seriousness of the terrorist
threat or the possibility of a coup against his regime. There is no
reason to doubt his ability to handle any political problem, unless
the military are more divided than would seem to be the case, but
there is reason for serious concern as to his determination and
ability to handle the terrorist situation. We are helping in the
security field as requested by Peralta.Notwithstanding all the rumors of possible coups against the
regime, present indications are that the elections will probably be
held as scheduled, unless (a) Peralta and the military decide that for security or
any other reason they should be postponed, or (b) the Constituent
Assembly should feel that it would not be in the best interests of
the country to continue the electoral campaign and would persuade
Peralta to serve as
president for a fixed period. Peralta is so committed to the elections, however,
that in either case, especially (a), he might prefer to step down as
a point of honor rather than see the timetable altered. The danger
of action against the regime would seem to be greater in March,
after the elections, rather than during the next two months. If the
campaign and the elections are reasonably free, that is, free of any
interference by the government or attempt of the regime to impose a
candidate, there might not be any problem provided the military are
willing to accept the results of the polls. If the elections are not
free, however, or the regime attempts to impose a candidate, we
might find not only segments of the population but also some of the
military taking matters in their own hands. That would obviously
lead to a very nasty situation, and one which the Communists and
others would tend to seize for their own purposes. It could also
raise some very difficult problems for us.This raises of course the question of our posture and what we
should do to assure a smooth transition to a constitutional system.
It is clearly in our
interest that free elections be held and that a constitutional
government assume power. Our ability to exercise any positive
influence is limited, however, especially since we have very little
leverage with the present regime. I believe our policy during the
next six months should be as outlined below, and that while planning
ahead we must move only one step at a time: To do what we can so that the elections are held on
schedule. We have and are continuing to let it be known that
in our opinion the elections should be held, that they
should be free, and that any attempt to overthrow the regime
could play into the hands of the Communists and could
therefore have serious repercussions not only for Guatemala
but also for the rest of the hemisphere.To assure to the extent we can acceptance of the results
of free elections. The three candidates are mediocre, and do
not inspire any great confidence, but we should be able to
work with any one of them.Support the new government when it comes into power on
July 1, to enable it to meet the problems of the country,
and to avoid any need for it to rely on the extremists for
support. This last consideration would be especially true if
the PR candidate, which is supported by the left, should
win.I regret that the situation does not permit a more optimistic
report.I have shown this message to CAS
and DATT and they have indicated
their concurrence.Mein
87. Memorandum From William G.
Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Memos to the President, Robert W. Komer, Vol. XXI. Secret.
A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.Washington, March 5, 1966, 9 a.m.
SUBJECT
Elections in Guatemala
Guatemala is scheduled to hold general elections tomorrow. Whether they
will bring tranquility or turmoil cannot be forecast with certainty. Much depends on the
returns and whether the Guatemalan people accept them as a reasonably
fair expression of popular will. Communist-dominated subversive groups
are waiting on the wings to exploit discontent.
Despite protestations that the voting will be unhindered and the ballot
counting honest, President Peralta has shown partiality during the campaign for the
PID party which his regime created,
whose standard-bearer is Juan de Dios Aguilar. The other two
candidates—Professor Julio Mendez of the moderately left of center PR
party and Col. Miguel Ponciano of the extreme right MLN party—are already protesting the
government’s partiality. Peralta
has not wanted OAS observers. But there
will be a large press representation on hand, some 25 reporters from the
U.S.
Our Embassy’s estimate is that none of the three candidates is
sufficiently strong to win an absolute majority.Transmitted in telegrams 566 and 594 from Guatemala
City, February 15 and 24. (Both National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 GUAT) If this happens,
the new Congress which takes office on May 5 must select the President
from the two receiving the most votes. We expect considerable political
maneuvering during this period (assuming an immediate post-election
blowup does not materialize) accompanied by political unrest. The
guerrillas and other elements of the extreme left are awaiting election
results and popular reaction thereto before deciding the course which
they will follow. If popular disturbances materialize, we can anticipate
their adding fuel to the fire in a bid to get a revolutionary situation
started.
In recent months we have tried to help the Peralta Government improve its capabilities for dealing
with rural and urban insurgency. The Guatemalans were slow in responding
to our offers of assistance. Last week they acted. AID and DOD
have done a good job in getting equipment and experts down there to help
them.On February 25 the Embassy reported
that Peralta had requested
emergency assistance for his counter-insurgency campaign. The United
States shipped equipment to the Guatemalan army on March 1; a team
of military advisers, and supplies for the Guatemalan police,
arrived shortly thereafter. (Memorandum from Burrows to Sayre, March 14; ibid., ARA/CEN/G Files, 1966: Lot 68 D 464,
DEF 19 GUAT)
Unless the election results produce a more violent popular reaction than
can be foreseen at the present time, the Guatemalan security forces can
probably cope with the situation. As a precautionary step, Linc Gordon met yesterday afternoon
with his interdepartmental Latin American Policy Committee to review the
general situation and the contingency plans.
WGBRWKKomer initialed
below Bowdler’s
typed signature and initials.
88. Memorandum From William G.
Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Guatemala, Vol. II,
1/66–11/68. Secret; Sensitive. A notation on the memorandum
indicates the President saw it.Washington, March 10, 1966, 5 p.m.
SUBJECT
Guatemalan Situation
Latest reports from Guatemala indicate that there are certain civilian
and military elements strongly opposed to the moderate PR party of Julio
Mendez, who are trying to pressure President Peralta to annul the elections or step
aside and let a successor do it. At this point we don’t know how strong
these elements are.
Ambassador Gordon Mein spoke with
Peralta this morning about
these reports. Peralta tended to
dismiss them and expressed his determination not to alter the schedule
for return to constitutionality. When Ambassador Mein asked him whether Mendez and the
PR would be allowed to take office should they be elected, he was less
definite, saying that the election would not be final until the Congress
has selected a President from the two leading candidates in May.As reported in telegram 666 from Guatemala
City, March 10. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14
GUAT)
Ambassador Mein and his staff
yesterday and today have made the rounds of the party candidates,
certain business and military leaders, and President Peralta, to convey to them our strong
desire to see the results of the elections fully respected and our
extreme distaste with any effort to alter or annul them.
I think it might strengthen Ambassador Mein’s efforts to prop up Peralta’s determination to stay in power—and at the same
time disincline him to tamper with the election results—if he were able
to convey to Peralta that the
“White House” would like to see the results fully respected and power
transferred peacefully, and offering U.S. cooperation and support in his
efforts to achieve this. An ounce of prevention now may be worth more
than a pound of cure later.Komer wrote in the margin
next to this paragraph. “Mr. President, this is tricky but it is oral, and if it did leak it would sound like
a good noise, not a bad one. On balance I’m for it.”
Attached is a suggested statement which the Ambassador in his discretion
could use orally in making this pitch to
Peralta.Attached but not printed. I would like to
have your authorization to send this to Ambassador Mein. Linc
Gordon concurs in this step.Although the memorandum does not record the President’s decision,
the Department proposed that Mein deliver the message to Peralta on the Secretary’s behalf.
(Telegram 460 to Guatemala City, March 11; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 GUAT) Mein replied that the proposed
message was “not necessary at this time” since an agreement had been
“reached and signed last night by representatives of military, PR
and PID providing for orderly
transfer of power if PR wins elections which is generally assumed to
be the case.” (Telegram 675 from Guatemala, March 12; ibid.) An
election tribunal later certified that the PR had won a majority of
seats in congress, clearing the way for Mèndez’ elevation to the
presidency. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, April 5; Johnson Library,
Memos to the President, Walt W.
Rostow, Vol. I)
WGB
Approve message
Prefer not to send message
See me
89. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,
O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this
estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the
participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments
of State and Defense, the National Security Agency, and the Atomic
Energy Commission. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in
this estimate on June 24.NIE 82–66Washington, June 24, 1966.
PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN GUATEMALA
The Problem
To estimate the situation in Guatemala and the prospects for stability
over the next year or two.
Conclusions
The staying power of the new, moderate-left government of Mèndez
will depend primarily on its relationship with the Guatemalan
military. The military leaders, recalling the Communist surge to
power in the early 1950s, may tend to overreact to any
administration appointments or policy moves which they regard as
favorable to the far left. Mèndez, a proud and somewhat sensitive
man, is likely to become restive over such circumscription of his
powers.In our view, his chances of maintaining himself in power through
1966 are good. During this period he will have the opportunity to
improve his ties with military leaders and the economic elite, but
probably this would require the sacrifice of some of the reform
measures he favors. The Communist guerrilla bands, although not
capable of taking power, are strong enough to carry out terrorist
campaigns that could keep the government under heavy pressure from
the military. These campaigns might be used to justify military
intervention if the right and the military leadership became
dissatisfied with Mèndez’ conduct of his administration.In view of the economic, social and political problems which will
confront Mèndez beyond 1966, we are not confident that he will
survive in office through the next two years. His administration’s
chances for accomplishing much, either in reform or in significant
economic growth and development, will depend heavily upon whether it
accepts substantial outside assistance—with its attendant
obligations—and uses it effectively.
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]
90. Letter From the Ambassador to Nicaragua (Brown) to the Director of
the Office of Central American Affairs (Burrows)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA/CEN
Files: Lot 69 D 515, POL
Nicaragua—1967. Secret; Official–Informal.Managua, January 7, 1967.
Dear Chuck:
In our recent letters we have been discussing various aspects of possible
results of General Somoza’s mounting drive for
power, and threats and predictions of the “chaos” which will allegedly
ensue because of mass refusal
to accept the election results.For
background on the elections, see Document
91. We have been reporting the evidence of
communist and extreme leftist preparations and even early attempts to
take advantage of any disorder, and the separate but equal concerns of
the government and anti-communist opposition about the communist
potential for trouble. Rumors are, as you know, endemic in these
countries, and right now many of them have to do with plots and plans of
the various protagonists. I heard from one of our locals yesterday, for
example, that there is a street story to the effect that the Acting
Chief of the Guardia, General Montiel, is planning a pre-election golpe
designed to forestall serious trouble on or after Election Day. I’m told
it is said that he would establish a junta militar in place of the
present constitutional government, put General Somoza in charge of the junta and clamp
down on everything for two or three years, just to keep the peace which
Nicaragua needs. So it goes, but this is by way of introducing the
report to you of a plot which for once has come directly to our
attention by means of one of the self-styled plotters. This scheme has
not yet, as far as we know, become the subject of gossip, and it appears
to have at least some of the earmarks of more probability and/or gravity
than many of the others.
An approach was made recently to one of our officers by a young
Nicaraguan lawyer named Morales, who is known for his solid
anti-Somoza record over
several years and for his membership in, and association with leaders
of, the Social Christian Party. Morales has no communist connections.
According to Morales, the participants in the plot are some Social
Christians and some officers of the National Guard, who are quietly
joining forces for a golpe against the authorities, in order to prevent
General Somoza’s election and to seize power before
the communists can take advantage of the disorders which will accompany
the election. The event is supposed to take place on January 22 when
Agüero is holding a rally in Managua and the President and the Somozas
are in Leon for the Liberal candidate’s demonstration in that city.
Morales was probing for an indication of our attitude toward such a
golpe. He was of course given a healthy slug of our hands-off treatment.
Nonetheless, he has wanted to keep the line open to us. We shall see
most discreetly what more we can find out.
The plot is more detailed than I have given you in the barebones
description above, which I think includes enough of the essential
elements to give you another example of what may be going on under the
surface. My own view is that the plot is almost certain to be
discovered, if it has not already come to the attention of the GON. Even if it isn’t, I find it difficult
to believe that it will be successful. In any event, our information so far is half-baked
indeed, and depends entirely on the word of one (half-baked?) informant.
We also wanted you to have this information at this stage so that we
might lay some sort of basis for what might come out of it.
The next episode of the Perils of Pauline will be shown on this same
screen.
Sincerely,
Aaron
91. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central
American Affairs (Burrows) to the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Gordon)Source:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL 14 NIC. Confidential.
Drafted by James R. Johnston.
Another copy indicates that the memorandum was cleared by Sayre. (Ibid., ARA/CEN Files: Lot 69 D 515, POL Nicaragua—1967)Washington, January 10, 1967.
SUBJECT
Nicaraguan Election Campaign and Prospects
With the Nicaraguan elections less than one month away (February 5), I
think you will be interested in Ambassador Brown’s assessment of the situation, including the
post-election role of the opposition. Summarized below are views he has
expressed to me in recent letters, responding to some provocative
communications from me.
General Somoza, the front-running
candidate of the government party, could win a free election, although
it might be close. Nevertheless, the Somoza tactic is apparently to build up a large
majority, by fair means or foul. Opposition candidate Fernando Aguero, as well as many others
in his camp, cannot believe that Aguero could lose in a free election.
Aguero is the kind who, when he does lose, would be inclined to lead a
resistance movement. However, in view of his proved ineptness as an
organizer and leader, as well as the probable reluctance of his
supporters to risk their current prosperity in a turmoil that might lead
to revolution, Aguero is unlikely to have much success in any
postelection efforts.
For many years the opposition, including its spokesmen in the United
States, has been making dire predictions of calamity to come, in an
attempt to frighten the United States into “doing something about
General Somoza”. In fact, only a
massive stroke by the United States could have dissuaded Somoza from his candidacy, and there
would have been little support in the United States Government for such
a move.
General Somoza seems to have the
Nicaraguan armed forces, the Guardia Nacional, behind him for a long
time to come. Instead of heaping abuse on the Guardia Nacional, the
opposition is appealing to it with blandishments promising a better deal
under Aguero, and is actually shouting “Viva la Guardia Nacional!”
Although serious trouble is not expected in Nicaragua, if it does occur,
we could not stop it if we tried. In any case, maybe a little revolution
would in the long run not really harm our interests. Even discounting
reports from prejudiced sources to the effect that General Somoza is in ill health and is
emotionally unstable, there is other evidence, varying in degree of
realiability, which indicates that once in office he may not be equal to
his aspirations. In Ambassador Brown’s own words, “The wondering eyes of the world may
sooner or later see Anastasio Somoza explode and fall apart into little pieces, as he
finds himself forced to take measures which may war with one part of his
nature, as he finds that Nicaragua will not move as fast as he thinks it
must under his peerless leadership, as he does not get the hemisphere’s
recognition of his deeds and good intentions, etc.”The sentence is in a letter from Brown to Burrows, December 23, 1966. (Ibid.,
ARA/CEN/N Files: Lot 69 D
528)
All this does not mean that the first months of 1967 will pass with
general tranquillity, but Nicaragua is expected to stagger through them
without major disorder.
92. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Nicaragua, Vol. I, 12/63–12/68.
Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President
saw it.Washington, January 23, 1967.
SUBJECT
Nicaraguan Situation
The rioting which broke out in Managua yesterday was a deliberate
provocation by opposition candidate Fernando
Aguero to gain at least a delay in the February 5 general
elections and, if possible, intervention by the US or OAS.
In a speech to his followers, Aguero called upon the Nicaraguan National
Guard to join him in overthrowing the Somozas. (General “Tachito”
Somoza is the Government’s
candidate.) He then led a demonstration through the city. A clash
between the demonstrators and the National Guard occurred, leading to an
extensive street fight. A CIA estimate
as of midnight placed casualties at 16 dead, 66 wounded.
CIA reports that the Government has
authorized two priests to enter the hotel to talk to Aguero.
Ambassador Brown reports that to
his best knowledge, no Americans have been hurt. Some 20 United States
citizens are in the besieged hotel. Brown has asked Nicaraguan authorities to exercise
extreme care in any action against Aguero so that the lives of Americans
and other foreigners will not be endangered.
Walt
93. Editorial Note
On the evening of January 22, 1967, several Embassy officers tried to
reach the Americans held hostage at the Gran Hotel in downtown Managua;
others tried to reach the leader of the Nicaraguan National Guard. Both
attempts were unsuccessful. After failing to contact interim President
of Nicaragua Lorenzo Guerrero
Gutièrrez, Ambassador Brown managed to express “grave US concern” to the
President’s press secretary. The press secretary called back to report
that President Guerrero and General Somoza were fully aware of the gravity
of the situation, particularly since the lives of Americans and other
hotel guests were at stake and assured Brown that, contrary to reports the Embassy had
received, the National Guard was not firing into the hotel. (Telegram
1065 from Managua, January 23, 0514Z; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 NIC)
In the early hours of January 23 the Embassy began to receive appeals to
intervene in the hotel siege. Ambassador Brown received such a call from opposition leader
Fernando Agüero. The Embassy
initially responded to these appeals by stating that “the action
requested would constitute foreign intervention into Nicaraguan
affairs.” (Telegram 1066 from Managua, January 23, 0740Z; ibid.) Several
hours later the Nicaraguan Government allowed the Papal Nuncio and the
Auxiliary Bishop of Managua to approach Agüero in an attempt to
negotiate a “peaceful evacuation beleaguered inmates, especially foreign
guests.” (Telegram 1067 from Managua, January 23, 1145Z; ibid.) When the
two prelates proved unable to mediate a settlement, the Nicaraguan
Government recommended that the Embassy assume the initiative.
Ambassador Brown sent a team of
senior officers to “persuade Aguero importance immediate release
hostages, pointing out obvious impact his continued control over them
will have on his American friends.” (Telegram 1068 from Managua, January
23, 1330Z; ibid.) After 2 hours of negotiation, the team returned
empty-handed. (Telegram 1073 from Managua, January 23, 1640Z; ibid.)
Meanwhile the Department, although agreeing with the decision to
intervene on behalf of the American hostages, expressed its concern that
the “GON seems to be shifting burden to
Embassy and USG.” The Department
instructed the Embassy to “make unmistakably clear to GON that we regard GON responsible for safety of Americans.” (Telegram 123306
to Managua, January 23, 11:23 a.m.; ibid.)
Before the Embassy could remind the Nicaraguan Government of its
responsibilities, a summons arrived from Agüero. He wanted the Embassy to deliver a message to
the Guerrero administration, containing his terms to resolve the
stalemate. The Embassy agreed to deliver the message “without taking any responsibility for promoting
conditions laid down.” (Telegram 1077 from Managua, January 23, 2157Z;
ibid.) Following further negotiations, with the Embassy acting as
intermediary, Agüero and his
followers agreed to evacuate the hotel, thereby releasing the hostages.
(Telegram 1078 from Managua, January 23, 2227Z and telegram 1085 from
Managua, January 23, 2330Z; both ibid.)
94. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 NIC. Confidential; Immediate.
Repeated to USCINCSO for POLAD, Guatemala City, Panama City,
San Josè, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa and passed to the White
House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and CIA.Managua, January 24, 1967,
2120Z.
1105. Subject: President Guerrero’s Comments on
January 22–23 Events.
I called on President Guerrero this morning
in order attempt evaluate his morning-after attitude and to get
across two points to him categorically and officially.
I opened conversation by congratulating President on GON’s contribution to resolution
very difficult and dangerous situation at Gran Hotel yesterday.
Guerrero replied that GON had of course been extremely
concerned. There were those, he went on, who wanted to take the
toughest kind of line of action, and “today some of us are being
criticized for having been too lenient in letting those people
go unscathed.” But, he added, he was confident GON was right. If hotel had been
conclusively attacked there would have been much more blood shed
on both sides, and of course GON
had to think about safety of Americans and other foreigners in
hotel. Guerrero said he was most grateful
for our Embassy’s help in making this possible.
A. Comment: There is little doubt that
there were hardliners within GON
circles, possibly headed by General Somoza, who were ready and anxious give National
Guard its head to clean up situation ruthlessly. But we are also
confident that it was Luis Somoza, President himself and most of
other GON leadership who were
responsible for
moderate solution which was reached. They were not of course
unaware that eyes of world and especially the US was on
them.
Guerrero’s reference to Embassy’s role gave
me opening for first of points I wanted make. I said I wanted to
make absolutely clear to him that in our passages back and forth
yesterday between Aguero group in hotel and GON safety of endangered Americans
was uppermost in our minds. As far as messages we carried
between two sides and the agreement in all its details which was
ultimately reached were concerned, he should understand that we
were acting merely as agents, without responsibility for any of
the arrangements. I said it was like two Nicaraguans talking to
each other over a telephone line which we provided. We tried to
make this abundantly clear to both sides during course of
negotiations yesterday, but I wanted to reemphasize it today.
President said of course GON
understood this and was most appreciative our undertaking do
what we did. Other governments who had citizens in hotel also,
he added, should also be grateful to US. Finally he said many
moderates in opposition had called him during course of
yesterday urging him to negotiate directly with Aguero and it
was great satisfaction to him be able tell them that talks were
going on successfully through our medium.
A. Comment: Since there are bound to be
many critics on both sides who will and probably are now
attacking agreement which permitted hotel evacuation, I thought
I should make above disclaimer of responsibility for content of
agreement at highest level GON
as soon as possible, in event there any doubt. Besides, it
happens to be quite true. We will make same point again with
opposition when we have chance.
I then made other point I had in mind based on fact that when
Aguero and other leaders (Pasos, two Chamorros, Rivas and
Frixione) emerged from hotel last night they suddenly entered my
well identified official car which had been used all day take
Embassy team back and forth. This was of course without any
pre-arrangement our part or expectation they might do so since
they were supposed proceed to homes on their own responsibility.
DCM Engle, who in charge of
Embassy team at hotel was horrified and considered forcing them
out of car. But he quickly and correctly concluded that to do so
in such public place and in front of many foreign and domestic
newsreel and other photographers would create most unpleasant
scene, to say the least, and consequences could not be foreseen.
Therefore they drove off in Ambassador’s car and were taken to
their homes. I explained to President exactly how this happened.
Guerrero brushed the incident aside and said it made no
difference at all. He added that what really annoyed him was
what the oppositionists had done after they got home. Aguero for
example made a grandstand play by visiting hospitals, and he and
other oppositionists held “drunken fiestas” in celebration. Guerrero said he thought this in extremely
poor taste so shortly after so many innocent people had been
killed and wounded.
A. This incident will hopefully not loom large as an issue, but I
thought I should attempt convince President of truth which is
that Aguero and company took outrageous advantage of us in this
instance. Morning news broadcasts apparently have not
specifically identified car in which they left. This connection
government representative at Hotel Arostegui was
eye-witness.
I concluded conversation by remarking that I hoped all would go
well from now on. Guerrero said he shared
my hope and added that he trusted that Department of State had
been and would be kept fully informed of developments as they
occurred. I said he could count on that.
Guerrero then said that he knew that
Senator Kennedy had made
a statement yesterdayIn telegram
125185 to Managua, January 25, the Embassy forwarded the
full text of the statement, in which Senator Robert F. Kennedy urged the
OAS Human Rights
Commission to investigate the situation in Managua and
called for a meeting of the OAS Council “to determine what steps would be
appropriate in the event that the violence continues.”
(Ibid.) which was very critical of the GON, calling for OAS action of some kind, etc. I
replied that if there was such a statement I had not seen it but
perhaps Senator’s comment had been based largely on events of
Sunday rather than peaceful conclusion of Gran Hotel crisis
yesterday. President mildly reaffirmed hope that US Government
would be completely informed and understanding. I said we would
do our best.
A. Comment: Again, there is little doubt
that course which events took yesterday afternoon was
considerably influenced image-building considerations, certainly
on part GON and perhaps also to
some degree on part opposition. Dominican experience was in many
people’s minds, and Luis Somoza at least is ever most alert to
his family’s public relations.
Comment: We will attempt further analysis as
we make further contacts. President did not mention election
prospects and I had concluded I should not raise matter at this
stage. Probably each side going make public claims “great victory”
for themselves. If Kennedy
statement has not been sent us, please transmit soonest for our
info.Brown
95. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 NIC. Confidential.Managua, February 10, 1967,
2100Z.
1286. Subject: Significance of Somoza’s Election for
US.
General Somoza’s election is now a reality,
two weeks after the heavy suppression of the opposition leadership’s
attempt provoke intervention and/or forestall election and overthrow
government. Review of what this all means in terms US policy and
tactics, short and long term, seems desirable soon as possible,
because of its potential effect network our relationships, including
our aid programs. Small and large decisions on many aspects
US-Nicaraguan relationships cannot long be postponed. My evaluations
and suggestions set forth herein are supplement to commentary we
have provided as developments occurred. Department’s views from its
vantage point will be most helpful.Depending somewhat on how GON
handle Pedro Joaquin ChamorroIn telegram
1138 from Managua, January 26, the Embassy reported that
Chamorro had been arrested without a warrant, an apparent
violation of the Gran Hotel agreement that held that
“constitutional and ordinary legal procedures would remain in
force since state of siege not imposed.” (Ibid., POL 23–9 NIC) In a meeting with
Ambassador Brown on
January 31, former President Luis Somoza explained: “We decided
after Gran Hotel evacuation that we ought pick up at least one
big one. Pedro Joaquin gave us our chance when he organized
street disorder which took place subsequently.” Somoza denied that Chamorro had
been seriously mistreated, although “guard did shove him around
with his rifle butt.” (Telegram 1220 from Managua, February 1;
ibid., POL 23–8 NIC) and
other prisoners, and whether GON
exercises retaliation on Aguero and other opposition leaders still
at large (other than severe election drubbing), events of Jan 22–23
and subsequent preelection period may be allowed fairly quickly and
smoothly recede into history as just another in series of foolish
opposition attempts overthrow Somoza-controlled regimes by violence with
accompanying bloody, heavy-handed, somewhat confused methods
employed by GON restore order and
keep constitutional forms in operation. Aguero’s move on Jan 22 and
course GON followed during Jan
22–Feb 4 period have unquestionably added to Nicaraguan pot large
residue bitterness which would not otherwise be there now, but in
long-run I wonder if period will not widely be regarded, here and in
outside world, merely as additional hard evidence firm Somoza determination maintain
control Nicaragua by any means, and advance proof of many people’s
fears and expectations of character of General
Somoza’s forthcoming administration.Somoza’s election last Sunday had of course
long been accepted as inevitable by all observers and probably by
almost all Nicaraguans (Aguero’s attempt make holding of election
impossible is good indication his own expectation). We still
maintain belief that Somoza
would have won in fairest and most honest election because of
liberal party’s traditional power base plus organization, program,
hard work and money. Nevertheless, many pro-Somoza election irregularities have
been proved by our own observation on election day, tending to
confirm opposition charges of hundreds more. Creeping processing (if
that is the most expressive word) of election returns can only
indicate further Somoza
machine manipulation in order show the world a landslide victory.
Aguero’s antics Jan 22 and later probably contributed to diminishing
his vote, because they led to GON
control measures which prohibited opposition build up to civic
campaign climax and also perhaps because the outbreak of violence
drove some oppositionists to abstain or even to vote for Somoza as leader party of “peace,
order and progress.” My own preliminary guess is that Luis Somoza
has been author, producer and director of show that has been played
last few weeks, with his candidate-brother and other liberal leaders
more or less willing go along with his tactics. His objects may have
included keep control, maintain conservative party as principal and
traditional opposition rival to Liberal Party, let Aguero destroy
himself for future PCT leadership, martyrize Pedro Joaquin Chamorro
temporarily so that he can knock off Aguero when he gets out of jail
(although Aguero will presumably still be strong enough so that both
will go down fighting), and let a relatively moderate opposition
leadership emerge which will safely represent the other half or so
of the elite. In meantime internal struggle for power within PCT
might help give new president some breathing-spell and chance get
administration off to relatively unhampered start.It is no news that an administration headed by General Somoza will add elements of
instability, tension and probable violence to the Nicaraguan scene
which were not present during the later years of Luis Somoza’s
presidency nor the Schick–Guerrero interregnum.
Although he bore the family name and was his father’s direct heir,
Luis Somoza loosened the reins and largely because of his personal
qualities and achievements gained some measure of opposition
acceptance. Nicaragua flourished and breathed even more freely
during the past four years. The problem inherent in General
Somoza’s presidency, made somewhat more
insoluble by recent events, is that the opposition will never give
him the benefit of the doubt. He has intelligence and might even
show some statesmanship if left alone and given a chance. Strong
probability, however, is that he will not be and the troubles which
are likely to come will be just those suited to bring out the worst
in his personality. He will have some problems getting and keeping an able group of
collaborators, even if he tries. As far as the non-Communist
opposition is concerned, there will probably be five years of
varying degrees of grumbling, lashing out in anger, subversive
plotting, uneasiness and unrest leading to sporadic outbreaks of
violence of one kind or another, etc., with some Communist potential
waiting in wings take advantage of any turmoil which might be
produced. All this is notwithstanding General
Somoza’s plus factors: a majority of “the
people” who are hoping he will help Nicaragua advance in peace, a
prosperous but basically fragile economic and fiscal outlook, and
guidance and assistance of his brother and some trained and able
government servants.Inevitable problem for us is how to live with this situation and
move toward our objectives. To exemplify just one set of problems on
the horizon, Somoza and his
administration are going to come to us with fresh economic
assistance ideas, and some will no doubt be good ones worthy of our
support. If we continue to do business as usual in this field of our
endeavors we will have to face the stings of an obstreperous group
of oppositionists, probably a minority, it is true, but still one
which is quite capable of loudly berating us with the old charges
that the US is thus helping Somozas line their pockets and stay in
power. I think that with luck, a Somoza who was not being too obvious in taking
advantage of us and with a lot of fervent persuasion we could
eventually turn away such charges locally. I am not as qualified to
estimate chances in the US of successfully braving press comment to
effect that we again “embracing militarist dictators” and so on. I
would hope that we can somehow find it possible to work
constructively and safely with the Somoza administration, building on what we have
already accomplished in the economic assistance area. There are
several other segments of our bilateral relationships which can be
similarly or more troublesome.I have no bright ideas or solutions, supposing as I do that we
shall have to wait a little longer to see how things go. I do urge
however that we receive as soon as possible an indication of the
Department’s current views on “Somozaland.” Foregoing are
preliminary comments re implications for US relationships with
Nicaragua of recent developments. We hope to come up later with some
specific suggestions re US stance.In
telegram 139655 to Managua, February 17, the Department
suggested a careful review of military and economic assistance
programs “to ensure that they continue to conform with basic
U.S. strategy of encouraging and supporting sound economic,
social and political development of country, including
progressive evolution of representative democracy.” (Ibid.,
POL 1 US)Brown
96. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 NIC. Confidential. Repeated to
USCINCSO, Guatemala, San
Salvador, San José, Tegucigalpa, and Panama.Managua, February 15, 1967,
0045Z.
1313. Subject: General Somoza Asks
for a Chance.
I lunched alone with General Somoza today at his invitation. His purposes were
evidently try feel me out as to our general attitude toward him and
forthcoming administration and give me his views on events since Jan
22, his poor public relations in US, intransigence of opposition and
Communist menace. Following are few highlights. Memo of conversation
follows by pouch.Forwarded as an
enclosure to airgram A–220 from Managua, February 18.
(Ibid.)Somoza said he deeply
disturbed about attitude American press toward himself and family.
He had tried help correspondents get well rounded view Nicaragua,
but they persisted in lambasting his family as cruel dynasty. Made
specific reference Newsweek article (Managua
1293)In telegram 1293 from Managua,
February 11, the Embassy reported that recent press accounts had
stung the Nicaraguan Government, including a Newsweek article in which an Embassy officer allegedly
admitted: “we got the wrong number in 1932”, when the elder
Somoza was elevated
to head the National Guard, “and to this day we’re trying to
live it down.” (Ibid.) and hoped Department could somehow
teach them some history. I remarked that he indeed has public
relations problem, that adverse press image will die hard and then
only if deeds are eventually persuasive to impartial
observers.Though he did not once suggest Aguero and other opposition leaders
are Communists, Somoza said
Aguero hoped by abortive coup attempt Jan 22 to bring about
intervention. Communists used him in attempt implement detailed plot
destroy capital. Aguero was mistaken in thinking he had support US
and others in hemisphere, but on January 23 manner Gran Hotel
evacuation arranged inevitably helped encourage him and Pedro
Joaquin Chamorro to further excesses. Street fracas January 25
proved this and gave excuse for jailing Chamorro. On this score I
told General that if he critical our part evacuation as encouraging
Agueristas, he might like know we receiving criticism from other
side too. He admitted he understood but some others did not.Somoza went on at length and
kept doubling back to theme that conservatives are incorrigible in
sniping at GON and free election in
which will of people demonstrated. Fundamentally what they were
doing was running down their own country in eyes of outside world,
and this would hurt them as much as the liberals, by affecting
investment climate and business. I said that many people now are
over-excited, expressed hope tempers would calm and spoke of virtues
of concept of compromise which vital to practice democracy here or
anywhere else. Somoza said
rich conservatives are not going to like him because he is going to
make them pay their taxes and thus prove to world that Nicaragua
loyal member Alliance for Progress. Nicaragua has tremendous
possibilities which will be realized if he is given a chance.Comment: Above brief summary gives impression
much more give and take our conversation than actually occurred. In
true Somoza style he did most
of talking in rich and confident detail, and my few remarks were
interjected to take advantage his cordial and apparently receptive
attitude. Chiefly I tried give impression friendly listener who
hopes Nicaragua will continue thrive in every way. Underneath
surface General Somoza seemed
wary and alert for any indications our pre-campaign and pre-election
personal relationship had changed. As usual he tried hard make good
impression, without showing much if any humility, and yet seemed to
be seeking almost desperately the understanding of his best friends
the Americans.On February 15 the Embassy
reported that Somoza
planned to visit the United States in March. (Telegram 1312 from
Managua; ibid., POL 7 NIC) The
Department instructed the Embassy to discourage the visit,
“since persons he might expect to see in Department will be out
of the country.” (Telegram 138358 to Managua, February 16;
ibid.) The Department also recommended against a White House
appointment, arguing that “the President and other United States
officials concerned with Latin American affairs are so involved
in Summit preparations” that an appointment “would not be
appropriate.” (Memorandum from Read to
Rostow, March 14; ibid.) The President
met Somoza at the White
House for a half hour on April 6 and introduced him to Rusk and McNamara before a Cabinet
meeting. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) The
Department later explained that the meeting had been arranged
“on very short notice when President found he had few minutes
available to receive Somoza unofficially and informally.” (Telegram
171222 to Managua, April 7; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 NIC)Brown
97. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A,
O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on
the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on October 12.SNIE 83.3–67Washington, October 12, 1967.
POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN NICARAGUA OVER THE NEXT YEAR OR
SO
Conclusions
President Anastasio Somoza is in uncertain health, but the chances
are better than even that he will remain alive and active during the
period of this estimate. He is not likely to alter the basic lines
of Nicaraguan foreign policy, though his regime may become somewhat
more authoritarian, and the incipient friction in his relations with
the US is likely to grow.In the event of Somoza’s death within the
next year or so, members of the country’s inner political
circle—from the Somoza
family, other propertied interests, the Nationalist Liberal Party
(PLN), and the National Guard—would probably work for a
constitutional succession with excellent prospects of success. The
resulting government would probably be more flexible in domestic
policy and easier for the US to deal with.If, however, Somoza became
incapacitated but remained active enough to insist on continuing in
office, or if he undertook a series of ill-advised, disruptive moves
and then died, the sequence of events would be more unsettling. We
regard these contingencies as possible but not probable.
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]
98. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central American
Affairs (Burrows) to
the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA/CEN/G
Files: Lot 70 D 75, POL 15–1 Head of
State, Guatemala 1967. Confidential. Drafted by Killoran.Washington, October 12, 1967.
SUBJECT
Your Meeting Today with Mr. Broe of CIANo substantive record has been found of
the October 12 meeting between Oliver and Broe.
CIA appears to feel more strongly than
we do at this time with respect to certain threatening aspects of the
Guatemalan situation. The Agency in recent briefings for key officials
of the U.S. Government has stated that President Mendez of Guatemala has
abdicated all power to the military and is himself in the hands of
extreme rightists.
Our own analysis of the situation is that Mendez has allowed the military
great latitude in their activities, but that the situation is not out of
hand. Mendez agrees in principle with the need to eliminate communist
and insurgent elements by clandestine means, but at the same time
recognizes the danger to his administration of the counter-terrorists,
who include among their targets certain members of the majority Partido
Revolucionario, as well as some labor and peasant leaders and
intellectuals.
Our Embassy in Guatemala now feels that with the relative success of the
GOG in dealing with the insurgency
problem, the continued activities of the counter-terrorist organizations
could lead to a loss of popular support for the Mendez Government and
the creation of a coup climate. I agree with this assessment. We are, in
effect, at a crucial point: Mendez could lose control of the situation,
but it does not appear that he has. Ambassador Mein feels that the Minister of Defense
is both loyal to Mendez and in control of the Army and that he has done
an effective job of preventing a confrontation between the Army and the
Partido Revolucionario.
If the opportunity arises, you might wish to determine on what basis the
CIA has decided that Mendez has lost
control. I should like to add as a footnote that Mendez never really
gained full control over events in Guatemala; he has no power base and
as a result has been forced to attempt to balance opposing factions and
satisfy divergent interest groups. In this he has been successful and we
have reason to believe he can prevent a serious deterioration in the
political climate. His style, however, will continue to be one of
compromise rather than self-assertion.
99. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs (Sayre) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA Files:
Lot 72 D 33, Guatemala. Confidential. No drafting information
appears on the memorandum.Washington, January 17, 1968.
SUBJECT
Terrorist Assassination in Guatemala of U.S. MILGP Commander and Chief of Navy
SectionThe White House Situation
Room forwarded a brief account of the incident to President
Johnson on January 16: “Two members of
our military mission in Guatemala City were killed and one was
wounded when the car in which they were riding was machine
gunned shortly before noon this morning. Col. John Webber, Jr.,
the Commander of the U.S. Guatemala Military Group, was killed
outright, and Lt. Comdr. Ernest Monroe died shortly after the
attack from his wounds. The identity of the assassins is not
known, but it is suspected that they were members of the Rebel
Armed Forces, a Communist guerrilla organization.” (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Guatemala, Vol.
II, 1/66–11/68)
The Guatemalan Government has declared a “State of Alert.” The Guatemalan
Minister of Defense believes that a strong reaction is necessary to the
pattern of Communist terrorist activities which has developed in the
last few days in order to demonstrate that the Government has control of
the security situation. He therefore intends to make a maximum effort
and has taken personal charge of the investigation of the assassination
of the two U.S. military officers.
The Guatemalan President has extended written condolences to Ambassador
Mein.
From the information available to me I would tentatively conclude: a)
that the assassination is part of a pattern of Communist terrorist
activities in Guatemala; b) the assailants knew that the occupants of
the car were U.S. military personnel and c) there is no reason for
believing at this time that U.S. personnel in other countries in Latin
America will be objects of such attacks. With respect to this last
point, however, the Communists have now “broken the ice” on
assassination of U.S. personnel in Latin America.
All of the available information indicates that the Country Team was
fully alert to the possibility of terrorist attacks; however, there is a
press indication that the terrorists were able to set up the
assassination because the MILGP
Commander was following a routine pattern of travel between his
Headquarters and home. If so, this would be contrary to instructions
from the Department which required Country Teams to assure that their top personnel varied
their pattern of activity sufficiently in going to their offices,
departing for lunch, and going home at night so that it could not be
regarded as routine. We will be checking this point out with Ambassador
Mein.
I will also be sending a round-up message on the situation in Guatemala
to all of our Ambassadors, who were instructed yesterday to review their
security procedures.
I understand that Ambassador Mein
has discussed with Assistant Secretary Oliver the latter’s planned visit
to Guatemala today. At present, Ambassador Mein recommends and Oliver agrees that Oliver should proceed according to schedule. However,
Ambassador Mein desires to review
the situation this morning and discuss it with Oliver before a final decision is made.
Ambassador Mein has a message
prepared giving the rationale and his recommendations which he will
transmit to the Department this morning.In
telegram 2854 from Guatemala, January 17, the Embassy recommended
that Oliver proceed as
planned since canceling the visit “might be interpreted by President
[Méndez] and others as indication that we
wavering in our support of government at very difficult time.”
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, ORG 7 ARA)
100. Letter From the Ambassador to Guatemala (Mein) to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA Files:
Lot 72 D 33, Guatemala. Secret; Official–Informal.Guatemala City, February 27, 1968.
Dear Covey:
Your letter of February 6Attached but not
printed. Oliver reported that
the assassinations of Webber and Monroe led the Interdepartmental
Regional Group for Inter-American Affairs (IRG/ARA) to “explore the underlying
causes of such dramatic incidents to determine whether the U.S.
should take some action.” The IRG/ARA had discussed a number of suggestions, but
sought the Ambassador’s “advice on what we might do to induce the
Guatemalan Army to put an end to its clandestine operations.” “What
bothers us at this end,” Oliver explained, “is the growing concern in the
U.S. about the violence in Guatemala and the feeling that we are
associated with a repressive regime.” reached me on February
12, when I was having to devote a great deal of time to personnel
reductions. The questions
raised by your letter and by the IRG/COIN decisions are of
such importance that I did not want to give you a hasty reply. Our
recommendations on personnel reductions are in, and we are now tackling
the CASP. The points raised in your
letter and those we must consider in the preparation of the CASP are so closely related that I wanted
to be sure that my reply not only represented my own analysis and
recommendations, but also that it did not reflect views contrary to
those of the other members of the Country Team as they will be included
in the CASP.
Let me say in the first place that I appreciate the opportunity to
comment. We have not been sent officially any details of the IRG/COIN
meeting, although through informal channels we have been sent IRG/ARA/COIN Action Memorandum No.
9Dated February 6. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/IG Files: Lot 70 D 122, IRG/ARA/COIN Action Memos) containing the
decisions taken at the January 31 meeting. Parenthetically, I would like
to suggest that some machinery be established for sending IRG documents to the field. They would be
very helpful. At its meeting on January 31, the IRG/COIN decided (a) that
diplomatic and military approaches should be made to the Guatemalan
Government to induce it to end its counter-terrorist activities, and (b)
to approach the President of Mexico and ask for suggestions regarding
the Guatemalan situation, and whether he would be willing to take any
initiatives with the Guatemalan Government toward remedying this
situation. Your letter only touched on the first point, but, and I trust
you do not object, I would like to comment on both aspects of the IRG/COIN
paper.
The situation in Guatemala is, as you say, an extremely complex one. It
is further complicated at the present time by extensive, and more often
than not erroneous reporting by an uninformed press in the United
States, and also by the apparent acceptance as “gospel” in some quarters
of statements regarding Guatemala by a couple of frustrated priests. I
am sure it is also complicated by the present frame of mind of the
people in the U.S., the frustrations over Viet-Nam, and the general
attitude toward the administration. I find the IRG/COIN decisions, to the
extent they represent Washington thinking, very disturbing and can only
hope that my comments, our reporting, and the CASP will help to clarify the picture and to place recent
developments in their proper context so that any action we might take
will not reflect only a negative posture but will direct itself to the
real problem, and will be of help to the Guatemalan Government in its
counter-insurgency activities.
It is very difficult to predict what lies ahead. That there will be
further acts of terrorism and counter-terrorism is generally accepted.
The unanswered questions
in everyone’s mind are who, when, where and why. The apparent open break
between the PGT and the FAR is likely to lead to increased
terrorism since not only has the PGT
been a moderating force, as hard as it might be to believe that there
has been any moderation, but the degree of force to be used is the very
issue which has led to the break. We do not know yet whether all the
elements of the FAR have broken with the
PGT, but we do know that at least
one large group has done so and that its plans include further
assassinations, robberies, terrorism, etc. It is a fact of life,
therefore, that terrorism will continue to be a part of the Guatemalan
scene, at least for the immediate future. There is little the Guatemalan
Government or its security forces can do to prevent terrorist actions,
and since it is well nigh impossible to know when and where the
terrorists will strike, it is extremely difficult to take measures to
prevent or meet such strikes. The only remedy, therefore, seems to be
constant vigilance and to handle each incident as it occurs, while at
the same time searching out the terrorists in the hope of eventually
eliminating the problem. This is what the Guatemalan security forces are
attempting to do. It is a very difficult problem which requires
unpleasant, and at times unpalatable, remedies, and which cannot be just
wished away.
We should not lose sight of the fact that the Guatemalan Government is
fighting not only for the survival of the present administration but
also for its very existence as an institution, and that what is at stake
for the Guatemalans is what we and others are fighting for in Viet-Nam
and other parts of the world. The proclaimed objective of the PGT and of the FAR, whether together or separately, is to take over
Guatemala and to establish a communist regime. The difference between
the two groups is primarily one as to methods. Thus challenged it is
only natural that not only the government, but the people also, react in
defense of their institutions, as deficient or ineffective as they may
be, and of their way of life. This is what is taking place and the
counter-terrorist actions taken by the security forces have, up to now,
the backing and tacit approval of the people.
There is one aspect of the IRG/COIN position that I find not only
disturbing but also puzzling. We have for some time, certainly since I
arrived in Guatemala, been concerned over the internal situation, the
guerrillas in Zacapa and Izabal, possible support from Cuba, and so
forth, and in the early days with the government’s failure to recognize
the problem and its apparent inability to take any corrective action.
The record will show that during the Peralta Administration, and since
Mendez Montenegro came to power on July 1, 1966, we have urged the
government and the security forces to take measures to eliminate the
guerrilla problem. The insurgency situation has been one of our great
concerns in Guatemala, and many of our actions and programs have been
directed specifically at getting the government to move and then in supporting it once it
began its counter-insurgency actions. We have had special groups visit
us to study the situation, and we have directed a large part of our
Military Assistance and Public Safety programs to this problem. The
Guatemalan Armed Forces finally launched their campaign against the
guerrillas in Zacapa and Izabal in October 1966. The campaign was
successful, so that today there are no organized guerrilla units in that
area. The surviving guerrillas either left the country or moved to other
sections of the country, with many of them coming to Guatemala City to
join forces with their urban comrades. The terrorists in the city today
are the same elements which were operating earlier in the mountains, led
by the same persons, and with the same objectives they had before, that
is, to create chaos and eventually take power. Their method of operation
may be different, that is, terrorism, assassinations, bombs, etc. rather
than encounters between units in the field, but otherwise there is no
change.
I am puzzled, therefore, by what appears to be a change in Washington
thinking. While the campaign was going on in the mountains we gave it
our blessing, but once the center of action shifted to the capital we
seem to view the matter in a different perspective. We seem to be saying
that the campaign in the mountains was “counterinsurgency”, and
therefore necessary if the democratic institutions were to survive,
while the campaign in the city against the same forces is “repressive
action”, and therefore wrong. I frankly fail to see the difference.
This does not mean that we should approve or command all that is being
done or all the methods that are being used. We don’t. We must, however,
view the matter in its true perspective and in the Guatemalan context.
The Guatemalan Government, and its security forces, is determined to
overcome the threat posed by the PGT/FAR and the only way it
can apparently do so, certainly in its own eyes, is by searching out and
eliminating the terrorists and the guerrillas. Economic and social
reforms, as necessary and urgent as they are, will help to weaken
whatever popular appeal the guerrillas might have among the lower
classes but they will not in themselves meet the immediate problem
created by the terrorists. The terrorists are not reformists who would
put down their arms if the government undertook social and reform
measures, but rather are men who have but one goal, namely, the
assumption of power.
Unless I misread the information coming out of Washington, there appears
to be a view held by some that the terrorists are reacting to the action
of the security forces—that counter-terrorism breeds terror-ism—and that
if the security forces cease their activities there will be no more
terrorism. (This reminds me a little of the debate in the States over
the bombing of North Viet-Nam.) To a certain extent this is true, since
the greater the pressures against the terrorists the more likely they
are to react, and some of
their recent activities would seem to indicate that they have been acts
of desperation. This does not mean, however, that the terrorists would
have been inactive, since that is not in their nature and in line with
their program. I am sure the security forces would be very happy to put
a stop to their actions if they could be assured that the PGT/FAR
would cease all violence. As mentioned earlier, the terrorists have the
initiative in that no one knows exactly where or when they will strike
next, so that if the situation is to be resolved by means other than
force the terrorists must either stop their activities or be prepared to
come to terms with the security forces. The President tried on at least
two occasions in the early days of his administration to find a peaceful
solution to the problem but he was rebuffed each time by the PGT/FAR.
The ideal situation would be, of course, for the government to depend on
the courts for the enforcement of the law and the application of
justice. The court system in Guatemala is not only antiquated but the
quality of the judges is very low. The security forces feel they cannot
rely on the courts for the administration of justice, and,
unfortunately, some of their recent experiences have not served to
reassure them. The judges are not only often incompetent, but they are
in many cases corrupt, and responsive to pressures and threats. Also,
the entire judicial process makes it very difficult to prosecute anyone
apprehended. There are no prosecuting attorneys as we know them, and
often the only accusing officer and witness is the policeman who
happened to arrest the defendant. The case of the guerrilla Obregon
killed in the city last Friday, February 23, is a good illustration of
this point. Obregon was captured by the police early in 1967, along with
several others, including the sister of the guerrilla leader Turcios.
The members of the group were tried and found guilty but released on
appeal. The speculation at the time was that the appellate judge had
been threatened and had, therefore, decided to release the prisoners.
Rogelia Cruz Martinez, whose death triggered the mid-January incidents,
is another case in point. She was being held for a traffic violation,
but the threats received by the judge from the FAR were such as to lead him to release her. There have
been other similar cases. The Congress begins this week debate on a bill
revamping the entire judicial system. Maybe this will help in the long
run, but it provides no alternative for the present.
I must apologize for going to such great length before answering the
question posed by the IRG/COIN, that is, what might we do to induce
the Guatemalan Army to put an end to its clandestine operations. I would
answer the question as follows: In my opinion we should not seek to influence the Guatemalan
Army “to put an end” to its clandestine operations. Not only do
they believe the method being followed is correct, but since
they are dealing with
a subversive movement it would be difficult to suggest a
substitute. We have not been able to think of a more effective
method. An approach by us to the Guatemalans would not produce
the intended results since they would, undoubtedly, tell us that
they have no alternative, that they must eliminate the enemy,
and that they would, therefore, have to continue their
counter-terrorist activities. It would, therefore, be a
non-productive effort on our part. In addition to being
foredoomed to failure, it would also weaken whatever influence
we might be able to exert for moderation.Any suggestion by us that the Army put an end to its
clandestine operations would more than likely be misunderstood,
not only by the Army, but by the President and other political
leaders as well. As discussed earlier, the security forces have
been successful thus far in their counter-insurgency operations,
as the very reaction of the terrorists would indicate, and for
us to suggest to them at a time when they have the enemy on the
defensive that they should let up could be interpreted by them
to mean that we have changed our position, that we no longer
support the government, and that we disapprove of its security
measures. There would even be those who, maliciously or
otherwise, would interpret our approach as an indication that we
no longer opposed the cause of the guerrillas. That may sound
ridiculous, but it would not be unlikely. Some could even go so
far as to speculate that what they might interpret as a change
of position on our part had been motivated by the Maryknoll
incident, and was simply an effort by us to save the lives of
those involved.We should also not deceive ourselves by thinking that if the
security forces put an end to their clandestine activities the
problem will disappear. At least since 1963 the communist
insurgents have engaged in widespread acts of terrorism
throughout Guatemala, and the government’s entrance into the
clandestine counter-insurgency field in late 1966 was a reaction
to the communist terror; an effort to find an effective means to
contain a threat which had not been contained within the
existing legal framework of law enforcement. If the armed forces
should cease their counter-insurgency activities before the
situation is brought under control the guerrillas and terrorists
would not only continue but would, undoubtedly, intensify their
efforts since they would be able to operate more freely. Such
freedom would probably also result in a more rapid
reorganization of the FAR
guerrilla force and a corresponding increase in the insurgency
threat to the government. This could also lead to an eventual
open confrontation between the PGT/FAR and the
extreme rightists, which would not only be nasty, but which
would pose some real issues for us. It should not be overlooked
that one of the reasons which led the armed forces to organize
the clandestine groups, and to use them in counter-insurgency,
was the threat by the extreme right in the early days of the
present administration
that if the government did not move against the communists the
right would. The actions taken by the armed forces, including
its clandestine operations, have served to remove this issue
from the political arena.This does not mean that there is nothing we can do. We have on
several occasions, and when supported by information available
to us, pointed out to the Minister of Defense, and to others,
that they might be contemplating action against innocent or
mistakenly-identified individuals. We have also suggested to the
Army that it exercise stricter control over the special unit of
the National Police engaged in locating and eliminating FAR elements. Also, we have
suggested that if the security forces feel it necessary to carry
out summary executions in certain cases that they bury the
bodies rather than leave them to be found, which produces a bad
psychological effect, and creates an impression abroad that
blood is flowing in the streets of Guatemala and that bodies are
appearing everywhere. This poses a problem for the security
forces, however, since they must continually show the public
that they are moving effectively against the guerrillas and
terrorists, and one way to do so is to leave the bodies of known
communists where they will be found, identified by the families,
and the events reported in the press. We should continue to urge
moderation, which is probably the only effective thing we can do
at the present time, and we will, of course, continue to do
this.
I realize this still leaves the problem of public and Congressional
concern over the situation in Guatemala unanswered, but I am afraid we
are going to have that problem as long as the situation here remains as
it is, and as long as the press in the U.S. continues to report mostly
the negative aspects of developments in Guatemala. Judging from the
reports I see, the press these days seems to be interested only in
terrorists, guerrillas, and so on, or in issues which can be played up
as anti-administration or anti-U.S. foreign policy. There seems to be no
ready answer to this specific problem, except to present the facts as we
see them, and to let the facts speak for themselves, while at the same
time pressing for moderation, and, if possible, an early solution to the
insurgency problem in Guatemala.
With reference to the suggestion that we approach the President of
Mexico, I am of two minds. In the first place, the suggestion reflects a
tendency which has always bothered me of calling upon others to help us
when we can probably do the job ourselves, or before we have even tried.
In this instance we have not discussed the matter with the Guatemalan
Government, and yet we are considering asking for help from Mexico.
Also, if we are going to approach a third party for help, why Mexico?
Mexico, contrary to what we might think, does not have much influence
with the Guatemalans, so that an approach by them on this issue would probably not be
productive. The other Central American Governments would have greater
influence than Mexico, but even that would be minimal. On the other
hand, maybe an approach by the Mexican President, should he agree to
make one, might be helpful in that it would give the Guatemalans one
more opportunity to seek Mexican Government cooperation in establishing
more effective control to prevent the smuggling of arms across the
border and the travel by Guatemalan insurgents through Mexico to Cuba,
Prague and other points behind the curtain. The Guatemalans believe that
their problems with the insurgents would be more manageable if the
Mexican authorities were more cooperative. If the Guatemalans are
correct in their estimate, and if the President of Mexico is willing to
use his good offices, it might therefore be a fruitful exercise.
In your letter you raised the question of a trip to Washington to discuss
this problem. I frankly have no desire to go to Washington at this time,
but your letter and recent communications from Chuck Burrows lead me to
believe that it might be a good thing to do. It might be helpful to sit
down with those working on Guatemala and to discuss not only the
situation as we see it, but also to get a better understanding of some
of the questions being raised in Washington. As to timing, I would
prefer to wait until we have our CASP
well underway, since our discussions in the preparation of that document
are basic to any fruitful discussions I might have in Washington. Unless
there is some urgency from the Department’s standpoint I would prefer,
therefore, to go some time in the latter part of March. I will write
Chuck Burrows about this, and, if you agree, plan to go up at that
time.Oliver continued the
discussion of Guatemalan security in a letter to Mein, March 8: “There was no
thought here that you suggest to the Guatemalan Government that it
stop its efforts to eliminate guerrilla activity either in the campo
or the city. The distinction we were seeking to make (and in
re-reading my letter, I see that this distinction was not made
clearly) was between discriminate and non-discriminate activities.”
“What has bothered us,” Oliver emphasized, “is the physical elimination of a
rather large number of persons who appear to have no political
coloration, or could not by a reasonable definition be called
Communists.” (Ibid., ARA Files: Lot
72 D 33, Guatemala)
Best personal regards.
Sincerely,
Gordon
101. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23 GUAT. Confidential. Drafted by
Wiggins on March 20.Washington, March 13,
1968.
SUBJECT
Security Situation, Terror and Counter-Terror in Guatemala
PARTICIPANTS
For GuatemalaCol. Rafael Arriaga, Guatemalan Defense MinisterCol. Laugerud, Deputy Chief of Staff, Guatemalan
ArmyCol. Ponciano, Embassy of Guatemala AttachéFor the U.S.Covey T. Oliver,
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American AffairsCharles R. Burrows,
Country Director, Central American AffairsRobert Starzel,
ARAGuy A. Wiggins,
ARA/CEN/GGeneral Robert
Porter, CINC, South CommandCINCSO, Panama
Mr. Oliver began the substantive
conversation by asking Col. Arriaga to summarize the security situation
in Guatemala.
Col. Arriaga replied that he was directing the counter-terrorism
campaign, which he justified as necessary to preclude right-wing
reaction against the Government of Mendez Montenegro. The Government of
Guatemala had been unjustly criticized for this campaign in the press.
He was, therefore, much concerned and wanted to know how it could
prevent newspapers (i.e., Miami Herald), from
printing false stories about it. The Maryknoll fathers, particularly the
Melvilles and Blase Bonpane, knew only people on the far left in
Guatemala. That is, they did not know anyone but the poor, so could not
give an honest interpretation of events. Life
magazine, which had printed three hostile articles, was not
interested in the attractive aspects of Guatemala, but only in reporting
how the army was protecting extreme right-wing terrorism.
Col. Arriaga then turned to the subject of the assassination of Col.
Webber, whom he described as a man who understood the Latin temperment
and was almost a Latino himself. Col. Webber, he said, had understood
the situation in Guatemala.
At this point General Porter arrived, accompanied by Mr. Robert Corrigan.
The conversation turned briefly to Panama and Col. Arriaga asked if the political crisis
there did not portend a coup by the extreme left. Mr. Corrigan explained
that it did not, and that the extreme left was not involved in the
crisis.
Mr. Oliver reviewed the
conversation for the new arrivals and pointed out to Col. Arriaga that
informed public opinion in the U.S., including congressional opinion,
took the view that there was too much violence from the right in
Guatemala.
In reply, Col. Arriaga cited the bazooka attack of March 7 on the
counter-insurgency force barracks at Cipresales. This bloody attack
which, he said, left two dead and 30 wounded did not get as much
attention from the press as the killing of one or two leftists by the
right-wing. Similarly the press always backed up statements by Castro
claiming that the CIA was behind every
anti-communist movement in Central America. Ambassador Burrows interjected that O’Leary of the
Washington Star would like to talk to Col.
Arriaga and it might be useful for him to do so.
Mr. Oliver reiterated U.S.
sympathy with Guatemala’s problems but asked, with all due respect to
the good intentions of the Mendez Montenegro Government, if it could not
do more to help the campesinos. He cited the army’s civic action program
and suggested that this was the type of activity that should be stepped
up to help the newspapers give the other side of the government’s story.
He reminded his guest that his impressions were not based on press
reports alone but also on other sources.
Reverting to the question of the press, Col. Arriaga said the security
forces had finally hit upon a way of making sure their story was told
correctly. When they captured two university students who set fire to
two department stores in Guatemala City they obtained the students’
confessions on tape and played the tape to the reporters, who “printed
the story exactly right this time”.
Mr. Oliver reminded him that we
still had a serious public relations problem; right-wing terrorist
groups were killing indiscriminately and many innocent people were
losing their lives. This was making thoughtful people in the U.S.,
including members of the judiciary, question the present tendency of the
Mendez Montenegro Government. Arriaga countered that 90% of the
casualties were inflicted by the leftists.
Mr. Oliver reiterated that it was
most important for us to collaborate on positive programs to improve the
lot of the people, so that the press would have something to concentrate
on other than violence. Col. Arriaga did not have an opportunity to
respond before the meeting ended.
102. Memorandum From Viron P.
Vaky of the Policy Planning Council to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA/CEN/G
Files: Lot 74 D 26, POL 23, Internal
Security, Jan–March 1968, Guatemala. Secret. Vaky did not initial the
memorandum. According to marginalia on the memorandum it was seen by
Oliver, Sayre, and Burrows. A handwritten note,
evidently from Vaky, reads:
“This is a response based on my conversation with INR/RAR.”Washington, March 29, 1968.
SUBJECT
Guatemala and Counter-terror
I made the points in the attached memorandum in a private conversation I
had with Ambassador Mein
yesterday prior to the IRG meeting.At the IRG/ARA/COIN meeting on March 28 Ambassador Mein analyzed the problems and
policies of the Guatemalan Government, including the status of the
counterinsurgency campaign. According to the record of the meeting,
Sayre indicated concern
about the Guatemalan Government’s response to insurgency and terror;
he noted that the element of counter-terror in this response had
adverse repercussions in Congress and public opinion in the United
States; and he questioned the effectiveness of counter-terror as a
doctrine. In conclusion he thought the Country Team should assess
whether counter-terrorism was “necessary to cope with the insurgency
and terror problems, and, if yes, submit specific recommendations
for making the counter-terror campaign more palatable. If no, the
U.S. Government should inform key Guatemalan officials that unless
the counter-terror campaign is stopped or substantially modified,
the USG will have to reassess its
assistance to Guatemala.” (IRG/ARA/COIN Action Memo No. 10, April 4; ibid., ARA/IG Files: Lot 70 D 122, IRG/ARA/COIN Action Memos)
These views are based on my experience as DCM in Guatemala and upon a close following of events since
I left.Vaky was Deputy Chief of
Mission in Guatemala July 1964–August 1967. They are the
product also of extended reflections on the situation and my experience
there. As I told Ambassador Mein
I feel somewhat like Fulbright says he felt about the Tonkin Gulf
resolution—my deepest regret is that I did not fight harder within
Embassy councils when I was there to press these views. I can in any
case understand quite well how easy it is to be complacent or
rationalize things.
Because I do feel so very strongly about the problem, I felt compelled to
repeat these points to you with the hope they may receive a
hearing.No written response to the
memorandum has been found.
Attachment
GUATEMALA AND COUNTER-TERROR
The Guatemalan Government’s use of “counter-terror” to combat
insurgency is a serious problem in three ways: The tactics are having a terribly corrosive effect on
Guatemalan society and the nation’s political
development;they present a serious problem for the U.S. in terms of
our image in Latin America and the credibility of what we
say we stand for;the problem has a corrosive effect on our own judgments
and conceptual values.
A. Impact on the Country
Counter-terror is corrosive from three points of view:
The counter-terror is
indiscriminate, and we cannot rationalize that
fact away. Looking back on its full sweep one can cite
instances in which leftist but anti-Communist labor
leaders were kidnapped and beaten by the army units; the
para-military groups armed by the Zacapa commander have
operated in parts of the northeast in war-lord fashion
and destroyed local PR organizations; people are killed
or disappear on the basis of simple accusations. It is
argued that the “excesses” of the earlier period have
been corrected and now only “collaborators” are being
killed. But I question the wisdom or validity of the
Guatemalan Army’s criteria as to who is a collaborator
or how carefully they check. Moreover, the derivative
violence of right-wing vigilantes and sheer criminality
made possible by the atmosphere must also be laid at the
door of the conceptual tactic of counter-terror. The
point is that the society is being rent apart and
polarized; emotions, desire for revenge and personal
bitterness are being sucked in; the pure Communist issue
is thus blurred; and issues of poverty and social
injustice are being converted into virulent questions of
outraged emotion and “tyranny.” The whole cumulative
impact is most unhealthy.
It is not true, in my judgment, that Guatemalans are
apathetic or are not upset about the problem.
Guatemalans very typically mask their feeling with
outward passivity, but that does not mean they do not
feel things. Guatemalans have told me they are worried,
that the situation is serious and nastier than it has
ever been. And I submit that we really do not know what
the campesinos truly feel.
Counter-terror is brutal. The
official squads are guilty of atrocities. Interrogations are
brutal, torture is used and bodies are mutilated. Many
believe that the very brutal way the ex-beauty queen was
killed, obviously tortured and mutilated, provoked the
FAR to murder Colonel
Webber in retaliation. If true, how tragic that the tactics
of “our side” would in any way be responsible for that
event! But the point is that this is a serious practical
political problem as well as a moral one: Because of the
evidence of this brutality, the government is, in the eyes
of many Guatemalans, a cruel government, and therefore
righteous outrage, emotion and viciousness have been sucked
into the whole political situation. One can argue about the
naivete of the Maryknoll priests, but one should not
discount the depth of the emotion and the significance of
the reaction. One can easily see there how counter-terror
has blurred the question of Communist insurgency and is
converting it into an issue of morality and justice. How
fortunate for us that there is no charismatic leader around
yet to spark an explosion.Counter-terror has retarded modernization
and institution building. The tactics have just
deepened and continued the proclivity of Guatemalans to
operate outside the law. It says in effect to people that
the law, the constitution, the institutions mean nothing,
the fastest gun counts. The whole system has been degraded
as a way to mobilize society and handle problems. Our
objectives of helping Guatemala modernize are thus being
undermined. The effect of the money we put into civic-action
and the pilot program in the northeast is, in my personal
opinion, more than offset by the effect of the
counter-terror. The value to the nation’s political
development of Mendez completing his term is probably
already gone.
B. The Image Problem
We are associated with this tactic in the minds of many people, and
whether it is right or wrong so to associate us is rapidly becoming
irrelevant. In politics just as important as the way things are is
the way people think things are. In the minds
of many in Latin America, and, tragically, especially in the
sensitive, articulate youth, we are believed to have condoned these
tactics, if not actually to have encouraged them. Therefore our
image is being tarnished and the credibility of our claims to want a
better and more just world are increasingly placed in doubt. I need
hardly add the aspect of domestic U.S. reactions.
C. U.S. Values
This leads to an aspect I personally find the most disturbing of all—
that we have not been honest with ourselves. We have condoned counter-terror; we may even in effect have
encouraged or blessed it. We have been so obsessed with the fear of
insurgency that we have rationalized away our qualms and uneasiness.
This is not only because we have concluded we cannot do anything
about it, for we never really tried. Rather we suspected that maybe
it is a good tactic, and that as long as Communists are being killed
it is all right. Murder, torture and mutilation are all right if our
side is doing it and the victims are Communists. After all hasn’t
man been a savage from the beginning of time so let us not be too
queasy about terror. I have literally heard these arguments from our
people.
Have our values been so twisted by our adversary concept of politics
in the hemisphere? Is it conceivable that we are so obsessed with
insurgency that we are prepared to rationalize murder as an
acceptable counter-insurgency weapon? Is it possible that a nation
which so reveres the principle of due process of law has so easily
acquiesced in this sort of terror tactic?
I cannot, from my own personal experience in Guatemala and what I
have seen since, honestly say to myself that the Guatemalan military
have any reason to believe that we really are opposed to this
tactic. I honestly think that on the contrary they believe we have
accepted and encouraged it—even though we have pro forma
remonstrated against excesses. We have talked to them to be sure,
but not very insistently, and the image the Guatemalan military man
gets from his total contact with the U.S. and U.S. advisors at all
levels is very much a mixed bag. It betrays, I am afraid,
intentionally or unintentionally, acquiescence and condonment.
Counter-terror is, in short, very wrong—morally, ethically,
politically from the standpoint of Guatemala’s own interest and
practically from our own foreign policy point of view.
D. What To Do?
I am frankly not sanguine we can stop counter-terror. But one thing
we can do is be honest with ourselves and admit to ourselves that
there is a problem, and that counter-terror is wrong as a counter-insurgency tactic. I just do not
think we have done that.
Beyond that there are three things to do: The record must be made clearer that the United States
Government opposes the concept and questions the wisdom of
counter-terror;the record must be made clearer that we have made this
known unambiguously to the Guatemalans; otherwise we will
stand before history unable to answer the accusations that
we encouraged the Guatemalan Army to do these things;most importantly, we should put our thinking caps on and
devise policies, aid and suggestions that can make
counter-terror unnecessary. It is argued that if we can
remonstrate strongly to the Guatemalans, they will say we
encouraged them to go ahead and now what do we suggest? It
is a good question, and we should ask ourselves that. If
counter-terror is justified by Guatemalans in terms of the
weakness of the legal system, is there nothing we can do to
help and prod them on legal reforms? Is there nothing we can
do to make them stop the brutality of torture and
mutilation? Is there nothing we can do to help them develop
philosophical concepts of institutions and a legal system? I
know that primitive violence has gone on a long time in
Guatemala and elsewhere. Do we just throw up our hands and
accept all of
its wrongness as long as it is also “effective” (and will
history’s verdict say it was “effective” in Guatemala)? If,
in fact, the GOG pleads
weakness in the conventional security apparatus, is that not
precisely what our assistance and counsel is for—to help
them perfect conventional, legal law enforcement?
If the U.S. cannot come up with any better suggestion on how to fight
insurgency in Guatemala than to condone counter-terror, we are in a
bad way indeed. But most of all, even if we cannot dissuade them, we
owe it to ourselves to come to terms with our values and judgments
and take a clear ethical stand.
103. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) and the Legal Adviser (Meeker) to Acting Secretary of State
KatzenbachSource: National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 GUAT–UK. Confidential. Drafted by Frank and McCormack; concurred in
by Webster, Salans, Burrows, Wiggins, and Shullaw. Originally addressed to the
Secretary; the word “Acting” was subsequently inserted by hand.
According to Rusk’s
Appointment Book he was in Washington on March 29 but left the next
day for Wellington, New Zealand, to attend SEATO and ANZUS
meetings. (Johnson Library)Washington, March 29, 1968.
SUBJECT
British Honduras Mediation
Discussion
In November of 1965 the United States agreed, at the request of the
Governments of Guatemala and the United Kingdom, to mediate their
dispute over British Honduras. On the Department’s recommendation the
President appointed Bethuel M.
Webster as the United States Government mediator.
Ambassador Webster has met with representatives of
the two parties and British Honduras many times during the last two
years. These discussions have centered on the conclusion of a settlement
under which British Honduras would become independent but would have
close ties with Guatemala. We have now reached a point where further
negotiations are unlikely to resolve the remaining differences between
the parties. We believe, therefore, that the time has come when the United States should present
to the parties the proposed treaty worked out by Ambassador Webster, which we believe represents a
fair solution to the dispute and would provide constructively for the
future of British Honduras.
The British and British Hondurans are considering calling a
constitutional convention in London this summer to prepare for British
Honduran independence in early 1969—even without settlement of the
dispute with Guatemala. It is important that they and the Guatemalans
have an opportunity to give consideration to our proposals for settling
the dispute before the first public steps toward independence are taken.
The claim to sovereignty over the territory of British Honduras is an
emotional issue in Guatemala, and the Guatemalans may react strongly
when the United Kingdom moves toward granting independence.
The proposed treaty (attached)Attached but
not printed. embodies many of the suggestions made by the
parties during their meetings with Ambassador Webster. They have
reviewed and commented on earlier drafts. The treaty provides that
British Honduras would obtain its independence from the United Kingdom
by the end of 1970 (Article 1); that Guatemala would have access to the
Caribbean through British Honduras (Article 2); that Guatemala may use
free-port areas in British Honduras (Article 3); and that certain common
service facilities would be integrated where feasible (Article 5). A
joint authority would be established to take jurisdiction over these
matters and others of mutual concern in the economic field (Article 9);
the United States would appoint the seventh member of the authority if
Belize and Guatemala cannot agree on a candidate. The British would make
a financial contribution of $3 million to the joint authority which
could be used, inter alia, to help construct a road connecting British
Honduras and Guatemala. (This road is of importance to the Guatemalans
since they believe the United Kingdom has an unfulfilled obligation,
resulting from an 1859 agreement, to build such a road.) The treaty
establishes a basis for British Honduras’ joining the Central American
Common Market if it should decide to do so (Article 10), and for British
Honduras’ joining the OAS (Article 13
(4)). It also provides for consultation and cooperation between
Guatemala and British Honduras in internal security (Article 12),
foreign policy (Article 13), and external defense (Article 14).
The treaty does not satisfy Guatemala’s demands for control over British
Honduras’ defense and foreign affairs and for the construction, by the
United Kingdom, of a $40 million road in Guatemala. The treaty would, in
general, be acceptable to the British and the Government of British
Honduras; it is likely to be opposed, for political reasons, by the opposition party in
British Honduras and by other elements of the population who deeply
distrust Guatemala.
We believe that it would be desirable for you to present the proposed
treaty to the British and Guatemalan Ambassadors. We suggest your doing
so on April 11 in Washington with Ambassador Webster present. If you
agree, we will prepare a talking paper for the occasion.
Recommendation
That you agree to present the United States’ proposed treaty in the
British Honduras mediation to the British and Guatemalan Ambassadors on
April 11.Katzenbach approved this
recommendation on April 4. Rusk met separately with the Guatemalan
and British Ambassadors on April 18, presenting each with a copy of
the draft treaty and an accompanying diplomatic note. (Telegram
149198 to Guatemala, April 18; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 GUAT–UK) At a meeting in Washington on April 23 Guatemalan
Foreign Minister Arenales
told Rusk that the draft
treaty was unacceptable to his government although he “would be able
to sell treaty easier in Guatemala if he had prestige of being
President of UNGA.” (Telegram
151804 to Guatemala, April 23; ibid.) On June 18 the Department
received a diplomatic note indicating that the U.K. Government also
found the draft unacceptable. (Telegram 193917 to Guatemala, June
29; ibid.)
104. Telegram From the Embassy in Honduras
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 18–1 HOND. Confidential;
Limdis.Tegucigalpa, April 2, 1968,
2330Z.
1943. For Assistant Secretary Oliver. Ref: Tegucigalpa 1917,In telegram 1917 from Tegucigalpa, April 1, the
Embassy reported that unofficial election returns indicated a
“crushing defeat” for the Liberal Party. (Ibid.) 1941,In telegram 1941 from Tegucigalpa, April 2,
the Embassy assessed general reaction to the municipal elections,
concluding that the Honduran public had reached a consensus that the
results were “so lopsided as to beg the question of free electoral
process.” (Ibid.) 1942.In
telegram 1942 from Tegucigalpa, April 2, the Embassy reported on
Liberal reaction to the “fraudulent elections.” (Ibid.)
I am deeply disturbed by manner in which municipal elections have
been carried out particularly in view of relative optimism which we had come to feel
regarding conciliatory atmosphere and the position of
non-partisanship of president and of the armed forces.The lopsided election results are an incitement to the liberals to
look for unconstitutional solutions and at same time are an
embarrassment to the Nationalist Party, to the GOH, to President Lopez and, frankly,
to the United States. Zuniga and his close associates did their work
not wisely but too well. Had he limited himself to bribery, use of
government transportation and other facilities for Nationalist
voters, this would have been not laudable perhaps but at least
understandable and, in the local context, acceptable. The use of
repressive gangster methods has, however, created a very bad effect.
The Nationalists, moreover, would probably have made a very
respectable showing without need resort to violence and
bloodshed.The question already being asked (and one which we must ask
ourselves) is what is to be the reaction of the U.S. Government and
specifically of this Embassy to elections which were so palpably
un-Alianza and un-Punta del Este in procedures. As an illustration
of how seriously this is viewed, Minister of Economy Acosta Bonilla
came to see me at lunch time April 1 unannounced and without
chauffeur. He foresaw grave harm to the laboriously built improved
image of the GOH abroad with
possible difficulties obtaining alliance loans as well as increasing
trouble and potential disturbances domestically unless something is
done at once to remedy situation. He said the only way this can be
done is if President Lopez promptly declared the most controversial
of the electoral districts null and called for re-elections in those
places, accompanied by an announcement that he would dismiss Zuniga
as person solely responsible for the elections. He urged that I see
the President and press this course on him. (We must recognize, of
course, that Acosta has his own axe to grind.) In meantime, he said,
public opinion closely watching Embassy and he recommended we avoid
taking any actions which might give impression we support Zuniga or
more unpleasant aspects of Lopez government. (Sandoval subsequently
told the DCMJean M. Wilkowski. that he so disturbed
with Zuniga’s manipulations that he considering offering his
resignation to President and specifically asked whether there would
be a change in U.S. economic assistance policy towards
Honduras.)Today I saw President and stressed to him our fear that handling
of election had been real step backward for Honduras, for his
government, and for his own prestige. I urged him to find some way
to restore conciliatory climate which had been so encouraging. Lopez
seemed tense and disturbed at events and said he feared that he had
now lost confidence of
Liberals and any possibility they might participate in government.
He spoke of possibility of repeat elections in six or seven most
controversial municipalities, was critical of Zuniga and even
touched on possibility of Zuniga absenting himself from country for
a couple of months. While I frankly doubt latter will happen, Lopez’
attitude at least seems constructive and he was regretfully aware of
damage which had been done to Honduras’ image abroad.At noon today Zuniga came to the residence at this [his?] request. I found him nervous and full
of self-justification. In same snow job he is probably giving
President he claimed poor Liberal showing was “a Liberal plot to
embarrass government” and claimed Nationalist success largely due to
hard work, good organization, and expenditure large sums of money
for bribery as well as pork barrel. He expressed suitable distaste
for intimidation and atrocities which he admitted had occurred in
two departments and which he said would be investigated. I told him
that regardless his rationalization, elections had done great harm
to Honduras both here and abroad and would certainly make our task
more difficult.I recognize that memories can be short here and the adverse
reactions may evaporate in a few weeks. I sincerely hope so. In the
meantime I request the Department’s authorization to return to
Washington for a few days’ consultation at my discretion if it
appears that this is most appropriate way to make known our concern
over situation.Jova
105. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in HondurasSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA/CEN/H
Files: Lot 70 D 59, Honduras 1968, POL 14 Elections. Confidential.Washington, April 4, 1968,
2338Z.
142043. Ref: Tegucigalpa 1943.Document 104.
Department shares your distress at manner in which elections were
carried out and your concern re possible consequences. However,
before a final determination is made of the necessity for
consultation you may wish
to consider the following factors that have occurred to Department: We believe it important that Lopez be persuaded to decide
for himself to take steps to redress the situation. If such
actions were taken following your return from hurried
consultation, it would be apparent to practically all
Hondurans that Lopez acted only under severe U.S.
pressure.On the other hand, if you returned from Washington and
nothing happened, it probably would be interpreted as
evidence U.S. acceptance of repression.It seems to us that you now even more than before offer
only possible channel of communication between Lopez and
Liberals. Your presence and influence may well be only
calming factor in this highly volatile situation.Your departure with its obvious implication of disapproval
of Sunday’s happenings could tempt Liberals to greater
militancy.Above considerations lead us to believe it may be advisable that
you remain in Tegucigalpa and continue your attempt convince Lopez
that it is to his advantage to assuage Liberal outrage.
Nullification of elections in five to ten municipalities where
violations of electoral laws and spirit of democracy were most
flagrant and announcement of date for new voting would be important
to show Liberals that Lopez seeking meet them half way. We also
believe that Lopez’ idea of sending Zuniga on mission outside
Honduras would be helpful in giving passions time to cool. In your
conversations with Lopez you may wish to tell him of Department’s
deep concern and hope that he will take immediate steps to restore
confidence of Honduran people and rest of world in GOH dedication to democratic
principles. If it later becomes evident that Lopez unwilling to act
to restore situation, we will consider bringing you to Washington
for longer period (sixty to ninety days).Katzenbach
106. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Central American
Affairs (Burrows) to
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
(Sayre)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA/CEN/H
Files: Lot 70 D 59, Honduras 1968, POL 14 Elections. ConfidentialWashington, April 12, 1968.
SUBJECT
Zuniga and what to do about him
Our Country Team in Tegucigalpa and we have given some thought to the
possibility and desirability of using such influence as we have to bring
about the removal of Zuniga from the Government of Honduras. The
Ambassador and the Country Team have heretofore ruled out such action
for the following reasons: The Government does function, however haltingly, and Zuniga
has been believed a key element in that limited
functioning.Were we to press for Zuniga’s ouster and succeed, we had no
idea who might succeed him and what might be the consequences of
the change (we still do not know).Were we to attempt to unseat Zuniga and fail, we would lose
almost all our influence with Lopez and the GOH.
These considerations are still valid, but the apparent brutality and
chicanery employed to make a farce of the March 31 municipal elections
necessitate a new review of the question, especially since it is quite
possible that Zuniga acted deliberately to sabotage any possible
conciliation between the GOH and the
Liberals. The review should consider, in addition to the questions
outlined above, the following: If Zuniga remains, how much further deterioration is to be
expected in the political situation? Is violence
probable?What effect will a complete Liberal break with the government
have on economic and social development?If the U.S. does decide to work for Zuniga’s removal what
leverage have we?
External Assistance
Although I believe that the degree of leverage
available to us because of A.I.D. programs is often
exaggerated, it is one source of pressure. The near
certainty that we will receive a formal request for
assistance in providing the infrastructure for the
projected pulp and paper complex does provide a
leverage not ordinarily present. However, if we use
this leverage in an attempt to unseat Zuniga we will
not be able to use the same leverage to try to
obtain more self-help measures from the GOH in the development
field. Further, we would need the firm support of
the World Bank and the IDB to make this leverage effective.
U.S. Private Investment
We might be able to convince the Hondurans (Lopez,
that is) that unless Zuniga
is removed to permit more stable and effective
government we would find it difficult to encourage
potential U.S. investment.
U.S. Influence Over Honduran
Opinion
A very large number of Hondurans are accustomed to
looking to the U.S. for guidance. Measures that
would clearly show our disapproval of the elections
(and by implication of Zuniga) probably would have a
strong effect. They might well lead Army leaders and
others to conclude that Zuniga must go and to press
Lopez to this end.
In this connection, it has been suggested that the
Ambassador and Country Team might be instructed to
maintain an attitude of cold correctness toward
Zuniga while exhibiting increased friendship and
approval for Acosta Bonilla and Sandoval. This
course might be useful, but might also backfire. On
balance, I think it would not accomplish too much.
Unless we decide to try to “get” Zuniga, there is
little to be gained by angering him (and probably
Lopez).
If Zuniga goes will the Lopez government survive?
Although the loyalty apparently is to Lopez there is a
possible danger that the confusion that would be created by
Zuniga’s removal and Lopez’ own lack of ability for the
day-to-day operation of the government might lead the Army
to feel that a change is needed. Furthermore, Zuniga’s own
performance in keeping this government on top of all
potential threats should not be underrated.
I believe that unless the government takes some action to
assuage the Liberals’ bitterness and to some extent redress
the electoral injustices we should seriously contemplate
attempting to procure Zuniga’s removal. I would think that
if by the latter part of April the situation has not
improved, Ambassador Jova should be brought to Washington for protracted
consultation and discussion of the procedure we should
follow with regard to Zuniga.In
an April 16 memorandum to Sayre, Burrows recalled that Zúñiga had recently
invited “an Embassy officer to his home and in a
90-minute conversation quite explicitly admitted his
deliberate sponsorship of the violence and fraud
attending the March 31 elections.” It appears that
Zúñiga wanted
to tell the United States: “I am number 1 in Honduras
and neither you nor anyone else can do anything about
it.” “The validity of such confidence on Zuniga’s part,”
Burrows
concluded, “is something that should be considered
carefully before we decide to ‘go for broke’ to obtain
his removal.” (Ibid.) According to the Embassy’s account
of the meeting: “Zuniga said it was he who pushed Lopez
into power, made him what he is and now does the real
work of governing. He enigmatically implied that Lopez’
presence was now not indispensable.” (Telegram 1994 from
Tegucigalpa, April 9; ibid., Central Files 1967–69,
POL 12 HOND)
107. Airgram From the Embassy in Honduras
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 HOND. Secret; Limdis. Drafted
by Jova on April 23.
Jova forwarded the
airgram to Sayre under cover
of an April 23 letter in which he wrote: “Frankly, I am increasingly
convinced that while the survival of the Government is important to
stability and development, our interests would be much better served
if we could eliminate Zúniga from the picture.” Jova explained that, “in accordance
with the Department’s desires I have tried to act as a channel
between the Liberals and the President and to help bring about a
reduction of tensions. This is very difficult under present
circumstances, and you will note from the attached airgram as well
as from our telegrams that we have been drawn into a considerably
more active role than is traditional. While in Honduras it is almost
impossible for the American Embassy to remain uninvolved, even here
this has its dangers.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA Files:
Lot 74 D 467, Honduras 1968)Tegucigalpa, April 24, 1968.
A–321. Subject: The President and the Zúniga Problem.
In my conversation with President López on
April 19 I pushed him further on the Zúniga problem than any time
previously. He attempted to make the point that his conscience was
clear as he considered himself apolitical, had received the Liberal
leaders openly and cordially in the pre-election period and had
given strict orders for the Armed Forces to play a non-partisan
role. I told him that while it was well known that he himself was
apolitical, he could not separate his own role as President from
that of Zúniga, his most intimate collaborator and “Prime Minister” who was at
the same time the admittedly real leader of the Nationalist Party
and the organizer of the electoral process. I stressed to the
President the very real usefulness of his apolitical stance as one
of the true unifying forces in the country. I urged that he not let
this be eroded. The President replied that he has even considered
resigning as his patience with the politicians has grown even
thinner, but fears that this would solve nothing and might plunge
the country into real chaos. I urged that he forget thoughts of
resigning but instead play his full role as President.I pointed out that the very fact that the President had received
the Liberals may in itself have led to their persecution as Zúniga
had himself told us that he considered this as a threat to himself.
When the President later remarked that his door continued open to
the Liberal leaders and that he was willing to receive them at any
time, I queried him whether this might not cause trouble with Zúniga
who, we understood, wished that contacts with the Liberals be
carried out through him. The President reacted rather sharply to
this, replying that Mr. Zúniga had nothing to do with this matter,
this did not concern him, and that he as President was free to see
the Liberals when and as he wished.In another portion of the conversation the President referred to
Zúniga as he has in the past as merely his assistant and
collaborator and one who could be dispensed with at will. To that I
replied that, while Zúniga had previously wielded power as in effect
the President’s private secretary and closest collaborator, he now,
as a result of the municipal elections, had unquestionably emerged
as a political power in his own right and as a consequence we
understood his attitude had changed and had become considerably more
domineering. I told the President that I recognized how useful
Zúniga had been to him, and the fact that as a private secretary
their interests were in large part mutual. Zúniga’s interests as a
political power now, however, might not coincide with the
President’s own interests and I suggested that the President examine
very carefully to what extent their interests coincided and to what
extent they diverged in order that he might be guided accordingly.
Certainly their interests had not coincided in regard to the
municipal elections and in this instance it had not been the
President’s interests which had been served…The President not only took my various references to Zúniga in
good grace but seemed to agree. In fact, I noted on his part an
attitude which bordered on the hostile towards Zúniga and it may be
that his recognition of the divergency of their interests is
growing. We must not forget that others, including Mrs.
López, are pressing him on this divergency.
It may also have been significant that in reply to my query he
suggested that I not mention to Zúniga the memorandum prepared by former President
Villeda Morales which I
had handed him.Not found. On
this occasion he said that this should remain between the two of us,
“If you tell Zúniga the whole town will know in no time.”I think it is obvious that the differences between these two men
are growing and the President may even have begun to fear him.
(Could this be why he is starting a new military unit to serve under
his personal command as a “Presidential Guard”?) I know that Mrs.
López is in a very depressed state, is
increasingly anti-Zúniga, and told the Archbishop that her husband
has lost prestige and power to “that man” and that she has no hope
left for the future. (This admittedly is an emotional woman’s view.)
Certainly the confirmation of Zúniga as the “political master of the
country” as a result of the election has increased the alarm and the
jealousy of various other Nationalist leaders and perhaps of some of
the military. Nevertheless, it is very possible that the President
would find it difficult (perhaps more so than we know) to take
action against Zúniga and will continue living with a situation to
which he has become accustomed and which in many respects has been
useful (and even profitable) to him. On the other hand, [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] received indications [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] that it would
not be impossible for the President to drop Zúniga were this to his
interest (see enclosure A).Attached but
not printed.In any case, my conversations with the President should make it
clear to him that, contrary to what we sometimes believe Zúniga has
led him to think, the American Embassy is not supporting Mr. Zúniga
in his present office and would be prepared to work directly with
the President toward a more conciliatory type of government at any
time the President might wish.Jova
108. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 HOND. Confidential. Drafted by
Starzel on April 29. The meeting was held at the Hotel Tequendama.
Oliver forwarded the
memorandum with a letter to Jova on April 30, in which he suggested:
“In view of my discussion with Acosta Bonilla you may have different
ideas now about an approach to oust Zuniga. If so, we would like to
hear them.” (Ibid., ARA Files: Lot
74 D 467, Honduras 1968) Jova
replied by reiterating his position on Zúñiga’s removal, with an important qualification:
“López must be brought to desire it himself.” (Letter from Jova to Oliver, May 7, transmitted in telegram 2254 from
Tegucigalpa, May 9; ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL 12 HOND)Bogota, April 25, 1968, 12:15
p.m.
SUBJECT
Current Political Conditions in Honduras
PARTICIPANTS
Roberto Ramirez, President, Central Bank of HondurasManuel Acosta Bonilla, Honduran Minister of the EconomyCovey T. Oliver, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
During the course of the Plenary Session of the IDB Governors on April 24, Minister Acosta requested an
opportunity for Ramirez and him to talk with Mr. Oliver, topic unspecified. When the
conversation was held, Acosta opened on the above subject and did most
of the talking. No other subjects arose.
Minister Acosta said that the recent municipal elections in Honduras had
not been conducted with complete honesty on the part of the Nationalist
Party and that, although the Honduran military had been kept
scrupulously out of the elections by the President, the resulting
bitterness had badly divided the country. He mentioned specifically the
estrangement of the labor unions.
Minister Acosta expressed the concern that if Vice President Zuniga
prevails in his drive for greater power within the government of
Honduras, the result will be a dictatorship. The Minister explained that
Ambassador Jova had made clear
the bad reaction in Washington to the latest elections but that the
President is blind to Zuniga’s faults and does not comprehend the
seriousness of the problem. At the same time, the Minister confided that
there are strong elements within the GOH
which desire the ouster of Zuniga.
Mr. Oliver asked about the
possible motivations of Zuniga and Minister Acosta replied that Zuniga
simply wants to control the government. At the present time he stands in
the way and is a bottleneck to all important programs. In the case of fulfilling the
requirements of the IMF Standby for
curtailing excessive government costs, Zuniga continues to run his
Ministry in defiance of the demands of the Minister of Economy.
Mr. Oliver asked if there were
solutions to the problem, such as holding new elections. The Minister
doubted the possibility of doing this, saying that the only answer was
to confront the President with the problem and cure his myopia towards
Zuniga. Mr. Oliver then asked if
there was any outside help which could be used to persuade the
President, suggesting both the outgoing and incoming OAS Secretaries General. Acosta discounted
these but thought President Somoza might be helpful. However, he believed that
Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa was
probably the best man, as he is both a close friend of President Lopez
and a highly respected figure as well. The possibility of contact at the
Central American Meeting of Presidents was also discussed, the advantage
there being that Somoza might
offer counsel without causing public notice of their contact.
Mr. Oliver asked if it might
settle tensions if the President brought more Liberals into his
government. Acosta thought that most Liberals would refuse to associate
with the present government, and he doubted that there could be any such
workable coalition. On this note, he also remarked that while many of
the “exaltados Liberales” were leaving the country or merely throwing up
their hands in frustration, the Communists are planning to take
advantage of the worsening situation.
The Minister commented that President Lopez may believe that Ambassador
Jova is acting on his own and
siding with the Liberals. Also, there is a belief that Washington may
not see the situation as the Ambassador does. Mr. Oliver praised the Ambassador’s
reporting and assured the Minister that Washington is as concerned about
the situation as the Ambassador is. Mr. Oliver then asked what serious consequences would arise
from the removal of as powerful a figure as Zuniga, referring as he did
to Colombian President Valencia’s
removal of General Ruiz Novoa in 1964. Both Acosta and Ramirez agreed
that Zuniga is really without power, that his only source of strength is
that the people at many levels view him as the shadow of the President.
That notwithstanding, Zuniga has no support from either political party
(except from “la basura”), the military, or labor. Mr. Oliver remarked that Zuniga is then
“not a power but a symbol of power.” Acosta agreed and noted that
Ambassador Jova understands this
well.
Going back to an earlier general reference of Acosta’s, Mr. Oliver called up the possibility of a
visit to Washington by President Lopez, noting that we would have
difficulties with this in the United States. Acosta nodded his
understanding and said that the President would be delighted to come,
that he has already made official visits to Nicaragua, Costa Rica and
Mexico, and that he went to Punta del Este.
Mr. Oliver closed stating that he
would consider calling Ambassador Jova to Washington for consultations, briefing
Ambassador Sevilla Sacasa on the
issue and the role he might play. There was brief discussion of the
possibility of Presidents Lleras and Trejos being useful, but it was agreed they would not be
so at this time.Jova returned to Washington
for consultation in early June, and participated in an IRG/ARA meeting on June 5, to
consider the Zúñiga problem.
(Telegram 173654 to Tegucigalpa, May 30; ibid., POL 1 HOND–US) An action memorandum
records the decision as follows: “To the extent feasible the USG should work to achieve its
objectives in Honduras through power centers other than Minister of
the Presidency Ricardo Zuniga. We should avoid giving the impression
that the USG favors Zuniga or is
building up his image. We should not become involved in pressing for
Zuniga’s ouster, but if internal pressures for his removal build up
in Honduras, the USG may be able to
use its influence discreetly to help nudge him out.” (IRG/ARA Action Memo No. 49, June 7;
ibid., IRG/ARA Files: Lot 70 D
122, IRG/ARA Action Memos,
1968)
109. Summary of the Discussion and Decisions at the 37th Senior
Interdepartmental Group MeetingSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, S/S–SIG Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/RA No. 37, 5/14/68, Latin America.
Secret. No drafting information appears on the summary; it was
prepared on May 24 and approved by Katzenbach on May 27.Washington, May 16, 1968.
PRESENT
Under Secretary of State, ChairmanDeputy Secretary of DefenseGeneral Brown for the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of StaffThe Director of Central IntelligenceMr. Poats for the
Administrator, Agency for International DevelopmentThe Director, United States Information AgencyMr. Bowdler for the Special
Assistant to the PresidentUnder Secretary for Political AffairsDeputy Under Secretary for Political AffairsSIG Staff DirectorAmbassador Mein,
GuatemalaJCS—General OrwatISA—Mr. Lang;
Mr.EarleState—Mr. Oliver; Mr.
Ruser
The SIG, at its 37th meeting, considered
the situation in Guatemala. Following are highlights of Ambassador
Mein’s presentation and the ensuing discussion.
Statement of Positions
The purpose of the meeting was to review the strategy toward Guatemala
proposed in the Country Team’s Country Analysis and Strategy Paper
(CASP) for FY 70.The FY 1970 CASP
for Guatemala was transmitted as an enclosure to airgram A–35 from
Guatemala, March 22. (Ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 GUAT–US) The IRG/ARA, reviewing the CASP, had found itself at variance with
the Country Team’s conclusions and recommendations.At its meeting on April 26 the IRG/ARA “unanimously agreed that the
basic U.S. strategy toward Guatemala proposed by the Country Team in
its FY 1970 Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) would not meet U.S. objectives
generally for the hemisphere or specifically for Guatemala.” As an
alternative, the IRG proposed a
strategy in which the U.S. Government would increase assistance to
Guatemala if the Méndez administration agreed
to promote economic development and social reform. The strategy
included the following: “If Mendez is unwilling to move on the basis
of our proposal, we should then reduce our aid on all three fronts
(economic, police and military) to minimal levels.” (IRG/ARA Action
Memo No. 38, April 29; ibid., S/S–SIG
Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/Memo No.
64, 5/3/68, IRG/ARA Decision on
Basic US Strategy Toward Guatemala)
Ambassador Mein, summarizing the
CASP’s recommendations, said the
Country Team had considered three alternative strategies toward
Guatemala.
—To continue the present strategy of supporting the Mendez regime,
and develop United States programs more or less along present
lines;—To put the Mendez regime on notice that we would have to cut back
our programs unless it moves faster on economic and social
reform;—To offer a substantial increase in our aid effort as an
inducement to more rapid reform.
The Country Team was proposing continuation of our present
strategy—albeit with certain changes in emphasis. It had discarded the
third alternative essentially because it understood that budget
stringencies would preclude a substantial increase in assistance. It had
concluded that the second alternative—a strategy of pressure—was both
unwise and undesirable. Mendez, with all his shortcomings, was
preferable to any alternative now in sight. Should he be replaced, the
next government would be either a purely military or a rightist
military-civilian regime. Mendez was committed to reform to the extent
politically feasible and was well aware of our position. It was not in
our interest to threaten Mendez with withdrawal of our support.
Assistant Secretary Oliver
reported that the IRG/ARA, in
contrast to the Country Team’s conclusions, had unanimously recommended
in favor of a combination of the Embassy’s second and third
alternatives— a strategy of pressure, combined with an offer of
increased assistance in return for accelerated self-help efforts. We
should encourage Mendez to mount a reform program and be prepared to
review our assistance effort in light of the regime’s performance.
In the discussion, it was noted that there had recently been considerable
criticism in the United States press concerning repressive measures by
the Guatemalan Government and our apparent association with them. The
United States Government was in a difficult position supporting a regime
which appeared to carry out—or tolerate—a campaign of counter-terror
against its political opponents. Our military assistance program and
AID’s public safety program, in
particular, were politically vulnerable. The United States public, not
aware of our limited leverage on Guatemala, misinterpreted these
programs as evidence of our support for the status quo.
Resilience of the Regime
There was a consensus that the resilience of the regime, its capacity to
undertake reform, was the key issue as between the opposing views.
Ambassador Mein said that in his
judgment Mendez’ freedom of action continued to be severely
circumscribed both by political factors and by available resources. The
politically dominant forces in the country remain opposed to significant
reforms.
The IRG/ARA view, on the contrary, was
that, following the events of March 28,On
March 28 Méndez fired three high-level military
officers: the Minister of Defense, the Commander of the Zacapa
Military Brigade, and the Commander of the Honor Guard Brigade.
(Memorandum from Bowdler to
Rostow, March 28; Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Guatemala, Vol. II, 1/66–11/68)
A third view was that we should not focus entirely on the capacity of the
government but also on the attitude of Guatemala’s socioeconomic
establishment. Since 1954, this power structure had remained essentially
unchanged: land-owning groups, some business interests, some elements of
the army. The Mendez government would be unable to undertake significant
reforms without at least the acquiescence of these groups. We should
attempt to engage these groups in a dialogue in an effort to persuade
them to accept such a program.
United States Objectives
Ambassador Mein underlined his
belief that survival of the duly elected Mendez government, followed by
an orderly transfer of power in 1970, should be the primary United
States objective—even if Mendez should have to sacrifice major reforms
during the remainder of his term. Survival of an elected government—this
would be the third such government to survive since 1821—would set an
important precedent, which would benefit the development of viable
democratic institutions in Guatemala.
In the discussion, the question was raised whether, if the government was
in fact so heavily dependent upon tolerance by the power structure, its
survival really made that much difference from the United States point
of view.
Another view was that a head-on confrontation with the regime— and all
the risks attached to such an approach—made in any case little sense,
given the regime’s limited room for maneuver. This issue was really not
one of how far we were willing to go in risking the regime’s survival
but whether Mendez and the United States could persuade the power
structure to accept a measure of reform.
Mendez’ Regime Performance
Ambassador Mein stressed his
disagreement with the estimate that the Mendez regime had been a
standstill administration. There had been significant progress, although
not as much as we would have liked to see and probably not as much as
Mendez could have accomplished. In assessing Mendez’ accomplishments, we
should keep in mind that the Mendez administration had started from
scratch. Progress under the previous military regime had been
negligible.
In this connection, the Ambassador recalled that the United States had
proposed 26 projects to the new government in late 1966; 24 of these had
been accepted by the Mendez government. The large loan pipeline ($70
million) was mainly in IBRD, IDB, and CABEI financed projects; the AID pipeline was quite modest.
Other Guatemalan achievements were: —sound monetary fiscal policies;—little labor unrest;—considerable progress under the northeast rural development
program;—encouragement of private enterprise and private foreign
investment (e.g., negotiations with International Nickel were
virtually completed).
In the important field of tax legislation, the government in 1967 had
increased the land tax and it now hoped to get the Guatemalan Congress
to approve AID’s property tax
development loan, which would
result in a substantial increase in tax revenues. The Ambassador
considered prospects for this loan favorable although he conceded that
there remained considerable opposition.
It was acknowledged that this loan, if authorized, could be an important
step towards a more equitable sharing of the tax burden by the
land-owning classes of Guatemalan society.
Rightist Counter-Terror
As regards the counter-insurgency situation, Assistant Secretary
Oliver noted that the
existence of rightist counter-terrorist groups was a major source of
concern to the IRG/ARA.
Ambassador Mein said that he
shared this concern and had raised this matter with Mendez on several
occasions. The President had not conceded any excesses in the
clandestine counter-insurgency operations.
Equally important, since removal of the three generals, there had, in
fact, been no new incidents. The clandestine units of the national
police had been dissolved. Activity of the clandestine army groups had
been curtailed. Victims of the counter-terror were, in fact,
overwhelmingly leftist subversives and sympathizers.
United States Leverage
Ambassador Mein said we should
recognize that our influence and leverage were, in fact, very limited.
There remained residues of resentment related to the events of 1954.
There also was some resentment related to the rather large United States
presence. Nationalism was a force to be reckoned with in our policy.
The question was raised whether the threat of withdrawal of our aid, even
if taken seriously, was likely to give us much leverage. Our present
program, in fact, was a modest one. Included in it were a prospective
educational loan and some $3 million in technical assistance, to which
we probably attached greater importance than the Guatemalan leadership.
The military assistance program was less than $2 million.
A contrary view was that we presumably would extend our approach to
IDB activities, which are of
considerably greater magnitude. A United States veto on IDB loans would undoubtedly be rather
painful to the regime.
Ambassador Mein said that Mendez
was fully aware of our views. Threats to withdraw the remaining program
would not be helpful. Our dissatisfaction with Guatemalan self-help
efforts was reflected in the fact that no loan agreements, excepting the
educational loan, were pending at this time. He strongly urged that we
proceed with the educational loan, which had been under discussion for
more than a year and which
tried to deal with one of Guatemala’s basic requirements.
Desirable Reform Steps
The discussion showed that there was essential agreement on the steps we
would like the Mendez government to take.
The steps identified were: —tax reform;—a rural development program;—educational reform and development;—cessation of the counter-terror;—freedom of activity for progressive democratic groups.
As regards political reform, Ambassador Mein suggested that this was not much of an issue. The
only important democratic political group now denied freedom was the
Christian Democrats. This matter was now in court and there was not too
much for us to do at this time.
Mr. Oliver said there was an issue
of whether to use economic aid as lever for political reform or whether
to relate political reform exclusively to our MAP and public safety programs. ARA came out in favor of the more moderate of these two
approaches.
Role of Milgroup
The Chairman raised the question of whether and how we could use our
Milgroup to encourage a democratic political orientation in the
Guatemalan armed forces.
The observation was made that there was some risk in our military
personnel entering the political dialogue of their host country. The
Guatemalan military was no longer a major obstacle to reform. Its
officer corps was increasingly drawn from the middle classes. Many of
these officers had received training in the United States.
As regards AID’s public safety program,
indoctrination in democratic political processes and the importance of
orderly judicial procedures were an important element of the training
program at the International Police Academy in Washington. We could not,
of course, be sure how much of this training Guatemalan police officials
were able to sustain, confronted as they were with political cross
pressures in their jobs back home.
Ambassador Mein said that the
Guatemalan military academy’s curriculum was being adjusted to modern
conceptions of the role of the military. It now includes a political
science course. Our military training program envisages sending young
military men to public and private universities in this country. In the
coming year four Guatemalan officers would be brought to this country
for this purpose.
The Chairman concluded that the personal and professional contacts of our
Milgroup—as well as AID’s public safety
officers—were an asset we should be sure to use fully. It was important
that our people speak up in all their contacts with Guatemalans and
vigorously express their viewpoint on the value of democratic and
orderly judicial processes.
Conclusion
There was a consensus that we should make a serious effort at a dialogue
with the Mendez government and the Guatemalan establishment on the
requirements for modernization. In this dialogue we should not threaten
withdrawal of our already limited program, as this might merely weaken
the Mendez government’s position. Conversely, however, we should use the
offer of additional aid as an inducement to obtain a commitment by the
government—and acceptance by the establishment—to a meaningful reform
and development program.
Action Summary
The Chairman directs: That the Country Team, in cooperation with the IRG/ARA: develop, in more specific terms, elements of a
development program which the United States would
support, and specific performance in the fields of tax
reform, agricultural development and educational reform
expected from the Mendez government in connection with
such a program.develop a plan for a dialogue with elements of the
Guatemalan social-economic power structure for the
purpose of assisting the Mendez government in obtaining
their acquiescence or endorsement for a stepped up
reform/development program.That, after this preliminary work is completed, the
Ambassador, supported by ARA/LA, commence a formal dialogue with President
Mendez and his government on the requirements for accelerated
development, offering an increased level of United States
assistance in return for increased self help efforts.That, drawing on its preparatory work, the Country Team
undertake a systematic effort at a dialogue with the Guatemalan
power structure on the need for accelerated development.That the Milgroup continue using its contacts for the purpose
of encouraging a democratic political orientation in the
Guatemalan armed forces.That all elements of the Country Team continue to emphasize
the importance we attach to democratic processes, freedom of
expression for democratic political forces, and orderly judicial
procedures.That ARA, in due course,
report on the results of these efforts.The Department forwarded the action summary
on May 30 and instructed the Embassy to submit first “its
recommendations for implementing 1a and 1b above, for IRG/ARA review.” (Telegram
173821 to Guatemala, May 30; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID(US) 8–8 GUAT) In airgram
A–581 from Guatemala, September 7, the Embassy submitted its
recommendations, including the following explanation: “The
airgram was drafted by Ambassador Mein and reviewed by him
with members of the Country Team thoroughly prior to his
tragic and untimely death on August 28. The only changes
made since then are minor ones which he had discussed with
the Country Team and authorized on the morning of August
28.” (Ibid., POL 1 GUAT–US)
In a memorandum to Katzenbach, October 14, Oliver reported that the
IRG/ARA judged that
“the airgram constitutes compliance with the SIG directive.” (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Agency File, SIG, 37th Meeting, 5/16/68,
Vol. 5)
Approved:
Nicholas deB Katzenbach Chairman Senior Interdepartmental Group
110. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Costa Rica, President
Trejos Fernandez Visit,
6/68. Confidential.Washington, June 3, 1968.
SUBJECT
Visit of Costa Rican President Trejos—June 4–5, 1968
The visit of President Trejos
gives you the opportunity to stress democracy and development under the
Alliance for Progress. Costa Rica gets high marks on both. It has one of
the longest traditions of stable, democratic government in the
hemisphere. It also has a good record of meeting Alliance goals in
education, health, agriculture and industry.
Your participation in the visit is limited to the welcoming ceremony, a
half hour office visit and a state dinner—all on Tuesday, June 4. The
welcoming statement and toast, which were sent to you at the Ranch, are
designed to give maximum emphasis to the democracy and development
themes.
On the official call, there are no outstanding issues in our relations
which require decision at the Presidential level. Our intelligence is
that President Trejos is not
likely to raise bilateral issues, leaving that for his accompanying
Ministers to discuss with State and AID.
I attach a memorandum from Under Secretary Katzenbach with talking points (Tab A)Dated May 31; attached but not printed.
which you might use in your conversations with President Trejos. You will want to mention his
consistent support on Vietnam.
There is one point not covered in the Katzenbach memorandum which President Trejos is likely to mention: his pet
project of a highway from San Jose to the Caribbean port of Limon and
modern port facilities. He regards this as the single most important
contribution to Costa Rican development at this stage. The World Bank
and the Central American Bank are interested in financing the project.
What remains is to work out the details. If he raises the subject, I
recommend you tell him you know about the project, and agree on its
importance.
Our record of assistance to Costa Rica is good. It has received $188.7
million under the Alliance in loans and technical assistance. For FY
1969, another $6.7 million is earmarked, subject to Congressional action
on the AID Bill and Costa Rican
self-help measures.Johnson met Trejos in the Oval Office, on June 6 at 12:25–1:10
p.m. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) A memorandum of
conversation is ibid., National Security File, Country File, Costa
Rica, Vol. I, 4/64–10/68. At his Tuesday luncheon meeting later that
afternoon, Johnson gave the following brief
assessment: “The Trejos
meeting was a good one. They have some population problems and are
not too happy about all the conditions placed on World Bank loans.”
(Ibid., Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings)
Walt
111. Editorial Note
In late May 1968 President Johnson proposed visiting
Central America as part of a trip to demonstrate his interest in the
Western Hemisphere, including stops in Colombia and Brazil. (Memorandum
from Rostow to the President, May 25; Johnson
Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 79) Although the
plans for South America subsequently fell through, the White House
announced on July 1 that Johnson had accepted an
invitation to attend a meeting at the headquarters of the Organization
of Central American States (ODECA) in
San Salvador. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) The President arrived in San Salvador on
July 6; later that day, he participated in a “working session” with the
Central American Presidents, addressing such issues of common concern as
regional economic integration. On July 7 Johnson
toured several sites in El Salvador, including a primary school named in
his honor. Before returning to Washington on July 8 he escorted
Presidents Somoza, Trejos, López,
and Méndez to their respective countries, attending
a brief ceremony upon arrival at each airport.
The Embassy in San Salvador considered the visit to Central America an
“unqualified” success: “This was probably the greatest event this little
country has ever experienced and US-Salvadoran relations will benefit
for years to come. Of more significance, the President’s demonstrated
and expressed personal interest in Central American regionalism and
integration cannot help but give a big shot in the arm to this concept.”
(Telegram 2268 from San Salvador, July 8; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 ELSAL) For Johnson’s remarks
during the trip, see Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1968–69, Book II, pages 780–800; and
Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1968,
pages 109–121) Documentation on the visit is also in the Johnson
Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File,
Central America; ibid., Hemisfair and Central America, 7/68; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 69 D
182, CF 305 through CF 308; and ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 ELSAL.
112. Minutes of Cabinet MeetingSource: Johnson Library, Cabinet Papers, July 10,
1968. Confidential. According to the President’s Daily Diary,
Johnson met with the Cabinet, July 10,
12:10–1:15 p.m. The first item on the agenda was the President’s
report on his trip to Central America. (Johnson Library)Washington, July 10, 1968, 12:10
p.m.
The President opened the meeting of the Cabinet at 12:10 p.m.
He began with a brief summary of the week-end trip to Central America
(see attached outline). After completing his formal report, the
President said:
“I would say there is no problem in Central America that money and
resources cannot cure. But the problems are many, and they are great. There is a great deal
to do in education, in health, in housing, in transportation and
communication.
“When all these problems are solved, we can expect to see a better life
for all the people of this hemisphere, and we can expect to see greatly
expanded trade between our country and all these nations.
“The trip was well worth the weekend. Never—not even on the last night of
a campaign, surrounded by my closest friends—have I experienced such a
warm spirit of affection and hospitality.
“Minor incidents—paint throwing and so forth—were really unimportant,
negligible occurrences on this trip. Every place we went, there were
thousands of people applauding the United States and applauding the
President. They appeared to me about as friendly as any people could
be.
“We received the same kind of welcome when we visited each country’s
airport, to drop off their Presidents.
“All in all, it was a good weekend. Now I hope that AID and USIA and the other agencies will follow up this effort, and
help these Central American countries as they have helped other
countries.
“My most vivid impression is that there is so much to do—and so little
time to do it.”
Attachment I
OUTLINE FOR THE PRESIDENT’S REPORT TO THE CABINET ON
HIS RECENT CENTRAL AMERICAN TRIPThe
outline was drafted by Rostow on July 9 as
“Talking Points on the Central American Trip.” (Ibid., Cabinet
Papers)
A. Purpose of the Trip
To show United States support for economic integration in
Central America.To dramatize the success of the Central American Common Market
as an example for other areas of the hemisphere and world of
what can be accomplished through regional cooperation.To rally increased effort to expand the quantity and quality
of education.
B. Direct Accomplishments
The meeting took place at a critical time when the Central
Americans faced important adjustment problems in the Common
Market; morale was sagging.My trip to review their achievements and problems with them
and offer increased US support recharged their confidence and
determination.
Before I arrived, they made a frank
assessment of their accomplishments, which are
impressive: —almost 700% increase in intraregional
trade;—an average annual growth in GNP of 6%, although it
has slowed down in the past 2 years;—a 65% increase in investment;—a 50% increase in expenditures for
education;—effective regional institutions under dynamic,
young leadership.
But more importantly, they also measured
how much more needs to be done:—in education, housing, health and population
control;—in diversifying and increasing exports;—in linking the countries with better roads and
telecommunications;—in perfecting the Common Market
institutions.
They agreed to redouble their efforts in these fields.They committed themselves to ratify the protocol imposing a
30% surtax on exports—an essential first step.
C. Important Follow-Up
The trip convinced me more than ever before that the road to
peace and progress lies through regionalism and subregionalism
in Central America.Central America can be made a microcosm for this process which
will be a challenge and stimulus for other areas to
follow.I am impressed by the material gains I saw and the human
talent available. I saw this particularly in the educational
field symbolized by the LBJ
School in a poor neighborhood and in the San Andres Normal
School which will house the Instructional Television pilot
project for Central America.But as I drove through the streets and countryside and saw
thousands of children and young people, I realized how much more
needs to be done quickly in schooling, housing, health and
jobs.
I am asking Walt Rostow to work with Secretary
Rusk and Bill Gaud in organizing a working
group to bring together resources in private industry, the
universities and government to spur a major development effort in
Central America.
A Political Side-Benefit
For the past 13 months relations between Honduras and El
Salvador had progressively deteriorated as both sides refused to
exchange prisoners seized in a border dispute area.The increased bitterness between the two countries was also
poisoning Common Market cooperative relations.My trip prompted the two sides to work out a quick solution
announced on the eve of my arrival.
113. Memorandum From the Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American
Affairs (Frank) to
the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver), the Legal Adviser
(Meeker), and the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–1 GUAT–UK. Confidential. Copies were sent to Webster and Killoran.Washington, August 2, 1968.
SUBJECT
British Honduras Mediation
On June 29, 1968 the Department, in accordance with a decision made by
Ambassadors Oliver and Webster
and Mr. Meeker, informed our
posts that we would terminate the British Honduras mediation and our
active participation in the dispute, and would so inform the parties to
the dispute in writing.In telegram 193917
to Guatemala, London, and Belize; attached but not printed.
Ambassador Mein has suggested that
we not abandon our role as mediator and that we continue our
participation through diplomatic channels rather than through Ambassador
Webster.In telegram 5715 from Guatemala, July 25. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
POL 32–1 GUAT–UK) Further suggestions have been
made that we end the mediation without sending a note, and/or inform the
Guatemalans of our willingness to remain involved and of our sympathy
for their position.
The issue is whether we should overturn the previous decision, i.e. (1)
whether we should terminate the mediation; (2) if so, how we should
terminate the mediation; and (3) whether we should inform the
Guatemalans of our sympathy and willingness to remain involved.
I strongly believe that we should end the mediation, that we should do so
in writing, and that we should make no commitments vis-à-vis further
participation in the dispute, for the following reasons: Ambassador Mein
suggests that the parties can reach agreement. I believe it is
now quite evident that a solution will not be
found in the foreseeable future—because of Arenales’
reaction to the mediator’s proposal, Mendez Montenegro’s
disinterest in the dispute, the politics and emotions in British
Honduras manifested after the treaty was published, and the
British unwillingness to resolve the dispute with a large cash
settlement.A solution will only come with time, when the reality of an
independent British Honduras is recognized in Guatemala and when
the British Hondurans, as masters of their own affairs, realize
the need to make concessions. These events will occur more
quickly if the parties are looking to
themselves rather than to the United States for an
answer.The United States can no longer fill a useful
role as a neutral third party. We are not needed to
facilitate contact and communication between the parties. We do
not have fresh ideas. The parties seem unprepared to have a
solution “imposed” on them by the USG, as has been shown by the unanimous objection
to the US treaty.Becoming involved in Arenales’ machinations
leaves us dangerously exposed. Arenales has told us he wishes
to reduce British influence in British Honduras. He has told the
British he wishes to reduce US influence in Central America. He
has told both of us that he believes the best solution would be
the bribery of either Price or
Goldson.By following the recommended course of action, we can always re-enter the discussions
and consideration of the dispute if we find it would later be in
our interest. This flexibility is preferable to a commitment to
participation, when significant events will soon occur, e.g., BH
constitutional conference and independence.The British Honduras issue is not of major concern to either
the Guatemalan public or to the President of Guatemala at the
present. It is possible this dispute could die a natural death.
However, if we remain involved and mislead the Guatemalans by
showing support or sympathy, we could induce
Guatemalan politicians to make the claim a political
issue—it could sprout like, and reach the proportions of,
the Venezuela– Guyana dispute. Rather than nipping this
at the bud, we would be assisting in creating an unfortunate
situation calling for later reaction.Only Arenales (for
personal reasons) and a handful in Guatemala are concerned with
the dispute. Mendez Montenegro has shown little interest in
assuming the risks of a settlement or in using the issue for
political purposes. I believe the Government
of Guatemala would not object if we terminate the
mediation and dampen rather than encourage Arenales.Ending the mediation in an oral or equivocal
fashion, especially when extrapolated in Guatemala
City, will result in the Guatemalans
misreading our position, in Arenales believing the Treaty was a Webster rather than a US
proposal, and in our diplomatic missions becoming more
involved—subjectively involved.
In conclusion, I recommend that we send notes to the British and
Guatemalans as outlined in paragraph three of the attached cable. If you
believe it advisable, we could always console the Guatemalans although
we should do so without any implication that we would support any
further efforts of theirs to gain control of British Honduras, to
prevent British Honduras from becoming independent, or to inflame the
British Honduras issue in Guatemala.An
attached handwritten note of August 3 indicates that Meeker agreed
that the United States should “deliver notes & cut this off
clean.” The issue of U.S. mediation in the British Honduras was
resolved on September 12, when the Department informed the U.S.
Embassies in Guatemala City and London of its conviction that “in
balance it is now in best interests US formally end its role as
mediator.” (Telegram 236943 to Guatemala City and London, September
12; ibid., POL 19 BR HOND) Identical
diplomatic notes to this effect were delivered to the Guatemalan and
British Embassies in Washington on September 20. (Telegram 242405 to
London and Guatemala City, September 20; ibid.)
114. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PER Mein, John Gordon. Confidential; Flash; Limited Office
Use. This telegram repeats a telegram originally sent from the
Embassy to the Director of the National Security Agency.Guatemala City, August 28, 1968,
2310Z.
Guatemala Critic. The following has been passed USIB agencies.
Following details re death Ambassador Mein obtained from Embassy chauffeur and Dr.
Salvador Ortega, who was on scene:
1500 Ambassador returning toward Embassy in official limousine,
along with driver. Proceeding north along Avenida Reforma,
between 12th and 13th streets, Zone 10.
1502 Green car, possibly 64 Buick, overtook limousine on left,
forcing it to curb, grazed left front fender. Small red truck
stopped immediately behind limousine, blocking it. Young man,
dressed olive-green fatigues, armed submachine gun, emerged from
green car, ordered chauffeur and Ambassador step out. Driver
stepped out of car, but Ambassador opened right rear door and began run back in
direction south, protected by car.
Armed youth ran to left rear fender of car, shouted halt, while
driver green car said “Shoot him, kill him.” Youth fired burst
5–8 shots, Ambassador fell about 12–15 yards behind limousine.
Green and red cars fled.
Embassy driver ran to Ambassador, was immediately joined by Dr.
Ortega who happened have been driving some twenty yards behind
limousine, had witnessed whole incident. Dr. Ortega says
Ambassador was killed instantly, probably by bullet through back
which cut aorta.
GOG authorities investigating, more
follows.Krebs
115. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA Files:
Lot 74 D 467, Guatemala, 1968. Drafted by Wiggins and cleared by Killoran.Washington, August 29, 1968.
SUBJECT
Assassination of Ambassador Mein
The Guatemalan Government has reacted quickly to the assassination of
American Ambassador John Gordon
Mein, who was shot down in the streets of the capital
yesterday afternoon while attempting to escape from would-be kidnappers.
Last night President Mendez Montenegro declared a state of siege. A
curfew was imposed and the frontiers sealed. The security forces have
rounded-up suspected left-wing extremists and are conducting a
house-to-house search for the assassins. Five suspects have been
arrested, but as yet no firm leads have developed.
The Castro-oriented Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), the organization that killed Colonel Webber and
Commander Munro of the U.S. Military Group last January, has just
claimed responsibility for the assassination. A bulletin issued by the
FAR states that Ambassador Mein was killed in reprisal for the
arrest by Guatemalan security forces of a top terrorist, CarlosFAR intended to kidnap the Ambassador
and hold him in exchange for their imprisoned leader. So far the GOG has managed to suppress the
bulletin.
The assassination has evoked an outpouring of messages of sorrow and
condolence from official and private Guatemalans. President Mendez
Montenegro has energetically condemned the killers and the Guatemalan
Congress has called for three days of mourning. Hundreds of visitors
called at the funeral home where the Ambassador’s remains are lying to
pay their respects. They included President and Mrs. Mendez, members of
the cabinet, the Supreme Court, and a congressional contingent which
came at midnight directly from the session at which they approved the
imposition of a state of siege. Similar widespread expressions of sorrow
are being reported by our embassies in other Central American
countries.
Our diplomatic and consular posts in Latin America have been requested to
fly the United States flag at half-staff in respect to the memory of
Ambassador Mein.
Ambassador Mein’s remains will be
brought to Washington by an airplane provided by the White House.
Interment will take place at the Rock Creek Cemetery on Saturday
morning,August 31. at an hour
not yet fixed.
116. Telegram From the Embassy in Guatemala
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PERMein, John Gordon. Secret; Priority; Limdis.Guatemala City, September 4, 1968,
2110Z.
6306. Subj: Death of Ambassador: Preliminary Political Assessment. Ref:
(A) Guatemala Critic;Document 114. (B) Guatemala 6220,
6221; (C) Guatemala 6238, 6264.Telegrams
6220, 6221, 6238, and 6264 from Guatemala City, August 29, 29, 30,
and 31, respectively, reported developments in the investigation of
the Ambassador’s assassination. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PER Mein, John Gordon)
While it may yet be too early attempt full analysis significance
and repercussions assassination, following is effort summarize
current status from our viewpoint. Must be recognized that
significant reactions to event this magnitude are slow in developing
here, and shock effect has not yet worn off. Hence, assessment such
reactions at this point necessarily tentative, speculative, and
subject later correction. Nonetheless, status summary may be useful
in maintaining congruence of views between post and Dept.
Facts of Case.
There are no significant changes or additions to details reported
Guatemala Critic message Aug 28. Other witnesses have confirmed
all essential details related by Embassy driver with exception
items such as make of green car (one witness who observed
incident from point some 60 yards away, across center strip
Avenida Reforma, believes green vehicle may have been 1968 model
Chevy II) and number assailants involved (other witnesses state
three men were in green car, as many as five in small red
Japanese back-up car. Consensus is that three of assailants fled
scene on foot when green and red car fled rapidly immediately
following shooting).
Status of Investigation.
Witnesses have been intensively questioned by authorities for
clues, descriptions, etc. GOG
security forces have published flyer with pictures 6 (six)
suspects, requesting public report any trace these individuals.
Flyer scattered over city by helicopter Sept 1. While there have
been continuing house-to-house searches, we have no word any
evidence found directly connected to murder. Military patrols,
roadblocks, area searches, etc., also being conducted, but
technique of GOG security forces
seems be more pinpointed “rifle” tactic than indiscriminate
“shotgun” approach so often used previously. We are satisfied
GOG actually making every
effort within its power apprehend culprits, and that lack of
success to date due intrinsic difficulty of problem rather than
to any lack of will or effort.
Motivation for Assassination.
All available indications, analysis modus operandi, known facts
and projections point to validity and authenticity FAR statement (Guatemala 6220,
6221) as to motive and character of crime. This explanation fits
all known facts: none other does. In summation, we think
following is motivation story: important FAR leader Camilo Sanchez was captured by GOG security forces night of Aug
24–25. In fear he would be made talk with disastrous results to
FAR, his comrades planned
abduct Ambassador as hostage for release of Camilo. Probable
that FAR unit seized first clear
opportunity to make attempt, which happened be afternoon Aug 28.
When Ambassador appeared be escaping them, FAR gunman fired. (We simply do not
know whether FAR intent was eliminate
Ambassador in any case, but it would appear live hostage would
be more useful to them, hence we believe intent was abduct
Ambassador live, hold him at least until Camilo released to
them.)
Consequences, Short Term. On violence: We note FAR
statement threatens further measures in aid of Camilo.
Presumably such measures would be other similar terrorist
acts against local and foreign representatives or symbols of
authority. While security measures already taken would make
any such attempts more difficult to accomplish, we recognize
FAR still has
capabilities for additional terrorism of this kind. Under
present conditions, FAR may
find kidnapping of another hostage too difficult to
undertake. In frustration, they might turn to indiscriminate
hit-and-run bombings, machine-gunnings, etc. as they have
done in past. It also possible that, at least during
remainder state of siege, terrorists will go underground,
attempt hide, flee country or in any case keep very quiet.
Again, this has been pattern after similar major incidents.
They prefer not confront GOG
security forces when latter engaged in major “offensive”
such as present one, but rather to lie low preserving
organization and individuals intact for resumption when heat
is off. This, however, is rational pattern—loss of Camilo to
GOG may prove sufficient
stimulus for FAR act in
irrational, unpredictable ways including renewed terrorism
despite security forces’ offensive. FAR may believe it must make its threat (in
statement) credible by further terrorism: this would
probably take form attempted assassinations or kidnapping
prominent personalities.On stability of GOG: We
see no evidence to date of any threat to stability GOG as result this incident.
Military establishment remains loyal to regime, fulfilling
constitutional role, there are no indications discontent
among military with such role. We have heard of no coup-type
plotting (and state of siege has, of course, legally
suspended all political activity). There is considerable
hand-wringing and talk of the “shame” visited on Guatemala
by this murder—but this is analogous in tone to similar
expressions heard in US after magnicides there. As of
moment, we would say that incident has either had no
measurable effect on GOG
stability or that such stability has been enhanced in some
degree by unanimity and uniformity of reaction among all
vital sectors repudiating senseless violence of which this
crime is result.
Consequences—Longer Term.
Effect of assassination on stability over longer term will depend
essentially on whether or not subversives resume terrorism. If
they do, GOG is prepared resume
counter-insurgent (including extra-legal, if necessary)
measures. This could again result in high level of violence
which is intrinsically dangerous to stability. Should be
recalled that in
March–August period, relative calm was possible because of
decision by subversives to temporarily suspend their terrorism
while they reorganize, in wake of GOG decision suspend offensive extra-legal COIN measures. Since subversives
are capable again initiating terror, tranquility is not wholly
within power of GOG to
determine—it must necessarily react to insurgent-initiated
violence even if consequences that violence include stagnation
in development, economic deterioration and intrinsic political
instability. GOG’s primary
objective remains—survival.
Murder of Ambassador has also produced great outpouring from all
sectors of expressions sympathy, friendship, respect, admiration for
him personally, and for country he so ably represented. Granting
that this is in part natural reaction of emotional Latins, there is
nonetheless evidence of a great reservoir of goodwill toward the
United States remaining here.At a
meeting in the Cabinet Room on September 9, the Secretary
briefed the President and Congressional leaders on the “tragic
loss of Ambassador Mein,
who was one of our best ambassadors—the first time in our
history we’ve had an ambassador assassinated.” After providing
details of the assassination and subsequent investigation,
Rusk reported that
President Méndez “clearly is popular in the
country” and “the military actually are loyal to the
constitutional government in Guatemala at the present time.”
“Despite the danger to some of our own people,” he concluded,
“we’re not basically disturbed about the possibility the
Communists could take over Guatemala.” (Johnson Library,
Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a meeting in the
Cabinet Room, September 9, 1968, 5:45–7:24 p.m., Tape FC003,
Part 1 of 3)[less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] and DAO
concur.Krebs
117. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL HOND–US. Confidential. Drafted by
Cates and approved by S on October
5.SecDel/MC/1New York, October 3, 1968,
noon.
SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-THIRD SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September–October 1968
SUBJECT
Secretary’s Talk with the Honduran Vice President, Foreign
Minister, and White House Ambassador
PARTICIPANTS
USThe SecretaryMr. John M. Cates, Jr., USUNHondurasVice President Ricardo ZunigaForeign Minister Tiburcio Carias CastilloAmbassador Midence (Washington)Johnson’s enjoyment with his visit to
Honduras.Reference is to
President Johnson’s brief and
informal visit to Honduras on July 8.
The Honduran presentation began with a review of the economic
difficulties, and also of the progress recently made, in Honduras. As
part of the development program, tax reforms had been introduced, in
accordance with the protocol of San Jose, growing out of the Central
American Common Market. The taxes were on luxury items outside of
general public use. However, after the tax had been introduced in San
Jose, Costa Rica, and thus supported by, and with the full knowledge of,
the Secretary General of the Confederation of Workers, FESESITLE,
FESISTRAN and SITRATERCO, public unrest had followed, charges being made
that the tax reform would affect the standard of living of the workers
by increasing their cost of living. This argument was seized upon by the
opposition party (Liberals) union with a segment of the business
community.
After a certain number of civil disturbances, the Minister said, one
Celio Gonzalez was arrested. It developed that he was actually the
leader of certain political interests, a Deputy in the opposition
Liberal Party, that were allied with employer interests in a plan to
overthrow the Government. The activity of this capital-labor coalition
against the Government was limited to the San Pedro Sula area. Although
they declared a general strike for the whole country it was not approved
by all unions and it only took hold in San Pedro. The Honduran
Government became concerned when the opposition announced that it had
found allies in its cause against the Government, and that one of its
allies was the United States. Despite claims on the part of the
opposition that the U.S. was supporting its cause, the U.S. Embassy had
not publicly denied the charges and this silence on the part of the U.S.
Embassy allowed the idea that the U.S. was involved to grow. Mr.
Johnson of United Fruit had obtained a denial
from the State Department in a phone call to Washington after Celio
Gonzalez had told him of U.S. support for the strike. This type of
denial was not enough. Belief in U.S. support for the opposition
actually came to be a stimulant to the opposition forces. The Minister
pointed out that it put the Honduran Government in a very difficult
position when a diplomatic
representative of a friendly country was believed to give aid to the
Government’s local opposition.
The Secretary noted that the U.S. Government’s relations were with the
Government of Honduras and that these relations were friendly and
correct; that the U.S. maintained the practice of not interfering in the
internal affairs of Honduras and had no intention of interfering in the
future.According to a note attached to
the memorandum, this sentence was inserted by S/S. He noted that in many countries people in
opposition parties liked to claim U.S. support. However, he pointed out
that there was a big difference between what people said the U.S. was
doing and what it was actually doing. The Secretary stated that if any
U.S. representative had done anything that departed from our policies
and practices, he wanted to be informed. He noted, however, that the
U.S. cannot accept responsibility for words that someone else had put in
its mouth. He then asked the Minister what Honduras wanted the U.S. to
do.
Vice President Zuniga then reported details on the alleged activities of
Mr. Mike Hammer, a member of the staff of the Institute for Free Labor
Development in Latin America. He said that Mr. Hammer had come from El
Salvador to deal with Mr. Johnson of the United
Fruit Company. Mr. Hammer as well as others are reported to have told
Mr. Johnson that the U.S. and AID favored the strike and the opposition
to the Government. Mr. Zuniga said that Mr. Hammer had been aided by the
American Consul in San Pedro SulaHerbert D.
Swett. having lived in his house, used his car, and operated
out of the U.S. Consulate as his headquarters in working with the
opposition strikers.
The Secretary said that he would investigate the matter at once and that
the U.S. had no intention of making difficulties for Honduras.
The Minister then said that the real interest of Honduras is to have
constructive friendly relations with the U.S. but that these relations
may be frustrated by local diplomats whose views do not conform to both
governments’ official interests.
The Secretary reiterated that there is a great difference between what
the U.S. does and what someone says we do.
The Minister then commented, however, that it was easy for the opposition
to exploit the failure of the U.S. to deny charges against it and that
U.S. contacts with the opposition had made people suspicious. The
Minister stated that the U.S. Ambassador himself requested that the
President of Honduras grant interviews to the opposition party leaders,
thus giving the impression of U.S. backing.
The Secretary reiterated that he would investigate the situation
thoroughly.In a December 2 memorandum
to Rusk, Oliver reported that the
allegations had been fully investigated and were without foundation.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CEN/H Files: Lot 70 D 59,
Honduras 1968, POL 1 General)
Following the departure of the Secretary, Vice President Zuniga and
Ambassador Midence sought out the Reporting Officer to fill in, between
them, details on the rather general presentation given formally to the
Secretary.
AID and thus is viewed as a U.S. agency.
When he came to San Pedro Sula, he was at home in the Consulate and was
taken around by the Consul more or less as a protege. It is important to
realize that the head of the strikers, Celio Gonzalez, is not only a
labor man but a Deputy in Congress for the opposition party and that his
interest was not the betterment of the strikers but the overthrow of the
Government. Midence pointed out that Gonzalez had been the leader in the
Honduran legislature of a move to criticize the U.S. for its
intervention during the Dominican crisis, implying that the return to
power of the opposition party would result in weakening the close
Honduran-U.S. working relations. Zuniga reiterated that the real
complaint from the Honduran Government was that the U.S. Embassy does
not deny rumors of U.S. implication in opposition maneuvers. In the
public opinion, Zuniga said, the American Ambassador is fighting against
the Honduran Government.
Another example of the U.S. interference on the side of the opposition
was seen in a visit to Honduras by Andrew McClellan, AFL/CIO
representative. McClellan had come to visit a project developed by the
Syndicato del Centro for giving land to various unions for housing, etc.
The Union was seeking financial support from the AFL/CIO. However,
according to Zuniga, the American Ambassador advised Mr. McClellan
against the project on the grounds that the particular Honduran union
did not deserve the loan from AFL/CIO because the union was in favor of,
and too friendly towards, the present Honduran Government. Mr. McClellan
subsequently advised the Honduran labor leaders that the AFL/CIO was
refusing the loan on the advice of the U.S. Embassy. The labor leaders
then wanted to issue a condemnation of this interference by the U.S.
Ambassador but the GOH stopped them.
Zuniga said he would be glad to have these labor leaders come to
Washington to corroborate this story.
Comment: The presentation was extremely confusing
with all three persons sometimes talking at the same time. The Foreign
Minister was somewhat embarrassed by bothering the Secretary at a moment
like this with a matter which appeared so trivial. The details of
alleged U.S. interference and
the exact request for U.S. rectification of the situation were difficult
to identify. According to Midence, most of the information put before
Secretary Rusk on October 3 had
already been given to Assistant Secretary Oliver. The main purpose of the Vice President’s
interview with the Secretary was apparently to make clear on a personal
basis the Honduran Government’s deep concern and to make sure that the
“U.S. did something.”
The Hondurans were critical of two former U.S. officers in Honduras:
Robert White, whose departure, Midence said, had been requested by the
GOH, and Thomas Killoran, alleging that these officers’ reports
had to be taken “with a grain of salt.”
Midence made a particular point of saying that the full political
implications of the situation had not been spelled out for Assistant
Secretary Oliver in their meeting
last weekOliver met Carías and Midence
on September 23; a memorandum of the conversation is ibid.
nor had the names of the American individuals whom the Hondurans felt
had been working against their interests been exposed. He and Vice
President Zuniga also emphasized that this matter was being handled only
by the Foreign Ministry and themselves.
Ambassador Midence at the end made it clear that in his opinion Mr.
Killoran was the villain of
the piece, as far as the Hondurans were concerned, and could not be
expected to give a correct account of the events.
One thing was clear: the Hondurans are badly rattled about what they
consider American interference to aid the opposition party and took
special care to send to Washington and New York their Vice President to
impress upon Secretary Rusk the
seriousness of the situation.
As to what action the Hondurans really believed Secretary Rusk should take, the Hondurans, after
repeated questions by the reporting officer, suggested that the American
Ambassador should be warned of the serious consequences of the continued
interference of his officers, and indeed of himself, for the safety of
the present Honduran regime, and for the future of Honduran–U.S.
relationships. Elaborating on the theme, they requested that the
American Ambassador “normalize his activities” so that he does not lend
support to the aims of the opposition and become an unwitting instrument
of the opposition. This would mean, they said, that the Ambassador
follow a “more correct policy” and be “more distant”. The Hondurans
apparently do not wish a public denial by the U.S. (the possibly fatal
consequences of this were suggested by the Secretary and subsequently by
the Reporting Officer) but they do wish to be sure that the U.S. Embassy
in Honduras “gets the word.”
118. Letter From the Ambassador to Honduras (Jova) to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL HOND–US. Confidential; Eyes
Only.Tegucigalpa, October 11, 1968.
Dear Covey:
I deeply appreciated your good letter of October 7Not found. The letter evidently related the
Honduran complaints against Jova as outlined in Document
117. and the patience you have shown in going into
all the details. I can only start off by saying that it is ironic that
the thrust of their complaints is against me personally. To be frank,
one of my concerns during the strike crisis was that I might be
considered by the Department as showing too much bias in favor of the
Government in what did seem to me from the beginning to be an
ill-conceived strike that had political motivations.
I do wish to thank the Secretary and you personally for the confidence
you have expressed in me, both in your letter and in your conversations
with Carías and Zúniga. Carías, of course, is not returning until around
October 21. Zúniga is back, however, but I have not seen him. I have
been told by others that he is in an extremely good mood. As a matter of
tactics, it is important to know whether Zúniga himself asked for my
removal or did he make that poor Foreign Minister take the lead? I agree
with your analysis of the essential weakness of Midence, but can quite
see him enjoying playing a role which includes “big time politics” and
currying favor with Zúniga, on whom, of course, he is entirely dependent
for his job.
I did not speak directly with the President during the strike as at that
time I felt there was no need for this as he was extremely busy and I
was in touch at least three times a day with Zúniga and an equal number
of times with Acosta Bonilla. There was, as a review of the cables will
show, no lack of communication with the Government on my part during
that period. I have, however, subsequently seen the President on three
separate occasions at public gatherings, the last time only yesterday.
He has gone out of his way to seek me out, has been very cordial and
readily assented when I expressed the hope of seeing him to discuss the
strike and post-strike situation. I hope this interview comes off, but
Zúniga may stop it.
This should provide the President a good opportunity to make any points
he may desire concerning any doubts he personally may have regarding the
Embassy/Consulate activities and should also provide me with a better
feel for what his own opinions are towards us and towards me personally.
I should be able to write you a more conclusive letter as to what might
then be our best follow-up response to the GOH after I have had such an opportunity to speak with the
President.Jova met
López on October 14. Jova enclosed a memorandum of the
conversation with an October 15 letter to Oliver in which he reported: “I
have heard locally that having failed to get me recalled Zúniga is
now attempting to discredit my reputation by circulating vicious
fabrications about my personal conduct.” (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL HOND–US)
As to the purpose behind Carías’ request and Zúniga’s intent, I fully
agree with your own analysis. Certainly Zúniga’s own position with
López and within the Government had been
weakened somewhat by the events succeeding the March 31 election and
even by his apparent victory in that election. The changes in the
Cabinet and in other areas of the Government strengthened the so-called
economic group which had been his “enemies” (you will recall your own
April 25 conversation in Bogota with Acosta Bonilla)Document 108. and eliminated
various Zúniga henchmen, particularly within the Supreme Court. Zúniga
and his wife were not appearing at social events at which the President
was present and as recently as September 4 at a party at the home of the
President of the Congress, President López held
forth at length and with considerable vehemence on how badly served he
was by his immediate staff, how poor the coordination was within the
Government and how his own commitments to Liberals and others were
undermined by his immediate collaborators for their own political ends.
While he did not mention Zúniga by name, all present afterwards
commented that he was the obvious target.
The strike, however, served at least for the time being to change this
atmosphere. It has apparently strengthened Zúniga and has drawn together
all of the Government, including Acosta Bonilla and Zúniga as well as
the military. I can thus well understand the reports that Zúniga has
returned from Washington and his high level meetings in a mood of
self-confidence and good humor. The Liberal Party has in effect been
pulverized as a result of the March 31 election and its own foolishness
and has a long road ahead to pull itself together; the unions have been
“put in their place” and for the time being at least their energies must
be devoted to internal matters and to rebuilding their strength; the
alliance between the unions and the business community of the north
coast has been shattered and several individual members of the business
community (including Gabriel Mejia) feel cowed, with a fear that their
business interests will be made to suffer; the Church is already
passively pro-Government while its pro-labor and campesino members have
received a warning through the expulsion of the Jesuits Alberdi and
Carney. (Although the latter
has been readmitted at our instance, stiff conditions have been placed
on his activities.) This does leave relatively untouched the only other
traditional “power center” of Honduras, i.e. the U.S. Embassy, and it
now appears that it is our turn.
In fact, “our turn” began some time ago, perhaps the moment Zúniga felt
the López Government was firmly installed, and I
think it would be illuminating for Chuck Burrows to tell you of some of
the harassments he encountered in his later days as Ambassador and also
on some of his subsequent visits here. I think there is no doubt that
Zúniga has always regarded the American Embassy as a check or monitor on
his undemocratic and unsavory operations and thus a potential enemy of
the regime. Zúniga probably looks upon U.S. military and economic
assistance as a source of competing rather than supporting political
power and in his mind the Embassy is thus his own potential enemy if not
the regime’s. In addition to an element of native paranoia which he
seems to have, I think it is only fair to recollect that it was long our
policy to keep López from coming to power, and I
believe that John Dreier, when Ambassador to the OAS, came here in 1957 on a special mission to dissuade
López from running.
Since I have been here, while my own relationships on the surface have
appeared very good, the Embassy as an institution and individual
officers, specifically Bob White, have repeatedly been targets for
attack and subject for complaint. While Bob White’s actual departure
from here was due to other reasons, I am sure that Zúniga in his own
mind takes credit for it as he made a special trip to Washington to
raise this matter in early June of this year. My own request for Joe
Then’s departure, you will recall, was also based largely on allegations
which, although they seem well founded, were made by Zúniga. You will
also recall that his deep suspicions of me arose when, at the
Department’s bidding, I tried to act as a channel between the Liberals
and the President and tried to bring about a reduction in tension
following on the March 31 elections. It was at this time that you
considered sending an emissary such as Sevilla-Sacasa to insure that
President López realized that I was not acting on
my own but in accordance with the Department’s instructions.
I am pretty sure that my own difficulty dates from that time and that
Zúniga is now ready for bigger game than White and Then. Certainly there
was nothing done or said by me during the current strike which would
justify even a mild complaint, let alone a request for my removal. The
Consulate at San Pedro Sula was in a more unenviable position, being
right in the thick of things. I daily preached caution to our Consul,
and I think that he capably played out a difficult role of keeping
communications open and at a most difficult time. The activities of the
visiting AIFLD representative, Mike
Hammer, may admittedly have been somewhat injudicious until brought
under control by the Consul.
But even in his case his actions were more subject to misinterpretation
than to actual wrongdoing, and when I found out about them I on my own
apologized to Zúniga for his activities and he returned to San Salvador
as the strike finished.
I appreciate the Secretary’s suggestion that it might be wise to send a
senior Inspector to Tegucigalpa. Much as I would welcome such a visit, I
am inclined to feel that it might, as you suggested, serve to undercut
my position here at this time. I should point out that in addition to
the telegraphic traffic, which was copious, we kept fairly complete
records of our telephonic conversations with the Consulate in San Pedro
Sula, with some of the Government authorities, and with the Department.
Thus rather than to send an Inspector here at this time, I would suggest
my sending up our file of telegrams, letters, and memoranda of
conversation, as well as memos prepared for me by the Consul covering
his activities and those of the AIFLD
representative. This material should permit someone on your staff or in
the Inspection Corps to reconstruct the situation here in a satisfactory
manner. Should, after this, there be questions still unanswered, it
would then always be possible to send someone down.
I shall look forward to writing you again after I have had a further
chance to sound out the President. In the meantime, I appreciate the
position you have taken that if the Government of Honduras desires my
removal it would have to formally indicate that I am persona non grata.
At the moment I am inclined to agree with your thesis that this was
something of a fishing expedition on the part of Zúniga,Jova added the following
handwritten footnote: “the slimiest of characters!” and one
which may require no significant follow-up on our part. I can assure
you, however, that should I at any time find that my presence here is in
fact a hindrance to the carrying out of satisfactory relations with this
country, I shall be the first to suggest a move.In a letter to Oliver on October 18 Jova reported that López had
been able “to ‘reestablish communications’ between Zúniga and
myself.” In a meeting on October 18 Zúñiga denied that it had been his intention to have
Jova recalled, blaming instead “those dummies Carías and Midence,”
who had misinterpreted and exceeded his instructions during their
visit to the United States. Zúñiga pleaded that “we work together closely for
the development of Honduras and good relations between our
countries.” Although he assured Oliver that “this ‘crisis’ has been overcome,”
Jova suggested that the
time had come for a change: “I suppose it is only logical that I
will be leaving here shortly after the new administration takes
over. By that time I will be approaching my 4th anniversary and I
would say that even in the best of circumstances that is long enough
in a place like this.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL HOND–US) Jova left Honduras on June
21, 1969; 2 weeks later he was appointed U.S. Representative to the
Organization of American States.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely yours,
John
119. National Security Action Memorandum No. 371Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, National Security Action Memorandums, NSAM No. 371. Limited Official Use.
Rostow forwarded the NSAM to the President as an attachment
to an October 17 memorandum in which he noted: “Covey Oliver and his staff have
cooperated fully on this effort and share our conviction about its
importance. Nonetheless, to make sure no momentum is lost, I think
it important formally to record your continuing interest and
endorsement for this program. The attached NSAM, which has been cleared with both Bill Gaud and
Covey Oliver, would
achieve this objective. I recommend that you sign it.”
(Ibid.)Washington, October 18, 1968.
TO
Secretary of StateAID AdministratorSecretary of CommerceSecretary of AgricultureSecretary of the Treasury
SUBJECT
Central American Export Development Program
At my recent meetings with the Presidents of Central America we agreed on
the critical importance of accelerating growth and diversification of
exports from the Central American countries to both U.S. and third
country markets. A series of follow-up meetings among officials of the
Central American Common Market, U.S., and Central American officials,
and prominent members of the U.S. private sector, reinforce my
conviction that it is important to maintain momentum toward a solution
of these problems. Accordingly I have approved the initiation of a
Central American Export Development Program to be organized at the
regional and country levels to insure participation of all elements
necessary to exploit successfully Central America’s export
potential.
The U.S. Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress is charged with the
responsibility for organizing the program, and in particular for
establishing effective administrative arrangements to link key groups
from the U.S. government and private sector to public and private
authorities in Central America.
All U.S. Departments and Agencies should, to the maximum possible extent,
assist the Coordinator to make this program a success.
Lyndon B. Johnson
120. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on December 19.SNIE 82–68Washington, December 19, 1968.
INSURGENCY AND INSTABILITY IN GUATEMALA
The Problem
To assess the prospects over the next several years for the insurgency in
Guatemala in the context of the country’s continuing political,
economic, and social problems.
Conclusions
The persistent insurgency by a small number of leftist extremists
is a particularly troublesome manifestation of Guatemala’s chronic
political instability. Nonetheless, the insurgency, now in its ninth
year, has survived rather than flourished. The insurgents, though
able to carry out dramatic acts of urban terror, have had little
success in gaining adherents in the countryside. Much of the energy
of the insurgent movement has been squandered on internal dissidence
and factionalism.We believe it unlikely that the insurgency, now at a low ebb, will
expand greatly, at least for several years to come. Over the next
year or so, the insurgents will probably attempt to keep the
pressure on the government through sporadic terrorism, including
acts against US officials. Their apparent motive is to provoke the
replacement of President Méndez by a repressive
military regime in the hope that it would cause the people to rally
to the insurgency.There are some indications that Fidel
Castro is planning to increase his support of the
Guatemalan insurgency, perhaps to the point of dispatching a small
force of guerrillas now undergoing training in Cuba. Such foreign
assistance might increase the insurgency’s capacity for violence and
terror, and thus increase its disruptive effect. But it would
probably not enhance the insurgents’ overall prospect for seizing
power.Since early 1968, Méndez has increased his
control over Guatemalan security forces and sharply reduced the
bloody and often indiscriminate counter-terrorism through which they
and right-wing vigilantes were combating the insurgents. The
President’s freedom of
action, however, still is limited, and he is unlikely to undertake
basic reforms or any other actions that would coalesce the military
and the political right generally against him. Though the security
forces have been able to keep the rural insurgency from getting out
of hand, they suffer from a variety of disabilities, including weak
leadership and poor and uncoordinated intelligence. The latter
disability in particular puts them at a disadvantage in coping with
urban terrorism.The basic political and social problems of Guatemala are not
caused by the insurgency, and they would persist even if it
collapsed. Even if the insurgents were to achieve their interim
objective of provoking the establishment of a harsh military
dictatorship, they would in our view benefit little, at least in the
short run. Over the longer period, the actions of such a regime
might increase the prospects for the emergence of a more vigorous
revolutionary movement; but we cannot know at this point what role,
if any, the current insurgents and their sometime allies among
Guatemalan Communists would have in such a movement.
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]
Argentina
121. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in ArgentinaSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PET 15 ARG.
Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Mann; cleared by Harriman, Ensor, and Meeker; and approved by Rusk.Washington, June 20, 1964, 3:53 p.m.
1259. Following are Department’s current views on oil problem.On November 15, 1963, the Illia administration issued a
decree annulling the contracts of foreign oil companies operating in
Argentina. For documentation on the decree, and the response of the
U.S. Government, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII,
Documents 199–202. Would appreciate your comments: About eight months have gone by since the contracts were
annulled. While we have received during this time vague
generalized assurances from Illia about fair solutions Argentine Government
has in fact made no concrete proposals about how companies’
contractual rights are to be restored or respected or, in the
alternative, for prompt adequate and effective compensation. The
alleged decision to intervene some or all of the properties on
an interim or permanent basis prior to some kind of mutually
satisfactory arrangement may not be decisive but it further
complicates situation.
We have asked that Legal Adviser’s latest opinion re
Hickenlooper AmendmentThe
amendment stipulated that the President suspend
assistance to any country that expropriated the property
of U.S. citizens or corporations without proper
compensation. (76 Stat. 260) be sent to you by
separate telegram (Deptel 1257).Dated June 19. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PET 15
ARG) Question remains in both legal and political
terms of how much longer we will be justified in saying that
the GOA has not failed for a
reasonable period of time to take appropriate steps to
discharge its obligations under international law, and that
the GOA is in fact operating
in good faith in the oil problem.
We would assume that the answer to this question will depend
on what happens hereafter and particularly on our estimate
of Illia’s will and
ability to overrule extremists in his government.
The fact that legal rights to claim eventual compensation
have not been impaired will have little effect in preventing
application of Hickenlooper Amendment if steps taken by
GOA from here on out are
not “appropriate”.
Mann’s conversation with
MODMann met Suárez on
June 4 at a dinner hosted by Secretary of Defense McNamara. (Telegram 1208
to Buenos Aires, June 5; ibid.) The principal points made by
the Argentine Minister of Defense are summarized in telegram
1267 to Buenos Aires, June 23. (Ibid.) gave us no
ground for optimism although he was described as one of the
“moderates”. Suarez said in effect that annulment of the
contracts was final, that “renegotiation” was a word which could
not be used, and that a process of “open bidding” would be
necessary.Suarez talked about returning the investments with interest as
if this would be a satisfactory formula. Mann tried to disabuse him but
is not sure he succeeded. The essence of our position must be,
it seems to us, that if the contracts are to remain annulled
then either a new arrangement must be made or the companies
should be compensated for the fair value of the contractual
rights which they had. Those companies which risked their
capital and found little or no oil and gas might be pleased to
pick up a windfall by having their money returned but we fail to
see why they are entitled to it. On the other hand, those which
found substantial quantities of oil are entitled to more than
the mere return of investment. Without trying to decide what is
fair value in a particular case, it seems to us that it is
essential that we have this general principle clearly in mind
because on it rests very large oil investments in Venezuela, the
Near East and elsewhere.This raises the question of whether there is not a danger that
Argentina will settle with one or more of the unsuccessful
investors on the basis of return of investment and then become
politically frozen on this formula which we assume we could not
accept here. Would appreciate your comments on this
point.This is one of the reasons we thought it would be prudent for
the U.S. Government to have a general review of the situation
with the Argentine Government. You could best decide with which
officials the matter should be raised. But if there are no talks
USG runs the risk of
becoming prisoner of developments which could seriously affect
our relations with Argentina and in which we did not play a
role. We worry, in a word, about leaving relations entirely to
discussions between private oil companies and the Argentine
Government. This does not mean that we would assume authority to
speak for the companies about details of particular settlements.
It does mean we should be free to influence the companies to
accept what we consider to be a fair settlement if one can be
arrived at.On the question of the application of the Hickenlooper
Amendment, if worst comes to worst we are giving thought here to
quietly cutting back on aid, including military aid, without a
formal invocation of the Amendment. We could leave a token
program or programs going as proof that we have not applied
sanctions and if pushed by press justify in an off-the-record way the cut-back on
the ground of failure of Argentina to take self-help measures or
some other line. There would seem to be ample ground for this in
current Argentine budgetary deficit, inflationary pressures,
etc. Would appreciate your opinion on this assuming we can
obtain support for this procedure in Congress as we think we
have chance of doing. The companies Mann has talked to here seem to be fully aware
of the disadvantages to them of formally applying the Amendment
and the importance of keeping doors open and playing for
time.We are of course conscious of the political pressures on
Illia and of the risk
of a golpe regardless of what is done about the oil problem. Our
concern is heightened by the apparent failure of the GOA to realize there is any
connection between a settlement of oil problems and its avowed
need for further private investment and outside financial and
economic assistance. Interview with Illia appearing N.Y.
Times today would seem further emphasize Illia’s lack
of reality.Reference is apparently
to Illia’s comment that “the door is open to foreign
investments,” even though Argentina was preparing to “move
into American oil field operations.” (New
York Times, June 20, 1964, p. 29) We also
have in mind the possible effect on the Chilean elections of
applying the Amendment to Argentina.
Since time would appear to be of the essence you should therefore
promptly convey to the Argentine Government in the way you deem most
appropriate that while the USG has hoped
that the Argentine Government and the companies would be able to arrive
at a satisfactory agreement oil problem is not one simply between
companies and Argentine Government. It involves very basic
inter-governmental relations between Argentina and US. Therefore, before
any final decision and action by Argentine Government on oil question
USG would wish to review whole
question with Argentine Government with view to working out solution
under which either new agreements are negotiated or just compensation
provided. In this connection, you should make very clear that any
formula for returning to companies merely their investment costs plus
interest could not constitute proper compensation.In its reply the Embassy commented that the
“adverse impact of oil actions on foreign public and private
investment is not now [an] important factor in Argentine thinking.”
“What it comes to is US public funds.” (Telegram 2064 from Buenos
Aires, June 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, PET 15 ARG) The Department subsequently
decided to withhold such public funds by refusing to sign an
amendment to the Silo loan, an AID
agreement to assist grain storage in Argentina. Mann initially explained that this
action was taken “pending further study of questions of self-help
and effect of annulment of oil contracts, particularly the former.”
(Telegram 1288 to Buenos Aires, June 26; ibid.) Three weeks later,
however, Mann gave Rusk a different explanation: “we
are delaying signature because of the oil question.” (Memorandum
from Mann to Rusk, July 20; ibid., POL 15–1 ARG)
Rusk
122. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Acting Secretary of State HarrimanSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PET 15–2 ARG.
Confidential. Drafted by Hoyt
on November 23 and concurred in by Ensor and Lowenfeld.Washington, November 25, 1964.
SUBJECT
Oil Contract Problem in Argentina
I bring the oil situation in Argentina to your attention at this time
because we cannot foresee a satisfactory settlement in the near future
and because of the following two factors: 1) The failure to reach an
agreement on the oil contract problem would probably bring the
Hickenlooper Amendment into the picture again when our Congress
reconvenes. As you know, we have dealt with this matter so far by
slowing down or stopping our aid without the formal invocation of the
Hickenlooper Amendment;In late July,
Mann drafted an action
memorandum for AID Administrator
Bell, justifying the “slow down” policy and outlining a plan for its
execution. (Ibid., ARA/APU/A
Files: Lot 69 D 87, PET 15–2, Airgrams, etc., 1964) In a July 31
letter Mann asked Martin for comment. (Ibid., ARA/LA Files: Lot 66 D 65, Argentina
1964) In response on August 15, Martin agreed questioning only certain “points of
emphasis and marginal issues of pace.” (Ibid., Central Files
1964–66, AID(US) ARG) After a
meeting with Senator Hickenlooper on August 12, Mann expedited implementation of
the policy. Congress clearly felt, he reported, that the “time has
come for United States to stand up for validity of contracts and of
treaties of all kinds.” (Telegram 194 from Buenos Aires, August 19;
ibid., AID(US) 8 ARG) In an October
5 letter to Martin, Hoyt explained that the memorandum
to Bell was no longer necessary: “Tom’s telegram 194 of August 19
gave you the answer that we were going to continue with the slowdown
program.” (Ibid., ARA/APU/A
Files: Lot 66 D 243, Correspondence—Hoyt Letters) we continue
to believe that this is the most effective way to handle this problem.
2) Argentina may soon seek large-scale financial assistance from us, as
well as from the Europeans and from the international financial
institutions for an Economic Development Plan which the GOA hopes to present after the first of the
year. Argentina has tried to separate the oil situation and its probable
request for international financial assistance. Obviously, this cannot
be done. The oil contract problem bears not only on our ability to be of
any assistance (Hickenlooper Amendment) but also on Argentina’s balance
of payments and budget situation and on its ability to inspire
confidence in both foreign and domestic investors.
Although there has been little progress during the last three months
toward a settlement of the oil contract problem in Argentina, it is possible that
developments during the next months may again bring this question into
prominence. During the past few days, there have been reports that a
settlement is about to be reached with one of the Argentine companies
whose contract was annulled (ASTRA) and that the GOA would then attempt to use the formula adopted in this
case as a basis for settlement with some of the foreign companies. We
will not know the opinion of the companies until they have actually been
presented with a concrete proposal. Much would probably depend upon the
amounts offered and whether the interest rate covers potential or real
profits.
While an attempt may be made to reach a settlement at this time with some
of the companies, we are inclined to doubt that any satisfactory
solution will be reached prior to the Argentine congressional elections
in March of next year and maybe not even then. We believe the GOA continues to consider this question
largely on the basis of its political rather than its economic aspects
and is not convinced as yet that a settlement with the foreign companies
will gain any votes in the March elections. There seems to be some
growing realization within the GOA that
the oil question will have a direct bearing on an Argentine request for
external financial assistance which the GOA is likely to request early next year. But, there is not
sufficient evidence to indicate that these realists have effectively
gained the upper hand within the Argentine Government over the more
nationalistic group which is opposed to a settlement of the oil
question.
Several of the oil companies seem to be prepared to wait for a settlement
until after the March elections, feeling that time is on their side.
They believe the Argentine Government needs the foreign companies in
order to produce sufficient oil to maintain self-sufficiency and that
pressures will grow on the GOA to reach
a settlement and thus avoid the loss of foreign exchange through the
importation of oil. However, the case of each company differs as does
the extent of their optimism and some will find it very difficult to
convince their stockholders that they should continue discussions after
the end of this year.
The U.S. oil companies have become concerned over some recent indications
that the Argentine Government may be counting on a more favorable
attitude within the U.S. Government toward the oil contract annulments
now that our own elections are over. We have informed the companies as
well as some Argentines that any such fallacious reasoning is entirely
unwarranted and that we continue to be just as much concerned over a
settlement of this problem as we were before. Nevertheless, we can
expect there will be some continued Argentine thinking along this line
and perhaps some attempts to try and convince us that now we should not
be concerned with the fate of the oil companies.
Recommendation
That we continue our present “slow-down” policy with respect to aid for
Argentina and try through this device to avoid the formal application of
the Hickenlooper Amendment while at the same time achieving its
objectives.
Also, that we avoid further comment to the Argentines on the oil
question. We have made clear many times our concern and the fact that
failure to settle this problem affects our ability to cooperate as fully
as we would like with Argentina. In my opinion, a more effective policy
is to now let the Argentines learn through experience that our
cooperation will be limited if the oil problem is not settled.Harriman approved this
recommendation.
123. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID(US) ARG. Confidential. Drafted by
Irwin on December 21
and approved in S on December 24. The
meeting was held at the Waldorf Towers. The memorandum is part II of
III.SecDel/MC/44New York, December 19, 1964, 5
p.m.
SECRETARY’S DELEGATION TO THE NINETEENTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, December 1964
SUBJECT
Effect of Hickenlooper Amendment on Argentine Silo Loan
Application
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.The SecretaryMr. Irwin
(Reporter)Mr. Von Reigersburg (Interpreter)ForeignForeign Minister Zavala
OrtizAmbassador Ruda
Foreign Minister Zavala launched
into a long and detailed presentation of the effect of the Hickenlooper
Amendment on recent Argentine
applications for a $25 million loan for wheat storage silos. He said
that the Argentine Minister of Economy had met Assistant Secretary
Mann at the recent ECOSOC meetings in Lima.Mann met Minister of Economy
Pugliese in Lima on December 8; a report on the conversation was
transmitted in telegram 685 from Lima, December 8. (Ibid., AID(US)9 ARG) The Minister
stated that Mr. Mann had told the
Minister of Economy that the Hickenlooper Amendment would prevent
favorable action by the U.S. on the silo loan applications, and that
subsequent meetings with Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Murphy
confirmed Mr. Mann’s
statement.
Mr. Zavala said that the GOA was taken completely by surprise by
this information because Ambassador Martin had been urging the GOA to complete the loan applications as quickly as
possible. He said that the GOA did not
understand why military aid was not similarly affected. He also referred
to conversations with the Secretary and Mr. Mann at the 9th Meeting of the OAS Consultative Group [where] the silo loan had been
discussed but no mention was made then of the possible applicability of
the Hickenlooper Amendment. He said that the GOA understood that since the problem between the GOA and the oil companies was under study
in the courts and since some companies had made out of court settlements
the oil issue would not affect the silo loan. He expressed the hope that
the oil cases would be settled soon.
Mr. Zavala said that had the U.S.
oil companies been Argentine in nationality, they, too, would have been
concerned with the wasteful exploration methods used. He said his
country had lost a great fortune in gas revenues because of the
companies’ actions.
The Foreign Minister said he deeply regretted this situation, and
emphasized what he called the unfair, heavy press campaign against
Argentina in both Europe and the U.S. and cited The
Washington Post. He deplored the possibility that the companies
might be able to exert undue influence on the U.S. Government saying
that the U.S. should not permit its excellent relations with Argentina
to be jeopardized by the opinions of private companies. He pointed out
that the lack of silos would force the price of Argentine wheat to drop
because the perishable product could not be held back from the
market.
The Secretary thanked Foreign Minister Zavala for his observations. He said that he regretted
that he was not fully informed on the details of the problem of the
silos, because recently he had been so heavily preoccupied with United
Nations and NATO matters. The Secretary
said that it is not the desire nor the intent of the U.S. to apply any
U.S. law in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. The Secretary agreed
that private firms should not have undue influence on the foreign
relations of nations. He assured the Foreign Minister that Argentina had a large
reservoir of friendship in the U.S., and said there is no campaign here
against the Argentine Government.
The Secretary said he wished personally to study the silo issue, and
offered to send an appropriate official to New York to discuss it with
the Foreign Minister.
Foreign Minister Zavala regretted
that he was returning to Buenos Aires December 20 directly from New
York.
The Secretary replied that he wished to be able to speak constructively
on the matter, and said that he would send the Foreign Minister a
personal letter explaining the situation after he had made a careful
review.Rather than send a personal
letter, the Secretary asked Martin to deliver an oral message to Zavala, indicating that the matter
had been “pursued and studied” as promised. Rusk also accepted Martin’s suggestion that “basic
discussions of overall economic policies be left for Minister
Economics and possibly President,” i.e., not the Foreign Minister.
(Telegram 659 to Buenos Aires, January 8; ibid., PET 15 ARG)
He inquired whether the Foreign Minister had had an opportunity to talk
with Mr. Mann concerning the
matter during the OAS meetings.
Foreign Minister Zavala replied
that he had been so busy with OAS
matters that he had not, although he said he had referred to the subject
briefly with Mr. Hoyt at the
airport in Washington December 19.A
memorandum of the conversation between Zavala and Hoyt is ibid., POL
ARG–US. He expressed his personal pleasure that the Secretary
had not participated in the decision and said that he had told President
Illia that he has great faith
in the Secretary as a friend of Latin America and Argentina. The Foreign
Minister said he had just concluded visits to the Central American
nations where he had declared Argentina’s faith in the U.S., and told
their officials that Argentina supported the U.S. in a common cause. He
said he plans to make a similar visit to Africa later this year in this
common interest. He said that the silo incident is embarrassing both at
home and abroad, especially when the press points out that the U.S. is
making large loans to Brazil and Chile. The Minister said that, as
everyone knows, Argentina inherited a heavy budgetary deficit, but that
this year it has been able to meet salaries, has made payments on some
debts, has met its international organization dues, has not made new
loans and has not sought to refinance old ones.
Foreign Minister Zavala then
referred briefly to trade relations and suggested that it might be time
to study bilateral trade relations between the two countries. He
suggested a joint committee be established without publicity.
The Secretary expressed the hope that forthcoming GATT negotiations will help ease matters.
He said that we believe our efforts to lower trade barriers across the board on a most
favored nation basis would be particularly advantageous to Latin
America, especially to Argentina. The Secretary said he would also
comment on this trade issue in his letter to the Foreign Minister. He
suggested that Argentina take another look at trade opportunities in the
U.S. because it might uncover some hitherto overlooked markets.
Foreign Minister Zavala concluded
with the plea that the silo issue is more than a matter of dollars or
law, but rather a “spiritual” issue between two friends, a matter of
trust. The relations of the two countries could be seriously damaged, he
said, by attitudes or actions reflecting distrust. The moral effect
would be more damaging than the economic effect of not getting the
silos.
124. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on June 9.NIE 91–65Washington, June 9, 1965.
PROSPECTS FOR ARGENTINA
The Problem
To assess the situation in Argentina, and to estimate the prospects for
the Illia administration through
the congressional elections scheduled for the spring of 1967.
Conclusions
During its nearly two years in office, the Illia administration has achieved
for Argentina the longest period of political stability in its
recent history, but has failed to develop a strong base of popular
and congressional support. During the same period the Argentine
economy has experienced a recovery, but only to the level it had
achieved in 1961. The Illia
administration has failed to cope effectively with inflationary
pressures or to make headway with the measures required to promote
balanced economic growth. (Paras. 7–30)The March 1965 congressional elections marked the return of the
Peronists as a major legitimate political force. The trend toward a
political polarization around the Illia administration and the Peronist opposition
will probably develop further in the congressional and gubernatorial
elections in 1967. (Paras. 12, 34)To avert a Peronist landslide in the 1967 elections, President
Illia will have to act
more vigorously to create an attractive political alternative to
Peronism. We believe it unlikely that he can do so. Alternatively,
he will have to devise some way to restrict Peronist participation
in the election. This would, of course, frustrate the endeavor to
reintegrate the Peronists into the normal political system. The
reaction of the die-hard Peronists would be violent, but could
almost certainly be contained. (Paras. 34, 37)The Argentine military remain the only element capable of
overthrowing the government. The officers now in control of the
military establishment would prefer to preserve the constitutional
regime. However, the military leadership in general has been
antagonized by the frustration of its desire for Argentina to play a
leading role in the OAS peacekeeping
force in the Dominican Republic. Some officers who have long
regarded the Illia
administration as weak and ineffectual are now less disposed than
ever to make due allowance for its political handicaps. Whether the
Argentine military will overthrow the Illia administration within the period of this
estimate remains highly uncertain, depending almost entirely on
their own estimate of the developing situation in Argentina. (Paras.
33, 38–40)If the military should conclude that the Peronists under extremist
leadership were likely to prevail in the 1967 elections, they would
first urge upon the government the necessity of restricting Peronist
participation in the elections. If not satisfied in that respect,
they would almost certainly intervene to impose their will, or to
prevent or annul the elections. (Para. 41)Most Peronist leaders recognize that the movement is on probation
in its resurgence into the national political arena. If, during the
next year or so, the Peronist leadership, or some elements of it,
should establish a reputation for reasonableness and moderation,
some of the military might come to discriminate between “good”
Peronists and “bad” Peronists and to tolerate the former. Thus a
Peronist electoral victory under moderate leadership might
precipitate a division among the military, with some calling for
immediate counteraction and others seeking to preserve the
constitutional regime at least until the presidential election in
1969. In such a case, a period of recurrent military crises, like
that which occurred in 1962–1963, might ensue. (Paras. 32,
42)The Argentine Communist Party is the largest in the Western
Hemisphere (60,000–65,000 members), but is not an influential
political force. The
Communists and Castroists have no significant subversive potential
in Argentina except insofar as they may be able to act in
conjunction with a mass reaction of frustrated and embittered
Peronists. (Paras. 18, 35)]
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]
125. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. 16. Confidential.Washington, October 19, 1965, 7 p.m.
SUBJECT
Aircraft for Argentina
Last May, DOD, with Secretary McNamara’s approval, reached an
understanding with the Argentine Ministry of Defense for the sale of 50
of our Navy A–4B aircraft to help them modernize their Air Force. Our
offer to help the Argentines came after we learned that they were
considering bids for very expensive French planes. We did not want
French influence in the Argentine Air Force. Since the Argentines were
determined to acquire fighters, we wanted to see them do it at a price
more nearly commensurate with their ability to pay. (The French “Mirage”
fighter costs 2 to 3 times more than the A–4B.) Another consideration
was the desire to maintain standardization of Latin American military
equipment with ours.
The Argentines have reached agreement with the Douglas Aircraft
Corporation on cost of modification and overhaul of the aircraft and now
are ready to conclude the necessary credit agreements with us.
In our 1966 Military Assistance Program for Latin America, there is an
item for $2.5 million in grant assistance to Argentina for spare parts
and support equipment for use in connection with the A–4B’s. Use of
MAP grant funds for training and
support assistance has been standard practice in the Latin American area
and is designed to help the recipient government maintain and obtain
maximum use of its equipment.
In view of your desire to review commitments of this nature, I wanted to
obtain your authorization before Defense proceeds to formalize the transaction. I recommend
that you authorize me to tell Defense that they may go ahead.
McG. B.
Proceed with the transactionThe President checked this option.
Hold up for further review
126. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of
StateSource:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL ARG–US. Confidential;
Exdis. Rusk was in Buenos Aires, November
15–16, for meetings with the Illia administration; he then proceeded to Rio de
Janeiro for the Second Special Inter-American Conference.Rio de Janeiro, November 17, 1965,
0320Z.
Secto 11. For Ball from Secretary. I am convinced after my talks with
Illia, Foreign Minister, and
economic team that it is time for us to begin to move forward with
Argentina.
They have proceeded with oil negotiations in good faith.In a November 18 memorandum to Mann, Sayre reported that Argentina has recently settled
with five American oil companies, leaving two with outstanding
contracts. (Ibid., ARA/APU/A
Files: Lot 69 D 87, PET 4—Agreements) So far as I can see the
Hickenlooper amendment is not now being violated in letter or in spirit.
The oil companies including PanAm are making profits and repatriating
them.
In terms of self-help the Argentines have taken significant steps to
increase tax collections which have risen 74 percent over last year,
they have produced a serious development plan; they have the respect of
the IBRD and IAB and are actively
negotiating project loans with them; they are entering a period of
crucial confrontation with Peronist unions in an effort to hold wage
increases to 15 percent in the next round.
They believe—and I agree—1966 may be the crucial year to demonstrate that
stabilization and growth are compatible.
And I am not unmindful of the 1967 Argentine elections and the various
matters in which I shall wish to have the collaboration of the Foreign
Minister in the months ahead.
In all our conversations there was no whining. But they feel they have
now created the basis for a new relation with us. What they want to know
is what we are prepared—and what we are not prepared—to do in Argentina
over the next year.
Specifically, as I understand it, there are the following issues: The Ex-Im loan for the four Boeings. The domestic airlines
operate at a deficit. There is a decent hope that their
international flights can be made profitable if they get the
Boeings. We understand that the British made yesterday an offer
of UC–10’s for immediate delivery. They would be less economical
than the Boeings. For quite narrow reasons of U.S. interest I am
inclined to believe this loan should be urgently completed.
Would you inform Linder.Harold F.
Linder, president and chairman of the Export-Import
Bank.The three loans for which funds have been committed and which
simply await our action. I believe we should move in one or more
of these promptly.The housing loan which was held up awaiting legislation and
then withdrawn. The legislation has now gone through. We should
carefully consider if we cannot move in this field of
considerable political and social importance.Assistance in debt roll-over. I am told they will require debt
and other adjustments of something like $100 million in 1966.
Against the background of a favorable IMF report and U.S. support they seek a further
European roll-over early in 1966. We should begin staff work now
to see what can be done, if their performance continues to
improve.
Neither the position of our bilateral relations nor their actual
self-help performance yet justify full steam U.S. support. But would you
look into the best ways to put some coal in the furnace promptly.Ball replied that the
Department was “in general agreement” with the Secretary’s analysis
but that action on the silo and housing loans would require “special
strong presentation at highest level because of potential effect on
U.S. balance of payments.” (Telegram Tosec 46 to Rio de Janeiro,
November 18; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL ARG–US)
Martin later complained
that the Embassy had heard “noises” from Washington which were not
in keeping with the Secretary’s telegram from Rio. The Deputy Chief
of the AID Mission in Argentina, for
example, had recently reported that the “attitude in AID/LA
was quite negative on reactivating housing loan which was canceled
last June.” (Letter from Martin to Vaughn, December 21; ibid. AID(US) 7 ARG)
Rusk
127. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 ARG. Secret; Immediate. Repeated
to Lima for Gordon and passed
to the White House and USIA.Buenos Aires, June 4, 1966,
1813Z.
1836. From Ambassador.
I find myself very puzzled about what might happen to Illia government. Week ago
qualified local observers were noting increased tranquility and
improved atmosphere for seeking political rather than military
solutions to Argentina’s problems. Yesterday was generally agreed to
have been most tense since Illia government took office with B.A. full of
rumors of all sorts of dramatic events, all pointing in one way or
another toward disappearance of Illia government, and all as of this morning
unfulfilled. [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] reports also alarmist but many of them are
from golpeslanted sources.During week several events took place which, added to others which
have occurred over past several weeks, provide basis for this
changed atmosphere, though no one of them was of major importance.
This combination of disturbing developments gave ammunition to
active golpistas, largely civilian, who are impatiently seeking to
create situation which military will consider justifies removal of
government. Long expected economic and political chaos or collapse
of government has not materialized and crisis over March 67
elections may be avoided and is in any case some months away. Hence
these frantic efforts to provide chaos through rumor and to pressure
military into action which government cannot overlook and which
might lead to confrontation in which military will be forced to use
their power.While some military leaders share this impatience, Ongania and to
lesser extent Pistarini, will make decision. Basically I believe
Ongania would prefer not to move but is profoundly unhappy about
state of country twelve years after Peron was overthrown and about
performance of this government. Therefore careful plans for takeover
have been drawn up by military in cooperation civilian experts. He
may have concluded move inevitable but if so I believe he will
prefer wait for situation in which he can justify action as clearly
necessary and in national interest and can avoid charge military
manuevered into action by civilian golpista intrigues with their
variety of good and bad motives. He is very close mouthed and I
doubt if more than two or three people, if that many, know what he thinks
about situation as of today. We are trying to find out but I am
doubtful of success. He is well informed on U.S. Government
position.If military moves believe there will not be armed opposition
though may be a few resignations in armed forces. Nor will there be
serious civilian disorder. However, short period in power may see
considerable strains as proponents of golpe, both civilian and
military, have varying motivations and policy conflicts could soon
become serious.I am convinced that Illia
will fight his removal to end. His skill at this should not be
underestimated. Some of his colleagues are apt to be less cool and
determined. Already there is considerable increase in activity and
flexibility in economic field though no major shifts have occurred.
President has held unprecedented series of long meetings over past
three weeks with economic team and with ministries responsible for
various areas of social and economic development. WednesdayJune 1. he met for four hours with
Pugliese and economic team and yesterday for another several hours.
His veto action on dismissal law was strong and basically sound.
Thursday Labor Minister Sola made radio speech which attacked
general strike called for June 7 in stronger terms than old-timers
here remember any labor minister to have used. At the same time Sola
has resumed dialogue with labor confederation (CGT). Government has persuaded leaders
to call off ten-day national teachers’ strike scheduled to start
June 6. Currently there are rumors that President will in few days
intervene Tucuman provincial government and University of B.A. Both
measures military have urged.Nevertheless, situation is sufficiently fragile that it is at
mercy of accidents. Our radio and newspaper contacts and trustworthy
personal friends feel nothing will happen now and that there is good
chance of Illia staying until
can be seen whether he can satisfy military on March election issue.
This will come to head in September– December period. But, without
knowing directly what Ongania and Pistarini think, this must remain
a guess. Parenthetically, Ongania and wife attended large buffet
supper given at Residence May 26 for Philadelphia Orchestra, ate at
small table with Cantilo, UCRP
President of Industrial Bank, gave President Illia an abrazo, and was quite
cordial with me and other Embassy acquaintances.Pouched today contingency paper on which we have been working for
some weeks.On June 4 the Embassy
forwarded a plan that considered a number of contingencies,
including Situation F, in which the “present government is
removed and replaced by a military junta which rules by decree.”
In this event, the Embassy recommended consultation with other
Latin American countries on the understanding that recognition
would be withheld until the new regime promises to honor its
international commitments, to respect civil liberties, and to
hold free elections; U.S. recognition only after a majority of
the “important Latin American countries” have taken similar
action; suspension of all economic and military assistance until
recognition; and a public statement that the United States
regrets “that a country of this hemisphere has left the
constitutional path” and will “wait and see what the
implications may be with respect to US–Argentine relations and
Argentine cooperation in the OAS
and in the Alliance for Progress.” (Airgram A–950 from Buenos
Aires; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 1–1
ARG–US)Martin
128. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in ArgentinaSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 ARG. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Dreyfuss and Krieg
on June 6 and approved by Gordon and Ball.Washington, June 7, 1966, 12:02 p.m.
1363. For Ambassador from Gordon.
I am of course aware your strenuous efforts to make known both
generally and to key Argentine figures our position of strong
opposition to coup against Illia Government and our support for continuous
Constitutional Government in Argentina. However, I raise question
whether most if not all of those actively pushing for golpe—and
perhaps key figures such as Ongania and Pistarini—may believe we are
making “the expected noises” and that, after a brief hiatus, we
would continue business as usual with an Argentine de facto
government should the coup against Illia actually materialize.Your contingency paper has not yet arrived. Meanwhile, in view of
fact that as stated in your telegram 1836Document 127. “the situation is
sufficiently fragile that it is at the mercy of accidents,” I would
like to have your views on the desirability and feasibility of
making absolutely clear to
those likely to be key figures in future developments that we would
not be able easily to cooperate with a de facto government that had
ousted constitutional Illia
administration. If you agree, an approach might be made to Ongania,
Pistarini, Julio Alsogaray
and/or such others as you may suggest along following lines: Express concern over most recent spate coup rumors and
approaches by golpistas who purport express attitude
Military High Command and Ongania that coup inevitable and
will be carried out.
Point out that we are currently engaged in planning
cooperative programs with GOA—both in military and economic
fields—and that we feel continuance constitutional
government and political stability necessary for us move
ahead with these plans. Our opposition to coup is not
merely philosophical opposition to rupture
constitutionality and democratic process, but also
strongly based on belief that military coup would be
serious setback to Argentina’s economic and political
development. Moreover, congressional and public reaction
in U.S. would be such as to limit severely if not make
impossible U.S. cooperation.
FYI. As you know MAP is subject strong
criticism encourages coups. Thus Argentine coup could
lead to amendment to pending legislation forbidding
military assistance to de facto governments or at most
elimination MAP
entirely. End FYI.
If it seems desirable to be more explicit, you could
mention that among the significant joint projects currently
under consideration are the five-year MAP/MAS Program (approx. $42 million grant and $67
million credit) and a loan for expansion Somisa facilities
($100 million approximately). Our ultimate decisions on
these projects would have to be taken in light of
circumstances then prevailing, including climate of
congressional and public opinion in U.S. A breach of
constitutionality would clearly create extremely unfavorable
atmosphere. Debt rescheduling would also be
prejudiced.A golpe would clearly rule out B.A. as site for OAS Conference.A military government offers certain superficial
advantages in terms of action over present civilian
administration, whose errors of omission and commission,
chiefly the former, are easy to point out. However, it is
our view that institutional instability constitutes a
serious obstacle to foreign investment, which is in turn
essential to economic development. Stability is perhaps more
important in this regard than efficiency. There is
considerable doubt in our minds that a military government,
which would not have organized public support, would in fact
be able to carry out the economic program needed to put
country on its feet or that such gains as were made would
not be swept away as soon as civilian government was
restored. This is reenforced by possible instability flowing from
fallings-out among coup leaders once constitutional
structure swept away.We continue to hope that coup can be avoided and that
Argentina will show that degree of maturity which is
expected of such a highly cultured, sophisticated
country.Please classify reply Nodis.Ball
129. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 ARG. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. No time of transmission
appears on the telegram.Buenos Aires, June 8, 1966.
1866. From Ambassador for Assistant Secretary Gordon. Reftel:
Deptel 1363.Document 128.
Appreciate sense and spirit of your thoughtful message in reftel.My immediate reaction is that approach you suggest likely to have
only limited value for two reasons.
There is considerable indirect evidence that many
military have convinced themselves that in removing
Illia
government they would be fulfilling basically identical
role in Argentina that armed forces performed in Brazil
in ousting Goulart. I am aware how different two
situations really are and of our official view of
legality of transfer of power there, but fact that new
Brazilian regime harps on its revolutionary character
has easily led local military to regard any differences
of legal form that may be required here as only ones of
form and to believe that they would be acting with
identical spirit of renovation, of anticommunism,
anti-corruption, anti-inefficiency and of unreserved
support for pro-Western foreign policy. They have
followed closely US aid to Brazil since Goulart
departure and press here has publicized, perhaps
excessively, enthusiasm of US investors for new regime
in Brazil.
Hence indications of so different a US response are I
fear being received either with considerable incredulity
or as last example in long history of US favoritism toward
Brazil over Argentina, already a subject of considerable
current comment here. It is not easy to convince them
that, so far as treatment by US would be distinct, the
difference would stem from quite different situations in
two countries preceding change in government.
I have met considerable comment that no foreigner can
understand depth of Argentine national frustration and
of desire that country get moving to catch up on 35
wasted years. Therefore they feel that regardless of
effect on external opinion of actions, they must make
decisions and take actions necessary to initiate this
process. They refer to it as deeply felt private
problems which only Argentines can understand or solve.
In this sense I think they have looked longingly at
successes of Castelo Branco, at Franco’s progress in
Spain in recent years and at de Gaulle success in France
as showing what an intelligent authoritarian regime of
the sort they plan to have can accomplish.
There is evidence that belief that only Argentina can
solve basic problems of Argentina, a nationalistic
attitude with a considerable history, it widely shared,
even outside golpe circles. We must move cautiously to
insure net positive result.
There are two points of lesser importance to be made: Belief is spreading, with considerable justification, that
favorable evolution Argentine trade surplus so far this year
will make refinancing avoidable, so this reference not
particularly helpful point.Also believe military would consider OAS meeting in BA of some importance to
prestige of Illia
government but of no significance to Argentine nation in
finding solutions to many grave problems with which they
believe it to be confronted and with which they purport to
be wholly preoccupied.Wish to note that in June issue of respectable Look-type magazine called Atlantida
there is article on coup plans which gives some purported details
about three plans. With respect to that of Army General Staff it
states, “The opposition of the United States is expected and it is
estimated that the opposition of the White House ‘to the new form of
government will be of a duration of no less than 6 months.’” Part in
single quotes claims to be from text of plan. This and other
evidence which has reached us lead us to believe that US position is
not only known but understood to be more than “pro forma.”Given these negative factors and possible exploitation of our
initiative by golpistas to arouse nationalist sentiments, I am not
disposed to seek out Ongania, whom I believe to be decisive figure
in implementing plans as now drawn up by military, to convey this
message now but to see if occasion may arise naturally or wait until
there is clearer evidence of crystallization of program for golpe
action justifying taking
risk of charge of interventionism. There is of course other
possibility that more impatient and incautious military figures may
seek or find opportunity to create situation in which he is forced
to move outside contingencies now foreseen by him in order to
maintain prestige and/or unity of armed forces. In this latter case
our position has only remote chance of influencing course of events
for potential instigators such pressure play are so emotionally
committed that US representations to them would be counter
productive. This position does not preclude Embassy military and
other officials following line you propose, with exclusion points
mentioned in paragraph 3 above in conversations where they may use
it without giving appearance of taking initiative. There will, we
think, be such opportunities in days ahead.Suggest it might help remove any possible belief in Argentine
military circles that at least Pentagon supported golpe idea that we
keep running into from time to time, if senior Pentagon army officer
could find occasion to make contrary clear to General Shaw who is
member Ongania group.General Shaw was
approached on June 14 by General William P. Yarborough, the
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Special Operations,
Department of the Army, who indicated that a coup d’état in
Argentina “could affect our assistance programs, including those
concerned with military.” According to Yarborough’s account,
Shaw “implied clearly though subtly his belief that interruption
US assistance would not be great disaster for Argentina.”
(Telegram 1405 to Buenos Aires, June 15; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–5 ARG) Could base
remarks not on intelligence reports but on public comments by you
and by Embassy here, as to tension in Argentina.Leak, attributable to legislative source, if to anyone, that
consideration being given to requiring cutting off military aid to
de facto governments might be of minor value in situation here
though again possibly counter-productive. However, I should think
such an inflexible provision would be so harmful to US interests
generally that we would want to take no initiative which would
appear in any way to endorse it. Therefore, I do not recommend that
such leak be attempted. To best of my recollection no sanction of
even as much as six months for this reason has ever been
enforced.Our basic line here has been that US could contribute best to
maintenance legality by helping in such small ways as available to
us in improving GOA’s performance
record. Still believe this more likely be profitable than
necessarily somewhat imprecise predictions of future consequences,
though vagueness, diffusiveness, illogicality and deviation from
facts characteristic of golpista rationale is most discouraging.
Hard to pinpoint issues which are in fact crucial to them. Even with this
qualification, however, believe we must continue do what we can on
positive side. For example: While IBRD decision will
help, believe evidence of US willingness to consider help
for Somisa also valuable because of army interest in plant
and in development heavy industry. Project could not go
forward without Illia’s full backing, which it now has, on
domestic and foreign financing. Therefore any sign of
progress helps government. However, statement by Pugliese in
present political atmosphere will be heavily discounted and
carry far less weight than US release. Urge
reconsider.Also would help if could be some evidence of action on
AIFLD housing loan.
With proper handling here, US approval could improve
atmosphere in some circles.Shortcuts to permit earlier action than would result from
normal procedures on release of silo fund loans also could
help. Our recommendations went to Washington in TOAID A–531 of June 7.Not found.We are working hard with some prospects of success to
shortcut usual bureaucratic delays and secure early
announcement of decrees approving new large investments by
Ford and
Dupont.We are also feeling our way toward making recommendations
to Illia government
in several fields outside area of direct US interest or
involvement, though political factors at moment, including
within UCRP, are so fluid
and complex that this is not simple.Martin reported
on June 15 that the Embassy had received information
that the military would give the Illia administration
“time to produce concrete results,” possibly as late as
September. The Ambassador concluded that the situation
had improved enough to allow his departure the following
day for a vacation in the United States. (Telegram 1908
from Buenos Aires, June 15; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
POL 23–9 ARG) The
Department cabled its concurrence. (Telegram 1406 to
Buenos Aires, June 16; ibid.)Martin
130. Editorial Note
On June 14, 1966, Félix Elizalde, head of the Argentine National Bank,
called on Special Assistant to the President Rostow
to discuss the recent Argentine proposal for a summit meeting of Latin
American Presidents. Elizalde delivered an oral message from President
Illia in which he maintained that “Latin America
appeared to be coming into a rare moment of political stability.” He
“wryly noted,” however, “that Argentina appeared to have somewhat
changed its status” since late-March, when Illia first issued his invitation for the summit.
Rostow asked Elizalde “how seriously he took
the military coup rumors coming from Argentina.” Elizalde explained that
“the problem came to rest on the elections of 1967. He thought Illia could hold the line until then
but some of the military were looking for excuses to move earlier. The
key task was to have non-Peronists win the elections of 1967.”
Rostow asked what the United States could do to
help. Elizalde replied that two projects needed immediate attention, the
Somisa steel mill and the El Chocón hydroelectric plant. The former—“a
symbol of independence in Argentina and an important installation for
the military”—required AID cooperation
with the Export-Import Bank; the latter was under consideration at the
World Bank. (Memorandum of conversation, June 17; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 IA)
According to a note for Rusk, June
20, President Johnson instructed the State
Department to “follow through” on Elizalde’s request “to assist
President Illia to keep the
Argentine military in line.” (Ibid.)
131. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 ARG. Confidential; Immediate.
Repeated to DIA and USCINCSO and passed to the White
House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, and CINCLANT for POLAD.Buenos Aires, June 28, 1966,
0640Z.
1981. Subj: Reported Fall of Illia
Government (report number eight).In
telegram 1974 from Buenos Aires, June 27, the Embassy reported that
the Commander in Chief of the Army, Pascual Angel Pistarini, had
ordered the arrest of Carlos
Augusto Caro, Commander of the Second Army Corps. (Ibid.) The
Embassy continued to follow developments, subsequently predicting
the “imminent fall of Illia
government.” (Telegram 1980 from Buenos Aires, June 28; ibid.) For
an account of events leading to the coup, see Document 134.
At 0200, based on many sources but not officially confirmed,
commanders-in-chief of armed forces have taken over as junta or
provisional government. Reports also state that Ongania will be
declared provisional president at 0700.Report from Army G–2 source is that President Illia’s resignation was demanded
and received.The Embassy later reported
that Illia had not yet
resigned but agreed to leave the Presidential palace, and
Onganía was to be “installed as new President some time this
morning.” (Telegram 1983 from Buenos Aires, June 28;
ibid.)Troops now surround War Ministry. Troops not in evidence outside
presidency. City quiet.Assuming military take-over now or about to be accomplished fact,
have instructed all Embassy MilGroup and U.S. agencies personnel to
desist until further notice from formal contact with Argentine
authorities. Military mission personnel having offices in ministries
will either report at Embassy or (lower echelons) stay at home. All
other personnel will report at Embassy as usual.Await instructions. No further reports until 0700.Saccio
132. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in ArgentinaSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 ARG. Confidential; Flash.
Repeated to USCINCSO. Drafted
by Dreyfuss and Sayre; cleared by Gordon, Martin, and Andreas F.
Lowenfeld (L); and approved by Ball. At 9 a.m., Gordon read the text of the
telegram to Rostow and asked if President
Johnson would like to clear it. (Ibid.,
ARA Files: Lot 68 D 93,
Telephone Conversations January 1966–December 1966) There is no
indication on the telegram that the President cleared it.Washington, June 28, 1966, 9:44 a.m.
1451. Ref Embtel 1981.Document 131.
Department approves your action cutting off overt and official
contact with Argentine authorities by all US representatives. You
should maintain this posture until further instructions. Do not take
any action vis-à-vis de facto authorities that could imply
recognition or continuance official relations. However, discreet
informal contact with de facto authorities, their spokesmen and
intelligence sources for purpose obtaining information and learning
of their plans should take place at your discretion.In response any press inquiries, you may state you keeping
Washington fully informed, that US Government carefully studying
developing situation, that you have no instructions as yet bearing
on future relations between US and Argentina, and that any USG announcement on policy in new
situation will be made in Washington.At noon briefing today we intend state we greatly concerned over
displacement democratic government and rupture constitutional
processes in OAS member state, that
we are following developments carefully, and we are reviewing
programs now in progress or planned for Argentina in light
developing situation. In keeping with international practice in such
cases, diplomatic relations are suspended. We will be consulting
with other OAS members in accordance
Resolution XXVI of 1965 Rio Conference.Resolution XXVI of the Final Act of the Second Special
Inter-American Conference recommended that member states consult
before recognizing a de facto government, giving consideration
to: whether a foreign country was involved in the overthrow of
the old regime and whether the new regime promised to hold free
elections, to honor its international obligations, and to
respect human rights. After consultation, each country was free
to decide whether to maintain diplomatic relations. If
you have any comment send Flash message.The Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, Leonard J. Saccio, responded: “I realize dilemma
USG faced with but
Department should take into consideration bare faced take over
of constitutional democratic government by military with no
justification. I recommend that some element of condemnation be
indicated in Department statement through use of stronger
language.” Saccio also suggested that the Department announce
the immediate recall of the AID
mission director and the military group chief. (Telegram 1986
from Buenos Aires, June 28 (1530Z); National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 ARG) The official
statement, delivered at the noon briefing, did not reflect the
Embassy’s suggestions. (Department of State Bulletin, July 25, 1966, p. 124)Further instructions will follow on AID and military assistance programs. Your immediate
recommendations on these and other ongoing programs would be
appreciated.The Embassy recommended
action in accordance with Situation F of the contingency plan
(see footnote 3, Document 127),
including: a) suspension of all economic and military
assistance; b) immediate recall of the AID mission director and the military group chief;
and c) cancellation of all official travel to Argentina.
(Telegram 1988 from Buenos Aires, June 28; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 ARG) Although it agreed to
cancel official travel to Argentina, the Department declined to
recall any members of the Country Team and would only report
that “careful consideration is being given to economic and
military assistance during period of nonrecognition.” (Telegram
1460 to Buenos Aires, June 29; ibid.)Department appreciates Embassy’s alert reporting of last night’s
activities and events and looks forward to continued up-to-the
minute reports of developments.Ball
133. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Argentina, Vol. II, 9/64–2/67.
Confidential. A copy was sent to Moyers. Another copy indicates that
the President saw the memorandum. (Ibid., Memos to the President,
Walt W. Rostow, Vol.
7)Washington, June 28, 1966, 11 a.m.
SUBJECT
Argentine Situation
The latest reports from Buenos Aires indicate that the Army has arrested
President Illia and removed him
from the Presidential Palace.
Where he will be taken is not known at this juncture. There are three
likely possibilities: 1. detained on Martin Garcia island in the River Plate
estuary.2. put across the border in Uruguay.3. sent to the United States to join his wife who is
hospitalized in Houston.
This unjustified military coup is a serious setback to our efforts to
promote constitutional government and representative democracy in the
hemisphere. It will be necessary to re-examine our whole policy toward
Argentina.Rostow inserted the following
handwritten comment at this point in the margin: “Mr. President:
This is Bill Bowdler. I wish to add a word of caution when you have
a moment.” According to the President’s Daily Diary Johnson called
Rostow at 11:42 a.m. (Johnson Library) No
substantive record of the conversation has been found. This
process will be carried out through the IRG–SIG mechanism starting
at noon today. The OAS may also have to
shift the site of the Foreign Ministers Meeting on OAS Charter amendment scheduled to open on
August 29 in Buenos Aires.
State this morning sent the attached cable to our Embassy in Buenos Aires
with guidance on official contacts and dealings with the press.Document 132. In paragraph 3 it
gives the press line which State is going to follow on the coup. The
line is the correct one for the time being.
Walt
134. Telegram From the Department of State
to Secretary of State Rusk in AustraliaSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 ARG. Confidential; Immediate.
Repeated to DOD, USCINCSO, CINCLANT, and all ARA posts except Kingston,
Port-of-Spain, and Georgetown. Drafted by Dreyfuss, cleared by Krieg, and approved by Sayre. Rusk was in Canberra June 25–July 2 to attend
meetings of the SEATO and ANZUS Councils.Washington, June 28, 1966, 3:18 p.m.
Tosec 60. Argentine Sitrep No. 1.
Argentina’s military forces, headed by Army Commander-in-Chief
Pascual Pistarini, ousted President Arturo Illia in a sudden move last night. Retired
CINCJuan Carlos Ongania, who is
highly respected by diverse civilian groups as well as in military
circles, is likely to be called upon by a junta composed of
commanders of three services to head new provisional government.
There has been no violence.Early in June there had been a spate of rumors of this possible
move by the military in association with various civilian groups,
who accused the Illia
Administration of indecisiveness in the face of the nation’s
economic and social problems and of being incapable of averting a
Peronist victory in congressional and gubernatorial elections
scheduled for early 1967. Statements by Illia over the past two weeks promising to take
steps to assuage the military’s discontent had appeared to calm the
situation and buy the President some breathing space.The spark that ignited the coup was a dinner held last week at
which Secretary of War Eduardo Castro Sanchez and II Corp Commander
Carlos Augusto Caro, both strongly constitutionalist and
pro-Illia, met with
several Peronist leaders. Pistarini yesterday relieved Caro of his
command, accusing him of endangering the unity of the armed forces
by dabbling in politics outside approved channels. He also said
Castro Sanchez was unacceptable to the army and demanded his
resignation, as well as that of the rest of the Cabinet. Illia countered by attempting to
remove Pistarini from his position, bringing on the sudden
confrontation that resulted in Illia’s ouster.The coup, as it developed, does not appear to be what most
military and civilian coup planners had hoped for, as they had
intended eventually to lead a “national revolution,” to save the
country from the “inept” Illia regime. The current move, however, has the
earmarks of an old fashioned military power play and will not
attract the popular
support the military leaders had hoped for, although there is little
likelihood of concerted violent popular opposition.Foregoing is for your background information.Ball
135. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Argentina, Vol. II, 9/64–2/67.
Secret.Washington, June 29, 1966, 7 p.m.
SUBJECT
Our Policy Toward Argentina
Linc Gordon, through the IRG/ARA mechanism, has done a careful
analysis of our political, military, economic and cultural relations
with Argentina and come up with specific recommendations for continuing
or suspending elements of on-going programs until diplomatic relations
are resumed. The attached memorandum from George Ball contains these recommendations.Attached but not printed. It is a
first-class job, which, incidentally, shows that the IRG/SIG
mechanism can be made to work promptly and effectively.
What the memorandum proposes is a delicately balanced package which
permits as much of our present programs to continue consistent with the
automatic break in diplomatic relations. The dividing line is
essentially official contacts: what can be carried forward without
dealing officially with the new military government should proceed and
what requires official contact should be held in abeyance. This puts us
in a correct posture with respect to the other OAS countries while we consult on recognition without
antagonizing the new Argentine government.
With respect to recognition, this must await formation of the new
government, a definition of the policies it intends to pursue, a request
for recognition and consultation with the other OAS governments. This may take 2–3 weeks. As George Ball suggests, we should seek
the usual assurances regarding acceptance of international obligations,
as well as respect for civil
liberties and an early return to constitutional government, before
recognizing. But we should not take too rigid a position on the
scheduling of elections which might preclude recognition if we did not
get the commitment.
I recommend your approval.
William BowdlerBowdler signed for
Rostow.
ApproveThe President
checked this option.
Disapprove
Speak to me
136. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 ARG. Secret; Immediate; Limdis.
Received in the Department on June 30 at 9:17 p.m.Buenos Aires, June 30, 1966,
2341Z.
2027. For Assistant Secretary Gordon. Subject: Private Conversation with General
Alsogaray.
Conversation took place in office of Alvaro Alsogaray under conditions outlined in Embtel 2019.Telegram 2019 from Buenos Aires, June 30
(1507Z), reported that the head of the military household,
General Julio
Alsogaray, had indirectly requested a private meeting
with the Chargé d’Affaires. Saccio proposed to accept the invitation on the
condition that he “need only listen and make no comment.”
(Ibid., DEF 9 ARG) The Department cabled its concurrence.
(Telegram 1465 to Buenos Aires, June 30, 12:27 p.m.;
ibid.) No one else present. Statement in three parts: 1.
Why the golpe took place, 2. What the new government proposes to do,
3. The structure of the new government.Stated that he and others had been working on the matter for some
months. Illia government had
been great hope that problems of the country would be solved.
However it began to make mistakes. The first was the cancellation of
the oil contracts which not only hurt investors but the country;
communism, the lack of order, the severe worsening of the economy, political
maneuverings, corruption, all caused great concern. Every attempt
was made to get the government to meet these problems, however,
nothing was done, suggestions were made. All that happened was a
calling of cabinet meetings out of which issued nothing of
constructive nature. The opening of dialogue with all sectors,
calling on the cardinal, these are things that should have been done
as a matter of course. No date had been fixed for the golpe. It had
been generally agreed that action would have to be taken in October
or December because of oncoming March elections unless of course the
government took affirmative and satisfactory action to solve the
problems of the country. It was obvious that the military had to
work clandestinely; the press picked this up; the government
reacted; the vicious circle was started. The military was forced to
act because its integrity was being challenged—(the activities of
General Caro and Secretary of War Castro Sanchez).What the new government proposes to do. The eventual goal to
create a democratic system of three or four parties. This could be
accomplished only sometime in the future after the basic problems of
the country are solved. (He did not say how long this would take or
use the term “years”, but clearly indicated that such a development
was well in the future.) In the past, under the political system in
effect there were but two choices, the bad and the worse, the
Radicales or the Peronistas. The experience of the country proved
that democratic political system could not successfully solve the
problems of the country. It is not going to be easy to solve the
economic problems of the country. He expected that the economy would
continue to go down in the near future then hopefully, once the new
government was able to restore confidence, Argentine investors would
withdraw their funds from the Swiss and American banks and
investments and foreign interests would begin to invest. The new
government will strive to establish a modern economy of free
enterprise taking full account of social obligations. It would not
be a 19th century free enterprise type, but akin to that which
exists as example, in Western Germany. The constitution still
reigns; liberties will be guaranteed; free press will be allowed to
continue. However if, for example, former government officials
attempt to attack present government, measures will have to be
taken. A full social security system will be established assuring
pension, unemployment benefits, benefits to mothers, the whole
gamut. The labor unions will be regulated; employer-employee
relations determined, but political activity by unions will be
prohibited. Outrageous demands on the part of labor, such as in the
case of the longshoremen, who get six times regular pay for working
at night—Buenos Aires is the most expensive port in the world—will
not be tolerated. State enterprises will be put on paying
basis.Peronism. Peronism as a political movement will not be permitted.
All political activity will be prohibited, Peronism included. The
belief in Peronism is
deep in the people but this will be taken into account through
proper labor and social welfare provisions to satisfy legitimate
needs.Foreign Relations. Argentina is a member of the Western world. It
is so by nature not by convenience. The U.S. is a friend; this too
is by nature and not by convenience. Great Britain is an old client
and an important market. With Spain, Argentina has special ties of
origin. (No mention was made of USSR, satellite countries or ChiCom.) As to the
countries immediately bordering Argentina, the border matters with
Chile will have to be settled. The establishment of a special
relationship with Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia, because of
Argentina’s size and potential, would be the “rector” of these three
countries. (Alsogaray repeated the word
“rector” searching for something better to express his meaning. It
was clear that he considered these three countries would be within
the sphere of influence of Argentina.)I asked Alsogaray to repeat what he said
about Chile. It was clear that he was not comfortable in doing so.
Obvious that there is a question in his mind propriety of the
present solution. I persisted and asked whether the settlement of
this problem would be along present lines. He ducked the question
again. In this exchange he mentioned England and the Islands
(Malvinas).He returned to the question of the economy again describing it as
a modern economy of free enterprise with full regard to social
obligations. He mentioned no specific measures that the new
government would undertake, however he said it was clear that it
would need assistance from outside sources. No mention was made of
military assistance.Structure of Government. There will be five ministries: Interior,
Economy and Labor, Defense, Justice, and Foreign Relations. Fifteen
secretariats will operate under the five ministries. Most of these
will be under Economy and Labor with Interior having charge of
Education as well as its usual functions. The three services will be
under defense. The five ministries with the president will
constitute the executive cabinet, the national cabinet will include
the ministries and the secretariats.Except for the exchange on Chile, Alsogaray’s
statement was frank and open. Because of the nature of the meeting I
did not ask many questions except to bring him out on the subject of
the guaranty of liberties, the program in the field of labor and of
course, Chile.Saccio
137. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 16 ARG. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
Received in the Department on July 1 at 11:10 a.m. Passed to the
White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, and CINCLANT for POLAD.Buenos Aires, June 30, 1966,
1720Z.
2020. Subject: Recognition of Ongania Government.
Embassy realizes others have experienced, as Country Team has
here, feelings of repugnance over military overthrow of
constitutional government of Illia. There was no real justification for move, and pretext was
flimsy.It was a long premediated power play which left in its
wake no semblance of constitutionality.Alliance for Progress received serious blow.Effect on public opinion in US, Latin America and
elsewhere is bound to blacken Argentina’s image
abroad.Cool analysis, however, results in recognition of following. Illia government not
only unpopular but object of attack by all sectors and even
within own party.There is no turning back.Ongania, of all Argentine military, is most prestigious,
respected, and capable.If there were plebiscite Ongania would probably win, even
over Peron.There has been no counter-action to golpe. Public mood has
been one of apathy toward events and expectancy and
wishfulness toward future.Ongania regime would probably not only meet all conditions
for recognition (except assurance of early elections), but
be firm anti-Communist partner of free world in OAS, UN, and other international bodies.Argentina still plays important role in achievement US
objectives such as projects Clear Sky and Skin DiverIn telegram 1472 to Buenos Aires,
June 30, the Department instructed the Embassy to
discontinue negotiations for Clear Sky, a project to
monitor Soviet compliance with the Limited Test Ban
Treaty of August 1963, until the restoration of
diplomatic relations. (Ibid.) The Department determined,
however, that Skin Diver, a “military scientific flight
operation” could continue. (Telegram 1460 to Buenos
Aires, June 29; ibid., POL 23–9 ARG) and in OAS and UN.Other members of hemisphere will undoubtedly be
recognizing Ongania government in short order.Embassy’s recommendation is that, after decent interval during
which US consults with fellow members of OAS, we recognize Ongania government. We should,
however, be neither first nor last.In
telegram 1186 to Buenos Aires, July 2, the Department forwarded
the text of the administration’s recognition policy as contained
in the IRG paper (see Document 135). The Department also
instructed the Embassy to convey the message that diplomatic
relations would be restored if the Onganía administration issued
a public statement testifying to its commitment to democracy and
civil liberties. (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARG–US)Saccio
138. Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 ARG. Secret; Immediate;
Limdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, NSA, and CINCLANT
for POLAD.Buenos Aires, July 5, 1966,
2333Z.
64. Subj: Private Conversation With Alvaro
Alsogaray. Ref: Buenos Aires 44.Telegram 44 from Buenos Aires, July 5, reported the
upcoming “talk” with Alvaro,
brother of General Julio
Alsogaray. (Ibid.) The Department suggested that
Saccio explain the U.S.
position on recognition, particularly with regard to democracy and
human rights. The Department provided the following guidance: “You
should not imply that we will refuse recognition if these points not
covered but stress that public commitments along these lines would
be most helpful with respect public and congressional opinion in
this country.” (Telegram 1713 to Buenos Aires, July 5; ibid., POL 16 ARG)
Civil and Human Rights. Alsogaray stated that
it had been the intention from the very beginning (in the planning
stage) that none of the civil rights be infringed except as
absolutely necessary in the political field. The constitution is
still in effect and will continue in effect. The top level of the
court system had to be changed for political reasons as well as for
corruption but the courts remain intact and will continue as before.
Though the provincial intervenors have the power to remove
individual members of the highest court in the provinces, very few
have been removed. No ad hoc committees of investigation have been
established. There have been no political arrests. The unions stand
as they were before.
Where there had been arrests as in the case of Ricardo Illia and
Mayor Rabanal, the others have been immediately turned over to the
courts for adjudication. Unless there is an attack against the
revolution, there will be no change in the rights of the people. The
press will continue to be free. All that the revolution planned to
do is to make minimum changes necessary to resolve the political
situation. In a democracy people have the right to change by voting
against the administration in power. In Argentina this meant
Peronists as the only [garble—alternative?]. This could not be
permitted. Even the Peronistas knew this as proven by their
acceptance of the revolution. Alsogaray
referred to the Peronist labor leaders acceptance of invitation to
Ongania’s swearing in.Elections in the Future. The plan of revolution and the present
intention is to solve the basic problems of the country so that it
can operate eventually as a viable democracy. It is hoped that in
time there will be created a democratic system of a limited number
of parties instead of the hundreds that existed before. However, the
government does not intend to fix a date or commit itself to a time
as to when elections will be held. This was mistake that was made
before since once a time is fixed the government cannot accomplish
anything; everybody becomes a politician. Besides problems in the
economic area are extremely difficult to resolve in a democracy.
However, there is no question about the intent of this government to
work for a democratic system. In fact, outside of the political,
none of the basic institutions of the country will be
modified.International Economic Policy. It is the intention of the
government to move toward a free enterprise system. (Instead of
elaborating on this, Alsogaray referred to our
conversation in March, stating that I was fully cognizant with his
theories and that these would all obtain in the new government.) The
oil contracts problem will be resolved; Argentina will sign
investment guarantee agreement. The exchange rate will be freed but
not immediately. Ongania determined to proceed carefully. This was
not a problem that could be resolved today. Many factors had to be
taken into consideration. He, Alsogaray, will
be given the job of coordinating all international economic
relations, working with the Minister of Economy and the Foreign
Ministry. He has already had conferences with the new Minister of
Economy and after similar conferences with the Foreign Minister and
President, he will take off on a quick review of the situation in
Western Europe and the U.S. Come September he will start the
negotiations on behalf of his government.International Relations. Argentina will be a close partner of the
U.S. on all questions involving free world and hemisphere. There
will be no hesitance on part of Argentina in joining the U.S. in the
solution of hemispheric problems. There will be no holding back as
in the case of the
Dominican Republic. However, as to Vietnam, Argentina will not send
troops to assist the South Vietnamese. If there is any action in
this sphere by the UN or other
international body, Argentina will support the U.S.In outlining these policies Alsogaray made
clear that though he was speaking with intimate knowledge of the
previous plans of the revolution and the present thinking, he could
not make any authoritative statements. He did say that the
government would be issuing public statements on these matters and
that they would be coming out probably next week or the week after.
I asked him specifically about whether a statement would be made on
the subject of future elections. He wasn’t sure of this but he
assured me that he was reporting correctly the thinking of the new
government. On foreign policy, para 4 above, he referred to his
conversation with Ongania yesterday as authority for his statements.
One reason he gives for the delay in making public statements on
policy was that the revolution was planned for later in the year.
With a smile he said that they had to respond to the counter golpe
of the government.I do not intend to pursue suggested talk with FonMin Costa Mendez unless he
persists, knowing that I have already talked to the
Alsogarays. Regardless of their views, I
believe latter have been frank and sincere. Do not think it wise to
appear to be checking their statements unless Department feels it
would be valuable to get a more “official” statement on future
elections. Not likely that I will be successful or that it will be
useful in view of the nature of their justification.After this meeting Saccio recommended recognition of the new
government by July 9, the national holiday and sesquicentennial
of Argentina’s independence. “Delay beyond July 9,” he
explained, “runs risk of damaging long-term U.S. interests with
respect to Argentina, since it starts to build up
incomprehension and resentment.” (Telegram 62 from Buenos Aires,
July 5, 2331Z; ibid.) The Department replied that recognition by
July 9 would be impossible without a declaration of the regime’s
democratic intentions. A public statement by an authorized
spokesman that was similar to the private assurances of
Alvaro Alsogaray
could provide the basis for immediate consultation, possibly
resulting in recognition by July 9. (Telegram 1872 to Buenos
Aires, July 6; ibid.)Saccio
139. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson in
TexasSource: Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Argentina, Vol. II,
9/64–3/67. Secret. According to an attached note, the telegram was
originally a memorandum drafted by Bowdler and revised by Bromley Smith. President
Johnson was at his ranch in Texas June
30–July 11. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary)Washington, July 7, 1966, 5:48 p.m.
CAP 66481. Subject: Argentine Recognition. Acting Secretary Ball requests
standby authorization to recognize the Ongania government.Reference is to a memorandum from Ball to the President, July 7,
attached but not printed.
The classical criteria for recognition (i.e., general control of the
country and pledge to honor international obligations) have been met. We
are still awaiting public affirmation of the OAS criteria: respect for human rights, peaceful settlement
of disputes, and eventual return to constitutional government.
Secretary Ball would use the
standby authorization this way: If the government makes a public statement on the OAS criteria prior to July 9, we
would recognize promptly.If the statement is not forthcoming, we would delay
recognition for several more days after July 9.
Our Embassy in Buenos Aires is now in contact with the new Foreign
Minister through a trusted intermediary.The
Embassy reported on the initial use of this channel in telegrams 79
and 80 from Buenos Aires, July 6. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARG–US) We relayed our
desire for an affirmative public statement on the OAS criteria. He replied that he personally
has no difficulty with the criteria, except for the election criterion
which he believes can be handled by appropriate wording. (We would not
stick on the establishment of an early date for elections.) He is trying
to get President Ongania to make the statement before July 9.
Through the Chileans, Colombians, Peruvians, and Uruguayans we are
seeking to bring additional pressure on Ongania for an early
statement.
I recommend that you grant the standby authorization in the understanding
that I will call you before recognition is extended to: Report on the nature of the Argentine statement.Obtain your approval of our announcement of recognition.There is no indication on the
telegram that the President approved this
recommendation.
140. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Argentina, Vol. II, 9/64–3/67.
Confidential. A copy was sent to Bill
Moyers. The memorandum was “sent by wire” to the
LBJ Ranch.Washington, July 9, 1966.
SUBJECT
Argentine Situation
The Ongania Government is not expected to make a helpful public statement
over the weekend on respect for human rights, peaceful settlement of
border disputes and eventual elections.
The Argentine Foreign Minister late yesterday sent word to the Embassy
that —the question of elections is difficult and requires careful
study and precise definition.—there is no problem on human rights and peaceful settlement
and this will be made clear “in forthcoming actions and
statements” (no time indicated).—he fully understands that the U.S. is not laying down
conditions for recognition.—he regrets that our suggestion for a public statement now
could not be adopted.As reported in
telegram 125 from Buenos Aires, July 8. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
POL 15 ARG)
In the balance of a public statement, we will put off recognition until
sometime next week. More than half of the Latin American countries are
with us in holding up on recognition. Those who have recognized are:
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay.
WGBBowdler initialed the
memorandum for Rostow.
141. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President JohnsonSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 16 ARG. Confidential. Drafted by
Sayre and cleared by
Krieg. Original forwarded
as an attachment to a memorandum from Rostow to
the President, July 13. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Argentina, Vol. II, 9/64–2/67)Washington, July 12, 1966.
SUBJECT
Recognition of the Argentine Government
Recommendations:
That you approve the enclosed telegram which would authorize our
Chargé in Buenos Aires to deliver a note to the Argentine Government
at noon on July 14, which would constitute an act of
recognition.Attached but not
printed. The instructions were eventually sent as telegram 2885
to Buenos Aires, July 14. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 16 ARG)That you also approve the text of a proposed press release,
herewith enclosed.Attached but not
printed. For text of the press release, see Department of State
Bulletin, August 1, 1966, p. 184. The
President approved both recommendations. A note attached to this
memorandum explains, however, that recognition had to be
rescheduled due to an apparent delay in the bureaucratic
process. The Department subsequently authorized delivery of the
official note of recognition for July 15 at noon. (Telegram 7529
to Buenos Aires, July 14; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 16 ARG)
Background:
The Argentine military overthrew the Illia Government on June 28. Subsequently, General
Juan Carlos Onganía, former
Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Army, was sworn in as President.
We have been consulting with the Latin Americans since the overthrow of
the Illia Government under
Resolution XXVI which was approved at the Rio Conference in November
1965. We also indicated informally to the Argentine authorities that
public statements on the points contained in Resolution XXVI, plus a
commitment on peaceful settlement of disputes, would facilitate
recognition by the United States. We added the point on peaceful
settlement after the Chileans expressed concern to us over Argentine
statements which the Chileans interpreted as forecasting trouble between
Argentina and Chile on their boundary disputes.
In the note from the Argentines requesting recognition they explicitly
stated their intention to respect their international obligations. A
speech by General Ongania on
July 9Attached but not printed. The Embassy
also forwarded excerpts of the speech in telegram 143 from Buenos
Aires, July 11. (Ibid., POL 15
ARG) has statements in it which apparently were intended to
respond to our concern about respect for human rights (Paragraph 2b of
Resolution XXVI) and about pacific settlement of disputes. Chile had
recognized the Ongania Government on July 8.
The significant omission is any statement on elections. Argentine
authorities have indicated to the Brazilians and us that it would be
very difficult at this time to make any definite statement on return to
constitutional democracy. However, Martinez Paz, the new Minister of the
Interior, told the press on July 9 that the Government would stay in
power as long as necessary to create a climate conducive to the exercise
of representative democracy.
Mr. Gordon discussed the
recognition problem on July 8 with Senators Fulbright and Morse. The
former felt we should be in no hurry to recognize; the latter made no
comment but his public statement on the Military Assistance Program
Bill suggests that he will
again charge the Administration with “walking out on democracy” if we do
recognize. Mr. Sayre has
discussed it with Senator Hickenlooper and Congressman Selden. He also
briefed Boyd Crawford, Chief of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Staff, who stated he would inform Dr. Morgan. All three felt that we had no other choice but
to recognize the new government. With the exception of Senator Morse all
of them expressed reservations on resumption of economic and military
assistance. Senator Hickenlooper went further and questioned whether we
should carry out any commitments we have made on economic and military
assistance to Argentina until Argentina fulfills its contractual
obligations; for example, the oil problem.
Eight Latin American countries have already recognized the Argentine
Government (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Haiti, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and
Uruguay). With the exception of Venezuela and, just possibly, Colombia,
the other Latin American countries are awaiting our decision and will
probably recognize at about the same time. Japan, Spain and all of the
NATO countries have recognized.
We have traditionally tried to maintain diplomatic relations with all of
the members of the OAS. We also give
considerable weight to the views of the Latins. In addition, the United
States has important interests in Argentina and Argentina is one of the
major countries in the OAS system. We
cannot exercise any significant influence in Argentina unless we
maintain relations with the authorities.
Dean Rusk
142. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in ArgentinaSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARG–US. Confidential. Repeated to
USCINCSO. Drafted by Krieg;
cleared by Pringle, Sternfeld, Salans, Gaud,
Lang, and Sayre; and approved by
Gordon.Washington, July 21, 1966, 7:12 p.m.
12800. Ref: Buenos Aires 219.The Embassy
submitted its recommendations for U.S. policy once diplomatic
relations were restored in telegram 100 from Buenos Aires, July 8.
Telegram 219 from Buenos Aires, July 18, requested the Department’s
comments. (Both ibid.)
U.S. policy toward Argentina for balance of 1966 will be to
observe plans, policies, and executive skill of new government with
view to developing longer range policy early in 1967 in light of
experience accumulated in interim period.Attitude toward GOA should be
friendly but reserved. We wish Argentine people well and want to
further economic and social development in line with principles of
Alliance for Progress, but are not yet certain to what extent
policies of new government will make our collaboration possible or
what form new GOA may want
assistance to take. We expect new authorities may need some time to
familiarize themselves with their work and develop own ideas
regarding our existing programs.U.S. will observe its commitments to Argentina, in accordance
normal international practice and international law. Commitments
made with Argentina prior to the change of government must still be
considered in effect, unless Congress approves amendments now
pending to Foreign Assistance Act which would require termination of
assistance.Reference is to several
proposals to modify the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, in
particular, an amendment offered by Senator Jacob K. Javits
(R–New York), that would suspend assistance to any member of the
OAS that “came into power by
the unconstitutional overthrow of a freely elected,
constitutional, democratic government.” (Telegram 6406 to Buenos
Aires, July 13; ibid., POL 16
ARG) Although the administration eventually defeated the
proposal, Congress adopted an amendment sponsored by Senator
J. William Fulbright
(D–Arkansas) that set a ceiling of $85 million per fiscal year
for military assistance and sales to Latin America, not
including support for military training or the Inter-American
Peace Force in the Dominican Republic. (80 Stat. 803)
A. Economic Assistance
AID projects which are already under
way pursuant to existing agreements should be continued unless the
new authorities object. If in any instance Embassy/USAID believes any programs we have
agreed to carry out should be suspended, reduced or altered,
Department should be notified promptly with reasons.Initiation of new projects during interim period is not
contemplated. Department does not desire to encourage discussion of
possible new projects during the interim period and suggests that
any proposals from the GOA be heard
without commitment.In an intermediate area between firm commitments and new
undertakings lie those projects which have been under intensive
discussion during recent months but which have either lapsed or on
which agreements have not been perfected. Grain storage project and
Central Housing Bank project fall in this category. In these cases,
Embassy/ USAID should await
Argentine initiatives and report them with recommendations to
Department–AID/W.
B. Military Assistance
Deliveries where there are contractual obligations will be
observed. Until Congress acts on foreign aid legislation, we plan to
hold deliveries on approved and funded grant program even though
Argentines may have already been informed of them. Our present
disposition (assuming satisfactory outcome on foreign aid
legislation) would be to proceed with items such as spare parts, but
continue withhold delivery on major end items such as armored
personnel carriers until we can (a) assess fully US Congressional
and public opinion on military assistance and (b) review five-year
grant credit program. Country Team members should not convey
foregoing policy to Argentine authorities but limit their comments
on requests for military assistance to stating (a) Congress is now
considering foreign aid legislation, and (b) requests will be
referred to Washington for consideration and decision.Training programs including MMTs
and normal MILGP personnel
movements should proceed according to plan.Visits of General or Flag rank officers not assigned to Argentina
should be deferred if possible. Suggest prior referral to
State/Defense for decision in each case.Department is aware foregoing does not cover all contingencies but
desires supply requested interim guidance. Washington agencies
studying assistance programs further and would appreciate your
raising such additional policy questions as you deem
pertinent.DOD implementing instructions re
training and rotation MILGP
personnel to be issued promptly. Will be followed shortly by
instructions on contractual obligations.Rusk
143. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARG–US. Confidential. Drafted by
Van Reigersberg and
approved in S on August 4. The time of
the meeting is from the Secretary’s Appointment Book. (Johnson
Library) A brief account of the meeting was forwarded to the Embassy
on August 1 in telegram 19146. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL ARG)Washington, July 30, 1966, 10:30
a.m.
PARTICIPANTS
The SecretaryDr. Alvaro Alsogaray,
Ambassador-at-Large of ArgentinaMr. Carlos A. Quesada Zapiola, Argentine Chargé d’AffairesMr. Angel R. Caram, Argentine Financial CounselorARA—Assistant Secretary
GordonLS—Mr. F. A. VanReigersberg
Mr. Alsogaray opened the meeting by repeating the
reasons for the recent Argentine revolution which he had already given
to Mr. Gordon in a previous
meeting,Gordon met
Alsogaray on July 28; a memorandum of the
conversation is ibid., POL 23–9
ARG. stressing that the two immediate causes were the rapid
deterioration of the Argentine economy and its move towards socialism as
well as the imminent threat of a Peronista victory at the polls. He
added that while no one had wanted the revolution, it had become
inevitable since the Argentine people are as afraid of a Peronista
return as the German people would be of a return of Hitler. He then
explained the objectives of the revolution, which in the political field
would be to re-establish the bases for representative democracy
(although the date for a “return to democracy” could not yet be
announced in order to avoid renewed plotting on the part of politicians)
and the transformation of the present “semi-collective system” into a
free enterprise system. The Argentine revolution is only beginning its
work but its leaders are optimistic as to its future because Argentine
labor and even the Peronistas have not come out against it yet.
Nevertheless, the Ongania Administration expects to face some
difficulties in the future as stern economic measures and
anti-inflationary policies are adopted. He described the external debt
situation as good and pointed to the internal budgetary deficit as one
of the main economic problems which the new administration wants to
tackle from the outset. The scandalous situation of the national
railroads will be the first item of business which the Government will
face since “100,000 men cannot be allowed to paralyze a country of 22
million.” In the field of petroleum, the Government will allow both
domestic and foreign companies
to explore the Argentine subsoil although no general law will be passed
to cover all such companies and the activities of each foreign company
will be regulated on a case by case basis. Furthermore, the new
administration is prepared to go ahead with the last stages of the
negotiations leading up to an investment guaranty agreement with the
United States which should attract foreign investors.
The Secretary stated that he was well aware of the importance of
Argentina in the world today and what happened in Argentina had a
bearing on every other country in this hemisphere. He indicated that the
U.S. Government regretted the steps that had to be taken in Argentina a
few weeks ago since it had hoped that the Argentine military and
civilian authorities would have been able to work out their differences
without the necessity of a coup. Nevertheless, it was important to look
towards the future and not allow this disappointment to color relations
between the countries. He noted that one positive element resulting from
the coup was the respect for General Ongania’s personal qualities in most of the Latin
American countries and the United States, and he could only express the
hope that the General would act on the basis of those qualities and that
his colleagues would permit him to do so. He stated that Ambassador
Martin would return to Buenos
Aires in two weeks and that he would keep in close touch with the
Argentine Government, trying to repair some of the damage that had been
done and to work constructively with a view toward the future. With
regard to the philosophy of private enterprise, the Secretary indicated
that while the United States firmly believes in it, he hoped that
Argentina would fully consider the changing role of private enterprise
both in this country and in Western Europe. He deplored the fact that in
a number of countries private enterprise had not caught up with the 20th
Century, noting that in the United States, for instance, the “robber
barons” of the 19th Century had been superceded by the socially aware
businessmen of the 20th Century with a strong sense of public
responsibility. He expressed the hope that Argentina would move in the
direction of modern capitalism. The Secretary also noted that American
businessmen are constantly being told that the U.S. Government expects
them to uphold the same standards of public responsibility abroad as in
this country.
Mr. Alsogaray stated that he was well aware of the
need for a greater sense of public responsibility on the part of
Argentine businessmen and indicated that the present Argentine
administration wants to model the country’s economy on the basis of the
European version of enlightened capitalism, which he described as a
“socially aware market economy.”
The Secretary stated that recent events in Argentina have affected the
lives of every country in this hemisphere. He stated that the United States therefore has a problem
now which it did not have two months ago and that a number of Senators
and U.S. organizations had attacked the U.S. Government because of its
recognition of the Ongania
administration. He expressed the hope that Argentina would keep in mind
that other hemispheric countries have problems of their own and that it
would follow a policy of moderation and restraint, especially in the
OAS. He added that the next MFM had become a “problem” although the
United States would have preferred that it had not become a problem and
that now it was up to Argentina to show understanding for the position
of its sister republics. The Secretary stated that Argentina could adopt
one of two alternatives with regard to the next MFM. Firstly, it could decide that the site of the meeting
was a nonnegotiable issue and therefore disregard the wishes of other
countries, or else it could take the initiative and by so doing increase
the prestige of its government all over the hemisphere by indicating
that it is willing to accept a solution that would receive the backing
of the majority of the hemispheric countries.
Ambassador Alsogaray stated that in his meeting with
Mr. Gordon he had discussed this
problem at length and that he was well aware of domestic problems both
in the U.S. and in other hemispheric countries. He said that he would
get in touch with his Foreign Minister and with General Ongania right away and that he would
explain the situation to them and advise them to refrain from adopting a
tough line on hemispheric matters. He insisted, however, that it would
not be easy for the Government to explain any softening of its attitude
to the Argentine people. Ambassador Alsogaray then
referred to the matter of economic relations and stated that a number of
organizations in Washington were awaiting instructions from the State
Department to go ahead with their studies of assistance programs for
Argentina which had been paralyzed for some time. He asked the Secretary
to intercede on his country’s behalf so that even though decisions might
not be taken, the examination and study of these problems might continue
in order to avoid any delays or slow-downs.
The Secretary stated that Mr. Gordon would look into the matter. In response to a
question from Mr. Gordon,
Ambassador Alsogaray stated that Argentina was in
favor of stepping up the process of Latin American economic integration
although the present administration had not devised any new policies on
the matter. He knew that General Ongania and Economics Minister Salimei supported
integration, both on a hemispheric and on a bilateral basis, especially
with Brazil and Chile, and that they were also interested in reducing
tariffs.
The Secretary stated that there was one additional item he wanted to
bring up to which increasing attention will have to be given in the next
months and that was the matter of the worldwide food situation in the next 10 years. He
stated that all food-producing countries will be facing growing markets
over the next decade and that purchasing countries will face increasing
difficulties both in increasing their domestic production and in paying
for food imports. Therefore there is a great need for increasing
efficiency on the part of the producing countries and for offering food
to potential buyers under terms which they can meet. He added that
Argentina, the United States, Canada and Western Europe may also have to
find a way to set up food and fertilizer reserves in the case of future
emergencies. He indicated that in spite of an increasing production of
wheat in the United States, our present reserves were somewhat below
what was considered a prudent level. Therefore the matter would have to
be given increased international attention in the next months and years
and there might be a need for looking at the situation both on a
worldwide and on a hemispheric level.
144. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Gordon) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files, 1967: Lot 70 D 150,
Argentina, 1967. Confidential. No drafting information appears on
the memorandum. Also sent to Katzenbach. A notation indicates that Rusk saw the memorandum.Washington, February 6, 1967.
SUBJECT
Military Assistance to Argentina
When the United States resumed relations with the Argentine Government on
July 15, 1966, it was decided that the United States would carry out
existing commitments. We resumed disbursements on existing AID loans, but have entered into no new
ones.
We are applying the same standards on loans through the Eximbank, IBRD, and IDB as we would
on any other Latin American countries.
We have not as yet resumed military assistance. It was decided in June
1966 that we would not do so for at least six months, and then only
after a full review of our relations. As you know, Ambassador Martin was here in January and Defense
and State reviewed the military assistance issue in detail.Memoranda to Gordon from Dungan, Martin, and Sayre, January 12, 12, and 19, respectively,
debating whether to resume military assistance to Argentina, are
ibid.
In summary we agreed: The FY 1966 grant program
should be carried out as it had been agreed with Argentina
before the coup. The program includes armored personnel
carriers.The FY 1967 grant program
should be carried out but with a substantial reduction which is
more than proportional to the cut taken by most other Latin
American countries. Controversial items such as armored
personnel carriers were shifted from grant to sale. Other major
items of a non-controversial nature such as C–130 cargo aircraft
would be provided on a credit or cash basis.Tanks which Argentina sought to purchase before the coup would
not be provided on any basis.Two destroyers authorized by the Congress would be loaned or
sold to Argentina.In telegram
134762 to Buenos Aires, February 10, the Department informed
the Embassy of these decisions. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF
19–8 US–ARG) According to a note attached to this
memorandum, Rusk
approved the telegram without reading it.
I have consulted with the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Latin
America which raised no significant objections to the proposed course of
action. I talked to Senator Javits who said he understood our position,
but could not modify his own position as reflected in the Javits
Amendment. Mr. Sayre and I have
talked to Carl Marcy and Pat Holt,Carl
Marcy, chief of staff, and Pat Holt, staff member, of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. respectively, but my several
efforts to agree on a time for consultation with the Morse SubcommitteeSenator Wayne
Morse (D–Oregon), was chairman of the Subcommittee on
American Republics Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. have been unsuccessful. Pat Holt informs me that
it would not be possible to arrange for consultation before the end of
February given the absence of Committee members in Mexico until February
15 and my absence at the Buenos Aires meetings. I believe that we should
now proceed on the FY 1966 and FY 1967 programs.
As you are aware, our future policy on military assistance to Argentina
and Latin America in general is under review.
145. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in ArgentinaSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1
US/Johnson. Confidential; Priority. Drafted
by Barnes and Dreyfuss on April 18, cleared by
Solomon and
Rostow, and approved by Sayre.Washington, April 28, 1967, 11:46
a.m.
184026. 1. Following is Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents
Johnson and Onganía, at the San Rafael Hotel, Punta del Este, April
13, 1967 at 6:30 p.m. Present at the meeting were: President
Johnson, Mr. Walt
W. Rostow, and Assistant Secretary Solomon for the United States; and
President Onganía, Foreign
Minister Costa Mendez and two
unidentified persons for Argentina.According to the President’s Daily Diary the meeting lasted from 6
to 7 p.m.; one of the “unidentified” participants was the Minister
of Trade and Industry, Angel A. Solá. (Johnson Library)
2. Argentina’s Political Situation
President Onganía apologized for
monopolizing the conversation, but said that it was important for
President Johnson to get a panoramic view of
Argentina’s situation from the lips of the Argentine President.
3. President Onganía said that
after the experience of two decades of difficulties, it had become
necessary for his country to undertake what he called the “Argentine
Revolution”. The Argentine Revolution called for the elimination of
political parties, within the framework of a democratic system. As proof
of the existence of a democratic system in Argentina, he could mention
freedom of the press and freedom for the individual. For example, there
was a better application of justice at the present time than before June
28, 1966. In addition, there was no state of siege, and there had been
nothing but peace and tranquility in his country during the ten months
of his government.
4. President Onganía went on to
say that the main problem that Argentina faced was the existence of an
archaic governmental structure which has the task of governing a modern
country. This archaic governmental structure had proved to be unable to
utilize the human resources of the country as they should be used. In
his conception, the function of the government was to provide guidance
and supervision to the individual and to private enterprise so that the
latter could go about the process of developing the country. He added
that he was convinced that Argentina’s main problem is political and not
economic.
5. President Onganía went on to
say that in the first stage of the Argentine revolution it would be
necessary to systematize the government’s machinery. The second stage
called for a reorganization of
the entire community, including its material, spiritual, and
intellectual values, so that Argentina could become what it should
be.
6. Argentina’s Economic Situation
President Onganía said that his
government had taken a series of important steps in the economic field,
with a view to reducing inflation, which was growing at a 30% per year
rate. These steps required the business and labor sectors to contain
their aspirations, but were necessary to reduce the rate of inflation
which was strangling the nation’s economy.
7. President Onganía said that
his government, by making adjustments in the current budget, had reduced
the projected deficit from $1 billion to $400 million. One of the items
that had been taking up a large share of the budget was government-owned
enterprises, especially railroads. His government planned to establish a
higher degree of rationality in the management of these enterprises, and
eventually to shift surplus personnel to more productive sectors. This
same process would be applied to government personnel.
8. President Onganía said that
there is one area in which the economy as a whole could be reactivated,
and that is housing, as there was a deficit of 1,500,000 units in his
country. In this endeavor, Argentina would need outside assistance.
9. President Onganía also said
that Argentina wants to increase its exports, especially in
non-traditional goods. He added that this does not mean neglect of beef
exports, since his country had built up its reserves of beef cattle, and
is now ready to go into the world market again. In that connection,
Argentina is worried about the lack of progress on a world meat
agreement in the Kennedy Round, although it had been assured of the
support of the United States in this connection. President
Johnson at this point observed that the Kennedy
Round meat group discussions were not
promising.
10. President Onganía said that
his country is putting to good use the IDB loan for agriculture, and that he is convinced of the
need of bringing the benefits of technology, specifically electricity,
to the rural areas.
11. Of equal importance to the problem of housing is the need to begin
the Chocon-Cerro Colorado project, which is a multi-faceted development
effort.
12. President Johnson said that he and his
government were impressed with the economic steps that had been taken in
Argentina under President Onganía’s direction and that he was a great supporter of
rural electrification.
13. Arms
President Johnson said that it is important that the
Latin American countries not embark on an arms race, and that he hoped
that President Onganía would provide leadership to
the rest of Latin America in this matter.
14. President Onganía replied
that his country does not aspire to have large weapons, rockets, or
anything like that, but that at the present time the Argentine Armed
Forces do not even have a minimum level of equipment. He said that it is
important that the military vocation of the Latin American countries not
be twisted, and that the Armed Forces of the Latin countries should not
become mere national police forces.
15. Summit Conference
President Johnson said that he hoped that President
Onganía would make a clear
statement on the success of the Summit Conference, to counterbalance the
effect that the statements of the Ecuadorean President might have on the
American public and Congress.See Document 51.
Rusk
146. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on December 7.NIE 91–67Washington, December 7, 1967.
ARGENTINA
The Problem
To consider the nature of Argentina’s basic problems, the character and
actions of the Onganía
administration, and the prospects for significant economic and political
progress over the next four or five years.
Conclusions
President Onganía is bent
on retaining power as long as necessary to revive the country’s
economy and, when that is accomplished, to tackle its political maladies. The
government has given priority to a sustained attack on the most
serious economic aberrations; it has meanwhile suspended politics as
usual, ordered all the political parties dissolved, and put off
indefinitely any attempt to come to grips with the country’s most
divisive political problem—Peronism.Onganía’s administration
has, for the most part, avoided repressive actions, and, in the
conduct of its business, it appears more civilian than military.
Most Argentines, though not enthusiastic about him, seem quite
willing to wait and see how his government performs. We believe that
Onganía will continue
to hold power over the next year or so.The administration has initiated a complex economic program
designed to achieve both financial stabilization and economic
development. It has sharply reduced the power of organized labor and
has taken positive action to reduce budget deficits, increase
production, and control inflation. These measures have attracted
considerable official and private financial and technical support
from abroad. Over the next year or two we look for additional
progress in budgetary reforms, in stabilization measures, and in
some aspects of development.Over the longer run—the next four or five years—we doubt that the
regime can continue to keep Argentine political problems on the
shelf. We think Onganía
will have great difficulty in holding cohesive civilian support
behind his program, and as time passes his military backing is
likely to become less solid. These factors will complicate any
attempts by Onganía to come
to grips with the Peronist problem. Further, we do not believe that
even over this longer period of time Argentina will establish a
representative system of government capable of reaching a consensus
on policies and tactics for dealing with its social and economic
problems.We believe, nonetheless, that the government will make
considerable progress in reducing the impact of fluctuating harvests
and commodity prices on annual growth rates. Broader economic
success, however, will depend on the government’s ability to
maintain continuity in its policies and to retain public confidence
in their durability over a number of years. We believe that the
government’s chances of remaining in power over this longer run are
considerably better than even, but we are less confident that it
will be able to adhere firmly to a successful economic
policy.Onganía’s anti-Communist
leanings will continue to be a force for close cooperation with the
US. Among the issues which could adversely affect US-Argentine
relations would be a refusal by the US to carry out what the
Argentine military establishment regards as a commitment to assist
in the modernization of its armed forces.
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]
Bolivia
147. Editorial Note
Covert financial assistance was a key element of U.S. foreign policy
toward Bolivia during the Johnson Presidency.
CIA documents have characterized the
overall goals of the U.S. Government’s covert action programs in Bolivia
during this period as follows:
“The basic covert action goals in Bolivia are to foster
democratic solutions to critical and social, economic, and
political problems; to check Communist and Cuban subversion; to
encourage a stable government favorably inclined toward the
United States; and to encourage Bolivian participation in the
Alliance for Progress. The main direction and emphasis of
C[overt] A[ction] operations is to force Communists, leftists,
and pro-Castroites out of influential positions in government,
and to try to break Communist and ultra-leftist control over
certain trade union, student groups, and campesino
organizations.”
Covert action expenditures in Bolivia between fiscal year 1963 and fiscal
year 1965 were as follows: FY
63—$337,063; FY 64—$545,342; and FY
65—$287,978. The figure for FY 65
included funds to influence the campesino movement, for propaganda, to
support labor organizations, and to support youth and student groups.
The FY 66 program also allocated funds to
support moderate political groups and individuals backing General
Barrientos for President.
When he took office in November 1963 President
Johnson inherited a longstanding U.S.
Government policy of providing financial support for Bolivian political
leaders. The policy was intended to promote stability in Bolivia by
strengthening moderate forces, especially within the National
Revolutionary Movement (MNR) itself,
which had a strong left wing under the leadership of Juan Lechin Oquendo, General Secretary
of the Mine Workers’ Federation.
In August 1963 the 5412 Special Group approved a covert subsidy to assist
the MNR to prepare for the presidential
elections scheduled for May 1964. The Special Group agreed in March 1964
that the MNR receive additional
financial support. Paz won the
election; Lechin (who had been Vice President under Paz) left the government and founded a
rival leftist party.
On November 4, 1964, the new Vice President, General René Barrientos Ortuño (MNR), led a successful military coup
d’etat, forcing Paz into exile.
In February 1965 the 303 Committee authorized a financial subsidy to the
MNR under Barrientos (who was aware
of U.S. financial support to the MNR) to
help establish an organizational base for the presidential election
scheduled for September. In May 1965 Barrientos responded to growing labor unrest by arresting and
deporting Lechin and postponing the election. The 303 Committee, which
considered a recommendation to support Barrientos as the best available
candidate, agreed in July 1965 and March 1966 to authorize additional
funds for MNR propaganda and political
action in support of the ruling Junta’s plans to pacify the country and
hold elections to establish a civilian, constitutional government.
When the presidential election was finally held in July 1966, Barrientos
won easily, and officials concerned with the covert operation concluded
that the objectives of the program—the end of military rule and a
civilian, constitutional government whose policies would be compatible
with those of the United States—had been accomplished.
148. Memorandum Prepared for the Special GroupSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special
Group Meetings, S.G.114, March 12, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only.Washington, March 10, 1964.
SUBJECT
Increase of Subsidy Provided to the Bolivian Government to support
its CovertAction Projects designed to break the power of the National
RevolutionaryMovement of the left (MNRI) and
the Communist Party of Bolivia (PCB)
REFERENCE
Special Group action taken on 8 August 1963Background: On 8 August 1963, the Special
Group approved a request to provide a covert subsidy in the amount
of [1 line of source text not declassified]
to take the necessary covert actions to overcome the emergency
situation which existed in Bolivia at that time and, once the
situation normalized, to enable Paz to consolidate his control. In late December,
the United States Ambassador and the CIA [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] requested an additional sum of [2 lines of source text not declassified] to
wrest control of labor organizations away from Juan Lechin Oquendo, the MNRI, and the PCB. On 8
January 1964, the CIA [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] discussed the request for additional funds
with Assistant Secretary Edwin W. Martin,As of January 3 Thomas Mann was Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs. and it was mutually agreed that
an increase in the subsidy was justified.A discussion of this plan is contained in a
January 9 memorandum prepared by J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere
Division in CIA (DDP). (Central Intelligence Agency,
Job 80–01690R, Directorate of Operations, Latin America
Division, WH/1/Bolivia, [file name not
declassified]) The United States Ambassador was
informed that Special Group approval would be requested at the
earliest possible date.Accomplishments: The first [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] provided [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] the following major
accomplishments: Eliminate Communist control over the National Campesino
Federation.Meet the necessary expenses in connection with the
establishment of the new anti-left Confederation of Bolivian
Workers (COB).Provide support to democratic elements in an effort to
unseat extremist leaders in the teachers, chauffeurs, and
printers unions.Break the power of the Communists over the Railroad
Confederation and subsequent congresses of the flour,
construction, and factory workers unions.Recommendation: That the Special Group
approve an increase [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] to the authorized subsidy being
provided to the Bolivian Government. The requested funds are
available within [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] authorized budget.The recommendation was endorsed by Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas C. Mann, on March 10.
(Department of State, INR/IL
Historical Files, 5412 Special Group Meetings) According to
minutes of the March 12 meeting, the Special Group approved the
recommendation. (Ibid., Bolivia, 1962–1980)
149. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of
State (Read) to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. I, Memoranda, December
1963–July 1964. Secret. According to a State Department copy, this
memorandum was drafted by Nicholas V. McCausland (ARA), cleared by Henry E. Mattox
(INR) and Allen D. Gordon
(AID), and approved by Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Inter-American Affairs Robert W. Adams. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 BOL)Washington, May 28, 1964.
SUBJECT
The May 31 Elections in Bolivia
Government Party in Transition
When President Paz decided that it
was time for the Bolivian revolution to enter a new, “constructive,”
development phase, internal stresses in the governing National
Revolutionary Movement (MNR) which had
grown over the years since 1952 were intensified. These tensions were
brought to the breaking point late last year by United States pressure
on the Government to carry out reforms in the state-owned tin mines,
since these reforms tended to undercut the power base of leftist Vice
President Lechin, his followers in the MNR, and the Communists who support him.In particular, the United States pressed for better
financial management of the Bolivian tin mines. The issue was
discussed in a meeting between President Kennedy and President Paz on October 23, 1963; see Foreign
Relations, 1961–1963, American Republics and Cuba,
Microfiche Supplement. The result was Lechin’s
expulsion from the MNR, and his own
candidacy against Paz for
election to the Presidency on May 31.
In April, former President Siles (1956–1960) returned from his
ambassadorial post in Spain to reenter politics as a champion of party
unity (presumably under his leadership). He advocates the return of
Lechin and other splinter elements to the MNR. Paz has
resisted this, and so far opposition groups have been unable to unite
against him.
Military Appear Loyal to Paz
Former Air Force Chief Rene Barrientos is Paz’ vice presidential running mate. He was involved in
a plot to overthrow Paz earlier
this month but now seems to
have abandoned his anti-Paz
activities.Information on Barrientos’
role in the alleged coup plot is in telegrams 575 to La Paz, May 4;
1515 from La Paz, May 16; and 1547 from La Paz, May 25. (All ibid.)
On May 15 Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Fox, Jr., the Air Attaché in
La Paz, met with Barrientos at the Bolivian’s request to discuss
relations with Paz. Fox told
Barrientos to “use his head for something other than a hat rack. He
[Barrientos] agreed and stated that he would get with the program
and even though he would lose many Paz-haters, he would positively support Paz.” (Department of the Army cable
IN 293440, May 18; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 90–1156R,
Directorate for Operations, Latin America Division, [file name not declassified])Paz believes the military high
command is loyal and able to control sporadic violence by the opposition
as well as any further attempts by Barrientos or Siles to use middle and
junior grade officers to advance their personal ambitions. President
Paz has declared that the
elections will be held on May 31 even though all of the opposition
parties which had presented presidential candidates have announced their
intention to abstain.
Implications for the United States
Negative Factors
Instability in the months following the elections is very likely. There
will be continuing resistance within the party and outside it to the
course Paz has set, especially to
his close association with the United States and the Alliance for
Progress. Lechin, Siles, and other opposition leaders will probably
continue to plot a coup d’etat since they do not believe the way to
power is open to them by constitutional means; and Paz’ decision to succeed himself poses
the question of personal as distinct from party dictatorship. If, on
election day, Paz is the only
candidate as now seems likely, the validity of his claim to a popular
mandate will be suspect.The Embassy in La
Paz reported Paz’s victory in
the Presidential election in telegram 1580, June 1. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
POL 14 BOL)
Positive Factors
Paz seems committed to Bolivia’s
economic and social development under the Alliance for Progress. Now
outside the government party, Lechin is in a less advantageous position
to obstruct Government efforts to rehabilitate the state-owned tin mines
and in other ways to strengthen Bolivia’s economy. Nevertheless,
Paz’ government inevitably
will have further clashes with the Lechin and Communist-led miners if it
is determined to carry out its rehabilitation program. If Paz is resolute, however, our aid
policy should begin to show dramatic results in the near future and forces of political
instability may be weakened.
Benjamin H. ReadPrinted from a copy that
indicates Grant G. Hilliker signed for Read above Read’s typed signature.
150. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National
Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source:
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol.
II, Memoranda, July–November, 1964. Secret.Washington, October 28, 1964.
SUBJECT
Bolivia
I talked briefly to Bill Dentzer, the Office Director for Bolivian/
Chilean Affairs, about the current goings-on in Bolivia. Here are some
points of interest.
Bill said that the present
disturbances can be characterized as a popular reaction to
repressive government. The students are a big factor in this
reaction.The Embassy reported on
the student demonstrations and their political implications in
telegram 426 from La Paz, October 24, suggesting that the
demonstrations were in part a response to the shooting of a
student in Cochabamba, and in part by the climate of political
agitation and discord between Paz and the military. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL–8 BOL) Much of the
leadership for the disturbances is coming from the Falangists (a
leftist but tolerable party) and the Communists.I asked Bill what the
disturbances could leave in their wake.A separate assessment of the political unrest in Bolivia, which
focused on the prospects for a military coup, is in an October
29 memorandum from Lieutenant General Alva R. Fitch, Deputy
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to Secretary of
Defense McNamara.
(Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 68A 306, Bolivia 000.1,
1964) He described the following alternatives:
Paz could stay
on. This looks like the most likely alternative;
Paz seems to
be keeping the support of the military.
Bill went on to
say that, while Paz is not particularly popular with the
people, they probably like him “best.” The people see no
clear alternative and, under Paz, they at least get less
instability.
The military could capitalize on the present disturbances
and take over the government. The leader of a military
government could be Barrientos, but it could also be
someone else; in this regard, it should be noted that
Barrientos is not all that popular with the
military.
Bill does not
regard a military takeover as highly likely; however, it
is in the ball park.
Paz could get killed
and there could be a state of anarchy for a while, followed
by some sort of coalition. Bill feels this is not a likely
alternative.
Bill said that
the possibility of a Communist takeover is nil. The
Communists do not have enough popular following or
acceptability. In addition, the military is violently
opposed to them.
Bill went on to
say that the main threat that the Communists pose is
that, in a state of instability or transition, other
parties will be looking around for support. In such a
situation, the Communists, while not being able to take
over the country, will be in a position to exert
significant influence.
The upshot seems to me to be that there is little likelihood of
something happening in Bolivia which we cannot live with. Given our
“druthers,” however, we would probably just as soon see the
disturbances end with Paz
still in the saddle.GC
151. Telegram From the Department of State
to All American Republic PostsSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 BOL. Secret; Priority. Drafted
by William L.S. Williams and Roger Brewin (ARA/BC) and approved by Adams. Also sent to Paris for
TOPOL.Washington, November 4, 1964, 21:22
p.m.
836. Subject: Bolivia. President Paz
Estenssoro has fled the country and arrived in Lima with
his family afternoon November 4. General Ovando Candia,
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, announced today the formation of
a military junta which he would head, but full junta has not been
named.A November 4 situation report
from Mann to the Special
Group (Counter-Insurgency) indicated that the coup began when
pro-Barrientos commanders of the Ingavi Regiment in La Paz rebelled
early on November 3. By late evening military garrisons in all major
cities except La Paz had joined the Barrientos cause. When the army
high command in the capital told Paz that the army would no longer support him in
office, the President fled. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA Files:
Lot 70 D 443, Political Affairs and Relations, 1964, POL 23, Internal Defense Plan)
General Suarez, Army Commander, announced he was a member. The situation
is extremely fluid, reports indicating the possibility that Vice
President Barrientos and Ovando
may vie for the leadership of the military government, possibly through
force.In a conversation with Bolivian
Ambassador EnriqueMann
expressed the view that “it was not at all clear who was in
control.” (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Central Files 1964–66,
POL 15 BOL) Reporting in
telegram 496 from La Paz, November 4, Henderson indicated that
“Ovando claim to
government has no color of constitutionality while Barrientos’
does,” and that Barrientos had referred to the Bolivian Government
as “his government.” Following a demonstration at the presidential
palace that day, Ovando
allowed Barrientos to assume leadership of the junta while he took
on the position of commander in chief of the armed forces. (Ibid.,
POL 23–9 BOL) There is
thus some uncertainty regarding the unity of the armed forces as well as
over the relationship of Communist-led miner militia to army units in
Oruro, leading mining center. The relationship of pro-Communist workers
in La Paz to the junta is also uncertain. Fighting between pro-Paz militia and the Army broke out
November 4, but has subsided. Sporadic rioting and sacking of buildings
continues, however. The military possess only a limited capacity to
preserve public order.Two separate reports
prepared on November 5, one by the Central Intelligence Agency ([text not declassified]), and one by the
Defense Intelligence Agency, provide details on the political
situation and prospects in Bolivia resulting from establishment of
the military junta. Both reports projected that the newly
established junta would maintain the pro-U.S. position of the
Paz government. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. II,
Memoranda, July–November 1964)
We are principally concerned by the extent of Communist power in the
country and the possibility that in the developing situation the
Communists may gain control of the government. Our overriding objectives
in the present situation, therefore, are to prevent the collapse of
authority, civil war and a Communist takeover, and to protect U.S. lives
and property. We have no present intention of recognizing any group
which may be contending for power, and would wish at appropriate time to
consult with other American governments this subject. We are, however,
endeavoring to maintain informal contact with the military leaders and Barrientos with a
view toward learning their intentions and the likely orientation of a
successor government.The Department
instructed the Embassy in La Paz to “take every appropriate action
to ensure continuation of a non-communist Barrientos government
during this interim period.” It stated that the Barrientos
government should be encouraged to consolidate and strengthen itself
by reaching a political truce with key non-Communist parties and
leaders in order to ensure a Lechin defeat in future elections,
which “should be scheduled for such time as Barrientos or other
non-communists are confident they can win.” (Telegram 267 to La Paz,
November 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 15
BOL)
In discussing the Bolivian situation with officials of other American
governments you may in your discretion say that the U.S. government
supported the constitutional government of Bolivia until it fell and
that just prior to his departure President Paz through his foreign minister conveyed to our
ambassador his thanks for the support and assistance we had given him
during recent crisis.
For Lima, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Rio de Janeiro,
Caracas: Embassies should make special effort brief appropriate
officials because situation might arise in which we would wish consult
on urgent basis on situation and attitude toward successor
government.
Rusk
152. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Harriman to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. III, Memoranda. December
1964–September 1965. No classification marking. The Department of
State copy indicates it was drafted by Brewin (ARA) on
December 2. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 16 BOL)
The following handwritten note is at the bottom of this memorandum:
“Mr. President: Rusk,
Mann, and I concur—the
plan is to deal with this in State Department—from press point of
view. McG.B.” Sayre
recommended the President concur in a December 3 covering memorandum
to Bundy. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. III, Memoranda,
December 1964–September 1965)Washington, December 3, 1964.
SUBJECT
Recognition of New Bolivian Government
Recommendation:
I recommend that the United States recognize the military junta headed by
General Barrientos as the government of Bolivia, and that our Embassy in
La Paz be instructed to acknowledge the junta’s note of November 7
requesting recognition.The President
approved the recommendation.
Background:
President Paz of Bolivia fled the
country on November 4 and a military junta headed by former Vice
President Rene Barrientos was installed on November 5. The new regime is
in control of the country, has encountered no resistance, has
reestablished constitutional liberties, and has reiterated its
intentions to hold elections. Barrientos and his principal advisers have
privately pledged that communist influence will be reduced and
eventually eliminated, and that they will not reestablish relations with
Cuba or Czechoslovakia. While the new government may not be able to
fulfill completely all of its assurances, unless we resume normal
relations with the Barrientos government, the possibilities for
communist influence and chaos increase. Congressional leaders have been
consulted and concur that recognition is desirable and U.S. performance
on existing aid commitments should be resumed. The AFL–CIO has been
reassured on labor rights by recent actions of the new government. The
Barrientos government has been recognized by seven countries in Latin
America, by most of the NATO powers,
and by others including India, Japan, Israel, and the Republic of
China.
W. Averell Harriman
153. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 CommitteeSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Special Files, January–June 1965. Secret; Eyes Only.Washington, January 29, 1965.
SUBJECT
Provide Support to [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] and the Popular Christian Movement
in Bolivia
1. Summary
It is proposed to provide in appropriate stages the total sum of [2 lines of source text not declassified].
Barrientos, due to his popularity and power position, appears to have
the best chance for organizing behind him a national consensus which
would provide the needed unity to proceed with the development of
Bolivia. [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] this sum of money will expedite and help other
negotiations currently being undertaken by the Embassy and the AID program. Barrientos has requested U.S.
Government help in his election campaign. [2 lines of
source text not declassified] The Embassy in La Paz, the
Department of State, and the CIA all
concur that in the present circumstances the best possibility for
stability in Bolivia is the ascendency to the Presidency of Barrientos
with a return to constitutionality. It is important that he have a
strong organizational base in order to bring in with him a Congress
which would be cooperative. This proposal has been fully coordinated
with and concurred in by Ambassador Henderson and Assistant Secretary Mann.Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Llewellyn E. Thompson concurred on
February 3, but according to a February 5 handwritten note by
Murat W. Williams (INR): “In approving this paper
Ambassador Thompson remarked
that he thought the whole question of this type of support in
elections should be reviewed on a general basis. A distinction must
be drawn between action to check communism and other activities in
internal political affairs.” (Memorandum from Mann to Thompson; ibid.) At a January 6 meeting of CIA and ARA officials Mann had suggested that, in response to a request
for financial aid, “Barrientos should be told we do not like to
intervene in an election of this nature, however if it were a
‘matter of Bolivian independence,’ we might do something.” Mann thought it was time for
Bolivia “to stand on its own feet.” (Memorandum from Carter to
Hughes, January 8; ibid.,
ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965) A message was sent to
La Paz apparently turning down Barrientos’ request for financial
aid, but with a proviso that the question could be reopened if
events made it necessary. (Draft message to La Paz with handwritten
note by Carter, January 14; ibid., Bolivia, 1962–1980)
2. Problem
To strengthen the organizational base of General Barrientos within
all sectors of the population through aid to his newly organized
political vehicle—the Popular Christian Movement. This movement will
be used to make inroads into the crucial areas where the communists
and leftist followers of Juan
Lechin are strongest, thus undercutting their natural
support.To indicate to General Barrientos that the U.S. government is in
support of him personally and of his efforts to create the
conditions for stability and unity which are essential for the
return to constitutional government.
3. Factors Bearing on the Problem
a. Background
Because of the constitutional provision that anyone holding public
office must resign from that office 180 days prior to an election,
General Barrientos must step down from the Junta in order to run for
the office of the presidency. General elections have been called for
September 1965. When Barrientos does step down he will no longer
have access to the facilities of the government such as air
transport, vehicles, and even government funds. Thus he is seeking
an alternate source of funding for his campaign. He [1 line of source text not declassified]
provided a detailed budget of his requirements to establish his
organizational base. He also provided a statement of his principles
and program together with a listing of the individuals who would
constitute his top command.[8½ lines of source text not
declassified]Barrientos is a long standing friend of the United States. He
received a good portion of his military training in the United
States. He was Air Attaché to Washington, attended American
University, and is a close friend of many high officials in the
United States Government.
[Omitted here is further discussion of the proposal.]
4. Coordination
This proposed activity has been fully coordinated with and approved by
the U.S. Ambassador, Assistant Secretary Thomas Mann, and has been discussed in detail with
appropriate officials of the Department of State.
5. Recommendation
That the 303 Committee approve the covert subsidization of the Popular
Christian Movement which will be the vehicle [1 line
of source text not
declassified] upon which to effect a return to constitutional
government in Bolivia. The total sum requested for this program is [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified].The 303 Committee
approved the recommendation by a vote by telephone on February 5.
(Memorandum from Williams to Mann, February 16; ibid.) According
to a February 10 memorandum [text not
declassified] to ARA,
Barrientos was informed on that date of the decision and of the U.S.
Government view “that relations between sovereigns should be based
upon dignity and mutual respect rather than financial
considerations; but in order to dispel any doubts” in Barrientos’
mind “of our attitude toward him, his request was approved as a
one-shot affair.” (Ibid.) Privately the [text not
declassified] assessment of the operation was more
positive, pointing out that “the risk of exposing U.S. participation
in the MPC program is probably worth
taking, especially if the operation helps to unify the country,
reduces political turmoil, and helps Bolivia along the road to
economic and social progress. The exposure of U.S. participation
would, undoubtedly, be embarrassing, but it probably would not lead
to serious repercussions.” (Memorandum from
FitzGerald to Helms, March 3; Central Intelligence Agency, Job
80–01690R, Directorate of Operations, Latin America Division,
WH/Bolivia, [file name not
declassified])
154. Telegram From the Embassy in Bolivia
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 BOL. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to
USSOUTHCOM for POLAD.La Paz, March 29, 1965, 18:00
p.m.
966. At President’s request, had four hour interview at his home with him
and MinEconomy Berdecio March 28. Barrientos in apparent good health,
disposition good, not suffering much pain from wound. (From other
reports we understood Barrientos had been extremely anxious and
depressed that wound might have caused permanent nerve damage. Since
securing medical advice that no permanent damage will result, his
attitude has improved remarkably. We are now reasonably sure wound not
self-inflicted, though many politicians choose to believe it was.)
Barrientos said wished to inform me of fundamental change of policy and
tactics to be followed by him and entire junta, In extended meeting
night of March 27, well into morning March 28, junta agreed it imperative armed forces
remain united to protect their existence.In
a meeting between State and CIA
representatives in Washington on March 31
FitzGerald remarked that although
Barrientos and Ovando “don’t
like each other, the truth is they are necessary to each other and
recognize it.” Ovando and
Barrientos “say harsh words about each other from time to time, but
often have a beer together at night.” (Memorandum from Carter to
Hughes, April 2;
Department of State, INR/IL
Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965)
This required that Barrientos resign as candidate, which he agreed to
do. Also required that Ovando
stop flirting with political parties, which Ovando agreed to do. Junta would henceforth devote
itself to substantive governmental accomplishments.
President explained logic of new position by admitting that his efforts
to get political parties work together had failed. His efforts increase
his own popularity had also failed. Since a political solution through
conciliation not possible, a solution would have to be imposed. This
means junta will remain in power for indefinite period, devote itself to
governing effectively, without trying to win favor of all sectors of
population. Admitted has made error in neglecting economic issues while
trying achieve political compromises, but said he now could not be
criticized for having failed try achieve political consensus.
Political and economic issues are, under the new “tough line,” to be
faced forthrightly. For instance, if miners give trouble, GOB will go in and seize mines. Army is now
in process taking over refineries in face of YPFB strike. Said Communists active in sabotaging economy,
and GOB would deal with them forcefully,
though would not make indiscriminate arrests or use documents mentioned
Embtel 957.In telegram 957 from La Paz, March 26, the Embassy
reported that the junta planned to arrest “300 Communists and
leftists” and exile them to Paraguay as political asylees. The
documents in question were three letters from the Italian Communist
Party to Lechin regarding $25,000 that it allegedly sent him.”
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 15 BOL)Juan Lechin Oquendo of PRIN is apparently to be among junta’s
first targets for neutralization. Barrientos said junta would do
whatever necessary to get country straightened out and on road to
recovery.
President said trouble could ensue as result implementation new policy
and junta would need military support.At
the same March 31 meeting between State and CIA officials (see footnote
2 above), Vaughn
remarked: “You don’t have to go down many notches economically in
Bolivia to be at the disaster point.” Vaughn said that “we have been hard, we have
demanded performance in return for aid. He questioned, however,
whether Barrientos can deliver.” The group decided to send an
observer to Bolivia to “give Barrientos advice on current economic
and political problems—particularly the question of whether or not
to have elections, as scheduled.” (Memorandum from Carter to
Hughes, April 2;
Department of State, INR/IL
Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965)
He argued that best method of avoiding a shooting situation is for armed
forces present formidable appearance. Simplest way in his view would be
through use armored personnel
carriers. Felt they would so intimidate possible demonstrators that
bloodshed could be avoided. Barrientos added that junta does not trust
most of police officer corps, thus could not rely on police to handle
serious public order problems.
I limited my response to Barrientos to saying I would present his request
to Washington, but at same time warned him APCS are not type of
equipment which provided Latin America through MAP under current policy. (Country Team recommendations
will follow.)Not further identified.
Also, while assuring him US wants to assist his government, asked him
realize that our requesting performance of GOB before extending further assistance was not evidence of
plot against junta. He agreed that four months had been lost with little
or no performance, and our position not unreasonable.
Much of this extended conversation spent reviewing major economic issues
such as COMIBOL, budget, railroads,
Lloyd. Barrientos assured me he now prepared come to grips with these
issues. Conversation also included some observations political scene, in
which Barrientos said he less concerned by Falange plotting, believed
Falange being led on by PRIN. He
expressed some reservations about Siles and MNR as troublemaking element, and indicated he felt
political parties largely limited their activities to conspiracy.
Comment: On March 28 ARMA found great relief expressed by general staff officers
that divisive forces pressing on junta had been eliminated, a reaction
which would tend confirm new line taken by Barrientos and junta. Believe
we can expect a few more decisions from junta on economic and
administrative problems. Though Barrientos may have lost some ground by
having to agree to withdraw as candidate, he remains as junta president
and could reconsider candidacy if public clamor for him became intense.
Apparently junta has made no decision on further postponement elections
at this time.
Henderson
155. Editorial Note
On May 24, 1965, the Department of State reported to the White House that
the military junta headed by General Barrientos had committed Bolivian
armed forces against the miners in the state-owned tin mining enterprise, COMIBOL. The purpose of this action was
to remove labor union leaders, “who are to a large extent either
communist or far leftist, and practically all of whom are opposed to the
Government of Barrientos,” and who “have resisted reform and sabotaged
the rehabilitation program” initiated by the junta to reduce labor costs
and improve the ability of the government to manage the mines in order
to ensure further U.S. assistance to COMIBOL. The report noted that although the junta
“undertook its action without U.S. commitments for assistance, it has
hoped for such aid.” (Department of State Background and Situation
Report, as of 1400, May 24, attached to memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy, May 24; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 BOL)
ARA and CIA representatives. According to ARA’s record of this meeting, prepared on May 20,
FitzGerald asserted that providing arms to
Barrientos to move into the mines “would make us ‘strike breakers,’ and
‘this we can’t do.’” Sayre
responded: “I think you’re right on the arms question. I think we’re
really not going to finance it.” A handwritten note in the margin,
apparently made by Denney, said:
“but we did!” (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, Denney,
and Evans, May 20; Department of
State INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA
Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965)
The Department informed Ambassador Henderson that AID had
authorized approximately $1.8 million in “special financial support for
planned military intervention in COMIBOL mines.” (Telegram 644 to La Paz, May 26; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
POL 23–9 BOL) The Department
authorized Ambassador Henderson
“to commit all funds requested and communicate this to GOB.” In addition, the Department
instructed Henderson to look into
arranging for emergency military supplies and equipment, including
ammunition and planes. (Telegram 624 to La Paz, May 24; ibid.)
Also on May 24 General Ovando
signed, on his own initiative, cease-fire agreements with student and
labor leaders representing the tin miners. Under the terms of the
agreements, Ovando would halt
troop movements on the mines and withdraw troops from the mines already
occupied, while the workers agreed to return to work. The government and
the miners were to negotiate their differences. This action, according
to a Central Intelligence Agency report of May 26 ([document number not declassified]), “was a direct violation of
junta policy and determination to follow through with military
operations to gain control over the tin mines.” As a result, the report
indicated, “the military government of General Rene Barrientos is in
serious danger of collapse.”
The report continued, “an assessment of those forces attempting to oust
him reveals that a successor government would probably permit Communists
and extreme leftists to consolidate and increase their power.” (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Bolivia, Vol. III, Memoranda, December
1964–September 1965) The report was forwarded on May 26 to McGeorge Bundy by CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence
Ray Cline.
On May 27, with indications that Barrientos and Ovando were near an open split,
Ovando became co-President
of the junta along with Barrientos with both men having the right to
exercise authority of commander-in-chief over the armed forces.
According to a May 28 Department of State Situation Report, “Barrientos
earlier had told our Ambassador that he intended to elevate Ovando to the co-Presidency in order
to ‘keep an eye on him.’” The report continued:
“We believe that relations between Ovando and Barrientos, never notably good, have
now reached their nadir, though their differences are again
momentarily plastered over. A split between the two would divide
the Armed Forces, whose ability to act as a stabilizing
anticommunist influence over the near and longer term would be
drastically diminished. We have instructed our Embassy to
continue exerting every reasonable effort to prevent such a
split, and that such efforts should be from a posture of
neutrality as between the two men. A senior United States
officer, who served in Bolivia for four years and is closely
acquainted with both Barrientos and Ovando, will leave the United States for Bolivia
Friday evening [May 28]. He will emphasize to both men the
paramount importance which the highest levels of the United
States Government attach to the preservation of the unity of the
Bolivian Armed Forces.”
The report was forward to the White House under cover of a memorandum
from Read to McGeorge Bundy on May 28. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
POL 23–9 BOL)
156. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of
State (Read) to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. III, Memoranda, December
1964–September 1965. Secret.Washington, June 5, 1965.
SUBJECT
Bolivia: Visit of Lieutenant Colonel Paul Wimert to La Paz
Ovando are reported in Exdis telegrams Numbers 1222 and
1227Dated May 31 and June 1. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
POL 7 US) from the
Embassy and in [1 line of source text not
declassified].Dated May 30 and May
31. (Ibid., POL 1 BOL; and Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. III,
Cables, December 1964–September 1965)
Assistant Secretary Vaughn and
other officers have talked with Wimert since his return. We believe that
he carried out his assignment fully in keeping with the instructions he
was given, and chances are fair that there will not be a split in the
Bolivian Government in the immediate future. Both Generals Barrientos
and Ovando have been made
unmistakably aware that the United States Government attaches the
greatest importance to the complete unity of the Military Junta and of
the Armed Forces in Bolivia. A Bolivian mission now in WashingtonA record of meetings of the Bolivian mission
with Vaughn on June 3 and
Mann on June 4 was transmitted in telegram 670 to La Paz, June 7.
The main points of the mission’s presentation were a request for
immediate U.S. assistance to allow Bolivia to increase its armed
forces by 10,000 to maintain security in cities where the army
occupied the mines, to improve the image of the armed forces, and to
provide funds for social and road projects so that surplus miners
could be hired. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1964–66, POL
BOL–US) has discussed in credible terms the relationships
between Barrientos and Ovando
and it has given assurances that they must and will keep together.
Wimert’s presence in La Paz was reported in today’s New
York Times, the source being Bolivian. We are treating the
article as inaccurate, as it is in a number of respects, and explaining,
if asked, that Wimert was in La Paz in preparation for his imminent
assignment to Santiago as Army Attaché.
On the basis of his talks and observations, Colonel Wimert belives that
civilians and military alike realixe the necessity of presidents Barrientos and Ovando sticking together. He says that
General Ovando can be classified
as a “conniver” who has always been known to play various parties
against one another, and that Ovando has not been making key decisions and is not as
forceful as Barrientos. He has, however, a fair knowledge of economic
problems and government administration. General Barrientos, Wimert
thinks, would best be described as a “can-doer”, perhaps too impetuous,
and not given to thinking out the entire problem. According to Wimert,
Barrientos has matured and is becoming more aware of the economic
problems of the country, and believes that the Junta now has to stop
shooting and come up with positive programs, especially in the mines, to
give the people something in return for having supported the Junta.
Wimert’s characterizations of the two men coincide with our own, but our
problem will be to shape and make realistic the Junta’s generalized
desires to move forward on the socio-economic front.
Hawthorne MillsHawthorne Mills
signed for Read above
Read’s typed
signature. Executive Secretary
157. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of
State (Read) to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. III, Memoranda, December
1964–September 1965. Secret.Washington, June 19, 1965.
SUBJECT
Report on Bolivia
Enclosed is a report on Bolivia prepared by the Latin American Policy
Committee during the past two weeks. The Committee, chaired by State,
includes representatives of DOD, AID, CIA
and USIA. The report outlines actions
that are now underway and that will be carried out during the next
thirty to sixty days. Such actions are designed to prevent possibility
of serious political, economic and social disturbances in Bolivia.
In our estimate, Bolivia is now in the process of making a promising,
albeit precarious, transition. The Department deems the situation
sufficiently serious, however, to warrant the preparation of contingency
plans.In a telephone conversation with
President Johnson on June 5, McNamara stated that he was “worried” about a blowup in
Bolivia. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
McNamara, Alpha Series,
June 5, 1965, 4:50 p.m., Tape 6506.01, PNO 4) In a telephone
conversation earlier that afternoon, Johnson
told Mann that “he wanted to
have a Task Force composed of high level people from CIA, State, Defense,” to develop
contingency plans for Guatemala, Colombia, and Bolivia. The
President said “he would like to have a Task Force which meets
regularly and to which he could look for advice and information.”
(Ibid., Mann Papers,
Telephone Conversations with LBJ,
May 2 1965–June 2, 1966) On June 8 Helms reported that Vance said he was going to phone Vaughn and “have him proceed
immediately to set up a task force or task forces to develop
contingency plans on Colombia, Guatemala and Bolivia.” (Central
Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job
80–B01285A, Helms Chrono as
DDP and DDCI) A draft plan has been prepared and will be
considered by the Latin American Policy Committee during the coming
week, prior to its scheduled transmittal to your office on June 25.Transmitted to Bundy on June 24, the paper provides extensive
coverage of seven possible contingencies for Bolivia. These included
assassination of Barrientos, of Ovando, forced removal of either Barrientos or
Ovando by pressures
applied by the other, the onset of a political crisis in which the
United States would be required to side with Barrientos or Ovando, Communist-supported
disorder erupting in Bolivia and threatening the lives and property
of non-combatants, non-Communist political elements seeking to
topple the Junta by an armed coup, or fighting erupting between the
Barrientos and Ovando
factions in the Bolivian military. In general the plan recommended
supporting Barrientos, if possible, and seeking peaceful
means—through unilateral and multilateral channels (such as the
OAS)—to disarm any crisis.
Direct use of U.S. forces was recommended only in the case of a
Communist-supported coup, and only with close consultations with key
OAS members. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1–1 BOL) In addition, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
is preparing biographic data on Bolivians who have or could assume key
roles in the government. This biographic data will be forwarded to you
on completion.
The Department’s Director of Bolivian and Chilean Affairs departed for La
Paz June 17 to discuss implementation of the enclosed report with the
Ambassador and the Country Team.Dentzer reported on his
impressions about Bolivia based on his trip in a June 25 memorandum
to Vaughn. (Ibid., POL 15 BOL)
Benjamin H. ReadInitialed for Read in an unidentified hand.
Enclosure
BOLIVIA
Introduction
This paper considers the short-term outlook for Bolivia and United
States actions over the next 30 to 60 days. It has been approved in
substance by the Latin American Policy Committee.
[Omitted here are a “Background” section on political events leading
up to the crisis in Bolivia’s mines and a “Current Developments”
section dealing with the events of May and early June 1965.]
Aims and Outlook
Our short-term aim is to take advantage of GOB willingness to bring stability to the mining areas,
in order to gain what progress we can for COMIBOL and the increased political
stability for Bolivia which could grow out of successful action.
This is the first time in more than a decade, and perhaps the last
time for a long while, that a Bolivian government has a chance to
bring law and order to the mines. We seek to attain these ends,
however, without unduly jeopardizing the status quo, since any
change now in the situation which finds the Armed Forces in power
could have unpredictable consequences. We also seek to achieve these
goals without decreasing the financial incentive for the government
to take a variety of actions which would improve the development and
long-term stability of the country. With the expulsion or voluntary
exile of many communists and extreme leftists, and the split within
the PCB, communist influence is now weaker than it
has been for some time. To keep the extreme left from regaining its
organized base in the mines, GOB
policies affecting them must be sound and workable. Meanwhile, with
no viable alternative to the Junta now on the Bolivian political
scene, the principal danger to the Junta lies from within;
Barrientos and Ovando must
be given strong encouragement to stick together. These are the
principal problems lying immediately ahead. Beyond that are our
longer-term goals. These involve getting the Armed Forces to retire
from running the government before they fail, seriously damage their
influence, or are torn asunder. To accomplish this, a viable
political alternative to the Junta government must be present within
a year or so. That alternative may be General Barrientos as a
civilian candidate for the Presidency, especially if the mine
rehabilitation scheme goes well.
The entry of government troops into the potentially most rebellious
mines on June 11 and 12 without bloodshed was a great victory for
the government. If the Junta successfully completes the operations
in which it is now
engaged, its prestige will be greatly enhanced. If something goes
wrong, that is, if it stops now or fails in the attempt— and we do
not think the Junta is out of the woods yet—its claim to the reins
of government will be jeopardized and it will face bloody skirmishes
with its enemies. We are cautiously optimistic that the
Barrientos–Ovando
relationship will hold together for a while. We do not think
anything has happened to change the underlying causes of differences
between the two; they both reached the brink and, looking over it,
retreated from it; realizing that the abyss below represented, in
all likelihood, a suicidal split in the Armed Forces and the removal
from the Bolivian scene of the only force for order and stability,
given present political and economic conditions. Their relations
probably will come under more intense strain, as the COMIBOL reorganization progresses,
and the question of whether and when to call for elections becomes
again a divisive issue for the Junta. Elections originally were
called for May, postponed until September, delayed until October,
and most recently postponed indefinitely.
Action Agenda
The following special actions are underway to carry out U.S.
objectives: EconomicAdvice to the GOB,
directly from Embassy/USAID and through the Triangular
Operation’s Advisory Group, on COMIBOL policy and
operations. U.S. financial and recruiting assistance
to obtain competent non-Bolivian nationals to manage
individual mines.Undertake a $1 million P.L. 480 Title IV wheat
program to stock COMIBOL commissaries with cheap flour for
the miners.Prepare special projects, as requested by the
recent GOB mission
to the U.S., which increasingly can absorb
unemployed miners and which manifest GOB and U.S. desire to
assist the mining areas. Embassy/USAID to make initial
recommendations by June 17.Internal SecurityReport by CINCSO and the MilGroup in La Paz by June
16 on whether Bolivian force levels should be
increased, whether additional needs for military
hardware exist, and whether the discipline and
reliability of the Armed Forces can be improved by
any short-term measures.Insure stepped-up delivery of the two T–28D
aircraft is arranged for June 17.Improve GOB
capacity to deter and control riots through the
supply of a limited number of personnel-carrying
armored cars.Encourage the GOB
to intensify its drive to collect weapons from the
miners and to insure their destruction so that they
do not get back into circulation.PoliticalReiterate through various channels to key leaders
the importance attached by the U.S. to Junta
unity.Continue discussions with governments of countries
adjoining Bolivia on the significance of
developments there to the hemisphere and to their
national interest.Seek to influence union elections and
developments, including action by American trade
union contacts.Increase through all official U.S. sources the
quality and quantity of political biographic data on
individuals who may become important in the near
future.Complete contingency plans to deal with possible
emergencies.
158. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 CommitteeSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Special Files, July–December 1965. Secret; Eyes Only. This is a
revised version of a draft prepared in the CIA on June 7. (Ibid., 303 Committee Files, c. 21, June
25, 1965)Washington, July 13, 1965.
SUBJECT
Expansion of Political Action Program in Bolivia
REFERENCE
Memorandum dated 29 January 1965Document 153.
1. Summary
It is proposed to expand up to [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] already approved on 5 February
1965, and [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] more to be used upon exhaustion of the original
sum) for propaganda and political action in support of the ruling
Bolivian military junta’s plans to pacify the country and eventually
hold elections to establish a constitutional government. This support
would be designed (a) to promote an eventual transfer of power to a government more stable than
the present provisional military regime and potentially capable of
meeting the country’s pressing problems;
(b) to bolster the junta’s unity and stability through discreet aid to
political groups and key individuals who will support continuation of
the regime and of the required power balance within it for as long as
may be necessary or desirable, as instruments for the achievement of
U.S. policy objectives in Bolivia, and (c) to provide levers with which
the two co-presidents of the junta, Generals Rene Barrientos and
Alfredo Ovando, can be
restrained from ill-judged or precipitate action that might split the
Bolivian armed forces and plunge the country into political and economic
chaos. The present proposal has a much broader purpose than that
presented last January as regards ultimate objectives, and differs
chiefly in the amount of funds now required because of changed
circumstances, the mechanisms to be used, and the variety and scope of
activities to be funded. It is possible that further expenditures may
later become necessary, but specific requirements cannot yet be
accurately predicted in view of the highly fluid Bolivian situation.
This proposal has the concurrence of Embassy La Paz, the Department of
State, and CIA.The June 7 draft proposal occasioned considerable
discussion before and after its preparation. When
FitzGerald stated at a June 2 meeting of
representatives of the ARA and
CIA that it might be an ideal
time to “give [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] a little covert support,” Denney replied that “it seems like
a waste of money to me.” (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, Denney, and Evans, June 4; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA
Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965) At the June 25 meeting of the 303
Committee the draft proposal was criticized by the participants
because it openly supported Barrientos. There was a difference of
opinion expressed concerning the relative merits of Barrientos and
Ovando and the risk,
according to Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, that supporting one over the other
could cause a “ruinous civil war.” The 303 Committee agreed to
postpone decision on the proposal pending further study. (Ibid., 303
Committee Files, c. 22, July 26) The revised July 13 proposal
reflected a U.S. policy decision, according to Sayre, “to encourage moderate and
responsible civilian political organizations looking to the time
when pressure will greatly increase on the junta to make concessions
to the desire of political groups to participate in the government
or to hold elections.” (Memorandum by Sayre, July 7; National Security Council 303
Committee Files, Subject Files, Bolivia, 1962–1980) This memorandum
was addressed to the Acting Deputy Under Secretary (Thompson) and was marked “not
sent.” Implementation will be [1 line of
source text not declassified] in coordination with Ambassador
Henderson in the field and
with appropriate officers of the Department of State in Washington.
2. Problem
To help create the conditions for an orderly transfer of power to
a constitutional government which would have reasonable prospects
for stability.To maintain in the meantime the stability of the junta government
through aid to political groups and individuals who will support continuation of the
present regime until the orderly transfer of power can take place,
which may not occur for a year or two.
3. Factors Bearing on Problem
a. Background
(a) The present situation in Bolivia is different from that prevailing at
the time the referenced memorandum was prepared and approved. The chief
new developments have been (1) the failure of Barrientos’ effort to have
himself elected president quickly and the indefinite postponement,
announced on 7 May 1965, of the national elections previously scheduled
for October of this year; (2) the mid-May decision of the junta to carry
out drastic reforms in the operation of the state mining corporation
known as COMIBOL, including the use
of force to extend governmental authority to the mining areas; (3) the
subsequent arrest and deportation to Paraguay of the extreme leftist
labor leader and politician Juan
Lechin and later of other troublemakers of the far left;
(4) the ensuing increased tensions and stresses within governmental,
military and political circles, heightened by public disturbances which
occurred during the last half of May and (5) the naming on 26 May of
Ovando as co-president of
the junta.
The present co-presidential arrangement is regarded as essentially
unstable over the long term. There appears to be strong sentiment
within the junta in favor of keeping Ovando from ousting Barrientos and vice-versa, since
any such move by either might irreparably damage the solidarity of
the armed forces and split them into irreconcilable factions. This
could in turn destroy both the junta’s ability to govern and public
acceptance of the military establishment. The regime would rapidly
collapse under those circumstances. The Embassy and the CIA [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified] believe that such a
collapse would entail passage of the political initiative to
extremist groups of both the Right and the Left, with a high
probability that a prolonged period of chaotic civil disturbance
and/or civil war would ensue.The Popular Christian Movement (MPC), regarded in January 1965 as the main vehicle for
the promotion of Barrientos’ presidential candidacy, has come to
play a definitely secondary role. It lacks political sophistication
and good leadership, and has remained essentially a rural, peasant
organization without substantial appeal to urban elements of the
population. In view of this and of the indefinite postponement of
elections, the MPC is no longer
considered adequate as the primary focus of the political action
program although it remains a useful instrument for mobilizing
peasant support. Of the [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] approved on 5 February 1965,
[less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] had been expended as of the end of June 1965, directly for
MPC organizational, propaganda,
and administrative expenses and indirectly for related support to
the regime.The essential factors in the present situation lead to the
conclusion that the present regime should continue, as the only
apparent feasible alternative for the time being to chaos and the
eventual dominance of extremist groups, pending the holding of
elections and installation of a constitutional government. There are
strong feelings among junta members as well as subordinate officers
of the armed forces in favor of the indefinite maintenance of
military pre-eminence in Bolivia, as insurance against a resurgence
of the sentiment that resulted in the downgrading of the military
establishment during the 12year tenure of the National Revolutionary
Movement (MNR). Coupled with this is
a realization that strong-arm tactics are not enough and that the
military must work to establish broadly-based support—passive if not
active—for its chosen role. There are political elements also which
appear willing to back the military for the time being, by
non-opposition if not by any overt act, lest a worse fate befall
them. The U.S. Government’s role should accordingly be that of
encouraging the emergence of a national consensus along these lines.
It will be necessary to provide covert support to these individuals
and groups that can be mobilized behind U.S. policy objectives,
since overt action, or even inaction, on the part of the U.S. which
appeared to favor one faction or another would imperil the unity of
the regime.The fluidity of the situation in the country makes it impossible
at this time to identify all elements to be aided through covert
channels. [11 lines of source text not
declassified] There will necessarily be flexibility in the
extent of the covert funding to be provided each of these and other
groups, in view of the rapidity with which Bolivian events tend to
move.
b. Origin of Requirement
[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not
declassified]
c. Pertinent U.S. Policy Considerations
Bolivia needs a moderate and effective government. There is neither a
single party nor a likely combination of parties capable of forming a
viable government with which we could cooperate. Hence, for the present,
there is no acceptable alternative to the junta, and there may be none
for a year or more. The unity of the armed forces is the key factor in
the continued strength of the government. The armed forces could be
split by the rivalry of Barrientos and Ovando, both of whom desire to be the constitutional
president. Meanwhile there is increased maneuvering among civilian
parties and groups who are looking toward the time when they can play a
more meaningful role in governmental affairs. In the long run there must
be a civilian government, and
we should encourage the growth of conditions which will make this
possible. As the civilian political situation unfolds we should identify
that group which gives promise of being most viable politically and most
energetic in attacking developmental problems, and give it our support.
Under present circumstances we must carefully assess the relative
strengths of Barrientos and Ovando as well as other leaders. We are inclined to
favor Barrientos at this time, but we must not antagonize Ovando, about whose orientation and
motivations we should know more, by playing favorites in such a way as
to set Ovando against us or to
cause him to bring his differences with Barrientos to a head.
[Omitted here is additional discussion of the proposal.]
4. Coordination
This proposal has been coordinated with and approved by the U.S.
Ambassador in La Paz and has been discussed in detail with appropriate
officials of the Department of State.
5. Recommendation
That the 303 Committee approve the covert political action program
outlined above. The total sum requested at this time is [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified], of which [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] is covered by a previous
approval. [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]The recommendation
was endorsed by Thompson on
July 19. (Ibid., 303 Committee Files, c. 23, August 9, 1965) In a
July 21 memorandum to McGeorge
Bundy, Executive Secretary of the 303 Committee Peter
Jessup indicated that “both State and Vance have approved” the proposal and wrote “I have
no magic formula either and recommend working along with Barrientos
as the only semi-competent available.” Bundy initialed his approval. (National Security
Council, 303 Committee Files, Subject File, Bolivia) The 303
Committee approved the recommendation on July 26. (Memorandum for
the Record, July 27; ibid.) At the request of Ambassador Henderson, the 303 Committee on
March 28, 1966, approved a request for [text not
declassified] additional funding to strengthen the
political coalition backing Barrientos in the upcoming election,
with the stipulation that such requests would “be frowned upon” in
the future. (Memorandum from Koren to Gordon, March 28; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Special Files, January–June 1966). The CIA paper, February 26, proposing the extension of the
political action program is ibid., c. March 28, 1966)
159. Letter From the Ambassador to Bolivia (Henderson) to the Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs (Gordon)Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 70 D 443, Def 19,
Military Assistance, 1966. Secret; Official–Informal.La Paz, May 31, 1966.
Dear Linc:
The short run Country Team objective in the domestic political field has
been to foster the circumstances in which elections can be held. In this
effort, we have held no brief for, and we have tried to avoid
identification with any particular candidate.
The Armed Forces must eventually transfer power. This can be done by
violence, or by elections.
The civilian political parties must eventually accept responsibility for
governing the country, and for engaging in political activities, as
contrasted with quasi-military activities. This can only come about by
holding elections.
We have used our resources to further this objective of elections, both
with the Junta, and with the leaders of the political parties (with the
sole exception of the extreme left). We have encouraged the Junta to
stand firm on the date of elections, once chosen; and have encouraged
political leaders to take a positive attitude towards the elections.
Any slate of candidates for the Presidency must include Barrientos, both
because he is willing to fight to be included, and because he has
genuine popular support. He can be eliminated by physical violence, or
by political chicanery, but as long as he lives, he will return to the
fight. He could also lose at the polls, although at present writing this
seems unlikely, but in that event, the new government would face a
formidable opposition.
Since Barrientos is a necessary element to holding elections, but not because he is our “chosen candidate”, we
have used some of our resources with him. He will not be an easy
president to deal with, and his regime may not live out its term. Much
will depend on his cabinet, and the degree of influence individual
ministers are able to exercise. But if there are to be elections, he has
to be there, and we have to deal with him.
Elections with Barrientos as the sole candidate, however, with the major
traditional political parties abstaining, would increase the
probabilities of post-election instability. The Falange would certainly
abstain if their candidates were running only against Barrientos. We,
therefore, encouraged
Andrade to take a chance (he didn’t really need much persuasion) in
order that the MNR (as still the major
political force in the country, even though presently divided) would be
represented at the polls. This has caused the Junta and the Armed Forces
some serious doubts, since they regard the MNR, however represented, as their mortal enemy (shades of
1946 and 1952).
The Andrade candidacy, and some behind-the-scenes maneuvering, (and,
modestly, our own conversations with Falange leaders) has now brought
the Falange into the campaign. The conditions are therefore present for
a (relatively) meaningful election.
Some flies, of course, remain in the ointment, this being Bolivia. If the
Junta plays too many tricks on Andrade, he will either throw his support
to a unified MNR, or be discredited. In
either case, the hand of the more extreme elements of the MNR will be strengthened, and Bolivia will
face a prolonged period of civil unrest.
It is one thing to win an election in Bolivia, it is quite another to
govern this country. Any administration needs an organization with
workers everywhere; a political philosophy responsive to popular demand
however imperfectly expressed; and skill in the arts of government. The
MNR, disregarding for the moment its
present plight, could muster these elements. Barrientos’ present
political coalition can not, although he has personal charisma and
political flair. The Falange has few assets in this respect, and would
quickly polarize the political scene.
This means to me that after the election will come a period of political
jockeying for new, more meaningful alignments. We hope that this
jockeying will be in purely political terms, and that violence can be
avoided. But uncertainty and a certain amount of boiling and bubbling
cannot be avoided.
Finally, there is always the enigma of Ovando. We know very little certainly about him. We do
know that he is unlikely to precipitate a showdown; that he is a master
of devious maneuver; that he puts the unity of the Armed Forces above
everything else; that he avoids imposing a decision (which has resulted
in vacillation and indecision on many trying occasions); and that he has
told us on a number of occasions that Barrientos must be a candidate for
the Presidency, against moderate opponents, naming Andrade of the MNR and Romero of the Falange.
This leads us to conclude that Ovando now wants elections, with Barrientos winning. He
could then retire with glory, to command a unified Armed Forces, free
from the divisive threat of Barrientos, and thus control the only real
unified force in the country. If Barrientos succeeds in governing the
country for four years, he will have resolved at least some of the
sticky problems which now confront the government, and Ovando could easily succeed him.
If Barrientos does not do what the Armed Forces thinks he should do,
Ovando could remove him,
although this would always be dangerous, both to the Armed Forces, and
to the country.
If we are wrong, and Ovando
intends to out-maneuver Barrientos, we will have little chance to
anticipate his move. We have, therefore, been careful to keep a clear
channel to Ovando, too.
I hope you concur, at least in major outline, in our strategy.In a June 3 memorandum to Morris commenting on
Henderson’s letter,
Williams wrote that this strategy was
approved months ago and confirmed more recently in a 303 Committee
paper. He went on to indicate that he was “puzzled that at this late
hour, thirty days before the elections in Bolivia, the Ambassador
should ask Mr. Gordon if he
approves a strategy which we have been pursuing for many months.”
(Ibid.) I would be pleased to have your comments.
Sincerely,
Doug
160. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January
1966–December 1968. Confidential.Washington, July 1, 1966.
SUBJECT
Bolivian Elections
Bolivia holds a national election on Sunday.
It is not an interesting contest. The government
candidate—General Rene Barrientos, who has headed the military junta for
the past 18 months—is almost certain to win.Results of the Bolivian election, in which Barrientos won handily,
are reported in airgram CA–219 to all
ARA posts except Caracas, July
8, 1966. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 14
BOL) The opposition is weak and divided. As many as four of
the six opposition parties may pull out of the race at the last minute.
There may be some violence. The OAS is
sending observers, which should provide some stability and help reduce
the traditional electoral manipulations.
The best that can be said for the elections is that it will serve to put
Bolivia back in the ranks of constitutional government—in form, if not
in substance.
W. W. RostowPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
161. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 CommitteeSource: National Security Council,
Files of the 303 Committee, Subject File, Bolivia. Secret; Eyes
Only. A handwritten notation on this memorandum reads: “Distributed
to members of 303 Committee for information on 21 July 1966. Not
reflected in 303 Minutes.”Washington, July 15, 1966.
SUBJECT
Results of the Political Action Program for BoliviaWilliam V. Broe, chief of
the Western Hemisphere Division of the Deputy Directorate of
Plans, briefly summarized the covert action program for Bolivia
in a July 15 memorandum to Helms: “With the election of Rene Barrientos as
President of Bolivia on July 3, 1966 this action was brought to
a successful completion.” Broe continued, “in view of
President-elect Barrientos’ arrival in Washington next week, it
might be appropriate to remind the Committee of [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] actions undertaken with Committee
approval in Bolivia.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Bolivia,
1962–1980) A separate undated briefing memorandum on [text not declassified] support for
Bolivian Presidential candidate Barrientos was forwarded by the
CIA to
Rostow on July 14 (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Intelligence Files, Guerrilla Problems
in Latin America) under cover of a memorandum from Broe to Jessup. (Ibid., National
Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. VIII) On
July 16 Rostow provided President
Johnson a copy of this briefing
memorandum, with the following note: “This is to explain why
General Barrientos may say thank you when you have lunch with
him next Wednesday, the 20th.” (Ibid.)
REFERENCE
A. Memorandum for the 303 Committee Subject: “Provide Support to
[less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] and the Popular Christian Movement in
Bolivia,” dated 29 January 1965Document 153.B. Memorandum for the 303 Committee Subject: “Expansion of
Political Action Program in Bolivia,” dated 13 July 1965Document 158.C. Memorandum for the 303 Committee Subject: “Additional Financial
Support for Political Action Program in Bolivia,” dated 26 February
1966Not printed. (Department of
State, INR/IL Historical Files,
303 Committee Files, c. 35, March 28) Also see footnote 4, Document 158.
1. Purpose of the Political Action Program
The referenced memoranda, the most recent of which was approved by the
303 Committee on 28 March 1966, concerned a political action program for
Bolivia. The purpose of this [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] program was through covert means
to ensure the orderly transfer of power via elections to a civilian,
constitutional government whose policies would be compatible with those
of the United States by: Providing covert financial assistance to the groups supporting
the candidacy of General Barrientos.Providing covert financial encouragement to opposition groups
who might otherwise abstain and endanger the legitimacy of the
elections.[3 lines of source text not
declassified]
2. Results of the Political Action Program
The objectives of this program have been accomplished. A new political
party was built to provide the platform for General Barrientos. This
base was reinforced by a coalition of already existing parties. Despite
many internal stresses, this pro-Barrientos complex was held together
during the crucial pre-electoral period by [1½ lines
of source text not declassified] covert financial support. At
the same time covert financial assistance was given to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
a rival party to ensure its participation in the elections. In addition,
a [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] subsidy payment was made to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a second
important opposition party which was considering withdrawing from the
electoral process. When these two most important opposition parties
would not abstain from elections, three other groups made [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
entries into the race, with the result that the election contest took
place between the Barrientos coalition and five opposition slates.
The combination of providing money and covert guidance to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
contending parties changed the political climate from a volatile,
conspiratorial atmosphere with little discussion of peaceful resolution
through elections to a full fledged electoral atmosphere with the
traditional violence and conspiracy thrust into the background.
While the very final count of the elections is not in at this writing, it
can be said that General Barrientos has won by the impressive majority
of about 60% of the vote in an election praised by OAS observers as democratic and honest.
[2 lines of source text not declassified] The
inauguration on 6 August 1966 will mean the end of 21 months of military
rule and the beginning of what hopefully will be a four-year term of
office for the desired civilian, constitutional government.
3. Prognosis
It is obvious that the recent election of this government is but the
first step towards establishing political stability in Bolivia. Much
depends on the political acumen of Barrientos himself, who is faced with
the task of manipulating and maneuvering the many divergent political
forces which now may be expected to turn their energies to toppling him.
The military, suppressed since 1952 by the previous regime, has obtained
another taste of power during the past 21 months, and although its
announced intention is to withdraw from politics, this may be only
temporary. The opposition parties will not want to depend on honest
elections in 1970 and can be expected to begin the anti-government
scheming which is endemic to Bolivian politics. The economic problems
continue to be as serious and extensive as ever. In summary, while the
above described political action program has returned Bolivia to a
constitutional government headed by a popular president, the prognosis
whether Barrientos can last out his term of office must be one of
cautious optimism.
162. Memorandum of Conversation
Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 7
BOL. Confidential. Drafted by Patrick F. Morris (ARA/BC) and approved in S on July 27. The meeting was held in Rusk’s office immediately
following a meeting between Barrientos and Gordon that focused on the
status of negotiations with the Export-Import Bank, the delay in
U.S. disbursements for a loan for COMIBOL, and U.S. supplying Bolivia with
helicopters under the MAP
program. (Ibid.)
President-elect Barrientos visited Washington July 19–23, in a
private capacity, primarily to address the International
Platform Association, a public speaking group, on July 22. He
had lunch with President Johnson at the
White House on July 20 and according to the President’s Daily
Diary, there was an exchange of gifts, followed by luncheon in
the State Dining Room at 1:50 p.m. (Johnson Library) No further
record of discussions has been found. In telegram 7236 to La
Paz, July 14, the Department had instructed the Embassy to
inform Barrientos not to expect substantive discussions nor
concessions during his trip. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 BOL)
Washington, July 21, 1966, 17:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Visit of General Rene Barrientos Ortuno, President-elect of the
Republic of Bolivia.
PARTICIPANTS
The SecretaryGen. Rene Barrientos Ortuno, Pres.-elect of BoliviaJaime Berdecio, Minister of the National Economy—BoliviaJulio Sanjines, Ambassador
of BoliviaLincoln Gordon, Assistant
Secretary—ARADouglas Henderson,
Ambassador—La PazPatrick F. Morris, Country
Director—BC
The Secretary opened the meeting by congratulating the President-elect on
his successful electoral campaign. He indicated that he and President
Johnson had followed developments in Bolivia
with a great deal of interest and were happy to see a return to a
constitutional government in that country. He said that General
Barrientos’ election victory was impressive.
General Barrientos thanked the Secretary and said that Bolivia was a
democratic country; that he had won the election but now he had to win
at successfully governing his country. He said that Bolivia made common
cause with the United States in upholding the democratic processes,
improving economic conditions and in countering communism.
The Secretary asked the General what he considered his three most
important problems. The General answered that the first was tin; Bolivia
must increase its production and at the same time must receive adequate
prices for the tin it sells. The second most important concern of his
Government is transportation; Bolivia must construct a road network so
as to integrate the national territory. The General and Ambassador
Henderson described to the Secretary the road projects which were either
under way or under consideration for United States assistance. General
Barrientos said that the third area of importance was the connecting of
Bolivia with outside world by better means of transport. He said that on
his way to the United States he had stopped in Peru and talked to
President Belaunde about the necessity for a road from the Peruvian port
of Ilo to the Bolivian border near Lake Titicaca. He said the Peruvians
have agreed to request assistance from the Inter-American Development
Bank to construct this road. He said that this road was of primary
importance for Bolivia.
The Secretary then asked about Bolivia’s food production capacity. He
wanted to know whether Bolivia was dependent upon large food imports or
whether it was comparatively self sufficient. It was explained to the
Secretary that a large segment of the indigenous population lived from
subsistence agriculture with potatoes as a staple; that in recent years
Bolivia had become self-sufficient in rice and sugar, but that it was a
net importer of wheat and wheat products.
The Secretary then asked about educational problems. Ambassador Henderson explained that the United
States Government was
assisting the Bolivians in defining their educational needs through a
contract with Ohio State University.
General Barrientos explained that there was a need for technical
education especially in the agricultural sector since campesinos who
were taught to read and write but who were not taught how to be better
farmers usually became migrants to the cities. He said it was absolutely
necessary to educate the campesino in practical agriculture so that they
would stay on the land.
The Secretary asked about health problems and was informed that
tuberculosis and silicosis were serious problems in the country
especially in the high lands. The high incidence of tuberculosis was
related to malnutrition. It was also explained that the anti-malaria
campaign begun initially by the Rockefeller Foundation in 1949 has been very successful,
continuing under the Bolivian Government with some assistance from the
United States.
The Secretary asked General Barrientos about the kind of cabinet he
thought he would have. The General answered that he hoped to have a
competent cabinet composed of men dedicated to the solution of the
nation’s problems. He said he hoped to avoid choosing representatives of
various political groups in order to satisfy partisan demands. He said
that he realized that he would have problems with the political groups
by doing this but that his main interest was in satisfying the people,
not political parties.
The Secretary said that President Kennedy set an example by choosing people on the basis
of their reputations. He said that he did not know personally
practically anybody in his first cabinet except his brother Robert Kennedy who became Attorney
General.
The Secretary then asked about Bolivia’s relations with its neighbors.
The General answered that Bolivia was on good terms with all of the
neighboring countries with the exception of Chile. He said that there
was a very deep feeling that Bolivia should have access to the sea.
The Secretary asked whether or not joint economic projects developing
contiguous border areas might not be an indirect way of lessening
tensions so that an eventual solution could be worked out.
Ambassador Henderson asked General
Barrientos whether some kind of regional development wasn’t the answer.
General Barrientos responded that the northern part of Chile was very
poor; that regional development projects would only improve the economic
condition of that area and would make Chile more determined to keep it
than it is now.
The Secretary said that accelerated economic growth in border areas have
proved to be one way of lessening the possibility of border problems. He
used the Saar region as a specific example.
General Barrientos said that he thought the Bolivian situation was
different since Bolivia was seeking access to the sea.
Ambassador Sanjines then
described a plan of providing Bolivia with a port within an enclave of
ten square kilometers between the present cities of Tacna and Arica. He
said he did not believe that there was need for a corridor from Bolivia
to the sea, if Bolivia could have a port on the ocean which was duly
recognized as Bolivian territory, this would be sufficient. He said with
air transport becoming more and more important such an enclave was
sensible since one would be able to take off from La Paz and land on
Bolivian territory on the Pacific Ocean.
The Secretary suggested that such a port might be multi-national or
perhaps an Alliance for Progress port.
The Bolivian Ambassador insisted that the only way that Bolivia would be
interested was if the Bolivian flag would fly over the territory.
The Secretary concluded the meeting by emphasizing President
Johnson’s dedication to the Alliance for
Progress and his specific interests in agriculture, education and
health. He said that the President had a passion for performance; that
he was interested not in just words but deeds. He wanted to see concrete
accomplishments under the Alliance as the result of United States
assistance as well as the result of the efforts of the various countries
themselves.
163. Editorial Note
On March 16, 1967, the Embassy in La Paz reported that President
Barrientos had personally informed Ambassador Henderson that two guerrilla suspects had been detained
by Bolivian authorities and, upon interrogation, had admitted
association with a group of 30 to 40 guerrillas “led by Castroite
Cubans” and other foreigners. The suspects reportedly mentioned that
Che Guevara was leader of
the guerrilla group, but they had not seen him. Barrientos urgently
requested U.S. communications equipment to enable the Bolivian
Government to locate reported guerrilla radio transmitters. Henderson made no commitments beyond a
promise to look into what the United States could do. (Telegram 2314
from La Paz, March 16; National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9
BOL)
A year earlier there were intelligence reports that Che Guevara was in South America, but
U.S. analysts found little supporting evidence. In a March 4, 1966, memorandum
concerning rumors of Guevara’s presence in Colombia,
FitzGerald noted that “penetrations of
insurgent groups had revealed no indication of Guevara’s presence in any
of these groups.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS, Operational
Group, Job 78–5505, Area Activity—Cuba) Further analysis by the Agency
identified seven conflicting rumors of Guevara’s whereabouts. A March
23, 1966, memorandum prepared in the Western Hemisphere Division noted
that Guevara’s usefulness had been reduced to his ability as a
guerrilla, and that “with his myth he is ten feet tall; without it, he
is a mortal of normal stature.” Under the circumstances, the Agency
concluded:
“… it is not believed justifiable to divert considerable amounts
of time, money and manpower to an effort to locate Guevara. It is considered far
more important to use these assets to penetrate and monitor
Communist subversive efforts wherever they may occur, since
Guevara’s presence in an area will not affect greatly the
outcome of any given insurgent effort.” (Ibid.)
On March 24, 1967, the Embassy in La Paz reported that Barrientos met
with the Deputy Chief of Mission on March 23 to advise him that the
guerrilla situation had worsened and that this deterioration caused him
increasing concern. Barrientos believed the guerrilla activity was “part
of a large subversive movement led by Cuban and other foreigners.” He
pointed out that Bolivian troops in the area of guerrilla activity were
“green and ill-equipped,” and reiterated his urgent request for U.S.
assistance. The Embassy told Barrientos that “our military officers were
working with the Bolivian military to ascertain facts relating to
requirements.” (Telegram 2381 from La Paz, March 24; National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 BOL) Two U.S. military assistance
advisory group officers reported that on March 23 guerrillas had
ambushed a 22-man Bolivian Army patrol near Nancuahazu, prompting the
Embassy to report to the Department on March 27: “There is now
sufficient accumulation of information to bring Country Team to accept
as fact that there is guerrilla activity in area previously mentioned,
that it could constitute potential security threat to GOB.” (Telegram 2384 from La Paz, March 27;
ibid.)
In a 90-minute meeting with Ambassador Henderson on March 27, Barrientos appealed for direct
U.S. budgetary support for the Bolivian armed forces to meet the
“emergency and one in which Bolivia was ‘helping to fight for the U.S.’”
In reporting this discussion to the Department, Henderson observed:
“I suspect that Barrientos is beginning to suffer some genuine
anguish over the sad spectacle offered by the poor performance
of his armed forces in this episode; i.e., an impetuous foray
into reported guerrilla country, apparently based on a fragment
of intelligence and resulting in a minor disaster, which further
tended to panic the GOB into a lather of
ill-coordinated activity, with less than adequate professional
planning and logistical support.” Henderson continued, “pressed by his military he
may seek resort to the lobbying talents of Ambassador Sanjines in Washington in an
effort to end-run proper channels of communication with U.S.
authorities.” (Telegram 2405 from La Paz, March 29; ibid.)
On March 29, the CIA reported that two
guerrillas captured by the Bolivian Army had furnished information that
the guerrilla movement “is an independent, international operation under
Cuban direction and is not affiliated with any Bolivian political party.
The Agency had received information about the development of other
guerrilla groups in Bolivia. “Should these other groups decide to go
into action at this time, the Bolivian Government would be sorely taxed
to cope with them” in addition to the Cuban-backed group. (Memorandum
from [name not declassified] to the Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division, March 29; Central Intelligence Agency,
DDO/IMS, Job 88–01415R, [file name not
declassified])
On March 31, the Department responded to Henderson’s concerns: “We have no evidence ‘end runs’
being attempted here.” The Department instructed the Embassy in La Paz:
“You may at your discretion inform Barrientos that we most
reluctant consider supporting significantly enlarged army,
either thru provision additional material or thru renewal budget
support. We fully support concept of providing limited amounts
of essential material assist carefully orchestrated response to
threat, utilizing to maximum extent possible best trained and
equipped troops available. Should threat definitely prove
greater than capacity present forces, Barrientos can be assured
U.S. willingness consider further assistance.” (Telegram 166701
to La Paz, March 31; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 BOL)
Also on March 31, the Department informed U.S. posts in neighboring
countries to Bolivia that the current plan “is to block guerrilla escape
then bring in, train and prepare ranger-type unit to eliminate
guerrillas.” The Department also indicated that the United States was
considering a special military training team (MTT) “for accelerated
training counter guerrilla force.” (Telegram 16641 to Buenos Aires, et
al., March 31; ibid.)
On May 11 Rostow reported to President
Johnson that “CIA has received the first credible
report that ‘Che’ Guevara is alive and operating in South
America.” The information had come from interrogation of guerrillas
captured in Bolivia. “We need more evidence before concluding that
Guevara is operational—and not dead, as the intelligence community, with
the passage of time, has been more and more inclined to believe.”
(Memorandum from Rostow to
Johnson, May 11; Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January 1966–December 1968)
According to the CIA report, May 10,
Che Guevara told [text not declassified] that he had come to
Bolivia “in order to begin a guerrilla movement that would spread to the
other parts of Latin America.” (CIA
Information Cable TDCS 314/06486–67; ibid.)
164. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January
1966–December 1968. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum indicates
President Johnson saw
it.Washington, June 23, 1967.
Mr. President:
This is what is going on with guerrillas in Bolivia:
Last March 24 Bolivian security forces were ambushed in a remote area of
southeastern Bolivia as they were investigating reports of a guerrilla
training camp. Since then 6 other skirmishes have been fought. The
Bolivian forces have come off poorly in these engagements, losing 28 of
their men to 2 or 3 known rebels killed.
Interrogation of several deserters and prisoners, including a young
French communist—Jules Debray—closely associated with Fidel Castro and suspected of serving
as a Cuban courier, strongly suggests that the guerrillas are
Cuban-sponsored, although this is hard to document. There is some
evidence that “Che” Guevaramay have been with the group. Debray reports
seeing him. A highly sensitive source [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] reports a recent
statement by Brezhnev that Guevara is in Latin America “making his
revolutions”.In a June 4 cable to
President Johnson,
Rostow noted that “CIA believes that ‘Che’ Guevara has been with this group.” He also indicated
that “we have put Bolivia on top of the list more because of the
fragility of the political situation and the weakness of the armed
forces than the size and effectiveness of the guerrilla movement.”
(Ibid., Latin America, Vol. VI, June–September 1967) The CIA received information, reportedly
based on a document written and signed by Che Guevara, in which the
revolutionary stated that “revolt started in Bolivia because
wide-spread discontent there and disorganization army.” ([text not declassified] Central Intelligence
Agency, DDO/IMS Files, [file name not
declassified])
Estimates of the strength of the guerrillas range from 50 to 60 men. It
appears that they were flushed out while still in a preliminary training
phase and before they intended to open operations. Despite this, they have so far clearly
out-classed the Bolivian security forces. The performance of the
government units has revealed a serious lack of command coordination,
officer leadership and troop training and discipline.
Soon after the presence of guerrillas had been established, we sent a
special team and some equipment to help organize another Ranger-type
Battalion. On the military side, we are helping about as fast as the
Bolivians are able to absorb our assistance. The diversion of scarce
resources to the Armed Forces could lead to budgetary problems, and our
financial assistance may be needed later this year.
The outlook is not clear. The guerrillas were discovered early before
they were able to consolidate and take the offensive. The pursuit by the
government forces, while not very effective, does keep them on the run.
These are two pluses.
At their present strength the guerrillas do not appear to pose an
immediate threat to Barrientos. If their forces were to be quickly
augmented and they were able to open new fronts in the near future, as
now rumored, the thin Bolivian armed forces would be hard-pressed and
the fragile political situation would be threatened. The hope is that
with our help Bolivian security capabilities will out-distance guerrilla
capabilities and eventually clear them out.
State, DOD, and CIA are following developments closely.A June 14 memorandum prepared by the CIA focused on Cuban sponsorship of the
Bolivian guerrillas and the failure of the Bolivian Government to
meet the insurgency threat. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Intelligence File, Guerrilla Problem in Latin America)
As I mentioned, Defense is training and equipping additional forces.
CIA has increased its
operations.
The Argentines and Brazilians are also watching this one. Argentina is
the only other country with a military mission in La Paz. Close military
ties between Argentina and Bolivia are traditional. The Argentines have
also furnished military supplies to the Bolivians.
W. W. RostowPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
165. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January 1966–December
1968. Secret. Prepared by Bowdler. Copies provided to Rostow and Sayre.Washington, June 29,
1967.
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador of BoliviaJulio Sanjines-GoytiaMr. William G. Bowdler
At the invitation of the Bolivian Ambassador, I went to his residence
this afternoon to discuss the Bolivian situation.
Most of the one-hour conversation was a monologue by the loquacious
Ambassador describing the background to the Barrientos administration
and the present political situation. Toward the end of the conversation,
he got around to the two points he had on his mind.
The first was increased external assistance. I asked him what
specifically he had in mind. He replied that he was not thinking of
budgetary support since Bolivia had passed that stage and was proud of
its accomplishment. I then asked him what type of project assistance he
had in mind. On this he was very vague, saying that we should send a
special mission from Washington to study what additional projects might
be started to further Bolivia’s development.
The question in which he was most interested—and obviously the main
purpose for the invitation—was to ask for our help in establishing what
he called a “hunter-killer” team to ferret out guerrillas. He said this
idea was not original with him, but came from friends of his in CIA. I asked him whether the Ranger
Battalion now in training were not sufficient. He said that what he has
in mind is 50 to 60 young army officers, with sufficient intelligence,
motivation and drive, who could be trained quickly and could be counted
on to search out the guerrillas with tenacity and courage. I asked him
whether such an elite group would not cause problems within the army and
perhaps even political problems between Barrientos and his supporters.
The Ambassador said that these problems could be minimized by rotating a
fixed number of the team back into the army at regular intervals. The
rotation system would have the added benefit of bringing a higher degree
of professionalism into the officer ranks of the army. I told him that
his idea may have merit, but needs further careful examination.
Before leaving, I told him that I had seen reports that Bolivia might be
considering declaring a state of war against Cuba. I asked him whether
he had any information to substantiate these reports. He expressed
complete surprise and strong opposition, pointing out that such action
would expose Bolivia to international ridicule. He speculated that these
reports might have been planted by Cuban exiles. He said that some
Cubans had approached him along this line and there may well be Cuban
exiles in Bolivia who are doing likewise with other Bolivian officials.
I told him that I also thought that this action would be a serious
mistake not only because of the light in which it would cast Bolivia,
but also because of the serious legal and practical problems which would
arise from being in a state of war with Cuba.
Upon departing, he said he appreciated having the opportunity to talk
frankly with me and expressed the desire to exchange views on his
country from time to time. I told him I would be happy to do this
whenever he thought it useful.
WGB
166. Editorial Note
In a July 5, 1967, memorandum to Special Assistant Walt Rostow, William Bowdler of the National
Security Council Staff summarized the current U.S. military training
role in Bolivia: “DOD is helping train
and equip a new Ranger Battalion. The Bolivian absorption capacity being
what it is, additional military assistance would not now seem advisable.
[3 lines of source text not declassified]”
Bowdler recommended that “a variable of the Special Strike Force
acceptable to the Country Team be established. It might be part of the
new Ranger Battalion.” (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Intelligence File, Guerrilla Problem in Latin America) The Country Team
objections were transmitted in telegram 2291 from La Paz, May 24. The
team stated that a strike force would be viewed by the Bolivians as a
“magical solution” and a “substitute for hard work and needed reform.”
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL 23 BOL)
At 4:30 p.m. on July 5 Rostow,
Bowdler, and Peter Jessup met in the Situation Room of the
White House with representatives of the Department of State including
Assistant Secretary of State Covey
Oliver, Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Sayre, and Ambassador Henderson, with William Lang of the Department of
Defense, and Desmond FitzGerald and William Broe of the Central
Intelligence Agency. The group
agreed that a special strike force was not advisable because of the
Embassy’s objections. They decided that the United States should
“concentrate on the training of the Second Ranger Battalion with the
preparation of an intelligence unit to be part of the Battalion.” They
also agreed to look into expansion of the rural police program, prepare
contingency plans to cover the possibility of the insurgency getting
beyond the control of Barrientos and the Bolivian armed forces, and
suggested that Barrientos might need $2–5 million in grant or supporting
assistance in the next 2 months to meet budgetary problems resulting
from the security situation. (Memorandum of meeting; Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. VI, June
1967–September 1967) The gist of these decisions was relayed to the
President in the context of a broader policy for counterinsurgency in
Latin America; see Document 61.
U.S. efforts to support the counterinsurgency program in Bolivia against
Cuban-led guerrillas followed a two-step approach. To help overcome the
deficiencies of the Bolivian Army, a 16-man military training team of
the U.S. Special Forces was sent to Bolivia to support the Bolivian
Second Ranger Battalion in the development of anti-guerrilla tactics and
techniques. The United States also provided ammunition, rations, and
communications equipment on an emergency basis under MAP and expedited delivery of four
helicopters. (Paper by W.D.
Broderick, July 11; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 70
D 443, POL 23–4, 1967, IRG Counter-Insurgency Subgroup) A July 3
memorandum prepared by the CIA reads:
“Although original estimates were that the battalion would not be combat
ready until approximately December 1967, the MILGROUP now believes that
this date can be advanced to mid-September 1967.” (Central Intelligence
Agency, Job 88–01415R, DDO/IMS, [file name not
declassified])
As the training of the Ranger battalion progressed, weaknesses in its
intelligence-collecting capability emerged. The CIA was formally given responsibility for developing a plan
to provide such a capability on July 14. (ARG/ARA/COIN Action Memo #1,
July 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 70 D 122, IRG/ARA/COIN Action Memos) The planned
operation was approved by the Department of State, CINCSO, the U.S. Ambassador in La Paz,
Bolivian President Barrientos and Commander-in-Chief of the Bolivian
Armed Forces Ovando. A team of
two instructors arrived in La Paz on August 2. In addition to training
the Bolivians in intelligence-collection techniques, the
instructors—[text not declassified]—planned
to accompany the Second Ranger battalion into the field. Although the
team was assigned in an advisory capacity, CIA “expected that they will actually help in directing
operations.” The Agency also contemplated this plan “as a pilot program
for probable duplication in other Latin American countries faced with
the problem of guerrilla warfare.” (Memorandum for the Acting Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division, August 22; ibid.)
167. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January
1966–December 1968. Secret. The memorandum indicates the President
saw it.Washington, September 5, 1967, 15:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Insurgency in Bolivia
During the past few days there have been two significant developments in
Bolivia’s efforts to deal with communist guerrillas: Bolivian security forces have discovered caches of documents
belonging to the guerrillas. These include passports, identity
cards, codes and photographs. The documents have been turned
over to us for analysis.As reported
in telegram 408 from La Paz, August 25. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
POL 23–7 BOL) A
preliminary reading from CIA
shows rather conclusively that “Che” Guevara travelled to Bolivia via Spain and
Brazil in late 1966 using false documents.This information was based on an early
CIA assessment of the
documents captured by Bolivian anti-guerrilla forces in late
August. ([text not declassified]
Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, [file name not declassified])
The other passports and ID cards are expected to give the
identity of additional Cubans active in the Bolivian guerrilla
movement. I will send you the CIA report as soon as received.After a series of defeats at the hands of the guerrillas, the
Bolivian armed forces on August 30 finally scored their first
victory—and it seems to have been a big one. An army unit caught
up with the rear-guard of the guerrillas and killed 10 and
captured one, as against one soldier killed. Two of the dead
guerrillas are Bolivians and the rest either Cubans or
Argentines. CIA believes that
several of the captured false passports they are now analyzing
may have been used by the Cubans to get to Bolivia.
The Bolivians want to use the information on “Che” Guevara in the trial of Regis
Debray, a young French Marxist intellectual, who is close to
Fidel Castro and strongly suspected of being on
a courier mission when he was caught in guerrilla territory in Bolivia
last April. It is not in our interest, or the Bolivians’, to have the
U.S. appear as the sole authenticating agent for the documents. Tomorrow
in the 303 Committee we will consider how best to handle the
authenticating aspect.
The victory of the Bolivian army over the guerrillas should do much to
bolster the morale and determination of the Bolivian troops and their officers. The second
Bolivian Ranger battalion which we have been training since June will
give them added capability to pursue the guerrillas. The new unit will
go into operation late this month.
Walt
168. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January
1966–December 1968. Secret. The memorandum indicates the President
saw it.Washington, September 6, 1967, 13:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Documents Relating to Cuban Intervention Captured in
Bolivia
CIA’s interim technical report on the
guerrilla documents found by Bolivian security forces in early August,
1967 is attached.Not attached. The undated
report was a preliminary technical analysis of the documentation and
other material found in five caches in various parts of Bolivia in
early August. The material included 21 different passports, 5
Bolivian internal documents, photographs, notebooks, maps, and 7
reels of magnetic recording tape. The report contained an inventory
of the materials. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, c. 58,
September 8, 1967)
The report focuses on the evidence pertaining to “Che” Guevara. The other material is still being analyzed. The
documentation on Guevara—two
passports, identity cards, health certificates and snapshots— show the
following: —the two passports bearing different names carry the same
photograph and fingerprints.—the fingerprints are identical to examples of prints of
Guevara furnished
to CIA [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] in 1954
and [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] in 1965.—a CIA photo comparison
analyst is of the opinion that the photographs are “most
probably” photographs of Guevara in disguise.—the passports show that Guevara most likely travelled legally from
Madrid to Sao Paulo, Brazil at the end of October, 1966, and
from there to La Paz on November 3, although the documents do
not indicate arrival in La Paz.—certain snapshots of what looks like Guevara in the jungle give no
evidence of a montage.
These findings lead to a strong presumption that Guevara arrived in Bolivia last
November, but they are still short of conclusive proof. The CIA report does not draw conclusions at
this stage.
In furnishing us the documents, the Bolivians asked that we give them the
results of our analysis so they could use the information in the
impending trial of Regis Debray—the young French Marxist intellectual
who is known to be close to Fidel
Castro. He was arrested in Bolivian guerrilla territory
last April after having entered the country clandestinely.
We do not want to become this closely involved with the Debray trial,
which has already become a cause celebre in France. The nature of the
evidence is such that it can be attacked as fabrication. Exclusive US
analysis will add credibility to the almost inevitable charge that
CIA planted the material. Debray,
echoed by the French press and the Communist propaganda mill, is already
claiming CIA and FBI involvement.In an August
24 memorandum to Oliver,
James R. Gardner (INR/DDC) had urged that the
Department be prepared to address charges by Debray of CIA involvement: “Normally the
Department and CIA have taken the
line that we should neither confirm nor deny charges about CIA activities even though in some
cases the temptation to deny is strong. (The Secretary has asked,
incidentally, that in no case should such a denial be made without
consulting him if there is any chance whatever that such a denial
might later be exposed as false or misleading.)” (Ibid., Bolivia,
1962–1980) INR was aware “that
CIA agents have participated in
some of the Debray debriefings.” (Memorandum from Gregory B. Wolfe (INR/RAR) to Hughes, August 23; ibid.)
To get around these problems, the 303 Committee has decided that we
should tell the Bolivians to surface the documents and request the
assistance of several governments in analyzing them. This could include
Argentina where Guevara was
born, Peru, Guatemala and Mexico where he resided; Uruguay, whose
passport he used; and Brazil through which he travelled enroute to
Bolivia. We would, of course, also cooperate. By broadening the analysis
base, we narrow our exposure and enhance credibility of the
evidence.The 303 Committee decided this
on September 8. (Minutes of September 8 meeting of the 303
Committee, September 12; ibid., 303 Committee Files, c. 58,
9/8/67)
Walt
169. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on September 14.NIE 92–67Washington, September 14, 1967.
THE SITUATION IN BOLIVIA
The Problem
To estimate the situation in Bolivia and the probable impact of the
present insurgency on it, over the next year or so.
Conclusions
The present insurgency in Bolivia is organized and supported by
Cuba. Its seriousness lies in the possibility that the insurgents
may eventually provide a rallying point for many disaffected
elements which hitherto have been unable to coalesce. The threat
posed is more a function of the inherent fragility of Bolivia’s
political, economic, and social structure than of the insurgents’
own strength and capabilities.Over the next year or so, there is little chance that the
insurgents will be able to bring about the overthrow of the
Barrientos regime, but it is also unlikely that the regime will be
able to stamp out the insurgency.A prolongation and expansion of the insurgency would impose severe
financial and psychological strains on Bolivia, greatly hindering
the economic development and social amelioration that are essential
to the achievement of stability in that country. Defense costs for a
protracted guerrilla war would add heavily to the already serious
deficit in the national budget, would further limit public
investment, and would threaten the government’s stabilization
program. In these circumstances, Barrientos would become
increasingly dependent on US aid. Although eager to obtain technical
and material military aid, he would be extremely reluctant to
sanction a military intervention in force by the already concerned
neighboring states or by the OAS.If the government’s counterguerrilla operations are protracted and
unsuccessful, that would encourage other disaffected elements to
undertake more active opposition to the government. It would also
seriously damage the morale of the military. In these circumstances,
the tenure of the Barrientos regime would become precarious.
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]
170. Editorial Note
A significant counterinsurgency program was a key element of U.S. foreign
policy toward Bolivia. The United States undertook in 1967 to help train
and equip a Bolivian Ranger battalion as part of Bolivia’s
counterinsurgency program aimed at Cuban-led guerrilla forces. In
addition to military training and advice provided by a Green Beret team,
the interagency Regional Group for Inter-American Affairs, which viewed
the Bolivian program as a pilot program for other Latin American
countries faced by guerrilla insurrections, approved in July 1967 the
assignment of a team to provide intelligence and technical support to
the battalion. The Bolivian Ranger battalion tracked down the guerrillas
in October 1967. CIA contract personnel
assigned to the Bolivian battalion as advisors unsuccessfully attempted
to prevent the execution of Cuban leader Ernesto “Che” Guevara by the Bolivian military. These advisors
provided on-scene reports of the execution to Washington. After
Guevara’s death and the end of the danger from Cuban-led insurgency,
U.S. officials responsible for coordinating covert activities took note
of these actions in Bolivia as evidence of the excellent U.S.-Bolivian
cooperation which supported efforts to acquire detailed intelligence on
Cuban-sponsored insurgency throughout Latin America.
171. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence HelmsSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January 1966–December
1968. Secret. A copy of the memorandum in CIA files indicates it was drafted by W.V. Broe and [name not declassified] in the Western Hemisphere Division
and approved by Thomas H.
Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans. (Central
Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS, Operational Group, Job 78–06423A, U.S.
Government—President)Washington, October 11, 1967.
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of StateThe Secretary of DefenseMr. Walt W. RostowAssistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
SUBJECT
Capture and Execution of Ernesto “Che” GuevaraYou are aware of the published accounts concerning the death of
Ernesto “Che” Guevara which were based in
essence on the Bolivian Army press conference on 10 October
attributing Guevara’s death to battle wounds sustained in the clash
between the Army and the guerrillas on 8 October 1967.On October 9 Rostow
informed President Johnson the “tentative
information” that the Bolivian unit trained by the U.S. “got
Che Guevara,” but
that information was inconclusive and based primarily on press
reports from Bolivia. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January 1966–December
1968) Guevara was said to be in a coma when captured and
to have died shortly thereafter, the heat of battle having prevented
early or effective treatment by Bolivian soldiers.[1 line of source text not declassified]
contrary information from [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] the Bolivian Second Ranger
Battalion, the army unit that captured Guevara. According to [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] Guevara was captured on 8 October
as a result of the clash with the Cuban-led guerrillas. He had a
wound in his leg, but was otherwise in fair condition.According to the text of a message sent by [text not declassified] on the scene,
Guevara’s fate would be decided on October 9 by the highest
Bolivian military authorities. “I am managing to keep him
alive,” he reported, “which is very hard.” ([telegram number not declassified]; Central
Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, [file name
not declassified]) He was questioned but refused
to give any information. Two Bolivian guerrillas, “Willy” and
“Aniceto,” were also captured.At 1150 hours on 9 October the Second Ranger Battalion received
direct orders from Bolivian Army Headquarters in La Paz to kill
Guevara. These orders
were carried out at 1315 hours the same day with a burst of fire
from an M–2 automatic rifle.In an
October 11 memorandum informing President
Johnson of the killing of Che Guevara,
Rostow remarked: “I regard this as
stupid, but it is understandable from a Bolivian standpoint,
given the problems which the sparing of French Communist and
Castro courier Regis Debray has caused them.”
Rostow pointed out that the death of
Che Guevara would
have a strong impact in discouraging further guerrilla activity
in Latin America. He also noted: “It shows the soundness of our
‘preventive medicine’ assistance to countries facing incipient
insurgency—it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion, trained by
our Green Berets from June–September of this year, that cornered
and got him.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country
File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memorandum, January 1966–December 1968)
On October 13 Rostow informed
Johnson of confirmation that Che Guevara was dead.
(Ibid.) [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] was an eye witness to Guevara’s
capture and execution.Richard HelmsPrinted from a copy that
indicates Helms signed
the original.
172. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence HelmsSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January 1966–December
1968. Secret. Copies of this memorandum in CIA files indicate that it was drafted by Broe and [name
not declassified] in the Western Hemisphere Division and
approved by Karamessines.
(Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS, Operational Group, Job
78–06423A, U.S. Government—President)Washington, October 13, 1967.
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of StateThe Secretary of DefenseMr. Walt W. RostowAssistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
SUBJECT
Statements by Ernesto “Che” Guevara Prior to His Execution in
BoliviaFurther details have now been obtained from [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] who was
on the scene in the small village of Higueras where Ernesto
“Che” Guevara was taken after his
capture on 8 October 1967 by the Bolivian Army’s Second Ranger
Battalion.A full account of the
capture and death of Che
Guevara is in CIA
Intelligence Information Cable [telegram
number not declassified], October 12. (Central
Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, [file name
not declassified])[less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] attempted to interrogate Guevara on 9 October 1967 as soon
as he got access to him at around 7 a.m. At that time “Che” Guevara was sitting on the floor
in the corner of a small, dark schoolroom in Higueras. He had his
hands over his face. His wrists and feet were tied. In front of him
on the floor lay the corpses of two Cuban guerrillas. Guevara had a flesh wound in his
leg, which was bandaged.Guevara refused to be
interrogated but permitted himself to be drawn into a conversation
with [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] during which he made the following comments: Cuban economic situation: Hunger in
Cuba is the result of pressure by United States imperialism.
Now Cuba has become self-sufficient in meat production and
has almost reached the point where it will begin to export
meat. Cuba is the only economically self-sufficient country
in the Socialist world.Camilo Cienfuegos: For many years the
story has circulated that Fidel
Castro Ruz had Cienfuegos, one of his
foremost deputies, killed because his personal popularity
presented a danger to Castro. Actually the death of
Cienfuegos was an accident. Cienfuegos has been in Oriente Province
when he received a call to attend a general staff meeting in
Havana. He left by plane and the theory was that the plane
became lost in low-ceiling flying conditions, consumed all
of its fuel, and crashed in the ocean, and no trace of him
was ever found. Castro had loved Cienfuegos more than any of
his lieutenants.Fidel Castro
Ruz:Castro had not been a
Communist prior to the success of the Cuban Revolution.
Castro’s own
statements on the subject are correct.The Congo: American imperialism had
not been the reason for his failure there but, rather, the
Belgian mercenaries. He denied ever having several thousand
troops in the Congo, as sometimes reported, but admitted
having had “quite a few”.Treatment of Guerrilla Prisoners in
Cuba: During the course of the Cuban Revolution and
its aftermath, there had been only about 1,500 individuals
killed, exclusive of armed encounters such as the Bay of
Pigs. The Cuban Government, of course, executed all
guerrilla leaders who invaded its territory.… (He stopped
then with a quizzical look on his face and smiled as he
recognized his own position on Bolivian soil.)Future of the Guerrilla Movement in
Bolivia: With his capture, the guerrilla movement
had suffered an overwhelming setback in Bolivia, but he
predicted a resurgence in the future. He insisted that his
ideals would win in the end even though he was disappointed
at the lack of response from the Bolivian campesinos. The
guerrilla movement had failed partially because of Bolivian
Government propaganda which claimed that the guerrillas
represented a foreign invasion of Bolivian soil. In spite of
the lack of popular response from the Bolivian campesinos,
he had not planned an exfiltration route from Bolivia in
case of failure. He had definitely decided to either fall or
win in this effort.According to [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] when Guevara, Simon Cuba, and Aniceto Reynaga Gordillo
were captured on 8 October, the Bolivian Armed Forces Headquarters
ordered that they be kept alive for a time. A telegraphic code was
arranged between La Paz and Higueras with the numbers 500
representing Guevara, 600
meaning the phrase “keep alive” and 700 representing “execute”.
During the course of the discussion with Guevara, Simon Cuba and Aniceto
Reynaga were detained in the next room of the school house. At one
stage, a burst of shots was heard and [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] learned later that
Simon Cuba had been executed. A little later a single shot was heard
and it was learned afterward that Aniceto Reynaga had been killed.
When the order came at 11:50 a.m. from La Paz to kill Guevara, the execution was
delayed as long as possible. However, when the local commander was
advised that a helicopter
would arrive to recover the bodies at approximately 1:30 p.m.,
Guevara was executed
with a burst of shots at 1:15 p.m. Guevara’s last words were, “Tell
my wife to remarry and tell Fidel
Castro that the Revolution will again rise in the
Americas.” To his executioner he said, “Remember, you are killing a
man.”The [text
not declassified] on site, reporting on Guevara’s
execution, indicated that “it was impossible keep him alive.”
([telegram number not declassified]
October 10; ibid., [file name not
declassified])At no time during the period he was under [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] observation
did Guevara lose his
composure.DickPrinted from a copy that
indicates Helms signed
the original.
173. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January
1966–December 1968. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The memorandum
indicates Johnson saw it.Washington, October 14, 1967, 12:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
“Che” Guevara
Attached is a memorandum from Dick Helms describing the detention and
execution of “Che” Guevara.Document 172.
CIA has also obtained [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] messages
sent from Havana to “Che” in
January and February 1967 showing that the Bolivian guerrilla movement
was a Cuban show designed to spark a movement of “continental
magnitude”.According to information
provided to the CIA, Che Guevara stated that the
ultimate purpose of the insurgency in Bolivia was to “create a Viet
Nam out of South America.” ([telegram number not
declassified] Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files,
[file name not declassified])
Several high ranking members of the Bolivian Communist Party were called
to Havana to convince them that it would be an error to present the
Bolivian operation as a national movement. These messages also indicate
that the French
pro-Castro communist
theoretician Jules Debray was sent to Bolivia to contact “Che” Guevara in late February. He was arrested in March.
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
we gather that Cuban officials accept the fact that “Che” is dead and may be trying to
recover the body. The communist-leaning President of the Chilean Senate,
Salvador Allende, has sent a message to President Barrientos asking for
the remains. This request, and one by the family,—”Che’s” brother went to Bolivia to
claim the body—probably led Barrientos to make the announcement that
“Che” had been cremated.
The Bolivians do not want an independent autopsy to show that they
executed “Che” and they are
intent on not permitting the remains to be exploited by the communist
movement.
The death of “Che” and Debray’s
dramatic public reversal of plea from innocent to guilty in the court
case represents a serious blow to Castro. Both his leading guerrilla fighter and guerrilla
theoretician have fallen in Bolivia. We do not know how he will react.
Against the possibility that he might try to recoup lost prestige by
some dramatic act against United States interests in Latin America—such
as bombing of one of our Embassies or kidnapping of diplomatic
personnel— we have instructed our missions to be on the alert and take
necessary precautions.This instruction was
transmitted in telegram 54210 to all ARA posts, October 14; it also instructed the posts to
refrain from any statements in which the United States takes credit
for defeat of the Cuban-led insurgency in Bolivia. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
POL 6 CUBA) In an October 10
memorandum Broe wrote that the defeat of the guerrillas and killing
of Che Guevara in Higueras
“not only wiped out the guerrillas active in Bolivia, but also
probably uprooted a Cuban-directed guerrilla network which was
destined to spread throughout Latin America.” (Broe to the Deputy
Director for Plans, October 10; Central Intelligence Agency, Job
88–01415R, DDO/IMS Files, [file name not
declassified]) The CIA
prepared a report on Cuban Subversive Policy and the Bolivian
Guerrilla Episode, May 1968, that was forwarded to President
Johnson on June 11, 1968,
with the following comment by Helms: “This detailed study gives an insight into
the doggedness with which Communist Cuba pursues its revolutionary
aims in Latin America.” (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Cuba, Vol. IV, Bowdler File, 1965–1968)
Walt
174. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 CommitteeSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Files, c. 63, December 1, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only.Washington, November 22, 1967.
SUBJECT
Exploitation of Residual Relationships Developed During the
Political Action Program for Bolivia
REFERENCE
Memorandum for the 303 Committee, Subject: “Results of the
Political Action Program for Bolivia,” dated 15 July 1966Document 161.
1. Summary
Reference memorandum reported the successful conclusion of a political
action program for Bolivia. This program, approved by the 303 Committee
on 5 February 1965, culminated approximately 18 months later in an
orderly transfer of power via elections to a civilian, constitutional
government and inauguration of President Rene Barrientos on 6 August
1966. [10½ lines of source text not
declassified]
2. Current Status
[6 lines of source text not declassified] This
effort which was responsive to the IRG/ARA/COIN Action Memorandum number one dated 20 July
1967,See Document
166. entailed the dispatch to the area of guerrilla
operations, by the Agency, of a highly professional and well equipped
team using Bolivian Government cover. [4½ lines of
source text not declassified] It so effectively improved the
intelligence capability of the Bolivian Second Ranger Battalion that
elements of that unit acting on field acquired intelligence were able
within a matter of days to establish contact with the main force of
guerrillas and on 8 October 1967 eliminate all but six of the
insurgents. Ernesto “Che”
Guevara was among those who
lost their lives. Clean up operations are continuing.
[3 lines of source text not declassified]
Specifically they were used to prevent the summary executions of Ciro
Roberto Bustos, Jules Regis Debray and other guerrilla captives, and
subsequently to arrange for their interrogation by experienced [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
interrogators. It was through information provided by Bustos that the Bolivian Army was able to
recover documents and matériel cached by the insurgents. These were
later used in the Bolivian presentation to the meeting of Foreign
Ministers where Foreign Minister Guevara Arce surfaced participation of Ernesto
“Che” Guevara in the guerrilla
operations.
[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not
declassified]
3. Future Plans
[1 paragraph (3 lines of source text) not
declassified]
4. Coordination
Assistant Secretary Oliver and Ambassador Henderson concur with the
continuance of these operational relationships.Oliver recommended approval in a memorandum to
Kohler on November 29.
(Department of State, INR/IL
Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, c. 63, December 1, 1967) This
approval elicited criticism, however, from within INR and ARA. In a memorandum to Trueheart on November 30, Gardner remarked: “we
learn that CIA sent a CI team to Bolivia in August of this
year, under Bolivian Government cover, [text not
declassified]. I would have supposed that this matter was
preeminently fit for 303 consideration.” (Ibid.) [text not declassified]
5. Recommendation
It is recommended that the 303 Committee note and endorse this
activity.The 303 Committee approved the
recommendation at its December 1 meeting. (Ibid.)
175. Letter From the Ambassador to Bolivia (Henderson) to the Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver)Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 BOL.
Confidential; Official–Informal.La Paz, January 5, 1968.
Dear Covey:
As you know from your discussions with Bolivian Foreign Minister Guevara
Arce and Foreign Minister Romero Loza, the GOB budget problem threatens the
capacity of Bolivia to resist extremist subversion and move the country
forward on its longer term development effort which I see as the best
insurance against successful future subversion.
My approach to the threat of subversion has been the policy spelled out
in our meetings last July. Acting on the understanding reached in our
discussion at the White House with Walt
Rostow, I have taken those measures which were necessary
to insure the stability and continuance of the Barrientos
Administration. At the same time, I have avoided precipitous,
unnecessary military and/or financial aid which would have tended to
reduce pressure on the GOB to look
primarily to its own resources for dealing with the guerrilla/subversion
threat.
Within this approach, I have carefully weighed the desirability and
timing of extraordinary aid. As we agreed last July, when I felt the
time had come for such aid, I would so advise you. I am convinced that
this time has now come and request your support in obtaining immediate
approval for $5,000,000 in supporting or similar aid for meeting this
budget crisis.
Throughout the struggle against Che
Guevara and his guerrilla movement, this Mission has used
its influence and resources to eliminate this threat to Bolivia and
hemisphere-wide stability. The immediate success of this policy is
apparent, but it has left the GOB with a
legacy of problems which I consider we must help the GOB resolve. The budget crisis is part of
the legacy.
At the beginning of 1967, the GOB faced
an uncovered budget deficit, after permissible borrowing from the
Central Bank under the IMF ceiling, of
about $7,000,000. My Country Team and I felt that this deficit was
manageable by the GOB itself and put
pressure on the GOB to accelerate
measures for generating new revenues and for basic institutional reforms
in its fiscal and budgetary practices. However, the injection of
Che and his guerrillas
changed this picture radically: Not only did the uncovered deficit
double largely because of direct and indirect GOB expenditures required to meet the threat but revenue
generating and reform measures were postponed in large part to avoid
disaffecting key political groups.
Today, the Bolivian Government faces an uncovered deficit of between
$12,000,000 and $15,000,000 which, under the IMF ceiling, cannot be met through borrowing from the
Central Bank. Bolivia has pursued a policy of monetary stabilization
since 1956 and has accepted the guidance of the IMF in carrying out this policy. Without raising questions
here about the appropriateness of some IMF guidelines, I am convinced that violating the IMF ceiling and suspending the stand-by
would create a most serious crisis in confidence and could lead to political and economic
consequences which could pose as immediate a threat to Bolivian
stability as Che did.
It seems to me to be incumbent upon us to take those actions, through
financial and other assistance, which will prevent the emergence of
conditions propitious to extremist subversion, particularly since some
Cuban Communist elements and organized supporters still survive and
there are, as you know, credible if inconclusive reports of guerrilla
planning and training by pro-Chinese Communists.
In seeking this $5,000,000 aid—preferably in the form of Supporting
Assistance, given the underlying political reasons for the problem
itself and for responding to it—I am asking for an extraordinary
injection of resources above the presently planned level of project
spending. I continue to endorse the development strategy spelled out in
our program documents, but I recognize that this strategy is seriously
endangered if the recurring imbalance in GOB revenues and expenditures is not overcome.
As a result, this $5,000,000 request is not intended to be a one-shot
palliative but part of a long-term strategy to help the GOB develop and install sound fiscal
policies and institutional competence to administer these policies. The
Country Team has been working on this approach for several years and on
the basis of experience gained, can be expected to continue to press
effectively for performance.
In view of the magnitude of the Bolivian problem and the need for
sufficient leverage to accomplish the results we have in mind, we are
developing a package of additional assistance over three years of about
$7–$8 million beyond the $5 million now requested. We are satisfied that
funding for this package can be provided from future PL 480 generations rather than additional
dollar inputs. Our analysis of existing project commitments plus
permissible counterpart drawdowns under the IMF ceiling have convinced us that the initial $5 million
needed now cannot be provided from local currencies at our disposal.
The strategy will be presented to Mr. Richard Richardson for his analysis
and evaluation when he arrives in mid-January. My Country Team and I are
looking forward to discussions with him which can facilitate my
negotiating with the Bolivians and expedite the processing of this
extraordinary aid package.
Let me reiterate my concern for immediate action. In the framework of our
discussions last July, this extraordinary $5,000,000 aid is required now
to bolster the capability of the GOB to
meet the aftereffects of the anti-guerrilla operation and to insure its
capacity to move forward sound fiscal and development policies. The
political climate, as reflected already to you by Ministers Guevara and Romero, requires prompt
response by us if we are to retain our capacity to influence the course
of political, military and economic events here, and not piddle away the goodwill we might
have generated—and then later have to do the operation at greater
cost.In a January 10 response to
Henderson, Oliver stated that Henderson had “definitely
corroborated my hunches.” Oliver indicated that “once decisions are made we
ought to move very fast.” (Ibid.)
With best personal regards and my best wishes for 1968.
Sincerely,
Doug
176. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, President Barrientos
Visit. Confidential. The memorandum indicates that President
Johnson saw it.Washington, June 26, 1968, 18:20
p.m..
SUBJECT
The Barrientos Visit and Economic Assistance
Bolivia had a $7 million deficit in 1967 and may have an additional $10
million in 1968. The deficits are due principally to a drop in tin
prices, the cost of putting down the Guevara guerrillas, a decline in revenues from the
nationalized mines, and delay in implementation of planned revenue
measures.
The Bolivians asked us for budgetary help last year, and Covey Oliver reluctantly agreed to
continue them on the dole (they were supposed to come off on January 1,
1968) provided they took self-help measures to cover part of the
deficit. The deal worked out after months of negotiations has these
elements: The US would authorize a $4.5 million
supporting assistance loan for budget support in 1968 and
approve standby authority to use up to $9 million in 1969 and
1970 from PL 480 local currency
generations.The Bolivians would implement fiscal
reform measures; increase revenues by 25% in 1968; reduce 1968
spending by 12% under planned levels; establish tighter controls
over free spending autonomous agencies; and continue IMF drawing eligibility.
By late May, the loan was on the verge of being signed.Details of the proposed U.S. aid package to Bolivia
were transmitted in telegram 167959 to La Paz, May 21. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
AID (US) 10 BOL) Further
negotiations in La Paz on the loan agreement were reported in
telegram 5287 from La Paz, June 25. (Ibid.) The Bolivians had
taken all the self-help measures except the key revenue-raising 10%
import surtax, but seemed ready to do that. Then President Barrientos
ran into some political flak with students, teachers and military
plotting. He did not want to increase political tensions with the
surtax, so postponed action until he had the situation well in hand. But
after taking care of his troubles, he continued to delay.
From some of our special intelligence, we have the distinct impression
the delay is related to Barrientos’ visit to the Ranch. We suspect his
advisers have told him that by talking to you, he can probably get the
budget support money without imposing the surtax. He may also think he
can get you to move three development loans (roads, community
development, aviation) which AID is
holding back until Bolivia gets its financial house in order because
each calls for a sizeable local contribution.
AID has told the Bolivians that the
FY 1968 SA money must be obligated by
June 30 or it lapses, and the prospects for FY 1969 money are most uncertain. Ambassador Henderson reports that even these facts
of life have not persuaded them to move on the surtax.
Unless the Bolivians have a change of heart between now and Sun-day,June 30. President Barrientos may try
to use the Ranch visit to engage in substantive talks.According to the President’s Daily Diary of July 5,
Johnson met with
President Barrientos at the LBJ
Ranch in Johnson City, Texas,
from 1:23 to 2:29 p.m. A State luncheon followed. (Johnson Library)
No memorandum of conversation of the Johnson– Barrientos meeting has been found. A White
House press statement on July 5 indicates that in the discussion
Barrientos “underlined the efforts that this government had made to
create an environment of political and social stability as well as
loyalty to democratic process.” (Ibid., National Security File,
Country File, Bolivia, President Barrientos Visit) We will
try to discourage this.
In reviewing the background, Bill
Bowdler concludes that AID’s insistence on self-help measures is justified from an
economic standpoint, but it does not give due weight to political
factors. Bill thinks we should
hold firm on the import surtax, but be more forthcoming on the three
development loans since they would help to sugar-coat the surtax for
Bolivian public opinion.On June 28 the
President approved Oliver
informing the Bolivian Finance Minister that if they put through the
import surcharge, the United States “would move right” with budget
support and project loans. The President would not raise the issue
with Barrientos. (Ibid.)
Walt
177. Action Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council
Staff to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Heads of
State Correspondence, Bolivia, March 1, 1968. Confidential.Washington, July 30, 1968, 4:00 p.m.
SUBJECT
Letter from President Barrientos
The Bolivian Embassy has delivered to State a long letter (Tab B)A Department of State translation is attached
but not printed. The Barrientos letter, July 8, was sent from New
York. (Ibid.) from President Barrientos thanking you for the
invitation to the Ranch and discussing issues he did not have time to
take up with you while there.
The issues boil down to: —recognition of Bolivia’s contribution to hemispheric security
by eliminating “Che”
Guevara.—Bolivia’s willingness to cooperate in physical integration,
but it also desires access to the sea.—a request that GSA make its 3-month suspension of tin sales
indefinite.—United States approval of a loan to moderate Bolivia’s
airports and airline.
At Tab A is a suggested reply prepared by State.Attached but not printed. The draft was prepared in
the Department of State and transmitted to the White House on July
24, along with the Department’s translation of the Barrientos
letter, under a covering memorandum from Read. (Ibid.) It compliments President
Barrientos on his decision to work toward greater economic integration
(i.e., Andean Common Market and the River Plate Basin Development) and
his success in dealing with the Guevara guerrillas. On bilateral economic matters, the
letter avoids getting into specifics because we do not know what use
President Barrientos might make of it. He knows that since the Ranch
visit, two loans (roads and agricultural cooperatives) have been
approved, and the airport-aircraft loan will be completed when details
on the down payment are worked out. We cannot agree to an indefinite
suspension of GSA tin sales, but the letter makes clear we will consult
fully with Bolivia on any significant actions we might contemplate
taking.
I recommend you sign the letter.The signed
letter to Barrientos is ibid.
WGB
178. Information Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security
Council Staff to President Johnson in TexasSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, January 1966–December 1968.
Confidential. The memorandum indicates it was received at the LBJ Ranch August 3 at 11 a.m.Washington, August 2, 1968, 15:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Political Crisis in Bolivia
President Barrientos is facing the most serious political crisis of his
two years in office. It stems from the publication of the “Che” Guevara diary, a copy of which was surreptitiously
furnished to Fidel Castro by someone in Bolivia.The Embassy at La Paz reported publication of the
Che Guevara diary in
Presencia on July 9. (Telegram 5629 from La Paz, July 10; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
POL 6 CUBA)
Since the diary was kept under lock and key by the Army, the finger
pointed there, bringing into question the loyalty and discipline of the
Armed Forces. This produced a political chain reaction of protest by
opposition groups, a police crackdown, threats of strikes and student
disturbances, unrest in the Armed Forces, and finally, replacement of
the civilian cabinet with a mediocre military one.On July 19 the Embassy in La Paz reported that
“public criticism of armed forces for leak of Che Guevara diary has dragged
their prestige to new low, putting irresistible pressure on them to
find scapegoat.” (Telegram 5812 from La Paz; ibid., POL 15–1 BOL)
In the midst of all this, Barrientos’ Interior Minister Antonio Arguedas
took off for Chile where he announced that he had been the one that
passed the Guevara diary to
Castro. The circumstances of
his “fleeing” Bolivia, his public statements, and his desire to come to
the United States rather than go to Cuba which has been desperately
trying to get him, all cast serious doubt on the bona fides of the
Arguedas story.At a meeting of the
Interdepartmental Regional Group for ARA, the group concluded that the Barrientos government
was in serious danger from a military coup and danger from students
and labor should he prorogue the Congress. The Group agreed it was
in U.S. interest for Barrientos to remain in power. They recommended
the U.S. Ambassador persuade Barrientos to return to a civilian
cabinet and maintain a functioning Congress. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, ARA
Files: Lot 70 D 122, IRG/ARA
Action Memos, 1968) It sounds to me as though he agreed to be
the scapegoat for his old friend Barrientos in order to take the heat
off the restive Armed Forces. Incidentally, Arguedas is due to arrive in
the United States on Saturday, August 4.
Barrientos still confronts a difficult situation at home. The shift to a
military cabinet has not really satisfied the Armed Forces and is being
severely criticized by civilian elements. Fearing a congressional
investigation of the diary episode if he allows Congress to convene on
August 6, Barrientos seems inclined to delay its opening. There are also
indications that ambitious officers in the Army would like to use the
crisis to dump Barrientos.
Ambassador Henderson talked to
Barrientos yesterday about our interest in seeing him complete his
constitutional term. He gave him our impression that allowing Congress
to convene on schedule and going back quickly to a civilian cabinet
would help him hold to this objective. Barrientos agreed, but was vague
on the timing.
So far, Barrientos has weathered the storm and probably has a better than
even chance to see it through. Given the internal nature of his
problems, there is little we can do but give him continued moral
support. This we are doing. It is definitely in our interest that he
remain in power, because it is doubtful that anyone else could make as
good a showing in managing that difficult country.[text not
declassified]
WGB
179. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 30 BOL. Secret; Sensitive. The date
is handwritten on the memorandum.Washington, August 19, 1968.
SUBJECT
Bolivia—Former Minister of Government Returns, Makes Accusations
Against CIA
Former Bolivian Minister of Government Arguedas returned to La Paz on
August 17. At press conferences held upon his arrival and again later in
the day, Arguedas ascribed his action of providing the Guevara diary to Castro to his desire to rid Bolivia of
“imperialism”, as exemplified by the activities of the CIA. Arguedas claimed that he had been recruited by the CIA in 1965, and provided considerable
information on names of CIA personnel
and their alleged activities in recent years in Bolivia.The Arguedas affair was the subject of a meeting on
August 19 at the Department of State between CIA and representatives of INR and ARA.
(Memorandum from William C.
Trueheart (INR/DDC) to Hughes
and Denney; Department of
State, INR/IL Historical Files,
ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1968–1969) A separate record of
this meeting, dated August 20, was prepared by the CIA. (Ibid., Latin America General,
1967–1968)
Embassy La Paz believes that Arguedas’ anti-CIA line may have been ordered by President Barrientos to
place the onus of the diary scandal on the U.S., thereby diverting
attention from the GOB’s
shortcomings.On August 22, in
summarizing the Arguedas affair for President
Johnson, Rostow
reported: “At first, it appeared Arguedas and Barrientos were in
league to make the CIA a scapegoat
and deflect from themselves some of the criticism over the Guevara diary episode. But in an
August 20 press conference, Barrientos defended Bolivia’s relations
with the US and condemned Cuba as the real threat.” (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV,
Memoranda, January 1966–December 1968)
Possible ramifications of this development are several: Greatly increased press attention here to CIA “activities”.Possible public demonstrations against our Mission in
Bolivia.Possible intensification by radical student and labor groups
of agitation against the GOB (a
minor demonstration occurred in La Paz on August 16, but was
easily broken up).This raises the question of U.S.–Barrientos relationships if
the Embassy’s belief is correct.
Regarding (1) above we are planning, at least for the time being, to
adhere to our usual policy of declining comment on accusations about the
CIA, no matter how absurd such
accusations are.
Regarding point (2) above, our most recent information is that La Paz is
calm. The Embassy has taken security precautions.
Regarding point (3), we continue to believe that the GOB can weather local threats as long as
support from the military is forthcoming. The Barrientos–Military
relationship, while uneasy since the onset of the diary scandal, is not
yet at a point where military support seems likely to be withdrawn.
On point (4), it is too early to predict the effects of this incident on
our relationship with Barrientos. We will be evaluating this question
over the next few days.
Action Taken: I have instructed Ambassador
Castro (who is in San
Salvador making his protocolary goodbyes there) to delay his arrival in
Bolivia (scheduled for August 20 but not yet announced publicly) for a
few days. The Ambassador will return here for further consultations.
This action is in accordance with the recommendation of Embassy La Paz
which believes demonstrations against Ambassador Castro are likely if he arrives at the
height of the present crisis.
180. Memorandum From Director of the Bureau of the Budget Zwick to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January
1966–December 1968. Confidential.Washington, December 21, 1968.
SUBJECT
Proposed P.L. 480 Program for Bolivia
Orville Freeman request your
approval to negotiate a $6.8 million P.L. 480 sales agreement with
Bolivia for wheat/wheat flour and tobacco.Attached, but not printed. Repayment will be in dollars over
twenty years with 5 percent down. There will be no currency use payment
under the Purcell amendment since no additional currency is needed at
this time.
Last June, AID authorized a $4.5 million
Supporting Assistance loan to Bolivia as the initial budgetary support
for an 18-month fiscal reform and stabilization program jointly
developed among AID, the IMF, and the Government of Bolivia. This
P.L. 480 agreement will constitute AID’s
major 1969 resource input for Bolivia and as such forms an important continuing element in the fiscal reform
program.
The local currency proceeds from this agreement will
be earmarked on a standby basis for budget support in CY 1969 should the need arise.
Thus, the P.L. 480 agreement should eliminate the need
for additional Supporting Assistance funds. If the need for
budget support does not arise, the proceeds will be used in the
agricultural sector.
State/AID has determined that Bolivia’s
resources are not being diverted to unnecessary military expenditures to
a degree which materially interferes with its development and that
neither U.S. development assistance nor P.L. 480 sales proceeds are
being diverted by Bolivia to military purposes.
Because this P.L. 480 agreement will support and reinforce the fiscal
reform program and will substitute for dollar assistance, I recommend that you approve negotiation of the
agreement.The approve option is
checked. Rostow appended a
handwritten note to a December 24 memorandum to Johnson recommending approval of
the package, indicating: “Final approval by telephone, 27 December,
1968.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Bolivia, Vol. IV, Memoranda, January 1966–December 1968)
Charles J. Zwick
Brazil
181. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Brazilian Affairs
(Burton) to the
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA/BR
Files: Lot 66 D 418, DEF—Defense Affairs, 1964. Confidential.
Drafted by Burton.Washington, January 8, 1964.
SUBJECT
The Position of the Military in Brazil
Regarding your query on the above at the noon inter-agency meeting (the
meeting on the contingency paper)The
parenthetical comment was handwritten by Burton. An inter-agency group met on January 8 to
consider a draft contingency plan for Brazil; no substantive record
of the meeting has been found. The draft, prepared in ARA/BR, addressed four contingencies:
Extreme Leftist Revolt; Democratic Revolt Against Excesses of
Regime; Removal of Goulart
by Constructive Forces; and Gradual Extreme Leftist Takeover. It
recommended that the United States avoid association with “rightist
coup plottings,” although covert contact with such groups was
necessary for intelligence collection and “the exercise of a
moderating influence, where appropriate.” In the event of an
“interim military takeover,” the United States should assume a
“constructive friendly attitude” while pressing for a “quick return
to constitutional democratic processes.” (“A Contingency Plan for
Brazil,” December 11, 1963; ibid., Central Files 1961–63, POL 23–9 BRAZ) today, may I
offer the following comment.
I believe that it is reasonably clear that a substantial proportion well
in excess of a majority among the military officers in Brazil are
heavily oriented toward the maintenance of orderly democratic processes.
However, I do not think that there has been up to now any really
substantial capability or will to mount a coup to overthrow Goulart. The military already had one
unhappy and unsuccessful experience in attempting to disrupt orderly
democratic processes when they unsuccessfully tried to block Goulart’s succession to the presidency
in 1961 and had to settle for a parliamentary arrangement which was
subsequently discredited and abandoned. In this sense, I think that
there has been a lot of confused thinking on the subject of a
deteriorating military capability to overthrow Goulart. I submit that this capability
has been deteriorated and ineffective since the ill-fated fiasco of
1961, even before Goulart
understandably started making appointments and promotions to protect
himself against similar future actions.
On the other hand, the military can be a restraining force against
extremists and undemocratic excesses. I think it is generally recognized
that the Army Attaché in Brazil, Colonel Walters, feels most strongly
that Goulart is bringing about a
political erosion in the military. Yet, Colonel Walters just last August
acknowledged to me that if Goulart attempted to move toward dictatorship in
violation of the constitution, there would, at the very least, be
shooting. While Goulart has
shown a great penchant for generating acute political tension and crisis
at periodic intervals, past history indicates a considerable tendency on
his part to retreat and compromise—to avoid ultimate explosion. For this
reason the military should be viewed as a potential politically strong
restraining force against Goulartist undemocratic excesses. Our chief
worry should be that the military might be confused and immobilized by
continuing slick and subtle political maneuverings by Goulart.
I might add that there is in the military a very considerable reservoir
of good will toward the United States and sympathy toward U.S.
objectives and policy; evidence of this erupted in many quarters at the
time of the Cuban missile crisis. For this reason and
because of the considerations set forth above we have taken the
position that the cultivation of the Brazilian military has high
political importance and we have therefore, for example, pushed
forward a program of defense lending for C–130’s.Negotiations on the sale of C–130 aircraft to
Brazil were completed in June, when the Brazilian Air Minister
signed a memorandum of understanding. (Telegram 2799 from Rio de
Janeiro, June 10; ibid., DEF 12–5 BRAZ–US)
I believe that the above is a reasonably accurate reflection of the
thinking of Ambassador Gordon, except that he might possibly speak with
more vigor in view of past difficulties and delays we had to surmount
before we got implementation of his C–130 recommendations.
I understand that you have recently been exposed to various opinions on
the Brazilian military in connection with a recent general discussion of
military assistance. This memorandum is intended to be responsive to
such comment as well as to the question you raised on the contingency
paper.
Please let me know if there is any additional information you would like
on the subject of the military in Brazil.
182. Notes of Meeting Between the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon) and the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA
Files, 1964: Lot 66 D 65, Brazil 1964. Confidential. Drafted by
Mann. These notes were
typed in ARA from an attached set of
Mann’s handwritten notes.
Gordon was in the United
States for consultation January 20–February 10. At an interagency
debriefing on January 23 Gordon argued that the United States need intervene
only if the Brazilian armed forces were divided: “If this split were
not to occur, a coup from either the right or left with armed forces
support would be over before the U.S. could exercise any significant
influence.” (Memorandum for the record from Robert J. Hill, Jr.,
January 24; Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC
330 68 A 306, Brazil 334–703, 1964)Washington, January 22, 1964.
Goulart—Childish and erratic.
Apparently tries to keep an inch or two windward. Does not believe he is
a commie. Very tolerant of commies because they are useful to him. More
a follower of Vargas and Peron. Personable demagogue.
Possibility of a Goulart coup followed by an eventual commie
takeover.
Brizola is Goulart’s
brother-in-law, has a radio station, former Gov. of Rio Grande do Sul.
Now a Congressman from Rio where he got a big vote. Demagogue more than
an intellectual type. Has said he would like to be the Fidel Castro of Brazil. Schilling is
his chief advisor who is a member of Communist Party.
Miguel Arrais, Gov. of Pernambuco. Wife is commie and he could be.
Shrewd—eligible for Presidency.
Carlos Lacerda (48)—Gov. of Guanabara. No. one anti-commie. One of ablest
in country. Brilliant. Was newspaper publisher. Good administrator.
Would make good President—under attack for being pro-American.
Adhemar de Barros (63)—Still Gov. of Sao Paulo, a key power. Steals but
is on our side. Says he will run but could not be elected. Ideal ticket
would be Lacerda–de Barros.
Meneghetti, Gov. of Rio Grande do Sul. (Around 65) Older but good. Some
iron but not vigorous.
Nei Braga—Gov. of Parana, south of Sao Paulo and most rapidly growing
state in Brazil. Good population with lots of drive. Around 40 years and
head of Christian Democratic Party. Anti-Communist and not always
outspokenly so. Catholic new dealer. Possible V.P. choice.
In Middle
Magalhaes Pinto (high 50’s). Gov.
of Minas Gerais. Has presidential ambitions. Plays both sides.
Technically in UDN but in minority group
which would bolt if Lacerda nominated. Difficult to say how able. But is
smarter than Goulart.
Carvalho Pinto. Former Gov. of Sao Paulo and Finance Minister. Able, good
administrator but provincial who does not understand finance. Honest and
puritanical. Sometimes plays to left. Dark horse presidential
possibility.
Trend against Kubitschek, and in favor of Lacerda. But election nearly
two years away.
Power Centers
Army
Church (weak and divided)
Industrial and Financial Community (Sao Paulo, Rio and Belo Horizonte in
that order)
Labor—Official part built by Vargas run by commies or Goulart
partisans.
Important to keep alive the Alliance for Progress idea in Brazil.
Burton has piece of paper of loans. About 27 in project
loans.Maybe handle PL 480IDBWorld BankFRINGE—Peace Corps, etc.
183. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 14 BRAZ.
Confidential; Limdis.Rio de Janeiro, February 21, 1964, 6
p.m.
1761. 1. Goulart received me
ThursdayFebruary 20. afternoon
for one hour responding my request early in week for renewal contact
after my recent Washington trip. He was in good mood, appearing pleased
with generally favorable reaction his Wednesday night speech.
2. I handed him original and translation Mrs. Kennedy letter of thanks,Not found. which he said would publish. He then questioned
me at some length about U.S. political scene, expressing great interest
in strength of President Johnson’s position and
expressing hope he might at some time meet President
Johnson informally. Said he was still thinking
of European trip in April or May and wondered whether he might pass
through Texas on way back. This was in tone vague conversation rather
than a pointed inquiry, and he emphasized that no definite travel plans
yet made, since they would require Congressional leave.
3. He then asked about prospects for early OECD response.Reference is to
the negotiations to reschedule Brazil’s foreign debt coordinated by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris.
Documentation on the negotiations is in the National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 14
BRAZ. I replied hoped not later than MondayFebruary 24. and possibly sooner. I
expressed concern that statement his Wednesday speech had over
anticipated successful results when negotiation not yet started, to
which he replied had to put best foot forward and had had personal
message from De Gaulle indicating latter’s disposition cooperate. I also
remarked that he had singled out reference to prospective fifty million
dollar German aid projects, which were much less than we had done in
recent years, to which he replied that structure of speech intended show
recent actions to strengthen relations with various countries, beginning
with December exchange of letters with President
Johnson.For text
of the letters, see Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64, Book I, pp.
81–83.
4. Apropos of De Gaulle, I mentioned with some asperity reported
statements visiting French Gaullist deputies on General’s ideas building
up economic relations with LA to help
“free LA from excessive dependence on
U.S.” I left with Goulart
memorandumNot found. showing
Brazilian trade with U.S. ten times that with France, relative amounts
of Brazilian coffee bought by two countries, absence of tariffs and
taxes on our part. Also pointed out that Brazil is receiving half its
wheat from U.S. practically as gift. This led to general discussion De
Gaulle’s motivations and notions world leadership, during which I
emphasized costliness world leadership under present conditions,
weakness French resource base, and tendency to exploit nuisance value
with being able back up by positive acts. I said that if De Gaulle would
lead Common Market to abandon taxes and discriminations against LA trade, this would really mean something,
but vague talk of blocs based on Latin affinities should be viewed
skeptically. This seemed to leave considerable impression on Goulart.
5. He asked me about Guantanamo and Panama problems, on which I gave him
straight forward factual background.
6. Cuba–Venezuela dispute reported separately.Goulart questioned how “a
small boatload of arms” could be considered an “invasion” and
recommended that the OAS consider
“some form of mild sanction proportional to the crime.” (Telegram
1759 from Rio de Janeiro, February 21; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 12 CUBA)
7. AMFORP problem reported
separately.Reference is to ongoing
negotiations to expropriate holdings of the American and Foreign
Power Company (AMFORP) in Brazil.
In his conversation with Gordon, Goulart raised specific problems associated with the
AMFORP subsidiary in Vitória,
suggesting that responsibility for its management be transferred to
the state. (Telegram 1760 from Rio de Janeiro, February 21; ibid.,
FSE 12 BRAZ)
8. He said looking forward to McCloy visit and thought Hanna case could
have constructive solution.On February 29
John J. McCloy, then a partner at the New York law firm of Mil-bank,
Tweed, Hadley, and McCloy, met Goulart in Rio de Janeiro to discuss the status of
the M.A. Hanna Mining Company. For a secondary account of the
meeting, see Kai Bird, The Chairman: John J.
McCloy, the Making of the American Establishment, pp.
550–553.
9. I then remarked on growing Washington concern at increasingly open and
favored Communist influence in Brazil, saying this now much greater even
than when Attorney General saw him December 1962. He replied with
defense legalization PCB, saying he genuinely believed
this would reduce their infiltration in and influence in other parties
and would demonstrate their small real strength in contrast highly
organized noise they were able to make. I asked how he could justify
idea legalizing. Replied Prestes’Luís
Carlos Prestes, leader of the Moscow-oriented Partido Comunista
Brasileiro (PCB). A PCB delegation met
Soviet officials at the Kremlin on February 9. (New York Times, February 10, 1964) trip excellent
way reducing receptivity PCB in Brazil, comparable to
Prestes’ Senate statement in 1946 that he would side with Russia if
Russia and Brazil in opposite sides of a war. Moreover, he said,
Communists and allies are now divided into three groups. There is the
Brizola group, largest in popular support but very radical in policies,
wanting violent overthrow regime now. There was the Chinese-Cuban group,
also violent but relatively small. Then there was the orthodox Moscow
group, by far the best disciplined, which was taking a very moderate
line corresponding within Brazil to Khrushchev’s moderate international
line in relation to U.S.
10. I said that Washington preoccupation went beyond question
legalization PCB, and was especially great at Communist
strength in Petrobras, communications, key labor unions, Ministry of
Education, etc. Long-term strategy was to get power, and if short-term
tactics change from moderation to violence, was there not a most serious
danger of paralyzing country
unless concessions were made to Communist taste. He replied you may stop
worrying about that. There was a test when Petrobras unions wanted to
launch general strike when two Petrobras directors were discharged, but
Goulart had opposed them and
they had not struck. (If price of this was Osvino’s appointment as
President Petrobras, I remain dubious as to who won.) He went on to say,
however, that he thought it was good for reactionary elite of country to
believe that left had such power, since this might prove only way of
getting them to accept basic reforms. He then launched into lengthy
disquisition on reforms, saying they were indispensable and that
blindness of Brazilian elite to their necessity was incredible. Said
eight thousand peasants wanting land had appeared in Governador
Valadares in Minas, and even if half of these Communists and other
outsiders, other half remained a serious problem for which practical
solution must be found and efforts to suppress through arming land
owners or police or army action would not do. Moreover, he said, no
reforms can be considered basic unless they amend constitution. A basic
reform must be reflected in revision of nation’s basic constitutional
document. He intended to keep on with his fight, and the reactionaries
would see that he would win. He ended the disquisition by saying “they
will give— they will give”.
11. As conversation was ending, he said he noted that I was probably
going to Washington in March for Ambassadors meeting on Alliance for
Progress widely reported in morning press. I said this not yet definite,
but purpose would be consideration how make AFP more effective. I said Washington perplexed at his
apparent prejudice against AFP. He
replied had no prejudice, but felt reformulation was essential. Said
best way of doing this would be meeting of all Western Hemisphere
Presidents, in which new ideas would not come simply from U.S. but as
common ideas to which all LA countries
would be committed because they had participated in formulation.
12. Comment: General tone conversation, including
apparent desire reasonable settlement Vitoria problem, more forthcoming
attitude on AMFORP in general,
welcome for McCloy’s prospective visit beginning March, and enthusiastic
appreciation our role on debt rescheduling problem, appeared reflect
real change his attitude toward U.S. over last few months, giving me
impression that idea radical break in favor line-up with Russia which he
had entertained last August was now abandoned. This is quite likely
reflection Russian indications that they are in no position to assume
heavy commitments to Brazil. On domestic front, on other hand, I read
both in and between lines disposition to take extreme risks, through
stimulation sporadic violence in countryside, mass meetings, strikes,
etc. to force constitutional amendments for basic reforms. I
increasingly suspect that major reform he is seeking is vote for
illiterates in hope this will spell death knell for Lacerda candidacy. This bodes very ill for
domestic tranquillity here in coming months.On February 19 Gordon discussed the situation in Brazil with
Lacerda, who reportedly felt “slighted because of very long interval
since our last talk.” Gordon
told Lacerda that some distance was necessary to avoid “so obvious a
public relationship as to make him appear a favorite son of U.S.”
Lacerda believed that the chances of a coup d’état, either for or
against Goulart, were
“negligible.” He feared, however, that Goulart would “register millions of illiterates
under guise of adult illiteracy,” thereby throwing the presidential
election in October 1965. (Telegram 1773 from Rio de Janeiro,
February 24; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 15
BRAZ)
Gordon
184. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 BRAZ. Secret; Priority;
Limdis. Repeated to Brasilia and Sao Paulo. Gordon was in Washington March
13–22 for consultation and the conference of U.S. Ambassadors and
AID Mission Directors to Latin
America.Rio de Janeiro, March 18, 1964, 7 p.m.
2002. For Ambassador Gordon.
Examination of latest phase of crisis (ushered in by March 13 rally and
President’s message to Congress) leads us to conclusion that there are
dangerous elements present which have not previously existed—even at
previous high-water mark of state of siege episode.On October 4, 1963, Goulart asked Congress for a 30-day state of siege
to restore order in the midst of general political unrest, including
rumors of an impending coup d’état. Goulart withdrew the request 3 days later in the
face of widespread opposition. On March 13, 1964, Goulart addressed a mass rally in
Rio de Janeiro organized by the General Command of Workers (CGT). Earlier in the day the President
had issued a decree to seize “underutilized” land within certain
federal jurisdictions. At the rally Goulart signed a decree to expropriate all privately
owned oil refineries. The next day, after signing a measure on rent
control, Goulart called on
Congress to amend the constitution as a means to promote other
“basic reforms,” including the legalization of the Communist Party.
In response to the President’s campaign, the opposition organized
its own mass rallies, including the “March of the Family with God
for Liberty” in Sao Paulo on March 19.
In broad terms, essentially new elements of current situation which
increase criticalness are as follows: There is general realization that Goulart has finally “defined himself”. This
commitment (which seems much firmer and more explicit than
anything Goulart has
come up with in past) has thus far received sustained support of
left as whole—including Brizola, PCB, various
other groups and subgroups. Only small Amazonas group (CPB) has
attacked Goulart’s new
position. While same sort of coalescing of elements of left took
place at time of state of siege, obvious and disturbing
difference is that they then opposed President whereas they now
support him.This phase of crisis, unlike predecessors, thus far appears to
be sustained push. Momentum of new Goulart offensive shows none of usual signs of
let-up (e.g. rumors of dissention among left, back-offs by
President, etc.).While success or failure of October fiasco seems to have been—
intentionally or not—geared to attempt on Lacerda, no such
problematic wild card exists in current drive which seems
carefully planned and appears to contain provisions for
substantial flexibility in likely event that favorable
Congressional action on President’s proposals not
forthcoming.Following factors bear on what Goulart might do in this case: (1) Goulart in various contacts
has given impression that he does not necessarily expect
Congress to accede to demands set forth in presidential message;
(2) Goulart now appears
to be sure enough of his power position to be willing to
consider by-passing Congress (without necessarily closing that
body); President’s confidence seems to be based at least
partially on CGT threat of
general strike if impeachment action started, CGT virtual ultimatum to Congress
to act on proposals of presidential message by April 20, rumored
possible declaration of military ministers in support of
Goulart’s proposals,
etc.; (3) among welter of rumors, two stand out which have
unusual persistence and ring of authenticity: First, that if
Congress does not act on request, Goulart will “decree” plebiscite on basic
reforms, and second, that Goulart will continue to flood market with
series of decrees (e.g. paper import monopoly, expropriation of
petroleum distribution industry, etc.). Aside from probability
or otherwise Goulart
will actually take these steps, psychological effect on public
of rumored impending action is very definitely such as to lead
to continued high pitch of crisis.Opposition—so far at least—has definitely not effectively
coalesced position. There seems to be some individual and/or
small group reflex reaction (talk about impeachment,
Congressional withdrawal to Sao Paulo, etc.) but efforts to
coordinate unified position in face of threat have not
materialized. (Lacerda’s
appeal to Adhemar and
Juscelino to form common front has resulted in somewhat
ridiculous poses of “I’ve always been a democrat; what’s new?”
instead of any real cooperation.)
In view of above factors, we somewhat apprehensive that (1) if rapid
deterioration of situation continues and (2) if opposition does not
somehow rally, substantial amount of ground may be lost irrevocably.
This leads us to wonder what actions within framework short term policy
paperFor text of the “Proposed Short
Term Policy Paper—Brazil,” September 30, 1963, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII,
Document 240. U.S. could take at this time to keep
opposition from becoming overly demoralized in face of Goulart drive.
One suggestion we have for your consideration at present is as follows: Discrete press leaks originating in Washington which clearly
demonstrate concern of USG over
recent turn of events in Brazil.In view of fact that you are staying over after general
departure of other LA Ambassadors
from Washington, might it not be useful to have this played up
as “extra and special consultation necessary in light of
Brazilian situation.”
Incidentally, our contacts with U.S. business community in last few days
have shown that most, if not all, view situation with alarm.
Brazilian business reaction appears similar, dollar on free market having
gone from 1460 to 1640 in last two days, while stock market has dropped
sharply (Embtel 2001).Telegram 2001 from Rio de Janeiro, March 18.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 2 BRAZ)
CAS concurs.
Mein
185. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to
the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. I, 11/63–6/64.
Secret.Washington, March 19, 1964.
SUBJECT
Chiefs of Mission Conference—Brazil and Chile
I attended a few sessions of the Chiefs of Mission Conference. One of the
more interesting included discussions by Ambassadors Gordon and Cole about the situations in
Brazil and Chile.
Brazil
Ambassador Gordon said that
the economic situation in Brazil is terrible.
Inflation was 80% last year and 50% the year before; prospects for
this year are even worse. In addition, there is stagnation— a
decline in net per capita income for the first time since the
1930’s. This stagnation results from a downward trend in the rate of
foreign investment (partly attributable to an unfortunate law on
profit remittances), and from a downward trend in the rate of
domestic investment (largely attributable to inflation and a lack of
confidence in the future). About the only bright spot is the foreign
exchange position, which is improved because of good coffee
prices.
The only thing worse than the economic situation is the political situation. Goulart is an incompetent,
juvenile delinquent, who represents a minority of Brazilians. In
the short run, he seems intent merely on survival. In the long
run, he would probably like a Peronista-type revolution, with a
lot of corruption at the top and support from the working
classes.
A Communist takeover is conceivable. Brizola and Goulart are rivals who often
work with each other; it is hard to tell how much. But there are
mitigating factors. Though a rabble-rouser, Brizola is not very
smart and not a good leader. In general, the leadership of the
extreme left seems divided.
The majority of voters are upset. They would like to throw out
Goulart. Also, the
military, which traditionally stays out of government, and which
traditionally is anti-Communist, is having its patience sorely
tried. But the leadership of the opposition is divided and it
has neither the power
nor the capacity to eject Goulart; furthermore, it would be difficult to
give the opposition this power and capacity. Generally speaking,
the policy of the opposition is to try to keep the ship of state
afloat in this very fluid situation until next year’s elections.
In this regard, the two likely successors look pretty good.
Kubitschek is spotty
but, on the whole is O.K. Lacerda would be excellent.
There are bright spots in the federal structure which, in Brazil,
is meaningful because the states have real power. Generally
speaking, the leadership in the states is first-class. Of the 22
governors, only one is really bad, three are poor, ten are good, and
eight are excellent.U.S. policy has the following elements in it: Like the Brazilian opposition, we hope the ship of state
can stay afloat until the elections.
We try to take advantage of the loose, sprawling,
multiple nature of Brazil to encourage the constructive
forces which reflect the majority of the people. Our
PL 480 program,
project aid, and the Alliance for Progress help to
demonstrate that, in the job of bringing about change,
there is a viable alternative to violent revolution.
The AID director from
BrazilJack B.
Kubisch. made the point that
many people in Washington feel that we should stand off
from Brazil until the Brazilians behave. This would be
tragic because it does not take into account the fact
that Brazil is a multiple society and that there are
many segments who are with us and whom we should not
ignore.
Our relations with the Brazilian military are good. This
is very important.
We have a friendly audience for USIS activities; in this regard the Embassy
has a “truth squad” which attempts to answer false
charges against the U.S.
Efforts with students in Brazil have been made, but there
is still a long way to go. This is a crucial field in
Latin America and, by and large, we have left it to our
enemies. We need more student exchanges, more books,
more pamphlets, etc. We must make the case for the
democratic alternative. An IMF stabilization program and foreign
investment are not good enough; they do not capture the
imagination.
In view of the civil war possibilities, the Embassy has
done contingency planning.In
telegram 1805 from Rio de Janeiro, February 27,
Gordon
reported completing a review of “possible lines of
covert action related to situation described in Burton
draft contingency paper” (see footnote 2, Document 181) and suggested that
the Special Group meet on March 19 to consider his
recommendations. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 1–1
BRAZ) The Special Group, however, did not meet while
Gordon was in
Washington. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files,
Special Group Files, Meetings) In a March 14 letter to
Mann,
Frank K.
Sloan reported that Gordon had expressed
reservations about a military contingency plan prepared
in DOD and “will discuss
the subject while in Washington next week.” (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1964–66, POL 1–1
BRAZ) No record of the meeting has been found. A copy of
the DOD paper, “Précis
of Contingency Plan for Brazil,” is in the Washington
National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 64 A
7425, Brazil 381, 1964.
[Omitted here is discussion on Chile, see Document
249.]
GC
186. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 BRAZ. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Passed to White House. The
telegram is based in part on information reported independently by
the U.S. Army Attaché, Vernon A.
Walters. According to Walters the conspirators had
agreed on seven grounds that could trigger a revolt. When they
appealed for U.S. assistance, however, Walters explained that he had
“no authority to discuss such matters.” Walters noted that he had
“passed information on to Ambassador who is taking matter up at
highest levels.” (Telegram DISC D–20 from Rio de Janeiro to the
Department of the Army, March 26; ibid., POL 23–9 BRAZ)Rio de Janeiro, March 26, 1964, 8 p.m.
2084. Please pass White House.
It has been reported by press that second Army Commander
Kruel recently told
Goulart that he
could not assure security of President if latter attended
planned May 1 rally in Sao Paulo. On this basis, it is widely
believed that Kruel’s
ouster as second army commander may be imminent.
Comment: If Goulart were to try to remove Kruel from second army command
it is not certain that he would go quietly. Efforts have
recently been made both by Adhemar and democratic military
leaders to secure Kruel’s
adherence to opposition side.
On March 20 Army Chief of Staff Humberto Castello Branco sent letter to generals
and other officers of army headquarters and subordinate units
(i.e. most senior officers other than those in major commands)
analyzing current situation in country and strongly upholding
army’s traditional role as a non-partisan defender of democratic
institutions. Letter (of which [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] has acquired
copy) is anti-Communist and by obvious implication
anti-Goulart,
condemning, for example, unattributed intentions of closing
Congress and calling Constituent Assembly.
Comment: Castello Branco, who is perhaps Brazil’s most
energetic, courageous and responsible army general on active
service, is reported by ARMA
[less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] recently to have agreed to lead
democratic resistance group in military. In his letter he is
assuming this leadership and throwing his own very considerable
prestige against Goulart
in direct challenge to latter.
According [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified], WarMin Jair currently in hospital for gall
bladder operation learned of letter only on March 24, on eve his
operation. He was furious and almost called off operation. According
ARMA, who got it from Army
Chief Surgeon, Jair recovering well but under any hypothesis will be
away from work for at least 30 days.
According ARMA, who has obtained
copies of documents in question, leaders of Democratic Military
Group are sending by safe-hand to officers sympathetic to their
cause throughout Brazil 3 questionnaires, which are in reality
instructions telling them how to put their units in readiness to
resist undemocratic moves by President and/or left. Second
“questionnaire” which is intended only for most trustworthy
officers, suggests that responsibility for giving signal for
action against regime should be vested in single senior
officer.
Comment: This single senior officer will
presumably be understood to be General Castello Branco.
General Comment: While above mentioned events are
encouraging in showing better leadership and new elements of
organization among democratic military resistance group, they also
obviously introduce short-term factors of instability into
situation.
Gordon
187. Telegram From the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon) to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 BRAZ. Top Secret; Immediate;
Exdis. Received in the
Department at 8:01 p.m., March 27. Bundy received an advance copy of this telegram on
March 27. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Brazil, Vol. II, 3/64) The next morning Bundy briefed the President on “a very disquieting
message” from Gordon: “We
will have a recommendation for you, I think, on the wire. It’s a
standby problem, but it might explode, he says, anytime in the next
month or so, day to day or month to month.” (Johnson Library,
Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation
between President Johnson and Bundy, March 28, 1964, 9:30 a.m.
CST, Tape F64.21, Side A, PNO 1)
The President was at his Ranch in Texas, March 26–31.Rio de Janeiro, March 28, 1964.
[telegram number not declassified]. The following
is [telegram number not declassified] transmitted
at the request of Ambassador Gordon:
Personal from Ambassador Gordon.
Please pass immediately to Sec. State Rusk, Assistant Secretary Mann, Ralph
Burton, Sec. Defense McNamara, Assistant Sec. Defense McNaughton, General Maxwell Taylor, CIA Director John McCone, Col. J.C.
King, Desmond
FitzGerald, White House for Bundy and Dungan,
pass to Canal Zone for General O’Meara. Other distribution only by approval above
named.
Since returning to Rio 22 March I have canvassed Brazilian
situation thoroughly with key civilian and military staff members
here, convoking Sao Paulo and Brasilia Post Chiefs to assist and
also making selected contact with some well informed
Brazilians.My considered conclusion is that Goulart is now definitely engaged on campaign to
seize dictatorial power, accepting the active collaboration of the
Brazilian Communist Party, and of other radical left revolutionaries
to this end. If he were to succeed it is more than likely that
Brazil would come under full Communist control, even though
Goulart might hope to
turn against his Communist supporters on the Peronist model which I
believe he personally prefers.The immediate tactics of the Goulart palace guard are concentrated on pressures
to secure from the Congress constitutional reforms unattainable by
normal means, using a combination of urban street demonstrations,
threatened or actual strikes, sporadic rural violence, and abuse of
the enormous discretionary financial power of the federal
government. This is being coupled with a series of populist
executive decrees of dubious legality and an inspired rumor campaign
of other decrees calculated to frighten resistance elements.
Especially important in this connection is the ability of the
President to weaken
resistance at the state level by withholding essential federal
financing. The government is also subjecting radio and TV outlets to
a partial censorship, increasing the use of the National News Agency
and requisitioning broadcast time for its reformist propaganda, and
making thinly veiled threats against the opposition press. The
purpose is not in fact to secure constructive social and economic
reforms, but to discredit the existing constitution and the
Congress, laying a foundation for a coup from the top down which
might then be ratified by a rigged plebiscite and the rewriting of
the constitution by a rigged Constituent Assembly.I do not wholly discard the hypothesis of Goulart’s being frightened off
this campaign and serving out his normal term (until January 31,
1966) with proper presidential elections being held in October,
1965. This would still be the best outcome for Brazil and for the
United States if it can happen. Goulart’s commitments to the revolutionary left are
now so far-reaching, however, that the chances of achieving this
peaceful outcome through constitutional normalcy seem a good deal
less than 50–50. He may make tactical retreats to tranquilize the
opposition again, as he has in the past. There are some signs that
this has happened in the past few days, as a result of the 19 March
massive opposition street rally in Sao Paulo, the declared hostility
of the governors of several major states, and warnings and rumblings
within the officer corps, especially of the army. But past
experience shows that each tactical retreat leaves considerable
ground gained and the next advance goes further than the previous
one. With his time running out and the candidates for the succession
getting actively into the field, Goulart is under pressure to act faster and with
less calculation of the risks. Misgovernment is also accelerating
the rate of inflation to a point threatening economic breakdown and
social disorder. A desperate lunge for totalitarian power might be
made at any time.The Goulart movement,
including its Communist affiliates, represents a small minority—not
more than 15 to 20 percent of the people or the Congress. It has
systematically taken control of many strategic points, however,
notably Petrobras (which under the decree of March 13 is now taking
over the five remaining private oil refineries not already under its
control), the Department of Posts and Telegraphs, the trade union
leadership in oil, railroads, ports, merchant shipping, the newly
formed rural workers’ associations, and some other key industries,
the military and civil households of the presidency, important units
of the Ministries of Justice and Education, and elements in many
other government agencies. In the armed forces, there are a number
of far leftist officers, who have been given preferment and key
assignments by Goulart, but
the overwhelming majority are legalist and anti-Communist and there
is a modest minority of long-standing right-wing coup supporters.
The left has sought to weaken the armed forces through subversive
organization of the non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel, with significant
results especially in the air force and navy.I undertook in March 21 talk with Secretary RuskAccording to Rusk’s
Appointment Book, he met Mann, Gordon, Burton, King, and FitzGerald at
10:02 a.m., March 21. (Johnson Library) No substantive record of
the meeting has been found. to appraise the strength and
spirit of the resistance forces and the circumstances that might
trigger internal violence and showdown. I find that since the
Goulart-syndicalist
street rally in Rio on March 13 there has been a radical
polarization of attitudes. Political and public leadership in
crystallizing overt support for the constitution and Congress, for
reforms only within the constitution, and for rejection of
communism, has come from a group of governors: Lacerda of Guanabara,
Adhemar de Barros of Sao Paulo, Meneghetti of Rio Grande do Sul,
Braga of Parana, and (somewhat to my surprise) Magalhaes Pinto of Minas Gerais.
They have been fortified by the clear declaration of ex-President
Marshal Dutra and the nomination acceptance speech of Kubitschek. The huge pro-democratic
rally in Sao Paulo March 19, largely organized by women’s groups,
has provided an important element of mass popular showing, which
reacts favorably in turn on Congress and the armed forces.There is a reciprocal interdependence of action between Congress
and the armed forces. Congressional resistance to illegal executive
actions and to unwarranted presidential demands for constitutional
change depends on the conviction that the members will have military
coverage if they take a stand. The legalist tradition of the armed
forces is so strong that they would desire, if at all possible,
congressional coverage for any action against Goulart. The action of Congress is
therefore one major key to the situation.While a clear majority of Congress mistrusts Goulart’s purposes and scorns his
evident incompetence, the present consensus of anti-Goulart congressional leaders is
that an absolute majority of the lower house cannot now be mustered
for impeachment. They also oppose a move of Congress away from
Brasilia as tending to undercut their already tarnished prestige,
although they would keep open a dramatic retreat to Sao Paulo or
elsewhere as a last resort in a near civil war or open civil war
situation. They are presently focussing on the approval of some mild
reform measures as one way of countering Goulart’s anti-Congress campaign,
and considering other more affirmative means of showing resistance.
They are most unlikely to vote a plebiscite law, a delegation of
powers, legalization of the Communist Party, votes for illiterates,
or other political changes sought by Goulart.By all odds the most significant development is the crystallizing
of a military resistance group under the leadership of Gen. Humberto Castello Branco,
Army Chief of Staff. Castello
Branco is a highly competent, discreet, honest, and
deeply respected officer who has strong loyalty to legal and
constitutional principles and until recently shunned any approaches
from anti-Goulart
conspirators. He has associated with him a group of other well
placed senior officers and is now assuming control and systematic
direction of the widespread but hitherto loosely organized
resistance groups, military and civilian, in all areas of the
country.Castello Branco’s
preference would be to act only in case of obvious unconstitutional
provocation, e.g., a Goulartist move to close Congress or to intervene in
one of the opposition states (Guanabara or Sao Paulo being the most
likely ones). He recognizes, however (as do I) that Goulart may avoid such obvious
provocation, while continuing to move toward an irreversible fait
accompli by means of manipulated strikes, financial undermining of
the states, and an executive plebiscite—including voting by
illiterates—to back up a Bonapartist or Gaullist-type assumption of
power. Castello Branco is
therefore preparing for a possible move sparked by a Communist-led
general strike call, another sergeants’ rebellion, a plebiscite call
opposed by Congress, or even a major governmental countermove
against the democratic military or civilian leadership. In these
cases, political coverage might have to come in the first instance
from a grouping of state governors declaring themselves the
legitimate Government of Brazil, with congressional endorsement
following (if Congress were still able to act). It is also possible
that Goulart might resign
under pressure from solid military opposition, either to flee the
country or to lead a “populist” revolutionary movement. The
possibilities clearly include civil war, with some horizontal or
vertical division within the armed forces, aggravated by the
widespread possession of arms in civilian hands on both
sides.Unlike the many previous anti-Goulart coup groups who have approached us during
the past two and one half years, the Castello Branco movement shows prospects of wide
support and competent leadership. If our influence is to be brought
to bear to help avert a major disaster here—which might make Brazil
the China of the 1960s—this is where both I and all my senior
advisors believe our support should be placed. (Secretaries
Rusk and Mann should note that Alberto
ByingtonAccording to Adolf A. Berle, Byington, a
Brazilian businessman, had been working to forestall a
“Goulart
dictatorship” and “bought on his own credit a shipload of oil to
make sure the Brazilian Navy would be able to function.” (Diary
entry, April 2, 1964; Beatrice Bishop Berle and Travis Beal
Jacobs, eds. Navigating the Rapids, 1918–1971:
From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle, pp. 788–789) is working with this
group.) We hold this view even should Castello Branco be relieved as Army Chief of
Staff.Despite their strength in the officer corps, the resistance group
is concerned about the adequacy of arms and the possible sabotage of
POL supplies. Within the coming
week, we will be apprised of their estimates of needed arms through
contact between ARMA and Gen.
Cintra, righthand man of Castello
Branco. POL needs
would include the navy fuel now being sought by Byington together
with motor fuel and aviation gasoline.Given the absolute uncertainty of timing of a possible trigger
incident (which could occur tomorrow or any other day); we recommend
(a) that measures be taken soonest to prepare for a clandestine
delivery of arms of non-US origin, to be made available to Castello Branco supporters in Sao
Paulo as soon as requirements known and arrangements can be worked
out. Best delivery means now apparent to us is unmarked submarine to
be off-loaded at night in isolated shore spots in state of Sao Paulo
south of Santos, probably near Iguape or Gananeia. (b) This should
be accompanied by POL availabilities
(bulk, packaged, or both may be required), also avoiding USG identification, with deliveries to
await outbreak active hostilities. Action on this (Deptel 1281)Telegram 1281 to Rio de Janeiro, March
26, reported: “Defense providing list of materials required and
other data on POL tanker action
we discussed with you. Urgently awaiting your on-scene
assessment of total situation as basis for moving ahead on this
and on shaping next steps vis-à-vis Brazil.” (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 2 BRAZ) should proceed
forthwith.The above two actions might suffice to secure victory for friendly
forces without any overt US logistical or military participation,
especially if politically covered by prompt US recognition our side
as legitimate GOB. We should,
however, also prepare without delay against the contingency of
needed overt intervention at a second stage and also against the
possibility of Soviet action to support the Communist-leaning side.
To minimize possibilities of a prolonged civil war and secure the
adherence of large numbers of band-wagon jumpers, our ability to
demonstrate commitment and some show of force with great speed could
be crucial. For this purpose and in keeping with our Washington
talks March 21, one possibility appears to be the early detachment
of a naval task force for maneuvers in south Atlantic, bringing them
within a few days’ steaming distance of Santos. Logistical supplies
should meet requirements specified in CINC South Brazil contingency Plan
(USSCJTFP–Brazil)Reference is
apparently to “US Southern Command Contingency Plan,” undated.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Brazil,
Vol. III, 4/64) reviewed here March 9. Carrier aircraft would be most
important for psychological effect. Marine contingent could perform
logistical security tasks set forth CINC South Plan. We would welcome advice soonest on
this or alternative methods meeting objective described
above.We recognize problem uncertain duration of need these forces in
area. With near-daily crises of varying intensity here, however, and
violence ready to become epidemic through rural land invasion,
clashes of rival Communist and democratic street meeting, or general
strike efforts, and with programmed crescendo of Goulart actions with special
commitment to “having achieved basic reforms” by August 24 (tenth
anniversary of Vargas suicide), real danger exists of eruption civil
war at any time. Only convincing sign of latter would be clean sweep
of extremists from military and civilian palace guard. Current
episode of rebellious sailors demonstrates fragility of situation
and possible imminence of showdown.We are meanwhile undertaking complementary measures with our
available resources to help strengthen resistance forces. These
include covert support for pro-democracy street rallies (next big
one being April 2 here in Rio, and others being programmed),
discreet passage of word that USG
deeply concerned at events, and encouragement democratic and
anti-Communist sentiment in Congress, armed forces, friendly labor
and student groups, church, and business. We may be requesting
modest supplementary funds for other covert action programs in near
future.I also believe that it would be useful, without entering into
detail, for Sec State or Presidential press conference response to
indicate concern at reports of economic deterioration and political
restlessness in Brazil and importance to future of hemisphere that
Brazil, true to its deep-rooted democratic and constitutional
traditions, will continue its economic and social progress under
representative democracy. We recommend such statement in next few
days.This message is not an alarmist or panicky reaction to any one
episode. It reflects the joint conclusions of the top Embassy staff
based on a long chain of actions and intelligence information which
convince us that there is a real and present danger to democracy and
freedom in Brazil which could carry this enormous nation into the
Communist camp. If this were a country of less strategic importance
to the U.S.— both directly and in its impact on all Latin America—we
might suggest a further period of watchful waiting in the hope that
Brazilian resistance unaided would take care of the problem. We
believe that there is substantial likelihood that it may do so,
given the basic sentiments and attitudes of the majority of the
people and the strength of organized democratic sentiment especially
in the southern half of the country. The power of Goulart and the presidency to sap
and undermine resistance
is so great, however, that our manifest support, both moral and
material and even at substantial cost, may well be essential to
maintain the backbone of the Brazilian resistance. No loss of time
can be afforded in preparing for such action. The alternative of
risking a Communist Brazil appears unacceptable, implying
potentially far greater ultimate costs in both money and
lives.
188. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Brazil, Vol. II, Cables, 3/64. Top Secret; No
Distribution. Another copy of the memorandum indicates it was
cleared by Bundy. (Memorandum
from Chase to Bundy, March
30; ibid.) The meeting was held at the White House.
FitzGerald also drafted an account of the
meeting, portions of which are summarized in footnotes below.Washington, March 28,
1964.
SUBJECT
Brazil
PARTICIPANTS
Alexis Johnson, Robert Adams, Ralph Burton, Gen. Goodpaster, Gen. Crawford,
Richard Helms, Desmond
FitzGerald, J.C.
King, McGeorge
Bundy, Gordon Chase
The group discussed the situation in Brazil with particular reference to
Ambassador Gordon’s message of
March 27, 1964 (copy attached).Document 187.
General—The group agreed that it would be
preferable if we could waffle through to the next election.
However, this is obviously not the primary consideration; we
don’t want to watch Brazil dribble down the drain while we stand
around waiting for the election.
The group discussed the present situation vis-à-vis Goulart and the Brazilian
military. It is not at all clear when and at what point we can
expect the military to act against the regime. Mr. Bundy said that the shape of
the problem is such that we should not be worrying that the
military will react; we should be worrying that the military
will not react. Mr. Adams
thought that the military would certainly react if Goulart started firing any of
the plotting army commanders. The group agreed that, in any event, all the
plotters in Brazil should react on the same signal.According to
FitzGerald “there was considerable
discussion concerning the need on the part of the
anti-Goulart
plotters to come to agreement concerning the nature of
Goulart actions
which would trigger a revolt. Mr. Burton referred to a recent
State cable from Ambassador Gordon in which seven possible triggers were
mentioned. It was pointed out that Goulart has the capability
of weakening the conspiracy by dismissing or reassigning
certain of the key military members of the conspiracy. There
was some speculation as to whether such dismissals would
result in counter-action by the conspirators.” (Memorandum
for the record, March 28; National Security Council, 303
Committee Files, Subject Files, Brazil)
Mr. FitzGerald wondered whether we will have
a problem in deciding when to move in favor of the
anti-Goulart forces;
how far will we have to let Goulart go? Others felt that this would not be a
serious problem; there would be plenty of signals we could act
on.
Ambassador Gordon’s Request—The group discussed
Ambassador Gordon’s requests
for action by Washington. Submarine Delivery of Arms—The group
agreed that this was a puzzling request. Mr.
Johnson wondered why the Brazilian
Army would need a drop of this relatively small size; the
military must have plenty of arms.Petroleum—The group agreed that the
request for POL was
legitimate. Noting that the 2nd Army in the Sao Paulo area
is the most likely to be anti-Goulart, [1½ lines of
source text not declassified]. This would be used
if an anti-Goulart
move takes place. It was noted that the Army must have the
ability to march from Sao Paulo to take over Rio; such
action, by the way, would probably end the fight.Task Force—The group questioned
Ambassador Gordon’s
request for the early detachment of a naval task force for
maneuvers in the South Atlantic. Mr. Bundy noted that “… the
punishment doesn’t seem to fit the crime …”. Gen. Goodpaster also did
not clearly understand how this particular move would be
helpful to the anti-Goulart forces at this time.Public Statement—The general
consensus was that there should not be a high-level public
statement of concern about the deteriorating situation in
Brazil. The group went on to discuss the possibility of
stimulating an appropriate editorial in the N.Y. Times or The Washington Post.
The group agreed, however, that this would have to be
handled carefully since the editorial could easily come out
in an unsatisfactory way (e.g., “Once again, the State
Department has misunderstood the deep revolutionary forces
in Latin America …”).—The group agreed that we are better off
to let the Belo meeting go on on April 21, and then do what
we can to make it
a flop. Mr. FitzGerald noted that if we
try to stop the meeting and are successful, the meeting
might be held in a place where our capabilities for making
it a flop are not as great as they are in Belo.Action Items—The group agreed that the
following action should be taken: [4 lines of source text not
declassified]Mr. Burton will
explore the possibility of getting the N.Y. Times to publish a satisfactory editorial
calling attention to the situation in Brazil; among other
things, he will try to determine what the N.Y. Times has said about Goulart in the past. Mr.
Bundy will
explore the possibility of getting an appropriate editorial
from The Washington Post.Although The
Washington Post did not print an “appropriate
editorial,” The New York Times
published the following assessment: “The political
situation is close to chaos. President Goulart is a curious
combination of stubbornness and weakness. He has proved
in recent years that he loves power, needs power and
will do almost anything to hold on to it.” (New York Times, March 31, 1964,
p. 34)State will send a cable to Ambassador Gordon which, inter alia,
will say (a) that we are taking action with respect to
petroleum; (b) that we are still not clear as to the
rationale behind the Ambassador’s requests for a submarine
drop and for a task force appearance; (c) that we want the
Ambassador to review our economic and financial relations
with Brazil and give us his recommendation on action we
should take; and (d) that we question the desirability of a
high-level public statement at this time. The cable will
also instruct Ambassador Gordon to keep a high level of security in
his contact with anti-Goulart forces. We don’t want to hamper him
in making contact, but want him to use a cut-out. Above all,
we don’t want to turn off our hearing aids.[text not
declassified] (Memorandum for the record, March
28; National Security Council, 303 Committee Files,
Subject Files, Brazil)GC
189. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson in TexasSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Brazil, Vol. II, 3/64. Top Secret; Priority. No time
of transmission appears on the telegram; it was received by the
White House Army Signal Agency at 6:56 p.m. Printed from a draft
copy that includes Bundy’s
minor handwritten revisions. A note indicates that the copy sent to
the President was “retrieved and destroyed.”Washington, March 28, 1964.
CAP 64100. To Colonel Connell for the President from Bundy. Following two messages are:
first, a long and important message from Ambassador Gordon, and a summary of a response
which we are making.
Text of Gordon Message:Document 187. Although the text does not
appear here, a copy of the telegram was forwarded to the President.
A handwritten note indicates the copy was returned to Dungan on March 30.
After interdepartmental consultation with DOD, JCS, State and CIA, we are drafting an answerSee Document 190.
which in substance will do the following: Inform Gordon that
neither submarine landing nor carrier task force sounds right to
us and ask for further elaboration of their thinking.Tell him that we think key problem in event of Army action is
supply and are actively preparing a covert capability for rapid
supply in this field.Ask Gordon to review
our economic and financial relations with Brazil and recommend
any desirable actions in the light of gathering crisis.Instruct him to insure highest degree of security consistent
with effective communication to anti-Goulart elements.Question advisability of early strong public statement here.
Instead we are exploring possibility of generating active press
comment against Goulart
since this strengthens his opponents without setting up USG as target of his
demagoguery.Make plain that fundamentally we share Gordon’s concern that he can
rely on us for effective action if worst comes to worst.
190. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Brazil, Vol. II, 3/64. Top Secret. Drafted by Adams and Burton. Printed from a draft copy
of the telegram. A typewritten note indicates that it was “cleared
in substance at a White House meeting.”Washington, March 28, 1964.Steps being taken to provide tanker service for POL requirements as estimated here. Our
estimate based on 30 day supply MO gas for Sao Paulo forces for both
combat and movement as far as Rio or Porto Alegre, AV gas for 40
squadron 1½ hour sorties, and navy special and diesel fuel for 30
days. Hope to advise you fully of detailed implementation within few
days.Exploring with other agencies additional courses of action
recommended in your report but awaiting word from you on logistic
support required. In this connection, while not desirous of
disrupting needed contacts or normal ARMA activities, hope you and ARMA or other key staff can avoid direct contact with
military plotters. Leave to your judgment but suggest that [2 lines of source text not
declassified].To what purposes would armaments offloaded from submarine be put?
How critical would small shipment this kind be to success of main
military thrust? Questions also arise here about feasibility
furnishing unmarked or non-US origin arms without these later being
attributed to US covert operation.Would not Brazilian military be able to provide military
protection in Sao Paulo–Santos areas for logistic support? If so,
why is there any need for stand-by US naval units or follow-up
military participation? Doubtful we can provide plausible cover for
naval operation.Would appreciate more detail on status of Castello Branco operation and on
estimated alignment and relative effectiveness, actual or potential,
of officers and key elements in the four armies and other armed
forces; also degree likelihood various possible Goulart actions which would
trigger their resistance. To what extent would such estimates be
affected by (a) Congressional support or non-support (b) differing
degrees gubernatorial action?Reply to your query on coffee tax or blocking coffee receipts in
preparation and will advise by April 1. How does your assessment
affect debt negotiations? Should we abandon, slow down or otherwise
modify debt negotiating strategy to avoid strengthening Goulart’s prestige? Should we hold
up approval or announcement of AID
loans? Are other
non-military measures desirable further to polarize situation to
Goulart’s
disadvantage?Statement by President or Secretary not believed desirable at this
time.
191. Telegram From the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon) to the Department of StateSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Brazil, Vol. II, 3/64. Top Secret. Printed from a
draft copy of the telegram. It was forwarded to the White House on
March 30. (Memorandum from Helms to Bundy, March 30; ibid.)Rio de Janeiro, March 29, 1964.
Personal from Ambassador Gordon.
Please pass immediately to Secretary of State Rusk, Assistant Secretary Mann, Ralph
Burton, Secretary Defense McNamara, Assistant Secretary Defense McNaughton, General Maxwell Taylor, CIA Director John McCone, Colonel J.C.
King, Desmond
FitzGerald, White House for Bundy and Dungan,
pass to Canal Zone for General O’Meara. Other distribution only by approval above
named.
Since my message on Friday,Document 187. The Navy crisis began on
March 24 when the Navy Minister, Sílvio Mota, imprisoned six
leaders of the sailors’ association for political activities. On
March 25 the sailors’ association responded with a rally in the
Guanabara metalworkers’ building, refusing to leave until a new
minister released their comrades. After negotiating for 3 days
Goulart accepted the
sailors’ terms, forcing Mota’s resignation. effects of
Navy crisis have substantially worsened the overall situation and
possibly shortened the time factors. The replacement of Navy
Minister Silvio Mota by a superannuated left-wing Admiral, Paulo
Mario Cunha Rodrigues, reliably reported to have been proposed by
Communist leaders and the CGT, the
retention of Aragao as Marine Commandant, and the total amnesty for
the rebellious sailors and Marines, are all body blows to the morale
of the officer corps of all three services and are apparently
frightening many congressmen. (We expect more light on latter point
from Brasilia Monday.)Telegrams 127,
128, and 129 from Brasilia, March 30, reported on Congressional
reaction to events surrounding the Navy crisis. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. II,
3/64) The worst feature of the episode is that the
tactical moves by the palace Friday afternoon were directed hour by
hour by a close-knit group composed mainly of Communists. Left-wing
group now talking openly about new advances beginning with “cleaning
out the Army”. Resistance
forces, both military and civilian, seeking recover from unexpected
setback and consulting feverishly on future courses of
action.Re para 2 of reference,Document 187. will transmit
bill of goods as soon as available. I have had no direct contact
with military plotters. My definite judgement is that ARMA must continue intelligence
contacts for which he uniquely qualified, but that any operational
contacts will become responsibility of [less than
1 line of source text not declassified].Re para 3 of Saturday’s messageDocument 187. purpose of
unidentified arms made available soonest and if possible
pre-positioned prior any outbreak of violence could be manifold,
depending on unforeseeable development of events. Could be used by
para-military units working with democratic military groups, or by
friendly military against hostile military if necessary. Immediate
effect, which we stress, would be bolster will to resist and
facilitate initial success. Given Brazilian predilection joining
victorious causes, initial success could be key to side on which
many indecisive forces would land and therefore key to prompt
victory with minimal violence. Risk of later attribution to US
Government covert operation seems minor to us in relation positive
effects if operation conducted with skill, bearing in mind that many
things we don’t do are being regularly so attributed.Re paragraph 4 of Saturday’s message, my purpose in paragraphs 14
and 18 of Friday’s message was to make clear that in civil war type
situation our ability show force promptly in response appeal from
politically recognized democratic side might be crucial determining
factor in early victory that side. I well understand how grave a
decision is implied in this contingency commitment to overt military
intervention here. But we must also weigh seriously the possible
alternative, which I am not predicting but can envisage as real
danger of defeat of democratic resistance and communization of
Brazil. We did not intend naval operation to be covert, and overt
maneuvers in South Atlantic could be healthy influence.Re para 5 of Saturday’s message recent ARMA [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] reports cover much of this ground. We
will continue studying and reporting regularly on these questions,
especially possibility and consequences initiative of group of
governors without prior Congressional coverage.Re para 6 of Saturday’s message, I see no present point in
foot-dragging on debt negotiations or hold action on AID loans, unless preceded by some
clear indication of United States government concern with basic
problem of Brazilian political regime. No one expects action on
debts until a month hence anyway. In case of AID projects of direct interest to clearly democratic elements, such
as Cemat, we believe approvals and announcements should continue. We
shall evaluate each case as it arises in light of political effects
at the time. If we later reach point of wanting to suspend aid
publicly, which would be especially dramatic if wheat included, more
appropriate time would be in response more obvious political
developments than have yet occurred and which would probably include
direct attacks on our economic interests. On this subject I await
eagerly your April 1 advice on coffee penalties.What is needed now is a sufficiently clear indication of United
States government concern to reassure the large numbers of democrats
in Brazil that we are not indifferent to the danger of a Communist
revolution here, but couched in terms that cannot be openly rejected
by Goulart as undue
intervention. I am cancelling my trip programmed to Alagoas and
Bahia Monday through Wednesday, sending Kubish to represent me, and
this cancellation will convey some measure of concern. Our discreet,
informal contacts with friendly Brazilians also help. Nothing that
we here can do, however, will be nearly as influential as a
high-level Washington statement. Press reports at home on the navy
crisis surely could serve as a peg for such statement.I therefore reiterate recommendation in para 17 of Friday’s
message. In light developments described para 1 this message,
earliest possible action would achieve optimum results.
192. Telegram From the Army Attaché in Brazil (Walters) to the Department of the ArmySource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. II, Cables, 3/64. Secret.
Repeated to DIA, CINCSO, and COMUSARSO. No time of
transmission appears on the copy printed here which is an
information copy sent from the JCS
and received at the White House at 7:12 p.m., and includes a
handwritten note from Bromley
Smith: “Linc Gordon asked that all who received his messages see
this one from our army attaché.”Rio de Janeiro, March 30, 1964.
ARMA saw General Cintra at 2400 hours
local Sunday.March 29. He had just
come from meeting of resistance movement to Goulart and said it had been decided to take action this
week on a signal to be issued later. Response to Castello Branco document from Second
Army Commander General
Kruel fully satisfactory.
Kruel stated that he agreed
one hundred percent with document and considered himself released from
any obligation to Goulart by
reasons of latter’s recent actions. Kruel added that if relieved as Second Army Commander he
would not turn over command. Cintra said that when Castello Branco is relieved as Chief
of Staff early this week he will immediately issue denunciation to
nation. Helicopter has been laid on to move Castello Branco, Gen Cordeiro de
FariasReference is to the following
military leaders: Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias, former Armed Forces
Chief of Staff; Eurico Gaspar Dutra, former President of Brazil
(1946–1951); Siseno Sarmento, Chief of Staff to Costa e Silva; and Augusto César
Moniz de Aragão. and Marshal Dutra out of Rio and on to Sao
Paulo when movement is imminent. Cintra indicated that he and BGEN
Syseno Garmento will remain in Rio de Janeiro. BGEN Moniz de Aragao will
operate in Rio Vila Militar. Movement in Vila Militar will begin from
bottom up and plans have been made to neutralize key units believed to
be favorable to Goulart and
leftists. Cintra said that central command of movement would initially
be in Sao Paulo. Arrangements have been made with navy and air force for
joint action. BGEN Souto Malan proceeding this morning to Porto Alegre
with full instructions for Maj Gen Adalberto Pereira dos Santos there in
command of Sixth Inf Div and next senior officer to Third Army
Commander. Cintra confident of Minas Gerais Garrison and said Governor
Magalhaes Pinto of that state
eager for move. Total movement may be triggered by meeting of democratic
governors in Porto Alegre on Wednesday.April 1. Day not yet decided for initiation of movement.
Cintra seemed confident of success.
Major Moraes Rego leaves in morning for Recife carrying instructions for
Fourth Army Commander Justino Alves Bastos. Comment: While this may be only talk ARMA has never seen Cintra as assured and positive. ARMA expects to be aware beforehand of go
signal and will report in consequence. If opposition intends to do
something this is time. Cintra stated flatly move would occur during
coming week barring overriding reason for postponement as further
waiting would only help Goulart.Walters gave the
following account in his memoirs: “I told the Ambassador [Gordon] on Sunday, March 30, that
all of my information pointed to an imminent action by those
Brazilian officers who feared that further delay would create an
irreversible situation. I told the Ambassador that I felt the
provocation the plotters had been awaiting had just been given by
the President [Goulart] in
seeking to disrupt the discipline, unity and hierarchy of the armed
services.” (Silent Missions, p. 386) At 7
p.m. (EST), Gordon reported: “Conviction is
spreading here also that showdown will result from current sequence
of events. We think critical point could come soon, perhaps even in
next day or so.” (Telegram 2116 from Rio de Janeiro, March 30;
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 23–9)
193. Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Rusk, Tape F64.21, Side B, PNO 1. No classification
marking. Rusk was in
Washington; the President was in Texas. According to the President’s
Daily Diary, Rusk placed the
call. (Johnson Library) The beginning of the conversation was not
recorded. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the
Historian specifically for this volume.March 30,
1964, 9:35 p.m.
Rusk:—Mann and group here, including CIA, on this Brazilian situation.Rusk met at 6 p.m. with
Mann, Burton, U. Alexis Johnson, Adams, and Ball; the meeting was joined in progress by
Greenfield, Bundy, Noland,
and FitzGerald. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) They met to
draft instructions to Ambassador Gordon in Rio de Janeiro and were still meeting when
the telephone conversation between Rusk and Johnson began. During
the discussion a decision was reached to have a Navy task force
commence moving as quickly as possible. The CIA representatives’ suggestion that this task force
“include an LSD loaded with a barge
containing appropriate arms and ammunition, in case of a
semi-clandestine arms drop, was accepted. Secretary McNamara was advised of this
decision.” (Memorandum for the record by
FitzGerald, March 31; Central Intelligence
Agency, Job 78–03041R, [file name not
declassified]) The crisis is coming to a head in the
next day or two, perhaps even over night. There is a snowballing of
resistance to Goulart and
therefore the thing may break at any moment. The armed forces, the
governors, particularly in populated states of the east coast, seem to
be building up real resistance there. I would like to send a message to
Linc Gordon. I’d like to read it
to you, if I may, and then also indicate that I’ve asked Bob McNamara to
get some tankers ready for some POL
supplies and things of that sort.
[Rusk reads a draft of Document 194.]
Rusk: Now the situation is
that—
President: Are you through with the message?
Rusk: Yes.
President: What you—
Rusk: Now, the situation basically
is that there is a very substantial build-up of resistance to Goulart. Now, if the governors of the
key states of the east coast, such as Minas Gerais and Sao Paolo, and
all those heavily populated states of the east coast who are
anti-Goulart, should join
together with the armed forces who are stationed in those key states,
then I think this may be something that we will have to go along with
and get in touch with. And we need to get Linc Gordon’s fundamental judgment. I tell
him that this is the principle judgment that he has got to make in which
he will earn his pay. He’s got to tell us his best judgment as to
whether this is an opportunity which will not be repeated, and which, if not taken now, will
give Goulart a chance to
undermine his opposition, and take Brazil down the road to a Communist
dictatorship. This message that I have read to you does not commit you
in any way, it simply, basically asking him for information, to give him
a certain atmosphere of our attitude here—
President: The effect though, what it says is get somebody legitimate and
get him substantial and don’t let it go Communist.According to FitzGerald,
Rusk said that “the
President instructed him that under no circumstances should Brazil
be allowed to go Communist.”
Rusk: That’s right. And I talked
to Bob McNamara to lay on some tankers to get some POL supplies and other things on the way.
And also General O’Meara has
been ordered by Bob McNamara to come to New York, to Washington tonight
to talk about contingency plans that might be needed in this situation.
So I would like just to send off this in effect advisory telegram to
Linc Gordon, our Ambassador,
to see whether by morning or during the day tomorrow that we might want
to make a decision here as to how we move in this situation.
President: Sure.
Rusk: That’s all right?
President: That sounds good. That’s fine.
Rusk: Now I have also, we had an
unfortunate accident today. The House Foreign Affairs Committee put out
a report on, that included some references to Brazil, a report that was
prepared last January, that included a reference to the fact that we did
not expect an early Communist takeover in Brazil.
President: Was prepared January ‘64?
Rusk: That’s right. Now I,
background has impressed people tonight to have them say that a high
State Department official said that the situation in Brazil had
deteriorated in the meantime, since that report was issued, that we are
deeply concerned about the prospects for representative and
constitutional democracy in Brazil. Because if this report had gone
down, goes down to Brazil without some sort of a correction, Goulart might take this as a blessing
for the things he’s trying to do. So without any direct quote of you or
me, I did do some back-grounding to try to counteract one or two
sentences in this report, for its, because of its impact in Brazil
tomorrow morning.
President: All right.
[Omitted here is discussion of Panama.]
Rusk: Right. Now, except for this
Brazilian matter, I can call you early in the morning. There’s nothing
here other than Brazil that would pull you back to Washington tomorrow
rather than Wednesday. But I
think this Brazilian matter just could blow over night, and I’ll be in
touch with you about it, so that you can make your plans.
President: Fine. Call me, if not I’ll be coming back on Wednesday, but
I’ll come any time I need to.The President
later told Reedy that Rusk
“expects something could happen tonight. So I rather expect we ought
to go on back to Washington as soon as we can without being
emergency. I don’t see anything to be gained to be in
Johnson City with the Hemisphere going
Communist.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording
of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Reedy, March 30, 1964, 9:35
p.m. CST, Tape F64.21, Side B, PNO
2)
Rusk: Oh, fine. Thank you, Mr.
President.
President: Bye.
Rusk: Bye.
194. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in BrazilSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 BRAZ. Top Secret; Flash;
Nodis. Drafted and approved by
Rusk.Washington, March 30, 1964, 9:52
p.m.
1296. For Ambassador from Secretary.
US policy toward Brazil is based upon our determination to support in
every possible way maintenance of representative and constitutional
government in Brazil free from continuing threat of dictatorship from
the left erected through a Goulart/Brizzola manipulation. It is of great importance
that there be a preemption of the position of legitimacy by those who
will oppose communist and other extremist influences. It is highly
desirable, therefore, that if action is taken by the armed forces such
action be preceded or accompanied by a clear demonstration of
unconstitutional actions on the part of Goulart or his colleagues or that legitimacy be
confirmed by acts of the Congress (if it is free to act) or by
expressions of the key governors or by some other means which gives
substantial claim to legitimacy.
With respect to US support capabilities, we can act promptly on financial
and economic measures. With regard to military assistance logistic
factors are important. Surface vessels loaded with arms and ammunition
could not reach southern Brazil before at least ten days. Airlift could be provided
promptly if an intermediate field at Recife, or other airfields in
northeast Brazil capable of handling large jet transports, is secure and
made available. In ambiguous situation it may be difficult for us to
obtain permission for intermediate stops from other countries such as
Peru.
You should ask your own service attachés, without consulting Brazilian
authorities just yet, to prepare recommendations on types of arms and
ammunition most likely to be required in light of their knowledge of the
situation.
In fast moving situation we are asking all of our posts in Brazil to feed
Washington continual flow of information on significant developments
their areas and to stay on 24-hour alert.
At this particular moment it is important that US Government not put
itself in position which would be deeply embarrassing if Goulart, Mazzilli, Congressional leaders and armed forces
leadership reach accommodation in next few hours which would leave us
branded with an awkward attempt at intervention. However, every
disposition here is to be ready to support those elements who would move
to prevent Brazil from falling under an authentic dictatorship of the
left heavily infiltrated or controlled by the communists. Obviously, in
a country of over 75 million people, larger than continental United
States, this is not a job for a handful of United States Marines. A
major determination by the authentic leadership of Brazil and a
preemption of the position of legitimacy are the greatest possible
importance. We will not, however, be paralyzed by theoretical niceties
if the options are clearly between the genuinely democratic forces of
Brazil and a communist dominated dictatorship.
As we see problem tonight, the greatest danger may well be that Goulart will be able to pull back
enough within next day or two to confuse situation, blunt edge of key
incipient conservative military action, and gain more time to paralyze
those elements who could resist a Communist infiltrated authoritarian
regime. Fragmentary reports reaching here tonight suggest that
anti-Goulart forces may be
developing a certain momentum. Our big problem is to determine whether
this presents an opportunity which might not be repeated. In this case
we would wish to make a major decision as to whether and by what means
we might give additional impetus to forces now in motion consistent with
considerations expressed above. No judgment you have been required to
make will compare to this in earning the pay of an underpaid
Ambassador.
Rusk
195. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 BRAZ. Secret; Flash; Limdis.
Repeated Immediate to Brasilia, Sao Paulo, and Recife. Received in
the Department at 7:12 a.m., and passed to White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, and CINCSO.Rio de Janeiro, March 31, 1964, 9 a.m.
2121. Pass White House, OSD, JCS, CINCSOUTH, CIA.
[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
has just received word from [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] that “balloon has gone up” in
Minas Gerais and that revolt against Goulart government expected to start in Sao Paulo in
about two hours. We have no confirmation. No details available at this
point other than report General Mourao Filho is in command. (Mourao
Filho is Commander 4th Military Region with headquarters in Juiz de
Fora.)At 10 a.m., the CIA confirmed that “an anti-Goulart revolutionary movement has
actually started in Minas Gerais and that Mourao Filho is leading an
unspecified number of troops toward Rio de Janeiro from Juiz de
Fora.” ([telegram number not declassified],
March 31; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Brazil, Vol. II, 3/64)
Gordon
196. Editorial Note
At 9:46 a.m. on March 31, 1964, Secretary of State Rusk called Assistant Secretary
Mann to discuss the emerging
coup d’état in Brazil: “Sec said M might want to get someone to put
together task force of 3–4 to start working on post coup emergency
assistance for Brazil. They discussed the confusing situation; don’t
know how much is true. Sec suggested M’s calling President to keep him
informed. M said he would prefer after the 11 am meeting; there would be
much more to say.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192,
Telephone Calls 3/20/64–4/9/64) Later that morning Rusk chaired an interagency meeting on
Brazil. (Johnson Library, Rusk
Appointment Book) In addition to Rusk, the participants included Secretary of Defense
McNamara, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Taylor, Lieutenant General
O’Meara, and Director of
Central Intelligence McCone.
(Message for Embassy Rio, March 31; ibid., National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol.
II, 3/64) Other scheduled attendees were Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Under Secretary
Johnson, Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary Kitchen, Special Assistant to the
President Bundy, Lieutenant
General Goodpaster, Assistant
Secretary of Defense McNaughton,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Sloan, and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Helms. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, U. Alexis
Johnson Files: Lot 90 D 408, Date Books, 1964) After
briefings on the latest developments and U.S. support capabilities, the
agenda called for consideration of possible military and political
action, including the dispatch of a naval task force, oil tankers, and
an airlift of ammunition to Brazil. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. II, 3/64) No substantive record of the
discussion at the meeting has been found.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff met on March 31 to review a revised contingency
plan for Brazil, USCINCSO
Contingency Plan 2–61. Talking points for the meeting recommended that
the JCS deploy a naval task force toward
Brazilian waters but defer any decision on whether to provide “covert
delivery of arms to the Castello
Branco Group.” In the event of civil war in Brazil,
however, the United States should “be prepared unilaterally to deliver
arms and other material support on an overt basis, employing any
available means, to the faction whose victory would best serve U.S.
interests.” (Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330
69 A 7425, Brazil) No substantive record of the meeting has been
found.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Solomon
also chaired an inter-agency task force on March 31, which met to
consider economic assistance to Brazil, on the assumption that a
“democratically-inclined pro-Western group” came to power. The task
force recommended that the “most effective form of assistance” would be
for creditor nations to participate in a voluntary, 3-month moratorium
on payment toward Brazil’s debt. (Memorandum from Weismann to Burton, March 31; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/BR
Files: Lot 66 D 418, AID, 1964) The
Department forwarded the “preliminary views” of the task force to the
Embassy for further comment. (Telegram 1316 to Rio de Janeiro, April 1;
ibid., Central Files 1964–66, FN 14 BRAZ)
197. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 BRAZ. Top Secret; Nodis; Flash. Received in the
Department at 12:21 p.m. and repeated at 6:23 p.m. to the White
House for Bundy, OSD for McNamara, and CIA
for McCone only. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. II,
3/64)Rio de Janeiro, March 31, 1964, 1 p.m.
2125. For Secretary from Ambassador. Deptel 1296.Document 194.
I warmly welcome reftel. Things
moving very quickly with apparently reliable reports military
movements in Minas Gerais fully backed by Governor Magalhaes Pinto and state police.
As of noon, no clear indications corresponding action Sao Paulo or
other states.I have taken action to get to key governors’ message on vital
importance color of legitimacy, stressing desirability political
coverage by majority Congress if that humanly possible. My
intermediaries are inquiring how governors’ group proposes handle
critical question mantle of legitimacy and position as defenders of
constitution, both in immediate and in subsequent actions, if
congressional coverage not available.Gordon’s instructions are
in telegrams 96 to Belo Horizonte, 235 to Brasilia, and 101 to
Sao Paulo. (All March 31; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 BRAZ)Most urgent logistical problem is motor and aviation gasoline in
event normal supplies become unavailable to friendly forces. Local
Esso contact states only Avgas tanker en route is Petrobras vessel,
and he knows of no Mogas in South Atlantic. Immediate action set
this in motion is in order. We are developing recommendations on
possible arms and ammunition requirements.Goulart’s Monday night
speech to sergeants,March 30; an
account of the speech was transmitted in telegram 2120 from Rio
de Janeiro, March 31. (Ibid., POL 23–8 BRAZ) which was ending when you
telephoned, looks like last straw. He made appropriate verbal bows
to constitution and legality, to church, and to green and yellow
nationalism rather than red models, but this was transparent
disguise for active support of subversion in NCO’s and psychological warfare against officer corps,
as well as Congress, press, and foreign and domestic business
groups. While dictating this, I received reliable report that
Kubitschek phoned
Goulart this morning to
declare his open opposition and has so stated to press.See footnote 2, Document
203.After deducting sixty-four dollars from my pay, my present
judgment is that this might not be last opportunity, but well might
be last good opportunity to support action by anti-Goulart group which still occupies
large proportion strategic military commands and direction
state-level forces in cohesive region states accounting for over
half population and all industry. I believe your major decision
should be in affirmative and will be preparing recommend means
giving resistance forces additional impetus.Your background briefing statement supplementing House Committee
Report was very well played here in press and serves immediate
purpose desired by my recommendations for some public expression
interest and concern.Mann told Rusk earlier that the Brazilian
Chargé d’Affaires had complained about the press reports,
predicting that he would receive “protest instructions.”
Mann asked how the
press spokesman should handle the incident at the noon briefing
and “it was agreed he should say in view of the situation we are
making no official comment and are following the situation
closely. Sec said if Linc thinks we cannot get away with that,
we will take another look. They agreed we should play for time;
maybe tomorrow we could talk.” (Mann to Rusk, March 31, 11:20 a.m.; National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls
3/20/64–4/9/64)Gordon
198. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in BrazilSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 BRAZ. Secret; Flash; No
Distribution. Drafted by Adams and approved by Ball. The Department later informed Gordon of several corrections to
the telegram; they are in footnotes below. (Telegram 1305 to Rio de
Janeiro, March 31; ibid.) The JCS
instructions implementing the decisions outlined in the telegram,
which were also in accordance with USCINCSO Contingency Plan 2–61, are ibid. The JCS assigned the code name “Brother
Sam” to the operation. (Telegram 5591 from JCS to CINCLANT, March 31; ibid.)Washington, March 31, 1964, 2:29
p.m.
1301. For your personal information only, the following decisions have
been taken in order be in a position to render assistance at appropriate
time to anti-Goulart forces if
it is decided this should be done.
Dispatch of US Navy tankers bearing POL from Aruba, first tanker expected off Santos
between April 8 and 13; following three tankers at one day
intervals.In telegram 1305 this
sentence was replaced as follows: “Dispatch of U.S. Navy tankers
bearing POL from Aruba, first
tanker expected off Santos April 13; following three tankers at
one day intervals.”Immediate dispatch of naval task force for overt exercises off
Brazil. Force to consist of aircraft carrier (expected arrive in
area by April 10), four destroyers, two destroyer escorts, task
force tankers (all expected arrive about four days later).The sentence was replaced as follows:
“Force to consist of aircraft carrier and two guided missile
destroyers (expected arrive in area by April 10), four
destroyers, task force tankers (all expected arrive about four
days later).”Assemble shipment of about 110 tons ammunition, other light
equipment including tear gasThe words
“tear gas” were replaced with the phrase “CS agent”. for mob control for air lift to
Sao Paulo (Campinas). Lift would be made within 24 to 36 hours upon
issuance final orders and would involve 10 cargo planes,“10 cargo planes” was corrected to read “6
cargo planes”. 6 tankers, and 6 fighters.
Unloading of POL by US Navy tankers (item
1) and dispatch of airlift (item 3) would require further development
politico-military situation to point where some group having reasonable
claim to legitimacy could formally request recognition and aid from us
and if possible from other American Republics. Dispatch of tankers from
Aruba and of naval task force does not immediately involve us in
Brazilian situation and is regarded by us as normal naval exercise.
Rusk
199. Telephone Conversation Among the Under Secretary of State
(Ball), the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann), and President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation among President
Johnson, Ball and Mann, Tape F64.21, Side B, PNO 3. No classification
marking. Ball and Mann were in Washington; the
President was in Texas. This transcript was prepared in the Office
of the Historian specifically for this volume. Before telephoning
the President, Ball called
Rusk: “B said he and
Mann were thinking of
calling the President and wondered if the Sec had. Sec had not. Sec
asked if there was anything new after the call to Rio. B said not
much; it is quite fluid, indefinite; Minas seems to be in revolt.
Sec asked if Linc were playing it carefully. B mentioned the cable
that went out.” (March 31, 3:31 p.m., National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Rusk
Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls 3/20/64–4/9/64) Ball’s account of both
conversations is in the Johnson Library, Papers of George W. Ball, Brazil,
3/30/64–4/21/66.March 31,
1964, 3:38 p.m.
President: Hello?
Ball: Hello? Oh, Mr. President,
this is George Ball.
President: Yes, George.
Ball: Tom Mann is on with me.
President: Hi, Tom.
Mann: Hi.
Ball: A quick run-down of the
situation in Brazil. We had a meeting this morning with Bob McNamara and
Max Taylor and General O’Meara,
who’s come up overnight. And we decided, on the basis of the information
that had come in this morning, to go ahead and start a naval task force
out but with no commitment so that it will be steaming down in that
direction. It couldn’t get into the area before April 10th and in the
meantime we can watch the developments and see whether it should go on
or not. But it could be done in a way that doesn’t create any kind of
public stir. The second thing is: I’ve located some navy tankers in
Aruba, and the big thing that they’re going to need if they have a
successful revolt down there, at some point probably, is some gasoline,
both for motor vehicles and for the aviation. The tankers are going to
be loaded, but again they can’t be down there till around April the 8th
to the 13th. But this is a precautionary move that we’re taking. Third
is: they’re getting together a shipment of ammunition, but this will
have to wait before we start moving it because it will probably have to
be moved by plane and that can only be done after the situation is
clarified and we would, clearly decide to make a commitment in the
situation. Now, what is actually happening on the field is very
confused. We’ve just had a teletype conversation with Linc
Gordon in Rio.The text of
the teletype conversation (2:30 p.m.) is ibid., National Security
File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. II, 3/64. It seems clear
that the state just north of Rio, which is Minas Gerais, is in revolt.
Both the army and the civilian authorities of the state seem to be
acting together and the army has apparently moved in and authorities
blocked the road from Rio so that the First Army in Rio couldn’t move up
and stop the revolt. We’re waiting for some clarification of the
situation in Sao Paulo, which is the key to the matter. There has
apparently been no movement in Sao Paulo but there is some expected at
almost any moment and we should know within the next few hours what’s
happening. The hope there would be that the Second Army would move and
block the road from Rio down and isolate Rio. And in the meantime they
have drafted an impeachment, in Congressional circles, of Goulart, but there has been no action
taken on it. But they’ve listed all the offenses against the
constitution which they allege. And there is a lot of bickering around
to see what could be done presumably in the way of forming some kind of
a rump civilian government which would have a claim to legitimacy. The
anti-Goulart
government—governors are apparently going to meet WednesdayApril 1. and, on the basis of the
information that Gordon has,
there is a significant number of the governors who are prepared to move
against Goulart, about 9 of them
altogether, which is a very impressive number.
President: How many do they have?
Ball: The total number of states
there is about, how many altogether? Nineteen.
President: Twenty?
Ball: No, 21 they tell me, but
these are the big ones, these are the important states. Now, we have
instructed Gordon not to make any
more contact with the Brazilians until we see how the situation
develops. I think there has to be some more movement in Sao Paulo to
make sure that this thing is going to move, since we don’t want to get
ourselves committed before we know how the thing is going to come out.
He feels that on the basis of the momentum that’s been started so far
that it can wait for 12 hours before anything has to be, or overnight,
before we have to take any decision on whether we should or shouldn’t
move. And I think that we can see the developments and then make a
judgment on it. I gather you’re planning on coming back [unintelligible]
tonight.
President: Yeah, I’ll be in there about 8:30.
Ball: Right. We may have another
meeting this afternoon with McNamara,In a telephone
conversation at 4 p.m., Ball
briefed McNamara on the
situation in Brazil. The two men agreed that “nothing further could
be gained at this time so the 5:00 meeting scheduled for today was
canceled.” (Johnson Library, Papers of George W. Ball, Brazil, 3/30/64–4/21/66) Rusk held a meeting on Brazil at 5
p.m. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 90 D
408, Date Books, 1964) No substantive record of the meeting has been
found. but in any event we’ll be changing the information,
but I did want you to know that—
President: I think we ought to take every step that we can, be prepared
to do everything that we need to do, just as we were in Panama, if that
is at all feasible
Ball: Right. Thank you, Mr.
President. We’re canvassing all the possibilities to make sure we’re
not—
Gordon’s outfit, or McCone’s, or you all’s, or McNamara’s, and we just can’t take
this one, and I’d get right on top of it, and stick my neck out a
little.
Ball: Right.
Mann: Well, we’re doing that.
Ball: Well, this is just our own
feeling about it, and we’ve gotten this well organized I think now, I
wanted you to know—Bundy called Ball at 6:40 p.m. to explain that
“the President would prefer to be brought up to date on the Brazil
situation in the morning unless there was some reason for a meeting
tonight.” (Johnson Library, Papers of George W. Ball, Brazil, 3/30/64–4/21/66) In a March
31 memorandum to the President, Bundy and Dungan reported that they would be kept informed by
the Situation Room and would notify the President of any
developments. (Ibid., National Security File, Memos to the
President, McGeorge Bundy,
Vol. I)
President: All right. [Omitted here is a short discussion of Panama.]
200. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs (Boster) to the Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State (Little)Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA Files: Lot 66 D 65, Brazil
1964. Confidential. Drafted by Boster. Copies were sent to Manning, Adams, Burton, and S/S. The
memorandum indicates that Rusk
saw it.Washington, April 1, 1964.
SUBJECT
Brazil
In two conversations last night and this morning with U.S. correspondent
Jules DuBois, the anti-Goulart
Governor of Guanabara, Carlos Lacerda, asked that word be gotten to Mr.
Mann “that it was extremely
important for the U.S. not to interfere by making any statement
whatsoever.”
Mr. Mann has asked that you convey
this message to the Secretary and suggests that, if he agrees, you might
also convey this to the White House. Mr. Mann agrees that it is extremely important that we (the
U.S. Government) stay in the background and not make any statements that
might damage the forces friendly to us in Brazil.
201. Teleconference Between the Department of
State and the Embassy in
BrazilSource:
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol.
II, 3/64. Secret; Exdis. According
to Rusk’s Appointment Book,
Rusk met Ball and U. Alexis Johnson at 10 a.m. for
the teleconference to Rio. (Ibid.)April 1,
1964, 1500Z.
Sec 1
Ball, Adams and Burton will be at 1500Z
teleconference here. Same rules as yesterday.The Department stated the rules as follows:
“During telecon request you number conference items
sequentially preceded by geographic indicator ‘Rio’. Dept
will number sequentially preceded by ‘Sec’.” (Telegram 1299
to Rio de Janeiro, March 31; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 2 BRAZ) All messages
considered Secret and Exdis.
Sec 2
Secretary also present this end.
Sec 3
Secretary requests brief situation report as of this hour.
Sec 4 Briefly, what is situation at this hour?What is present attitude first army?Where is Kubitschek at present? Did you meet with
him last night?Will the momentum continue on the anti-Goulart side without
some covert or overt encouragement from our side? Sec 5
Any signs of hostility toward American personnel? Sec 6
Are fourth army and Rio Grande do Sul supporting
Goulart? Sec
7 On our Sec 6 change “fourth army” to “third army.” Sec
8
Have any leaders of rebellion pressed you for overt support?
Would overt indication our support play into Goulart’s hands at this
moment?
Sec 9
We have nothing further here. Do you have anything further?
Sec 10
If you have nothing further we terminate conference. Thanks very
much.
Rio
Ambassador Gordon, Minister
Mein, Mr. Gresham
present.
This is Ambassador Gordon.
Rio 1
Hard news is that Kruel
and second army as well as Alves Bastos and fourth army in
Pernambuco have declared for rebellion. Fourth army has taken
over Governor’s palace in Recife.
Favorable rumors include:
Second army past Rezende on border Sao Paulo state of Rio
and moving toward this city. Expected arrive some time this
late afternoon.Possible joining of rebellion by first army forces sent
toward Minas last night.Stories inside Agencia Nacional that high command officer
corps resolved not to fight rebellion.Refusal Gen Oromar Osorio of Vila Militar to permit
marines to arrest Lacerda who still barricaded in Guanabara
Palace.
Unfavorable rumors are: That Brizola forces have occupied all Rio Grande do
Sul radio stations.That third army in far south loyal to Goulart and moving
north against Sao Paulo.
Congress awaiting military resolution of events and appears
disposed legitimize whatever emerges.
Navy friends tell us of effort to get three destroyers and
submarine out of Guanabara Bay. Not yet successful. If
successful may need diesel fuel for sub.
CGT has called general strike on
nationwide basis but without visible effects in Sao Paulo. This
ends Rio 1.
Rio 2.
Garble above refers to report from navy friends that they trying
to send three destroyers and one submarine out of Guanabara
Bay.
Above replies to Sec 3. On Sec 4 para B has been very hard get
intelligence on first army. Ministry of War completely shut off
from access and surrounded by tanks and armored cars. Agencia
Nacional rumors reported above purport to come from inside phone
messages but we unable confirm at this time.
I met Kubitschek at 2115
and drafted message which apparently not sent during last
night’s confusion. Essence was much less complacency re outcome
than yesterday morningIn a
conversation with James Minotto, staff member to the Senate
Appropriations Committee, Kubitschek said that “for practical purposes
situation all over. There was going to be successful coup
against Goulart,
resistance to which would be general strike lasting two or
three days. Workers, however, would go back to work when
they got hungry.” Kubitschek also reported that he told
Goulart that “he
was breaking with him since President following course which
would lead to turning country over to Communists.” (Telegram
2126 from Rio de Janeiro, March 31; ibid., POL 23–9 BRAZ) and
wonderment that Sao Paulo had not yet moved. This now overtaken
by events with Kruel and
Adhemar statements and actual move by second army. Kubitschek said that move from
Sao Paulo would be critical to success and if rebellion
smothered Goulart would
be on high road to dictatorship.
We discussed legitimacy problem which he thought would be readily
cared for by Congress if military balance favorable. He had seen
Goulart in
midafternoon and pleaded with latter to save mandate by making
clean break with CGT and
Communists but Goulart
said this would be sign of weakness which he could not
afford.
Momentum now clearly gathered and for these hours does not need
special encouragement from US.
Have just learned that Kubitschek conversation report was sent last
night as Embtel 2134.Dated April 1. (Ibid.)
Flash [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] has just received report from usually
reliable source that General Jair has sent note to Goulart saying he is breaking
with him and will urge army troops loyal to him, Jair, to unite
and join forces with Kruel. If this is true it should have profoundly
favorable influence on outcome.
Re Sec 5 there are no such signs of hostility.
Re Sec 6 we have only unfavorable rumor re third army reported
above.
Sec 7 is last received from you. This ends Rio 2.
Rio 3
Except for Adhemar and some of his fellow Paulistas who continue
talking unclearly about arms needs and possible desirability of
show of naval force there has been no pressing for overt
support. I do not consider Paulista approaches as serious or
responsible. At this moment overt indication our support would
be a serious political error which would play into Goulart’s hands. We shall of
course continue focussing on this question hourly as situation
evolves. This ends Rio 3.
Rio 4
Sec 8 received and answered by Rio 3. This ends Rio 4.
Rio 5
Nothing more now. This terminates teleconference.
202. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Security Council, 303 Committee
Files, Subject Files, Brazil. Secret. Drafted by
FitzGerald. The time of the meeting is
taken from the President’s Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)
FitzGerald also drafted a longer version of
the memorandum, which included the discussion of Panama and Cuba.
(Central Intelligence Agency, DCI
(McCone) Files, Job
80–B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1 Jan–30 Apr 64)Washington, April 1, 1964, 11:15
a.m.
SUBJECT
Meeting at the White House 1 April 1964Subject—Brazil
PRESENT
The PresidentState Department: Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Under Secretary
Johnson, and Mr. Ralph BurtonDefense Department: Secretary McNamara, Deputy Secretary Vance, General
Taylor and General O’MearaWhite House Staff: Messrs. Bundy, Dungan, Moyers,
and ReedyCIA: The Director, Colonel King and Mr.
FitzGeraldThe meeting commenced with a briefing on the latest intelligence
reports by Colonel King
including items from the 10 o’clock telecon between State and
Ambassador Gordon.Document 201. Matters seemed to
be more favorable to the insurgents than they had been the previous
evening, particularly in view of indications that General Kruel is moving Second Army troops
to the Sao Paulo border.Secretary Rusk said that
Ambassador Gordon was not
advocating U.S. support at this time. Only the Paulistas had
requested such aid and this without definition. Ambassador Gordon, with whom the Secretary
agreed, believes that it would be wrong at this stage to give
Goulart an anti-Yankee
banner.Secretary Rusk referred to a
“leak” the evening before regarding the movement of a Naval task
force to the area of northern Brazil. (General
Taylor said that there was not actually a
leak but that it appeared to be a deduction by newsmen based on
knowledge that a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs took place.) It
was agreed that newspaper queries concerning the Naval movement
would be treated routinely and that it would not be shown as a
contingency move having to do with Brazil.Secretary Rusk commented
that the reporting from Brazil was excellent and endorsed the
statement of facts presented by Colonel
King.Secretary McNamara
reported on the status of the task force. It sailed this morning and
would be in the vicinity of Santos by the 11th of April. The arms
and ammunition are now being assembled for airlift in New Jersey and
the airlift would take 16 hours from the time of decision. As to
POL, the earliest Navy tanker,
diverted from the Aruba area, would be in place on the 10th or 11th
of April. There is, however, a Norwegian tanker chartered by Esso in
the South Atlantic loaded with the necessary motor and aviation
gasoline. It is headed for Buenos Aires and should arrive there on
the 5th or 6th of April. It was decided that [3
lines of source text not declassified]. This should be done
as soon as possible.
(Messrs. Bundy and Dungan, following the meeting, said
that they had taken exception to the Navy’s order to its task force
which had placed the movement clearly within the contingency plan for
Brazil. They felt that this was an unnecessary security hazard.)
D Deputy Chief, WH
(Special Affairs)
203. Teleconference Between the Department of
State and the Embassy in
BrazilSource:
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol.
II, 3/64. Secret; Exdis. A
handwritten note indicates that “Ball gave essence of this to the President by
phone.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ball called
Johnson at 3:52 p.m. (Johnson Library) No
substantive record of the conversation has been found. Ball briefed the Secretary at 3:53
p.m.: “B said Gordon thinks
it is all over. B reported on his talk with Rio. Sec said we should
look into the question of recognition; perhaps if Mazzilli succeeds, there is no
question. B will get Chayes working on it. B said we were still
working on getting POL down there,
since we could not be sure of the situation.” (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls
3/20/64–4/9/64)April 1,
1964, 2030Z.
For Ambassador.
Our request for teleconference at 2030Z today grows out of decision at
White House this morning that we have regular daily teleconferences with
you in view of high value placed on information obtained by this means
previously.
If impossible for you to be present each time DCM entirely satisfactory. Ordinarily DOD and CIA
representatives will also be present this end with Ball, or U A Johnson and Mann.
Suggest 1500Z, 1900Z and 2300Z for times of teleconference tomorrow.
Suggest you send telecon message in advance each teleconference to be
available at start of conference here with situation report covering any
significant developments under following headings referred to by number
and letter.
Military Situation Developments in each of four armiesAction by air force or navyShifts in allegiance of key military forces or
officersPossible or actual independent moves by non-coms or
enlistedOtherLogistic Situation Adequacy of POL,
armaments, ammo, other military suppliesNeed for US logistic support actionOther
Sec 1
Teleconference—Washington–Rio.
Treat all messages Secret and Exdis.
Conferees here are UA Johnson, Adams, McNaughton (DOD) and Col. King (CIA). Who is at your end and did
you get our advance?
Sec 2
Your 2147 and Brasilia 133 received.Telegram 2147 from Rio de Janeiro, April 1, forwarded
unconfirmed reports that Goulart had resigned. (Ibid., Central Files
1964–66, POL 15–1 BRAZ)
Telegram 133 from Brasilia, April 1, reported that Goulart had evidently
flown to Brasilia to “confer with congressional leaders.”
(Ibid., POL 23–9
BRAZ) Do you have anything further on Goulart resignation?
End Sec 2.
Sec 3
Undersecretary Ball now
present.
End Sec 3.
Sec 4
Re POL Norwegian tanker Finnanger under Esso charter carrying
Avgas and Mogas en route Buenos Aires will be off Santos on or
about 7 April. If diversion required instructions must be given
6 April.
There is also Tidewater ship J Paul Getty
carrying 500,000 barrels bunker fuel scheduled arrive Rio 5
April. Another Tidewater vessel carrying same amount bunker fuel
due arrive Santos 9 April.
Re para 1 JANAF msg J–9Dated April
1. (Ibid.) we perceive no way get diesel fuel off Rio
until arrival MSTS tankers 13 April.
End Sec 4.
Sec 5
Re last sentence Rio 1, we have a special task force here now at
work several days on economic and financial assistance,
emergency relief, etc. and are prepared promptly to act on your
recommendations.
End Sec 5. Sec 6
Nothing further here now. Would appreciate flash wrap-up report
tonight about four hours from now. Would be prepared gather for
another telecon tonight if you consider desirable. Otherwise
will telecon with you at 1500Z tomorrow.
Will reply Rio 6 by cable tonight.
CCN line 1 wrap-up.
End Sec 6
This is Ambassador Gordon.
Rio 1
We believe it is all over with democratic rebellion already 95
percent successful. First army solidly in favor and at 1640 Gen
AncoraJair Dantas Ribeiro;
he was replaced the next day by Artur Costa e Silva.
ordered cessation military action against rebels. Ancora and
Kruel meeting at 1800
in Rezende. First army command to be assumed by Gen Costa e Silva, strongly
democratic. Still awaiting formal announcement but we believe
Goulart has already
or is just about to resign. Mazzilli would then take over on interim basis
as provided in constitution. Castello Branco states no need US logistical
support. Radio stations in Rio all now in friendly hands state
Goulart has resigned
but Brigadeiro MelloFrancisco de
Assis Correia de Melo, Air Force Chief of Staff. of
air force states this not yet true.
Still some concern at possible civil strife in Porto Alegre,
Recife and on limited scale perhaps here too, as well as problem
left leaning groups in marines and other scattered groups armed
forces. Reaction labor unions still uncertain. We have begun
staff work on possible needs for internal security help,
financial stabilization etc. No word yet on Congressional
reactions. Goulart
arrived Brasilia 1430 Brasil time. This ends Rio 1.
Rio 2
Have received your Sec 1 and 2 and 3. I am accompanied here by
Mein and Gresham.
Have you received my Rio 1?
End Rio 2.
Rio 3
Have just received [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] indicating that Goulart may be planning to
stay in Brasilia and look for some kind of compromise political
solution. My first reaction is that this would be most difficult
to achieve, given momentum of anti-Goulart movement.
Regarding your advance message, some of it is obsolete but we can
meet teleconference times suggested and will also be guided by
your format in wrap-up report tonight.
This ends Rio [3].
Rio 4
Sec 4 recd. Possibility Petrobras sabotage cannot yet be wholly
discounted and we should keep these tankers coming until
situation clarified. End Rio 4.
Rio 5
Do you have any other questions for us now? End Rio 5.
Rio 6
Sec 5 is good news. Would appreciate summary your thinking these
points. End Rio 6.
Rio 7
We have nothing further now. If you do not, should we terminate?
End Rio 7.
Rio 8
Sec 6 recd. Will act accordingly. Presently doubt need for
further telecon tonight but will give advance warning if
desired. Confirm 1500Z tomorrow. End Rio 8.Bundy called the
President at 4:30 p.m., explaining that, in light of
Gordon’s report,
it would not be necessary to reconvene that day to discuss
Brazil. Johnson agreed to schedule a
meeting of the National Security Council for the following
morning. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts,
Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Bundy, April 1, 1964, 4:30
p.m., Tape F64.22, Side A, PNO 3) Bundy later explained to
Rusk that the
NSC meeting, although
“more for show than for use,” would allow the participants
to “wrap up on Brazil.” (April 1, 6:37 p.m.; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192,
Telephone Calls 3/20/64–4/9/64)
204. Editorial Note
On April 2, 1964 (12:25 a.m. EST), the
Embassy Office in Brasilia reported that President Goulart had left Brasilia by airplane.
Although he might land first in Porto Alegre, reliable congressional
sources indicated that Goulart
was flying to Montevideo. Meanwhile a special joint session of Congress
was meeting to declare that Goulart had fled the country, that the presidency was
vacant, and that Paschoal Ranieri Mazzilli, formerly President of the
Chamber of Deputies, was now
Acting President of Brazil. (Telegram 137 from Brasilia; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
POL 15–1 BRAZ) At 3:05 a.m. EST, the Embassy Office reported that the
President of the Senate, Auro de Moura Andrade, had declared that the
presidency was vacant—in spite of an official statement that Goulart was merely “absent in Rio
Grande do Sul.” Shortly thereafter, Mazzilli took the oath of office at Planalto, the
presidential palace in Brasilia. (Telegram 138 from Brasilia, April 2;
ibid.)
Under Secretary of State Ball, who
was monitoring the situation from Washington, described his role in
subsequent events:
“At three o’clock in the morning I was down at the Department,
which was normal in any crisis. Rusk was away somewhere. As I mentioned, crises
always seemed to occur when I was Acting Secretary. I don’t know
why. Finally, on the strong urging of our ambassador down there
who was [Lincoln Gordon],
I sent a telegram which had the effect of, in effect,
recognizing the new government. Goulart wasn’t quite out of the country, and I
was taking a chance. But it worked out beautifully and was very
effective. It was the kind of thing that marked a period to the
end of Mr. Goulart. But
the President was furious with me, the only time he was ever
really angry with me, I think. Why hadn’t I let him know? Why
did I do this without letting him know? I said, ‘It was three
o’clock in the morning, Mr. President.’ He said, ‘Don’t ever do
that again. I don’t care what hour of the morning it is, I want
to know. I’m not saying what you did wasn’t right, but after
this I want to know.’ Thereafter I never hesitated.” (Johnson
Library, Transcript, George W.
Ball Oral History Interview #2, July 9, 1971,
pages 39–40; see also George W.
Ball, The Past Has Another
Pattern, page 429)
The telegram described by Ball has
not been found.
205. Teleconference Between the Department of
State and the Embassy in
BrazilSource:
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol.
II, 3/64. Secret; Exdis.April 2,
1964, 1500Z.
Sec 1
Participants in Washington:
Under Secretary Geo. Ball;
Deputy Under Secretary U.A.
Johnson; Mr. Burton; Mr. Sloan (DOD)
Sec 2
NSC meeting here 1700Z on
Brazil. Do you have statement to suggest for White House or
State Department and your view as to what level we should play
this. We do not want to tie President on prematurely.
End Sec 2.
Sec 3
MAP civic action and military
spare parts cargoes are on ships Del Sud
arriving Rio 8 April, Del Mundo arriving
Recife 3 April, Mormon Hawk arriving Rio
10 April and Del Sol arriving Recife 13
April. Will presume you have no objection to cargo being landed
unless you advise otherwise.
End Sec 3.
Sec 4
Who likely to be FinMin in Mazzilli government? What will be chances for a
serious effort to put financial affairs in order during next 30
days of political campaigning?
End Sec 4.
Sec 5.
What is your assessment of Mazzilli? Is he apt to stand for election at end
of constitutional 30 day period? Who are other likely contenders
for presidency?
End Sec 5.
Sec 6
Since Naval task force will not be approaching northern Brazilian
waters until April 4 we are not now planning to take any action
turn it back for another 24 hours unless you think
otherwise.
End Sec 6.
Sec 7
Share your concern that Mazzilli election be fully constitutional and
approve action you have taken. We can avoid statement here until
you think it desirable in light situation there. However, would
appreciate soonest your draft for message from the President to
Mazzilli for despatch
at such time as you recommend. If you believe that additional
White House or Department statement would be desirable I would
also appreciate your recommendations on text.
End Sec 7.
Sec 8
Four Navy tankers in loading and movement process. Schedule of
arrivals in Santos area and description of loading on each ship
will be sent you immediately. We concur they should continue.
Will advise further on recall of Task Force.
End Sec 8.
Sec 9
We have nothing further here. Do you?
Please be sure to have sitrep sent to us 30 minutes in advance of
1900Z telecon, since Ball
and others will be briefing Senate Foreign Relations Committee
at 2000Z.
All messages in telecon should be considered Secret and Exdis.
End Sec 9.
Sec 10
Ref Rio 7.
Yes we will work out wider distribution here.
All right to send sitrep by telegram for wider distribution
provided no reference made therein to covert operations or US
military activities.
End Sec 10.
[Omitted here is text of Situation Report as of 1100 hours.]
Rio 2
This is Ambassador Gordon.
I am troubled about questionable juridical situation surrounding
early morning installation of Mazzilli as Acting President. Declaration by
Congress and Senate President Moura Andrade that presidency
vacant was not backed by congressional vote. Supreme Court
President did preside over swearing in of Mazzilli but it was not backed
by Supreme Court vote. If Goulart leaves Brazil without permission from
Congress he automatically forfeits office under Article 85 of
Constitution. In absence of that, however, I believe it most
desirable that Congress legitimize situation by some sort of
vote and that this be done before Pres
Johnson send any telegram to Mazzilli.
I have so advised Dean in Brasilia and he is seeking out various
congressional leaders in order impress on them importance from
international viewpoint of clear congressional legitimation.
Will report results as soon as available.
New subject is Navy Task Force described Deptels 1301 and
1305.Document 198 and footnote 2
thereto. I believe this should now be recalled with
avoidance any showing in Brazilian waters or public information
of its having been despatched. Navy tankers on other hand should
be kept heading this way until oil supply situation clarified.
If Brizola led resistance movement in RGSRio Grande do Sul. does not
evaporate, POL may be needed
there. Also morning radio reports indicate that large Duque de
Caxias refinery here still under Commie control and they preventing
operation. On other hand smaller local Manguinhas refinery
apparently operating about half capacity. Sabotage danger
Petrobras refineries cannot yet be discounted. Please inform
types and quantities POL
contained Navy tankers referred para 1 Deptel 1301. This ends
Rio 2.
Rio 3
Sitrep was sent as advance material and supplemented by my Rio
1.
Did you receive this? We would like brief time to reflect on
question White House or State Dept statement. Preferring if
possible to hold off until situation in RGS and prospects
congressional action referred Rio 2 are clearer. How much time
can you give us before some sort of statement may be
unavoidable? [End Rio 3.]
Rio 4
ARMA just returned from seeing
Castello Branco who
reports whole country quiet except Porto Alegre. There Brizola
still in control having claimed deposition of Meneghetti. Army
troops from STA Maria, RGS Parana and STA Catarina are moving on
Porto Alegre. Gen Joao Costa COMDR parachute unit was with
Castello Branco
planning airborne attack if necessary. Navy units going to
lagoon and Guaiba estuary to complete action against Porto
Alegre. Goulart still
there as is Assis Brasil.Reference
is to Argemiro Assis Brasil, Chief of the Casa Militar;
General Nicolau Fico, Army Commander in Brasilia; Admiral
Cândida Aragão, Commander of the Marines; Brigadier
Francisco Teixeira, Commander of the Third Air Zone;
Abelardo Jurema, Minister of Justice; and Osvino Ferreira
Alves, President of Petrobras. Fico gave up in
Brasilia and some arrests being made.
Chief of Cabinet to War Minister Costa e Silva is very pro US Brig Gen Siseno
Sarmento.
Castello Branco states
ADM Aragao is not under arrest, contrary previous reports, but
is being sought. Brig Teixeira likewise. Jurema is confirmed as
under arrest.
Further on petroleum. Osvino Alves is reported under arrest this
morning. Supply situation could become serious or critical
within three or four days since Petrobras supplies have been
sharply reduced in last ten days. Rationing in Sao Paulo with
service stations held to 30 percent of normal supplies. Belo
Horizonte stocks requisitioned for military use. Confusion
Petrobras and Fronape their tanker organization. Oil company
representatives have been summoned to Navy Ministry for meeting
at 1400 local time. [End Rio 4.]
Rio 5
Reply to Sec 3 is that we have no objection to landings in Rio
and Recife.
Reply to Sec 4 not yet known or indicated. My purely personal
hunch is that leading Paulista banker such as Gastao Vidigal
would be good prospect. Any new FinMin obviously faces gravest
problems but we cannot yet see political situation sufficiently
clearly to answer second question.
Reply to Sec 5 is that Mazzilli is man of clearly moderate orientation
and skillful legislative tactician but unlikely have great
executive force or vigorous policy ideas. Policies would have to
come from cabinet members. He is likely to look to capable and
highly respected names for cabinet.
Reply to Sec 6 was given in Rio 2. We believe Task Force but not
tankers should be recalled soonest.
This ends Rio 5.
Rio 6
Will send draft message President Johnson to
Mazzilli this
afternoon. Also other drafts if indicated. Will also send sitrep
in ample time for 1990Z teleconference. On handling of our
sitreps do you want us to send appropriate material as regular
telegrams for wider Washington distribution or can you arrange
that for us? This ends Rio 6.
Rio 7
On last point above it would help us if you could handle wider
Washington distribution of necessary material since we feel
heavily loaded here. This ends Rio 7.Ball briefed the
President on the situation in Brazil at 10:40 a.m. After
reviewing the teleconference with Gordon, Ball explained “that we
will probably not have a recognition problem because this
will be the same government and this will avoid the
recognition of a new government. We will treat this
government as a continuation of the old one.” (Johnson
Library, Papers of George W.
Ball, Brazil, 3/30/64–4/21/66)
206. Summary Record of the 525th Meeting of the National Security
CouncilSource: Johnson
Library, National Security File, NSC
Meetings File, Vol. I, Tab 6, 4/2/64, US Policy Toward Brazil.
Secret. Drafted by Bromley
Smith.Washington, April 2, 1964,
noon.
U.S. Policy Toward Brazil and Other General
Topics
CIA Director McCone gave a briefing from prepared
notesMcCone’s record of the
meeting, including the notes for his briefing on Brazil, is in the
Central Intelligence Agency, DCI
(McCone) Files, Job
80–B01285A, Meetings with President
Johnson. on the following items:
[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated items.]
e. Brazil—Colonel
King was asked to review the latest information from
Brazil. Most of his facts came from a teleconference between the State
Department and Ambassador Gordon
in Rio (copy attached).Document 205. He reported that
Goulart and his
brother-in-law, Brizola, had left Rio for Porto Alegre. Military
resistance has ended everywhere except in Porto Alegre, where there may
be fighting later if Goulart’s
supporters choose to resist Brazilian forces now moving on the city.
Secretary Ball reported that last
night’s action by a minority of the Members of the Brazilian Congress
who declared the office of the Presidency vacant and named the President
of the Congress, Mazzilli, as
President was of doubtful legality. This doubt will remain as long as
Goulart is in Brazil or
until he formally resigns. The Brazilian Constitution contains no
provision to oust a President. While we do not wish to cast doubt on the
legitimacy of Mazzilli as
President, we do not wish formally to accept a government which the
Brazilian courts may later decide is illegal. Mazzilli can hold office for thirty
days during which time the Congress elects a President to hold office
until the national election scheduled for 1965.
The President pointed out that Mazzilli was not in a very strong position if only 150
out of over 450 Congressmen voted him into office. Under Secretary
Ball replied that while it
was true that a minority of Congressmen had acted to put Mazzilli in office, the legal situation
would be improved as soon as Goulart resigned or went into exile.
The President asked whether there were any pockets of resistance
remaining. General Wheeler said that Goulart has relatively little military force loyal to
him. One regiment and possibly a cavalry unit have not yet given up to
the rebels.
The President asked what happens next. General Wheeler replied that the
Brazilian army would move on the pockets of resistance and clear them
out. He indicated that the Second Army would move into Porto Alegre to
overcome any units still supporting Goulart.
Secretary Rusk commented that it
was more important to the Brazilians than to us to achieve a legitimate
transfer of power. The domestic situation in Brazil would be improved if
a new government could be legitimized quickly.
The President asked why the Congress shouldn’t meet to make Mazzilli the legal President pro tem.
Secretary Rusk replied that
Ambassador Gordon was using the
resources available to him to encourage Brazilian legislators to do just
this. Under Secretary Ball noted
that there would be no problem of U.S. recognition of the new government
because we would merely continue our relations with the President.
Secretary Rusk said that all we
could do today would be to sit and wait. He said that the U.S. Navy task
force proceeding toward Brazil should continue until we receive further
information from Brazil.
Secretary McNamara recommended
that the task force continue southward. It is now near Antigua and can
be turned around tomorrow if the situation continues to improve. It will
still be a long way from Brazil.In a
telephone conversation the next morning, McNamara and Rusk agreed that it was time to
“turn that task force around.” McNamara said that he would do so “after talking to
the President.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192,
Telephone Calls 3/20/64–4/9/64) The JCS issued the instructions recalling the task force at
11:30 a.m. (Telegram 5644 from JCS
to CINCLANT, April 3; ibid., Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 BRAZ)
[Omitted here is discussion of unrelated items.]
The President asked what we were doing in Cuba to make it “just a
nuisance.” Following the laughter, Secretary Rusk commented that if Brazil turned out the way it
appears to be going, there would be a beneficial effect on the Cuban
problem and on the political situation in Chile.
Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
207. Editorial Note
In a teleconference on April 2, 1964 (4 p.m. EST), Ambassador Gordon reported that Army Chief of Staff Castello Branco had just confirmed
that “democratic forces” were in full control of Rio Grande do Sul,
thereby eliminating the last pocket of military resistance. When a radio
station announced shortly thereafter that former President Goulart had arrived in Montevideo,
Gordon relayed the news with
the salutation: “Cheers!” (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Brazil, Vol. II, 3/64) At 5 p.m. EST, the Embassy reported that Congress was not interested
in a formal vote transferring power to the new government, preferring a
fait accompli to “new juridical arguments.” The Embassy therefore
recommended “proceeding forthwith with dignified LBJ public telegram” of
congratulations to Acting President Mazzilli. (Telegram 2162 from Rio de Janeiro, April 2;
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 23–9 BRAZ) Gordon reiterated this recommendation
in a teleconference at 6 p.m., “despite continued uncertainty
whereabouts Goulart.” After
discussion among Secretary Rusk,
Under Secretary Ball, and Deputy
Under Secretary Johnson, the Department gave its
tentative approval: “If you are satisfied that message from President
Johnson to Mazzilli would not be premature and would not be
interpreted as interference in internal affairs we are prepared to
recommend to the President its prompt issuance this evening.” Gordon replied: “Since country now
completely pacified and in hands democratic forces with congressional
support even though no formal vote, I cannot see how message could be
construed as interference. Since prospects congressional vote now seem
minimal, I believe that the sooner we act the better.” (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. II, 3/64) President
Johnson approved the message, which the White
House released later that evening. The text of the message is in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Lyndon B. Johnson,
1963–1964, Book I, page 433.
208. Summary Record of the 526th Meeting of the National Security
Council With the Congressional LeadersSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
NSC Meetings File, Vol. I, Tab
7, 4/3/64. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. McCone also drafted a record of the meeting.
(Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285A, No. 2, Memos for the
Record, 1 January–5 April 1964)Washington, April 3, 1964, 2 p.m.
Various Subjects
The President opened the meeting with the Congressional Leaders by saying
that his purpose was to bring them up to date on recent developments.
Various Council members would report on current situations. He first
called on Secretary Rusk for a
summary of developments in Brazil.Shortly
before the NSC meeting, Rusk called Robert Adams in ARA: “Sec asked him to put together a
dozen examples of appointments that Goulart was making that looked like extremism, and
3–4 good examples of kinds of proposals G was making which seemed to
undermine constitutional situation down there. Sec needed them by
1:15 for 2 pm meeting.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Rusk
Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls 3/20/64–4/9/64)
Secretary Rusk summarized our
relations with Goulart,
including Goulart’s discussion
with President Kennedy, and
later, in Rio, his discussion with the Attorney General.Goulart met President
Kennedy during a visit to
Washington, April 3–4, 1962. For documentation on the visit,
including memoranda of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII,
Documents 223–225.
Attorney General Kennedy met
Goulart in Brasilia on
December 17, 1962. A memorandum of conversation, transmitted in
airgram A–710 from Rio de Janeiro, December 19, is in the National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1961–63,
033.1100–KE/12–1962. Despite our efforts to persuade
Goulart to follow a
democratic reform program, and despite our efforts to support the
Brazilian economy by making large loans, Goulart had moved toward the creation of an
authoritarian regime politically far to the left. The current revolt in
Brazil was not the traditional “golpe” of the Latin American variety but
rather a combination of governors, government officials and military
leaders who had joined together to oust Goulart when they became convinced that he was leading
Brazil to economic and political disaster. As to the current situation,
the rebel government now has full control of the country. The military
leaders in Brazil have long visualized themselves as guardians of the
democratic process.
Secretary Rusk described the major
problems which the new government in Brazil faces. First are the
economic problems which involve renegotiation of large loans coming due
shortly and revision of those economic policies of Goulart which had resulted in
inflation and economic difficulty. The Goulart men will have to be removed, which means a reorganization of the
governmental structure. There is a reasonable prospect now that the new
government will turn its attention to the major problems of Brazil. The
U.S. did not engineer the revolt. It was an entirely indigenous effort.
We now have fresh hope that Brazil can face up to its current
problems.
Senator Dirksen asked how much
money we had given in grants to Brazil. Director
Bell reported that we had made very few grants
but had made many large loans. Senator Dirksen then asked if there were any outstanding unpaid
loans. Mr. Bell replied that we are now owed
approximately $136 million in payments on loans which amount to between
$500 and $700 million. Senator Dirksen asked whether Brazil had lived up to its
agreement to the stabilization plan we had financed. Mr.
Bell replied that we had put up $60 million
when they began to implement parts of the stabilization plan. When the
Brazilians did not follow through on the plan, we then stopped further
assistance.
Senator Hayden asked whether it was not true that the Brazilians had an
excellent record of loan repayment. Mr. Bell said
no Brazilian loan was in default.
Senator Morse said he thoroughly
approved of the way the President and the State Department had handled
the situation in Brazil. He said we would have to provide new economic
assistance to Brazil but he hoped that the time had come when we could
get something for this new aid.
The President replied that we are hard at work with our allies to provide
the economic help which the new Brazilian government will need. We are
doing everything possible to get on top of the problem of helping the
new government.
Senator Dirksen asked about the
position the new government would take toward expropriation of U.S.
private investments. Secretary Rusk said that we did not know, but that one of the
first things we would talk to the new government about would be their
attitude toward expropriating U.S. property.
Senator Fulbright asked what
effect there would be in Latin America if the coffee legislationReference is to legislation allowing the
United States to fulfill its obligations under the International
Coffee Agreement of 1962. The bill, rejected by the House of
Representatives in 1964, was eventually passed and signed into law
in May 1965. (79 Stat. 112) now before the Senate were
rejected, as appeared probable. Secretary Rusk replied that Senate rejection of the coffee plan
would be very serious for us and for the Brazilians, as well as to the
Latin Americans.
Senator Dirksen said he felt that
if the legislation were called up now it would be defeated.
Under Secretary Ball said that we
should look at the coffee agreement in the light of the new Brazilian
situation. If the agreement were rejected by the Senate, the new
Brazilian government would consider the action a “no confidence” vote.
He said he could not stress too much the importance of Senate approval
of the coffee agreement. A rejection would be no less than a disaster
for the entire Alliance for Progress.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Brazil.]
Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
209. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 BRAZ. Secret; Priority. Passed
to the White House, CIA, JCS, OSD, CINCSO, CINCSTRIKE also for POLAD, and CINCLANT also for POLAD.Rio de Janeiro, April 7, 1964, 7 p.m.
2204. Ref: Deptels 1336In telegram 1336 to
Rio de Janeiro, April 6, the Department stressed the importance of
preserving the “color of legitimacy” and asked the Embassy to
consider what the United States could “appropriately do to influence
events in this direction.” (Ibid.) and 1342.In telegram 1342 to Rio de Janeiro, April 6, the
Department reported that a New York Times
representative had phoned to comment on recent developments,
including allegations of censorship and a “rumored threat to close
Congress if uncooperative on Presidential changes.” The Department
suggested that the Embassy use its influence to “check or slow down
such developments.” (Ibid.)
We fully agree concerns expressed reftels. Fortunately, similar
feelings are shared by many influential elements in leadership of
revolution, including most of the governors concerned (with possible
exception Adhemar), UDN leaders in
Congress, and at least some of military.
I distinguish between two types of constitutional problem. Those
concerning timing of congressional election of president and
eligibility Castello
Branco seem to me of secondary order, subject to
juridical rationalization without undue distortion.
Distinguished lawyers have already expressed view that Article
79Reference is to the Brazil
constitution of 1946. (2) reference to election being held “thirty
days after the last vacancy” can be construed as meaning “within
thirty days,” since constituent assembly would otherwise have
said “on the thirtieth day”.
Congress is now passing a law to establish the manner of the
election, which will also cover this point. As to eligibility
under article 139 (I) (C), there is plausible argument that in
context of nearby articles this refers only to direct popular
elections and not to indirect election by Congress. As a second
line of retreat in case Castello
Branco, chiefs of general staff may be construed
as referring only to general staff of the armed forces, and not
to chiefs of staff of individual services.
Atmospheric noises about shutting Congress down are, I believe,
only from irresponsible sources and need not be taken
seriously.What seems to be more serious is question public liberties and
cancellation mandates extreme left-wing deputies. In this respect,
there is real problem of vigorous desire on part military leadership
of revolution to make quick and effective purge of Communist and
other subversive extremists in public services, trade unions, and
Congress. There are ten or twelve congressmen such as Brizola, Neiva
Moreira, Juliao, Marco Antonio Coelho, Max da Costa Santos, Benedito
Cerqueira, and Sergeant Garcia, whose active participation in
efforts at violent subversion is certainly beyond doubt and should
be readily subject to objective proof. Unfortunately, articles 45
and 213 are very strong protections of congressional immunities. The
harder-line military are talking about revoking the mandates of up
to forty left-wing congressmen, which would be grossly excessive,
but even the most moderate feel it essential to revoke those of some
ten to twelve. The right way to do this would be under article 48
(2), but with the PTB solidly
opposing, it would be very difficult to secure a two-thirds absolute
majority for this purpose. The cases of Governors Arraes and Seixas
Doria appear to have been cared for through impeachment by their
respective legislative assemblies. The two related problems are
press censorship and holding of suspected subversives without habeas
corpus.On press censorship, we have pointed out through both military and
civilian channels importance of not creating hostility among foreign
and especially US journalists. I got a strongly helpful reaction on
this from Lacerda, who at six pm instructed an aide to determine who
was responsible and say he would denounce it publicly if not called
off forthwith. He was on way to see Castello Branco and promised make this point
strongly.The military leadership has prepared a so-called “institutional
act” designed to revoke parliamentary immunities, life tenure for
professors and judges, and stability of tenure for civil and
military public employees, and there is under debate today the
question whether this should be simply issued as an executive act of
the high command of the
revolution or perhaps issued ad referendum by Congress. Putting a
good juridical face on the former would be very difficult, but it
may already be a fait accompli. We have tried to use our limited
influence in the circumstances, and I stress that it is limited, to
maintain the greatest possible color of legitimacy in the form of
congressional sanction.I took advantage of an almost accidental date with the new War
Minister MondayApril 6.
afternoon to point out that we are happy with the results of the
revolution, that we want to support the new government in every
possible way, but that our ability to support depends upon domestic
congressional and public opinion which is very sensitive to anything
which smacks of an old-fashioned reactionary Latin American military
coup. For this reason, while recognizing the need for an effective
purge of true subversives, juridical appearances are highly
important. Tuesday morning, I arranged to convey a similar message
to Castello Branco, doing
it through Colonel Walters since I felt it unwise to see Castello personally at present
stage. Walters also talked with Colonel Miranda of National Security
Council. I made the same points in call on Lacerda Tuesday
afternoon. War Minister Costa e
Silva was not very responsive. Castello Branco, who is more
sophisticated and civil minded, did appear to understand it and
undertook to bear it in mind. Lacerda fully acknowledged the point,
which fits with his own current campaign to dampen down excesses by
police and army. He felt it unlikely, however, that some form of
juridically questionable institutional act could be avoided, saying
it was an inevitable bridge between the revolution and the full
restoration of constitutional guarantees.Department should bear in mind that Brazil had very narrow escape
from Communist-dominated dictatorship and is only few days past what
could have been civil war type confrontation. I see no way now of
pushing this question further without over-straining our credit and
producing counter-productive reactions. If other opportunities
present themselves, we will make use of them.Gordon raised the
question of “constitutional formalities” in a meeting with
Mazzilli on April 8.
After expressing similar concern, Mazzilli said that he was “using all resources
to secure meeting of minds between military and political
forces, with conservation of constitutional forms as ‘point of
honor for the country.’” (Telegram 2209 from Rio de Janeiro,
April 8; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9
BRAZ)Gordon
210. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central
Intelligence McCone and John J.
McCloy
April 9, 1964,
11:10 a.m.[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, Telephone Calls, Eyes
Only, 3/4/64–5/19/65. No classification marking. 4 pages of source text
not declassified.]
211. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–3 BRAZ. Confidential; Immediate;
Limdis. Repeated to the White House, OSD, JCS, CINCLANT, CINCSTRIKE, CIA, and CINCSO.Rio de Janeiro, April 10, 1964, 2 p.m.
2235. References: Embtels 2230 and
2231.Telegrams 2230 and 2231 from Rio
de Janeiro, both April 10, forwarded the translated texts of the
Institutional Act and its preamble. (Ibid.) The act was signed on
April 9 by three military ministers: Artur Costa e Silva (Army),
Francisco de Assis
I must confess to considerable dismay at Thursday’sApril 9. course of events, leading to
the promulgation last night of the institutional act as a fait
accompli on the exclusive authority of the military ministers. The
juridical rationalization of the revolution as containing its own
inherent constituent power is a wordy statement that might makes
right (or makes law). Until yesterday morning, we had understood
that congressional coverage and a plausible dress of legitimate
continuity would be achieved, but apparently the congressional
leaders would not accept certain of the demands insisted upon by the
military leadership, who in turn were pressed by some of the more
radical younger officers. The latter were concerned that
maneuverings by Kubitschek and
PTB might prevent the removal
from key power centers of many active participants in Goulart’s extreme left conspiracy.
We should be able secure
more details on the failure of Wednesday’s negotiation during the
course of the day.Mitigating aspects of the development are that: (a) Congress not
being closed, although presidency much strengthened in relation to
Congress; (b) six-month time limit on suspension of certain
constitutional guarantees; (c) confirmation of next year’s
presidential election on dates provided by 1946 constitution; (d)
limitation of application of whole institutional act to period
ending January 31, 1966; and (e) conservation intact of federal
system with state autonomy and constitutional arrangements.Greatest hope for avoidance of undemocratic excesses rests in
character and convictions of Castello
Branco, who this morning appears almost certain of
election, Dutra having withdrawn and Kruel possibly doing likewise. We are planning
communicate to Castello by
one means or another the signal importance from viewpoint foreign
opinion and future collaboration of his reaffirmation devotion to
democratic procedures, respect for individual liberties, and
reestablishment of harmonious collaboration among the three
constituted branches of government in the national interest.Meanwhile we are faced with difficult problem USG public stance over coming few days.
We take as basic premise the absolute necessity that the new
government succeed both politically and economically. They will need
our cordial and generous support to do so. At same time, we do not
see how we can pretend to approve of way in which institutional act
was issued. After reviewing various alternatives, I have concluded
that our best stance until Castello’s inauguration (which is now expected on
Sunday) is the closest possible approximation to golden
silence.Specifically, we recommend that any USG spokesman say in response to questions
substantially as follows: “The Brazilian Congress is scheduled to
elect a president and a vice president on Saturday afternoon to
serve for the remainder of the five-year presidential term ending
January 31, 1966. They are expected to take office shortly
thereafter. In these circumstances, we prefer to withhold any
comment regarding the institutional act and its implications until
the new president has taken office and made the policies of his
government known.”As additional unattributed background for press, we suggest you
point out that only since revolution has depth and breadth of
subversive activity become clear, affecting many government
agencies, both military and civilian, trade unions, journalism,
teachers, transport and communications, etc., all systematically
aided and abetted by Goulart
regime. Accumulating evidence points to a Goulart plan to complete a
left-wing coup d’état prior to May 1, which would have involved the
closing of Congress and either a Peronista type or outright Communist-dominated
dictatorship with no respect for democratic forms or constitutional
liberties and no mercy for opponents. Steps in this included planned
violence against Rio April 2 democratic rally, to be followed by
intervention in Guanabara, other announced Goulart left wing rallies
throughout April, and CGT ultimatum
to Congress to accept all reforms by April 20 under penalty general
strike which Goulart had
said publicly he would not oppose. It appears that May 1 was to have
been a victory celebration under Communist sponsorship. Country was
in process becoming armed camp, with grave danger massive bloodshed.
Starting with March 13 rally, Communist backing of Goulart became open and total.
Goulart’s collaboration
with Communists and associates had become so close in final weeks
that he was becoming their virtual prisoner. Kruel and others tried almost
desperately as late as March 31 to get Goulart to disavow the CGT and the Communists but without avail. As to the
congressmen whose mandates were revoked this morning the majority
were demonstrably implicated in direct subversive activities, such
as instigating NCO and enlisted men
rebellions, fomenting rural violence and land invasions,
distributing arms and organizing guerrilla forces. Others were
implicated in Goulart plans
for abolishing constitutional order. Some half dozen were known CP
members masquerading under other party labels. While we do not seek
to justify extra-legal processes adopted by revolutionary leaders to
carry out “operation clean-up”, a substantial purge was clearly in
order.We are not making any announcements on aid projects during this
interim, pending inauguration and policy declarations by new
president.Gordon
212. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 BRAZ. Confidential;
Priority.Rio de Janeiro, April 20, 1964, 11 p.m.
2331. 1. Herewith highlights my first private talk with President
Castello Branco in Brasilia
Saturday morning,April 18. lasting
eighty minutes. After exchange
courtesies, I congratulated him on inaugural address and remarked that
we looked on April revolution as possible turning point in affairs Latin
America and world as well as Brazil, provided proper use made of
opportunity. Also spoke of convergence US and Brazilian interests on
major issues, interest in seeing a strong and progressive Brazil, and
desire approach possible divergences on any minor issues with good will
on both sides. President concurred and expressed special appreciation
for LBJ telegram.Reference is to Johnson’s
message congratulating Castello
Branco after his election on April 11 to succeed
Goulart as President of
Brazil. (Telegram 1401 to Rio de Janeiro, April 14; Johnson Library,
National Security File, Special Heads of State Correspondence,
Brazil, Branco Correspondence, Vol. I)
2. President then noted that American press reaction to his speech had
been favorable, but concern clearly existed in US as to possible
revolutionary excesses. He understood the withdrawal of political
rights, Celso FurtadoFormer head of the
Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE). had been especially
badly received. I replied that there was indeed such concern, not
because of disagreement with basic purposes of revolution, but because
repressive measures could be arbitrary or excessive, state police in Sao
Paulo seemed presently very extreme, and some judicial or other review
procedure would have important favorable effect on free world opinion.
Also said Furtado case especially sensitive in view his international
renown, CIAP membership, and possible
invitation by an American University as visiting professor. President
said he understood Furtado had appointed many Communists to SUDENE, which I acknowledged, but I then
explained in some detail reasons our own appraisal Furtado. President
listened attentively to this exposition. (See separate wire on
discussion Furtado case with Justice Minister Milton Campos.)Telegram 2330 from Rio de Janeiro, April 20.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 29 BRAZ)
3. We then turned to discussion economic and social problems. President
inquired at some length about Alliance for Progress, Marshall Plan, and
my earlier interest in Brazilian economic development. While expressing
great confidence in medium and long-term Brazilian prospects, given
effective policies and administration, I emphasized technically
difficult problem of coping with inflation which had in January–February
reached annual rate one hundred and fifty percent, an importance of well
planned investment program to cushion shock of this inflation and spread
austerity burdens as equitably as possible. Indicated our readiness to
support both short and long-run efforts within general AFP framework and available resources.
President asked me to review history of Brazilian planning and AFP coordinating efforts in recent years, and concluded this
discussion by saying he placed highest importance on effective public
investment planning and coordinating mechanism, this under active study,
and he hoped arrive at decision by next Wednesday, April 22.
4. Following suggestion by Foreign Minister, I then explained AMFORP history and status to president,
pointing to use Colombian precedent as possible means for early
solution. Explained urgency solution from viewpoint avoiding further
deterioration electric service and starting financing important new
projects to avoid medium-term power shortage in center south. President
undertook review promptly with Finance and Mines Ministers, as well as
Foreign Minister.
5. President asked me about prospects additional PL 480 supplies and debt rescheduling, to which I replied
with summary exposition present status.
6. Talk also touched on general international developments such as
Sino-Soviet dispute and French policies under De Gaulle. President felt
Russia relatively quiescent but ChiComs rashly and dangerously
expansionist. He showed particular interest in France, remarking that De
Gaulle had always seemed to him obsessed with concept of national
greatness symbolized simply by military power, a concept Castello Branco regarded as obsolete
and irrelevant to present world realities.
7. Contrast between tone this talk and that recent Goulart audiences was as day and
night. Castello Branco was
alert, attentive, intelligent, and responsive. He made no incautious
predictions on future line of action, and I did not seek any. He
obviously still feeling his way on many matters of organization,
administration, and policy, but appeared to be doing it thoughtfully and
conscientiously. I left the interview with the feeling that this was a
most auspicious beginning.
Gordon
213. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurrekd in this estimate on May 27.SNIE 93–64Washington, May 27, 1964.
THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BRAZIL
The Problem
To assess the stability of the Castello
Branco regime and the outlook in Brazil during his stated
term in office.
Conclusions
President Castello
Branco, whose term runs through January 1966, probably
will provide reasonably effective political leadership along
moderate reformist lines.The Director
of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, feels that
the thrust of this estimate is overly optimistic in several
respects. He believes that it does not adequately take into
account the enormous gravity and many-sided challenge of the
political situation; the persisting confrontation of powerful
forces on both the right and the left which will hamstring
necessary reformist action; the political inexperience of the
President and most of his Cabinet and the absence of enough
qualified second- and third-level technical personnel; and the
prospective destabilizing role of some of the revolution’s
military leaders who would emphasize continuing repressive
action at the expense of meaningful social reforms. For these
reasons, the Director believes that there is an even chance that
the regime will slip into increasing authoritarianism, thus
precipitating another constitutional crisis within the period of
the estimate. [Footnote in the source text.] It is
unlikely that the supporters of deposed President Goulart will be able to mount a
serious challenge to the stability of the new regime, although some
leftist extremists may attempt demonstrative acts of violence to
discredit it. The principal danger to the stability of the new
regime is the possibility of a falling out between Castello Branco and some groups
within the military who want a more thorough purge of the old
political order. We believe that, with some concessions to
expediency, he will succeed in maintaining general control of the
situation. (Paras. 2–15)Brazil’s economic and social problems—worsened but not caused by
Goulart’s disruptive
rule—are not amenable to quick or painless solutions. The new regime
is likely to take constructive steps on several fronts, but over the
next years or so it probably will be unable to do much more than to
lay a basis for future progress. It probably will enact a number of
social reforms as an earnest of its concern for Brazil’s depressed
classes, but will concentrate initially on combatting inflation and on other
measures needed to get the economy rolling again. For political
reasons, however, it probably will stop short of stringent austerity
measures. It will need considerable foreign economic assistance to
reschedule Brazil’s huge short-term debt and to help cushion the
shock of the economic stabilization measures it does undertake.
(Paras. 16–21)
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]
214. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 17 US–BRAZ. Confidential; Priority;
Limdis.Rio de Janeiro, June 10, 1964,
noon.
2790. 1. President Castello
Branco received me in Brasilia Tuesday afternoonJune 9. for one and one-quarter hours.
At start, I presented him book on White House, recently published
Portuguese translations of LBJ biography
and collection of speeches, and Kennedy half dollar. All were graciously
acknowledged.
2. I said purpose of visit was to review general situation prior to
Washington consultationsGordon was scheduled to
arrive in Washington on June 13 to review the status of economic
assistance to Brazil. (Telegram 2695 from Rio de Janeiro, May 29;
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, AID(US) 9 BRAZ) He was one
of six Ambassadors in Latin America to meet President
Johnson on June 18; see Document 18. According to Rusk’s Appointment Book Gordon also met Rusk on June 18; no substantive record of the
meeting has been found. (Johnson Library) The next day the
Department reported that AID had
approved a $50 million loan to Brazil for balance of payments
assistance. Although the agreement was to be signed immediately, the
actual disbursement of funds was made contingent on settlement of
the AMFORP dispute. (Telegrams
1776 and 1778 to Rio de Janeiro, June 19; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID(US) 9 BRAZ) The United States and
Brazil signed the loan agreement on June 23. and learn
Castello’s state of mind
after two months in office. President asked if I had seen Juracy Magalhaes recently (I had done
so late Tuesday morning) and then showed me staff report on areas of
friction abroad, including chapters on AMFORP, Hanna, CTB, French contentious cases, and
remittance of profits, saying that work on resolution of all was going
forward rapidly. Then showed me separate mimeographed bill on profits
remittance revision, which would receive final cabinet consideration
Thursday and go to Congress promptly thereafter. President emphasized
systematic staff work as basic
feature his administration, saying he felt pleased with progress
considering that neither he nor ministers had expected to be in office
and therefore had lacked period of advance preparation. He mentioned
main legislative items of housing, taxes (in two phases), bank reform,
agrarian reform, the strike regulation law, all as indicating real
progress in governmental process. He said threefold goals of inflation
containment, development, and reform were no mere slogans, but genuine
objectives which were being fleshed out in administrative and
legislative measures. We had a little interchange on need for popular
slogans to win broad support, which president acknowledged but said he
approached with wariness, considering damage done the country by such
past slogans as “petroleum is ours,” and “reforms with or without the
constitution.”
3. President then said he had great interest in Alliance for Progress and
its effective application in Brazil. Said he felt threefold program
entirely in line with charter of Punta del Este, also actively
interested in having social as well as economic side maintained, noting
special importance of social side in northeast. He said investments in
human beings essential even for effective economic development there,
and he rejected argument that social benefits would come automatically
from promotion of industrialization. President talked warmly of recent
Recife meeting with Kubish.
4. I then turned conversation to political side, saying that cancellation
Kubitschek political rights
would raise serious questions abroad and asking how he would explain it
if in my place.On June 5 the Department
suggested that Gordon convey
to Castello Branco the
“seriousness” of international reaction to the suspension of
Kubitschek’s political
rights. (Telegram 1697 to Rio de Janeiro; ibid., POL 29 BRAZ) In telegram 1716 to Rio de
Janeiro, June 9, Mann also
recommended that Gordon
express to Castello Branco
“the mounting concern which we feel here” regarding actions taken
under the Institutional Act: “The failure on the part of the
Brazilian Government to follow due processes of law and to proceed
in a democratic manner will increase our difficulties in responding
to Brazilian requests for economic assistance.” (Ibid.) The Embassy
reported that telegram 2790 had arrived after “Ambassador’s call on
Castello Branco in
Brasilia and on eve his departure for U.S.” (Telegram 2818 from Rio
de Janeiro, June 11; ibid.) Mann reported on the “Kubitschek thing” in a telephone conversation with
the President, June 11; see Document
16. President first traced formal steps in procedure,
stating that charges and requests for cancellation came from three
ministers, that evidence was carefully collected, National Security
Council considered and recommended, and he then acted. As to reasons, he
said they were both past and future. In past, despite Kubitschek’s substantial contributions
to development of country, these had been made without regard to
financial responsibility and with large scale corruption, including
personal enrichment Kubitschek and
his friends. In addition, Kubitschek had wooed Communist support, and had paid
price of letting them get into the governmental machine, where as previously they had been working
on students and trade unions and others outside. He said that among
other things, Kubitschek had
dismissed Lucas Lopes, who now one of Kubitschek’s leading defenders, as Finance Minister at
insistence of Prestes. As to future, cancellation of mandate and
therefore candidacy was essential to safeguard country against
rebuilding of same phenomena of corruption and Communist infiltration
from which country had suffered in last decade. Kubitschek had been intending to base
his candidacy not merely on PSD, but on
Goulart supporters in PTB and on Communist collaboration.
President said he recognized that procedures had distasteful aspects,
not meeting usual norms of right to defense or judicial review, but he
felt that conditions of country initiated by Kubitschek himself and greatly intensified by Goulart had made exceptional
procedures indispensable to effective clean-up and replacement of
country on sound track of honest democratic government. June 15 would
end this phase, any further clean-up actions taking place under normal
National Security Law S. President noted that popular reaction to
Kubitschek cancellation had
been very small. The Congress was debating subject at that very moment,
and he expected PSD speeches denouncing
injustice and making some sort of manifesto, but he did not believe
PSD would obstruct governmental
program.
5. I then asked whether he planned to issue any sort of official
declaration or justification of action on Kubitschek. President replied that something of sort was
being projected, on basis partial rather than full dossier, since full
revelation would be embarrassing to nation. I urged strongly
desirability of issuance some form official justification, emphasizing
importance of this to public opinion abroad. President appeared to be
impressed by my emphasis on this point.
6. I then speculated on political effects, including likelihood that
PSD might now turn to Kruel as candidate, and danger
militarization of whole political process, noting concern in foreign
press and public opinion of possible slide into military dictatorship.
(This whole political discussion was conducted with caution, since I am
still developing personal relationship with Castello Branco of type permitting
candid treatment such matters.) President replied he well aware concern
of excessive militarization but absolutely confident that action his
government would dispel this concern. Pointed out that military
candidates in Brazil had never gotten much enthusiasm, even from the
armed forces noting such cases as those Monteiro, Lott, etc. Also said
he would require any officers desiring to be candidates to take leave
from jobs, said they could not use their offices as campaign
headquarters in the way Lott had done. He said, incidentally, that
Kruel had telephoned a few
days ago to indicate his personal endorsement of cancellation Kubitschek political rights.
7. I then raised question of possible prolongation Castello’s own mandate. On this, he
was reticent, although indirectly indicating reluctance consider anything which appeared to be of
personal benefit to him. We discussed in this connection length of
necessarily unpopular austerity phase of anti-inflation effort, which he
said might be much longer than six months but he hoped would be over by
first anniversary of revolution next April. Also said that essence of
his government would be noninvolvement in campaign. Remarked with smile
that Lacerda had had anti-Goulart issue as major campaign weapon, and might in
future become anti-Castello,
although he hoped that Lacerda’s future political posture would become
more positive than negative.
8. As conversation concluding we covered smaller points. President said
had discussed C–130 project with Air Minister earlier same day, with
negotiations to proceed. Details will go through JBUSMC.
9. In response to question on embarked aviation, President said he would
settle this within few weeks. Issue could be settled only by President,
and he intended to resolve it once for all. Then remarked that Kubitschek had bequeathed country two
aircraft carriers, the Minas Gerais and Brasilia, one anchored uselessly in Guanabara Bay
and the other anchored uselessly in the central plateau.
10. President inquired on relation timing my return and Juracy Magalhaes arrival in
Washington. Said he placed highest hopes on Juracy’s effectiveness as
Ambassador. In addition to formal credentials, he is giving Juracy
personal letter to LBJ.Magalhaes evidently delivered
the letter when he presented his credentials to President
Johnson on July 9. (Johnson Library,
President’s Daily Diary) He also mentioned Lacerda’s mission
to Europe and US to help explain revolution, and indicated hope
President Johnson might be able receive
Lacerda.
11. President then asked me about US political party convention
prospects, Presidential elections, and other aspects current US scene.
We also talked of common acquaintances, President speaking of Colonel
Walters in terms of affection and respect. Conversation ended on most
cordial note, leaving me impression real progress in melting reserve
which is one of Castello’s
personal characteristics.
12. Comment. My general impression was extremely
favorable. I did not encounter any nervousness or anxiety on Castello’s part, despite fact that
Kubitschek action obviously
tough decision. On contrary, impression was rather one of calm resolve
to get on with problems of clean-up, administrative rebuilding, and
positive program. I also noted feeling of greater confidence on economic
subjects, together with full backing policy lines recommended by
Campos.In a June 15 memorandum to
Bundy, Sayre offered the following
comment: “All reporting indicates Brazil is seriously proceeding on
reform measures. Unfortunately there is an undercurrent that the
U.S. owes Brazil assistance because it threw out the Communists.”
(Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. IV,
4/64–8/64)
Gordon
215. Letter From the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon) to the Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA Files: Lot 66 D 65, Brazil,
1964. Confidential; Official–Informal.Rio de Janeiro, August 10, 1964.
Dear Tom:
This is in reply to your letter of July 31,Attached but not printed. In his letter to Gordon, Mann reported that the Johnson
administration had recently given “a considerable amount of thought
to the problem of helping Brazil to get its house in order.”
According to Mann immediate
action was necessary. “If Brazil fails to act responsibly in the
months immediately ahead,” he argued, “we will then be in a crisis
situation again, perhaps of even larger proportions.” Mann also reported, however, that
IMF officials had expressed
“great skepticism about the ‘gradualist’ approach to the problem of
inflation,” a concern shared by “those of us who are working on this
problem in the Department.” carried here by Bill Rogers at
the beginning of last week. Bill’s trip was extremely helpful for all of us. In addition
to some immediate problems, including the Rio–São Paulo highway
question, it gave us the chance to review the broad strategy of our
economic assistance relationships with Brazil in the light of the way in
which the governmental program has been shaping up. It has also given
Bill some most useful
firsthand insights into the attitudes and problems of the
Campos–Bulhöes team and of
the Castello Branco government
in general in the economic field.
From our own talks in June,See footnote 3, Document 214. I know
that you and I are in accord that the coming months are a time of
exceptional importance in determining the economic and political course
of Brazil for perhaps a long period to come, with derived effects on the
whole future of Latin America. In this respect, the revolution was
decisive in creating new opportunities, but not necessarily in how those
opportunities will be used. The Castello
Branco government must make good use of this time, and
our own efforts should be directed toward promoting and supporting that
objective. It would be a disastrous error for us to relax in our
relationships with Brazil on the mistaken theory that the revolution had
eliminated the Communist or Peronist danger here and things could now
simply take care of themselves. I know that this is not your view, but
with the world so full of urgent crises, I occasionally have the feeling
that some elements in the bureaucracy are all too ready to relax into a
“business as usual” frame of mind.
Your letter of July 31 is concentrated mainly on the stabilization
effort. The Castello Branco
government, for its part, has constantly emphasized the three-fold goals
of stabilization, development, and reform. I believe that this rather broader emphasis is
correct, for both economic and political reasons. It is true that
rampant inflation is the most acute of the economic problems facing the
government. Yet it would be an error to concentrate policy-making
entirely on anti-inflation measures, or to give stabilization an
exclusive priority, even for a limited period of time.
In economic terms this is because Brazil is still a fairly poor country
with a very rapidly growing population, which was suffering in the last
year from stagnation along with accelerating inflation. It must continue
the building of essential economic and social infrastructure and the
stimulation of private investment in both industry and agriculture at
the same time that it is fighting hard to reverse the inflationary
forces. Even in the interests of stabilization itself, moreover, the
acceleration of certain types of investments, such as those designed to
finish up projects already begun, so as to get some goods and services
out of investment already made, or those designed to improve
agricultural output and a better flow to market, will contribute
directly to supply and demand equilibrium. The problem cannot be tackled
simply on the demand side. And in political terms, there must be a
reasonably widespread conviction that burdens of austerity are being
spread with equity and that beyond the tunnel of austerity there is the
light of development and of progressive reform.
The alleged dichotomy between the “once for all” or “gradualist” attack
on inflation, mentioned in your luncheon with the IMF people, seems to me an essentially
false option. Inflation at the rate of 120 percent per year, which had
been reached in Brazil in the first quarter of this year, is the
economic counterpart of a heavy locomotive on a down slope or a heavy
merry-go-round, with a tremendous amount of momentum built into it in
the form of habits and expectations in all sectors of the
community—businessmen, bankers and borrowers, workers and consumers.
There is no way of stopping such a machine abruptly without producing an
explosion or converting the energy of momentum into such intense heat
that it will consume the whole institutional structure.
The realistic questions are: (a) Is the goal really stabilization or is
it simply continuing inflation at a substantial even if lower rate, and
(b) is the time period by which stabilization is to be achieved
politically and economically a realistic one? Even the most orthodox
monetarist would not expect to achieve stabilization in Brazil’s present
circumstances in less than six to twelve months. Whether it should be
six to twelve, twelve to eighteen, or eighteen to twenty-four months
does not seem to me a matter of fundamental doctrinal difference. The
essential objective is that the goal be the right one, the direction of
policy the right one, and the time be what is realistically feasible. An
effort to bring about an
excessively abrupt halt to inflation would either mean massive
deflation, with wholesale bankruptcies and very heavy unemployment, or
would require the kind of price-wage freeze and direct intervention in
every phase of the economy which could only be enforced in a rigid
dictatorship. Given Brazilian habits and attitudes, I doubt whether even
a rigid dictatorship could enforce it.
With respect to the restoration of confidence and the change of
expectations, I cannot agree that it makes little difference whether the
rate of inflation is fifty percent or a hundred percent. In my mind, the
direction of change is as important as the actual rate of inflation at
any given moment. The change of expectations involved in shifting from a
constant or accelerating rate of inflation to a decelerating rate of
inflation is as significant as the change involved in shifting from some
inflation to no inflation. I see two critical points of inflection in
the inflationary curve: the change from concave upward to concave
downward (which is the move from acceleration to deceleration), and the
later change from concave downward to actual stability.
That much having been said, the problem before us is to judge whether the
Brazilian government’s policies are really bringing about this first
point of inflection, whether the deceleration will be maintained, and
whether its pace is sufficiently rapid. The cases cited by the IMF of “all-out campaigns for a limited
period of time”—Greece, Formosa, and Bolivia—seem to me only partially
relevant. They involved either beginning situations which were much less
severe than the present one in Brazil or volumes of outside aid which
constituted a far larger proportion of domestic gross product than can
conceivably be envisaged in the Brazilian case. The world is not
prepared to finance an import surplus in Brazil of one or two billion
dollars a year. Such a surplus could not be absorbed here, even if
financing were available, because industrialization has already
proceeded to the point where such staggering competition from the
outside world would be unacceptable.
I do not want to prejudge the new Brazilian economic plan, since we are
just beginning our analysis of it. Ralph Korp’sFinancial Attaché in Rio de Janeiro.
preliminary indications, however, suggest that it is, in some respects
at least, encouragingly tough considering the situation with which this
government began in April. Castello
Branco, Campos, and Bulhöes show no fear of unpopularity as such for a
limited period of time. They accept this as inevitable. The danger of
those who would play personal politics with Brazil’s profound problems
lies at the present in other quarters.
Castello Branco’s willingness
to have his term extended was essentially a result of his conviction
that there would be another year of unpopular measures, and that the
active campaign period should wait until after the eventual up-turn
rather than getting started in the midst of this unpopular phase. I even
have doubts as to whether the government program may not be excessively
austere on some points, notably the postponement of any further military
or civilian civil service wage increases until after December 1965. I
should like to leave a quantitative discussion of these matters,
however, for analysis in the coming days and weeks when we have had a
better chance to study the details of the program.
Although I was not personally involved in the mid-1950’s, as you were, I
know the history of the broken promises in connection with past aid
package negotiations with Brazil. Since 1961 I have been painfully and
intimately involved with them. Looking back at the 1953 and subsequent
cases with some historical perspective, however, I am not persuaded that
our Export-Import Bank loans were all to the bad. It is a misfortune
that Kubitschek was not restrained
from various inflationary follies, including the building of Brasilia.
On the other hand, the positive things that were done as a result of the
project-formulating work of the Joint Brazil–US Economic Commission in
the early fifties, and the later help from some World Bank and much
Export-Import Bank financing, did make possible the São Paulo
development which in turn created the middle class which won the April
revolution here in Brazil. And Brazil did enjoy a six to seven percent
annual growth rate all through the 1950’s, even though there were
imbalances in some of this growth. So neither in economic nor in
political terms was that money simply thrown down the drain. Quite the
contrary. This is not an argument for aid now regardless of performance,
but merely a caveat to the over-gloomy view of our actions a decade ago.
Obviously we do want effective performance now, and there is good reason
to believe that the Castello
Branco government will provide it.
In arriving at judgments on the relation between the performance of the
new Brazilian government and our own (and IMF’s and others’) support, we must bear in mind that these
are not mutually independent phenomena. These questions always involve
the will of the government concerned and the political capacity to make
that will effective. On the former point, my judgment is that this
government has a stronger will for the right policies than any other in
Brazil’s postwar history. On the latter point, our own support in
adequate quantity and at the right time may itself make a decisive
contribution. If we wait too long to observe performance we may by that
very delay make the performance impossible. The only satisfactory
arrangement is to have the performance and the outside support run in
parallel, and with both related to realizable targets.
The government is already under heavy political fire from an unhealthy
and unholy alliance. That alliance naturally includes the Communist,
fellow travelling, and extreme negative nationalist forces who were in
the Goulart camp. It includes
conservative land owners who hate the thought of even the most minimal
land reform. It includes the backward monopolistic nationalist business
group which fears competition from foreign private investment and
opposes any domestic democratization of capital or internal competition
as well. And in recent weeks it has threatened to include the powerful
voice of Carlos Lacerda for purely personalistic reasons; I hope that
his basic intelligence will soon put these in their proper perspective,
but I cannot yet be confident of this.
So far, Castello Branco has
maintained a resolute tranquillity in pushing ahead with what he
believes is right, but some positive economic and social gains along
with the wage austerity and other negative aspects of the stabilization
program may be crucial to the survival of the government’s program—and
conceivably in certain circumstances, to the survival of the government
itself. It is especially important that sacrifices not all appear to be
concentrated on wage-earners, or in any event that progress is in sight
on housing and education as an offset to temporary wage level
sacrifices.
We should also be careful to define performance requirements in terms
which are within reasonable judgments of what is politically manageable
by a relatively strong and good willed government, but one which does
not possess dictatorial powers. As I see the postwar record, a chronic
source of disillusionment with IMF
stand-by agreements in Latin America has been the extraction of
commitments from hard pressed finance ministers who did not themselves
believe they were capable of being carried out when those commitments
were signed. It is a sobering experience to review the history of these
agreements and the brief periods within which many of their provisions
were disregarded. These would not be good precedents for us to follow in
present Brazilian circumstances.
It is against the above background that we should confront the question
of the timing and nature of further economic support for the Brazilian
program. We should of course continue processing projects as rapidly as
the mechanics permit. As to the next phase of comprehensive negotiation,
there emerged from a long discussion Thursday afternoonAugust 6. among Bill Rogers, Jack Kubish,
Ralph Korp, and myself the conclusion that the desirable timing would be
in mid-October, related to the Campos presentation to CIAP now scheduled for about October 10.
We believe that it would be most desirable to promote the negotiation of an IMF stand-by agreement at the same time. We
have already suggested to Campos the desirability of requesting the
presence of at least one IMF Staff man
here as soon as possible.
Ideally, IMF assistance should be used to
liquidate commercial arrears and reduce the backlog of financial arrears
(including payments to small suppliers who cannot be included in the
rescheduling negotiations and cutting down the excessive volume of
outstanding swaps, the renewal of which is itself an inflationary
factor). It would be helpful to obtain corresponding action from the
private banks, at least in reopening the $90 million in US bank credit
lines and longer-term credits from both US and European banks along the
lines of the 1961 arrangements. Our own assistance would include an
estimate of the total project support through fiscal ‘65 at least, and a
complementary program loan from AID. I
would hope that at the same time the World Bank would be prepared to
make further encouraging qualitative noises about its expectations in
Brazil, and that the IDB might indicate
some orders of magnitude of its expected assistance. I naturally also
hope that Harold LinderPresident and
Chairman, Export-Import Bank. might by then be prepared to
consider some modest new project loans for especially attractive
projects within the Export-Import Bank’s traditional fields of activity.
Together with a forecast on PL 480, this
could make a substantial showing of external support for the GOB efforts, with both good economic and
good political results.
It would also be very desirable to give at least some preliminary
indications in October of what might be done during the calendar year
1966. Exactly what and in what form, I would prefer to defer for
recommendation after seeing how much of a basis the Brazilian program
affords. Even with respect to 1965, there is the critical question of
what portion of our commitments, if any, may be contingent upon
Congressional action in the form of supplemental authorization and
appropriation for the present fiscal year.
So far as broad magnitudes of development assistance are concerned,
assuming that the stabilization effort is going in the right direction
and that IMF resources are concentrated
on short-term strengthening of the balance-of-payments position, I
believe that Brazilian needs for total annual long-term capital inflow
during the next few years are in the general range of six hundred to
seven hundred million dollars per year. This is consistent with the
“Gordon formula” of thirty
percent for Brazil applied to the Punta del Este overall figure of more
than two billion per year in annual outside resources. More important,
it is consistent with a rough macro-economic analysis of the Brazilian
situation, and with rough
estimates on sectoral requirements and sectoral lending opportunities
and absorptive capacities.
As to the sources from which such a total might be made up, the following
indicates reasonable orders of magnitude:
AID and Export-Import
Bank$250 millionPL 48075IDB75IBRD and IDA100European and Japanese Bilateral50–100Net private (gross would be larger)100Total$650–700 million
This total is about three and one half percent of GNP. Since it is additional investment and takes the form
of high return imports, it could make the critical difference between an
unsatisfactory and a satisfactory growth rate.
The short-term problem of food supply, also mentioned in your letter, is
one which has been greatly worrying me. It is a major contributory
source to the growing unpopularity of the present government, although
it arises now by coincidence and is not a result of the stabilization
effort. I have reviewed the problem at length with Dick NewbergDirector, Office of Agriculture and Rural
Development (AID) in Rio de
Janeiro. and Jack Kubish. They advise that the main remedies,
some of which cannot be effective rapidly, lie in domestic action here,
but there are some contributions we can make through technical
assistance and through certain elements of the AID program, such as rural credit and fertilizer imports,
as well as through PL 480. We have helped
Newberg to secure a strong position in the Agriculture Ministry to
advise on improvement of relevant domestic policies, and we will have
further specific recommendations for our action in the near future.
Let me conclude on a somewhat personal note. I have the impression—I hope
erroneously—that some elements in Washington may look on me as a mere
advocate for anything the Brazilian government may request, or a
proponent of unlimited and unconditional aid to Brazil simply because I
am Ambassador here. This is not a stance that I want to occupy or feel
justly described as occupying. Many GOB
proposals or requests are turned down here without Washington ever
hearing of them. Like Castello
Branco, the AID Mission
and I are interested in successful policies and good results, not in
ephemeral popularity.
At the same time, having helped guide United States strategy through the
tortuous period of the Goulart
regime, and also being vindicated (so far at least) with respect to the
political moderation and progressive reformism of the Castello Branco regime (see recent
issues of Newsweek compared with their June
appraisals), I do feel entitled to some degree of credit and to
reasonable promptness of response from Washington when I plead urgency.
The bureaucratic machine in recent weeks has occasionally been
exasperatingly slow or unresponsive. A good example is the absence of
action on the declaration of US-use PL
480 cruzeiros as surplus, on which Ralph
Burton will show you my recent letter to Kermit Gordon.Director, Bureau of the Budget. The “recent letter” from Lincoln Gordon to Kermit Gordon has not been found.
Another example is the very chilly first response to the proposal for
including a Guanabara housing project in the AFL–CIO housing guarantee
program. These two examples have a direct bearing on our influence with
youth and labor groups, both of which we have been repeatedly (and
rightly) enjoined to cultivate with all instruments at our disposal.
I have sometimes been reminded of the magnificent little book by F.M.
Cornford, entitled Microcosmographia
Academica—only fifty pages long and a valiant precursor of
Parkinson—which is a masterpiece of exposition of bureaucratic
obstructionism. Among other principles, Cornford points out that there
is “generally only one reason for doing something, but many reasons for
doing nothing”. The present is not the time to apply this principle in
Brazil!
I need hardly emphasize, after the recent Foreign Ministers’ meeting on
CubaSee Documents
19–23. and the prompt
Brazilian response on Vietnam,Reference
is evidently to the Brazilian response to President
Johnson’s personal message on the Gulf of
Tonkin incident; see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I,
Document 281. that in its international posture the
new Brazilian government has now rejoined the free world. In addition to
the economic issues discussed in this letter, this political
consideration is a valid reason for resolving close cases in favor of
support for Brazil. I do not have as long an experience in Latin
American affairs as you, but my own has been very intensive in the past
eight years. I believe that wise policies on our part may help to set
this country, and with it much of the rest of the continent, on a
long-lasting course of healthy development as a firmly-anchored member
of the free world community and an assured ally of the United States.
Such an objective warrants a strong effort on our part and a willingness
to take some risks.
Please forgive the length and rambling character of this letter. I hope
it may be helpful in clarifying our frame of mind here in Rio on these
fundamental issues.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
Lincoln
216. Memorandum From Robert M.
Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. VII–a, 8/64–11/68.
Confidential.Washington, September 30, 1964.
I am reluctant to burden you with the rather lengthy memorandum and
telegrams attachedAttached but not printed
are a September 14 memorandum from Rostow to Mann; telegram 700 from Rio de Janeiro, September
24; and telegram 42 from Brasilia, September 28. In a September 7
memorandum to Mann, Rostow proposed a “broad strategy”
for attacking inflation in Brazil: “The Situation in Brazil—now
reinforced by the election of Frei in Chile—gives us a rare and
perhaps transient interval of opportunity. We could not conceive of
a government in Brazil more mature, more level-headed about
relations with the U.S., and in its attitudes towards private
enterprise.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1
BRAZ) but there is a “great debate” going on about our policy
toward Brazil. I think you need to know about it. The success (or
failure) of our Brazilian policy will determine the course of events in
Brazil for years to come.
Essentially, Rostow is suggesting
the shock treatment. Gordon is
pressing for strong support of what might be called a moderate course,
although bringing inflation down from 140% to 10% in less than two years
may not be regarded as moderate by those people who get hit.
I believe everyone agrees with Rostow on the seriousness of the issue and
the objective. The argument is over means. On that, I side with
Gordon. But I think both make
a mistake in trying to apply U.S. and Western European economic theories
to Brazil. In homogenous commodities, price may respond fairly well to
supply and demand theory. Even here, however, poor marketing makes this
debatable. But on manufactured products, Latins are real monopolists.
Any program that is based on the premise that increasing supply will
result in an automatic cut in
prices in Latin America, fails to recognize this social attitude. Social
and political rigidities in Latin America are strong. I think this is
why Tom Mann views with some skepticism that even the “moderate” program
pushed by Gordon will be carried
out and he, therefore, wants to keep on maximum pressure by putting out
our money generally after Brazil delivers the goods.Bundy wrote his response on
the memorandum: “I’m with Gordon. Rostow is very strong but not strong enough to
remake Brazil one-handed.” On November 2 AID Administrator Bell approved a
proposal to provide Brazil with $100 million for project loans and
$150 million for a program loan “on the most concessionary terms
legally available.” (Memorandum from Mann to Bell, October 29;
ibid., ARA/LA Files: Lot 66 D 65,
Brazil 1964) The United States and Brazil signed the agreement on
December 14.
RMS
217. Telegram From the Embassy Office in
Brasilia to the Department of
StateSource:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate.
Repeated Immediate to Rio de Janeiro and Priority to Buenos Aires,
Santiago, Lima, Quito, Bogota, Caracas, Mexico City, Panama,
Guatemala, USCINCSO, and USUN. Passed to the White House,
DOD, and CIA.Brasilia, May 4, 1965,
2130Z.
153. For President and Secretary of State from Harriman.
Immediately upon arrival in Brasilia 1330 Tuesday, I was received
by President Castello
Branco for one and one-half hour working luncheon,
together with FonMinVasco Leitao da Cunha and
Ambassador Gordon.
Conversation was cordial, frank, and very much to the point.In my opening exposition, I first reviewed reasons for President
Johnson’s emergency action last
Wednesday,On Tuesday, April 27, the
President sent U.S. Marines to the Dominican Republic to protect
American lives in the midst of civil war; he later claimed that
action was necessary to prevent the establishment of a Communist
dictatorship. In response to criticism that he had acted
unilaterally, the President dispatched Ambassador at Large
Harriman and a team
of high-level officials to Latin America for consultation, i.e.,
to explain the decision and to seek support from other
countries. Before Harriman arrived in Brasilia, Walters met Castello Branco to “prepare a
favorable atmosphere.” When Harriman landed at the airport, Walters gave him a note:
“Don’t push too hard. The door is open.” (Vernon A. Walters, Silent
Missions, pp. 399–401) collapse local authority in Dominican Republic and
increasing takeover of rebellion by foreign-trained Communist
elements. Since we aware of GOB
support for multilateral force resolution and indications of
willingness contribute thereto, I concentrated on immediate problems
how secure effective OAS action to
authorize I–A force and work toward Dominican Republic conditions
permitting people peacefully choose own government. I also expressed
appreciation GOB public support
President Johnson’s actions.Castello Branco replied
that problem had two aspects. Substantive one was to avoid Communist
seizure of another country, as well as saving innocent lives. Formal
one was to legitimate actions through effective OAS measures. GOB subject to two constraints in sending troops: (a)
must have OAS request and (b) must
have congressional approval. It is vitally important secure
two-thirds MFM vote on I–A force. To
get this, most effective step is to galvanize OAS five-man commission on spot and get
them to take three steps soonest: (a) secure effective cease-fire,
(b) make clear to LA governments and
publics the nature and extent of Communist threat, and (c) to insist
on constitution of I–A force under its political guidance. He said
commission so far acting too much like Red Cross body and not taking
enough political leadership. He instructed FonMin to communicate forthwith to
Penna Marinho in this sense.We also discussed Brazilian approaches through Ambassadors here
and in Washington to press Peru and Ecuador to favorable vote. They
will also work on Chile, Uruguay and Mexico, although not expecting
much from latter two.Castello Branco stated
failure secure two-thirds vote would create major rupture in OAS and also be signal for political
violence in much of hemisphere. He felt sure that US would not
withdraw any forces and made clear he would not want us to. On this
point, I assured him President Johnson would
stand firm until it was clear that Dominican people would have
opportunity establish government of own choice. If MFM vote not secured, Castello Branco doubted
possibility going through with May 20 Rio conference.Castello Branco stated
categorically that after favorable MFM vote he would request congressional authority to
send force. We did not discuss size of force or command
arrangements, but ARMA’s contacts
indicate Brazilian military thinking of one infantry battalion, one
MP company, and possibly a tank company totalling up to one thousand
men. Castello Branco had
discussed Monday evening with congressional leaders and was seeing
them again at 1500 when we adjourned. Their reaction was that OAS request was key, and that with such
request favorable vote would be given although with some
difficulties in chamber. Castello
Branco also thought MFM might want to decide specifically on which countries to
invite to send forces, and they should if possible include one of
the “shy maidens.”In discussing hostile attitude Chile and Venezuela, I mentioned
personal friendship with Bosch
as one element and reluctance believe that he had lost effective
leadership of rebellion to Communist and allied elements. Castello Branco said he had
received two telegrams from Bosch protesting US intervention, but shows no
disposition to credit Bosch
line.After presidential meeting, we continued briefly with FonMin, who sending instructions to
Penna Marinho through OAS. GOB has been without direct
communications with Santo Domingo Embassy for three days. We offered
ours if they have any trouble, but agree OAS politically preferable channel if working.FonMin also gave us copy their
Monday morning instructions to MFM
representative, strongly opposing Mexico, supporting US actions and
resolutions. Translation follows separately.FonMin also gave preliminary
views on how Dominican Republic crisis will require being taken into
account at May 20 Rio Conference if held, specifically possibility
acting on establishment permanent arrangements for emergency I–A
peacekeeping force.Castello Branco agreed to
keep in closest touch with us here and in Washington to concert
specific moves to achieve our mutual objectives on which there
appears to be full agreement.On May 6
the OAS voted to form an
Inter-American Peace Force, a unit that augmented U.S. forces
with contingents from several member states led by Brazil. Six
days later, the OAS voted to
postpone the Second Special Inter-American Conference scheduled
to start in Rio de Janeiro on May 20. For documentation on the
Dominican crisis, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume
XXXII.Gordon
218. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on May 12. The estimate superseded SNIE 93–64 (Document 213).NIE 93–65Washington, May 12, 1965.
PROSPECTS FOR BRAZIL
The Problem
To assess the character of the Castello
Branco regime, and to estimate Brazil’s political and
economic prospects over the next year or two.
Conclusions
The Castello Branco
government has provided responsible and effective leadership,
reversing the movement toward chaos of the Goulart period and making an
impressive start toward reasonable solutions of Brazil’s many
problems. President Castello
Branco commands, largely on his own terms, the strong
support of the military establishment and the cooperation of
Congress. This has enabled him both to preserve the qualified
constitutional system imposed by the military after Goulart’s removal and to press
ahead with his program of major reforms. (Paras. 1–11)So serious and basic are the economic problems inherited by the
Castello Branco
government, however, that despite its determined efforts
improvements can come only slowly. While attempting to bring
Brazil’s hyperinflation gradually under control, the administration
is also trying to prepare the way for rapid economic growth and
meaningful social reform. Its accomplishments so far have fallen
short of its aims: it could not prevent a small decline in the
economy in 1964, and its goals of relative price stability and
vigorous economic expansion by 1966 are probably already beyond
reach. Nevertheless, it has achieved much in correcting the worst
imbalances and has set the stage for a significant reduction of
inflation and a respectable rate of economic growth. (Paras.
17–27)Popular discontent is likely to increase over the next year,
primarily because all elements of the population are feeling the
pinch of the regime’s austerity program. Because the regime’s
integrity and authority are widely respected, however, this
discontent is not likely to precipitate a major challenge to political stability. Over the
next year, leftist extremists will probably try to carry out
sporadic sabotage and terrorism, but their capabilities are limited
and Brazil’s security forces will almost certainly be able to handle
any threat they may pose. The so-called hardline groups in the
military are likely to attempt to coerce the President occasionally,
as in the past, but such pressures will almost certainly not
threaten his overthrow or even force him to reverse his essentially
moderate political policies. (Paras. 12–16, 28–34)There is, of course, a potential conflict between the regime’s
determination to ensure the continuation of its program and its
desire to hold presidential elections as scheduled in November 1966.
To ensure continuation of its policies through an electoral victory,
the regime will probably seek to form a combination of political
machines at the state level that can “deliver” the vote. Castello Branco would be the
strongest pro-regime candidate. Although he has so far flatly
refused to run, there will be considerable pressure on him to change
his mind. In any case, we consider it likely that the election will
be held. (Paras. 36–39)
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]
219. Memorandum From William
G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. V, 9/64–11/65.
Secret.Washington, October 26, 1965.
SUBJECT
Storm Clouds in Brazil
In the past few days the political-military crisis in Brazil, resulting
from the October 3 gubernatorial elections and the return of President
Kubitschek on October 4, has
become more serious. Former Ambassador Juracy Magalhaes, who recently returned to Brazil,Magalhães was appointed
Minister of Justice and the Interior on October 7. reportedly
believes that the Castello
Branco Government has lost considerable ground since
October 3.
The “hard line” supporters of the April 1964 Revolution interpreted the
recent elections as a defeat for the Revolution. They fear a return to
power of pre-revolutionary elements associated with subversion and
corruption. Governor Carlos Lacerda is in the forefront of the “hard
line” movement.
On October 13 President Castello
Branco sent to the Congress special measures to forestall
the anti-revolutionary implications of the election results and of
Kubitschek’s return. These
measures were designed in large part to mollify the “hard-liners.” The
measures have run into trouble in the Congress. The Castello Branco Government, lacking
the necessary votes to put them through, has been placing the heaviest
possible pressure on the Congress and has indicated that the Congress
must either vote with the Government or risk losing its right to
participate in the nation’s political decisions.
The Congressional vote was originally scheduled for today. As indicated
in recent cable traffic,The principal cable
is telegram 885 from Rio de Janeiro, October 25. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–5 BRAZ) there has been
considerable speculation that the government, anticipating defeat, was
prepared to declare a state of siege or to issue a new Institutional Act
to counter anticipated coup action by the “hard-liners.” Embassy Rio
reports that the vote has been postponed until tomorrow.In telegram 891 from Rio de Janeiro, October 26;
ibid. This probably indicates that the government is hopeful
of being able to put together enough votes by then to pass the
legislation.
Ambassador Gordon left for Brazil
this morning.Gordon was in Washington,
October 11–26, for consultations on economic assistance to
Brazil. He will be in Rio by this evening.
ARA has recommended to Secretary
Rusk that we take a position
of complete neutrality in word and deed on this one.The Department instructed the Embassy as follows:
“During current crisis in Brazil, Department believes that best
posture for US is one of complete neutrality both in word and deed.
Given extreme sensitivity of issues involved, U.S. officials should
refrain from making any public statements at this time.” (Telegram
655 to Rio de Janeiro, October 26; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–BRAZ) I think this is the
wisest course to follow for the time being.
WGB
220. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–5 BRAZ. Confidential; Immediate;
Limdis. Repeated to Brasilia and passed to White House, DOD, and CIA.Rio de Janeiro, October 27, 1965,
1851Z.
910. 1. It will be obvious to Department that second Institutional
ActCastello Branco announced
the second Institutional Act on the morning of October 27. The act
revived several elements of its predecessor, including the authority
to suspend the political rights of citizens and elected officials
for 10 years. It also expanded membership on the Supreme Court,
dissolved the existing political parties, and increased the
government’s power to intervene in the individual states, declare a
state of siege, and recess the Congress. Presidential elections were
scheduled for October 1966 with Castello Branco declared ineligible to succeed
himself. On October 27 Bundy
prepared a memorandum to the President on the crisis leading to the
second Institutional Act. A handwritten notation on the memorandum
indicates it was not sent. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Brazil, Vol. V, 9/64–11/65) represents severe
setback in our own hopes, which I believe have been fully shared by
Castello Branco himself,
Juracy Magalhaes, and most
key advisers of GOB, that Brazil could
maintain uninterrupted march on road back to full constitutional
normalcy. All the defects in law and principle contained in the first
Institutional Act (see my Embtel
2235,Document 211. April 10, 1964) have
been repeated in the second, amplified by fact that this no longer in
first flush of successful revolution following near chaos.
2. My first impression, without opportunity since TuesdayOctober 26. night return for any
conversations outside Embassy staff, is that this measure reflects much
greater than necessary concessions to hard line, engendered by
unfortunate concomitance of Lacerda intemperance, Kubitschek return, provocative
statements of Supreme Court president, and other adventitious factors
generating emotional military reactions which have reduced the
President’s effective authority and weakened congressional support for
government. In longer term perspective, it is the price paid by
Castello Branco for failure
to start months ago the systematic building of a political base and his
reluctance to develop a strong domestic program of propaganda and public
relations.
3. As in previous case, act falls well short of outright dictatorship.
Congress remains, although obviously subject even greater executive
pressures, press remains free, and opposition political organizations
will be recreated under terms July 1965 party statute. Governors elected
October 3 are expected to be empowered. Nevertheless, reassertion at
this late date of unqualified revolutionary constituent authority is
very arbitrary law-making, with no bow either to Congress, plebiscite,
or other device for popular legitimation, and we must expect US and
foreign press and other reactions accordingly.
3. [sic] In face this fait accompli we confront
several difficult problems. Some OARS
may be tempted to react vigorously, even to point of cutting relations,
or to refuse attendance November 17 LA
conference. Domestically, today’s action reflects a polarization of
forces which in long run can only serve interests of extreme left or
right and which it is in US interest to seek depolarize in any way we
can.
4. I believe we neither can nor should avoid a formal public reaction to
Institutional Act no. two. Suggested text in para 6 below, choice of
spokesman obviously best determined by Department. Purpose is to express
concern, strengthen President’s hand in resisting hard line pressures
for harsh application new powers, and at same time to indicate
continuing broad support of economic policies and program.
5. In event Department spokesman queried re continuation aid to GOB, suggest reply on lines GOB program fits Punta del Este criteria,
has just been reviewed and warmly endorsed by CIAP, and withdrawal support would not only undermine
further economic and social progress but also reduce prospects early
achievement full constitutional normalcy.
6. Begin text: The USG regrets that the Brazilian executive authorities have
felt that, in order to safeguard the country from a recurrence of the
chaotic political and economic conditions which made necessary the
revolution of March 1964, it was necessary to adopt a new series of
extra-ordinary measures. It feels confident, however, in view of the
record of the Castello Branco
government during the past 18 months, that these measures will be
applied with moderation and restraint. It [also] hopes that the very
substantial progress already made in the efforts toward economic
stabilization, renewed development, and the reform and modernization of
economic and social institutions will be carried forward to full
realization, and that Brazil’s precious heritage of constitutional
government based on representative democracy will be consolidated as the
institutional foundation for the further progress of this greater sister
nation. End text.
7. Department may wish repeat this message in whole or part to other
LA posts.Bowdler forwarded the
telegram to Bundy as an
attachment to an October 27 memorandum in which he argued: “I think
that Gordon might be able to
make his point with Castello
Branco, Juracy
Magalhaes, and others, in private talks and avoid
running the serious adverse risks.” Bundy concurred. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. V, 9/64–11/65) In telegram 670 to
Rio de Janeiro, October 28, the Department informed Gordon that the Embassy was free to
express concern to “selected Brazilians” in private, but the
Department would continue to give “no comment.” (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–5 BRAZ) On October 29 Gordon reported raising the issue
with Magalhães, who “naturally preferred silence to condemnation,
but saw no harm and some real merit” in an official U.S. statement
of “regret.” Gordon
recommended making a high-level statement as soon as possible, which
he believed could be done “without undue inconsistency and to
overall benefit.” (Telegram 949 from Rio de Janeiro; ibid.) The
Department, however, refused to change its position. (Telegram 688
to Rio de Janeiro, October 30; ibid.)
Gordon
221. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–5 BRAZ. Confidential; Priority;
Limdis.Rio de Janeiro, November 3, 1965,
1817Z.
993. Subject: Talk with President Castello
Branco on Second Institutional Act.
Taking advantage of All Souls’ holiday, President asked me to meet
him TuesdayNovember 2. morning
for almost two-hour private conversation on above and related
subjects. President started by inquiring about Mrs. Gordon’s recent trip on Sao
Francisco River, his own similar voyage forty years ago, problems of
internal road and rail transport and coastal navigation in Brazil,
comparisons with French transportation system as he saw it in
1936–38. Thence talk moved to disastrous United Front experience in
France, perspicacity of de Gaulle in those days compared with now,
refusal of old French generals to listen to him, etc. Castello then said that such
topics were agreeable to discuss on a holiday morning, but were not
reasons for which he had asked my call.Turning to second Institutional Act, President said he had spent
some time Monday afternoon reviewing foreign press comments. He
mentioned Washington Post sympathetic
attitude but also harsh condemnation by New York
Times and Herald Tribune, several
Paris papers, and comments elsewhere in Latin America. He said he
was not surprised at sharpness of some foreign reaction, recognizing
that close acquaintance with Brazilian history and contemporary
reality was essential to understanding of what had happened.He then made brief exposition of immediate background of the
Institutional Act (partly overlapping Embtel 988)Telegram 988
from Rio de Janeiro, November 2, reported on a discussion the
previous evening between Castello
Branco and Vernon
Walters. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–5 BRAZ) saying that
substantial portion of Congress and several Supreme Court justices
had mistaken his desire to return to constitutional normality as
willingness to return to the prerevolutionary past. Kubitschek’s
misunderstanding had been even greater. In eyes these groups, April
revolution had not signified a serious change of direction for
Brazil; it was rather a mere change of persons in power which could
easily be reversed. As early as October 15, Castello had become convinced
that this misunderstanding must be corrected, either through
congressional acceptance of the government’s proposed new
legislation on federal-state relations and restriction of Cassados
or through issuance of second Institutional Act. Strenuous endeavors
were made to bring home to Congress the significance of the choice,
but in considerable measure due to Kubitschek and Lacerda
influence, an adequate number of congressmen had not been persuaded.
He then requested my own observations.Prefacing with request permission to speak personally and with
complete candor, I replied at length. I said that he knew our
official public position to be that these were internal political
matters, but had some reason to suppose that my own reactions were
widely shared by Washington authorities. I said the initial impact
on me had been both shock and sorrow. I had been shocked at extent
of arbitrary powers assumed through the act and sorrowful at fact
that it symbolized a major setback in his own effort, which American
authorities had followed with great sympathy, to bring about full
constitutional normalization without jeopardizing basic purposes of
revolution. I appreciated that in the immediate circumstances the
alternative might have been even worse, and I understood the
adventitious factors of Kubitschek’s return and Lacerda’s agitation, but I could not help regret
that the situation had gotten to the point where such a choice was
necessary. I referred to
missed opportunities during the last twelve months to begin building
a serious political base for revolution and to develop adequate
domestic propaganda and internal public relations designed to give a
broad sense of public participation and enlist the support of
various influential groups. Where governors or candidates had done
so, I remarked, they had generally been successful in recent state
elections, as in cases Parana, Para, Maranahao, and Goias, but
federal government had failed to take such measures on nation-wide
basis.Then quoting National Archives motto that “What is past is
prologue,” I said I could summarize present view by saying this was
a lost battle but not necessarily a lost war. For future, I saw both
constructive possibilities and also very serious dangers. I then
specified a number of critical issues.The first concerned the use that would be made of the
extraordinary powers, which in themselves were obviously juridically
barbarous. It seemed to me clear that, despite the widespread
acceptance in the country for the Institutional Act, ranging from
enthusiasm to relief to passivity, tension between the hard line and
the moderate line of the revolution was certainly not ended. (A) It
was still visible in question whether governors-elect Negrao de Lima
and Israel Pinheiro would be installed in office. (B) It would also
be reflected in the extent of new cassations. (C) Then there was
sensitive and important issue of restrictions of press freedom. On
this point (although I had not yet seen Deptel 696),In telegram 696 to Rio de Janeiro, November 1,
the Department suggested that Gordon “make Juracy and others see heavy cost
GOB would pay abroad for
restricting press freedom in Brazil.” (Ibid., PPB 9 BRAZ)
I said was well aware of irresponsibility of much of Brazilian
press, having myself frequently been victim of distortions or
misrepresentations, but President must be aware that foreign opinion
regarding Brazil was formed by reporting of newpapermen and nothing
could antagonize them more rapidly than restrictions on press
freedom. Castello
interrupted at this point to indicate his concurrence.Second important issue for future, I continued, was that of his
own tenure in office, referring to press reports his possible
resignation on January 31. Mildness of some of foreign reaction to
Institutional Act, I said, must be attributed to his own
demonstrated record of moderation and personal confidence which he
had inspired abroad.Third critical issue concerned positive side of revolution,
including success of Juracy’s effort to build political base and
development of effective internal public relations emphasizing
positive goals of modernization and constructive reform as well as
opposition to corruption and subversion. Here too Castello interrupted to express
concurrence, saying
this required team effort and he was now reconstructing ministerial
team with this as well as other points in mind.Turning then to grounds for worry about future, I said that
essential concern was that situation might slide into outright
military dictatorship. Persons familiar with Brazilian history knew
that historic political role of armed forces had been to intervene
to place nation back on tracks of order and progress when it was
threatened with being derailed, in effect exercising “moderating
power” contained in the imperial constitution until 1889, but not
themselves to govern. Now there seemed to be some indication of
desire by armed forces to assume governmental responsibility itself.
Men drawn from military career had of course played large part in
Brazilian politics historically and at present, but I saw an
important distinction between “civil military” types such as
Juracy, Ney Braga,
Jarbas Passarinho,Braga and Passarinho
were the outgoing governors of Paraná and Pará,
respectivly. and Castello
Branco himself, and others whose essential view was
that all problems could be resolved by force alone, rather than by
persuasion and enlisting of public support or a judicious mixture
between persuasion and force. If this latter type won control, I
could see no reason to expect Brazil to be exempt from universal
rule that force breeds counterforce. I felt that radical left in
Brazil, as illustrated in nomination of Marshal Lott,Kubitschek, had been
nominated for Governor of Guanabara as the candidate of the
Brazilian Labor Party (PTB). His
candidacy was subsequently voided by the Superior Electoral
Tribunal. had been deliberately trying to precipitate
military dictatorship in hopes of securing power through long-run
broadly based united front movement of protest and reaction.President listened attentively to this long exposition,
interrupting at several points but not dissenting. He remarked that
few people outside Brazil had understood depth of corruption and
subversion which had been tolerated under Kubitschek and then actively stimulated under
Goulart. He cited a
statement of Luis Carlos Prestes, Secretary of Brazilian Communist
Party, in late 1963 to affect that “We already have the government
but do not yet have the power.” Thence effort to neutralize armed
forces by subversive organization of NCO’s. This led to digression in which we compared
Goulart regime to recent
Indonesian experience under Sukarno, perhaps only two historic
examples of deliberate “superversion” of national institutions in
mistaken view that Communists could always be controlled.I then asked President his general impression of my reactions to
institutional act. He replied that they were reactions of a good and
close observer, but he thought too pessimistic. I said that this was
good news and asked why. He replied for two reasons: (a) My
combination of American and university backgrounds may have made me
too perfectionist on some points of juridical principle, and (b) he
was convinced that a military dictatorship could be and would be
avoided. He then proceeded to describe two types of military
dictatorships, the classical Latin American type of simply ruling by
force and enjoying fruits of power and more recent Nasserist type,
with socialist overtones and drumming up of popular support through
intense nationalism. He thought Brazil would resist implantation of
either type. I raised question whether certain of Lacerda’s writings
and some thinking among younger officers might not be signs of
incipient Nasserism in Brazil. President thought this was possible
but unlikely, especially if effective work now done to build
political base for revolution. He expressed confidence in success of
Juracy’s efforts in this regard. Although saying it would be work of
months and not merely days or weeks. He thought November would be
critical month in laying out basic guidelines of this effort and its
success should be readily visible by about next March.President then changed subject to University of Brasilia, saying
that he was returning there early Wednesday in order to deal at
firsthand with that crisis. Juracy had reported to him talk with
Vice President Lowry of Ford Foundation which I had arranged last
Saturday.October 30. I
repeated Lowry’s concern that present crisis threatened major loss
to Brazil of non-Communist professors, especially in sciences where
talent scarce and jobs easily obtained elsewhere. This was in
addition to adverse foreign reaction to mishandling an admittedly
extremely difficult problem of faculty and student subversion at
Brasilia.In conclusion, President raised subject of forthcoming Rio
Conference and visit of Secretary Rusk. He expressed keen desire for long private talk
with Secretary, apart from protocol visits and any social affairs
such as projected Roberto Campos dinner. He thought that perhaps
Saturday afternoon or Sunday November 20 or 21 would be best
indicated time.Throughout this long talk, I was seeking to appraise President’s
general frame of mind in face of last week’s critical developments.
He was somewhat tired and still reflecting some of extreme tension
to which he had been subjected but basically well composed and apparently conscious
of heavy responsibilities he still faces and prepared to come to
grips with them. I did not request, and he did not offer, specific
commitments on any of points outlined above, but I believe they may
have some real weight in decisions of coming weeks.In telegram 1046 from Rio de Janeiro, November
7, Gordon reported having
an “extremely encouraging” talk about the situation in Brazil
with Juracy Magalhães on November 6. Since Castello Branco had described
Gordon as “deeply
worried but excessively pessimistic,” Magalhães offered
reassurance: the purpose of the Second Institutional Act was “to
save Brazilian democracy, not to destroy it.” Magalhães was
confident that world opinion would recognize this once certain
events transpired, including: “the installation of the recently
elected state governors; the rebuilding of a political party
structure; the direct election next year of other governors and
congress; and the moderation with which the arbitrary powers of
the IA–2 (Institutional Act No. 2) will be used.” (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 15–1 BRAZ)Gordon
222. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in BrazilSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–5 BRAZ. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Kubish and
Sayre on November 6,
cleared by Vaughn and
U. Alexis Johnson, and
approved by Rusk. In a
November 6 memorandum to Rusk,
Vaughn recommended approval of the telegram: “I am convinced that
other crises may develop in which the Brazilian military will be
tempted to become even more dominant and repressive, and I am
concerned that perhaps some of our own U.S. officials, particularly
in the military services, may not fully appreciate the serious
damage to our interests which could result from such a development.
This cable should make our basic policy view quite clear and
strengthen Ambassador Gordon’s hand, and ours in ARA, in executing that policy.” (Ibid., POL 23–9 BRAZ)Washington, November 7, 1965, 2:09
p.m.
744. For Ambassador from Secretary. Subject: Recent Developments in
Brazil. I have read your telegram 993Document 221. reporting your
conversation with Castello
Branco on Brazil’s Second Institutional Act.
You have struck precisely correct note. Although we have been maintaining
silence publicly on Second Institutional Act, Castello Branco and other Brazilian
leaders should be made acutely aware our serious concern and deep disappointment over
recent developments in Brazil. We had strongest hope that Brazil was
moving toward effective exercise political democracy and was achieving
substantial success in its economic reform and development programs. We
sincerely regret backwards steps on the political side and earnestly
hope that the arbitrary powers assumed in the Institutional Act will be
employed with the greatest moderation and restraint.
Because of Brazil’s great size and influence in hemisphere, events in
Brazil have far-reaching consequences throughout the hemisphere.
Important developments in Brazil inevitably affect the United States and
the free world. The emergence of a repressive authoritarian regime would
represent a serious reverse in an otherwise rather encouraging series of
developments throughout the hemisphere under the Alliance for Progress.
Unless the danger of a sharp movement to the extreme right is averted,
the basis will be laid for vigorous reaction from the left and serious
political instability in Brazil. We must do whatever we can to avoid
such developments. The Alliance for Progress and many of our hemispheric
policies and programs can only be effective with the cooperation of a
Brazilian government that is following progressive policies and avoiding
the extremes of both the right and the left.The following sentence was removed from the beginning of the last
paragraph: “I have discussed Brazilian developments with the
President who is apprehensive over this recent turn of events in
Brazil.”
I am sure you have already been talking to your Country Team about the
situation in Brazil and what influence the United States might be able
to bring to bear. I also understand that you will soon be submitting
recommendations on the specific short-term policies and lines of action
we should follow with respect to the Brazilian government. In the
meantime, I wanted to emphasize to you my concern about developments in
Brazil and to urge that you and your Country Team consider very
thoroughly how we can best bring our influence to bear, including
economic and military assistance, to persuade Brazilian
leaders—especially Brazilian military leaders—to pull back from their
apparent commitment to increased authoritarianism.In his reply Gordon urged that the Department reconsider its
decision against issuing a public statement: “By holding to line
that Second Institutional Act is purely domestic political affair,
we tend to give impression inside Brazil, in rest of LA, and in US itself that we condone or
even applaud what has been done.” (Telegram 1083 from Rio de
Janeiro, November 9; National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL
23–5 BRAZ) The Department declined Gordon’s request, maintaining that the press saw
nothing inconsistent or paradoxical in a public stance of “no
comment.” The Department was concerned, however, about press reports
that the Embassy disagreed with official policy: “This is extremely
unfortunate and we assume you are dealing with this matter in the
manner you think best.” (Telegram 802 to Rio de Janeiro, November
12; ibid.)
Rusk
223. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–5 BRAZ. Secret; Priority;
Limdis. Repeated to Brasilia.Rio de Janeiro, November 14, 1965,
2129Z.
1124. Ref. Embtel 967.In telegram 967 from Rio de Janeiro, October 31,
the Embassy described conditions leading to the Second Institutional
Act, analyzed public reaction to its promulgation, and assessed
political consequences for the “foreseeable future.” According to
this assessment, Costa e
Silva had emerged from the crisis in a “greatly
strengthened position,” while Lacerda’s ability to influence events
had been “diminished considerably.” (Ibid.)
Depressing and dangerous situation described in recent messages
has brightened notably over past several days as result
well-conceived and executed GOB
campaign to expound positive aspects and purposes of revolution.
This campaign has also given important psychological boost to
President’s prestige and image as being in command of situation,
sorely lacking in weeks following October 3. Nevertheless it is not
yet possible to have full confidence in continuation this prospect.
In longer view, developments during past three months have obviously
represented substantial retrogression in terms political objectives
Castello Branco
government (CBG). Institutional Act No. 2 (IA–2), however its powers
may be used, stands not only as symbol of authoritarianism to
outside world but also could tempt extremist political and military
leaders to seize control of this ready-made dictatorial mechanism.
Problem for United States policy is to assess to what extent and in
what ways USG can use its resources
and influence so that powers of government remain in moderate hands
while danger of move toward extremism is reduced and constitutional
legitimacy and the rule of law restored, in order to contribute to
building of permanent political bases for stability plus
progress.At outset we should have no illusions regarding our ability
greatly to influence course of political developments in Brazil,
given its size and complexity and ease with which attempts to
intervene in domestic politics could backfire.Whenever opportunities are afforded (as in my recent conversations
with President Castello
Branco and Justice Minister Juracy Magalhaes)See Document 221 and
footnote 8 thereto. I intend to say frankly to
political and military leaders of country that USG not only regrets arbitrary
assumption of discretionary powers by CBG, but sees serious danger
of slippage into undisguised military dictatorship unless way is
found to reassert unequivocally hierarchical authority of President, military
ministers, and major troop commanders over radical elements among
middle-rank officers. At same time, Defense Attaché, who enjoys
respect and brotherly affection of almost every top figure in
Brazilian army has been authorized, under my close direction, to
convey similar thoughts to selected influential senior and
middle-level military commanders whose discretion can be trusted.
Other appropriate senior Country Team officers, both civilian and
military, will privately and discretely make known USG position.There is risk that one or another of our interlocutors may resent
this kind of talk and may therefore attempt to build our action into
public issue of interference in internal affairs. However, this risk
is acceptable since the message as such is unobjectionable. Risk of
not making clear our views is that it could lead to miscalculated
assumption there is no limit to USG
toleration of arbitrary abuse of power by GOB. (Brastel 62Dated
November 5. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1964–66, POL
15 BRAZ) shows this assumption already present to a
degree.) Defense Attaché reports many officers now beginning to show
interest in USG views on Brazilian
developments about where IA–2 could lead them. Our encouragement
needed to stimulate especially military to think hard before taking
further rash initiatives in political area.Reftel noted first real test of
new situation is installation of Guanabara Governor-elect Negrao de
Lima December 5. Although tension continues on this issue, with
Negrao’s testimony to IPMMilitary
Police Investigation. on Communist Party Nov 15 or 16
being a delicate passage, odds now seem much better than ever after
unequivocal stand taken by President, that this crisis point will be
passed relatively calmly.We may be able exercise some salutary influence in this situation.
We are making clear that USG
watching it closely as one test of GOB intentions, although this is clearly internal
affair, we are reminding selected contacts that US Congress, which
controls purse strings on foreign assistance, is responsive to
negative US public opinion attitudes on issues such as this.Additionally Embassy and USG
should treat Negrao as any of other governors-elect, although
without making contrived public issue of it. For instance, I intend
to have program officer of AID
mission seek appointment with Negrao for purpose of briefing him on
Guanabara projects completed, under way and under discussion, and
eliciting any ideas he may have on future areas of cooperative
effort. Moreover, if Negrao should again express interest in going
to US, as he did immediately following elections, we should respond
by offering facilitative assistance, plus financial assistance if
indicated.Similar treatment should be provided to Governor-elect Pinheiro in
Minas Gerais, although problem is less serious and immediate since
President has already received Pinheiro and inauguration not due
until January 31, 1966.On longer-range problem of building permanent political base, CBG
now seems to be headed in right direction of organizing new party to
support revolution, getting political as well as technical talent in
cabinet, and mounting sustained public relations campaign. Although
abolition existing parties should theoretically facilitate task of
building revolutionary party, other factors complicate task. Abrupt
extinction of parties has left residue of confusion and ill feeling,
parochial and personal differences and ambitions at state and
municipal levels, which was one of reasons for proliferation of
parties, will require time and patient effort to overcome. It is,
however, noteworthy and encouraging sign of deep-seated Brazilian
democratic orientation that while Mexican example of single-party
institutionalized revolution is well known to Brazilians, no serious
movement to follow this example has surfaced.During past ten days, our early concern that Castello Branco might give up
fight and precipitate succession prematurely has been resolved by
his unequivocal declaration of intent to serve until March 15, 1967,
and to use this time actively to pursue economic and political goals
of revolution. One of these goals is ending of arbitrary powers of
IA–2 at time of transmission of presidency, so that successor regime
will be functioning on basis of a reformed and stabilized democratic
political system. The Secretary should have the opportunity to
stress importance of this point when he meets with Castello Branco during Rio
Conference.At the meeting in Rio de
Janeiro on November 20, Rusk assured Castello Branco that the concern previously
expressed by Gordon was
“by no means limited to the Ambassador. A cold reading of the
terms of the Institutional Act could not but leave a shocking
effect, especially to Americans trained to regard the
constitution and its limitations on all branches of the
government as the fundamental basis of organized national life.
The reader not familiar with Brazil and with the President’s
character and attitudes could easily be misled, since he had no
way of knowing what the Institutional Act was not intended to be
in practice.” (Telegram Secto 51 from Rio de Janeiro, November
23; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1964–66, POL
BRAZ–US) We should take advantage of all high-level
visitors to Brazil in coming weeks and months to express similar
viewpoint, especially to WarMin Costa e Silva and to other political
and military leaders.Where local and personal bitterness appear to be holding up
progress toward establishment of an effective party structure, and
opportunities are afforded in conversations with the political
figures involved, we intend discreetly make clear the importance
USG attaches to this element of
CBG program.To give technical support to development of party and popular
support base, we should through covert channels renew our offer to
provide assistance to CBG in scientific opinion sampling. In this
same area, continued encouragement should also be given to the
government’s program, launched since his return by Juracy, to
explain government’s programs and objectives to people. Radio-TV
appearances by cabinet officials, state governors, and congressional
spokesmen for administration have already begun to have positive
effect.Our post-institutional act view of AID strategy is fully covered in redraft of Brazil
annex paper,A copy of the revised
draft, November 4, is in the Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. V, 9/64–11/65. prepared
at White House request and sent Bundy via courier (copy pouched Kubish),
supplemented by Embtel 1053.Telegram 1053 from Rio de Janeiro,
November 8, forwarded several revisions to the text of the
Brazil annex paper. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID(US) BRAZ) Subsequent CBG
actions, including strong policy declarations in President’s Niteroi
and Rio speeches of Nov 11 and 13, confirm our confidence in
continuity CBG efforts for stabilization, development, and reform
and make even more conclusive the choice of strategy and maintenance
of aid negotiating timetable recommended in those documents.We are also giving thought to alternative lines of action if
situation takes sharp turn for worse in short or medium term future.
These will be subject separate message.Not found.Gordon
224. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson in TexasSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID(US) 9 BRAZ. Confidential. No
drafting information appears on the memorandum. According to the
President’s Daily Diary, Johnson was at his
Ranch in Texas, November 19–December 12 and December 21–January 2,
1966. (Johnson Library)Washington, December 3, 1965.
The Problem:
Your authorization is requested to proceed in early December with
negotiations with the Government of Brazil for a program loan to cover
Calendar Year 1966, and to conclude the loan if negotiations produce a
Brazilian commitment to a satisfactory program. Concurrent negotiations
are expected to be in process between the IMF and the Government of Brazil for an extension of
Brazil’s IMF standby agreement, and the
United States and IMF expectations of
Brazilian commitments have been coordinated.
Discussion:
Since coming to power in April 1964, the Castello Branco Administration has conducted an
admirably tough economic program of stabilization, development, and
reform. These self-help measures have been on the whole very effective
in reducing the rate of inflation and commencing a broad-based and very
promising process of economic development and social progress. We
consider that Brazil has made excellent use of the support we have been
providing and is today conducting the strongest program of economic
self-help in the hemisphere.
AID provided a $50 million contingency
loan to the new government in June 1964, and on the basis of formal
self-help commitments made by Brazil to CIAP, a $150 million program loan was authorized last
December. Other international assistance for 1965 included a $53.6
million U.S. Treasury exchange agreement and a $125 million IMF standby agreement, as well as project
assistance from AID, the Inter-American
Bank, and the World Bank, and a modest amount under PL–480.
The Brazilian performance this year has on most points exceeded the
commitments for self-help undertaken a year ago. This record was warmly
endorsed in a formal CIAP review last
month.
Additional funds are required for 1966 to support an expanded level of
import necessary to achieve Brazil’s investment and growth objectives. Ambassador
Gordon and his country team
have strongly recommended an AID program
loan of $150 million, plus a number of project loans (estimated to total
around $75–$100 million) and a new PL–480 agreement (preliminary
estimate: $35 million). The program loan decision needs to be taken now,
in order to relate the timing and the content of our negotiations
properly to those of IMF.
The country team’s estimates are that Brazil’s needs for net capital
imports to support an adequate rate of economic and social development,
supplementing intensive self-help measures to mobilize internal
resources, are on the order of $600–$1000 million a year for the next
several years. The country team considers that, allowing for imports
from private investment, international institutions, PL–480, and AID project loans, the “resource gap”
justifies a program loan of at least $200 million in 1966. The structure
of Brazil’s trade and balance-of-payments, however, makes it unlikely
that more than $150 million of resources in the form of additional
developmental imports from the U.S. can be effectively transferred and
used. Even this figure implies a substantial increase in Brazilian
imports from 1965 levels.
Administrator Bell and his staff in Washington,
recognizing the uncertainty of any balance-of-payments projections and
the greater familiarity of the country team with conditions in Brazil,
nevertheless consider that the very substantial improvement in Brazil’s
balance-of-payments position over the last year, the doubts about the
amount of increase in Brazilian imports in 1966, and the availability
for emergency needs of additional sources of funding from the IMF, combine to suggest that $100 million
might turn out to be enough to support the Brazilian self-help
program.
The question has been raised whether a portion of the development import
needs should be financed by drawings on the IMF over and above the amounts needed to repay IMF loans coming due in 1966. Such IMF resources, however, should be reserved
for unforeseen short-term balance-of-payments difficulties arising from
commodity price fluctuations or other factors beyond the country’s
control. (Note that a one cent per pound drop in coffee prices loses
Brazil $25 million over a year.) What Brazil currently needs is
long-term development capital rather than short or medium-term
balance-of-payments support. Like many other less developed countries,
Brazil’s foreign indebtedness structure is already overweighted with
short and medium-term debt, and we have been pressing them to avoid
further such accumulations.
Both Ambassador Gordon and
Administrator Bell agree that if Brazil continues
its present strongly favorable economic progress it should be possible to reduce the level of
the program loan for 1967 and to reduce AID assistance to Brazil progressively thereafter.
Ambassador Gordon and his country
team believe that their recommendation for a $150 million program loan
on economic grounds is strongly reinforced by political considerations.
Their views are summarized in the following paragraphs.
From a situation of galloping inflation, growing stagnation, and imminent
leftist, anti-American dictatorship less than two years ago, the
Castello Branco government
has brought Brazil halfway along the road to price stability. It has
restarted development on a sound long-term basis. It has reversed the
nationalist and statist trends to favor private enterprise and foreign
investment. It has undertaken major modernizing reforms. It has adopted
a strongly pro-Western foreign policy. It is fighting a life-and-death
struggle against both right and left-wing extremists to preserve these
policy lines, ensure a like-minded successor regime, and restore
constitutional normality. It has enjoyed our vigorous political and
economic support.
In October 1966, elections are scheduled for Congress, eleven State
Governors and all State legislatures; as well as an indirect election of
the successor President by the Congress. Castello Branco has only recently and belatedly begun
the task of building a strong political base and popularizing the
positive goals of the revolution. The local currency counterpart of our
program loan, to be applied largely to private enterprise expansion,
education, health, and agricultural development can make a major
contribution to the success of this effort.
To reduce our program loan for 1966 from the $150 million level being
provided in 1965 would appear to be a withdrawal of U.S. support at the
most decisive moment in the Castello
Branco effort.
Nor can we neglect the effect of reduced support for Brazil on our whole
stance toward Latin America and the Alliance for Progress. The proposed
loan, while large in dollars, is relatively small in relation to
Brazil’s size. It amounts to $1.77 per capita, compared with proposed
program loans for 1966 of almost $10 per capita for Chile and $4 for
Colombia. A reduction now would look like a penalty for effective
self-help. It would be taken as a deliberate blow to the largest nation
in Latin America, in face of the Castello
Branco regime’s wholehearted cooperation with us in
hemispheric and world affairs, including the provision of a sizable
military contingent in the Dominican Republic. Since Brazil by itself is
35 percent of Latin America, and the Alliance stands or falls by success
or failure there more than anywhere else, reduced support for Brazil now
would look like a retreat from our renewed commitments to sustain the
Alliance, including your warmly welcomed pledge reported by me to the
Inter-American Conference in Rio.
The risks to U.S. political and security interests if our policy should
fail in Brazil are enormous and the costs of failure would be very large
in relation to the sums under discussion. Such failure might take the
form of an anti-American nationalist military dictatorship or of a
Communist-controlled regime. Both are plausible hypotheses. Continued
full support for Castello
Branco and his policies is the best insurance available
against these contingencies.
Use of U.S. Funds. The program loan will be used
to finance basic imports from the United States. A major share of the
counterpart funds will be used for loans to finance private sector
development in agriculture, industry, and housing. Other amounts will be
used to finance special programs in education, labor, and public
health.
Effect on U.S. Balance of Payments will be
minimal in view of the restriction on the use of the loan funds for
imports from the United States. Disbursements will not occur until well
into 1966. Measures introduced by the Central Bank will increase the
attractiveness of United States exports and thereby result in additional
follow-on exports from the United States. The expectations for 1966 are
that there will be a net capital inflow into Brazil from Western Europe,
Japan, and the international financial institutions.
Recommendation:
Weighing these factors together, it seems to me we have two alternative
courses of action: To authorize a program loan of $150 million, stating during
the negotiations that we are not sure that the requirements of
Brazil’s recovery will in fact call for the full amount during
1966, that we expect to review requirements quarterly during the
year, and if less than the full amount is needed, the remainder
will be held back for disbursement in the following year and
taken into account in negotiations for AID loans at that time.To authorize a $100 million program loan, stating during the
negotiations that requirements may in fact call for larger
amounts if the actual pace of Brazilian recovery and growth so
indicates, and we would be prepared to add to the loan up to a
maximum of $150 million if it is needed during the year.
I consider that the minimal economic needs of the situation might be met
by the second alternative, especially if there is some lag in the
implementation of the Brazilian investment program. On the other hand,
political considerations so strongly favor the first alternative that I
believe it to be the clearly indicated course of action.
Accordingly, I recommend that you authorize us to proceed with
negotiations for a $150 million program loan under the general framework
outlined above, and in accordance with the detailed statement of proposed terms and conditions
which is attached to this memorandum. Administrator
Bell joins me in this recommendation.A note on the memorandum indicates that the
President approved the loan on December 11. In telegram 1014 to Rio
de Janeiro, December 11, Harriman informed Gordon that, although the loan was not tied to
Vietnam, the Department urgently sought his advice on how to
approach Castello Branco
for a suitable military contribution. (Ibid., National Security
File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. VI, 12/65–3/67) In response
Gordon suggested an
informal approach without reference to the program loan. Any linkage
between Vietnam and the program loan, he explained, “would be
disastrous, and even private hint would arouse resentment from
Castello Branco, who
although good friend is also very dignified and proud Brazilian.”
(Telegram 1432 from Rio de Janeiro, December 12; ibid.) The
Department agreed to treat Vietnam separately, but instructed
Gordon to approach
Castello Branco in an
official capacity, i.e. on behalf of President
Johnson. (Telegram 1018 to Rio de Janeiro,
December 15; ibid.) The United States and Brazil signed the program
loan on February 10, 1966.
Dean Rusk
225. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson in TexasSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Memos (B), 12/13/65–12/31/65.
Secret. The memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Bundy also attached a
December 23 memorandum from Harriman to the President; see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. III,
Document 240. Both were sent to the Ranch on December
31.Washington, December 31, 1965,
noon.
Averell Harriman and I owe you an
interim report on the effort to get troops from Brazil to Vietnam. With
your permission we separated the $150 million program loan from the
issue of troops, but in the same meeting in which Gordon told Castello Branco about the loan, he
made a very strong pitch on the troops and made it clear how much this
matters to you.An account of the meeting is
in telegram 1456 from Rio de Janeiro, December 17. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. VI,
12/65–3/67)Castello promised to give the
matter his prayerful consideration. He pointed out that under the
Brazilian Constitution Congressional approval is required before troops
can be sent abroad and the Brazilian Congress does not reconvene before
March. Gordon and our excellent
military attaché General Walters
(who are very close to Castello
Branco) are following up on this and although it is clear
that Castello faces a bigger and
harder political problem than Harriman and I thought possible, Gordon and Walters think that in time a Branco contribution in some
form can be worked out.
Just before Christmas Harriman
submitted to me a memorandum for you on this subject, but he asked me to
hold it to see whether we would get something more from the Brazilians
in the next few days. Nothing new and startling has come in and the
above report is the essence as it now stands.Although providing coffee and medical supplies,
Brazil never sent troops or military supplies to Vietnam.
(Department of the Army, Allied Participation in
the Vietnam, p. 169)
McG.B.
226. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79R–01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on August 18. The estimate superseded
SNIE 93–65 (Document 218).NIE 93–66Washington, August 18, 1966.
THE OUTLOOK FOR BRAZIL
The Problem
To estimate the situation in Brazil and the prospects for the next year
or two.
Conclusions
Castello Branco has managed
for the most part to preserve constitutional forms without
endangering the objectives of the revolution and has retained solid
military backing. His economic corrective measures are showing
favorable results, but the results have come slowly and the measures
have provoked widespread dissatisfaction.The administration is determined to see that acceptable candidates
are chosen in the series of elections scheduled for this fall. It is
taking steps to ensure that no opponents will become governors in
the indirect elections on
3 September in 12 states. But the touchiest election will be the
direct popular one to be held on 15 November for federal congressmen
and state legislators; Castello
Branco may deem it necessary to interfere directly
and obviously so as to retain a working majority in Congress.Costa e Silva, who has been
War Minister, is almost certain to be elected president by the
present Congress on 3 October. He will probably not exert much
influence in the “lame duck” period before his four-year term begins
on 15 March. Castello
Branco’s policies will not change much in those
months, though there will be some loss of momentum.General dissatisfactions will persist, but the new government will
probably succeed in keeping the opposition off balance and
fragmented. At least to begin with, Costa e Silva’s control over the military
establishment will be firm, and we do not believe that a military
coup against him is likely during the period of this
estimate.Costa e Silva’s
administration is likely to be a marked departure from Castello Branco’s, not in its
broad goals, but in style of governing, in choice of key advisors,
and in certain lines of policy. In some ways he will probably
perform better; for example, he will give higher priority to public
relations and may reduce popular opposition to some extent. He is
likely to try for better relations with students and labor
organizations, but will take whatever measures seem necessary to
prevent a resurgence of the extreme left.In other matters, however, Costa e Silva will probably not do as well. In his efforts to “humanize” the
economic program, he may weaken present checks on inflation. Because
he is less judicious and more a man of action than Castello Branco, we see more
chance that he might resort to harsh, authoritarian methods.
Finally, we think that he will put more emphasis on Brazilian
nationalism and that in time this could cause friction in
US-Brazilian relations.
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]
227. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. VI, 12/65–3/67.
Confidential.Washington, December 6, 1966.
SUBJECT
Program Loan for Brazil
AID requests (Tab A),Tab A was a memorandum from Gaud to the President, November 22;
attached but not printed. under the new commitments
procedure, your authorization to negotiate the following assistance
package for Brazil for 1967: —a $100 million program loan—up to $90 million for project loans (fertilizer plant, power
generating facilities, highway maintenance equipment, seed
capital for a national savings and loan system, and agricultural
diversification) without submitting each project for your
approval.
AID also asks your approval to start
discussions with the Brazilians on “sector” loans in agriculture,
education and health for 1968 without making any specific dollar
commitments. This lead time is necessary in order to influence the
Brazilian 1968 budget preparations which begin in early 1967.
The $190 million loan level is $40 million less than you authorized for
1966.
BOB recommends approval of the AID request (Tab B).Tab B was a memorandum from Schultze to the President, November
29; attached but not printed. Treasury objects to only one
aspect. Joe Fowler is against the use of dollars for a $20 million
savings and loan (home financing) project included in the $90 million
project loan level. He argues that cruzeiro counterpart funds generated
by the program loan should be used instead (Tab C).Tab C was a note from Fowler;
attached but not printed.
Joe Fowler consistently opposes the use of dollar
loans for local cost financing because of their alleged adverse impact
on our balance of payments position. To get at the facts, an
inter-agency group under the direction of Charlie Schultze recently made
a thorough study of this issue. State, CEA, AID and BOB—with only Treasury objecting— found
that there was no inherent reason why project dollar loans for local
costs should have any different effect on the balance of payments than
other forms of aid.
Other reasons why I do not go along with Joe
Fowler’s objection are: —In Latin America in particular we find that our dollar
assistance does not leak to any significant degree to other
areas.—The project loan in question is designed to stimulate
institutional development in one area where Brazil is most
deficient—home financing.—The Brazilians agreed to our terms for the loan on the basis
of dollar support and will probably scrap the project unless we
carry through with it.—Cruzeiro counterpart funds generated by the program loan are
already largely earmarked for equally pressing local cost
projects.
I am satisfied that the $190 million package has been carefully tailored
to Brazil’s needs and ability to use the money effectively. The
safeguards on self-help, performance review and tied procurement will be
adequately covered. Brazil’s economic and political record in 1966 has
not been all that we desired. But its over-all performance has been
satisfactory and its collaboration with us on hemisphere and world
issues continues to be close. The Costa e
Silva administration is not expected to change this.
I recommend that you approve the package requested by AID.
Walt
Approve $100 million program loan:
YesThe President checked this
option.
No
Speak to me
Approve $90 million project loan level (i.e. without
subsequent individual project review):
Yes
Yes, but with $20 million savings and loan project covered by
counterpart fundsThe President
checked this option.
Prefer project-by-project review
Speak to me
Approve AID’s request to
start discussions on “sector” loans without specific dollar
commitments:
YesThe President checked this
option and wrote: “Very confidential. Conditionally,
provided I don’t get boxed in as I have been by AID, Ag[riculture] and
State on India.” The United States and Brazil signed the
program loan agreement on March 11, 1967.
No
Speak to me
228. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 BRAZ. Secret. Drafted by J.A.
DeSeabra (OPR/LS) and S.C. Lyon
(ARA/BR). Approved in the
White House on February 2. The time of the meeting is taken from the
President’s Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) The conversation began in
the Oval Office.Washington, January 26, 1967,
12:31–12:55 p.m.
SUBJECT
Brazilian-U.S. Relations
PARTICIPANTS
Lyndon B. Johnson, President
of the United StatesLincoln Gordon, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American AffairsA note on the memorandum indicates that
Gordon, Tuthill, Leitão da Cunha, and Macedo
Soares were present for part of the conversation only.John W. Tuthill, United
States Ambassador to BrazilJosé A. De Seabra, InterpreterArthur da Costa e Silva, President-elect of BrazilVasco Leitão da Cunha,
Brazilian Ambassador to the United StatesEdmundo Macedo Soares e Silva, President, National Confederation
of Industries of Brazil
President-elect Costa e Silva
expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to meet a man of the
stature and leadership qualities of President
Johnson, and stated emphatically that his
country was, as it has always been, a staunch friend of the United
States.
President Johnson said that he was well aware of the
traditional friendship between the two countries, and was glad that the
President-elect had been able to come to the United States before
assuming his many important responsibilities. It is the intention of the
United States to continue to cooperate with Brazil in all possible
efforts towards achieving ever greater progress in that country.
Costa e Silva said that he hoped
that the United States will continue to be favorably disposed toward
Brazil while he endeavors to reestablish a totally democratic and
legitimate regime in his country.
At this point, the two Presidents moved to the White House lawn and
continued their conversation.
President Johnson expressed in warm and forceful
terms his appreciation for Brazil’s prompt and determined action during
the Dominican crisis. Costa e
Silva mentioned the part that he played at that time as
Minister of War. He further stressed the need for continued vigilance
and action against the danger of communism.
President Johnson said that the two countries should
always stand together so as to resist effectively any totalitarianism,
be it from the left or the right.
Then the conversation continued for a short time in the Cabinet Room in
the presence of Assistant Secretary Gordon, Ambassador Leitão da
Cunha, Ambassador Tuthill, and Governor Macedo Soares.
The Presidents exchanged complimentary remarks about their respective
Ambassadors. President Johnson mentioned that he
had granted very prompt recognition to the Brazilian revolutionary
regime on the strong recommendation of Mr. Gordon. He added that even though such prompt action had
created some difficulties for him at home, the subsequent turn of events
had borne out the sound judgment of Mr. Gordon, who was to be considered a hero and not a
“scapegoat.”
229. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. VII, 3/67–9/67.
Confidential.Washington, June 14, 1967.
SUBJECT
Brazilian Performance under the Program Loan
Costa e Silva has been in office
for three months and it is apparent that his administration varies in
style and substance from Castello
Branco’s. Performance in two areas are of particular
concern to us: foreign policy and the domestic stabilization
program.
Castello Branco carried out
tough political and economic measures designed to consolidate the
“revolution” with little regard to their impact on his public image. He
kept a tight rein over policy making by his Cabinet. Cooperation with us
on foreign policy matters could hardly have been closer.
Costa e Silva is much concerned
with being “popular,” restoring the “democratic” image of Brazil and
“humanizing” the economic recovery program. At the same time, he
personally does not want to depart too far from the objectives of the
1964 revolution. Costa e Silva
appears to be leaving broad authority with his Cabinet Ministers without
close coordination at the
top. They have yet to hammer out an overall, consistent policy.
As a result, there is a puzzling ambivalence in the orientation of the
Costa e Silva
administration. For example, in foreign affairs Costa e Silva expresses close
identification with our policies—and I believe he is sincere in this.
But his Foreign Minister publicly advocates a “noninvolvement” policy on
Vietnam, insists on a nuclear-test-for-peaceful-uses exception in the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, strikes a reluctant stance on Venezuela’s
complaint against Cuba and takes an equivocal position on our efforts to
unscramble the Israel-Arab problem.
On the domestic front, Costa e
Silva professed support for stabilization program and
accepted the self-help terms of the $100 million program loan negotiated
with Castello Branco. On that
basis, we authorized the first $25 million tranche with the clear
understanding that release of subsequent tranches would depend on
performance.
Recent performance has been so poor that fiscal and monetary results
deviate widely from CIAP targets which
were conditions of the program loan agreement. These targets are no
longer attainable. We are therefore being forced to revise our strategy
and tactics regarding our economic assistance.
The failure of the Brazilians to meet the targets is illustrated by these
key examples: —At the end of May the budget deficit was 1.12 billion new
cruzeiros, while the commitment for the full year was projected
at 554 million new cruzeiros.—The coffee price decision announced four days ago provides
for a price increase to growers averaging 28% for the year,
instead of the 10–15%, which we understood would be the target.
(The increase will act as a strong disincentive to agricultural
diversification.)—The level of domestic credit appears to have expanded during
the first five months of 1967 by 600 million new cruzeiros—the
amount projected for the entire year.
It is not clear to what extent these policies are the result of catering
to domestic political pressures, technical incompetence on the part of
the new Ministers, or lack of coordination and control during the first
months of the Costa e Silva
administration.
What concerns us is that if Costa e
Silva does not develop a responsible fiscal and financial
program and stick to it, the stabilization program will be undermined
and our assistance will be wasted.
State–AID, together with Treasury and
BOB, have developed a strategy for
trying to make the Brazilians face their problems and take corrective
action. It has these elements: —Tuthill will personally discuss the situation with Costa e Silva as soon as
possible, making clear that we cannot make further disbursements
of the program
loan because of wide deviations from the loan agreement. He will
also indicate that project and sector loans may be affected. At
the same time, he will express our desire to continue to support
Brazil’s development and will propose that we renegotiate
economic policy targets consistent with effective stabilization,
development, and reform programs.—The AID Mission Director will
take similar action at the Ministerial level and Covey Oliver
will talk to the Brazilian Ambassador here.—AID/State will coordinate
closely with the IMF and IBRD, both of whom will send
review teams to Brazil in early July.—If Costa e Silva is
willing to develop a more adequate economic program, we will be
prepared to negotiate a new agreement with him for release of
the remaining $75 million of our FY 1967 program loan. The new
agreement, of course, would be submitted to you before the final
approval.—If we cannot negotiate a satisfactory agreement in 1967, the
$75 million will not be disbursed and we will try to negotiate a
new program in 1968.Rostow added the
following handwritten postscript: “It may be wiser for you
to pull him up short with a personal letter expressing your
anxiety.” No evidence has been found that Johnson sent the proposed
letter to Costa e
Silva.
Walt
230. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID(US) BRAZ. Confidential; Immediate;
Exdis. Repeated to
Brasilia.Rio de Janeiro, August 4, 1967,
0110Z.
816. For the Secretary, pass White House for President
Johnson, pass Defense Department for Secretary
McNamara.
Subject: Conversation with President Costa e
Silva re Supersonic Aircraft.
I saw Costa e Silva today,
Foreign Minister Magalhaes
Pinto and Counselor Herz [garble] were also
present.
I told President Costa e
Silva that I had returned to Washington last week
under instructions from the USG
in order that I could be fully informed on problems which
existed for the American Government in connection with the
economic and military aid programs and the purchase by Brazil and other countries
of supersonic aircraft.On July 26
Tuthill met President Johnson “to
discuss the Mirage airplanes that Brazil wants to buy from
France.” (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) In a
July 25 memorandum to the President,
Rostow explained that the meeting
would allow Tuthill “to tell Costa e Silva that he personally discussed
this problem with you.” Although no substantive record of
the meeting has been found, Johnson
evidently gave Tuthill the letter for Costa e Silva.
Rostow also recommended that
Johnson review the talking points
for the Ambassador’s meeting with the Brazilian President. A
draft letter and the talking points were attached to the
memorandum. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File,
Brazil, Vol. VII, 3/67–9/67) The final letter from
Johnson to Costa e Silva, July 26, is
in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL 7
BRAZ. Two days before seeing Costa e Silva I had discussed
matter in full detail with Andreazza, who is Minister of
Transport but who is quite clearly one of Costa e Silva’s authorized
channels for discussions with me. At that time Andreazza stated
that he felt request for postponement of decision of supersonic
aircraft for sixty days to be an acceptable request and stated
that he would recommend such a position to Costa e Silva.
It was quite evident today that Andreazza had in fact done his
duty. As soon as all of the basic points of the talking paper
had been covered and after Costa e
Silva had read President
Johnson’s letter, he said explicitly
that he would agree to take no action until after October 1,
1967. He made it quite clear, however, that this was not an easy
decision for him to make. He stressed the overall dangers of
guerrilla activity in Latin America and the indications of an
increased tempo in Brazil. He mentioned the bombing of the Peace
Corps office two days ago as a symbol of this unrest. He stated
that the government has arrested eleven men in the area where
the states of Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo and Goias come together.
These men had a supply of military equipment and bombs and were
fabricating additional weapons. He said that every indication
was that this was the same group that had attempted to
assassinate him in Recife last July. He pointed out the
relationship between this group and the Recife assassination
attempt (which in fact did result in the killing of an admiral
and two other persons) was not yet publicly known and asked that
we hold this information close. He stated that he fully expects
a stepping up of terrorist activity as a result of the LASO conference. [He indicated]
that in a huge country like Brazil, Brazilian forces must have
modern equipment and increased mobility. Speed could easily be
of the essence in handling internal difficulties. Secondly,
Costa e Silva
stressed the question of morale in the Brazilian Air Force. He
went over the well-known ground of the obsolescent nature of
most of the equipment in the Brazilian Air Force. He stressed
that the loss of morale was a constant worry to him.
Costa e Silva also repeated
his well-known concern at the tendency of some people in the United
States to think of Brazil as just an other Latin American country. He asked for
example how one could consider the security problems of Ecuador and
Brazil on the same basis. He reverted to his war time experience
when he said American equipment was shipped in such volume to the
Brazilian forces that it couldn’t be handled, at least temporarily.
Since the war he and the Brazilian military have wished to
strengthen bi-lateral relationship with the United States in the
field of military equipment so that at a time of crisis, Brazilian
military would be able to effectively use increased supplies of
modern equipment. He stressed that only reluctantly would he go
elsewhere for modern equipment, but he also once more repeated that
if he couldn’t get such modern equipment in the United States he had
no choice but to go elsewhere. He also spoke scornfully of an
armaments race as far as Brazil is concerned.Despite these concerns, however, Costa e Silva stated that he recognized President
Johnson’s political problems at the moment
and he wished to be helpful. He said that he would write a personal
letter to President Johnson outlining his
thoughts and describing in some detail the nature and timing of his
needs re equipment.I felt it would be useful for President Costa e Silva to be able to read
and to ponder over the talking points as approved by President
Johnson. Accordingly, we prepared a
slightly modified version of the talking points in order to remove
one or two minor points which we felt might be unnecessarily
irritating to Costa e Silva.
A copy of this modified version was left with Costa e Silva and is being air
mailed to the Department.Not
found.Costa e Silva noted
particularly point three which states that USG is prepared “to authorize Northrop to begin
contract talks after October 1.” He stated that he was unhappy to
see that the first planes could only be received after July 1, 1969.
He felt that the first deliveries should be not more than 20 months
after the commencement of talks. In fact, this would only move date
back to June 1, 1969 but it was clear that he wants earliest
possible deliveries. He indicated that French deliveries could be
made much earlier.Costa e Silva said several
times that in any case the purchase of advanced equipment, including
supersonic planes, did not represent a serious drain on Brazil’s
economy. In the case of French Mirages, he said that the French had
indicated a willingness to accept payments over an eight to ten year
time span. (Comment: William Sweet, who
apparently represents Northrop on this deal in Rio, states that the
Canadians can match the French in financing of the F–5s provided of
course that the United States will authorize export.)Throughout conversation which lasted more than an hour, Costa e Silva was serious but
always friendly. It was quite clear that he recognized the
seriousness of the political issue in the United States and he was
anxious to avoid complicating problems for President
Johnson. The seriousness with which he
considers the question, however, and his determination to resolve it
via modernization of the Brazilian forces was evident throughout. He
wants to stick with the United States as his source of supply and
training but he will go elsewhere if this cannot be done.Comment: I feel that President
Johnson’s letter and talking points enabled
us to pull this out of the fire at last possible moment, Costa e Silva clearly responded to
what he felt was President Johnson’s personal
interest in matter and perceptive approach to it. It’s now up to us
after October 1.Tuthill
231. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 BRAZ–US. Secret. Drafted by
Oliver and approved by the White House on September 1.Washington, August 29, 1967,
2130Z.
SUBJECT
Transmitting the Response of the President of Brazil to a Letter
from the President of the United States
PARTICIPANTS
ForeignLeitao da Cunha,
Brazilian Ambassador to the United StatesUnited StatesThe PresidentWalt W. Rostow,
Special Assistant to the PresidentCovey T. Oliver,
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs
Ambassador Leitao da Cunha took
the occasion of his meeting with President Johnson
to present a letter from Brazilian President Arthur da Costa e SilvaDated August 24; attached but not printed.
and to speak on the following subjects: The President of Brazil wishes the President of the United
States to know that he has given the most careful and friendly
attention to President Johnson’s letter to
him of July 26, 1967.See footnote 2, Document 230.
The President of Brazil assures the President of the United
States that Brazil intends to continue its relations with the
United States at the traditional level of close friendship. The
President and Government of Brazil, moreover, have great
confidence in President Johnson
personally.The President of Brazil understands the problems faced by the
Executive Branch of the Government of the United States in the
matter of supersonic military aircraft; and, as already
communicated to President Johnson’s
Ambassador to Brazil, Brazil will abstain until October 1967
from further steps toward acquisition of such aircraft. The
President of Brazil, however, must express his concern about the
basic problem of aircraft modernization in Brazil. Brazil’s Air
Force equipment is today obsolete. In the period 1947–52,
Brazil’s Air Force equipment was equivalent in modernity,
although much less numerous, to the equipment of the United
States Air Force. But from 1952 on, Brazilian Air Force aircraft
have become increasingly obsolescent. Today Brazil’s military
aircraft are approximately 20 years out of date, and Brazil’s
Air Force pilots are not able to receive training on modern
equipment. It is essential that Brazilian pilots have
opportunities to train on updated equipment in order that Brazil
should be able to meet any national or international emergencies
that might arise. With the obsolescent equipment now in use, the
Brazilian Air Force encounters morale and recruiting
difficulties.The Ambassador then emphasized the essentiality to Brazil of
the M–16 semiautomatic rifle.In
telegram 392 from Rio de Janeiro, July 17, Tuthill
maintained that “the sale of M–16 rifles is of critical
importance to achievement of our overall policy objectives
in Brazil.” (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–8 US–BRAZ) In a
memorandum to Rostow, July 26, Bowdler reviewed the difficulties involved
in meeting the Brazilian request for the rifles, including
supply requirements for the Vietnam war. Bowdler recommended that
the United States supply the rifles over a 2-year period as
long as delivery did not cause “domestic problems” or
interfere with contracts with other foreign countries.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Brazil, Vol. VII, 3/67–9/67) The Ambassador stressed
that modern small arms of this sort are essential for the
defense of Brazil’s Air Force bases. At the present time, he
told President Johnson, these bases and
other installations in Brazil are being defended by troops armed
with 1909 bolt-action, Mauser rifles that themselves were only
slight modifications of the 1898 model Mauser. Thus, Brazil’s
small arms are nearly 60 years behind the times.The Ambassador alluded to the difficulties that Brazil is
encountering in getting delivery of Hughes helicopters. His
implication in this
instance was that the difficulties lay with the supplier, and he
acknowledged that the United States Government was having
similar difficulties with the supplier as to helicopters needed
for Viet Nam.The Ambassador developed for President
Johnson the concept of cyclical swings
in national conduct as to nationalism. He stated that the swing
in Brazil today, in a new administration following one that was
not at all nationalistic, is toward “latent nationalism.” This
“latent nationalism” can be moderated by intelligent and
understanding collaboration between the leaders of Brazil and
friendly countries, especially the United States. If not
moderated, this “latent nationalism” could lead to incidents or
events not typical of the general history of relations between
Brazil and the United States.The Ambassador closed his presentation with a return to the
problem of supersonic military aircraft. He stated:
“Fundamentally, Brazil is not interested in acquiring supersonic
military aircraft elsewhere; but, if there is no reasonable
opportunity to acquire such aircraft from the United States,
Brazil will have to look elsewhere, including France, from which
country Brazil has even received a suggestion that a Mirage
factory be set up in Brazil.”
President Johnson said that the United States
Government would certainly bear the President of Brazil’s views very
much in mind, in the first place because of President
Johnson’s very high regard for President
Costa e Silva. (At this
point, the President expressed to the Ambassador a degree of personal
esteem for the President of Brazil that was obviously moving to
President Johnson’s listener.) President
Johnson expressed his gratitude to the
President of Brazil for his letter and for the additional message
brought by the Ambassador of Brazil. As to aircraft, both the letter and
the message show that Brazil is once again acting with reason and
moderation. President Johnson said that he believes
that the United States Government can find some answers to Brazil’s
needs. Although we are having great difficulties within the United
States at the present time, the President of the United States is trying
to find answers to the underlying problems so that policy may be
stabilized. The President of the United States wishes to avoid, however,
a chain reaction about military assistance matters involving supersonic
aircraft.In a January 20, 1968,
memorandum to the President, Rostow reported
that Costa e Silva had
decided to purchase F–5 aircraft instead of the French Mirage.
Rostow commented: “No civilian president could have withstood the
pressures he faced in the campaign to buy the French aircraft.”
(Ibid., Vol. VII–a, 8/64–11/68)
As to the M–16 semiautomatic rifle, the President of the United States
very clearly understands Brazil’s needs and regrets that the rifles
could not have been supplied “yesterday.” The President of the United States is hopeful that
by working additional shifts and the like, the suppliers in the United
States can meet both the needs of the United States and its allies in
Viet Nam and some of the needs of Brazil.
232. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. VII-a, 8/64–11/68.
Confidential.Washington, December 5, 1967.
SUBJECT
Program Loan Assistance for Brazil
Herewith are memos from Bill Gaud and Charlie Schultze
(Tab A)Dated November 30 and December
4, respectively; attached but not printed. recommending
action on further disbursements of the $100 million FY 1967 program
loan signed with Brazil last March. The Brazilian Finance
Minister will be in town for talks tomorrow and Thursday.
In my memo to you of November 22 (Tab B),Attached but not printed. I explained the poor self-help
performance of Brazil which led to postponement of further disbursements
after the initial $25 million tranche in July. Since then Brazil has not
taken adequate fiscal and monetary corrective measures. As a result it
has suffered a serious loss in reserves (some $250 million in five
months) and faces a renewed inflationary surge next year.
The issue is whether we should make another disbursement now in
anticipation of promised corrective action by next January or February
or make it contingent on performance.
Ambassador Tuthill favors immediate release of $25 million
to create a favorable political impact and because he is convinced that
Costa e Silva is committed
to stabilization.
Covey Oliver recommend
tying the disbursement to prior satisfactory devaluation, credit
tightening and budget trimming, leaving the timing up to the Brazilians.
They would be willing to increase the tranche to $50 million if this
would help the Minister take action now.
Gaud and Oliver, except he questions
increasing the release to $50 million in order to advance corrective
action one month earlier. Secretary Fowler shares this
view.
Given the importance of Brazil and your good relations with President
Costa e Silva, I favor being
as forthcoming as we can consistent with our overriding objectives of: —keeping Brazil’s momentum toward stabilization.—maintaining a record on Brazil which will win continued
Congressional support.
The Gaud–Oliver
formula comes closest to satisfying all points. I recommend you
approve it.
Gaud and Oliver also ask authorization
to tell the Finance Minister that we are prepared to
negotiate a Program Loan agreement for 1968. The exact amount
and self-help conditions would be submitted to you for approval,
probably in January. I support this request.
Walt
Approve Gaud–Oliver
recommendation for $25 million after
performance, with possible increase to $50 million for
early action, and agree to negotiate 1968 program loan.
Approve BOB–Treasury
variant of $25 million after performance, and
agree to negotiate 1968 program loan.
Approve Tuthill recommendation for $25 million now.
Speak to me.The
President checked this option. In a memorandum to the President,
December 13, Rostow
explained that further discussion was unnecessary since the
talks with Finance Minister Delfim Neto had resolved the matter:
“$25 million will be disbursed early in January when Brazil
takes the agreed exchange and credit actions” and the “remaining
$50 million will be made part of the 1968 program loan.”
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Brazil,
Vol. VII–a, 8/64–11/68)
233. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. VII–a,
8/64–11/68. Secret. The memorandum indicates the President saw
it.Washington, February 16, 1968, 1:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Brazilian Political Scene Displays Danger Signals
I thought you would be interested in the following assessment on the
Brazilian situation which Covey Oliver sent to Secretary Rusk yesterday:Not found.
“As the Costa e Silva
Government nears its first anniversary in office, it
increasingly demonstrates authoritarian tendencies. The
honeymoon Costa e Silva
enjoyed during his first months in office has ended. Opposition
attacks on the Government’s lackluster performance, spearheaded
by increasingly vituperative and telling thrusts from Carlos
Lacerda, now seem to be severely stinging the Brazilian
Military.
Although Costa e Silva can have
no fear that his opposition has any chance of overturning his
Government, his reactions to charges of weak leadership, corruption
among some of his ministers, and ‘military tyranny’ may well be to clamp
down unwisely on the Congress, the press, or opposition leaders
themselves. He is being pressed by key military advisors to act more
firmly against Carlos Lacerda and other gadflies in the civilian
opposition. We have reports of a generalized unrest among military
officers over the performance of the Costa
e Silva Administration to date, and some evidence of a
possible plot among extremist officers to assassinate Lacerda, should he
continue his outspoken attacks on the Military as an institution. While
we doubt that this will occur, some moves of a more authoritarian nature
are distinctly possible in Brazil during coming weeks.
I have been in touch with Ambassador Tuthill about
these reports and he is deeply concerned.Reference is to a February 2 letter from Tuthill to Oliver, and a
February 6 letter from Oliver
to Tuthill. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
DEF 6 BRAZ) He fears that the Costa e Silva Administration, which has conspicuously
failed to build a credible civilian political base, or to give any real
role to its majority supporters in the Congress, will fall back all too
readily on military means to deal with its civilian opposition. Should
the Brazilian Military allow itself to be so provoked, the Ambassador
foresees very serious consequences for U.S.-Brazilian relations in light of the violent
press reactions in both Brazil and the U.S. which would occur, and the
attitudes of key U.S. congressional leaders toward ‘military
governments’ in Latin America.
Ironically, our bilateral relationship with Brazil has developed more
favorably in recent weeks. The soluble coffee issue seems to be headed
toward a satisfactory outcome; the climate for negotiating additional
economic assistance this year is favorable; and the Brazilian Foreign
Minister, Jose de Magalhaes
Pinto, has recently been making obvious efforts to improve
his relations with the U.S., probably reflecting his hope to build U.S.
support for him as a successor to Costa e
Silva. It is, therefore, possible that the next few
months could see contradictory trends in the political and diplomatic
scenes.
Although there are no immediate actions required, I thought you should be
apprised of this new set of concerns.”
Walt
234. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President Johnson in
TexasSource: Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. VII–a,
8/64–11/68. Confidential. Sent by pouch to the President at his
Ranch in Texas.Washington, February 23, 1968.
SUBJECT
1968 Economic Assistance for Brazil
This package contains the unanimous recommendation of AID, State, Agriculture, and BOB, with Treasury concurrence, that you
approve an economic assistance program for Brazil for 1968 of $255
million.Attached but not printed are a
memorandum from Zwick to the President, February 9, and two
memoranda from Gaud to the
President, both February 6. Of this amount, $170 million is
FY 1968 money for program, sector and
project loans, $50 million a carryover from the 1967 program loan, and
$35 million of PL–480.
Brazilian performance last year was not as good as we would have liked.
In large part, it was due to President Costa e Silva’s new team getting its policies and
priorities established. The soft spots were the large budget deficit,
too rapid expansion of private credit and a sizeable depletion of
foreign reserves. But inflation was reduced from 41%in 1966 to 25% in 1967. The import
liberalization program was maintained. And the January exchange rate and
credit actions showed a renewed commitment to stabilization.
The negotiating strategy of our assistance package has been carefully
coordinated with the IMF and World Bank.
The self-help conditions are hard-headed but realistic. Gaud and Oliver find that the application of the Symington
Amendment is not required. Applicability of the Conte–Long Amendment
will depend on whether President Costa e
Silva decides to buy supersonic aircraft or other
sophisticated weapon systems. The aid package is structured to permit
Conte–Long deductions if this becomes necessary.For an assessment of the Conte–Long and Symington
amendments, “Probable Consequences of a Refusal by the US to Sell
F–5 Aircraft in Latin America,” see Document
66.
I recommend you approve the negotiating package as proposed by Bill Gaud and Covey Oliver.
Walt
ApproveThe President
checked this option and added by hand: “ask Oliver to get maximum credit
with all Brazilians on this.” According to another copy of this
memorandum, Assistant to the President Jim Jones relayed this
message to Rostow by
telephone on February 24. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. VII–a, 8/64–11/68) The United
States and Brazil signed the program loan agreement on May
23.
Disapprove
Call me
235. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79R–01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on March 21.NIE 93–68Washington, March 21, 1968.
BRAZIL
The Problem
To estimate the situation in Brazil and the prospects for the next year
or two.
Conclusions
The Costa e Silva
administration has many things in common with that of Castello Branco, but is relaxing
some of the more stringent economic controls which the latter had
imposed. It is also tolerating, and to some extent responding to, a
greater expression of nationalistic feelings, which for the most
part have long had an anti-US cast. Yet such policies will probably
not bring Costa e Silva
appreciable new popular support; instead, a troubled economy, plus
political restraints which are not likely to slacken, will tend to
diminish his popularity.Civilian opposition will probably increase, but it is disorganized
and unlikely to coalesce very effectively in the next two years. The
military establishment probably will urge further restraints on
civilian political dissidence, insist upon stronger leadership by
the government, and press for the present moderate program of arms
acquisition. The President will probably act strongly enough in
these respects to satisfy most military opinion. Hence he is likely
to stay in office until the end of his term in 1971, and his
administration is likely to become somewhat more
authoritarian.Brazil’s economy showed some progress in 1967, but its problems
are too fundamental, too numerous, and too interrelated to permit
any great gains in the next two years. Problems of inflation, the
budget, and the balance of payments will be manageable, but will
nevertheless remain serious. The restraints required to maintain a
reasonable degree of financial stability will keep increases in
production at modest figures. Thus economic improvement will not be
sufficient to provide for much higher levels of living or to permit
extensive social reforms or advances.Despite Brazil’s increasing nationalism, the Costa e Silva government will
maintain a much friendlier attitude toward the US than the Quadros
or Goulart regimes did. It
will not, however, follow the US lead in international matters as
closely as Castello
Branco’s did, and we believe it will be less sympathetic toward the
US role in Vietnam. It will probably continue to oppose ratification
of the international treaty on nuclear nonproliferation in its
present form.
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]
236. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 BRAZ. Confidential; Immediate.
Repeated to Brasilia, Sao Paulo, Recife, and USCINCSO.Rio de Janeiro, December 14, 1968,
1625Z.
14310. Subject: Preliminary Assessment of Brazilian Political Situation
in Light of 5th Institutional Act. Ref: Rio de Janeiro 14305.Telegram 14305 from Rio de Janeiro, December 14,
forwarded a free translation of the fifth Institutional Act (IA–5).
(Ibid.) The act allowed the President to recess the congress, state
assemblies, and municipal chambers; to intervene in the states and
municipalities without constitutional restraint; to suspend the
political rights of any citizen for ten years; to revoke legislative
mandates at the federal, state, and municipal level; and to
confiscate the property of anyone who may have “enriched themselves
illicitly while exercising public office.” Unlike previous acts,
IA–5 did not have an automatic expiration date.
Institutional act decreed last night amounts to a self-issued
license authorizing executive to govern without trappings or
inconveniences of democracy. It signals bankruptcy of an effort by
Brazilian military to demonstrate that they better able than
civilian elements to move Brazil toward goals of development and
political stability through democratic means. Failure of effort is
not due to any demonstrated inability of Brazilian people to measure
up to their role, but to incapability of military to understand what
democracy is and how it works.Present leaders of Brazilian military are patriotic, sincere, and
proud. Historic military role of keeping country on the track by
changing its government from time to time has produced an attitude
of self-righteousness not easily permeated by opposing views,
especially when advocated by persons or groups whose orientation is
different from and perhaps suspect to disciplinarian minds.Current crisis had its precise beginnings in a speech by
opposition deputy Moreira Alves on floor of Congress which was
insulting to army. This incident, while injurious to pride of army,
had no intrinsic significance and would have been ignored most
places. When issue was blown out of proportion by military
insistence on disciplinary action against Moreira Alves, it headed
fatally for a constitutional confrontation which could only be
resolved by defeat of Congress or of the military acting through
weak and vacillating executive. When Congress won legal battle by
refusing to remove Moreira Alves’ immunity, military felt they could
only recoup by extra-legal action clothed in pseudo-legality of an
institutional act.This confrontation occurred against a backdrop of problems
generated by government’s failure to understand Brazil’s really
fundamental needs in this era. GOB
failure to take imaginative and convincing steps toward improvement
of woeful educational situation and relief of depressed urban and
rural laboring classes produced agitation for changing these
conditions, especially within the church and among students. To a
conservative group which does not accept inevitability of social
revolution taking place in world, such activities appear unpatriotic
and dangerous, and therefore are further justification for strong
measures.The institutional act and the arbitrary and repressive actions
being based on it have produced as much of an about face in the
direction the Brazilian Government claimed to be going as would an
overthrow of the government. Indeed it is reasonable to believe that
if Costa e Silva had held
rigidly to the constitution, he would have been overthrown.Within the United States Government, I believe we should
understand the situation in this light. On the other hand, we are
not faced with the problem of recognizing a new government nor with
the need to announce suspensions of aid, military assistance, and
other programs customary on overthrow occasions. As of this moment,
it appears that our long-range interests might be better served if
we were to avoid such overt actions. We should, however, without any
announcement, for the moment quietly withhold any pending actions on
disbursements or commitments.There are going to be plenty of occasions in the future when
divergent GOB and USG policies and attitudes will create
friction between our governments, so we will do well to avoid now
any that can be avoided.
A public statement at a high US Government level deploring the setback in
development of Brazilian democracy is called for, and important to
encourage friends of democracy in Brazil, but it should not point the
finger too accurately at the persons or groups responsible. These
people, while nationalistic and narrow, are fundamentally favorable to the US and can be counted
on to side with us either sentimentally or overtly in any East-West
confrontation. It is highly likely they will continue in control of
Brazil for a number of years to come. It is from them we must obtain
cooperation in enterprises of mutual interest and through them that we
must work to help Brazil emerge from the underdevelopment of which their
own attitudes are one manifestation.
Belton
237. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in BrazilSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 BRAZ–US. Secret; Priority;
Limdis. Drafted by Proper and Kubisch on December 16 and approved by Vaky. Repeated to Brasilia, Sao
Paulo, Recife, CINCSO, CINCLANT, and USUN.Washington, December 17, 1968,
0038Z.
288130. Subject: Developments in Brazil.
This message is first effort to assess serious impact of recent
Brazilian developments on our current relations, gives initial
policy guidance, and asks Embassy to focus on problems of deepest
concern to us and on matters requiring decision over coming days and
weeks.For the moment, at least, Brazilian regime appears to have
stripped itself of any disguise as military dictatorship, although
possibly more akin to collegiate than one-strong-man type. Fifth
Institutional Act and actions in immediate aftermath are harsh, not
only in Brazilian context but also in comparison to some of
hemisphere’s other military regimes. We note that extra
constitutional measures have no fixed expiration date and that
measures against human rights are strong.Would appreciate your looking for and commenting especially on
following in your messages to come: Appearance of national leader or leaders who are both
rational enough to understand serious problems in current
situation and influential enough do something about them.
Costa e Silva
would obviously not seem qualify. Will he reassert himself?
Will some other leader or group of leaders emerge? Or are we
going to have to deal with likes of Gama e Silva, Portella,
and Siseno Sarmento?Reference
is to Luís Antônio da Gama e Silva, Minister of Justice;
Jaime Portela de Melo, Head of the Military Cabinet; and
Siseno Sarmento, Commander of the First Army.Reappearance of moderation in handling of critics and
press. We consider Brazil’s press to be one of country’s
most important democratic institutions and believe it will
provide one of the first signs of regime’s relaxation, if
such is to happen. The posture, comment, and continued
independence of the church and its leading spokesmen also
have highest importance.Clarification of regime’s support—or lack thereof. We
unable at this moment identify any major non-military group
supporting recent actions. If this true, we must consider
how long military will be able remain united and govern
effectively.We are clearly unhappy with events and do not intend sound happy.
This is matter of basic policy which all members country team
instructed observe. On other hand, following factors lead us to
avoid expressing excessive unhappiness officially and publicly: Brazil is a big country of special importance to us on
world scene, and there is no need to elaborate on range and
significance of our interests there which have not changed
materially as a result of last few days’ developments
although ways and means of serving them may have. Brazilians
are aware of their role and not likely appreciate lectures
from U.S.Despite current degree of repression, Brazilian traditions
of moderation run deep, and we must allow that they will
begin reassert themselves shortly. In addition, arrests and
censorship may begin to stop in few days and may be
uncoordinated acts of lower level officials and not
established central Government policy.A major problem facing us is to avoid pushing Brazilian
leaders into further irrational acts affecting our relations
now and in future while, at same time, not leading Brazilian
democrats and others in hemisphere to believe we complacent.
There probably no way of fully achieving these
irreconcilable goals, but we must endeavor strike best
balance.Current Brazilian actions can make it extremely difficult for us
to initiate or maintain our cooperation on many fronts. This is a
question of fact. We do not think it would be productive for us to
remind Brazilians of this in terms that could be considered
threatening. On other hand, neither would we wish lessening of U.S.
assistance and cooperation to come as surprise. Delicate balance
also needed to arrive at equilibrium between these extremes. Among
programs and activities that need prompt consideration are such
things as remaining 52,000 tons of PL
480 wheat for this calendar year, authorization and negotiation of
AID and PL 480 assistance for 1969, deobligations on authorized
but unsigned AID project loans,
ongoing AID activities, A–4 aircraft
request, destroyer escorts, submarines, press release on civil
aviation agreement, soluble coffee mediation efforts, Peace Corps
activities, Clear Sky, and Fernando de Noronha agreement. You will
no doubt know of others. As you consider and recommend position we
should take on these and similar matters, and obtain Washington
approval, we will be
giving expression in specific terms to over-all policy stance we
want to assume.In addition, you should consider desirability of mounting highly
selective approaches on part of five or six top USG representatives in Brazil
individually and privately to 20–30 influential Brazilians. These
could be certain cabinet ministers, business leaders, key military
figures, political leaders, plus labor, church, university and
cultural leaders. On an unofficial basis, they could be told of our
true feelings about developments, and the word would thus get around
in Brazil without our publicly shaking our finger at the GOB. It has been suggested that USG official could make his points by
referring to questions being asked in United States about what is
really happening in Brazil and natural consequences thereof.It would also be possible here for high ranking USG official to meet on a background
basis with selected members of U.S. and foreign press giving our
true reaction on a nonattribution basis. Thus word would get out in
stories to Brazil and third countries that USG was distressed, without naming names or using
quotes. U.S. Ambassadors in other LA
countries could also be asked to present our views to their host
governments and some governments in turn might possibly exert
salutory influence on GOB. Embassy
views requested on these thoughts.Embassy should also consider how best to refer in Brazil to
Ambassador’s Washington consultation and how to use his farewell
calls in Brazil to achieve desired results. He will be discussing
this and other aspects this message on his return tomorrow.Rusk
238. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID(US) BRAZ. Confidential; Immediate;
Exdis. Repeated to
Brasilia.Rio de Janeiro, December 19, 1968,
0220Z.
14464. Subject: Conversation with FonMinMagalhaes Pinto.
Had private meeting with FonMinMagalhaes Pinto and Secretary
General Gibson Barboza tonight. As conversation proceeded it became evident FonMin’s primary interest was in how
USG would handle aid programs. I
told him that no recognition problem exists, and USG was not cutting aid. However
reaction in Washington to recent events had been very strong.
Although we did not wish aggravate situation by strong public
statements, general feeling when I left was that A–4 issue and aid
questions should be put in freezer until we had better indication of
whether Brazil would revolve towards restitution of basic democratic
rights (Minister readily agreed no such rights existed any longer).
Told him USG would fulfill its
contractual obligations but would take “wait and see” attitude on
future AID programs and those
presently under negotiation.FonMin then gave lengthy
exposition of events leading up to institutional act. Gist was that
pressures had been building up for some time. Marcio Moreira Alves
didn’t represent more than ten or fifteen percent of problem, but
his case was poorly handled and poorly resolved. Result was that it
attracted all attention. After vote it became clear that military
wanted President to take action.FonMin stated (and other sources
have confirmed) that President resisted. First night he told
military there would be no solution that day. By second day it
became clear that if he didn’t act he would be “passed over”
(ultrapassado). Thus he chose least bad course of action, which was
issuance of fifth institutional act.Minister said President’s intention is to use massive powers he
has firmly but moderately. Greatest fear of military was subversion,
which would also affect economic development. Some of this was
imaginary but some represented solid facts. President’s intention is
to resist radical groups and avoid image of military
government.FonMin stressed fact that neither
institutional act nor complementary act closing Congress had
termination date. Admitted “frankly” that absence of termination
dates reflected desires of two groups: radicals who saw it as
opening to continue harsh action for extended period, and liberals
who saw it as opportunity to abandon extraordinary powers at first
opportunity. FonMin could assure
us President desired no dates in order be able terminate acts just
as soon as he can neutralize radicals. He presently under pressure
from military and unable make public statement to this effect but
“USG should have confidence in
him.”According FonMin, President
hopeful Brazil can shortly present better image. It impossible make
public announcement but he hopes convene Congress on normal
constitutional date, which is March 1. Reconstitution of political
sector not difficult task. Congress will function, but it will of
course not have powers it previously had. Press presents much more
difficult problem, but demands of censors will be reduced. President
desires return full freedom of press as soon as possible “but dust of institutional act has
not yet settled.” Biggest problem is that military hold press
responsible for student agitation. It clear FonMin was at loss to explain just
how press freedom can now be restored.FonMin stressed that “President
has taken situation in his hands.” Asked that I tell Secretary
Costa e Silva “will
proceed on democratic road soonest but needs comprehension of USG.” Specifically, FonMin said it would be useful if
USG acts “with greatest
prudence.” Any condemnatory attitude in present excited atmosphere
could permanently damage US–Brazil relations. Minister did not find
it “useful to stop matters presently under consideration.” Freezing
them at this moment, he claimed, could lead to nationalistic
reaction in army against US.At this point I told FonMin
yesterday’s statement by Finance Minister Delfim Neto (Rio’s
14456)In telegram 14456 from Rio de
Janeiro, December 18, the Embassy reported that Delfim Neto had
publicly stated that the United States would not restrict
economic assistance to Brazil as a result of IA–5.
(Ibid.) had been made without any consultation with us
and was distinctly unhelpful. GOB
was now pressing us for early action on AID programs on which it had previously dragged its
feet. Attempts to use aid for political purposes could force a
decision on USG which would not be
in interest of either our countries.FonMin claimed Delfim had spoken
without consulting him. Said he believed Delfim had talked by
telephone directly to Washington with “official of IDB or State Department official in
charge of economic affairs.” FonMin assured me he would speak to Delfim and other
economic ministers tomorrow and urge them not to take precipitous
action which could create political difficulties.FonMin was clearly being good
soldier and putting best light on bad situation. Will comment
further in subsequent message.Not
found.Tuthill
239. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in BrazilSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL BRAZ–US. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
Drafted by Oliver, Vaky, and Kubisch and approved by Oliver.Washington, December 19, 1968,
2343Z.
289961. Ref.: State’s 288130, Rio’s 14464.Documents 237 and 238.
Given the serious consequences for U.S.–Brazil relations that will
inevitably follow if Costa e
Silva and the military continue on path assumed over
past few days, we are searching actively for some way or means to
try and turn them back, even partially, from such a course. We
recognize risk of a counterproductive result if we are too
unskillful or untimely in our efforts. We also realize marginality
of our influence and likely sensitivity of key figures in power,
especially now.Nonetheless, the stakes are high. A misguided and repressive
military dictatorship would have grave consequences for Brazil and
would set in motion a serious erosion in U.S.–Brazil relations which
we must make every effort to avoid. We know that it may be necessary
to endure such an erosion temporarily in order for us to remain free
of identification with the Costa e
Silva government and that our very long term
interests in Brazil may best be served by working with what have
become the disaffected groups in the country.But we obviously must not resign ourselves too readily to such a
regime as an inevitable consequence of what has happened in recent
days. Almost all agree that Costa e
Silva and the military overreacted in near cosmic
terms to the provocation presented. Is it too late for them to
redress the balance? Can a look by key Brazilians at U.S.–Brazil
relations for the future play a part in turning the military
juggernaut around, or at least in getting them to repair some of the
damage already done? Is there still time to head off possibly worse
acts yet to come?These thoughts were behind para 6, reftel. We think following script is about right,
subject to minor variations to accommodate to characteristics of
person spoken to, and offer it for your urgent appraisal:“Brazilians know that the United States thinks of its relationship
with Brazil as a very special one, both as to the world as a whole
and certainly within the hemispheric community. What Brazil does and
how she does it is of very great significance. So far the changes
made recently have not been taken in U.S. public opinion as marking
a definitive and
irrevocable transition from democratic norms. There is still time
and a good opportunity to avoid the congealing of public opinion in
the U.S.A. along lines that would make it very difficult for any
administration in this country to continue those degrees of
cooperation and mutual assistance that the needs of the Brazilian
people and our own deep friendship for them make desirable.
Responsible people in both countries are surely aware of forces in
the world that would like nothing better than to see relations
between these two great countries of the Western Hemisphere decline
to the merely correct, or even deteriorate farther, in a downward
spiral. The one (script user) who speaks these words does not mean
to threaten, intrude, or preach. As one personally committed to the
transcendental cause of that unexpressed ‘Alliance within an
Alliance,’ he feels he must say them in the hope that it is not too
late for Brazilians to be able, as they always have before, to pull
back from rigidities and to face their problems with elegance,
compassion, wisdom and good spirit. North Americans do not suggest
what might be done, not only because we do not so conduct ourselves
with Brazilians, but also because we know that no one better than
the Brazilians themselves can find hopeful and salutary ways
out.”Style of approaches would be calm, friendly and frank—no
histrionics, no threats and no tutelary or directive nuance.
Uniformity of line by all U.S. officials that express it is highly
important especially since also desirable use officials representing
various U.S. agencies.If you think some special person (such as General Walters, who is now in the United
States) would be able to assist you in such an effort, let us know
and we will try and make necessary arrangements. Your views
requested on this point.In telegram
14524 from Rio de Janeiro, December 20, the Embassy concurred
with the Department’s assessment of the situation, but stressed
the possible consequences of any precipitate action. In
particular the Embassy recommended against sending a special
emissary, which “would be viewed as interference Brazilian
affairs and would be distinctly counterproductive. If emissary
were a military figure would be interpreted by one & all as
USG support for recent
GOB moves and encouragement
further movement to the right, no matter what he might say after
arrival.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL
BRAZ–US)Rusk
240. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 BRAZ. Confidential; Priority.
Repeated to Brasilia, Recife, Sao Paulo, USCINCSO, USUN, CINCLANT,
and Buenos Aires.Rio de Janeiro, December 20, 1968,
1930Z.
14526. Joint Embassy/Defense Message. Subject: Developments in Brazil.
Ref: State 288130.Document 237.
This telegram is first attempt to give our tentative views on
matters raised para 3 reftel.
Department will no doubt appreciate that in present fluid situation
with various elements asserting their influence on a greatly altered
power structure, precise answers are impossible.Re paragraph 3(a), recent events have not essentially changed the
names of those at the top of the GOB
power structure. What has changed is the structure itself which in
turn has altered the relationship of one leader vis-à-vis another.
While we agree that Costa e
Silva does not qualify as strong leader, he is
probably as capable as anyone else who might take over in present
circumstances. He clearly does not have the same autonomy he had
before, nor is he likely to regain it. Moreover, his chances of
finishing his term may have been reduced. Fact that he has publicly
stated he in authority twice in as many days (Rio 14422 and
14435Dated December 17 and 18.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 BRAZ and
POL 2 BRAZ,
respectively)) interpreted by many as evidence of his
precarious position.Nevertheless Costa e Silva
still President of Brazil. His freedom of action has been limited by
radical military elements but fact that he holds top position gives
him an advantage in any struggle that others do not enjoy. Certainly
USG will have to cope more and
more with likes of Gama e Silva, Portella and Syseno Sarmento, but,
hopefully, more moderate elements will hold the marginal balance of
power.In responding to paragraph 3(c), the Embassy believes that a tug
of war presently going on between radicals and more moderate
elements in military. On its outcome will depend regime’s base of
support. Principal issues being debated are how to deal with
“subversion and corruption.” Only significant military group which
opposes act outright is idealistic “hardline” group led by Col.
Boaventura Cavalcanti, but it not in position swing much weight.
Radical element which has throughout crisis been led by Generals
Syseno Sarmento, Commander of First Army; Moniz de Aragao, Chief of
Veterinary Service;Henrique
Assumpcao, Syseno’s chief of staff; and Portella of military
household favors extended congressional recess and prolonged and
thorough application of institutional act. More moderate element,
which appears to be headed by Generals Lyra Tavares, Minister of
Army; Reynaldo, Commander Command and General Staff School; Newton
Reis and Bina Machado, both sub-chiefs of Staff of the Army,
apparently favors early restoration of constitutional rights.
Specifically, they reportedly respond sympathetically to pleas for
reopening of Congress March 1. Costa e
Silva portrayed by various sources as leaning toward
moderation but unable to show his hand at present. His initial moves
are simply directed towards re-establishing the credibility of his
position. A key figure in this situation is General Castilho,
Commander of the Vila Militar, who has been variously portrayed as a
Syseno or Lyra Tavares man. Castilho was clearly one of those who
transmitted the pressure from the banks, but his personal loyalties
in the current struggle have not yet been defined. Basically he
favors the “hard” approach and is a man of personal courage who
enjoys popularity among junior officers.Aside from small number of perennial pro-government politicians
who have been falling into line, only major non-military group to
support recent actions has been conservative-business class,
particularly in Sao Paulo. Essentially, this group believes new
regime will follow policies which will be more efficient and will
benefit private enterprise. However, there are some influential
businessmen who do oppose GOB
actions and are worried about political trends. It should also be
noted that a part of the educated population as always is basically
apathetic and knows relatively little about recent events because of
censorship.It difficult to speculate at this point on signs of moderation in
handling critics and press. Some prisoners have been released, some
arrests are still being made and cassation lists are expected. There
are those who think Congress can be reactivated on March 1 and that
press censorship can be eased. We agree with Brasilia (Brasilia
3271)Dated December 18. (Ibid., DEF
6 BRAZ) that reopening Congress will be uphill battle.
Yesterday, for example, Senate President Gilberto Marinho, Arena
President Daniel Krieger, and hard-line Senator Dinarte Mariz tried
to see President but were unable to. In our view most that can be
expected is that some sort of emasculated Congress may begin to
operate within the next few months, but even this appears to us to
be an optimistic prediction.Question of press even more difficult. Various government sources
tell us plan is to ease censorship gradually. Suggestions of
self-censorship have already been made. Control will then be
maintained by threats of
renewed censorship and economic measures (most newspapers are in
debt to GOB which has newsprint
monopoly). This may meet with some success but it is hardly much of
an improvement over current situation. Furthermore, we believe that
there are still journalists in Brazil who would be courageous enough
to speak out in the face of these threats, and we have no reason to
believe military activists would be willing to accept any
significant criticism of what they have done. Thus, we view
restoration of press freedom as a long term process. Implicit
recognition of this made in yesterday’s press briefing when GOBDated
December 20. (Ibid., PPB 3)Church has not yet assumed a formal position, but could be
rallying point for opposition. Some prominent churchmen initially
reacted with unequivocal opposition to recent developments. These
include Secretary General National Conference Brazilian Bishops, Dom
Aluisio Lorscheider, conservative Cardinal Jayme Camara of Guanabara
and Archbishop Helder Camara of Recife, latter two of whom have
issued strong public anti-government statements since December 13.
Ultimate posture of church depends on future government conduct
toward clergy and church prerogatives, but the prevailing tendency
seems to be to speak out with greater unity in opposition to the act
(Recife 1606).Dated December 19.
(Ibid., SOC 12–1 BRAZ)Tuthill
241. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in BrazilSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 BRAZ. Confidential; Limdis.
Drafted by Kubisch on
December 24 and approved by Vaky.Washington, December 25, 1968,
0057Z.
292127. Subject: Developments in Brazil: Significance of Institutional
Act (IA–5).
We are now proceeding on assumption that by early January
situation in Brazil should have clarified sufficiently that USG will be able to establish kinds of policy guidelines
and make necessary operating decisions which will undoubtedly be
required by then. In previous messages Country Team has been asked
to provide its assessment and recommendations on these matters by
first week in January and to consider whether DCM, who will become Chargé later in
January, and AID Mission Director,
and perhaps others, should come to Washington for short
consultation.While we have been furnishing you with highlights of reactions and
thinking in United States, including in USG, we thought you might also find useful some
preliminary comments as to how we perceive overall Brazil situation
now, eleven days after promulgation of IA–5. We recognize that both
you and we are by no means fully informed on details of what
happened during first important hours following congressional vote
of December 12, that we do not and may never know all of pressures
that were exerted and by whom, nor what the realistic alternatives
were. We also realize that new phase is only beginning to unfold and
that it too early to say how exceptional powers will be used by
Costa e Silva. Finally,
we realize that Brazil’s needs and performance cannot be measured
against North American or northwest European standards of
constitutional democracy, nor even easily expressed in Anglo-Saxon
terms.But, by whatever measuring standards one might be expected to
apply, political development has been dealt a hard blow and human
rights, as defined by minimum international standards, have already
suffered to some extent and remain under serious threat. There is no
arguing arbitrariness of IA–5 and powers it gives Costa e Silva. Looks to us that he
can do almost anything he wishes to almost anyone in country with
only a small handful of men having power to do much about it—and
they are far from an appealing lot. Moreover, proximate
circumstances which brought IA–5 into being would indicate an almost
paranoiac overkill response to provocation presented. Seems almost
incredible to us that threats to government or country’s well being,
or prevalence of subversion and corruption, were such as to warrant
gross breaching of constitutional restraints and political and civil
rights—or that, if so, there weren’t wiser, more civilized and
lawful ways of dealing with them.It has become almost cliché to refer to Brazilian military
establishment as being different from that of its hispanic
neighbors. Undoubtedly this has been true for practically all of
Brazil’s modern history. Acting almost supra-Government, Brazilian
military entered political arena infrequently and then only to save
country when it appeared to be in last extremity. Under leadership
of Castello Branco, armed
forces provided backbone as impressive effort was made to establish
a governmental system that would offer best blend of democratic, popular participation in a
free society and authoritarianism believed needed to ensure Brazil’s
order and progress. Clearly, constitution of 1946, modeled after
U.S., had failed and permitted the near chaos of early 60’s.But, staying in power after ‘64, Brazilian military found
themselves with responsibilities that go with governing. And in
Brazil, like so many developing countries, there was certain to be
widespread dissatisfaction with government’s performance in many
sectors, lacking as it did capital and human resources—and
commitment of the society—to do all that needed doing,
simultaneously. Natural consequence was criticism of military, and
in Brazilian context, and in eyes of military itself, such criticism
was to military like insult to flag or to nation’s honor. Thus
military reacted in name of patriotism and country against
criticism, revealing that in this respect at least they have
something in common with fellow professionals in other LA countries.To us this appears to be important watershed in Brazil’s political
development. IA–5 of December 13 was throwback to its two
predecessors of April 1964 and October 1965, but in our view has far
more significance than either. Given near chaos and disorder which
preceded and passion of moment that followed Goulart’s ouster, April
‘64 Act could be understood. Even October ‘65 Act could be justified
by Castello to some extent
as he said to us morning after Act was promulgated—and later
demonstrated in fact—that he only assumed powers not to use them.
Moreover, neither of these Acts was as extreme as one of December
13, and both had clearly specified expiration dates. Even so, as you
know, in retrospect we believe we erred after October ‘65 Act in not
drawing back further from our close association and public
identification with Castello Government.Perhaps Brazil’s misfortune has been that Costa e Silva became its president
twenty-one months ago instead of one of others more favored by
Castello Branco. With
all laws, powers and constitutional provisions apparently needed to
lead his country and govern effectively he has brought it to present
state. Thus, the watershed: unable to succeed with kind of open
democracy Brazil attempted from 1945 to 1964, country has now also
lost its chance—at least for present—to move ahead even under
strongly guided semi-authoritarian democracy.In our view, therefore, prospects are not good. For foreseeable
future military would appear be unwilling see Brazil buffeted by
pressures resulting from free expression in even semi-open society.
Nor, unless they change, can military accept criticism inherent to
their role as government of developing country. Some Brazilian
mutation of harsh authoritarian regime, therefore, and possibly some
succession of such regimes, appears be in offing.But, as stated in previous messages, and this of highest
importance, U.S. interests and objectives in Brazil are virtually
same now as they were eleven days ago. In the new circumstances we
will undoubtedly have to adapt ourselves to revised ways of serving
them. We await your further thoughts and recommendations as to how
best to proceed and make foregoing available to you, not as
representing full consensus in Washington nor to signal kind of
analysis or recommendations we want. Rather, foregoing represents
preliminary views of only small number of U.S. officials who have
consulted on matter, and of several consultants outside Department
who have had significant experience in Brazil, and does not reflect
dissent of several who believe, stated at its most extreme, that we
are greatly overemphasizing importance of recent developments in
Brazil and that this episode will find its way into Brazilian
history without greatly affecting period immediately ahead. We hope
you will find these comments helpful and in your analysis and
recommended policy lines will address more important questions
raised.Merry Christmas.Rusk
242. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID(US) BRAZ. Secret; Priority.
Repeated to Recife and Sao Paulo.Rio de Janeiro, December 28, 1968,
1915Z.
14720. References: State 288130,Document 237. 291004,In telegram 291004 to Rio de Janeiro, December 21,
the Department suggested that the Embassy submit its recommendations
on economic assistance and other bilateral matters within the next 2
weeks “if, as we expect, situation clarifies sufficiently for you to
do so.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL
BRAZ–US) 292127.Document 241. Joint State/AID Message.
In the absence of a clear view of what the Brazilian political
future holds, the Embassy believes the basic premise on which the
U.S. Government should operate is that we still want to see Brazil
advance and develop, and therefore we continue to be willing to
assist this process
wherever the prospects for accomplishment are reasonable. In
adopting this premise we are recognizing that genuine political
development can only be achieved as an extremely long-range result
of other fundamental social and cultural improvements, which in turn
can be assisted and accelerated with outside help of the sort we are
able to offer. We assume that while in certain circumstances we
would cut off aid, we would be reluctant to do so, thus we assume we
are involved in a process of determining first how, under the new
conditions existing in Brazil, we ought to tailor our programs for
maximum results, and, secondly, how to use our preparedness to
continue assistance as a stimulus to encourage the GOB to relax its political extremism.
Another important consideration is the political image of the U.S.
both here and throughout the Hemisphere. We are aware also that our
posture must be adjusted to the need for continuing support for aid
programs in Brazil among those U.S. public and Congressional
elements who may favor aid in general but who have difficulty with
the fact that it does not buy instant democracy.We anticipate it will take some weeks or even months before the
pattern of Brazilian Government and politics will become
sufficiently clear to enable us to make final recommendations on the
shape of our aid program to reflect fully the changed situation.
Until the new norms of the IA–5 become spelled out in practice,
e.g., in such areas as civil liberties, freedom of press and
parliamentary and judicial processes, and until we know how the
GOB will perform in the economic
field under the changed circumstances, we feel a wait-and-see
approach on new aid undertakings to be appropriate. Such an approach
in the form outlined below would reduce (but not entirely avoid) the
impression in Latin America and the U.S. that the USG uncritically accepts what has
happened here. Moreover, if skillfully handled it might strengthen
those elements in the military and the government who are counseling
restraint in the use of IA–5 and an early restoration of civil
liberties, although we must recognize that our influence on internal
political events is marginal at best.At the same time, we do not wish to breach existing commitments.
To terminate or suspend activities which have been undertaken or
authorized on the basis of good faith and with the investment of
energies and financial resources on both sides could create an
aftermath of distrust that could circumscribe our options for the
future. Thus, for the initial wait-and-see period or first phase,
and unless the situation deteriorates, we recommend a policy of (a)
continuing activities covered by existing agreements and (b)
proceeding, in an unhurried manner, with negotiations of outstanding
loan authorizations, namely, health sector, southern states road
maintenance, education sector, Passo Real, IBGE, agricultural
research, to the extent practicable, or we would attempt to
structure the completion of negotiations on these loans so that the socially-oriented
ones, such as health and education, would get signed first. If there
is future political retrogression, we would once again suspend
negotiations and further review the situation.In all continuing activities we would seek to minimize and if
possible avoid publicity. We must however expect pressures on GOB side to hurry negotiations and to
generate publicity which we will be alert to combat.During the wait-and-see phase we would not discuss further with
the GOB the contemplated FY 1969 loan program (program loan,
three education sector loans, and Manaus power). Of this package the
most immediate significance for USG/GOB relations is
the program loan, negotiation of which had been planned for January.
These negotiations would have to be postponed sine die. The
suspension of dialogue on new programs might well mean that we would
not be able to authorize these loans, or at least some of them,
before the end of the fiscal year. With this in mind, we may wish to
reconsider fairly soon whether preparatory work on the education
sector loans should not go forward as an exception to the
“wait-and-see” approach, since these loans seem to us to be of high
priority even under the changed political circumstances in
Brazil.In the meantime, we would convey the policy outlined above in
broad terms to the top leadership of the GOB. We would say that, while we cannot anticipate the
reaction of the new U.S. administration which will be taking office
on January 20, we assume its attitude will be shaped by traditional
U.S. concern for individual freedoms. Therefore, it is likely that
the length of the “wait-and-see” period, particularly with respect
to new FY69 assistance commitments, would be influenced by future
Brazilian actions regarding civil liberties, press freedom, and the
like. The Ambassador’s farewell calls on the President and a number
of cabinet officers would provide appropriate occasions to get this
message across, and, possibly, to learn of the GOB’s plans re IA–5.In specific terms we thus envisage the following U.S. position,
program by program: FY68 Program Loan. Because of the undesirable impact
payment of $50 million tranche now due under the FY68
program loan would have, we recommend protracted delay. We
can expect considerable diplomatic pressure from the GOB to release these funds. No
recommendation on the second tranche can be made at this
time.Development Loan Projects. In an attempt to avoid the
impression that we were going back to “business as usual”
our tactics would be different from those formerly employed
in at least two respects: (1) we would not press the GOB to take action in order to
move forward on pending matters, but instead would let the
initiative come
from the Brazilian side and (2) even with rapid movement on
the part of the GOB to bring
these pending matters to a head, we would reevaluate the
political situation on one hand and the importance we attach
to the particular loan on the other before any signings.
Undue GOB delays or failures
to meet conditions of the loans will lead to early
termination and appropriate deobligations or
de-authorizations. The deadlines which we had previously set
for ourselves would have to be extended because of the
current interruption and deliberate spacing of the
signatures.Development Grant Projects. Continuation of ongoing
activities, with a special review of public safety program
to determine whether modification of the current phaseout
schedule would be appropriate in light of the changed
situation.Counterpart Releases. We advocate continuing releases of
PL 480 and program loan
counterpart generated from existing agreements. As indicated
in Rio 14497,Not found.
further delays in a number of cases will be disruptive for
projects in which we have had strong interest.Housing Extended Risk Guarantees. Follow through with
closing and signatures on already authorized guarantees. On
December 2, USAID
requested January 24 for execution of documents. BNH has not
yet responded. Our information indicates that sponsors and
BNH would be desirous of postponing until early March.
USAID would concur on
basis of current situation, but position of U.S. investors
should be ascertained by AID/W. Further authorizations are not an
immediate issue as GOB has
not yet indicated interest.Other AID Guarantees.
Follow through on applications submitted where letters of
intent already issued. Would also continue process new
applications as these are essentially non-concessional,
private sector to private sector activities.Title II–PL 480. On
humanitarian grounds, continuation of planned
programs.Title I–PL 480. Inasmuch as
Title I sales are complementary to program assistance,
negotiations on new agreement will also have to be
delayed.We have also considered our position concerning Exim-Bank
financing and assistance from multilateral agencies. We recommend no
change in Exim approach toward private sector projects. Such
proposals should continue to be considered on their individual
merits and within normal Exim financing policies. Pending projects
for publicly-owned companies, such as Volta Redonda and Rio Doce,
would be used by the GOB to create
the impression that the U.S. has no qualms about new economic assistance to Brazil: in
general Exim should put a “slow man” on the job for the time being
and final approval and announcement of each loan should be
considered at the time in terms of its political impact.On multilateral assistance, our recommendation is that projects
being considered by the multilateral agencies be processed as per
their usual policies and regulations. We should avoid actions that
would lead to accusations that the U.S. is attempting to use
multilateral agencies to accomplish unilateral political objectives.
U.S. positions on specific projects should be taken on the merits of
the individual projects.Tuthill
243. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 US–BRAZ. Confidential; Priority;
Limdis. Repeated to Brasilia, Sao Paulo, Recife, Montevideo, and
CINCSO.Rio de Janeiro, January 9, 1969,
2340Z.
196. Subject: Call on President Costa e
Silva. Accompanied by POL
Counselor I payed half hour farewell call today on President in presence
of FonMin at President’s summer
palace in Petropolis.
President’s greeting was effusive and following courtesies and rambling
exchange on merits of contact lenses Costa
e Silva himself broached subject of recent events by
noting I would be leaving at a time when Latin America gives a confused
impression: Colombia in state of siege, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina and now
Brazil under “exceptional regimes.” Uruguay didn’t even have strength
left to go into exceptional regime. It was good neighbor but has been
“virtually turned over to Communists.”
Costa e Silva showed
considerable awareness and apparent comprehension of US criticism. Said
US had “stratified life” and could not be expected understand problems
of countries in development stage. Your democracy is the ideal, he
noted, but we cannot pattern ourselves after your system. If US were in
developing stage now it would be going through same problems we are
experiencing. Even then, US had advantage of elite immigration whereas
Portugal sent us its castoffs.
I assured him US did not wish to impose its pattern upon any country but
I recalled that prior his election Costa e
Silva had told me of three things I must bear in mind: 1)
the military is the most political institution in Brazil, 2) the
military want Costa e Silva to
be President and 3) he, Costa e
Silva would work for a return to a situation in which
either a civilian or a military man could be chosen President. Told him
I had used his statement in my reports to Washington, which was
following present current developments with concern. Was there any
message he wished me to convey?
President said that I as one who had lived here should explain “entire
situation” to Washington, pointing out that there is “complete
tranquility” in Brazil. (One of his favorite phrases which he used
several times again today.) We have “maintained order.” We had to
sacrifice some of the “non fundamentals to preserve the fundamentals,”
but as soon as we can we will return to state of normality. This will be
done “opportunely,” but with the necessary caution.
President went on to castigate “political class” much along lines his New
Year’s eve speech. He had worked for an understanding between
politicians and military but politicians didn’t want understanding. If
we only were acquainted with all facts we would know that politicians
wanted to undo all the achievements of revolution. “No one worked harder
with politicians than I but they refused to understand.”
As example of difficulties he faced, Costa e
Silva cited Correio da Manha. I
wanted to ease press censorship, he said, but as soon as I did Correio da Manha printed a letter I was supposed
to be sending to President elect Nixon (Rio’s 149).Dated
January 6. (Ibid., POL 15–1
BRAZ) No such letter exists. This type of thing would not be
permitted in US and Correio could be sued by you,
but our laws are not strong enough to deal with irresponsible press
(“yours in US is more responsible”). Correio even
printed all the criticisms of the American and European press. For these
reasons we had to seize yesterday’s edition.
President noted military in Brazil have traditionally played political
role. I have tried to break that tradition (he pointed to his civilian
attire), but this can’t be done from one hour to another. For the moment
I have had to step back into my military role but as soon as possible I
will resume forward progress in my civilian role.
Of one thing you can be sure, Costa e
Silva said. There will be a presidential succession as
provided for in constitution. Jokingly remarked that this would happen
if for no other reason than that he doesn’t like the job—it is too
difficult.
President closed conversation by asking me to assure my government that
Brazil is now a true friend of the US. This might not be the case under
“the others” (presumably he was referring to the pre-1964 Goulart group).
Comment:Costa e Silva took on the
attitude of a garrulous, kindly— and tolerant—grandfather worried about
the wayward and disoriented members on the Brazilian political scene. He
obviously wanted to give the impression that all was quiet and that he
had only taken a slight— and temporary—detour from the democratic path.
Following initial pleasantries, he launched into one of his long
monologues and brought conversation to abrupt but cordial end after 1800
bugle sounded. It was hard to get word in edgewise.
It is difficult to know how much of this he believes himself. He is, of
course, now aware of the restless forces within the Brazilian military
but he may be convinced (or trying to convince himself) that he can
contain them. The general impression that he gave us was that, despite
his native shrewdness, he may well be underestimating the forces at work
in this country.
Tuthill
244. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Brazil, Vol. VIII, Filed by
LBJ Library, 7/65–1/69.
Confidential. The memorandum indicates the President saw it.Washington, January 13, 1969, 3 p.m.
SUBJECT
Brazil
A political struggle within the army continues in Brazil—with the result
in doubt, and the prize being de facto control of all levels of
government. President Costa e
Silva issued another “Institutional Act” on December 13
under extreme pressure from his fellow generals—he hopes to use its
extraordinary powers sparingly, but he is being pressed hard to widen
the political purge and to clamp down permanently on the Supreme Court, the press, and other
opposition expression so that the “work of the Revolution” can be
finished in peace. He may be unseated by his
military colleagues if he continues to resist invoking more extreme
repressive measures.
Meanwhile, the country stays quiet, helpless to affect the course of
events. To varying degrees labor, church, students, journalists,
“intellectuals”, and most politicians are shaken and temporarily cowed.
Most businessmen and some politicians applaud the tougher government
line on “subversion and corruption”. Censorship is now technically
lifted—but newspapers must practice a form of rigid “selfrestraint” or
face confiscation.
Moderate civilian politicians urge the U.S. to wait quietly on the
sidelines—not publicly denouncing the dictatorial trend—but holding back
any new aid commitments until the struggle between moderates and
radicals in the army is resolved. Our Embassy in Rio de Janeiro also
advocates this course. State has followed this line since December
13—while maintaining normal diplomatic, aid, and military contacts, we
have been “reviewing” our assistance programs, a polite way of saying
“no new commitments.”
So far, the Brazilian Government has not disputed our posture on aid. The
Finance Minister hopes we will soon release $50
million from the 1968 program loan—an installment due in December for
which Brazil’s self-help performance fully qualifies. However, we are
holding up this release until the political picture clears somewhat, in
part in anticipation of strong negative reactions from the Congress,
should we release quickly.
Unless Costa e Silva presses for
the money—which he has not done to date,
Secretary Rusk believes we should
hold this important decision for the next Administration.
Walt
Chile
245. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division
(King) to
Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource:
Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–01690R, DDO Files, Western
Hemisphere, Chile, [file name not
declassified]. Secret. Drafted on January 2. Forwarded
through the Deputy Director for Plans. Copies were sent to DDCI, DDP, and ADDP.Washington, January 3, 1964.
SUBJECT
Political Action Program in Chile
REFERENCES
A. WHD Memorandum to DCI on Same Subject Dated 24 December
1963Not found.B. Memorandum dated 30 December 1963 from E.H. Knoche requesting
clarification on some points of the WHD MemorandumNot found.
Enno Henry Knoche was Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence.
1. Our comments on the questions posed in Mr. Knoche’s memorandum are
listed below.
2. Support for the Democratic Front
On 19 December 1963 the Special Group approved a one-time payment [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
to the Democratic Front [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified].The minutes
of the meeting are in Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, Meetings,
January 2, 1964. The suggestion for this payment originated
with Ambassador Cole and was
concurred in by Assistant Secretary Martin. Arrangements are now being made to transfer this
money [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]. This Special Group paper did not request regular
monthly payments to the Democratic Front.
During his December 1963 Washington visit, [name not
declassified] mentioned that the Democratic Front required 1.5
million dollars for its election campaign—one million of which it could
raise locally. The implication was a pitch for $500,000 from United
States sources.
3. Present Assistance to the Christian Democratic
Party
Policy Approval
In view of the ambiguous position of the Christian Democratic
Party on a number of issues of interest to the United States,
the subject of
assistance to this party was periodically coordinated at various
levels, with the people responsible for policy. The idea of
assisting the Christian Democrats was first broached to us on 22
March 1962 by Ambassador Cole and the then Special Assistant to the
President, Richard Goodwin. The Special Group approved a program
of assistance to the Christian Democrats on 19 April 1962 and
again on 30 August 1963.The funding
approved was [text not declassified]
and [text not declassified],
respectively. The minutes of the Special Group meetings are
in the Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files,
Meetings, April 26, 1962 and September 6, 1962. The
Latin American Policy Committee approved the continuation of the
assistance at meetings held on 10 January 1963 and 20 June
1963.The minutes for both
meetings are ibid., LAPC
Action Minutes, 1962–1963. On 14 August 1963 Mr.
Martin and Ambassador
Cole agreed again
that this assistance should continue. The Special Group paper on
one-time assistance to the Democratic Front which was approved
on 19 December 1963 refers explicitly to our assistance to the
Christian Democrats.Reference is to
a CIA paper for the Special
Group, December 13, 1963. (Ibid., Special Group Files,
Meetings, December 19, 1963)
Rationale for this Assistance
The reasons for our non-attributable assistance to the Christian
Democratic Party are:
To Deprive the Chilean Communist
Party of Votes
The Christian Democratic Party is the fastest growing
party in Chile. Its social program and evangelical
fervor has enabled it to compete successfully with
the Communists for the votes of students and
workers. The Christian Democratic Party is the only
non-Communist party in Chile in a position to attack
directly the Communist Party at its mass base. This
has been demonstrated in the municipal elections of
April of last year, in the student elections, and in
the fight for control of labor unions, which, though
still controlled by the Communists, are showing the
signs of Christian Democratic Party inroads.
To Achieve a Measure of Influence
Over Christian Democratic Party Policy
This objective could not be realized effectively
because of security restrictions under which we must
operate in this case. The Special Group, in
approving assistance to the Christian Democratic
Party, insisted that this assistance be
non-attributable. [1½ lines of
source text not declassified] Since security
has been tightly maintained, Eduardo Frei, the
leader of the Christian Democratic Party, is
unwitting of the fact that he is being aided by the
United States Government and believes that this
assistance is being provided by his [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] friends.
To Foster a Non-Communist
Coalition
One of the original objectives in March 1962 was to
strengthen the Christian Democratic Party so that it
would be more attractive to the Radical Party as a
coalition partner. Up to April 1963 the Radicals had
been the largest single party and the Christians the
second largest in Chile. Hence a coalition of these
parties with the greatest voter appeal was viewed as
a viable non-Communist barrier. Since the Radical
Party joined the Conservatives and Liberals in their
own alliance, the Democratic Front, on 11 October
1962, this objective is not now feasible.
4. Parliament’s Role in the Election of a
President
In the event no candidate achieves a majority, the Chilean constitution
does provide parliament with the right to select the president between
the two leading candidates. The composition of the present parliament is
such that it could select the runner-up over the Popular Front
candidate. Historically, however, parliament has never passed over the
candidate who received the largest popular vote, and we have no hard
intelligence to the effect that any leading groups are planning to do
this, if it should become necessary, nor do we have any indication that
public opinion would approve such a move. Moreover, parliamentary
elections are scheduled for March 1965, and it is unlikely that many
parliamentarians will conclude that their reelection will be best
assured by going against the will of the people by flouting Chile’s
proud democratic spirit and by assuming the responsibility for the civil
unrest that would follow such a decision.
5. Military Intervention
Traditionally, the Chilean military establishment has not interfered with
the political life of the country. The last military coup occurred in
1932. The Chilean military stood idly by and watched a Popular Front
government assume power in 1938 and permitted it to govern until 1941
when it fell of its own weight and without military intervention.
Although the military have the capabilities to intervene, we have no
intelligence or other reports indicating they are planning or
considering this.
6. How Business Circles View the 1964 Elections
The fact that the Socialist/Communist Front did not do as well as
anticipated in the municipal elections of April 1963 has created some
new optimism in regard to the 1964 election results. However, although
we (and our counterparts in the State Department) do not view the
election of the Popular Front candidate as a probability, we do feel it
is a distinct possibility. Business circles of course have no illusion
about what would happen should the Socialist/Communist Front win, but
they believe this possibility to be less likely than we do.
Should a Christian Democratic victory occur, it might be noted that the
Christian Democratic Party tends to favor selective nationalization and
increased state planning. Undoubtedly, private industry would be in a
better position with Duran as president and will probably suffer
increased restrictions under a Christian Democratic administration.
7. Should we be Supporting the Christian Democratic
Party
Although the Christian Democratic Party and the Democratic Front do not,
in large measure, compete for the same votes and the Christian
Democratic Party has demonstrated its ability to compete with the
communists for worker votes, its position on a number of issues of
interest to the United States makes it advisable to reexamine our aid to
this party. [2½ lines of source text not
declassified] In any event, we must face the fact that the
Christian Democratic Party will be less favorable and responsive to
United States Government policies than the Democratic Front, that it
will try to establish relations with Iron Curtain countries, that within
the limited capability of Chile it will endeavor to increase its trade
with the Soviet Bloc and will not follow the United States lead in
foreign policy with the same willingness as the present government.
8. Should we Alter our Chilean Program
Two aspects of our Chilean program should be exploited with Secretary
Mann.
Depending on [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] our intelligence reports, and State
Department findings, the entire subject of Chilean election
subsidies, with particular emphasis on assistance to the Democratic
Front, should be discussed with Secretary Mann.If a decision is made to continue assistance to the Christian
Democratic Party, an effort should be made to achieve greater
influence over it by modifying the Special Group restriction on
non-attributability. Funds could be provided in a fashion causing
Frei to infer United
States origin of funds and yet permitting plausible denial.J. C. KingPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
246. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Dungan) to the President’s
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: National Security Council,
303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Chile thru 1969. Top
Secret.Washington, January 18, 1964.
It seems to me that the Special Group might, at an early date, give
consideration to the interests of the United States in the Chilean
election which occurs in December 1964.The
presidential election in Chile was scheduled for September 4.
No one familiar with Latin American affairs has any doubt as to the
importance of the outcome of this election, not only in Chile but
throughout the hemisphere.
I believe it is an opportune time for us to review what our posture
should be toward the two major non-communist political groupings and
whether we should be furnishing indirect assistance to either or
both.
I would suggest that State and CIA be
given the assignment to make an assessment of the situation—an updating
of the recent NIEReference is to NIE
94–63, “The Chilean Situation and Prospects,” October 3, 1963, an
analysis “with particular reference to the September 1964
presidential elections.” (Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII,
American Republics, Microfiche Supplement, Chile)—
and make a recommendation with regard to support. This should be
undertaken promptly, in my opinion.At the
end of the memorandum is the following typewritten note: “Mr.
Jessup telephoned Mr.
Dungan to advise him that
Chilean proposals have been approved recently and another paper may
be forthcoming in a few weeks. Mr. Dungan never returned the calls.”
RAD
247. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 90–347R,
DDO Files, [file name not declassified].
Secret. Drafted in the Western Hemisphere Division.Washington, February 28, 1964.
SUBJECT
Conversation between Chief and Deputy Chief, WHD with Assistant Secretary Mann, on 28 February 1964On 28 February 1964 Chief, WHD
advised the undersigned of his conversation with Mr. Mann in which Mr. Mann expressed a desire to have the
Special Group approached for the purpose of obtaining its approval
for election support of the Democratic Front [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] Mr. Mann’s rationale was that Duran, being more pliable—from the
American viewpoint—in economic matters than Frei: that American copper
companies would conceivably be ready to invest five hundred million
dollars in Chile as they were prepared to do in 1958, that Duran might draw further votes away
from Allende, all this would
point to the desirability of helping [name not
declassified] at this time. Mr. Mann felt that the [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] injection recently
given [name not declassified] when compared
with the [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] a year given the CD’s was out of balance; Mr.
Mann felt that the
support to the CD should be continued because they too offer strong
competition to Allende.Chief, WHD requested the
undersigned to think about the best way to get a paper to the
Special Group at the earliest possible date.In telegram 04580 to Santiago, February 28, the
CIA reported that a proposal
to increase financial support to the Democratic Front would be
submitted to the Special Group on March 5. The CIA also indicated that the
administration intended to propose a cutback in the subsidy to
the Christian Democratic Party. (Ibid.) The Special Group,
however, did not meet on March 5 and failed to discuss Chile at
its next meeting, March 12. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special
Group Files, Meetings)[name not declassified]Printed from a copy that bears this typed
signature.
248. Editorial Note
In a memorandum to Assistant Secretary Mann, March 6, 1964, Ralph
W. Richardson, the officer-in-charge of Chilean affairs,
assessed the significance of the upcoming congressional by-election in
Curicó. Although the seat itself was not important, Richardson explained that the
by-election would “serve to measure the relative strengths of the
political parties,” possibly determining “future realignments prior to
the Presidential election.” He pointed out that Julio Durán Neumann, the Democratic
Front (DF) presidential candidate, had
already declared the by-election a national “plebiscite,” confident that
the DF parties would repeat their share
of the municipal elections in April 1963, when they received a combined
49% of the vote. The Popular Action Front (FRAP), however, also enjoyed a “special advantage” at
Curicó: “its candidate is the son of the late Socialist Deputy.” As for
the presidential election, Richardson concluded that “the time is rapidly
approaching when we should come to some basic decisions, whatever the
outcome of the Curicó election. I think we need to weigh not only the
probabilities of victory by the DF and the PDC, but also such issues as whether it is in the US
interest to try to keep Durán and
the Democratic Front in the race, even if we were to decide to do what
we can to favor Frei’s chances of
winning.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Santiago Embassy
Files: FRC 69 A 6507, 1964, POL 14
Elections (Presidential) 1964 (1))
On March 15 the FRAP candidate won the
Curicó by-election with 39.5 percent of the vote; the next day,
Durán resigned as the DF presidential candidate. McGeorge Bundy asked Ralph Dungan to comment on these events
at a White House staff meeting, March 18: “Dungan said he was not really upset about the
by-elections in Chile in which the communists gained, nor, he said, is
the ambassador. There is a three to one chance that everything will turn
out all right. Bundy reminded him
that with those odds, we could lose five countries in Latin America.”
(Memorandum for the record by W.Y. Smith, March 18; National Defense
University, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group) On March 25 Assistant
Secretary Mann also discussed the
political fallout from Curicó at a meeting with Central Intelligence
Agency officials, including Desmond
FitzGerald, J.C.
King, and Cord
Meyer. According to a record of the meeting: “FitzGerald said the most important
thing is to keep people from panicking as a result of Curico. King proposed we give additional
support [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified], but through channels other than those now being
used. [1 line of source text not declassified] He
said the Agency is thinking in terms of [less than 1
line of source text not declassified]. Cord Meyer said this would of course
have to go to the Special Group. King agreed.” Mann wondered whether “a leftist Radical candidate in
the race wouldn’t help keep
leftist Radicals from drifting to Allende.” The participants agreed that “the matter will
be pursued after Mann has talked
with Cole.” (Memorandum from
Carter to Hughes, March 26; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA–CIA
Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965)
Richardson later commented on the
impact Curicó had on the decision-making process: “While I agree that we
certainly do have a situation to worry about, I still cannot repress a
feeling of satisfaction in seeing how quickly and cleanly our ‘decision’
to swing behind Frei was made for
us. I really had wondered before Durán’s disaster whether we were going to get any
definite decision from the front office on which group we should help.”
(Letter to Jova, April 3;
Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Santiago Embassy Files: FRC
69 A 6507, 1964, POL 14 Elections
(Presidential) 1964 (1))
249. Memorandum From Gordon
Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. I, 11/63–6/64.
Secret.Washington, March 19, 1964.
SUBJECT
Chiefs of Mission Conference—Brazil and Chile
I attended a few sessions of the Chiefs of Mission Conference. One of the
more interesting included discussions by Ambassadors Gordon and Cole about the situations in Brazil and Chile.
[Omitted here is discussion on Brazil; see Document
185.]
Chile
In contrast to Brazil, the economic
situation in Chile is remarkably good. Ambassador Cole said there is a growth
rate of 5%, unemployment is at a low level, and savings are up.
Progress has been made in land and tax reform. There are, of
course, some problems—e.g. unfavorable balance of payments and
inflation. These problems tend to be related to Chile’s desire
to push forward quickly in the field of economic
development.
One of the outstanding aspects of the Chilean economy is the
extent of U.S. involvement. The U.S. has big stakes in copper
and manufacturing of all kinds. The huge U.S. involvement in
Chile leads the Chileans to an ambivalent attitude towards the
U.S. For example, while they like us in many ways, there is
plenty of latent hostility.
Chile’s biggest problem is political—the
election for the Presidency in September (it should be noted that in
Chile the President has great power). It now appears that there may
be only two primary candidates—Frei, the moderate, and Allende, the extreme leftist. If there is a two man
race, Frei is very likely to
win. If there is a three or four man race, Allende’s chances will be improved.
On balance, Ambassador Cole
estimates that the odds are 3 to 1 against Allende winning in September. He
noted, however, that a year ago he would have placed the odds at 10
to 1.In effect, there are four possibilities vis-à-vis Allende and the election. Allende could get
beaten at the polls.Allende could get the
most votes but not get the Presidency. According to Chilean
law, if no candidate gets a majority, the assembly chooses
one of the two leading candidates. Normally, it chooses the
candidate with the most votes; however, it does have
constitutional power to pick the second biggest
vote-getter.Allende could win but
be overthrown by the armed forces or the “carbinieri”; this
would have to be done before Allende gets a chance to consolidate his
power. Normally, the armed forces are very non-political,
but they might conceivably intervene if Allende won.Allende could win and
stay in power.If Allende wins and stays
in power, we are in trouble. For example, he will probably
nationalize the copper mines, which in turn, might end the aid
program because of the Hickenlooper amendment;This amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 was initially approved in August 1962, and subsequently
revised in December 1963. Sponsored by Senators Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R–Iowa)
and E. Ross Adair (R–Indiana), the amendment stipulated that the
President suspend assistance to any country that expropriated
the property of U.S. citizens or corporations without proper
compensation. (76 Stat. 260) this, in turn, could lead
Chile to ask the Bloc for economic aid. There are very few
significant short term things we can do between now and election
time. Generally speaking, we should simply do what we can to get
people to back Frei.GC
250. Memorandum Prepared for the Special GroupSource: National Security Council,
303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Chile thru 1969. Secret; Eyes
Alone. Dungan forwarded the
paper to Bundy as an
attachment to an April 2 memorandum in which he commented: “As I
told you this morning, I have no way of knowing whether $750,000 is
the right amount, but I certainly would not balk at it. You might
inquire, however, why the cost of campaigning in [text not declassified] Chile is always so much higher than
it is in the United States. As I indicated, I will follow up with
Des[mond FitzGerald] on the implementation of
this program without getting in any further than is absolutely
necessary.” (Ibid.)Washington, April 1, 1964.
SUBJECT
Support for the Chilean Presidential Elections of 4 September
1964
REFERENCES
A. Memorandum for The Special Group, dated 13 December 1963,
Subject: Financial Support to Chilean Democratic Front [1 line of source text not declassified]Not printed. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special
Group Files, Meetings, December 19, 1963)B. Memorandum for The Special Group, dated 27 August 1962,
Subject: Support to the Christian Democratic Party of Chile (PDC)Not
printed. (Ibid., August 30, 1962)
1. Summary
This is a proposal for political and propaganda action directed at the
defeat of Salvador Allende, the
Communist-supported candidate for the Chilean presidential elections of
4 September 1964. The sum of $750,000 is being requested for the
implementation of courses of action that will contribute to this
objective by increasing the organizational efficiency and campaigning
ability of the Christian Democratic Party, by inducing as far as
feasible, supporters of the former Democratic Front to cast their votes
for Frei and deny their support
to Allende, and by attempting to
discourage third candidacies—such as Jorge Prat’s. It should be noted
that representatives of the Christian Democratic Party visited, on their
own initiative, the U.S. Embassy in Santiago on 26 March and, after
presenting their current and proposed budgets, asked for a one million
dollar subsidy for Frei’s
campaign. The Embassy and our field representative recommended that this
amount be provided for this purpose.
Funds for this activity have not been programmed for FY 1964 and are not available within the
Agency; it is recommended that this amount be obtained from the Agency
Reserve for Contingencies.
2. Problem
To provide financial support, as necessary, to the democratic forces of
Chile in an effort to defeat Salvador
Allende, the Communist-sponsored candidate of FRAP. The objectives of this support are: (a) to minimize the
number of democratic votes that may drift to FRAP as a result of the fractionalization of the Democratic
Front; (b) to obtain the support of democratic parties and organizations
for Eduardo Frei, the Christian
Democratic candidate; (c) to strengthen the Christian Democratic
organizational structure and campaigning ability so that it can appeal
to the largest number of Chileans including FRAP voters, former Democratic Front supporters, and new
voters; and (d) to induce “Independent” candidates, such as Jorge Prat,
to withdraw from the campaign.
3. Factors Bearing on the Problem
The Curico by-elections of 15 March 1964 changed the Chilean
political spectrum radically by forcing the withdrawal of the
Democratic Front’s presidential candidate, Julio Duran, and disrupting the
Democratic Front coalition composed of the Liberal, Conservative,
and Radical parties.The dissolution of the Democratic Front has polarized the
elections around the candidacies of Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party and
Salvador Allende of
FRAP. In this situation the
preferences of the voters who had been committed to Duran become the key to the
election and to the defeat of Allende. In turn, the attitudes of these voters will
be heavily influenced by the official position of the Radical,
Conservative, and Liberal parties. The parties of the Democratic
Front coalition polled approximately 921,000 votes in the April 1963
municipal elections which amounted to 46% of the votes cast. (Out of
this 46%, the Radicals got 21.6%, the Liberals got 13.1%, and the
Conservatives got 11.3%.) As a basis of comparison it should be
noted that the Christian Democratic Party obtained 453,000 (23%)
votes and FRAP 583,000 (29%) votes
at that time. Since the estimated electorate for the 1964
presidential elections is two and one quarter million, either
candidate will have to poll roughly one million, one hundred, and
fifty thousand votes to win. Thus, even if there is no precise
correlation between the voting patterns of municipal as compared to
presidential elections it is clear that neither candidate can hope
to win the elections of 4 September without appealing to a
substantial number of the Conservative, Liberal, Radical, and new
voters.It can be said, in general, that the majority of the Conservative
vote will be for Frei in view
of this party’s Catholic tradition. The Liberal Party, which is
staunchly anti-Communist, also can probably be depended upon to
deliver a substantial segment of its vote to Frei. Historical factors, including
the traditional anti-clericalism of the Radical Party and its past
participation in a Popular Front Government, indicate that a
substantial number of votes will probably shift from that party to
FRAP.The ability of the Christian Democratic Party to appeal openly for
the vote of the former Democratic Front is seriously limited by
Frei’s need to maintain
his image as an honest and dedicated leader of the underprivileged
who is above political “deals.” Conversely, the leaders of the
former parties of the Democratic Front, especially the Radical Party
which depends heavily on patronage to maintain its organization
intact, would be hard pressed to throw their support to Frei in the absence of a PDC public appeal for their assistance.
This dilemma poses the need for an external stimulus which will
bring the Democratic Front parties and the PDC to a sophisticated agreement on the support of
Frei for the presidential
elections.Apart from the problem noted above, there remains the persistent
need to assist the PDC in the
construction of an efficient capillary organization that will
conduct an effective campaign, especially among peasants and women.
A tentative analysis of the Curico election results indicate that
the greatest FRAP gains and
Democratic Front losses came from the category of peasants and
women. Consequently, Frei
must make a major organizational effort to counteract FRAP influence in these areas. The
Curico campaign also demonstrated that the PDC organization is inadequately supplied with
vehicles, party workers, loudspeakers, and the other accouterments
of an effective campaign.Thus, as a result of the situation outlined above, it becomes
necessary to take all possible action to assist Frei in his campaign and to limit
the number of former Democratic Front votes that might go to
Allende. Some of the
methods that will be used to achieve these objectives, insofar as
feasible, are: Bring pressure to bear on the Radical Party to prevent it
from formally endorsing Allende, or, failing in this, to remain
neutral or to run its own candidate if it appears that he
will not damage Frei.
In the event the Radical Party declares for Allende, financial
assistance will have to be provided to individual Radical
leaders or groups capable of bringing Radical voters into
the Frei camp.To influence the Conservative and Liberal parties to
support Frei in a
manner that will not damage his image as a reform candidate.
To achieve this it will be necessary to provide financial
assistance to the Liberal and Conservative parties or those
of their leaders who will work to swing their votes behind
Frei.Provide a substantial subsidy [less than
1 line of source text not declassified] for the
purpose of strengthening his electoral machine and campaign
capabilities. Efforts will also be made to influence
Frei to reach a
private agreement with the Radicals for their support in
exchange for some patronage.Bring pressure to bear on Jorge Prat, partly through
Conservative and Liberal leaders, to induce his withdrawal
from the presidential contest.Provide financial assistance, as necessary, to ancillary
organizations, such as youth and student groups, peasant
organizations, slum dwellers’ associations, labor unions,
and women’s clubs, to bring their votes to Frei.In the latter stages of the campaign to buy some votes
outright if required.[3 lines of source text not
declassified]Some funds will also be utilized for specialized
propaganda operations, some of which will be black, to
denigrate Allende.
4. Coordination
This proposal has been coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs who believes that—should it appear necessary
at a later date—additional funds should be sought.In a memorandum to U.
Alexis Johnson, April 2, Mann approved the proposal with the following
clarification: 1) that the money be divided, [text
not declassified] going to support Frei and the remainder to other
objectives; 2) that Frei be
made “explicitly aware” that the U.S. Government was the source of
the money; and 3) that the procedures for transferring the money be
“closely coordinated with Mr. Mann.” (Ibid., April 2, 1964)
In this regard, it should be noted that on 26 March 1964 the Embassy was
visited by Frei’s [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
campaign managers who presented their current budget showing a rate of
expenditure of $100,000 per month which they claim they are meeting with
much difficulty. They also presented a proposed campaign budget for the
next five months of $300,000 per month which they state would be
required to mount an effective campaign. The Chileans suggested that the
U.S. Government make up this difference which amounts to one million
dollars for the period from now to election time. The Embassy and our
field representative reviewed the budgets, felt they did not seem
unreasonable, and subsequently recommended that the Chilean’s request
for one million dollars be granted as soon as possible.
At the same time, the Embassy strongly recommended that the mechanics of
the operation insure that this assistance not seem to come from U.S.
sources.
5. Recommendation
It is recommended that: Action under paragraph 3 f above be approved for immediate
implementation.The U.S. Government provide $750,000 for this purpose.Funds [1½ lines of source text not
declassified], be passed covertly in a manner [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] to infer U.S. Government origin of the funds yet
permit us plausible denial if necessary. This will be done by
attributing the funds, explicitly, to U.S. non-official sources.
This approach is required in an effort to obtain some essential
leverage [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified]. It is realized that this recommendation
does not reflect the Embassy’s position.The Special Group met on April 2 at 3:30
p.m. in the White House Situation Room. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson Files:
Lot 90 D 408, Date Books, 1964) The minutes of the meeting
record the decision on Chile as follows: “The paper,
‘Support for Chilean Presidential Elections,’ was approved.
Mr. FitzGerald announced that a
solution to the slight difference of opinion between
Ambassador Cole and
the CAS in Santiago had been
reached and that attribution of U.S. support would be
inferred but there should be no evidence of proof. Mr.
FitzGerald indicated that this was
operationally feasible.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files,
Special Group Files, April 9, 1964, 116)
251. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 CHILE. Confidential; Priority.
Repeated to POLADs at CINCLANT and CINCSO.Santiago, April 22, 1964, 7:15
p.m.
939. Subject: Assessment Socialist-Communist Candidate Salvador Allende. Ref: Deptel 591;Telegram 591 to Santiago, April 17, requested
the Embassy’s assessment of Salvador
Allende: his personality, political objectives, and
the short-term effect of his election, including the likelihood of a
Communist takeover. (Ibid.) Embassy A–703, 1/29/63;Airgram A–703 from Santiago, January 29,
1963, reported that the Popular Action Front (FRAP) had nominated Allende as its presidential
candidate. (Ibid., Central Files 1961–63, 725.00/1–2963)
A–755, 4/10/64.In airgram A–755 from
Santiago the Embassy transmitted and analyzed the FRAP campaign platform. (Ibid.,
Central Files, 1964–66, POL 12
CHILE)
Allende is a chameleonic person
who over years has appeared on occasion as idealistic socialist reformer
who believes democracy and other times as military revolutionist
striving bring revolution a la Cuba to Chile. His motivation and drive
for more than twenty years have centered on his ambition become first
Marxist president of Chile and be first to bring “popular democracy” to
power in South America. The essential opportunism of man is evident but
always within a leftist sphere or orientation. He does not possess
unusual intelligence and his
ideas and program have changed little, if at all, over years. As
politician he is good speaker and hard worker. Personally he is vain,
quick tempered, easily offended, socially as well as politically
ambitious, able turn on or off at will a considerable social charm. He
is sensitive to charge he would be dominated by Communists or that he
would institute anti-democratic measures. Nevertheless were he to
achieve power we think he could be led by events into being harsh and
ruthless with his opponents but more likely use exile than prison or
pardon. It is probable that he thinks in terms Marxist regime similar
Castro’s Cuba in its free-wheeling, relatively independent line but more
sophisticated, cultured, without emotional excesses of “tropical”
country such as Cuba.
Domestically his major objectives appear be:
1) Nationalization copper, nitrate, iron, public utilities, banks,
insurance, foreign commerce; 2) drastic land reform; 3) fully planned
economy; 4) franchise to illiterates and military enlisted
personnel.
Foreign policy objectives appear be:
1) Alignment with underdeveloped countries; 2) establish relations bloc
countries and ChiComs; 3) drastic reduction US influence in Chile and
Hemisphere including termination Military Assistance Pacts; 4) closer
association with Cuba and pressure on OAS end Cuba’s isolation and drastic but not clearly
specified changes in OAS structure. As
nearly as we can tell there is no visible disagreement on any above
objectives between socialists and Communists. Presumably Allende as well as Ampuero
socialistsFollowers of Raúl Ampuero
Díaz, secretary general of the Socialist Party. desire
greater degree independence from Moscow, are against Communist proposed
“single party of left” and logical and emotional grounds exist to
explain rivalry which now present between parties. Despite Allende’s periodic statements (often to
American press representatives) that he is not a Communist, and rather
wide-spread belief among Chileans including many opposed to him that he
basically democratic, mild socialist opposed to communism, record shows
he has collaborated with Communists for more than 15 years with no
apparent difficulty. We conclude shrewd Communist Secretary General Luis
Corvalan has based his party’s support for Allende on some sureness of expectation that serious
disagreements with Communists on Allende’s part will not arise. Probable that even should
Allende be tempted to turn on
Communist partners once in office he would be unable do so due perhaps
as much to patterns and associations he has established over years as to
any direct control by Communists.
If Allende should win the
Communists will be able rightfully to claim most of the credit and we
would assume they will press for due recognition in the form of
positions within Allende’s
government and will be granted them although socialists have told us and
have been saying for years that these would not be key posts such as
Interior or Defense. For Allende
would be difficult say no to his principal supporting force which only
one able effectively bring people into streets to support him should he
desire it. We would expect many of Communists in various important but
not top positions in ministries would come from those hundreds Chilean
technicians and professionals now in Cuba who can be expected return
immediately should Allende win.
We would expect effective Commie control of several ministries could be
achieved within few months after inauguration. We estimate bottom would
drop out already shaky economy with Allende victory and beset by problems he likely turn
naturally to Communists for support on more and more matters and in more
and more areas. We think also Chilean middle-class will be rather easily
intimidated by actual and threatened mob pressures which Communists can
provide. Commie control likely become de facto in gradual manner not
apparent most Chileans at least for many months.
Factors against takeover are first and most important armed forces
including Carabineros, secondly Congress and thirdly strong Chilean
democratic tradition which prevails in great majority presently
politically aware Chileans. Communists are well aware obstacle armed
forces present but they and Allende as well under existing system which calls for
retirement of all officers senior to an officer promoted head service
and promotion for all those below, at least have instrument which if
played well offers possibility keeping armed forces neutral on sidelines
political arena.
Among immediate effects Allende
victory may be virtual panic among many upper and upper-middle class
circles and certain paralization private investment. Our guess is
Allende would try restore
confidence by acting in reassuring manner fearing military and thinking
of congressional elections in March 1965, but he would quickly have to
take some nationalization step satisfy his supporters (most widely
popular and least likely cause him trouble here would be telephone
company). Should he gain control Congress through added socialist/
Communist seats and possibly agreement with radicals and/or left-wing
Christian Democrats he would press ahead more vigorously with his
program. We would expect Communists to favor “respectable” democratic
via pacifica course until such time as they have achieved control
political apparatus and at least have neutralized armed forces. We think
possible but not probable that should he win by very small plurality
over Frei and Congress hesitate
on naming him he will gamble on armed forces traditional
non-interventionist role and bring mobs into streets pressure Congress and if successful
might then continue with drastic measures in hope of gaining sufficient
control to handle likely reaction from democratic forces.
Negative economic impact will be very great immediately and probably over
short-term as well. Allende would
probably try expand activities and efforts existing GOC institutions which directly involved in
economy in effort compensate for lacks and lags in private sector. He
will undoubtedly seek help from bloc and “unaligned” countries but
conceivably might make unreasonable request of USG (e.g. low interest loan pay for expropriation copper
companies and utilities) expecting turn down which he could use as
ostensible justification Chilean public for turning [to] bloc. In
general economic deterioration after Allende victory would tend stimulate and be used justify
extreme internal measures toward full statist economic power as well as
shift to excessive Chilean dependence Communist bloc aid and trade.
Jova
252. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central
Intelligence McCone and the
Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
80–B01285A, DCI (McCone)
Files, Telephone Calls, 3/4/64–5/19/64. Eyes Only. No classification
marking. The text was prepared in the CIA from a tape recording.Washington, April 28, 1964, 11:35
a.m.
DCI: Good morning, Tom.
M: Good morning, how are you?
DCI: I’m fine, how are you?
M: Fine. You sound like you are in a well.
DCI: I’ve got Pat CarterMarshall Carter, Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence. here and we were talking
over Chile. I wanted him to hear what we were talking about, so if it is
agreeable with you, I’ll continue to use this loud speaker.
M: O.K. sure.
DCI: Now, every place I go I get alarming reports on the intense effort
of the Andes [?] backed probably by the Communists. I even got it from
3½ lines of source text not declassified] a
frightening story of the
intensification of the Socialist Communists. He claimed they had 300
sound trucks and 3500 personnel, of which 3400 are members of the
Communist Party, working on the Andes campaign at this time. I have no
doubt that this is exaggerated …
M: Nevertheless, John, it is very
serious. Are you familiar with the program we are working on?
DCI: Yes, I am thoroughly familiar with it.
M: Is there anything else we can do?
DCI: Yes there is. I do not think that your Embassy is set up to handle
this problem properly. In the first place, Cole, the Ambassador, is not there and won’t be there
until the end of June. Secondly, this is an area, my people tell me,
where he is lacking in experience and also lacking in courage. I think
you ought to take a very good look at that. He is coming out of an
academic life and this is something he doesn’t know anything about you
see. Second thing, your deputy chief of mission, fellow named Jova, I don’t get a very good report on
him either. I don’t know him.
M: What we planned to do with Cole, psychologically mainly, was to get him to try to go
back, fly down for 10 days in the middle of his vacation. He is a very
hard man to handle. He wants to quit, you know.In November 1963 Martin recommended that Rusk call the Ambassador; Jova had suggested that Cole might stay for the
presidential election if his arm were “properly twisted.” According
to Martin, this tactic was
successful. (Martin, Kennedy and Latin
America, p. 322) The Department, however, informed
Cole on February 5 that
the White House would announce his resignation in 2 days. (Telegram
425 to Santiago, February 5; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PER Cole, Charles W.) Two weeks later, President
Johnson asked Cole to remain in Santiago until September;
Cole agreed to do so.
(Telegram 682 from Santiago, February 19; ibid.)
DCI: Yes, I know. He had his resignation . . .
M: And we thought it would be a mistake to send a new man down just on
the eve of.
DCI: Yes, I think that is right, but I wondered whether you didn’t have
some political activist expert you could put down there on TDY.
M: Well, I think that is right. We’ll do that.
DCI: What we have done—I have taken J.C.
King and removed him of all responsibility. He is
generating a lot of ideas [1½ lines of source text not
declassified] and I am going to have the whole subject reviewed
at the Special Group on ThursdayApril
30. so that the White House and everybody will be in circuit
on it. I would appreciate it very much if you could go over, if you are
gong to be here Thursday, and sit in on it. Can you do that?
M: Yes, I can do that. I would like to. I have had the same idea that we
should really wire in the White House on that.
DCI: All right. Well, let’s do that on Thursday. I’ll get
Mac to put it on the calendar first thing and
that would set it at 3:30 Thursday afternoon.At its meeting on April 30 the Special Group
decided: “(a) that contact should be made with Ambassador Cole to urge his return for a visit
in the coming weeks, (b) that talks with American business interests
should proceed to determine the amount and method of their support,
and (c) it was further decided that higher authority would be
apprised of the closeness and importance of this Chilean election
and that the Group itself would continue to review the problem in
the coming weeks.” (Memorandum for the Record, May 1; National
Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Minutes, April 30, 1964)
According to notes of the meeting taken by
Hughes, “Mr. McCone said he had spoken twice to the Secretary
about it [Chile] on the phone within the past 24 hours.” Hughes also
noted that “Mr. Mann asked
how much money might be secured from American businessmen that
McCone had been in
contact with. McCone said
about a million dollars.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group
Files, April 30, 1964)
M: I’ll be there and in the meantime, is that the only thing that occurs
to you that we are not already doing?
DCI: Well, I think we have to get in closer touch with this business
group that name not declassified] heads and see
if they might.…
M: Well, we had a meeting on this the other day. J.C. was there. He can tell you all
about it. On what they can do, I asked the small group of people not to
tell me what they were going to do, but to tell J.C. Whatever had to be done to do it
through him.
DCI: He has an idea that they might move in on this beef problem which
you are familiar with, I guess.
M: I asked yesterday that somebody get [to] work on that. I was very
discouraged. Tom TaylorReference is
evidently to A. Thomas Taylor, president of International Packers,
Ltd. was talking about the beef thing which is important and
I was unconvinced they were really going to get enough beef there. I
asked the fellows yesterday to send a telegram out on this also, but
…
DCI: Out to where?
M: I am going to work on it today to see what we can do about the beef.
The trouble is that the passage to the Andes is going to be closed in
about two weeks. If we don’t get the cattle through on hoof then there
isn’t much storage facility there for frozen beef. We are going to have
to fly it in almost by shuttle. And then there is the problem of price,
of bringing the price down from the present level of 1750 pesos to 1350
pesos. That is a matter of money. But the first thing is to get the beef
there or to get a secure way of making sure it will be there.
DCI: Well, we can go into that.
M: We are going ahead with a rather large PL 480 program and that is on the price of food again, but
we are giving them all that they are asking for. The telegram we
sentTelegram 613 to Santiago, April 27.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol.
I, 1/64–8/64) was to ask them if this was really enough. We
didn’t want to treat this as a routine PL
480 type deal. We want to get enough food down there to bring prices
down. I think your idea is a good one. We’ll get the best guy we can
down there on TDY.
DCI: Yes, that is what I would do, if I were you. We will keep J.C. in and we will give him all the
support he needs.
M: Yes, I agree with that.
DCI: So that we will be . . . .
M: If you have any other concrete ideas, you’ll let us know?
DCI: I’ll get [name not declassified] on the
telephone. He has called me once or twice on this and I might even go up
and sit down and talk with him personally. I know him very well. I’ll
see if that can be arranged.
M: O.K. and if you get anything else concrete, let me know.
DCI: Will do.
M: I am worried about this. I think this is the biggest problem we have.
O.K. John. Thank you.
DCI: Goodbye.McCone later attached a note
entitled “Information on the Beef Requirements in Chile,” in which
he estimated that Chile would require “approximately 5,000 tons of
cattle on the hoof per month.”
253. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Chile, Vol. I, 1/64–8/64. Top Secret. Drafted by Dentzer.Washington, May 1, 1964.
SUBJECT
Presidential Election in Chile
This memorandum will inform you of the status of the presidential race
and indicate US Government activity concerning this important
election.Bundy forwarded this
memorandum to the President under a May 13 covering memorandum that
noted the importance of the upcoming Presidential election in Chile.
“In essence, the problem we face is that a very popular and
attractive candidate, named Allende, who has thrown in his lot with the
Communists, has more than a fighting chance to win. We have a
coordinated Government-wide program of action to strengthen his
opponent and support actions in Chile which will work to the
advantage of those now in power. It is a highly fluid situation and
one in which there may have to be further action as we get into the
summer. I have been very much encouraged by the determination and
unity which all Departments of the Government are showing on this
one, and we will be watching it very closely, but I do think you
ought to know about it yourself.” (Ibid., Memos to the President,
McGeorge Bundy, Vol.
IV)
Situation
On September 4, two months before our own elections, a critical
presidential election is scheduled in Chile. The two leading candidates
are Salvador Allende, an avowed
Marxist leader of a Communist-Socialist coalition, and Eduardo Frei. Frei heads the Christian Democratic Party, a somewhat
left of center reform party close to the Catholic Church. In the 1958
election Allende came within
32,000 votes of winning a plurality and becoming president.
At this point in the campaign, most observers rate Frei slightly ahead, but the race will
be extremely close and many things could happen in the four months
before the election. The democratic forces are presently split, with
Radical party candidate Julio
Duran back in the race after the results of a
congressional bi-election in March shattered his coalition of rightist
parties and indicated he stood almost no chance of being elected. Also
working against Frei is a Chilean
tolerance for native Communists, who have long been on the public scene,
and a long-standing anticlerical feeling which hurts the
Church-identified Christian Democrats.
Discussion of U.S. Action Program
Clearly, the September election will be determined by factors which are
deeply rooted in the political, economic, and social fabric of the
Chilean scene and by the campaign abilities of the major contenders.
Given the consequences, however, if this major Latin American nation
should become the first country in the hemisphere to freely choose an
avowed Marxist as its elected president, the Department, CIA, and other agencies have embarked on a
major campaign to prevent Allende’s election and to support Frei, the only candidate who has a
chance of beating him. Chief elements in this campaign are the
following: Providing covert assistance through secret CIA channels to Frei’s campaign chest and for
other anti-Allende
campaign uses. [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] has been approved by the Special Group
and earmarked for these purposes, and additional funds will be
sought as necessary.Providing AID loans in CY 64 amounting to approximately $70
million, principally in program budget loans to maintain the
level of the government investment budget, thereby keeping the
economy as a whole active and unemployment low. $60 million of
this aid has already been extended.On April 3 the United States and Chile signed an agreement
to provide $55 million in program loan assistance in CY 1964. For an account on how
the funds were utilized, see United States Senate, Committee
on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Foreign Aid
Expenditures, United States Foreign Aid in
Action: A Case Study, Washington, 1966, p.
31.Examining means to alleviate the rising cost of living through
efforts to increase the supply and lower the price of major
foods. We are making available $20 million of PL 480, almost half of which is
wheat. In addition, we are reviewing our on-going PL 480 Title III food distribution
program through voluntary organizations to expand it wherever
possible; the current FY 64
program costs $12.5 million and touches an estimated 2 million
people, 1/4 of Chile’s population.Assisting U.S. business groups with information and advice
through David
Rockefeller’s Business Group for Latin America—a blue
ribbon group of American companies in Latin America—in their
support of a Chilean business group helping Frei and attempting to hold
down prices.Organizing a political action and propaganda campaign through
CIA contacts in coordination
with or parallel to Frei’s campaign. This includes voter registration
drives, propaganda, person-to-person campaigning in the cities
and rural areas, and arrangements to provide some Italian
Christian Democratic organizers to Frei as advisers on campaign techniques.Encouraging the GOC and IMF to avoid rupturing their
standby stabilization agreement, a break which would have
damaging financial and psychological consequences. An IMF team presently is completing a
review in Chile, and a Chilean team sent by President Alessandri will arrive in
Washington on May 4 for discussions with the Department.Attempting discreetly through normal U.S. contacts with the
non-political Chilean military and police to encourage their
rising awareness of the subversion which would take place under
an Allende
government.Continuing USIA placement in
Chile of unattributed material, giving special care to low-keyed
efforts which do not expose U.S. Government involvement.Encouraging, through covert ties and private U.S.
organizations, effective anti-Allende efforts by Chilean organizations
including the Roman Catholic Church, trade union groups, and
other influential bodies, such as the anti-clerical
Masons.
We are attempting to insure that extraordinary caution is observed in
this action campaign to conceal official U.S. government interest, and
we have rejected several ideas which have seemed to entail undue risks
or excessive American involvement.
Personnel
I plan to strengthen our Embassy in Chile in the four months prior to the
election by adding to the present staff there next week a top-ranking
political officer with an excellent record on the Cuban desk, Robert Hurwitch.Hurwitch was given the rank
of first secretary in the Embassy’s political section. Although he
reported to Santiago in May, Hurwitch did not officially assume his position
until July 5.
I also plan to raise with Ambassador Cole, who recently arrived in the U.S. by ship on two
months’ leave from post, the desirability of interrupting his vacation
to return to Chile soon for a ten-day period. I am aware of the
background concerning his two months’ leave, but I am concerned about
possible reactions in Chile and the U.S. to so long an absence in
relation to this critical election.Later
that afternoon Mann told
Rusk that “he would like
to talk about Chile and a number of problems.” A meeting was set for
6 p.m. (Rusk to Mann, May 1, 12:14 p.m., National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls
4/20/64–5/22/64) According to Rusk’s Appointment Book Rusk met Mann
at 6:35 p.m. (Johnson Library) No substantive record of the
conversation has been found.
254. Telegram From the Deputy Chief of Mission in Chile (Jova) to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Chile,
1964–1967. Secret; Priority. Also addressed to Dentzer. The telegram was
forwarded through CIA
channels.Santiago, May 5, 1964.
76320. Please pass to Mann and
Dentzer from Jova.
Accompanied by RobinsonJohn P.
Robinson, AID mission director
in Santiago. I had a two-hour conversation May 4 with
Frei at latter’s home.
Also present was latter’s top political advisor, Juan de Dios
Carmona. At end of conversationDuring
the earlier discussion, Frei expressed “unusual optimism” concerning his
electoral prospects—although he “jokingly observed that his
selfish interests should lead him paint a bleaker picture to the
US authorities for obvious reasons.” (Telegram 999 from
Santiago, May 5; National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 CHILE) Jova urged Frei to reconsider his position on a
presidential election by congress should no candidate receive an
absolute majority of the vote; Frei had publicly accepted the tradition of
selecting the front-runner, even though the Chilean constitution
formally allowed a choice between the two leading candidates.
Jova reported that
“this is obviously a course which does not appeal to him
[Frei], but which he
might be prepared to follow if the margin by which he trailed
were small and providing the military as well as the congress
were cooperative.” (Telegram 1005 from Santiago, May 5;
ibid.)Frei asked to see me
alone.He started off this private conversation by expressing gravest
concern activities and indiscretion of [name not
declassified]. He said he had been horrified to hear that
on at least two occasions [name not
declassified] had spoken indiscriminately in regard to
USG aid to the Frei campaign. On one occasion
speaking to Salvador Pubill, PDC
campaign finance manager, [name not
declassified] told him he saw no emergency requirement in
collecting funds from industrialists for campaign in view of fact
that Frei was to receive one
million dollars in assistance from USG. On another occasion he told Antonio Baeza of
COPEC that the financial
resources of the business community should be kept in reserve for
the congressional elections in March as the Frei campaign was well supplied
with funds amounting to approximately one million dollars from
USG and private sources. On a
third occasion he said (it was not clear to whom) that on his recent
trip to the U.S. he had agreed arrange with [name
not declassified] and his group that the technique to
follow would be to feed funds raised by [name not
declassified] to Frei to help him win campaign but with ultimate
intention of using this as a noose with which to control him once he
were elected president.Frei said that he has only
seen [name not declassified] three times in
his life and on only one occasion, at a recent tea at his house, had
serious campaign matters been discussed. He was concerned however at
[name not declassified] thrashing around
in a variety of political fields in which he was unfamiliar and in
which he seemed to be enjoying “playing cops and robbers”. He told
me that he had impression [name not
declassified] respected and paid attention to me and hoped
that I would convey to him the message to be discreet. Statements
such as those he had made above might already have done great damage
to his campaign and moreover they were in large part untrue. He
hoped that all concerned would be extremely careful on any loose
talk on any matters connected with financial assistance. Much of
this in any case was still undecided upon but any linking of him to
USG or U.S. private sector
financial assistance was fatal.(FitzGerald and Gomez felt that their own
conversation with [name not declassified]
seems bear out some of above allegations. Hence we decided
BeltonWilliam Belton, then
political advisor to the Commander in Chief, Southern Command,
had been counselor at the Embassy in Santiago, 1956-1958.
in view his close friendship might be best person admonish [name not declassified] and we asked him to do
so prior his departure last night’s plane.)As will be reported in separate telegramTelegram 1000 from Santiago, May 5. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 14 CHILE) On April
5 Durán reentered the
race as the candidate of the Radical Party.Frei said he thought that
Duran should be kept in
the race at any price. Although some members of his party disagreed
with him he said he still was of firm opinion that a withdrawal by
Duran might have as its
consequence the endorsement of Allende by Radical Party or instances of individual
Radical senators and deputies proclaiming Allende individually. Such actions
would then enhance Allende’s
stature as “democratic”, respectable candidate and would serve
increase his independent votes.He spoke with considerable cordiality in regard to Duran and expressed hope that some
way might be found help him financially. While such support might be
obtained from Radical bankers and business men, he doubted that
enough would be forthcoming and felt that serious consideration
should be given subsidizing him either from PDC campaign funds or from other (presumably USG) sources. He said subsidy required
would add up to some escudos 450,000. From this campaign chest
Radical deputies would in turn be subsidized at rote escudos 4,000
apiece. He said some “dignified” manner to channel this subsidy
would have to be found, that it should not in any way be through
PDC officials but might
preferably be handled through some pro-Radical banker or business
man.Frei said he would call on
Duran personally in next
few days in order try salve his feelings which have been hurt by
other PDC activities and church
attitudes. He would speak to [name not
declassified] on latter and asked me to do same. (I intend
to do this by merely reporting to [name not
declassified] without comment some of Duran’s complaints.)Mann replied on May 18:
“We informed [name not declassified] of
[name not declassified] indiscretions
and told him effort being made put gag on [name not declassified]. We have no reason to believe
American business community will make contributions to
campaign.” (Mann to
Jova, undated;
Department of State, INR/IL
Historical Files, ARA Country
Files, Chile, 1964–1967)
255. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Coordination for
Intelligence and Research (Carter) to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (Hughes)Source: Department of State, INR/IL
Historical Files, ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965. Secret.
Also addressed to Denney and
Evans. Forwarded through
Scott.Washington, May 7, 1964.
SUBJECT
ARA–Agency Meeting of May 6,
1964
PARTICIPANTS
ARA—Mr. Mann, Mr. Adams, Mr. Pryce, Mr. Dentzer; Agency—Col.
King, [name not declassified];
INR/DDC—Mr. Carter
Chile
Tom Mann referred to the attached
communicationDocument 254. from our Chargé in
Santiago indicating that [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] has been making indiscreet remarks about
U.S. Government aid for Chile.
Mann said the people on the ground are apparently right, that we must
have a low noise level.
[name not declassified] said he had always thought
[name not declassified] “indiscreet”, and
added that what he didn’t like was [name not
declassified] trying to bleed us and not pay himself. (See
attachment #2.)Not attached.
King said we should decide
whether we will give money to the [name not
declassified] group. Mann interjected that [name not
declassified] was a blabbermouth. King agreed, but pointed out the influence [name not declassified] has [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Mann wanted to know how much money was
involved and King thought
roughly $300,000 from the private sector.
Mann said there was some question now of whether the private sector
should give any support. He said he would see [name
not declassified] the next day and that we owed it to him to
tell him [name not declassified] is talking.
Mann’s inclination is to back
away right now in view of what [name not
declassified] has said. Mann then asked, “do you agree I advise him to lay
off”?
The consensus of those present was in the affirmative.
[name not declassified] said the post had
recommended [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] for [name not
declassified], but that he himself thought [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] would be
better.
King explained that the money
could be passed in such a way that “[name not
declassified] will know he is under obligation but will be
unable to prove it.”
Mann said he just wanted to be sure [name not
declassified] stayed in the race. King and Dentzer
wanted to lay on some conditions beyond just staying in the race, which
they said [name not declassified] would do
anyway.
Mann summed up by saying we had
agreed on three things: “1) We have decided to give [name not
declassified] money.“2) I will advise [name not
declassified] to stay out and“3) on Frei, go all
out—give him whatever he needs.”
King wanted to know if he could
give [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] now. He thought this need not go to the Special
Group. Mann agreed provided the
Agency had the leeway to give it. But he said King should meantime look at the
effect this has on the Frei
position.
Mann remarked that Chargé
Jova’s reporting had become
sharper in the past few days. He said he was getting more respect for
Jova.
Mann also told J.C. King to check in with Jova when King returns to Chile. King, a bit unhappily, replied “if that’s the way you
want it.”
Subsequent to the meeting Pryce
informed King, [name not declassified] and me that Hurwitch will go to Chile immediately,
but that Belton will not go at present, though he may go a month or so
before the elections. Belton has just been in Chile in connection with
his POLAD work at CINCSOUTH and this
gave Jova a chance to consult
with him.
256. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central
Intelligence McCone and the
Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source:
Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI’s Telephone
Calls, 3/4/64–5/19/64. No classification marking. The text was
prepared in the CIA from a tape
recording.Washington, May 7, 1964, 11:45 a.m.
B: Yes, John, how are you.
DCI: Fine. Say, I have had J.C.
King in New York on this Chilean problem and there was a
plan worked out in a meeting with [name not
declassified] and GeneenReference
is to Harold S. Geneen, president of the International Telegraph and
Telephone Company. of the IT&T [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified] on how to handle
this meat and food problem, inflation problem over the next 4 months.
Now it can be handled through PL 480,
AID, but it is going to require
prompt and decisive action. I am calling you to have you jot it down on
your pad to see that it doesn’t get bogged down in the machinery of
AIDPL 480 and Alliance for Progress and all
the rest.
B: I talked with Orville Freeman
yesterday in the context of the beef problem and there is a way to kill
a couple of birds with one stone. If we could get a lot of beef down
there right now it would help relieve the (blot) here where the
President is trying to find every possible way to buy beef. In the
meantime, it is something they very much want.
DCI: Yes. Of course that involves quite a cost problem. The beef can be
gotten in the Argentine and transported . . . .
B: Yes, but at the moment the President would be willing to go far out on
using domestic beef for that.
DCI: Well, I talked to the President about it and I told him that was a
possibility, if he wants to take the lumps on the cost, then it is
perfectly all right. It means quite a subsidy and there may be some way
to do that. That might be a sure way to get prompt action.
B: Well, that’s the point. Now, the trouble is, all of this stuff isn’t
available. I mean, apparently there is some mottling on processing.
DCI: Well, I don’t know . . . .
B: (. . . .) promised to look into it and he is supposed to call me this
morning. Let me needle him on this whole thing.
DCI: They need 2700 tons of processed beef a month for the next 4 months.
This is my own mathematics. Don’t hold me to that figure. It may be up
higher than that.
B: Well, they did make a contract with Uruguay, I think, or Argentina, I
don’t know, for part of it.
DCI: Well, now, unfortunately, I am going to be away for a couple of
days, but I have got J.C. King
on this Chile problem on a full-time basis. Now in addition to this, we
have gotten the interested banking and industrial companies to come in
and support political actions to the tune of million or million and
one-half dollars and we will have to up our own ante in this thing, but
the point I want to make is that this requires prompt action and this is
one situation where we have to win the game. Tom is out of town. I don’t know where he is. Tom Mann. But just keep this on the
front burner and if there are any problems of procedure or approvals due
to your machinery, why maybe we can use some of our machinery on a
contingency basis, you see. In order to get immediate action.
B: I’ll get a hold of Orville and
Dave Bell and we will crank
the thing right up.In a May 8 memorandum to
Bundy, Chase noted the importance of the
PL–480 program in Chile, and
urged the Department to “move fast on these programs and to let us
know if there is any way we can help.” Bundy approved. (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, 1/64–8/64) The United States and
Chile signed a PL–480 agreement on
June 30, which included a one-time provision to support beef imports
(up to 3,000 metric tons for 1964), and doubled the previous amount
of financial assistance allotted under Title IV for the export of
agricultural commodities to Chile, i.e., from $21 to $42 million.
(15 UST 1428)
DCI: O.K. and I will be back here SundayMay
10. or Monday and we’ll talk about it. Good, fine,
goodbye.
257. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group
Files, c. 120, May 14, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Jessup. Copies were sent to
Johnson, Vance, and McCone. The meeting was held at noon in the White
House Situation Room. (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, U. Alexis Johnson
Files: Lot 90 D 408, Date Books, 1964) No CIA action papers were prepared for the meeting.
(Memorandum from Joseph W.
Scott to U. Alexis
Johnson, May 11; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group
Files, May 14, 1964)Washington, May 12, 1964.
SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group, 12 May 1964
PRESENT
Mr. Bundy, Mr.
Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McConeAlso present were Under Secretary Thomas C. Mann, Colonel
J.C. King, and Mr. Desmond FitzGerald
1. Chile
Mr. McCone referred to
several meetings he had had in recent days with American
industrialists with major interest in the Chilean economy. In one
instance, David Rockefeller
headed a group representing various companies. In another, he stated
that he had been visited by Clyde E. Weed, Chairman of the Board,
and Charles M. Brinckerhoff, President of Anaconda Copper Company.
He had also received a visit from the Chilean copper magnate,
Augustin Edwards. All were concerned with the closeness of the
coming election, the amount of backing being funneled to Allende by outside interests, and
the need to bolster candidate Frei with funds. Mr.
FitzGerald, recently returned from Santiago,
and Colonel J.C. King had
also been in contact with business interests.Mr. Mann had recently been
in New York, he said, and he, too, had talked to some of these
businessmen. He felt that there was already too much open talk in
these circles which was filtering back to Chile. Even Frei had pointed out that
publicized large-scale U.S. business support for his candidacy would
be a kiss of death. On the basis of the risks and the apparent lack
of security, he felt the U.S. “private sector” should not engage in
political action in this Chilean election.The concept of American commercial firms passing financial aid
surreptiously to the U.S. government raised so many questions of
ethics, financial and interrelationships that Mr. McCone said he felt the matter
should be discussed in the Group. A lengthy exchange of views
ensued, but the conclusion was that the legal aspects were too labyrinthine and the
questions of tax benefits, conflicts of interest and corporation
behavior were too murky to make any clear determinations. The risks
of acting as an agent, in effect, of U.S. capital and the lack of
assurance on security before, during, and after the election led to
the agreement that McCone
would convey to Mr. Weed the U.S. decision not to become a partner
with business interests in covert political action but at the same
time to assure him that the U.S. was making every effort, on a
priority basis, to prevent the election of Allende.President Johnson evidently approved this decision. At the
weekly meeting between ARA and
CIA representatives on May
21, FitzGerald referred to the President’s
“desire that U.S. private business not become involved in the
Chilean election.” Mann,
alluding to Johnson’s views on the subject,
agreed to FitzGerald’s proposal to meet
Augustín Edwards in New York on the condition that the CIA bear “in mind the President’s
admonition.” (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, May 26; ibid.,
ARA–CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965) No further evidence
has been found on the substance or circumstances of this
“admonition.”It was determined that Mr. FitzGerald would
then come up with specific proposals for a large-scale covert
political action program in support of Frei at an approximate cost of $2,000,000. It was
anticipated that this paper would be ready for submission to the
Special Group later this week.The
outcome of the Special Group meeting was discussed on May 13 at
the weekly meeting between ARA
and CIA representatives.
FitzGerald reported that earlier “he
had almost been thrown out of McCone’s office” for characterizing the Special
Group discussion on May 12 as “good.”
FitzGerald concluded, however, that
“the amount of private sector money involved was ‘too small’ and
the proposal ‘too risky’.” Mann agreed with this assessment, adding that
“it is now up to us to come up with a meaningful USG program to defeat Allende.”
FitzGerald explained that the CIA had prepared a proposal to the
Special Group “for an additional $1,250,000 for use in the
Chilean election.” “Mann
commented that that was very well as far as it went, but that we
shouldn’t tie ourselves to that amount.
FitzGerald said this was no problem,
since we could get more if needed.” (Memorandum from Carter to
Hughes, May 14; ibid.)
[Omitted here is discussion of Haiti.]
Peter Jessup
258. Editorial Note
On May 14, 1964, the Special Group considered a proposal to increase the
funds available for covert use in the Chilean presidential elections. In
a May 13 memorandum for the Special Group the Central Intelligence
Agency maintained that “recent political developments and additional
information” indicated that an additional $1,250,000 was needed for the
program to defeat Salvador Allende
Gossens, the
candidate of the Popular Action Front (FRAP). The proposal was designed primarily to increase
financial support to Eduardo Frei
Montalva, the Christian Democratic candidate, thereby
allowing his party to “campaign at its full potential.” The CIA also argued, however, that its
assistance was “instrumental” in maintaining the Radical candidate,
Julio Durán Neumann, who had
recently avoided an attempt within his party to endorse Allende. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group
Files, May 14, 1964) The Special Group approved the proposal at its
meeting on May 14, including a “tentative breakdown” for the additional
funds. (Memorandum from the CIA, May 13;
ibid.) According to the minutes of the meeting, the Special Group, while
agreeing to the “overall amount” of the program, endorsed “the principle
of financial flexibility,” a principle which was explained as follows:
“if, as the campaign develops, one segment needs additional support and
another less, authority exists to shift the subsidy in the needed
direction.” Bundy informed the
participants that “higher authority was aware of the seriousness of this
election.” (Memorandum for the Record, May 14; ibid., May 21, 1964)
259. Letter From the First Secretary of the Embassy in CHILE
(Hurwitch) to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Washington National Records
Center, RG 84, Santiago Embassy Files: FRC 69 A 6507, 1964, POL 14 Elections (Presidential) 1964
(2). Secret; Official–Informal.Santiago, June 19, 1964.
Dear Mac:
I have had very much in mind your request for another opinion as to
whether an Allende victory would
be seriously detrimental to US national security interests. While a
month in Chile hardly constitutes a valid basis in time for a definitive
response, I am moved to write now before I become too deeply immersed in
political detail, knowing that should the scene alter significantly I
might write again.
I think that what is fundamentally happening in Chile is that political
power has slipped from the hands of the upper classes and both the
middle class (PDC) and the working
class—or its spokesmen—(the FRAP) are
making a determined bid to possess it. Traditionally, the middle class
has looked upward and has been politically allied with the upper class. The comparatively recent
emergence of the Christian Democratic party as an important political
force, however, has brought a change. The PDC stems from and has in turn rallied to it the Chilean
middle class, an agglomeration ranging in socio-economic terms from
lower to upper middle class and in political terms from leftish to
conservative orientations, and has attracted significant segments of the
working class, as well. The upper class parties (Liberals and
Conservatives) have in turn, somewhat reluctantly, come out in support
of Frei, the candidate, but most
find the PDC program too radical. The
Socialists and Communists (now FRAP)
have for decades struggled unsuccessfully to wrest political power from
the upper classes through peaceful means via the ballot. Had not the
PDC with its strong candidate
attracted timely support, I think the FRAP with its good candidate would this time have had its
best chance for victory to date. Whichever party wins, I believe, will
effect social changes (diminishing the influence of the propertied
classes) from which Chile probably will not be able to turn back. While
under-estimating the resiliency of the upper classes would be foolhardy
(they seem to have succeeded nicely in corrupting the Radicals), the
ideology and spirit of the PDC seems to
involve something deeper than mere political competition. The FRAP in power would recognize the upper
classes only to the extent its purpose was served.
The Catholic Church has entered this game with a fair-sized stack of
chips. The liberal wing of the Church, which is dominant here and ably
represented by Cardinal Silva, is deeply attached to the Frei campaign and should derive
considerable prestige and impetus from a Frei victory, within Church circles especially.
Repercussions of a PDC victory in both
Latin American political and Church circles should redound to our
benefit. Conversely, an Allende
victory in Chile would have discouraging effects throughout the
Hemisphere.
On the other side, Radio Habana has been clamoring for an Allende victory. After his reverses in
Venezuela and Brazil, Fidel must
be desperate to demonstrate to his Soviet patrons through an Allende victory that they are indeed
backing the right horse. The FRAP
campaign appears well-financed and that Fidel among other outsiders has purchased a stack of
chips would not be surprising. For the Soviets, an Allende victory should significantly
strengthen their “peaceful coexistence” line to the discomfiture of the
Chicoms, and encourage the USSR to
allocate more resources elsewhere in LA
to propagate similar victories. A Chilean base on the mainland would of
course be very valuable to the USSR
(cf. the long frontier with Argentina).
A Frei victory, on the other hand,
could lead to greater adherence by Latin American left extremists to the
Chicom line of violence. While in
many senses a “violence” line might be easier for us to handle in Latin America, it may not be
amiss for our policy planners to take a look now at the implications for
US policy toward the Hemisphere of a Frei victory as it relates to the Soviet/Chinese
split.
To move from the broader dimensions of the significance of the Chilean
elections, from which I really do not think the local situation can or
should be divorced, assessments of the FRAP and Mr. Allende
are of course critical. Ernst Halperin had done the best recent study of
the Communists and Socialists in Chile that I have read (it is entitled
Sino-Cuban Trends: The Case of
Chile—Tom Hughes’ people
have it). One gains the impression in Chile that the Socialists are more
intellectually inclined and not as tough-minded or as well organized as
the Communists who constitute the dominant element in the FRAP. They are, incredibly enough, often
more left than the local Communist Party, are less addicted to the via
pacifica and are rather admiring of China.
Allende is a good vote getter,
but does not seem to be a man of outstanding ability, courage or
intelligence. Although many here maintain that once in power Allende would control or break with the
Communists, the evidence is that he has made strong public and private
commitments to them (nationalization of the copper mines, Cabinet
membership, etc.) and has a long history of unmarred relations with them
(dating from 1951). Given the stakes, it is really difficult to see how
the outside as well as the local Communists would readily surrender
their considerable financial and other investments in an Allende victory. Nor would Allende, given a thin margin of victory
at best together with his personal qualities, be likely to be an
independent— a la Castro. He
might adorn his administration with as many respectable trappings as
possible—pacts with the Radicals, and, less likely but still possible,
with the left wing of the PDC. Beneath
the dress, however, the heart of the matter should I think be regarded
as heavily Communist-influenced, unless there were an accompanying open
break with the Communists or similar clear evidence that Allende had chosen a course not hostile
to us. I should be inclined to view ambivalence on his part negatively,
for little in his past appears to warrant giving him the benefit of a
doubt in view of his Communist alliance.
An Allende victory would
constitute a defeat for US policy. It probably would be accompanied by
alarms from the U.S. press and business interests, inevitably justified
by Castro crowing and Soviet
needling of the Chinese. As a practical matter, whatever our assessment
of the significance of an Allende
victory, we may find our maneuverability the day after the election
(results are known rapidly here) severely circumscribed. (I have often
thought that the real tragedy for us of Castro’s having embraced the
Marxist, rather than our, world lay in the limitations now placed upon
the flexibility of US policy toward situations which superficially
resemble that of Cuba.) Another “Castro” in the Hemisphere,
particularly one who achieved power through the democratic process in a
country where we have invested the highest rate of per capita
assistance, would be awfully tough to handle from both the international
and domestic standpoints. This would clearly be a case where one and one
totalled much more than two and the consequences throughout the
Hemisphere of a second Castro
would be serious. I would hope that we would, nevertheless, be able to
avoid precipitate action and to retain enough flexibility to encompass
the possibility that Allende
unexpectedly might decide to steer his course in our direction either
voluntarily or as a result of our margin of influence. The risks of a
policy on our part which appears to accept Allende, however, could I think only be justified by
expectations based on something much more concrete than a general notion
that good-will on our part will engender a similar response.
You may imagine how pleased I am to be here and to have the opportunity
to chew on this problem with very competent colleagues. I hope the
foregoing has not needlessly taken too much time out of your busy
day.
With warm regards.
Sincerely,
Robert A. HurwitchPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
260. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 Chile. Confidential; Priority.
Repeated to CINCSO and CINCLANT for POLADs.Santiago, July 2, 1964, 11:00 a.m.
10. I saw President Alessandri for
about one hour today accompanied by Jova. President said that while new $15 million credit
helpful, he disappointed in that he expected $30 million along with a
rise in copper prices. I reminded him that he could add the PL–480 proceeds to his $15 million but he
maintained that little of this would arrive before election date and much not until
after his mandate finished. Hence, he foresees deficit of as much as $45
million.
He said he profoundly disturbed by short-sighted political stance we seem
to be taking in that he understands USG
only concerned with period through September 5 with the implication
being that an Allende victory
might see shutting off of aid. He said that while he believes Frei will win we should not discount
possibility of Allende victory
and urged that we take longer, broader view of matter. Should Allende win, Alessandri would have two months during
which to educate Allende and to
“channel him into less poisonous paths.” He did not think that Allende himself wanted “extreme
solutions” and would do his utmost to hold down the Communists. In
answer to my question, said he did not believe Allende is true Marxist but merely an
opportunist whose campaign was considerably less violent than that of
Gonzalez-Videla. When I expressed concern at Allende’s links with Communists in today’s
circumstances, Alessandri
observed that in many ways Communists easier deal with than Socialists
and that his real fear was of Ampuero whom he considered real extremist.
In any case, should Allende win,
he hoped USG position would be one of
reserved watchful waiting and readiness to move rapidly and with
flexibility.
He maintained that if we closed all doors on Allende, we would push him further left and on path
similar to Cuba. He compared cases of Cuba and Bolivia maintaining that
latter had been saved by US flexibility but recognized that this
flexibility easier for US due to minimum US investment as compared to
Cuba and (Chile) he speculated whether Cuba might not have taken
different route if US had been more prudent and then urged prudence in
regard Chile even if Allende
won.
In view of above, he felt it particularly necessary that during his last
two months in office, Chile have an easier economic situation in order
give Alessandri some room for
economic maneuver during time when he will be “educating” the next
president. Regardless of who wins, he said it would be necessary bring
him down to earth after stratospheric euphoria of campaign and its many
promises. If either candidate were to attempt to fulfill promises, would
soon ruin Chile and would be thrown out in a short time. In many ways,
he said Frei’s lot will be more
difficult than Allende’s as he
will be under greater pressure fulfill his promises.
In any case, regardless which is victor, Alessandri felt he himself would have important role to
play during two month interim period and felt if he given the necessary
assistance, his influence on next president might be decisive.
I told him that I would report his views to Washington and was certain
that his opinion as to next administration would be useful. As regards
his request for more aid, told him could make no commitment and while I would report his
views to Department, still hopeful he would find that PL–480 would arrive soon enough to do the
trick in conjunction with $15 million credit. The president said he
wished he could believe this but is certain he would need more
money.
Comment: I believe Alessandri’s views important but think it by no means
certain that Allende will be
willing to work with Alessandri
and be “educated” during interim period.
I see no immediate need give active consideration Alessandri request for additional $15
million. But it may become clear that further US aid required after
IMF review Chilean situation
scheduled later this month or, more likely, after September election. In
either case, we should be prepared move fast if necessary.The Chilean Ambassador to the United States, Sergio
Gutiérrez-Olívos, reiterated much of Alessandri’s argument in a meeting with Mann on July 6. According to a
memorandum of the conversation, “Mann said that while he was not as optimistic as
President Alessandri
regarding Allende’s
susceptibility to influence, the Department intends to be realistic
and flexible if Allende
wins.” (Ibid., AID(US) Chile ) In
telegram 25 to Santiago, July 8, the Department reported that
Alessandri should now
feel reassured that the United States would not “cut his
Administration adrift in final 60 days in event Allende wins.” The Department,
however, did not wish to negotiate the terms for additional economic
assistance until September, “when our response can take into
consideration Frei’s views
and/or situation then prevailing as well as incumbent GOC position.” (Ibid., AID(US) 9 Chile )
Cole
261. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Chile, Vol. I, Memos 1/64–8/64. Secret.Washington, July 8, 1964.
SUBJECT
Survey Poll on Chilean Presidential Candidates
You are right: [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] a poll in April and May of the three candidates
for President in the Chilean
election.Mann reported the results of
the poll in a telephone conversation with the President on June 11;
see Document 16. The poll showed
that Frei (Christian Democrat)
would receive 52% of the vote: Allende (Socialist-Communist) 36%; Duran (Radical) 7% and 5% undecided.
[less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] a poll in March before a by-election in which the
Radicals lost badly. In that poll, Frei was also ahead. The second poll showed Duran lost badly and that Frei picked up slightly more of the
voters who switched from Duran
than did Allende.
The poll was taken by an experienced [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified] firm which had previously
conducted polls in Chile. Nevertheless, the poll was a small sample—only
2000. State regards it only as an indicator of how the situation lined
up in May and not what it might be now or how it might end up on
September 4.
Chilean President Alessandri
thinks Frei is ahead but he also
went to great lengths in a recent conversation with our Ambassador to
urge that the United States keep an open mind on Allende and not cut off financial
assistance should Allende
win.See Document
260.
The Chilean President race is a hard one. The Christian Democrats are
coming from behind. They now have a good organization but they have to
guard against over-confidence and fight all the way to the finish line
if they hope to win.
[1 paragraph (2 lines of source text) not
declassified]
McG. B.Printed from a copy that
bears these typed initials.
262. Editorial Note
On July 23, 1964, the 303 Committee considered a proposal to provide
“supplementary support for the Chilean presidential elections.” In a
July 21 memorandum to the 303 Committee the Central Intelligence Agency
reported that an additional $500,000 was needed for the program to
defeat Salvador Allende Gossens,
the candidate of the Popular Action Front (FRAP). The money would permit Eduardo Frei Montalva, the Christian Democratic
candidate, to “maintain the pace and rhythm of his campaign effort”—and
allow the CIA to meet any “last minute
contingencies.” The CIA explained that
Frei had miscalculated his
finances, an error “attributable to the PDC’s inexperience in organizing a campaign of this magnitude.”
(National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Chile
thru 1969) In a July 23 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Peter
Jessup recommended the proposal as follows: “We can’t
afford to lose this one, so I don’t think there should be any economy
shaving in this instance. We assume the Commies are pouring in dough; we
have no proofs. They must assume we are pouring in dough; they have no
proofs. Let’s pour it on and in.” (Ibid.) The 303 Committee approved the
proposal for supplementary support at its meeting on July 23.
(Memorandum for the Record from Jessup, July 24; ibid., Minutes, July 23, 1964)
263. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 Chile. Confidential. Repeated to
CINCSO and CINCLANT for POLADs.Santiago, July 29, 1964, 6:00 p.m.
167. Ref: Embtel 158.Telegram 158 from Santiago, July 29, reported on
the circumstances that led to the meeting among Frei, Jova, and Stevenson. The Embassy also explained that the
meeting was “the first time we had spoken with Frei for almost two months as due
to FRAP attacks on Embassy and
attempts link Embassy and PDC had
thought it best maintain discreet distance.” (Ibid.) Subj:
Frei’s Views on US Role in
Final Days of Campaign.
Frei said he thought that the US
and the Embassy in particular should continue to act with prudence and
discretion in regard to his campaign. The last weeks of the campaign
will be particularly bitter and great care should be exercised not to
permit an extraneous matter to arise and possibly play a disruptive and
possibly decisive role on the course of the campaign. He thought our own
activities had been well handled in this regard and implied that he saw
no reason why discreet contacts between Embassy and selected PDC leaders should not continue to be
maintained.
When discussing financial resources he observed that PDC was adequately supplied and in any case
it was desirable that the Chilean people themselves be made to feel an
obligation to contribute and thus feel selves as personally involved in
campaign. He hoped we could assist him, however, through furnishing
information on FRAP activities. He hoped that in
our conversations with our liberal and conservative contacts we would
stress to them the need to maintain the “national and popular character
of the campaign” and that the face of the right not be shown too much.
With our Radical friends he hoped we would urge them to keep Duran in the race.
He made the interesting observation that he felt that among the reasons
that it was necessary for him to win by a really large majority was the
reassuring effect that this would have on potential private investment
from abroad. A win by a mere plurality or by a very narrow majority
would keep alive the suspicion in the United States and Europe that
communism was still just around the corner in Chile and this would
discourage the massive investments that he felt Chile needed.
We told him that Ambassador very specially hoped he and his cohorts would
keep in mind fact that US was also engaged in political campaign and
that ill-considered statements or actions in Chile could also create
complications there. “Understanding attitudes” were a two way street.
Frei said he very much aware
of this problem and sympathized with attitude of parts of American
public which complained of lack of support and understanding for US
policies in spite of extensive and long continuing assistance programs.
A balance had to be struck between local and international
considerations and this was often difficult.
Cole
264. Memorandum From Robert M.
Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, Memos, 1/64–8/64.
Secret.Washington, July 31, 1964.
SUBJECT
Chilean Contingency Planning
The LAPC has held two meetings on a
contingency plan for Chile. Although the first draft, and the revised
draft which the LAPC considered July
30, cover contingencies should Frei win (a) handily or (b)by a slim margin, all of the discussion has
centered on the contingency of an Allende victory.The Latin
American Policy Committee first met on July 9 to consider a draft of
the contingency plan for Chile. The May 28 draft was forwarded on
June 5 as an enclosure to airgram A–926 from Santiago. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
POL 1–1 Chile ) The action
minutes of the July 9 meeting are in the Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. II, Memos
6/64–8/64. The revised draft and the minutes of the LAPC meeting on July 30 have not been
found.
As you are aware, the polls and recent reports indicate Frei is ahead. Frei himself is now plotting his
strategy on winning big instead of just winning.
The consensus on contingency plans is shaping up as follows, based on
current intelligence: The revised draft of July 30 is too wordy (it runs to 31
double-spaced pages), attempts to cover too much ground, and
proposes courses based on inadequate intelligence. It should be
tightened up and shortened.We should proceed on the assumption that Allende is bad medicine, but we
should not slam the door because he might double-cross his
Communist friends. President Alessandri, Felipe
Herrera, and others, insist we can work with
Allende.The most likely possibility, should Allende win, is that he would
try to establish a broadly based government, play for time to
consolidate himself, and try to get the U.S. to finance his
administration. We should, therefore, move promptly, but without
provocation, to get him to define his position. We should do
nothing that would let rumors start that we support him.
(Current intelligence is that the Communist Central Committee is
telling its people they cannot expect any important posts in an
Allende Government at
first.)If Allende wins a bare
majority, the key to keeping him out peacefully is Radical
support for Frei in the
Congress. The Chilean Congress has a tradition of confirming the
candidate with the highest popular vote, but we could push for a
Frei approval on the
theory that the Chilean people gave a majority vote to policies
espoused by Frei and
Duran, and a minority
to Communist-Socialist policies.The Soviets will probably offer substantial financial
assistance to Allende if
we refuse, and may be even if we do not. But they would be
inheriting an economy which is in serious difficulty as opposed
to Cuba, where it was basically strong. In the Soviet-Chinese
fight, Chile is extremely important to the Soviet thesis that
communism can achieve power by peaceful means.We would have an extremely difficult time marshalling forces
against letting a victorious Allende take office, or doing anything about
getting him out. Chilean tradition is to let the victor take
office. If the reluctance of Latin Americans on Cuba is any
criterion, the Latins would not go along with a move against
Allende. There would
probably be a serious division of opinion in the U.S.The armed forces in Chile are anti-Communist. It is possible
that they might move as the Peruvian military did to keep out
Haya de la Torre, but the odds are they would not. They would
more likely play it as the armed forces did in Brazil, but
divisions among the Chilean armed forces are less likely.
DOD is reviewing its supply situation in
the Canal Zone, should additional riot control supplies be needed in a
hurry. It is also identifying the location of additional supplies in the
U.S., should these be needed. Riot control supplies already approved,
are in place in Chile, and the feeling is that these are adequate for
the foreseeable future, i.e., the next month or two.
State is having another try at a contingency paper and the LAPC will review it at an early
meeting.No evidence has been found that
the LAPC met to discuss a
subsequent draft of the contingency paper for Chile.
RMS
265. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. VI. No classification marking. Copy to
Reedy.Washington, August 13, 1964.
This is merely an extra note of insurance, but you may want to know that
we have been asked by our friends in Santiago not to make any public
recognition of Chile ‘s break with Cuba.Although it had recently voted against such action at the 9th
Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Chile suspended diplomatic relations
with Cuba on August 11. In response to this request, we are
making no public statement at all, and when pressed by reporters we will say simply “This is a
decision taken by a democratic government in the light of its own
assessment of its international obligations, and that is all we need to
say about it.”
If we look as if we are interfering in any way, it will be bad for our
friend Frei and good for the
Communist-supported Allende.
The election prognosis continues favorable at the moment.A handwritten notation at the end of the memorandum
reads: “O.K. L”.
McG. B.
266. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs (Barall) to the Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA Files: Lot 66 D 65, Chile
1964. Confidential. Copies were sent to Adams, Rogers, and Dentzer.Washington, August 20, 1964.
SUBJECT
U.S. Identification with Frei in the Chilean Election
At your staff meeting, today, and in all conversations regarding the
forthcoming election in Chile, both Chileans and Americans
unquestioningly accept U.S. support of Frei. While the alternative of Allende is a horrible one, it is safe
to predict that we will have many severe problems even with Frei, and that Chile’s problems will
not be solved automatically by the election results—at least this is
what my Chilean friends tell me, and all support Chile.
Since we are identified as such ardent supporters, Frei is likely to ask for enormous sums
of money on political rather than economic-development grounds. He is
almost certain to urge us to finance some doctrinaire programs which
will be unacceptable to the U.S.
Frei is not likely to have the
political strength to cope with inflation and mount an effective
stabilization program. Even if he obtains a majority of the popular
vote, it is hard to believe that he will be able to coalesce a majority
in the Congress, particularly since he cannot be sure of internal
discipline on the part of the left wing in his own party. For the same reason, and in
the light of his promises to workers and peasants, I don’t see how he
can tackle the problems of wage stabilization effectively.
Although I am sure we cannot change our over-identification with
Frei before the election, I
would recommend a much cooler, factual, “show-me” attitude as soon as
the election results are known, so that he doesn’t take for granted U.S.
support for his programs on the theory that we consider him to be the
only alternative to a Communist takeover. I am not suggesting that we
should not be willing to provide massive aid to CHILE if the conditions
are right. But if we provide big sums without real assurance of
permanent change for the better, the net result may be permanent change
for the worse—and we’ll get Allende next time around.
267. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Security Council, 303 Committee
Files, Minutes, August 20, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by
Jessup. Copies were sent
to Thompson, Vance, and McCone.Washington, August 21, 1964.
SUBJECT
Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 20 August 1964
PRESENT
Mr. Bundy, Ambassador
Thompson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McConeA special meeting of the 303 Committee was called for 1600 on 20
August 1964 to discuss two papers concerning Chile: a CIA paper dated 20 August 1964,
“Supplementary Support for the Chilean Presidential Elections of 4
September 1964,”Not printed. (Ibid.,
Subject Files, Chile thru 1969) and an undated CIA memorandum, “Church Social and
Political Projects in Chile.”Dated
August 20. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, c. 9,
August 20, 1964)The first paper cited a cable of 19 August 1964 from the “Joint
Embassy Election Team” in SantiagoNot
found. seeking additional funds as the political race
enters its last two and a half weeks. The sum requested was [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified], and in view of the extreme long-range
importance of the outcome of this political struggle, the Committee
members felt that this late hour request was justified.The second paper dealt with the political action program
undertaken by [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] in support of the CDP candidate. [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified], apparently on the basis of conversations
with various U.S. citizens, private and official, over the past
year, assumed that he had a tacit commitment for financial support.
Although no formal commitment to [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified] was ever authorized, the
Committee felt that [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified], regardless of his erroneous
impression, had made measurable contributions to the Frei campaign through his “front”
organizations and that some allocation of funds should be made to
defray his stated deficit of $395,000.Accordingly, the Committee approved the sum of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as
requested by the “Joint Embassy Election Team” with the stipulation
that no more than [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] of this sum should be allocated to [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] political action program deficit.According to his own notes of the meeting,
“Ambassador Thompson
commented that [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] seems a great deal, but he did
not enter any caveat to that effect.” (Department of State,
INR/IL Historical Files, 303
Committee Files, C. 9, August 20, 1964)Peter Jessup
268. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. II, 9/64–11/64. Secret.
Dungan forwarded the
memorandum to Bundy and
Moyers on September 4 and
in a covering memorandum noted: “I know that both of you are
interested in the Chilean election which is being held today.
Therefore, I thought you would want to see a memorandum which I had
prepared earlier this week by DDP
giving their estimate of the outcome of the election. This analysis
does not reflect the views of the Intelligence component of the
Agency.”Washington, September 1, 1964.
SUBJECT
Chilean Election Forecast
1. The total of registered voters for the 4 September 1964 election is
2,915,000, 45.7% of whom are women. An estimated 83% turnout is expected
amounting to approximately 2,400,000 voters going to the polls.
[Omitted here are the detailed results of several election
predictions.]
b. An August 1964 sampling of the important areas of Santiago and
Valparaiso shows Frei ahead by
20.2% over Allende in these
cities:
Frei54.4%Allende34.2%Duran6.9%Undecided4.5%Bundy forwarded
these results to the President on August 25. (Memorandum
from Jessup to
Bundy, August
24; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country
File, Chile, Vol. I, 1/64–8/64)
(For an examination of details as well as regional
polling data in five provinces, please see attachments 2 and 3.)None of the attachments was found.
6. Divisional Estimate:We do not believe that it is possible to predict this election
with any great degree of accuracy, that is to say, within one to
two percent. For one thing, polling must be relatively inexact
in view of the fact that expected voters this year exceed by
more than one million the number of voters in the past
presidential election. (This greatly increased expected vote is
due mainly to laws passed during the Alessandri regime making voting mandatory.) As a
consequence, pollsters do not have available the type of
district bench marks which are used so extensively in polling in
the United States. The enormously increased registration and
expected vote can be assumed, however, to be of distinct
advantage to the Christian Democrats in view of the fact that
new registration will be heavily weighted among women who by and
large favor Frei by more
than two-thirds.Some general regional observations are of interest. The
northern provinces have traditionally been communist and radical
strongholds. The PDC has worked
hard to change this and Allende seems to have only a slightly favorable
margin there. In the central urban area with its high number of
women registrants Frei
should win Santiago and Valparaiso by a substantial margin. In
the central rural area Allende may carry Aconcagua and Talca with the
vote being close all the way down to Malleco. The PDC seems to do not badly among the
campesinos in Curico, Talca and Chillan. In the race in
Concepcion, traditionally radical and marxist, Frei has a 50–50 chance.From recent polls it would appear that the undecided vote as
of the middle of August is about 5 percent. There is some
indication that this undecided vote comes principally from
Allende’s
semi-defectors; logically, one would expect it to be composed
also of radicals who find it difficult to choose between a far
leftist and a catholic candidate.We believe that Frei
will win by a clear majority. From the point of view of U.S.
interests a clear majority for Frei would be highly satisfactory and therefore
we believe that this is the important point rather than trying
to predict the exact percentage. Such a majority would mean that
the election would not have to be thrown to congress and
therefore that the uncertainties surrounding that process,
including the possibility of rioting, would be eliminated.
Furthermore, with a clear majority Frei would not have to make any political deals
with other parties. Forced to predict, however, we would give
the following: Frei—53
percent; Allende—41
percent; Duran—6
percent.Rusk briefed the
President on the Chilean election at a NSC meeting on September 1: “It
looked as if a victory for the non-Communist forces in Chile
would come up in the election 4 September, partly as a
result of the good work of CIA; and this development would be a triumph
for democracy and a blow to Communism in Latin America.”
(Memorandum for the record by Ray S. Cline, September 1; Central
Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Files, Meetings
with the President) The election was also discussed on
September 2 at the weekly meeting between ARA and CIA representatives. While
FitzGerald gave the DDP prediction cited above,
Mann said that
“his source had indicated that Frei would probably win by a plurality but
not by a majority.” Mann congratulated the Agency, saying that,
“regardless of the outcome, he believes that we have done
everything that is possible.” (Memorandum for the record by
FitzGerald, September 3; ibid., Job
78–03041R, DDO/IMS Files, US Government—State)
269. Editorial Note
On September 4, 1964, the Johnson
administration closely monitored the official tabulation of votes for
the presidential election in Chile. The Department of State received
hourly updates from the Embassy in Santiago and forwarded the
telegraphic reports to the White House. (Memorandum from Chase to Bundy, September 4; Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Latin America, Vol. II, 6/64–12/64; telegrams 366,
367, 368, 369, 370, and 371 from Santiago, September 4; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
POL 14 Chile) Although the initial
returns suggested the eventual outcome, the actual result was
surprisingly decisive. With 87 percent of the electorate participating,
Eduardo Frei Montalva, the
candidate of the Christian Democratic Party, received 56 percent of the
vote; Salvador Allende Gossens,
the Popular Action Front (FRAP)
candidate 39 percent; the Radical Party candidate, Julio Durán Neumann, finished
third.
President Johnson addressed the
importance of the Chilean election at a news conference on September 5.
The election, he said, served
as a reminder of the strength of democratic institutions throughout
Latin America; it was a victory for democracy as well as a defeat for
communism, i.e. “those who are hostile to freedom.” The President
suggested that some credit should go to the Alliance for Progress, whose
ideals and programs Frei had
endorsed during the campaign. Johnson was careful to point out, however, that the
election “was an internal matter in which the people of Chile were the
only judges of the issues.” (Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Lyndon
B. Johnson, 1963–64, Book II, page 1040)
Frei expressed his
appreciation for these remarks on September 7, when Ambassador Cole delivered an oral message of
congratulations from President Johnson. Frei
also praised the Embassy for its role during the campaign, citing “its
discretion and cooperation.” (Telegram 383 from Santiago, September 8;
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 14 Chile)
In a September 2 memorandum the CIA
argued that various elements of the covert political action program—the
financial and organizational assistance given to Frei, the effort to keep Durán in the race, the propaganda
campaign to denigrate Allende—were “indispensable ingredients of Frei’s success.” “Frei’s chances of winning the
election,” the Agency concluded, “would have been considerably more
tenuous, and it is doubtful if his campaign would have progressed as
well as it did without this covert U.S. Government support.” (Department
of State, INR/IL Historical Files,
Chile, 1964–1967) The day after the election Cole reported that the combined effort of U.S. agencies
“contributed significantly to the very satisfactory Frei victory on September 4.” (Telegram
372 from Santiago, September 5; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 Chile)
The 303 Committee also discussed the Chilean election at its meeting on
September 10. The official minutes of the meeting record the discussion
as follows:
“Mr. Bundy indicated that
a vote of commendation should be extended to those responsible
for the successful outcome of the Chilean election. Those
present concurred wholeheartedly. Mr. McCone remarked that the
voters, themselves, in Chile deserved some commendation for the
high numbers of the electorate voting (86%) and the very few
votes that were invalidated (six-tenths of 1%). Ambassador
Thompson indicated
that there were those who felt that President Frei could still prove a
difficult personality. Mr. McCone commented that certain U.S. business
leaders with direct interests were immensely pleased and felt
that they could negotiate any problems arising during the
Frei administration.
Mr. McCone added that it
was the present analysis of his area specialists that without
the large scale covert support provided for the campaign,
Frei would have
gained, at most, a bare plurality. This was the first clear
majority in a Chilean election in 22 years.” (Memorandum for the
Record by Jessup,
September 11; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Files,
September 24, 1964)
270. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (Hughes)
to Secretary of State RuskSource:
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol.
II, 9/64–11/64. Confidential.Washington, September 5, 1964.
SUBJECT
Frei’s Victory in Chile has
Broad Hemispheric Significance
A new dimension to democratic left. For the first
time in Latin America, a Christian Democratic Party has achieved power.
These parties, which are beginning to gain a foothold in several Latin
American countries, are outspokenly pro-Western in foreign policy. In
domestic policy, they advocate a middle road between capitalism and
Marxism with strong emphasis on the role of the working man. The
Communists and particularly the Castro regime have watched the Christian
Democratic parties with concern, fearing that their advocacy of
revolutionary changes with freedom might attract majority support.
Frei’s victory confirms their
fears.
Smooth transfer of power foreseen. Frei will lose no time in designating
the officials of his government. In staffing the ministries he will be
able to call upon some of the most able technicians in the present
Alessandri government who are
members of his party. Outstanding among these is Sergio Molina, Director
of the Budget and coordinator of Chile’s 10-year development program,
adopted in 1961. Foreign Office undersecretary, PDC member Enrique Bernstein seems likely to become the new
Foreign Minister.Frei announced his cabinet on
October 26: Gabriel Valdés Subercaseaux, a Christian Democrat, was
named Minister of Foreign Affairs; Molina, a political independent,
Minister of Finance. The PDC
lacks enough top caliber technicians and administrators, however, to
fill all the government’s top posts and it will probably turn to
political independents.
Congressional hurdle. Frei must now buttress his personal victory— the first
majority obtained by any Chilean presidential candidate since 1942—with
greater representation of his party in Congress where it has only 32 out
of a 192-seat total. In August the PDC
said that its most pressing goal is to increase its congressional
strength in the March 1965 elections when all the Chamber and about half
the Senate will be renewed. Although the party is almost 30 years old,
its spectacular increase in strength has occurred only since the last
congressional elections in 1961. While the present Congress may give
Frei limited emergency powers to help solve some of the
country’s immediate problems, Frei will need a much larger plurality over the long
pull.
Even if his party doubled its strength in Congress next March, he would
still need additional support in attacking Chile’s longstanding
problems. The two rightist parties (Liberal and Conservative), which
helped to elect Frei as “the
lesser of two evils”, will probably desert him when he moves against
their entrenched interests. He has repeatedly attempted to win the
Socialists in the FRAP away from the
Communists, but with virtually no success so far. His most likely source
of new support seems to be the center Radical Party, which might
cooperate with him in return for guarantees of security for the many
Radicals holding government jobs.
Implications for US. Frei’s victory is being hailed by stateside radio
broadcasts as a victory both for Western democracy and the US. This is
to some extent an over simplification, and the US will face problems as
well as opportunities in Chile. While Frei has supported Western political objectives and the
Alliance for Progress, he has at times been vigorous in his criticism of
capitalism. His reform efforts will doubtless provoke propertied
interests and lead to charges that he opposes free enterprise.The CIA
assessed the outlook for the president-elect as follows: “Frei will be a less accommodating
and a more nationalistic ally than Alessandri, because of his zeal for reform.
Frei’s favorable
attributes more than offset this.” “With some good fortune and
tactful handling, Frei could
become an outstanding leader and statesman in Latin America and an
exceptionally valuable, if occasionally carping, friend of the
United States.” (Special Report prepared by the CIA, [text not
declassified]; Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Chile, Vol. II, 9/64–11/64) Meanwhile,
Frei has scheduled an
economic mission to the US. He has been holding conversations with US
copper companies in an effort to achieve a mutually satisfactory
relationship with them. The PDC goal is
to double copper production by 1970 in order to generate the revenues
needed to support the party’s social program.
271. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. VI. No classification marking. A notation
on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.Washington, September 20, 1964.
SUBJECT
Ralph Dungan and Chile
I have talked to both Dungan and
Dean Rusk about this, and
Rusk plans to talk to
Tom Mann.Rusk raised the issue with
Mann on September 3, the
day before the presidential election. “The Sec asked if he
[Mann] had a good man for
Chile; we should have a name available soon. Mr. Mann said he had called [Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Administration] Tom Beale and had pointed
out the urgency. Mr. Mann
said they had cleared through Ralph
Dungan who had been mentioned as a chief candidate.
Sec asked if Mann had any
suggestions personally. Mann
said we should take one of our better ambassadors out of the
field—someone strong on economics. Assuming Frei wins, we will be faced with an
economic problem. Mann said
he did know someone else but had not yet had an answer. Mann suggested the Sec sound out
the President. Mann thought
the candidate should also know the language. Sec said let us give
some thought to the matter; we should move fairly fast.” (Rusk to Mann, September 3, 1964, 3:05 p.m., National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone
Calls 8/25/64–9/13/64) You may want to speak to Mann about it yourself on the El Paso
trip.
Everyone agrees that the job of Ambassador in Chile is now highly
important. Frei plans to embark
on a course of anti-Communist reform which will involve important
negotiations with major American copper interests. We need an Ambassador
who is fundamentally sympathetic to the cause of democratic reform, but
realistic on the need to meet the fair interests of our businessmen.
Rusk and I both believe that a
progressive and imaginative Ambassador will be needed as a
counterweight, and that Dungan
would be an excellent choice. This situation is much like that in
Panama, where Vaughn is doing an excellent job of producing new ideas,
while Tom Mann keeps an eye on
the brakes.
Ralph Dungan is a liberal
Catholic with strong convictions on the need for progressive policies.
He is also a realist. He is a good friend of Frei, with whom he has been in close touch for years. I
am convinced that he wants to do this job because it engages all his own
convictions, and not because he wants the empty pleasure of being called
Ambassador.
Ralph is not absolutely ideal for
this job—it would be better if he had some business reputation, and
better also if he spoke Spanish (although he is prepared to work on that
passionately). But against any presently available businessman,
Ralph has the great
advantages of prestige in your Administration, proven sympathy for the
progressive anti-Communist effort in Latin America, and a close personal
relationship with Chile. He has the confidence of the Secretary of
State, and he will be an energetic and loyal Ambassador for you
personally.
Dean Rusk thinks we should send
Cole’s successor to Santiago
very promptly. I myself do not believe that is very important. If you
now make clear your intention to send Dungan at the right time, he could readily stay here
until Thanksgiving or even New Year’s. An able Chargé can easily keep
house between now and then.
What is needed is a decision. It will not be good for the Frei administration to believe that we
are unable to pick a man for this crucial job during the next six weeks.
We have twice delayed Cole’s
resignation, and we have now run out of spare time.
If you do designate Dungan, I
think we can get cordial and responsive notices from the Times and the Post, and
also from other less doctrinaire observers of the Latin American
scene.The White House announced on
October 2 that President Johnson had nominated Dungan as Ambassador to Chile. (Telegram 290 from
Santiago, October 2, ibid., Central Files 1964–66, PER Dungan, Ralph) Dungan was officially appointed on
November 24, confirmed by the Senate January 15 (Congress had been
in recess at the time of his appointment), and recommissioned
January 18. He presented his credentials in Santiago December
10.
McG.B.
272. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of Coordination for
Intelligence and Research (Carter) to the Director of Intelligence and Research
(Hughes)Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA
Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965. Secret. Also addressed to Denney and Evans.Washington, October 1, 1964.
SUBJECT
ARA—Agency Meeting September 30,
1964
PARTICIPANTS
ARA—Mr. Mann, Mr. Adams, Mr. PryceCIA—Mr. FitzGerald, [name not
declassified]INR/DDC—Mr. Carter
Chile.
FitzGerald said the Station Chief
in Chile had talked with Ambassador Cole shortly before the latter’s departure from Santiago
and that Cole said Secretary
Rusk doesn’t want us in our
dealings with the Frei Government
to use leverage acquired through support of the CD.According to Rusk’s Appointment Book, Rusk met with Cole on September 11. (Johnson Library) No
substantive record of the meeting has been found.FitzGerald said this made him
very unhappy. He wanted to know if Mann was aware of a directive of this nature.
Mann said he was not. In any
case, he added, it depended on the way you use leverage. He doubted that
the Secretary’s directive was “as sweeping as it sounds.” He thought the
matter could easily be cleared up by talking with the Secretary.A handwritten note in the margin by this
paragraph reads: “INR
participation?”
[name not declassified], who made a recent trip to
Chile, said he found Jova (DCM) concerned about “our using our power
position.” Mann commented he was
not worried about using it; only about our misusing it.
FitzGerald said “it’s the
atmosphere of mistrust that bothers me.”
Said Mann: “Don’t worry. I trust
you.”
Mann went on to reveal there will
be a new Ambassador in Santiago soon and indicated it would be Ralph Dungan, though cautioned that
this was to be held close since the agrement had not yet been
requested.
Mann said a topflight economist
is needed to replace the outgoing economic counselor.The outgoing chief of the economic section, Thomas
R. Favell, did not report to his next assignment until August 1965.
He was replaced 3 months later by Robert G. Walker. In his
view the political battle is over. The battle now will be in the
economic field.
[name not declassified] reported that while in
Chile he talked with [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] whom we assisted to the tune of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
shortly before the September 4 election.See
Document 267. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
told him that funds on hand would last only until December, clearly
implying he expected more. [name not
declassified] said he made it clear to [less than
1 line of source text not declassified] that no more funds
would be forthcoming. Asked if [less than 1 line of
source text not declassified] had clearly understood this [name not declassified] replied, “He didn’t hear
me.”
[Omitted here is discussion of Cuba and Venezuela.]
273. Editorial Note
At a meeting with Central Intelligence Agency officials on October 12,
1964, Assistant Secretary Mann
reported his approval of a proposal for additional covert assistance to
the Christian Democratic Party. The proposal would provide [text not declassified] to maintain the
grass-roots organizations of the party—the slum-dweller and campesino
departments—for the remainder of the calendar year. Ray Herbert, Deputy Chief of the Western
Hemisphere Division, recommended extending the term of the program,
arguing that the Christian Democrats were “the only effective force
fighting Communists in these areas.” Mann disagreed: the Christian Democrats might use U.S.
support against the “other non-Marxist parties.” He maintained that the
current proposal was sufficient but agreed to reconsider the issue in
several months. When Herbert
raised the question of assistance for the congressional elections in
March 1965, Mann was more
adamant: “Tell them not to expect any help to beat other non-Commie
groups. Tell them we helped them fight Marxists. This is different. This
would be intervention.” (Memorandum from Carter to
Hughes, October 13; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA–CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965)
On October 13 the CIA drafted a
memorandum to the 303 Committee detailing its program to support the
Christian Democratic grass-roots organizations. Before the memorandum
was submitted, however, Mann
insisted on redrafting the proposal. The final memorandum stipulated
that the CIA explain to Frei: a) the difference between
assistance for a presidential election against a Marxist candidate and
assistance for a congressional election against a field of democratic
parties; and b) that the current program was intended for a
“transitional period” only, to allow the Christian Democrats to combat
Communist influence in the “campesino and slum sectors.” (Ibid., 303
Committee Files, October 29, 1964) Ambassador-designate Dungan expressed similar concerns when
asked to comment on the proposal:
“I would only add to the recommendation a caveat that support
during this period does not mean a continuation of support for
this or other PDC activities in
the future. It seems to me that this should be made explicit so
that no inference to the contrary might be drawn. It may well be
that we will want to continue some support, but unless there are
overriding considerations of which I am not aware at this time I
believe it is a sound principle to permit popular democratic
parties to go it alone. If the PDC or any other democratic party comes to power,
part of assuming the responsibility that goes with power is
finding ways and means of supporting the party structure.”
The 303 Committee approved the CIA paper,
as amended, by telephone on October 20. The official record of the
decision notes that Dungan’s
statement set “the limitations under which any future proposals of this
kind will be viewed in this Chilean post-election period.” (Memorandum
for the record from Jessup,
October 22; ibid.)
274. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 Chile. Confidential. Drafted by
Lunn.Washington, October
12, 1964.
SUBJECT
Meeting of Mr. Mann with
the Mission of President-Elect Frei of Chile
PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Mann, Assistant
Secretary, ARAMr. Solomon, Deputy
Assistant Secretary, ARAMr. Rogers, Deputy U.S.
Coordinator, AA/LASenator Radomiro Tomic,
Member, Chilean DelegationSergio Molina, Member,
Chilean DelegationJorge Ahumada, Member, Chilean DelegationJosé Piñera, Member, Chilean DelegationThomas R. Favell, Counselor Economic Affairs, SantiagoJohn P. Robinson, Director, USAID, SantiagoWilliam T. Dentzer, Jr.,
Director, Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, ARAHarry H. Lunn, Jr., Office of Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, ARA
Mr. Mann welcomed the special
mission sent by President-elect Frei to begin economic discussions in Washington with
the U.S. Government and international agencies. Senator Tomic, chairman of the mission,
responded and noted the informal and unofficial nature of the team’s
visit since the Frei Government
will not take power until November 3.
As an introduction to the economic program proposed by the new
government, Senator Tomic
described the political situation in Chile which had led to Frei’s election on a program of
“Revolution in Liberty”. He noted that the March 15 by-election in
Curico effectively had eliminated the candidate of the “status quo”
government coalition and forced a choice between Frei’s democratic reform program and
the Marxist alternative offered by Allende. While Frei’s decisive election showed the clear preference of
Chileans for the democratic alternative, one could not ignore the nearly
40% vote for Allende. Chilean
expectations for the Frei
Government are high and immediate performance is necessary to
consolidate the Government’s position in the March 1965 Congressional
elections.
Senator Tomic then commented on
the basic contradiction of a country with rich resources and a facade of
effective democracy which had failed to fulfill its economic and social
promise to the people. For the future, one of the strongest assets of
the country in fostering
democratic institutions would be the international solidarity enjoyed by
Chile, especially within the Inter-American system inspired by
Presidents Roosevelt, Kennedy and Johnson.
The Frei Government, Senator
Tomic explained, would pursue
parallel and inter-related economic and social programs. On the economic
front, the government will attempt to spur development through doubling
exports—primarily relying on increased copper production, but also
emphasizing steel, paper, wood and fishmeal—and overcoming agricultural
production and marketing problems. Priority social goals involve
agrarian reform, education, housing and “promotion popular”, a broad
scheme of community social and economic action.
This program necessarily will be extremely expensive and Chile must rely
on international solidarity to make possible the future pledged by
Frei to the Chilean people;
in particular, Chile looks to the United States for assistance. In
economic discussions this week, Chile will seek renegotiation of debt
falling due in the next few years held by agencies of the U.S.
Government—especially the Export-Import Bank ($75 million) and the
Treasury ($21 million)—and will make a case for further credits from
these agencies, including program assistance from AID of $150 million.
Mr. Mann thanked Senator Tomic for his frank exposition and
indicated the interest of the United States in President-elect Frei’s objectives and the desire of the
United States to provide significant assistance for a sound and
realistic economic plan. He noted that we are far more prepared to give
heavy assistance to a plan that will work than we are to contribute
small amounts to a bad plan that merely increases a nation’s debt and
postpones the day of economic reckoning. The sole question was whether a
program would work and be effective. Mr. Mann expected that discussions this week would focus on
such basic technical issues as inflation and programs for productive and
social investment, and that a program could be developed that we would
find possible to support within the limits of our ability. In this
connection, Mr. Rogers noted that
FY 1965 funds for the Alliance are
limited and subject to considerable competition as the result of
favorable development opportunities elsewhere in the hemisphere.
Senator Tomic asked that an
understanding on levels of U.S. assistance be reached as soon as
possible because the new government needed to act quickly and decisively
in the five months remaining before the Congressional elections. Senor
Molina raised the particular
problem he will face in assessing external resources for the budget
message he must submit as Finance Minister on November 18. Mr. Mann indicated his expectation that the
current week of discussions would make it possible to move ahead on
arriving at subsequent assistance projections as the program and its
requirements become clear.
275. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL CHILE–US. Confidential. Drafted by
Dentzer and approved in
S on November 23. The time of the
meeting is taken from Rusk’s
Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) The memorandum is part II of II;
part I recorded Rusk’s initial meeting with the Chilean delegation
on October 14. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL
CHILE–US)Washington, October 17, 1964, 10
a.m.
SUBJECT
The Secretary’s Second Meeting with the Mission of President-Elect
Frei of Chile
PARTICIPANTS
The SecretaryMr. Mann, Assistant
Secretary, ARAMr. Solomon, Deputy
Assistant Secretary, ARASenator Radomiro Tomic,
Member, Chilean DelegationSergio Molina, Member,
Chilean DelegationGabriel Valdes, Member,
Chilean DelegationJose Pinera, Member, Chilean DelegationJose Zabala, Director, CORFO,
New YorkMr. Dentzer, Director,
Bolivian-Chilean Affairs, ARA
The Secretary asked whether the delegation was satisfied with its
discussions in Washington.In addition to
meetings with Rusk and
Mann, the delegation met
with Dungan, AID Administrator Bell, EXIM Bank President Linder,
and representatives of CIAP, IDB, IBRD, and IMF.
(Telegram 331 to Santiago, October 17; ibid., POL 7 Chile) Senator Tomic responded, expressing his
satisfaction. Mr. Mann also
expressed satisfaction with the talks.
In response to Secretary Rusk’s
question about the next step in negotiations, Mr. Solomon indicated that a mission would
be sent to Santiago as soon as possible after Frei’s inauguration to pursue these
discussions further in conjunction with the Embassy and AID mission there.
The Secretary asked about the European portion of the delegation’s trip.
Mr. Valdes indicated the results
of the trip were good, that the Europeans were interested in Chile, and
that the Europeans were interested to know what the U.S. would do,
especially on the question of debt rescheduling. Mr. Mann affirmed U.S. willingness to
attempt to work out arrangements with the European creditor nations
which would be in line with Chilean hopes.
Senator Tomic spoke of the
importance of U.S. assistance to Chile in the spirit of inter-American
solidarity, and emphasized that the Frei government wished to show achievement to the people
before it requested of them
the full sacrifice that Chilean development would require. The Secretary
assured him that the U.S. would keep in close touch with Senator
Frei’s advisers in the period
leading up to the November 18 budget presentation to the Congress by the
Chilean Minister of Finance, an event mentioned by the Chileans earlier
as a date by which they hoped to have a clear picture of the amount of
U.S. aid in 1965. Secretary Rusk
also indicated his hope that efforts by the Chilean people would be
called for at that time, and Senator Tomic assured him that this would be the case. Mr.
Mann indicated he was willing
to go along with the Frei
government in postponing some of the sacrifices necessary so long as an
earnest start was made now. He indicated to the Chilean mission that the
Frei government would get at
least what the Alessandri
government received in terms of U.S. aid and added that he hoped
circumstances would support even more aid. He stated the U.S. could not
make any commitment now, however, and Tomic indicated he understood why this was the case.
Secretary Rusk inquired about
agricultural imports into Chile, which he was informed ran about $125
million dollars a year. The Secretary stressed the importance of cutting
back on this use of foreign exchange.
Senator Tomic asked for a special
message from President Johnson to Frei on the occasion of the
inauguration, and the Secretary indicated such a message would be
sent.
The Secretary concluded the meeting by expressing his hope that the
delegation has been satisfied with its mission to Washington. Senator
Tomic indicated they were
indeed satisfied and that they understood why the United States could
not go further at this time, even though the Chileans might like to have
a commitment. The Secretary assured Senator Tomic that the United States would move promptly in
pursuing this subject and stressed again the two points mentioned in his
previous interview with the delegation, the need for using foreign aid
on a sound basis to build lasting achievements and the need to use funds
committed on a timely and current basis. Senator Tomic assured the Secretary that Chile
would do its part in carrying out the responsibilities of its
partnership with the United States if the U.S. did likewise. He
expressed the hope that Chile would be independent of U.S. assistance at
the end of Frei’s six years in
office. Mr. Mann assured Senator
Tomic that the U.S. was
willing to help Chile or any friendly nation that sincerely tried to
help its people and sought to put its own house in order.
276. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID(US) 8 Chile. Confidential;
Immediate. Passed to the White House.Santiago, November 13, 1964, 1:00
p.m.
126. For Mann and Bell from Solomon. I met with Frei for over two hours this morning, accompanied by
Chargé, Dentzer and Robinson.
Molina and Ahumada also
present.
Frei opened meeting by expressing
his great appreciation for substantially increased U.S. assistance and
good will toward Chile shown in all levels of U.S.
He then took up the subject of U.S. assistance in CY 1965, explaining his approach to the first year of his
government’s life, that previous Chilean Governments had always asked
the people to sacrifice for stabilization programs but that the programs
never worked, that past governments had not cared about all the people,
and that his people were mindful of this. For this reason, he wanted to
achieve both a reduction in price inflation this year and show concrete
benefits to the people, distinguishing his government thereby from its
predecessors. He said that reaching the goal of only a 25 per cent price
inflation in 1965 was his number one aim and that if he fell short of
this, he would consider his first year a failure. If he attained this
goal, he could go to the people with the political strength and moral
right to demand greater sacrifice. He stated that he hoped, therefore,
to sustain a heavy public investment program during this year, but he
said that the information given him concerning proposed U.S. assistance
for 1965 indicated it fell short by $40 million of his needs. I
explained this was not so, and reviewed with him two budgets showing
that 1965 U.S. assistance to the balance of payments including debt
relief would be $135 million or 35 per cent greater than in 1964 and
that 1965 assistance to the budget would be $102 million or 50 per cent
greater than the actual 1964 level.
He was surprised and I believe impressed by these figures, which put U.S.
aid in 1965 into the best—but fair and defensible—light, contrary to the
figures presented on a different basis by his Minister of Finance. I
further explained the changes we hoped to see in their investment
program, exchange rate policy, etc. and believe was able to disabuse him
somewhat of his belief U.S. conservative tradition underlay our position
and rather that we were only concerned with workable achievement of
targets.
Frei then turned conversation to
the need for $20 million assistance for remainder of 1964. He said he
had understood from reports to him prior to the Tomic mission to Washington and from
subsequent conversations in Santiago with our Embassy that the U.S.
would be willing to be of assistance for the final portion of 1964, that
it was imperative in terms of investor confidence that his government
not be forced to break the IMF
agreement, and that his government could not afford to begin its tenure
by holding off unpaid creditors to an unprecedented extent. It then
became clear that GOC would have 100
million escudos in unpaid bills as of December 31 in contrast to usual
float of 50 million. Frei
inquired whether it would be possible for the U.S. to give $20 million
now, subtracting this sum from our announced program loan for 1965 for
the time being, but with a “gentleman’s agreement” that the same advance
against 1966 assistance would be given toward end of 1965. After
explaining impossibility of this, I offered to expedite as much as
possible the processing of the aid program loan with the possibility if
negotiations went quickly enough of signing the program loan agreement
in mid December accompanied by initial tranche. However, this would
still have to stretch over the full extent of CY 1965, and thus require adjustment in 1965 expenditures
or revenues. Molina not
enthusiastic about this and mentioned he might try New York banks and
hoped we would give him support. I didn’t answer and turned conversation
to specific alternatives on finding local resources which we believe
possible and preferable.
While this subject was left unresolved, it emphasized GOC need for wide access to escudos from
the program loan to finance the investment budget. I therefore agreed on
Frei’s request and as a
gesture of cooperation to reduce the project component of our 1965 aid
loan $10 million, increasing program loan to $80 million, as authorized
by Washington.
Frei also asked that we jointly
work out some kind of announcement concerning the nature of this week’s
talks. I told him we could not make any loan announcements or specify
amounts of assistance but would be glad to work out some language of a
generalized nature reporting on the work of the past week.
At conclusion of this general discussion, Frei asked me to stay on alone. Tenor of discussion was
that he expected to come under attack in the coming months from certain
sectors of the Chilean business community—not the industrial sector but
the banking and commercial sectors—and he hoped to have U.S.
understanding that these attacks would be based on reasonable
curtailment by legitimate governmental means of their power in society,
as we would be able to judge for ourselves. I suggested as a friend that
his best defense against such attacks was carrying out the financial
discipline and other policies essential to both the private sector and
overall Chilean development. He asked once again for our assistance in helping to resolve his
financial problems of 1964, which he characterized as an infortunate
inheritance from the previous government. In mentioning this, he
acknowledged his confusion over previous reports that the U.S. would be
willing to render such assistance, and he asked that U.S. officials
never shrink from giving him any bad news about the future, whether it
concerned aid or any other subject. In the course of agreeing I made
clear what he had not realized before our discussions that any post
election assistance would have had to come out of the same total Fiscal
Year 1965 Chilean pot and really it boiled down to timing. He accepted
this simplistic approach and conversation ended on warm note. We invited
to tea today.An account of the “tea”
meeting between Frei and
Solomon is in airgram
A–385 from Santiago, November 16. (Ibid., AID(US) 9 Chile) The agreement to provide $80 million
of program loan assistance in CY 1965
was signed on January 5. For an account of how the funds were
utilized, see United States Senate, Committee on Government
Operations, Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, United States Foreign Aid in Action: A Case
Study (Washington, 1966), p. 32.
Jova
277. Memorandum for the 303 CommitteeSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Special Files, January–June 1965. Secret; Eyes Only.Washington, January 25, 1965.
SUBJECT
Financial Support to Selected Candidates in the 7 March 1965
Congressional Elections in Chile
1. Summary
This is a proposal to provide funds in the amount of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to
approximately 35 selected candidates running for Senate and Chamber of
Deputies (Lower House) seats in the 7 March 1965 congressional election
in Chile. Selection of these candidates is being made jointly with the
Ambassador. Each candidate is involved in a close race with a candidate
of the Communist-Socialist FRAP coalition and in some cases
against undesirable extremist candidates of his own or other parties as
well. This action is primarily a denial operation against the FRAP [2 lines of source
text not declassified]. Candidates to be supported represent
all non-FRAP parties, and support is
for specific individuals rather than for parties. Funds will be passed
covertly through several channels to ensure maximum security. The net
result of this operation should be an increase in the overall ability of
the Chilean Christian Democratic Party (PDC) to promote those activities needed to bring about
necessary reforms and to reduce the effectiveness of the FRAP opposition.
2. Problem
To defeat those FRAP candidates who are
in close competition with candidates from other parties in the 7 March
congressional election. Secondary advantages to be obtained from this
denial operation will be: (a) the defeat of troublesome members of
non-FRAP parties who are running on
the same party ticket with the more moderate, pro-U.S. candidates who
receive our support [2½ lines of source text not
declassified].
3. Factors Bearing on the Problem
Significance of the Congressional
Election
The March election will be the most important political event to
take place in Chile in 1965 since its outcome will influence
future political alignments and determine whether the Frei government can
successfully carry out its reform program. Elective offices to
be filled are all 147 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 20 of
the 45 Senate seats. The FRAP
is trying to stage a comeback after its defeat in the September
presidential elections, while the PDC, which is now a minority party with only four
Senators and 28 Deputies, is hoping to obtain the congressional
strength it will need to implement its reform program. Even if
the Christian Democrats attain an election majority in the
Chamber of Deputies they will still need the support of
individuals in other parties to put through this program in the
Senate. The Radical Party is badly split, and the moderate
Radicals now in control of the party are being challenged by
left-wing Radical candidates who are determined to swing the
party into an alliance with the FRAP in opposition to the Frei government. A small
dissident Socialist group which supported Frei in the presidential
elections is running candidates under the label of the
Democratic Party and is hoping to attract a portion of the
electoral support of Socialists and other FRAP members who are dissatisfied
with Communist domination of the FRAP coalition. The FRAP parties themselves were unable to reach a firm
electoral agreement; in some districts there is an electoral
pact whereby all FRAP coalition
members are instructed to vote for one of the FRAP parties; in other districts
the FRAP parties will be
competing against each other.
Discussion
Since all political parties are participating in the March
elections, we are not basing our support on a choice of one
political faction, as was necessary in the presidential election
where the campaign was clearly between the Christian Democrats
and the Communists. The upcoming congressional races have been
studied in great detail, electoral district by district, in
order to select candidates of non-FRAP parties who need help in order to defeat their
FRAP opponents and who have
a good chance of success if they receive our support.
4. Coordination
This proposal has the approval of Ambassador Dungan, who has reviewed the list of proposed candidates
and has agreed that covert support should be provided to most of them.
The remaining candidates are under consideration and final selection
will be made only with the approval of the Ambassador.
5. Recommendation
It is recommended that the amount of [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified], which is available within the
CIA, be used to provide covert
support to selected candidates who are in close competition with FRAP contenders in the 7 March
congressional elections in Chile.Acting
Deputy Under Secretary Thompson agreed to support the proposal on the
understanding that Dungan
would determine the amount of money actually spent. (Memorandum from
Mann to Thompson, February 3; ibid.) The
303 Committee ratified this decision by telephonic vote on February
5. (Memorandum from Murat W.
Williams to Mann, February 16; ibid.) On March 7 the Christian
Democrats captured an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies
and emerged as the strongest party in the Senate. In a March 11
memorandum, the CIA reported that
Dungan had authorized
[text not declassified] for 29
candidates, [text not declassified] of whom
were subsequently elected. The Agency assessed the outcome as
follows: “The landslide proportions of the Christian Democrats’
congressional victory had not been expected by the Embassy or the
CIA Station or, indeed, by
President Frei himself. It is
believed that Agency operations contributed modestly to the victory
by insuring the defeat of some FRAP
candidates who might otherwise have been elected and by helping to
elect [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] Christian Democratic deputies which assured a
working majority.” (National Security Council, 303 Committee Files,
Subject Files, Chile thru 1969)
278. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Bogota,
Santo Domingo, Caracas, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, Lima, Panama,
Guatemala, Buenos Aires, USCINCSO, and USUN.
Passed to the White House, DOD and
CIA.Quito, May 7, 1965,
2040Z.
842. For President and SecState from Harriman.On April 27
President Johnson sent U.S.
Marines to intervene in the Dominican civil war. In response to
criticism that he had acted unilaterally, the President sent
Harriman to Latin America
to explain the decision and seek support from other countries.
Documentation on the Dominican crisis is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume
XXXII.
During my brief visit to Santiago, GOC
had made most thorough security arrangements through national police,
lining streets where needed and protecting chancery and residence, as
well as President’s palace. We were greeted with some derogatory shouts
and clenched fists, at the same time a certain number of friendly
waves.
President Frei with Foreign
Minister Valdes received
Dungan and myself shortly
after my arrival for over two hours and a half talk, mostly in English
with little translation. Therefore we were able to cover a wide range of
subjects. Frei listened
attentively to my explanation of situation in Santo Domingo which
required President Johnson’s
decision, with description of some vivid details of Communist take-over
and atrocities. I emphasized that Communist subversion was now the
dangerous aggression the hemisphere had to face and described Brazilian
and Argentine ideas regarding necessity to expand permanent arrangements
for rapid OAS peace keeping capability
in order to avoid President being faced with necessity to take
unilateral action in another crisis. I said that although he [Frei] appeared now to be out of
sympathy with the President’s decision, I believed he would reverse his
opinion when all the facts were in and applaud the courage and
decisiveness of President Johnson’s action. In any event the immediate situation was
being dealt with at USG’s request
through the OAS in both political and
peace keeping fields. There appeared unanimous agreement in objective of
creating stability which would permit Dominican people select government
of their own choice. I asked for his full cooperation to this end.
Frei replied that he understood
the President’s dilemma and reasons his decision, but hoped that the
President would understand the political scene in Chile. Chile has the
largest Communist Party in the hemisphere. He believed he could reduce
its influence through his
policies. Communists had led in attacking former ruling class privilege.
He was convinced the way to eliminate Communist influence was his social
and economic revolution which would achieve more for the people and
out-do them in appeal. He recognized importance of private investment
and took pride in sensible new arrangements with Anaconda and Kennecott,
and also with American Foreign Power and International Telephone and
Telegraph. His policies were pro-American. He had won the election with
that plank [in] his platform. He had great admiration for President
Johnson’s domestic program,
but we had to understand Chile feared military dictatorship and military
intervention as much as Communist subversion. Chile was getting along
well today with civilian governments in Argentina and Peru whereas
military dictatorship particularly in Argentina would reverse this
situation and possible Argentine military intervention menace Chile’s
independence. He and his colleagues had worked hard to develop Christian
Democratic Party. 20 years ago they only had 20 percent as many votes as
the Communists whereas today Christian Democratic Party vote was five
times as large as the Communists. American liberalism had given
inspiration and courage to the CDP and he hoped that this liberal United
States image would not now be blurred by military action or
identification with and support of military regimes. The Communist issue
was not as clear cut in Chile as in the United States and U.S. should be
prepared to accept certain risks to maintain our liberal leadership. The
Communists had helped awaken the people to oppose the status quo and had
to be dealt with as part of the political scene in many L.A. countries.
In Chile the Communists could be beaten through political action rather
than military suppression. Frei
expressed confidence that his program would succeed and thus Communist
influence would fade. I interrupted to say that Communist danger was
different in almost every country and the tactics in dealing with it had
to be flexible.
After much discussion, he agreed. He pointed out that he could not
jeopardize his own leadership and that of the CD Party by becoming
involved in military intervention in D.R. He therefore could not support
the OAS resolution and cannot send
troops.The OAS voted on May 6 to establish an Inter-American Peace
Force, a unit that augmented U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic
with contingents from several member states. Chile was one of five
countries to vote against the proposal. (Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1965, pp. 854–869)
If he proposed it, he would be defeated in Congress and reduce his
influence. In any event he obviously did not want to take this action.
Dungan asked if he would send
a medical unit. This he declined as any military unit, even medical,
required congressional action. But when I pressed him to participate,
mentioning Peruvian food shipment, he finally agreed to send relief
supplies. I pressed him on the necessity for Chile, as representing constructive liberal force
in L.A., to take an active part in helping solve Dominican situation,
and urged him to send a representative in whom he had confidence to
Santo Domingo to keep him informed of the true situation during coming
months. He admitted that he had no confidence in his present Chargé and
turning to Valdes told him to
select someone promptly. Neither man had any suggestions of concrete
action to be taken except to state that some reasonably representative
government must be established soonest with elections to follow as soon
as practicable. He had expressed no choice of factions. He did however
refer to Bosch as “a coward
remaining securely under American protection in Puerto Rico.” He had had
communications from Colonel Caamano but had no judgement of his
position. I explained rebel isolated position in a small part of Santo
Domingo and lack of control of other parts of the country. I said we
must avoid unilateral political action in the recognition of any group
as this was almost as bad as unilateral military action. He agreed and
commented that we must await more information from Santo Domingo
particularly the commission’s report.On May
1 the OAS voted to send a
five-member committee to the Dominican Republic. The committee was
instructed to seek a negotiated settlement and report its
conclusions or recommendations. Chile abstained from the proposal.
(Ibid., May 17, 1965, pp. 738–748)
As I took my leave Frei expressed
hope that even though we had differed on D.R. situation, and might again
disagree on tactics for achieving mutual objectives this would not
affect warm friendship that existed between our two countries and
intimate personal relationship he had with Dungan in Santiago. He expressed great confidence in
Tomic and hoped he could
develop similar relationship in Washington.President Johnson and
Mann reviewed Chile’s
role in the Dominican crisis on May 25: “Mr. Mann said that although the
Mexicans voted against us, they did not lobby against us. The
Chileans did, and they are the ones who hurt us. The President said
he thought we should take a few siestas ourselves and go to sleep
for a while on some of their requests. Mr. Mann said he could not agree more.”
The two men later discussed how to implement this policy: “Mr.
Mann said that we would
have to go slow but we should put a price tag on it without ever
admitting this has anything to do with their actions. The President
said that Mr. Mann should
tell these people that he is doing his best, but people are upset
and it is very, very difficult. Mr. Mann said he understood very well.” (Johnson
Library, Papers of Thomas C.
Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2, 1965–June 2, 1966)
To Santiago for Dungan:
Since this written in Quito hope you will make such comments or additions
you feel desirable.Dungan’s account of the
meeting between Frei and
Harriman was transmitted
in telegrams 1722 and 1729 from Santiago, May 7 and 8, respectively.
(Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 7
US/HARRIMAN)
Coerr
279. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 11 US.
Confidential; Priority. Passed to DOD.Santiago, June 14, 1965,
1540Z.
1920. Subject: Project Camelot.See Document 280.
Communist newspaper Saturday morning, June 12, broke story Project
Camelot under headline “Yankees Study Invasion of Chile,” subheaded,
“Project Camelot Financed by U.S. Army,” etc.
Embassy recently became aware through university community of serious
anxiety middle-of-the-road scholars with this project and specifically
with the manner in which university people here were approached by SORO
personnel.The Special Operations
Research Office, a private research organization affiliated with the
American University in Washington, D.C.
I consider, particularly under current conditions, this effort to be
seriously detrimental to U.S. interests in Chile and urgently request
full explanation of Department Army actions in this regard. Was this
project approved by the Department?
On basis December 4 memorandum SORO concerning Project Camelot,A copy of the memorandum is in the National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
DEF 11 US. consider this whole effort not only politically
dangerous, but a serious duplication of other U.S. Government efforts,
and a waste of government funds. Urgently request guidance from
Department and explanation from Army OSD
this activity in Chile without prior notification.The Department subsequently reported that it had
expressed its concern in a letter to the Secretary of the Army.
(Telegram 1238 to Santiago, June 17; ibid.) In the letter, the
Department complained that the arrangements for Camelot fell “far
short of the kind of coordination that such an ambitious project may
require.” In addition to telegram 1920 from Santiago, the Department
had received other reports of the “unfavorable impression made by
the Camelot project on Latin American scholars—a fact of
considerable political importance.” (Letter from Llewellyn Thompson to Stephen Ailes, June 19; ibid.)
Joseph Califano, Special
Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, defended
the project in a memorandum to Bundy, June 24: “No Camelot research activities have
been authorized or conducted outside the continental United States,
including Chile. The only known contact is a letter written by a
U.S. scientist to a Swedish social scientist presently resident in
Chile.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Chile, Vol. III, 12/64–9/65)
Dungan
280. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President JohnsonSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 11 US.
Confidential. No drafting information appears on the
memorandum.Washington, June 30, 1965.
I understand that you wish a brief memorandum on the “Camelot”
matter.The President had asked
Mann for a memorandum,
particularly in the wake of an upcoming investigation by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee: “I want a complete report from you on
your best judgment sometime before the day’s over on this Camelot
project and Ralph Dungan and
what he did about it, and who got this stuff out, the Army and the
State Department fighting about it.” “I don’t know why Ralph Dungan’s getting it out in
the paper and why it’s getting published, and what the story is, and
give me a memo on it so I can understand it.” (Johnson Library,
Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation
between President Johnson and
Thomas Mann, June 30,
1965, 12:57 p.m., Tape F65.52, Side A, PNO 1)
I have discussed this with Secretary McNamara and he and I agreed that we personally would
both review urgently the Army sponsored research activities on political
and international problems outside the United States and try to prevent
the kind of stir and misunderstanding which has arisen from Camelot.
Senator McCarthy’s office is trying to locate him in order that he and I
can be in touch by telephone in order to arrange a meeting to discuss it
with him.I did reach him; he is relaxed and
will wait until Fulbright returns and can talk about it. This was a
part of McCarthy’s attitude toward CIA, etc. DR. [Footnote
in the source text.]
Camelot is an Army sponsored project being carried out by the Special
Operations Research Office. It is a large-scale unclassified project
calling for an estimated 140 professional man hours of work and a budget
of more than $4,000,000. The proposed study would attempt to make a
scientific analysis of international tension and war and insurgency and
counterinsurgency. Considerable case work abroad is envisaged, including
intensive studies of Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and
Venezuela.
Such studies made by private social scientists would probably elicit
little attention, even though some of the “jargon” of the social
scientists subjects them to quick public misunderstanding. The
sponsorship of such studies in foreign countries by our own military
services touches upon sensitive nerves and can cause problems. In Chile,
for example, discussions among social scientists about the project was
the basis for a sharp communist attack as well as criticisms from
skeptical and more traditional social scientists themselves.
It is my understanding that, inside the United States, there are
important differences of opinion among social scientists about the
utility of this type of quantitative research project.
Secretary McNamara and I will
follow up on this here, and I will try to help Ralph Dungan cool tempers in Chile.
This will serve as the report which you requested from Tom Mann earlier today.The Department of Defense announced the
cancellation of Project Camelot on July 8. The President
subsequently directed the Secretary of State to “establish effective
procedures which will enable you to assure the propriety of
Government-sponsored social science research in the area of foreign
policy.” (Letter from the President to Rusk, August 2; Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, p.
832)
Dean RuskPrinted from a copy that
indicates Rusk signed the
original.
281. Memorandum From William
G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. IV, 10/65–7/67.
Confidential.Washington, November 10, 1965.
SUBJECT
Chilean Program Loan
BOB will have back to you sometime today
the Chilean loan paper with Schultze’s recommendation.Attached but not printed are memoranda to the President from
Bell (November 6) and
Schultze (November
10). I understand that BOB
will recommend a reduction of $10 million in the $80 million
recommended.
Our negotiating team has not left for Santiago and will not do so until
the President’s authorization is in hand. Dungan has been informed of the delay.In telegram 431 to Santiago, November 9. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
AID(US) 9 Chile)
At staff meeting on MondayNovember 8.
you asked why the program loan had to be as high as $80 million. The
AID memo to the President does not
really address itself to this question. The Chileans wanted $100–$130
million for 1966. State, AID, and the
Country Team scaled this down to $80 million, based on these
considerations: This amount is what they think Chile
needs to cover its balance of payments deficit and to produce
the local proceeds necessary for Frei to continue an adequate level of public investment to maintain the
momentum of his “Revolution in Liberty”.An amount higher than $80 million would reduce the pressure on
Chile to make needed self-help efforts.An amount appreciably lower (say $60 million) would confront
the Chilean Government with the need to cut its 1966 investment
program even more drastically than we are proposing, or resort
to inflationary financing. Frei would undoubtedly opt for the latter and
thereby aggravate the problem which is Chile’s most serious
obstacle to a viable economy.In a
November 10 memorandum to Bundy, Mann reported taking another consideration
into account: “the fact that the Chilean Government was most
uncooperative in the Dominican crisis.” Although he
concurred in providing the $80 million program loan,
Mann suggested a
confidential mission to tell Frei “that we expect cooperation to be a two
way street and that we are very disturbed about the Chilean
Government’s attitude towards the Dominican crisis.”
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Chile, Vol. IV, 10/65–7/67)
BOB is recommending a reduction of $10
million. The BOB argument is that
increased copper prices and better tax collections make a reduction of
this magnitude possible without materially affecting either Chilean
balance of payments or the public investment budget. As I mentioned in
staff meeting this morning, BOB also has
in mind demonstrating to Chile and other aid recipient countries that we
follow a flexible approach in setting the limits of our assistance.
The state of play as I write this memo is that BOB is waiting to hear from Dave Bell whether he goes along with the BOB cut and will modify his memo
accordingly.
I think that the cut can probably be justified. But we need to weigh the
political impact from these standpoints: If the project loan assistance for Chile (which was $16
million in FY 1965) is not continued in FY 1966 (as ARA
says is the case, and they have agreed to that), the net
reduction of our assistance will be $26
million.The assistance to Brazil should also reflect a corresponding
reduction if we are to avoid invidious comparisons.
I suggest that in your memo to the President recommending approval of the
loan, you make these points:
On the anniversary of his first year in office (November 3)
President Frei
addressed the nation. Regarding U.S. aid, he said:
“Without abandoning any of our fundamental positions,
we have maintained loyal and frank friendship with
the United States and have found in them
understanding for our task and fundamental economic
cooperation for the life of the country, which is a
debt that we recognize”.
Chile has told us that it will participate in the Rio
Conference.Reference is to the
Second Special Inter-American Conference which was held in
Rio de Janeiro November 17–30.We can hardly do less for a strong democracy like Chile than
we do for shaky constitutional government in Colombia and a de
facto government in Brazil.In terms of the contest between democracy and communism to
bring reform and prosperity to the people of Chile, and of the
other Latin American countries, we have a big stake in the
success of the Frei
experiment.The memorandum to
the President was apparently never sent. On November 15 the
Department informed the Embassy that action on the program
loan had been deferred pending the outcome of the Harriman–Solomon mission. (Telegram
454 to Santiago, November 15; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 10 IMF)
WGB
282. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador to Chile (Dungan)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Situation Room File, Outgoing Traffic,
11/9/65–11/14/65. Secret; Eyes Only. A draft with Bundy’s handwritten revisions is
ibid., White House Central File, Confidential File, Oversized
Attachments, December 1965.Washington, November 12, 1965, 8:48
p.m.
CAP 65695. Eyes Only for Ambassador from McGeorge Bundy.
October price rise in Chilean copper from 36 to 38 cents is
asserted by companies to be a primary reason for identical U.S.
copper price rise
announced this week by Anaconda and Phelps Dodge. This creates most
serious concern here and leads us to ask what combination of carrots
and sticks might persuade the Chileans to reduce their price by 2
cents.We fully recognize that export price of copper is a deeply
sensitive question in Chile and that world copper market is tempting
at present. But we also believe strongly that long-run price
stability is deeply in interest of both U.S. and Chile, and CEA as well as some of the wisest heads
in copper business tell us that high copper prices may simply lead
to rapid substitution of aluminum in important sectors of the
market, like automobile radiators and local electric transmission
lines. High voltage lines have already been lost to aluminum.We thus see a strong basis of common interest between Johnson and Frei administrations and sensible
copper companies in preventing runaway copper prices.We have our eye on the following possible sticks: Pending $80 million program loan.Hold-up on investment guarantees for $80 million Kennecott
loan to Chile and $135 million new Anaconda investment with
the result that there would be no expansion.Hold-up on pending Ex-Im Bank applications for $135
million of loans to companies operating in Chile.Use of 700-thousand-ton U.S. stockpile to break world
copper market.Use of government incentives to promote substitution of
aluminum for copper.Among carrots available we are considering: Strengthening of program loan in return for price
rollback. As we see it, two-cent increase brings only 38
million a year to Chilean Government, and we are ready to
consider sympathetically any politically manageable deal
which would cover cost of rollback.Continuing warm political support for Frei on all practicable
issues.Personal appeal to Frei from highest level here.We recognize difficulty of Chilean decision to reduce prices and
are prepared to do our best to create a situation in which such a
decision can be strongly defended by Chile. It occurs to us, for
example, that a price rollback here might usefully set stage for
later Chilean action, and there may be other things we can do which
you would see more clearly than we can. In any event, your
assessment should consider relative advantages of Chilean rollback
before, with, or after a decision by American companies to rescind
U.S. price increases.We know this is a tough one, but effective rollback of copper
price increases is at least equal in importance to earlier aluminum
rollback. Chilean
rollback now looks like the key, so success with Frei is of first importance to us.
We count on your political imagination to devise best possible
tactics to achieve this result.
Please answer via same communications channel.
283. Telegram From the Ambassador to Chile (Dungan) to the President’s
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, White House
Central File, Confidential File, Oversized Attachments, December
1965. Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to the Department of State.Santiago, November 13, 1965,
1530Z.
131545Z. Eyes Only for McGeorge
Bundy from Ambassador. Ref: CAP 65695.Document 282.
Understand generally impact copper price rise and effect on US
economy and problems caused by increase following on heels aluminum
roll-back. Request urgently some backup data on inflation effect in
order make convincing case here if this course is directed. Taken as
given the question of inflationary impact copper price rise, I
wonder whether you have bought too easily the assertion that Phelps
& Anaconda price increases necessitated by Chilean action. In
other words, there are two ways in which US economy could be
protected: (1) force roll-back in Chilean price increase as you
suggest or (2) force American companies to absorb raw material price
increase. Here are some factors which suggest course number two. Pure copper bars put on board ship Antofagasta at cost of 14½ cents per pound—copper
sold in US at 38 cents and on LME at 65 cents per pound. Somebody makes a
hell of a profit.Chilean copper represents only 13 percent American
consumption. According 1963 Bureau Mines figures Chilean
imports to US 228,000 tons out of consumption 1,744,000
tons. Therefore, theoretically Chilean price rise need have
minor inflationary impact in US. Chileans believe that
substantial amounts Chilean copper now being bought US
companies 38 cents going into London market at 65
cents.USG has held off antitrust
suit US companies at our request pending outcome copper
legislation. Suggest you consult findings Department of
Justice regarding price and market control in copper before
we embark on
what I consider to be a suicidal course in terms of American
foreign policy.I mention the above among other elements which should be
considered before the decision is made to force Chile to back down
on its recent price increase. I am not an expert on copper prices
and marketing, but I know enough to lead me to question whether
forcing Chile to back down is the only or best method to pursue in
order to keep prices to US copper consumers within non-inflationary
limits.
I am certain that you have already given thorough consideration to
inevitable adverse political effects of course suggested reftel. Political effects not only in
Chile but through the LDC’s.
Nevertheless, I feel I must state my own opinion before we embark on
this course.
Carrot-stick combination listed might succeed in forcing GOC rollback. The cost to the Frei government and to the extent that
it represents the hope of democracy and the Alliance for Progress in
Latin America would be incalculable. Recent increase to 38 cents
strongly supported by all political parties including the conservatives
and public opinion. LagarrigueJavier
Lagarrigue, head of the Chilean Copper Department. now
struggling against increasing pressure to push price to 40 cents in view
of tight market apparently continuing well into the future. In other
words, to force Frei government
to a rollback might very well bring the government down or so weaken it
as to make it difficult or impossible to pursue the reform program on
which it is embarked.
Substitution question is not paramount in Chilean minds. Their research
shows very tight supply for immediate future and increase markets in
developing countries as means of meeting long range marketing problems.
Moreover Chileans believe that substantial sales in London market over
relatively long period at high prices plus long term prospective tight
supply has probably already caused whatever substitution is likely to
occur. In other words, the substitution has or is occurring without any
price benefits redounding to Chile.
However the overriding consideration in your suggestion is whether we are
going to confirm in the minds, not only of Chileans, but all the world
the Marxist propaganda line that our only interest is in protecting the
profit situation of our American companies. I realize completely that
there is a large and critical American self-interest involved here. I
have no doubt that it is important to maintain stable prices in primary
metal in the American market. The central political question is who will
pay the piper. Reftel clearly says
that in every case where a price is to be paid it will be paid by the
producing country to the advantage of the American entrepreneur.
I respectfully suggest that most serious consideration be given to the
very long-run adverse political effects that course suggested in reftel will have for the United States.
I also respectfully suggest that the course suggested is political
suicide for the US in the developing world and particularly Latin
America.
If after your meeting today you conclude a Chilean roll-back is the only
solution I will put together your imposing arsenal of sticks and not so
imposing supply of carrots and make a deal. It can be done, I believe.
But the price will be atrocious and I strongly recommend that every
other course be explored before we resort to the one suggested reftel. There is also a very real
possibility that Frei as a matter
of principle and practical politics will consider this suggestion beyond
the pale.
I shall stand by for instructions. If you decide that the pitch should be
[made] I will try to do it today or tomorrow when I have lunch with
Frei.
Incidentally, the copper veto has not yet been released.Reference is to Frei’s program to manage the copper industry, which
was approved by the Chilean Congress on November 3. Frei subsequently modified the
proposal by presidential veto. I would not be at all
surprised to see the whole Chileanization scheme scrapped in face of
proposal in reftel and we would end
up with marketing monopoly if not outright nationalization. It probably
would be economic suicide for Chile but I think they might risk it.
Dungan
284. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs (Mann)Source:
Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C.
Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2, 1965–June 2, 1965. No
classification marking. Drafted by Patricia A. Saunders. Mann was in Washington; the
President was in Texas. According to the President’s Daily Diary,
Johnson placed the call.
(Ibid.)November 13, 1965, 12:15 p.m.
The President said he wanted to talk about the Chilean copper thing. He
said he guessed that Mr. Mann had
seen all the traffic including Dungan’s cableDocument 283. saying the copper
companies want to roll back. Mr. Mann said he had not seen the cable. The President asked
Mr. Mann to get all of the
communications and to read them and then they could see what could be
worked out. The President said that McNamara had talked with the President of AnacondaCharles Jay Parkinson. and they don’t
want a higher price. They say that the trouble is that Frei only has 30% of the Senate and
they forced him to raise the price to 38 and will force him to go to 40.
The President said that the danger was that they would go up
further.
The President said he had been advised to send a person down to convince
Frei that he should roll the
price back to 36¢. Ralph Dungan
says that the copper companies ought to roll back, not Chile. The
President said he thought we had to find some way to say we will both
roll back. He thought we should explain that if our economy goes bad we
will not be able to give any loans. Ask them to keep the price down and
keep it out of the papers. Tell them we have not decided on an $80
million loan—probably will give them 60, but we will talk about that
later.
The President said he had been informed that Mr. Mann was not the one to go down to
Chile for this job. Mr. Mann said
that was correct—he was too visible. The President said they were
suggesting Clifford, but he did not like to use
these private lawyers who had clients of their own.
Mr. Mann asked about Bob Anderson and the President said he
thought he was a little too much Johnson. Mr. Mann said he thought he was a very
convincing talker and that he can make a very good case. Mr. Mann said he thought perhaps we should
send someone down outside of government.
Mr. Mann said that Mr. Bundy was suggesting a young fellow
named Gensberg (?)Reference is apparently
to Edmund E. Getzin, chief of the Division of Industrial and
Strategic Materials Division, Office of International Commodities,
Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State. on his
staff. Mr. Mann said he did not
know him. The President said he was more of a price man in this country
and he did not think he was the one to do it.
Mr. Mann said we needed a tough
guy and that the best negotiator in this building was Tony Solomon. He negotiated the
agreements with Brazil and the first one with Chile and Mr. Mann was convinced that he would do the
job. He added that Mr. Solomon
has no political image—he is just a very good economist. Mr. Mann said if the President wished to
choose someone to go, Solomon
could accompany that person. This would eliminate the need for the
person chosen by the President to speak Spanish.
The President asked if Berle would
be any good. Mr. Mann said he
might. He said he knew the Latins and he has a liberal image.
Mr. Mann said he thought the trick
would be to send somebody down to say the first objective is to get a
roll back to 36¢. Mr. Mann said
he would have to say that the American companies would go along with it.
Even if this failed, at least we should get a commitment not to go any
higher. Mr. Mann said he would
hope that both things could be accomplished. He said he thought the
substitution argument 36 to 38¢ makes aluminum competitive with copper,
and the argument that Chile has a program to increase its production
from 600,000 to 1 million tons by 1970, should show that the Chilean
Government has every reason to keep the price down so that they do not
lose the market. They should go into volume rather than price. Mr.
Mann said it might also help
if we could offer them something on our tariff. He said he did not know
what the US attitude would be but we do produce 90% of our own
consumption.
Mr. Mann said another arrangement
would be the stockpile. And another would be the AID package.
Mr. Mann said the one thing we
should not do is offer them any kind of political support. He said that
Frei was o.k. but that his
party has leftwingers and the opposition is leftwing and they may shift
any day on Chicom representation in
the UN or they could take all of Latin
America away from support of keeping them out. They could also shift on
the Dominican Republic.
The President asked if they had any communists in the government. Mr.
Mann said no, but they are in
the opposition. He said that in the party they have socialists who are
even left of the communists—who are for violent political action. He said that he felt, with these
pressures, we could not depend on Frei’s political moves. The President asked what
political support Mr. Mann was
talking about and Mr. Mann said
that he was referring to the paragraph in the cable that went out last
night from the W.H.Document 282. The President asked
who sent it and whether Mr. Mann
had seen it. Mr. Mann explained
that Mr. Bundy had tried to reach
him but he was at the Japanese [Embassy?] and they could not get to
him.
Mr. Mann said that the President
should not forget that Frei has a
lot of leverage on us because of the US copper industry and the deal
just through Congress. He said we should not push him too far.
Mr. Mann said the second thing was
the cartel with Zambia and Congo. He said Zambia will be under great
pressures to impose economic pressures against Southern RhodesiaOn November 11 Prime Minister Ian D. Smith
unilaterally declared Rhodesia’s independence, prompting Zambia and
Great Britain to press for economic sanctions. and if they do
then there will be the problem of getting Zambian copper out. He said
this copper goes through Rhodesia and the Rhodesians could retaliate.
One-sixth of the world’s copper is produced in Zambia and if this were
taken off the market Mr. Mann did
not think we could hold the price line. Mr. Mann said he thought we should get the UK to help us in urging the Zambians not to
get into blows and counter-blows with the Rhodesians.
The President said that he thought Mr. Mann should try to pull this together. The President
said that he is advised that an emissary should go to Chile right now.
McNamara thinks that the
price will go to 40¢.
The President said he would like to have a memo from Mr. Mann on the following items.
Points:How do we increase our own production and the production of
friendly countries—work around the clock, do it any way we
can.Find out what procurement the government has—not only Defense
Department but each and every agency.Forego, substitute, postpone or minimize the use of
copper.See what the principal civilian requirements are such as power
companies, what suggestions they have on how they could minimize
consumption—civilian as well as government.Try to evolve some plan that could be sold to any leftist that
would show it would be to his gain rather than loss. Frei’s expansion
programSubstitution argumentStock pileTariffAID Package
Mr. Mann asked the President who
was in touch with the companies and the President said McNamara and Califano.
[Omitted here is discussion of possible candidates for the mission to
Chile.]
285. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
(Mann)Source: Johnson Library, White House
Central File, Subject File, Ex BE 4/Copper. No classification
marking. Drafted by James D. Johnston, Mann’s staff assistant. The memorandum was evidently
sent to the President at the LBJ
Ranch in Texas.Washington, November 13, 1965.
Our views on the Chilean export of the copper problem follow:
You should know that we have a telegram from our embassy in ZambiaTelegram 711 from Lusaka, November 12.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 16 RHOD)
reporting that President Kaunda believes that the British measures
against Southern Rhodesia are deficient; and that if the rebellion is
not nipped in 3 months, the Rhodesian rebels can consolidate their
positions and begin winning sufficient international support to make the
unilateral declaration of independence irreversible. Kaunda believes
that active participation by Zambia in the sanctions program is
indispensable if the program is to succeed. He says Zambia cannot be the
channel for sustaining the Smith regime. Kaunda, therefore, requests the
British and us to provide contingency and economic assistance so as to
permit Zambia to impose a total boycott on all Rhodesian imports,
including coal.
George Ball and I believe this
poses even more serious problems than last month’s Chilean price
increase. We are sending a cable,Not
further identified. copy of which will be repeated to you,
which will in essence point out that Katanga and Rhodesia supply 25% of
the world’s supply of copper and if this were taken off the market, not
only would a world shortage and sky-rocketing prices result, but the
British would lose a large amount of foreign exchange (British have spoken to
George Ball about 200,000,000
pounds), which they have asked if we could replace. We have replied to
the British in the negative, given our balance of payments situation. We
are saying to Kaunda that Zambian sanctions against Southern Rhodesia
would hurt Southern Rhodesia less than counter-sanctions against Zambia
by Southern Rhodesia would hurt Zambia, since: (a) railroad through
which Zambian copper now moves to sea passes through Southern Rhodesia
and we are not certain of time it would take or the cost to ship Zambian
copper by other means; (b) Zambia is dependent on Rhodesia for coal.
Telegram presumably will say that we are not prepared to pick up large
checks either for Zambia or for the British if Zambia engages in
sanctions campaign against Southern Rhodesia. Also, Zambia may have in
mind military and other actions in addition to economic sanctions.
On the Chile side of the copper problem, we think an effort should be
made to get Frei to agree: (a) to
rollback copper price from 38¢ to 36¢ contingent
on U.S. industry taking the lead and, (b) regardless of Frei’s willingness to do a rollback, to
agree to resist pressures which Dungan reports already exist for additional price rises.
Avoidance of additional price increases in view of the uncertain Zambian
situation is even more important than the rollback.
In approaching Frei, we should not
push our case to the breaking point since Chile’s ability to reverse its
position on the agreement reached with the copper companies and Chile’s
ability to expropriate the copper mines, gives Frei real leverage in the precise area
which is of most concern to us at this time.
Ball, Solomon and I agree that the most effective way to
approach Frei would be to
emphasize the following point: A 38¢ price level—and even more so if price levels increase—
will result in substitution of aluminum for copper. This
conflicts with the plans of the Chilean government already
publicly announced to increase copper production from 600,000 to
1,000,000 metric tons by 1970. The United States is, itself, a
large copper producer and we believe maximum revenue from
industry will be gained by paying attention to volume as well as
to price.Not only in order to maximize the return from the copper
mining industry but also in order to prevent inflationary price
increases consistent with actions which the U.S. government has
already taken with regard to aluminum, the U.S. government would
be prepared to sell from its stockpile. We should not commit
ourselves at this time to sell, or to sell at any particular
price level, but should leave the impression in Frei’s mind that we will
probably sell from our strategic stockpile if the price remains
at 38¢. The experts tell us that the President has the authority
to sell from the 775,000-ton stockpile by making a determination that the national
security justifies such action. There would, however, almost
certainly be sharp criticism of this action on the ground that a
security stockpile was being used to support price
policy.Inflationary price rises in the U.S. set off by copper will
have an adverse impact on the U.S. competitive position and
hence on U.S. balance of payments position. This would, of
course, affect the ability of the U.S. to finance its AID program. We, therefore, think
that Frei should
cooperate with us in maintaining a reasonable price level in
copper. If the Chilean government can cooperate with us, we
would be prepared to finance through the Exim Bank, the purchase
of 2 jet aircraft valued around $15 million and to make a
program loan at an $80 million level. This would help cushion
the loss of $16 million which would result from a 2¢ rollback in
the price of Chilean copper.The U.S. will undertake at the earliest opportunity within the
GATT framework to eliminate
the present U.S. tariff of 1.7¢ a pound on imported copper (this
has some, but only limited, attraction for Chile because
Kennecott and Anaconda, under an agreement with the Chilean
government, currently absorb this tax so that Chilean government
revenues would not be currently affected. However, this has some
attraction for Chile since it does remove one trade barrier and
presumably increases their ability to extract additional
concessions from the companies).
We have considered, but do not yet have final opinions, on the following
additional aspects of the problem: Increase of production. Our present information from industry
sources is that it would take 12 to 18 months to increase
production either here or abroad.U.S. government procurement. We will try this afternoon to get
some figures or information on this from other U.S. government
agencies and will report later.Possibility of postponement or substituting uses of copper.
Our first information is that the substitution of aluminum for
copper in underground cables and in some automobile parts, such
as radiators, is not yet technically and economically feasible.
It may be in the future. We need more time to report on
this.Suggestions from major users of copper as to ways of
minimizing consumption. We will need more time to report on
this. Consultation with industry will be required.In addition to the points suggested above, arguments Frei could use to convince
Leftists and Nationalists that copper rollback is in Chilean
interest. We could suggest to Frei that Chile, Canada, the United Kingdom,
Peru, Zambia, the U.S. and other copper producers consult
together concerning measures for keeping prices at a level which will not invite
substitutions and be harmful to the copper industry and at the
same time meet world demand during this period of shortage and
uncertainty. Frei might
find that participation in a committee of this kind would be
useful to him from a domestic political standpoint.
On the separate question of who might be the most effective persons to
approach Frei, George Ball and I believe that Governor
Harriman and Tony Solomon, together, would be the
best choice for this job.A handwritten note
from Marvin Watson records the President’s decision: “Califano—call Tom Mann notify Harriman and Solomon ask them to undertake this
assign[ment] and proceed as your judgment dictates.” (Johnson
Library, White House Central File, Subject File, Ex BE 4/Copper) For
another account of these instructions, see Joseph A. Califano, Jr., The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson: The White House
Years, p. 102.
Thomas C. MannPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
286. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White
House.Santiago, November 16, 1965,
0001Z.
629: Ref: Embtel 626.Telegram 626 from Santiago, November 15, reported
that Harriman had arrived in
Santiago without publicity. (Ibid., INCO COPPER 17) For
President from Harriman. Pass
Ball, McNamara, Mann, Califano,
Bundy.
At 3 p.m. Ambassador Dungan, Solomon
and I met with President Frei
alone at his private residence. I stressed President Johnson had personally sent mission
to share with Frei some of
his problems as U.S. President: Inflation. Underlined serious concern that unless great
care exercised inflation could jeopardize continued success
of full employment economy policies beneficial not only U.S.
but world economy. If we can hold prices, success possible
without serious reduction overseas expenditures.Balance of Payments. Though situation somewhat improved,
we have come to limits requiring great care be
exercised.Copper Prices. Reviewed steel and aluminum cases. Said
President Johnson
feels Chile the bellwether: If Chile brings price back to 36
cents price rise can be prevented. Said President Johnson asks Frei’s cooperation to
reverse this recent price increase knowing he is equally
concerned with the health of the world’s economy. Pointed to
gain for Chile in discouraging substitution for copper.
Noted that President Johnson feels that Frei and he have same
material as well as political interest in this.I then said we realize there are serious political difficulties
for President Frei in
considering this, and that we are prepared to discuss ways and means
of helping him cooperate in bringing copper price back to 36 cents.
We authorized to discuss ways of compensating Chile for short-term
loss involved. Moreover, we would welcome any ideas on ways in which
we can help Frei with
political problems his cooperation would pose.President Frei responded
that “naturally” he must consider the question because President
Johnson had sent a
personal mission asking him to do so. “My disposition is to help,
because the United States helps us. But the problem is not easy,” he
said, giving the following reasons: It is not just a problem of the U.S. market, but also the
London market which indirectly affects prices on more than
one million tons of copper in the world market.All political elements in Chile have attacked the GOC for not setting even higher
copper prices. The conservatives, radicals and liberals have
even been more strongly critical than the Communists. The
most reasonable of congressmen have spoken of 45 cents, the
radicals of 50 cents, and others even more.Substitution problem very serious, Frei convinced, when London
market goes over 60 to 62 cents. (Yesterday it was 67
cents.)Some producers (not American companies) are purchasing
copper at 38 cents, processing it, and selling in Europe at
67 cents. In view of this Frei has been criticized here for
discouraging further price increase.GOC cabinet members are
unanimously in favor of increasing the Chilean selling price
still further. Frei
has stood alone in cabinet arguing for “rational” pricing
policy. GOC has advised
European consumers of intention (but not formal decision) to
raise Chilean price to 40 cents in early January if the
present conditions of the London market continue. All
members of cabinet feel price should be over 40
cents.President Frei then
described his difficult struggle to reverse the serious inflation
which existed when he came into office, and emphasized the
“tremendous importance” to Chile for balance of payments and other
reasons for a one cent change in the copper price. “For us copper is
not just one problem; it is the problem,” Frei said. He recognized he must
have good will for President Johnson whom he described as extremely open and
generous toward Chile.Frei asked if U.S. could not
keep U.S. price at 36 cents by removing 1.7 cent import duty.
Solomon replied that
though that should be part of the considerations, the price
stability of the world copper market which we both desire requires
the cooperation of our two countries. Unilateral U.S. action on
tariff without GOC roll-back would
promote undesirable multiplicity of price markets in various parts
of the world.Frei said he would consult
with his advisers, and arranged for Solomon and Dungan to meet at 6 p.m. this evening with Saez,
Lagarrigue and Tomic to
explore in depth ramifications and possibilities. He agreed that
this evening’s meeting might be first of several. He has agreed to
see us again possibly 10 o’clock this evening if other meeting makes
sufficient progress.An account of the
meeting among Solomon,
Sáez, and others is in telegram 630 from Santiago, November 16.
The Embassy also reported that Frei had decided against meeting at 10 p.m. in
order to confer with his advisers. (Ibid., POL 7 US/HARRIMAN)
Comment: Difficult as yet to judge whether
Frei’s willingness to explore
possibilities represents simply courtesy to President Johnson or a degree of substantive
flexibility. Obviously he will be influenced by the advice of his
experts as well as his political pressures. Strike still unsettled and
copper bill must be returned to Congress shortly with both item vetoes
and essential additional provisions requiring majority approval of both
Houses.
Dungan
287. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, INCO COPPER 17.
Secret; Immediate; Nodis. No time
of transmission appears on the telegram; it was received in the
Department at 4:42 a.m.Santiago, November 17, 1965.
642. Fm Harriman to the President.
Info Ball, Mann, McNamara, and Califano.
At a meeting with Ambassador Dungan, Solomon
and me this evening, President Frei (Tomic,
Saez, Lagarrigue also present), received us in a grave mood. He began by stating simply and
clearly that President Johnson’s
request for rollback of copper price poses the most difficult problem
conceivable for his government at this time. However, referring to
substantial assistance US provides Chile, Frei stated that it was not in his “hands” to say no to
a request from President Johnson
for cooperation. Frei said that
the economic difficulties of the price rollback, although important,
were not controlling and that the discussions between us had been
“positive”.
Political Problem for GOC: Before
describing further the substance of his response, Frei elaborated political problem
request poses. If GOC reduces copper
price to 36 cents it will have to face a “political crisis of the
highest magnitude.” Although he personally can understand why it is
desirable accede President’s request, it is absolutely impossible to
explain to the Chilean people [who] see US as so tremendous,
powerful and rich that it is not possible for them to understand why
such step necessary. No political party, nor the military nor the
ordinary Chilean would understand. Opposition already maintains that
GOC has given excessive benefits
to American companies in copper agreements. Only today, he noted,
important Chilean mining entrepreneurs called on him urging that
time ripe to raise copper prices to 45 cents. Frei asked specifically that I
inform President Johnson that
he can count on GOC’s cooperation
but “If President Johnson can
find another formula, another way, he will again render us a new
service. But if he cannot find another way of handling this problem,
we will cooperate even though this means for GOC the gravest risk in its history.”Timing of Chilean Response: Frei then turned to problem of timing proposed
Chilean rollback. Two factors make present moment extremely
unfavorable for rollback: Copper strike, which hope to resolve within a week,
resolved by drastic action. (President Frei this afternoon,
exercising emergency powers, arrested several leaders of
socialist-led copper workers union and took over operation
mines.)Copper legislation, which he hoped would be resolved in a
month. To move price down now would probably kill
legislation, Frei
concluded.
Two alternatives proposed by Frei: First—Chile would roll back price in its
world sales but only after other major producers take the
initiative. Politically impossible for GOC to take initiative for rollback. Initiative
would bring his government down. Chile would, however, follow
lead by U.S. domestic and European producers, and we could
inform the European producers of this agreement which GOC would confirm. I responded that
our understanding had been that Chile was the bellwether, and I
questioned whether USG has
leverage to induce Europeans take lead.
Second—bilateral arrangement with U.S. to reduce price on copper
for U.S. consumption to 36 cents. Frei turned to this second alternative by saying
that if U.S. and Europeans cannot take initiative, let us then
restrict the problem to the U.S. market. Chile’s real interest
is in cooperating with the U.S., not with Europe, which would
benefit from general reduction in Chilean price. Frei said there have been
several instances in past when price to U.S. for Chilean copper
was below general Chilean world producers’ price; the most
noteworthy example the agreement in 1951 with President Truman
which was dictated by Korean War circumstances.Documentation on the agreement, which was
concluded on May 7, 1951, is in Foreign
Relations, 1951, vol. II, pp. 1239–1242, 1258–1273,
and 1276–1279. Vietnam is similar situation,
Frei noted.
Frei made it clear that
his preference is for the second alternative. When Solomon explained U.S. faced
with difficult problem if action not taken within few days,
Frei responded that
under second alternative we could begin discussions immediately
on informing U.S. domestic producers of impending Chilean
rollback and in the meantime Chile could suspend application of
38 cent price to exports for U.S. consumption.
Importance to GOC of U.S.
cooperation: Frei went to
considerable lengths to stress his conviction that Chile’s national
interest lies in promoting close and cooperative relationship with
USG. If U.S. is truly interested
in Chile’s “experiment” it will succeed, he said. Frei explained that “We are for
free enterprise, not [Communist?] economy. We must make agricultural
and economic reforms made 30 years ago in Europe and the United
States, in spite of strong opposition from vested interests.” It is
essential for GOC that Chilean
people sense clearly USG confidence
in GOC.I told President Frei we
would advise Washington of his proposals and left open question of
considering other alternatives.
Comment: Ambassador Dungan and Solomon concur with me that compelling Frei, assuming that could be done,
which we doubt, to take the first open action to rescind the price
increase would represent too high a political cost to Chile and to the
U.S. Also we believe there is fair chance (based on our conversations
with Brinckerhoff of Anaconda and other copper experts), that given
their past opposition to price increases, European producers would go
along with U.S. domestic producers in rescinding price increase if they
were assured that Chile would follow as Frei has promised. However, Washington is in better
position to ascertain if this presumption correct under present world
circumstances. Certainly it is the unanimous view of all experts that
raising margin
requirements in New York copper market and tightening trading practices
on London Metal Exchange (with its consequent reduction in prices) would
make this price reduction more feasible for all producers, both in
Africa and the U.S., as well as for the GOC.
Question arises if Frei’s second
alternative—reducing prices to 36 cents on all sales to U.S. market—is
not more advantageous from U.S. viewpoint since the cost of offsetting
Chile’s financial loss would be 1/6 or less of the cost under the first
alternative. Also it then makes sense to apply export controls on copper
to keep the U.S. economy on 36 cent copper which is certainly easier
than trying to keep worldwide producer sales on 36 cents, particularly
with possibility of Zambian difficulties.
If, however, decision is to opt for first alternative of worldwide price
reduction, then we believe that economic package outlines previous cable
636Telegram 636 from Santiago, November
16, reported on a second meeting among Solomon, Sáez, and others, in which the Chileans
suggested elements of a tentative agreement. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, INCO COPPER
CHILE) would probably suffice, bearing in mind Frei’s caveat about U.S., Canadian and
European producers reducing prices first with him following after strike
and copper bill settled, estimated to take four weeks.
Although we are not recommending it, if it is difficult to reach decision
quickly between alternatives, we could attempt to conclude now agreement
with Frei based on alternative
two, but leaving open to us option for reasonable time to explore
feasibility of alternative one.
During conversation Frei was
informed by Dungan of uncertain
GOC position on ChiCom
representation issue. Frei
reacted immediately. Went to telephone and ordered GOC representative to vote against
admission Communist China.
Dungan
288. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in ChileSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, INCO COPPER 17.
Secret; Nodis; Flash. Drafted by
Mann, cleared at the
White House and by Bell
(paragraph on AID), and approved by
Mann.Washington, November 17, 1965, 8:47
p.m.
469. For Harriman and Solomon. Please express to President
Frei President Johnson’s warm personal thanks for his
offer of cooperation. We are gratified that he understands the reasons
why the failure to hold the price line in the US economy would be
detrimental not only to the US but to the hemisphere and the world.
In view of the need for urgent action here and Frei’s political difficulties described
in Embtel 642Document 287. we accept Frei’s second
alternative, i.e., a bilateral arrangement between Chile and the US.
We plan, as a first step, to make a public announcementThe text of the announcement made by Secretary of
Defense McNamara is in
telegram Tosec 42 to Rio de
Janeiro, November 18. (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, INCO COPPER 17) at 7:15 p.m.
Washington time today November 17 which will refer to hostilities and
disturbances on world scene and threatened disruptions and distortions
of copper market which pose problem of inflationary pressures in copper
and generally throughout our economy. (You may inform Chileans that
because of press leaks today on copper problem it was necessary to move
quickly in order to avoid risk that substantial quantities of copper
would be attracted abroad by higher prices.) USG announcement will cover following specific points: USG will promptly make available
approximately 200,000 tons of copper from the stockpile and
arrange for its orderly disposition to correct current imbalance
between supply and demand. FYI.
The mention of this amount of copper does not foreclose the
possibility of additional releases in the future should this
prove to be necessary. End FYI.Special export licenses will henceforth be required for
exports of copper produced in the US or imported for consumption
in the US market. Export licensing procedure would apply to
scrap. FYI. This would be
necessary to prevent higher prices elsewhere draining copper
from this economy. Licenses would of course be granted for
Chilean copper imported into the US in blister form for
processing and reexport. End FYI.The President will recommend to Congress early in 1966 a
suspension of import duties for a limited period of time. The
exact nature of the
Executive’s recommendation to the Congress will be determined
after appropriate consultation with the Government of Chile, the
US copper industry and the US Congress. FYI. An alternative formula would be the
elimination of the 1.7¢ a pound tariff so long as the world
price should remain above a certain level. The GOC should not be informed of this
however unless Washington specifically so authorizes you. End
FYI.USG will discuss with Directors
of New York Commodity Exchange solution of problem of excessive
speculation in copper trading, perhaps by raising the margin
requirements to a figure comparable to requirements for trading
on the New York Stock Exchange. FYI. USG has no
legislative authority to direct that this be done. End FYI.
Once this announcement is made we believe, on basis of our conversation
with members of US copper industry today, that US producers will in the
case of Kennecott maintain its current 36¢ price level and that other US
producers will roll back to 36¢ a pound. We estimate the steps taken in
the announcement will result in a 36¢ price level in our market.
As we understand, GOC, when US price
level at 36¢ is established, would be willing to make available, through
the usual commercial channels, copper in quantities currently being
imported for consumption in the US at a price of 36¢. FYI. The current level of US imports of
Chilean copper for domestic use is about 100,000 tons per annum. We
would prefer not to specify the 100,000 tons, thus leaving open the
possibility of being able, depending on future developments, to maintain
some flexibility in level of Chilean copper imports into this market.
Request your opinion however on whether failure to specify precise
tonnage would create a substantial risk that GOC will attempt to reduce this amount in the future
especially if world prices remain at a level higher than 36¢.
Continue FYI. Similarly, we are inclined
to believe it would be advantageous to US to fail to fix precise term of
bilateral arrangements with Chile since future is somewhat unsure,
especially in view of uncertainties surrounding future relations between
Southern Rhodesia on one hand and Zambia and Katanga on the other. We
are hopeful that Zambia and Katanga copper can continue to be exported
at current or increased levels but we cannot be sure that there will be
no temporary interruptions in flow from these sources.
Continue FYI. In addition to current
level of 100,000 tons imported from Chile, US is currently importing
about 150,000 tons from Canada produced by International Nickel and
Noranda and 50,000 tons from Peru produced by the Cerro Corporation. The
industry estimates that since both Canada and Peru have free economies
most of Canadian and Peruvian imports will continue to flow into this
market and that it will adjust
to 36¢ price level since it is in the interest of these producers to
maintain their traditional customers in this market and also because a
part of this fabrication of this copper is done in US. The 200,000 ton
imports from Canada and Peru will presumably be partially offset by
export controls on scrap which according to our latest information is
now leaving US at rate of about 135,000 tons annually. Balance can
presumably be made up from stockpile. We do not think it is necessary
therefore to approach Canadian and Peruvian Governments at this time.
End FYI.
The US, in cooperation with policy of Chilean Government to reduce
inflationary pressures in Chilean economy and promote Chilean economic
development and social progress and, in cooperation with programs of
international institutions, will make available 90 million dollar
program loan on terms and conditions to be agreed upon by Governments of
US and Chile. Negotiations will commence immediately and will follow
self-help principles already discussed between two governments. Ten
million dollars was added to 80 million dollar figure previously under
consideration in view of estimated four million dollar loss to Chilean
economy from roll back to 36¢.
Report urgently whether this arrangement is satisfactory to Chilean
Government.
FYI. Foregoing leaves unresolved
question of worldwide roll back which, as we understand, GOC is in any case unable to accept until
copper legislation is finally approved by Chilean Congress and until
strike is settled. Depending on reaction of world market to steps
described above we have in mind possibility of discussing with GOC later question of general roll back. We
leave to your discretion question of whether this possibility should be
mentioned to GOC at this time. Our
immediate aim is to obtain roll back in Chilean copper exported to US
and this is paramount for time being.
Likewise we leave to your judgment whether to inform Chilean of
following: Industry members today expressed strong opposition to copper
commodity agreement. It is possible that we will be able to bring them
around on this point but we are not in a position now to make any
commitments to GOC beyond statement that
we are prepared to discuss this problem with them since a commodity
agreement would presumably require Congressional approval and we are
uncertain at this time of what Congressional attitude would be,
especially if US industry is strongly opposed.
We did not reveal to industry today fact that Chileans had raised with
you possibility of USG using its
influence to get companies to agree to additional concessions in their
negotiations with GOC. We estimate
situation at moment here is such that this would be unwise since our
program is dependent on cooperation of industry. We are not therefore in a position to make any
commitments at this time concerning negotiations between GOC and copper companies beyond undertaking
to permit floating of 20,000 dollar Chilean bond issue in this market
and permitting financing of Chilean copper expansion program along lines
already discussed.
For same reasons we did not discuss with industry representatives
question of creation of revolving fund and have not had time to study
effect on US economy of increased Chilean capacity to process copper.
You should therefore make no commitments regarding this.
We are however as always ready to discuss with Chileans these and other
problems in an effort to find a mutually beneficial solution.
Report soonest GOC reaction to
foregoing.Frei accepted the U.S.
proposal in a meeting with Harriman on November 18. Harriman and Frei agreed that the understanding should be
“essentially verbal,” but that Solomon and Sáez would draft an unsigned memorandum
for the record. (Telegram 661 from Santiago, November 18; ibid.)
Califano forwarded a
copy of the unsigned memorandum to President Johnson on November 20. (Johnson
Library, White House Central File, Confidential File, Oversized
Attachments, December 1965)
Ball
289. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. IV, 10/65–7/67.
Confidential.Washington, December 10, 1966.
SUBJECT
Loans for Chile
AID requests (Tab B),Tab B was a memorandum from Gaud to the President, November 16;
attached but not printed. under the new commitments
procedure, your approval of a $65 million assistance package for Chile
divided as follows:
—$35 million program loan;—$20 million sector loan for
agriculture;—$10 million sector loan for
education.
The request is $25 million under what you approved for 1966, and $40
million less if the PL 480 reduction is
included.
Joe Fowler concurs in the proposed program (Tab
C).Tab C was a memorandum from
Fowler to the President, undated; attached
but not printed.AID knows about the understandings
mentioned by Fowler in his note. Charlie Schultze recommends your
approval (Tab A).Tab A was a memorandum
from Schultze to the
President, November 30; attached but not printed.
One aspect in which you will be particularly interested is the
relationship of continued high copper prices and the level of our
assistance. Bill Gaud foresees
the possibility that copper prices in 1967 may stay close to the present
high level. Against this possibility, he plans to release the $35
million program loan in three tranches, the final $15 million subject to
need in the light of copper prices and exchange reserve trends. From the
windfall copper earnings this year, the Chilean Government has agreed to
use, as the situation permits, $40 million for advance repayment of
short term US debt: $7 million to the US Treasury and $33 million to US
private banks.
Tony Solomon and Linc Gordon strongly recommend that we
not try to get the type of copper arrangement with Chile that we had
this year. Their reasons and alternative suggestion for handling—which
they have discussed with Joe
Califano and Gardner
Ackley—are explained in the memorandum at Tab D.Tab D was a memorandum from Gordon to the President, November
23; attached but not printed. They propose securing a Chilean
commitment that Anaconda will supply the United States with 125,000 tons
or more at market price during 1967 instead of extending this year’s
deal which would cost AID $25 million
for the difference between 36 cents and present market price.
I join Gaud,
Fowler and Schultze in recommending that you approve the Chilean
aid package.None of the options below is
checked. On December 20 the Embassy reported that Frei had decided to forego the
program loan due to increased revenues from the high price of
copper. (Telegram 2119 from Santiago, December 20; Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. IV, 10/65–7/67) In
a December 21 memorandum to Rostow, Bowdler called the report a
“bombshell,” although he noted that Frei still wanted $30 million of sector assistance.
Bowdler also commented:
“This demonstration of Chilean self-help is welcome, even if it
makes AID’s estimates of Chilean
requirements look a little sick.” (Ibid.)
Approve
Disapprove
Speak to me
Solomon– Gordon formula for meeting our copper
requirements from Chile for 1967.
ApproveThe President
checked this option.
Disapprove
Speak to me
Walt
290. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (Hughes)
to Secretary of State RuskSource:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, OPR/FAIM/IS
Files: Lot 81 D 121, Chile (INR),
Background Intelligence Notes and Memorandums, 1963–1974.
Confidential.No. 55Washington, January 25, 1967.
SUBJECT
Frei Moves to Break Political
Impasse in Chile
President Eduardo Frei has faced
up squarely to the major political crisis which began on January 17 when
the Chilean Senate denied him permission to leave the country for a
visit to the US.President Johnson announced on December 20,
1966, that Frei had accepted
his invitation to make an official visit to Washington February 1–2,
1967. The statement included the following remark: “I am
particularly interested in learning more from President Frei about the achievements of his
great experiment of revolution in freedom.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966,
Book II, pp. 1446–1447) Senators who opposed the visit cited this
remark in refusing to grant permission for Frei to leave the country. (New York Times, January 18, 1967) Although
both sides continued to discuss the possibility of a visit,
Frei never visited the
United States as President of Chile. He has chosen to force
what may be a political showdown with his opposition rather than to risk
further erosion of his leadership and authority to execute foreign
policy and to implement his domestic program. Although the outcome of
Frei’s struggle with the
opposition is by no means assured, his prospects of success now seem
reasonably good.
Frei will fight.
Frei will be both aggressive
and shrewd in combatting the presently united Senate opposition. He
undoubtedly hopes to inflict sufficient damage within opposition ranks
to ensure a viable course for his program during the remaining three
years of his tenure in office. He will try to use to full advantage the
sympathy for him and outrage toward the Senate opposition felt by many
Chileans who Consider that their national prestige has been tarnished.
His proposal for a constitutional amendment which would allow him to
dissolve Congress and call new elections has apparently taken the
initiative away from the opposition and frightened some sectors within
it. In his battle to sustain his political leadership, Frei will probably rely heavily upon
generating and channelling public opinion to support his cause and
confound his enemies. At the same time, he will seek to divide the
fragile and eventually untenable togetherness which at present unifies
the right, the Radical center, and the extreme left. On the tactical
level, Frei has already begun to
oust officeholders belonging to the opposition parties—principally
Radicals—from government jobs.
The escalating conflict. The spectacular success
of Frei and his Christian
Democratic Party (PDC) in the 1964 and
1965 elections badly shook the opposition parties. Instead of the
traditional Chilean Government by coalition and compromise, the
opposition was faced with a well-defined program backed by a party
controlling a majority in the Chamber of Deputies and the largest single
bloc (13 of 45 seats) in the Senate. Initially, the opposition sought to
delay and compromise, but the President’s resistance to any watering
down of his program, reinforced by his continued popular support,
brought about a hardening of opposition which finally came to a head on
January 17 in the Senate veto of his US visit.
A blow where it hurts most. Frei has devoted much time and effort
to developing a position of leadership in hemispheric affairs. As one of
the outstanding Latin American advocates of social reform within a
democratic framework, he has travelled widely to express his views to
other leaders in the Hemisphere and in Europe. Frei hoped to use the occasion of his
planned trip to the US to strengthen his prestige and to discuss with
President Johnson topics which
may appear on the agenda of the Summit meeting that is under
consideration for April. The opposition parties not only bore a
cumulative grudge against Frei
over domestic issues but also strongly resented the boost to Frei’s standing which the US visit
would have represented. Their refusal to allow him to leave the country
was a measure of this resentment and an attempt to undercut Frei’s prestige by casting doubt on his
authority in Chile.
The Senate’s action arouses uncertainty as to whether Frei will attend the proposed Summit
meeting, where he would be expected to play an influential role. For the
moment, at least, Frei’s
attention has focused so sharply upon his domestic concerns that he
undoubtedly has relegated the Summit meeting to second place in his
order of priorities.
Constitutional reform proposal challenges
opposition. The opposition-controlled Senate can maintain its
bottleneck on Frei’s legislative
program and—as has been seen—can seriously hamper his conduct of foreign
policy; at least until the next congressional elections in 1969. To
overcome this stalemate is now the principal task facing Frei; to do so without either
sacrificing vital aspects of his program or abandoning his democratic
principles poses a major challenge to his ingenuity. Confident of his
public support, Frei denounced
his obstructionist opposition on January 19 in announcing the
constitutional reform proposal to allow dissolution of Congress and
holding of new elections. Rejecting both compromise and unconstitutional
methods, he challenged the opposition parties to let the people decide
who should speak for them.
Frei has stated his case in such
terms that an outright rejection of the reform proposal by the
opposition parties would be tantamount to an admission that they fear
elections, and that Frei is right
in calling the opposition “unrepresentative.” Nevertheless, the proposed
constitutional amendment is complicated, and Congress could well spend
many months discussing and amending it. Moreover, the constitution
requires that 60 days elapse between passage of an amendment by both
houses and final approval by a joint session. Meanwhile, the municipal
elections on April 2 will test the state of public opinion and thus each
party’s chances in national elections. A great victory by the PDC would adversely affect the prospects
for passage of the constitutional amendment, so far as opposition party
acquiescence is concerned; and a poor showing by the PDC would be likely to cause the
administration to reconsider its position on the amendment; if neither
extreme occurs, the amendment may well go through.
Can Frei
win? Frei’s personal
commitment to his program and to the battle to establish presidential
authority gives him an intangible but very real psychological advantage.
He seems to have maintained very substantial popular support and the
personal affront administered him by the opposition has almost certainly
enhanced his popular appeal. His constitutional reform proposal
obviously entails considerable risk to the PDC, but perhaps even more to the opposition. Certainly the
risk to some Radical and National Party senators is so great that the
very threat of the proposed amendment may provide useful opportunities
for disarming some elements of the Senate opposition, and perhaps thus
open the way for new working arrangements within the present
Senate.The proposal to amend the
constitution was passed on December 30, 1969, and signed into law on
January 21, 1970. In addition to a provision for national referenda,
the amendment allowed the President to leave the country for 2 weeks
without congressional approval. The amendment took effect on
November 4, 1970—the day after Frei left office.
291. Editorial Note
In early 1967 the Johnson
administration considered a proposal to provide financial support to the
Christian Democratic Party (PDC) for the
municipal elections in April. When Deputy Assistant Secretary Sayre first raised the issue on
February 17, Assistant Secretary Gordon replied: “On substance, you know my ground rule
that we should engage in election funding only where there is a clear US
national interest at stake. In Chile there was in the 1964 national
elections but this is not at all self-evident in the 1967 municipals. It
also seems to me extraordinary that PDC
should still need funding on this scale after two years in national
power.” “Much as we admire Frei,”
Gordon concluded, “a very
strong case would have to be made to justify this funding, and I have
grave doubts that it can be made.” (Memorandum from Gordon to Sayre, February 18; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Chile,
1967–1968)
At a March 2 meeting with Sayre,
William V. Broe, chief of the
Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate for Plans, reported that
Ambassador Dungan had forwarded a
request from President Frei for
funds to cover half of the PDC campaign
budget of $1 million. Although he was against financial support for the
party, Dungan suggested an
alternative: a direct subsidy of $75,000 to Frei himself. Dungan also recommended that the Johnson administration “express
interest” in giving the Christian Democrats assistance to “organize the
party more rationally and put it on a self-sustaining basis.” After
presenting the Ambassador’s views, Broe commented: “The $75,000 sop to Frei would accomplish little,” he
argued; “if we were to give any support at all, we would have to go all
the way.” In Broe’s opinion, the
United States should decline the request but do so in such a way as to
“hold out hope for the future.” Sayre maintained that the Christian Democrats were not
as badly organized as was generally believed. Moreover, Gordon had already questioned the need
for the program since there was no apparent threat to U.S. interests.
Sayre, therefore, agreed to
await the outcome of the municipal elections, i.e. to see how well the
PDC could do “without outside help.”
Sayre thought the Department
would instruct Dungan to “hold
out some hope” to the Christian Democrats “but not do anything.”
Broe replied that, “in view
of the time elapsed already, the Party has probably already gotten this
message.” (Memorandum for the record by Sliffman [Broe], March 6; ibid., Latin America,
1966, 1967, 1968)
292. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 IA
Summit. Confidential. Drafted by Barnes. Approved in S on April 19 and by the White House on
April 22. The luncheon meeting was held at President
Johnson’s temporary residence. The
memorandum is part II of II parts. Part I, “Conference of Chiefs of
State,” is ibid. The meeting of American chiefs of state was held at
Punta del Este, April 12–14.Punta del Este, April 13, 1967, 2:00
p.m.
SUBJECT
Chilean Progress and American Assistance
PARTICIPANTS
For the U.S.President Lyndon B.
JohnsonSecretary of State Dean
RuskAssistant Secretary Lincoln
GordonAmbassador to OASSol M. LinowitzSpecial Assistant to the President Walt W. RostowFor ChilePresident Eduardo
FreiForeign Minister Gabriel
ValdesAmbassador Radomiro
TomicAmbassador Pedro Daza(LAFTA)Amb. to OAS Alejandro
MagnetSpecial Advisor Raul Saez
Both President Johnson and
Secretary Rusk expressed their
praise for the progress made in Chile under the Frei administration. Secretary
Rusk said it was important for
the entire hemisphere that Chile become a successful example of economic
and social progress. President Frei said progress had been achieved in a number of
fields, such as housing, education, health, and industrialization, but a
great deal of work remained to be done in the field of agriculture. He
said he faced opposition from two extremes: the right on the one hand,
and the left, composed of the Socialists and Communists, on the other.
The Socialists were now more extremist than the Communists. The left
coalition was acting in a very aggressive fashion, realizing that if the
Frei administration were
successful, particularly in the field of agrarian reform, this success
would have a far-reaching impact, not only in Chile, but throughout
Latin America. It would spell the end of any hope for power in the hands
of the extreme left.
When Secretary Rusk asked President
Frei what his most pressing
problem was, he replied that it was the whole problem of agriculture.
Chile was going to have to spend $170 million on food imports this year.
In addition, Chile’s rural population was pressing for a betterment of
their conditions. In the past, any attempts to increase the prices of
agricultural products had been attacked as a boon to the wealthy
land-owners. Now, however, with an increasing number of small farmers
being created under
agrarian reform, this problem is decreasing in magnitude. Chile needed
fertilizer, seed, and credit for its agrarian reform and modernization
problem.
In this connection, Chile would like American assistance in a pilot
agricultural project. Chile would be able to finance compensation for
land, but would appreciate assistance in the other aspects of this
project.Tomic raised the “pilot
agricultural project” in a conversation with Gordon, April 27. Although he
failed to offer any details, Tomic maintained that agrarian reform in Chile would
fail without U.S. assistance. Gordon reiterated the “U.S. commitment to agrarian
reform in Latin America and our interest in seeing it succeed in
Chile.” Gordon suggested,
however, that further discussion of the issue take place in
Santiago. (Telegram 184953 to Santiago, April 29; ibid., POL 7 CHILE)
Finally, President Frei said that,
in spite of what some others had said in the course of the
conference,Reference is evidently to
critical remarks made by President Arosemena of Ecuador; see Document 51. he felt Chile had received the proper
understanding and cooperation from the United States.
293. Letter From the Ambassador to Chile (Dungan) to the Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs (Gordon)Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files, 1967: Lot 70 D 150, Chile
1967. Confidential; Official–Informal. A notation on the letter
indicates it was sent on April 24.Santiago, April 19, 1967.
Dear Linc:
Before getting into the main business of this letter, I want to offer my
most sincere congratulations to you as the person most responsible for
the success of the Punta del Este meeting. I know that in many ways it
was the product of team effort, but I also know that without your
persistent and wise leadership it could have been a fiasco. We are all
in your debt.
It occurred to me that while you had the benefit of our various cabled
analyses of the recent municipal elections,The “cabled analyses” are telegrams 3420, 3468, and 3658 from
Santiago, April 3, 5, and 14, respectively. (All ibid., Central
Files 1967–69, POL 18–1 CHILE) The
Christian Democratic Party received 36 percent of the vote; the
Radical Party finished second with 16 percent; the Communist,
National, and Socialist parties split the remainder. you
might like to have an informal
rundown of the situation as I see it. There is no doubt that the
Frei government and the
PDC took a drubbing in the eyes of
the public and the world, despite the fact that they made substantial
gains in the number of local officials whom they elected, and despite
the fact that they held onto significant elements of the electorate. In
my opinion the psychological defeat which they suffered was due in large
measure to their political error of projecting the municipal election as
a plebiscite. The situation is not dissimilar to that which we have in
the United States. You know the reluctance of an incumbent President to
commit his prestige in a Congressional election, but it would be
virtually impossible to get a President to put his prestige on the line
in a whole series of local contests. I’m really at a loss to know why
this happened here, and the only reason that I can deduce is that, stung
by the Senatorial rebuke in January, Frei felt that he had to strike back in a decisive way.
Moreover, I think he was bemused by the prospect that the magic of
Freismo could even pull him through an election in which local issues
and candidates traditionally have dominated the picture.
If he had not made it a plebiscite he could have very well argued that
this was simply a normal return of voters to their traditional political
homes. If, on the other hand, the PDC
had come out as everyone was predicting they would, he could have
claimed it as a magnificent surge in support of his program despite the
normal trend in municipal elections. There is no doubt that the
plebiscite decision was a major political blunder which is now well
recognized here in Chile.
But regardless of the psycho-political effect, do the election returns
have any real significance in terms of indicating an ideological or
political preference of the electorate? I am
inclined to think not. I believe that the Chilean electorate is
essentially a conservative electorate, but a large part of it is also
unsophisticated and really not clued in to the real issues on a
day-to-day basis. They tend to participate in elections every three or
four years without any continuing involvement, through the press or
otherwise, in what could be called “issue politics.” Moreover, in each
election there is a rather substantial group of new voters whose
political allegiances are increasingly difficult to predict. My own
belief is that local candidates and a certain discontent over PDC style (prepotencia), and the adverse
effect of stabilization on upper and middle class voters combined to
drive voters into their traditional political patterns.
If the election does not represent a significant shift in the
sociopolitical opinions of the electorate, it does represent a reshaping
of party political strength—the net effect of which is to shift the
effective political spectrum left. This may sound somewhat involved, but
let me describe what I mean. The Radical Party is in the control, and is
likely to remain in the control, of a Marxist-oriented faction. As a
minority and power-hungry party, the temptation to amalgamate with other
elements will be overpowering,
as we are now seeing in the Colchagua Senatorial election where the
Radicals have joined in support of a Socialist candidate. I believe that
the Communists will give tacit support to this kind of a coalition, and
among the three of them, on the basis of the municipal percentages, they
control more than 45% of the vote. If you add to this grouping some
disaffected left-wing PDCers and some spiteful Nacionales, you have a
majority of the Chilean electorate. The only coalition of forces (not
necessarily of parties) is left leaning. There does not appear to me to
be any attraction on the right. I would like to think that there is some
possibility of the center left elements in the Radicals regaining
control of their party and mobilizing their share of the electorate in
support of some sort of a loose arrangement with the PDC, but I honestly do not see it.
Surprising though it may seem, the anti-clerical basis of radicalism is
present here, but even more important, is the rejection by the moderate
elements of the Radicals, including Julio
Duran, of the reformist policies and programs which the
PDC and we have backed in Chile in
recent years.
Looking ahead, the picture as I see it is as follows. First, there will
be a two to two and a half year period of jockeying and flirtations
between Radicals and Socialists, perhaps some elements of the PDC with the Communists, and probably
continued friction between the Communists and the Socialists. In short,
the political picture in the immediate future is likely to be very
murky.
In the face of this, the Christian Democrats are faced with basically two
choices. First, nailing their shirt to the mast and plowing ahead with
their program, changing their rhythm to accord with economic reality,
and I believe most importantly, abandoning their ideological penchant
and attempting to build bridges to any respectable element in the
community which will support a progressive program. I describe this
political policy as pursuit of the politics of consensus, and abandoning
the politics of ideology.In a May 16 letter
to Dungan, Gordon replied that he was
“heartily in accord” with this conclusion: “In observing the
Frei–Tomic dichotomy over the last year,
I have been increasingly impressed with the absurdity of Tomic’s notion that the PDC could be made into a kind of
Chilean PRI (in Mexican terms), and
concerned at various missed opportunities to seek the support of
moderate Radicals and others outside the PDC fold. Is there anything that we might do to
encourage your recommended trend, other than friendly conversations
when the opportunity permits?” (Ibid., ARA Files, 1967: Lot 70 D 150, Chile 1967) I
believe that Frei can do this
because he is by far the strongest political force within the PDC. If he puts himself forward as
President of all the Chileans and makes clear in ways that he has not
done heretofore that he is working for the welfare of the bulk of the
Chileans, he may be able to pull it off. In other words, he must seek to
build around a core of 30–35% of the electorate a sufficient number of people who believe in the
soundness of his program to carry his party and his candidate to victory
in 1970. This will take some doing because it involves very courageous
acts on the economic side and a really completely new style of Chilean
politics.
The alternative to Frei being able
to pull this off, I think, is a return to the old system of three
political forces, with the Presidency probably going to a so-called
Popular Front candidate elected with the basic support of the Radicals
and Socialists, and I believe, the tacit support of the Communists. In
such a situation the PDC would come in
with about 30% of the vote and the Nationals with about 15–20%. It is
impossible to predict what kind of a program such a government would
advance, but I cannot but think that it would be either a do-nothing
government or one which would be oriented radically to the left.Sayre wrote the following
comment in the margin: “This is puzzling since Socialists are
farther to the left than Communists.” Gordon also picked up on this point in his letter of
May 16 cited above: “Given the extremely radical position of the
Socialists, and your own description on page 2 of the controlling
Radical faction as Marxist oriented, why should one be confident
that a Popular Front Presidency would not ‘be oriented radically to
the left.’ On the face of it, that would seem precisely the
orientation to be expected.” (Ibid.)
For the moment I really don’t think there is very much for us to do
except to keep our lines open to all elements, especially the Radicals
and the Nationals, and wait for the situation to clarify somewhat. I
think we should continue to support the bulk of the Frei program because it is the most
sensible—indeed the only coherent program in Chile today. However, I
think our support must be extended with a firmer hand than probably has
characterized our effort here in the past. I do not mean by this to be
self-accusatory, although undoubtedly we have made mistakes. I am simply
reflecting my conviction that the situation is a good deal crunchier at
the present time than it was before the April elections. It’s an up-hill
fight, politically and economically, and is going to require a higher
degree of discipline on their part than they were willing to accept
heretofore. Fortunately or unfortunately, we are part of the
disciplinary side of the equation.
I hope these thoughts may serve to clarify rather than to confuse those
of you who are trying to make something out of this complex situation. I
assure you that we are not pessimistic but that we, as I think the
present government does, recognize the need for change of style and a
change of pace. I don’t think there’s much danger of a strong shift to
the left within the PDC, but only the
next few months will be able to give us a clear indication of that.
With every best wish.
Sincerely,
Ralph
294. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Gordon) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs (Kohler)Source: Department of State, INR/IL
Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, c. 49, April 28, 1967.
Secret; Eyes Only. Sayre
initialed the memorandum for Gordon.Washington, April 25, 1967.
SUBJECT
Proposal to Aid Moderate Elements in Radical Party of Chile
There is attached a memorandum for the 303 CommitteeDated April 8; attached but not printed.
that proposes covert financial assistance of $20,000 to the moderate
faction of the Radical Party (PR) of Chile to attempt to contain the
drift of this Party, under its present pro-Marxist National Committee,
toward an alliance with the Communist-Socialist Popular Action Front
(FRAP). The memorandum points out
that the PR holds the balance of power in the Chilean Senate between
President Frei’s Christian
Democratic Party (PDC) and the FRAP, and notes that under the current
leadership of the National Committee (CEN) the Party has tended
increasingly to vote with FRAP to
obstruct key legislation of President Frei’s program, the success of which the US regards as
of first importance. The memorandum also states that the Committee has
recently enjoyed a considerable accrual to its prestige because of the
relative success of the PR in the 2 April nationwide municipal
elections.
Election of CEN members is to take place at the Party convention in June.
It is argued in the memorandum of proposal that were the leftist control
of the Committee eliminated or diluted in this election, sentiment in
the PR to maintain the current voting alliance with FRAP would be weakened, and that the
likelihood of effective collaboration between the two groups in the 1969
Congressional and the 1970 Presidential campaigns would also be reduced.
The expenditure contemplated in the memorandum is directed toward this
Committee election.
ARA agrees that the ends sought by the
proposal are desirable.In a draft
memorandum from Gordon to
Kohler, April 19, this
sentence continues: “but we have serious doubts that the action
recommended would be successful.” A handwritten note on the draft
memorandum indicates that Sayre decided to withhold signature on the
memorandum until the Embassy had the opportunity to clarify its
“contradictory advice.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Chile,
1967–1968) In his reply on April 25 Dungan stated his case as follows: “I believe that
this program is reasonably sure of accomplishing its modest purpose
to deny an open field to the Marxist-oriented wing of the party. It
is a one-shot operation which may or may not have future
implications for the U.S. I believe that the risks are minimal and
the prospects for success in the attainment of limited objectives
are good. To take no action involves little risk but a high
probability that the present leftist-oriented leadership of the CEN
will be strengthened.” (Ibid.) We recognize that there is no
guarantee that the action contemplated will in fact achieve the ends sought, but we
believe that on balance it represents the most practicable means
immediately available to ensure that we can go into the 1969 and 1970
campaigns with some reasonable prospect of preventing the undesirable
coalition.
ARA recommends that you support the
proposal in the 303 Committee.According to
the minutes of the April 28 303 Committee meeting: “The proposal to
help save the Radical Party from marriage with FRAP was approved by the committee
with some members curious about whether $20,000 was sufficient to
keep the prospective bride intact. It was explained that this was
estimated to be about what the traffic could properly bear at this
time.” (Memorandum for the record, May 1; ibid.) On July 3 the
Embassy reported that the election for the national committee of the
Radical Party had resulted in a “resounding triumph” for the leftist
faction. (Telegram 21 from Santiago; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 12–3 CHILE)
295. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. IV, 10/65–7/67.
Confidential.Washington, June 27, 1967.
Mr. President:
Last December you authorizedBill Gaud to negotiate with Chile
a program loan ($35 million) and sector loans in
agriculture ($20 million) and education ($10 million). The sector loans were to be submitted to you for final
approval.
You will recall that because of the windfall from high copper prices, President Frei
decided last December to forego the program loan as long as the
price of copper remained high. He asked, however, that negotiations
proceed on the sector loans.
Since then, the price of copper has dropped sharply. The Chileans are
discussing with AID the possibility of a program loan covering the
balance of 1967. Negotiations on the agricultural sector loan are
proceeding. The education loan agreement has been completed.
Attached is a memorandum from Bill
GaudAttached but not printed
was a June 16 memorandum from Gaud to the President.asking your approval of the educational sector loan.
Charlie Schultze and Joe Fowler concur in the request, as
does Covey Oliver.Attached but not printed was a June 24
memorandum from Schultze to
the President.
The loan is justified because:
—Chilean self-help this year has been good.—Chile has agreed to two major steps for improving its overall
economic performance as conditions for this loan.—Chilean performance in education has been impressive.—The loan will accelerate Chile’s own efforts.—It is in line with the Punta del Este decisions to put increased
emphasis on education.
I recommend approval.The approve option is
checked. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: “Mr. Bowdler said he’d notify all
concerned. RLN.”
Walt
296. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. IV, 10/65–7/67.
Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the
President saw it.Washington, July 20, 1967, 3:00 p.m.
Mr. President:
In the past few days, President Frei has suffered two body blows from his own Christian
Democratic Party.
The Party’s National Council on July 12 published an extraordinarily
naive—and unhelpful—statement saying that:
—the Cuban-backed Latin American Solidarity Organization
(Castro’s vehicle for
promoting “national liberation” movements) should be allowed to
establish an office in Chile provided it does not stimulate
violence.—guerrilla warfare is a phenomenon resulting from underdevelopment
and exploitation by national oligarchies and foreign interests, and
not always attributable to Cuba.
The statement reflects the ascendancy of “left-wing” elements of the
Party and their desire to strike a “liberal” stance in the face of
goading by the Socialist-Communist coalition which has picked up voting
strength in recent municipal and by-elections. Frei responded with a strongly-worded,
public denunciation of LASO. This
statement also helped reassure President Leoni and the Christian Democrats in Venezuela who were
furious over the Chilean PCD declaration.
The second set-back is the capture of the Party national leadership by
the “left-wing” during last weekend’s National Assembly. Ralph Dungan reports that Frei, who has remained aloof from Party
politics, did not intervene in the Assembly and the “moderates” were not
a match for the more aggressive “left-wingers”.Reported in telegram 206 from Santiago, July 19.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL 12 CHILE) Dungan
left Chile on August 2 to assume his new responsibilities as the
first Chancellor of Higher Education in New Jersey. On July 25 the
White House announced that his replacement would be the Ambassador
to Ethiopia, Edward M. Korry.
Korry was confirmed by
the Senate on August 23 and presented his credentials in Santiago on
October 16.
The new leadership will try to push Frei towards greater nationalization of important
sectors of private enterprise. Anticipating this, Frei, in signing the new Agrarian
Reform Law on July 16, made clear that he would not vary from his
announced government program fostering the growth of the private
sector.
Ralph Dungan concludes that
Frei is so strong with the
rank and file of his party that the new leadership will not be able to
budge him from his policies if he is willing to take his case to the
Party faithful.
Walt
297. Memorandum From William
G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Chile, Vol. V, 6/67–11/68. Confidential.Washington, December 18, 1967.
SUBJECT
Chile: Frei Suffers Another
Setback
President Frei seems to have
suffered another setback yesterday when the Christian Democratic
candidate for a Senate by-election in the conservative, agricultural 8th
District of southern Chile lost by 58 votes to the Communist-backed
Radical nominee. Lavendero, a young dynamic, middle-of-the-road
Christian Democrat who strongly supports Frei, waged a vigorous personal campaign. But the party
machinery, now controlled by the more leftist elements of the PDC, sat on their hands. Baltra, an
old-time Radical politician of extreme left bent and president of the
Chilean-Soviet Friendship Institute, ran in combination with the FRAP coalition. The Communists, in a
quiet, sophisticated way, campaigned hard for him.
The Baltra victory—if sustainedBaltra was
subsequently declared the winner in the Senate
by-election.—is expected to consolidate the Radicals joining
forces with FRAP in a move to beat the
PDC in the 1970 Presidential
elections.
It will also weaken Frei’s hold
over the PDC by giving the more radical
elements—already unhappy over Frei’s moderation—ammunition to swing the party further
left.
Frei has had a rough year on the
political front. It started off with the Senate denying him permission
to visit the US. The PDC made a poor
showing in the spring municipal elections. At the summer party
convention, the radical young turks took over the party leadership. They
embarrassed Frei with their
sympathetic statement on the LASO
conference.The first conference of the
Latin American Solidarity Organization was held in Havana,
July–August 1967. More recently Frei has had a hard time getting his party to back him
on his anti-inflationary wage readjustment program.
There are still three years to the next elections. If the Christian
Democrats are to stay in power, they will have to show more cohesion and
success than they have during the past 12 months.
WGB
298. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. V, 8/67–11/68.
Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President
saw it.Washington, January 18, 1968.
SUBJECT
Ed Korry Reports on
Chile
When Ed Korry called on you before
going to Chile,According to the President’s
Daily Diary, Johnson met
Korry for a brief
“courtesy call” on October 4, 1967. (Johnson Library) No substantive
record of the meeting has been found. you told him that he is
an Ambassador with a built-in “self-starter” who did not need to be
pushed from Washington. The attached reportAirgram A–327 from Santiago, January 10; attached but not printed.
Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL
CHILE–US. demonstrates the accuracy of your remark.
After observing the Chilean scene for three months, he concluded that
Frei was being out-maneuvered
by the Chilean Communist Party, with potentially serious implications
for Chilean democracy and for us. He decided to discuss the situation
with Frei, which he did on
January 3 with good results.
Ed’s analysis runs like this:
Since taking office, Frei
knowingly played along with the “opening to the left” tactic (i.e.,
diplomatic and trade relations with Moscow and friendly dialogue with
the Chilean Communist Party), of which his Foreign Minister and
Ambassador Tomic are leading
advocates. He did this to curry Communist support to put through his
“Revolution in Liberty” program. In the process he shunned cooperation
with democratic forces to the right of the PDC (i.e., the Radical Party) and increasingly blamed them
for hindering passage of that program. This alienated the Radicals and
blurred the sharp distinction between those who believe in democratic
principles and those who do not which emerged so clearly in the 1964
elections and won Frei the
presidency. In the ideological confusion, the Chilean Communist Party
smartly out-maneuvered Frei by:
making a formal alliance with the Radicals; maintaining their coalition
relationship with the Socialists; and establishing a working intimacy
with key members of Frei’s own
party. As a result, the Communists were pushing the government into an
isolated position in which Frei
seemed to be unable to control his party and was forced to lean more
heavily on the discredited Right for survival.
Ed thinks our policy has been
partially to blame for this state of affairs because we have
over-emphasized economic support of Frei’s program—which Ed fully supports—in the mistaken assumption that
economic performance would produce the political results we seek. He
thinks the US Ambassador should be providing more political assistance.
A chance trip with Frei on January
3—three days before the Christian Democratic National Convention—gave
Korry the opportunity to
express his concern to the President. Frei welcomed the discussion and apparently responded to
Ed’s counsel. At the
Convention, Frei had a head-on
collision with the wing of his party which wants a further shift to the
left and which won control of the party leadership last July. Frei won and forced the radical
directorate to resign. He also unequivocally attacked the
Communists.
I think Ed’s analysis is dead
right. The “self-starter” came into play at a critical moment.The CIA later
claimed its share of credit: “We wish to point out that the
Ambassador’s awareness of the situation and the information he used
in carefully stirring Frei to
action were largely the result of our intelligence effort in Chile”
and “the result of close briefings provided the Ambassador by
Station personnel.” (Memorandum from Broe to Helms, January 24; Central Intelligence Agency, DDO
Files, [file name not declassified])
Time will tell whether Frei will
be able to reestablish a clear-cut distinction between the Communists
and anti-Communists and win back the confidence of the democratic forces
which elected him in 1964. We are fortunate to have Ed in Chile as Frei moves toward the crucial national
election of 1970.
Walt
299. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. V, 8/67–11/68.
Confidential. A notation indicates that the President saw the
memorandum.Washington, February 15, 1968, 7:15
p.m.
SUBJECT
The Cabinet Resignation in Chile
Ambassador Korry reports that
President Frei’s Cabinet resigned
last night.Telegram 2474 from Santiago,
February 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1
CHILE) The Embassy also reported that the key figure in the new
cabinet was Raúl Sáez, the Minister of Finance. (Telegram 2494 from
Santiago, February 15; ibid.) He accepted the resignations
and is expected to announce a new slate of Ministers by tomorrow.
This is the long-expected Cabinet reshuffle. It is designed to give
Frei a free hand in shaping
new policies for coping with mounting political and economic
problems.
To continue his stabilization program, Frei needs new legislation regulating wage increases
covering last year’s inflation (about 22%) and some retrenching of his
more ambitious programs. His wage readjustment proposal, which would
have substituted bonds for most of the cash, was withdrawn after the
Senate made clear it would not approve. Prospects for getting any
non-inflationary proposal through are not encouraging.
The Senate opposition comes not only from the “outs” on the right and
left, but from elements inside his own party. In his three years in
office. Frei has not cultivated
support from the non-communist parties. On the contrary, he has
alienated them. He now finds he has less support in the Congress than he
did when he started out.
Complicating matters further, a President in Chile begins suffering from
“lame-duckitis” after he passes the half-way mark in his term. Ed Korry in a cable todayNot further identified. describes the
situation in these terms.
“Chilean politics have descended into pre-electoral arena with all
parties maneuvering for advantages prior to the 1969 Congressional
elections. It is painfully clear that all opposition parties are
putting partisan interests ahead of the country’s; their
determination is to discredit Frei as a governing force; their belief is that the
PDC can be blocked from renewing
its mandate in the 1970 presidential vote, if Frei is paralyzed or severely
limited from executing his proposals.”
Korry is working closely with
those who will form the new economic team. How they will work out a
sound economic program for 1968 within the existing framework is not
clear. It is reassuring to have a smart operator on the scene.
Walt
300. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL CHILE–US. Secret. Drafted by
Shankle and cleared by
Morris. Initialed for
Oliver by Sayre.Washington, March 5, 1968.
SUBJECT
Ambassador Tomic and
Christian Democratic-Communist Popular Front in Chile
President Frei told Ambassador
Korry that it would be
valuable to him if we could take advantage of farewell meetings with
Ambassador Tomic to emphasize the
total US coldness to any possibility of a Christian Democratic Popular
Front combination with the Communist Party in Chile.Reported in telegram 2547 from Santiago, February
21. (Ibid., POL 7 CHILE) You may wish to take advantage of
the occasion of your March 7 luncheon with Ambassador Tomic to discuss this with him,
possibly before or after the luncheon. If, given the ceremonial nature
of the luncheon, it seems inopportune to do so, we can see that
Ambassador Tomic receives our
thoughts on this matter on some other occasion.
As you can see from the general briefing memorandum for the
luncheon,In this March 5 memorandum
from Oliver to Katzenbach, Oliver explained that Tomic had a “good chance” of
winning the 1970 presidential election and that the purpose of the
luncheon was to convince him that “he has made friends at the
highest levels of the U.S. Government.” (Ibid., POL 17
CHILE–US) Ambassador Tomic has ideas about forming a political grouping of
the left and left-center. He clearly includes the Communists in his
thinking. President Frei believes
that Ambassador Tomic has
convinced himself that the US would be willing to provide the same
degree of support to such a coalition government including Communists as
it does to the present government. President Frei believes that Tomic should be disabused of this idea, and he hopes
that we would make our opposition clear before Ambassador Tomic returns to Chile. President
Frei said that Ambassador
Tomic running on a straight
PDC ticket would be the strongest
presidential candidate in 1970, and that it would be within his
character to decide to make a deal with the moderate forces in Chile in
pursuit of the presidency if need be.
Ambassador Korry stresses that in
discussing this matter with Tomic, there should be no indication of initiative from him
or from President Frei.Donald F. Herr, staff assistant to the Under
Secretary, wrote the following note on the memorandum: “I have heard
that Chilean Communists are less red than the Socialists. Tomic’s idea of a coalition of the
left may not be all that bad. At any rate, it is worth further
investigation.” The talking points for the meeting suggested that
Katzenbach “privately”
discuss the problems associated with a Popular Front in Chile,
including the following argument: “The United States is a strong
supporter of Christian democracy in Latin America. Any combination
with communists, however, could only serve to bring this support
into question.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Katzenbach Files: Lot 74
D 271, Luncheon—March 7, 1968, Host for Chile Ambassador Tomic) No substantive record of the
luncheon has been found.
301. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 CHILE–US. Confidential. Drafted
by Morris on March 20 and
approved in S on March 21. The meeting
was held in the Secretary’s office. According to the Secretary’s
Appointment Book, Rusk briefly
met Korry before meeting
Tomic. (Johnson Library)
No substantive record of that meeting has been found.Washington, March 19, 1968, 10:30
a.m.
SUBJECT
Farewell Call by Ambassador Tomic
PARTICIPANTS
ForeignAmbassador Radomiro
Tomic, Ambassador of ChileUnited StatesSecretary RuskMr. Patrick F.
Morris, Country Director, Office of
Bolivian-Chilean Affairs
After an exchange of pleasantries with Ambassador Tomic on his sojourn in the U.S. and
his pending departure for Chile, Secretary Rusk asked the Ambassador about the present economic
difficulties in Chile and the prospects for the future. He said that he
understood that there was a possibility of an alignment of democratic
parties with non-democratic parties in Chile, and asked Ambassador
Tomic to comment on it.
Ambassador Tomic answered that he
wanted to be absolutely frank with the Secretary and therefore he had to
admit that the government of
President Frei had reached the
limit in its ability to carry forward its program of economic and social
reform within a democratic framework. He explained that the government
lacks the popular support primarily from organized labor to reach its
stabilization goals as originally projected. The Christian Democratic
party will have to accept the fact that it cannot get over 33% of the
vote in the forthcoming congressional and presidential elections and
therefore must look to working with other parties if it is to continue
as an active promoter of social and economic change in Chile. There is
the need for a new alignment of forces and a re-definition of social and
economic goals to coincide with this realignment. Under these
circumstances, it is possible that the Christian Democratic party will
enter into some kind of arrangement with other parties on the left.
The Secretary commented that of course Chile would have to make its own
decisions regarding its political future, but that any democratic party
should make a very careful examination of the ultimate aims and
objectives of the Communist party before entering a political
arrangement with them. He said that he could not speak on Chile, but
that the pattern of Communist party activities in Southeast Asia and the
Middle East clearly indicates that they have not abandoned their goals
of world domination. He said that the tradition of democratic
institutions in Chile might make it strong enough to withstand the
strains of a coalition government which included the communists but that
in some of Chile’s neighbors with less strong institutions such a
coalition might have more serious results. He then asked why a coalition
of democratic forces of the Center and Left could not be worked out.
Ambassador Tomic answered that the
situation in Chile was very confused. He said that the moderates within
the Radical party were not in control of the party machinery; that the
Right was generally discredited and there were many divisions in the
non-communist Left. It is necessary that a new combination of forces be
brought into being which is not based upon the leadership of an
individual, (caudillismo or personalismo) but which expresses the needs
and aspirations of the Chilean people. The Christian Democratic party is
a vital and modern party which is guided by the aspirations of a
majority of the electorate, but it will not achieve its objectives
within the narrow confines of its own structure. It can serve as a
nucleus for a broader and more inclusive political expression. He said
that he recognized that it would take a number of miracles to bring such
things to pass.
The Secretary congratulated him on his ambassadorship of three years in
Washington and wished him well on his return to Chile.Tomic also made a farewell
call on President Johnson,
March 22. A brief account of the meeting is in a March 22 memorandum
from Bowdler for the file.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol.
V, 8/67–11/68)
302. Record of Discussion at the 32nd Meeting of the Senior
Interdepartmental GroupSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S–SIG
Files: Lot 70 D 263, SIG/RA #34,
3/26/68, Future Meetings. Secret. Drafted by Hartman on March 26. ARA prepared a discussion paper for the
meeting in which it reviewed the current political and economic
situation and recommended that the United States support the
anti-inflationary program of the Frei administration while encouraging “the
development of a moderate political consensus in Chile of which the
Christian Democrats would be the main element.” (Ibid., SIG/Memo #57, 3/20/68, 32nd SIG Meeting)Washington, March 21, 1968.
PRESENT
Under Secretary of State, ChairmanDeputy Secretary of DefenseChairman, Joint Chiefs of StaffThe Director of Central IntelligenceThe Administrator, Agency for International DevelopmentMr. Akers for the Director, United States Information
AgencySpecial Assistant to the PresidentUnder Secretary of TreasuryDeputy Under Secretary for Political AffairsCounselor of the DepartmentSIG Staff DirectorDODMr. LangGeneral OrwatMr. McGiffertState Mr. OliverAmbassador Korry
[Omitted here is discussion of future meetings.]
II. Chile
The Chairman said that he had asked Mr. Oliver to present several of the particularly difficult
problems in Latin America to the SIG
prior to SIG discussion of the Joint
State/Defense Study.Reference is to a study
entitled “Latin America: A Recommended U.S. National Strategy,”
prepared under the direction of Ambassador Edwin M. Martin. The SIG discussed the Martin study at its meetings on May
2 and June 13. At the latter meeting, Katzenbach directed that the country teams consider
the study “in their policy/program planning and development.”
(Ibid., SIG/RA #41, 6/26/68, Chairman’s Summary at Discussion and
Decision) He thought that this would be useful to SIG members in giving them a more detailed
knowledge of particular country problems.
Ambassador Korry then gave a
presentation on the general situation in Chile and the problems faced by
Frei as he approaches the
coming elections. Ambassador Korry stressed his conclusion that Chile’s long history
of democratic evolution would continue. He felt that this might very
well mean however, a more left-wing group coming to power, possibly with
the active cooperation of the Communist Party. This would obviously
present special problems in our relationship with Chile. He thought that
the record of the Chilean Government in agricultural reform and
anti-inflation measures was reasonably good but that the test,
particularly on inflation controls, was only now coming. A major factor
in Chilean elections, aside from the personality of the candidate in the
presidential election, is the rate of inflation.
Ambassador Korry also described
the copper situation and the windfall benefits that the copper companies
have gained because of the strike in the United States and its effect on
world copper prices. Ambassador Korry pictured the political party structure and
mentioned the status of current aid discussions.
Mr. Katzenbach summed up the
discussion by saying that our choices in terms of US actions were
narrow. In essence, we were trying to take out insurance which would in
some way strengthen the moderate forces in the coming 1969 congressional
elections. We could do this through applying additional resources,
particularly where they helped achieve economic stabilization. But we
had to make a choice at some point about whether to apply pure IMF doctrine with the risk of seriously
damaging moderate forces or taking a less rigid stand. The central
problem remained, however, how to hold inflation in controllable limits.
He agreed with Ambassador Korry
that whatever we did in Chile, we should conduct ourselves in as
unobtrusive a fashion as possible and not allow US prestige to be
completely tied to one personality.
[Omitted here is discussion of Panama.]
AA HartmanStaff Director
303. Telegram From the Embassy in Chile to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 CHILE. Secret; Priority;
Limdis. Repeated to USCINCSO.Santiago, March 29, 1968,
2205Z.
3042. Subj: The End of the Revolution in Liberty.
However the current maneuverings among the Chilean parties may
end, the inescapable fact is that we are witnessing the end of the
noble and necessary Frei
experiment in “Revolution in Liberty.” Because the US has attached
so much prestige and so many resources to the person of Frei and to his programs, it is
essential in my view that we understand now the situation as it is
and gear our actions as well as our policies to it.The current congressional struggle over the GOC’s wage readjustment bill is both an
uproarious wake for the Frei
administration and a licentious baptism for an unrecognizable
bastard offspring. No one now has manageable control over events in
Congress, least of all the President. Having reportedly decided that
he erred in making a deal two weeks ago with the Communists, he is
seeking to “balance” his opening to the left with one to the
right—or to anyone.I say the revolution in liberty has ended because, as Ambassador
Tomic told the Secretary
in his farewell call March 19,See Document 301. the government of President Frei has reached the limit in its ability to carry
forward its program of economic and social reform within a
democratic framework. Tomic’s
judgement is beyond dispute. Neither the political nor economic
situation provides meaningful opportunities for Frei to move forward. At best he
can only “consolidate.” For the remaining two years nine months of
his term he can only fight for a semblance of personal dignity and
an appearance of control over events.At the time I left for Washington three weeks ago today, we were
using our influence to seek a locus of interim stability. In our
view, the one hope of consolidating the past gains of the Frei administration and of
effecting a political equilibrium prior to the March 1969
congressional elections was the program which the new Minister of
Finance Raul Saez had agreed to execute. While no one had any
illusions about the defensive nature of the Saez budget,
particularly since at best it involved a retreat to an inflationary
rate of 25 to 30 pct, it did offer an opportunity to control
economic forces, to achieve a defensible level of growth, to make a
start on the reduction of a swollen bureaucracy, to concentrate on production
improvement, to create a climate of quasi confidence in the business
and foreign sectors and above all to lay a base for improved
performance prior to the 1969 congressional and 1970 presidential
elections.As Saez and we feared, the President caved at the first crunch. He
fell into a trap laid by the Communist Party which astutely
recognized that the Saez ministry would have the effect of stopping
the slide of Chilean politics to the left. The Communists wanted
Saez out and they maneuvered him to the sidelines.Sáez resigned on March 15 and was replaced by
Andres Zaldivár (Telegram 2844 from Santiago, March 15.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1967–69, POL 15–1
CHILE) Having sucked the President into a position of
dependence on Communist goodwill, the Communists, true to their word
are now seeking to gut the rest of the bill. Indeed they are having
difficulties explaining their initial maneuver with Frei to their own militants in the
labor field. Hence the President, having made dubious gain from his
mismatch with the Communists is back at square one with nothing
ahead but the adders and snakes of the other political parties. He
now regrets his liaison with the Communists as does his Minister of
Interior Perez Zujovic who was the midwife of this abortion.
Frei must not know the
axiom which governs the lives of surgeons and of statesmen—that you
can never afford to say “oops.”There are those who believe that the only real option open to
Frei is to operate
temporarily outside the democratic framework. Exponents of this
approach believe he could turn to the military to impose a program
that would hold the inflationary line and establish some economic
and political order. After taking into account (a) the posture
adopted two weeks ago by the military chiefs in their interview with
Frei in which they
reportedly eschewed stronger options and pressed instead the
military’s wage claims (b) the absence of a potential man on a white
horse and the generally unimpressive intellectual caliber of the
leading officers (c) the proclivity among officers to join with the
civilian claimants and to blame the GOC for the failure to manage Chile’s economic affairs
well, particularly their pay raises (d) the reluctance, to use the
mildest adjective of Frei, to
take extra-constitutional measures, I can only conclude that this
possibility is an outside one. In any event I have no sympathy for
it.The structure and tradition of Chilean democratic politics has for
many decades pushed parties into alliances. As I have reported
almost from the time of my arrival here, three years of aloof
operation above this historic pattern has (perhaps it was
inevitable) led to the political isolation of Frei. Historic examination will
also show the
dispassionate observer that almost every President has had three
years in which to introduce reforms before being immoblized by the
political system prior to the extended period of campaigning for one
kind of election or another. Moreover, some of the reforms of the
past (e.g. the first Alessandri’s introduction decades ago of social
security) were perhaps as “revolutionary” in Chile as anything
attempted by the Frei
government thus far. Finally, it has been the custom for Chilean
Governments in the second half of presidential tenure to accept,
however reluctantly and fatalistically, the inevitability of
printing money as the only “democratic” way out of the political
impasse. What we are hearing as a debate in Congress right now is
the reversion to form. And it must be honestly stated that Frei is seeking to hold some kind
of line. Thus far he has rejected such crackpot ideas as importing
4,000 cars to sell in this seller’s market at profits of E 50,000
each to fill budgetary gaps and such potentially explosive proposals
(from his own party) as breaking the copper agreements by taxing the
companies’ income or adding an export tax on copper. But to get a
law he will probably have to yield some place. If there were no law,
the odds are that we would then be in a situation of “revolution” or
“liberty” since the cost of living the first two months has risen
fast (8.4 percent) and since the official index increase of 21.9
percent for 1967 has not yet been compensated. Most Chileans prefer
not to analyze long-term economic trends: rather they want cash to
pay bills. In their overwhelming majority they will not blame the
political parties: they will hold the GOC responsible for blocking increases.[sic] Senator Ibanez, the leading light of
the Nacional Party and former Finance Minister Lucho MacKenna (under
Alessandri) called on me
yesterday to enlist my consent for a scheme they wanted to negotiate
with GOC. Their proposal called for
division of wage readjustment bill into two separate bills: (a) one
would be confined strictly to readjustment aspects including a 21.9
percent cash payment to one third of public sector workers now
scheduled to get 12.5 percent through mechanism of cash bonus: the
wage increases for all the public sector would be financed by higher
consumption taxes (which is a part of GOC proposal) and by further cuts in GOC expenditures and (b) separate
financing bill for rest of fiscal expenditures. In latter Nacionales
would insist on heavy cutbacks in agrarian reform programs including
firing of MinAgriculture Trivelli and INDAP head Chonchol, cancellation of planned increase
in sales tax, reduction of wealth tax. The role they had given the
U.S. was to use the program loan for housing and for CORFO’s planned investment. I rejected their proposal, pointing out inter alia that,
as far as I was concerned, availability of program loan
depends on meaningful anti-inflation program and other
criteria. I seriously doubted Frei would accept their proposal. If they
really interested in healthy economy it was essential that they help get
sensible wage bill through Congress now so housing starts
could begin without delay. I added that I did not want to
get involved in Chilean party politics. They had
collaborated with the Communists in getting rid of Saez.
Their explanations for their actions were not convincing to
me. Therefore since they were among the parties who had
gotten themselves into this mess over wage readjustment they
must extricate themselves.Late today left-wing newsmen were spreading rumors that
Nacionales were going to vote for Reajuste because I had
called them in (sic) to denounce
their politicking and to accuse them of accelerating
Communist gains.Senator Ibanez put forward the extraordinary argument that the
U.S. owed Chile’s pro-American private enterprise sector “damages”
because of our support of Frei’s programs. In support of this thesis he
invoked the recent toast by the Vice-President of Ambassador
Tomic and of the
Frei government. In this
connection, we are informed by AP’s Lee Brady that today he asked
Communist Senator Teitelboim his reaction to Vice-President’s toast
and that the reply Brady says he filed was that if Tomic ever had chance to be
president it has disappeared. What Teitelboim presumably meant is
that CP won’t play ball with Tomic which was his view at this time in any
case.Thus far, I have made clear to all who have sought me out— and I
have sought no one—that U.S. is leaving it to Chileans to decide
their political and economic future. U.S. aid has nothing to do with
parties or with personalities but with effective use of economic
resources. I got this across to Foreign Minister Valdes who summoned
me for unrelated business when he broached subject. I noted to him
that GOC has not consulted U.S.
about deal with Communists nor any other aspect of current political
problem, that we had no complaints and I trusted he had none either.
He did not. I also mentioned to him that GOC’s total silence on anti-American terrorism
contrasted with the immediate denunciation by Allende and Teitelboim and that I
wondered if this reversal of roles taken together with Zuniga’s
eulogy of the guerrillas in Bolivia meant that the U.S. should deal
in the future with the FRAP in such
matters.Once we have clearer idea of what kind of bill will emerge from
Congress and its likely effects on U.S.-Chile relations as well as
perspectives of Chilean politics, we will provide our views by
cable.The Embassy reported on April
4 that the Senate had narrowly approved a modified version of
the wage readjustment bill. (Telegram 3107 from Santiago; ibid.,
LAB 11 CHILE) An analysis of the “budgetary effects” of the bill
is in telegram 3149 from Santiago, April 9. (Ibid.)Korry
304. Memorandum From the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division
(Broe) to the
Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines)Source: Central Intelligence Agency,
DDO/IMS Files, Job 79–00207A, [file name not
declassified] Political and Economic 1968. Secret.Washington, April 26, 1968.
SUBJECT
Circumstances Leading up to CIA
Participation in Electoral Operations in Chile
The second confrontation in Chile between the Christian Democratic Party
and the Socialist–Communist Political Front (FRAP) will come in September 1970. In the first round in
1964, the Christian Democrats were victorious resulting in the election
of President Frei. Since that
time the Christian Democrats have encountered increasing difficulty in
both the economic and political fields. As an indicator of their
economic problems, inflation which was reduced in the first two years of
the Frei administration from a
level of about 39% to 17% a year has begun to climb again. In 1967 the
rate was 21% and for the first three months of 1968 it was 10%. Since
these are government figures the actual rate is undoubtedly higher.
Perhaps even more important than a deteriorating economic situation has
been the development of a leftist trend within the non-Communist
political parties and a growing political isolation of the Frei administration. The Radical Party,
a key left of center group, is now controlled by its more extreme
faction which favors an electoral alliance with the FRAP. The National Party, a right of
center group, which has borne the brunt of some of the reforms carried
out by the Christian Democrats, such as in the agrarian sector, has been
alienated from the Christian Democrats and is now in active opposition.
Even within the Christian Democratic Party itself there is a strong
extreme faction which would be amenable to collaboration with the FRAP and for a period was in control of
the party leadership. The control of the Radical Party by its extreme
faction is one of the more worrisome aspects of the situation since a
Radical–FRAP electoral alliance
could elect a president in 1970. As a recent example of the desperate
situation confronting Frei, the
administration felt it had to turn to the Communist Party to get
Congressional approval of their wage readjustment bill. The Communists
exacted their price by forcing the Christian Democrats to remove a
no-strike provision from the bill. During further consideration of this
bill the Christian Democrats then turned to the National Party for
support; they in turn forced the Frei administration to agree to lower taxes. As a result
of both of these deals the prospects for increased inflation are better
than ever.
Faced with this deteriorating situation and with the prospect that if
left unchecked the present political trends could bring to power a
popular front government in Chile in 1970 the Ambassador began to
mobilize his Embassy. He brought together key officers, which included
the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station, and began to map out his program.
It was understood by all that the major response by the Embassy would
have to be in the overt sector probably through providing additional
program loan assistance to the Chilean Government in order to help it
hold down inflation and to carry forward its essential programs. It was
also recognized that a smaller, supplementing effort would be needed in
the covert field through an election operation in connection with the
Congressional elections of 1969. These elections are all important since
their outcome will determine the nature of the party alliances that will
be formed in connection with the presidential election of September
1970.
Using information and analyses provided by the Embassy’s political
section as well as from [less than 1 line of source
text not declassified] the Station has begun to put together a
political action program to be carried out within the context of the
overt effort. The final political action proposal will be a joint
Station/Embassy effort with the Ambassador playing the key role. This
proposal is expected to arrive in Washington within the next 7–10 days
and will be submitted to the 303 Committee for approval.Korry subsequently forwarded
a proposal for a “covert election operation of very limited scope,”
a [text not declassified] contingency fund
including direct support to moderate candidates from the Christian
Democratic, Radical, and National parties. According to an undated
memorandum prepared by the CIA: “The
Ambassador has no intention to channel support to candidates through
the political parties themselves because of the danger that funds so
channeled would be used to support individuals contrary to our
interests; i.e. left-wing Radicals and left-wing Christian
Democrats.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Chile, 1967–1968) The
basic concept is to undertake a district by district analysis of the
voting patterns and electoral trends in each district so that we can
determine where covert leverage can be most effectively applied. With
this information the objective is to elect as many moderate candidates
of the Radical, Christian Democratic, and National parties as possible
at the expense of the FRAP. If this can
be successfully accomplished and an overt program implemented, our
prospects for heading off a FRAP
victory in 1970 might be improved.
William V. Broe
305. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL CHILE.
Confidential. Drafted by Shankle and Morris. Copies were sent to Korry and Bowdler. A notation on the
memorandum indicates Rusk saw
it.Washington, May 15, 1968.
SUBJECT
Chilean Political Situation
Discontent within Chile’s traditionally apolitical military forces has
added new dimensions to President Frei’s political difficulties. Recent events in Chile
have aroused widespread public uneasiness accompanied by rumors and
allegations that a military coup was possible or even imminent.
All branches of the military and the national police are dissatisfied
with their pay and allowances. The military have been displeased by the
weak authority of the GOC in dealing
with political opposition and strikes. However, despite these and some
professional grievances, there is no evidence of conspiracy or plotting
within the military or police. In an attempt to placate the military,
President Frei has appointed his
personal friend, retired Army General Tulio Marambio, as Minister of
Defense. He has also designated a personal friend as new CINC of the Army, and named a retired
general to become new Director of the strike-plagued Postal Service. The
appointment of General Marambio, the first military man to hold cabinet
position in more than ten years, is not in itself sufficient to placate
the military. On the contrary, he was considered a “political general”
by his peers before his retirement. However, Marambio has already
initiated discussions on substantial pay increases which should take
some of the heat out of the military discontent. Also, the GOC now seems to be demonstrating a firmer
hand in the face of strikes. This should improve the government’s image
in the eyes of the armed forces.
On the other hand, the appointment of a military man to the cabinet has
exacerbated public tensions which have been steadily growing as
President Frei becomes more and
more a lameduck president, and as his authority and control appear to be
weakening. The basic political struggle is taking place in congress,
where President Frei’s 1968
anti-inflationary wage policy proposals are being debated. The political
attitudes towards these proposals, however, should be viewed in the context of a situation
where all political parties have found common cause in a campaign to
discredit President Frei and the
Christian Democratic Party. At stake are the 1969 congressional and 1970
presidential elections.
President Frei’s wage proposals
have already been emasculated. Indeed, it is questionable whether what
remains of President Frei’s
initial proposal can even be considered anti-inflationary, or if in its
present state it would only contribute further to the inflationary
spiral.
The current level of political tensions can be expected to continue, if
not increase. All the strikes are not over, and preferential treatment
for the military could trigger strike activity on the part of other
public employees. Prospects are that there will be continued agitation
from wage earners as the rate of inflation accelerates. With the
government unable to impose its will on the congress to approve an
anti-inflationary wage policy, it will probably rely more and more
heavily on the police and armed forces to contain labor pressures. Even
though there is little evidence of a possible coup, there is a real
possibility that the police and the military, by receiving special wage
treatment and carrying out the government’s dictates in containing labor
pressures, will become more closely identified with and eventually more
involved in the Frei
Administration. The appointment of military officers who are personal
friends of President Frei to key
positions may indicate that the process has already begun. Although each
move by Frei with the military
has a logic of its own, the inexorable buildup of circumstances
compelling the military and the government toward each other, if carried
to extremes, could eventually compromise the military’s traditional
apolitical stance. This would come about more by accident than design.
But the result would be that the military, caught up by circumstances,
would find itself propelled into positions and activities which clearly
extend into political and government spheres.
The spectre of military participation has frightened the Communist Party,
the best organized of President Frei’s opposition, into a counter-coup campaign. The
communists justifiably fear that they would be the first victims of any
extra-constitutional steps by the Frei Administration or the military. The communists
charge that the US is plotting with the Chilean right to persuade the
military to initiate a coup. On the other hand, in an attempt to
establish its own credentials with the military, the communists are
expressing their sympathy for the financial plight of military
personnel.
Although there has been no significant evidence of military plotting or
conspiracy, and although it is most unlikely that extra-constitutional
means will be employed to deny President Frei the remainder of his presidential term; the entire
process of cabinet changes, military appointments, coup scare and
communist counterattack must
be viewed as a manifestation and warning signal of the political and
economic malaise gripping Chile. Its acknowledged successes
notwithstanding, President Frei’s
Administration has not succeeded in solving Chile’s ingrained economic
problems, particularly inflation. Social discontent and political
agitation are on the upswing. The political consensus with which
President Frei assumed office,
unless in retrospect it was in fact illusory, has disappeared. He faces
political opposition on every front, including from within his own
party.
Although the wage bill struggle, a festering sore that has been draining
the country’s energies since last October, is almost over, the more
serious, deeply rooted problems are still unsolved. We expect that the
political difficulties that plague the Frei Administration will continue and even possibly grow
worse as the forthcoming elections draw nearer. However, in considering
the current and projected crisis situation, we should not lose sight of
the fact of Chile’s jealously guarded tradition of constitutionalism and
democratic processes. This is the foundation of the Chilean political
and social structure, and all political parties and groups, except the
most extremist, quasi-terrorist lunatic fringe, can be expected in the
final analysis to behave in a manner consistent with this tradition,
even though their tactics are so self-serving as to raise serious
doubts.
306. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs (Bohlen)Source: Department of State, INR/IL
Historical Files, 303 Committee Files, c. 71, 7/12/68. Secret; Eyes
Only. Initialed for Oliver by
Sayre.Washington, July 5, 1968.
SUBJECT
Chile: Assistance to Congressional Candidates
The attached memorandumDated June 20;
attached but not printed. asks 303 Committee approval of a
proposal that we help elect, through covert financial assistance,
moderate candidates in the 1969 elections in Chile. An initial
contingency fund of $350,000 is requested, which would be used for this
purpose at the direction of
the Ambassador on recommendation of an Embassy “election team” made up
of State and CIA personnel.
The memorandum identifies a number of factors at work in Chile since
early 1967 that have gravely eroded the position of President Frei and his moderate supporters and
that have led to a situation in which all three of the likely important
candidates in the 1970 presidential elections are actively seeking
Communist Party support. These adverse influences include a renewed
upsurge of inflation, a decline in the rate of increase of the GNP, a loss of momentum in the pace of
social reform, and loss of important areas of support in Congress with
an accompanying assumption of leadership of the Christian Democratic and
Radical Parties by left-wing elements. The upshot of these developments
is a real possibility that in 1969 Chile will elect a Congress dominated
by the Communists and by the Socialists, who in Chile are a particularly
doctrinaire and left-wing group. Such a development would in turn bring
quite material prospects that in 1970 there will be elected as President
either a pro-Communist President or—as in the case of former Ambassador
Tomic—one who can be unduly
dependent on Communist and Socialist support.
The objective of the attached proposal is therefore to promote the
election in 1969 of the greatest possible number of moderate senators
and deputies in order to maximize effective opposition to the popular
front candidate in 1970 and to create a body of moderates who could act
as a restraint on the policies of any popular front president, should
one be elected.
The determination as to which candidates will be supported will be made
by the Embassy election team. Support will go to the candidate as
individuals rather than to party organizations, for these organizations
will almost certainly nominate some men that the U.S. would not wish to
assist. The money will be made available to those selected through a
number of tested individual channels whose stature is such that their
contributions will appear natural and appropriate. Risks of exposure,
while of course present, are believed to be acceptable. As Embassy
selections are made, and as the campaign procedes, the Agency will from
time to time submit reports to the 303 Committee on the progress of the
Embassy’s efforts.
Of the $350,000 sought, $250,000 would be used in the manner described
above. $100,000 would be spent for media operations (CIA has access to two of Chile’s leading
newspapers and to a national net of radio stations); for possible
support to a new splinter socialist party in order to exacerbate
socialist differences; and for support to farm, youth and urban
organizations that are effective among particular sectors of the
electorate.
ARA agrees with the objectives of the
proposal program and believes that the methods and tactics described in
the CIA memorandum are suited to their attainment. The forces
led by Frei are by and large
dedicated to reform through the democratic processes; they represent
therefore an important alternative to the varieties of social extremism
that trouble the politics of Chile and of much of the rest of Latin
America. The survival and health of these forces is desirable and
congenial to our interests. I therefore recommend that you support the
proposed action program.The 303 Committee
considered the proposal at its meeting on July 12. Broe explained that the funds would
act as a “reserve” to support individual moderates who would be
“carefully selected in an effort to brake the leftward drift toward
a popular front which threatens to engulf Frei.” “By early planning, a
country team setup, and personal direction of Ambassador Korry,” Broe maintained, “significant results are possible.”
The Committee approved the proposal “with the proviso that monthly
progress be indicated to the committee from this moment on.”
(Memorandum for the record by Jessup, July 15; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Files, c. 71, 7/12/68) The 303 Committee received progress reports
on the congressional elections on September 3 and December 27.
(Ibid., c. 73, 9/3/68 and c. 74, 12/27/68)
307. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. V, 8/67–11/68.
Confidential.Washington, July 24, 1968.
SUBJECT
$20 Million Program Loan for Chile
Herewith a recommendation from Bill
Gaud, Covey Oliver
and Ed Korry, endorsed by BOB and Treasury, that you authorize a $20
million program loan to Chile for the remainder of 1968 (Tab B).Tab B was a memorandum from Gaud to the President, July 15;
attached but not printed.
Charlie Zwick’s lucid memorandum summarizing the loan proposal (Tab
A)Tab A was a memorandum from Zwick to
the President, July 20; attached but not printed. has all the
essential elements and I will not repeat them. You should understand, as
Charlie points out in his recommendation, that the loan is primarily a
political bailing out operation to help President Frei and the moderate Christian
Democrats make the best possible showing in the Congressional elections in March 1969. These elections
set the stage for the Presidential elections in September 1970.
After a record of steady progress in reducing inflation and stimulating
development and reform during 1964, 1965 and 1966, President Frei fell on hard times in 1967 and
1968 when the opposition on the left and right ganged up on his
anti-inflation program. If we do not help him to the extent recommended,
he will either have to slash his investment budget for Alliance programs
or engage in highly inflationary Central Bank borrowing, either of which
will have serious adverse political implications for him in the March
1969 elections.
I join Ed Korry and Covey Oliver in the political judgment
that our interests in Chile are best served by helping Frei through this particularly hard
period. Hopefully, our aid, combined with his own self-help measures,
will enable him to reverse the economic trends and make a good showing
in the Congressional elections. If it does not turn out that way, we
will still be free to decide how we will gear future aid.
In recommending that you authorize negotiation of the loan, I suggest you
do so on an ad referendum basis.
Walt
ApproveThis option is
checked, and a July 25 handwritten notation by Bowdler indicates that
Rostow informed
Bowdler and Dottie
Fredley. On August 27 Rostow reported that the negotiations had been
concluded, that Chile had agreed to the fiscal and monetary
conditions, and that a severe drought in Chile “makes the
program loan more important than ever in President Frei’s economic planning.” The
President authorized the loan. (Telegram CAP 82188 from
Rostow to the
President, August 27; Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Chile, Vol. V, 8/67–11/68)
Disapprove
Call me
308. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. V, 8/67–11/68.
Confidential.Washington, October 17, 1968, 11:50
a.m.
SUBJECT
PL 480 Program for Chile
The attached memorandum (Tab B)Tab B was a
memorandum from Gaud and
Freeman to the President,
October 10; attached but not printed. from Orville Freeman/Bill Gaud recommends your approval of a
$3 million PL 480 sales agreement with
Chile for corn/grain sorghum and rice. Chile would repay this amount in
dollars over a 20-year period, with a 10 percent down payment.
This PL 480 assistance for Chile is
urgently needed because of a severe drought which has caused an
emergency shortage of livestock feed. Chile has done quite well in
meeting the self-help conditions we set in an earlier agricultural
sector loan and PL 480 agreement.
The Chilean Governent is feeling particularly isolated after the recent
military coup in Peru, as Chilean leaders see themselves completely
surrounded by military regimes. President Frei would undoubtedly welcome a sign of US support for
his democratic government at this moment.
Charlie Zwick supports the Freeman/Gaud
recommendation (Tab A)Tab A was a
memorandum from Zwick to the President, October 15; attached but not
printed.. I also recommend that you approve the negotiation
of this sales agreement with Chile.
Walt
ApproveThis option is
checked. Handwritten notations by Bowdler indicate that Dottie Fredley and
Sam Lewis were
informed on October 17 at 4:50 p.m. and 4:55 p.m., respectively,
and a copy was sent to Fredley on October 18.
Disapprove
Call me
309. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Chile, Filed by LBJ Library. Confidential.Washington, January 14, 1969, 4:55
p.m.
SUBJECT
FY 1969 Assistance Program for
Chile
Bill Gaud and Covey Oliver have requested your
authorization to negotiate a $68 million economic assistance package
with Chile for 1969 (Tab C).Tab C was a
memorandum from Gaud to the
President, December 23; attached but not printed. The package
includes a $20 million program loan, a $10 million agricultural sector
loan, a $36 million PL 480 agreement, and
$2 million in project loans. Orville
Freeman joins Gaud
in recommending your approval of the PL
480 sale agreement—mainly for wheat, corn, and rice (Tab D).Tab D was a memorandum from Gaud and Freeman to the President, December
23; attached but not printed.
Charlie Zwick has some reservations about Chile’s economic performance
and prospects. On balance, however, he recommends your approval of the
whole package (Tab A).Tab A was a
memorandum from Zwick to the President, January 6; attached but not
printed.
Joe Barr is prepared to support
all elements of the package except the program loan. He questions the
need for balance of payments support of this magnitude, and raises other
questions about the realism of AID’s
proposed negotiating instructions. He states that he can not weigh what
he sees to be economic shortcomings in the program loan proposal against
political considerations underlying our support for President Frei, and would have to leave that to
your judgment. Barr is satisfied,
moreover, that the arrangements governing AID lending in Chile provide reasonably satisfactory
protection for the US balance of payments (Tab B).Tab B was a memorandum from Barr to the President, January 10;
attached but not printed.
We provided a $20 million program loan for Chile in 1968. The final
installment was released in December. Chile’s performance on the
self-help commitments under that loan and under an earlier agricultural
sector loan of $23 million
has been reasonably satisfactory—especially when Chile’s economy is
being buffeted by the worst drought in its history. As Zwick and
Barr state, progress toward
price stability has been slipping. The outlook is now for about 30
percent inflation in 1969—up from 28 percent last year. But without
substantial continued foreign support, Frei’s stabilization program could completely collapse.
The drought has undermined both agricultural and industrial production
and sent unemployment rates skyrocketing. To deal with this temporary
social and political crisis, Frei
is having to divert funds for temporary jobs and emergency farm credit.
So far, Chile is managing its economic crisis with considerable skill.
The outlook for 1969 is not as bleak as Zwick and Barr suggest.
This assistance package has been worked out in close cooperation with the
IBRD and the IMF, both of whom have negotiating teams in
Chile now to work out overall agreements to support Frei’s 1969 program. Our negotiating
objective in the fields of fiscal, exchange rate, and monetary policies
are integral parts of this effort. For example, Chile is seeking an
IMF standby, and the IMF team doubts that Chile will qualify
without the prospect of the US assistance package outlined in this
memorandum. It is very important to the future of Frei’s economic program that we be able
to negotiate our package this month in parallel with the other two
international agencies. Our negotiating leverage is also augmented by
simultaneous negotiations.
Critical congressional elections are scheduled for March in Chile.
Frei’s term runs until late
1970. His ability to continue those constructive programs in such fields
as agrarian reform and education which have made Chile a leader in the
Alliance for Progress depend heavily on the kind of showing his party
makes in the March election. With the great strains placed on the
economy by the drought, Frei
needs both the assistance proposed and the strong moral support implied
by a negotiating package of this type. Ambassador Korry urges your approval of the
negotiations so that no time-lag can intervene in the rhythm of our
support for Frei’s program.
Chile has made outstanding achievements in the social and political
fields under the Alliance for Progress—and Frei is currently reasserting a strong leadership
position within the Christian Democratic Party to consolidate many of
these gains during his two years in office. Although Chile’s economic
problems are worrisome, Frei has
shown remarkable tenaciousness and courage in facing up to them in
recent months. I have looked carefully into the reservations expressed
by Barr and Zwick, and I think
they are based to some extent on a misunderstanding of recent actions
taken by the Chilean Government and Congress.
On balance, I think Chile is a good bet and that President Frei deserves our full support. I
recommend that you authorize negotiation of the full assistance package
as outlined in the Gaud
memorandum at Tab C.
Walt
ApproveThe first and
last options are checked and the President wrote: “Let’s pass
until next week.” In a January 16 memorandum to the President,
Rostow reported:
“Rusk is inclined to
go with Ed Korry’s view
on the Chilean loan. If you approve, he will clear with
[Secretary of State-designate William P.] Rogers—if it is the
transitional problem that concerns you.” In response, Johnson checked the “Talk to
President” option. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Chile, Filed by LBJ Library) On January 17 Korry reacted angrily to a
report that the Department of the Treasury had “rejected” the
program loan: “If parochialists in Treasury are going to
exercise veto power over US foreign policy, if they are to be
both arrogant and powerful enough to assume such political
responsibilities in defiance of the considered judgments of
State, AID, and the President’s
personal representative, then it is the latter’s responsibility
to record for history the range of possible consequences of
their action.” (Telegram 215 from Santiago, January 17; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL CHILE–US) President
Johnson subsequently
approved the loan.
Disapprove
Call me
Colombia
310. Letter From the Ambassador to Colombia (Oliver) to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA/LA
Files: Lot 66 D 65, Colombia 1964. Secret; Official–Informal. A copy
was sent to ARA/CV.Bogotá, November 18, 1964.
Dear Tom:
We are not yet reporting officially what I am going to sketch for you
here, because we want to check on the principal source of information,
Dr. Harold Dunkerly of the Harvard Advisory Group to the Ministry of
Finance.
On Monday lastNovember 16. Dr.
Dunkerly had a meeting with Fowler and got a
general picture of the thinking that developed in Washington regarding
the future of the AID program for
Colombia. In generalized terms, Fowler left
Dunkerly with the impression that the program for the future would be
based on the success of the fiscal and budgetary program that at the
time of our departure for Washington seemed well on its way through
Congress as a result of the political consensus that Lleras Restrepo was supposed to have
achieved.
Yesterday Dunkerly asked to see me (with Fowler). He
said that he had had a long conversation Monday afternoon with Calle.
Without linking his visit to any request from Calle, Dunkerly
nonetheless managed to communicate the impression that he was speaking
Calle’s mind. Dunkerly said that the Government’s program was “in
jeopardy” and that the situation for the future was “highly dangerous.”
He explained that Carlos Lleras Restrepo had turned out, so far, to be a
“damp squib” (“wet firecracker” in American English). The expected
consensus had not been achieved. Calle, who has no political power of
his own and had staked everything on Lleras’ effectiveness, now foresaw not only a net loss
of a half billion pesos in expected increased revenues but the fearful
prospect of heavy political demands from the Coffee Federation on the
present fisc. At maximum, the Federation could pressure for drain of
another half billion from the Central Bank and have already asked for
drawing rights for 150 billion for the current month. We are getting
together a complete analysis on the details of the immediately
foregoing. The details will come later and officially.
The big point is that the economists on the GOC side, including Calle, foresee that, if an effective
political turnaround does not take place, this country will be in
galloping inflation by next March. This will present not only a severe
economic setback but have very grave political repercussions.
What Dunkerly wants me to do is to get in touch with Lleras Restrepo and seek to induce him
to take an active leadership role on the economic front. Dunkerly’s idea
is that I should use the lever of possible loss of program aid, which is
running about one-fourth of the Colombian budget on present projections.
My own feeling is that Lleras is too sophisticated for this gambit to be
credible. My inclination is simply to go over with him the very serious
consequences for Colombia and for the Alianza as a whole if this
situation is not corrected. We have much more reflection to do here
before the Country Team makes recommendations through official
channels.
I have had a request in to see the President ever since my return from
Washington, and I would like to get to talk to him before I see
Lleras Restrepo. If the
President does not give me an interview today, I cannot see him until
next Monday, at the earliest, because of my official visit to Operations
UNITAS at Barranquilla–Cartagena.In a
meeting with Valencia on
November 25 Oliver outlined the difficulties involved in completing
the 1964 program loan, including marine insurance and forward
procurement. Valencia
suggested that Oliver discuss the details with Calle. (Telegram 530
from Bogotá, November 27; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID(US) 9 COL)
I am very sorry to have to report this situation. Dunkerly is true to his
profession, that is, he is somewhat of a crepe hanger, and that is one
of the reasons we are checking out his conclusions before reporting
officially.
Time is not helping. The Chinese Ambassador told
me he thought the piece in the issue of November 13 was absolutely
outrageous.Reference is to a brief
report on the anti-guerrilla campaign in Colombia, which, according
to Time magazine did not progress “until two
years ago when Major General Alberto Ruiz Novoa became War
Minister.” (Time, November 13, 1964, p.
61) There has, to my way of thinking, been a continuous Time line building up Ruiz and turning down the
legitimate Government of Colombia. I noticed the Ruiz build-up even
before you rang me up about this assignment. It seems to go on
steadily.
Ambassador Stewart’s telegram
quoting the views of President Leoni is also very much in my mind.Leoni suggested that the United States “move
cautiously” before recognizing the new regime in Bolivia. Any
precipitate action by the United States, he argued, “might have
direct bearing on Colombia and the political ambitions” of General
Ruiz. (Telegram 712 from Caracas, November 16; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 16 BOL)
I am convinced that we have got to do everything we can to uphold
constitutional government in Colombia. This may even require us to
consider AID assistance on a bail-out
basis, although I certainly hope it never comes to that. Be assured that
I will do everything I can to help Colombia remain a country of law and
a worth-while model of economic development.In his reply Mann instructed
Oliver to disabuse anyone with “doubts about our full support
constitutional government and fact that American public and official
opinion would react adversely to a military movement in Colombia.”
(Telegram 356 to Bogotá, November 27; ibid., AID(US) 9 COL)
Sincerely yours,
Covey
311. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 1 COL.
Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bogotá. Passed to the White
House. Mann was in Lima to
attend the third annual meeting of the Inter-American Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC).Lima, December 9, 1964, 5:05
p.m.
695. From Mann. Following are my
first reactions to latest Colombian exchange crisis. Would appreciate
views of Ambassador Oliver and Department. CostanzoHenry J. Costanzo, director of the Office of Latin
America, Department of the Treasury. leaves tonight for
Washington after first meeting with Minister Calle scheduled to take
place this afternoon. He will bring to Department details our discussion
here.
First, it seems to me first question we must ask ourselves is
whether, if GOC makes no change
in its exchange policy, disbursement of $45 million would
stabilize the situation. On basis of info available to me I
doubt very much that it would. It was, I am told, recognized in 1963 that the
maintenance of two exchange rate system was difficult at best
and would require a high level of confidence in the peso to
maintain. I understand that the then Minister of Finance,
Carlos Sanz de
Santamaria, refused at that time to move to a
single rate, or some other more adequate system, but agreed to
reconsider if exchange loss should exceed $30 million in 1964.
It seems clear that the weak political position of President
Valencia, the recent
capital flights, and the relatively heavy recent foreign
exchange losses present us with a very different situation from
the one we faced in 1963 and when we signed the 1964 aid
program.
Instead of confidence, there is an obvious lack of confidence in
the ability of the government to avoid devaluation. Purchase and
sales of exchange this week should tell us more. But I
understand that outstanding import licenses total about $500
million which can be presented for payment at the nine-to-one
rate at any time. All of this suggests that unless effective
corrective action is taken first, the disbursements would be
quickly wasted in a futile effort to maintain a nine-to-one
import rate while price rises over past two years suggest it
should be at least closer to thirteen-to-one. This kind of a
futile exercise would presumably not promote either political
stability or economic progress.
Second, there is the question of whether we are obligated by the
loan agreement to make the disbursement, having in mind that
Colombian performance has been relatively good on the self-help
measures specified in the agreements and that there is no agreement
on exchange rate. It would seem to me that marine insurance issue
gives us an out. Perhaps the attitude of Congress re taxes gives us
another peg but I assume this would be more relevant to 1965
performance. Do our program loan agreements contain a general escape
clause which can be used where conditions have changed to such an
extent to make it impossible to achieve its purpose? If not, it
seems to me they should in the future.Third, is the question of whether the U.S. should seek to avoid
the political onus for the urgently needed exchange reforms. This is
a luxury I don’t think we can afford. However, I understand the
IMF is willing to return a team
to make suggestions about corrective action. The IMF rather than the U.S. should suggest
the precise corrective action needed. I understand there are a
number of possibilities, some of which might be more acceptable to
Valencia than others. In
this connection, is it correct that one of principal political
problems is public promise of Valencia not to devalue plus belief that movement
from nine-to-one rate would not only be a partial devaluation but
would raise food costs as well? Would it be feasible to use PL 480 to help in food cost
front?
Finally, it seems to me both Colombian and U.S. interests would be best
served by urging that corrective action in exchange rate be taken
forthwith and that disbursements of our aid be used to support GOC effort. For this we could stick on
marine insurance issue as Ambassador Oliver suggests, perhaps with
whatever adjustments are necessary on issue of forward procurement.
Will report on conversations with Calle today.In the meeting with Mann on December 9, Calle acknowledged that resolute
action was necessary not only to address the exchange rate but also
to adjust much of the government’s economic program. In return,
Mann agreed to expedite
the 1964 program loan by resolving the outstanding issues of marine
insurance and forward procurement. Mann believed there was no alternative and step was
“essential part of measures needed to keep Colombian economy
viable.” (Telegram 698 from Lima, December 10; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 10
PERU/IMF) Although Valencia continued to resist
devaluation, the two sides eventually agreed on a formula to resolve
their legal differences, thereby freeing $35 million of the program
loan by December 31. (Memorandum from Sayre to Bundy, December 21; Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Colombia, Vol. I, 12/63–7/65)
Would appreciate Ambassador and Department reactions this line of
thought.No response has been
found.
Jones
312. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and ResearchSource: National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CV Files, 1965: Lot 67 D 622, POL 2 Sitreps. Secret. Drafted in
INR/CA by Robert R. Hendon, Thomas C. Colwell, and Mary K.
Manzoli. Forwarded to Mann as
an attachment to a May 5 memorandum from Wolfe who noted that
Sayre had requested the
paper on Mann’s behalf
earlier in the day, thereby precluding its coordination within
either the Department or the intelligence community. (Ibid.)
Sayre forwarded the paper
to Bundy on May 12.
(Memorandum from Sayre to
Bundy, May 12; Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Colombia, Vol. I,
12/63–7/65)Washington, May 5, 1965.
COLOMBIA: SITUATION AND PROSPECTS
The Basic Judgment
Political tensions in Colombia have once again built up to crisis point.
There is, as on the many other occasions when the National Front
government has been torn by deep partisan conflict, a chance that some
fundamental change in the
governing authority will be made. That change could come by military
coup or through some basic political rearrangement in the form and
composition of the government. Colombian politicians of all stripes and
the military establishment, however, have a way of coming together for
mutual advantage in time of crisis and thereby averting a break up of
the National Front and a return to civil strife or military
dictatorship. We believe that the danger of a military coup or a
breakdown in the Front is greater today than a year ago, or even several
months ago, but we are still inclined to feel that the end is not at
hand yet.
The Current Situation
The recently announced alliance of the majority Laureanista– Alzatista
(L/A’s) faction of the Conservative Party and two smaller opposition
parties, the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL) and the Popular National Alliance (ANP), has created
the latest, serious problem for the Front government of Conservative
President Valencia. The alliance
formalizes the L/A’s de facto opposition to the National Front
government, which along with absenteeism in the Congress and lack of
party discipline, has served to block passage of important legislation
since mid-1964. The Liberal Party that shares the responsibility of
government with the Conservative Party in the National Front and the
Ospinista minority faction of the Conservative Party (still loyal to the
National Front) are pressuring Valencia to remove the L/A’s from the government or to
exact a pledge of legislative support from them. Valencia is extremely reluctant to make
any move that would further undermine his already shaky government.
What May Happen
Valencia probably will respond to
the present crisis—as he has to other crisis situations in the past—by
temporizing, in hopes that it will go away. If the Liberals force the
issue and the L/A’s remain intransigent, Valencia may be forced to remove the latter from their
government posts. This measure would probably kill any chance for
congressional action on a major fiscal package now under consideration
and all but end hopes for any meaningful legislation before elections in
March 1966 when a new congress is to be chosen. An outcome to the
present crisis of this sort would probably not topple the Valencia government.
The National Front’s problems are growing, however, and its political
base for dealing with these problems is shrinking. The greatest danger
that may emerge from the latest crisis is that it may lead Liberal Party
leaders to believe that the National Front cannot survive the electoral
test in 1966 when it is their turn to put a member of their party in the
presidency. As a result, the Liberals may decide to conspire with the military with the idea of
bringing about an extra-legal change of government through which they
would gain the upper hand. The military, faced with a growing problem of
subversive violence, may be receptive to the Liberals’ overtures,
thinking perhaps that the Liberal leaders might be able to help them
establish effective government. At this time there is little indication
that the Liberals are seriously considering an extra-legal change or,
for that matter, that they have the military support they would need for
such a move.
Economic Problems as a Factor
Colombia’s financial condition is deteriorating and the economic
frustrations of the masses contribute to political tensions.
Inflationary pressures are not great at the moment but a push against
prices is expected in coming months. A Special Session of the Congress,
called to consider a package of revenue proposals, may reject some of
the measures proposed by the Valencia government that could at least limit the size
of a prospective large 1965 budget deficit. The spread between the
official and the free rate of exchange is increasing and the government
lacks the international reserves to protect the official rate against
speculative raids and the rising demand for imports. Valencia’s heavy commitment to avoid
devaluation has prevented his administration from taking the remedial
measures that are necessary to rectify the monetary and exchange
situation.
The prospect is that Colombia will try during the balance of 1965 to
obtain short-term commercial financing to relieve pressures on the
exchange rate and impose additional indirect taxes on imports. With
government attention devoted primarily to maneuvering its way through
the country’s political and financial difficulties, it does not seem
likely that Colombia will make much headway on basic long-term social
and economic reform in the near future.Mann briefed President
Johnson on Colombia during a telephone
conversation the afternoon of May 5. He told the President “we have
a problem in Colombia.” Mann
explained that Colombian President Valencia is very pro-U.S., but “does not know beans
from bull about economics” and wants $60–100 million a year to
maintain rates of exchange that are unrealistic. Valencia does not want to devalue
or stop inflation because it will cost him popularity, but if he
doesn’t do something “it will cost us billions without giving us
anything.” Mann told
Johnson that “we have this type of problem
all over the world, but in Colombia it is a matter of leadership. He
said if it blows it won’t necessarily go Communist but he did not
think this guy would last. He said he has been very anti-Communist
and a good friend but does not know anything about running a
country.” (Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2, 1965–June 2, 1966)
313. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in ColombiaSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL COL. Secret; Immediate; Limdis.
Drafted by Sayre, cleared by
Palmer and Eaton, and approved by Sayre.Washington, May 22, 1965, 2:18 p.m.
954. Our first objective in Colombia is to prevent overthrow of
constitutional government especially if there is a chance that golpe may
result which would bring to top undesirable extremist elements on either
side.On May 21 Valencia declared a state of siege
in response to violent student demonstrations against U.S.
intervention in the Dominican Republic. In a May 21 memorandum to
Mann, Vaughn reported: “This action
should place the GOC in a stronger
position for taking effective action in maintaining public security
and resolving its continuing economic problems.” (Ibid., ARA Files,
1965–67: Lot 70 D 295, Colombia, 1965)
Our second objective is to get government to institute necessary reforms
and adopt such other measures as necessary to assure its longer term
stability.
As between these two objectives it is obvious we must choose the first if
the situation requires it. We undersand from all of your reports however
that the situation in Colombia does not require us to make such a choice
at this time. On the contrary we understand that GOC has taken advantage of current demonstrations for the
purpose of imposing a state of siege which will permit it to institute
the measures necessary to achieve economic and political stability. We
also understand from your messages that government is now in firm
control of situation with support of police and military and that
government is moving as swiftly as it can to adopt needed reform
measures. We on our side are also prepared to move swiftly to complement
Colombian action.
If there are any moves which the United States Government can make to
assist the GOC in present political
crisis, you should not hesitate to recommend them.Oliver forwarded a
preliminary reply in which he reported that the Colombian Government
was, in fact, reluctant to use the state of siege as a means to
institute fiscal reforms. (Telegram 1473 from Bogotá, May 24; ibid.,
Central Files 1964–66, DEF 6 IA) Moreover if for any reason
you do not believe our
position outlined Deptel 949 is adequate, you should not hesitate to say
so.Telegram 949 to Bogotá, May 21,
reported on international efforts to stabilize Colombia’s finances,
particularly as a result of the recent mission of Gerald M. Alter,
director of the Western Hemisphere Department, World Bank. After two
meetings with World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and
Department of State officials, Alter was instructed to return to
Bogotá with joint conditions for extending emergency financial
assistance to Colombia. The conditions stipulated that the Valencia administration impose a
4.5 peso per dollar payment tax for the remainder of its term.
(Ibid., FN 16 COL) The Embassy considered the overall strategy
“excellent,” although it advised against authorizing Alter to speak
on behalf of the U.S. Government. (Telegram 1463 from Bogotá, May
22; ibid., E 1 BRAZ)
If pressure for furnishing military contribution to IAF in Dominican Republic substantially
contributes to present political crisis, you may indicate to GOC US would hope contribution can be made
but we will not press if this the case.
Rusk
314. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Colombia, Vol. I, 12/63–7/65. Secret. Drafted by Hill and Eaton. Read forwarded this memorandum to Bundy on June 4.Washington, June 4, 1965.
SUBJECT
Situation in ColombiaAs indicated in recent previous memoranda from Mr. Read to Mr. Bundy on this subject,Memoranda from Read to Bundy, May 7, May 22, and May 24, are
ibid. a serious political and economic situation is
developing in Colombia and the United States has been trying to obtain action which would
shore up the National Front Government of President Valencia.Mann reviewed the
Colombia crisis with President Johnson
earlier that morning and told the President he was holding a
meeting on Colombia and that the situation is very bad.
Mann reported the
“World Bank thing becoming unglued. The President said it looked
as if we ought to pour all the money we can in—try to save the
President [Valencia]. He
said he thought this was better then trying to remake the
government. Mr. Mann
explained how difficult it would be to pour enough money in. He
said they were going to kick around several alternatives and
then planned to go over and talk with Mc-George Bundy so the
President’s staff would be clued in.” (Ibid., Papers of
Thomas C. Mann,
Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2, 1965–June 2, 1966)
The immediate situation is that President Valencia has been unable yet to
follow through on his earlier decision to institute an economic
program (including a de facto devaluation of the peso) which,
together with substantial aid from the U.S. and international
lending institutions, would tend to stabilize the economic and
political situation. The economic program and de facto
devaluation were worked out over the last few weeks in outline
between the World Bank and the Minister of Finance, with the
approval of President Valencia.
The United States made a positive response to these negotiations
by indicating to the Government of Colombia through the Bank its
readiness to support such a program with immediate release of
$10 million from the 1964 program loan and, subject to
negotiation, with $60 million in FY 1966 AID program
funds, and additional support from PL 480, Export-Import Bank and Treasury for a total
of about $100 million over the next twelve months if the
devaluation was the 50 per cent believed by the Bank, the IMF and our economists to be the
appropriate level for effectiveness. (This would have been
effected by imposing a 4.5 peso “payments tax” on top of the
import exchange rate of 9 pesos to the dollar; President
Valencia approved
first a 3 peso tax and then a 3.5 peso tax as negotiations
continued.)
President Valencia’s
approval of effective devaluation was a major change in his
previous position. His Government devalued just after he came to
office in 1962, but the devaluation was a failure through
mishandling. He did not want to try again and overruled a
recommendation for a new devaluation from his previous Minister
of Finance last December. The persuasion of circumstances over
the last months, including the need to cut back imports sharply,
changed his mind.
In addition, the U.S. readied a negotiating team and developed
its negotiating position to be ready to go to Colombia instantly
when the Colombian program was approved by the Cabinet and made
arrangements for funds to be made immediately available to
support the Colombian effort. The IMF also indicated to the Colombian Government its
readiness to roll over Colombian indebtedness and provide an additional standby
of $20 million, and the IBRD
was prepared to provide large project assistance. This outside
official support, together with the return of normal private
foreign credit lines which would have accompanied adequate
monetary, fiscal and exchange rate measures, would have
permitted higher imports. Higher imports, together with
appropriate internal financial policies, would have led to
increased production and employment rather than a stagnant
economy.
The Colombian Minister of Finance first indicated that he
expected to get the required unanimous Cabinet approval under
the existing state of siege and take action by Presidential
decree at the 3.5 if not 4.5 peso tax level over or just after
the week end of May 30–31. This did not come about. In the
intervening week, serious difficulties have arisen. Unanimous
Cabinet approval has not been obtained. Leadership elements in
the Liberal Party, which forms part of Valencia’s coalition, have
opposed the devaluation.
News of the proposed devaluation leaked to the Colombian press
and set off a strong adverse reaction. In Congress, opposition
elements were joined by some Liberals in denouncing the
devaluation. President Valencia, today reported in Bogota’s press as
himself opposed to devaluation, has apparently done little to
get the Cabinet, the national leadership, or public opinion
behind the proposed program. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, the leading
Liberal, has tried to stay in the background for political
reasons, disassociating himself from the proposed devaluation.
The Finance Minister indicated that he expected action by today,
Friday, June 4, but there are no indications that he has yet
enough votes for the needed unanimous Cabinet decision.
Indecisive leadership and the difficulties of acting through the
coalition National Front system lie at the root of the present
mishandled situation. Alberto Lleras, who was President prior to
Valencia, governed
through much of his administration with a state of siege for public
order reasons. The state of siege also permitted him to act by
decree when Congress did not act because it was hampered by the rule
that unless otherwise decided by a two-thirds majority, all action
must be by two-thirds majority. Lleras did not use his decree
authority extensively. Valencia has attempted until now to govern without
the state of siege. But the political base of the National Front has
tended to fragment as time has passed. Consequently, Congressional
action is continually more difficult to achieve. Therefore Valencia has turned to the state of
siege device. But even with the state of siege he needs a political
base of support because there are now mechanics for reversing his
decree rulings. Thus leadership is needed and he has been lacking in
this quality especially on economic issues.
Should the Colombians not approve an adequate economic program,
including exchange reforms, the economic and political situation
may be expected to
erode further. Economically, intensified exchange controls would
be tried, together with tight credit to the private sector. But
imports, production and employment would be down and
inflationary pressures high.
Politically, the prospects would be for impaired stability of the
government rather than sudden or violent action to depose it,
but this could change. At the least the National Front would
lose ground at the March 1966 Congressional elections, probably
primarily to the forces of former dictator Rojas Pinilla, and
would have uncertain prospects in the May 1966 Presidential
elections. Economic deterioration could lead to a decision by
Valencia to resign or
by the military, persuaded by the business elite, to take
over.
The military under its present leadership is opposed to taking
over civilian political power, but it might be persuaded to
later if the situation deteriorated sufficiently. Lower level
military leaders have not been active politically either, but
they also might become restive later if the general situation
deteriorated badly. They might then become responsive to former
Minister of War Ruiz, who is presently quiet but has had
political ambitions.Ruiz, who was
forced to resign the War Ministry in January, announced on
May 9 that he would also discontinue his recent attempt to
found a political movement. A united military
takeover led from the top would probably be peaceful. A takeover
incited from the lower ranks could be bloody. There is no
indication that Communists would play a significant part in a
takeover under either circumstance, but the situation could
change.
De facto devaluation also entails political risks, especially if
badly handled, but the benefits in terms of a sense of a positive
forward movement of the economy and corresponding political gains
would be high if well handled.
President Valencia may
appeal for sizeable U.S. loans without a satisfactory economic
program or devaluation but granting such aid would offer no
solution.
One hundred million dollars from the United States, which is the
extent to which we are prepared to support a good program, would
not greatly change the economic situation without such a program
because private bank and commercial credits would not be
available for lack of confidence in financial policies, and the
international financial institutions would not provide
complementary support.
As much as three to four hundred million dollars from the United
States Government would be needed for one year to provide the
same amount of push to the economy without a good Colombian
program as would be achieved with $100 million with a good
program. And even then
the Colombian Government would have to undertake a larger
devaluation and greater financial adjustments in 1966 after the
next President came to office.
The U.S. is continuing actively to take steps to help stabilize
the situation and shore up constitutional government in
Colombia. In addition to readiness to quickly support an
acceptable program with large scale loans (see paragraph 2), the
following actions are now under way: Ambassador Oliver is being instructed to see
President Valencia and certain other Colombian
political leaders, after checking with the Minister of
Finance, if the Colombian Government still seems to be
wavering on undertaking a positive economic
program.I have arranged to consult with Colombian Ambassador
to the United States Uribe and Dr. Carlos Sanz de
Santamaria, Chairman of the CIAP and a former
Colombian Minister of Finance.Ambassador Bernbaum is returning to Venezuela to
convey our assessment and position to the Venezuelans
and obtain their thinking and possible assistance.
President Leoni
has previously conveyed to us his great concern about
Colombia; many Venezuelan leaders believe that an
overthrow of constitutional government in Colombia would
sooner or later encourage one in Venezuela.The Ambassador of Brazil is likewise being called in
to convey our position to Brazil.
We have considered sending someone to Bogota to reinforce Ambassador
Oliver in his conversations
with President Valencia and
others there but have decided against it because Ambassador Oliver has close and effective
relations with President Valencia, our doing so at this juncture might open us up too
much for special appeals for assistance without a program, and to do so
might also imply too much United States involvement in the delicate
issue of devaluation.On June 5 Mann told the President that his
June 4 meeting on Colombia (see footnote 3 above) had included
Sanz de Santamaría and
Uribe, in addition to those in the administration who were either
“concerned with” or “knew about” Colombia. After the meeting,
Mann asked that Vaughn prepare a memorandum on the
situation in Colombia for the Secretary, which is the source text.
Mann also gave
Johnson the following assessment: “If the
government does not take the necessary steps then in the next two or
three days we think there will be a change but we do not see any
danger of a commie takeover if the Army stays united. We have no
evidence of a split.” The President asked Mann to set up a task force to
develop plans for Colombia, as well as Guatemala and Bolivia. “We
should have a special task force on top of it with the best names,”
Johnson said, “and be prepared in advance
instead of waiting until they are shooting at us.” (Memorandum of
conversation, June 5, 12:10 p.m.; Johnson Library, Papers of
Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, May 2,
1965–June 2, 1966)
315. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. 11. Secret. A notation on the memorandum
indicates that the President saw it. According to another copy, the
memorandum was drafted by Bundy and Gordon Chase. (Ibid., Country File,
Colombia, Memos, Vol. II, 6/65–9/66)Washington, June 30, 1965, 6: 25
p.m.
SUBJECT
Colombia
Since one of the stickiest areas in Latin America these days is Colombia,
I thought you might be interested in having a brief report on the more
immediate and major problems in that country as well as U.S. efforts and
plans to cope with them.
The most serious immediate problems appear to be economic. Lack of
political and economic confidence has caused the free rate of
exchange to depreciate from 10 pesos to the dollar in October 1964
to 19 pesos to the dollar now. The official import rate is
over-valued at 9 pesos to the dollar and is increasingly under
pressure. Liquid reserves are dangerously low and business activity
threatens to be curtailed by the lack of essential imports and of
credit. There is a substantial inflationary potential because of the
gap between budget expenditures planned for 1965 and anticipated
revenues.
There is a difference of view on how to meet these problems. On
the one hand, the Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the U.S.,
along with a number of high-level Colombians (e.g. the recently
resigned Finance Minister), believe that Colombia must institute
a comprehensive economic program, which should probably include
such measures as budget balancing, wage-price restraint, an
increase in imports and a de facto devaluation of about 50%; we
would be prepared to support such a program with up to $90
million of new commitments.
On the other hand, President Valencia holds a different view. While, in May,
he appeared ready to go along with the above comprehensive
economic program, he has more recently said that such a program
would be politically too risky, particularly the de facto
devaluation (we don’t agree).
What Valencia seems to
prefer is that we provide substantial assistance (estimates vary
from $200 million to $400 million), without taking the necessary
self-help measures, on the grounds that this would enable him to
avoid a revolution or at least an electoral defeat for the National Front in
Colombia. We are not anxious to meet Valencia’s desire, among other things, because
it will cost us a lot more money and because we believe that a
large loan to Colombia without adequate self-help measures,
would severely undercut the credibility of an important Alliance
for Progress dimension.
The situation, however, is not without hope. Largely as a result
of our Embassy’s efforts, there are indications that a number of
influential Colombians are becoming more and more convinced of the
need for a positive economic program. State’s present estimate is
that the odds are slightly in favor of Colombia attempting a
comprehensive economic program of the type outlined above, although
probably with some changes. State also estimates that the odds are
somewhat better than even that the program, if attempted, will be
reasonably successful.If, in the last analysis, President Valencia refuses to undertake a comprehensive
economic program a number of contingencies could develop. These are
analyzed in the attached contingency plan,Attached but not printed. The contingency plan
was prepared in response to the President’s request for a “task
force” on Colombia. (Memorandum from Vaughn to Rusk, June 22; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23 GUAT) The Latin American
Policy Committee drafted the plan, which was then forwarded to
the White House on June 24. (Memorandum from Read to Bundy, June 24; ibid., ARA Country Files: Lot 68 D 385,
LAPC—Colombia) which
notes that the most likely contingency is continued drift and
deterioration under the National Front and that the next most likely
contingencies are (a) the withdrawal of Valencia, (b) a military takeover, and (c) a general
uprising. State does not foresee the danger of a Communist take-over
in Colombia in the short term, in view of the fact that the extreme
left in Colombia is badly fractured, poorly led and not very
popular.Bundy wrote the following
note at the end of the memorandum: “You may have seen Charles
Bartlett’s praise of this policy yesterday.” Bartlett was a
columnist with the Chicago Sun
Times.McG. B.
316. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on July 9.NIE 88–65Washington, July 9, 1965.
PROSPECTS FOR COLOMBIA
The Problem
To estimate Colombia’s prospects over the next year, with particular
reference to the viability of the National Front system of
government.
Conclusions
The National Front system of government has not functioned
effectively, particularly under the presidency of Valencia (since 1962). The
recurrent crises of the past year have aggravated the country’s
basic economic problems and political tensions. (Paras. 4–17)The Valencia administration
is under strong pressure from organized labor, business interests,
and military leaders to cope more effectively with the deteriorating
situation, but so far has proved incapable of developing and
carrying out a sustained program of remedial action. The National
Front system contains so many built-in checks and balances that it
allows the multiplicity of political factions embraced within it to
prevent decisive political action. Moreover, the measures which we
believe to be most urgent—e.g., a further devaluation, more
effective price and wage controls, and increased taxes—would be
unpopular and difficult for any government to carry out. (Paras.
10–17, 28, 30)Despite widespread and rising dissatisfaction with its
performance, the Valencia
government may be able to continue in office, at least until the
close approach of the congressional election scheduled for March
1966. But even if it should be able to bring itself to adopt and
carry out a program likely to prove beneficial over the longer term,
it is unlikely that such a program could produce sufficient
improvements before the election to reverse the growing popular
dissatisfaction. The Opposition will probably gain enough seats in
Congress to deprive the Front of the two-thirds majority required to
do business under the present system. (Paras. 28, 30–31)There is likely to be rising demand for a basic change in the
system. This would be extremely difficult to accomplish by
constitutional means and may therefore lead to a military coup with
respectable civilian support. Such a move would entail considerable
risk of precipitating various sorts of violence; it is unlikely that
the military would undertake it unless they were convinced that a
national crisis was inevitable in any case. But if there were to be
a coup during the period of this estimate, the military would
probably be able to control the situtation. (Paras. 19–27, 29,
32–33)A military coup would not in itself solve any of Colombia’s basic
problems. It might open the way to the establishment of a new system
of civil government more capable of dealing with them, or it might
lead to a period of unpopular authoritarian rule. On the other hand,
the prolongation of the present ineffectual system of government
tends to increase the severity of Colombia’s problems and to
enchance the appeal of those who favor radical social revolution,
including the present relatively ineffective groups who advocate
violence. (Para. 34)The residual rural banditry is criminal rather than political in
character. The Communists and other extremist groups are not now
capable of overthrowing the government or even of sustaining
insurgency in any considerable area. (Para. 21–26)
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]
317. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of the Budget
(Schultze) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 16.
Confidential. Forwarded to the President as an attachment to a
memorandum from Bundy,
October 30, who commented: “Charlie Schultze’s memorandum seems to me first-rate and I
fully concur with it.” (Ibid.)Washington, October 29, 1965.
SUBJECT
Loan for the Government of Colombia
In the attached memorandumAttached but not
printed. the AID
Administrator has requested your approval to sign a loan of $65 million
for the Government of Colombia by November 1, or as soon thereafter as
negotiations are completed.
This is the first such aid commitment submitted on an individual basis
for your approval. We will shortly recommend to you procedures to
provide for your review of the AID
program at three critical points: The approval of a country program in the budget
process;Approval of specific commitments ready for execution;
andRegular reporting of progress on the country’s self-help
efforts and actions taken by AID
in this process.
AID has spent almost a year convincing
the Colombians that we are serious about self help: • we have entered into no loan agreements with them so far
this year,• we even withheld a payment last
January of $10 million under the previously approved
1964 loan,• negotiating together with the IMF and the World Bank, AID now is getting written
commitments from Colombia that promise some real
progress.
Actions already taken
In fact, some of the toughest measures have already
been executed. 1. In September, Colombia devalued its currency
by a substantial percentage. The IMF,
World Bank, and AID all think this
devaluation will be successful in eliminating the biggest single drain
on the Colombian economy, particularly in the private sector. All three
agencies will be watching the results closely. 2. The Colombians have
imposed a 20 percent surcharge on income tax, and 3. They have
effectively more than doubled the export tax on coffee, to change a
heavy government subsidy into a self-sustaining operation.
Commitments and controls on future action
The loan agreement won’t be simply for measures already
taken. AID will only disburse the
$65 million in quarterly segments, $20 million on signing and
$15 million each in February, May, and August. And each release will be
made only if a review of performance indicates that Colombia is making
good progress in a number of important areas, including: —a flexible exchange rate policy and a liberalized trade
policy—a non-inflationary fiscal, monetary, and wage policy—tax improvement measures which should help support a 10
percent increase in public investment—new program for agricultural development and reform—an expanded program of primary education financed at the
local level.
The funds will be used to finance imports from the
U.S. Secretary Fowler is satisfied with
the provisions of the loan from a U.S. balance of payments point of
view. Special conditions will be attached which
have the effect of neutralizing the balance of payments impact in
1965.
Other contributors
In addition to AID, the World Bank and
the IMF are contributing $130 million.
Their commitments will also be tied to the same self-help efforts that
the U.S. is insisting upon. The three agencies (AID, IMF, IBRD) have worked out a common approach
and joint arrangements to make this work.
I recommend that you approve this loan request.Before approving the loan the President asked for
further comment from Oliver
and Mann. Oliver replied: “A democratic,
confident Colombia is of the greatest importance to our strategic
and political national interests; and a new program, sound on
development merits, is also the best guarantee we can supply that
Colombia will achieve orderly, constitutional transfer of power in
the 1966 elections.” (Telegram 630 from Bogotá, November 2; Johnson
Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Mc-George Bundy, Vol. 16) Mann wrote: “If we fail to come
through in a timely way with our end of the bargain, the progress
which has been made could begin to come unraveled because of
political pressures in Colombia.” (Memorandum from Mann to the President, November 2;
ibid.) Both reports were forwarded as enclosures to a memorandum
from Bundy to the President,
November 2. Johnson approved the loan “with
reluctance, reservations and considerable misgivings—but with the
understanding that it results in no loss in bal of pay this yr &
that Oliver, Vaughn & Mann, Schultze, follow this day to day adm. & keep us
informed.” (Memorandum from Bundy to the President, November 2; ibid.)
Charles L. Schultze
318. Memorandum From William
G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Colombia, Vol. II 6/65–9/66.
Confidential. A copy was sent to Bill
Moyers.Washington, March 24, 1966, 5: 30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Colombian Congressional Elections
Last SundayMarch 20. Colombia held
congressional elections. Going into the elections, the National Front
Government (FTN)—a coalition of the
Liberal and Conservative parties which have alternated in power since
1958—appeared to be in
deep trouble.In a March 18 memorandum to
Rusk, Gordon concluded: “Although the
final results could go either way, it appears that the opposition
coalition will probably win about 51% of the votes cast, as well as
a majority of the seats in the congress. Under these circumstances,
a post-election coup by the military against the opposition is a
possibility, although not a probability. Should the opposition win
more than 55% of the votes cast, a military coup would become
somewhat more likely.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA/CV/C Files: Lot 69 D 407, POL 14 Elections) An FTN defeat could have produced a
fragmentation of the political party structure with very serious
consequences for our interests in Colombia.
With 90% of the vote tabulated, the FTN—to everyone’s surprise— has scored an impressive victory: —It increased its margin of the popular vote to 57% and gained
an equally large edge in congressional seats.—It has left the opposition in disarray, with the
non-communist left badly beaten and the far right under former
dictator Rojas Pinilla, although somewhat strengthened, still
far short of being able to challenge the FTN.—It virtually assures the FTN
candidate—Liberal Carlos Lleras— clear sailing in the May 1
presidential elections.—It substantially improves the FTN chances of being able to get a 2/3 working
majority in the Congress so that it can govern within the terms
of the FTN agreement rather than
under a state of siege decree, as it has so often had to do in
past years.
The FTN victory for
us means: —improved prospects for more stable, efficient and progressive
government in Colombia over the next four years.—continued good performance on our Program Loan
agreement.—continued cooperation with us on major international
issues.Two handwritten notes on
the memorandum by Komer and the President read: “Good news,
contrary to early press reports. RWK”
and “Congratulate Covey Oliver.
L.”
WGB
319. Letter From the Director of the Office of Colombian-Venezuelan
Affairs (Hill) to
the Ambassador to Colombia (Oliver)Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/NC Files: Lot 72 D 235, Eyes
Only. Secret; Official–Informal; Eyes Only.Washington, April 1, 1966.
Dear Covey: The primary reason for our decision against your proposal [1 line of source text not declassified]
was the general premise that we should not run the potential
risks of such action unless U.S. national security is directly
involved. This does not seem to be the case in Colombia at the
present time.Your proposal was discussed thoroughly in ARA/CV and with Bob Sayre, who also discussed it
with Tom Mann. The
general consensus, including the concurrence of CIA, was to
decide against your proposal, although Tom would have liked to
have discussed it with Mr. Gordon. This was not practical within the time
frame because of Mr. Gordon’s absence until next Monday.April 4. Even so, Mr. Gordon’s general views are
known to coincide with what was decided.I think that the purpose of your proposal was well taken, [4 lines of source text not declassified].
I agree entirely with the line of thought in this regard as
expressed in paragraph 3 of your proposal message.In paragraph 3 Oliver agrued: “As I see it, a determined,
vigorous, plausible candidate of opposition within
constitution would be a good thing for Colombia. It would
mark beginnings of a new party alignment related to
twentieth century issues. It would call attention to
specific alternative lines of development-related action
that could be asserted and debated on their merits. It would
canalize protest into proposals for democratic action; and
these would (1) help Lleras with less open-minded power
groups in his entourage and (2) keep masses from buying
dialectical shibboleths out of ignorance and dissatisfaction
with their alternation from government processes.” (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/NC Files: Lot 72 D 235,
Eyes Only) A poor showing by the opposition and a
small vote for the Lleras candidacy might well put the Lleras
administration at a psychological disadvantage subsequently and
give opposition elements an advantage in their efforts to
undermine his government. Nevertheless, the congressional
elections of March 20 constitute in themselves a genuine mandate
for the FTN and should provide
an answer to any future criticism that Lleras was not the
majority choice. Such a position could certainly be justified
with the press and with the other countries in the Hemisphere.
In view of the mandate provided by the congressional elections
and in view of the fact that we have no assurance now that the present political
system or U.S. interests in Colombia will be jeopardized, [5 lines of source text not
declassified].In analyzing further your proposal, I think it needs to be
broken down into two parts: (1) Ruiz as an effective opposition
presidential candidate during the next month, and (2) the
related possibility of the development of a new opposition party
with middle and lower class support within the democratic left.
(I think Ruiz’ insight that the failure of the MRL has left a vacuum on the
democratic left in Colombia, as mentioned in paragraph 2 of
Embtel 1258,In telegram 1258 from Bogotá, March 25, the
Embassy described a meeting between Ruiz and an Embassy
officer, March 24; paragraph 2 concluded that Ruiz was
“still undecided but seemed inclined run,” while paragraph 3
reported that Ruiz had “discussed great vacuum extant on
Colombian democratic left owing failure MRL.” (Ibid.,
Central Files 1964–66, POL
14 COL) is certainly correct.)With regard to part 1, I think the surest advantage of your
proposal lies in the short range context. The advantage of
providing legitimacy for the Lleras administration probably
outweighs the disadvantage of possible troubles stirred up for
the FTN in the short and perhaps
the long range by a more effective opposition. Apart from the
general premise mentioned in paragraph 1 above, your proposal
would probably be a good idea simply in the short range
context.Part 2 of your proposal raises the question of whether a new
opposition party is really desirable. In this regard, we are not
yet prepared to accept fully the possible argument that the two
traditional parties have lost their usefulness and must
necessarily be replaced by a new party or parties in order that
Colombia may have a democratic system capable of stability and
progress. If the National Front system were discarded and if
real competition between the Conservative and Liberal parties
were once again possible, it is our hope that one or both of
these parties (but more likely the Liberal party) might assume
the role of a progressive reform party sufficiently to meet
popular aspirations, keep the support of labor, and win new
support from the middle and lower classes.Consequently, it would seem that a major goal which we should
try to pursue during the coming Lleras administration should be
modification of the National Front to permit such competition,
preferably a modification permitting the free participation and
competition in the political system of all parties. Such a
development should benefit the traditional parties more than the
opposition, we think, if the traditional parties concentrate on
reform and if the modification of the system were undertaken
soon. Basically, traditional parties would have an advantage
over the opposition because of tradition, existing organization,
capable
leadership, and an apparent continuing appeal to a significant
segment of the Colombian people. As long as the restrictive
ground rules of the National Front prevail, the traditional
parties will suffer from the lack of competition and the lack of
meaningful alternatives.Nevertheless, the idea of a new opposition party such as you
suggest has several positive aspects. First, it would fill the
void in the democratic left, if the traditional parties can’t.
Second, it would channel the existing opposition, particularly
ANAPO, along more
responsible lines and prevent a default to extremism. Third, it
might help to pressure a modification of the National
Front.Possible negative aspects of such a party might include the
following. First, such an opposition party led by Ruiz might be
more likely to heighten discontent than to clarify issues and
might well make it more difficult for Lleras to govern. This
would be particularly unfortunate if there is a good chance that
Lleras’ economic and
social program will be good. Second, it is not clear that Ruiz’
ideas and programs would be all that good. Certainly it is
highly doubtful that they are as good as those of Lleras at this
stage. Third, there is some room for doubt whether an effective
opposition party such as you envisage could really get very far
at this time. It is quite likely that even with Ruiz such a
party might not remain cohesive and effective for very long. A
struggle for control between Ruiz and RojasGeneral Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, former
President of Colombia (1953-1957), was the founder and
leader of ANAPO.
might well take place. A presidential campaign of one month
duration might be insufficient to strengthen Ruiz’ position
enough to effectively challenge Rojas. In addition, there is
some question whether Colombia is really ready or much
interested in a new party. The congressional elections seemed to
support this argument to a certain extent. It would probably
take a strong charismatic figure, like a Betancourt or a
Frei or even a
Gaitan,Jorge Eliécer Gaitán,
leader of the Liberal Party until his assassination in
Bogotá on April 9, 1948. to generate such a movement.
At this point, there is not much on which to base such a party
in Colombia except for ANAPO
and possibly the UTC.In sum, while your proposal has much merit [2½ lines of source text not declassified], the case is
just not strong enough [1½ lines of source
text not declassified]. I should add that my own view
was influenced by knowledge of operations of this sort in the
past which, despite being advertised as secure and effective,
proved to be neither. Nevertheless, all agree that it is to your
credit to have made such a proposal and shows your alertness to
the situation as it is developing.Actually, it would be more appropriate for the FTN to finance Ruiz as an
opposition candidate. If the FTN
recognizes this as advantageous, and if the FTN is astute and Machiavellian
enough, it may do so. I was glad to see from paragraph 6 of
Embtel 1285According to paragraph 6 of telegram 1285
from Bogotá, March 30, there was speculation that the
National Front was “asking for further contributions from
followers in order finance opposition candidate if money
proves only obstacle.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 COL) that this
may be the case.
If you have any comment with regard to any of the above, please let us
know.
With best regards,
John Calvin Hill, Jr.Printed from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
320. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Gordon) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CV/C Files, 1966: Lot 69 D 407,
POL 14, Elections. Confidential.
Drafted by Lord. A notation
on the memorandum indicates that Rusk saw it.Washington, April 30, 1966.
SUBJECT
Colombian Presidential Elections
Colombian presidential elections are scheduled for Sunday, May 1 (today).
The candidate of the National Front, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, a Liberal,
is expected to win handily with as much as 70% of the vote. The
opposition candidate, Jose Jaramillo Giraldo, a political lightweight,
is supported actively only by the followers of ex-dictator Gustavo Rojas
Pinilla, and has no real chance of challenging Lleras.
The elections may be plagued by abstention and by public order
disturbances. Because of the National Front’s victory in the
congressional elections on March 20 and the poor prospects of Jaramillo,
voter apathy is likely to be widespread, with the result that Lleras may
win with less than 2 million of 7 million possible votes. Dissident
Liberal and Conservative
leadership has called for abstention by its adherents. Both Lleras and
Rojas stand to be somewhat embarrassed by a small voter turn out. Voting
could also be affected by the current student strike over university
issues, if the students try to interfere with orderly elections.
If elected, Lleras is scheduled to take office on August 7 for a
four-year team. Lleras is a combination of politician, economist, and
businessman, who is expected to provide capable administration and
improved economic policies. He may be hampered in implementing his
development and other legislative programs by the lack of the required
two-thirds congressional majority. If so, he may have to either seek to
amend the constitution or else continue to govern by decree under a
state of siege, as the present Conservative administration of President
Valencia has done since May
1965.In telegram 1423 from Bogotá, May
2, the Embassy reported that Lleras won the election, and that voter
turnout had been higher than expected. (Ibid., Central Files
1964–66, POL 14 COL)
321. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Colombia, Vol. II, 8/65–9/66.
Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the
President saw it. A copy was sent to Bill Moyers.Washington, September 19, 1966.
SUBJECT
Colombia: What We Achieved With Our Program Loan
A year ago when Colombia faced a severe political-economic crisis, you
authorized a $65 million program loan to Colombia on the basis of
meaningful self-help measures. Today the situation in Colombia contrasts
most favorably with that of last fall, thanks in considerable part to
that loan.
The outlook then was grim: —The budget was seriously in deficit.—The inflationary threat was grave.—Disposable foreign exchange reserves were badly
depleted.—Substantial payment arrears had accumulated.—An over-valued exchange rate resulted in stifling
controls.—Public confidence was at a low ebb.—The spring general elections and survival of the National
Front were in doubt.
In September, 1965, the Consultative Group (IBRD, IMF, AID) helped the Colombians draw up a
stabilization program buttressed by external financial support. After a
year the program has removed the main causes of instability. This is the
picture today: —The current budgetary surplus has reached levels permitting
an acceleration of investment expenditures.—The inflationary spiral has been brought under
control.—Net exchange reserves have increased by some $41 million,
with payments arrears eliminated.—Trade liberalization has exceeded the IMF target.—There has been a resurgence of confidence inside and outside
Colombia.—The elections were orderly and the democratic, progressive
forces of the National Front emerged strengthened.
Much remains to be done, of course, but our investment in this important
Latin American country during the past 12 months has paid off.
Walt
322. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Colombia, Vol. III, 10/66–11/68.
Confidential. Forwarded to the President under cover of a November
15 note in which Rostow reported: “Because of the urgency in getting
on with loan negotiations with Colombia, Secretary Rusk will raise
at the luncheon meeting today the attached authorization
request.”Washington, November 15, 1966.
SUBJECT
Program Loan for Colombia for 1967
AID and BOB request, under the new commitment procedures, your
authorization to negotiate a $100 million program loan for Colombia for
the balance of CY 1966 and CY 1967. Joe Fowler raises no objections on
balance of payments grounds although he maintains his reservations on
program as against project lending.Attached, but not
printed, are memoranda to the President from Schultze (November 5),
Fowler (undated), and Gaud (October 31).
The amount is $35 million more than you approved for 1966: —$20 million to support Lleras and his vigorous development
program.—$15 million to cover the balance of 1966 (our loan went only
to October).
As last year, we will coordinate our loan negotiations with the IMF and the IBRD-led Consultative Group for maximum leverage on
self-help commitments. They are expected to furnish $65 and $100 million
respectively.
A loan of this magnitude is justified because: —Lleras needs this amount to launch his development program
while continuing stabilization measures.—Colombia’s self-help performance this year has for the most
part been highly satisfactory, and should be better under
Lleras, a sophisticated economist and more able political leader
than his predecessor.—The self-help requirements and tying procedures are well
conceived to maximize our interests.—Lleras belongs to the new generation of democratic,
progressive Latin American leaders whom we wish to see
succeed.—Lleras has already taken the leadership in promoting
accelerated Latin American economic integration—the cornerstone
of our summit package.
I am satisfied with the soundness of the proposed loan and join in the
recommendation that you approve it.
Later this month we will seek your approval of CY 1967 program loans to Brazil and Chile, both in
considerably lesser amounts than you approved for this year.
Walt
Approve
Disapprove
Speak to MeAlthough
none of the options is checked, the issue was decided at the
Tuesday luncheon on November 15. According to a record of the
meeting Johnson cleared
the negotiations, but asked “if we really want to blow that much
on Colombia.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of
Walt W. Rostow,
Meetings with the President, April–December 1966) Rostow answered this question
in telegram CAP 661074 to the President, November 27: “The
Colombia loan was calculated within a plan to live with the
FY 1967 appropriation for
Latin America. The object was to give Colombia the kind of lift
we have given at a critical stage to Brazil and Chile in the
past two years. Now Brazil and Chile are moving, aid is on the
way down.” (Ibid., Country File, Colombia, Vol. III,
10/66–11/68) President Johnson subsequently approved signing the loan
as negotiated. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, April 26, 1967;
ibid.)
323. Telegram From the Embassy in Colombia
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23 COL. Secret; Limdis.Bogotá, April 27, 1967,
2325Z.
4414. 1. At President Lleras’
invitation [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] I went to his private residence last night to
brief him on security developments as we see them, especially related to
recent upsurge guerrilla activities. [2½ lines of
source text not declassified]Not
found.
2. President conceded that memo confirmed his own fears for the immediate
situation but appeared visibly sobered and perturbed by its
implications, including the role of Cuba in professionally training and
supplying guerrilla needs. He then reviewed need for new tactics by
GOC armed forces. He feels present
situation under control however precarious but apprehensive lest another
three or four successful forays by guerrillas against the military will
undermine army morale and perhaps cause loss of confidence in ability
his government maintain law and order.
3. President cited military and police reports that rural populace
attitude toward security forces has worsened in recent months while
guerrilla bands woo tacit support local peasants by ample use of funds,
paying generously for food and local supplies.
4. President has called meeting for April 28 his top military commanders
for discussion new tactics to cope with deteriorating situation.On May 9 Lleras met Ambassador Carlson [text not declassified] for a “second round of
discussions on insurgency activities.” Lleras stated his belief that
the counterinsurgency campaign must be waged as “a concerted
coordinated effort,” employing civic action programs as well as
unconventional military tactics. The efforts of the previous
administration, he maintained, had been hampered by deficiencies in
such factors as funding, imagination, and coordination among the
intelligence services. Lleras also asked the Americans for
“suggestions on specific and concrete tactical measure that might be
used.” (Telegram 4580 from Bogotá, May 11; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23 COL)
Carlson
324. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs (Kohler)
Washington, August 16, 1967.[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Files, c. 57, August 22, 1967. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text
not declassified.]
325. Memorandum From William
G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Colombia, Vol. III, 10/66–12/68. Confidential.Washington, April 19, 1968.
SUBJECT
Colombia
You asked for a memorandum covering Colombia’s economic performance and
the difficulties arising from current loan negotiations for 1968.
Colombia’s Economic Performance
With a $100 million program loan from us and sound exchange, fiscal and
budgetary policies laid down by President Lleras, Colombia had a good
year in 1967: —despite the sizeable drop in coffee revenues, 4.5% growth in
GNP was achieved;—careful budget management and improved tax collections (up
20% over 1966) made possible a 42% increase in public
investment, primarily in agriculture and education;—wise monetary measures held the cost of living increase to 8%
compared with 13% in 1966;—minor exports were up 20% over 1966;—sound management of the exchange rate permitted a gradual
depreciation of 16% without the usual strains;—commercial arrears were eliminated by July 1967, although
substantial arrears in the capital market remain;—planning at the national level, especially in education and
agriculture, greatly improved.
To the economic gains must be added Lleras’ success on the political-security front. He
achieved a good working majority in both houses to achieve passage of
reform measures. Guerrilla activity fell to a new low under a
two-pronged offensive of increased military pressure and economic
assistance to heretofore neglected rural areas.
The Loan Negotiations
The principal components of the aid package for 1968 are a $58 million
program loan and a $15 million agricultural sector loan. PL 480 sales of $14.5 million are also
involved.President
Johnson approved negotiation of the aid
package to Colombia in late February. (Memorandum from Rostow to the
President, February 24; ibid.)
When Lleras was over the economic barrel last year, he agreed to specific
performance targets in writing, although it grated on him. This year,
with a clear record of significant accomplishments, he dug in his heels
and asked that the assistance package for 1968 be given on faith that he
will maintain sound economic policies.
When negotiations began last month, AID
was edgy about certain backsliding indicators: —in January Lleras had stopped further adjustments in the
certificate exchange rate;—a promised additional 20% liberalization of imports had not
materialized;—the desired additionality had not been achieved and Treasury
was pressing for sterner action.
This prompted AID to serve up the 1968
package with another set of conditions involving specific performance
targets. Lleras balked. When he failed to liberalize imports 20% by
March 31, as he had promised, AID
withheld payments of the last $20 million tranche of the 1967 loan.
At the height of the impasse, Lleras broke off talks with World Bank
representatives, the leaders of the negotiating group. And he let it be
known to AID that he would not accept
fixed targets on the key issues of devaluation, import liberalization
and additionality.
Since then, both sides have maneuvered away from their rigid positions: —Lleras wrote SchweitzerPierre-Paul Schweitzer, managing director of the
International Monetary Fund. that the dual exchange
rates will be unified soon and, subsequently, the unified rate
will be flexible “along the lines observed during 1967.” AID now finds this
satisfactory;—The Colombians recently started strong efforts to safeguard
the US share of the commercial market within its completely
controlled import system;—AID is willing to drop prior
commitments on import liberalization during 1968 in favor of
performance review in October which could affect the amount of
the second tranche. AID would
link the level of coffee receipts, aid disbursements and import
targets so that greater than expected coffee receipts or failure
to increase imports could result in reduced loan disbursements.
Lleras says this is agreeable;—AID will not insist on a 20%
liberalization of imports before
releasing the last tranche of the 1967 loan and will release the
money as soon as the 1968 loan agreement is initialled. Lleras
says once he has the money in hand, he will liberalize in the
amount agreed.
So negotiations are back on the tracks and should be completed in the
next two or three weeks.The United States
and Colombia signed two agreements, the $58 million program loan and
the $15 million agricultural sector loan, on July 15. The PL–480
agreement was signed on May 31.
Lessons to be Learned
At the outset, AID was too demanding on
specific written commitments. They should have known from last year’s
experience that Lleras, with a good record behind him, would not agree
to terms which rubbed him the wrong way in 1967. AID should have been willing to settle for more general
assurances.
Lleras was too swift in taking umbrage—but this is his nature.
With more firm direction from the top, this kind of thing could be
avoided, but you are familiar with that situation.
WGB
Ecuador
326. Editorial Note
In telegram 923 from Quito, May 22, 1965, the Embassy assessed the
internal threat to the junta in Ecuador. Although a change did not
appear imminent, the Embassy recommended emphasizing “the imperative of
unity” to all factions of the military, while warning opposition leaders
that a revolutionary alliance with the Communists would attract the
“deep distrust” of the United States. The Embassy also reported that it
was encouraging the junta to form a counter-insurgency group “capable of
snuffing out initial revolutionary attempts to establish insurgent
forces.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 ECUADOR) On July
14 the Department noted that demonstrations had so weakened the junta
that plans to hold elections in July 1966 appeared “unrealistic.” To
avoid a violent overthrow of the government, the Department suggested
that the Embassy urge the junta to “shorten substantially scheduled
transfer of power, modify composition significantly, or transfer power
to provisional civilian government.” (Telegram 26 to Quito; ibid.,
POL 15 ECUADOR) The Embassy replied
that such interference would not “expedite the process,” since the junta
had just announced a new plan to restore constitutional order.
Meanwhile, the Embassy reiterated its proposal to support the junta in
forming a counter-insurgency group. (Telegram 59 from Quito, July 15;
ibid.)
[text not declassified] (Department of INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Files, c. 24, August 26, 1965) The Department countered by citing NSAM 177 (see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume IX,
Document 150), which assigned overall responsibility for
police assistance programs, including counter-insurgency efforts, to the
Agency for International Development. The Department argued that an
overt program managed by AID and
maintained under the Ecuadorean National Police stood a better chance of
surviving the junta. (Memorandum from Vaughn to Thompson, August 16; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Files, c. 24, August 26, 1965)
On August 26 the 303 Committee approved the proposal to support a
counter-insurgency group in Ecuador, subject to further clarification of
the organizational details. (Memorandum for the record by Jessup, August
27; ibid., c. 25, September 9, 1965) In telegram 221 from Quito,
September 6, Coerr explained
that, due to growing opposition within the military, “it would be
impossible to establish special unit in DGI.” Coerr recommended
transferring the unit to the army, although this might pose “a problem
in inter-agency relations within USG.”(Telegram 221
from Quito, September 6; National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–3
ECUADOR) On September 9 the 303 Committee decided that the Department of
Defense [text not declassified] should “sort out
these arrangements and keep the committee informed by phone.”
(Memorandum from Carter to Vaughn, September 13; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Special Files, July–December 1965). [text not
declassified] (Memorandum from Jessup to Vance, September 10;
National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject
Files, Ecuador)
327. Memorandum From William
G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Ecuador, Memos, 12/63–11/68.
Secret. A copy was sent to Bill
Moyers. A notation on the memorandum indicates that
the President saw it.Washington, March 28, 1966, 6: 30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Situation in Ecuador
For the past week the Military Junta in Ecuador has been faced with
mounting pressures to step down. It began with a commercial strike in
Guayaquil last Tuesday and has gradually spread to other cities. The
base of the movement has also broadened to include other anti-Junta
groups—political parties, chauffeurs federation, students, etc. A
deteriorating economic situation has added to the Junta’s woes.
Last Friday the Junta, with the firm backing of the Armed Forces, seemed
to be gaining the upper hand. Over the weekend, the picture changed as
the strike continued and clashes between the Armed Forces and university
students and other demonstrators increased.
Ambassador Coerr called State this
afternoon to report that the Junta had announced that: (1) its members
would “reintegrate” themselves into the Armed Forces and (2) there would
be drastic changes in the plan for transition to constitutional
government. Elections had been set for July 3. He did not know yet to
whom the Junta would be turning over the government. The most likely
possibility seemed to be a non-partisan civilian acceptable to the
military and anti-Junta elements. A Guayaquil business-man—Clemente Yerovi—and former President
Galo Plaza are rumored as likely candidates.In a March 29 memorandum for the President, Bowdler reported that Yerovi had been chosen as interim
civilian President and was “known to be friendly towards the United
States, which should ease our task in dealing with him.”
(Ibid.)
So far the Armed Forces remain united and firmly in control of the
security situation. This afternoon’s announcement reflects their
decision that the present Junta should step down because it has lost
public confidence and can no longer maintain a political climate which
will permit meaningful elections in July. For the Armed Forces the way
out is to put in a new face and adjust the date for elections to allow
tempers to cool and make fresh preparations for elections.
Ambassador Coerr is active in this
very fluid situation, using his influence to bring about a government of
conciliation as rapidly as possible, while continuing to press for a
return to constitutional government without delay.
There is nothing further at the moment that we can do from here. The
Inter-American Interdepartmental Regional Group meets tomorrow to review
the situation.The Interdepartmental
Regional Group for Inter-American Affairs met on March 29 to
consider a draft contingency plan on Ecuador. A record of the
meeting is in IRG/ARA Action Memo
#4, April 1; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
ARA/IG Files, 1966–68: Lot 70 D
122, IRG/ARA Action Memos,
1968.
WGB
328. Memorandum From William
G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Ecuador, Vol. I, 12/63–11/68.
Confidential. A copy was sent to Bill
Moyers. A notation on the memorandum indicates that
the President saw it.Washington, March 30, 1966, 6: 00
p.m.
SUBJECT
Ecuadorean Crisis
The situation in Ecuador moved back toward normalcy, although there still
are a few trouble spots.
The commercial strike has been called off. Interim President Clemente Yerovi took over at noon and
announced a three-point program: prompt elections, austerity to solve
the financial crisis, and protection of the “sucre” against devaluation.
He has not named his cabinet, although he indicated that it would be
broadly representative, including the political parties.
The trouble spots are where communist-led students have seized provincial
government buildings in two provinces. Government security forces have
cleared them out in one province but have not yet acted in the other.
Our Peace Corps volunteers have been threatened by the communists in
this province. Ambassador Coerr
has personally called the Defense Minister and National Police Chief to
request protection of the volunteers.
The question of recognition is pending. It is contingent on whether
President Yerovi, in a diplomatic
note to be delivered soon, presents his government as a continuation of
the former regime or a new one. The lawyers in State say we can play it
either way.According to circular telegram
1935, April 4, the Embassy received a note in which the new
government expressed its firm intention to return to constitutional
rule. Although the note failed to address the legal question of
continuity, the Department saw “no reason [why] we should not
continue relations with Ecuador,” pending consultation with other
Latin American governments. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 ECUADOR) The Department
authorized delivery of a note to the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry on
April 12, expressing the desire of the U.S. Government to continue
cordial relations. (Circular telegram 1970, April 8; ibid.)
Paradoxically, the change in leadership enhances the chances of having
meaningful elections. The military junta had scheduled elections for
July, but could not get the political parties to participate. President
Yerovi may have to delay
elections two or three months beyond July, but he is expected to get
full participation.
WGB
329. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Ecuador, Vol. I, 12/63–11/68.
Confidential.Washington, June 23, 1966.
SUBJECT
Emergency Budget Support for Ecuador
Dave Bell, with the concurrence of
Charlie Schultze and Joe
Fowler, requests your authorization to negotiate a loan
of up to $10 million to Ecuador to help meet its budgetary needs for the
balance of this year. Their memoranda are attached.Attached but not printed are memoranda to the
President from Schultze, June
14, and Bell, June 7.
The background to this request is: The two-month old interim civilian government of President
Yerovi inherited a
serious budget problem from the ousted military junta.Despite its belt-tightening efforts, it still confronts a
deficit estimated at $15 million. Any further belt-tightening
would be at the expense of its badly needed development and
reform program. This should be avoided.Last month you authorized negotiation of a loan of $4 million.
This authorization recognized that $4–6 million more might be
necessary. The Yerovi
Government declined the $4 million loan, considering the amount
inadequate and the self-help conditions proportionately too
stiff.Since then the Government has taken several self-help measures
on its own and worked out assistance arrangements with the
IMF ($13 million standby)
and some New York banks ($11 million to meet foreign exchange
needs).Our $10 million loan would be tied to additional self-help
measures and released in installments based on
performances.
I consider this a good loan from an economic and political standpoint.
President Yerovi has established
a realistic schedule for returning the country to constitutional
government by the end of the year. He needs our support for
constitutional, as well as economic, recovery.
Walt
Approve loanThis option
is checked.
Disapprove loan
Speak to me
330. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in EcuadorSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL ECUADOR–US. Confidential;
Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Sayre and approved by Gordon.Washington, April 22, 1967, 2:55
p.m.
180672. Ref: Quito 5478.President Otto Arosemena Gomez, who was
elected by a constituent assembly on October 16, 1966, publicly
criticized the Alliance for Progress at the meeting of American
Presidents in Punta del Este April 12–14. An account of his meeting
with President Johnson on April 13 is in Document 51. Telegram 5478 from Quito, April
22, reported on a meeting with Defense Minister Febres Cordero, in
which Coerr argued that Arosemena’s criticism of the Alliance was
jeopardizing “continued USG
investment in AID program.”
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL 15–1 ECUADOR)
We concur line you took in Quito 5478.Arosemena’s activities have
effect on three levels which are interrelated (a) hemispheric, (b)
US–Ecuador, and (c) international financial agencies.At present moment Ecuador in general and Arosemena in particular are
regarded as being “off-base”. Although Latins share some of
underlying concerns of Ecuador, they repudiated his tactics and many
of specific complaints. Arosemena misjudged Latin temperament on overall
hemispheric problems. This is understandable because politically
Ecuador has more in common with Bolivia (which was not present) and
Haiti (which played no real part in OAS preparations or Summit meeting) than it has with
most LA countries. It is in our
interests to maintain general hemispheric view that Arosemena is attacking
inter-American system, Alliance, etc. and not United States.United States posture must be one of dignity and understanding in
response to “shin kicking” by Arosemena. Our line will be that we are following
principles of Alliance, that we have taken into account January
CIAP review in cooperating with
Ecuador and that we are working closely with IBRD and IDB. FYI. If Ecuador
desires special CIAP review to deal
with its specific complaints we will be glad participate. We are
discussing this possibility with Sanz. End FYI.If Arosemena carries his
irresponsible conduct too far, i.e. he creates financial or other
crisis, there is risk forces opposed to him will unite to oust him.
It is therefore important that you a) discreetly set or keep record
straight by letters to President, Minister of Finance, etc., after
meetings in which Ecuadorean complaints are clarified (at opportune
times you can find ways to make clarifications public), b) avoid any
comments or suggestions that could be taken as implying Arosemena has become obstacle to
US-Ecuadorean relations and should be removed, and c) act promptly
to discourage any change in constitutional order in Ecuador.We should adhere guidelines of Alliance and CIAP. We should close ranks with other
lending institutions and make certain we are in step. If there are
programs or projects that are not working, we should correct them or
terminate them. Watchword should be “patience.”We recognize that you have trying situation in Ecuador. Impact
Arosemena’s conduct now
limited to Ecuador with rest of Hemisphere lined up with US. It is
important that we avoid doing anything here or in Ecuador that would
change this favorable situation.Rusk
331. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL ECUADOR–US. Secret; Limdis.Quito, May 13, 1967,
2220Z.
5824. 1. I called yesterday at my initiative on President Arosemena for review of Ecuadorean–U.S.
relations Prior to my departure on home leave (mentioning that this
leave coordinated with children’s vacation and had been long
planned).
2. After congratulating him on political gains he had made as result his
performance Punta del Este,According to an
April 20 INR report Arosemena received an enthusiastic
reception after Punta del Este as “the only Latin American president
with the ‘courage to put the US in its place’.” Arosemena’s performance “fed
Ecuador’s pride which—apart from Ecuador’s coming in second in a
basketball competition in Scranton, Pennsylvania—has had little
sustenance in recent years.” (Ibid., ARA/EP/E Files: Lot 70 D 247, POL 15 Arosemena
Government) I pointed out that these gains had been made
largely at expense of AID program’s
reputation. I pointed out that the program’s degree of success depends
largely on its political support by the government and political
acceptability to the people, both of which had suffered significantly
through the attacks which he had been making, especially since his
return from Punta del Este. I said I thought his public statements about
the aid program were unbalanced, in that they mentioned nothing good
about it, and in some cases erroneous, in that they disregarded
pertinent facts.
3. During our discussion Arosemena
stuck to his guns, reasserting his declarations about the aid program
and giving ground, by tacitly accepting my point of view, in only two
respects. When I told him I had been disappointed that he had publicly
declared the U.S. was requiring “inadmissible” conditions on the malaria
loan, despite the fact that I previously assured him I would take no
position on requests until sub-ministerial negotiations had reached
either agreement or clear disagreement, he obviously got the point but
avoided comment. When I pointed out that he had urgently requested my
assistance in signing the primary education loan and then expressed
recognition only by publicly disputing whether his or the Yerovi government should get the credit
for having eliminated from the loan twenty “humiliating” conditions, he
laughed in hearty agreement.
4. He declared he would never accept conditions that we are negotiating
in the proposed malaria loan designed to insure that the National
Malaria Eradication Service (SNEM) be independent and employ an outside
administrator, and he asked why we tried to impose these conditions on
him when we had not imposed them on the military junta. He was surprised
and interested to learn that these conditions had characterized the
successful program that had been started before the military junta
assumed power and terminated in 1965.
5. I assured him and he recognized that we are interested in carrying
forward the program on Alliance for Progress criteria and with no
thought of any period of coldness or retaliation in reaction to his
criticisms. He commented that we had authorized two grant projects since
his return from Punta del Este and called my attention to the very
favorable publicity he had given to the signing of the public safety
project agreement.
6. He continued to rant about the performance of the TAMS engineering
company under the road construction agreement. When I called his
attention to my previous suggestion that he meet personally with TAMS
representatives in order to get from them information with which to form
a balanced picture of the value of their operations, he said he would
meet with them only to kick them physically out of his office.
7. Our conversation being interrupted by his need to meet with his
cabinet and chiefs of staff in order to consider the Duran strike
situation which had produced some dead and wounded, he suggested that we
continue our talk early next week.Arosemena and Coerr held “two strenuous hour-long
negotiating sessions” on May
16 and 17, reaching agreement on the wording of the proposed Malaria
loan. (Telegram 5909 from Quito, May 17; ibid., Central Files
1967–69, AID(US) 8–5 ECUADOR)
Coerr
332. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Ecuador, Vol. I, 12/63–11/68.
Confidential.Washington, August 29, 1967.
Mr. President:
Herewith a recommendation from Agriculture and AID, concurred in by State, Treasury and BoB, that you authorize a $2.2 million P.
L. 480 sale to Ecuador for small quantities of wheat and tobacco.Attached but not printed are memoranda to the
President from Schultze,
August 24, and Gaud and Freeman, August
21.
Despite Arosemena’s unhelpful
performance at Punta del Este and doubts regarding the economic justification for P. L. 480 help, I favor this modest
assistance: —Arosemena has pulled
back a considerable way from his Summit obstreperousness,
joining with our Ambassador on August 17 in a public celebration
of the 6th anniversary of the Alliance for Progress.—The local currency proceeds will be used to encourage
much-needed improvements in agriculture—a key Summit
objective.—Arosemena has made
considerable progress during 1967 in getting Ecuador’s budgetary
and balance of payments situation straightened out.—We have a stake in continued political stability in Ecuador
which Arosemena has
achieved while returning the country to constitutionality via
elections scheduled for next June.
Walt
Approve
DisapproveThe last two
options are checked. Rostow apparently did not raise the issue again
until September 6, when he returned the memorandum to the
President with a request for additional guidance. (Memorandum
from Rostow to the
President, September 6; Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Ecuador, Vol. I, 12/63–11/68) Johnson’s response is recorded
in a note dictated later that day aboard Air Force One: “I don’t
want to agree to that Ecuador thing. Hold up on it. They can
argue with me about it, but I am not going to force this. I
haven’t forgotten Punta del Este.” The note indicates that
Jones informed Rostow of the President’s
decision on September 7. (Ibid.)
See me
333. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Ecuador, Vol. I, 12/63–11/68. Secret. A
notation on the telegram indicates that the President saw it.
Oliver’s original
memorandum to the President, September 7, is ibid., Memos to the
President, Walt W. Rostow,
Vol. 40.Washington, September 8, 1967.
CAP 67779. Ecuadorean PL–480 Loan: Special
Factors Involved.
When we informed Covey Oliver of
your decision on the PL 480 loan to
Ecuador, he expressed deep concern.
I told him to prepare a memorandum to you giving his reasons why he
considers it important to make the loan. This is his message to you:
I am working very hard on trying to turn the Ecuadorean President’s
attitude toward the Alliance for Progress around. I cannot promise
success, but I have fair Hopes. Your Ambassador there has been active
and helpful, and I have spent about three hours with the AID Director thereL. Paul Oechsli. on this topic while he was
here.
The Ambassador, the Director and I believe that there is a reasonably
good chance that if handled as a good teacher would handle a lagging and
defensive pupil, we might bring President Arosemena up from the bottom of the Alliance class to
the median level. (The Ambassador has written me (eyes only)Not found. that if allowed to drift and sour
even more, this man might do something foolish, such as declaring a
prominent Embassy official persona non grata. This latter should not be
taken as a threat but as an indication of the President’s basic
psychological problem: he was a late starter on what the Alliance is all
about, and he has yet to catch up with the other presidents in
understanding.)
Another factor, very important in Latin ways of looking at things, is
that my able predecessor pretty well made what the Ecuadoreans consider
a commitment about this PL–480 loan—at
least it seems that he did not spell out to the Ecuadoreans all the
steps involved in getting final approval.
A new Ecuadorean Ambassador will be presenting credentials to you on
September 12. The denial of the loan will make it hard for me to carry
on my special course for Ecuadoreans with him, as I had expected.According to the President’s Daily Diary, the
new Ambassador, Carlos Mantilla Ortega, presented his credentials to
the President in a brief meeting (12:23–12:28 p.m.) at the White
House on September 12. (Johnson Library)
Johnson met Oliver immediately following the reception
(12:28–1:04 p.m). No substantive record of either conversation has
been found.
334. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in EcuadorSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID(US) 15–8 ECUADOR. Confidential;
Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by J.F.
Smith; cleared by Berlin, Sayre, and Fowler; and approved by
Oliver.Washington, September 18, 1967,
2024Z.
39022. Subject: PL–480 Sales Agreement.
Ref: State’s 33719.In telegram 33719 to
Quito, September 7, Oliver
reported: “Final decision on PL–480
sales agreement highly unlikely this week. I am working on matter
but could not assure you response will be favorable.” (Ibid.)
Joint State/AID Message. For Coerr from Oliver.
PL–480 memorandum covering 15,000 MT
wheat and 582 MT tobacco and tobacco products has been approved in
principle but not yet formally. Delay in obtaining approval reflects
continuing concern at highest level over GOE’s criticisms of U.S. trade and AID policies expressed during Punta del
Este Conference.According to Robert M.
Phillips, chief of the Embassy’s political section,
Johnson was so displeased at the
thought of rewarding Arosemena with the PL–480 loan that “it was only on the fourth try
that the President relented and then solely on condition that
Covey Oliver would
call in Carlos Mantilla and let him know that we were getting
tired of Ecuadorean griping about the conditions of aid.”
(Letter from Phillips to Coerr, September 26; ibid., ARA/EP/E Files: Lot 70 D 247,
POL 15 Arosemena Government)Accordingly, I am requesting Ecuadorean Ambassador to call upon me
afternoon September 19, for purpose not only disclose high level
approval but also indicate to Ambassador difficulties posed for
USG by irresponsible statements
of government receiving assistance from USG.I recognize this may eliminate some of impact which you hoped to
gain by announcement there. However, I consider it essential
disabuse Arosemena of
assumption that he has special relationship with high level USG officials.Negotiating authorization re PL–480
Agreement will be forthcoming ASAP following September 19
meeting.Would appreciate any comments or suggestions you may have Prior to
September 19 meeting.Coerr’s comments are in
telegrams 1033 and 1034 from Quito, September 19. (Ibid.,
Central Files 1967–69, AID(US)
15–8 ECUADOR) After receiving a written report on the meeting
with Mantilla, Johnson
approved Oliver’s
recommendation “to inform Ambassador Coerr that he may proceed with negotiations.”
(Memorandum from Rostow
to the President, September 19; Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Ecuador, Vol. I,
12/63–11/68)Rusk
335. Memorandum From William
G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Ecuador, Vol. I, 12/63–11/68. Confidential.Washington, September 28, 1967.
Walt—
As Covey puts it: “Arosemena flunked his course”.
From the attached cable you will see that last Tuesday he picked up where
he left off at Punta del Este in attacking the Alliance for
Progress.Reference is to telegram 1154
from Quito, September 27; not attached. At a reception for Latin
American journalists on September 26, Arosemena called the Alliance for Progress “a
frustrated hope,” a criticism that was widely reported in newspaper
accounts the following day. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID(AFP))
Covey has taken these actions: —instructed Wym Coerr
to go play golf and negotiate no aid agreements.—delayed action on two pending loans in the IDB.—asked Jim Fowler to
background Ben Welles (NY Times) on the
speech and refute each charge made.
Arosemena seems to be in the
final stages of negotiating a $30 million loan with a consortium of
European banks—at 8½% interest with “no strings attached”—and therefore
thinks he can thumb his nose at us again.
I want to wait until next MondayOctober
2. to see how this business shakes down before reporting to
the President.Rostow relayed a brief report to the President
on September 30. (Telegram CAP 67847 to the LBJ Ranch; Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Ecuador, Vol. I, 12/63–11/68)
WGB
336. Editorial Note
On October 3, 1967, Ambassador Coerr reported his view that economic assistance to
Ecuador could no longer be justified in the wake of President Arosemena’s renewed criticism of the
Alliance for Progress. In response Coerr recommended: a) delivering a diplomatic note
stating that, until “the two governments hold a full and frank exchange
of views,” all loans would be temporarily suspended; b) withdrawing
authorization to negotiate the PL–480
agreement; c) offering an official reply in his speech at the American
School in Guayaquil on October 6. (Telegram 1226 from Quito; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
AID (US) 9 ECUADOR) The Department
indicated “general agreement” with Coerr’s analysis, stating that, to continue economic
assistance after Arosemena’s
attack, would only encourage the view that the “U.S. cow, when kicked,
gives more milk.” Negotiations for the PL–480 agreement, as well as development loans, were therefore
suspended, in accordance with the Ambassador’s recommendations. The
Department declined, however, to authorize a written response, fearing
the “effect of note would be to make matter bilateral issue between U.S.
and Ecuador.” (Telegram 50611 to Quito, October 7; ibid.) As an
alternative, the Department approved Coerr’s suggestion to respond orally “to correct the
record” in the American School speech doing so “in non-personal and
non-polemic terms, and in context of positive description of U.S.
assistance.” (Telegram 49689 to Quito, October 6; ibid., AID(AFP))
337. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 44. No classification
marking.Washington, October 7, 1967, 7:43
p.m.
Our ambassador in Ecuador gave what is described as a factual speech on
the history of our aid relations with Ecuador. As a result of this
speech they have asked for his withdrawal within forty-eight hours. We
do not have the text yet of what he said but will have it tomorrow.The text of Coerr’s speech was transmitted in telegram 1299 from
Quito, October 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17
US–ECUADOR)
I am told by Bob Sayre that
Secretary Rusk thinks that we probably should not ask for the withdrawal
of the Ecuadorean ambassador to Washington. I believe we should decide
that tomorrow.
During the night Bob Sayre and
Bill Bowdler will be studying
the precedents and getting us more information from Ecuador.
I shall be in touch with Secretary Rusk tomorrow and will forward to you
his recommendations plus all the materials we have bearing on the
problem.
WWRPrinted from a copy that
bears these typed initials.
338. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Ecuador, 12/63–11/68. Confidential.
Another copy indicates that the memorandum was drafted by Bowdler. (Ibid., Memos to the
President, Walt W. Rostow,
Vol. 44)Washington, October 8, 1967, 1:40
p.m.
SUBJECT
Recall of our Ambassador to Ecuador
Supplementing my note of 12:10 p.m. today,In
an October 8 memorandum to the President, Rostow reported Rusk’s decision
that “we, as a great power, should not over-react to Arosemena’s childishness,”
presumably in reference to a proposal to retaliate by requesting
Mantilla’s recall. In forwarding the text of Coerr’s speech, Rostow also commented: “Although I
can understand a government being annoyed with an Ambassador that
takes up, point by point, arguments made by its President—and even
making fun of one—his speech hardly justified being taken as a
federal case.” (Ibid., Country File, Ecuador, Vol. I,
12/63–11/68) these are the steps which Covey Oliver is recommending to Sec.
Rusk: Instruct Ambassador Coerr to leave Quito by 5:35 p.m., October 9,
when the 48 hour period expires.Call in the Ecuadorean Ambassador this afternoon to give him a
note saying we will honor the request but expressing regret that
Arosemena has taken
offense at the free discussion of the successes and failures of
the Alliance. (Tab A)The note, Tab
A, is attached but not printed. The exchange of notes is in
Department of State Bulletin,
November 6, 1967, p. 621. A brief account of the Oliver–Mantilla meeting is
in telegram 50652 to Quito, October 8. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
POL 17
US–ECUADOR)Release the two notes to the press, together with Coerr’s speech.Also tell the press that we had planned, before we were aware
of the Ecuadorean note, to ask Coerr to come to Washington to work on a study
of our long-range relations with Latin America. (This is in fact
true. The study is to cover our military relations.)As instructed in telegram 50568 to Buenos
Aires, October 7. (Ibid., AID(AFP))Not retaliate against Arosemena by asking for the recall of Ambassador
Mantilla.If asked about continued economic assistance to Ecuador,
respond that Ecuador is a member of the Alliance for Progress
and loans to Ecuador will continue to be judged by Alliance
criteria. (From a practical standpoint this means no assistance
because of Ecuadorean nonperformance, unless we decide
otherwise.)
I understand that Covey is also
recommending to Sec. Rusk that he call you to get your approval on these
steps.Rusk approved these
recommendations “on his own responsibility,” asking only that
Rostow so inform the
President. (Memorandum from Rostow to the President, October 8; Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Ecuador, Vol. I,
12/63–11/68) By way of precedents, on two previous occasions
Latin American governments have asked our Ambassadors to leave: —by Brazil during the Eisenhower administration, for public
criticism of Brazilian coffee policy;On December 3, 1954, the White House
announced the resignation of James S. Kemper, U.S.
Ambassador to Brazil; Kemper became the source of
controversy by predicting an imminent fall in the price of
coffee.—by Haiti during the Kennedy administration, for alleged plotting
against Duvalier.On June 14, 1963,
the Government of Haiti requested the recall of U.S.
Ambassador Raymond L. Thurston.
The text of the Ecuadorean note is at Tab B.Attached but not printed.
Walt
339. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA Files,
1967–69: Lot 72 D 33, Ecuador. Secret. Drafted by Sayre and cleared in draft by Gaud
and Idar Rimestad, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management.
The memorandum was originally addressed to the Secretary; the word
“Under” was subsequently inserted by hand.Washington, October 12, 1967.
SUBJECT
U.S. Representation in Ecuador
Discussion:
The recall of Ambassador Coerr and
the policy you approved on economic assistance will require some
adjustments in our representation in Quito. I propose to proceed as
follows: Our Embassy will be headed by the Chargé, probably until the
end of President Arosemena’s term in September 1968.We will consider assigning an additional officer to the
Embassy if a definite need is established.After the AID Mission Director
completes the review of existing loans with the Ecuadorean
Government, he will be transferred and not replaced, unless and
until a situation develops in which we would foresee the need to
develop a new and active aid strategy toward Ecuador. We expect
the review would be completed within the next six to eight weeks
and that the transfers would take place as soon as possible
thereafter. We expect that there will be other AID personnel changes and
reductions but these cannot be identified immediately.
Recommendation:
That you approve the foregoing line of action.Katzenbach approved this
recommendation on October 16.
340. Telegram From the Embassy in Ecuador
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID(US) 9 ECUADOR. Confidential;
Immediate. Repeated to Guayaquil and USCINCSO for POLAD.Quito, October 17, 1967,
0430Z.
1422. To be delivered 8:00 a.m. October 17, 1967. Subject: Meeting with
FonMinIn telegram 51806 to Quito, October 10, the
Department forwarded instructions for the meeting with Prado. If
Prado raised the issue of AID in
Ecuador, the Embassy should propose a joint review to determine
whether any loans required termination. In this event, the Embassy
should also “make clear that we are suggesting this action as a
result of President Arosemena’s statements of September 26 and that it is
not in retaliation for Ambassador Coerr’s recall.” (Ibid.)
Chargé called on FonMinCoerr, GOE–USG
relations, and U.S. assistance policy to Ecuador. Other topics
(LA armaments developments, Plaza
OAS candidacy, Ecuador–Peru
relations) will be treated in septels.Telegram 1444 from Quito, October 17, reported discussion on
the candidacy of former President Galo Plaza as OAS Secretary General. (Ibid.,
OAS 8–3) No telegram has
been found reporting discussion of “LA armaments developments” or “Ecuador–Peru
relations.”ForMin asserted GOE request for
Ambassador Coerr’s recall
based on “undeniable fact” that he had become “obstacle” to
continued friendly relations between GOE and USG. FonMin said President Arosemena could not be expected sit
down and talk in frank and cooperative spirit with Ambassador who
had ridiculed him in public speech (FonMin referred to humorous anecdote about $350
allowance and to analogies to football contained in speech as
particularly offensive to President). In view this situation, FonMin said, President and he
decided best way to put GOE–USG relations back on right track was
to request “removal of obstacle as soon as possible”. FonMin then stated at length that
the GOE had always sought and would
continue to seek only the closest and most cordial relations with
USG.Wym and Otto Arosemena, it seems likely
that the evil genius behind the demand for Wym’s recall was Foreign
Minister Prado, who apparently took full advantage of Otto’s vanity and his
impetuousness.” (Letter from Phillips to Lubensky, December 21;
ibid., ARA/EP/E Files: Lot 70
D 247, POL 17 Persona Non
Grata) (He then shifted to other matters treated in
septels.)Chargé responded that USG position
re recall Ambassador Coerr
had been made amply clear in Department’s note of October 8 to
Ecuadorean Embassy, and that there was nothing further to add except
to reiterate as stated in note, USG
also desired maintain traditionally friendly relations with GOE.Stating that USG sincerely wished
USAID loan agreements with
GOE to constitute basis for
fruitful cooperation rather than discord, Chargé then proposed
bilateral review of existing loans, and suggested that GOE designate reps to meet with USG reps to consider each loan in
detail. Purpose of review would be to determine specific GOE objections to terms of any loans.
After GOE objections specified,
USG would attempt satisfy these
objections, or, failing this, would propose that loan or loans be
terminated by mutual accord.Re new loan applications to AID,
Chargé stated that in interest clarifying situation, USG believed review of existing loans
should be completed Prior to any consideration new applications.
Chargé emphasized that new loans would then be examined from
standpoint AFP criteria, but that
none would be approved unless GOE
gave Prior assurances re their acceptability.FonMin replied that in principle
review seemed sound method to arrive at differences and to attempt
solve them. He asked Chargé put proposal in writing, after which he
would consult with President Arosemena, who he thought would agree with idea
(Embassy recommendation on how to put proposal in writing to
follow).In telegram 1443 to Quito,
October 18, the Embassy forwarded its recommendations. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL 17 US–ECUADOR) The
Department instructed the Embassy to submit for approval any
written communications to the Ecuadorian government regarding
economic assistance. (Telegram 56494 to Quito, October 19;
ibid., AID(US) 9 ECUADOR)FonMin did not show concern about
postponement new loan applications. He added that if review existing
loans proved successful, same method could be applied to new loan
applications thus ensuring beforehand their acceptability to GOE. Re meeting AFP criteria, FonMin
said that GOE largely endorsed
these, and recalled that President Arosemena had refused to sign Presidents’
declaration at Punta del Este not because he disagreed with contents
(which FonMin said GOE supports completely), but because
declaration did not go far enough.Chargé said Embassy understood GOE
performance vis-à-vis AFP criteria
would be subject of Oct 20 CIAP
meeting. FonMin said he aware of
meeting, but confessed he did not know who GOE rep would be since Intriago had resigned as FinMin.
Chargé stressed importance of meeting and of GOE attendance. FonMin said he intended check to make sure GOE competently represented.Re recent negotiations between GOE
and European commercial lenders, Chargé mentioned dangers inherent
such borrowings on short-term, high interest-rate conditions, and
pointed out obvious contrast with concessional terms offered by
AFP lending agencies. FonMin replied he first to admit
AFP agency terms much more
favorable, but asserted that urgency Ecuador’s needs might oblige
GOE to seek loans on harder
terms. He said country could not always wait the “months and years”
required to negotiate loans from AFP
agencies. In reply to Chargé’s question if GOE had projected its future debt-servicing burdens if
it indulged in long-scale borrowing on hard terms, FonMin asserted that if proceeds
wisely invested, loans could pay for themselves in increased
productivity. Alluding to domestic political factors, FonMin said “government which
expects some day to return must show results when first in office.”
He referred to President Arosemena’s promise to build one school a day for
rest of his term, and implied that promise had to be kept no matter
where funds came from.Status PL 480 authorization was not
raised during meeting.Comment follows.No further comment
from the Embassy has been found.Crowley
341. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1
ECUADOR. Confidential. Drafted by Kilday on December 21. A notation on the memorandum
indicates that Rusk saw it.Washington, December 22, 1967.
SUBJECT
President of Ecuador Hopes U.S. Will Appoint New Ambassador
On December 20, Ecuadorean Ambassador Carlos Mantilla told me that
President Otto Arosemena is most
anxious that a new U.S. Ambassador be appointed soon. According to
Mantilla, Arosemena fears that
extreme leftists and other political antagonists will seek to build pre-electoral confusion into a
situation of disorder, hoping thereby to disrupt or prevent the
elections. He believes that during this critical period the presence of
a U.S. Ambassador would be a major stabilizing factor as it would
signify the restoration of close U.S.-Ecuadorean relations as well as
President Johnson’s personal interest in the
reestablishment of full constitutional government in Ecuador.
I told Ambassador Mantilla that President Johnson
genuinely regards our Ambassadors as his personal representatives, and
that he personally decides questions relating to ambassadorial
appointments. I opined that Ambassador Coerr probably would have been replaced by now if
President Arosemena had not
chosen to express his dissatisfaction by formally and publicly
requesting the Ambassador’s recall. I said that I was not aware of
President Johnson’s plans regarding a successor to
Ambassador Coerr nor would it be
possible for me to make unsolicited recommendations to the President on
this question. I did promise the Ambassador that I would inform you of
President Arosemena’s feelings in
the matter.
It is clear that the absence of a U.S. Ambassador in Quito is the cause
of considerable discomfort to President Arosemena and his political faction. However, there is
no convincing evidence that the extreme left has the capability or even
the intention of preventing elections, or that the absence of an
Ambassador in any way favors the ambitions of this political grouping.
The Bureau is watching this situation closely, but at this moment I am
not persuaded that our over-all interests would be served by the early
replacement of Ambassador Coerr.
To the contrary, in view of the insulting manner in which Ambassador
Coerr was ejected, I feel
that the naming of his replacement in the near future would have a most
undesirable effect on the U.S. image in Ecuador and elsewhere in Latin
America.
342. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Ecuador, Vol. I, 12/63–11/68.
Confidential.Washington, January 25, 1968.
SUBJECT
IDB Loan to Ecuador
Since Punta del Este no new AID loans
have been given to the Arosemena
Government in Ecuador. Disbursements on existing loans have been held up
pending a review of which ones Ecuador wants badly enough to meet the
self-help criteria. This process will be strung out for the remainder of
Arosemena’s tenure (until
September 1, 1968).
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
will shortly have to decide on a $3 million loan to resettle small
farmers under the agrarian reform program. The loan will be on
concessional terms from the Fund for Special Operations to which we are
the principal contributor and where our vote is decisive.
The question arises whether your injunction against lending to Arosemena applies to the IDB as well as AID.
I recommend that you not carry the freeze to the IDB where our opposition to a small loan to improve
agriculture which meets all IDB criteria
will be taken as vindictive on our part.
Walt
OK to approve IDB
loanThis option is checked.
Freeze also applies to him
Call me
343. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Ecuador, Vol. I, 12/63–11/68.
Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the
President saw it.Washington, March 6, 1968.
SUBJECT
Ecuador
Last Saturday President Arosemena
reshuffled his cabinet. He dropped Foreign Minister Julio Prado, the
architect of his Punta del
Este posture and the ouster of Ambassador Coerr. In his place he appointed Gustavo Larrea, until
recently Ambassador in Washington.
Because Larrea is such a good friend of the United States, this is
obviously intended as a conciliatory gesture toward us. In return,
Arosemena Covey Oliver about
the impending cabinet changes.
Other indications of Arosemena’s
desire to kiss-and-make-up Prior to elections (June 2) and transfer of
power (September 1) are: his reasonably cooperative and conciliatory attitude on the
joint review of their complaints about the AID program;no attacks on the Alliance since September 1967;the prompt release without publicity of a US tuna boat seized
by an Ecuadorean frigate last week.
Our Chargé in Quito recommends that we respond favorably to these
conciliatory actions, short of sending a new Ambassador until after the
June elections. Among the things he suggests are: let it be known publicly around April 1 that appointment of a
new Ambassador is under active
consideration;resume low-level technical talks on pending loan applications
(in the understanding that negotiations would not be completed
until termination of Arosemena’s mandate).In telegram 3295 from Quito, March 5.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL
17 US–ECUADOR)
Covey Oliver will be sending you
his recommendation on how we might proceed.Not further identified. I will withhold judgment until I see
what Covey advises. In any event,
we should say nothing about consideration of a
new Ambassador to Ecuador until you fill the vacancies at Buenos Aires
and Montevideo. There are indications that the Argentines and Uruguayans
are a little restive on this score. They would take amiss any indication
that Ecuador is receiving prior attention
Walt
344. Discussion Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of
Ecuadorean-Peruvian Affairs (Berlin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver)Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/EP/E Files, 1968: Lot 70 D 478,
Personal Mail. Confidential. A handwritten note reads: “For Your
3:30 pm Meeting Today.” No substantive record of this meeting has
been found.Washington, August 6, 1968.
SUBJECT
Timing of the Arrival in Quito of Ambassador Sessions
Discussion:
You will recall that Embassy Quito recommended in June that the new
Ambassador not present credentials to President Arosemena, but that he arrive in Quito
and present his credentials at the time of or immediately following the
inauguration.In telegram 4823 from
Quito, June 10. (Ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 ECUADOR)
José María Velasco Ibarra was elected on June 2 to serve a
fifth term as President. This office disagreed with that
recommendation and argued that the best interests of the United States
would be served by the Ambassador’s arrival in Quito before the end of
the Arosemena administration.
These opposing recommendations originated in differing judgements over
the political future of Arosemena
and the relationship to that future of the arrival of a new U.S.
Ambassador. Briefly, the Embassy argued that the reelection of Arosemena in 1972 would not be in the
interests of the United States and, accordingly, the United States
should take no action that would tend to improve Arosemena’s chances for re-election. To
send an Ambassador now would amount to reconciliation with Arosemena and, in the judgement of the
Embassy, would rehabilitate his image and increase his potential for
re-election in 1972 or later. Thus, the United States should not send an
Ambassador to present credentials to Arosemena.
We agreed that the arrival of an Ambassador during the Arosemena administration would amount
to a reconciliation with Arosemena and we maintained that this is precisely what
the U.S. should seek. We judged that Arosemena stands a better than even chance of returning
to the Presidency at some point in the future, and we doubted that these
odds would be altered substantially by the refusal of the U.S. to effect
a reconciliation with him. (Certainly the repeated election of Velasco indicates that the Ecuadorean
electorate is not greatly
influenced by a candidate’s past relationship with the U.S. or by fears
that the U.S. might not find him acceptable.) Thus, in the possibility
that Arosemena may well return to
the Presidency anyway, we thought it would be wise to effect a
reconciliation with him now and thereby to maximize chances of
developing a better relationship with him the next time around.
The arguments pro and con that were fairly clear in June have become
somewhat obscured with the passage of time and with new developments.
Favoring presentation of credentials to President Arosemena are the following new
considerations: President Arosemena’s
cooperation with the U.S. on the IBRD fisheries loan question;Our current efforts to persuade Foreign Minister Larrea to
obtain agreement from Velasco
Ibarra to meet with the U.S. in a fisheries
conference. Our Chargé in Quito believes that Larrea would
undertake this mission with greater enthusiasm if he knew the
Ambassador were to present his credentials before September
1.
New considerations which tend to argue against presentation of
credentials include the following: The nomination and confirmation of Ambassador SessionsAccording to the President’s Daily Diary,
the issue of an ambassadorship for Edson O. Sessions, a
Chicago businessman and former Ambassador to Finland, was
raised in a June 19 telephone conversation between the
President and Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen
(R–Illinois). (Johnson Library) Dirksen called the President
to discuss a possible Latin American post for Sessions on July 3, the
same day Crowley
requested verbal agreement for Sessions as U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador.
(Telegram 5222 from Quito, July 4; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17–1 US–ECUADOR) On July 26
the White House announced the nomination, which was
confirmed by the Senate 3 days later. already
constitute something of a rapprochement with Arosemena and have been cited
by Arosemena as evidence
that U.S.-Ecuadorean relations are as good as ever.The arrival of the Ambassador just before the inauguration,
rather than a month or six weeks before the inauguration, would
be so obviously designed to put the U.S. blessing on Arosemena that it could
displease Velasco and
add a minor but unnecessary irritation to the U.S. relationship
with him. Our Chargé in Quito thinks it possible that the
arrival of the Ambassador now could make Velasco less willing to commit
himself to a fisheries conference before he takes office.The arrival of the Ambassador after the inauguration might
betaken by Velasco as a
highly complimentary U.S. effort to make a qualitative
distinction between him and Arosemena.
Conclusion:
The arguments for and against the arrival of Ambassador Sessions are relatively equal in weight
and strength. His arrival would put us on an excellent footing with
President Arosemena in the event
Arosemena returns to the Presidency, but
his nomination and confirmation already have taken the sting out of our
previous posture of no Ambassador for Arosemena. His arrival before September 1 might well be
an irritant in the relationship with Velasco but this is likely to become insignificant as
time passes. Arrival before September 1 might well induce Arosemena to try harder to please us on
the fisheries issue, but it might also lead Velasco to a less accommodating position on the same
problem.
Recommendation:
Although we no longer see a clear and strong advantage to the U.S. on
either side of the issue, we incline to accommodation of President
Arosemena and Foreign
Minister Larrea. Therefore, we recommend that Ambassador Sessions proceed to Quito to present
his credentials to President Arosemena and to attend the inauguration ceremony and
that he then return to Washington to arrange his business and personal
affairs before departing to take up his post on a permanent basis.Sessions presented his
credentials to President Velasco in a formal ceremony on September 26.
(Telegram 6625 from Quito, September 30; ibid.)
Mexico
345. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source: Johnson Library, Recordings
and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between
President Johnson and Thomas Mann, Tape F64.07, Side B,
PNO 3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in
the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. An
informal memorandum of conversation, including discussion of Panama,
is ibid., Papers of Thomas C.
Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, January 4, 1964–April 30, 1965.
According to the President’s Daily Diary (Johnson Library),
Andrew Hatcher and George Reedy were in the Oval
Office when Johnson called Mann.Washington, January 25, 1964, 12:20
p.m.
[Omitted here is discussion of the negotiations to resume diplomatic
relations with Panama.]
President: Please, let’s get it
in shape so we can get some people named now. And let’s find some good
top men. I am not at all happy with my Ambassador to Mexico. I want to
get the greatest man in America. I had the greatest and I pulled him up
here. He got me in Panama right after he got here.Mann was Ambassador to Mexico
prior to his appointment in December 1963 as Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs. He began his new assignment on
January 3, 6 days before student demonstrations led to the crisis in
Panama. And now I want you to find me—I want a Marlin
Sandlin. I want somebody that’s forty-five years old. You reckon he
could get out of his business interests and give them up and go down
there?
Mann: Well, you said you didn’t
want another Texan there. Marlin would be. The trouble with Marlin is,
he’s chairman of the board of Pan American Sulphur.
President: Well, couldn’t he get
out of that and resign it and give up his interests?
Mann: He could, but he’d be
attacked and so would you.
President: All right.
Mann: I think Marlin’s a great
guy—
President: Well, let’s get—
Mann: —but it depends on your
political judgment.
President: No, he would be. What
else can we get?
Mann: Well, we can get him
Colombia. You could move Freeman to Mexico.
President: I want to get some man
I know in Mexico that’s my friend, that’s looking after me, that’s my
manager, that’s damned able.
And I want him to understand business and I want him to be young and
attractive. I want him to be a Sargent Shriver type.
Mann: Well, why don’t you pick a
good lawyer with good political sense? Somebody you know and have
confidence in? We’ve got some Foreign Service people. I know that
Friday,January 24. the Secretary
and Ball thought that they were
going to—the Secretary said he was going to recommend
Freeman, who is your, probably one of the two
best you’ve got in Latin America. The other one being in Brazil.
President: OK.
Mann: Mexico. We could fill
Colombia. But if you want somebody you know personally, and you don’t
know Freeman—
President: No, I don’t.
Mann: —that would eliminate him.
But he’s good and he would be loyal to you.
President: Well, don’t you know
somebody that I know that’s good?
Mann: I can get on the phone.
President: Like Marlin?
Mann: Well, I really hesitate for
you—
President: I’m not talking about
Marlin. I’m talking about somebody of his same qualifications, that’s
got his appearance.
Mann: Let me then try—I’ll talk
to Marlin and see if we can’t cook up two or three names for you.
President: All right. Do
that.
Mann: Probably be from Texas, but
that wouldn’t bother you?
President: No, but I’d rather get
some other state. California might be good.
Mann: I think a young lawyer with
good political instincts is what you want.
President: What about a
Mexican?
Mann: Well, I wouldn’t recommend
that to you.
President: We got a helluva good
Mexican out there that’s head of finance department, California.
Mann: Well, if you know him. He
has a couple of strikes on him. The Mexicans don’t like what they call
“pochos,” that means people—
President: All right. OK. All
right. The Mexicans won’t take a white man. I don’t—God-damned if I can
understand that.
Mann: Well, it’s a—
President: OK. That’s all right.
You go on and get me a good one. But get me one. I want to help them.
We’ve been miserable to the Mexicans. I want you to get some in your
Department. If you know any smart ones, you hire some. The Alliance for
Progress. You don’t have to go to Puerto Rico.
Mann: I think we could hire him
up here and that would be easy. If you’ve got a fellow you want hired up
here—
President: Well, but hell, he
gets more than you do. He gets $23,000 a year.
Mann: Well, everybody gets more
than we do, but—
President: You find some
Cornelli, or—What’s his name, George?
Reedy: Luevano
President: Cornevano? What?
Reedy: Luevano. Danny
Luevano.
President: Luevano. Danny
Luevano. He’s the head of finance in the state of California and they
say he’s a damned-able citizen. He’s coming in next week and I’ll send
him to see you.
Mann: All right. Fine.
President: OK.
Mann: Fine.In a subsequent discussion with Mann on ambassadorial candidates,
the President agreed to move Fulton “Tony”
Freeman to Mexico, replacing him in
Colombia with Covey Oliver.
(Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
Thomas Mann, February 5,
1964, 10:35 a.m., Tape F64.10, Side B, PNO 4) On February 29
Johnson announced the appointment of
Daniel M. Luevano to be
Assistant Secretary of the Army.
346. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 MEX. Secret. Drafted by Donald F. Barnes (LS) and Hawthorne
Q. Mills (S/S–S). Approved by
Bromley Smith on February
27. The meeting was held at the President’s residence. According to
the President’s Daily Diary, Johnson stayed at
the private home of Louis Taubman, a Texas oil and real estate
developer, throughout his visit to Palm Springs. (Johnson Library)
After the private meeting the two Presidents were joined by their
respective advisers for further discussion. A memorandum of
conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7
MEX. Presidents Johnson and López Mateos were in Los Angeles to
receive honorary degrees, Doctor of Laws, from the University of
California.Palm Springs, February 21, 1964, 4:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Meeting between President Johnson and
President Lopez Mateos
PARTICIPANTS
President JohnsonPresident Lopez Mateos
Mexican-American Relations
President Johnson said that relations between the
United States and Mexico had never been better.Johnson briefly discussed the state of
U.S.–Mexican relations with Mann, February 19; see Document
2. He said that this situation was due largely to
the work of President Lopez Mateos. He said that he would like to meet
with President Lopez Mateos at Chamizal some time before the latter
leaves office and that the meeting should be the occasion for a tribute
to President Lopez Mateos. The Mexican President replied that he too
would like a meeting at Chamizal. He added that the Chamizal solution
should not be credited to him personally but rather to the rule of law
and the goodwill evidenced by the two countries. He said that Mexico
planned to erect a monument to President Kennedy at Chamizal.The
Convention Between the United States of America and United Mexican
States for the Solution of the Problem of Chamizal transferred 630
acres of land along the Rio Grande to Mexico, thereby confirming the
arbitration award of 1911. The convention was signed on August 29,
1963, ratified by the Senate on December 17, and entered into force
on January 14, 1964. (Department of State Bulletin, February 3, 1964, p. 186) For documentation on
the negotiation of the convention, see Foreign
Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII, Microfiche Supplement,
Mexico. Johnson and López Mateos met
at Chamizal on September 25, 1964, for a ceremony marking settlement
of the dispute. For text of Johnson’s remarks,
see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1963–64, Book II, pp. 1117–1122.
President Johnson said that he had heard from
American businessmen in Mexico that they were very pleased with the
treatment they had received from the present Mexican Administration. He
asked whether equally good
treatment would be received from the next Administration. President
Lopez Mateos replied that the new Administration would extend even
better treatment to American businessmen in Mexico.
President Lopez Mateos said that a number of recent events had led his
country to adopt certain international policies which had been
interpreted by some people as anti-American. President
Johnson noted that Mexico had every right to
exercise an independent foreign policy and he was sure that when the
chips were down Mexico would be on the side of the United States.
President Lopez Mateos affirmed that this was the case. He added that
the U.S. Presidents he had dealt with invariably had shown great
understanding of Mexican problems and that he had attempted to show an
equal understanding of American problems. This approach had created the
unprecedented goodwill that exists between the two countries.
Alliance for Progress
When President Johnson requested President Lopez
Mateos’ opinion of the Alliance for Progress, the latter replied that
Mexico, unlike some countries in South America, believed that the
program was sound. All projects which had been carried out in Mexico had
been fruitful and effective, and his only criticism was that the
Alliance often moved too slowly. Mexico had always understood that the
Alliance was a cooperative effort, which was not the case with some
South American countries that had been unwilling to effect the necessary
internal reforms.
General de Gaulle
Asked for his opinion of General de Gaulle and French recognition of Red
China, President Lopez Mateos replied that he believed de Gaulle had a
Napoleonic complex and was moved by the idea that France, for historical
reasons, had to make an effort to achieve standing as a major world
power. He believed the retirement of Chancellor Adenauer who had formed
such close ties with General de Gaulle had led the latter to feel that
France would now be isolated within Europe. His reaction was to create a
new center of attention in the Far East by recognizing Red China and in
Latin America by visiting Mexico.
President Johnson asked whether Mexico would be
influenced by France’s recognition of Red China. President Lopez Mateos
replied emphatically that it would not. He added that his country would
always make its own foreign policy decisions.
Panama
In reply to President Johnson’s request for his
opinion on Panama, President Lopez Mateos replied that he felt the two
countries had been boxed in by words. He believed the United States
realized that the 61year old treaty had to be brought up to date, while
at the same time Panama did not want to administer the Canal. He
believed that Panama was
incapable of running the Canal by itself. The positions of the two
countries were not as far apart as they seemed and a solution could be
found if they could break out of the vicious circle of words. President
Lopez Mateos said that except for the loss of life the incidents that
had taken place in Panama were unimportant in themselves. As long as the
basic Panamanian grievances remained Castroites and Communists
throughout Latin America would take advantage of the situation to add
fuel to the flames. He said that most thinking Latin Americans believed
that the time had come for the United States to revise the treaty.
President Johnson said that the United States was
always ready to sit down and discuss the treaty with Panama, but that
under no circumstances could this country agree in advance on the
revisions.
Cuban Subversion
President Johnson said that he was very concerned
over Cuban efforts to export its revolution, as evidenced by the arms
cache that had been found in Venezuela. President Lopez Mateos replied
that it was impossible to export revolutions. He said that if fertile
soil for a revolution existed in a given country, that country would
have a revolution of its own without the need of importing one. If
fertile soil did not exist, no one could successfully create a
revolution in that country. He gave Mexico as an example, saying he was
sure that Mexico with almost forty million inhabitants had more
Castro sympathizers than
Venezuela, but that these people had had no success in spreading their
ideas. As far as propaganda was concerned, Venezuela was spreading more
anti-Castro propaganda than
Cuba was spreading anti-Venezuela propaganda.
Braceros
President Johnson asked President Lopez Mateos for
his opinion of the bracero question now that the U.S. Congress was going
to let the agreement expire.The “Bracero
program” was passed in July 1951 as an amendment (PL 82–78) to the Agricultural Act of
1949. (65 Stat. 119) The program authorized the recruitment of
migrant farm labor from Mexico for work in the United States.
Although voting to extend the program in 1961 and 1963, Congress
allowed the law to lapse at the end of 1964. He said that he
realized that the braceros represented a sizeable source of foreign
exchange for Mexico.
President Lopez Mateos replied that he had always felt that the use of
Mexican braceros in the United States was a matter of mutual convenience
rather than an obligation on the part of the United States. As Mexican
Secretary of Labor many years ago he had told representatives of
American unions that as soon as Mexican braceros received wages equal to
American workers, he knew that U.S. farmers would prefer to use American
labor. He still recognized that fact. His main concern was that illegal border crossings be
prevented. He said it was logical to expect more illegal crossing
attempts both because many Mexicans would continue to want to work in
the United States and many American farmers would seek continued cheap
labor. The only ones to be hurt by these illegal crossings would be
American workers whose wages would be depressed. The Mexican Government
would have to undertake a public works program to provide employment for
the braceros. This would undoubtedly be a priority matter for the next
Administration. It might perhaps be possible to start a large settlement
program in the southeastern part of Mexico, although the necessary
financial resources were not available.
Salinity
President Johnson acknowledged that the problem of
the salinity of Colorado River water was a source of concern to Mexico.
He said that a solution to this problem should be legislative rather
than judicial but that the United States would have to await the outcome
of experiments conducted by the Bureau of Reclamation. He noted that
authorizing legislation and appropriations would have to be obtained
from Congress and that he did not believe he could present such a
request before January 1965. He said that he was aware of Mexico’s
concern, since Texas farmers were also concerned over salinity of the
lower Rio Grande.
President Lopez Mateos said he was aware of the problems that President
Johnson faced with the Congress and that he did
not want to give the impression that he was pressuring the United
States, although he recalled that President Kennedy had told him that the Bureau of Reclamation
experiments would be concluded in October of 1963.Kennedy was in Mexico, June
29–July 1, 1962, for a state visit with López Mateos. For a memorandum of conversation on
the salinity problem, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII,
Microfiche Supplement, Mexico. A joint statement also
addressed the salinity of the water supply along the border. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 529–531) He said
that he was confident that a solution would be worked out, and asked
whether the two governments might not set a date by which the salinity
problems of both rivers might be settled. President
Johnson replied that since Congressional action
was involved it would be difficult to set a date.For text of the joint statement issued following
the meeting in Palm Springs, see ibid.: Lyndon B. Johnson,
1963–64, Book II, pp. 305–308.
347. Editorial Note
On May 11, 1964, President Johnson called Assistant
Secretary Mann to discuss a
recent incident involving the Ambassador to Mexico, Fulton “Tony”
Freeman. Johnson asked:
“What’s this story about Freeman mixing up in
politics down in Mexico?” He then described an article in which the
Ambassador reportedly said that the Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI) candidate, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, would win the
presidential election on July 5, and spoke “approvingly” of the expected
result. The opposition was already criticizing
Freeman for interference in Mexican affairs.
Although he had not seen the story, Mann doubted that Freeman could
have made the statements attributed to him. He assured the President:
“My advice to Tony was to stay away from the press in Mexico.” The two
men agreed that the story was “bad for the [Mexican] administration and
bad for us.” Johnson told Mann to call
Freeman for a report on the incident. (Johnson
Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation
between President Johnson and Thomas Mann, May 11, 1964, 12:17 p.m.,
Tape F64.26, Side B, PNO 2)
Mann reported back to the
President within the hour:
Mann: I talked to Tony on the
telephone.
President: Yeah.
Mann: He said what happened
was: last Wednesday [May 6] he went over to make a speech at the
University Club there and the press got a hold of it and asked him
what he thought about who’s going to win the election. He said that
was none of his concern. They asked him then what the American press
was saying about the Mexican election. He said he told them what the
American press was saying.
President: He ought to have
told them that he wasn’t a reporter.
Mann: Exactly. And I told
him—He knows he’s goofed on it but apparently it’s not a major issue
down there yet. It was [unintelligible] the opposition PRI got a hold of it and made a
statement. But this was just a one shot affair that happened last
Thursday or Friday. There hasn’t been any published it since or any
editorials about it. And I reminded him again that the magic words
were: “We don’t intervene in Mexican internal affairs. They’re
perfectly capable of running their own government.” And he agreed
that was the line he would follow and not let the press push him off
that line.
President: All right. (Ibid.,
Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Thomas Mann, May 11, 1964, 12:50 p.m., Tape F64.26,
Side B, PNO 3) The portions of the conversations printed here were
prepared in the Office of the Historian specially for this
volume.
348. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Mexico, Vol. I, Memos, 12/63–12/65. Confidential.
Another copy indicates that the memorandum was drafted by Mann. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/MEX Files: Lot 69 D 377, POL 33 Water, Boundaries, Inland Waters)Washington, June 22, 1964.
SUBJECT
Salinity Problem with Mexico
Over the last month, State and Interior carried on intensive discussions
to find a solution to the salinity problem. A proposal was worked out
which Mr. Dungan and I discussed
with Senator Hayden.Senator Carl T. Hayden
(D–Arizona), chairman of the Senate Committee on Appropriations.
Johnson reviewed the negotiations with
Senator Hayden in a telephone conversation with Assistant Secretary
Mann on June 11; see Document 16. I understand that
the Senator found it acceptable, but that we are unable to proceed with
negotiations until other problems on the Colorado, which the Senator
regards as related, are also settled. I am not certain Mexico will
accept the proposal but it gives us a negotiating position for the first
time.
In the meantime, Mexico continues to receive what it regards as poor
quality water. Mexicali farmers are agitated, and carrying on weekly
demonstrations. They plan demonstrations throughout Mexico on July 12.
Although they have been assured by Mexican officials that a solution is
forthcoming momentarily, they are aware of none and fearful of receiving
water beginning in October which they consider unusable for irrigation.
They use U.S. Department of Agriculture handbooks to prove their case.
The Mexican President has been told by his Senate Majority Leader
(Senator Moreno
Although the effect on our relations with Mexico will be serious, the
probable risk to the water rights of the seven Colorado Basin States is equally disturbing. Over
the two and one-half years that this dispute has dragged on, Mexico has
insisted more and more that it is entitled to water of equal quality.
Mexico argues that the TreatyReference is
to a treaty relating to the utilization of water from the Colorado
and Tijuana Rivers and from the Rio Grande. The treaty was signed by
the United States and Mexico on February 3, 1944. (59 Stat. (pt. 2)
1219) divided the waters of the Colorado, and that it is
unjust for Mexico to receive all of the drainage and for U.S. irrigators
on the opposite bank of the river to receive sweet water from storage.
We can make a fairly persuasive case on the basis of the history of the
Treaty, and the Treaty itself, against the Mexican contention for equal
treatment. But I am rather uneasy about arguing before the International
Court, where all but a few of the judges are from the less developed
countries, that Mexico is not entitled to equal treatment. We estimate
that we are now delivering to Mexico 600,000 acre feet of drainage water
to fulfill our Treaty commitment. At ultimate development (about 1980),
it is estimated that we will be delivering about 900,000 acre feet of
drainage water. With runoffs averaging 10 million acre feet or less over
the last several years, the danger of an adverse decision requiring us
to deliver water from storage is uncomfortably evident.
Although neither Senator Hayden nor Reclamation have been willing to
acknowledge the risks we are running, they are now acting as if they
understood them.
It is essential that we begin negotiations with Mexico immediately if we
are to have any hope of selling the proposal which has been worked out.
More delay, accompanied by anti-American demonstrations in Mexico, may
make it politically impossible for Mexico to agree to anything we would
regard as reasonable. I hope that you can get Senator Hayden’s agreement
that we may proceed with negotiations.Johnson on June 23. (Johnson Library,
President’s Daily Diary) No substantive record of the meeting, or
evidence that the salinity problem was discussed, has been
found.
Dean Rusk
349. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/MEX Files: Lot 71 D 188, POL 14 Diaz Ordaz Election—1964.
Confidential. Drafted by Harry Bergold (ARA/MEX) and initialed for Mann by Adams. A notation on the memorandum indicates that
Rusk saw it.Washington, July 2, 1964.
SUBJECT
Mexican Elections, July 5
The Mexican presidential campaign, ending with the July 5 elections, has
been unusually active with minority parties, both left and right, having
been encouraged by the dominant “official” party, the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI), to campaign
forcefully in opposition to the Government. In early April, there was
some fear that the PRI’s policy of an
open campaign might result in violence especially in outlying rural
areas. This fear was heightened, on April 6, when PRI candidate Gustavo Diaz Ordaz found himself in the midst of an
unfriendly demonstration mounted by leftists and communists in the
northern city of Chihuahua. The PRI did
not meaningfully curb the leftist opposition but it did greatly increase
the security protection for Diaz Ordaz. This proved sufficient to deter
demonstrators and the rest of the campaign was almost completely free of
disturbances.
It is expected that Diaz Ordaz will win the kind of overwhelming victory
that PRI presidential candidates are
accustomed to.Díaz Ordaz won the
presidential election with approximately 88 percent of the
vote. Current Mexico City guesses are that he will get
between 85 and 90 percent of the popular vote with most of the remainder
going to the conservative National Action Party (PAN). Except for the
marxist Popular Socialist Party (PPS), no communist or far leftist
parties are registered for participation in the election. A communist
party, the Peoples Electoral Front (FEP), is running a candidate, even
though the party is unregistered, and he will probably get several
thousand write-in votes.
PRI presidential nomination.
A specific conclusion that can be drawn from Diaz Ordaz’ campaign
speeches, traditionally general in their content, is that the candidate
is determined realistically to attack the problem of rural poverty in
Mexico. To effect the necessary changes, Diaz Ordaz will have to force the Mexican bureaucracy
to bring to bear on the agrarian problem a number of essential
technical, financial and other institutional reforms. In foreign
affairs, the Diaz Ordaz administration may from time to time take
positions closer to ours than was the case under the Lopez Mateos
Administration, but no major shifts in Mexican policy are expected in
the short run.
350. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Mexico, Vol. I, Memos, 12/63–12/65. No classification
marking.Washington, July 27, 1964.
SUBJECT
Salinity Problem with Mexico
The Mexican Ambassador will call on you at 6 PM, July 28, to deliver a
letter from President Lopez Mateos on our proposal to resolve the
salinity problem on the lower Colorado River. Secretary Udall, Tom
Mann, and Mr. Sayre, from my staff, will attend.
The Mexican Ambassador will make three basic points: Mexico appreciates the efforts the U.S. has made to achieve a
solution to the salinity problem. The U.S. proposal being
discussed in the International Boundary and Water Commission
would reduce the amount of salt in water delivered to Mexico,
but there would still be more salt than would result from normal
irrigation operations. The proposal promises a further reduction
in salt from Wellton-Mohawk, but gives no indication as to when.
Moreover, it still contemplates the delivery of underground salt
water and not “return flow,” as defined by the Treaty.Mexico regards a by-pass channel (either entirely separate, or
within the present channel of the Colorado River) as the only
way to achieve a prompt and satisfactory solution.Mexico will continue to reserve its legal position on the
interpretation of the 1944 Treaty and international law just as
both countries did in the Chamizal settlement.
I recommend that you inform the Mexican Ambassador: We share the Mexican desire for an early solution to this
problem.We will review our proposals to see if there is any possible
way to reduce further the amount of salt which would be
delivered to Mexico this winter. We will also try to give Mexico
an answer on when the Wellton-Mohawk district can achieve normal
operation, i.e., when it will be in salt balance.We have studied the by-pass channel alternative. We know that
Mexico is interested in a result that would be satisfactory to
both governments, and not necessarily in the alternatives the
U.S. adopts to achieve that result. At the moment we cannot say
whether a by-pass channel should be included in the combination
of works to achieve that result.We agree that we should seek a practical solution with no
attempt to interpret or modify the 1944 Treaty. We have no
problem with both sides reserving their legal positions.Although he delivered the letter as
scheduled, Carrillo
Flores reported that “the situation had
changed since the letter had been written in that the
Mexican Commissioner had given the views of the Mexican
Government to the United States Commissioner.” President
Johnson asked
Udall “to take
action to resolve the salinity problem.” Johnson also extended an
invitation for Díaz
Ordaz to visit his Texas ranch in October.
(Memorandum of conversation, July 28; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 MEX–US)
McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
351. Editorial Note
[text not declassified]
352. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL MEX–US. Confidential. Drafted by
Sayre. Approved in the
White House on December 10. The memorandum is part I of II. Part II
recorded discussion on November 12 on Mexican-Cuban relations.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Mexico, Diaz
Ordaz Visit, 11/12–11/13/64)LBJ Ranch, Texas, November 13, 1964, 10–11:45
a.m.
SUBJECT
President Johnson’s Conversation with
President-elect Diaz Ordaz
PARTICIPANTS
The PresidentPresident-elect Diaz OrdazAntonio Carrillo Flores, Ambassador of MexicoThomas C. Mann, Assistant
SecretaryAngier B. Duke, Chief of
ProtocolRobert M. Sayre, White House
staffDonald Barnes,
Interpreter
The President outlined his economic philosophy. He emphasized especially
the need to maintain the confidence of investors. He observed that
investors have to feel secure and have no fear that their investments
will not be destroyed or confiscated by the government. The United
States was now in its 45th month of unbroken economic growth. The
President felt that investors’ confidence was a major factor in setting
this record. He regarded a high level of investment as basic. Without
it, plants would not be built, nor jobs created. He was not disturbed at
a high level of profit. On the contrary, he welcomed it because the
government got 52¢ out of each dollar of profit. The greater the profits
of business, the more government received to carry on essential
programs.
Diaz Ordaz expressed general agreement with this philosophy, but he said
Mexico had a special problem which could not be resolved by guaranteeing
the security of investment. This problem was the extent to which the
Mexican economy was dependent on actions of the United States
Government. He then discussed cotton (threat of variable subsidy); sugar
(no assured quota); coffee (no U.S. legislation implementing the
International Coffee Agreement); silver (U.S. stocks could upset the
market); lead and zinc (stagnation in industry because of over supply);
fluoride (tariff barriers), etc.
Diaz Ordaz said Mexico needed long term assurances on its primary
products so it could do long term planning. He said that Mexico had
always found great comprehension in the United States. But he regarded
this as an “act of grace,” by the United States.
(Mr. Sayre asked the Mexican
Ambassador later if this did not amount to a suggestion for a trade
agreement. The Ambassador said it probably did, but a bilateral
agreement and not participation in GATT. Mexico found no merit in joining GATT.)
Diaz Ordaz said the President could expect any Mexican Ambassador to be
persistent, because it needed cooperation on its primary products to
avoid a very serious situation.
The President said he understood this problem. He was certain that the
Mexican President-elect understood the political problems of the United
States on importing primary products because they were not different
from the problems the President-elect would face. The President said he
would like to be helpful on, for example, sugar. But when he agreed on a
foreign quota, he had to hold down the domestic quota. The inevitable result was that farmers who
could vote in the United States asked why Mexicans who do not even live
in the United States got quotas and American farmers did not. Sugar is
now grown in 22 states and the Senators from these states are, of
course, pressing for increased domestic quotas.
The President said he knew that the Coffee Agreement was essential. He
noted the problem of only having coffee consumers in the United States
and no producers interested in market stability. But he assured the
Mexican President-elect that he would seek action on coffee. He observed
that it would be very difficult to get good legislation, but in doing so
we would show our real friendship for Latin America.
Diaz Ordaz said he understood the situation perfectly. He regarded these
problems as trade matters and hoped they would be dealt with as trade
problems and not political problems. He thought that relations would be
stronger if Mexico did not have to depend on loans or special
legislation by the United States Congress.
The President said he could not agree that loans adversely affected
relations. He recalled his own personal experience in borrowing money
from a friend when his friend had reason to doubt that he would ever be
repaid. The President considered the lender as one of his best friends
and still did today. He thought that loans on special terms were
helpful.
Diaz Ordaz said there were two urgent problems:
1. Colorado River Salinity
He said that he knew we had reached agreement in principle and that only
a few details remained to be worked out.
Diaz Ordaz said he could not agree with the United States that it had no
obligations as to quality merely because it is not mentioned in the
Treaty. He thought the United States had an obligation to act
responsibly. He was confident that the International Court would hold
that the water users on the right bank of the river were entitled to the
same quality of water as those on the left bank. He thought the problem
could be settled in the near future if the Boundary Commission had
instructions to do so.
The President said that the United States Boundary Commissioner had such
instructions. He observed that Commissioner Friedkin was one of the most
competent persons he had working for him and knew he would do a good
job. He said he could not accept the legal viewpoint, which Diaz Ordaz
had outlined, but that Diaz Ordaz could be assured that the United
States would do the right thing.
The President referred to the salinity problem on the Rio Grande, which
was so injurious to farmers in the United States. Diaz Ordaz said that
Mexico is ready to do what is necessary to solve this problem on the basis of the same
principle he proposed for solution of the Colorado River problem.
2. Migratory Workers (Braceros)
PL–78 had not been extended.See footnote 4, Document 346.
But he expressed concern that the situation which existed before the
agreement would recur. He said Mexico would not ask for extensions of
the agreement or the hiring of Mexican workers. He wanted the United
States to prevent illegal entries and improper recruiting activities. He
wanted to be assured that any Mexicans brought in on private contracts
were properly treated.
The President said that both Mexican and United States labor unions had
opposed PL–78. The Secretary of Labor was
making a concerted effort to find workers in the United States. If this
effort did not prove successful, then he thought the United States and
Mexico should enter into a new agreement. He urged that such an
agreement be simple and avoid the bureaucratic red tape which plagued
the existing program.
At 11:45 a.m. the meeting ended and the President and President-elect
departed for a tour of the Ranch.
353. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. IX. No classification marking.Washington, March 12, 1965.
SUBJECT
Salinity Problem with Mexico
We agreed in late January on the text of a proposed five-year agreement
with Mexico in an effort to reach a practical solution to the salinity
problem. We have been checking it out since then with domestic interests
to make certain it is acceptable before signature. The text of the agreement, in the form of a
Boundary Commission Minute, is attached.Attached but not printed.
We have also worked out a five-year truce under which both countries
agree to negotiate remaining differences instead of going to the World
Court. The chief remaining difference is Mexico’s claim for damages
which State is thinking of disposing of in a loan to help rehabilitate
the Mexicali Valley.
State and Interior are working on a memorandum of understanding between
them to define the responsibility of each agency for carrying out the
proposed agreement.
Udall and Mann consider the proposed settlement
as better than generally thought possible and recommend we accept
it.
The seven Colorado Basin States were consulted at a meeting at Phoenix on
January 26–27. The seven Governors have now written you accepting the
agreement with some reservation, expressing their appreciation for the
close consultation with them, and commending the negotiators. Interior
believes it has satisfied the Governors on their reservations. It is
recommended you reply in general terms to the Governors and leave the
technical points for Secretary Udall to handle.
Senators Hayden and Anderson and
Congressman Aspinall have accepted the agreement. However, Senator
Hayden made his approval subject to the condition that you would send up
a budget amendment for FY 1966 requesting
the $2.2 million needed to complete the $5 million in works called for
in the agreement (Interior has $2.8 million), and $3 million to start a
$7 million 17-well ground water recovery project in the Yuma area.
Interior recommends that you accept Hayden’s conditions. Budget concurs,
but recommends that Hayden be informed that the 94-well ground water
recovery program in the Yuma area, of which the 17-well project is a
part, poses difficult problems in our relations with Mexico, which must
be studied thoroughly. The Administration’s commitment is, therefore,
limited to the 17 wells. Mexico has protested the 94-well ground water
recovery program, but State interposes no objections to the 17 wells.
Budget will send separately the proposed budget amendment for your
signature and transmission to the Congress.
We considered the possibility of a ceremony in connection with the
signing of the agreement. Mexico is opposed. They regard the agreement
as a hard bargain, and thus difficult to sell politically in Mexico.
Simultaneous Presidential announcements of the settlement are planned at
the time of signing. I will recommend the draft of such a statement
after it has been worked out with Mexico.
Recommendations:The
President approved all three recommendations. The agreement on
the salinity of the lower Colorado River was signed on March 22.
The text of the agreement, a statement by President Johnson and a joint
State–Interior announcement are in Department of State Bulletin, April 12, 1965, pp.
555–557.
That you sign the attached lettersNot
attached. to the Governors of the Basin States.That you approve the Budget amendment.That you authorize the signature of the proposed agreement with
Mexico.McG.B.
354. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of the Interior UdallSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Mexico, Vol. I, Cables, 12/63–12/65.
Confidential.Washington, April 6, 1965.
The President has approved the proposed agreement with Mexico, which the
Departments of State and Interior recommended, as the best attainable
measures we could take now to settle the salinity problem. The
Wellton–Mohawk problem is a special case, but it would be desirable to
look at projected future operations on the Colorado River so that we
will avoid the possibility of a future dispute with Mexico.
We should consider whether projected future operations will serve the
basic interests of the United States. The basic interests here involved
are, of course, protection of the water rights of the United States and
the maintenance of friendly relations with our nearest southern
neighbor. The example of excellent relations with Mexico also has a
bearing on our world posture.
I know that some of the Basin States continue to be dissatisfied with the
1944 Water Treaty itself and believe that our policy should be conditioned by the fact
that Mexico was guaranteed a quantity of water larger than it should
have been given. I should think our best interests are served by
carrying out in good faith the bargain made in 1944. I gather that the
Mexican response to comments that the 1944 Treaty was a bad bargain for
the United States has been that Mexico made bad bargains in 1848 and
1853.
One of the conclusions that the two Departments have apparently reached,
after more than three years of work on the Wellton–Mohawk problem, is
that the United States has an obligation to act reasonably in conducting
irrigation in the United States. In technical terms, this translates
itself into a requirement that U.S. irrigation districts maintain
approximate salt balance. This fairly well defines our legal view of the
1944 Water Treaty.
On the other hand, Mexico has from the first held to the view that the
Treaty divided the waters of the Colorado and that it was, therefore,
entitled to the same treatment as users in the United States. In short,
it asserts that the United States has no right to deliver all of the
drainage water to Mexico, but should divide it proportionally among all
the users on the lower Colorado.
If, as is apparently generally expected, the overall quality of water in
the lower Colorado continues to deteriorate, it would be to Mexico’s
interest to test its legal theory. On the other hand, it is in our
interest to avoid such a test. But if we are to do so, we need complete
data on projected developments as the basis for developing an agreed
strategy.
The Department of the Interior should take the leadership in developing
data on the following points and any others that the two Departments
consider appropriate. I would hope we could have the study before the
end of the year. The study should assume that the Department of the
Interior will in the course of the next few years be able to limit flows
to Mexico to its guaranteed annual allotment of 1,500,000 acre feet: What will the quality of water delivered to Mexico be each
year over the next twenty years? This should consider existing
projects, those contemplated in the Pacific Southwest Water
Plan, and others that might be developed over the next twenty
years.What will the quality of water delivered to U.S. irrigation
projects below Imperial Dam be overall and by project for these
same years?What quantity and percentage of Mexico’s guaranteed annual
amount will be drainage return flow for these same years?What U.S. irrigation districts in the lower Colorado River now
use drainage return flow for irrigation? Is it contemplated that these amounts
will increase or decrease over the next twenty years?The proposed study has not been found. In a
memorandum to Rusk,
March 22, 1966, Sayre
complained: “The Interior Department ought to have been able
to furnish us before now the results of studies on the
salinity of water to be delivered to Mexico that the White
House requested in April 1965.” (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 MEX–US)
McGeorge Bundy
355. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Mexico, Vol. I, Memos, 12/63–12/65. No classification
marking.Washington, December 21, 1965, 2
p.m.
SUBJECT
Lower Rio Grande Salinity Problem
The attached memo from State (Tab B)Tab B is
a memorandum from Read to
Bundy, December 15;
attached but not printed. explains that the US-Mexico
Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC)
has come up with a recommendation for solving the lower Rio Grande
salinity problem. The solution involves building a canal in Mexico to
take the saline drainage to the Gulf of Mexico. Cost of construction and
of operation and maintenance (estimated $1.2 million) would be shared on
an equal basis. State proposes that announcement of the IBWC recommendation be in the form of a
joint press release by you and President Diaz Ordaz.
The IBWC recommendation has been staffed
out. Bureau of the Budget is on board. Congressman de la Garza wants to
introduce the enabling legislation. Senator Yarborough has been filled
in and supports the project. The local Texas farmers, needless to say,
are all for it. Interior is not directly involved, but has been
informed.
The project is a good one. It is beneficial to farmers on both sides of
the border. It is in line with your general effort to solve boundary
problems with Mexico. At a time when other Latin American countries are
denouncing—and shooting—each other over border disputes, it is a good example of how states
with a common border can cooperate to mutual advantage. From a domestic
and foreign standpoint, I think it would be advantageous for you to be
associated personally with it.
I, therefore, recommend that you authorize us to negotiate with the
Mexicans for a joint Presidential announcement along the lines of Tab
A.Attached but not printed. If
you authorize the negotiations, we will, of course, check the text
worked out with the Mexicans with you before giving it to Bill Moyers for release.
McG.B.
Authorize negotiations for a Presidential
announcementThe President checked
this option. For text of the press statement released by the
White House on December 30, see Department of State Bulletin, January 24, 1966, p. 118. On
February 10, 1967, the White House announced that the United
States and Mexico had approved an agreement to solve the
salinity problem of the Rio Grande. (Ibid., March 13, 1967, pp.
428–429; and Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1967, Book I, p. 175)
Prefer not making it a Presidential announcement
356. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Mexico, Vol. II, 1/66–2/67. Confidential. Drafted by
Barnes on April 27 and
approved by Walt Rostow on
June 2. The meeting was held at Los Pinos on the “evening of April
14 and morning of April 15.” According to the President’s Daily
Diary, Johnson met Díaz Ordaz in a private session on April 14
(9:30–10:15 p.m.); the two men met again the next morning
(9:20–10:37 a.m.) with their key advisers. (Johnson Library)
President Johnson was in Mexico City for an
informal visit, including a ceremony to dedicate a statue of Abraham
Lincoln. For his remarks at the dedication and other occasions
during the visit, see Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp.
416–422.Mexico City, April 14,
1966.
SUBJECT
Conversation between Presidents Johnson and
Diaz Ordaz, Los Pinos, Mexico City
PARTICIPANTS
President Lyndon B.
Johnson, United StatesPresident Gustavo Diaz
Ordaz, Mexico
Cotton
President Diaz Ordaz said that Mexico had suffered considerable losses
because of a drop in cotton prices. He complained that the Soviet Union
was depressing the international cotton market by buying and then
reselling cotton for export at low prices. He said that the United
States, and Mexico, plus the other cotton-producing Latin American
countries, supplied over half of the world market, and were therefore in
a good position to affect world prices. He expressed his appreciation
for the position adopted by the U.S., which could easily dump cotton,
thereby getting rid of its surpluses and in the process ruining the
economies of many countries, including Mexico. This, he said, would be
like winning all of the chips in a poker game: the game would be over.
He was encouraged by the establishment of the International Cotton
Institute, headed by former Mexican Agriculture Secretary Rodriguez
Adame, but believed that a world agreement would be useful to help in
the stabilization of prices.
President Johnson replied that he was aware of the
importance of cotton to so many countries, and that the U.S. would
continue to study possible means of stabilizing prices. He said that an
overly high price for cotton might lead to a loss of markets, because of
competition by synthetic fibers.
Sulphur
President Diaz Ordaz said that the Pan American Sulphur Company and the
Mexican Government differed over the amount of sulphur reserves in
Mexico, and that the company estimated the reserves as being higher than
did the Mexicans. This was an important difference of opinion, since the
reserve estimates had a direct bearing on the amount of sulphur that
Mexico would allow the company to export. President
Johnson suggested a compromise between the two
figures, and requested Mexico to do everything it could to permit
increased exports to the U.S., to alleviate the strong pressures for an
increase in sulphur prices in the U.S., which in turn contributed to
inflationary trends. President Diaz Ordaz said that he would look into
the matter, and that Mexico would do anything it could in this
direction. He wanted to point out that the above-mentioned company had
maligned Mexico in many other countries, saying that Mexico was not
living up to its agreements, while the truth was that the company had
not been able to export its allocated quota the previous year.
Cultural Exchange
President Johnson recalled that when he was a
Senator, he had visited the then President-elect of Mexico, López
Mateos, in Acapulco, and that at that time there were a number of issues
pending between the two countries: The Chamizal, Colorado River
salinity, for example. Now,
all of those problems had been settled, and he thought that this was a
propitious time to launch a joint and positive effort, taking advantage
of the absence of major differences. He suggested that the two
Presidents each appoint a panel of imaginative men, to come up with
suggestions for an exchange of persons; not of students or teachers, but
in different fields. He proposed, for example, that the U.S. might send
Secretary Freeman to advise Mexico on agricultural
problems, much in the same line as the Secretary’s trip to Vietnam. He
also mentioned the possibility of Under Secretary Mann going to Mexico to consult with
the Government on economic problems, including the cotton matter. He
suggested that Mexico might send representative artists to tour the
U.S., particularly in areas with a heavy concentration of
Mexican-Americans. As an example, he mentioned Cantinflas.“Cantinflas” was the stage name of the Mexican
comedian Mario Moreno.
He also said that thought might be given to having Mexico send persons
to provide leadership to Mexican-American citizens in the U.S.
President Diaz Ordaz said that he thought that this proposal was a good
one. Mexico had a number of artists it could send to the U.S. He would
exclude painters, since in Mexico, because of a certain snobbish
approach, many painters were Communists, and he would not want to send
them to the U.S.
Future Visits
President Johnson suggested that the two Presidents
and their families might meet at Big Bend National Park, and in the
adjoining Mexican forest area, to emphasize recreation and conservation.
President Diaz Ordaz said that he was all in favor of this, and
suggested that the two Presidents also visit the Amistad Dam nearby. His
only concern, a minor one, was that he would have to obtain permission
from the Mexican Congress to cross the border, and he did not want to
have to go to his legislature too often for this purpose. President
Johnson said that this problem could be
obviated by having the two Presidents meet on the Mexican side of the
border.
Mexican Economy
Both Presidents agreed that the Mexican economy was doing very well;
President Diaz Ordaz said that his country had reached the “takeoff”
point. They both also agreed that Mexico should increase its efforts to
assist less developed countries, particularly in Central and South
America. President Diaz Ordaz said that he intended to follow this
course. It had been amusing, he said, during his recent visit to Central
America, to see how Mexico is considered there, and especially in
Guatemala, as the “Colossus of the North.” He said that the best
Ambassadors Mexico had in
these countries were Central Americans who had studied in Mexico, many
of whom had married Mexican girls. There were large numbers of Central
Americans studying in Mexican institutions at the present time.
In-bond Warehouses
President Diaz Ordaz said that he was interested in settling the problem
of in-bond warehouses on the border, since sales from these warehouses
produced no revenue to either government. President
Johnson said that he agreed that the matter
should be studied.
Ex-Im Loan to PEMEX
President Diaz Ordaz effusively expressed his delight that we have broken
a long taboo against Exim Bank loans to nationalized oil companies. He
stated that Mexico probably could have obtained the loan elsewhere but
was happy that our policy has changed. He also referred to the
unhappiness that arose in the United States over the credit Mexico
obtained about two years ago for the purchase of Soviet drilling
equipment. He said that Mexico was extremely unhappy about the Soviet
equipment which is far inferior to the latest U.S. equipment and even to
some equipment that Mexico has.
President Diaz Ordaz’ Central American Trip
At the luncheon at Los Pinos, President Johnson
asked Diaz Ordaz to tell Mrs. Johnson about his
trip to Central America. President Johnson
indicated that he might wish to send Mrs. Johnson
on a similar trip.
Cuba, Dominican Republic and OAS
The two Presidents, in their conversation, did not mention Cuba, the
Dominican Republic, or the OAS.
President Johnson mentioned the Dominican Republic
briefly to Foreign Secretary Carrillo
Flores stating that he had to do something when
Ambassador Bennett called while
the Embassy was being fired upon. He also told the Foreign Secretary
that Castro had told the British
Ambassador in Havana that the Soviets had let Cuba down badly on two
occasions, once over missiles and once over the Dominican Republic. The
Foreign Secretary made no comment.For text
of the joint statement issued following discussions with Díaz Ordaz, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966,
Book I, pp. 422–424.
357. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
(Mann) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 11. No
classification marking. Rostow forwarded the
memorandum as an attachment to an August 30 note in which he
recommended approval of “Tom’s suggested strategy.”Washington, August 30, 1966, 12:45
p.m.
Mr. President:
Carlos Trouyet and others in the
Mexican private sector recently bought a number of Mexican cotton
textile mills and invested capital in modernizing them. The pressure on
Diaz Ordaz is almost certain to come principally from these owners.
Measured in terms of millions of square yards, Mexican cotton textile
exports to the U.S. have risen from virtually zero some 3 or 4 years ago
to an estimated level of perhaps 60 to 70 million in 1966.
An increase of this magnitude in Mexico’s traditional exports of cotton
textiles to our market cannot continue because (a) this would be unfair
to many other cotton textile exporting countries which, at our
insistence, have agreed on voluntary restraints, and (b) because the
long-term cotton textile agreement negotiated some years ago would
unravel. The pressure in Congress for protective import quotas on cotton
textiles would then be irresistible.
I therefore believe the U.S. has no alternative but to make clear to
Mexico that it is necessary to work out with them a ceiling on the level
of their cotton textile exports to this market and that, failing in
this, we will have to impose the quota that the world agreement
contemplates. This ceiling should be a generous one, but in any event
Mexico will come out with a much higher level of exports than they are
entitled to from an historic point of view.
The tactic is important. I suggest that Walt
Rostow and Linc
Gordon call in Margain and explain that you really had no
choice in this matter for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph,
and you are under great pressure not only from the industry but from all
the interested departments, as well as other cotton exporting countries.
Walt and Linc should explain to
the Ambassador that under the long-term agreement which Mexico is party
to, notice is required, and that this notice will have to be given. They
should add that this would still allow 60 days to negotiate a
satisfactory level, and they should suggest that the Mexicans send their
best team to Washington to talk about this at their earliest
convenience. The U.S. negotiating team should be headed by Linc
Gordon if he is here, and if not, by Bob Sayre. Commerce and the other
interested departments should of course participate. The negotiations
conducted through Freeman thus far have not
prospered and, in my judgment, it is not likely that they will as long
as we negotiate through the Embassy in Mexico City.
Some two or three days following this meeting, a more formal notice
should be given the Mexican Embassy at working levels and in the most
abbreviated and polite form possible. The lawyers may say that this must
be done in writing. If so, this is O.K. provided care is taken with the
text.
There will be some repercussions in Mexico simply because all Mexican
Governments must continually demonstrate to their people that they are
negotiating tough with the U.S. There may be some adverse publicity.
However, it would be easy to overestimate the significance of any
initial official government reaction to the conversation and notice,
since the Mexicans know as well as we do that their whole economy
depends on our cooperation. They will have to find a way to adjust just
as soon as they are convinced that there is no more give in the U.S.
position.The President approved these
recommendations at the Tuesday luncheon on August 30. (Memorandum
from Rostow to the President, August 30; ibid.)
According to the President’s Daily Diary, luncheon participants
included Rusk, McNamara, Moyers, and
Rostow. (Johnson Library) No substantive
record of the meeting has been found.
Tom MannPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
358. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 13. Confidential. A copy was
sent to Moyers.Washington, September 29, 1966.
SUBJECT
Status Report on Your April 15 Agreements with President Diaz
Ordaz
Secretary Rusk and Linc Gordon will be in Mexico this
weekend for the inauguration of the new Mexican Foreign Office
Building.Rusk was in Mexico City,
September 30–October 1. Memoranda of his conversation with Díaz Ordaz on September 30 are in
the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/MEX Files: Lot 69 D 377, POL 7 Visit—Secretary Rusk.
I thought you would like to know where we stand on implementation of the
decisions you reached with President Diaz Ordaz last April 15, some of
which will be discussed by the Secretary and Linc during the visit.
Measures to Expand Border Trade
Ambassador TurkelAmbassador Harry Bulletin, January 9, 1967, pp. 70–71)
will make this study. He has for the past several weeks been briefing
himself on a part-time basis. Next Monday, October 3, he starts
full-time work on the project. Professor James
Gander will be working with him. Professor Gander has developed a
bibliography and collected information on border trade which will serve
as the starting point for the project. After briefings and research in
Washington, Ambassador Turkel will move his base to El Paso. He plans to
have his study completed in about three months. The Mexicans have also
named their man.
Consultation on Cotton
Secretary Freeman visited Mexico City June 6–7. He
had a full and frank exchange of views with President Diaz Ordaz and
other high officials on the cotton pricing problem. He reassured the
Mexicans that the U.S. would: (1) not dump cotton, (2) not sell cotton
below 22 cents a pound for the marketing year 1966–67, and (3) continue
to support Mexico on an international cotton commodity agreement. This
trip fulfilled your commitment to the Mexican President.
Since then, the problem of limiting cotton textile imports from Mexico
has arisen with which you are familiar. Discussions with the Mexicans
continue. Their latest response indicates movement in the direction of a
negotiated settlement.
Expeditious Transfer of Chamizal
Commissioner Friedkin is close to completing acquisition of lands now in
private hands to be transferred to Mexico under the Chamizal settlement.
Federal agencies are also letting bids for the relocation of public
utilities now on those lands. Once these tasks are completed, we will be
in a position to set a date for the formal transfer. We would like to
hold the ceremony on September 25, 1967. This is the anniversary of your meeting with President
Lopez Mateos in 1964 for the symbolic transfer. It also gives us time to
get the Chamizal Memorial Park and Memorial Highway projects underway so
that their dedication can be made part of the ceremony. We have informed
the Mexicans of this time-table.
The House has passed a bill authorizing 100% federal financing of the
Chamizal Memorial Highway. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has
reported out a bill requiring the State of Texas to pick up 50% of the
tab. Senator Yarborough will try to have this amount reduced to 10% when
the bill goes to conference.The final
version of the bill (PL 89–795),
which was signed into law on November 8, placed a ceiling of $8
million on the federal contribution to the Chamizal highway. (80
Stat. 1477)
Commission to Raise Living Standards in Border
Communities
State and OEO have developed a
comprehensive plan for establishing the Joint Commission, including
negotiations with the Mexicans (Stage I), an initial study of economic
and social problems of the border communities (Stage II), and specific
proposals for administering and financing our part of the program likely
to emerge from the study (Stage III). You have authorized action on
Stages I and II. State reviewed the proposals with the House and Senate
Latin American Subcommittee and ran into no significant problems.
Secretary Rusk and Linc Gordon will be discussing them
with the Mexicans this weekend. On his return next week, Linc will call Ambassador Telles to express your wish that he take
the chairmanship of the U.S. Section of the Commission.
Creation of Lincoln–Juarez Scholarship Funds
State has worked out a plan for funding our part of the program and
selecting the scholars. It has also prepared detailed proposals for the
creation of a Joint Commission to supervise the operations of the two
funds and has asked Ambassador Freeman to discuss
them with the Mexicans. Secretary Rusk and Linc
will be following up on this matter.
Increase in Cultural Exchange
Charlie FrankelAssistant Secretary of State
for Educational and Cultural Affairs. has done an excellent
job of stepping up the flow of U.S. cultural programs to Mexico. I sent
you his first report last May. At Tab AAttached but not printed. is his most recent account of what
he has done. Getting the Mexicans to reciprocate looms as a problem.
Rio Colorado Salinity
The Mexicans have been concerned that (1) our ground water recovery
program on the lower Colorado River would reduce the underground water
flows to Mexico and (2) our substituting these recovered waters for
surface waters in the river water delivered to them under the 1944 Water
Treaty would leave Mexico with poor quality water.
State and Interior have reached agreement on the nature of the assurances
to be given to Mexico on these points. Secretary Udall is going to Mexico in November to
present the assurances.
This summer Mexico asked us for additional water to cover an acute
shortage. Despite our tight situation, Interior agreed to lend them
40,535 acre feet to be repaid over a period of time depending on the
adequacy of our runoffs next year.
Gulf of California Nuclear Desalinization Plant
The Joint Study Group is continuing its pre-feasibilities studies. The
pace of their work has moved more slowly than we would like. Our members
have virtually completed their assignments. But the Mexicans have not
kept pace. At their request, a meeting of the Group scheduled for
October has been postponed to January, or later.
W. W. RostowPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
359. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Mexico, Diaz Ordaz Visit, Background
and Misc., 10/26–28/67. Confidential.Washington, October 24, 1967.
SUBJECT
Ford’s Difficulties in Mexico
The attached memorandum from Tony SolomonAttached but not printed. describes a
serious problem the Ford Motor Company is having with its operations in
Mexico. He suggests that
you mention the matter to President Diaz Ordaz.
The difficulty in a nutshell is this:
Ford built a plant in Mexico City to produce sophisticated assembly-line
production tools. It exports about $5 million worth of these per year.
Part of the deal was that in exchange for this investment the Mexicans
would add 5000 units to Ford’s basic quota of automobiles (20,000)
produced in its car plant. The tool plant is a marginal operation. The
car plant is profitable only with the additional quota.
The Mexicans, in a move to force Ford to allow Mexican capital to buy
into the company, (i.e., Mexicanization program), has told Ford that it
can no longer have its extra quota of cars. Ford has gained a temporary
reprieve, but says that it will close down its tool plant operation
unless it is allowed to retain its additional quota.
We feel that Ford is being unfairly treated. They built the tool plant in
the understanding that they could produce more cars. This understanding
is being withdrawn. We think it is bad for Mexico and our whole Alliance
for Progress effort to have private enterprise in an attractive venture
as tool-making squeezed out.
Consequently, Tony suggests that you propose to President Diaz Ordaz that
he appoint someone from his personal staff to go into the problem
quietly with your representative.Rostow added the following
suggestion: “For example, Tony Solomon.”
As Tony notes, it would not be productive to have Secretary Rusk raise this with Carrillo Flores, since he would have to
turn it over to his Cabinet colleague who is behind the squeeze.
I concur in Tony’s suggestion.
Walt
I’ll make the proposalThis option is checked. According to a handwritten note on the
memorandum, the President told Jim Jones: “Be sure I’m reminded
of this.” No evidence has been found that Johnson raised the issue with
Díaz Ordaz during the
state visit.
Prefer not to
See me
360. Editorial Note
On October 26, 1967, President Díaz
Ordaz arrived in Washington for a 3-day state visit to
the United States. Following the ceremonies, Díaz Ordaz met President Johnson
for a broad discussion of U.S.-Mexican relations. The official memoranda
of conversation record the following topics: Hemisfair, Chamizal,
Vietnam, Latin American Common Market, Mexican Temporary Workers,
U.S.-Mexican Border Development Commission, Friendship Parks, Screwworm
Barrier, Possible Trade Restrictions, Latin American Nuclear Free Zone,
Nuclear Desalinization Plant, and Mexican Scientific Development.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Mexico, Visit of
President Diaz Ordaz, Chamizal Settlement, 10/26–28/67) On October 27
Johnson and Díaz
Ordaz met for another discussion, addressing such issues
as Peru, Brazil, and Military Equipment for Mexico. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 MEX) The two Presidents then attended
a ceremony in the Rose Garden, where Secretary of State Rusk and Foreign Minister Carrillo Flores signed the formal
agreement legalizing the transfer of Chamizal to Mexico. On October 28
the state visit concluded with a joint ceremony at EL Paso and Ciudad
Juárez to mark the Chamizal settlement. For remarks made by
Johnson and Díaz
Ordaz during the trip, see Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Book
II, pages 945–962; and Department of State Bulletin, November 20, 1967, pages 673–685. Documentation on
the visit is also in the Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Mexico, Visit of President Diaz Ordaz; and National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Official Visit Chronologies,
1967: Lot 68 D 475, V–49A and V–49B.
361. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Mexico, Vol. IV, 1/68–10/68.
Confidential.Washington, March 9, 1968.
SUBJECT
Mexican Border Restrictions
US merchants, particularly in Laredo, felt the pinch and made loud
complaints at State, here and on the Hill. On both occasions strong representations to the
Mexican Ambassador and the Foreign Office brought relaxation of the
enforcement.
While we protested the Mexican action, our grounds were not strong
because the Mexican Government was simply enforcing customs regulations
on the books—even though not always applied. Mexico has a peculiar
customs system under which nationals returning by air can bring back a
long list of articles duty free, while overland returnees are restricted
to just a few items. We understand the severe enforcement measures at
Christmas and Washington’s birthday were due to pressure of Monterrey
merchants who anticipated heavy purchases in US border cities by
Mexicans living in the interior.
The issue of eliminating the discrepancy of exemptions between air
travellers and overland travellers was raised in the US–Mexico Trade
Committee meeting last December. The Embassy has also taken it up with
the Foreign Office. In view of the recent difficulty, State instructed
Ambassador Freeman on March 1 to press for a
resolution of the problem.In telegram
123164 to Mexico City. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, FT 23 MEX) He
is to point out that purchases along the border by our respective
tourists is a two-way street. For years we have waived the Treasury
requirement that US tourists must remain at least 48 hours outside the
US before taking advantage of the duty-free exemptions for purchases
abroad. In the new proposals governing US tourism, Mexico has a
privileged position. We expect the Mexicans to reciprocate.
Specifically, Freeman is to seek: —simplification and clarification of customs
regulations.—elimination of differences between air and overland
travellers, hopefully making the overland treatment conform to
the more liberal air treatment.—assurances of consistent enforcement during holiday and
non-holiday periods.
I will keep you posted on how these talks progress.An initial report on the Embassy’s efforts is in
telegram 3868 from Mexico City, March 15. (Ibid.)
Walt
362. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 MEX.
Confidential. Drafted by Maxwell Chaplin (ARA/MEX). A notation on the memorandum indicates that
Rusk saw it.Washington, July 31, 1968.
SUBJECT
Student Disturbances in Mexico
After five days, the worst student disturbances in Mexico City in 20
years appeared to be abating on July 31 as federal troops were withdrawn
from the city. The demonstrations and rioting primarily involved
secondary students, protesting police brutality and grievances against
the bus companies, who were subsequently incited by communist and
pro-Castro groups. Police
sources have reported four students dead, and over 200 persons
injured.
When student demonstrators overwhelming riot police in the center of the
city on July 29, army troops had to be called in to restore order and to
expel students from the secondary schools they had occupied.
Following the initial disorders July 26 the Government arrested Communist
Party (PCM) leaders and raised a communist paper. The press continues to
stress communist and foreign involvement and the Government has
indicated its intention to deport large numbers of foreigners including
known communists even if they were not involved in the disorders. The
daughter of U.S. folksinger Pete Seeger and one other American are among
those who were arrested.
Embassy Mexico reports that while there is broad sympathy among students
for the demonstrators and against police, there is little popular
support, and even some resentment of the disruption caused.
The GOM may have used the disorders as a
pretext to remove from circulation those communist leaders who it
suspected might have led disturbances during the Olympics in
October.
President Diaz Ordaz has not cut short a trip in the provinces in an
apparent effort to minimize the importance of the riots. Protection of
our Embassy has been excellent, and the American School, closed July 30
because of a bomb scare, reopened July 31, as did the National
University.
The student grievances about police brutality, bus company failure to
indemnify injured students and Government violation of university
“autonomy” remain. When news of the four student deaths (currently
suppressed) becomes public, further disorders are likely, though current
estimates are that the worst of the violence has run its course.
363. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 MEX.
Confidential. Drafted by Michael Yohn and Maxwell Chaplin. A
notation on the memorandum indicates that Rusk saw it.Washington, September 20, 1968.
SUBJECT
Mexico—Prospects following Occupation of the National
University
The Mexican Government, in occupying the National University, has now
committed itself to coercion as its method of ending the two-month long
student disorders. The next week should reveal whether or not the
majority of students have the will to continue their opposition in the
face of the Government’s declared policy.
At this point, we see the following as likely developments flowing from
the GOM decision: The GOM will continue to take
a hard line against the students and will occupy other
educational facilities as necessary.The Olympic Games will be held, although marred by sporadic
violence.Students are not likely to attract significant support from
other important sectors and will not threaten the stability of
the Government in the short run.The prestige of Diaz Ordaz’ regime has been damaged both
because of its initial vacillation in handling the students and
because of its violation of university autonomy.
364. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to Acting Secretary of State KatzenbachSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 MEX. Confidential. Drafted by
Michael Yohn.Washington, October 3, 1968.
SUBJECT
Mexican Situation
Last night’s serious violence in Mexico City seems to have been the
result of provocation by student extremists and gross over-reaction by
the security forces. We see its significance as follows: It was a harp blow to President Diaz Ordaz and his Government, both because of
the excessive force used and because it underscores the GOM failure, after 11 weeks, to
eliminate violence.It reopens the question of whether the Olympics can be held.
An International Olympic Committee decision to postpone, or
cancel, the games would have serious political consequences for
the Diaz Ordaz
regime.
Issues for U.S.
The continuing violence raises two concerns for the U.S.: 1) the safety
of U.S. athletes and visitors to the games and 2) U.S. participation in
scientific and cultural activities associated with the Olympics.
Thus far, the violence has been contained in certain areas of the city,
has not been directed against the U.S., and has not threatened any
visitors exercising reasonable caution. Therefore we do not feel a
warning to our citizens is warranted at this time.
Our participation in the scientific and cultural activities is still
going forward as planned, with the exception of the space and nuclear
energy exhibits, whose installation at university sites has been delayed
at GOM request.
We believe it important to avoid any indication that we lack confidence
in the GOM’s ability to control the
situation. Accordingly, in responding to press questions today the
Department’s spokesman said that we believe the GOM will provide security to visitors and that we are not
warning against visiting Mexico City during the Olympics.
365. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Mexico, Vol. IV, 1/68–10/68.
Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President
saw it.Washington, October 5, 1968.
SUBJECT
Mexican Riots—Extent of Communist Involvement
You asked about the extent to which the Cuban Communists or other foreign
groups were involved in the Mexican riots this week.
The CIA analysis attached (Tab A)Tab A is a memorandum prepared by CIA, October 5; attached but not
printed. concludes that the student demonstrations were
sparked by domestic politics, not masterminded by Cubans or Soviets.
Their primary role was restricted to supplying some money to student
groups.
CIA believes the weapons employed by the
students could have been obtained locally. Although they did not start
the trouble, Mexican Communists, Trotskyists, and Castroites all
capitalized on the disorders once they began and took active parts.
An FBI report (Tab B)Tab B is a cable from FBI Director Hoover to the President, et al., October
5; attached but not printed. asserts that a Trotskyist group
initiated the sniper fire at the police and army from prepared positions
in various apartment buildings, and they were responsible for touching
off the bloodshed. This so-called “Olympia Brigade” reportedly obtained
automatic weapons from Cuban and Guatemalan extremist organizations and
plans acts of sabotage during the Olympic games.
Walt
P.S. Bruno Pagliai called when he was in Washington for the Bank and
Fund meetings. He had talked with President Diaz Ordaz. Diaz Ordaz vows that he will
establish law and order and see the Olympics through. Diaz Ordaz says that the riots were
carefully planned. A good many people came into the country. The
guns used were new and had their numbers filed off. The Castro and Chinese Communist groups
were at the center of the effort. The Soviet Communists had to come
along to avoid the charge of being chicken.
Walt
366. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President JohnsonSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 MEX. Confidential.Washington, December 11, 1968.
SUBJECT
Your Meeting with President Gustavo
Diaz Ordaz, Friday, December 13, 1968
The Visit
You last saw President Diaz Ordaz when he made a State Visit to the
United States in October, 1967. At that time, you visited the Chamizal
site and participated in a ceremony at the Mexican Chamizal Monument.
This latest visit will be the final step in the historic Chamizal
settlement—to inaugurate the President Adolfo Lopez Mateos Channel which
will carry that portion of the Rio Grande which was relocated as a
result of the Agreement. It will be your sixth meeting with President
Diaz Ordaz and will give you the opportunity to stress the cordial
relations which exist between our countries.
Mexico Today
The student conflict which erupted July 15 is drawing to an end. The
Student Strike Committee has called for a return to classes and is being
heeded by increasing numbers of students. The threat of violence has
largely passed, although we expect the students will continue to
pressure the Government for certain legal reforms and for the
replacement of several unpopular police officials. The prolonged nature
of the conflict, and the fact that the Government of Mexico resorted to
heavy repression on several occasions, have somewhat marred President
Diaz Ordaz’ image. The President, however, remains in firm control of
his Government and continues to enjoy broad support throughout Mexico.
For the coming year he will give much of his attention to the decision
on a candidate to succeed him in 1970. There are no clear favorites at
this point.
Mexico’s economic situation continues to be relatively favorable with
real GNP growth averaging 3 percent per
year, and a rate of inflation within acceptable bounds. Mexico continues
to have an excellent international credit rating. Recently, however,
several soft spots have become apparent for which remedial action will
probably be necessary: 1) a trend towards excessive foreign borrowing to
compensate for a sharply increased current account deficit; 2) an
industrial sector which has
difficulty in competing in world markets and; 3) a poverty stricken
rural sector which encompasses 50 percent of their nation’s population
but accounts for only 16 percent of the GNP.
The Olympics, as you know, were held with outstanding success. The Games
were a source of great national pride for all Mexicans.Attached but not printed are: talking points, a
tentative schedule, a status report on matters previously discussed
by the Presidents, and biographic data. According to the President’s
Daily Diary, the two Presidents met on the Paso del Norte Bridge in
EL Paso, Texas, December 13, 11:33 a.m. CST. (Johnson Library) The schedule was largely
ceremonial; no memorandum of conversation has been found. For text
of Johnson’s prepared remarks and luncheon
toast, as well as the respective efforts of Díaz Ordaz, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson,
1968–69, Book II, pp. 1186–1192.
Dean Rusk
Panama
367. Memorandum of Telephone ConversationSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Panama II, Part B, January–February, 1964. No
classification marking. Taylor was in
Washington; O’Meara was in
Panama.January 10, 1964,
0151Z.
SUBJECT
Conversation between General Taylor and
General O’Meara
Gen OMeara: Some Panamanian school kids came up into the area in the
afternoon and tried to plant a Panamanian flag on the Balboa High School
Flag Pole. The crowd built up but the Panamanian police were able to
eject them from the Zone.
Gen Taylor: When did it all start?
Gen OMeara: It started about 4 or 4:30 in the afternoon.
Gen Taylor: Was this carefully premeditated?
Gen OMeara: It was spontaneous to begin with. I have no indication that
this was a planned operation, however, during the evening when the kids
went back to the school, the mob started forming. They got beyond the
competence of the Canal Zone Police to handle it. Reports we have were
that some of the police were physically attacked and used their weapons
to defend themselves. Apparently, there were some wounded. At 1959
(local) the Acting Governor asked me to assume Command which I have done
(Fleming, by the way, is on his way to the States). We immediately moved
troops into position. The initial reports we get are that wherever
troops have made contact, the mob has fallen back, without any
difficulty. As far as I can determine now, there are not many
Panamanians in the Canal Zone though some of them who are there have set
some fires. That is the situation as of this moment.Background information on the riot and a report by
Colonel David Parker, Acting Governor of the Canal Zone, is in
“Panamanian Situation Report for the President of the United
States,” prepared by the NSC,
January 10, 4:30 a.m. (Johnson Library, National Security File,
NSC Histories, Panama Crisis,
1964) An initial report on the riot was transmitted in telegram 305
from Panama City, January 10, 5:53 a.m. (Ibid.) Director of the
Office of Central American and Panamanian Affairs V. Lansing Collins’ account of his
actions during the evening of January 9 is in a January 10
memorandum for the record. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAN–US)
Gen Taylor: Have you any estimate of the size of the
mob involved?
Gen OMeara: Yes, there are varying estimates. They say Fourth of July
Avenue is pretty well jammed. There are some estimates of 4000 people. A
lot of these reports we are getting are rather exaggerated. Some of them
have established to be false, once we got our own people on the ground
to look the situation over. However, it is unquestionably a sizable mob.
We got an intercept from the CZ police about 20 minutes ago and orders
went out to the Guardia Nationale to clear the mob from Panama without
using gunfire if possible. About 5 minutes ago we got a report that the
Acting Governor had talked to Diarino?Commander Bolivar Vallarino,
Commandant of the National Guard. (spelling) and asked him if
he would break up the situation. Viariano as you know is the Commandant
of the Guardia Nationale. He said it was much too large for him to
handle and he was not moving on it. This is certainly a contradiction of
what we heard over the radio but that doesn’t mean that both things are
not correct. Viarino is not a terribly courageous man. Some of his
underlings are much stronger.
Gen Taylor: This is a picture of considerable
disorder in Panama itself and all along the borders.
Gen OMeara: Probably some buildings have been set fire to but so far as
we know everything is under control. Some fires have been set within the
Zone. Some automobiles have been burned along Fourth of July Avenue.
These were probably Panamanian automobiles.
Gen Taylor: Meanwhile your troops are being used
simply to back up the —?
Gen OMeara: No, I have taken over completely. Wherever the troops appear
on the scene, the CZ police fall back and come under the command of my
troop commanders. I am in complete command.
Gen Taylor: You are in command of all forces
now?
Gen OMeara: I am law and order now. I am in command of the Canal
Zone.
Gen Taylor: Of course, you are keeping all your
people out of Panama and defending only the Canal Zone.
Gen OMeara: That is correct. We will not move out of the Canal Zone
boundaries. I made an announcement over the radio telling all people to
return to their quarters and anyone not living in the Zone, working in
the Zone, or going to school in the Zone to leave the Zone
immediately.
Gen Taylor: Is there anything we can do up here?
Gen OMeara: No, I don’t think so. I think we will have the situation well
in hand in less than an hour. If not, I will certainly call you
back.
Gen Taylor: Your estimate is that this was
spontaneous and gradually building up?
Gen OMeara: We have no evidence that it is other than spontaneous. This
is very hard to assess at this time. There is no evidence that this was
an organized affair. Though it is possible in view of the large numbers
who developed between 1800 and 2000 local.
Gen Taylor: Has this flag affair been an issue
before?
Gen OMeara: Yes. It started in the Zone with the school kids when the
flags were taken down in front of the school the—US flag. US school kids
made a big fuss about it and after about 3 days fussing in the papers,
the Governor who is arriving in Miami now, has been handling this and I
have not been involved at all—this is not my business. After about 3
days of furor in the local papers the Panamanian students today finally
entered into the thing and started putting some Panamanian flags on the
grounds of the American High School in Balboa. This is what really
triggered the affair.
Gen Taylor: This is a question of whether they have
a Panamanian flag flying in front of the High School in Balboa. Was that
the start of it?
Gen OMeara: The Governor has 16 sites which by the agreements between the
two governments, confirmed by the two Presidents, at which the
Panamanian flag will be flown with the American Flag. The US schools
were not included. The issue of whether the US flag would be pulled down
was raised by the US students. Several of them raised flags where they
had previously been taken down. That’s been the fuss over the last three
days. Today the Panamanians joined in the fun.
Gen Taylor: Are these Panamanian students who are
attending American Schools?
Gen OMeara: No, these are Panamanians who came from Panama.
Gen Taylor: Let me know if I can be of any help.
Gen OMeara: I believe we will have it in hand in the next hour.
Gen Taylor: Has Secretary McNamara called you?
Gen OMeara: No one has called me except you.
Gen Taylor: I will block him off then.
368. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with the
President. Secret. Copies were sent to the DCI and the Chief of the Western Hemisphere
Division.Washington, January 10, 1964.
SUBJECT
White House Meeting on Panama, 10 January 1964
PRESENT WERE
The PresidentFor StateMessrs. Rusk,
Ball, Mann, Martin, and CollinsFor DefenseMessrs. McNamara,
Vance, and
AilesFor USIAMr. WilsonFor the White HouseMessrs. Bundy,
Dungan, Salinger, and MoyersFor CIAMessrs. McCone and
HelmsThe meeting opened at 0930 without the President who joined at
1015. The initial effort was to establish the facts which had caused
the riots of the night before in Panama City and the Canal Zone. Mr.
Mann briefed on the flag
incident and the background of the flag controversy between the
United States and Panama. Casualty figures up to that point were
cited and agreed on at least as far as Americans were concerned (3
United States soldiers dead, 34 Americans injured). Mr. McCone pointed out that Panamanian
Communists had taken advantage of the flag incident to kick off
trouble of a kind which we had been predicting ever since last
summer would occur the end of December or early in January.In a telephone conversation with
McCone, McGeorge Bundy stated that he
was “most dissatisfied” that trouble in Panama had “been brewing
for 3 days and nobody was informed of it. I think that is
disgraceful.” McCone
responded: “Yes. I didn’t know a thing about it.” (Telephone
conversation between DCI and
McGeorge Bundy,
January 10, 8:45 a.m.; ibid., DCI Telephone Calls, January 1–March 30,
1964) [3 lines of source text not
declassified] (Mr. McCone repeated this briefing later when the
President had joined the meeting.) The undersigned spoke of the
Panamanian student-organized demonstration which was scheduled to
begin at 1100 today, also of the problems which might arise
depending upon where it was decided to bury the students killed in
the rioting the night before. There then followed a general
discussion of the tactics to be used in dealing with these problems in the OAS, the United Nations Security
Council, with President Chiari, etc. Attention was given to the handling of
the Senate and House leadership in connection with the problem. It
was also decided to destroy cryptographic and other sensitive
material in the Embassy so that it could be evacuated if this seemed
desirable.After the President took over the meeting, he was brought up to
date on the situation in Panama and on the actions which the
Secretary of State was proposing. After considerable discussion of
these proposals, the following were decided upon: The President would speak on the telephone with President
Chiari, provided
that Mr. Salinger
was able to ascertain through President Chiari’s Press Secretary
that President Chiari would receive the telephone
call.Mr. Mann would head
a delegation representing President
Johnson to leave for Panama
immediately, this group to include Messrs. Vance, Martin, and Dungan. [1 line of source text not declassified]The OAS Peace Committee
would be encouraged to make an immediate investigation of
the situation on the ground.Mr. Ball would get
in immediate touch with the congressional leadership to
brief them on developments.The White House would issue a statement to the press
announcing the Mann
mission and appealing for an end to violence in
Panama.There was considerable attention paid to the history of
difficulties with Panama over the Canal Zone. Touched on were the
legal problems, financial considerations, and the traditional
attitudes of the “Zonies” who have always had strong support from
certain congressional committees.RH Deputy Director for Plans
369. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Senator
Richard
RussellSource:
Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between the President and Richard Russell, Tape F64.04, Side B, PNO 1. No
classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office
of the Historian specifically for this volume.Washington, January 10, 1964, 11:25
a.m.
President: Dick?
Russell: Yes sir.
President: I want to talk to
you—off the record a minute—about this Panama situation. What do you
think about it?
Russell: Well, Mr. President, I
predicted as far back as 1956 that something like this was going to
happen. I’m not at all surprised. I don’t know all the facts of
it—Harry McPherson talked
to Bill Dodd on the phone and
told him something about it, but I just don’t know. ‘Course, I know that
nobody is going to agree with this except me, but I think this is a
pretty good time to take a strong stand; people in this country, I
think, are ready for it. I may be a fool, but if I had said anything, if
I were the President, I’d just tell them—I’d say this is a most
regrettable incident and it will be thoroughly investigated, and—however
the Panama Canal Zone is a property of the United States, the Canal was
built with American ingenuity and blood, sweat, and sacrifices, that it
was of vital necessity for the economy and defense of every nation of
this hemisphere and that under no circumstances would you permit the
threat of interruption by any subversive group that may be undertaking
to establish itself in this hemisphere. I’d give a little lick to
Castro in there. I don’t know
what the State Department—I suppose they have suggested you make an
apology.
President: No, but it looks
like—it doesn’t look good from our standpoint.
Russell: Well, it started with a
bunch of school boys, from what I hear about it, and those people down
there—they’ve had a chip on their shoulders for a long time.
President: Yeah, they have and
we’ve known it.
Russell: And we’ve helped it on
four different occasions, and if I made a statement, I’d point that out.
We have voluntarily increased payments to them and they have that high
standard of living there proportionally—not as compared with our
country, but with the other Latin American countries—because I think
that some 40–50 thousand of ‘em worked on that Canal in conjunction with
the operation, and one thing I
certainly would do is—if it were me—that man—if the fellow got up in the
United Nations and went to attack us on account of anything that
happened about the Canal, I’d have Adlai
Stevenson ask them if they’re willing to go back to the
status quo. People that we did the injury [to in] connection with the
Canal is not the Panamanians— we brought them out of the jungles, where
they were hiding, thinkin’ that old Cortez was still trying to get ‘em
for slaves—several hundred years after Cortez’ death. People we did an
injustice with was Colombia—took that isthmus away from ‘em and set up
that puppet government down in Panama. So anything that’s happened out
of the Canal is more of an injury to Colombia than it is to Panama, and
if I wanted to be Machiavellian about it, I’d get that Colombia delegate
to get up and just raise the devil about that. It’s really injurious to
Colombia to even have a Panama—that’s part of Colombia. I don’t know how
the State Department is going to handle it—of course it does look like—
but it all happened on American soil. That’s one thing, primarily, that
you can—and it grew out of this agreement about the flag down there that
started with Eisenhower, and I think Kennedy fortified it when he went down there, and that
was a mistake to start with—but it was done. He insisted to the State
Department that it increase payments every two years. What does the
State Department think you ought to do about it?
President: We’ve had a meetin’ of
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, Cy Vance, Bundy, and the group that we normally meet with. Tom
Mann says that—I talked to him a couple of times during the night,No record of the President’s telephone
conversations with Mann has
been found. and he’s a pretty solid fellow, pretty strong,
pretty pro-American—he says that our students went out and put up our
flag in violation of our understanding. They started to put up their
flag and we refused it, and we made our people take down our flag, and
their rioters increased—Communists we know there, we’ve been having some
contact with—they had a lot of Molotov cocktails and they’d planned this
thing apparently just usin’ the flag as an excuse. But they would have
kicked it off some other way some other time, but this was ideal. Then
our damned fool police started shootin’ into ‘em, and they say—
Russell: I hear they killed 13–14
Americans.
President: Yeah, yeah, when they
started doin’ that, then snipers started pickin’ off American troops a
little later. But we fired into our civil guard, which are our employees
and Panama Canal Zone employees. They started firin’ into the crowd and
shot off 4500 rounds of ammunition, and—
Russell: Well, if they’d stayed
on American soil, and if there’s any one thing that is essential to the
economic life as well as the defense of every nation in the hemisphere, it is the
Panama Canal, and we can’t risk having it sabotaged or taken over by any
Communist group. And there’s no question in my mind but what Castro’s—that’s his chief aim
there.
President: That’s what he
tells—that’s what he tells.
Russell: And I would certainly
say that in any statement I made even if I had to be rather apologetic
to the Panamanians in accordance with the State Department’s
idea—undoubtedly was inspired—right after Castro came into power, you know, he sent a group down
there and like to have taken the damn country over—they landed on the
coast there.
President: I thought I might do
this: I thought I might call—if I could talk to him—he claims he’s
broken off diplomatic relationship— but I might call their President and
say I regret it is a situation of violence that developed, and I thought
we should do everything we could to restore quiet, and I appreciate his
calling the Panamanian people last night to remain calm and hope he’ll
do everything possible to quiet the situation, and I’ll do the same. And
I’m going to send my trusted representatives, Tom Mann and other Panama
Canal Board people in there today to assist in findin’ a solution to the
situation, and both of us are aware of the possibility that the elements
unfriendly to both of our countries are tryin’ to exploit the situation,
and I want to keep in close personal touch with him. Then I thought I’d
send Tom Mann and Ed Martin and
the Assistant Secretaries, Cy
Vance, on the Panama Canal Board, and probably this boy
Dungan, who’s handled it here
at the White House and who is a pretty level-headed fellow—used to be on
Kennedy’s committee.
Russell: That’s sensible, but
I—
President: Don’t know, I might
ask Harry McPherson—he’s been
down there and been awful concerned about it. I might ask him to go with
‘em.
Russell: Well, you couldn’t get a
better boy to come back and give you a clear report as an observer—he
wouldn’t be stampeded in any way. I certainly take a chunk out of the
Communists; you’re going to have trouble there all through your entire
tenure as President—in that area down there. Castro is going to pick up the tempo of his activities
down there, in his desperation, and that’s goin’ to be a trouble spot. I
have held that opinion for several years, now, and especially when they
extended—they increased the payments here the last time—in which I said
that we were in danger there because if we [unintelligible] on the part
of the Panamanians that we’ve done them some injustice. We’ve really
done them a hell of a favor. They’re a whole lot better off than the
Colombians. They have better income, everything else. Not that that
satisfies ‘em; the only way you can satisfy ‘em is to give ‘em the Canal and that wouldn’t
completely satisfy ‘em. You’d have to operate it for ‘em too.
[Here follows conversation unrelated to Panama]
President: They’re going to get
the President of Panama. I’ll call you back.The President called Russell
again at 1:25 p.m. to inform him of the substance of the
conversation with Chiari.
The President told Russell
that he informed his advisers, “I was damned tired of their
attacking our flag and Embassy, and our USIA, every time somebody got a little emotional
outburst—so they had better watch out.” Johnson
informed Russell that
Mann, Martin, and Vance were going to Panama and
that, “Cy Vance can be pretty
tough.” Russell responded
that O’Meara was “a pretty
good man.” Johnson stated that O’Meara “has had to order his
people to start shooting again” and that it was “hot as a
firecracker” in Panama. Johnson then told
Russell that the
“position we ought to be on the Hill” is that the administration
acted swiftly and properly and was sending the right men there.
Johnson remarked, “they tell me that
everyone in Latin America is scared of this fellow Mann. They highly regard him
because he’s a tough guy.” Russell responded that he hoped there was “iron”
under Mann’s “velvet gloves.”
(Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
Richard Russell, Tape
F64.04, Side B, PNO 3)
Russell: All right.
President: Bye.
370. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Panamanian
President ChiariSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, NSC
Histories, Panama Crisis, 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. President
Johnson was in Washington; President
Chiari in Panama
City.January 10,
1964, 11:40 a.m.
President Johnson: Hello Mr. President.
Mr. President, I wanted to say to you that we deeply regret the situation
of violence that has developed there.
We appreciate very much your call to the Panamanian people to remain
calm.
We recognize that you and I should do everything we can to restore quiet
and I hope that you’ll do everything possible to quieten the situation
and I will do the same.
You and I should be aware of the possibility and the likelihood that
there are elements unfriendly to both of us who will exploit this
situation.
I am sending immediately, my trusted representative, Secretary Thomas Mann and others associated with
him and the White House to Panama to assist in finding a solution to the
present situation and accurately finding the facts.
I think it’s important that we keep in close personal touch with each
other, and I will be ready to do that.
I hope you’ll give Secretary Mann
any suggestions he has that might result in the development of
correcting the situation.
President Chiari: Would you
please allow me a moment, Mr. President?
I am going to tell you now, President Johnson, the
same that I plan to tell Mr. Thomas
Mann when he arrives either later today or tomorrow. I
feel, Mr. President, that what we need is a complete revision of all
treaties which affect Panama–U.S. relations because that which we have
at the present time is nothing but a source of dissatisfaction which has
recently or just now exploded into violence which we are witnessing.
President Johnson: Tell him that first we must find
out what caused the riot, get all the facts in this situation. Mr.
Mann will be there for that
purpose. We have got to see what all entered into this, and we will want
to receive from Mr. Mann any
suggestions he has.
President Chiari (interpreted):
The President wishes to say, sir, that he wants President
Johnson to be aware of the fact that President
Chiari came to Washington in
1961 and at that time he spoke to President Kennedy and that since 1961 and those conversations, not
a thing has been done to alleviate the situation which has provoked this
violence, and Panama now has 8 to 10 dead and over 200 wounded in the
hospitals.
President Johnson: Tell him there’s nothing we can
ever do that justifies violence, and we want to look forward and not
backward, and what we must do is to review with responsible and able and
trusted officials of this government the situation that he reviewed with
President Eisenhower in 1960 and with President Kennedy in 1961, and Mr. Mann can do that with him on the
ground, and then we will look at the facts and try to deal with the
problem in this country. We have a problem here just as he has it
there.
Tell him that violence is never any way to settle anything, and I know he
and Secretary Mann can get
together, and he can give him a viewpoint of his country, and we will
give him the viewpoint of our country and we will carefully and
judiciously and wisely consider both viewpoints and reach an area of
agreement.
President Chiari (through
interpreter): The President is in complete agreement with you, Mr.
President, that violence leads nowhere, however, he feels that he must
take cognizance of our intransigence and our indifference to Panama
problems during the past two years, especially in recent months where
things have been at a standstill, and it is urgent that men of goodwill,
you in the United States and President Chiari in Panama, should attempt an urgent solution to
these problems.
President Johnson: Tell him the people will be in
the plane in 30 minutes—the most respected people I have to talk to him
about it in detail, and in the meantime I am going to count on him to
preserve order there as I’m going to preserve it here.
President Chiari: At what time
will the airplane arrive in Panama?
President Johnson: Approximately five hours.
President Chiari (through
interpreter): He’s very grateful for your cooperation.
President Johnson: Tell him I don’t know how to act
more promptly than that.
President Chiari (interpreter):
They say that’s very fine, and they’re very very grateful.
President Johnson: But say to the President that
we’re having a serious problem as we know he has one there, and it’s
going to take the wisdom and the strength of all of us to solve it.
President Chiari (interpreter):
He said one of the things that President Chiari admires in President Johnson
is the fact that he is a man of action and of few words, therefore, they
have great confidence that this situation will finally be resolved.
President Johnson: Thank him very much—Goodbye.
371. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, Mc-George
Bundy, Vol. I, November 1963–February 1964. No
classification marking.Washington, January 10, 1964.
SUBJECT
Panama Situation Report, 7:00 p.m.The OAS without debate is sending
the peace committee to Panama at once. This committee as now set up
includes Argentina, Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic, and
Venezuela.On January 10 the OAS issued a communiqué announcing
the formulation of the Inter-American Peace Committee comprised
of representatives of Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, the Dominican
Republic, and Argentina. The committee was to travel to Panama
to investigate the situation and recommend measures for a
settlement of the dispute. The text of the communiqué is in
Department of State Bulletin, February 3,
1964, p. 152.Dean Rusk says it is friendly
to us.Panamanians have sent in a note definitely breaking
relations,The message severing
diplomatic relations was from Panamanian Foreign Minister
Galileo Solis to
Secretary Rusk, January
10, 3:10 p.m. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Panama Crisis,
1964) and their political noise level remains high. We
are not confirming break in relations, since after all we expect
Mann to see Chiari.The U.N. Security Council meets tonight and while there will be
some noise, Rusk expects that
the dispatch of the OAS peace
mission will hold the line for tonight.Rusk had urged that the
OAS Peace Commission take up
the problem in a noon meeting with departing Panamanian
Ambassador Augusto Arango. (Memorandum of conversation, January
10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1964–66, POL
PAN–US)On the central front of restoring peace and safety, the immediate
prognosis is better. Rusk,
McNamara, and I agree
that tonight will be the test whether we have a turning point
here.On the night of January 10
Johnson told Senator
Mike Mansfield: “I’m waiting on that Panama thing to see if they
have another riot there.” He added: “I think these damned
Communists are goin’ to cause trouble every place in this
country they can, and I think we’ve got to get a little bit hard
with ‘em.” Johnson
continued: “I don’t know— Dick
Russell may be right. He says that they’re goin’
to do this in every damned nation they can.” (Johnson Library,
Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation
between President Johnson
and Mike Mansfield, January 10, 10:25 p.m., Tape F64.05, Side A,
PNO 1)Mann has landed.McG. B.Printed from a copy that
bears these typed initials.
372. Telegram From the U.S. Southern
Command to the Department of
StateSource:
Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Panama Crisis, 1964. Confidential.
Repeated to OSD and JCS and passed to the White
House.Panama City, January 11, 1964, 0840Z
SC1118A. For Secretary Rusk from
Assistant Secretary Mann.
Secretary Vance and I met for an
hour and a half with President Chiari, Foreign Minister Solis, and Mr. Morgan, Head of the US Section, Foreign
Office.
We first said that in our opinion the most urgent question was to
reestablish peace and law. President readily agreed. Vance made point that US would maintain
order in the Canal Zone.
Chiari then referred to his
telephone conversation with President JohnsonSee Document 370. and in forceful
tones said that more conversations would serve no useful purpose unless
Washington group had authority to agree immediately to a “structural
revision” of outdated 1903, 1936, and 1955 treaties. Chiari said that unless we had this
authority he would proceed to break diplomatic relations and leave the
whole problem to his successor. He said little had come of his talk two
years ago with President Kennedy
and that the Panamanian people were tired of excuses and delays and
particularly tired of hearing the US say “this or that treaty provision
is not negotiable.”
I made it very clear that I had no authority to agree to discuss
“structural revision” of the treaty, but said I would report his
statement to the President and to the Secretary of State. I said that in
my personal and unofficial opinion the answer would be automatically
negative simply because there were certain things politically impossible
in the US just as there are in Panama; that politics was the art of the
possible; that there were a number of states we did not have relations
with; and while we would regret having no relations with Panama, this
was something we could live with even though this would create an
impasse which would make it impossible for the two governments to deal
with urgent problems; and finally, this would be contrary to the best
interests of both governments.
While we were stuck on this point, I inquired what he meant by use of
expression “structural revision.” He said he simply meant an agreement
under which representatives of the two countries would meet and start
with a clean slate to negotiate a completely new treaty. He thought that specifics of the needed
revisions could best be developed during the course of those
negotiations.
I then inquired whether he thought it was worth while for the US and
Panama to try to reach as large an area of agreement as possible on what
had actually happened in the last two days. I said that Washington
regretted this as much as Panama and I pointed out that American lives
had also been lost. I said I hoped we could stipulate a good many facts.
Chiari replied that he
thought that this was the job of the Peace Committee and so there was no
reason to try to reach an understanding on what had happened because
“Our people will blame you and your people will blame us.” To this I
replied that there were a number of gaps in our information and I
presumed a number of gaps in his, for example, was the Panamanian flag
torn by American students or by Panamanian students? We have some
pictures of this part of the incident that might be of interest to him.
Who fired the first shot? What factors were responsible for the
relatively heavy gunfire? Toward the end of this part of discussion,
Chiari seemed to warm to
this idea of a fact finding Panama-US group. It is not impossible that
we will get to work with a Panamanian committee to determine the true
facts.
I told Chiari that we had
information which indicated that the Communists were involved in the
disturbances. Chiari readily
agreed that this was the case. I pointed out that Castro agents in Panama were as great a
danger to Panama as they are to the US Government. We are both in the
same boat.
I then pointed out to him that considerable progress had been made in
cooperating with Panama since 1960. The Thatcher Bridge exists; the Zone
honors Panamanian exequaturs; Panamanians have received wage increases;
the number of security jobs for which Panamanians were not eligible has
been reduced; agreement has been reached on withholding Panamanian
income taxes for Panamanian employees; agreements have been reached on
flying the Panamanian flag along with US flags in the Zone. Chiari agreed that this was progress
but stated that the Thatcher Bridge had been agreed to in 1942 and that
Governor Fleming unilaterally decided on wage increases without
Washington’s instructions.
Chiari then took off on the flag
issue in very strong language and said the US had not lived up to its
agreement. He said that after his conversation with President Kennedy in 1961 he believed that Panama
and the US had reached a reasonable agreement. In the ensuing months,
however, US restrictions were noted with respect to flying the
Panamanian flag at military installations, the US schools, and on ships
transitting the Canal, moreover, he pointed out that the US elected to
lower the US flags at certain installations rather than fly the
Panamanian flag at those agreed to places. He seemed to be impressed
when we replied that
Washington was not aware until last night that this was a serious issue.
I said he should understand very clearly that the US lives up to its
agreements. He agreed that flag issue should be discussed, stating that
it was the “hot potato” of the moment.
We agreed to discuss the flag issue tomorrow evening at a time and place
to be arranged after discussions with the Foreign Minister. I suggested
that we might meet with the Foreign Minister and report back to him.
Chiari said that the US ought to
withdraw its military forces from the Zone border area and replace them
with police and firemen. I said that this illustrated the divergencies
in our information since we understand that General O’Meara’s troops fired only at
individual snipers. It was police that were engaged in the heaviest
fire. Chiari did not reply to
this.
We both deplored the loss of life and I pointed out that American lives
had been lost on the Atlantic side without any return shots being fired
by US. Chiari said “All I know
is that 16 Panamanians died and over 200 are wounded.”
We were met at the airport and conducted to the palace in cloak and
dagger fashion and much of the conversation was conducted with
background of 600 Panamanians outside chanting “Out with the gringos.”
All of this could have been staged. Nevertheless, conversation which
began in a cool and almost hostile atmosphere ended on warm note. In
beginning Chiari’s intention may
have been to probe hard for a soft spot on issue of “structural
revision” of treaty.
Recommend I be authorized to inform Chiari that US will not now agree to negotiations to
bring about “structural” changes in treaty; and that I be authorized to
say that this does not necessarily close the door for all time for
discussions on treaty revisions, since it is possible that current
studies on feasibility of sea level canal may eventually lead to a
change in our attitude. Entire Washington group concurs in this
recommendation.
Saturday morning we expect to send separate telegram on flag issue.In telegram SC1125A to McNamara, January 11, Vance reported that he planned to
inform the Panamanian Foreign Minister that U.S. and Panamanian
flags would be flown outside public schools in the Canal Zone.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Panama,
Riots, Part A, Vol. II, January–February, 1964)
373. Editorial Note
On January 11, 1964, President Johnson considered
instructions for Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Thomas Mann and his party for
their discussions in Panama. In consultation with McNamara and Bundy, the Department of State prepared
instructions that were based on Mann’s recommendation earlier that day as outlined in
the last substantive paragraph of Document
372.
The President sought the advice of Senator Russell and read the draft instructions to him over the
phone. According to their conversation, the draft instructions proposed
that both sides agree on the facts surrounding the riots; that “we
should be forthcoming on flag issues since our good faith is involved”;
that, with regard to structural revision of the treaty, “we cannot agree
to formal negotiation in which revision of fundamental relationships and
responsibilities would be a pre-arranged and accepted objective,” but
“that does not mean that there might not be certain aspects of the
treaty of importance to Panama which could, after informal discussion,
be taken up between the two governments.” The draft instructions urged
Mann to “remind Chiari that considerable progress has
been made on many points” as a result of his discussion with President
Kennedy, and that after
restoration of relations, if further progress is made in talks not
earlier than February or March, and if “Chiari’s mood improves, it might be well to suggest that
highly discreet cooperation between us about the Communists and
especially Castro plotting, both
against Panama and the United States, be continued and strengthened.”
The instructions concluded that events taking place in Panama “have
demonstrated clearly that the reality behind the reports pointed toward
Panama as a special target of Communist conspiracy.” The draft
instructions were not found.
In reviewing the draft instructions with Russell, the President voiced his concerns: “I’m a
little bit dubious. I’m afraid that we’re going a little bit further
than we ought to go, but it is pretty difficult to say to people that
you just won’t talk, I mean, it won’t be courteous if you won’t listen
to ‘em.” In particular, with respect to the instruction concerning
structural revision of the treaty, the President said: “It seems to me
that we’re kinda givin’ in there and respondin’ at the point of a
pistol.” Johnson then stated: “What I am doing
here, if I approve these instructions— I am agreein’ to discussion of
the treaty.” He reflected, “I know damned well one thing—I can take the
position of discussion—we’ll discuss it but we won’t do anything. But I
guess if you’re goin’ to discuss it you ought to discuss it in good
faith, and that’s what they want, and I don’t know how that’s goin’ to
be interpreted in the public eye—whether they’ve got to kill a few
American soldiers to get us to discuss somethin’—I don’t like that. On
the other hand we’ve got to do somethin’.”
Russell responded that the draft
instruction to Mann was “a hell
of a long thing you’re sendin’ down there. It would confuse me if I were
down there with all the pressures that he must feel in that atmosphere
down there.” Johnson reported that Mann and Vance “had a good talk” with Chiari and “both of ‘em were awfully
tough with him.” Johnson also pointed out the
sensitive political aspects of the crisis: “Every damned one of ‘em are
runnin’ against us for their reelection. Six hundred of ‘em stood
outside and said ‘get out of here Gringos.’” Russell agreed: “They’ve been doin’ that—the one that
denounces the colossus of the north most vociferously is the one that
wins, and that’s been true the last three elections they’ve had. On the
surface we haven’t got a friend there, but if we weren’t there they
wouldn’t have anything. They would be livin’ out there half-naked in
those swamps.... You can’t close the door to any negotiations, but you
can certainly [say] that we can’t negotiate in this atmosphere, but
we’ll talk to you some time later.”
In response to Johnson’s inquiry if the draft
instruction was “softening up” what Mann had recommended, Russell said: “One or two sentences seem to me like it’s
sort of puttin’ him in a halter.” “That’s what it seems to me” the
President responded. Russell
suggested that the President simply tell Mann that he agrees with his recommendation and that
he’s “depending on your good judgment.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Senator Richard
Russell, January 11, 1964, 1:05 p.m., Tape F64.05, Side
A, PNO 2)
Johnson then called Bundy and told him that he had “confidence in Mann’s good judgment.” The President
said that he would tell Mann:
“Tom, you are a man on the ground with common sense and we trust
you and Cy Vance or we
wouldn’t have sent you there, and we are prepared to support
you, and we agree in essence with your recommendation.
We—therefore—we’re not goin’ to discuss structural changes in
the treaty at this point. However, you are at liberty to assure
the President that under appropriate circumstances, we’ll be
very happy to discuss any troublesome problems with them, but
we’re not goin’ to do it at the point of a gun. We’ve got the
rest of the world to live with. People just can’t take the law
into their own hands and they didn’t protest what these kids
did—they just started shootin’ and riotin’. And if we go in
there and start opening up a treaty under those circumstances,
we’d be the laughing stock of the world.” (Ibid., Recording of
telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Mc-George Bundy, January 11; 1:25 p.m., Tape
F64.05, Side A, PNO 3)
Bundy included these points,
along with concurrence in Mann’s
proposed flag plan, in a revised instruction and told the President that
he had been “up and down the question of all the other things that are
at issue.” Bundy also had a
January 11 memorandum from Gordon
Chase on these matters. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File,
Panama, Riots, Part B, Vol. II, January–February, 1964) “Each and every
one of them,” he told the President, “in one way or another, has a
political hooker attached to it” and that “every one of them has either
a Congressional obstacle or a legal obstacle and it’s a tricky
business.” He suggested that Mann
take up these matters at a later time. (Ibid., Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, January 11, 1964, 1:25 p.m.) The
portions of the conversations printed here were prepared in the Office
of the Historian specifically for this volume.
374. Telegram From President Johnson to the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Mann) in PanamaSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
NSC Histories, Panama Crisis,
1964. Confidential; Flash. Repeated to Rusk, McNamara, and McCone.Washington, January 11, 1964, 5:34
p.m.
CAP 64016. Reference your CINCSO
110840Z SC1118A.Document 372.
We have full confidence in you and in Vance, and fully concur in what you have done so
far.We agree in essence with your recommendation in last paragraph of
reftel and also with you and
Vance on flag
issue.You should tell President that we cannot negotiate under pressure
of violence and breach of relations and that therefore his demand
for agreement to structural revision of treaties is
unacceptable.You should also tell him that in the appropriate circumstances and
when peace has been restored, we will give sympathetic welcome to
discussion of all troubles and problems with our Panamanian
friends.
375. Telegram From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs (Mann) to
Secretary of State RuskSource:
Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Panama Crisis, 1964. Confidential;
Immediate. Passed to the White House, CIA, OSD, and USUN.Panama City, January 12, 1964, 0656Z
SC1144A. Vance, Mann, Martin, Stuart and LtCol Moura met this afternoon with
Panamanian Foreign Minister Solis, David
Samudio, Director of Planning of the Presidency, Eloy
Benedetti, Judiciary Advisor of the Foreign Office, William Morgan Chiari and returned with the
President’s reply. Foreign Minister said at end of first conversation he
could make no comment until he had consulted with Chiari. Five topics were discussed:
We informed the Panamanians of Secretary Vance’s decision that
American flags would be flown outside of schools in the Zone
and, in compliance with U.S.-Panama agreement, Panamanian
flags would be flown side by side with U.S. flags. I said
this meant 18 new flag stations and would raise the total
number of flag stations to about 35. He pointed out
Vance’s decision
involved no new concession but only execution of Prior
agreement. We pointed out no concession possible under
duress.
Panamanians pressed hard for display of Panamanian flag on
ships transiting canal and in U.S. military installations in
Zone. We replied we were disposed to study these two issues
but could make no commitment. After return from Presidency,
Panamanians stated that flying of flag at 18 schools should
not in any sense be interpreted as settlement of question of
whether U.S. was complying with Kennedy–Chiari communiqué during Presidential
visit.The text of the
communiqué is in Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy,
1962, pp. 481–482. During conversation
on this point, we offered to coordinate press release
covering this with Panamanians. After returning from
Presidency, Panamanians made clear Vance’s decision was U.S.
unilateral decision. We said we understood both sides
reserved their position on remaining flag issues. We have
reports that Panamanians in streets applauded radio
announcements of Vance’s press release.
We informed Panamanians that five known agitators were at
that moment haranguing large and growing crowd in Shaler
triangle and requested that Guardia Nacional be instructed
to arrest these five men, all of who have received training
in Cuba. The Foreign Minister requested names of the five men and
these were supplied him. We stated that situation was urgent
and if there was further delay in authorizing Guardia
Nacional to act, situation could become critical in terms of
Panamanian ability to maintain law and order and could lead
to bloodshed on a much greater scale than had taken place in
the last few days. We also informed Panamanians that there
have been four more U.S. military casualties today on the
Atlantic side of Zone. Fire returned with shotgun today on
only one sniper. Also snipers were firing regularly into the
Tivoli Hotel from Panamanian territory. U.S. Lieutenant was
wounded by this fire after meeting. (Shortly before
midnight, Mann
telephoned Foreign Minister and told him four snipers on
roof of legislative palace still firing into Tivoli
Hotel.)
After returning from Presidency, Foreign Minister stated
categorically and with considerable emphasis that the
President had decided to order National Guard to restore
order and that this would be accomplished forthwith.
While not certain, our estimate is that if Guardia Nacional
acts with decisiveness and speed, it can probably still
regain control of the situation. Further delay could be
fatal. A few minutes ago, Vallarino, first commandant of the Nacional
Guard, informed General Bogart that he was on way to the
Presidency and after his return he expected to request us to
supply him with tear gas. (A truck was immediately loaded
with tear gas in anticipation of such a request.)
While Foreign Minister’s statement regarding restoration of
order was unconditional, we received word through chairman
of Peace Committee that Nacional Guard would act only if
U.S. military withdrew from Canal Zone boundary, a
sufficient distance so as to be invisible from Panama
side.
General O’Meara
stated that on the Pacific side this condition already
exists except when necessary to repel invaders and except
for two military police at each Zone entry point stationed
there to control entry of legitimate traffic. This has been
conveyed to Tejera and condition has been withdrawn, though
Chiari has asked
and received authority to announce he is acting at request
of Chairman, Peace Commission.
We informed Panamanians we had had a long and constructive
discussion with Peace Committee which had requested us to
designate U.S. official who could work with committee.At a 4:30 p.m. meeting of the
OAS Peace Commission
in Panama City on January 11, Mann stated: “One, we
cannot negotiate under pressure of violence or threats
to break relations; therefore, any demand for structural
revisions is not acceptable to the United States. Two,
under appropriate circumstances, and after peace has
been reestablished, we welcome the idea of discussing
all problems with our Panamanian friends.” (Memorandum
for the record prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Johnson
Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Panama Crisis, 1964)
We replied immediately that Martin would represent U.S. Presumably the
Peace Commission made the same request of Panamanians. After
his return from Presidency, Foreign Minister stated that
Ambassador Arango would be representative of GOP before commission.
Parenthetically, we report that Peace Committee impressed us
as being objective and constructive. They correctly stated
their first job was to bring an end to disorders. They said
that they did not consider themselves to be a fact-finding
committee but that their role was rather one of
conciliation. In addition to our giving them an oral summary
of developments since the beginning of violence, we informed
committee of Vance’s
decision to fly U.S. and Panamanian flags in front of Zone
schools and gave them candid statement of U.S. position on
issue of treaty revision. Committee stated that it did not
consider itself authorized to get into issue of possible
“structural revisions” of treaty but thought committee could
be useful in trying to identify issues which could
contribute immediately to present crisis and to attempt to
conciliate differences between the two governments on these
issues. We expressed agreement in principle. In our opinion,
commission’s view realistic and constructive. We offered
fullest cooperation, including facilities for inspecting
Zone and detailed inspection of places in Zone where
controversial events have taken place, including inspection
of vehicles alleged to be tanks. We contradicted
commission’s information machine guns were used by U.S.
police and military. We stressed factors of surprise, small
size of Zone police, aggressive and violent attitude of
Panamanians who invaded Zone, necessity of protecting women
and children, and overwhelming superiority of Panamanians as
compared with police available in earliest stages of
rioting.
We next informed Panamanians of U.S. positions as described in
numbered paragraphs 3 and 4 of White House message CAP
64016.Document 374. Essentially
same position had been given Chiari night before. Panamanians asked for
repetition. We carefully went over this ground twice. Upon their
return from presidency, Panamanians stated President Chiari would discuss this and
other substantive issues only after they had demonstrated their
capability to restore order in Panama. We have unconfirmed
reports Panamanians will continue to insist, as Chiari did in his first
conversation, that U.S. agree in principle to “structural
revisions” of treaty as a condition precedent to GOP agreeing to further discussions
of outstanding issues, including resumption of relations.
Department should understand clearly this is principal issue and
not our willingness to engage in discussions. It is however
still possible that Chiari will cave.
We stated to Panamanians we were at a loss to reconcile
Chiari’s
complaint to me that we had not promptly named an Ambassador
to replace Farland with statements of GOP officials over radio and to
our charge here that diplomatic relations already severed.
We asked for clarification. Upon their return from
presidency, Panamanians stated that this was also issue that
would be discussed with us after GOP had restored order in Panama City. We
expect, but cannot be sure, we will be told tomorrow that
relations have been severed. If this proves to be the case,
this is obviously irrational maneuver on Chiari’s part to
strengthen his pose before Panamanian people as the champion
of Panamanian sovereignty and its claims to Canal Zone. As
an out, Panama may intend to use Peace Committee as forum
for discussions of outstanding issues.
At conclusion of meeting, Foreign Minister requested that we
postpone our return to Washington. We said we had intended
to return SundayJanuary
12. but would stay over a while longer.Rusk informed the
President that the delegation planned to leave Panama
City following the 3 p.m. meeting with Chiari on January 13,
and Johnson approved. (Recording of
telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Rusk, January 13, 12:45
p.m.; Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape
F64.05, Side A, PNO 5) The President called Bundy to arrange to
meet Mann and the
delegation upon their arrival in Washington. The
President then asked Bundy, “How are we goin’ to leave the
impression with the country that we’re not soft on
Panama after Rusk
tells the AP that we’re
goin’ to negotiate.” Bundy responded that Rusk swore he didn’t say
that. The President replied that the “AP quotes him all morning
long. I heard it as sayin’ that as soon as we get
quieted down, we’re goin’ start negotiatin’.” Bundy agreed to talk to
Rusk. The
President then stated, “I talked to him so damned much
about it that I’m gettin’ embarrassed for mentioning
it.” Both Bundy
and the President agreed that most leaks came from the
Department, not Rusk. Bundy suggested Rusk was “a clam
presiding over a sieve.” The President continued to
complain about leaks and suggested that Bundy tell Ball, Harriman, “and
the rest of them” that he was “getting damned sensitive
about it.” (Recording of telephone conversation between
President Johnson and Bundy, January 13, 1:05
p.m.; ibid., Side B, PNO 2)
376. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAN–US. Confidential. Drafted by
Mann on January 14. The
meeting was held at the Presidential Palace.Panama City, January 13, 1964, 3:15
p.m.
SUBJECT
Panama
PARTICIPANTS
PanamaHis Excellency Roberto F.
Chiari, PresidentHis Excellency Galileo
Solís, Foreign MinisterUnited StatesThe Hon. Ralph
Dungan, The White HouseThe Hon. Cyrus R.
Vance, Secretary of the ArmyThe Hon. Thomas C.
Mann, Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. Dungan, Mr. Vance and I called on President
Chiari today in the Palace
at about 3:15 in the afternoon. Foreign Minister Solis was present.
Earlier in the day Solis had himself suggested that it would be
appropriate for us to pay a courtesy call on the President.
I began the conversation by expressing our appreciation for the
courtesies we had received and said we had come to pay our respects and
to ask his leave to return to Washington now that progress had been made
in restoring peace and order.
I said that I had already said to the Foreign Minister that there was no
hurry in telling us whether Panama would be willing to resume diplomatic
relations. Mr. Martin was staying
behind to work with the Peace Committee and he could relay to Washington
any message on the subject.
President Chiari said he had
already decided to withdraw Panamanian diplomatic personnel from
Washington and to remove the seal from the Embassy building. He
requested that we do the same.
I said that we regretfully accepted his decision but that we wanted to
make absolutely certain the President understood that we were ready to
resume discussion of all problems, including those concerning the Panama
Canal treaties, provided only there was no duress and no pre-condition
about a Prior agreement to “structurally revise” the treaties.
The President said further discussions about the existing treaties were
useless. The condition to resumption of relations was that we agree to
make a fresh start, to consider the treaties abrogated and to sit down
to negotiate a new one fair to Panama and fair to the United States.
The conversation to this point was largely in Spanish. I asked the
President for permission to repeat in English to my colleagues what he
had just said. I did this and the President, who speaks English fairly
well, confirmed in English that my summary was accurate.
Mr. Dungan then said that he found
it difficult to reconcile this position with the friendly conversations
about United States-Panamanian relations which he and President
Kennedy had had in 1962 in
Washington.A memorandum of this
conversation, June 12, 1962, is printed in Foreign
Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII, Document 405.Dungan said that emphasis in
these meetings had been on reaching “practical solutions to practical
problems.”
President Chiari said that he and
President Kennedy had indicated
sympathy to a fresh start to discussions about the Zone which did not
take into account the existing treaties. A Joint Commission was set up.
Since then little had been accomplished, he said, because the Americans
said this or that issue was ruled by existing treaties or for other
reasons. So the Joint Commission accomplished nothing. It was no use to
start this kind of thing again.
President Chiari, continuing to
speak in English, then said that United States equipment at the Rio Hato
base should be evacuated by sea instead of being taken overland where it
would be seen by Panamanians. The evacuation could be done by sea, in
landing craft already at the base, and it would be all right if this
were done in three or four weeks. Meanwhile the Guardia would protect
the base and after its evacuation the Government would use the base
buildings as schools to protect them. Neither we nor the President
mentioned base personnel or the agreement under which we occupy the
base. We made no comment on the statements about the Rio Hato base save
to say we would look into this matter.
At this point, I asked if the three of us might speak to the President
and the Foreign Minister alone. The Assistant Chief of Protocol, the
Chief of Protocol and Captain Boyd of the Guardia (really of the Presidential Guard),
who were sitting down the drawing room were then asked to leave, and
they did.
I then said that, entirely unrelated to the topics we had discussed, and
because we would not soon be talking directly to each other again, I
wished him to know that, according to our intelligence: The Castroites, the Communists, have penetrated high positions
in his Government and among them were advisors to the President
himself.On January 13 Helms provided the
Department of State with information linking Panamanian
official Thelma King
and the Arias Madrid family, including
presidential hopeful Arnulfo Arias,
with the Castro
regime. (Memorandum from Helms to Hughes; Central Intelligence Agency, Job
78–03041R, DDO/IMS Files, [file name not
declassified])Castro would soon be
trying to introduce arms into Panama.Most of the persons just arrested for leading the recent riots
have been released.
The President only nodded. He made no comment. I said I thought the
President should know about our conclusions, based on our intelligence,
because, though we were interested in stability in and peace with
Panama, communism was even a greater danger to Panama than it was to the
United States.
Finally, I asked if I could speak frankly about one final point: Since we
would have no relations, I wanted to make absolutely clear that it was
up to us to maintain order in the Canal Zone and to prevent invasions
from the Zone into Panamanian territory; and equally it was up to the
Government of Panama to maintain order in Panamanian territory and
prevent invasions of people from Panamanian territory into the Zone.
There should be no mistake. We would have to defend ourselves, including
the women and children in the Zone, if mobs should again force their way
into the Zone. The casualties could be heavy. No one except the
Government of Panama could prevent further intrusions into the Zone. The
responsibility on both Governments to maintain peace during the break in
relations was therefore a heavy one.
The President expressed his agreement and, after observing the amenities,
we took our leave.
The conversations were carried out in an atmosphere which was rather
solemn and official-like but everyone was polite at all times. There
were no recriminations except perhaps that the President’s statements
about past failures to reach agreement could be called almost
bitter.
377. Memorandum of Conference With the PresidentSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Files of McGeorge
Bundy, Miscellaneous Meetings, Vol. I. Secret.
Prepared by Bromley
Smith.Washington, January 13, 1964, 9:45
p.m.
OTHERS PRESENT
Secretary Rusk, Secretary
McNamara, Director
McCone, Under Secretary
Ball,Mr. Chayes, Mr. Lansing Collins (State), Mr.
Jenkins (part time), Mr.
Moyers, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Bromley Smith
There was no formal discussion between 9:45 PM and 10:00 PM when the
Mann delegationThe Mann
delegation, which had just returned from Panama were: Mann, Vance, Dungan, and Colonel J.C.
King. arrived in the Cabinet Room. The
President informally commented on a State Department draft press
statement to be issued at the conclusion of the meeting.For the statement as released on January 14, see
Department of State Bulletin, February 3,
1964, p. 156.
Assistant Secretary Mann reported
that there was a possibility of a revolution in Panama tonight. The
delegation had learned that Arias might join with
the Communists to overthrow Chiari. Several members of the delegation stated that
Chiari was in trouble from
both the right and the left and agreed that his overthrow was a
possibility. Mr. Mann stated his
view that the U.S. should not intervene with U.S. troops in a Panamanian
coup unless it was clear that the revolutionists would be
successful.
The members of the delegation paused to read a CIA report which had been [1 line of
source text not declassified]. The report indicated there was
some substance to a plan for a coup to be launched tonight.Not found. Similar reports are in a telegram from
Martin and O’Meara to Mann and Vance, received January 13 at 10:10
p.m. (USCINCSO SG1186A, January
13; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 PAN)
Secretary McNamara left the room
to telephone General O’Meara,At 9:45 p.m. in the
first of two telephone calls McNamara made during this meeting to O’Meara, McNamara told him to “give the
substance of the message that is there to President Chiari.” (Johnson Library,
President’s Daily Diary) Also see footnote
7 below. Commander of the Southern Forces, to
instruct him to get to Chiari
the report of the coup plans. General O’Meara was to tell Chiari that our informing him of the coup plans was
evidence of our support of him against a revolutionary group.
Mr. Mann reported on the
delegation’s conversation with Chiari this afternoon.See Document 376. The Panama
President returned to the position taken during the first talks, i.e.,
Panama will not discuss any problem with the U.S. until the U.S. agrees
to revise the three existing treaties with Panama.
With respect to a possible coup in Panama, Mr. Mann recommended that if Chiari requested our assistance, we
should intervene in the Panamanian Republic with U.S. troops. If
Chiari appears to be losing
to a coup led by Arias and the Communists, we
should intervene after a request from Chiari. Mr. Mann’s view was that Chiari appears to have the support of the people, and,
therefore, the chances of Arias and the Communists
overthrowing him is not great. He admitted that the loyalty of the
Panamanian National Guard would be crucial in a revolutionary
situation.
The President said that we cannot permit Arias and
the Communists to take over Panama. We should immediately inform General
O’Meara.
Mr. Mann said that General
O’Meara could tell General
Vallarino, the Commander of
the Panamanian National Guard, that we will not let the Communists take
over Panama. In case the Guard was thinking of defecting from Chiari, we could tell them that we
would support the existing government against an
Arias–Communist coup. Also, General O’Meara could tell General Vallarino that if the Guard needed help
in preventing a Communist take-over, we would help the Guard. Chiari would also be told of our
intentions.
Secretary Rusk wondered whether we
should tell Arias. He was thinking of a
pro-American, such as Robles,
who may have the loyalty of the National Guard, with whom we could work
more easily than Chiari. He
thought that perhaps we should tell the Guard and Robles.
The President asked why we should not tell Arias
that we have received reports that Communists are trying to take over.
We could say that the U.S. will not accept a Communist take-over and
anyone who goes with them we will oppose as well.
Secretary McNamara left the room
with Secretary Rusk and the
President to telephone General O’Meara.The instructions
given O’Meara during the
second telephone call at 10:30 p.m. were confirmed by telegram (see
footnote 8 below) at the request of
President Johnson. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Panama Riots, Vol. II, Part A, January– February
1964) The substance of the conversation is contained in a
copy of the message attached to these minutes.Telegram CAP 64020, January 14, 12:37 p.m.
(Ibid.) The President and Secretary Rusk were present and participated in the discussion of each
point as it was given by Secretary McNamara to General O’Meara.
In response to the President’s request, Mr. Mann gave additional information on his talks with
President Chiari, who is
probably under heavy pressure from National Guard leaders and Panamanian
businessmen because of his hostility toward the U.S. Mr. Mann believes that Chiari will eventually agree to talk
with us even though he refuses to do so now. He recommended that we play
our cards very carefully until such time as internal pressure in Panama
forces him to accept our basis for discussions. In response to the
President’s question, Mr. Mann
said Chiari advisers, several of
whom are left-wing Communists, are telling Chiari to hold out because the U.S. will give in to his
demands.
The President asked whether we could prove that arms had reached Panama
from outside. He was told that we have considerable substantial evidence
but no actual proof that Cuba or any other country has shipped arms to
Panama.
Mr. Mann said that Chiari’s actions were irrational and
not in the interests of Panama. Secretary Rusk said that he believed Chiari’s advisers could make a rational case in support
of Chiari’s refusal to negotiate
with us now. Looking at it from the Panamanian side, Chiari’s advisers could say that he
should keep pushing against us, thereby building support for Panama’s
case among members of the OAS and the
UN. Even if Panama did not win full
support in these two organizations, the difficulties caused to us would
prompt us to come closer to meeting the Panamanian demands. Thus, by
refusing to talk now, Panama could expect to create a situation which
they might think would force us to be more forthcoming on treaty
negotiations.
Mr. Mann said that President
Chiari had told us that we
would have to leave our base at Rio Hato and remove the equipment now
there.
In response to a question from the President as to what we should now do,
Mr. Mann said we should play the
entire problem in low key during the Presidential elections in Panama. A
longer range plan should be developed involving negotiations with
Colombia and Nicaragua for permission to build a sea-level canal in
their territories. Once these two options were obtained, we could return
to the Panamanians and tell them that we were going to build a sea-level
canal either in Colombia or in Nicaragua which would greatly reduce the
importance of the existing Panama Canal. The Panamanians would then be
prepared to make a satisfactory deal with us. Mr. Mann stated that a sea-level canal
could be built for approximately $300 million and was already required.
Because it would be built at sea level, few people would be required to
operate it since it would have no locks. The security problem would also
be less.
Under Secretary Ball demurred with
respect to the need for a sea-level canal and said it would cost
billions and was not required on the basis of existing traffic for the
year 2000.
Mr. Mann asked and received the
President’s permission to develop a long-range plan which would meet the
serious situation in Panama. He said we could not solve the dangerous
situation which now exists unless we came up with a long-range plan to
satisfy Panamanian demands.
In response to Secretary Rusk’s
question, Secretary Vance said we
could operate the Panama Canal independent of any help from Panama if we
had to. Panamanians residing in the Canal Zone could operate it if
necessary. Therefore, we can operate the Canal without Panamanian
cooperation. This means that we are not obliged to find an immediate
solution to the present problems because we face the prospect of not
being able to keep the Canal open.
Secretary McNamara returned to
the room following a second conversation with General O’Meara who reported that the coup
information contained in the CIA message
had been passed to Chiari in a
meeting attended by one of Chiari’s advisers who is a known Communist. General
O’Meara believed that this
Communist would relay our knowledge of the Communist coup to his party
members. Therefore, General O’Meara concluded that any coup was stopped for
tonight.
The President asked whether we had proof that Castro was involved in the Panama rioting. Mr. Mann said we had received reports of
Cuban arms going to Panama, but we had no conclusive proof.[text not declassified]
(Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, Meetings with the President)
Not enough time had elapsed since the riots began for Castro to send armed support to Panama.
Secretary Vance said we did, in
his opinion, have evidence of Castro’s support.
Director McCone said that one of
our informants had told us last August that there would be trouble in
Panama in January, that Panama was Castro’s number one priority target, and that Castro had agreed to send arms to
revolutionary elements in Panama.
The President asked whether there were any more reports of crisis
situations in Latin American countries. He expressed his concern that
the Administration would be accused of knowing exactly what was going to
happen and not doing anything. He did not want to have a Pearl Harbor
type situation on his hands. He asked what we had done on the basis of
the report Mr. McCone referred
to. Mr. Bundy replied that he
believed it was fair to say that the intelligence community had not
predicted that civil disorder would break out in Panama as it had. He
knew of no other crisis situation, with the possible exception of Bolivia, where an effort may
be made by the leftists to overthrow La Paz’s government. In response to the question of what we
had done, Secretary Rusk said we
had exchanged information with the Latin American countries about
Castro’s activities.
The President asked Mr. Mann to
give a detailed report on his trip to Panama. Mr. Mann began by calling attention to the
exemplary way in which our military forces in the Canal Zone had handled
a very difficult situation. Mr. Dungan and Secretary Vance fully agreed with this statement. Mr. Mann said that the group’s final
meeting with Chiari was as tough
as the first and quite different from the friendly attitude which
prevailed in meetings with other Panamanian officials between the first
and final Chiari meeting. Mr.
Mann said the Panamanians had
broken relations with us before the delegation had even arrived in
Panama and now refused to renew relations. He said it was possible that
the OAS peace commission might bring
about a restoration of relations. He predicted continuing and growing
trouble in Panama in the days ahead.
Secretary Rusk made the following
points: We cannot be pushed out of Panama because we have overwhelming
force there. Some 8000 U.S. troops could easily handle the few
thousand National Guardsmen in Panama. The President asked
whether this was so, and Secretary McNamara said it was.U.S. presence in the Canal Zone is so beneficial to Panama
that responsible Panamanians realize that the Republic’s
economic future depends on our remaining in the Zone.The members of the OAS peace
commission have indicated that they are fed up with the
Panamanian attitude and are not hostile to us. Their attitude
will be reflected in the attitude of several Latin American
governments.We will be supported in our insistence on conditions which
permit us to continue operation of the Canal by those countries
which are interested in the unhampered use of and in the
security of the Canal.
On the other side, Secretary Rusk
said that the Panamanians can make things very difficult for us in the
OAS and in the UN. Additionally, there are many who will
have sympathy for the Panamanians because they believe we have not been
fair to the Panamanians. We must acknowledge that the heavy-handed way
in which we have handled treaty matters in the past has led some to lose
sympathy with us.
Secretary Vance said that while
there are many problems, the crucial issue is U.S. sovereignty. If we
lose our sovereignty in the Zone, he doubts we can protect the
Canal.
Mr. Mann said we must face the
fact that the Panamanian aim is full control of the Zone. If we agree to
treaty revisions now, the Panamanians will demand more changes before
the ink is even dry on the new
treaty. The unsatisfactory situation cannot be solved without major
changes in the future. He repeated his belief that we must consider
building a sea-level canal.
Mr. Ball said one thing we could
do promptly would be to reconstitute the Panama Canal Board which is now
not attuned to the situation in Panama.
Secretary McNamara said an
immediate requirement was the naming of a political chief who would
speak for the U.S. Government and be above the Commander-in-Chief,
Southern Forces, as well as the Governor of the Canal Zone. Mr.
Dungan filled in details of
the three sources of power now which exist under present U.S.
organization arrangements. Secretary McNamara said in his view the U.S. Ambassador should be
the chief and should boss the entire operation. Secretary Rusk had certain doubts that a U.S.
Ambassador, based in the Republic of Panama, could operate the Canal,
which is a huge business enterprise, employing thousands of people.
The meeting was interrupted while the President and others read a report
of Foreign Minister Solis’ press conference. It now appears that the
Panamanians are willing to talk without Prior commitments and without an
agenda. This is our position also.
The remainder of the meeting was spent in redrafting the press statement
made at the conclusion of the meeting (copy attached).
(Note: This is only a partial record because of my absence during part of
the meeting.)Another account of this
White House meeting was made by J.C.
King whose account records three points not covered
by Smith: (1) Mann had
indicated that he believed “eventually we should negotiate with the
Panamanians, but that there should be no fixed requirements levied
upon us before sitting down to discuss demands”; (2) in response to
the President’s inquiry, Vance indicated that U.S. troops showed great
restraint and did not provoke the Panamanians; and (3) the President
said “we must be firm but not inflammatory.” He also said “we have
done nothing to be ashamed of,” and that “in public statements we do
not want to give any impression we are willing to consider revision
of the Treaty.” (Memorandum from King to McCone, January 15; ibid.)
Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
378. Telephone Conversation Among President
Johnson, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Mann),
and Ralph Dungan of the National
Security Council StaffSource:Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of
telephone conversation among President Johnson,
Thomas Mann, and
Ralph Dungan, Tape
F64.05, Side B, PNO 4. No classification marking. This transcript
was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this
volume. According to Mann’s
record of this conversation, he called the President to advise him
of the latest information he had received from Martin in Panama, and Dungan was in Mann’s office during his telephone
conversation with the President. (Ibid., Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, January 4,
1964–April 30, 1965)Washington, January 15, 1964, 1:03
p.m.
[Omitted here is the opening portion of the conversation which was not
recorded. According to Mann’s
record of the conversation, which covers the opening portion of the
discussion, Martin reported that
the OAS Peace Committee informed him
that Chiari had agreed to three
things: (1) “The Panamanians will not withdraw their personnel from
Washington and we will not need to withdraw our personnel from Panama”;
(2) “All conversations between us and the Panamanians will be conducted
through the Committee and the Committee wants it this way. Mr. Mann said he thought this was a good
idea”; and (3) “According to Velarde (press secretary) Panamanians are
now agreeable to settling the bus strike on reasonable terms. Mr.
Mann said this was very
important.” (Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, January 4, 1964–April 30,
1965)Martin’s report of the
Peace Commission’s 5:30 p.m. meeting, January 13, 1964, is in USCINCSO telegram SC1188A, January 14.
(Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Panama, Riots, Vol. II,
Part A, January–February)]
Mann: Solis said—that’s the
Foreign Minister—he has told the Committee that they are now willing to
agree that if they have bilateral talks with us—new relations—and if we
fail to reach an agreement, Panama will recognize the old treaty—the
1903 treaty and the two amendments still stand. In other words, this
means they’re not revoking the treaty, and that is, I think, very
important. According to the Foreign Minister, they estimate the talks
will take 2 to 3 years before they’re concluded. That will give us
plenty of time, and it will take plenty of time to go into all these things in depth. Takes the heat
off immediately, and this is also important.In his assessment of Martin’s discussions with the Peace Committee on January
13, Bundy told the President
that, “in sum, they show a substantial back-off by Solis from the
position taken by Chiari
with Mann.” Bundy informed the President:
“There is some evidence that the Panamanians are feeling for a way
to get discussion going without sticking firmly to their talk of
agreement to discuss revision of the treaties. This is clearly what
the Peace Committee wants and is pressing them for. But when
directly pressed on this point, Solis did not budge and the formal
position is just as it has been—the Panamanians say that relations
are broken and will remain broken until we agree to discuss revision
of the treaties.” (Memorandum from Bundy to the President, January 14; ibid., Memos to
the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. I, November 1963–February 1964)
Now, the Panamanians, according to the Committee, always— they’ve been
shifting so fast you can’t be sure—are now willing to resume relations
and begin talks on the whole range of problems between the U.S. and
Panama, which would include treaties, and undoubtedly would include
their demands for treaty revision. They would agree at the same time to
continue law and order in the Zone and avoid violence, which is the main
point. There would be no agenda to these talks and no pre-commitments on
our part. We would not commit ourselves to anything; just begin to
talk—negotiate. The question that the Committee asked Ed Martin is, how soon would he be
prepared to begin talking. The Panamanians have said it may take them a
couple or three months to get ready. We should answer that we would be
ready in a month and sooner, if necessary. Just to keep the record
straight on this.
Dungan: After O’Meara has
satisfied himself that order has been restored—would be a couple of
days.
Mann: Now, the Panamanians were,
I think, unreasonably, but nevertheless—I am sure this is an important
political factor—disturbed about our references to the soldiers. They
don’t know yet about Vance
meeting with the press, on the record, which is still going on—or was a
couple of minutes ago—and they don’t know about the Secretary’s
television conference. I thought I would call Ed about those so he can
get word to the Committee beforehand and prepare them on these in case
there’s something in there, and if we get this—if we can get this, Mr.
President, I think we’ve achieved substantially everything that you
asked us to. I think it’s a good deal for us.
President: What do we get out of
it besides a lot of talking with them and their raisin’ hell about
revisin’ the treaties?
Mann: Well, the first thing you
do is—that situation down there is so explosive that we avoid
large-scale, major large-scale casualties— prevent it. Give us time to
get tempers time to cool down there and sit down and look at the thing,
and there may well be things that we can readily agree to, and try to
find a basis for agreement between us and the Panamanians. That preserves all our vital
interests and, I think this is something we should [unintelligible].
Dungan: You’re not, Mr.
President, if you move back exactly to the position that the United
States was in prior to the time of this outbreak—and you have gained, it
seems to me, for what it’s worth, the approbation of all of Latin
America. Position, I think, is much stronger in Latin America because we
have stood up strongly, you haven’t been oppressive, and you haven’t
lost a bloody thing. You’re no different on the treaty revision part
than you were before the outbreak began.
Mann: We’re not conceding
anything yet except that we’re ready to talk. That’s all we’re—
President: You don’t think there
will be an interpretation placed on setting these conferences that we’re
implying that we’re goin’ into ‘em with good faith to revise the
treaty?
Mann: Well.
Dungan: As a matter of fact, Mr.
President, it seems to me after you’ve had an opportunity—now I realize
that there’s a distinction between the substantive and political—but
after you’ve had a chance to review a lot of these issues and after
they’ve been talked through over a couple of years, it probably will
be—you will come to the conclusion that you will want some treaty
revision without substantially changing our sovereign right or your “as
is” sovereign rights in the Canal Zone.
Mann: I agree with you that the
way this was phrased is very important.
Dungan: Very.
Mann: What I suggest on that is
that we, through the Committee with the Panamanians in both ways we
will—discussion will include something like the whole range of
U.S.-Panamanian relations. Try to avoid—
President: I sure don’t want to
imply that I’m goin’ to sit down and talk to ‘em about changes that I’ll
make in the treaties and revise the whole thing, and all they got to do
is burn the USIS, Embassy, and then we
come in—hat in hand—and say come on boys, we’ll let you write your
ticket.
Mann: We’ve agreed, as I said
earlier, that there are no preconditions. We’re not committing ourselves
to any treaty revisions.
President: Well, just make that
awfully clear in our statement—all right?
Dungan: And also, they’re very
insistent on not giving any of this publicity, is that right, Tom?
Mann: Right. I’m coming to that.
The Committee, not the Panamanian Government, is putting the pressure on
both us and the Panamanians to avoid official statements to the press
until we can get time to talk
and let tempers cool down. In the long run, Mr. President, we’re going
to be judged by our deeds and not our words.
President: But you may not be
around to judge ‘em if they think we’re sittin’ down to revise some
treaties, Tom.
Mann: Well, that’s true, and I
think we have to go up on the Hill and explain very clearly what—
President: Did you go up there
this mornin’?
Mann: Haven’t been up yet, sir,
but I’m waiting for Vance to get
through.
President: Uh huh.
Dungan: I called Dan Flood this
morning.
President: How did Vance get along? Anybody know?
Mann: We don’t know yet.
Dungan: Not finished yet.
Mann: I think I will get up this
afternoon and talk to Vance and
work out a plan to get in touch with some key people on the Hill.
President: I think that’s very
good. Okay. Anything else?
Mann: That’s all, sir, but is it
all right to say that we will agree to—
President: I think we can always
agree to talk and listen. I don’t want to imply that we’re—by so
doin’—that we’re making any commitment of any kind.
Mann: All right, sir.
President: I want to be fair and
want to be reasonable and want to be just to these people, and if we’ve
got problems with wage scales or arrogant military people or Zonites
that cause these troubles, or any improvement or changes we can make,
we’re anxious to do it—wage scales, or whatever it is. But if they think
that all they gotta do is to burn a USIS and shoot four or five soldiers and then we come
runnin’ in and—hat in hand—well, that’s a different proposition.
Mann: No, I think this is clear.
We’ve won our point. We’re not going to negotiate under duress—that is,
until law and order is restored.
President: What do you mean that
they’re upset about what we said about the soldiers? Do you mean about
their behavin’ admirably under extreme provocation?
Mann: Yes. [chuckle] They’re the
most unreasonable people, Mr. President, you can imagine, but we still
have to live with them [unintelligible].
President: Well, you better go on
and get started on your other Canal—
Mann: Well, that’s what I think,
too.
President: I do, too, and I
thought so before you got back here. So, the quicker you get on it, the
better off we’ll—
Mann: I’ll tell Ed that we will
agree to tell the Committee we will agree to discuss the whole range of
U.S.-Panamanian relations.
President: Have you talked to
Secretary Rusk and McNamara?
Mann: I talked to Ball—Mr. Rusk is at dinner, but I think I will touch base with
him …
President: Did you talk to
McNamara?
Mann: Not yet.
President: Talk to McNamara and if it’s agreeable to
them, it’s okay by me.
Mann: All right sir. Thank you
very much.
President: Bye.
379. Editorial Note
On January 15, 1964, the Inter-American Peace Committee issued a
communiqué noting its satisfaction with “the re-establishment of peace”
between the United States and Panama, “which is an indispensable
condition for understanding and negotiation between the parties.” The
English-language version of the communiqué reported that the parties
have agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations and “have agreed to
begin discussions which will be initiated thirty days after diplomatic
relations are re-established by means of representatives who will have
sufficient powers to discuss without limitations all existing matters of
any nature which may affect the relations between the United States and
Panama.” (Department of State Bulletin, February
3, 1964, page 156)
Initial reaction to the communiqué in Washington indicated that the
crisis may have passed. At the January 15 daily White House staff
meeting, Bundy commented that
“our success in Panama thus far is largely due to the first-rate
personal performance of the President.” (Memorandum for the record
prepared by William Y. Smith, January 15; National Defense University,
Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group)
Following release of the communiqué in Panama, however, a dispute arose
between the parties over interpretation of the text whether the Spanish
word “negociar” meant “discuss,” as it appeared in the English text, or
“negotiate,” as the Panamanians argued. According to a January 16
memorandum from Bundy to
Johnson, President Chiari said in a public statement on January 15: “I
promised the nation that
diplomatic relations would not be re-established with the United States
until that country consented to begin negotiations for the drafting of a
new treaty, and this promise has been obtained through the mediation of
the Inter-American Peace Committee.’” (Memorandum to the President from
Bundy, January 16; Johnson
Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. I, November 1963–
February 1964) According to a report from Martin in Panama, Foreign Minister Solis had said to
him: “Chiari had to say what he did because ‘Communists are still
agitating and the university students have not understood IPC communiqué.’’” (Telegram SC12300A from
Martin to Mann, January 15; ibid., NSC Histories, Panama Crisis, 1964)
President Johnson told Rusk on January 16: “I think we sit tight on the Peace
Committee’s statement. It’s possible that some of the leftwingers will
try to force Chiari’s hand but I
think we’ve gone about as far as we can go at this point, and I think
he’ll find a way to swing around and not cause too much trouble.”
(Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Secretary Rusk, January 16, 1:15 p.m.; ibid.,
Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F64.06, Side A, PNO 4)
380. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in PanamaSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, NSC Histories, Panama
Crisis, 1964. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Mann and cleared by Rusk and the White House. A copy was
passed to the White House.Washington, January 16, 1964, 12:01
p.m.
7294. For Martin from Mann. In view of the agreement that all
discussions between the United States and Panama should be through the
Peace Committee and risk that Chiari will use meeting with you for his own political
purposes, suggest that you postpone your meeting with Chiari and convey orally following
message to Trucco with request that he orally deliver message to
Chiari in our behalf: From the beginning we have made it clear to all concerned that
the United States is willing, in language of English text of
Peace Committee report, “to discuss without limitation all
existing matters of any nature which may affect the relations
between the United States and Panama.” As the minutes of the
Peace Committee show, this clearly means that the Government of Panama would
be free to raise any questions it wished.We will not negotiate under pressures whether these pressures
be aggressions against the Canal Zone or threats of mob violence
or the breaking of diplomatic relations or any other kinds of
pressures. Nor will the United States accept Panamanian
pre-conditions as Panama’s price for being willing to discuss
issues with the United States.Our insistence on the word “discuss” rather than the word
“negotiate” in the Peace Committee’s English version of the
communiqué was to avoid any possibility that the Government of
Panama would interpret the phrase “negotiate without
limitations” as any kind of a pre-commitment to replace the
existing treaties with a new treaty. In this connection, the
United States notes that according to a report appearing in The New York Times of January 16:
“President Chiari, in a ten minute broadcast, stated
categorically that Panama regarded Washington’s accord
to ‘negotiate without limitations’ as a commitment to
replace existing treaties with a new one.”
The English text of the Peace Committee report therefore uses
the word “discuss” instead of “negotiate”. The United States
acquiesced in translating the word “discuss” as “negociar” in
the Spanish text only because the word “discutir” was thought by
some to have a connotation of conflict. The minutes of the Peace
Committee clearly show however that the consistent United States
position was that stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this
memorandum.The issue therefore was and remains simply this: Is the
Government of Panama agreeable to discussions with the United
States covering the whole range of issues affecting United
States and Panamanian relations? Or does the Government of
Panama refuse to enter into discussions with the United States
unless the United States first agrees to Panamanian
preconditions about replacing or structurally revising existing
treaties?
Rusk
381. Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance) to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD/ISA Files, FRC 330 68 A 4023, Panama, 1964. Top
Secret.Washington, January 22, 1964.
It is requested that you develop contingency plans for U.S. military
intervention in the Republic of PanamaAn
entry in the President’s Daily Diary, dictated by Valenti, indicates that at 8:30
a.m. on January 22 the President “instructed Secretary of Defense
McNamara to have plans
ready for any contingency in Panama. If a coup is used, let us have
detailed plans prepared for it.” (Johnson Library) under the
following circumstances: The present Government of Panama requests U.S. military
assistance to prevent its overthrow by Communist/Castro oriented
political groupings.A Communist/Castro oriented government has seized power in
Panama and a decision is made by the U.S. to intervene for the
purpose of replacing it with a government friendly to the
interests of the U.S.
Under each of the assumptions listed above, planning should envision two
separate responses by the Guardia Nacional.In a telephone conversation with Mann at 9:30 a.m. on January 22, the President
expressed his concern about the capabilities of the Panamanian
National Guard and reported that he had asked McNamara “to get ready for the
worse if something happened down there.” Although Mann told the President that “the
relationship between the Army and the Guard is good,” the President
felt that it might be necessary to seal off the Canal Zone “for
security reasons.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation between
Mann and President
Johnson, January 22; ibid., Papers of
Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, January 14,
1964–April 30, 1965) These are: Guardia opposes the Communist takeover.Guardia supports the Communist takeover, is neutral, or is
divided in its loyalties.
The purpose of the military action will be to establish sufficient
control over selected territories in the Republic of Panama as to permit
a non-Communist government to exercise power in the Republic. Minimum
force will be utilized to achieve this objective. Further, the planning should envision the
earliest possible withdrawal of U.S. forces after the objective is
achieved.
These plans should be developed as a matter of priority.The JCS informed
USCINCSO the night of
January 22 that Major General F.T. Unger of the Joint Staff,
representing General Taylor, would arrive in
Panama January 23 to consult with O’Meara and Martin and assist in the
development of contingency plans that would be “for priority
consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” (JCS telegram 4506 to CINCSO, January 22; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
DEF 1–1 PAN) McNamara sent
the President a summary of the JCS
plan for military intervention in Panama on January 31. The concept
of the plan was based on quick reaction, early seizure of centers of
power within Panama City, securing the installations and borders of
the Canal Zone, and secondarily sealing of Colon because it was a
“Communist stronghold.” (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Panama Riots, Vol. II, Part F, January–February, 1964)
Cyrus R. VancePrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
382. Telephone Conversation Between President
Johnson and Senator Richard RussellSource: Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Richard Russell, Tape F64.07, Side A, PNO
3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the
Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.Washington, January 22, 1964, 6:55
p.m.
[Omitted here is a brief conversation not related to Panama. The
President then read Senator Russell a press statement on Panama he planned to make.
Johnson subsequently issued the statement on
Panama, slightly revised but with no substantive changes from the text
as described to Russell, to news
correspondents on January 23. (Department of State Bulletin, February 10, 1964, pages 195–196)]
Russell: Well, I guess that’s all
right, if you feel like you’ve got to issue a statement.
President: Well, I think we’ve
got to get back to—
Russell: [Unintelligible] come in
there and march across the Zone [unintelligible] across the Panama Canal
Zone.
President: No, we’re not.
They’re—
Russell: Come and walk across—go
swimmin’ in the locks if he wants to.
President: Yeah, but our
people—no, we don’t. We don’t want ‘em to leave. They think they can put
that Canal out of commission—6 months mighty easy, and we got to be
awfully careful about security. And they’re not goin’ to let any mobs
come in there, and they’re not goin’ to let Castro set up a new
government, although every night they think he’s goin’ to—and we’re
tryin’ to get the thing back.
Russell: I wish to hell
he’d—Castro’d seize it. Then, maybe, dammit, those people in the State
Department and these weepin’ sob sisters all over the country would let
us go in there and protect our rights. I wish old Castro would seize
it.
President: Well, now, this is
pretty—don’t you think this is a pretty good statement? This is not
State Department talk.
Russell: I know it.
President: It’s right out of my
office here with Jack Valenti and
Ted Sorensen.
Russell: [Unintelligible] you
feel like you had to issue any statement.
President: Oh, I think I have to
try it or do all I can to bring about an adjustment of some kind—
Russell: There’s people who are
hurting—we ain’t hurting—we’re not—
President: Yeah, but—yes, we are
hurtin’, Dick. We’re hurtin’ in the hemisphere and we’re hurtin’ in the
world. That damn propaganda is all against us, and it’s just everywhere,
it just looks—
Russell: I read a piece in the
Manchester Guardian, and one in this London
paper, and they both said that we ought to have learned by one mistake
in Cuba not to make another now by surrendering here in Panama.
President: Well, we’re not
surrendering. But I think that there are a good many chicken things that
we can do and should do, and Vance thinks so, and thinks that we should have done
‘em, and—for instance, we think that we’ve got a very archaic
Board—Panama Canal—we think our governor is no good, he’s an old
ex-military fellow. That Board of Engineers—that’s not up to it. Nobody
thinks it is—Vance, General O’Meara.
Russell: Well, we’ve been
retiring them off down there for a long time.
President: And we know our
Ambassador wasn’t worth a damn. He just sold out to the Panamanians a
hundred percent. Came back and denounced everybody, and that’s why he
got fired—because he wanted to run for governor of West Virginia on the
Republican ticket.
But he said that he wanted—he’s one hundred percent Panamanian, and he
was just raisin’ hell about what the Zonists were doing. We’ve got a
list of things that’s two pages longThe
Department of State plan described 14 specific actions which could
be taken in the Canal Zone to improve relations with Panama, 8
potential minor revisions to the Canal Treaty that would have the
same effect, and discussed a potential sea level canal. (Attachment
to a covering memorandum from Read to Bundy, January 21; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAN–US) that we can do and
we ought to do, and that don’t sacrifice anything. But, there is some
merit to their side—not in violence, not in shootin’ people, but what I
think is—I don’t think I can get by with a press conference without this
question comin’ up. I just think it’s as sure as the sea. I’ve got to
see the Peace Commission in the mornin.’The
President received the Inter-American Peace Committee at the White
House at 10:40 a.m.; the meeting lasted no later than 11:05 a.m.
(Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of the
conversation has been found. I’ve got to follow some kind of
a discussion with ‘em, and this has been pretty much my line.
Russell: Yeah, you’re not
changing your position any. I just thought I’d let him sweat for a while
there.
President: Well, I am. I’m
lettin’ him sweat.
Russell: Have you withdrawn your
aid yet?
President: Yeah, we’re not giving
them a damn thing, and furthermore, just confidentially, I’ve moved all
of our dependents—I’m movin’ ‘em out to South Carolina.
Russell: Well, if you’ve done
that, you’ll hear from Chiari
before long and he’ll be on his knees. I just wouldn’t be too swift if I
were you.
President: I’m not. I’m goin’ to
wait until day after tomorrow. I’m goin’ to wait another day or two.
But—
Russell: Hold it just as long as
you can, Mr. President. You’ve got all the cards—and this damn yappin’
over here about this OAS—it don’t amount to a thing—just because they
feel like they’ve got to stick together whenever one—you got to get down
and really talk to ‘em underneath the bed sheets, they say. Well, I
don’t blame you a damn bit.
President: I came back here last
night from the Canadian Embassy and Rusk and the whole outfit met with me and I stayed up
until 2:00. I was at the desk at 1:00, and I was the only man in the
room that said, “No.” I didn’t have Vance and McNamara, but I told every one of ‘em—
Russell: Rusk belongs to the New York Times, Washington Post, the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch.
President: I said I am not
about—not one goddamned bit—as long as I’m President, which is goin’ to
be for 11 months, gentlemen—I’m not about to get on my knees and go
crawlin’ to him and say I want
to apologize to you for you shootin’ my soldiers; by God I ain’t goin’
to do it. I wasn’t raised in that school, and they hushed up and didn’t
say anything. But I’m gettin’ ready to have a press conference and I got
to be prepared—and I’m goin’ to be prepared on everything if I can, and
this is one of the things to be prepared on. And I just want to check it
with you before I—
Russell: Well, if you got to
issue a statement, that’s about as good as you can make.
President: All right. Okay. You
know anything else?
Russell: I was hoping you might
defer it.
President: Well, I’m goin’ to
defer it. I’m goin’ to defer it.
Russell: I think you’ve got all
the cards, and the little flurry here in the States—Rusk and that crowd, I imagine, Cousin
Adlai—I haven’t seen or heard from him, but I imagine Cousin Adlai is—
President: I haven’t heard a word
from him. I haven’t heard a word from him.
Russell: But the people of this
country are just one million percent back of your position.
President: Well, I don’t know
whether they know it or not, but I did get a poll in Pennsylvania today
that shows—
Russell: I know it—you ask any
Congressman or Senator about his mail.
President: Do you know what
Pennsylvania—a fellow running up there for Senate took the most
reputable poll in Pennsylvania today and you know it shows I get more
Republicans than the Republicans get, and I beat Scranton 79 to 20. I
beat Goldwater 82 to 17 in Pennsylvania.
Russell: You just go on and do
what is in this country’s interest, and tell Rusk and these other fellows to jump in the lake, and
it’ll stay that way. The American people have been crying for somebody
that had some of the elements of “Old Hickory” Jackson in him. They
thought they had him in old Ike, but Ike had to be a captive of those
people because he didn’t know what else to do. You know this government;
you know the world. Ike—he was limited in his experience and afraid of
himself, so he leaned completely on John Foster Dulles.
President: Well, everybody is
when you get—
Russell: I know, but somebody
down there just got to take the bull by the horns one of these days and
play the part of old Andrew Jackson—say, “well gentlemen, this is
it.”
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Panama.]
383. Editorial Note
On January 25, 1964, President Johnson telephoned
Assistant Secretary Mann to
inquire whether the Inter-American Peace Committee was making any
progress on a draft agreement on resumption of diplomatic relations
between the United States and Panama. Mann replied that “we do not have a solution,” and “we
don’t want to agree on anything before checking with the President.”
Mann said that “he did not
think the President should be too optimistic because when he sounded
optimistic this encouraged the Panamanians to think that we were willing
to agree to what they wanted.” He told the President that he, Vance, and
Dungan would be working some more on the draft and “thought it best not
to bother the President until they had their homework done.”
Johnson asked Mann to get the draft into shape. (Memorandum of
telephone conversation between Mann and President Johnson, January
25, 12:20 p.m.; Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, January 14, 1964–April 30, 1965)
The President received a copy of the draft the afternoon of January 25.
Asked if he concurred by Acting Secretary of State George Ball, the President stated: “I
don’t want to be pinned to it for another 30 minutes.” (Recording of
telephone conversation between President Johnson
and George Ball, January 25, 2:05
p.m.; ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F64.07, Side B, PNO 4)
Johnson then called Senator Russell and told
him he thought the draft was “all right, but I just didn’t want to wrap
it up and get it tied” without getting Russell’s views. The President was concerned that
“there’s some sleeper in it” he couldn’t see. He then read the text of
the draft agreement:
“The governments of Panama and the United States have accepted
the invitation made to them by the Peace Committee with a view
to reestablishing diplomatic relations between the two countries
as soon as possible, and to seek prompt elimination of the
causes of tension between the two countries. The parties have
agreed between themselves that 15 days after having
reestablished the above mentioned relations, they will appoint
special ambassadors with sufficient powers to negotiate—in other
words to discuss—a good faith attempt to resolve all the
problems without any limitations whatsoever that affect the
relations between the countries.” The draft concluded: “Each of
the governments shall be absolutely free to present for
discussion any matter and take any position they deem necessary.
All agreements reached will be promptly implemented in
accordance with the constitutional processes of each
government.”
Russell indicated that the draft “sounds all right” but “the State
Department will use that as a basis to—just to try to negotiate that
treaty away.” The President pointed out that Tom Mann was the key
official on this matter and “he’s the strongest guy over there.” Russell
then noted: “I see you’ve got that word ‘negotiate’ in there, and that
was what the breach was over before, wasn’t it?” He thought the issue
was over “the difference
between ‘discuss’ and ‘negotiate’.” Johnson said
that “one was ‘discuss’ the problems and the other was ‘negotiate’ a
treaty. I didn’t want to agree before I sat down to ‘negotiate’ a new
treaty. I agreed to sit down and talk and discuss any problems but
discussing a problem and negotiating a treaty is a different thing.”
Johnson continued, “I don’t mind negotiatin’ on
the problems—that’s what I’m anxious to do—but I’m not willin’ to
negotiate a treaty in advance.” Russell then indicated that he thought
that was “all right.” (Recording of telephone conversation between
President Johnson and Richard Russell, January 25, 2:30 p.m.; ibid., Tape
F64.07, Side B, PNO 5) The portion of the conversation printed here was
prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this
volume.
The President then called Mann and
said that “he did not want the word ‘negotiate’ to appear. He said
‘agree’ or ‘discuss’ are all right. He said it could read ‘with
sufficient powers to enter into a good faith agreement to resolve all
the problems’” between the countries. Johnson told
Mann he was ready to approve
the draft with that modification. Mann said he didn’t think the Panamanians “were going to
buy” the modified draft. He said he “thought their whole idea in the
wording was to make it appear that we were going to scrap the old treaty
and start negotiating a new one.” He said he thought “we could live with
the draft we had given the President.” (Memorandum of telephone
conversation between Mann and
Johnson, January 25, 3:05 p.m.; ibid., Papers
of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, January 14,
1964–April 30, 1965) There is a recording of the Mann– Johnson
conversation which amplified their discussion. In this recording,
President Johnson said, “Well, we don’t have to
live with anything they give us.” He continued, “Now, remember this: I
think we’ve got the cards. I don’t give a damn what you say about Latin
America— they’re goin’ to have to depend on us and they’re not goin’ to
take over there. We’re goin’ to take over if anybody does, and the more
they wait, the more they suffer and the more trouble they’re in, and
they’ve got to come to us. We don’t have to come to them.” He asked
Mann if there was anything in
the modified draft that indicated the U.S. was “caving,” and Mann responded “no,” not in the
modified draft. (Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Thomas
Mann, January 25, 2:50 p.m.; ibid., Recordings and
Transcripts, Tape F64.07, Side B, PNO 7) The portion of the conversation
printed here was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically
for this volume.
On January 27 Mann called
Johnson to inform him that “as we anticipated,”
the Panamanians had not bought the new draft agreement and that “an
impasse had been reached.” He also informed the President that the Peace
Committee had “read the riot act” to Miguel
Moreno, the Panamanian contact with the Peace Committee.
(Memorandum of telephone conversation between Mann and President
Johnson, January 27, 7:20 p.m.; ibid., Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations
with LBJ, January 14, 1964–April 30,
1965) Mann also told
Johnson that “we don’t like the language” being
proposed by the Panamanians, and that they would continue their efforts
to work out an acceptable agreement. (Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
Thomas Mann, January 27, 7:20
p.m.; ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F64.08, Side A, PNO 5)
On January 29 President Johnson discussed the
Panamanian revisions with Russell who felt, “this is utterly
unreasonable. I thought we’d already gone too far, but when they come in
and make us admit—make us agree in advance—to rewrite the treaty in some
unknown way that we don’t even know, I just don’t believe any reasonable
person would support that.” (Recording of telephone conversation between
the President and Russell,
January 29, 10:30 a.m.; ibid., Side B, PNO 4) In a conversation with
Senator Mansfield later that morning Johnson told
him that the Peace Committee was about to break off negotiations because
the Panamanians insist that the United States “revise these treaties in
advance without knowing how they want them revised, and unless we agree
to that, they want to take it to the OAS.” Johnson stated, “I’m going to tell
‘em that we just can’t do that.” Mansfield agreed: “That’s right. You
can’t do it and you can’t give them a blank check before you sit down.”
(Recording of telephone conversation between the President and
Mansfield, January 29, 11:11 a.m., ibid., Tape 64.09, Side A, PNO 1) The
portions of the conversations printed here were prepared in the Office
of the Historian specifically for this volume.
384. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAN–US. Confidential. Drafted by
Bunker.Washington, January
29, 1964.
SUBJECT
Panamanian Complaints concerning the Canal Zone
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Tejera Paris, Chairman, Inter-American Peace
CommitteeAmbassador Miguel J. Moreno,
Jr., of PanamaAmbassador Ellsworth Bunker
of the United StatesBunker was confirmed by
the Senate as U.S. Representative to the Council of the
Organization of American States on January 23.
I suggested to Ambassador Tejera that it might be helpful if he,
Ambassador Moreno and I could
have an informal talk to see whether we could find any alternative
formula which might bring the two sides closer together. Accordingly, we
had lunch together, and in the course of our conversation I said to
Ambassador Moreno that I thought
it might be helpful if he could tell me the major issues with which
Panama was concerned.
Ambassador Moreno replied that,
in the first place, he wanted to make it clear that the nationalization,
security, or demilitarization of the Canal was not an issue. Panama
recognized that the security of the Canal was an obligation of the
United States which it could not and should not give up.
The points, however, with which Panama was concerned were the following:
Perpetuity
The Ambassador said that he did not want to specify what
might seem a reasonable period, but that some time limit
should be written into the Treaty, and that there was a
strong feeling among all Panamanians that the perpetuity
clause was outdated and unnecessary today. He doubted that
if a treaty were to be negotiated today anywhere, a
perpetuity clause would be acceptable.
Re-examination of Panama’s Sovereign
Rights in the Zone
Flying the flag, he said, is one way of achieving this. There
has been a feeling, however, among Panamanians that whenever
the question of sovereign rights is raised by Panama, the
United States is prone to fall back on Article III of the
1903 Treaty.
Larger Benefits from Operation of the
Canal
Ambassador Moreno
felt that Panama should have a greater share in revenue from
the Canal. Panama also felt that it suffered from unfair
competition from U.S. commissaries, which sold luxury goods
at very low prices.
The Position of Panamanian Workers
While the principle of equal pay applied, the fact was that
most of the higher-paying jobs are occupied by Americans and
the lower-paying ones, by Panamanians. The provision that
security positions should be occupied only by Americans had
been used to pre-empt positions for U.S. citizens. The
number of security positions, he said, had been increased to
some 3000 in order, it was felt, to eliminate
Panamanians.
Ambassador Moreno went on to say
that Panama was not intransigent, that President Roosevelt had agreed to
negotiations in 1934, with the
result that a treaty had been agreed to in 1936. President Eisenhower
had also agreed to negotiate in 1953, and a treaty had been agreed to in
1955. It was difficult for him to understand, therefore, why the United
States was so fearful of an agreement to negotiate. I explained to him
again that the interpretation which President Chiari had put on the word had made
agreement to negotiate a revision a precondition for entering
negotiations. As I had explained in the meetings of the IAPC, this we
could not and would not do. I did not believe that any country would be
willing to enter negotiations on the basis of prior conditions.
Ambassador Moreno went on to say
that because of past experience in negotiating with the United States,
precise language in the communiqué to be issued by the IAPC was
important. I asked whether he could suggest language and whether we
could attempt to work out language which would be mutually acceptable.
He then suggested the following as a substitute for paragraph 3:
“Within the thirty days following the re-establishment of said
relations, the parties will designate Special Ambassadors with
sufficient powers to reconsider, without limitation, the
relations between the two countries, including the review
(revisión) of the Treaties and other agreements regarding the
Canal, with sufficient powers to enter into new pacts (pactos)
which may result from said review.”
I said that I would consult my government to see whether some such
wording would be acceptable, and that I would meet with him and
Ambassador Tejera after a meeting which was scheduled for the White
House at 3:45 p.m.Bunker, Mann, Ball, Vance,
and Dungan met with the President at 3:50 p.m., and then they were
joined in the Cabinet Room by the Congressional leadership to
discuss Panama. This meeting lasted until 5:15 p.m., when the
Congressional leadership departed. At 5:25 p.m. the remaining group
convened with the President in the Oval Office until 6 p.m. (Johnson
Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of these meetings
has been found.
Ambassador Tejera remarked that he felt it would be unfortunate to have
the dispute go to the Council. It would result in stirring up old
hatreds and playing into the hands of the communists, who would resort
to the demagogic appeal of anti-imperialism. This could be dangerous for
his own country as well as for other Latin American nations.
After the White House meeting, I met with Ambassador Tejera and
Ambassador Moreno at 6:00 p.m.,
and informed them that the language proposed by Ambassador Moreno was not acceptable. Ambassador
Moreno said that he would
have no alternative then but to present his government’s note to the Chairman of the Council,
requesting that a meeting be convened. He telephoned me later at 10:00
p.m. to say that this was then being done.On January 29 Panama broke off talks with the Inter-American Peace
Committee and formally requested a meeting of the OAS Council in order to invoke the Rio
Treaty on the grounds of United States aggression. The Panamanian
request is in OAS doc,
OEA/SerG./V/C–d–1189. Bunker’s
statement to the OAS Council
rejecting all charges of U.S. aggression against Panama, January 31,
is in Department of State Bulletin, February
24, 1964, pp. 300–302. In circular telegram 1390 to all ARA posts and CINCSO for Martin, January 30, the Department
of State presented the basic U.S. position in the OAS Council, pointing out that
“informal soundings” among other COAS representatives indicated “considerable doubt”
that the Panamanians could obtain the necessary 11 votes to invoke
the Rio Treaty. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1964–66, POL
PAN–US)
385. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Panama, Vol. I, December 1963 to January 1964. No
classification marking. The memorandum is unsigned.Washington, January 31, 1964.
SUBJECT
The Panama SituationIn response to your request, this memorandum contains observations
and suggestions relative to the Panamanian situation. They are based
on limited access to the facts and on history. As such, they are, at
best, additional yardsticks which may have some use in weighing the
difficult decisions which fall within your heavy
responsibilities.The following assumptions underlie the
observations and suggestions in this memorandum. We have only one fundamental national interest to protect
in the present situation. We have got to insure untroubled
and adequate water-passage through Central America. It is
desirable to seek to secure this interest at a minimum total
cost to this nation and, if possible, by ways which do not
undermine our capacity to exercise a constructive influence
elsewhere in Latin America.
The pressure for social change is just short of violent
revolution in Panama and in much of the rest of Latin
America. The pressure comes primarily from the inside,
from the decay and antiquation of the social structures
of various Latin American countries.
Even if we desired to do so, we could not, as a practical
matter, stop the pressure for change. But we may have
something constructive to contribute to the form and
pace of the change if we play our cards carefully and
wisely.
Change in Panama is part of the whole problem of change in
Latin America. Our actions with respect to the part will
have a significant effect on our ability to act
constructively with respect to the whole.Our actions in Panama will produce respect, rather than
fear and suspicious hostility in Latin America, provided
that our unquestionable power is used only with restraint
and with justice and in accord with the decent opinion of
Latin America.If the above assumptions are accurate and are at the heart of our
national interest in the present situation, the following general
observations on United States policy will be derived from them: Those United States policies (words and actions) which
preserve untroubled water-passage through Central America
but also tend to permit reasonable and peaceful adjustments
in our relationship to the changing situation in that region
make sense in terms of our national interests.Conversely, those policies (words and actions) which
enable us to preserve the water-passage only by a large
increase in the costs of military and police protection and
at the price of intensified suspicion and antagonism towards
the United States throughout Latin America are to be
minimized or avoided entirely if at all possible.
Specific suggestions on policy (words and actions):
In the light of these assumptions and general observations the
following specific suggestions may be worth considering: Welcome, wholeheartedly, consideration by the OAS of the difficulties in
Panama and urge that body’s help in finding a solution;
offer every facility for on-the-spot study in the
Zone.Reject firmly but without fanfare the charges of
aggression and also make it clear that we will not
accept unilateral dictation from any nation, large or
small.Make clear that the President of the United States
does not quibble over words such as “discussion or
negotiations”; that, if changes are desirable, as well
they may be, we are prepared at all times to sit down to
discuss, to negotiate and to agree on a mutually
acceptable basis.Avoid boxing ourselves in at home against change
through the fanning of our own emotions by crediting
Castro and Communism too heavily for a difficulty which
existed long before either had any significance in this
Hemisphere and which will undoubtedly continue to plague
us after both cease to have much meaning.Stress with our own involved bureaucracy that our
national interest is trouble-free water-passage, not the
safeguarding of an outdated position of privilege
(Zonists, understandably, might have difficulty
differentiating between the maintenance of their special
interests and the national interests). To this end, at
an appropriate time: Act to limit continuous service in the Zone
for all U.S. military and civilian personnel to a
maximum period of four years and seek a sharp
reduction particularly in civilian
personnel.Cut the commissaries or so alter and limit
their character that they will handle only those
few unique items of U.S. merchandise which may not
be readily available locally.Fully integrate all schools and colleges in
the Zone.Tighten up on all salaries and emoluments to
Zone employees to bring them in line with general
U.S. personnel practices applicable elsewhere to
overseas personnel.Indicate a readiness, at an appropriate time and when
not under duress, to consider: Steps to give additional recognition to
Panamanian titular sovereignty in the Zone.Revision of the rental agreement.An increase of Panamanian participation in the
operation of the Canal up to and including some
Panamanian representation on the Board of the
Canal Company, always, however, contingent upon
the need for a trouble-free operation of the
waterway.Begin to give serious consideration in diplomacy to
marshalling international support for a Mexican-owned
and operated canal through Mexico, with a view to
sobering the Panamanians in their demands and, also, in
recognition of the growing need for additional
water-passage through Central America.
Some or none of the above specifics may have applicability in the light
of your understanding of all the facts. They are merely suggestive of
the kinds of words and actions which, it would seem, might be helpful in
the present difficulty. And to ease those difficulties may be the best
that can be hoped for until it is crystal clear that another canal will
be built and our dependence on this outdated monopoly will have thereby
been reduced.
386. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL PAN–US.
Confidential. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads “Secretary
saw.”Washington, February 1, 1964.
SUBJECT
The Panama Problem
It seems to me that the “line” we take from here on out in our talks with
Panamanians and with other Latin Americans is very important.
Chiari decided to put pressure
on the United States to force us to agree, in advance of discussions, to
negotiate a new treaty to replace, or at least substantially alter,
existing treaties. As Moreno has
confirmed to Bunker, this means language which can be interpreted as
United States pre-commitments to open up the sovereignty and perpetuity
issues to re-negotiation.
Breaking of relations was part of the tactic of pressure. The demagogic
press, television and radio campaigns by Panamanian media, controlled
for a time from the Presidencia itself, was part of the tactic. So was
the complicity of Panamanian Government officials in the 36 hours of
violence. The demagogic appeals to Latin American governments for
support, intransigence in the Peace Committee and the invocation of the
Rio Treaty on false charges of United States “aggression” were part of
the tactic. Chiari’s “painting
himself into a corner” by unnecessary public statements was part of the
tactic.
In launching the campaign, Chiari
was gambling that the United States would yield. The gamble turned out
to be a bad one. We have already gone as far as we can in making
concessions. Chiari has not
really moved an inch.
All of these facts are, or will be, known to knowledgeable people in
Latin America. There are signs that at least some Latin Americans are
beginning to realize the dimensions of Panamanian irresponsibility and
understand that the validity of their treaties and their interests, as
well as ours, are involved.On January 30
Lansing Collins provided
Mann with an analysis of
Latin American official opinion on the Panama situation, which
indicated that Latin American officials deplored any attempt by
Panama to take the issue to the United Nations and “have expressed
understanding of our firm position in Panama.” (Memorandum from
Collins to Mann, January 30; ibid.)
It is doubtful that Chiari can
yield. If the impasse continues, it seems equally doubtful that
Chiari can “hang on” until
the May elections. He may decide voluntarily to turn the office over to
someone else. He may be overthrown. Nevertheless, anti-communist
political leaders of the country continue their active or tacit support
of Chiari because this is “good
politics” as long as there is a chance that the United States will yield
to Chiari’s pre-conditions.
As long as the anti-communist political leaders continue their support of
Chiari’s tactic, only the
communists or Arnulfo Arias, perhaps in combination with each other,
will have an organization and a plan— in short, the capacity—to fill the
vacuum which Chiari’s departure
will leave.
If this estimate is correct, then it would make good sense to disabuse
all Panamanians, and indeed all Latin Americans, of any ideas that, in
the end, we are going to save Chiari by agreeing to his preconditions. Only then will
anti-communists adjust to reality and begin to organize and plan. When
they adjust to reality Chiari
will lose support. But we gain by giving anti-communist elements the
time and the opportunity to organize an alternative to a
communist-infiltrated or communist-controlled government.
By being candid and decisive we would also minimize the risk that other
Latin Americans will miscalculate in the current OAS proceedings.
387. Telephone Conversation Between President
Johnson and the Assistant Secretary of State
for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source:
Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
Thomas Mann, Tape F64.10,
Side A, PNO 5. No classification marking. This transcript was
prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this
volume.Washington, February 3, 1964, 7:10
p.m.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Panama.]
Mann: Now, the other thing is
more important. On Sunday morning,February
2. I had a long talk with Sanchez
Gavito—the Mexican—and he’s worked up an idea which he’s
put on paper. It says that in case the Rio Treaty is—the Council votes to invoke the Rio
Treaty as Panama has requested and there will be a commission—a five
man, five nation commission set up which will act as a mediating body
between the U.S. and Panama [unintelligible]. Secondly, that there would
be a U.S.-Panama—plus one other—a three man commission to investigate
the facts, what happened. Now he sent over this morning to
Ralph Dungan a copy of this draft. I’ve
suggested several changes, after talking with the Secretary, and most of
these have been bought, subject to your approval, by us. I think that
this resolution, if it goes through, would be satisfactory from our
point of view—just as satisfactory as we can expect at this time in the
meeting in the OAS. Tonight this draft
will probably be circulated, and I just wanted to be sure you had—or
Ralph, or somebody, I haven’t been able to get
him this afternoon—had an opportunity to—
President:
Ralph’s here now, but he’s talkin’ about
appointments. He hadn’t talked about the Mexico draft.
Mann: All right. Well, he’s got
the papers, and—
President: Well, he keeps them on
deep freeze up there. He never does let me see what he gets—
Mann: And if I could talk to him
one minute, I could get him the latest information I have on these
drafts.
President: Now, I’ll tell you
what I think. I think the Secretary ought to make a full scale speech
outlining what happened in Panama, and just saying we’re ready to talk,
willing to talk, eager to talk, but we’re not gonna negotiate a treaty
in advance. But he ought to say that our flag went up by our kids; they
made a mistake; they came in and shot our soldiers; we gave them
birdshot; we tried to defend ourselves the best we could, but they
burned our USIA office; and just
outline what horrible things they did without sayin’ they’re horrible.
But let the world know it. John
McCone told me that every country he went to—Spain was
just up in arms, France couldn’t understand it, Great Britain thought it
was terrible; Germany thought—couldn’t understand why we had started
shooting in Panama, because we’ve been—
Mann: We’ll start drafting a
speech right away.
President: I’ve just been beggin’
you all to do it, and I know damn well my Johnson
City instinct tells me that you oughtn’t to sit on your can and do
nothin’, and I’ve made one or two statements myself. But the New York Times says that we’ve said nothin’, and
I just think it’s awful that we just sit here like a bunch of mummies
and run under the ground, and I think you ought to have a full—
Mann: We’ll do a draft and I’ll
tell you about the—
President: John McCone talked to the head of
every government in Europe, and every one of ‘em think we’re terribly
wrong, and our side has never
been given, and when he explained it to ‘em they said, “well where in
the hell has your Secretary of State been.”During a February 6 luncheon meeting with Rusk, McCone restated that “world opinion was thoroughly
convinced that the United States actually invaded Panama, killing
Panamanians,” and that he “could not understand the reluctance on
the part of the President and Rusk to admit participation of Castro Communists in
the Panama situation.” (Memorandum for the record by McCone, February 6; Central
Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A,
Memos for the Record, January 1–April 5, 1964)
Mann: All right, we’ll start
drafting away on that and get it out.In a
telephone conversation with the President on February 5 Mann reported that Secretary
Rusk was planning to make
a statement on February 7 that would correct a number of
misconceptions in the press on the events in Panama. He also
reported that work was continuing on the Gavito plan, and that the
meetings in the OAS were proceeding
well. “I thought Bunker
handled himself extremely well,” he said. “The Latins are—nearly all
of them expressed, when they voted for the Rio Treaty, said they
were not passing on who was guilty and who was innocent. They made
that very clear, and I think that was very helpful.” (Recording of
telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Thomas Mann, February 5, 10:35 a.m.; Johnson
Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F64.10, Side B, PNO 3)
Rusk addressed the dispute
with Panama at his press conference on February 7; for text, see
Department of State Bulletin, February 24,
1964, pp. 274–275. Now, should I talk to
Ralph about these latest changes?
President: Yeah.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Panama.]
388. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Southern
CommandSource: National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
POL PAN–US. Confidential;
Immediate. Drafted by Mann
and cleared by Bunker.Washington, February 8, 1964, 1:00
p.m.
USCINCSO 17. For Martin from Mann. Re Your SC1666A.In
telegram SC1666A, February 7, Martin provided Mann with a long analysis of political developments
and possibilities. (Ibid.) Appreciate your helpful analysis
of current situation in Panama.
I am sure you understand that we would prefer to see Chiari continue in office because of
inevitable risks for us inherent in any political upheaval and
probability that United States will be blamed for causing Chiari’s downfall. At same time I do
not believe we should alienate
Arnulfo Arias or any other non-communist political group for the reason
that they may come to power no matter what we do or say. If they do we
will have to deal with them. It seems to me, therefore, that as between
non-communist groups our attitude should be one of strict
nonintervention and that we should take special care to avoid the
appearance of having intervened against Chiari.In a meeting between
representatives of ARA and CIA on February 5, Mann had inquired what the
Communists would do should Chiara fall. He said “if the commies take
over we are ready to send in troops, but we want to know in
advance.” Mann was told that
there was no evidence the Communists were working with Arnulfo Arias
and that it would not be “the end of the world” if Arias took over,
since “Arnulfo was probably the only one that could control the
streets.” (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, Denney, and Evans, February 6; Department of
State, INR/IL Historical Files,
ARA/CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965)
You are correct in saying that our main concern at moment is to prevent
growth of commie influence and especially any commie takeover. In this
connection, we will, as you suggest, review all evidence available to us
regarding Arnulfo Arias and his group and their connections with
leftists and extremists, especially communists. I think it is obviously
important for us to have as clear an idea as we can get of the role and
influence which the communists would have should Arnulfo Arias take
over.
I learned this morning that the General Committee acting under the Rio
Treaty has appointed a five man committee consisting of representatives
of Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil and Costa Rica to do both the
mediation and the investigation job.On
February 4 Bunker defended the
U.S. record in Panama concerning the events of January 9 and 10
before the Organization of American States Council. (Department of
State Bulletin, February 24, 1964, pp. 302–304) On February 7 the
Council met and adopted a resolution calling upon both sides not to
take steps that might endanger the peace and creating a general
committee of all members of the Organ of Consultation, except Panama
and the United States, to investigate the events of January 9 and
10, to submit a report on efforts of the Governments of Panama and
the United States to find a solution, to assist in finding a “just
solution,” and to create special subcommittees as needed. The
resolution was adopted by a vote of 15–0–2 (Chile and Colombia). The
text of the resolution is ibid., p. 304.
Sanchez Gavito says the strategy
is to go slow on the investigation and to push hard on mediation with
the aim of getting relations restored and United States-Panamanian
bilateral talks started.
At the same time, Sanchez Gavito
stated that there is an OAS consensus
that the OAS should have a presence in
Panama City and that the plan is for the five man committee to depart
for Panama soon. Sanchez Gavito
estimated that the five man committee might stay in Panama a week or ten
days and then return.
Even though Cottrell is arriving in Balboa today, I think you should stay
on in Panama long enough to be sure that the committee is not going to
plunge immediately into an investigation of the facts or take other
important action during its stay there. When had you planned to return
to Washington?
Rusk
389. Telephone Conversation Between President
Johnson and the President’s Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source:
Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
McGeorge Bundy; Tape
F64.13, Side B, PNO 7. No classification marking. This transcript
was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this
volume.Washington, February 20, 1964, 5:05
p.m.
President: Adlai has got a new formula that starts
us out where we were the first day to negotiate a treaty—a new
treaty—with the Panamanians.During a
conversation a few minutes earlier with
Johnson, Stevenson suggested that Chiari was interested in the
following formula to resolve the impasse with the United States:
“the two parties agree to appoint negotiators to discuss and review
all aspects of U.S.-Panama relations, including the Canal Zone. The
President responded that, “we could’ve agreed on that, Governor, the
first day.”Johnson stated that this language
would give the impression that the United States would re-negotiate
the treaty, or at least that is the way the Panamanians would view
it. Stevenson suggested that
the language did not include a pre-commitment to re-negotiate the
treaty, and he asked Johnson to consider it
seriously rather than rejecting it immediately. The President was
not convinced. (Recording of telephone conversation between
President Johnson and Adlai Stevenson, February 20, 5
p.m.; ibid., Tape 64.13, Side B, PNO 6)
Bundy: Oh, I don’t believe
it.
President: And he doesn’t see
anything wrong with it, and if he were Secretary of State and the
President both he would negotiate it. And, so I thanked him and told him
to put it in the mail and send it down. You watch for it.
Bundy: (Laughter) What am I
supposed to do with it, make him burn it, or answer?
President: Oh, he was kind of
sniffy. He said that I hope that you won’t reject it out of hand; I hope
you’ll carefully consider it.
Bundy: Well, we’ll do that.
President: ‘Cause the quicker you
settle this one the better off you’ll be, and so forth. And the truth of
it is I think Mr. Chiari wants
to settle it.
Bundy: Uh huh. Uh huh. Has he had
anything from the Panamanians or is this out of his own head?
President: Oh, I think he’s just
gettin’ into a field where—he’s been down talking to the State
Department about it and they added to it, “without any prior
commitments.” Now, were you in here the other day when we had the
Senators here?
Bundy: No sir, I was still on
that short holiday (laughter).
President: I wish you’d been here
and heard the hell I caused by just mentioning it.
Bundy: Yeah.
President: And I’m not—well,
anyway, we just want to carefully consider it, weigh it and everything,
and then do nothing about it.
Bundy: Right.
President: I’m not going to
use—the two words I’m not going to use are “negotiate” and “revising the
treaty.”
Bundy: Yep.
President: I told them that to
begin with, and the quicker they find that out, the better off they’ll
be.
Bundy: Right.
President: And, if we can get any
other language—I think that we say that when we say we’ll talk to ‘em
about anything, anywhere any time.
Bundy: We’ve got a good sentence
in tomorrow’s speech on that. It says we’ll talk about all problems, and
we’ll, you know, we can do it any time and any place. There’s no
problem. And I think, Mr. President, that there’s a new formula that
ought to be looked at, which is that we ought to get some third party to
say what they think they want to sit down and talk about, and we say
what we think we ought to talk about, and then we just agree to talk
about it. We don’t care what Chiari says he’s going to do. He can say, “I’m going in
to revise the treaties,” and we say “we’re going to discuss.” That
wouldn’t bother you, would it? He can propose anything he wants.
President: Well, I’d let him cool
off for awhile.
Bundy: That’s what I—you know, my
honest judgment, I’m sorry to say, is that I think there’s not a five
percent chance of settling this before their elections.
President: I think that’s
right.
Bundy: I think it’s easier just
to play it along. Now, there are some hazards down there, and Panama is
not in the best of condition, and there’s some losses in moving this direction, but
the losses—we’ve taken an exceedingly clear position—the losses in
moving away from that are very much greater. I’ve seen the polls on this
subject, and I’m sure you have—the position of the U.S. Government—
President: Well, I just brought
over a picture of Ted Sorensen and his girl, and Walter Winchell is on
the same column, and he’s got the damnedest diatribe about how we’ve
been mistreated you ever saw.
[Omitted here is a brief discussion unrelated to Panama.]
390. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource:Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Panama Riots. Vol. II, Part G, January–February, 1964.
Bundy wrote the following
note at the top of the page: “P[resident] read but doesn’t really
agree.”Washington, February 25, 1964.
SUBJECT
Panama
I want to tell you quite privately that I agree with Dean Rusk that it would be good to get Panama
off the stage for the present, if we can do so without retreat.Rusk, McNamara, Mann, and Bundy met with the President from
5:45 to 6:05 p.m. on February 25. (Ibid.; President’s Daily Diary)
No written record of their conversation has been found, but it was
at this meeting that Rusk
presumably made this suggestion. The two basic elements which
you have established and defended without a break since January 9 are
that we will not agree in advance to revision of the treaties, and that
we will not agree to “negotiate.” I believe that any form of language
which leads to a resumption of relations and a beginning of talks is a
victory for the United States and for you, if these two conditions are
met.
There are rumors of deterioration in Panama, and we could well have
trouble of various sorts between now and May. Of course these same
rumors are helping to move Chiari—if he is moving. As long as the monkey is clearly
on Chiari’s back, we can stand
any trouble, but if we should have a chance to get language which meets
our essential conditions and let it go, I think we could come under some
attack. It is not yet clear that we have such language, and there is one
word that I would change in
the Costa Rican draft,The draft language
reads: “The parties agree to appoint negotiators with sufficient
powers to discuss and reconsider all aspects of United States of
America-Panamanian relations, including the canal treaties, to seek
the prompt elimination of the causes of the dispute with a view to
harmonizing the just interests of both parties and their
responsibilities to the Hemisphere and world trade. Both parties
agree to discuss the differences existing between them without
preconditions as to the positions they may consider necessary to
adopt as a final result of the meetings that will take place between
the negotiators.” (Telegram 3195 from USUN, February 26; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAN–US) the last word
“negotiators.” But we are getting close.
I have always supposed that if we did get into talks with the Panamanians
we would find ourselves able to agree to significant changes in our
existing relations without giving way on gut issues like the perpetuity
clause or our own ultimate responsibility for the security and
effectiveness of the Canal. Your choice of Vaughan as your prospective
Ambassador shows your own readiness to pick a man who has much more
basic sympathy for the Panamanians than for the conservative Americans
in the Canal Zone (almost too much so, in my judgment).
The talks can go on for a long time, and there should be a clear
understanding on both sides that they will. But I myself think they can
lead to a new level of understanding, provided we get past election year
emotions on both sides.
We have been right so far, and there is nothing cosmic about this issue
yet, but I do think it would be good to take talks with no retreat if we
can get them.
McG. B.
391. Telephone Conversation Between President
Johnson and Senator Richard RussellSource:Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts,
Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Richard Russell, Tape F64.14, Side B, PNO 1. No
classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office
of the Historian specifically for this volume.Washington, February 26, 1964, 12:10
p.m.
President: Dick?
Russell: Yes sir.
President: Getting a lot of power
and pressure here on Panama, now, and I’ve got this thing down to about
where it says practically what I’ve been saying all the time. I don’t
know how I can resist it much longer when the Secretary of State,
Defense, and Bundy, and all my
advisers, think that we’re going to cause an explosion if we don’t sit
down at the table with them. They’ve come in now with a Costa Rican
proposal that is two paragraphs, and I want to read it to you. I think
if you’ll take one moment I’ll read you what Bundy says to me. It is kind of a summary:
[The President read the text of Document
390.]
Now, he feels rather deeply there because I overrode all of them last
night—in fact, this morning with this combined language:
[Omitted here is the language from footnote 3,
Document 390.]
Russell: Well, of course,
Panamanians are going to accept that as an assurance that we will make
some substantial changes in the provisions of the treaty. I know you’re
under a bit of pressure down there, Mr. President.
President: Well, I know, but as I
see this, I don’t say I’m going to do a damned thing but discuss it, and
that is what I’ve said the first moment I talked to him. And now maybe I
read it wrong, but I’ve got it down to where that’s about what I say.
I’m not going to have any pre-conditions whatever.
Russell: What’s the word after
“pre-conditions”?
President: “Without
pre-conditions as to the positions they may consider necessary to adopt
as a final result of the meetings that will take place between the
negotiators.”
Russell: The trouble is that this
pressure is going to be relentless, and those negotiators will go down
there and want to give something and then Bundy and Rusk and
New York Times school of thought will put
relentless pressure on you.
President: That’s right—there’s
no question—they’ve been doin’ that for 2 months.
Russell: And they will not give
the American people even a part of their view. It has never been
mentioned here that the last time we had to settle with them we gave
them about $40 million worth of property down there—just gave it to them
out of hand. I don’t know what they’ve done with it. I reckon Chiari and these other Presidents have
stolen it. You can steal it and get your hands on it once you’re in
there. But we gave them a tremendous amount of property there and
they’re going to expect something equally big or bigger out of this, and
I don’t know how we’re just gonna get it. Of course, it could get it
through a treaty or be taken out of the Alliance for Progress funds, but
there’s never going to be a time that that group’s not going to be
urging you to give in to Panama [unintelligible].
President: We know that. We know
that. Well, I’ll say Bundy has
supported me on this all the way through. I’ve just taken it on and
Mann has supported me—Tom
Mann. Tom thinks it’s brought us a good deal of respect in the
Hemisphere. Tom Mann thinks this has helped us. Tom Mann thinks we’re
stronger in the Hemisphere today than we were 90 days ago because of
what we’ve done in Panama and what we’ve done in Cuba. He thinks we’re
in worse shape than we’ve been in 20 years, and that the Hemisphere is
in a very dangerous position, but he thinks that these two little
insignificant moves have let them know that—“don’t tread on me.” And he
thought they needed to know that pretty much.
Russell: I can’t help but feel
that it has helped us.
[Omitted here is discussion relating to Cuba and other parts of the
Hemisphere.]
President: Now, let me go back
again. I’ve got to sit down and talk to ‘em, and I don’t know how I can
get by saying any less.
Russell: There’s just one thing
in there that shook me a little bit. Go ahead and read it again.
President: “The parties agree to
appoint negotiators”—I named Tom Mann—“with sufficient powers to discuss
and reconsider”— they’ve got to say that they’ve got to have the power
to discuss—“all aspects of U.S. and Panamanian relations”—I told them
that from the first day I’ll discuss anything, anywhere, any time, but I
wouldn’t agree on any pre-conditions before I sit down—they didn’t make
me do that with the Russians in Berlin—“including the Canal Zone treaties with a view
to”—doing what?—“to harmonizing the just interest of both parties”— I
assume our men will look after our interests—we’ll just have to fight
that—“seeking the prompt elimination of the causes of dispute—”
Russell: We being in there is the
cause of it.
President: “and fulfill their
responsibilities to the Hemisphere and world trade. Both parties agree
to discuss the differences existing between them without pre-conditions
as to positions they may consider necessary to adopt as a final result
of the meetings that will take place between the negotiators.” Now, that
adds up in one word—and I may not be—if I can read and understand—now,
I’m not a lawyer, and I may not be—but I have not implied or said that I
would do anything except discuss any problem they had.
Russell: It is all very clear to
me except that word “reconsider.” I don’t exactly understand what you’re
going to reconsider.
Johnson: Well, the first thing, we’ve got no diplomatic relations. We’ve
got to start out—talk. They want so many employees. They say the Canal
Zone has got all our people. They’ve got different wage rates. They’ve
thought up a good many of these things and our people tell me that maybe
we ought to have a civilian governor instead of some retired military man that knows nothing
about it, that maybe we—Cy Vance
says that he can take a list of 15–20 minor things that could create
some of this friction with the workers.
Russell: They don’t know what
they want, Mr. President. We pay them almost the same thing now. There’s
little difference for the overseas. A Panamanian working for the Canal
gets the same thing as a canal worker on a lock on the Savannah River in
Augusta.
President: But some of them get a
pack of cigarettes for 15 cents in the Zone and 50 cents some other
places—got commissaries and all kinds of different cut-rates. Anyway,
they think—the Army thinks— Vance
thinks—and I think he’s pretty able about it—that we can find a good
many things that would improve conditions, if we’d been alert to it. We
ought to have a new Board and able Board with good men on it—Gene Black
type of man, instead of some just honorary [unintelligible] deal, and
they all understand that this is a real problem and we’ve got real
interests to protect. Tom Mann thinks we ought to start taking some
borings in Nicaragua for a sea-level canal, and he thinks that will put
them in place a little bit. We’ve got a good many things that we think
we can do that will help, but we’re just refusing to agree on any
language now, and I have said I’ll discuss anything, any time.
Russell: Well, I think that’s all
right, except when you get together, then the price is going to be—
President: Oh, hell, yes, that’s
right. But I can’t fail to get together without hurting myself, can’t
I?
Russell: Well, I don’t think
you’re hurt up to now.
President: No [unintelligible].
Well, thank you my friend.
Russell: Yes sir.
392. Editorial Note
On February 26, 1964, at 12:31 p.m., President
Johnson spoke on the phone with Adlai Stevenson, who was in Washington to
testify at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Stevenson urged the President
to approve the language of a proposed agreement between the United
States and Panama that had been worked out by President Orlich of Costa
Rica (see footnote 3, Document
390.)Johnson said to Stevenson: “I think when you say you’re
gonna reconsider the treaties that the implication is you’re gonna
rewrite the treaties, and that you’re gonna rewrite the substance of
‘em, and that you’re gonna get rid of the perpetuity clause, which
they’re claiming, and I think
that they’ll think that. And then the heat that’s gonna be on me when
they—The New York Times—and my negotiator sits
down with ‘em— they come back in—it’s gonna be something
terrific.”Johnson then complained about
Panama’s actions and expressed his willingness to discuss anything, but
reiterated his opposition to having “to say in a written document that I
am going to reconsider a treaty.”Johnson continued:
“I’ve talked to the leading people who would have to consider a treaty
and I couldn’t find one vote anywhere. And I think that we’re just
toying with somethin’ that we couldn’t have the United States Senate—my
honest judgment is I couldn’t get 20 votes for any treaty that
substantially rewrote the present one.”
Stevenson presented the case for
resolving the issue as soon as possible by accepting the current
language, which he told Johnson he had drafted in
part:
“I do think that it’s awfully important from your point of view
to clear away this little mess, because it’s affecting the
attitude of Latin Americans way beyond the boundaries of Panama,
as you know. I feel as though we’re stuck on this dime, and that
this controversy between this miniscule country and the United
States is totally avoidable and unnecessary—it’s a diversion of
attention from the major problems in Latin America. I just think
that from the State Department point of view it’s much better to
get this one out of the way with language as good as this, which
is so far from where we started, we’d be well advised to do
it.”
Johnson told Stevenson that he
preferred to use the term “representatives” rather than “negotiators.”
(Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Adlai
Stevenson;Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts,
Tape F64.14, Side B, PNO 2)
The President then spoke to Rusk
about the proposed language of the agreement with Panama. “There’s no
use in our debating it; we’d better just let it ride for a day or two.”
The President agreed to allow Rusk
to come to the White House to discuss the draft language, but told him:
“I’m not going to buy what I got on my desk.” (Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
Dean Rusk, February 26, 1:10
p.m.; ibid., Tape F64.15, Side A, PNO 1)
Johnson talked to Senator William Fulbright later
that afternoon: “Adlai came down and started a heat wave on Panama. He
got into negotiations up there without anybody knowing it and he came up
with a proposal that we turned down in the first hour when we talked to
the President of Panama, and we have made positive proposals to ‘em and
we think that in due time they will come around and get them, but I had
to see Tom Mann and I had to see Rusk and I had to talk to Adlai for an hour …” (Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and William
Fulbright, February 26, 3:06 p.m.; ibid., Tape F64.15, Side A, PNO 2)
The portions of the conversations printed here were prepared in the
Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
The afternoon of February 26 Thomas Mann sent the mission at the United
Nations a variation on the Orlich text that the President would accept
provided that Panama “resumes relations with the United States prior to
commencement of discussions.” The revised text reads:
“The parties agree to appoint authorized representatives with
sufficient powers to discuss and consider all aspects of United
States and Panama relations, without any limitation whatever, to
seek the prompt elimination of the causes of dispute with a view
to harmonizing the just interest of both parties and their
responsibilities to the Hemisphere and world trade. Both parties
agree to discuss the differences existing between them without
preconditions as to the positions they may consider necessary to
adopt as a final result of the meetings that will take place
between the authorized representatives.” (Telegram 2284 to USUN,
February 26; National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1964–66, POL
PAN–US)
Although there were indications from some Panamanians that the dispute
would soon be resolved, by February 29 there was no official response
from Panama on the revised text of the proposal set forth by President
Orlich. Mann informed the White
House he had been told that Sanchez
Gavito, the Mexican Ambassador to the OAS, was prepared to put forth a proposal
to the OAS Peace Committee that would
perhaps break the deadlock between the United States and Panama on the
language of an agreement. Mann
wrote to Bundy that “this
approach has possibilities because it gets us off the hook of being
unable to agree on the pre-conditions.” (Memorandum from Mann to Mc-George Bundy, February 29;Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. III, March 1964) After
consulting with Bundy that
afternoon, the President approved the proposal “as a basis for
negotiations to be conducted by Ambassador Sanchez Gavito, acting entirely on his own initiative.
The fact of prior consultation with the United States Government will
not be revealed.” (Memorandum for the record by Bundy, March 29; ibid.)
393. Telephone Conversation Between President
Johnson and Secretary of State RuskSource:Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts,
Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Dean Rusk, Tape F64.15, Side B, PNO 1. No classification
marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian
specifically for this volume.Washington, March 2, 1964, 11:35
a.m.
President: What’s the news on
your front today?
Rusk: Well, I think that maybe
your press conference helped ease things—the tension—a bit on this
Panama business.In a press conference on
February 29 President Johnson stated he
realized that the treaty with Panama had been written in 1903 and
modified from time to time, that “problems are involved that need to
be dealt with and perhaps would require adjustment in the treaty.”
He also said that “Just because Panama happens to be a small nation,
maybe no larger than the city of St. Louis, is no reason why we
shouldn’t try in every way to be equitable and fair and just. We are
going to insist on that. But we are going to be equally insistent on
no preconditions.” (Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–64, Book I, p.
325) I think we may find a way to get some progress there.
Cyprus: we’re expecting word from the Turks about—
President: On Panama, what are we
going to do? Is Tom Mann getting Mexico to say that we are anxious to
talk any time, anywhere about anything, period?
Rusk: That is the present ploy.
That is the present move so that the two governments would not have to
say anything, but the OAS would simply
recommend that they establish relations and get to the conference table.
But you’ll have a chance to see any text before any agreement is given
on it. Have you had any reactions to your press conference from the
Hill today?
President: No.In a telephone conversation with the President that
evening, Senator Fulbright, reacting to the President’s press
conference statement on Panama, told Johnson:
“I thought you put it very well.” The President responded: “All
right. You just stay with me and we’ll do all right.” (Recording of
telephone conversation between President
Johnson and William Fulbright, March 2,
8:50 p.m.;Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F64.16,
Side A, PNO 2) Earlier that day George Ball had told the President:
“I thought you did splendidly, and I thought you advanced the
possibility of working something out.” (Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
George Ball, March 2,
11:50 a.m.; ibid., Tape F64.15, Side B, PNO 2)
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Panama.]
President: Now, on Panama I think
if the Mexican thing doesn’t work today, we ought to come in some other
place, and somebody ought to say tomorrow, we want to talk any time,
anywhere, about anything. We’re ready. Let’s press them; let’s shove
them a little bit.
Rusk: Right.
President: If we need to call
Chiari again, maybe we ought
to get in direct communication with him and say, “why don’t we resume
diplomatic relations and sit down. We got a number of plans for
improving this thing if you’ll do it, and we may not have an agreement
for a year or two, but there’s no reason why we ought to stand off and
bark. It’s not helping your economy and it’s not helping ours.”
Rusk: Right.
President: I’d let them be
squeezed a little more down there. I think that before they go
Communist, that they’ll go American. That’s my judgment. If you squeeze
their nuts just a little bit—I think we’ve been too generous, The New York Times and Washington
Post with them— and now we’ve showed we’re a little reluctant.
I think that maybe they’re more willing to come along if we shove it up
to them.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Panama.]
394. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, FRC 330
69 A 7425, PAN 381, Panama Crisis, January–March, 1964. Secret. A
note on the memorandum reads: “Sec Def has seen.”JCSM–157–64Washington, March 2, 1964.
SUBJECT
US Policy Toward Panama (U)In consequence of the present difficulties in US-Panamanian
relations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have undertaken an appraisal of
US military requirements in Panama for consideration in the
development of a national position toward that nation. The salient
features of this appraisal, amplified in the Appendix and Annexes
hereto,Attached but not
printed. are summarized below.Access to a canal remains vital to the economic, political, and
military interests of the United States. If denied access to such a
canal, the United States could defend its interests in limited or
general war, but its
ability to do so would be impaired. Without the availability of such
a canal, transportation costs would be increased with adverse
economic effects on the United States and certain Latin American
countries, whose political stability, in consequence, would be
adversely affected.As long as the Panama Canal remains the sole water route across
Central America, security of these vital interests of the United
States dictates the continued employment of a substantial number of
US citizens for an indefinite period and a buffer zone for its
protection. The former places affluent American communities next to
Panamanian slums. The latter results in unused land over which
Panama is denied the exercise of sovereignty. Given this situation,
it is difficult to devise any arrangement permanently satisfactory
to both the United States and Panama.The present Panama Canal is, in some respects, already inadequate
and, during the last quarter of this century, will reach the point
at which it will not be able to handle the volume of traffic
demanding its services. The construction of a wider, deeper,
sea-level canal would be advantageous to the military, economic, and
political interests of the United States. It would be less
vulnerable to sabotage, fewer forces would be required for its
protection, and the largest naval ships could be accommodated. Over
the long range, its construction would permit modification of the
basic factors which are presently the source of continuing
US-Panamanian friction. Over the short range, early decision and
active manifestation of a US intent to construct such a canal might
facilitate US discussion with Panama. Of various plans for a new
sea-level canal, one which reduces vulnerability to disruption of
the existing and proposed canal by a single military attack, or by
the action of a single political group, is preferred
militarily.In addition to the protection of the canal, the US military
presence in Panama is associated with hemispheric security. The
importance of this latter mission is increasing with the growing
threat of Castro-communist subversion. Panama is valuable in this
connection because US forces and facilities are already there. The
United States could acquire, but only at a substantial price,
comparable facilities elsewhere. Nevertheless, no substitute
presently exists, and the United States should seek to maintain the
military base complex in Panama considered essential for the purpose
of hemispheric security.To provide a basis for the determination of a US position and the
development of detailed positions necessary to support national
policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of
Defense: Support: An early decision for the construction of a
sea-level interoceanic canal at a location which
reduces vulnerability to disruption of both the existing and
proposed canals by a single military attack, or by
the action of a single political group.Action which will clearly indicate that the early
construction of such a canal is a firm US
intention.The concept that discussion with Panama be
premised on the firm US intent to construct such a
canal.The view that the United States should insist on
maintaining military areas and facilities related to
the operation, maintenance, sanitation, and
protection of the Panama Canal and to hemispheric
security. However, nonessential areas and facilities
in the Canal Zone, including acreage not required
for a minimum buffer zone, should be identified by
US agencies for possible transfer to Panama in the
event further concessions are deemed necessary. In
return for any US concessions, the United States
should insist on Panamanian recognition that at
present, and for the foreseeable future: The US military presence in Panama is
important to and in furtherance of hemispheric
security.The conclusion of an agreement pertaining to
base rights and the status of military forces
outside the Canal Zone is an important and
appropriate contribution Panama can and should
make to the inter-American system.In implementation of subparagraph 6 a (4) above, request
the Secretary of the Army, in his capacity as personal
representative of the President and as the stockholder of
the Panama Canal Company, to: Provide appropriate guidance to the Governor of
the Canal Zone/President of the Panama Canal Company
for a joint study, with the Commander in Chief, US
Southern Command, of areas and facilities which
might be transferred to US military
jurisdiction.Determine whether the Canal Zone Government will
agree to transfer to US military jurisdiction that
part of the Coco Solo complex, with attendant
housing, which is presently under Canal Zone
Government control.In implementation of subparagraph 6 a (4) (b)
above, direct the preparation of a proposed base
rights and status of forces agreement for eventual
use in discussions with the Republic of
Panama.For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Maxwell D. TaylorChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff
395. Telegram From the U.S. Southern
Command to the Department of
StateSource:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL PAN–US.
Confidential.Canal Zone, March 5, 1964,
0740Z.
SC2024A. For Mann from Cottrell.
Following is the way I add up the situation at the present moment: Heavy pressures on Chiari are increasing daily from business men
and publishers to restore relations and arrest the economic
decline. Support from this group for standing on principles has
vanished in direct proportion to the threat to their pocket
books. Their former support is turning rapidly to criticism of
Chiari having
handled the situation very badly.Workers in Panama are very concerned as notices of layoffs are
received, and their former support for the government is
vanishing.Arnulfo’s star is rising among the workers as a magician who
will restore the situation. Thus, Chiari must see that a continued stalemate is
working against his administration and against the chances of
Robles in the May
elections. The oligarchy’s fear of Arnulfo is providing
additional political pressure on Chiari for an early settlement.The forces exerting pressure on Chiari to stand firm are his hard line left
advisors, student leaders and Communists, plus possibly
Moreno and Boyd with
political axes to grind who have nothing to lose and much to
gain if they can induce the US to cave on the negotiate
point.I believe the National Guard is capable of controlling any
violence instigated by the left and would do so if Chiari moved towards
accommodation.The formula of rioting to attract US attention and extract
concessions is an old ploy used successfully in the past. The
killing in the January 9–16 affair was an unexpected result
brought about by the trained Communist additive to the old
recipe. The killings produced a real shock causing Chiari to over react and paint
himself into a corner.I believe Moreno and
Boyd were turned loose by Chiari to see how far they could go in pushing
the US to accept the Chiari position. This probing ran into a stone
wall and I think the realization is now sinking in here that the
stalemate can only be broken by a Chiari retreat from his position.The former violent feelings against Americans, the zone and
the US armed forces are receding rapidly in my opinion. Visiting
Americans,
consular officers and Americans living in Panama City now move
freely about the city without molestation or evidence of any
apparent hostility on the part of the general population.In my opinion the Communists made great headway in promoting
the riots and during the present stalemate, particularly in
strengthening and broadening the base of their organization.
However, in the present climate I do not think they yet have the
capability of matching or neutralizing the National
Guard.
Conclusion: Despite the hazards of political predictions, in my best
judgment at this moment, I think the shifting of the balance of forces
here indicates a Chiari
accommodation and restoration of relations at any time within this
month. I do not believe he will sit tight until the May elections much
less October. If he were to make this mistake I think he will be
removed. Based on my previous experience in Panama during similar but
less serious riots I believe that this last tantrum is nearing its end.
There may be a coup if Chiari
does not move but I do not believe there will be any further rioting
against the zone this year. Amen.
396. Telephone Conversation Between President
Johnson and Senator Richard RussellSource:Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts,
Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Richard Russell, Tape F64.16, Side B, PNO 3. No
classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office
of the Historian specifically for this volume.Washington, March 9, 1964, 9:45 p.m.
President: I think this is pretty
much our formula and I’ve got to let them know in the morning, and it
looked all right to me but there might be a catch in it and I just want
to check it.
“The governments of the Republic of Panama and the United States of
America have agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations as soon as
possible to seek the prompt elimination of the causes of conflict
relative to the Panama Canal and to attempt to resolve other
problems existing between them without limitations or any
pre-conditions of any kind. As a result, within 30 days following
re-establishment of diplomatic relations, both governments will
designate special am
bassadors with sufficient powers to carry out discussions and
negotiations with the objective of reaching a just and fair
international agreement which will eliminate the above mentioned
causes of conflict and resolve the other problems referred to above.
Any agreements that may result would be subject to the
constitutional processes of each country.”
Russell: [Laughter] Well, that’s
one of the most skillfully worded statements I ever read, Mr.
President.
President: Well, it’s ours. We’ve
had to be negotiatin’ and we’ve had new treaties and everything, and I
said I’m willin’ to say I’ll meet ‘em any time, anywhere, any place, and
do what’s fair and just and right, but I will not agree to negotiate a
new treaty unless I think that one is required and I’m not going to
agree to any precondition. I’m going to say that I don’t so they don’t
get misled.
[Omitted here are several minutes of word-by-word analysis of the
statement, discussion of haggling over language, and conversation
related to Cuba.]
President: He [Mann] came in the other day and asked
me to sign this agreement and said we’re close to it and we need to sign
it now, and we attached appendix A and B, your conversation, the
press—and Chiari’s, and I said, “No I won’t sign that; I just won’t do
it.” He had Rusk with him; he had
Bundy with him; and he had
McNamara with him. All of
them had recommended it and I said I’m not going to do that and he said,
“Why?” And I said because Chiari
says he’s going to have a new treaty and I’m not going to admit to it. I
may have one— may agree to it—but I’m not going to say I’m going to have
it. I said that from the first day. Now, the second thing I’m not going
to say—I am not going to say in your formal statement here, you say
“negotiate.” I’m not going to say I am going to negotiate a new treaty.
Now, that’s in the formal statement, and that’s in Chiari’s statement, so those two
things go out. So he said, we’ll do what you say. So I cut it back and
sent it back to ‘em. Now they’re coming in here tonight at 8 o’clock
with this statement. Now Chiari
hasn’t approved it but the OAS has urged
this be done.
Russell: Well, he’s gettin’
weak.
President: Well, I told them to
squeeze his nuts a little more [unintelligible].
Russell: Has got him by the balls
and he has to come in a little later ‘cause you’ve got his water cut
off—he can’t move.
President: Now, I notified Cy
Vance 5 o’clock this
afternoon. They think they’re going to have a big demonstration if this
happens, and that they’re gonna try and take over—the Communists are—and
I just said we’re not going to have any Cuba there. They say it will be
from the Communists who’ve got a foothold there and they’re going to be raising hell about it and
are going to try to have a Communist coup when this takes place.In that telephone conversation, Vance warned President
Johnson that Chiari “is going to recognize US now and therefore
we’re tightening up our shoe laces in case there should be any
violence associated with that.” (Recording of telephone conversation
between President Johnson and Cyrus Vance, March 9, 5:05 p.m.;
ibid., Tape F64.16, Side B, PNO 2)
Russell: Well, half of the police
he’s got there can beat the socks off of ‘em.
President: Well, this General
O’Meara can. They tell me he’s smart. He’s on the job and I trust
him.
Russell: O’Meara’s tough as hell.
You give him the reins.
President: I’ve done given him
the reins; I’ve done given him the reins. I told Cy Vance at 5 o’clock this afternoon to
tell O’Meara that we would not have another Cuba in this hemisphere, if
he had enough men; if he didn’t, I’d send him some more.
Russell: Don’t need the men, just
a little freedom of movement. O’Meara is a pretty tough fellow.
President: Well, he’s got his
orders. Okay, now if you don’t see anything wrong with this I’m going to
go on.
Russell: Well, it’s all right,
not near as bad as I thought you’d be driven to.
President: No, you didn’t think
I’d be driven to it. Now don’t go needlin’ me, Dick. What are you tryin’
to do, I’m still at work. I haven’t even had dinner and you just needle
me, my friend—now don’t.
Russell: I wouldn’t be your
friend if I didn’t tell you what I thought.
President: Well, now you do think
it is wonderful. You didn’t think I’d run, did you?
Russell: No. No, you haven’t.
President: So help me, I’m not
runnin’ yet.
Russell: No. You left the door
open to get out. You haven’t run a foot yet.
President: Well, we’ve
always—you’ve never said you wouldn’t sign a new—you’d do what is fair,
don’t you?
Russell: Absolutely.
President: That’s all I’m going
to do.
Russell: I hope so.
President: If it’s not fair and
just, I’m not going to do it.
[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam.]
397. Editorial Note
On March 10, 1964, the President talked on the telephone with Mc-George Bundy about the latest
proposed language for an agreement on Panama. The President was
concerned about reports from Panama and in the press that an agreement
with Panama leading to resumption of relations and the prospect of
negotiations for a new treaty was imminent. Johnson
told Bundy: “We’re not goin’ to
have prima facie evidence that we’re agreeing to a new treaty.” He did
not want to be put in the position of being bullied by The New York Times and Washington Post
into accepting an agreement that could be interpreted as U.S. acceptance
of the Panamanian demand to negotiate a new treaty. Referring to some of
their journalists, the President told Bundy: “I think they’re very dangerous characters, and I
don’t think that we can allow them to get us boxed in here.” He
continued: “Let’s don’t have Nixon and the rest of them saying we’re negotiatin’ a
treaty.” (Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, March 10, 10:57 a.m.; Johnson Library,
Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F64.17, Side A, PNO 1)
The President then called Mann and
told him that he had spoken to Bundy and there were three things he opposed in the
draft: the mention of “negotiations,” “Panama Canal,” and
“international.” “Now, if I have to give,” he said, “I’d leave ‘Panama
Canal’ in up in the first paragraph, although it’s desirable to take
out, and I might even take ‘international.’ I’m not going to take
‘negotiations’, though.” He added:
“And I’d squeeze their nuts a little down there, anyway, if I
were you. I’d tighten it a little bit and let them worry a
little bit. I don’t think we need to come hat in hand. We’ve
been fair, and we’re going to continue to be fair, but let’s
don’t—just—I’m tired of these people that recede and concur
every time the U.S. is attacked. I want to resist somebody
somewhere, some time. I’m not a warmonger, and don’t want to go
to war. But I don’t think we’re goin’.”
Mann said that he had “some other ideas that would protect us some.” The
President then told Mann:
“You were just as right as you could be, my friend, on
negotiations the first day—not that it means anything other than
discussion, but to them it means a new treaty, and we might as
well face this thing now. If we agree and get along then when we
don’t have a new treaty, they’re going to say we made a
commitment and couldn’t live up to it, and I don’t want to be in
that position. I’d rather take the heat now.” (Recording of
telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Thomas Mann, March 10, 11:11 a.m.; ibid., Tape
F64.17, Side A, PNO 2) The portions of the conversations printed
here were prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically
for this volume. Another record of this conversation is in a
March 10 memorandum of conversation; ibid., Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, January
14, 1964–April 30,
1965. The Mann record of
the conversation indicates that it took place at 11:40 a.m.
According the President’s Daily Diary, Johnson met
for lunch with Rusk, Mann, and McGeorge Bundy at 1:12 p.m., March 10, during which
Panama was no doubt discussed. (Johnson Library) No other record of this
meeting has been found.
398. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79R
01012A, DDI Files, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem.
According to a note on the cover sheet, this estimate was prepared
in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense
and the National Security Agency. The U.S. Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on March 11.SNIE 84–64Washington, March 11, 1964.
THE SHORT RUN OUTLOOK IN PANAMA
The Problem
To examine the situation and short run prospects in Panama, with
particular emphasis on the Castro-Communist threat.
Conclusions
The process of political change in Panama, where the uneasy rule
of the elite was being challenged by a variety of extreme
nationalists, has been accelerated by the canal crisis. With general
elections scheduled for 10 May, political maneuvering is in full
swing. All the candidates are virtually compelled to take a strong
nationalistic stand. Candidates and party alignments are still
likely to be changed. The power struggle may not be resolved at the
ballot box; any of the principal candidates might resort to a coup
rather than accept defeat. A new government might feel more able to
compromise on the canal issue, although it would first try to
consolidate its control of the government apparatus.The Communists and Castroists, riding the current wave of rabid
nationalism, have made substantial gains. They have established
effective cooperation with each other, have expanded and improved
their organizations, and have increased their influence with
nationalists both in and out of government. We do not believe that
they are strong enough at this stage to carry out a coup by
themselves. We believe
that in the immediate future they will concentrate on working with
radical nationalist elements to undermine the already weakened rule
of the traditional oligarchy. They will also seek to keep the canal
issue alive and unresolved.One durable result of the crisis is this: from a negligible factor
in Panamanian life, the Communists and the Castroists have become a
significant one. Their short run prospects have been sharply
improved, and the longer the treaty issue remains agitated, the more
lasting their gains are likely to be. Even if their strength and
influence should diminish, the heightened level of nationalism will
persist, and will confront the US with a succession of
difficulties.
[Omitted here are sections I. “The Political Framework,” II. “The Canal
Issue,” and III. “Riots and Their Aftermath.”]
IV. The May Elections
The approach of the presidential election makes it extraordinarily
difficult for the Chiari
government, or any political group, to take a moderate stand on the
canal issue. With extreme nationalism in the ascendant, each
candidate will be judged by his position on this issue, and the
campaign will have a high content of Yankee-phobia.The Contenders. There are, at this stage,
seven presidential candidates.See Annex
for a complete list of Panama’s political parties and
coalitions. [Footnote in the source text. The Annex is attached
but not printed.] (Chiari cannot succeed himself.) There is strong
pressure within the oligarchy to have the two conservative
coalitions agree on a single unity candidate, but thus far neither
candidate has been willing to withdraw. Of these currently running
only four are of consequence. Marco Robles is a member of the conservative National Liberal Party
and the candidate of the parties in Chiari’s governing
coalition. [2 lines of source text not
declassified] In effect, he will be largely judged
by Chiari’s success
or failure.Juan de Arco Galindo is a member of
the conservative National Patriotic Coalition and candidate
of the Opposition Alliance (OA).[1 line of
source text not declassified] The OA, like most
Panamanian coalitions, is an amalgam of personalistic
parties, and some of its leaders are unsavory opportunists.
Galindo’s main problem will be to keep the OA
together.Arnulfo Arias is leader and candidate
of the nationalistic Panamenista Party. [7
lines of source text not declassified] Some opinion
holds that Arnulfo may have come to the conclusion that
accommodation with the US is a necessity. [2 lines of source text not declassified]Miguel
Moreno, the candidate of the small
ultranationalist National Reformist Party, is also supported
by a diversity of other elements. He himself has frequently
expressed violently anti-US views, and the vigor with which
he has recently presented Panama’s case before the OAS has made him a national
figure. He still has little chance of election as the
nominee of a minor party, but key members of the oligarchy
may decide that his current popularity would make him a
strong unity candidate. In this capacity, he would probably
have the backing of Colonel
Bolivar Vallarino, commander of the National
Guard, with whom he has long had close personal ties.
Moreover, some of the Communist leaders see in him a way to
supplant the oligarchy by a transition government which
could pave the way for a “socialist revolution.” [less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] Moreno also happens to be the only important
candidate that the PdP has much hope of influencing.The Election Outlook. Political forces in the
country are still shifting and are likely to keep on doing so
throughout the campaign. If an honest election were held with the
present party line-up, Arnulfo would probably win against the
divided oligarchy. We believe the chances are better than even,
however, that the oligarchy will close ranks around a unity
candidate, perhaps Moreno or
Robles. In this event,
the election would probably be close. The oligarchy controls the
National Electoral Board which supervises the counting of votes and
arbitrates voting disputes, and this could be decisive in a close
election.
V. The Possibility of a Coup
With Panama in a state of acute tension there is some chance of a
coup. It could come from any one of several directions. The
oligarchy might seek to forestall an election victory, or a coup, by
Arnulfo. Arnulfo might mount a coup himself, fearing that the
oligarchy meant by chicanery or violence to keep him from the
Presidency. The Communists and Castroists might come to believe that
they could use the masses in the streets to nullify the government’s
police power and thus seize control with a small number of resolute
activists. Such an attempt would, however, mean risking their
present assets and their increasing influence. We do not regard the
likelihood of a coup as very great at present; it will probably
increase, especially in the event of continued economic
deterioration. The period between the elections in May and the new
President’s assumption of office in October will be a delicate
one.If a coup attempt were launched, the attitude of the Guardia
Nacional (GN) would be crucial;
indeed, any coup plotters would almost certainly seek to enlist the
GN’s support, or to neutralize
it. The GN is Panama’s only security
force and numbers about 3,500 men. It is a disciplined and fairly competent body,
believed to be loyal to its commander, Colonel Bolivar Vallarino. It could probably control
minor civil disorders, but in the event of widespread and sustained
disturbances it would probably not be capable of maintaining control
without substantial outside assistance.Vallarino has in the past shown himself reluctant to undertake
decisive action on his own initiative, except when the interests of
the GN were involved. He is bitterly
opposed both to Arnulfo and to the Communists, and realizes that he
would almost certainly lose his job if either took over. Hence, we
believe that Vallarino would oppose a coup attempt by either. He
would probably support a coup launched by the oligarchy to prevent
Arnulfo’s election; he might even act to prevent Arnulfo from taking
office if he were elected.
VI. The Outlook
The Government. The intense and conflicting
pressures on Chiari will
almost certainly increase. The economic consequences of the impasse
will be felt more and more by the Panamanians. To some, especially
the oligarchy, this argues for attempts at a settlement with the US.
In the minds of most, however, it probably increases anti-US
sentiment. The situation is further complicated by the May
elections; if Chiari
appeared to be settling for something less than a US commitment to
write a new canal treaty, the government coalition would almost
certainly be defeated in the election—and large-scale rioting might
be renewed.A new Panamanian Government might have stronger mass support and
thus more room for maneuver on the canal issue. Its leaders, even if
rabidly nationalistic, would no longer be under election pressures,
and presumably would have to concern themselves with reversing the
process of economic deterioration. However, a new government would
be likely to go slow, seeking first to consolidate its control of
the governmental apparatus.The Castroists and the Communists. Although
both the Castroists and Communists have made significant gains since
the crisis, we do not believe that, at this stage, they are strong
enough by themselves to seize power. Nor do we believe that they
intend in the immediate future to risk their gains and assets in
such an attempt; PdP leaders have expressed concern that the US
might directly intervene to prevent or redress a Communist takeover.
However, if it appeared that radical nationalists were about to
seize power, the Castroists and Communists would probably join them
in the hope of securing positions of major influence.Barring such an opportunity, the short run tactics of the PdP and
its sympathizers are to extend their influence, to build up their
assets, and to consolidate their gains. They will continue to
support the government’s
intransigent stand, and they will attempt to exert pressure on the
administration to stand firm. At the same time, they will try to
undermine the oligarchy, perhaps charging it with plans to betray
Panama to the US. They will capitalize on any opportunity to exploit
economic dissatisfactions and chronic social inequities. Even the
more militant VAN can be expected to adopt similar tactics, at least
for the near future.The crisis has made many Panamanians more receptive to the
ultranationalist line advanced by the Castroists and Communists. For
some, especially among the lower classes, the oft-repeated charges
of Yankee aggression have been proved. Especially during the
election period, the Castroists and Communists will continue to
profit from the strong nationalistic and anti-US sentiments rampant
in Panama, whatever their origin. If and when this chauvinistic
fervor diminishes, some reduction of their influence is likely. But
it will not vanish away. One durable result of the crisis is this:
from a negligible factor in Panamanian life, the Communists and the
Castroists have become a significant one. Their short run prospects
have been sharply improved, and the longer the treaty issue remains
agitated, the more lasting their gains are likely to be. Even if
their strength and influence should diminish, the heightened level
of nationalism will persist, and will confront the US with a
succession of difficulties.
399. Editorial Note
On March 12, 1964, McGeorge Bundy
informed President Johnson that the delegation of
five Organization of America States Ambassadors was prepared to work out
with Panama the new language of an agreement that would include the most
recent changes reflecting the President’s requirements, and that
Mann was “very eager” to have
the President’s concurrence. Johnson insisted on
another look to make sure the language was right. “I know that it’s
awfully important that we settle some of these things,” he told
Bundy, “and they’re mounting
and pickin’ up, but I’m not that anxious to settle it, and I’d just
rather ride ‘em out and take the consequences than to capitulate.” He
added: “Tom capitulates easier than I thought. He was the strongest guy
you ever saw when he started. Are there some forces that have got him
worried?” Bundy responded: “I
honestly believe that he feels that he has won this one, and you’re
looking for the third touchdown instead of the second.” (Recording of
telephone conversation between President Johnson
and McGeorge Bundy, March 12,
10:31 a.m.; Johnson Library,
Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F64.17, Side A, PNO 4) The text of the
OAS language is in telegram 462 to
Panama City, March 12; National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1964–66, POL
PAN–US)
Secretary Rusk, Assistant Secretary
Mann, and McGeorge Bundy joined President
Johnson at 1:26 p.m. in the Oval Office to
discuss the situation. William J. Jorden in Panama
Odyssey, includes an account of the meeting in which the
President’s anger and disappointment with Mann, as expressed to Bundy in the telephone conversation cited above, had not
subsided. According to Jorden’s account, Mann threatened to resign and
Johnson threatened to fire him, but the moment
passed and the two agreed to work together. Mann also agreed to inform Ambassador Sanchez Gavito that the President would
not accept the language. (University of Texas Press, Austin, 1984, pages
79–80)
On March 16, the third anniversary of the establishment of the Alliance
for Progress, the OAS released the
proposed language. At 12:10 p.m. that day the President addressed the
Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress on the dispute
with Panama:
“… The United States will meet with Panama any time, anywhere, to
discuss anything, to work together, to cooperate with each
other, to reason with one another, to review and to consider all
of our problems together, to tell each other our opinions, all
our desires and all our concerns, and to aim at solutions and
answers that are fair and just and equitable, without regard to
size or the strength or the wealth of either nation.
“We don’t ask Panama to make any precommitments before we meet,
and we intend to make none. Of course, we cannot begin on this
work until diplomatic relations are resumed. But the United
States is ready today, if Panama is ready. As of this moment I
do not believe that there has been a genuine meeting of the
minds between the two Presidents of the two countries
involved.
“Press reports indicate that the Government of Panama feels that
the language which has been under consideration for many days
commits the United States to a rewriting of the 1903 treaty. We
have made no such commitment and we will not think of doing so
before diplomatic relations are resumed and unless a fair and
satisfactory adjustment is agreed upon.” The text of the
President’s remarks is printed in Public
Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson,
1963–64, Book I, pages 383–384.
On March 16 at 4:40 p.m., Bundy
reported to President Johnson that Mann had spoken to the OAS Ambassadors, who wanted to know
whether, in the continued absence of an agreement between Panama and the
United States, more mediation would be helpful. The ambassadors also
inquired about a response to Panama if it asked for an agreement on the
basis of the two paragraphs presented earlier in the week, and how to
respond if Panama requested a U.S. Ambassador. Bundy consulted with Mann on these two points and told the
President that he and Mann were
in agreement that with respect to the offer for further mediation, “We’re inclined to
say, ‘no, thank you very much, you’ve done your best, but we think that
the problem is one of a meeting of minds between the two governments.’”
He added: “to the first question we would say, ‘no, there is no meeting
of the minds between the two parties, and we just have to recognize that
there isn’t.’” As to a possible Panamanian request for the resumption of
diplomatic relations with the United States, Bundy proposed that they reply, “why certainly, if it is
understood that there is no agreement between the United States to
revise the treaty.” Bundy also
suggested that the United States “reopen the question of what these
paragraphs say,” to ensure that Panama cannot justify that the United
States has agreed to negotiate a new treaty.
Johnson told Bundy that the OAS
Ambassadors should “continue to play” with the two paragraphs and go
back to the Panamanians “to get them straightened out and make them quit
lying and saying that we’ve agreed to negotiate a treaty.” (Recording of
telephone conversation between President Johnson
and McGeorge Bundy, March 16,
4:40 p.m.; Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F64.17,
Side B, PNO 2) The portions of the conversations printed here were
prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this
volume.
400. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Panama, Vol. III, March 1964. Secret.Washington, March 18, 1964.
SUBJECT
Panama
Ralph Dungan tells me that he
spoke to you about a proposal which Sterling Cottrell has made for the
next step on Panama. Cottrell’s proposal was made to Tom Mann, and I
have not yet had a chance to get Tom’s comment on it, but here it
is:The President and Bundy discussed the proposal on
March 18. The President told Bundy “it appeals to me; I’m ready to do that—be
glad to—go on, tell ‘em to do it.” Johnson also
stated, “We’re anxious to resume relations, one; talk, two.”
(Memorandum of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, March 18, time undetermined; Johnson
Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F64.18, Side A, PNO
2)
We should announce our readiness to resume normal relations in the
following language—or alternatively, and to me less effectively— we
could have the OAS urge this course on
both countries in closely parallel language:
“The Government of the United States proposes that normal
relations with the Government of Panama be restored through the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations. It also proposes that
Special Ambassadors from each country be appointed to ascertain
and examine all outstanding issues between the two countries and
to prepare a joint recommendation to both governments as to how
these issues can be resolved in fair and satisfactory
manner.
“If the Government of Panama agrees, relations will be restored
immediately and the Special Ambassadors will be appointed within
30 days thereafter.”
If you should wish to do this, it could be announced by PierrePierre Salinger. after your OAS meeting this afternoon. My own instinct
is still to wait a few days, but you may wish to turn discussion to a
new proposal and away from the difficulties of recent days.
McG. B.
401. Editorial Note
On March 21, 1964, President Johnson informed Secretary Rusk that he had decided to make a public and background
statement on Panama. The President wanted to clear the air and put the
issue in perspective by focusing on the positive aspects of
U.S.-Panamanian relations throughout history. He told Rusk that he intended “to invite the
press in and spend 10 to 15 minutes with me, just talking with me, off
the record.” He read a draft of the public statement to Rusk, who thought it was “very
constructive.” The text of the statement released on March 21 is printed
in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B. Johnson,
1963–64, Book I, pages 404–405. Johnson
then told Rusk he thought he would
say to the press on background:
“I’ve seen a lot about this Panamanian situation—I’ve seen a lot
of speculation and discussion, back and forth. This is a very
important problem for both countries and I’ve given a lot of
thought to it. Our situation has never changed since Secretary
Rusk and McNamara and I met the first
morning, and I called the President of Panama. And I said, then,
in effect this and I have repeated it ever since. But somehow or other, I’m
not sure that everybody understands it, and this is our position
then and this is our position now.” (Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and Dean
Rusk, March 21, 12:16 p.m.; Johnson Library,
Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F64.18, Side B, PNO 2)
Mann agreed with Rusk that the
President’s proposed statement was all right to be presented to the
press as background. Mann
reported that Rusk had just met
with Ambassador de Lavalle,
Chairman of the OAS, who had asked for
suggestions on how relations between Panama and the United States could
be restored and suggested going back to the two paragraphs on which the
OAS Committee had almost succeeded
in obtaining an agreement earlier in the month. “We can’t do that after
we’ve broken up, and after they leaked everything to everybody,”
Johnson told Mann in a telephone conversation. “We can’t ever agree
on those two paragraphs. They ought to know that—or we would have agreed
to ‘em the other day.” Mann
suggested getting the OAS to work with
them on alternatives. Johnson indicated that his
preferred alternative was “one, to resume relations; two, discuss
everything— review everything.” (Recording of telephone conversation
between President Johnson and Thomas Mann, March 21, 1:25 p.m.;
ibid., Tape F64.19, Side A, PNO 3)
After his conversation with Mann,
the President consulted Senator Russell, who asked why Johnson felt
it was important to issue a statement. “It’s made only, Dick, to try to
get off of dead center.” Johnson continued: “The
Secretary of State has really had no authority in this thing—and
Assistant Secretary of State either—because I told ‘em that I’m not
goin’ to agree to negotiate a new treaty, and so it’s been more or less
taken out of their hands, and the ball’s in my court.” The President
indicated that the OAS should go back to
Chiari. He told Russell: “What I’m going to do when I
make this statement—I’m going to give it to the head of the OAS and I’m going to say to the OAS, ‘now goddammit, I’ve gone as far as a
human bein’ can go. You got to make this fellow go.’ I’m gonna put the
ball back in his court.” Russell assured Johnson
that if he felt compelled to make a statement, “I think it’s all right.”
(Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Richard
Russell, March 21, 1:32 p.m.; ibid., Tape F64.19, Side A,
PNO 4) The portions of the conversations printed here were prepared in
the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.
The President issued his statement at a press conference held at 1:45
that afternoon at the White House. Later that afternoon, he told
Mann that “he had a hell of a
good press conference,” and read the complete transcript of the press
conference over the phone. Mann
said that the statement “may help to clarify things over there.” He told
the President: “I don’t mind fighting the Panamanians—rather enjoy it,
but I don’t want to fight this whole OAS.” He indicated that if the United States had to negotiate an agreement with the
Panamanians, “we’ll go carefully.” (Memorandum of conversation, March
21, 3:35 p.m.; ibid., Papers of Thomas C.
Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, January 14, 1964–April 30, 1965) A
portion of the conversation was recorded and is ibid., Recordings and
Transcripts, Tape F64.19, Side B, PNO 2.
402. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA/Panamanian Affairs Files: Lot File 66 D 329.
Confidential. Drafted by Bunker. Copies were sent to Mann and Allen (RPA). A copy was
also sent to Rusk under cover
of a memorandum by Bunker on
March 24.Washington, March 23, 1964, 3:33
p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Moreno of
PanamaAmbassador Bunker of the
U.S.
SUBJECT
Panama–U.S. Relations
I met Ambassador Moreno at the
1925 F Street Club for a private, off-the-record talk. I made it clear
to him that I was doing this on my own responsibility and that it was
important that the subject of our discussion should be kept confidential
and not divulged to the press.
I said that it seemed to me President Johnson’s
statement of March 21See Document 401. had been most constructive. In some ways it was broader and went
beyond the OAS communiqué of March
15.Released on March 16, it reads: “The
Governments of the Republic of Panama and of the United States of
America have agreed to reestablish diplomatic relations as soon as
possible to seek the prompt elimination of the causes of the
conflict relative to the Panama Canal and to attempt to resolve
other problems existing between them, without limitations or
preconditions of any kind.“Consequently, within 30 days
following the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, both
Governments will designate special ambassadors to carry out
discussions and negotiations with the objective of reaching a fair
and just agreement which will eliminate the above-mentioned causes
of the conflict and resolve the other problems referred to above.
Any agreements that may result would be subject to the
constitutional processes of each country.” It indicated to me
that there was now a genuine meeting of the minds between the two
presidents. Furthermore, we had struggled over words and semantics for
two and one-half months,
to date without results, and it seemed to me that the time had come to
substitute action for words. I suggested that one of several procedures
might be followed.
President Chiari might
issue a statement welcoming President Johnson’s
statement, indicating that as a result of the statement there was a
genuine meeting of the minds, that it was obvious that both sides
wished to resolve their difficulties and that therefore, the
Government of Panama was prepared to resume diplomatic relations
with the United States.The Government of Panama might authorize Ambassador Moreno to state that in view of
President Johnson’s statement of March 21 that
the United States is prepared to review every issue that now divides
the two countries and every problem which the Panamanian Government
wishes to raise, the Government of Panama is prepared to resume
diplomatic relations to be followed by the appointment by both
countries of special representatives with full authority to discuss
all problems and with the responsibility for seeking
solutions.We might deliver joint or simultaneously separate notes to the
OAS saying that both governments
are resuming diplomatic relations and expressing appreciation to the
OAS for its efforts to bring
about an understanding between the two governments.
Ambassador Moreno said he felt
that in some ways, the “agreement” of March 15 was more specific than
the wording of the President’s statement. I pointed out to him that
there had been no “agreement”, that in the course of negotiations here
we had agreed to several texts which Panama had not accepted and they
had agreed to a text finally which we had not accepted. It seemed to me
that having gone through 28 texts we had about exhausted the possibility
of finding mutually acceptable wording and that the time had come to
act. I thought that now it must be evident to both sides that our
procedural objectives were really identical; i.e., we both wanted to
resume diplomatic relations, we were both ready to discuss, consider,
review—whatever words one wished to use for the process—all of the
problems existing between us in an effort in good faith to find fair,
reasonable and just solutions. That being so, let us get on with the
job.
Ambassador Moreno said that there
had been a good reaction in Panama to President
Johnson’s statement and that President
Chiari would make a
statement this afternoon regarding it. He would try to get the text as
soon as possible. He commented that he felt there might be criticism in
Panama on the procedure I had suggested on the ground that the
Government was backing down still further from its original position and
acting on the basis of wording less precise than that in the March 15
communiqué. I replied that it seemed to me that President
Johnson’s statement was no less precise and, in
fact, was more comprehensive,
and therefore in a way more favorable to Panama. Ambassador Moreno then said that he would want to
talk with his Government and would keep our conversation on a strictly
confidential basis.
403. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. II. No classification marking.Washington, March 24, 1964.
SUBJECT
Chiari statement: our next
moveIf you find the Chiari
statementOn March 24 Chiari issued a statement
responding to Johnson’s public statement of
March 21, agreeing in principle with the proposal to resume
relations and begin talks, but reiterating his support for the
OAS formula—see footnote 3, Document 402. A
Department of State translation of Chiari’s statement, forwarded to the White House
on March 25, is in the National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 PAN. unhelpful and
wish to back away from any resumption of relations, I think we
should quietly but promptly let it be known that the Chiari statement has not increased
our hopes. We could point quietly to his references to the
contractual clauses of the treaty and his desire to solve all
differences and all problems “once and for all.” We could also note
his reference to “the necessary constitutional procedures,” which
means a treaty. On this course, we should simply be back where we
were, and you would be standing pat on your statement of last
Saturday.March 21; see Document 401.A second course would be to say that you find the Chiari statement interesting but
that we need to examine more closely the two OAS paragraphs before we come to a final agreement. On
this course, we could put to the OAS
language which does not mention the Panama Canal directly and which
replaces the words “discussions and negotiations” by less
fought-over phrases. Tom Mann thinks there is a fair chance of
success in this course and that with luck he could win the OAS representatives back on to our
side. I think Bill Moyers has language to propose on this
course.The third course is to decide that a prompt de facto resumption of
relations is more important than the fact that any Panamanian
politician will have to speak in terms somewhat like those which
Chiari uses. If we make
this view, then I would advise an immediate announcement along the
lines of the draft statement attached.Not found attached.
I think these choices are quite clear-cut, and I doubt if we need a long
discussion of it.In a handwritten note at
the end of the memorandum Bundy added: “P took still another course, a sort of
III in which we try to resume without
agreeing to 2-para formula.” In a telephone conversation with
Bundy that evening,
Johnson inquired whether Rusk was prepared to accept
Chiari’s statement.
Bundy responded: “I
think—no sir, I don’t think that. I think he did not want to have us
back away, and we’re not doing that, and I think I’ve talked to Tom
[Mann] more recently than I have the Secretary, and he’s thought
about it more. Tom, I think, will be very pleased with this
thing—finding out what the hell they mean—and then going the course
of trying to amend the two paragraphs in the light—in the general
line that you approved tonight. I don’t think we’re going to have
any trouble with the Secretary on this.” (Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
McGeorge Bundy, March 25,
7:32 p.m.; Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F64.20,
Side A, PNO 8)
Mc.G. B.
404. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
NSC Histories, Panama Crisis,
1964. Secret. Copies were sent to Mann and Dungan.Washington, March 25, 1964.
SUBJECT
Panama
I have spoken with Tom Mann and set in train the negotiating process you
authorized last night.See footnote 5, Document 403.
Ambassador Bunker will be going to
Moreno today and will make
the following presentation: We have made our statement;You have made your statement;Why don’t you resume relations at once?If you resume, of course we will resume and send an Ambassador
forthwith.
If the Panamanians accept this démarche, we are in. If they come back and
ask questions about our view of the OAS
two paragraph formula, then Bunker
will come back to Mann, and
Mann will instruct him to say
that if the Panamanians wish to go this more complicated route, we would
have to insist on minor modifications in the formula. Tom would then
negotiate to get the Panama Canal and the word “negotiations” out of the
two paragraphs. This second phase is not being discussed even with
Bunker until we see how the
first phase works.
In all this we are keeping the number of those informed as small as
possible, and we are pointing out to the Panamanians that we can
negotiate quietly to resume relations, or make our case to the
newspapers, but we can hardly do both at once. But we do not kid
ourselves that Moreno or his
compatriots will be as quiet as we would like.
McG. B.Printed from a copy that
bears these typed initials.
405. Telephone Conversation Between President
Johnson and the President’s Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source:
Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
McGeorge Bundy, Tape
F64.20, Side B, PNO 2. No classification marking. This transcript
was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this
volume.Washington, March 25, 1964, 5:30
p.m.
Bundy: [Tape begins
mid-conversation] from Moreno
who says that they just don’t think that they can sell—and keep the
peace—a straight resumption of relations on these two statements.Reference is to
Johnson’s statement of March 21 and Chiari’s communiqué of March 24;
see Document 401 and footnote 2, Document 403. Ambassador Bunker would
now like to go back to Moreno
and suggest that there be a resumption of relations on the basis of a
letter that we would send to
the head of the OAS, which I’d like to
read to you, because I think it’s a good play:
“I have the honor to advise Your Excellency that the Governments
of Panama and the United States of America have agreed to resume
diplomatic relations as of today’s date, exchange of Ambassadors
forthwith. My government will appoint without delay a special
representative together with a representative of government of
Panama—will be empowered to review all the issues between the
two countries and to seek a fair and just resolution of these
issues.”
Then there’s a paragraph thanking the OAS
for its constructive and untiring and invaluable work, etc. This would
be just a way of letting them off the hook of the fact that we’re not
going to buy those two paragraphs. The question of whether we would go
back and renegotiate the two paragraphs could be left down the pike and
we wouldn’t have to cross it. As I say, Ambassador Bunker, who’s close
to this, thinks there’s—you know—a fighting chance that this would work,
and I see no pain in it. Is that all right with you?
President: Now what do we do when
we write ‘em that? Do we embrace the two paragraphs?
Bundy: No, we do not. We do not
refer to the two paragraphs, and we’re simply standing on your statement
in this letter. Yeah. No, we do not, Mr. President, and we’ve made it
clear to Moreno that those two
paragraphs are not agreed and that we have not accepted them, and we
cannot at this stage accept them. That’s been made very clear to him
today, and what we’d like to do is to let that sink in overnight and
then go back to him tomorrow and say, now we’ve got another idea which
is that we could write the OAS and say
we’re going ahead that we’re going to review all these issues and seek a
fair and just resolution—doesn’t refer to the Panama Canal, doesn’t
mention negotiations, and it doesn’t mention the two paragraphs.
President: What makes you think
that they would take this if they wouldn’t take anything—
Bundy: Gives him something to
say, that we have given one more statement of our intent to seek a fair
and just resolution and that—what I think—I think the reason Ambassador
Bunker wants to do it is not
so much that the expectation of agreement is necessarily very high, but
that we’re quite sure that this will be regarded as a forthcoming act
from Lavalle’s point of view—the head of the OAS Council—and that that would give us pressure against
Panamanians from other Latin Americans, instead of having the position
in which they say they seem to be the ones who are being forthcoming
with respect to the OAS recommendation.
I myself think, Mr. President, to be honest with you, I’m not quite as
optimistic as Ambassador Bunker,
but I can’t see that we lose anything by trying this one more, and I
think we gain to the degree that the OAS
people begin to think we’re the ones who put the ball back in their court. If it doesn’t work, then
at least it’s their play, and we aren’t being asked what our next step
is.
President: Well, I don’t
understand it. It doesn’t have any appeal to me, but if you and
Rusk think it’s all right, and
think it’s the thing to do, I’d go ahead.
Bundy: Well, the real question is
whether it has any negative to you, Mr. President.
President: No, no.
Bundy: And I don’t see anything
in that—it’s a perfect—it’s a diplomatic play.
President: No, it doesn’t have
any negative. The reason it doesn’t is because I can’t see what purpose
it serves.
Bundy: [unintelligible] any
positive in it either [laughter].
President: That’s right, but I
don’t want—I don’t quite understand it, and I don’t want to be
obstinate. If you and Rusk think
it’s all right, it’s all right with me.
Bundy: We do, yes sir, and so
does Tom.
President: All right.
Bundy: Aye, aye, sir.
406. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson in TexasSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Panama, Vol. III, March 1964. Secret. The telegram
bears a handwritten note by Jack
Valenti that reads: “LBJ approved by phone to Secy Rusk, 3/30/64.”Washington, March 30, 1964,
22:57Z.
CAP 64105. On Panama, Secretary Rusk, Mann, and I
would now like your authority for Bunker to propose the following letter to Moreno for possible delivery by both
governments in identical notes to the Chairman of the OAS Council. We do not believe the
Panamanians will accept this solution, but we do believe it is useful to
offer it as a means of getting basic responsibility fixed back on
Panama.The Consul in Panama
(Taylor) reported on March 28 that, with
the Panamanian elections scheduled for early May, “Chiari’s present seemingly rigid
stand motivated by political considerations.” He also indicated that
“Senator Fulbright’s remarks have bolstered Chiari’s belief that if he stands
firm he will eventually obtain close to what he originally
stipulated.” (Telegram 514 from Panama City, March 28; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
POL PAN–US) Regarding
Fulbright’s remarks, see footnote 3
below. The operative paragraph is
paragraph 2, and you will want to check it word for word.
The word “re-examine” is safe, and I think we should stick with it at
this stage. We could also use nearly any other word except “negotiate,”
but I think we should allow the Panamanians to make further suggestions
if they have enough interest.
If you approve this move by word to Valenti or Connell, Bunker would present this proposal to Moreno tomorrow, along with a clear
statement that this is the best we can do and that he should not expect
any softening of the U.S. position because of the Fulbright speech.
FBI reports make it clear that
Moreno and Chiari have put undue weight on
Fulbright’s remarks,On March 25 Fulbright
made a speech advocating that the United States renegotiate the
Panama Canal Treaty. Johnson complained: “I’m
just within an inch of gettin’ an agreement with them and every time
I do, The New York Times, The Washington
Post, or some damn fool Senator gets up and knocks it off.”
(Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Spessard Holland, March 25,
4:40 p.m.; Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape 64.20,
Side A, PNO 10) The President also complained to Bundy that “they all assume
Fulbright speaks for the administration.” Bundy responded that it was
“extraordinary that Fulbright would take such a stance.” The
President replied, “Fulbright’s that way, though. He is very
unpredictable.” Johnson also recalled Truman’s
onetime quip that Fulbright was only “half-bright.” (Recording of
telephone conversation between President
Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, March 25, 4:35 p.m.; ibid., PNO
11) thinking that they indicate public pressure in the U.S.
for an early settlement on terms more favorable to Panama than those we
are proposing.
Bunker believes that this offer of
identical notes will regain support for us in the OAS Committee.
Draft letter follows:
Note: In second paragraph in place of re-examine,
we might use deal with.
Draft Note—United States
Your Excellency: I have the honor to advise Your Excellency that the
Governments of the Republic of Panama and the United States of
America have agreed to resume diplomatic relations as of today’s
date.In order to seek the prompt elimination of the causes of
conflict existing between them, my government will also appoint
without delay a special Ambassador with sufficient powers to
re-examine all the issues between the two countries, without
limitation or preconditions of any kind, with the objective of
reaching a fair and just agreement, subject to the
constitutional processes of each country.The Government of the United States of America desires to
express its gratitude for the untiring and invaluable efforts of
the members of the Inter-American Peace Committee, the Council
of the Organization of American States, the General Committee
and the Special Delegation, without which this constructive
result would not have been possible.Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest
consideration.
Ellsworth
Bunker Ambassador
Representative of the United States of America on the Council of the
Organization of American States
His Excellency
Dr. Juan Bautista de Lavalle,
Chairman of the General Committee of the Council of the Organization of
American States,
Acting Provisionally as Organ of Consultation.
407. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. III. No classification marking.Washington, April 1, 1964.
SUBJECT
Ambassador Bunker’s meeting with Moreno
Bunker reports that he had a quite
satisfactory talk with Moreno
this afternoon.In a telephone conversation
earlier that afternoon, Bundy
told the President that “we’re again sort of within a very few
inches of an agreement” with Panama. (Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
McGeorge Bundy, April 1,
2:23 p.m.; ibid., Transcripts and Recordings, Tape F64.22, Side A,
PNO 2) He presented to Moreno the attached redraft, from which the direct
reference to the Panama Canal has been removed.Not attached; the language as approved is printed
in Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1964, p. 656, and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1964, pp. 365–366. He told Moreno that he had your personal
backing in making this proposal and that what you were aiming at was the
simplest, clearest understanding that was possible. He told Moreno further that you did not want
complicated language which might stand in the way of getting an agreement through the Senate at
some later time. He told Moreno
that we had no fall-back position and that if this did not work we
thought it would be best to wait until the elections.
All in all, he sounds as if he had acted like the excellent Ambassador
that he is, and I wish we had used the technique of sending him in with
your direct instructions before now.
Moreno did not seem to be terribly distressed at the omission of the
Panama Canal reference, but he did argue strongly for the inclusion of
the footnote saying that the word “agreement” is used “in the broadest
sense that the word has in international law.” Bunker told him that we did not want
that clause in the statement of agreement, but when Moreno said that it would be only a
repetition of what the Chairman of the Council has said before,
Bunker indicated that we would
not object to having Chairman Lavalle repeat it on his own. He took this
position because Dean Rusk had
told him earlier that phrase was really no bother to us, and that in
fact it protects us. Dean’s reasoning is that “the broadest sense”
covers everything from an informal oral understanding to a treaty. It
remains true that some Panamanians will read this note as meaning that
the agreement which is being sought will be a new treaty.
But as long as we are not pinned to this understanding directly, and as
long as we are protected by the fundamental clause of the whole
arrangement—”without limitations or preconditions of any kind”—I think
we can endure to have the Chairman interpret the agreement in this way.
Do you agree? If not, we should tell Bunker at once.
Moreno left Bunker saying that he would do his best
to button up an agreement on this basis. My own guess is that we may get
one more bit of pressure from Panama, but Bunker is optimistic.On
April 2 the NSC met to review a
number of issues including Panama. According to Bromley Smith’s
account of the meeting, Rusk
stated that “there may be developments later today with respect to
wording of an announcement which would be acceptable to us.”
(Summary Record of NSC Meeting No.
525, April 2, noon; Johnson Library, Natioal Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. I, Tab 6,
4/2/64) According to McCone’s account of the meeting, Rusk reported that “there was a
possibility that today or tomorrow there would be a break which
would permit us to move to the conference table” with Panama.
McCone noted in his
record of this NSC meeting that “on
April 1st, the President asked me personally if I thought we were
acting correctly on this Panama issue. I replied that I felt his
position was defendable and would not recommend any changes.”
(Memorandum for the record by McCone, April 2; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with the
President) Prior to the NSC meeting
on April 2, Johnson queried McNamara about the pending
agreement. He responded that having an agreement would be helpful
and the timing, in spite of the Fulbright speech, was all right. “I
think if it drifts on too long, there’ll be criticism mounting in
our own press, so I would conclude it.” (Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and Robert
McNamara, April 2, 11:15 a.m.; Johnson Library,
Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F64.22, Side A, PNO 5)
McG. B.Printed from a copy that
bears these typed initials.
408. Telephone Conversation Between President
Johnson and Robert
AndersonSource: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of
telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Robert Anderson, Tape F64.22, Side B, PNO 2. No
classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the Office
of the Historian specifically for this volume. Robert Anderson was a lawyer and
former Secretary of the Treasury under President Eisenhower.Washington, April 3, 1964, 12:55
p.m.
Anderson: Hello, Mr.
President.
President: Say, looks like we are
going to get this Panama agreement worked out.
Anderson: Yes.
President: And then we are going
to have to negotiate—uh, resolve some problems we have between the two
of us.
Anderson: Yes.
President: And we’ll have a full
time ambassador and all the staff we need but we want you to be the top
lawyer on negotiatin’ with them.
Anderson: I’ll do whatever you
say, Mr. President.
President: Well, that’s what I
want, and I’ll give you everything you need and I just want to—if we
have to rewrite a treaty—well, we want to look at it carefully and I
just want some fella that I have absolute confidence in. And I want to
be measured by only one standard, and that’s what is right and just and
fair. And I think if you do that, you could be very helpful. You could
start ‘em off and then come in from time to time, but just be kinda my
advisor on it, and let me name you as my man.Shortly before this conversation, the President
consulted Mann, who urged
that Anderson be designated
to head the team: “We need a tough guy now to get down to the hard
negotiating and I would try to talk Bob into it.” (Telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
Thomas Mann, April 3,
12:06 p.m.; ibid., PNO 1)
Anderson: All right, sir. Now,
you know, of course, that I don’t really know much about—
President: I don’t care about
that. Good thing you don’t.
Anderson: All right, sir.
President: You still got your law
license, haven’t you?
Anderson: That is correct.
President: Good-bye. Bye.
Anderson: Okay, my friend.
409. Summary Record of the 526th Meeting of the National Security
Council With the Congressional LeadersSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
NSC Meetings File, Vol. 1, Tab
7, 4/3/64. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The meeting lasted
no later than 3:35 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) McCone has a much briefer account
of the Panama discussion in his record of this meeting. (Central
Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A,
Memoranda for the Record)Washington, April 3, 1964, 2 p.m.
Various Subjects
The President opened the meeting with the Congressional Leaders by saying
that his purpose was to bring them up to date on recent developments.
Various Council members would report on current situations. He first
called on Secretary Rusk for a
summary of developments in Brazil.
[Omitted here is discussion of Brazil (Document
208) and Vietnam (Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, Volume I,
Document 107).]
The President then turned to Panama and read the declaration which he
said he would make this afternoon if the Council approved.See footnote 3, Document
407. He summarized the U.S. position on the Panama negotiations,
i.e., that we would not accept preconditions but we were prepared to
review with the Panamanians all problems. He characterized the
declaration as containing nothing offensive to either side and as
stating the same position he had taken during his first telephone
conversation with President Chiari of PanamaDocument 370. which took place immediately after the incident in Panama. He
informed the group that he had chosen former Secretary of the Treasury
Robert Anderson as his
Special Ambassador to conduct the negotiations with the Panamanians.
Senator Mansfield and Senator Fulbright interrupted to state their belief
that the agreement proposed by the President was an excellent one.
The President then announced that he was seeking Panamanian agreement for
Jack Vaughn as U.S.
Ambassador. He summarized in detail the career of Mr. Vaughn.
The President asked whether the Council approved the declaration, and
hearing no objection, the President said we would proceed to give our
statement to the OAS group. He then
praised Ambassador Bunker for his
contribution to reaching an agreement.
Secretary Rusk explained that we
could not accept any precommitment with respect to negotiation with the
Panamanians because, if we did not reach any agreement, we could be
accused of bad faith. If the
Panamanians denounced the existing treaty they could use a charge of our
bad faith in arguing before the International Court that the treaty was
no longer valid. There is no reference to the Panama Canal in the
agreement. We are not calling attention to this because if we did we
would create a problem for President Chiari. Chiari’s
opponents could say he had retreated from his position that he would not
renew relations with the U.S. until we had agreed to renegotiate the
treaty. Secretary Rusk said that
the solution of the current phase of the Panama problem would clear the
atmosphere for OAS action on the Cuban
arms cache in Venezuela.
The President said that our insistence on talking without preconditions
was our first and last position. We may be prepared to accept changes in
the treaty but we could not do so until the Panamanians had agreed to
talk without preconditions.
There followed a brief procedural discussion as to how Special Ambassador
Anderson would be formally
empowered to proceed. Confirmation by the Senate is not required because
he will have the personal rank of Ambassador.
Senator Hickenlooper said the
Panamanians had denounced the treaties. What would we do if in the first
discussion the Panamanians took the position that no treaty existed?
Secretary Rusk replied that as far
as he knew the Panamanians had not denounced the treaties. They
recognized the existence of the treaties and their language attacking
them had not gone so far as to claim that they had no validity.
Senator Morse said that the
Panamanian agreement was a great agreement and he congratulated the
President and the Secretary of State. He said, however, he felt obliged
to say that he disagrees entirely with the program for South
Vietnam.
[Omitted here is further discussion of Vietnam.]
Turning to Panama, Senator Saltonstall said that in his view the problem
there arose because of the attitude of U.S. citizens in the Canal Zone.
He asked what we were doing to improve this situation. The President
replied that Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance had gone down to Panama, had reviewed the
situation, and had recommended certain changes which have already taken
place. In addition, General O’Meara, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern
Command, is to make additional recommendations on this subject.
[Omitted here is discussion of Africa.]
The President then read a draft press statement which would be issued
following the conclusion of the meeting (copy attached).Not attached but an apparent reference to a
statement made to the White House correspondents by Press Secretary
George Reedy, at 3:40
p.m. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings, Vol. I) The
statement was approved by those present.
The President then read a statement which he is going to make to the
OAS Ambassadors at 4:00 PM covering
the Panama agreement (copy attached).Not
attached; printed in Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1964, pp. 655 and 656, and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1964, pp. 366–367.
Senator Humphrey stated that the President’s statement on Panama was
excellent. He said our forbearance and patience had paid off.
[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, Cuba, and Cyprus.]
The President then explained to the group that he had put in a call to
President Chiari of Panama on
the assumption that the meeting would be finished. President Chiari was now on the line and he said
he would now talk to him. (The photographers entered to take pictures.)
The record of the conversation is attached.Not attached; for the transcript of this telephone conversation,
see Document 410. Only one side of the conversation was audible to those present.
At the conclusion of the conversation the President commented that
President Chiari had broken into
English at the end to say, “That’s the way to do it,” then returning to
Spanish.
[Omitted here is discussion of Zanzibar and Indonesia.]
The President asked all those present to go with him to the Fish Room to
meet the OAS Ambassadors gathered there
to hear the President’s statement on Panama. The Cabinet Room had to be
vacated so that the television cameras could be put in place.
Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
410. Telephone Conversation Between President
Johnson and Panamanian President ChiariSource: Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and President Chiari, Tape F64.22, Side B, PNO
4. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared in the
Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. President
Johnson was in Washington; President
Chiari in Panama City.
Except where noted, President Chiari spoke through a translator.April 3, 1964,
3:35 p.m.
President: Hello, Mr. President,
this is Lyndon Johnson. I wanted
to express our great pleasure at the agreement that has been
reached.
President Chiari: He is
delighted, Mr. President, that both nations have been able to find a
formula in order to re-establish diplomatic relations. He wishes to
thank you for that and he is delighted that the two nations now will be
able to discuss the problems that for so long have been between
them.
President: We appreciate your
desire to move on to a lasting agreement, Mr. President, that will
resolve these difficulties, and I am today appointing the ablest and
strongest man that I know, former Secretary of Treasury Mr. Robert Anderson, to be our Special
Ambassador.
President Chiari: Has he been
named as Special Ambassador?
President: Yes, sir, he will be
named as Special Ambassador to do the negotiating. He was Secretary of
the Treasury under President Eisenhower and is a
man that enjoys my unlimited confidence.
President Chiari: He is
delighted, Mr. President, and he wishes to thank you very much. He
wishes to assure you that sometime during tomorrow they will nominate a
very capable Panamanian to represent Panama in Washington as
Ambassador.
President: Thank him very much,
and we look forward to hearing about his nomination. Tell him that Mr.
Anderson is a first-rate
lawyer, having been a Professor of Law. He’s—his instructions will be to
secure a fair and just agreement that will be satisfactory to the people
of both nations.
President Chiari: He is
delighted, Mr. President, and he is certain that as long as there is
good will and good faith on both sides that we will be able to resolve
these long standing problems that have existed between the two nations,
and that he looks forward to a future of the friendliest possible
relations between the two nations, since they have the same common
objectives.
President: Well, tell him as we
stated in the very first conversation we had together that we cannot
have any pre-commitments. But
Mr. Anderson will listen to all
the differences that exist between the two nations and we will try to
find an agreement that will be satisfactory.
President Chiari: Fine, Mr.
President. That’s very fine.
President: Tell him we expect to
name a Mr. Jack Vaughn who has
lived in Panama a goodly part of his time and who is now head of the
Peace Corps for Latin America, to be our regular Ambassador there.
President Chiari: Fine, and I’m
delighted, Mr. President.
President: He has had a decade of
service in Latin America and he’s been on the faculty of Johns Hopkins
School of International Studies here.
President Chiari: Fine. Thank you
very much, Mr. President.
President: He spent from 1952 to
1960 in and out of Panama and some of his friends no doubt will know
him.
President Chiari: He is certain
that that will be the case, Mr. President.
President: And tell him that we
would like to have clearance on him just as quickly as we can, and we’ll
submit it through channels shortly.
President Chiari: Fine, with a
great deal of pleasure, Mr. President. And we will do the same with you,
Mr. President, as soon as possible.
President: All right. So tell him
that the two countries can now sit down together without limitations or
pre-conditions of any kind and as friends try to find the proper and
fair answers.
President Chiari: [in English]
That is the right way to do it and I hope we get success on that.
[through translator] That is the right way to do it and I hope we get
together on that.
President: [Chuckle] Thank you,
Mr. President. I’m lookin’ forward to seein’ ya.
President Chiari: [in English]
Okay. Good-bye.
411. Editorial Note
[text not declassified]
412. Memorandum From Albert E.
Carter in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the
Director (Hughes)
Washington, April 10, 1964.[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA/CIA
Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965. Secret. 2 pages of source text not
declassified.]
413. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, April 17, 1964.[Source: Central Intelligence Agency,
DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B012785A, 303 Committee, 1964.
Secret; Eyes Only. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]
414. National Security Action Memorandum No. 296Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. V, May–June 1964.
Secret.Washington, April 25, 1964.
TO
Secretary of StateSecretary of Defense
SUBJECT
Interdepartmental organization for Panamanian affairs
The President has approved the following organizational arrangements
relating to the formulation and execution of U.S. policy in Panama.
1. Panama Review Group
The Panama Review Group, composed of the Secretary of the Army,
the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, the
Special Representative, a White House representative, and chaired by
the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, will be
the principal point of focus below the President for the formulation
and execution of policy with regard to Panama. The Executive
Secretary of the Panama Review Group will be designated by the
Department of State.The Panama Review Group will work closely with the officers
supporting the Special Representative in exercising control over
actions which might affect the treaty discussions, publicity, and
security.
2. Panama Review Committee
A Committee composed of the Ambassador to Panama, CINCSO, and the Governor of the Panama
Canal Zone, and chaired by the Ambassador, will be established and will
meet periodically at the call of any member to discuss conditions in
Panama and the Zone and exchange reports and proposals on actions to be
undertaken in the interests of the United States and better
U.S./Panamanian relations. The President expects that the members of
this Committee will share their concern fully and frankly with each
other, and will work together closely in discharging their respective
responsibilities. Any differences which may arise will be referred to
the Panama Review Group located in Washington. Any action agreed upon by
the Panama Review Committee will be reported to Washington by the
Ambassador before this action is taken, whenever
such action could affect the work of the Special Representative. The
Special Representative will be notified through Washington of such
proposed action.
McGeorge Bundy
415. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Panama, Vol. V, May–June 1964. Secret.Washington, May 8, 1964.
SUBJECT
Panamanian ElectionsA meeting of the Panama Review Group was held today to discuss the
Panamanian elections, scheduled for Sunday.May 10. The memorandum for the record of this
meeting, held at the White House and drafted by FitzGerald on
May 12, is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 78–03041,
Directorate of Operations, [file name not
declassified].The group agreed that the general shape of the problem is as
follows: First, we can expect to see attempts
at vote-fixing by all three candidates—Robles, Arnulfo, and Galindo. Second, while it is not a certainty, there probably will
be some violence during the elections, particularly on Monday and
Tuesday when the votes will be counted. Such violence will be
primarily and initially between Panamanians. But we cannot discount
the possibility that Communist and student elements will take the
opportunity to make attacks against American targets, in and out of
the Zone.The CIA warned of this possibility in [document number not declassified], May 7.
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Panama,
Vol. V, May–June 1964) In a May 8 telegram from the Canal Zone,
USCINCSO indicated that
the CIA conclusions were
“entirely reasonable.” (Telegram SC3415DA for JCS; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAN–US) According to Gordon
Chase of the NSC staff, “State
and Ambassador Vaughn
seem to feel that CIA has
overstated the dangers of a serious explosion.” (Memorandum from
Chase to Bundy, May 8;
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Panama,
Vol. V, May–June 1964) Lansing Collins reported that Vaughn had indicated that
“he agreed with the tone” of the CIA report, although he thought the conclusions
“slightly exaggerated.” (Memorandum of conversation, May 8;
ibid.)We have no favorites in the election and our posture throughout
this period will be strictly “hands-off.” Generally speaking, there
are only two exceptions to this policy. We will take appropriate
steps to protect American lives and property, if it becomes
necessary to do so. And we will act if there is a clear danger of a
Communist take-over, which is not likely.The following U.S. Government actions have been taken or are in
train. U.S. military forces have been readied to take prompt
action in the event they are needed. 2000 airborne troops
will be available to arrive in the Canal Zone in 10 hours. About 1300 Marines
will be 20 miles off Panama shores (but out of sight) by
Sunday morning. All this is most
privately done and Cy Vance assures me there will be no
leak.Appropriate Government departments and agencies will be
alerted to watch the Panama situation closely on a 24 hour
basis.To minimize the possibility that the press will blame us
for whatever happens in the elections, State plans to make
it clear, on a background basis, that we have no favorites
in this election; as a matter of fact, none of the
candidates are shining lights.Long-standing emergency instructions to Americans in
Panama are in effect (e.g. stay off the streets). In the
event of attacks on the Zone, the Zone police will minimize
shooting and will rely, insofar as possible, on such devices
as tear gas, which they now have in plentiful supply.A Contingency Plan for Panama,
prepared on May 1 and approved by the Departments of
State and Defense, and the CIA, was forwarded to Bundy at the White
House on May 7. (Washington National Records Center,
OSD Files: FRC 330
69A 4023, Panama, 1964)The White House Situation Room has been alerted to watch the
elections closely; for spot status reports over the weekend, you may
want to call the Situation Room directly. For “deeper” analysis, I
will, of course, be available. But we probably won’t know much
before Monday.McG. B.
416. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 14 PAN. Confidential. Repeated to
CINCSO, CINCLANT, Governor of the Canal
Zone, and DIA.Panama City, June 1, 1964, 2:00 p.m.
672. Drama of May 10 Panamanian presidential election will formally close
June 6 when Marco Robles
scheduled receive credentials
as President-elect in formal ceremony at Los Santos.On May 29 the Embassy has reported on the results
of the election in Panama, in which Robles received 130,154 votes; Arnulfo Arias 119,
786 votes; Galindo 47,629 votes; Molino 9,714; and three other
candidates shared just over 10,000 votes. (Telegram 667 from Panama,
May 29; ibid.) Following is Embassy’s preliminary assessment
of aftermath of election:
Possibility of widespread violence in protest against Robles victory now seems slight
because: government’s political organization was skillful enough and
sufficiently well-heeled to keep its backstage manipulations fairly well
hidden; Arnulfo Arias apparently has no stomach for an effort at violent
rebellion, at least at this time; and National Guard remains alert and
capable and is backing Robles.
Robles is widely regarded as
honest man who, while no great statesman or intellect, will nevertheless
be more forceful President than Chiari has been. It is generally thought he will be less
tolerant than Chiari was of
Communist and crypto-Communist elements. He describes himself as simple
country boy from the interior who won honest election, who is
compromised by no political debts, and who will run his government with
firm hand.CIA and ARA representatives met on May 15 to review the
election. CIA reported that after
Galindo refused to withdraw, Robles was “under no illusion that he is running
ahead of Arnulfo Arias.” Robles believed that he would “ostensibly win the
election due to National Guard support and its control of
balloting.” (Memorandum from Carter to Hughes, May 15; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA–CIA
Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965)
Trouble with this portrait is that political organization which
engineered his victory was just as crooked as any other in living memory
in Panama, he or his close associates have already shown disconcerting
readiness to cooperate with certain leftists, and his victory was
heavily financed by number of people who will certainly present him with
political bill he will probably not be able refuse even if he wants
to.
This is not to say however, that Robles is not, from our point of view, an improvement
over Chiari, but how much of one
is problematical. He is probably somewhat stronger character; he is
perhaps educable; he doubtless realizes it is good politics, at least in
short-term, to seek improved relations with US; and he has cooperated
with US in past.
Not clear yet what kind of National Assembly Robles will have to work with since official count not
yet finished and all kinds of frantic deals are being made. Prospects
are he will command narrow majority but will be confronted with very
active opposition. Assembly will probably also contain one or two able
and energetic Commies or near-Commies.
Chiari government is undoubtedly
in difficult financial straits which will be worse by October when new
administration takes over. We will almost certainly be importuned to
bail them out.
In short, prospects are: (1) next four months will be difficult going for
Chiari government which
encountering severe financial problems (2) economic conditions may so
deteriorate that Panamenistas and Communists may find pretext to
undertake, perhaps jointly, major protest efforts such as mass
demonstrations, general strike, etc. (3) Chiari government will weather interim period and (4) in
October Robles will take over
government facing economic and financial problems with which unable cope
without external financial assistance. Present indications are Robles government will follow much
along same pattern as that of Chiari and other recent Panamanian governments and will
be largely representative of same pressure groups, but it does not
appear that in immediate future we will face another crisis like last
January. Time is running out, however, and we shall have to work harder
to get Panamanians begin face up to their fundamental social and
economic problems.
Vaughn
417. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. VI, August 1964–January
1965. Confidential. A note on the first page reads: “Classified
confidential only because of the references to the hiring of
Panamanians for the Canal Zone police force (Item 4), and the
proposed reduction in the 25% tropical differential pay (Item 7).
These are sensitive matters with our U.S. citizen employees.”Washington, August 27, 1964.
SUBJECT
Actions Taken in the Canal Zone to Improve Relations with Panama
Since the Riots of January 1964
Under the supervision of the Secretary of the Army, as a part of a
continuing program to improve relations with Panama, the following
specific actions have been taken since January by the Canal Zone
Government and the Panama Canal Company.
Flying Panamanian flags in the Canal
Zone.
Action. During the January riots, the
decision was made to adhere meticulously to the agreement to fly
the Panamanian flag wherever the U.S. flag is flown on land by
the civilian authorities in the Canal Zone. Dual flag poles and
dual flags have been installed at all schools in the Canal Zone.
A formal agreement with the Republic for the half-masting of
flags on national days of mourning is under discussion. Pending
such agreement, the flags of both nations are half-masted for
either nation’s days of mourning.
Disciplinary action against U.S. citizen
employees.
Action. Two employees whose opposition to
the Administration’s policies exceeded normally acceptable
standards have been discharged, and a third has been demoted.
These employees’ acts included publication of libelous material
and other acts of rank insubordination. The discharged
employees’ appeals are currently under consideration in the U.S.
Civil Service Commission. These discharges will have a salutary
effect on any employee who may be inclined to make inflamatory
public statements in opposition to conciliatory moves toward
Panama.
Wage increases to Panamanian employees.
Action. A series of wage increases was
initiated in 1962, designed to eliminate the marked gap between
wage levels in categories of jobs held for the most part by
Panamanian citizens and the categories held mostly by U.S.
citizens. The third and final increase under this program was
put into effect in July 1964. The program will increase annual
labor costs in Canal Zone agencies by approximately seven and
one-half million dollars.
Hiring of Panamanian citizens for the Panama
police force.
Action. In the past all police positions
in the Canal Zone have been designated as Security Positions,
reserved for U.S. citizens only. Thus, law enforcement in the
all-negro non-U.S. citizen communities within the Canal Zone and
along the Canal Zone border has been carried out by white U.S.
citizen policemen, creating both national and racial conflicts
in police actions involving Panamanians. On August 21, 1964, by
an amendment to Army regulations made possible by Executive
Order 11171, authority was granted to the Governor of the Canal
Zone to employ 25 Panamanian citizens for the police force
outside the Security Position category. This action was not
taken in response to any Panamanian demand, but it gives promise
of better relations between the Canal Zone police and the
Panamanian citizens in the Zone. It also opens a new category of
jobs formerly closed to Panamanian citizens.
Review of security positions.
Action. At the time of the establishment
of the Canal Zone Merit System in 1959 some 4,000 jobs in the
Canal Zone were classified as Security Positions, reserved for
U.S. citizens. Periodic reviews since that time reduced the
number to approximately 2,500. The Governor of the Canal Zone
has been directed to restudy the Security Positions in the Canal
organization with a view to further reducing the total.
Desegregation of public accommodations.
Action. Traditionally, Canal Zone
communities and public accommodations have been segregated along
national lines, which amounted to racial segregation in that
most Panamanian citizen employees are negro. With the passage of
the Civil Rights Act in the U.S., the Governor of the Canal Zone
issued orders eliminating the last vestiges of racial
segregation by desegregating all swimming pools and Government
housing within the Zone.
Reduction of the tropical differential.
Action. While again, not in response to
any Panamanian demand, the Secretary of the Army has formally
proposed to the employee organization in the Zone a prospective
reduction in the tropical differential paid to U.S. citizen
employees from 25% to 15%. Although not done for this purpose,
such a reduction would have a beneficial effect on relations
with Panama. When carried out, it would help eliminate
accusations of inequality of treatment and will create some
additional job opportunities for Panamanians. This action
derives from a three-year study and is now in the final stages
of discussion with employee representatives. The Secretary of
the Army will visit the Canal Zone on 28 August to participate
in these discussions. A final decision on implementing details
of the reduction is expected soon afterward.
Establishment of a Labor Advisory
Committee.
Action. For approximately two years, the
Governor of the Canal Zone has been discussing with
representatives of the Government of Panama the establishment of
a bi-national Labor Advisory Committee to advise him on labor
matters involving Panamanian employees of the Canal enterprise.
General agreement has been reached with Panama on the terms of
reference for the Committee, and its early establishment is
anticipated.
Panamanian Consultants to the Board of
Directors of the Panama Canal Company.
Action. Panama has long aspired to some
participation in the management of the Panama Canal Company. The
President recently
approved the recommendation of the Secretary of the Army that
two prominent residents of Panama, one Panamanian citizen and
one U.S. citizen businessman, be appointed as consultants to the
Board of Directors of the Panama Canal Company. The U.S.
Ambassador and the Governor of the Canal Zone have nominated
appropriate individuals and invitations will be extended to them
at an early date.
Scholarships in the Canal Zone College.
Action. In early June, the Governor of
the Canal Zone announced a scholarship program for ten
Panamanians to attend the Canal Zone College. Forty-seven
applicants took examinations, and final selection of the winners
was made on August 15.
50th Anniversary of the Panama Canal.
Action. The 50th Anniversary of the
opening of the Canal occurred on August 15th of this year. The
Anniversary was commemorated by quiet and restrained ceremonies
which were not offensive to Panama.
Resumption of community relations
programs.
Action. The Governor of the Canal Zone
and the U.S. Ambassador have discussed with the Foreign Minister
of Panama the resumption of various Canal Zone-Republic of
Panama community relations programs. Canal Zone support of rural
medical clinics has been resumed, and the city officials of
Colon joined in Canal Zone 4th of July celebrations. Other
similar activities are being encouraged.
Electric power and water for Panamanian border
communities.
Action. Prior to the January riots,
action was under way to provide Canal Zone water and electric
power to several Panamanian border communities remote from
Panamanian sources. The lines required within the Canal Zone
have been installed, and initiation of service awaits only the
completion of installations required on the Panamanian side.
Coordination of public information
activities.
Action. Steps have been initiated to
improve coordination of the public information activities of the
Canal organization, the military commands, and the U.S. Embassy,
both in normal times and during emergencies.
Sea level canal proposal.
Action. At the invitation of Ambassador
Anderson, the
Secretary of the Army explained the status of the sea level
canal project to
Ambassador Illueca of Panama on 7 July. The scope of the
engineering problems, the economic advantages to Panama of such
an arrangement, and the possibilities of a canal in Colombia
were covered. Subsequent statements by Panamanian officials
indicate their recognition that the U.S. must eventually build a
sea level canal and could possibly build it outside Panama.
The numbered actions above are confined to those primarily within the
authority of the Secretary of the Army and the Governor of the Canal
Zone. They do not include actions such as AID activities, loans, and grants, wholly within the
authority of the U.S. Ambassador and the Department of State or actions
within the Canal Zone in support of State Department discussions. The
latter are being handled by the Department of State through Ambassador
Anderson and Ambassador
Vaughn and are still in the preliminary discussion stages. They include
proposals such as the extension of Panama’s commercial activity in the
Canal Zone, release of unneeded lands and installations, a corridor
under Panama’s jurisdiction across the Zone, enforcement of certain
Panamanian laws in the Canal Zone, and many other Panamanian aspirations
requiring inter-agency action of Congressional approval to accomplish.
Progress on these broader matters has been delayed pending the
installation of the new President in Panama. They will also be affected
by Panama’s reaction to a formal U.S. proposal for site surveys
including the required option for operating rights in a sea level
canal.
The best prospect for a major improvement in U.S.-Panamanian relations is
that offered by the sea level canal project. If the United States and
the Republic of Panama can agree on the nature of the operating rights
which the United States must have if a sea level canal is to be
constructed in Panama, this agreement would put to rest many of the
emotional issues which now plague our relations. It would also clear the
air of many of the uncertainties with respect to United States policy
which are the source of most of the unrest among the U.S. citizens in
the Zone. Initially, this agreement would be operative only with respect
to survey rights but would also include a detailed option for further
arrangements for U.S. operating rights in a sea level canal. It would
not commit the U.S. in any way to the construction of such a canal. The
Department of State and the Department of the Army are actively engaged
drafting a proposal along these lines which will be ready for clearance
with appropriate Congressional committees and discussion with Panama in
the near future.
S. 2701, the site survey authorization bill, has passed the Senate and is
scheduled for House action in early September. A hearing was held on 17
August 1964 before the Senate Appropriations Committee on the proposed FY 1965 funds for the site
surveys which are the first step in the sea level canal project.This bill became Public Law 88–609 on
September 22, and created the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal
Study Commission to determine the best means of construction, and
estimated cost of such canal.
Robert S. McNamara
418. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAN–US. Secret. Repeated to
Governor of the Canal Zone, USCINCSO, and CIA.Panama City, October 8, 1964,
noon.
251. Subject: Current Assessment of US–Panama Relations.
With advent Robles government we
find our position here greatly improved in several respects: We are now dealing with a more responsible Panamanian
Government which is determined tackle number Panama’s chronic
problems with courage and vigor. For example, it is already
moving forward with realistic plan for development of country’s
interior, something US has long advocated. It has pledged itself
to thorough tax and budgetary reform in accordance with Alliance
for Progress precepts and Robles has so committed himself to US in detail
and in writing. More importantly, he has already undertaken some
measures along these lines with sufficient signs of meaning
business that he has raised real crisis of anguish from
traditional vested interests, including some of his own
political supporters.We can communicate sensibly and candidly with Robles government.Robles has pledged
himself to firm stand against Communist agitation, in welcome
contrast to his predecessor, and his past conduct as Minister of
Government and Justice gives credence to his present statements
of intent.Both publicly and privately Robles has indicated willingness negotiate
sea-level canal treaty with US and his FonMin has indicated willingness
negotiate military base rights.
Thus on whole we have in Robles
and his government something far better, from point of view US
interests, than might have been hoped for under circumstances—stagnant
state of Panamanian economy; four years of drifting and corruption under
Chiari; acute, universal,
and long-standing Panamanian dissatisfaction with arrangements governing
Panama Canal; and still fresh memory of events of January 1964 which saw
our bilateral relations plummet to their lowest point in history and
caused US to be charged with aggression before UN and OAS.
All this looks good and I believe there is much on plus side of ledger,
much more perhaps than we had any right to expect. I am persuaded,
however, that these circumstances do no more than provide US with brief
breathing spell and do not in any way eliminate severe problems which
face us as result profound and continuing Panamanian dissatisfaction
with existing treaty arrangements governing present canal. They provide
us time to find solutions to our present problems, although they perhaps
provide us time to find solutions.
We cannot realistically expect Robles to be satisfied with mere talk about future canal
or even with negotiation of liberal arrangements providing for new
canal. Pressures are increasing for changes, here and now, with regard
to present canal. Robles will
not be able to ignore them. Neither will we.
I share Governor Fleming’s great concern, as reflected in minutes of
Panama Review Committee meetings and in his own reporting to Washington,
over adverse image which Panama Canal (and therefore US) enjoys here. I
am constrained to add, however, that I do not believe it can be improved
without actual changes in practice, most probably including changes in
law and treaty structure, we are not going to solve our problems by
better or more accurate or more extensive public relations measures.
I submit following propositions as guides to policy formulation for next
few weeks and months:
Whatever we propose do about sea-level canal, we must prepare
ourselves for substantial early adjustments in present
arrangements. In my judgment these should include (a)
increased annuity (b) greater direct Panamanian
participation in commercial activities in Canal Zone (c)
agreement to further symbols of Panamanian sovereignty such
as issue of Panamanian stamps in Canal Zone and requirements
for merchant vessels to fly Panamanian flag as well as US
flag during transit of canal and (d) some formula which
would put terminus (10 years? 15 years? Opening of sea-level
canal?) on our present perpetual rights in Canal Zone.
Elusive problem of sovereignty, which is what sticks most in
Panamanian craw, would not be eliminated by any of above and
might, in long
run, be increased. I think we would however alleviate
problem for short run which is presumably all we need.
Panama remains small, immature, backward country trying to
deal with world’s most powerful nation. Fact that Panamanians
have not yet, so far as I am aware, produced coherent bill of
particulars in forum of special ambassadors will not relieve US
of burden of producing sensible proposal. We are not thereby
relieved of our basic problem of engendering healthful political
atmosphere of partnership, in absence of which we will have only
unpersuasive legalisms and physical force to protect our vital
interests.Next January 9 is date of crucial importance. If Robles is unable by then to
point to substantial concrete progress in negotiations with US
he will be faced with severe internal pressures which will put
great strain on his ability to control situation, could result
in fall of his government, and could lead to assumption of power
by extremist regime of either right or left and in any event
will sorely tempt him deflect these internal pressures onto US.
Neither alternative appears helpful to say the least. (One
possible device to relieve situation might be state visit by
Robles to Washington
in, say, December, but here again there would have to be more
than eyewash.)
I recognize there are two fundamental questions which my argument raises
and which deserve answer. First is why should we give away quids
without, apparently, exacting equivalent quos? Answer lies, I believe,
in fact that only real quo of lasting value to us here is responsible
stable Panamanian Government and society which can and will work with US
in enduring partnership solidly based in political reality. Robles has it in his power to give us
such quo provided we protect him by actions which make clear that we are
sympathetic to Panamanian aspirations and are prepared to go long way to
meet them, in short that to cooperate with US is compatible with
Panamanian pride. I am convinced that if we are forthcoming Panama will
also be forthcoming, at least to far greater degree than if, as in the
past, we hold back and force Panama to wring reluctant conessions from
us in atmosphere of acrimonious and niggardly bargaining.
Secondly, why should we give anything away until we have nailed down all
future guarantees we need? Answer is that we do not have luxury of time
and Panama simply will not play this game anyway. One sure way to
prevent our getting arrangements we want for future canal is totally to
resist Panamanian efforts to modernize present arrangements. We should
not underestimate Panama’s capacity to cut off its nose to spite our
face.
Vaughn
419. Memorandum of Telephone ConversationSource: Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, January 14,
1964–April 30, 1964. No classification marking.Washington, November 18, 1964, 2:35
p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
The PresidentMr. Mann
The President called and asked Mr. Mann what was happening in Panama. Mr. Mann explained about the change in
Ambassadors and asked if that was what the President was referring to.
The President said he wanted to know how Anderson’s negotiations were coming and mentioned the
up-coming anniversary of the riots of last year.
Mr. Mann said this situation was
charged with dynamite.On October 13
Robert M. Sayre of the
NSC staff wrote Bundy that Vaughn suggested “the United States
must make meaningful concessions to Panama, or anti-U.S. elements in
Panama will use the anniversary of January 9, 1965 for another
blowup.” (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Panama, VI,
August 1964–January 1965) On November 12 Mann told a meeting of officials from ARA and CIA that he “considered it likely that ‘all hell will
break loose’ in Panama January 9.” (Memorandum from Carter (INR) to Hughes; Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, ARA–CIA Weekly
Meetings, 1964–1965) He said he was leaving in 15 minutes to
talk to Secretary Ailes. Mr.
Mann said that he was working
on a sea level canal treaty on which the Department agrees and to which
they hope to get Defense’s agreement.Documentation on U.S.-Panama negotiations on the Canal treaty, from
1964 through the Johnson administration is in
the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/SR/PAN Files: Lots 73 D 286 and 73
D 216, and ARA/LA/PAN Files: Lot
75 D 457. Mr. Mann
said that they are going to have to talk to the President about calling
in the Leadership and going over it with them, if the President is
satisfied with the text of the sea level canal. Mr. Mann said we are getting ready to
negotiate with Colombia, Panama and Nicaragua and then crank up some
publicity to improve our image. Mr. Mann said what we wanted is reasonable but the
Panamanians won’t like it. He said what they wanted essentially is for
us to dig the ditch and turn it over to them after we get our money
back.
Mr. Mann said that we have kept
Bob Anderson informed about
all these things, that he has a copy and knows what we are doing. Mr.
Mann said the Panamanians
themselves have not done much negotiating because they have not been
able to agree on a position among themselves and they have used our
elections as an excuse. The President said that we should push Mr. Anderson to push them and say that he
is ready to go.
Mr. Mann said that the record is
very clear that we have pushed them, not once but many times.
The President said to add it again today. To tell them he is ready to
talk. He told Mr. Mann to
instruct Anderson to proceed and
contact them and say that the President is waiting on them. The
President said perhaps it would help if we could make some adjustment in
wages and show a little social consciousness. Mr. Mann said he thought we could. He said
so far Defense, the Governor and O’Meara are all opposed to recommendations made by the
Ambassador. The President asked what some of these recommendations were
and Mr. Mann mentioned the
following: 0
Flying flags all over the
place, including on ships that pass through the canal.
Making Spanish an official language, a second language.
Collecting Panamanian income taxes inside the Zone for the
Government of Panama.
Use of Panamanian postage stamps in Canal Zone.
Appointment of consultant to the Board of Directors.
Establishment of labor advisory committee.
Supplying them with free potable water to increase annuity.
Mr. Mann said he thought we are
going to be able to do some of these and we have to do it before
Christmas. The President said even before that. The President said that
the students were not as well disciplined as he. He mentioned that a
year later we were right where we started.
The President asked Mr. Mann if he
should tell McNamara to review
this thing again and see what he can do. Mr. Mann said this sounded good and said he would tell Steve
Ailes and they would go over it.
The President asked Mr. Mann if he
had spoken to Adlai Stevenson after his visit and Mr. Mann said he had not seen him, but that
he had received a letter and a memo from Stevenson and had written him a
letter.None found.
The President asked who had turned down these recommendations and Mr.
Mann said Steve Ailes, the
Chairman of the Board of the Panama Canal Company. He said he thought
[garble] stockholder.
The President said he thought that McNamara had more social consciousness than that and
that he would rather make adjustments in time than to plant his feet in
concrete.
Mr. Mann told the President that
the thing that is going to help us the most is to get out in front with
a lot of publicity on this new canal. He said then we can get this whole
thing in perspective, we can tell everyone here and in Panama and the
whole world that the present canal is limited and that we are going to
build a new one and therefore we are dealing with a wasting asset. Mr.
Mann said what we were not
going to be able to do, unless the President thought it was politically
possible, is to make the sweeping concessions on sovereignty and
perpetuity that they want.
The President said that he would talk to McNamaraApparently having
just spoken to the President, McNamara called Mann to say that “he was very anxious to see us make
changes” in Panama and required a list of things Mann would like done sent “over
immediately.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation between
Mann and McNamara, November 18, 2:45 p.m.;
Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C.
Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, January 14, 1964–April 30,
1965) and told Mr. Mann to put a red flag on two things; one the conference
with Leadership—to notify them plenty ahead of time so that he did not
have to call them in on Christmas Day on a crisis basis—to move it up,
and secondly see if we can’t get the Ambassador’s recommendations
re-worked.
420. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security Security
File, Country File, Panama, Vol. VI, August 1964–January 1965.
Confidential.Washington, undated.
SUBJECT
Relations with Panama and Sea-Level Canal Negotiations
A briefing for you on relations with Panama and proposals for
negotiations with Panama on canal problems has been arranged for
December 2 at 5:45 PM.
Relations with Panama
The Robles Administration passed a test of strength during the week of
November 23–27 against Communist and anti-American elements. The demonstrations which
occurred were not primarily directed at the United States, but were
intended to protest what these elements regarded as a weakening of the
Panamanian position in its negotiations with the United States. Although
the National Assembly sustained the Government, it did so in a
resolution which called for abrogation of the 1903 Treaty. Before these
events, it was hoped that a satisfactory interim program, until a
sea-level canal were opened, might be the nine-points agreed to between
State and Defense (Tab A).Tab A, atttached
but not printed, is a November 19 memorandum from Mann to McNamara, that contains nine
interim steps that would demonstrate to Panama progress in the
negotiations and reduce the possibility of violence. These were: (1)
flying Panamanian flags in addition to the American flag and flag of
registry; (2) Spanish as an official language in the Zone; (3) use
of Panamanian postage stamps with Canal authority overprinting in
the Zone; (4) a Panamanian and an American citizen resident in
Panama to join the Canal Board of Directors; (5) negotiations for a
Labor Advisory Committee;(6) negotiations for an agreement for
purchase of gasoline for use in the Zone; (7) negotiations for
withholding and remittance to Panama of income taxes of Panamanian
employees of private companies in the Zone; (8) negotiations to
permit private Panamanian companies to establish businesses in the
Zone; and (9) free treated water to Panama. It is doubtful
now that such an interim program would be adequate. State suggests the
following program, on which McNamara has not yet had a chance to decide his
position.
Possible Package Program
A general policy statement which
discusses relations with Panama and negotiations on a sea-level
canal (draft attached Tab B).Tab B,
attached but not printed, is a draft outline of a policy
statement prepared by Mann on November 28. Such a
statement, if made this month, would permit us to seize the
initiative and dampen current efforts by anti-American elements
in Panama to stage large anti-American demonstrations on January
9; avoid any appearance of responding to pressure generated by
demonstrations; and provide the terms of reference for the
conduct of negotiations with Panama and other countries on a
sea-level canal.
Such a statement would restate our major objectives in operating
the present or any future canal; recognize that the existing
canal and treaty arrangements are becoming obsolete; note the
Congressional authorization for a sea-level canal study, and
give some ideas on how the surveys would be conducted, and how a
sea-level canal would be financed, constructed, operated,
maintained and defended; discuss what we propose to do about the
present canal during the interim period until a new one is
opened, including the protection of the interest of American and
Panamanian employees; and request the cooperation of all in this
forward-looking program.
A sea-level canal treaty which would give
us the right to conduct necessary surveys and construct a new
canal at our option. (Draft of November 18 is attached at Tab C.Tab C, attached but not printed, is a
draft of the treaty prepared November 18. There are
still some disagreements between State and Defense on this draft
which they hope to reconcile before the December 2 meeting.) The
treaty would separate the security aspects from the business of
operating a canal. The canal would be operated and maintained by
an international commission on a self-sustaining basis. Defense
of the sea-level canal would be the responsibility of the United
States and Panama (Colombia or Nicaragua–Costa Rica) with almost
the entire burden falling on the United States.The Joint Chiefs addressed the issue of a
proposed sea-level canal in two memoranda to McNamara on December 2,
JCSM–1012–64 and CM–285–64. (Washington National Records
Center, OSD Files: FRC 330
70 A 1266, Pan 800 (4 January, 1965), Sea Level Canal, and
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Panama, VI, August 1964–January 1965, respectively) The
JCS generally concurred
in the proposed treaty provided “joint defense” included the
right of the United States to defend the host country
against Communist domination as well as to defend the canal.
The JCS also noted that the
draft treaty should be submitted to careful analysis and
interagency coordination before it was adopted as
policy.
The country in which the canal is located would retain
sovereignty, but would grant to the Commission specific rights
which would enable the Commission to control, operate, maintain
and protect the canal. The suggested composition of the
Commission is such that we would have a majority.
This treaty, and the base rights treaty under 3 below, would be
negotiated with Panama, Colombia, and Nicaragua-Costa Rica
before we begin surveys or other works. Such simultaneous
negotiations in advance would put us in the best bargaining
position with these countries. Panamanian oligarchs will not
like the international approach on operating the canal, but this
offers the best basis for selling it to world opinion and puts
us in a favorable position.
A base rights treaty to accompany a sea-level
canal treaty which covers the continued stationing of our forces in
Panama (Colombia or Nicaragua-Costa Rica). Present treaties permit
such forces only for defense of the canal, and we need to broaden
this to cover hemisphere defense. Such a treaty would be similar to
the NATO status of forces
agreements, but it cannot be drafted until Defense determines what
areas of lands it needs for bases.
A new treaty with Panama which would
replace all existing treaties and would remain in force until
two years after a sea-level canal opens. The Panamanian Foreign
Minister has informed us that the Robles Administration must
obtain agreement to negotiate a new treaty if it is to remain in
office. Ambassador Vaughn
agrees with this assessment. In drafting it, we would follow the
same technique as on the sea-level canal—recognize Panamanian
sovereignty but then provide specific grants of rights to the United States.
Some 80% of the provisions could be the same as in the three
existing treaties. (State has prepared a rough draft, which is
attached Tab D.)Tab D, attached but
not printed, is the Department of State draft prepared on
November 26.
The purpose of such a treaty would be in great part
psychological—to remove those emotional issues (sovereignty,
etc.) which provide grist for agitators in Panama, and at the
same time, preserve our essential rights and requirements for
operation, maintenance and protection of the canal (operation of
courts, police jurisdiction, stationing of military forces,
etc.). It would include those items from the nine-point interim
program (Tab A above) that are appropriate. At the same time we
must expect the Panamanians to insist that many of the
peripheral privileges we have hitherto enjoyed, which cannot
reasonably be justified as necessary for
the operation, maintenance and protection of the canal, will
probably have to be eliminated (operation of commissaries, movie
houses, bowling alleys, use of Canal Zone stamps, use of
unneeded land and facilities, and so forth). We should be able
to soften the blow on civilian employees by cost-of-living
allowances or agreement by Panama that the employees may run
cooperative stores, or both.
An undertaking on our part to help Panama to
adjust economically to the construction of a sea-level canal
elsewhere in Panama or in another country.
For the meeting on December 2, it is proposed that we concentrate
primarily on the proposed policy statement. If you approve the
statement, you could then review it with the leadership on December 18,
and any others you thought appropriate, such as General
Eisenhower. It is hoped that the statement
could be issued before Christmas.
It is intended that all the proposed treaties be negotiated with Panama
at the same time, and the package then presented to the Senate for
ratification. Only the sea-level canal and base rights treaties would be
negotiated with Colombia and Nicaragua-Costa Rica.
Secretary McNamara plans to bring
Cyrus Vance and Steve Ailes
to the briefing.
Robert Anderson, Leonard Meeker (State’s Acting Legal
Adviser), Ambassador Vaughn and
Edward Clark (Director of
Panamanian Affairs). Secretary Rusk is meeting with Foreign Ministers who will be in
New York for the meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. He has reviewed
the general features of the program outlined above and concurs in them.
But he does not believe we
should at this time raise the possibility of using nuclear detonations
to build the canal.
Bob Sayre and I would also attend
the briefing.
McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
421. Draft Record of MeetingSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Miscellaneous
Meetings, Vol. I. Confidential. Drafted by Sayre on December 4. The meeting
was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. No other record of
this meeting was found.Washington, December 2, 1964, 6:30
p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
White HouseThe PresidentMcGeorge BundyRobert M. SayreStateW. Averell Harriman,
Acting SecretaryRobert Anderson,
Special AmbassadorThomas C. Mann,
Assistant SecretaryLeonard Meeker,
Acting Legal AdviserJack Vaughn,
Ambassador to PanamaEdward Clark,
Director of Panamanian AffairsDefenseCyrus Vance, Deputy
SecretarySteven Ailes, Secretary of the Army
The President inquired as to the status of the nine points which had been
discussed as a possible interim program on the Panama Canal.The nine points were contained in a November 19
memorandum from Mann to
McNamara; see footnote 2, Document 420.
Mr. Ailes said that the points had
been studied by State and Defense and had been agreed upon, but that
action had not been taken because of new suggestions which were to be
discussed at the meeting.
Mr. Anderson said that the nine
points had originated in a memorandum from Foreign Minister Eleta. Eleta presented them to Mr. Anderson in a meeting in New York City, and asked for a
response within three or four days. Eleta said that he needed U.S. agreement on these points
in his feud with Ambassador Illueca. Mr. Anderson told him that this was an internal Panamanian
problem in which the United States did not want to become involved. The
United States would consider the points only in the context of
US-Panamanian relations.
Mr. Anderson then turned to the
general problem of negotiations with Panama. He said the 1903 Treaty was
an emotional problem with Panama. Panama would not be happy with any
patchwork on it. He did not believe there could be any lasting
settlement with Panama on such a basis. On the other hand, he was fully
aware that the United States could not give up any of its essential
rights. He said a draft proposal had been prepared which the President
might consider, but he himself was not ready to recommend the specific
draft he had in his hand.
The President asked what he was specifically expected to do. The
President said he did not think a large meeting was the proper forum for
a decision by him on the matter. He said such decisions invariably
leaked before he was ready to make them because some of the participants
felt a compulsion to talk to newsmen, or to people who leaked the
decision to newsmen. He emphasized strongly that decisions affecting the
national security had to be protected. Premature release of information
could adversely affect our negotiating position and, therefore, the
security and defense posture of the United States. He took the gravest
view of the improper release of information obtained in conversations
with him.
Mr. Bundy said that the purpose of
the meeting was a briefing. He thought that the whole problem should be
laid out so that the President would be aware of it. He saw no need for
any specific decision at this point, and the President was not being
asked for that. All that was desired at this time was an indication, on
the basis of the briefing, whether Mr. Anderson, State and Defense, should proceed to draw up
specific recommendations which the President could consider.
The President suggested Mr. Anderson proceed with his presentation.
Mr. Anderson said that there were
four principles on which he thought we should proceed: There had to be a new instrument. Mr. Anderson was aware of a
difference in opinion between State and Defense on the tactical
approach, i.e., whether you say there will be a new treaty and
then negotiate with the Panamanians on what goes into that
treaty, or whether you say you will negotiate with the
Panamanians on what concessions you will give up and then put
the remainder in a new treaty. He thought this was largely a
matter of semantics. The important point was whether we agreed that there will
be a new treaty. The words could be worked out for any proposed
statement. In any case, everyone agreed that we had to insist
that the existing treaties are binding and must be observed
until a new treaty enters into force.The new treaty would have a time limit, defined as a specified
length of time after the new sea-level canal opens for
operations. He thought that the “perpetuity clause” had to go,
and the idea of limiting the new treaty in duration on the basis
of opening a new canal seemed a reasonable and feasible
approach.The United States would recognize that Panama has sovereignty.
There should be no debate about whether it is titular
sovereignty, or whether the United States has rights as if it
were sovereign.The United States must have those rights which are essential
to the operation of the canal during the life of the new
agreement. He thought it entirely possible to define what those
essential rights are.
Mr. Anderson thought if everyone
agreed on these general principles, then he, State and Defense could
draft a proposed policy statementPresident
Johnson issued a statement concerning a
decision by the United States to build a sea-level canal and to
negotiate a new treaty with Panama on December 18. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1963–64, Book II, pp. 1663–1665, and
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents,
1964, pp. 370–372. which the President could review
with the Congressional leadership on December 18, and such other persons
as the President thought necessary.In
JCSM–1052–64, December 17, the JCS
informed McNamara that they
agreed in principle with a draft of the President’s statement on
Panama, provided the draft incorporated some proposed changes. The
JCS also indicated that a
“policy directive delineating a specific course of action is
urgently required” and recommended its development “as a matter of
priority.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files; FRC 330 69A 7425, Pan 381
(18 January, 1964), Panama Crisis, August–December 1964) Former
President Eisenhower was consulted on December
16 and according to the record of this briefing said “that ‘by and
large’ the draft statement on Panama is ‘all right’ and that he
doesn’t see anything wrong with it.” (Memorandum prepared in the
CIA, December 17; Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. VI,
August 1964–January 1965) The record of meeting with the
Congressional leadership on December 18 is ibid., Bundy Files. The objective
would be to announce such a policy statement immediately after a
discussion with the leadership. He thought that the general approach
with the leadership should be that the policy statement represents what
the Administration has decided must be done.
Mr. Mann associated himself with
the four principles as outlined by Mr. Anderson. He said State had already drafted a proposed
new treaty. The draft included all of the rights which Army and State
considered essential. He regarded it as a tough document and was not
certain it could be sold to Panama. He emphasized that it should be
negotiated at the same time as the sea-level canal treaty and a base
rights agreement. He viewed them—with respect to Panama—as one package.
Mr. Vance agreed with this
point.
Mr. Mann said we should negotiate
with Panama, Colombia and Nicaragua–Costa Rica simultaneously.
The President inquired why these negotiations were necessary and why a
new treaty was necessary. Would it not be possible to do what was
proposed by executive action?
Mr. Mann said there were several
sites for a canal. He thought we should look at them. He did not think
the decision could be made on the basis of cost alone. It might be
cheaper to build a canal in Panama, but not get a treaty there that is
politically acceptable.
Mr. Anderson said that there are
matters which cannot be settled except by treaty. The nine points could
probably be carried out by executive decision. But return to Panama of
unnecessary lands required Congressional approval. He referred to a
triangle of land (Shaler Triangle) that is of absolutely no use to the
United States, but without a treaty we cannot return it to Panama.
Mr. Ailes said estimates on digging
a new canal in Panama are about $750,000,000. Digging one in Colombia
would cost about $1.1 billion. He said digging it by conventional means,
or using atomic detonations, would make a difference in the cost. He had
no estimate on the route through Nicaragua-Costa Rica.
Mr. Anderson thought that the
“how” of digging a canal should not be a consideration now. Nor did he
think that the cost should be the basis for a determination. Mr.
Mann agreed. He thought we
should consider the technical aspects and the cost, but we also had to
consider the political situation.
Mr. Harriman said we should avoid
any discussion of “how,” especially any discussion of the use of atomic
power. With the test ban treaty we could not use atomic detonations. In
10 or 15 years, when we get ready to build a canal, the whole state of
the art might be different.
The President asked for Ambassador Vaughn’s comments.
Ambassador Vaughn said he agreed
with the views expressed by Ambassador Anderson. He viewed the anniversary date of the riots in
1964—January 9—as a crucial date. He expected riots of even more serious
proportions unless some action were taken before that time which would
remove the Canal Zone as a popular issue.According to a December 9 memorandum from Jessup to Bundy, “Mr. McCone has been riding the Panama
horse quite hard lately.” Jessup continued, “He feels strongly that time is
running out unless the U.S. is prepared to make substantial
concessions here and that anything short of a bilateral agreement
which meets the issue head on will result in the fall of Robles.”
(National Security Council, Files of the 5412 Special Group/303
Committee, Panama)
The President inquired whether the United States had failed to live up to
its commitments taken in April 1964, to appoint special Ambassadors and
to begin discussions immediately and in good faith.
Ambassador Vaughn said that it was
fulfilling its commitments. He did not regard this as the problem. He
noted that the January 1964 riots were carried out without any effort by
the Chiari Government to control them, and some reason to believe the
Government supported them. The situation was different now. The Robles
Government had responded effectively to demonstrations in November. He
did not expect it to be behind demonstrations this January. The leaders
now would be the communists, hyper-nationalists and the Castroites. They
would have an issue—no apparent progress in a year. Unless we could
effectively deflate this issue, he saw these anti-American elements
uniting into an FALN-type operation. (The FALN is a Castroite-Communist terrorist organization
operating in Venezuela.) He expected this would lead to bombings,
including an effort to bomb the canal. He did not want to “cry wolf,”
but he honestly believed we were in for real trouble unless we
acted.
Ambassador Vaughn regarded the
Canal Zone as the classic colony. In our national interest he thought it
had to be eliminated or else we were in for the same kind of trouble we
see in Africa. In response to a question, he said he did not expect it
to go the way of Africa because he thought we were smarter than de
Gaulle.
Mr. Bundy interjected that the
dietary habits were different in Panama also.
Mr. Anderson said there was no
suggestion that we had been derelict. Ambassador Illueca (Panama’s special Ambassador
for discussions on Panama) was engaged in a personal feud with Foreign
Minister Eleta. He wanted to be
the spokesman. He did not want to respond to instructions from the
Foreign Office. Eleta decided to
remove him. Panama has now named five Ambassadors to conduct discussions
with the United States. De la
Rosa had been elected the spokesman. If Panama had its
way, Ambassador Anderson said it
wanted us to get out of the Canal entirely and let Panama run it. Then
it would try to profit from what it considers its monopoly position. He
said he had made it completely clear to the Panamanians that the United
States would not agree. The canal was essential to our security. It was
essential to world commerce. We had obligations which we could not
ignore.
Ambassador Anderson said that the
Panamanian negotiating group told him they had 52 points which they
wanted to discuss. He offered to discuss them. But he said it should be
done informally. No papers would be passed. While they were talking, if
they said one day that they accepted a point and the next day that they
had to reject it, he would
understand. At the same time, he would have the same options. He said
there should be nothing in writing until the discussions had progressed
to a point where it was obvious there was an area of agreement. Second,
he said he wanted it clear that what he said today would not be in the
paper tomorrow. He said the Panamanians accepted this approach.
Ambassador Anderson said that the
Panamanians then proposed a joint declaration. It gave the Panamanians
the best of both worlds. He offered to discuss it with them on Friday,
December 4. They wanted agreement immediately because they had to leave
next week and would not be back until January 2 or 3. When Ambassador
Anderson inquired why, they
said they had to go back and consult to get approval on the 52 points.
At the same time, they insisted that they had to have something before
January 9. Ambassador Anderson
said that this led him to conclude that the United States would have to
act unilaterally so that it could be said this month.
Mr. Ailes said a sea-level canal
could be built at its present location. He said Congress had
appropriated $400,000 to initiate the work of an Interoceanic Canal
Commission, but wanted site surveys first before it appropriated any
money for a canal.
Mr. Anderson said that he was
thinking of December 18 as the date for a meeting with the leadership to
review the Administration’s plans. In the proposed sea-level canal, he
said we were thinking of an international commission to run the canal.
We knew Panama opposed this. Maybe they would come around. Mr. Mann interjected that simultaneous
negotiations with Colombia and Nicaragua–Costa Rica should help. We
favored an international commission because it gets us away from the
big-little country controversy.
In response to a question, Ambassador Vaughn said there were probably 600 card-carrying
Communists in Panama. He estimated there were 300 Cuban trained
terrorists. The Communists have cells in the rural areas. They claim
they can bring 20,000 demonstrators from there into Panama within a day.
He thought they could. At the moment, they have no issue. He thought
there were 20,000 sympathizers. The Communist stronghold is in the
University. The danger is not the Communists alone. It arises when the
Communists and the nationalists (and on the Canal issue every Panamanian
is a nationalist) combine over an issue. January 9 provided such an
issue.
The President inquired why things had quieted down in April. Ambassador
Vaughn said he thought that
the agreement which had been reached at that time gave the Panamanians
hope that their aspirations would be realized. Mr. Bundy thought a major reason was also
that the Panamanians had grown weary. Mr. Mann observed that the economic pinch which resulted
from the unrest, lack of tourists, fall of business activity, etc., was
certainly a major reason.
Ambassador Vaughn thought that a
policy statement, based on the four principles Ambassador Anderson had outlined, would keep
things reasonably quiet.
Mr. Mann said that the nine points
which had been discussed were no longer considered to be an adequate
interim program.
Mr. Ailes thought this might be
true, but an announcement of a new treaty would stir up old attitudes on
the Hill. He recognized that the
January 1964 riots had shaken those old attitudes and that there was
more understanding of the problem now.
Mr. Vance added that there has
also been changes in the composition of the Congress, which had
helped.
Mr. Mann said he thought a
statement was necessary domestically to put the problem in prospective,
and to get the people to look to the future instead of to the past.
The President said he would consider a statement after it had been
prepared by Ambassador Anderson,
State and Defense.According to the
President’s Daily Diary, Anderson and the President met alone in the Oval
Office from 7:16 to 8:18 p.m. (Ibid.) In Panama
Odyssey, William Jordan briefly recounts this meeting. (p.
100) Thereupon the meeting ended 7:20 PM.
422. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy)Source:
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol.
VI, August 1964–January 1965. Secret.Washington, undated.
SUBJECT
Panama
This is in response to your query whether (1) we should be taking any
further action to prevent trouble in Panama on January 9 or in the near
future, and (2) whether there is anything we should do, overtly or
covertly, to prevent Panamanian public opinion from swinging against the
presence of our military forces there.
As regards the possibility of disturbances on January 9, the Communists
have been thrown off balance by the President’s statement, President
Robles has assured
Ambassador Vaughn that no trouble
will be tolerated, and what appears to be a very satisfactory solution
to the half-masting of flags on that date has been worked out between
the Canal Zone and the Panamanian Government. Ambassador
Arias has likewise informed the Department that
the Panamanian Government anticipates no difficulty in handling any
attempts at disorders on January 9. Embassy Panama’s telegram 427,
December 31,Not printed. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 PAN) indicates belief
that prospects are good of getting through this period without major
difficulty.
In view of the above, we agree that there is nothing further now that we
can effectively do to minimize the possibility of disturbances on
January 9, but we are launching a longer-term program to capitalize on
the initiative the President’s statement has given us. A telegram
outlining our views is already in draft, and we shall be in touch with
the White House and other agencies on this program in the next few
days.
With regard to the problem of influencing Panamanian public opinion on
the question of our military forces and bases, we have considered the
possibility of inducing an official Panamanian statement disowning the
recent statement by Castillero Pimentel in which he called for the
withdrawal of U.S. forces. Foreign Minister Eleta discussed this statement with Ambassador Vaughn, indicating that Castillero had
been reprimanded and soliciting Vaughn’s advice regards the advisability of the
Panamanian Government issuing a statement that Castillero was not
speaking for the Government. Ambassador Vaughn expressed his judgment to Eleta that it would be preferable not
to make such a statement at this time.
We are inclined to agree with Ambassador Vaughn’s on-the-spot judgment on this point, although we
believe that such a statement might be appropriate a little later after
the ground has been prepared. To this end, [less than
1 line of source text not declassified] through the Panamanian
press, radio and TV which will have the objective of educating the
Panamanian public regarding the important part the United States
military presence plays in the Panamanian economy, pointing up the
disastrous consequences for Panama if the United States bases should ever be closed and
pointing the finger at the Communists as those who are pushing this line
for their own ends.At a meeting with CIA and ARA representatives on December 30, Mann reported that the President
had phoned him and asked “for guarantees that there would be no
trouble in Panama on January 9.” FitzGerald assured Mann that Robles had been
“strengthened greatly by President Johnson’s
statement on the canal.” Mann
asked what CIA had done to ensure
that there would be no trouble. FitzGerald told Mann that “Robles had been assured of all the
support he asked for” and “any demonstrations would be easily
controlled by the Panamanian Government.” (Memorandum from Stuart to
Hughes, Denney, and Evans, December 31; Department of
State, INR/IL Historical Files,
ARA–CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964–1965) Another record of this
meeting was prepared by FitzGerald. (Memorandum
for the record, December 31; Central Intelligence Agency, Job
78–03041R, DDO/IMS Files, [file name not
declassified])
TCM
423. National Security Action Memorandum No. 323Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. VI, Memoranda, September
1964–January 1964. Secret.Washington, January 8, 1965.
SUBJECT
Policy toward the present and future of the Panama Canal
TO
The Secretary of StateThe Secretary of DefenseThe Director, Central Intelligence AgencyThe Chairman, Atomic Energy CommissionThe Director, Bureau of the BudgetThe Director, U.S. Information AgencyBasic policy toward the present and future of the Panama Canal has
been set forth by the President in a statement on December 18, 1964,
of which an authentic copy is attached.Attached but not printed; see footnote
3, Document 421. This statement makes it U.S.
policy to work toward a new sea level canal and to propose
renegotiation with Panama of the existing Panama Canal
Treaties.The Secretary of State is requested to begin discussions as
appropriate with the Governments of Panama, Colombia, Nicaragua, and
Costa Rica, with
respect to the possibilities of a sea level canal. The Secretary is
requested to determine which of these governments would be
interested in the possible construction of a sea level canal through
its territory. The United States is prepared to begin negotiations
with interested governments on the terms and conditions for the
construction and operation of a sea level canal. Depending on the
results of these negotiations, it is expected that we would proceed
with selected site surveys.We have in mind a treaty for a sea level canal in which
sovereignty over the canal area would remain in the country or
countries through which the canal would pass. The United States
would be authorized, at its option, alone or with others, to
undertake construction. Financing would be the primary
responsibility of the United States Government, but the door could
be left open for it to accept contributions from other sources, both
public and private.The United States Government has no final position on the exact
form by which interested governments might join in operation of a
sea level canal. There are advantages and disadvantages in an
international commission which might include representatives of
users or of financing groups or of the Organization of American
States. There are equally advantages and disadvantages in bilateral
operation by the United States and the country through which the
canal might run. Moreover, it is possible to think in terms of two
layers of responsibility, one bilateral and the other broadly
international. Final decisions on these matters will be made by the
President in the light of further advice and recommendations from
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.It is expected that the defense of the new canal would be the
responsibility of the United States and the country or countries
through which the canal runs. We should seek treaty terms which give
to the United States the necessary rights and freedom of action to
ensure the effective security of the canal regardless of the actions
of the other country or countries.The tolls for a sea level canal would be fixed in such a way as to
put the canal on a self-sustaining basis, to pay an annuity to the
host government, to amortize this investment and to serve the
interests of world commerce. Like the present canal, the new
interoceanic canal would be open to the vessels of all countries on
the basis of equality.Whatever treaties are agreed upon would, of course, be subject to
approval and ratification in accordance with the constitutional
procedures of the United States and the other country or countries
involved.With respect to the negotiation with Panama, the following
principles will guide our negotiators: We are glad to join with the Government of Panama in
searching for solutions which are compatible with the
dignity, responsibility and sovereignty of both nations. It is
clear that we must make provision for the continued
protection and operation of the existing canal by the United
States until it is replaced.We are prepared to negotiate a new treaty with Panama
governing the present lock canal, based on the retention by
the United States of all rights necessary to the effective
operation and protection of the canal, including
administration of the areas required for these purposes.
This treaty would replace the 1903 Treaty and its
amendments. It should recognize Panama’s sovereignty. It
should provide for a termination date for rights retained by
the United States based on the operational date of a sea
level canal wherever it might be constructed. It should
provide for the effective discharge by the United States of
its responsibilities for hemispheric defense. The present
treaties would, of course, remain in effect until a new
agreement is reached.The new treaty for the existing canal should include
adequate provisions to ensure continuation of our military
bases and activities in the Canal Zone until the closing of
the existing canal, without loss of necessary rights or
freedom of action. The treaty should make no distinction
between the use of bases for purposes of protection of the
canal or for hemispheric security. The agreement should
contain appropriate acknowledgment of Panama’s contribution
to hemispheric security under these arrangements. In
addition, arrangements should be included to continue
existing U.S. military base rights in the Republic of Panama
outside the Canal Zone and to create appropriate status of
forces provisions for U.S. servicemen when outside the
Zone.Upon the closing of the existing canal, our military
rights under the new treaty as discussed in the preceding
paragraph will terminate. Therefore, negotiations should
also be started for a base rights and status of forces
agreement with Panama, related to hemispheric security, to
come into effect upon the closing of the present canal. This
new agreement should provide for continuation of U.S.
military bases and facilities in the present Zone and
outside the Zone in the Republic of Panama, with such
changes as are needed. The agreement should also cover
whatever new arrangements are needed in connection with the
security and defense of the new canal wherever it is
located.Wherever the new canal is built it will create new
opportunities. To be sure, closing of the present canal
would cause economic problems for Panama, but these would be
offset to a great extent by those new opportunities which
would be created if the sea level canal were built there.
Panama would benefit not only from the actual construction
of such a canal, but would also continue to enjoy the
benefits of the present canal until the new one were
completed. We are prepared to consider now with Panama a
program of how best to take advantage of these opportunities
and to meet these problems. The efficient employment of Panamanian
workers employed in the present canal whose services would
not be needed in the operation and maintenance of the sea
level canal will form a major topic of our discussions with
Panama.We will also take every possible step to protect the
employment rights and economic security during the
transition period of United States citizens now employed in
connection with the operation, maintenance, and defense of
the present canal. We shall do what is necessary to find
them employment fitting their skills and experience and by
providing retraining where this is called for.
In summary, the President’s new policy sets three principal tasks
before the United States Government, in order to satisfy the
requirements of the present and the future: Working out satisfactory arrangements for the
construction and operation of a new sea level
canal;Providing a new treaty framework for the interim
period to govern the operation and administration of the
present lock canal; andAgreement on the terms of arrangements for facilities
for defense of the existing and sea level canals and for
the security of the Hemisphere.
These three problems are intimately interrelated and, to the
maximum degree practicable, should be addressed
simultaneously.
NSAM 152 dated April 30, 1962, and
NSAM 164 dated June 15,
1962,For texts, Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume
XII Documents 402 and 406. are
rescinded; except paragraph 6 b and c (2) of NSAM 152.McGeorge Bundy
424. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Acting Secretary of State BallSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA Assistant
Secretary Files: Lot 70 D 295, Panama. Confidential. The date is
stamped on the memorandum but is too faint to determine a day;
Rusk was not in the
Department February 1–14. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) The
memorandum indicates that the Acting Secretary saw it.Washington, February
1965.
SUBJECT
Sea-Level Canal Discussions with Central American Countries
Secretary Ailes and I visited
Panama and Colombia on February 1 and 2. Secretary Ailes was unable to accompany me on
visits to Nicaragua and Costa Rica (January 28 and 29) because of other
commitments. Attached is the list of persons who accompanied us.Attached but not printed.
In Nicaragua and Costa Rica, I met with the Presidents and Foreign
Ministers, as well as members of the Administration and opposition
parties. In Costa Rica, I also talked to all of the former Presidents
since 1944.
In Panama, Secretary Ailes and I
talked only to the Foreign Minister. Although we met with President
Robles and other Panamanian officials, we did not engage in any
extensive discussions with him on a sea-level canal, or other matters,
because it was clear Robles wanted his Foreign Minister to handle the
discussions.
In Colombia, we talked to the President, the Foreign Minister, and the
Cabinet in separate meetings. Because Colombia has a National Front
Government, this included the country’s important leaders, but it did
not include as broad a spectrum of the opposition as we talked to in
Costa Rica.
The atmosphere was favorable in Nicaragua, Costa Rica and
Colombia—especially in Colombia. We found a general willingness to
authorize preliminary reconnaissance of proposed routes and to enter
into negotiations looking toward the construction of a sea-level canal.
We found a general concern about the future of Panama, if the canal were
constructed other than in Panama. Especially in Costa Rica and Colombia,
Government leaders offered to be of assistance in bringing Panama around
to a favorable attitude. In all three countries we heard suggestions of a multi-lateral arrangement
designed to be most helpful to Panama in making the transition from the
present lock canal to a sea-level canal.
We found a general misunderstanding in all of the countries about the
earnings from the canal; the role which the canal plays in the
Panamanian economy; the economic benefits of the canal to the US; the
fact that the present canal had not been amortized; and the difference
between the rights needed for the present canal and those that might be
required for a sea-level canal. I believe we cleared up much of this
misunderstanding, but much more needs to be done.
In Panama, we found the Foreign Minister very unhappy that we were
discussing a sea-level canal with other countries. He regarded it as
blackmail. He insisted that we have a legal and moral obligation to
operate the present canal until Panama agrees that we might cease
operation. I told him that we would be as helpful as we could to Panama,
but we did not consider that existing treaties imposed such a legal or
moral obligation. Panama believes that further violence in the Canal
Zone would be detrimental to the world position of the US, and it
therefore regards violence as a bargaining weapon. It also considers
that it has a trump card, with respect to US military bases in the Canal
Zone.
Panama regards a canal as its primary natural resource, and gives little
evidence of a willingness to consider seriously an economic development
program in which a canal is only one industry. The Foreign Minister
expressed willingness to consider international control of a sea level
canal during the period of amortization. But afterwards, he said the
canal would be under the exclusive control of Panama. Panama would be
willing to consider some restrictions on its authority to set tolls, but
it was clear that Panama regarded itself as one of the world’s main toll
roads, and that its present intention is to exact a tribute as high as
the traffic will bear. The Foreign Minister seemed unwilling to accept
our view that a canal should be thought of as a service to world
commerce, with the primary benefits for Panama to be derived from
secondary developments, such as new ports, industries, and other
economic activity.
I will be talking to Robert Anderson in the next few days about additional personnel
he may need to continue the necessary negotiations. I believe we should
now move forward as rapidly as possible with the objective of concluding
the necessary treaties with the interested countries by the end of this
year.
425. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Bundy Files, Memos to the
President, Vol. X. No classification marking.Washington, May 10, 1965.
SUBJECT
Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations
Agreement has been reached by Tom
Mann, Jack Vaughn,
Steve Ailes and Bob Anderson on a
new and forthcoming approach to the Panama Canal treaty negotiations. On
the basis of the new instructions, Anderson hopes to be able to hold rapid and fruitful
discussions with the Panamanians.
The core of the new approach is to tell the Panamanians that: Our aim is to negotiate with them promptly a sea level canal
treaty acceptable to both countries;U.S. base rights and a status of forces agreement will be
negotiated along with but separate from the canal treaty;if agreement on a sea level canal is reached and U.S. base
rights are obtained, we will alter our existing rights under the
1903 treaty and work out an interim treaty or a transitional
agreement covering the period from the present to the coming
into effect of the sea level canal treaty; andwe will attempt to finish our negotiations with the
Panamanians before talking further about site surveys or a sea
level canal with Colombia, Costa Rica or Nicaragua.
Bob Anderson will be talking with
Congressmen tomorrow about the new approach in keeping with our
commitment to tell certain Congressmen informally about any new
proposals before informing the Panamanians.In a May 7 memorandum to Bundy, Mann
emphasized the need to keep Congress informed: “We should be very
sure that Congress is going along with us at all stages of the
negotiations.” (Ibid., NSC
Histories, Panama Crisis, 1964)
If all goes well, the new approach will be explained to the Panamanians
at a meeting in the State Department this Wednesday.May 12.
McG. B.
OKThis option is
checked. In a telephone conversation with Anderson on May 17, the
President told him: “God almighty, you watch Panama any way you
can.” Johnson continued, “Where you can
really talk to ‘em and—gonna work out all right—do it so they
can’t say that we messed around for a year and wouldn’t talk to
‘em.” (Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Robert Anderson, May 17, 9:07 a.m.; Johnson
Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Tape F 65.29, Side A, PNO 1
and 2)
Speak to me
426. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Panama, Inter-Oceanic/Panama Canal Negotiations, Vol.
I. Confidential.Washington, June 22, 1965.
SUBJECT
Panama—Canal Negotiations
Secretary McNamara, Ambassador
Anderson and I are scheduled
to meet with you at twelve noon Wednesday June 23 to discuss the status
of Canal negotiations with Panama.According
to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting with the President was
held between 12:30 and 1 p.m. on June 23. (Johnson Library) William
Jordan briefly covers this meeting in Panama
Odyssey. (p. 109) The principal subject for
discussion and decision will be a proposed new arrangement for joint
United States-Panamanian operation of the present Canal.
Discussion:
Agreement has now been reached by the United States and Panamanian
Special Representatives to negotiate, separately but concurrently, (1)
base rights and status of forces agreements, (2) a new treaty to replace
the 1903 Treaty and (3) a sea level canal treaty and to submit them as a package to the
legislative authorities of both countries. I am informed that the
Panamanian negotiators accept willingly that the United States should
have responsibility for protection of the Canal and the ultimate say in
the operation and maintenance of the Canal; they have, however, taken a
firm position that Panama should share in the activities of the Canal
Zone Government as well as the Panama Canal Company. A decision is
therefore required whether the United States can agree to joint
management and, if so, what form such an arrangement should take.
State and Army have studied this question and believe that a formula for
joint management which will protect the United States objective of
retaining ultimate, unimpaired control can be devised. There is enclosed
a paper entitled “Possible Elements of a Joint Panama Canal Authority”
drawn up by State, Army and Ambassador John N. Irwin II, which sets forth the outlines of such
a formula.Attached but not printed.
This paper is limited to the concept for a joint authority. It is also
contemplated that the treaty will contain a separate provision
empowering the President of the United States to take such action as he
deems necessary to assure continued effective operation of the Canal
under adverse conditions.
Consideration has been given to providing for participation by Panama on
the Board of Directors of the present Panama Canal Company. This course,
which also accepts the concept of joint administration, would be
difficult to negotiate, would probably never be entirely acceptable to
Panama, and would not offer the political advantages of a clean break
with the past and a fresh new start with Panama. I believe an entirely
new approach might also be easier to take to Congress.
Recommendation:
That decision in this matter be deferred pending full discussion with
Ambassador Anderson on
Wednesday.
Dean Rusk
427. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, Mc-George
Bundy, Vol. 13. Confidential.Washington, August 30, 1965, 1:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
The Panama Canal NegotiationsI have just talked at length with Bob
Anderson and he tells me that the political problems
of the Panama negotiations are now getting ripe for a brief report
to you. I agree with him. There are decisions in the offing which
only you can make and which I think you will want to make directly
with Bob.The essence of the situation is that Anderson and his team are very clear now on the need
for a Joint US–Panama Authority to run the present Canal under the
new treaties with Panama. You have approved this idea in principle,
and for discussion, but there is no final Presidential decision, and
still less any public White House position.In discussing this idea on the Hill, in a preliminary way, Anderson’s colleagues, Jack Irwin and Bob Woodward, have
found substantial preliminary resistance from the House Subcommittee
led by Mrs. Sullivan, and
also from Senator Hickenlooper.Anderson himself has stayed
away from the House Subcommittee so far. He does not want to be in
the position of giving them a fat target before there is a definite
US Government position. He fears that if he were to advocate the
Joint US–Panama Authority before you have made your own decision, he
would be inviting public and definite opposition from Mrs. Sullivan and others.Anderson is convinced that
the Joint Authority will be indispensible to a successful
negotiation. He is also convinced that real US interests can be
protected, essentially by giving both Presidents a veto of changes
in the existing code which covers the existing Canal. Anderson & Company therefore
plan to make a flat recommendation to you in favor of a Joint
Authority.The next question is that Bob needs to know whether you want him
to be the spokesman or whether you wish to announce your decision
yourself, perhaps to an appropriate group of bipartisan leaders. He
and I are inclined to think that if the President and
Commander-in-Chief were spokesman on an issue of this sort, the
chances of effective
support would be greatly increased. This is, of course, what
happened when you announced that you planned to negotiate these new
treaties last December.
Anderson is now preparing
a definite and clear recommendation on the Joint Authority for
submission to you.Document 428. He can come
in and get your decision either in the latter part of this week
or after Labor Day. We think our tactics should be decided
fairly soon because the Panamanian Congress is in October, and
our own Congress should know our position before it goes home.
On this basis, may I make an appointment through Marvin Watson
for Anderson:
Later this weekNone
of the options is checked, but Bundy wrote at the top of this memorandum:
“Hold for Panama meeting Thurs.” The President met with
Anderson and
Irwin in the
Oval Office at 1:55 p.m. on September 2. (Johnson Library,
President’s Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has
been found, although a September 14 memorandum from
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Jack Vaughn to Rusk indicated that “The
President approved” the Anderson and Irwin recommendations “and directed
Ambassador Anderson
to canvass the Congress to ensure that there would be
sufficient Congressional support.” (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–3 PAN)
Early next week
Speak to me
I have talked to Larry O’Brien about the problem of Mrs. Sullivan—and probably Dan Flood—and
he thinks we have a lot of ways of handling this sort of opposition,
and that on the Hill in
general it is well understood that it is time for change in
US–Panama relations. I will plan to ask him to join in the Anderson meeting (if he hasn’t gone
off to deliver the mail).McG. B.
428. Memorandum From the President’s Special Representatives
(Anderson and
Irwin) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, NSC Histories,
Panama. Confidential. The memorandum was unsigned, but a handwritten
line at the top of the first page indicates it was from Anderson and Irwin.Washington, September 2, 1965.
SUBJECT
Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations
Since May, the United States negotiators have been discussing with the
Panamanians three treaties, an Interim Treaty (regarding the existing
Canal), a Sea Level Canal Treaty and a Base Rights and Status of Forces
Agreement. All aspects of the discussions have been carefully
coordinated with the Departments of State and Defense on a continuing
basis. We have reached a point in the negotiations at which we wish to
bring to your attention the far-reaching nature of the proposals which
have been discussed, and alternatives, and to recommend courses of
action for your decision.
We have informed key Senators and Representatives about the general
progress of the negotiations and are meeting with varying degrees of
concern, in some cases deep concern, because of the prospect that the
United States may actually relinquish practical aspects of sovereignty,
and because there might be delegated to a new Joint Authority the
important functions which the Congress has heretofore controlled
directly, such as: formulation of new laws for the Canal Areas, approval
of the budget and expenditures, and decisions with respect to tolls,
commercial enterprises and employment conditions.
Based upon your decisions resulting from this meeting, we recommend that
you advise the leaders of Congress (including the majority and minority
leaders of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations and
Commerce Committees of both Houses and the House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee and its Panama Canal Subcommittee) of your policy
goals with respect to the Panama Canal and of the guidelines you have
given to the United States negotiators. In view of the extent to which
the suggested new participation by Panama in the practical application
of sovereignty will depart from tradition, it is doubtful that anyone
but you can persuade the leaders of Congress to accept these
changes.
I. INTERIM TREATY
1. Form of Administration of Existing Canal
Following the guidance of your December 18, 1964, statement,See footnote 3, Document 421. we
have sought a treaty which will recognize the sovereignty of Panama
while retaining such rights as are necessary to provide effective
operation and defense of the Canal and to enable us to treat fairly and
helpfully the Canal employees, both United States and non-United States.
We are seeking a treaty which will be recognized as a sincere and
generous effort on the part of the United States to meet Panama’s
aspirations; so that, if it should be rejected by Panama or if accepted
and later events require the use of military force to ensure the
operation or defense of the Canal against hostile Panamanians, the
United States will be in a more favorable position, and especially in
Latin America, than under the 1903 Treaty or a new treaty in which
Panama does not participate as a real partner.
We have been discussing with the Panamanians two formulas for Panamanian
participation in the administration and operation of the Canal: a proposal (suggested by us) that Panama be given a minority
participation on the Board of Directors of the existing Panama
Canal Company, the authority and responsibility of the Board to
be expanded to include functions now exercised by the Governor,
anda proposal (suggested by Panama but also considered
independently by us to be a possible solution) to create by the
Interim Treaty a Joint Authority in which the United States and
Panama would share as partners full authority and responsibility
to operate the Canal and administer the Canal Areas.
We recommend proposal (2), the Joint Authority, because: While meeting the principal aspirations of Panama, we believe
we can retain for the United States (i) the ultimate control of
the administration and operation of the Canal through majority
control of the Board of Members or by having a “casting vote,”
and (ii) the unilateral right for the President of the United
States to defend and secure the Canal under any circumstances in
which he believes such action necessary.It is an overt expression of Panamanian sovereignty and will
be a major step in eliminating the “foreign colony” stigma with
which Panamanians view the Canal Zone.It seems to offer the best hope of concluding a mutually
satisfactory bilateral arrangement with Panama which will both
ensure the continued
effective operation and defense of the Canal and reduce the
likelihood of violent United States-Panamanian
confrontations.It is doubtful that we could negotiate successfully Panamanian
membership on the Board of Directors of the existing Panama
Canal Company. The Panamanian negotiators state that the
Panamanian Government has never officially recognized the Panama
Canal Company, that its existence has been a continued source of
irritation to Panama, and that it is not compatible with a
recognition of Panama’s sovereignty.United States agreement to participation by Panama on the
Canal Company’s Board of Directors would, in effect, be
accepting the idea of joint administration without receiving the
political benefit which would flow from an offer of a new and
real form of partnership with Panama, as under the Joint
Authority proposal.The United States can include in the Treaty provisions which
will ensure fair treatment to the employees (both United States
and non-United States) in the light of the changed
circumstances, and the United States Government can take action
independent of the Treaty to provide for the United States
employees.
The principal disadvantages of the proposed Joint Authority are: It removes the United States, and particularly the United
States Congress, from direct control over the Canal. Ultimate
control would be exercised through a Board of Members the
majority of whom would be appointed by the President of the
United States.A significant number of Senators and Representatives will
oppose strongly a real partnership with Panama. They will
consider it a “giveaway” and a weakening of our historic
position of strength in Central America, a position they believe
is needed to ensure the defense of the Western Hemisphere and to
retain reasonable tolls for the benefit of both world commerce
and United States shipping and those who ship the cargoes,
particularly those ships and cargoes involved in trade between
the east and west coasts of the United States. Their principal
concern, however, might be said to be the instability of Panama
and its Government, the seeming lack of capacity of its people,
the lack of concern of the controlling “oligarchy” for the
masses, and the activity of Communist elements.
In addition to the above two proposals, Panamanian representation on the
Board of the Canal Company and creation of a Joint Authority, there are
several possible alternate concepts of administration. Among these are: Maintain the existing Panama Canal Company and Canal Zone
Government while granting significant concessions to
Panama.Abolish the Panama Canal Company/Canal Zone Government and
reestablish an independent United States Government agency similar to that
existing before the establishment in 1950 of the Panama Canal
Company; grant significant concessions to Panama, perhaps
including some form of Panamanian participation in the functions
of the United States Government agency.Create by treaty a multinational agency composed of
representatives of the United States, Panama and the principal
users of the Canal, or perhaps others selected by any variety of
ways.A plan, known as the Machado Plan, under which the World Bank
would be authorized to organize an international corporation to
purchase the interests of the United States in the Panama Canal
Company and the Canal Zone Government and obtain from Panama a
long-term franchise to operate the Canal as an international
waterway on a self-sustaining and self-liquidation basis. This
plan might provide a quick and practical business solution of
the problem and avoid many of the political differences which
have arisen in the past.
Alternatives (a) and (b), maintenance of the existing organization or
establishment of a new independent Government agency, would be much more
acceptable to Congress than the proposed Joint Authority, but neither
would meet the Panamanian aspiration for sovereignty. We believe Panama
would refuse Alternative (a) but might be induced to accept Alternative
(b) for a specified and fairly short term of years if convinced there
was no hope for some form of real participation.
Alternatives (c) and (d), multinational operation and the Machado Plan,
would be difficult to sell both to Panama and to Congress, but we
believe it possible to do so to the Panamanians if they are convinced
they cannot negotiate a satisfactory bilateral arrangement.
2. Tolls and Unamortized United States Investment
These two subjects present primarily internal United States political
problems.
Tolls
One of the traditional purposes of the Canal has been its
contribution to world commerce. The United States never raised
tolls since the Canal was opened, and inflation has had the
effect of reducing tolls to approximately one-third of the 1914
toll. Strong voices in Congress have opposed any increase in
tolls, even though many Canal Governors have recommended
increasing them.
It would probably be possible to establish a new tolls system,
based party on value of cargo, which would be more equitable
while more profitable. We recommand that the Joint Authority be
empowered to hold toll hearings and fix tolls, possibly subject
to the Presidents of the United States and Panama each having a
unilateral power to veto increases.
Unrecovered United States Investment
The unrecovered United States investment in the existing Canal
enterprise is fixed variously at from $329,000,000 (net direct
investment) to $463,000,000 (equity of the United States
Government). There are two schools of thought: (i) those who
believe that the United States has been more than repaid through
the use of the Canal for commercial and defense purposes for a
period of over 60 years, including two world wars, the Korean
war and the current world situation, and (ii) those, including
many in Congress, who believe the unrecovered investment should
be recovered.
The Panamanians dispute the amount of our unrecovered investment
and argue that the United States has adopted intentionally the
policy that has resulted in no amortization. They point out that
the United States can afford to subsidize world commerce but
that Panama cannot, so either the tolls should be raised to
bring an optimum income to Panama or the United States should
pay Panama an equivalent sum.
A related factor is that the Panama Canal Company now pays
interest to the United States Treasury (approximately
$11,000,000 in 1964) on the interest bearing investment of
$329,000,000 computed on the basis of statutory criteria
established by Congress. After payment of the interest, the
Panama Canal Company now is not able to establish adequate
reserves for capital improvements.
If you approve the Joint Authority proposal, we shall try to
achieve some formula which will permit recovery of the
unrecovered investment in the 1903 Canal, either by agreeing on
a figure to be amortized under the new arrangement or by
obtaining a new equity when the sea level canal financing is
arranged. Acceptance of the Joint Authority proposal would have
the effect of discontinuing present interest payments to the
United States Treasury.
Other Issues
Among other difficult and sensitive issues in the negotiations of the
Interim Treaty are the law to be applied in the new “Canal Areas,” the
system of courts, the financial solvency of an independent Joint
Authority, the commercial enterprises of the Panama Canal Company, the
welfare of the employees, and the question of defense and security of
the existing Canal. We believe that reasonable solutions can be achieved
under the Joint Authority proposal.
With respect to the duration of the Interim Treaty, Panama opposes
strongly tying the duration to the effective date of a sea level canal
because of the United States position that we may build the sea level
canal in Colombia or elsewhere. However, we believe we can obtain an
Interim Treaty with a duration of between 35 to 60 years.
Public Announcement of Progress in Negotiations
The President of Panama wishes to make a public announcement of progress
in the negotiations before the opening of the Panamanian National
Assembly on October 1. It may be advisable to have a joint announcement
of the President of the United States and the President of Panama in
order to assist the President of Panama and to have more control over
the exact wording. What can be said will depend on the progress made not
only on the Interim Treaty but also on the Sea Level Canal Treaty and
the Base Rights and Status of Forces Agreement. The primary interest of
the Panamanians is the Interim Treaty.
II. SEA LEVEL CANAL TREATY
1. Option
In the Sea Level Canal Treaty we are seeking essentially an option to
construct a sea level canal in Panama at a time and place and by a means
of our own choosing. Panama wishes to have a sea level canal if one is
constructed, but the concept of the option causes difficulty to Panama
because of our announced intention to seek similar options from Colombia
and from Nicaragua and Costa Rica. If we are successful in signing three
satisfactory treaties with Panama it may be advisable to reconsider
present plans to proceed with site surveys in Colombia, Costa Rica and
Nicaragua.
We anticipate difficulty, particularly in obtaining an open-ended option
to construct a sea level canal by nuclear methods. Consequently, it may
be necessary to agree to share with the host countries the decision with
respect to construction of a canal by nuclear means.
2. Form of Control
No decision has yet been made with respect to the agency to control a sea
level canal. Should it be multinational, binational, or possibly a
combination of the two?
We recommend that the treaty provide for a multinational agency composed
of representatives of the United States, the host country, the
financiers and the principal users of the Canal but include a provision
to permit the United States and the host country to decide on a
bilateral agency rather than a multinational agency if the United States
and the host country, before the financing arrangements are made, each
determines that it prefers a bilateral arrangement.
3. Other Issues
Although there are numerous other complicated problems, such as the
method of financing, defense of the canal, tolls, compensation of the
host country, question of provision for repayment to the United States
of the unrecovered investment in the 1903 Canal, and the duration of the controlling agency and
of the treaty (including Panama’s desire to own the sea level canal
outright after the cost has been amortized), we refer to these only for
your general information and do not seek decisions at this time.
4. Congress
Congressional criticism is most likely to be reflected in concern over
multinational control of a sea level canal, and over control of tolls.
Some have expressed the view that a new canal should be built outside of
Panama.
III. BASE RIGHTS AND STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT
The Base Rights and Status of Forces Agreement has been prepared by the
Department of Defense and is based on similar agreements with other
countries. The present draft provides that the bases will be made
available by Panama free of charge, in keeping with a worldwide
Department of Defense policy. The Panamanians may expect payment.
The prosposed Base Rights and Status of Forces Agreement will be opposed
by some in Congress on the grounds that we are giving up areas in which
we are now “sovereign,” turning them over to Panamanian sovereignty, and
taking them back under a treaty which gives us less control than we now
possess.
IV. GENERAL
1. Compensation to Panama
In the Sea Level Canal Treaty draft, we have provided for an annual
payment of a fair and reasonable return to Panama, without specifying
the amount. In the Interim Treaty we provide for a payment to Panama in
the proportion of Panama’s interest in the Joint Authority. There is no
provision in the Base Rights and Status of Forces Agreement for any
payment to Panama. We have included in the Sea Level Canal Treaty draft
a general undertaking to assist Panama in meeting the adverse economic
impact of a sea level canal which will be caused by a sharp decrease in
employment and similar changes in the existing economy.
The Panamanians have indicated that they will put a price on the use of
their land and water areas (their “greatest natural resouce”) and either
expect to receive it from the canal revenues, or for the United States
to pay the difference. As stated earlier, there is a possibility Panama
may demand rent for use of the military bases. They will ask United
States assistance in meeting their economic problems when the sea level
canal is opened.
2. Possible Special Trade Relationship with
Panama
The Panamanian President, Foreign Minister and special negotiators have
expressed, at various times, a pointed hope that the United States might be willing,
because of the unique relationship with Panama, to grant Panama trade
preferences or even a complete exemption from customs duties in the
United States market. The most active negotiator, Ambassador Aleman, has
said that this would result in new investments in small industries in
Panama—on the order of those that have been developed in Puerto
Rico—which would have markets in the United States, and that this
business would become so important to Panama eventually that Panama
would beseech the United States to remain in partnership in canal
operations in order to retain the trade preference that would be made
dependent upon the Canal partnership. Such a trade relationship would be
logical, would cost the United States virtually nothing (since there are
now few Panamanian products that would compete more effectively in a
duty-free United States market), and would assure the United States an
increasing reciprocal market in Panama while promoting a longer Canal
partnership.
We have been told informally in the State Department that special
legislation for this purpose possibly could be justified upon the basis
of the unique Canal relationship, and we recommend that you direct the
Executive Branch to seek to devise a plan for such a special trade
relationship and, if found feasible in the light of all other United
States trade relationships, to formulate such legislative proposals as
it may be desirable to submit to the Congress.Attached but not printed is Annex A, a list of 31
members of Congress briefed by Irwin and Woodward.
429. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Panama, Inter-Oceanic/Panama Canal Negotiations. No
classification marking. A note on the memorandum indicates the
President saw it.Washington, September 11, 1965, 11:00
a.m.
RE
Panama
Hill for the Panama proposals
that you approved in principle, subject to such consultation. Yesterday
he gave us a report which is generally encouraging. A detailed write-up
is being prepared and should be available to you before Monday.September 13. The “write-up” has not been
found. In essence, Anderson reports understanding and support from about
9/10ths of the 36 Senators and Representatives he saw, running the
spectrum from Mansfield to Mendel Rivers. The only negative notes of
significance were struck by Hickenlooper, Russell and Mrs. Sullivan.
Hickenlooper said that while he
would have done it differently, he would not actively oppose your
judgment. Russell said he was against the proposals and would vote
against them, and would make a brief statement for history against them,
but he knew that if you were for them, they would carry, and he wanted
you to know specifically that he was not going to make a general fight
against you on this issue. He disagreed, and he wanted history to know
of his disagreement, but that was all.
Mrs. Sullivan was the one person
who gave indications that she might wish to make a fight on the issue.
She couched her argument in terms of the failure of American policy to
meet the needs of the simple people of Panama. She claimed that we were
merely giving further aid and comfort to the “oligarchy.” Henry Wilson
and others who know her think this is merely a screen for her real
concern, which is with the Americans in the Zone and the powers of her
committee. Tom Mann and Henry Wilson are going to try to find ways of
talking further with her.
Bob Anderson presented his report with his usual modest precision, but
those who heard him were enormously impressed by the job he has done. He
himself is wholly confident that there is now solid basis for a firm
approach to the Panamanians, and precise language is being drafted for his use in this approach
next week. If all goes well, there should be enough of an understanding
with the Panamanians for an important joint statement by the two
Governments safely ahead of the October 1 meeting of the Legislature in
Panama. Our assumption is that this statement should be made by the two
Presidents together, and the papers are being prepared with this
object.On September 24 President
Johnson read an approved
joint statement on areas of agreement on a potential treaty that was
simulataneously released in Panama by President Robles. The statement and
Johnson’s prefatory
remarks are printed in Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book II, pp.
1020–1021.
I have the impression that Bob Anderson has been determined to show that
anything Goldberg can do, he can do better.
McG. B.
430. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on July 14.SNIE 84–66Washington, July 14, 1966.
PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN PANAMA
The Problem
To estimate the situation in Panama and the prospects for stability over
the next six to twelve months.
Conclusions
Discontent with social and economic conditions, particularly with
the high level of unemployment and the poor and inadequate housing
in the cities, is continuing to grow among the Panamanian
population. Criticism of the Robles government’s handling of the
Canal negotiations will probably become more intense after the
National Assembly reconvenes on 1 October. Students and urban slum
dwellers will probably be
in the forefront of any violent manifestations against the
Panamanian elite or against the US.New civil disturbances are probable over the next six to twelve
months; more likely than not they will be precipitated by sudden,
unpredictable incidents. We believe that the Communists in Panama
have the capability to intensify and broaden such disturbances to
some extent, but that the Robles government and the Guardia Nacional
would still be able to restore control. Even if no disorder or
upheaval takes place during the period of this estimate, the
Panamanian political situation is likely to become somewhat more
fragile than it is at present.Arnulfo Arias and his Panamenista party have the strength— which
the Communists lack—to transform a civil disturbance into a popular
rising against the Robles government. In the event of prolonged and
widespread disturbances, the Guardia probably could not maintain
control without outside assistance—presumably from US forces in the
Canal Zone. However, Arnulfo seems inclined to bide his time, hoping
that rising discontent over the Canal issue will bring him to power
in the presidential elections of May 1968, if not sooner. In the
event that both the Panamenistas and the Communists should take part
in a successful effort to overthrow Robles, we think that Arnulfo
would dominate the successor regime without allowing the Communists
to gain major influence.
[Omitted here is the 5-page Discussion section of the estimate.]
431. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President JohnsonSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAN–US. Secret. Drafted by
Clark and cleared by
Gordon.Washington, July 25, 1966.
SUBJECT
Panama
You are scheduled to meet on Tuesday, July 26, 1966 at 6:00 p.m. with the
principal officials concerned to discuss Panama.The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the
White House. Johnson participated in the
meeting between 6:43 and 7:35 p.m. (Johnson Library, President’s
Daily Diary)
Background
The IRG/ARA met on July 21, 1966 to
review United States policy toward Panama in the light of the status of
the treaty negotiations and the current political situation in
Panama.A summary record of the IRG/ARA meeting is in the National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/IG Files: Lot 70 D 122, IRG/ARA Action Memos, 1968. The Special National
Intelligence Estimate (Enclosure 5) was also considered. Specific
subjects discussed were: (1) prospects for the successful conclusion of
new treaties with Panama (Enclosure 1), (2) the possible need for a
contingency plan for use if the treaty negotiations reach an impasse,
(3) short-range actions in the economic and social field which might be
taken by the United States to improve the atmosphere in Panama for the
treaty negotiations (Enclosure 2), (4) actions which might be taken to
assist Panama to develop and carry out a program of long-range economic
and social development (Enclosure 3), and (5) Panama’s request for
expanded United States direct assistance to its National Guard to
improve its capability to maintain internal order (Enclosure 4).Enclosure 1, Status of Treaty Negotiations;
enclosure 2, Urban Impact and Development Loan Program for Panama,
FY 1967; enclosure 3, New
Development Authority for Panama; and enclosure 4, Grant Aid for
National Guard, are attached but not printed. Enclosure 5, SNIE 84–66, is Document 430.
IRG/ARA Conclusions
The following conclusions were reached by the IRG/ARA: That we continue our present policy of endeavoring to
negotiate expeditiously new canal treaties with the Robles
Government.That a special Inter-Departmental Working Group be formed to
develop by September 6, 1966 a contingency plan for use should
treaty negotiations reach an impasse within the next six
months.That we press forward with the GOP to develop and carry out an urban impact
program.That we impress upon the GOP
the urgent need to draw up a long-term economic development plan
to fit into the anticipated new treaty arrangements; that we
seek the establishment by Panama of a Development Authority for
this purpose; and that we offer our assistance and cooperation
in this undertaking.That we meet the GOP’s request
for grant aid to expand the National Guard.
Issues for Decision
Urban Impact Program
A decision is needed regarding the priority this program should
receive, considering the FY 1967
AID funds available and the
competing demands of other areas.
Long-Range Economic Development Plan
Assuming that the GOP will be
receptive to United States proposals for formulating a
long-range economic development plan and establishing a
Development Authority, a decision is needed on whether specific
assurances can be given to the GOP that expanded financial and technical resources
will be made available to the Development Authority to implement
the plan.
Darien Gap
The proposal to complete the Darien portion of the Pan American
Highway which you mentioned in your April 15, 1966 speech in
Mexico has relevance to Panama’s long-range development. A
decision on this matter which is being requested separately
would assist in formulating a long-range development plan for
Panama.
Assistance to National Guard
The IRG/ARA has agreed that in
spite of the political risks involved the United States should
finance the new 500 man addition to the Guard and the salaries
of the 500 men added in 1965. This assistance would be made
through a general budgetary support grant which would be made in
such a way as to involve the least possible political risk. Your
approval is requested of the course of action agreed upon by the
IRG/ARA.
Dean Rusk
432. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAN–US. Secret; Sensitive.Washington, July 27, 1966.
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of StateAdministrator GaudDirector HelmsSecretary ResorAssistant Secretary GordonAmbassador Anderson
SUBJECT
Presidential Directives on Panama
In order that we all have a clear understanding of the directives given
by the President at the conclusion of our Panama review meeting on
Tuesday, July 26, I thought it useful to recapitulate them as follows: Director Helms is to
review the [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] to assure that it is in a position to
furnish ample and timely intelligence on developments.In a July 27 memorandum to the CIA’s
Deputy Director for Plans setting forth the President’s
directive for the Agency, Helms noted that “the President wants us to
watch the situation in Panama most closely and to do
everything we can to guard against being caught by surprise
in terms of riots, attempts to overthrow the government, and
other possible troubles in the area.” (Central Intelligence
Agency, Job 80–B01285A, DCI
(Helms)
Chronological Files, July 1, 1966–December 31, 1966)Assistant Secretary Gordon is to establish a Contingency Planning
Group and immediately to proceed to develop alternative courses
of action should the treaty negotiations reach an impasse.A draft of a Department of State
contingency study on Panama, based on the President’s
directive, was prepared on September 16. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol.
15) Ambassador Irwin will give special attention to determining
maximum concessions which we might make to the Panamanians,
taking into consideration the requirements to retain United
States control of operation and defense of the Canal and what
the Congress is likely to accept. Assistant Secretary Gordon and Ambassador Irwin will work closely
together in carrying out their respective assignments and both
keep Ambassador Anderson
fully informed.Assistant Secretary Gordon, in consultation with Administrator
Gaud, is to: establish a group to review actual and planned
assistance to Panama with a view to developing and
putting into effect as rapidly as feasible sound
projects for economic and social development, with
special emphasis on those having more immediate human
impact.Department of
State and AID
proposals for dealing with economic and political
issues in Panama were presented to the President
under cover of a July 25 memorandum from Rusk to
Johnson. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL
PAN–US)develop a plan for a Panama Development Authority,
which Mr. Gordon
will try to persuade the Panamanians to accept.assist United States businessmen interested in private
investment in Panama.Secretary Gordon is to proceed with arrangements for further
grant assistance to strengthen the National Guard.In order to assure full coordination within the government,
Secretary Gordon is to
pass on all public statements and new initiatives relating to
Panama. He is to coordinate these closely with Ambassador
Anderson for their
possible effect on the canal negotiations.
W. W. Rostow
433. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. VIII (part 2 of 2),
September 1966–May 1967. Secret. A note on the memorandum indicates
that the President saw it. Copies were sent to Moyers and Henry Rowen of the
Bureau of the Budget.Washington, September 22, 1966.
SUBJECT
Status of Panama Account
This is where we stand on implementation of the directives which you gave
at the Panama Review Meeting on July 26.
1. Review of [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified]
less than 1 line of source text not declassified]
have been made. [1½ lines of source text not
declassified]
2. Contingency Plans Against Negotiation Impasse
Linc Gordon has prepared a paper
(Tab A).See footnote 3, Document 432. It
is being reviewed by the Country Team, our negotiators and the Latin
American IRG. The deadline for
completion is September 27.
Jack Irwin was not able to make
an estimate of the prospects for successful negotiations by our target
date of September 15 for the reasons discussed in the last paragraph of
this memorandum.
3. List of Possible Concessions
Jack Irwin was charged with
determining maximum concessions which we might make to the Panamanians,
taking into consideration our requirements for control and defense of
the Canal and what Congress is likely to accept. A paper listing
possible concessions (Tab B)Tab B, attached
but not printed, is a draft report, “Possible Unilateral United
States Activities,” September 8. is being reviewed in State
and DOD. Ambassador Anderson, who is in town today, will
also be going over it.
4. Economic Study Group
A team under the leadership of Philip Klutznick recently completed a
survey of Panama’s short-term and longer-term needs. A summary of the
contents of the report is at Tab C.Tab C,
attached but not printed, is an undated report prepared by Klutznick
on Panama aid program.
The short term recommendations call for an immediate impact program of
$16 million covering urban renewal and rehabilitation projects. As
indicated in George Ball’s memo
at Tab D,Tab D, attached but not printed,
is a September 9 memorandum from Ball to President
Johnson. these recommendations have been
accepted and Ambassador Adair instructed to begin negotiations
immediately.
5. Plan for a Panama Development Authority
Ambassador Adair has discussed
the desirability of setting up an Authority with President Robles and Foreign Minister Eleta. He got a non-committal, lukewarm
response.
The Klutznick team looked into the matter and concluded that the better
part of wisdom was to work through the existing Planning Board and try to strengthen it. They
found that the Board as an institution is equipped to handle budget,
economic and social planning as well as physical planning and
evaluation. The main problem is an incompetent Director. State/AID are trying to get him replaced and the
staff augmented with capable people.
6. Stimulate Private Investment in Panama
We are not doing well on this. Bill Gaud is making a survey of investment
guarantee applications which AID has
received. Beyond that State and AID have
done nothing. I will have another go at Linc and Bill. I recommend the
next time you talk to them, you press hard for immediate action. Our
private sector can play an important role in Panamanian development and
we must take advantage of this asset.A
handwritten note by Rostow next to this
paragraph reads: “I’m going to dig into this personally.”
7. Assistance to the National Guard
We have told the Panamanians that we are willing to subsidize
(indirectly) an increment of 500 men for the balance of this fiscal year
if they will put the increase in their budget. (We are already paying
for 500 men added to the force last year.) They want us to pay for 1000
men without it showing in the budget in the mistaken idea that this is
the best way to hide our subsidy.
A 500 increment is as much as they can successfully handle. President
Robles’ opposition is
already starting to make political hay of the fact that the government
is carrying 500 more men on the force than appears in the current budget
and that the U.S. is footing the bill.
8. Status of the Negotiations
Negotiations advanced at a steady clip during July and August. The first
round on the draft treaties served to identify areas of difference. The
second round focused on analysis of the differences and means for
resolving them.
Half way through this round (September 1) the Panamanians asked for
suspension of talks while they returned to Panama to help work out their
government’s position on economic compensation. This has caused a delay
in our timetable of September 15 for Jack Irwin’s estimate of the
prospects for reaching a settlement.
Negotiations are tentatively scheduled to be resumed on September 27.
Jack expects that it will be several more weeks
before he can give you a valid judgment on the prospects. Jack is
understandably cautious. But the record of the negotiating sessions show
a good spirit and flexibility on the part of the Panamanians. At this
point, there is more reason for optimism than pessimism.
9. Congressional Consultations
On August 24 Jack Irwin briefed
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the status of the
negotiations. Fulbright,
Hickenlooper, Gore, Lausche,
Carlson and McGee were
present. The Senators were interested, full of questions and
appreciative. There were no surprises beyond Fulbright’s comment that he
would vote against a sea-level canal treaty that did not provide for
multilateral operation.
Walt
434. Memorandum From the Representative to the Organization of
American States (Linowitz) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Panama, Vol. VIII, September 1966–May 1967.
Confidential. A notation on the memorandum indicates
Johnson saw it.Washington, March 14, 1967.
SUBJECT
Panama Canal Negotiations
Bob Anderson called me today from New York in order to pass on this
word:
At the Summit Meeting in Punta del Este, President Robles of Panama plans to talk to you
about the progress in negotiations with reference to the Panama Canal
matter. Bob Anderson feels that Robles will want to put pressure on you
to speed up the discussions and negotiations.Panamanian Foreign Minister Eleta made a similar request to
Rusk when he visited
Washington in January. (Memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Eleta, January 18; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–3 PAN–US) He suggests
that you might want to take the play away from Robles by telling him at
once that you have been pushing for carrying on the negotiations as
speedily as possible and that your understanding is that good progress
is being made.According to a memorandum of
conversation of a meeting between Gordon and Panamanian Ambassador Ricardo Arias, April 2, the
Ambassador told President Johnson that
President Robles hoped that
all outstanding questions concerning the treaty negotiations “might
be settled through direct presidential discussions” at the upcoming
meeting in Punta del Este. Johnson replied that
“both sides had good negotiating teams and there was no reason to
‘pass the buck’ to the Presidents at this time. He understood the
importance of the time element, but thought that the negotiations
could be pushed ahead rapidly by the negotiating teams themselves.”
(Ibid., POL 33–3 CZ)
Bob say that three point still remain unsettled in connection with the
negotiations: (1) compensation, (2) how long the treaty should last, and
(3) jurisdiction over personnel. He proposes that when Robles raises the question of
compensation with you, you might want to point out to him that it would
be difficult to have Congress accept a guaranteed revenue figure
substantially in excess of the present $2 million per year, and that
therefore it would be mutually advantageous to explore other ways of
providing added revenue to Panama. (Bob proposed, for example, some
tariff arrangements which might be favorable to Panama.)
The Panamanian Foreign Minister, Fernando
Eleta, spoke to me about this situation a couple of times
in Buenos Aires. I am not, however, close enough to the negotiations to
comment on Bob Anderson’s suggestions, but I know he would be pleased to
discuss them with you personally if you had a few minutes to do so
before the Summit.
Sol M. Linowitz
435. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 IA–SUMMIT. Confidential. Drafted by Neil A. Seidenman (OPR/LS) and approved in the White
House on April 28. The discussion was held during a “working
breakfast.”US/MC–9Punta del Este, April 3, 1967, 8:45 a.m.
SUBJECT
U.S. Panamanian Canal Treaty Negotiation
PARTICIPANTS
United StatesPresident JohnsonSecretary RuskMr. RostowSecretary GordonAmbassador IrwinMr. Neil Seidenman,
InterpreterPanamaPresident Marco A.
RoblesForeign Minister Fernando
EletaAmbassador Ricardo
AriasAmbassador Diogenes de la RosaMr. Hernan Porras, Special Advisor
President Robles said he wished
to take up two points in particular with President
Johnson, and in the matter of “one farmer to
another.” The first was the matter of arrangements under the new treaty
governing the administration of justice in the Canal Area Panama wishes to uphold its
sovereignty over the Area, but considers that such sovereignty cannot be
successfully exercised without the ability to administer justice in the
criminal, civil and administrative fields. Panama recognizes that the
effective functioning of the Joint Authority will require certain
preconditions. Panama considers joint administration of justice
acceptable, however, with reference only to cases directly related to
the operation of the Canal. He appealed to President
Johnson to help to bring about agreement
between the two countries on this score. He stated that from the
Panamanian standpoint, criminal acts not related to the operation of the
Canal should not be prosecuted by any but Panamanian authorities, as
provided by the Constitution and laws of Panama.
The second point President Robles
wished to bring up concerned revenue to Panama accruing from the Canal.
Every country receives benefit from the utilization of its own natural
resources. Panama’s principal resource is its geographic position and
the interoceanic canal made possible by that position. President
Robles stated that Panama
has never received fair compensation for its contribution and role
making possible the building and operation of the canal. The rate survey
carried out by the American firm, Arthur D. Little,Arthur D. Little Company studied the issue of tolls
and concluded that they could be raised 125 percent without
affecting Canal traffic. indicates that Panama could be
receiving much more from the Canal than its present revenue. Panama is
working to enhance the social and economic development of its country,
consistent with the goals of hemispheric growth and progress adopted at
Punta del Este in 1961. By now Panama has contracted foreign loans to
the extent that it is approaching the saturation point in its external
credit position. A continuation of present policies in this area could
lead to “asphyxiation”.
President Robles went on to say
that Panama wants no more than a fair return from the Canal, so as to be
able to secure the financial resources needed for economic and social
development programs. Those programs are now proceeding well, but they
would stand to suffer in the absence of sufficient funds to feed them.
An important source of such funds should be Panama’s share in Canal
revenues, by virtue of its geographic and human contribution to the
Canal.
President Robles said the
negotiation of these problems can proceed in the climate of tranquility
that his administration has maintained. It is of great political
importance for President Robles to be able to sign the treaty as soon as
possible, so as to eliminate the nationalistic passions and emotional
effects surrounding this issue, which otherwise could give rise to
agitation and set up a prolonged chain of disturbances in Panama.
President Robles said that the key elements of timing include the fact
that the ordinary session of the Panamanian Legislative Assembly begins
in October 1. During that session, according to the rules of procedure,
a whole range of issues may be taken up, with all the attendant
opportunities for prolonged and politically biased debate. If the
agreement can be concluded well before the ordinary session, President
Robles would be able to call
a special session, in which debate would be limited exclusively to the
Treaty.
President Robles said that the
other key date is that of forthcoming elections in Panama. He has been
able to create a climate of tranquility for the signing and ratification
of the Treaty. However, if the process drags on too long, he would
hardly be able to contain the situation throughout the weeks and months
of political campaigning, which is already in its initial stages. The
presidential elections are to take place on May 1, 1968.
President Johnson expressed understanding of the
wishes of President Robles, and
said that we, too, want to conclude the agreements at the earliest
possible date. We share Panama’s sense of urgency, and are anxious to do
all possible to speed up the negotiations. He will speak with Ambassador
Anderson promptly on his
return and issue appropriate instructions to our negotiators to this
effect. The President told Robles that he would personally follow the progress of
the negotiations. He agreed with him in his desire to avoid dragging on
too long, which could make trouble for both countries, and he would be
prepared to meet again with Robles if this should be useful.
With regard to Panama’s share of benefits from the Canal, President
Johnson stated that he assumed the amounts to
be received by Panama would be determined, based on the revenue sharing
concept, upon traffic volume through the Canal and Canal earnings
derived from the volume. The President assured Robles of his awareness of Panama’s
needs for development programs. There are problems of mutual concern in
all our countries, and we appreciate their importance to Panama.
With reference to the issue of justice, President
Johnson said the United States would be happy
to review the question of civil justice. There are some problems
involved, but he would ask that the civil issue be reviewed again, in
order to discover some solution that would be mutually satisfactory.
The President agreed with President Robles on the importance of the earliest possible
conclusion of the agreement. He reiterated that the Canal earnings would
rise according to the volume of the traffic. Also, we would ask our
negotiators to give sympathetic review to the matter of justice. The
President went on to say that he had spoken with Ambassador Anderson on several occasions in the
past about the negotiations.
The latter has been out of the country for several weeks, and there has
been no recent opportunity to discuss these matters further with him.
The President told Robles that
as a result of this meeting he would again take these things up with him
so that he (Ambassador Anderson)
and Ambassador Irwin could
bring about a speed-up in our work.On April
22 Rostow reported to President
Johnson that “all concerned are operating
with the sense of urgency you promised Robles.” He outlined progress in the areas discussed
between the Presidents at Punta del Este, indicating that “Anderson and the Panama Review
Group will want to discuss the deal with you prior to sounding out
key Senators and presentation to the Panamanians.” (Memorandum from
Rostow to President
Johnson, April 22; Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. VIII (part 1 of
2), September 1966–May 1967) The President expressed the hope
that this approach would meet with the satisfaction of President
Robles, and assumed that
Robles’ people would be
available for rapid pursuit of the negotiations. He praised President
Robles for the wisdom of his
view that he should get these matters behind him well before the
elections.
President Robles brought up the
subject of land return to Panama. He explained that as things now stand,
Panama City and Colon, at their present stage of growth, are hemmed in,
with no further space available in which to expand. He stated that these
lands are not needed for the operation or defense of the Canal. If they
could be returned to Panama, this would provide for further development
of these two cities. He noted that this matter is also politically
sensitive, and could lead to irritations and resentment. Secretary
Rusk commented that he had
spoken recently to Secretary McNamara on the subject of return of land areas to
Panama and that Secretary McNamara said he would review sympathetically Panama’s
requests. President Johnson said he, too, would
review this issue.
The interview closed with a discussion of the statementsJohnson’s statements at Punte del Este are in
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, 1967, Book I, pp. 444–451. to be
made to the press, which have been separately reported.
436. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on May 4.SNIE 84–67Washington, May 4, 1967.
PANAMA
The Problem
To consider the prospect for political stability and for the Canal
treaties between now and the scheduled inauguration of a new president
in October 1968.
Conclusions
Increased tension and political turbulence are likely as the
presidential campaign and the issue of new Canal treaties impinge on
a situation none too stable in the first place.The small number of elite families, long in political and economic
control, may be hard pressed in the elections of May 1968 to keep
one of their own in the presidency and to retain dominance of the
National Assembly. The challenge will come from Arnulfo Arias, whose
anti-elite Panameñista Party is the country’s only mass movement.
The danger of serious disorders will probably become somewhat
greater than at present, and could become much greater.Although there are a great many important political variables in
Panama, the timing of the completion of the treaty negotiations will
be a crucial factor in determining the extent of political unrest as
well as the chances for ratification and implementation of the
treaties.In view of such uncertainties on the political scene, there will
clearly be major problems in getting the Canal treaties completed,
ratified, and then held to by the government succeeding that of
President Robles. Unless the
treaties are ratified before October 1967, there is small chance of
getting satisfactory treaties completed until after a new
administration takes office in October 1968.
[Here follows the 8-page Discussion section of the estimate.]
437. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. IX, Memoranda and
Miscellaneous. No classification marking. There is an indication on
the memorandum that Johnson saw it.Washington, June 9, 1967, 8:25 p.m.
Mr. President:
Bob Anderson called me this afternoon to tell me the following: —The negotiation is now at the wire.On May 31 Rusk sent the President a memorandum on the
status of the negotiations. Rostow
transmitted it to the President with the observation: “The
remaining hurdle is the price tag—but that’s not exactly
trivial!” (Both ibid.) He hopes to wind it up at a
meeting starting at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow with Panamanian
negotiators.—On the gut issue of financing, they will keep the 90¢ toll,
which leaves 25¢ left over above costs. He would first propose a
division of 17¢ for Panama; 8¢ for the U.S. His fallback is 20¢
for Panama, 5¢ for the U.S. This means that Panamanians might
fetch up with between $15 and $20 million a year, depending on
traffic. This compares with the $80 million a year they
sought.—We would permit Panamanian jurisdiction over certain criminal
cases in the Zone for personnel not associated with the Canal;
tourists, etc.—The lock canal treaty would terminate in the year 2000 except
if we were actually in the process of building a new sea-level
canal at that time, in which case the treaty would run on to the
year 2010.—The treaty governing the sea-level canal would run 60 years
from the time it became operational.—Compensation to be paid Panama under a sea-level canal treaty
would be decided at the time of the financing and in the light
of the financing method. (Bob Anderson cleared this position,
which varied from his initial instructions, with Bob McNamara and Covey Oliver.)—We will give up to the Panamanians certain territories which
we have agreed with the JCS; but
two antenna fields would have to be moved at some future time,
involving an estimated cost of $6 million.—We would also surrender an area in which we have military
quarters, which are desirable but not necessary to the defense
arrangements.—We would surrender some piers for which they would be able to
earn some money.—We would surrender one area containing houses now occupied by
Panamanians, on the stipulation that the occupants would keep
their present houses.—The Panamanians will accept without change a standard status
forces agreement, approved by the JCS.
As noted, the only variation from instructions which have been cleared
with you and on the Hill, is the
question of a compensation formula for the sea-level canal. Although Bob
McNamara gave his assent, there appears to be some concern among the
military that ambiguity about the compensation formula will weaken our
option on the sea-level canal and might leave us at the turn of the
century without military base rights.A June
10 memorandum from Sayre to
Rusk reported on this
problem: “Anderson talked
twice to General Wheeler and
with Secretary Resor on the
JCS and Army problems on the sea
level canal compensation provisions. Wheeler’s preoccupations relate to the period after
the lock canal terminates. They are (1) continued neutrality of the
canal, (2) access and transit for U.S. warships, etc., and (3)
defense of the canal.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, ARA Files:
Lot File 72 D 33, Entry 5396, Panama) I am now checking into
the seriousness of this point. You may wish to talk directly tonight
with Bob Anderson about it.
Finally, Bob Anderson notes that we have come to a strategic
psychological moment. He thinks he can clinch the deal tomorrow; and
that the deal is viable on the Hill. He cannot vouch for its viability in Panamanian
politics.
If he gets your go ahead, they will make a firm decision tomorrow morning
that they have a treaty and then take a few days getting the details on
paper.
I recommend that you talk to Bob Anderson this evening, directly.The President’s Daily Diary indicates that
Johnson commented on
Rostow’s recommendation
that the President speak to Anderson: “I’ll have to do that tonight—which I’ll
do.” There is no indication in the Daily Diary that the President
spoke to Anderson, nor has
any other record of such a conversation been found. (Johnson
Library)
Walt
438. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. IX, Memoranda and
Miscellaneous. Confidential.Washington, June 16, 1967, 07 p.m.
Mr. President:
Bob Anderson called in to report
the present state of the Panama negotiations. He will be meeting again
on MondayJune 19. afternoon. He will
use his own judgment in dealing with the two positions set out below
unless you wish to give him instructions which he would, of course,
welcome.
I. Our position
We have offered: —17¢ per ton for the Panamanians; we would keep 8¢;—the lock canal treaty ends in the year 2000, but will
continue to 2010 if construction on the sea level canal is under
way;—the sea level canal treaty would run 60 years from the time
it became operational;—we would maintain the right to defend the lock canal for 10
years past the expiration of the treaty (the Panamanians argued
for 5 years);—payments under the sea canal would be negotiated at the time
that financing was arranged; but guidelines are written into the
present treaty.
II. Panamanian position
They ask: —20¢ per ton for Panama in the first year; 5¢ for the
U.S.;—an increase of 1¢ up to 25¢ per year in the subsequent five
years (at this time that would absorb the calculated amount
available after costs without raising tolls; but in the future,
that may not be the case since other aspects of the treaty are
likely to reduce canal costs.);—a guarantee for the value of the dollar over the whole period
of the life of the lock canal in terms of the purchasing power
of the dollar in 1967;—a guarantee of $1.9 million a year (the present annuity) in
addition to the sums to be derived from the new split of profits
from tolls;—a 60–40 division in favor of Panama if tolls should increase
(we are calling for a 50–50 split);—an exchange of letters in which we agree to look into their
request for preference in U.S. markets for Panamanian
goods;—a U.S. commitment to build a 4-lane highway 10–12 miles in
length from our military base in Rio Hato to La Chorreda;—the U.S. should build an underpass between the beach and Rio
Hato to avoid our military vehicles from crossing the
highways;—that we build an all-weather road from Vera Cruz to Arrajan—
about 8–10 miles.
III. Bob
Anderson’s thinking
Up to this point he has made no concessions to the Panamanian position.
His thought is that he move his offer up from 17¢ a ton to 20¢, leaving
us 5¢. As an alternative he is considering letting 20¢ be the base,
letting the Panamanian take rise 1¢ a year for 5 years, but reserving
10¢ for ourselves (this reservation would not be real unless tolls were
raised over this period or operating costs declined).
Without any commitment he would be prepared to give a letter indicating
our willingness to consider the problem of Panamanian preference in the
U.S. market.
He is hesitant about the roads, underpass, etc., because he doesn’t know
the price tag and they would be subject to Congressional
appropriation.
The atmosphere has gotten increasingly emotional as the climax of the
negotiation comes near. De La Rosa has stated that he would probably
have to resign if the Panamanian proposal is not accepted. They have
almost certainly been in informal communication with their President.
They have suggested Presidential communications. Bob Anderson has tried to discourage
this by saying that’s not the way we operate.
As he approaches this final stage, having narrowed the issues, his
general attitude is to be mildly generous about the financial terms— and
prepared to take the heat in the Congress for that—rather than to risk
for the President and the country a Panamanian explosion.
He concluded, as I indicated, by saying that he didn’t wish to burden you
at this time. He wished you to know how things were proceeding and that
he would welcome any guidance you might wish to give him before his
meeting on Monday afternoon.In a June 17
note to Rostow, the President
wrote: “Walt, call and thank him very much and tell him we follow
his general judgment.” Rostow
annotated this note: “done.” (Johnson Library, National Security
File, Country File, Panama, Vol. IX, Memoranda and
Miscellaneous)
Walt
439. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs (Sayre) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–3 CZ. Confidential. Drafted by
Clark and R.A. Frank (L/ARA).Washington, June 27, 1967.
SUBJECT
Panama Canal Treaties
President Johnson and President Robles announced June 26 that the
negotiating teams of the United States and Panama had reached agreement
on the details of three new treaties relating to (a) the present Lock
Canal, (b) a possible Sea Level Canal in Panama, and (c) the Defense of
the Panama Canal and its Neutrality. The announcement, copy
attached,The statement that
Johnson and Robles announced on June 26 was attached, but is not
printed. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 17, 1967, p. 65, or American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, p.
660. states that the Treaties are being submitted to the
representative Governments, that arrangements will be made for signature
after approval by the two Presidents, and that the Treaties will then be
presented to the two countries legislative body for consideration in
accordance with their constitutional processes. Neither the texts nor
details of the Treaties are being made available to the press or public
at this time.
The following are the major points in the three treaties:
1. The Lock Canal Treaty
The Treaties of 1903, 1936, and 1955 with
Panama are terminated as are all other agreements or treaties which
are inconsistent with the Lock Canal Treaty.The Administration. A United States–Panama
binational entity, called the “Joint Administration of the Panama
Canal”, would be established and would operate the Panama Canal and
administer the “Canal Area”. The Administration would assume control
of the Canal and Canal Area not sooner than six months nor later
than twenty-four months after the Treaty enters into force. The
Administration would be governed by a Board of nine members, five
appointed by the President of the United States and four appointed
by the President of Panama. The Board acts by a majority vote unless
otherwise provided in the Treaty. The Chairmanship of the Board
would alternate annually between a United States and a Panamanian
member. In order to carry out its responsibilities and functions, the
Administration would have numerous express rights and powers,
including the right and power to promulgate a statute of laws, to
establish a court system, and to establish a police force. Some
Panamanian civil laws would apply in the Canal Area and some
Panamanian criminal laws may apply in the Canal Area. The Panamanian
courts would have some jurisdiction in the Canal Area.The Canal Area. The “Canal Area” is delimited
in the Treaty and includes land and water areas which comprise the
present Canal Zone. Land and water areas in the present Zone which
are no longer necessary for the operation of the Canal would be
returned to Panama.Employees. The Administration would have all
rights and powers relating to employment policies and labor
relations with its employees. Persons presently employed by the
Panama Canal Company and the Canal Zone Government would be
transferred to employment of the Administration under conditions
established in the Treaty. Such persons would receive the same
compensation they presently receive; would be guaranteed increases
in minimum wages; would receive salary increases to offset any
possible increase in the cost of living or other net financial
disadvantage through their transfer; and would continue to receive
the benefits of the United States Civil Service retirement law and
all other protections and benefits equivalent to those in effect
prior to the transfer.Taxation. The Administration would be exempt
from all Panamanian taxes, with the exception that the
Administration would pay Panamanian taxes on certain retail or other
commercial enterprises it may continue to operate.Tolls. The Treaty provides that the
Administration will operate the Canal to provide to Panama and the
United States a fair return “in the light of their contributions to
the creation and maintenance of the Canal and in the interest of
world commerce”. The Administration, in its first year of operation,
would pay to Panama seventeen cents per long ton of commercial cargo
transiting the Canal, and that annual payment would increase by one
cent for five succeeding years, the annual payment to Panama
thereafter being twenty-two cents per long ton. In fiscal 1969,
seventeen cents per long ton would, according to present
predictions, be approximately sixteen million dollars. The
Administration would, in its first year of operation, pay to the
United States eight cents per long ton of commercial cargo, and that
annual amount would increase by one cent for two years, the annual
payment to the United States thereafter being ten cents per long
ton.Neutrality and Non-Discrimination. The Panama
Canal would remain neutral and would be open to vessels of commerce
and of war of all nations on terms of entire equality and
non-discrimination.Termination. The Treaty would remain in force
until December 31, 1999; however, it would be superseded by the Sea
Level Canal Treaty if the United States constructs a sea level
canal.
2. Sea Level Canal Treaty
The Sea Level Canal Treaty in effect provides that the United States has
an option, which it must exercise within twenty years, to construct a
Sea Level Canal on the site of the present Lock Canal or in the Darien
region of Panama. The Sea Level Canal would be operated by an
“Inter-Oceanic Canal Commission”. The Commission would be governed by a
Board consisting of nine members, five appointed by the President of the
United States and four by the President of Panama. The United States,
after consultation with Panama, may offer others the right to
participate in the financing of the Canal, and, in this case, those who
participate in the financing might be represented on the Board. The
Board would have numerous express powers to operate and maintain the Sea
Level Canal; however, the “Canal Area” would be abolished and the
Commission therefore would have no powers with respect to court, laws,
and law enforcement. The Treaty would terminate sixty years from the
date the Sea Level Canal is opened, but not beyond 2067.
3. Defense Treaty
Both the Lock Canal Treaty and the Sea Level Canal Treaty provide that
Panama and the United States shall provide for the defense, security,
neutrality, and continuity of operation of the Canal in a Defense Treaty
signed on the same date. Under the Defense Treaty, the United States
retains certain defense areas in which it may maintain its Armed Forces.
The Treaty provides that “In case of an international conflagration or
the existence of any threat of aggression or any armed conflict or other
emergency endangering Canal defenses,” Panama and the United States
“would take such preventive and defensive measures necessary for the
protection of and common interests in effectuating purposes of the
Defense Treaty.” The United States may act unilaterally in the Defense
Areas or in the Canal Area. The United States would be able to use the
Defense Areas for “related security purposes” and would consequently
continue other military activities, such as training. The Defense Treaty
contains extensive provisions relating to the status of our forces
similar to other status of forces agreements.
440. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. IX, June 1967–April 1968.
Secret. There is an indication on this memorandum that
Johnson saw it.Washington, August 8, 1967, 7 p.m.
SUBJECT
Robles Delays Signing of
Panama Canal Treaties
Panamanian President Robles has
assured Ambassador Adair that
the Panama Canal Treaties will be signed but not without further
delay.
Robles hopes to be able to sign
before the end of August but the State Department believes a more
realistic date would be the middle or end of September.
In the attached copy of a cable from Panama,Telegram 368 from Panama, August 8, is attached but not
printed.Adair reports that Robles says he needs additional time
for discussions with Panamanian leaders. He believes, and Adair agrees, that the delay in
signing is working in favor of eventual approval. Adair believes
Robles will not press for
ratification of the treaty before his 1968 elections.
State officials agree with Adair that we should not pressure Robles into an early signing.
Secretary Rusk will be making
recommendations shortly. He is expected to suggest that key members of
Congress be informed of the current situation at an early date.
Consideration is also being given to releasing to the press the texts of
the treaties accompanied by an explanation of the delay in signing.Memorandum from Rusk to President Johnson, August 8. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 37, August 1–10, 1967) On
August 10 Sayre informed
Rusk that the President
had approved the official release of the draft treaties, but only
after consultation with Panama. On August 11 Anderson stated he “saw no positive
advantage to releasing the draft treaties.” Eleta and Panama’s chief negotiator
both thought release at this time “undesirable.” (Memorandum from
Sayre to Rusk, August 16; National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PAN–US) Leaked texts of the
treaties had already appeared in the Chicago
Tribune and were printed in the Congressional Record of July 17, 21, and 27, 1967.
Walt
441. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. IX, June 1967–April 1968.
Confidential. A handwritten L on the memorandum indicates the
President saw it.Washington, October 6, 1967.
SUBJECT
Panamanian Developments
Encouraging Economic Outlook
A year ago we were concerned about public unrest in Panama arising from
sluggish economic conditions. You will recall that you authorized a high
impact economic assistance program.
We are a long way from solving Panama’s basic problems of unemployment
and maldistribution of income, but the short term gains are encouraging.
Our Embassy reports that Panama has achieved a remarkable annual growth
rate of 8%, which is expected to continue. Business is booming. Growth
in the manufacturing sector is higher than the overall average. Exports
are up, but so are imports. The deficit is made manageable by higher
earnings from the Zone. The Embassy says that much of the growth stems
from confidence by the business community that satisfactory treaties
will be negotiated which will bring larger income to Panama.
Further Slippage on the Treaties
With respect to the treaties, we have more slippage in the Panamanian
timetable. Robles is still
consulting key persons on the drafts. This process will not be completed
until the end of October. During November, Robles and Eleta
expect to consolidate all the changes recommended by the Council,
Cabinet and ex-Presidents. The Panamanian negotiating team would return
to Washington around mid-November. Talks on the changes they
want—Eleta says about 70—are
expected to last until the end of January. According to their schedule,
signature would take place in late January or February, with
ratification to follow in a special session of the National Assembly
after their May Presidential elections.
All of this hinges, in the first place, on the nature of the treaty
changes they propose. Eleta says
most of them are “drafting” changes. Assuming this hurdle is passed,
there remains the question of who the Presidential candidates will be
and who wins the elections. Beyond that arises the question of whether we want to
seek ratification in the middle of our presidential campaign. The
prospects for the treaties continue to be “iffy”.
Walt
442. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. IX, June
1967–April 1968. Confidential. A handwritten notation on the
memorandum indicates the President saw it.Washington, December 28, 1967,
noon.
SUBJECT
Panama: Politics and the Treaties
Five months ago we were ready to sign the new Canal treaties. Today it is
clear that the lameduck Robles
Government will not be able to follow through on signature.In a November 13 memorandum to Helms, Director of the Office of
National Estimates Sherman Kent stated, “the political maneuvering
now underway in Panama in preparation for the presidential election
of 1 May 1968 is increasing the chances of civil disorder and has
virtually eliminated any chance of progress on the draft Canal
treaties— at least until after a new Panamanian president takes
office in October 1968.” Kent indicated that Arnulfo Arias was “the
odds on favorite” to be the next president if elections were free
and fair. He would be “sticky” to deal with. The Robles government, according to
the memorandum, was in no position to press approval of the
treaties, especially because popular, nationalistic opinion was
increasingly opposed to them. (Washington National Records Center,
OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468,
Panama 000.1, 1967) The treaties will pass to the successor
administration which assumes office on October 1, 1968. It is a safe bet
that this administration will want to put its stamp on the treaties. So
renegotiation to some degree early in 1969 is a virtual certainty.
This turn of events has worked out well for us: —we will have gained 5 years of relative stability following
the 1964 riots.—the generous treaties which Bob Anderson negotiated have
disarmed our critics.—the delay in signature is not due to us but to failure of
Robles to prepare
the way for action in Panama—this is well understood.—the delay removes the treaties from the Panamanian electoral
campaign (elections are on May 12, 1968) as well as our own,
which is to our advantage.
At Punta del Este Robles urged
you to ask the US negotiators to step up the pace of the negotiations so
that he could sign and obtain National Assembly ratification before the
1968 political campaign got underway. You obliged him. But he had not
done his homework with his congress. He ran into trouble, temporized,
and ended up unable to muster sufficient support to put the treaties
through.
The electoral campaign caught up with him. What little chance he had at
least to sign the treaties vanished when he mishandled the selection of
his successor by his loosely-knit coalition. As a result, four of the
parties bolted and joined his arch-rival Arnulfo Arias. If the elections
are anywhere near honest, the charismatic Arias is bound to win.
Arias—who was twice elected President and both
times deposed by the National Guard—is a flamboyant and erratic leader.
His problems with staying in power have been with his own people rather
than with us. Whether he has mellowed with the years, we don’t know. We
have followed carefully his attitude toward the treaty negotiations. In
this he has been most prudent. He has aimed his criticism at Robles as a president who had no right
to negotiate the treaties because of his fraudulent election in 1963
[1964]. But he has carefully avoided attacking us or the contents of the
treaties.
A year from now when the treaties are looked at again, there may be
substantial reasons for a major overhaul. Assuming Arias wins and is
allowed to take office, he may seek substantial changes. But we may also
want to reconsider the approach in the light of what the Plowshare
experiments demonstrate and the Canal Study Commission may have
concluded by then on the best route to follow.
Walt
443. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Agency File, SIG, 32nd Meeting, March 21, 1968, Vol. 4.
Secret.Washington, March 19, 1968.
SUBJECT
Panama Situation
The Panamanian electoral crisis is coming to a headIn telegram 125046 to Bogota, San José, and Panama
City, March 5, the Department pointed out that “while a physical
clash between the opposing Arias and Samudio [Robles’ successor candidate for
President] factions has been averted, the underlying issue of
control of the electoral machinery—and hence the outcome of the May
12 elections—has not been resolved. Therefore, it is only a matter
of time before the political cycle produces another crisis.”
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL 14 PAN) with the
impeachment trial of President Robles now slated to begin on Monday, March 25.Telegram 128456 to Mexico City, Rio de
Janeiro, and San José, March 12, provides background on the onset of
the impeachment crisis. (Ibid.) I recommend you devote a few
minutes of today’s luncheon meeting to a review of this problem.Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Meeting
Notes)
The Present Situation
Neither President Robles nor
Opposition Candidate Arias give any sign of backing off from their
intransigent positions. Robles
keeps putting pressure on National Guard Commander Vallarino to side with him, but so far
Vallarino has kept strictly
neutral.
The trial may force Vallarino’s
hand. Arias will expect him to carry out the National Assembly’s verdict
and whatever orders the new President gives him. Robles will not step down. He hopes
the Supreme Court will invalidate the Assembly’s action and Vallarino will close the Assembly.
Under these circumstances, the pressure on Vallarino will be to say plague on both houses and take
over the government. There are some unconfirmed indications he is
planning such action if the politicians do not compose their
differences.
What We Have Done
We do not want to take sides, nor become too heavily engaged in any
mediation effort. We believe a face-saving formula for all parties would
be to have the OAS send electoral
technicians and observers to
help in arranging honest elections. The OAS has done this in several Caribbean countries.
At our urging, the Colombians and Costa Ricans have proposed electoral
specialists, but gotten nowhere. We have encouraged Archbishop Clavel
and his “third-force” group of civic and business leaders to advance the
idea, but they have had no success. There are indications that Arias
would probably accept outside observers if Robles and his candidate, Samudio, would. Anything that promotes fair elections
favors Arias’ election. But Robles last weekend publicly stated
that observers were not necessary because the elections would be “free
and pure”.
What We Might Do
State has so far approached the problem with extreme caution.In a March 19 note for Rostow,
Bowdler pointed out: “I
have not gotten very far in persuading ARA to take more initiative in the Panamanian
situation.” Bowdler
continued, “I am not a wild-eyed interventionist. But remembering
what neutral inactivity cost us in the DR, I would like to try an additional low-risk
initiative.” (Ibid., National Security File, Agency File, SIG, 32nd Meeting, March 21, 1968, Vol.
4) While I think prudence is called for, I also believe some
modest risk-taking might spare us from a military coup in Panama and
possible bloodshed.
The key is Vallarino and his
National Guard. Only he has the power to enforce a settlement on both
sides or take over the government.
So far we have not dealt directly with Vallarino. Last week he expressed a desire to see CINCSO Commander General Porter, but
word was sent back that he should deal with Ambassador Adair on
political matters. Ambassador Adair has instructions to urge Vallarino—if he comes calling—to push
both sides into accepting outside observers.
What I would like to have Secretary Rusk explore with his advisers is for us to take the
initiative with Vallarino and
press him to use the OAS observers
formula as the way out of the impasse. If he is agreeable and asks for
our help, we should be prepared to support his efforts with Robles, Samudio, Arias and the
Archbishop.
Should it become public that we have taken this initiative, I do not see
that we have lost anything. For, we are not taking sides, we are
supporting constitutional government, we are encouraging free and honest
elections using a method already employed by four other Caribbean
countries, and we are trying to head off either a bloody clash between
the contending parties or a military coup.
W. W. RostowPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
444. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. IX, June
1967–April 1968. Secret. A note on the memorandum indicates the
President saw it.Washington, March 26, 1968, 8 p.m.
SUBJECT
Panama Situation
There is a marked deterioration in the situation in Panama in the wake of
the National Assembly’s impeachment of Robles on SundayThe United
States was notified on March 27 that, by virtue of a judgment issued
by the Panamanian National Legislative Assembly, Robles had been deposed and First
Vice President Maz Del Valle had been sworn in as President on March
24. (Telegram 139993 to all Latin American posts, April 1; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
POL 15 PAN) and the
increasingly repressive actions taken by the National Guard against the
rival government of “President” Del Valle and Opposition Candidate
Arias.
National Guard Commander Vallarino
has not formally abandoned his neutral stance of maintaining law and
order until the Supreme Court rules on the Assembly action.The Supreme Court of Panama, with one dissenting
vote, ruled the Robles
impeachment proceedings unconstitutional, and Robles, with the support of the
National Guard, retained the Presidency. Additional information is
in circular telegram 136251 to all Latin American posts, March 26
(ibid., POL 15–1 PAN), and in a
memorandum from Rostow to President
Johnson, April 1. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. IX, June
1967–April 1968) But under this guise, he has ransacked the
headquarters of opposition candidate Arias and cordoned off the National
Assembly Building—the seat of the Del Valle Government.
There was a showdown at 5:00 p.m. today when “President” Del Valle, his
Cabinet and the majority of the National Assembly members tried to enter
the Assembly Building. Ambassador Adair has just reported the National
Guard drove them off with barrages of tear gas.
So far, we have not been dragged into the dispute. But the danger signals
are up. The heavy-handed action by the National Guard against the
Arias–Del Valle group could bring a sharp
public reaction.In a March 25 memorandum to
Rusk, Oliver noted that
“the position taken by the Guard has aroused considerable resentment
in opposition circles, who interpret it as evidence of Guard
partiality to Robles.”
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL–PAN) This
reaction could be turned against us out of frustration or hostility by
playing on the fact that
the tear gas (being used rather indiscriminately) is from the US and we
have heavily subsidized increases in the strength of the National Guard
during the past two years. References to this are beginning to appear in
the anti-Robles propaganda.
So far, the general public—and even the students—have been apathetic and
aloof from the political maneuvering. Even the communists and their
allies have not taken sides. Whether the action by the Guard this
evening will bring the people into the streets in support of
Arias and Del Valle remains to be seen.
Ambassador Adair continues to
monitor the situation closely. He believes there is little we can do to
influence events in this domestic squabble which would not drag us into
the middle.
Walt
445. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. X (part 3 of 3),
May–December 1968. Secret. A note on the memorandum indicates the
President saw it.Washington, May 11, 1968, 11:55 a.m.
SUBJECT
Panama Elections: Sunday, May 12, 1968
Tomorrow Panama holds national elections. The outlook is for peaceful
balloting. If there is trouble, it is most likely to come after the
results are announced.On April 26 Helms warned the President: “in
view of the Panamanian election two weeks hence, I think you may be
interested to note our concern that it may not go off as smoothly as
one is inclined now to think.” (Memorandum from Helms to
Johnson; Central Intelligence Agency, Job
80–B01285A, DCI (Helms) Chronological Files, January
1, 1968–July 31, 1968)
The assumption is that the official candidate, David Samudio, will win.
President Robles controls the
electoral machinery. The National Guard is actively backing Samudio. So
the stage is set for Samudio to emerge the victor—by foul means if fair
ones do not work. The CIA reporting
shows that the Robles government
is ready to engage in massive manipulation of the ballot boxes if
necessary.
Opposition candidate Arnulfo Arias has campaigned actively despite his
loss of face in the unsuccessful impeachment struggle against President
Robles last month. Prior to
this setback, most observers believed Arias would
win a clear majority. How voters will react to
Arias’ lack of muscle in the impeachment
showdown and the government’s apparent intention to insure Samudio’s victory, we do not know.
The intensity of any public reaction to manipulation of election results
will hinge on the degree to which the ballot boxes are stuffed and how
blatant Robles and Samudio are about it. The showdown
should come on Monday or Tuesday.May 13 or
14.
On May 30, 1968, the Panamanian Board of Election announced that Arnulfo
Arias had defeated David Samudio by approximately 175,000 to
134,000 votes. In an assessment of the prospects of the
Arias government, Director of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research Hughes informed Secretary Rusk that “When it was obvious that
despite extensive irregularities committed by Samudio partisans and the Guard,
Arias and the NU
had received an overwhelming majority of the votes in the May 12
elections, the Guard, perhaps fearing violence, moved to a neutral
position assuring a relatively fair vote count and an
Arias victory. It seems unlikely that Samudio can block
Arias’ accession to the Presidency by October
1. The period prior to the inauguration will be one of horse trading
between Arias, the other NU leaders, Samudio
supporters, the National Guard, and anyone else who desires influence in
the incoming government.” (Research Memorandum RAR–16 from Hughes to
Rusk, July 22; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
POL PAN–US)
447. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PAN–US. Secret; Exdis; No Distribution Outside the
Department.Panama City, May 20, 1968,
2250Z.
3434. Subject: MinottoJames Minotto, former
staff member of the Senate Appropriations
Committee.–Vallarino Conversation.
Minotto met privately with Vallarino at noon today for approximately half an
hour. His report on meeting follows:Having met General Vallarino twice before in 1965 and 1967 there was no
problem in immediately resuming our previous cordial
relationship.I advised the General that I was on a business trip to Panama and
points south and that prior to leaving my hometown of Phoenix,
Arizona, the superintendent of the Arizona Highway Patrol had given
me a personal letter for the General and also a large gold star
appointing him a Colonel in the AHP (the highest rank this
organization had to confer). Vallarino was very pleased and said he would thank
Superintendent James Hegarty of the AHP in a personal letter for the
honor conferred on him. Having successfully disposed of the “cover,”
I then asked the General if he would be good enough and give me
10–15 minutes of his time for a private and confidential discussion.
His answer was, “I will be very happy to talk to you.”I started our conversation by making it very clear that I was not
connected with the U.S. Government at this time, not like a year ago
and other times when I was a staff member of the United States
Senate, Committee on Appropriations.I also made it very clear that the Ambassador, or any person
connected with our Embassy in Panama, was not aware of what I would
discuss with him, nor had I seen the Ambassador prior to my visit to
him today.I informed the General that on my way from Arizona to Panama I had
further discussions with people of authority and particularly in
Washington with Members of Congress, people with a long record of
service (such as Senator Hayden) and who had over the years gone by
shown a warm interest and a friendly feeling towards Panama and its
people.These people, whose names I did not elaborate on (except Senator
Hayden) were all quite concerned about the newspaper reports
emanating from Panama and gave a rather detailed and vivid account
of the presidential
elections and the present status of uncertainty and unrest.I told the General that I as a private citizen and being fairly
familiar with Latin America was equally concerned with the people
above referred to, that Panama’s image was in grave danger as not
being a democratic republic that adhered to the democratic
principles of the people electing their president, but that
unscrupulous forces were, according to many newspaper reports, and I
emphasized that my knowledge was solely obtained from newspaper
sources, trying to manipulate the election of their candidate, even
though he had been defeated by a substantial majority at the
polls.On May 17 Hughes informed
Secretary Rusk that
“Arnulfo Arias apparently received such
large majority in the May 12 election that the government cannot
impose its presidential candidate, David Samudio, without resorting to
extensive and blatant fraud. Nevertheless, the Samudio forces seem determined
to arrange their victory. Once again the National Guard is
caught in the middle, but this time internal dissension is
threatening the unity of the Guard. Commandant Vallarino, who is
wavering in his support for Samudio, must contend with a powerful clique of
officers so deeply committed to Samudio that they fear a NU victory would cost them their jobs.” (Memorandum
from Hughes to Rusk,
Intelligence Note 360, May 17; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 PAN) I did not
mention the name of this candidate. I continued to explain to the
General the seriousness of this situation in our relations with
Panama, because the American people get their information about what
is going on in the world from newspapers, TV and radio, and that the
large volume of critical reports about the honesty of the Panamanian
election could have very damaging repercussions in the political and
economic field as well.Congress has its ears tuned to public opinion, and if the thought
were to prevail that Panama had a government that did not represent
the choice of the Panamanian people, such programs as aid, military
assistance, and the pending Panama Canal negotiations could be
seriously impaired.I said to General Vallarino: “General, I am speaking solely in a private
capacity, but let me tell you that people of great prominence in the
United States feel that the future of Panama lies in your hands. You
have had over many years an unblemished record, you yourself told me
a year ago that you had no ambitions to be President, that you were
dedicated to your job as head of the National Guard of Panama, the
only armed forces of your republic, to maintain law and order and to
protect the constitution and the rights of the people.I have assured my friends at home that you would never tolerate
any crooked practices and that you would stand firm for an honest
election. I also understand that at present the National Election
Board is checking the
presidential elections returns and rejecting any irregularities. May
I ask you the one and only question that I would like to have your
views on?” His answer was, “Yes, go ahead.” Then, sir, please tell
me if you would stand by the decision of the National Election Board
and if necessary enforce it. His answer was, “I will enforce the
decision of the constitutionally created National Election Board,
and I will not tolerate any act that would void the will of the
people.” I added, regardless who the presidential candidate is, who
would get the majority of the popular vote? His answer was,
“Yes”.Finally I mentioned the National Tribunal, which I understand is
composed of three men, to whom complaints about irregularities are
submitted. I also mentioned that there was a rumor that such a small
group of men could be swayed by material promises, thus nullifying
the will of the people.He smiled and said: “My actions will be guided by the decision of
the National Election Board, and I will not go beyond the decision
of the NEB.As I bade the General goodbye, I told him that I would pass on to
my friends at home what he had told me and that I felt sure they
would be very happy to hear this and that he (General Vallarino) was doing a great
service to his country, to the cause of democracy, and to the
continuance of amicable and useful relations between his country and
the United States.In conclusion, I wish to state that our conversation was at all
times an extremely friendly and open discussion, and I very
definitely gathered that impression that the General was sincere in
what he told me and that his statements honestly reflected his stand
in this matter.Adair
448. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to
the Department of StateSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 98, October 5–9, 1968. Secret;
Exdis; Immediate. Repeated to
Pancanal Govt and USCINCSO.
Rostow sent a copy of this telegram to
President Johnson at 7 p.m. October 9 and
commented: “The attached indicates that there are now again thoughts
within the National Guard in Panama of a coup against
Arias.” (Ibid.) On September 26 the CIA had sent the White House a
memorandum alerting them to “coup talk” among members of the
National Guard likely to be affected by Arias’
proposed changes in the leadership of the Guard. (Ibid., Vol. 96,
September 26–30, 1968)Panama City, October 9, 1968,
2105Z.
4872. For Asst Secretary Oliver and Sanders ARA/Panel. Subject: Possible New Crisis in National
Guard.
New GN crisis is presently in the
making. Dept has by now received reports submitted this morning
through intelligence channels.The White
House received information indicating that a group of National
Guard officers reached a decision to stage a military coup and
take over the government within the next 48 hours. (Ibid.,
Country File, Panama, Vol. X (2 of 3), May to December
1968)At noontime Col Urrutia asked MLGP CMDR Arias
was not keeping his earlier promises relative to the GN and that the GN officers feared the President was eventually going
to destroy the GN organization. As
examples of broken promises he mentioned (1)
Arias’ latest intent not formally to name
Pinilla as first
commandant because of shortage of funds and (2)
Arias’ statement to Urrutia (which Urrutia
says he did not pass on to the officers concerned) that Torrijos and Boris Martinez would
have to go. Urrutia did not mention to Seddon anything about a
coup.Urrutia said he wanted to be sure that Ambassador Adair was aware of the current
situation and that he would like an opportunity to talk with me. He
did not specifically ask Seddon to make an appointment for him.
Seddon promised to convey Urrutia’s explanation to me. Seddon,
having talked with me before meeting Urrutia, told the latter that
the Ambassador could not involve himself in changes of personnel in
the GN. Seddon also commented that as
CMDR in chief the president had right to assign GN officers as he deemed fit. Urrutia
acknowledged this but added that the officers “were not fools and
could see the handwriting on the wall.”A few minutes after talking to Urrutia this noon, Seddon talked
with Vallarino who told him
the outlook was not good and that he should watch developments
closely. He expected trouble—not now— but in about six months
time.The question is whether I should speak with Urrutia and if so what
to tell him. My door has always been open to anyone wanting to see
me. If Urrutia calls on me, Arias will know it
soon thereafter. I feel it would be almost imperative for me to tell
Arias of Urrutia’s call. Urrutia probably
would not object. By such action I and the USG would be in the middle. Other GN officers as well as political
supporters of both Arias and Samudio would soon know of my
involvement.If Arias and the GN should become reconciled thereafter, we might gain
good will. If the GN should
reluctantly abandon the reported but still unverified plans for a
coup on grounds of an inferred disapproval on part of US after my
talk with Urrutia, the opposition press would probably charge
interference and claim this was proof of US support of
Arias in the recent elections.If a coup occurs and Urrutia should claim he asked for an
appointment beforehand with the US Ambassador and was refused, we
may come in for criticism from other sources.In the event Urrutia should come to my office, I could make the
following points:
(1) The USG has made clear
its stand on respect for constitutional processes. (2)
USG has maintained
strictly neutral attitude in Panama’s recent elections and
does not intend to interfere in Panama’s domestic politics.
Relationship between President of Republic and GN is domestic matter. (3)
Panama has established reputation in recent years for law
and order. Panama has completed three 4-year terms of office
without an unconstitutional change. These are important
facts to bear in mind relative to GOP’s image both at home and abroad. (4) I
trust that whatever GN does,
it will have good of country at heart rather than individual
personal advantage. (5) Suggest that GN make every effort resolve its problems
through peaceful discussions.
I propose (but will await Dept reply) to send Seddon back to
Urrutia to say he has given me Urrutia’s message, that I appreciate
the information and that I hope differences can be resolved through
friendly reason and discussion. If Urrutia again raises point of
meeting with Ambassador, Seddon would tell him the door of my office
was always open and if he wanted to make an appointment Seddon would
arrange it. If Urrutia asks for the appointment, Seddon will tell
Urrutia that I would probably feel compelled to inform Pres
Arias of the discussion.If Urrutia comes to my office, I would subsequently seek an
appointment with Arias. Failure to do the
latter would almost inevitably lead to greater criticism of US
involvement if a coup were to follow my talk with Urrutia.Embassy has no hard evidence which would support claim of some
GN officers that
Arias is planning to destroy the GN although intelligence reports do
indicate that Arias is planning further changes
to consolidate his
control over the GN. On the contrary,
the statement issued by Arias immediately prior
to the inauguration bespake respect for GN and intent not only to preserve promotion system but
to raise salaries. Torrijos
and Boris Martinez are both strong-minded officers and being the
most vulnerable may well be the force behind the present
crisis.On October 9 Samuel Lewis of
the NSC staff sent a memorandum
to Rostow stating that “there is
substantial danger that a coup is in fact being contemplated.”
Lewis wrote that
there was “nothing more on this situation than contained in the
two messages [see footnotes 1 and 2
above]. I have talked to State and stressed the importance of
doing everything we can to avoid the demise of another
constitutional government on the heels of the Peru affair.
Oliver will get
guidance to Adair tonight. [less than 1 line
of source text not declassified] of what is in the
wind, in case he has not already sniffed it out.” (Ibid., (3 of
3), May–December 1968) The guidance telegrams have not been
found.Adair
449. Memorandum for RecordSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Panama, Vol. X (part 3 of 3), May–December 1968. Secret.Washington, October 12, 1968, 6:50
a.m.
SUBJECT
Coup in PanamaAt about 2200 EDT on 11 October, Guardia Nationale (GN) elements began taking over the
National Government in Panama City and the City Governments of Colon
and David. USCINCSO Duty
Officer confirmed the fact that the Tocumen Airport had been closed
to traffic by the GN. He also
reported that USSOUTHCOM forces were in Readiness Condition 2, that
Major General Dany was present in the Joint Operations Center and
that battle staffs were being Mann ed.Within several hours, the GN took
over the Presidential Palace and appeared to be in general control
of the provinces. Meanwhile, President Arias,
with several members of his cabinet, took refuge in the Canal Zone and requested to see
the US Ambassador or the Canal Zone Governor.In telegram CAP 82541, sent to President
Johnson at the LBJ Ranch at 12:12 a.m. EST and received at 1:15 a.m. CST, October 11,
Rostow informed the President: “A
military coup has taken place against President
Arias after 11 days in office. The
National Guard is evidently following orders from General
Vallarino who went
through the motion of resigning as Guard Chief earlier
yesterday, along with other disgruntled officers.” The telegram
continued, “troops control the Presidential Palace but
Arias had escaped to the Canal Zone and
has requested asylum.” The telegram concluded that while
Arias’ large popular following could be
expected to resist, the coup had some civilian support and was
“well organized and planned.” (Ibid.)The coup appears to be headed by Lt Col Omar Torrijos and
supported by Major Boris Martinez and Major Federico Boyd. Lt Col
Urrutia, the newly appointed commandant of the GN, is under arrest. Guardia Nationale
troops are arresting the political followers of President
Arias (Panamanistas) in both Panama City
and Colon.Former GN First Commandant
Vallarino, who reportedly
was fishing on an off-shore island, expressed surprise at the coup
and GN troops reportedly have been
ordered to prevent him from entering the Commandancia. The Tocumen
Airport was reopened early on the morning of 12 October and although
sporadic acts of violence have been reported, the GN continues to maintain public
order.Ambassador Adair and Canal
Zone Governor Major General Leber, who were in Washington, D.C. on
11 October, are returning by USAF aircraft to Panama, with an ETA of
0838 EDT 12 October.M. W. Kendall Brigadier General, USADeputy Director for Operations (NMCC)
450. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson in
TexasSource: Johnson
Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 99, October
10–15, 1968. Secret.Washington, October 12, 1968,
2103Z.
CAP 82561. Herewith the line Secretary Rusk is taking on Panama. State 254600 to Panama.
At present seems to us we have three immediate objectives: Prevent civil strife and bloodshed;Seek some solution to political crisis that will
preserve as much constitutionality as possible;
andAvoid to the extent we can having US be target enmity
of significant elements of Panamanian nation.
What happens in Panama on heels of Peru will also be relevant in
terms encouraging or discouraging similar acts other
countries.
We believe following is appropriate scenario for immediate future: We should not facilitate any attempts by
Arias overturn junta by violence.
All your reports thus far and intelligence assessment here
indicate he cannot now be successful and any effort would
only lead to bloodshed without satisfactory solution. It may
in fact be necessary at some future point to actively
discourage Arias from all political
activity, and we may have to return to our original posture
of asking him again to refrain from political activity while
in the zone.We believe that we should now approach junta and guardia
through appropriate informal channels and tell them
compromise with Arias coalition and
utilization some formula of constitutional government is
critical to nature of our future relationships, and that US
attitude toward new governments will be guided thereby. We
understand this may eventually mean giving up on
Arias, but critical now to see if
his government can be utilized to form new civilian or
part-civilian government. For example, we note CIA sitrep here indicates coup
leaders have asked First VP Arango to assume presidency but
he has thus far refused.
Per telcon,Not further
identified. approach to Aleman will be made
along following lines.
“You know that a complete break with constitutional
government is much more difficult for other countries to
deal with than is some variation on the original
constitutional arrangement. First preference would be to
see if something can’t be worked out for
Arias to return. If this proves
impossible, how about a government headed by Arango? The
worst situation would be for a military junta to set
itself up completely apart from the constitution.”
In addition you are now authorized have Seddon make
similar discreet and quiet approach to Guardia officers
making same points and pointing out in appropriate tone how
difficult it will be for us to continue be of assistance to
Guardia in long-run future.All such approaches are, of course, to be quiet,
unofficial and undertaken with utmost discretion.On October 12 the IRG Group discussed
appropriate U.S. action in response to the coup in
Panama. In reporting results of this meeting to
Adair,
Oliver noted:
“key question is as to manageable and desirable extent
to which U.S. should seek to influence formation of new
‘respectable’ government by Junta.” (Telegram 254640 to
Panama, October 13; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 PAN) A report on
these discussions is in the minutes to the IRG meeting, held
8:40–10:40 p.m. October 13. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/IG Files: Lot 70 D 122, 5451, IRG/ARA Minutes)Rusk
451. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. X (Part 3 of 3),
May–December 1968. Confidential. A separate copy of this memorandum
indicates that it was drafted by Samuel
W. Lewis. A note on the memorandum indicates the
President saw it.Washington, October 14, 1968, 5:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Panama Coup
I am attaching the latest situation report on Panama, drafted by Covey
Oliver’s inter-agency working
group. Its tenor is encouraging.Dated
October 14; attached but not printed.
Avoidance of major bloodshed or violence which could threaten the canal
has been the top priority governing US actions toward President
Arias. We have denied him access to radio
facilities in the Zone with which he might have fomented mob action
against the Junta, and have, of course, refused to help him militarily.
Time is now rapidly running out for him.
Although we have no formal relations with the Junta, key US moves in the
last 36 hours have included: —discreet efforts to persuade the Junta to take
Arias back peacefully, or to install
the Vice President in his place. (Unsuccessful.)—stressing the importance of a civilian character for the
government—and promptly calling new elections. (Junta
agrees.)—allowing Arias to remain in the Zone,
but insisting that he stop his political operations so long as
he stays there. (Political activity apparently reduced or
suspended since the warning was given last night.)—trying to engage the OAS with
some mediation role (Galo Plaza won’t call the OAS Council into action unless any
violence erupts; however, informal OAS consultation is now going on among eight key
country representatives).—avoiding making public statements on the bankruptcy of
Arias’s situation as long as possible
so as not to increase the possibility of his attempting to turn
his followers’ ire against the US. (Pressure from the US press
now is enormous, however—and distorted news stories are
appearing widely here. State will provide a full background
briefing tomorrow.)The press
background briefing has not been found.
Multilateral consultations about recognition of the Junta will begin
tomorrow—after it is obvious to all that Arias’s
bid for forceful return has failed, and that the Junta’s provisional
government is indisputably in control.
Walt
452. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. X (Part 3 of 3),
May–December 1968. Secret. A note on the memorandum indicates the
President saw it. Another copy of this memorandum records Lewis as the drafter. (Ibid., Memos
to the President, Walt W.
Rostow, Vol. 100, October 16–22, 1968)Washington, October 21, 1968.
SUBJECT
Panama
Two issues will very soon require your decision: What to do about President Arias, still a
refugee in the Canal Zone.Recognition of the new provisional government.
Arias’ Future
Ten days after taking refuge in the Zone, Arias
still refuses to leave the Zone voluntarily, either to seek asylum in
other countries (several have offered it) or in the US. The OAS refuses to become involved. Bob
Anderson is trying today to persuade him to come to the US. There is
some chance he may succeed.Rostow reported that evening that
Arias “will leave voluntarily for the U.S.
tonight by U.S. military aircraft.” He added: “Bob Anderson’s
telephone call apparently did the trick.” (Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, October 21, 8:10 p.m.;
ibid.)
We have progressively tightened control on his visitors and
communications. Yet despite his repeated assurances of “good behavior”
to Governor Leber, he continues political activity which threatens to
incite violence. Recent examples include: —telegrams to you, other American Presidents, the UN, and the OAS Council; (Tab A)Attached but not printed.—a press conference Saturday by his principal advisor;—supply of money and encouragement to supporters in
Panama;—calls via clandestine media for violent resistance to the
Guard.
Initially stunned and disorganized by the National Guard’s coup,
Arias’ supporters are regrouping. A general
strike today is eighty percent effective in Panama City; some skirmishes
with the Guard have occurred; tension is rising, and a spark could
ignite serious bloodshed. Arias now has no chance
to return to office except through violence. Should it erupt while he is
in the Zone, the National Guard will blame the US and might well stand
aside from protecting US installations.
According to Governor Leber, Ambassador Adair and General Porter at CINCSOUTH, Arias’
presence in the Zone can be tolerated only 2 or 3 more days at
most.In a meeting between U.S. military
authorities in the Canal Zone and General Torrijos on October 19, Torrijos pressed for “help of
U.S. military and other U.S. Government agencies” to “get
Arias out of Canal Zone promptly.”
Torrijos argued that
Arias’ presence in the Canal Zone was a
“threat to political stability in Panama,” a threat to regularizing
commerce and the Panamanian economy, a threat to U.S.-Panamanian
relations, and a threat to Junta plans for returning the government
to civilian constitutional control. ([text not
declassified]; Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of
Operations, [file name not
declassified]) If persuasion fails, forcible expulsion
would raise the spectre of a western hemisphere “Dubcek case.” Army and
State are working on “scenarios” in which we would expel him using
plausible legal procedures to minimize the “kidnapping” appearance.
Nonetheless, involuntary removal would undoubtedly be widely condemned,
no matter how justified.
Recognition
Several factors bear on the timing of diplomatic recognition: —no other governments have yet recognized and they are moving
slowly so long as Arias is in the Canal
Zone.In an October 19
memorandum to Rusk,
Oliver noted: “I
have managed fairly wide communication through the Latin
Americans of the dilemma, and I am now beginning to get some
promise of results as to resumption of relations by Latin
American countries. I should like to see Japan, the U.K.,
and the EEC countries act fairly soon.” (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
POL PAN–US)—rapid recognition by the US will imply to many Latins US
support for the military coup and probable connivance.—prompt recognition would reassure the new government that we
are not favoring Arias and would calm their
nerves (they are getting extremely nervous and
unpredictable).—early recognition might make expulsion of
Arias easier to justify, since he would
no longer be a President still technically in his own
country.
In light of the conflicting arguments, Secretary Rusk has not yet decided to recommend
early resumption of relations.At the
Tuesday luncheon meeting on October 22, Rusk reported: “Arias left the
Canal Zone. We can now hold up on recognition of the government.”
Later in the meeting, President Johnson responded: “Okay on that, holding off for a
while.” (Notes on President’s Tuesday Luncheon, October 22; Johnson
Library, Tom Johnson Meeting Notes)
Walt
453. Memorandum From Samuel W.
Lewis of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Panama, Vol. X (part 3 of 3), May–December 1968. Confidential;
Limdis.Panama City, October 29, 1968.
Walt—
Tom Mann talked with Bill Bowdler yesterday
aboutArias. At Arias’
request, Mann spent an hour with
him on Sunday morning. Mann’s
record of the meeting is attached.Attached
was an October 28 memorandum prepared by Mann of his meeting with Arias
on October 26.
Mann feels that we should do our
best to continue being nice to Arias, to the extent
possible, because he and his followers will continue to be important in
Panamanian politics. Mann thinks
we will have to retain Arias’ goodwill if we are
ever to get a canal treaty which can be ratified by Panama.
So far, no US officials except Bob Anderson have talked with
Arias, although Covey Oliver has been prepared to see him if he asked.
Mann is suggesting some kind
of “hand-holding” by State may be in order. I’ve discussed this with
Oliver’s Deputy, Pete Vaky,
in Oliver’s absence, and they are
thinking it over. There are obvious risks because of
Arias’ unpredictability and the way in which he
may distort any such contacts.
Incidentally, an FBI report suggests
Arias is attempting to arrange for air and sea
transportation back to Panama.
Sam
454. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Departments of State and Defense and the NSA participated in the preparation of the estimate,
which was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and
concurred in by all members of the United States Intelligence Board
except for the AEC and FBI
representatives who abstained because the subject was outside their
jurisdiction.SNIE 84–1–68Panama City, November 1, 1968.
THE SITUATION IN PANAMA
The Problem
To assess the character and the short-term prospects of the military
regime.
Conclusions
Military rule of Panama is likely to continue for some time,
perhaps a year. The provisional government, headed by two former
colonels, is mainly a front for the leaders of the coup, who are now
in command of the Guardia
Nacional.In a November 1 memorandum
to Rostow, Lewis reported that “CIA confirms that there is no communist influence
visible in the Panamanian Junta or Provisional Government.”
Concerns about Colonel Omar Torrijos, one of the principals in
the coup, were primarily about his brother, but “Torrijos himself, however,
has shown no sympathy for the Party in the past.” Lewis added: “All indications
are that the problem with the Panamanian Junta is that it may
succumb to the temptation to impose rightist authoritarian
solutions, not that it is under leftist influence.” (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. X
(part 1 of 3), May–December 1968) But the situation is
fluid, and relationships among the new leaders of the Guardia and
between the Guardia and the provisional government are subject to a
variety of strains.The Guardia staged the coup of 11 October in order to protect its
own position rather than to carry out any specific program for
Panama. The new regime has pledged a return to constitutional
government via elections, but has not specified any time-table and
the procedures it has outlined could cause a considerable
delay.It is unlikely that any effective opposition to the new regime
will develop over the short term from supporters of Arnulfo
Arias, extreme leftists, or the oligarchy.
We expect the regime and most of the oligarchs to adjust gradually
to each other.Although it is eager to secure recognition by the US, we doubt
that the regime would be very responsive to pressure from the US,
particularly with respect to a time-table for elections. A prolonged
delay in recognition would bruise the feelings of the leaders of the
new regime, but they would not be likely, in any case, to encourage
blatant anti-Americanism.We doubt that the military regime will act upon the draft Canal
treaties which were widely criticized in Panama. The regime,
however, might move to open discussions looking toward revised
agreements which would be signed and ratified only after
constitutional government had been restored.
[Omitted here is the 12-page Discussion section of the estimate.]
455. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. X (part 3 of 3),
May–December 1968. Secret.Washington, November 9, 1968.
SUBJECT
Panama
State is very anxious to obtain your approval to resume diplomatic
relations with Panama on Monday, November 11. (Tab A)Tab A, attached but not printed, is a November 1
memorandum from Rusk to the
President requesting authorization for resumption of diplomatic
relations with the new Government of Panama.
By delaying until now, we have obtained important concessions from the
Provisional Government.
—restoration of some of the constitutional guarantees which had
been suspended by the junta;—dismissal of two pro-Communist newspaper editors who had received
their jobs as a favor to the brother of a key member of the military
junta;—formal public commitment to hold new elections, restore all
constitutional guarantees, and return government to full civilian
control—within a reasonable period of time;—relaxation of press censorship, and reopening of opposition
newspapers.
Further delay, however, will probably be self-defeating.
We have FBI and CIA reports showing that Arias is planning to try to regain
power by violent means.Information from the
FBI report on Arias’ plans is in
a November 11 memorandum from Vaky to Rusk’s
Special Assistant, Harry Shlaudeman. (National Archives and Records
Administration, ARA Files: Lot 72 D
33, Entry 5396, Panama) Information from the CIA report is in an Agency memorandum of November 21
entitled “Activities of Arias Supporters in Costa Rica.” (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Panama, Vol. X (part
3 of 3), May–December 1968) He is trying to arrange to
reenter Panama clandestinely and is encouraging supporters in Costa Rica
to initiate guerrilla warfare from across the border. Failure by the
U.S. to recognize is encouraging these efforts.
Ambassador Adair believes that we
should resume relations on Monday, November 11, so that our announcement
will follow closely the action yesterday restoring some of the
constitutional guarantees. State’s proposed press release highlights our
concern for continued movement toward full restoration. (Tab B)Attached draft dated November 9; see footnote 5 below.
Eighteen countries have now recognized. The thirteen in Latin America
include all the major nations of the hemisphere except Canada and the
United States.
CIA has looked carefully at
Arias’ public charges that the military junta
is Communist-dominated. All available evidence shows that leftist
influence is slight—less than was present in Arias’ own government.
I recommend that you authorize resumption of diplomatic relations with
Panama on Monday, November 11.
Walt
Approve recognitionThis
option is checked and two handwritten notes on the memorandum,
both dated November 12, indicate the President’s approval and
Rostow’s notification
of Reed, Lewis and Bunker. The Department requested the Embassy in
Panama to inform the Panamanian Government of this decision in
telegram 270098 to Panama, November 12. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAN–US) On November 13 the
Embassy in Panama City advised the Panamanian Foreign Ministry
of the resumption of relations. The Department statement
released that day is in Department of State Bulletin, December 2, 1968, p. 573.
Disapprove
Call me
Approve press statement
Disapprove
Call me
456. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in PanamaSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15 PAN. Secret. Drafted and
approved by Oliver. Also sent
to San José and USUN for Anderson.Washington, December 6, 1968, 21:41
p.m.
283324. For Ambassador. Subject: Arias’ Plan for
Reestablishment of Democracy in Panama:
Arias–Oliver Conversation.
Arias and Oliver met alone, December 6, at Department.
Conversation was based on Arias’ Nov 19 letter
to President.Not printed. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Special Heads of State
Correspondence, Panama, Presidential Correspondence) In
informing the President of the Arias letter
on November 23, Lewis
indicated that Arias had said that “such a
meeting could head off unspecified dangerous problems in
Panama.” Lewis also reported that although the Department did
not recommend that the President meet with
Arias, Lewis thought that he should be seen by “a
responsible U.S. Government official” and suggested Covey Oliver. (Memorandum from
Lewis to
Johnson, November 23; ibid.)Arias agreed that conversation was to be held
under “strict rules of confidential state security”, as his letter
to President had suggested. Oliver said he was going to listen, as President
would have, pointing to a wall photo of President listening to
Oliver.Conversation was cordial. Oliver found Arias in good
control of himself and seemingly objective about his problems. At
four points in conversation, Oliver was able to warn and advise
against adventurism on Costa Rican-Panamanian frontier,In a December 3 memorandum to the President,
Rostow reported that, “ex-President
Arias’ followers have started some
guerrilla efforts along the Costa Rican frontier. Only one
encounter with the Panamanian National Guard has been confirmed,
but the prospect is for continuing skirmishes.” (Ibid., Country
File, Panama, Vol. X (part 1 of 3), May–December 1968)
thanks to way in which conversation was steered.
Arias agreed throughout that he did not
want bloodshed and that he sought ways of keeping groups on frontier
from engaging in use of force.In letter to President Johnson, Arias had
said he wished to present a “simple pragmatic plan” to restore
Constitutional Government. In conversation with Oliver, Arias
outlined plan as follows: USG to continue policy of
keeping all types of assistance relations with present Junta
at minimum and seek all opportunities to indicate moral
displeasure and concern at continuation military regime in
Panama.Arias to continue and intensify his
efforts to work out a united front of civilian politicians.
Front would include all elements of Panamanian traditional
politics that could be brought together, including Samudio and practically
everybody else, except Eletas, who are only civilians
playing ball with Junta. (Arias
insisted that Junta had shown disrespect and distaste for
all civilian politicians except Eletas and a few of their
hangers-on.) Arias intimated that he
might be willing to deal with other civilian politicians on
question of who would lead in first reinstallation civilian
government.Build up of pressures under lines of action (a) and (b)
should be directed toward displacement top command of
present Junta and its replacement by wiser and more moderate
National Guard leaders. After this transitional change in
Junta had been made, in due course Panama could go back to some form of
civilian government, either on basis of past election, de
facto shift from military to civilian Junta, or some new
electoral basis. Arias insisted present
Junta leaders would not permit this evolution to take place;
hence they have to be displaced;To make (a) effective, according to
Arias, Seddon and Angueiras should
be replaced on U.S. MilMission by new men, loyal to prospect
of shift back to civilian rule. These men must be very able
and astute. Arias explained that
regardless of their personal attitudes and viewpoints,
Seddon and Angueiras are popularly thought to be in cahoots
with present Junta leaders. Their replacement now would be
signal to people that USG
not in fact overly friendly to Junta.Probably best man to replace top of present Junta under
(c) would be Col. Abel Quintero, presently on duty at
Inter-American Defense Board here. Arias seemed to dismiss
Vallarino and
Urrutia.In conversation Arias complained mildly at
outset about attitude U.S. Embassy in San Jose as being opposed to
needs of Panamanian refugees in Costa Rica. This led to first of
several Oliver tacks on dangers of border adventurism. In synthesis
Arias came to these positions: He is opposed to violence and does not want to see
operations from Costa Rica;He recognizes that violence may bring other leaders to
top, using his name, and that present Junta might be
strengthened by a frontier challenge;He cannot be sure he can control the frontier groups
unless he has something to give them in the way of hope,
such as by evolution of proposal in para 3. (At this point
Oliver made it
clear that he did not think Arias ought
to try to “bargain” his dissuasion of frontier elements
against USG “acceptance” of
Arias Plan. Arias then recast his
position, saying that main thing was to see what could be
done to take care of refugees who could not safely return to
Panama. Arias insisted there were far more unarmed and
homeless refugees than potential guerrilla fighters along
Costa Rican border and expressed belief that proper refugee
care would reduce danger armed conflict.)Arias tried throughout to establish environment
for further discussions on basis “Arias Plan”.
Oliver made no such
commitments but said he would transmit Arias’
views.Department will now begin study of situation and shortly will
instruct as to further passing of this information and as to
possible lines of action. Meanwhile Amb’s comments on basis this
report are invited.During a December 10
meeting Anderson
“strongly advised Arias to withdraw from
public view, stay out of Panamanian affairs, go where he can be
comfortable and unnoticed, and sit and wait.”
Arias “expressed warm appreciation for
this advice and assured Anderson that he will follow it.”
(Telegram 285234 to Panama City, December 11; National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15 PAN)Rusk
457. Memorandum for the FileSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Panama, Vol. X (part 1 of 3), May–December 1968. Secret. Prepared by
Lewis of the NSC staff.Washington, December 9, 1968.
SUBJECT
Panama
Walt Rostow told me today that
the President does not want to “provide any military assistance” to the
Panamanian junta during the remainder of his Administration, unless it
were a case involving vital US national security.
Rostow agreed that such a situation does not
currently exist.On December 3
Rostow informed the President that the
National Guard Commander had asked to purchase from U.S. Army
stocks, $20,000 worth of field equipment and combat rations for
counter-insurgency operations. Adair recommended approving the sale, which did not
include weapons or ammunition. The Department authorized Defense to
make the sale, but Rostow noted that
Arias and his followers would create
adverse publicity if they learned of the transaction. The President
wrote on the memorandum: “I question this, call me. L.” (Ibid.) On
December 5 a representative of the Junta approached U.S. officials
requesting military assistance, particularly two helicopters, “for
use by the National Guard to contain insurgency in Panama.” (Undated
CIA report under cover of a
memorandum from William V.
Broe to Assistant Secretary of Defense Lang, December 9; National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files: Lot 72 D 33, Entry 5396, Panama)
Rostow authorized me to talk discreetly with
Covey Oliver, without putting
anything on paper, to see that all decisions on MAP or public safety assistance are stalled through January
20. Rostow indicated the President’s concern
covered even innocuous MAP assistance
items such as spare parts, tools, field canteens, etc. on a straight
sales basis. If State insists
on the necessity for some sort of military aid, whether it involves
hardware or training, the issue should be presented to the President by
Secretary Rusk for decision.
I discussed this matter orally with Ben Read (S/S), Art Hartman
(U), and Pete Vaky (ARA) in Covey
Oliver’s absence, making the President’s wishes clear to each
of them. They all affirmed that no affirmative
decisions would be made on any MAP or
Public Safety items without prior consideration by the President.
Samuel W. Lewis
458. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Panama, Filed by LBJ Library. Secret. A handwritten note
on the memorandum reads: “Jones told
Walt.”Washington, December 30, 1968, 18:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Military Assistance for the Panamanian National Guard
Since the Panamanian coup in October all U.S. assistance to Panama’s
National Guard has been suspended. Secretaries Rusk and Clifford have now concluded we should resume assistance
on a very limited scale in order to safeguard our working relationship
with the Guard necessary for security of the Canal Zone. Rusk states: —We have turned down Guard requests for training, repair and
maintenance services, and routine “soft goods” items. Guard
officers are already showing some resentment against the
U.S.—We may have to ask for the Guard’s help during January,
should anti-U.S. agitation occur as in past years on the
anniversary of the 1964 student invasion of the Zone.—The Panamanian Government has been taking steps toward the
restoration of constitutional government; new elections are
publicly planned for early 1970; Panama also is seeking our
advice on badly needed reforms in public administration and
education.—We cannot indefinitely suspend assistance to the Guard and
continue to count on Guard assistance in protecting the
Zone.
Rusk believes that some renewed
training plus about $15,000 worth of spare parts, shop and maintenance
equipment, and automobile tools—all previously programmed—will safeguard
our relationship with the Guard for the time being. Deliveries of arms,
tear gas, ammunition, or heavy equipment would remain suspended—along
with training for combat operations. Adverse publicity should be
minimal.
The Canal Zone Governor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary
Clifford all concur in Rusk’s
recommendation.
Former President Arias’ efforts to stir up guerilla
operations against Panama show no real results to date.
I believe you should approve resumption of very limited military
assistance to Panama, as detailed in Rusk’s memorandum.
Attached is the memorandum from Secretary Rusk.Dated December 26;
attached but not printed.
Walt
ApproveThis option is
checked.
Disapprove
Call me
Paraguay and Uruguay
459. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in UruguaySource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 UR. Confidential. Drafted and
approved by Mann. Mann briefed President
Johnson on the situation in Uruguay, June
11; see Document 16.Washington, June 12, 1964, 12:47
p.m.
480. From Mann. We note that
Embtel 829In telegram 829 from Montevideo, June 11, the
Embassy provided details of an “alleged golpe.” (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 UR) reports your belief
that if a golpe was in fact seriously contemplated it has been
frustrated or effectively deferred and we approve of your decision to
have Embassy officers quietly pass word around that United States is
opposed to the violent overthrow of constitutional government. Hoyt will
carry message from me to Yriart to same effect.
It seems to us here the real course of rumors about golpes stems from
basic dissatisfaction on the part of the Uruguayan people with inept way
in which Uruguayan government has managed its affairs. Even before we
received your telegram we had commenced study of suggestions United
States might make to Uruguay re their unsatisfactory economic situation,
but we wonder whether political reform is not also an essential
ingredient of political stability.
Do you agree that there is need for single executive and if so what are
Colorado and Blanco groups prepared to do so that country can move in an
orderly fashion in this direction? What other political reforms should
be taken by the Uruguayans while there is perhaps still time?
I recall that in case of Cuba posture of U.S. Government was one of
unqualified opposition to dictatorship even to the point of denying
Batista arms. Cuba enjoyed a privileged position in trade. Communist
takeover nevertheless followed due, in my opinion, partly to
disenchantment of Cuban people with a series of inefficient, ineffective
and corrupt governments which had failed to fairly distribute wealth and
were oblivious to needs of poor.
Maybe the best service we can make towards preservation of democracy in
Uruguay is to make it work. How can we do this?
Rusk
460. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs (Mann) to the
Ambassador to Uruguay (Coerr)Source:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/APU/U Files: Lot 67 D 468,
Letters (Official–Informal) from and to Embassy Montevideo. Secret;
Official–Informal. Drafted by Mann.Washington, June 23, 1964.
Dear Wym:
As you will have gathered from our telegram 480 of June 12,Document 459. I am concerned by the
present lack of leadership and drift in Uruguay. All of the danger flags
seem to me to be flying high and I wonder whether there is anything that
we can do to help the Uruguayans get things back on the track before we
are faced with the prospect of a coup. I take it we still have some
time.
Specifically, I have been wondering whether it would be productive or
counter-productive for you, quietly and on a personal rather than an
official basis, to plant the idea with your close personal friends that
maybe the democratic elements in Uruguay might like, on their own
initiative, to begin thinking in terms of amending the constitution so
as to do away with the plural executive and restore the single
executive. I understand from Hank [Hoyt] that one
way to do this would be to obtain a two-thirds majority in both houses
of congress, followed by a majority plebiscite vote in favor, as was
done in 1951.
This is, of course, all very delicate and your judgment will be better
than mine. It depends to a large extent on your judgment as to whether
we would stir up any hornets nests by making such a suggestion, that is
to say, whether any great body of opinion in Uruguay is still wedded to
the side of a plural executive and whether out of such discussions this
could emerge as a Uruguayan rather than U.S. idea. All of this is, of
course, none of our business, but it does seem to me that it is
difficult to think in terms of meaningful reforms and dynamic leadership
which will be needed to get things going again in Uruguay unless it is
constitutionally possible to have leadership. This would be only a first
step to be sure, but it might be an indispensable step to make democracy
work in Uruguay.
This was really the question behind my telegram 480. I don’t know whether
the idea is any good at all but would appreciate having your views on
this or any other thing we can do to help. If you think it would be
wise, given the propensity for all Embassy messages to leak through the
Foreign Office in Montevideo, for me to talk with
Juan Yriart, I could undertake to
do so. Another problem is that I don’t know whether Yriart has any
political influence in Uruguay.
Hank reminds me that we have four congressional leaders who are coming up
to look at our electoral processes in the fall. I don’t know whether it
would be wise for me to ask questions, for example, of a group of this
kind who are relative strangers. In any case, I would not wish to do
anything without your concurrence.
Meanwhile, we are going to do everything we can to keep the dike of
democracy up in Uruguay. But if the general situation continues to
deteriorate, I suspect we will find ourselves in the same position as
the little Dutch boy who was looking at more holes than he had
fingers.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Thomas C. MannPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
461. Telegram From the Embassy in Uruguay
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 UR. Confidential.Montevideo, July 8, 1964, 18 p.m.
21. For Mann. Deptel 480.Document 459. I heartily agree that
last month’s golpe scare stemmed chiefly from dissatisfaction with
GOU’s inability act constructively
on increasingly obvious economic problems, and that we must continue our
intense and difficult efforts to help Uruguayan democracy to work in
order our basic objective of maintaining Uruguayan independence. I also
agree that Uruguay’s greatest weakness is political. We therefore tend
naturally to think of political reform and specifically of the possible
advantages, from viewpoint of USG
objectives, of having Uruguayan reform their constitution to replace
present collegiate executive with single executive. Our analysis must
consider (1) constitutional basis of reform, (2) its political chances,
(3) its theoretical comparative advantages, (4) its practical
comparative advantages, (5) conclusion, (6) recommended U.S. action.
Uruguayan constitution, section XIX chapter III, provides for
amendment on initiative (a) of 10 percent of citizens inscribed in
National Civic Register, (b) by proposal approved by two-fifths full
membership General Assembly; either (a) or (b) then requiring
approval by “absolute majority of citizens participating next
national elections” and “this majority must represent at least 35
percent of all persons inscribed in National Civic Register”, (c)
approval of proposed amendment by absolute majority general
assembly, subsequent approval by national constituent constitution
called for purpose, and approved by electoral majority as above in
special election.
(A) Given comparative strength of Blanco and Colorado parties in
relation to each other, and their internal fractionalization, it
is very unlikely that either party could put through
constitutional amendment against opposition of the other.
(B) Substantial elements of Blancos and Colorado would have to
combine to achieve constitutional amendment, but this unlikely.
At present Blancos expect to lose and Colorados to win 1966
elections. Blancos would expect to have greater power in
collegiate than single executive system and in past have favored
collegiate executive when they expected to lose. Although many
Blancos now favor single executive in principle it appears at
present they would refuse cooperation in seeking constitutional
reform. Colorados traditionally have favored collegiate system
and at present appear reluctant move toward single executive
because they fear such move would increase their internal
divisions. Probable Blanco opposition and Colorado reluctance
gives reform little political chance.
(A) Theoretical comparative advantages of collegiate versus
single executive from U.S. viewpoint difficult to estimate.
Weakness of collegiate system in which majority party is now
fractionalized and lacks leadership are obvious. Question is
whether single executive under conditions we assume will prevail
after next general elections would be more advantageous to U.S.
First and basic of these conditions would be continuation of law
of “lemas.” This system permits many different factions within
each of two major parties participate in national elections and
gives these elections character of simultaneous primaries and
general elections. Within each party this system has effect of
institutionalizing political cohabitation without agreement and
gains electoral cooperation without promoting subsequent unity.
(See A–356, December 14, 1963.)In
airgram A–356 from Montevideo, the Embassy analyzed the
“Political Structure of Uruguay’s Traditional Parties.”
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL
12 UR) Post-election fractionalization in both
parties is reflected not only in NCG but parliament.
(B) Law of “lemas” is Uruguayan device (a) to preserve two major
parties against otherwise probable danger they would split
formally into multiplicity of minor parties as in other
parliamentary systems, and (b) to avert civil strife between two
major parties. It has served at least these two purposes with
moderate success for many years. However, presumably it will
also continue to facilitate fractionalization within parties
regardless of whether executive is collegiate or single.
Theoretically, single executive might be able to supply more
leadership than collegiate, but on other hand it could also
stimulate more opposition. Collegiate system worked with
comparative efficiency when majority united under party boss in
1954–1958. (This boss was Luis Batlle whose policies left much
to be desired from U.S. viewpoint.) Theoretical advantages and
disadvantages about even or possibly shaded on side of single
executive.
So our immediate practical question must be to estimate nature of
likely winner should there be single executive in 1966. Blancos
at present appear unlikely to win. Among Colorados, most likely
candidates would be:
Oscar Gestido (age 62),
present member NCG and
acknowledged leader list 14; Zelmar Michelini (age 40) leader
list 99. Among these three, Batlle and Gestido almost hopeless
beyond repair as economic thinkers. Michelini intellectually
able to think in economic terms, and politically promising, but
reliability from U.S. point of view untried, and his competence
as political boss dubious. Doubtful that present selection of
candidates would produce single executive through whom we could
pursue U.S. objectives as effectively as through collegiate
system. Comparative practical advantage lies with collegiate
system.
Since theoretical comparative advantage of single executive at
present appears slight and unsure, and immediate practical
comparative advantage lies with continuative collegiate system, we
do not recommend USG attempt work in
favor of constitutional reform.
(A) One set of conditions could change above estimate and
recommendation. Although highly improbable, it is conceivable
that the growing economic and political pressures may lead major
factions within both Colorados and Blancos to agree on
constitutional reform in 1966 elections. Should we see this
process developing well among both parties we might discreetly
attempt to help it along. However, for us to speak in favor of
constitutional reform before such development would probably
incur the heavy liabilities of U.S. involvement in a prime
domestic political dispute and would be counterproductive in
that it would enable the opponents of constitutional reform to
attack it as U.S.-inspired.
(B) Under these conditions our basic courses of action must be to
continue attempt identify and strengthen economically and
politically
constructive elements in Uruguay along lines LAPC. We are submitting specific
course of action with revised LAPC, airpouching 10th.The Embassy forwarded its proposed revisions to the LAPC paper in airgram A–14
from Montevideo, July 12. (Ibid., POL 1 UR–US)
Coerr
462. Memorandum From Robert M.
Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Paraguay, Vol. I, 1/64–8/68.
Confidential.Washington, August 7, 1964.
The LAPC discussed Paraguay on August
6.The minutes of the meeting have not
been found.
Ambassador Snow reported a
noticeable political liberalization in Paraguay. Public criticism of the
regime is permitted in the press and otherwise, but it is cautious and
not extensive. The general public is reasonably content with the
political situation, and there is no serious agitation against Stroessner. Ambassador Snow said he had devoted considerable
effort to determining the number of political prisoners, and found them
highly exaggerated. He has concluded that there are no more than a
dozen, give or take a few. He considers figures alleging that there are
thousands of political exiles as fiction. He would put the figure at
600–700 at most, and of these he has been told by the Paraguayan Foreign
Minister,Raúl Sapena Pastor.
that all but about 25 would be permitted to return to Paraguay
unmolested. He reports police brutality as minimal, probably no more
than in Mexico, or other Latin American countries in which he has
served. He is concentrating his efforts on emphasizing respect for human
rights, etc. None of this changes the fact that Stroessner is a dictator of the Odria
or Somoza type. He is definitely
not of the Trujillo, or Duvalier stripe, however.
There was general agreement on the line that we should treat the
Paraguayan Government and its officials with respect, but that we should
carefully avoid becoming identified with Stroessner, or lay ourselves open to the assertion that we “support” the
Stroessner Government. Our
line should be to the Government, and to opposition leaders, that our
interests is in working with the Paraguayan people, and helping to
improve their well-being.
On the economic side, Paraguay is doing reasonably well, and the economic
situation is improving. We have a modest technical assistance program.
We have made one small loan. The discussion was about expanding it.
There was general agreement that we had an obligation to improve the
Asuncion airport. An American firm did the engineering, the Eximbank
loaned the money to build it, and an American firm did the construction.
The airport is breaking up because of poor drainage. There was also
general agreement that we might consider one or two other projects.
As a side light, Mr. Mann reported
on his conversations with Senators Morse and Gruening
on Haiti. He said he had laid out the possibility to them of being
pushed out of Haiti by Duvalier unless we were a little more
forthcoming. He inquired as to their attitude on approval of investment
guarantees. Senator Morse thought
we should go further and approve project loans. Senator Gruening agreed on investment
guarantees, but asked that we keep it quiet. In sum, up against the hard
realities, they come out about where we do.
As a result of the LAPC discussion,
Ambassador Snow will submit a new
paper on Paraguay, which as he put it, would “open the throttle a
little” on AID assistance.Not further identified.
RMS
463. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 UR.
Secret. Drafted by Hoyt on
November 30. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Rusk saw it.Washington, December 1, 1964.
SUBJECT
Uruguayan Situation Report
Last June we called Ambassador Coerr on consultation because we were becoming
increasingly concerned as to what might be done to make the Uruguayan
economy and Uruguayan democracy work. Since then we have become even
more concerned because the situation has deteriorated further and there
have been for the first time in many years rumors of serious unrest in
the Uruguayan military and the possible threat of a military coup. We
hear that both Argentina and Brazil are also concerned over the
situation in Uruguay and in fact that certain of the Brazilian military
might be in favor of a coup should Uruguay fail to restrict the
activities of Brazilian exiles (including former President Goulart and his brother-in-law,
ex-Governor Brizola) now in Uruguay.
Factors leading to this serious situation are: the growth rate in recent
years has been almost zero; the inflation rate has reached between 40
and 50% and the budget deficit is large and growing; Uruguay’s foreign
exchange position is becoming precarious and wool exporters are pricing
themselves out of the market. At the same time the nine-man collegium
Executive is having great difficulty in reaching decisions and
implementing them and the parties which elected them to power are
fragmented and virtually leaderless after the death or absence from the
scene of four of the leading politicians. Although the Uruguayan
Development Council has come up with an excellent diagnosis of the
country’s problems and what should be done about them, the government
has not as yet taken the corrective action. Both our Ambassador and the
Uruguayan Ambassador here believe that the measures necessary to improve
the situation can only be taken by the Uruguayans themselves.
As a result of our concern, we telegraphed to Ambassador Coerr on November 25Telegram 278 to Uruguay. (Ibid.) and his
reply is contained in Tab A.Telegram 519
from Uruguay, November 29; attached but not printed. In
effect he confirms the deteriorating situation and points out that there
seemed to be two alternatives:
(1) either a change by a coup or (2) a constitutional change on a basis
which would provide an opportunity for the two traditional political
parties to work more closely together on the country’s problems.
We agree with the Ambassador that a constitutional solution is the one
which we should hope for and support. The military who have been
mentioned as possible leaders of a coup are not qualified and probably
would not have any significant civilian support. They would be opposed
strongly by the well-organized Communists and a takeover by incompetent
military could degenerate into further chaos and advantages for the
Communists. On the other hand, constitutional reform will be slow and
the situation may become so bad that those favoring constitutional
reforms will not have time to bring them about. The Embassy points out,
however, that the increasing political and economic pressures on the
government and the increased rumors of a coup are bringing the
politicians closer together on the need for constitutional reform, and
that a solution along these lines is now more probable than
heretofore.
The Embassy estimates that a coup is not imminent despite rumors and
increased military preoccupation with the country’s problems. The
military apparently have decided to meet with the nine-man Executive to
impress on that body the need of getting on with the business of
government. But, apparently most military do not favor a coup.
Unfortunately, we have not seen much to indicate that the government is
prepared to take the necessary action and an IMF representative who visited Uruguay last week states
that there seems to be no competence nor understanding of economic
problems within the upper echelons of government.
A series of strikes, inflation, and the worsening economic situation are
increasing disillusionment within all sectors of Uruguay. Despite
Uruguay’s reputation as a model democracy, and the general antipathy to
a coup within the country, a spark from any of these incidents might
touch off a wave of more popular support for a coup.
Our Ambassador has recommended that we start to give more attention to
the movements for constitutional reform and judiciously support such
movements without identifying ourselves with any particular plan. He
also has recommended that he take this line with the new Brazilian
Ambassador, and we concur, believing this might be the best channel to
get word of our views back to the Brazilian Government and help
forestall any move which the Brazilian military might be inclined to
make towards supporting a Uruguayan military coup.
I wish you to be informed of this situation because while it might drag
on for a long while (and the Uruguayans do have remarkable recuperative
power), it also might degenerate fast and we might find a coup taking place. A coup in
“model” Uruguay would have many repercussions throughout the hemisphere.
Our main problem is that we can do little to help the Uruguayans. They
are failing to make democracy work and the remedies lie almost
exclusively in their own hands.
I attach as Tab B my reply to Embassy Montevideo’s telegram no. 519.Telegram 284 to Uruguay, November 30;
attached but not printed.
464. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the National
Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The United
States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on June
17.SNIE 98–65Washington, June 17, 1965.
THE SITUATION IN URUGUAY
The Problem
To assess the economic and political situation in Uruguay, the
potentialities for extremist subversion, and the involvement of Brazil
and Argentina, over the next year or so.
Conclusions
There is growing dissatisfaction with Uruguay’s present
governmental system, particularly with its nine-man executive, the
National Council of Government (NCG). This device, designed to prevent one-man or one-party
rule, has also prevented effective governmental action to halt a
steady economic deterioration marked by growing budgetary deficits,
an accelerating inflation, a decline in real wages, and a banking
crisis. (Paras. 3–9)Within the period of this estimate, the NCG may be reformed by constitutional amendment, or
there may be a credible prospect of the adoption of such an
amendment in the general election to be held in November 1966.
However, the political and legal obstacles to such a reform are great. Moreover, reform
of the NCG would not, in itself, end
the factionalism which characterizes Uruguayan politics or ensure
effective action to cope with the economic situation. (Paras.
17–18)In Uruguay there is already some apprehension of a military coup
to alter the political system. We consider it almost certain that no
such move is now imminent. If, however, the situation continues to
deteriorate without effective remedial action by the NCG or a credible prospect of
constitutional amendment, the odds in favor of a coup attempt will
mount. If there should be a coup, it would almost certainly be
initiated by non-Communists. If initiated by a President who had
full military support, the actual takeover would almost certainly be
quick and effective. Any other coup attempt would almost certainly
encounter both military and popular resistance and might result in
prolonged and widespread violence and disorder. (Paras.
19–21)The Communists have no illusion that they could seize power in
Uruguay in present circumstances. They are apprehensive of a
rightist coup, however, and are preparing to stimulate popular
resistance to one. In a confused and disorderly situation, their
labor leadership and paramilitary capabilities could be an important
factor. It is unlikely that they could gain a dominant influence,
but, if they were to make a substantial contribution to the defeat
of a coup attempt or to a democratic counter-coup, they would gain
respectability and further political opportunities. (Paras. 10–14,
22)Brazil is seriously concerned about the subversive threat which
would result if Communists or extreme leftists were to gain power or
important influence in Montevideo. Brazil would be reluctant to
intervene militarily in Uruguay without US and Argentine concurrence
and OAS approval, but would almost
certainly do so if convinced that the situation there required it.
(Paras. 22–25)If Brazil were to intervene in Uruguay, the Argentine military
would wish to intervene also. An incidental consequence might be the
overthrow of the constitutional government in Argentina, if it did
not sanction Argentine military intervention. If Argentina did
intervene, it would almost certainly be in collaboration (rather
than conflict) with Brazil. (Paras. 26–28)
[Omitted here is the 10-page Discussion section of the estimate.]
465. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAR–US. Secret. Drafted by
Snow and approved in
S on December 16. Rusk stopped in Paraguay after
attending the Second Special Inter-American Conference in Rio de
Janeiro November 16–24.Sec/MC/12Asunción, November 24, 1965, 10:25
a.m.
SUBJECT
U.S.-Paraguayan Relations and Hemisphere Problems
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.The SecretaryAmbassador SnowParaguayPresident StroessnerForeign Minister Sapena
PastorActing Foreign Minister Gonzalez Torres
During the Secretary’s visit to Paraguay he was received by President
Stroessner at the National
Palace. At the beginning there were photographers and reporters in the
President’s office as well as certain members of his staff, but as soon
as the initial amenities had been exchanged, all present departed except
the President, Secretary Rusk, the
Foreign Minister (Raúl Sapena
Pastor), the Acting Foreign Minister (Dionisio Gonzalez
Torres) and Ambassador Snow.
Recalling his daughter Graciela’s visit to Washington in President
Kennedy’s time, the President
observed that she had told him of meeting the Secretary and of finding
him to be a warm, gracious and unpretentious person. The Secretary was
most welcome here, the President’s only regret being that the visit was
of such short duration.
Secretary Rusk said that President
Johnson would undoubtedly wish him first of all
to convey to President Stroessner
his appreciation for the sending of Paraguayan troops to the Dominican
Republic. President Stroessner
said that the Paraguayan people were true friends of the United States.
Paraguay’s foreign policy, which had been consistent and unequivocal,
was based on the same broad objectives as that of the United States.
President Stroessner had from the
outset favored the entry of U.S. troops into the Dominican Republic and
his intention throughout had been to cooperate with the United States.
Referring to Cuba as an example, he said that the Paraguayans realized
the need of timely intervention on the part of other free countries
against communist takeovers in the hemisphere.
Secretary Rusk said that at times
we found it necessary, as in the Dominican case, to act without being
able publicly to explain in full the reasons for our action. This was
because of the sensitivity of intelligence information. The communists, in their insistent
campaign to dominate the world, were constantly engaged in subversive
plotting. In the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and the Congo they had had
concrete plans of that nature.
President Stroessner, with further
reference to the troops in the Dominican Republic, reported having
received a special message from General Palmer, the American commander, to the effect that the
Paraguayan troops were superb and that the President and the Paraguayan
nation had every reason to be proud of them. The President said he
understood and applauded the U.S. action in Vietnam, which was worthy of
a great people like the Americans. Secretary Rusk informed him that since 1945 the U.S. had sustained
160,000 casualties worldwide in the cause of peace and freedom. As for
Vietnam, we were faced with two essential alternatives: either we could
withdraw and in so doing leave all of Southeast Asia open to conquest by
the Red Chinese, or we could stand firm. The President could rest
assured that we would stand firm.
The Secretary then commented on the encouraging degree of economic and
social developments he understood had occurred in Paraguay and asked the
President if he wished to comment on the subject. The President instead
spoke for several minutes on political issues including certain leaders
in the hemisphere whom he distrusted. The Brazilian general commanding
the OAS forces in the DR had sent him word that the situation
there was chaotic, that the provisional President was a communist and
that the Minister of Justice was likewise. As for Juan Bosch, the
President continued, he was a thoroughly contradictory man. Instead of
thanking the U.S. and other OAS
countries for having sent troops to preserve his country from communism,
Bosch was actually advocating
the seeking of an indemnity from the United States, Brazil and Paraguay.
The President also believed it was a mistake to have caused the removal
of General Wessin y Wessin from his command and political position in
the DR. Wessin was a staunch
anticommunist. It was likewise erroneous, the President continued, to
assert as some did that Fidel
Castro had “betrayed” the Cuban revolution. Castro had always been a communist and
the Cuban revolution was strictly a communist affair from the start.
People like Betancourt, who had
given much aid and comfort to Castro in the early days, were the kind who now
supported Bosch and misrepresented
the Cuban revolution. The President also criticized “Pepe” Figueres on
similar grounds, suggesting that he and these other Caribbean political
figures were and had been unduly influential in Washington, and that in
consequence the U.S. was being misled with regard to the Dominican
Republic. Secretary Rusk doubted
that the Figueres–Betancourt–Muñoz Marín group were
currently asserting unusual influence. When they had offered their services earlier this year to
the OAS as a sort of interim commission
to administer the DR, the offer had not
been accepted.The final version of the
memorandum eliminated the following sentence at this point:
“Moreover, a Texas President in the White House was not likely to
sit idly by while the communists took over the DR.”
The President returned to the subject of the Paraguayan people. He
described them as a homogeneous race, instinctively and thoroughly
anti-communist. A while ago a delegation of Uruguayan leftists had come
to Asunción to petition for the release of several communist prisoners
being held by the Paraguayan Government. A group of Paraguayan citizens
spontaneously staged an anti-communist
demonstration in front of the hotel where the delegation was staying.
Demonstrations in other Latin American countries were almost invariably
pro-communist and anti-U.S., he reminded those present. According to
FAO statistics, the people of
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay were among the best fed in the world.
Considering all children of primary school age, Paraguay had the highest
percentage attending school of any country in Latin America. A hundred
years ago, according to the Almanach de Gotha, Paraguay was the most
developed country in South America. It was a great country then, a great
country now and he felt deeply honored to be a Paraguayan. When the time
came for dispatching troops to the DR,
the only problem was of restricting the number because the troops all
wanted to participate. One amusing incident had resulted in his allowing
a young soldier to go with the contingent extra-complement.
The President next took up the question of the sugar quota, setting forth
the Paraguayan position, pointing out that Bolivia for some reason had
not only received a quota but had been given the prospect of an increase
in the initial figure, whereas Paraguay had been entirely deprived of
its previous quota. The Secretary frankly explained that the sugar
quotas were worked out by the legislative branch of the U.S.
GovernmentThe final version of the
memorandum eliminated the following clause at this point: “—in what
could be described as a confused atmosphere and—.” in a
complicated manner. By the time State Department officials and others
had learned of what was happening to the Paraguayan quota, it was too
late to influence the result because Congress was at that moment
hastening to adjourn. President Stroessner requested that the U.S.
examine the possibility of restoring a quota to Paraguay a year from
now, the Secretary assured him that his request would receive careful
attention.
The President’s next topic was the need for more agricultural credit.
This was not a rich country, he said, but it could be if its
agricultural and human
resources were developed properly. Such could only be done with an
adequate volume of foreign credit. More money was needed now for the
small Paraguayan farmer. By contrast, a rich country like Venezuela
shouldn’t need outside help, although it appeared to be getting it. The
Paraguayans did much with little; there was no misery here, even if
there were many with very few material possessions. One should contrast
conditions here with the slums in Caracas and elsewhere.
The Secretary stated that he had discussed the level of aid with Foreign
Minister Sapena and Ambassador
Snow. The U.S. would always
be interested in knowing the President’s view of priorities in aid
matters. President Johnson also was convinced, he
said, that rural development was indeed of the utmost importance. If the
combined efforts of all in this regard should prove inadequate, the
world might possibly be facing a food crisis one of these days. The
tendency in the developing countries had been to neglect the rural
people in favor of industrial development.
Stressing the theme that inadequate attention had hitherto been paid to
his views and his requests for U.S. aid, both military and economic, the
President informed the Secretary that he had spoken many times about
these matters to Ambassador Snow,
but he was not certain that whatever the Ambassador had reported was
reaching the top of the U.S. Government. He believed we were far more
attentive to the pleas of such countries as Chile and Bolivia for
example, both of which countries possessed very unstable political
structures. The late President Kennedy, however, had seen fit to state publicly that
the Government of Paz Estenssoro
was a “model for the hemisphere”. He (President Stroessner) had been told by Paz Estenssoro himself that Paraguay
had the model government. President De Gaulle, President Castello Branco, General Ongania, an ex-Foreign Minister of
Uruguay and others had assured him that he was a great president
presiding over an exemplary government.
The Secretary assured the President that the U.S. Government intended
always to give thoughtful attention to its relations with Paraguay.
The President took up the topic of arms assistance. “We Paraguayans,” he
said, “do not play our anti-communism for U.S. dollars. We will be
anti-communist with the United States, anticommunist without the United
States, or even anti-communist against the United States, if that ever
should be necessary.” The President then gave details regarding U.S.
arms he had heard were being supplied to Uruguay and Bolivia, two
countries which were receiving considerable military aid, whereas
Paraguay was receiving very little indeed. All of the American military
officers of the Southern Command in the Canal Zone assured him that the
one and only obstacle was the State Department. The military officers referred to were
in favor of much more generous treatment for Paraguay, but it was always
the State Department which blocked their way. He could not understand
this because Paraguay was just about the only country in the hemisphere
which had remained consistently in support of U.S. policies, had not
wavered from its anti-communist stand, had maintained a period of
internal peace and growing prosperity for eleven years, had held its
currency stable and had aroused the admiration of various other
countries. In view of how things really were in Paraguay and of such
testimony as he had previously quoted, he was curious to know just how
the mind of the State Department really worked. He realized that people
like President Johnson and Secretary Rusk were extremely busy people, but he
thought that Paraguay should receive more attention at the top and more
favorable treatment in general.
The Secretary said that if President Johnson were
sitting where he was in President Stroessner’s office, the latter would quickly discover
that President Johnson knew a good deal about
Paraguay and the two chiefs of state would be talking like neighboring
ranchers within a few minutes.
Before departing, the Secretary took occasion to express to the President
his admiration for Foreign Minister Sapena
Pastor as a highly competent colleague with whom it had
always been a pleasure to work.The final
version of the memorandum eliminated the following sentence at this
point: “The interview lasted approximately an hour and five
minutes.”
W.P.S.
466. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Uruguay, Vol. I, 1/64–12/68.
Confidential.Washington, June 28, 1967.
Mr. President:
In the attached memorandaAttached but not
printed are memoranda to the President from Schultze, June 24, and Gaud, June 15.
Our ability to negotiate such a loan now comes at a critically important
time: —President Gestido under
the new constitutional system has the authority and purpose to
resolve Uruguay’s serious economic problems.On November 27, 1966, the Uruguayan
electorate voted to replace the National Council of
Government with a one-man presidential system. President
Gestido assumed
office on March 1, 1967.—These problems were brought on by a decade of drift and
unwise policies by weak collegiate governments which built up
the income of the urban sector at the expense of the rural
sector.—Uruguay’s productive capacity is in agriculture and the
solution to the problems must begin with modernization of
policies and practices in this sector.
The conditions accompanying the loan require specific actions by the
Uruguayan Government to remove the major disincentives to investment and
production in agriculture. President Gestido has indicated willingness to take hard self-help
measures. We have every reason to think that our conditions will be
acceptable to his economic team and to him. In addition to the
conditions, our negotiating position calls for release of loan funds in
four tranches, each based on a prior review of performance.
Covey Oliver, Joe
Fowler and Charlie Schultze have
reviewed the loan package and recommend approval. I concur.
Walt
ApproveThe President
checked this option.
Disapprove
See me
467. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files, 1967–1969: Lot 72 D 33,
Uruguay. Confidential. Drafted by Sayre and Sanders. A notation
on the memorandum indicates Rusk saw it.Washington, August 18, 1967.
SUBJECT
Uruguayan Situation Report
The economic-political crisis in Uruguay is deepening. The situation
might be described as a “crisis of confidence” which has affected
members of the government, the two main political parties and the
people. The crisis arises principally from the inability of the
government to grapple effectively with the serious economic-financial
situation confronting the country; spiraling inflation, budget
imbalance, balance of payments problems, and the added burden of
repairing the serious damage to the economy caused by inclement weather
of the last six months. These problems in turn have given rise to social
problems; i.e., strikes, work slowdowns, and communist agitation.
The ineffectiveness of the government is due to the indecisive nature of
President Gestido’s leadership.
Despite the hopes of Uruguayans and the USG, Gestido has been
unable to rise above “politics as usual”, and not being very clever
politically, he has managed to alienate the largest part of his own
Colorado Party. The political crisis of June 1967 illustrates this
situation: Gestido’s reaction to
an attack on his managing of the economic situation by the leader of the
largest faction of the Colorado Party was to exclude that faction from
his government, form a new government representing only a minority
(one-third) of the Party and completely reverse his administration’s
economic policy from one seeking an IMF-type solution to one of rigid controls.
We, however, share the Country Team’s doubts that a coup will be
attempted in the short term. Gestido still has several options open to him both on
political and economic fronts. Politically, he could broaden the base of
his administration by coming to agreement with the leaders of other
factions of the Colorado Party or alternatively he could form a
coalition government with selected factions of the opposition Blanco
Party. The Embassy continues to urge the administration to adopt a sound
stabilization and economic growth as a basis for US and IMF support. If Gestido could bring himself to heed this advice, which
he receives not only from us but from the majority of the members of his own political party, he
could perhaps restore confidence in himself and his government.
Foreign Minister Luisi, Ambassador Yriart, other high Uruguayan
officials, and we expected the present crisis when Gestido decided against a sound economic
program and opted for controls and other economic measures that have
previously been so ineffective. At the moment we see no other course
open to us but to await sound Uruguayan policies which we can support.
We have rejected the alternative of supplying US dollars to support an
unrealistic exchange rate and inadequate economic policies.
468. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Uruguay, Vol. I, 1/64–12/68.
No classification marking.Washington, December 12, 1967.
SUBJECT
PL 480 Agreement with Uruguay
Herewith a unanimous recommendation that you authorize negotiating a
$19.3 million PL 480 agreement with
Uruguay.Attached but not printed are
memoranda to the President from Schultze, December 7, and Gaud and Acting Secretary of
Agriculture Schnittker, December 1.
Uruguay needs this assistance. The loan has been carefully coordinated
with the Agricultural Sector Loan you authorized last June. The new
Uruguayan PresidentPresident Gestido died on December 6; he was
succeeded by Vice President Jorge
Pacheco Areco. has pledged to support the
economic recovery program launched by President Gestido which the PL 480 and Sector loans are designed to support.
I recommend approval.
Walt
ApproveThe President
checked this option.
Disaprove
See me
469. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Paraguay, Visit of President
Stroessner, 3/20–21,
1968. Confidential.Washington, March 19, 1968.
SUBJECT
Visit of Paraguayan President Stroessner
Tomorrow President Stroessner
comes to Washington for a two-day official visit. Your participation is
limited to: 11:30 a.m.—Welcoming Ceremony at the South Lawn.12:00 noon—Office meeting with President Stroessner.8:00 p.m.—State dinner.
A reception is being offered by the Paraguayan Ambassador at the Pan
American Union on Thursday evening, but I advise against your
attending.
President Stroessner is coming
armed with a “shopping list” as he did at Punta del Este. Nick
Katzenbach’s briefing memorandum (Tab A)Tab
A was a March 18 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President; attached but not
printed. President Johnson
met Stroessner at Punta del
Este on April 13. In addition to presenting his “shopping list,”
Stroessner received an
invitation to visit Washington after complaining that he was
“developing a complex about it.” Memoranda of conversation are in
the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference
Files, 1966–1972: Lot 67 D 586, CF 151. A CIA assessment on “Stroessner’s Paraguay,” March 1, is in the Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Paraguay, Vol. I,
1/64–8/68. describes what the items are. Most of them are for
economic assistance, but there also may be a request for artillery. He
may support the requests by possibly offering a Paraguayan army unit for
Vietnam.
Nick counsels that you be non-committal on the offer of troops and handle
the request for aid and military equipment by saying your advisers will
study the requests and be in touch with him later. This is how his Punta
del Este shopping list was handled—with good results.
The principal problem with this visit is President Stroessner’s image in certain circles
as an old-style Latin American dictator and criticism of you for
inviting him.In a memorandum to Rostow, March 18, Harry C. McPherson, Jr., Special
Counsel to the President, anticipated the criticism: “I wish we
weren’t entertaining Stroessner so soon after Bobby’s announcement.
For better or worse, he has the militarist-oligarchist image that
liberal Democrats have complained about for years; I imagine Bobby
will attack his presence here as symbolic of what’s wrong with the
Alianza, etc. ‘If Jack were in office, the
White House would be entertaining Eduardo Frei.’” (Ibid., Visit of President Stroessner, 3/20–21, 1968) On March
16 Senator Robert F. Kennedy
announced his candidacy for President of the United States.
So far, we have had only one newspaper article striking this theme—in the Washington Post. The characterization is unfair
to him and your purpose in having him up here.
Stroessner has granted
considerable political liberalization in recent years and is making
steady headway with economic and social reform and development. The
charts at Tab B illustrate this.Attached
but not printed. We want to encourage this trend. The
suggested welcoming statement and toast (Tab C) are designed to put the
visit in this context.Attached but not
printed. For Johnson’s
welcoming remarks and toast to Stroessner, see Public Papers of
the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968–69, Book I, pp.
419–424. The press back-grounder will do likewise.
The points we would have you stress in your talks with the Paraguayan
President are: that he continue political liberalization so that the
principal opposition can function freely;that he press forward with reform of budget and tax structures
which CIAP has recommended as
being of primary importance;that we appreciate Paraguay’s help in the OAS and UN, where Paraguay is now a member of the Security
Council.According to the
President’s Daily Diary Johnson met Stroessner in the Cabinet Room on March 20,
12:14–12:50 p.m. (Johnson Library) When Stroessner mentioned
several requests for economic assistance,
Johnson “expressed sympathetic
interest and suggested that these be taken up with Secretary
Rusk.” (Memorandum
of conversation, March 20; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 PAR) Memoranda of his
conversation with Rusk, March 21, are ibid.
W. W. RostowPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
Peru
470. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PET 6 PERU.
Confidential; Limit Distribution.Lima, January 15, 1964, 13
p.m.
829. For: Mann. IPC Case. Embtel 822.In telegram 822
from Lima, January 14, the Embassy advocated a flexible “policy of
restraint,” i.e., linking the level of economic assistance to
progress in the negotiations for an IPC settlement. (Ibid.) In approving the Embassy’s
recommendations, the Department also provided the following
guidance: “Peruvians can make own deductions to this effect, but
link must not be obvious and must be denied if they ask. You will
simply have to give bland explanation of further delays (i.e. on
projects still frozen) by stating programs ‘being processed’ and
that this taking longer than originally expected; part of blame
could be placed on reorganization here.” (Telegram 549 to Lima,
January 22; ibid.)
Reference contains our recommendations for action immediate future
subject case and related effect aid program. As you doubtless informed,
since GOP broke off negotiations with
IPC on October 28 and submitted an
unsatisfactory draft bill to Congress we have been dragging our feet on
implementing aid program and endeavoring by this means to influence
GOP toward more sound and sober
attitude this case.
Peculiarity situation is that in effect we have been applying Hickenlooper amendmentAmendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
initially approved in August 1962 and subsequently revised in
December 1963. Sponsored by Senators Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R–Iowa) and E. Ross Adair
(R–Indiana), the amendment stipulated that the President suspend
assistance to any country that expropriated the property of U.S.
citizens or corporations without proper compensation. (76 Stat.
260) without Peru as yet having taken specific acts which
would legally warrant such course. This in part came about, ironically,
through President Belaunde’s
asking Moscoso last September if USG
through AID might not facilitate
solution with IPC.Moscoso raised the issue with Belaúnde on August 28, 1963. For
background information on the IPC
case, see Document 478, and Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol XII,
Document 432. What he actually had in mind was
USG help for IPC to pay $50 million bonus GOP sought. While we of course could not do this, we were
on the point of announcing a rather large AID package totaling some $64 million and I was instructed
on the last critical weekend of October 28 to inform Belaunde that this
amount was ready for announcement. The idea was that such an
announcement might help to deflect any Peruvian public or congressional
criticism from Belaunde administration-proposed settlement with the
IPC.
Since GOP took course it did
notwithstanding this gesture, and there ensued press campaign here,
principally through El Comercio, to demonstrate
that Peru could do what it wanted with IPC without penalty, we took decision to hold back on these
new programs in hopes of using this asset to influence a better course.
In my opinion this was proper thing to do. It has had effect of sobering
GOP attitude and, I hope, of
increasing chances for satisfactory solution. Nevertheless, to use
AID program at such a stage to
influence the outcome of a particular problem is of course to tread on
dangerous ground for obvious reasons. I earnestly hope, therefore, that
we can resume a normal pace of operations at earliest possible moment
consistent US interests. I believe this moment will have arrived when
and if the executive branch is once again in negotiating contact with
the IPC.
Once this has happened, we will have gone full circle and nothing
concrete will have been changed with single exception of GOP’s laws nullifying arbitration awards
which formed tax base for IPC
operations. As to these acts, however, we have officially stated our
reservations; IPC has declared its view
that awards remain in full force and effect; and UK has now formally protested and, for its part, declared
awards still to be valid.
As you are doubtless aware, this case, plus that of Peru telephone
company which now seems to have a more hopeful aspect,The Peruvian Telephone Company, a subsidiary of the
International Telegraph and Telephone Company, was engaged in
negotiations to maintain its position in Peru. Documentation on
these negotiations is in the National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, TEL PERU; ibid.,
ARA/EP/P Files, 1955–1964: Lot
67 D 566, Perutelco—TEL 11; ibid., ARA/EP/P Files, 1963–1967: Lot 70 D 139,
Telecommunications, IT & T Working File. constitute the
only dark clouds on a rather encouraging situation here. A respectable,
democratic and progressive regime is in office and it gives every
evidence of a desire for close collaboration and warm friendship with
US. The economy is sound, growing and diversified. While Peru has severe
problems, it also has many elements of strength which should make it
possible to achieve real progress here under Alliance for Progress. I
hope you will agree with us as to the tactics to follow at this stage,
and that you will be able promptly to impress on Peru’s new Ambassador,
Celso Pastor,Mann met Ambassador
Pastor and Peruvian Vice President Seone on
January 30. (Telegram 575 to Lima, January 31; ibid., Central Files
1964–66, POL PERU–US) as we
have tried to do, the importance of renewing actual negotiations as soon
as possible and, eventually, of achieving bilateral solution of this
problem.President
Johnson asked Mann about Peru on February 12. Mann replied: “I don’t think Peru
is my main concern at the moment. I have a report that President
Belaunde has a plan of a
takeover [of IPC] in 30 years. There
is a claim for back taxes of $50 million. I’m going to have to warn
about expropriation and the Hickenlooper Amendment applies to this.” (Memorandum
of telephone conversation; Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, Jan. 14,
1964–April 30, 1965)
Jones
471. Editorial Note
In a June 27, 1964, letter to Ambassador Jones, the
Peruvian Minister of Government and Police requested U.S. assistance to
equip and maintain a Special Police Emergency Unit (SPEU). (Airgram A–020 from Lima, July 8;
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, DEF 19 US–PERU) After considerable debate in Washington, the
U.S. Government informed the Peruvian Government of its tentative
support, citing the prospective role of the SPEU in dealing “with a variety of threats including riots,
subversion, terrorism, demonstrations, land invasions, civil
disobedience, and uprisings up to and including small-scale guerrilla
activities.” (Airgram A–294 from Lima, October 29; ibid., POL 23 PERU) The formal negotiations to
establish the SPEU were conducted
primarily through the Agency for International Development and
complicated by competing interests of the Department of Defense and the
Central Intelligence Agency. In a December 10 letter to Jones, Nicholas
McCausland, the officer-in-charge of Peruvian affairs, reported that the
JCS feared the SPEU was “a pilot project by which CIA plans to get its oar into operational
activities in Latin America.” (Ibid., Lima Embassy Files, Classified
Personal Papers of Ambassador J. Wesley
Jones: Lot 73 F 100, McCausland, Nicholas V.)
On April 8, 1965, the Special Group (CI)
met to consider the counter-insurgency situation in Latin America,
particularly in view of the SPEU
proposal. According to the minutes of the meeting (Document 28), the participants “endorsed the CIA/AID
proposal for a special airborne police unit to be tried on an
experimental basis in Peru.” The provisional agreement stipulating U.S.
assistance for the SPEU was signed in
Lima on June 26. In a memorandum to Secretary Rusk, August 18, Assistant Secretary Vaughn reiterated the importance of
supporting the program: “the insurgency situation in Peru has shaken the
Peruvian Government and we are now hearing reports of a possible
military coup if President Belaunde does not deal with it effectively.” “We believe
that the correct way to deal with insurgency is first with civilian
police forces [i.e. the SPEU]. When it
escalates to the point where civilian police forces can no longer handle
it, then it becomes a problem for the army.” (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, ARA
Files, 1967–1969: Lot 72 D 33, Special Group CI (1964–1966))
472. Letter From the Deputy Director of the Office of
Ecuadorean-Peruvian Affairs (Barnebey)
to the Ambassador to Peru (Jones)Source:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/EP/P Files, 1959–1968: Lot 72 D
101, PET 6 (IPC) 1965.
Confidential.Washington, September 30, 1965.
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
I want to report to you on the results of a meeting Jack Vaughn had last FridaySeptember 24. with Tom Mann, with Rostow, Sayre, Johnston, and myself in
attendance. The meeting covered Jack’s approach to
date and proposed increased flexibility in our policy on the IPC negotiations.
Let me stress at the outset that this is merely an advance notification
of how Jack is thinking of
handling the problem, and is subject to modification depending on the
outcome of certain key conversations he will hold in coming days.
Jack reviewed for Mann the results of his conversations
with President Belaunde,Vaughn visited Lima in
early-September as part of a 2-week trip to Latin America. An
account of his meeting with Belaúnde is in telegram 347 from Lima, September 2.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, ORG 7 vaughn)
concluding by saying that there seems to be little prospect for solution
of the IPC case in the next year or so.
Moreover, Jack is inclined toward the view that
Belaunde may prefer to keep
the IPC case around for resort to
possible expropriation as and when the political going gets particularly
rough.
Based upon Jack’s report, he and Mann discussed what would be the next
appropriate step. Their conclusions were essentially as follows: An assurance would be sought from Belaunde that he would not expropriate IPC during the remainder of his
presidential term.Subject to getting this assurance from Belaunde and further
conversations as Jack
deems necessary with Congressional leaders (notably Senator
Hickenlooper) and the
company, IDB soft loans to Peru
would be resumed. The first such loan would be the $18 million
Comunidades Indígenas loan to be approved in the course of the
next few weeks. (Activity under this loan, to be administered by
several ministries and Cooperación Popular, would be directed
toward strengthening the legally recognized indigenous communities of the highlands;
proceeds of the loan would be re-lent to the communities for
agricultural improvement and community development
projects.)Until a satisfactory solution is achieved in the GOP–IPC negotiations, we would continue the policy of
denying AID loans to Peru.
Belaunde would be
told that we recognize his political difficulties in settling
the IPC case, but he would have
to come to recognize U.S. domestic political considerations as a
limitation on AID lending
decisions.
During the conversation a great deal was said about Belaunde’s apparent weakness as a
President and as a politician, as illustrated by his lack of
determination to settle the IPC case.
Mann called attention to the
country’s economic problems, such as a potential inflationary spiral,
the Government’s failure to put its fiscal house in order, and its
failure to adopt progressive taxation which would work toward
eliminating some of the greatest disparities in Peru’s income
distribution. Mention was made, too, of the counter-insurgency campaign,
with Ambassador Pastor having told Jack how
seriously he views the problem and the new Foreign Minister apparently
having told Reuters that communism is no problem in Peru. Dr. Rostow reiterated his view that we
should approve specific development loans as a counter-insurgency move
(a position not regarded as persuasive, particularly as to combatting
insurgency on a short-term basis). On the other hand, Dr. Rostow’s statement in support of
Belaunde’s efforts toward
rural modernization and national integration was received rather
better.
There was general agreement as to the disenchantment Mann, Vaughn and others have come to have regarding Ambassador
Pastor’s contribution toward improving
U.S.-Peruvian relations. The consensus seemed to be that
Pastor has not been able to look beyond Peru’s
boundaries during his service as Ambassador here, and apparently cannot
see, let alone convey to his Government, a larger view of U.S. or free
world interest in many of the issues confronting his and our
Government.
In this regard Jack called attention to Ambassador
Pastor’s latest offer to take a leading role in
the IPC negotiations. During the
September 22 conversation, Pastor mentioned seeking
“plenipotentiary powers” from Belaunde to negotiate this dispute.
Pastor also said he might ask that two or three
Peruvian experts concerned with these negotiations come to Washington to
join him in working out this matter. During the conversation
Jack did not comment upon this possibility, but
I would be interested in your views as to whether such a course of
action would be useful.
I will keep you informed as to the progress of the impending policy
change.In a December 23 letter to
Jones, Barnebey reported that Vaughn was seriously considering whether to modify
the soft loan freeze policy, possibly as early as the end of January
1966. In reference to the possibility that APRA might obstruct a settlement in the IPC case, Barnebey also offered the following suggestion: “It
occurs to me that given the excellent relations that another agency
has with Aprista leaders in Lima, you might want to explore how some
of these contacts can be used effectively in the event that an overt
approach to Aprista leaders does not yield beneficial results.”
(Johnson Library, Papers of John Wesley Jones, Classified
[Correspondence])
Sincerely,
M. R. BarnebeyPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
473. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PET 6 PERU.
Confidential. Drafted by Neil A.
Seidenman in LS and H. W. Baker, labor attaché at the
Embassy in Brazil, on November 19 and approved in S on January 20, 1966. The meeting was
held at the Hotel Gloria. The memorandum is part III of III. A draft
memorandum of the entire conversation is ibid., ARA/EP/P Files, 1967: Lot 70 D 139,
POL 3 OAS—General. Rusk
was in Rio de Janeiro November 16–24 for the Second Special
Inter-American Conference.Sec/MC/21Rio de Janeiro, November 17, 1965, 15
p.m.
SUBJECT
Relationship of International Petroleum Company and U.S. Loan
Policy
PARTICIPANTS
U.S.The SecretaryWalt W. Rostow,
Counselor, Dept. of State, and Chairman Policy Planning
CouncilJack Hood Vaughn
(Coordinator), Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American AffairsNeil A. Seidenman,
OPR/LS, Reporting
OfficerH. W. Baker, American Embassy Rio de JaneiroPeruJorge Vasquez Salas, Foreign Minister of Peru
The Secretary said that this was a problem that was making our lives very
complex, and Presidents Kennedy
and Johnson had made special efforts to move resources into Latin
America and specifically into Peru in support of the Belaunde Government. However,
legislation on foreign investments has been passed by the United States
Congress.The phrase, “which is the
source of [the] problem,” concluded the sentence in the draft
memorandum, but was subsequently removed in S. Specifically,
foreign assistance legislation has provisions limiting appropriation of
funds for countries whose governments confiscate investments or property
of American enterprises.The final version
of the memorandum also eliminated the following sentence at this
point: “The Secretary said he had testified against this legislation
but it was passed, and we have it.” The Secretary said he was
not here to negotiate on the IPC problem
and reiterated our commitment to support the prosperity and independence
of Peru.
The Foreign Minister expressed his appreciation for the Secretary’s
concern over this problem. “My government,” he said, “shares this
concern.” This was a matter that has been the subject of serious,
earnest, concentrated study by the Peruvian Government. He said the
Peruvian Government has never expected and does not expect or intend to
confiscate or seize any property or infringe on the rights of any
individual or company within the territorial bounds of its country. Peru
simply desires to be in a position where it can control and manage the
natural wealth of the country. In the process of implementing the laws
and regulations applicable to this area in Peru, he said, Peruvian
authorities have no intention of subjecting any party to discrimination
but rather adhere to the principle that non-national interests certainly
should not be allowed to enjoy greater benefits than Peruvian nationals;
that all should have equal status under the laws of the country. To
proceed otherwise would be tantamount to going back to the practices of
extraterritoriality. The Foreign Minister said he hoped the United
States would realize a country must be in a position to dispose of its
own wealth and resources, not with a view to punishing any one, but in a
way that parties concerned will be justly compensated. Peru has
undertaken a program of land distribution. To carry out this reform it
is necessary to expropriate to progress toward an equitable
redistribution of the national landed estate. However, Peru lacks
adequate financial resources to pay for all of this property and must
compensate former owners with long-term bonds which the GOP intends to make fully redeemable within
the prescribed period. If it is legal to make compensation for
expropriated property in the form of bonds, certainly this should be
acceptable to foreign property owners as well. This is not a plan for
confiscating property.
The Secretary said that he would like to have some time to review the
Minister’s remarks and talk again while they are still here together.
The Secretary said that perhaps it would be desirable to have further
discussions between the
governments, since previously there had only been contacts of the
company involved with the Peruvian Government.
The Foreign Minister said he believed the problem was a matter of
national jurisdiction, not subject to handling on a
government-to-government basis. In the view of the GOP it would be a great mistake to transfer
this problem to the realm of diplomacy which would simply mean repeating
an historic error committed by Peru at a time when it allowed important
property within its territory to remain under the ownership of British
interests.
The Secretary stated that this was a decision to be made by the Peruvian
Government; the Peruvian Government makes its decisions and the American
Government makes its decisions, so these decisions should be balanced.
The Secretary said we are only asking that due consideration be given to
the factors involved in the hope that both parties can adjust their
respective interests. On our side, the Secretary said, it is a matter of
our being able to tell the American taxpayers what we are doing with
their tax money and that it is worthwhile.
474. Editorial Note
In early January 1966 Ambassador Jones suggested a
plan for “political action” to resolve the status of the International
Petroleum Company (IPC) in Peru. In a
January 4 message, Jones explained that President
Belaúnde could not submit an
IPC settlement to Congress without
the tacit support of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA). There was, however, a problem: “A
decision of such importance to APRA can
only be made by party leader [Victor] Haya De La Torre who is at present
in Europe.” Jones, therefore, recommended that a
U.S. official approach Haya in Europe in an attempt “to persuade him to
send assurances to President Belaunde that the Apristas will make no trouble over the
issue and urge him [Belaunde] to
act now.” (Memorandum from Broe
to Vaughn, January 4; Department
of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Latin
America Country File, Peru, 1961–1964)
[text not declassified]
At a meeting with a U.S. official in Hamburg, January 16, Haya agreed to
support a fair settlement of the IPC
case and acknowledged that Belaúnde’s latest proposal, as outlined by the officer,
was, in fact, reasonable. According to a subsequent report: “No
financial or other commitments were made, nor were any requested by
Haya.” (Memorandum to the 303 Committee, January 17; ibid., 303
Committee Special Files, January–June 1966)
475. Memorandum From the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Peru—Belaunde Correspondence.
Confidential. Another copy indicates that Bowdler drafted the memorandum.
(Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. 19) Gordon was in Washington for his Senate confirmation
as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; he did
not formally assume his new responsibilities until March 9. In a
memorandum to the President, January 27, Bundy explained that Gordon “will bring cool good sense” to the IPC case—a case on which, he admitted,
“we have been a shade rigid.” (Ibid.)Washington, January 29, 1966.
SUBJECT
Letter to Peruvian President Belaunde
In a recent conversation with Ambassador Jones,
President Belaunde expressed deep
frustration over Peru’s failure to obtain major concessional assistance
from the U.S. which he attributes to the fact that he has not yet
reached an agreement with the ESSO-owned International Petroleum Company (IPC) on the basis for its continued
operations.Belaúnde summoned
Jones on January 20, declaring that “he
would never sign an agreement [with IPC] under pressure, that US aid policy must first
return to normal before he could conclude an agreement.” In
reporting the conversation, Jones suggested
that “a promise of additional aid now might be an important element
in support of those other factors which the Department is aware now
working toward a settlement.” (Telegram 1036 from Lima, January 21;
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, PET 6 PERU)Belaunde is under strong
political pressure to expropriate the IPC holdings, which he does not want to do. On the other
hand, he has not been able to accept a satisfactory settlement with the
Company because he assesses the political risks to himself and his party
as too high. The Company has made several reasonable proposals during
the past two years. A fuller description of the issues involved in the
IPC case is at Tab C.Dated January 29; attached but not printed.
Walt Rostow, Tom Mann and I have been reexamining our position on the
IPC case in the light of the
Belaunde–Jones conversation. We
have reached the conclusion that the conversation opens the door for a
new effort to work out a basis for more effective cooperation with
Peru’s development plans and a simultaneous understanding on the IPC case. We have decided that Walt Rostow, under the cover of a
CIAP mission to discuss
multinational projects for opening the South American heartland, should
go to Lima next week to discuss with Belaunde: Peru’s economic, financial and reform performance and
prospects, including their relation to possible increased USG and multilateral assistance to
Peru.His willingness and ability either to reach a mutually
satisfactory settlement with the Company or, at least, to give
assurances that the status of IPC will not be changed for the duration of his
term (3 years) except as mutually agreed by Peru and the
Company. The present operating conditions are not unsatisfactory
to the Company.
Tentative guidelines for Rostow’s talks with
Belaunde are at Tab B.Dated January 28; attached but not
printed.
Walt Rostow’s hand would be
greatly strengthened if he were to carry a personal letter from you to
Belaunde. Based on previous
conversations with Belaunde, we
believe that having the letter may well spell the difference between
success and failure of his mission. The thrust of the letter would be
your interest in seeing Belaunde
carry forward his economic and social development plans on the basis of
a strong self-help program backed by well-organized and sustained
external support and in clearing the path of misunderstandings and
obstacles which impede full cooperation between our two governments. The
obstacles refer not only to the IPC
case, but also to Belaunde’s
public criticism of the Alliance and the need for better management of
the Peruvian economy and greater effort in basic reforms. The text of a
suggested letter is at Tab A.Dated January
29; attached but not printed. The final version of the letter is in
the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Peru,
Vol. II, 1/66–10/67.
The way this letter is phrased and the CIAP cover which Rostow would use in
making the trip (one of many he has made to Peru in recent years)
reduces the risk of disclosure of the purpose of the visit and places us
in a good position publicly to refute charges, should they be made, that
the Rostow visit is a pressure move on the IPC case.
I think we should take advantage of this opportunity to seek a solution
to this knotty problem which, if left unsettled, poses a serious threat
to US–Peruvian relations and to our Alliance image. Another
consideration is that aspects of the Belaunde program are designed to bring the long
neglected Indian population into the mainstream of national life,
thereby countering communist efforts to use Indian discontent to launch
a guerrilla movement. Much stands to be gained by the
Rostow trip, and the risks are minimal.
I recommend that you send the suggested letter.Bundy forwarded the proposal
under the cover of a memorandum to the President, January 29, on
which he wrote the following parenthetical comment: “a good bargain
with Belaunde will help us on
all fronts & Walt is a good bargainer.”
Johnson indicated that he would “prefer not
to send the letter,” but “let’s discuss [the issue] further.”
(Ibid., Special Head of State Correspondence, Peru—Belaunde Correspondence) The
President discussed the letter, as well as the “overt and covert
purposes” of Rostow’s trip to Peru, at a
February 3 meeting in the Oval Office. (Johnson Library, President’s
Daily Diary) After minor revisions, Johnson
signed the letter and directed Rostow to
deliver it to Belaúnde. (Note
from Marie Fehmer to Juanita Roberts, February 3; ibid.)
Lincoln Gordon
476. Memorandum From the Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning
Council (Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. II, 1/66–10/67.
Secret; Eyes Only. The President also received an advance report on
the Rostow mission from Bromley Smith on February 9.
(Ibid., Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. 20)Washington, February 10, 1966.
You have the cabled reports of my mission to Peru plus the Washington
instructions I followed.Rostow’s instructions were attached as Tab B to
Document 475. Bowdler forwarded the “cabled
reports” to the President under the cover of a February 10
memorandum. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Peru, Vol. II, 1/66–10/67) These were telegrams 1107 and 1114 from
Lima, both February 5. (Also in National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PET 6 PERU and POL 29 PERU, respectively)
Rostow delivered the letter in a meeting
with Belaúnde on February 4.
A detailed account of the meeting is in airgram A–450 from Lima,
February 9. (Ibid., POL
PERU–US)
The facts are: Belaunde fully met the
condition we laid down; namely, that he give to you personally
his assurance that the status of IPC would not be impaired in the lifetime of his
administration.He subsequently confirmed his verbal message to me in a
conversation with Ambassador Jones. He
knows I reported in writing; he knows you have that report; and
he has confirmed its accuracy.In
telegram 1124 from Lima, February 8. (Ibid., POL PERU–US)What he permitted me to communicate to you, he has often said
to some of our officials. But this time he knew he was making a
most solemn and personal political deal. It could be explosive
for him if it is known. He has put his political life in your
hands. That is why I asked my cables to be handled with such
special care.Before I left, Linc
Gordon cleared the deal with Senator Hickenlooper. As you know, I
was recruited for this job by all three of my Latino pals: Tom
Mann, Jack Vaughn, and
Gordon.As the attached cableTelegram
1138 from Lima, February 10; attached but not
printed. indicates, there is some irony in all this:
Belaunde is the most
pro-U.S. business President in Latin America. IPC is simply an inherited
political problem peculiarly difficult for his rickety
coalition. His campaign speeches and subsequent dilatory tactics
have not helped. But basically he wants a settlement if he can
swing it: he doesn’t want to nationalize: if he breaks his word
to you, the Hickenlooper
Amendment is there, and he knows it.I recommend that we proceed promptly with the $15–20 million
A.I.D. package as promised.Sometime at your leisure and convenience, I’d like to tell you
what the east slopes of the Andes look like. The last real
frontier. Real nice place to bring up kids.
Walt
477. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Komer) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Peru, Vol. II, 1/66–10/67. Confidential.Washington, February 15, 1966, 17:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Peruvian President’s Reply to Your Letter
I received the Peruvian Ambassador this afternoon who wanted to deliver
President Belaunde’s reply to the
letter which you sent to him via Walt
Rostow.The letter from
Belaúnde to
Johnson, dated February 10, included an
English translation. (Ibid., Special Head of State Correspondence,
Peru—Belaunde
Correspondence)
The reply is in Spanish and I have sent it to State for translation. The
principal points are: He is profoundly grateful for your letter.The conversations with Walt
Rostow permitted a fruitful exchange of
constructive ideas. Before replying to you, he wanted to talk
first with Ambassador Jones.The opening of the eastern slopes of the Andes offers a new
frontier for colonization which will help win the battle over
hunger and poverty. U.S. help in the initial phase of
feasibility studies, as well as the new phase of actual work,
will be of inestimable importance.The cordial relations between our two countries is reflected
in the growing participation of U.S. private capital in Peru.
The contribution of these companies is much appreciated.The only point that causes “certain preoccupation” is the
“notorious difference” between the loan assistance given by
“Official Institutions” to Peru in comparison to other
countries. From his conversations with
Rostow he gathers that there is the
intention to “balance the flow of assistance” under the
Alliance.There is no reason for concern over the activities of U.S.
businesses in Peru, which throughout the history of the country
have never been the
victims of arbitrariness or unjust treatment. Where problems
have arisen, they have been discussed with a high sense of
responsibility and without precipitous action. He is confident
that the few cases pending solution will be resolved by
harmonious agreement.He greatly appreciates your personal support for his
“Cooperacion Popular” program designed to bring the Indian
communities into the mainstream of Peruvian life.He has sent through Ambassador Jones his
pledge of support for the Pope’s peace efforts in
Vietnam.
The letter in tone and content is friendly and forthcoming. Point 2 is
his way of referring to his understanding with Walt Rostow on the IPC case (Tab A). His reference to wanting
to talk to Ambassador Jones before replying to you
refers to his desire to review the memorandum of understanding which
Walt prepared. Points 4, 6 and 7 are designed to provide additional
reassurance.The President wrote the
following instruction at the end of the memorandum: “Bob see me.”
For an explanation of what Johnson may have had on his mind, see footnotes 2 and 3, Document 479.
RWK
Tab A
Memorandum of Understanding Prepared by Walt Rostow and Shown to
President Belaunde by
Ambassador Jones
The following memorandum will be the basis of my report to President
Johnson: President Belaunde
wishes President Johnson to understand
that he will try to settle within the next year the IPC case.Under no circumstances does President Belaunde intend to
confiscate IPC. (Ambassador
Jones will say that he presumes
that this is in response to the formula which we reiterated
three times yesterday that the status of IPC “would in no way be further
impaired.”)It is President Belaunde’s judgment that his political
possibilities for settling the IPC case would be improved by a resumption of
normal aid relations with the U.S. along the lines of the
sequence presented to him on Friday afternoon.With respect to Viet-Nam President Belaunde wishes President
Johnson to know that he will
continue to support the peace initiatives of the
Vatican.
478. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
(Mann) to
President JohnsonSource: National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PET 6 PERU.
Confidential; Nodis. In an
attached transmittal note to the President, Mann explained that the IPC problem was a “case study on the
difficulties of (a) using aid as a lever to further the national
interests and (b), without going into detail, getting the
Inter-American Bank to play an effective role in promoting
self-help.” The memorandum was forwarded under the cover of a
February 21 memorandum from Komer to the President. (Johnson Library, White
House Central Files, Confidential File, Co 234)Washington, February 19, 1966.
AID TO PERU AND THE IPC PROBLEM
The La Brea y Parinas oil field in Peru (which is only part of the IPC’s holdings) was the subject of a
dispute between the United Kingdom and Peru in the early part of this
century. In 1918 the Peruvian Congress authorized its Foreign Minister
to arbitrate. An arbitration award was handed down in 1922 which
established a tax regime for this particular oil field. In 1924 the
IPC, now but not then a subsidiary
of Standard Oil of New Jersey, bought this oil field from the British
owners. As far as I know, it is undisputed that the American company
bought in good faith reliance on the award.
The Miro Quesada family, which owns the largest Lima newspaper, El
Comercio, has conducted for many years a newspaper campaign for
nationalization of the entire oil industry in Peru. In addition, this
newspaper asserts that the award was not valid and hence, under its tax
calculations, IPC owes Peru more than
the approximately $70 million dollars at which the company values its
assets in La Brea y Parinas.
Like Illia in Argentina, Belaunde, who depended on El Comercio’s
support in his campaign, promised to settle the IPC problem. In his inaugural address on July 28, 1963
Belaunde stated that he would
settle it within 90 days.
In August 1963 Mr. Moscoso went to
Lima and discussed with Belaunde
the possibility of announcing a large aid package in order to provide a
better atmosphere in Peru for a settlement. Active negotiations between
Peru and IPC were going on at that time
and when it appeared, near the end of the 90-day period, that a solution
was imminent, our Ambassador was instructed to offer a $64 million
dollar aid package to Belaunde.
Two days after this offer was officially made, Belaunde broke off negotiations with
the company and submitted two options to the Peruvian Congress. One was
nationalization. The other was a contract under which, according to the
company, IPC would have been obliged to pay more than 100% of
its net earnings and which it therefore considered confiscatory.
The Peruvian Congress did not follow either option recommended by
Belaunde. Instead, it passed
two other laws; one nullifying the 1918 Act which had authorized the
arbitration and the other declaring the arbitration award null and
void.
At this point, in the first week of November 1963, it was decided not to
go ahead with the $64 million dollar aid package previously promised
with the aim of encouraging the Peruvian government to resume
negotiations with IPC. The Peruvian
government was not officially informed of this decision.
In February 1964 the Peruvian Congress passed another law, in essence
authorizing the President to negotiate with IPC and to submit the negotiated solution to Congress for
approval. This was part of the “buck-passing” between Belaunde and the opposition-controlled
Congress which has recently complicated the problem.
In 1964 and 1965 I and various Department officers talked with Belaunde, urging him to reach agreement
with the company or, in the alternative, to agree to submit the legal
issue of the validity of the award, which underlies the problem, to the
International Court or to arbitration. Belaunde says in essence that domestic political
pressures are too great to permit agreement on what the company regards
as fair terms. He refuses to go to the World Court or to arbitration
because he knows he will almost certainly lose.
He talks, instead, of the dangers of communism if we do not increase aid
levels. He has made several public statements criticizing the sluggish
AID procedures; and his Ambassador
to Washington (and his brother-in-law) and others conducted a campaign
consisting of complaints about our alleged attempts to influence
internal Peruvian policy. Meanwhile, El Comercio has stepped up its
attacks against IPC. Its line was to
urge the President to nationalize, arguing that the U.S. would not
react.
Certain elements in our Congress and press have spoken about my “hard
line” policy and about the big U.S. jumping on poor, defenseless,
democratic Peru in order to increase the profits of oil companies. These
sources do not mention the United States’ stake in opposing widespread
disregard of contracts in the contract society in which we live. Nor do
they mention the importance to the success of the Alliance of the
private sector, whose participation on an adequate scale depends on
observance of contracts.
In spite of these criticisms, I believe the policy has been successful in
achieving its principal objective, i.e., deterring confiscatory action
by Belaunde.
The tactic has been not to cut off, but to cut back, aid without
specifically admitting to Belaunde that we were doing so. Our premise was that our relations with
Peru would in the long run be better if we deterred confiscation than if
Belaunde were lulled into a
sense of security leading to confiscatory action which would then oblige
us to apply rigidly the Hickenlooper-Adair Amendment. During calendar year 1964 we authorized
road loans of $39 million dollars through AID and Eximbank; agricultural credit of $8 million
dollars, and a labor housing cooperative loan of $6 million dollars.
These were made on Ambassador Pastor’s oral
assurances to me on three separate occasions that the IPC case would soon be settled.
In 1965 we made a $2 million dollar project loan for an agricultural
university and continued our Peace Corps, technical assistance and
military aid programs which total about $26 million dollars a year. In
addition, Peru continued to receive substantial loans from the
Inter-American Bank and other international institutions. In 1966 the
Inter-American Bank made a $20 million dollar soft loan which, like its
loans in 1965, were almost wholly from U.S. funds.
During 1964 the company, incidentally, offered to give up its title to
the oil and gas in place and to accept in lieu thereof an operating
contract to terminate in twenty-five years. In September 1964 the
company thought it had reached an understanding, which had been reduced
to writing and orally agreed upon by two representatives of Belaunde, only to have it rejected by
the President a few months later who claimed throughout that he was
under irresistible domestic pressures. One principal issue remaining is
whether the total “tax take” of Peru will be 85% or a smaller figure in
the range of 65–75% which the company wants. The company considers this
precedent important to its efforts to hold the present world tax split.
They tell me they would prefer nationalization and loss of this
investment to agreeing to a bad tax split precedent.
Mr. Gordon proposed the recent
Rostow Mission to Peru. As near as I can make
out, Mr. Belaunde has committed
himself not to “confiscate” the IPC
property during his term of office. In his letter to you, President
Belaunde states:
“The misinformed and irresponsible statements made in recent
years by certain organs of the foreign press about the intended
confiscation of foreign companies established in this country
are completely groundless and are disproven by facts in a nation
whose acts conform faithfully to its constitution and laws.”
The question is whether, despite the undertaking not to confiscate,
Belaunde may take other
action such as increasing taxes which might be tantamount to
confiscation. On this I understand we have Belaunde’s oral assurances to
Rostow and Jones that he
will take no action which will further impair the company’s position.
The majority opinion here is that Belaunde will probably not take any precipitate action
during his term of office against the company but will leave the problem for his successor.
Belaunde is not a decisive
person and if he is not misled into thinking that the United States will
continue a large aid program regardless of his actions, I think we could
afford to take this chance. Belaunde is a weak man, but he has his good points. I
concurred in the Rostow Mission and in view of Mr.
Gordon’s feeling on the
matter, I concur in the following recommendations:According to a letter from Barnebey to
Jones, March 4, the White House informed
the Department on February 26 that the President approved these
recommendations. Barnebey remarked: “In view of all the current
interest in assistance to Peru on the 5th, 6th, and 7th floors of
this building, not to exclude that of the White House, we should
strike while the iron is hot.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Lima Embassy Files, 1966: Lot 69 F 191, PER
Jones)
We make additional project loans to Peru as follows:
$9 million dollars agricultural credit loan, part of which would
be funded with P.L. 480 local currency; $2 million dollar loan
for community development (Cooperacion Popular); $3 million
dollars for feasibility studies of new projects; $1½ million
dollars for civic action training and $4 million for road
construction.
That no additional project or program loans be made from AID funds without your approval
until we have negotiated with Peru a realistic self-help program
comparable to those already negotiated with Brazil, Chile and
Colombia. The self-help negotiations can best be conducted under
the leadership of the World Bank, which is interested in playing
this role, and with the cooperation of the International
Monetary Fund.
Inflation in Peru was at a 15% rate in 1965 as compared with 10%
in 1964 and 6% in prior years. The inflation is in part due to
budgetary deficits and the inadequacy of Belaunde’s agricultural
policies.
Belaunde should be told
orally, when the project loans are signed, that self-help is
essential; that we will be obliged under the Hickenlooper–Adair Amendment to stop
disbursements on all outstanding loans if confiscatory action is
taken; that our ability to extend large scale loans on soft,
concessional terms is limited both by our own balance of payments
and budgetary problems and by the relatively strong position of the
Peruvian economy; and that we expect Peru to be more forthcoming and
consistent in dealing with the threat of communism to the
hemisphere.
Finally, I should add that our tactics in dealing with Belaunde have been influenced by large
U.S. private investments in Peru, particularly in mining.
Thomas C. MannPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
479. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
(Mann) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. II, 1/66–10/67.
Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President
saw it.Washington, February 22, 1966.
SUBJECT
Allegations About Change in Our Aid Policy for Peru
Mr. Komer has a summary of the
facts regarding the IPC problem as it
affected our aid program in Peru. I hope you will have a chance to read
it.At 11 a.m., Mann called the President to ask if
he had seen the memorandum on the “IPC–Peruvian matter.” (Document
478) Johnson admitted he had not, but
instructed his staff to “get him an announcement that balanced this
thing.” He told Mann “to get
it on paper but to make sure that the President was not announcing
that we have backtracked and made a bad mistake and Bobby Kennedy
had forced him to change it.” The President further stated that “he
did not object to the deal made” but “does object to announcing both
deals which says that the Mann–Johnson policy has been
abandoned and we are going to sit back and let them confiscate.”
(Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C.
Mann, Telephone Conversations with LBJ, May 2, 1965–June 2, 1966)
From the beginning, our objective has been to prevent a
confiscatory-type action. The record does not show any
difference of objective or tactic between the Kennedy Policy in late 1963 and our
policy in 1964–66.
This policy has been successful. We will have our
maximum chance of ultimate success if we follow the three
recommendations made in my memorandum of February 19. However, if the
Peruvian press were to report Belaunde’s promise not to confiscate, Belaunde would be charged with having
“sold out” the national patrimony. The danger is that Belaunde would then feel obliged to
prove his “patriotism” by moving against the IPC property. This could, in turn, bring into operation the
Hickenlooper–Adair Amendment, relations between the
U.S. and Peru would then be in open crisis. And we would have failed to
obtain our objective.
The proposed AID loans to Peru do not represent a change in policy or tactic.
From the beginning we have been granting or withholding soft loans
depending on whether we thought it would help us achieve our objective.
In 1964, for example, we made larger loans than those now proposed.
The investor agrees with our tactic. Yesterday
the highest officials of the IPC
volunteered to me their appreciation. They expressed agreement with the
tactics which have been recommended. Their hope is that they can go
quietly to work and reach some kind of a modus vivendi which will
postpone the problem of this particular oil field while enabling them to get on with
improvements they wish to make in other properties. I do not, therefore,
expect any dissent from Senator Hickenlooper or from the private sector.
The Eder article is therefore incorrect in its major
premise.In an article attributed
to Richard G. Eder, February 10, The New York
Times disclosed that the United States had quietly reversed
its policy of restricting economic assistance to Peru as a means to
force a favorable settlement in the IPC case. President Johnson’s
reaction was twofold: he demanded an investigation of the leak and
instructed that “no new loans are to be made to Peru without [his]
prior approval.” (Memorandum from Bowdler to the President, February 10; ibid.,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. II, 1/66–10/67) In
a February 21 letter to Jones, Cutter
explained: “The spate of newspaper articles concerning our AID policy in Peru caused considerable
worry here coming as it did with the Viet Nam debates and other
Senate criticism of our policies and the President became personally
involved. In view of this high level interest, no decision could be
made until fully cleared with the White House. The receipt of
Belaunde’s letter has now
made it possible to move ahead with recommendations to the White
House.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Lima
Embassy Files: Lot 73 F 100, Cutter, Curtis C.) But I do not
think it follows from this that we help ourselves by debating details of
delicate foreign policy issues in the press because, given Latin
American realities, this would make it impossible to achieve our foreign
policy objectives.
The difficulty we are having with press treatment of our Latin American
policy stems from the fact that the other side has preempted the field.
No knowledgeable person outside of government is willing and able to
take them on and to counterattack by dealing with the real, and not the
phony, issues. I have already spoken with you about my suggestions on
how to deal with this. I expect to have something concrete on this
soon.
Thomas C. Mann
480. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Komer) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Memos to the President, McGeorge
Bundy, Vol. 19. Secret. A notation on the memorandum
indicates the President saw it.Washington, February 23, 1966, 17
p.m.
The Peru Matter. After further checking, I feel
obligated to report back honestly my private feeling that countering the
unfortunate news leak runs
too much risk of stirring up even more trouble—and of a setback to the
promising course set in train by Rostow’s
successful visit: Disturbing as such leaks are, this one was a two-day wonder
unnoticed in the country at large. But if we leak a
counter-story, even as mild a one as Walt Rostow reluctantly suggests, we may open
the whole issue up again. Will smart-aleck reporters like
KurzmanThe Washington Post. and Eder
settle for the Rostow line or start digging
again? Our quiet deal with Belaunde also undermined Bobby Kennedy and
others, who were planning to speak out on Peru—we might stir
them up again.On the merits, we got the maximum politically possible from
Belaunde on the
IPC case. Moreover, things
are going our way in Peru. Stirring up the IPC case again might put us right
back in an impasse again.Should we penalize Belaunde, who acted in good faith? We still want
to be tough with Peru, but (as Tom Mann proposes) it’s better to
shift the argument to the much firmer ground of needed self-help
and anti-inflation measures. If we press hard on these lines, no
one can legitimately complain.We could keep Peru on a short rein by stretching out the four
small loans (actually totalling only $15 million, since the rest
is local currency), and saying that any help beyond this would
depend on adequate self-help. Putting out this story 4–5 weeks from now when the first loan was
ready for signature would create no problems.Then in six months or so, if all goes well, we’ll have ample
opportunity to correct the record by demonstrating how the hard
line on aid has paid off in such countries as Pakistan, India,
Turkey, Colombia, Brazil, and
Peru.
I have no special axe to grind on this Peruvian affair, and I fully
realize the problems created by loose talk. It doesn’t come from over
here. But in this case correcting the record may hit the wrong
culprits.The President wrote the
following note at the end of the memorandum: “I agree—go ahead.” In
telegram 854 to Lima, March 9, the Department instructed Jones to
tell Belaúnde his assurances
that IPC would not be “further
impaired” were satisfactory; and the U.S. Government would consider
individual AID project loans “on
their merits,” including the Cooperación Popular community
development loan of $2.1 million. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. II, 1/66–10/67)
Jones relayed this message to Belaúnde on March 17. (Telegram
1303 from Lima, March 10; ibid.)
R. W. Komer
481. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. II, 1/66–10/67.
Confidential. Earlier in the day Rostow
received a memorandum from Read which, “in view of the President’s
interest in this particular problem,” requested White House
concurrence for the loan. (Ibid.)Washington, May 27, 1966, 20 p.m.
SUBJECT
Loan to Peru for COOPOPCooperación
Popular.
Last February you authorized resumption of significant concessional
lending to Peru, provided President Belaunde agreed to solve, or maintain the status quo on,
the International Petroleum Company (IPC) case and take effective self-help measures. You told Bill
Bowdler that you did not want the loans to be authorized without your
prior approval.
The first loan is now ready. It is a good loan—$2.1 million for community
development programs in Indian villages. Belaunde has kept his word on IPC and is working out in a highly satisfactory manner with
us and the World Bank a development program based on sound self-help
measures. All interested agencies, including Treasury, have approved the
loan.
I recommend that you authorize us to go ahead.
Walt
ApproveThis option is
checked. A notation by Bromley
Smith indicates that S/S and Bowdler were informed on May 28.
Disapprove
See me
482. Memorandum for the Record
Washington, May 8, 1967.[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Files, c. 51, May 5, 1967. Secret. 3 pages of source text not
declassified.]
483. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. II, 1/66–10/67.
Confidential.Washington, May 19, 1967.
SUBJECT
Program Loan for Peru
The attached memoranda contain a request by Bill Gaud for authorization
to negotiate a $40 million program loan with Peru, and concurrences by
Charlie Schultze and Joe Fowler.Attached
but none printed.
Need for the Loan. Since he took office in 1963,
President Belaunde has pressed a
development program targeted largely toward opening the interior of
Peru. Public investment has outstripped revenues and led to inflationary
pressures and a foreign exchange drain which now threaten financial
stability. The program loan—part of a joint program worked out with the
IBRD and the IMF totalling $175 million—is designed to
permit Belaunde to correct his
financial difficulties while continuing a reasonable development
effort.
Conditions for the Loan. Belaunde’s budgetary deficit for the
year starting July 1, 1967 is expected to run up to $186 million if
remedial action is not taken. Exchange reserves dropped nearly $30
million during the first quarter of 1967.
The proposed loan would be negotiated if: —The Peruvian Congress authorizes new revenue measures which
will net $116 million.—The government cuts back expenditures by $15 million.—Belaunde turns down
the military’s bid to spend some $30 million on supersonic jet
aircraft.—Peru negotiates a satisfactory standby agreement with the
IMF.
These conditions involve tough decisions from which Belaunde has until recently shied away.
But on May 8 he asked the Congress for authority to raise revenues and
cut expenditures in the amounts indicated above. The loan will be
contingent on his getting this authority and accepting the other
conditions.
The loan would be disbursed in three installments, each contingent on
compliance with the terms agreed upon.
Funding the Loan. Funds are presently available
from the FY 1967 appropriation to cover
the loan. If there is a long delay in the negotiations it will have to
be funded in FY 1968.
Other related considerations. Together with
Frei, Lleras and Leoni, Belaunde represents a new generation of political
leaders of democratic bent, deeply interested in modernizing their
countries. We have a stake in seeing Belaunde and his program succeed.
Belaunde has stuck faithfully to
his promise not to impair the position of the International Petroleum
Company. IPC continues to operate under
the same conditions that existed when Belaunde took office. Negotiations between IPC and government continue. Differences
have been narrowed, but a final settlement has not been reached.
In the past we have had trouble with Peru over seizure of our tuna boats.
There have been no recent incidents. We have proposed negotiations on a
conservation agreement and are awaiting Peru’s response.On October 2, 1966, three U.S.-owned tuna clippers
were detained for operating within the 200-mile fisheries
jurisdiction claimed by Peru. The boats were released on October 6.
Memoranda on the tuna boat incident from Rostow
to the President, October 4, 6, and 7, are in the Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, 1/66–10/67.
Documentation on the incident and the controversy over the legal
limit of Peru’s territorial waters is in the National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–4 PERU.
Recommendation
I joined Fowler and Schultze in recommending authorization to negotiate the
loan subject to the conditions stated and to further consultation with
you prior to signature of the loan agreement.
Walt
Approve
Disapprove
See meThe President
checked this option and wrote: “What does [Lincoln] Gordon &
[Sol] Linowitz do or
say on these loans? They should be in on them. L.”
484. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson in
TexasSource: Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. II,
1/66–10/67. Confidential.Washington, May 29, 1967,
1648Z.
CAP 67481. Peru Program Loan.
On May 19 I sent you a memorandum transmitting a request from Bill Gaud
for authorization to negotiate a $40 million program loan with
Peru.Document 483. The loan is designed
to help Belaunde correct
inflationary and balance of payments problems while continuing his
development efforts. Joe Fowler, Charlie Schultze and I concurred in the
request.
The loan was to be tied to four self-help conditions. These conditions
represent tough political decisions for Belaunde, but are essential to any stabilization
program. I noted that we did not know whether Belaunde would be willing to make these
decisions and get Congress to act on additional revenue measures.
You sent the memo back to me inquiring whether Secretary Rusk and Linc Gordon had endorsed Gaud’s request. It has the full endorsement of Gordon who originated the authorization
request. Since Bill Gaud acts as Secretary Rusk’s agent in these matters, the loan authorization
was not submitted to him. I am confident, however, that he would go
along with the Gaud–Gordon recommendation.
Since I forwarded the memorandum to you, President Belaunde has acted—successfully—on one
of the four conditions: a cutback in government expenditures. He has had
partial success in a second: substantial additional revenues via new
import duties and internal taxes.
It is important that we be in a position to tell Belaunde that we are prepared to help
him if he is willing to take strong self-help action. He may be
unwilling to meet all our conditions or, accepting them, unable to get
the Congress to enact new taxes. In either case, the responsibility
would be his and not our unwillingness to help as we have in the case of
his principal neighbors: Brazil, Chile and Colombia.
With the clarification on Linc
Gordon’s endorsement of the loan, may we proceed with the
negotiations subject to the stipulated conditions?
YesThe President dictated
the following instructions: “Walt: I don’t want Gaud making loans to South America
without consulting with our Latin America men. You might talk to
Oliver about this when he gets back.” (Note from the President to
Rostow, May 29; Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. II, 1/66–10/67) Jim Jones,
Assistant to the President, subsequently reported: “Walt Rostow said Covey Oliver has now reviewed the
Peru loan and agrees with the necessity of going ahead. Does the
President approve?” Jones informed
Rostow of the President’s approval on May
30. (Note from Jones to the President, undated;
ibid.) According to a memorandum from Rostow to
Gaud, May 31, President
Johnson authorized the negotiations “in the
understanding that the agreement reached with Peru will be submitted
to him for review prior to signature.” (Ibid.)
No
See me
485. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in PeruSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5, PERU.
Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Sayre, cleared by Vance, and approved by the Secretary.Washington, June 17, 1967, 20:01
p.m.
212297. Ref: Embtel 5814.Telegram 5814 from Lima, June 14, reported that
Peru was considering the purchase of Mirage fighter aircraft from
France. (Ibid.) In a June 15 memorandum to the Secretary, Oliver explained that “a contract
between Peru and France on the Mirage seems imminent.” He
recommended that Rusk raise
with McNamara a proposal to
begin delivery of supersonic fighters to “the major South American
countries” in 1969. In an attached note Rusk wrote that he would “like to speak to Covey Oliver on this.” (Ibid.,
ARA Files, 1967–1969: Lot 72 D
33, Military Assistance Program) According to the Secretary’s
Appointment Book Rusk met
Oliver and Sayre on June 17 at 5:28 p.m.
(Johnson Library) No substantive record of the meeting has been
found. For Ambassador.
You should seek immediate interview with President Belaunde regarding program loan and
Peruvian plans purchase Mirage aircraft.You should inform President you will receive instructions within a
few days which will authorize you to discuss Peruvian Air Force requirements for
F–5 aircraft. These instructions will define as specifically as
possible at this time how we would propose to carry out our
commitment to assist Latin Air Forces in obtaining suitable
replacement jet fighter aircraft beginning in 1970. It should be
made clear that financing would be on commercial basis outside
MAP.At the same time you should make clear that you cannot make
specific commitment that this means delivery of F–5 aircraft to Peru
could begin in 1969. This would depend on overall performance of
Peruvian economy as set out in program loan negotiation
paper.We could not agree to be party to transaction which diverted
substantial Peruvian resources from economic to military purposes
when the latter purposes are of low priority.You should also make clear that your instructions on the program
loan specifically provide that diversion by Peru of substantial
resources to low priority military requirements (read jet fighters
from France) would preclude the negotiation of program loan.We cannot of course tell Peru how to utilize its resources. We
assume Peru is committed goals of Alliance as we are and that it
wants to give highest priority to economic and social development.
If Peru decides otherwise then U.S. must make its decision
consistent with Charter of Punta del Este and Declaration of
Presidents. We would regret our inability to help Peru in such
circumstances but we would be left with no other alternative.In a meeting with
Jones on June 20 Belaúnde maintained that Peru
needed supersonic fighters due to the “unsettled condition” of
the world. Jones explained that the United
States was reviewing its policy on supersonic aircraft in Latin
America, but warned: “If GOP
decided use its resources buy plane like Mirage, USG would feel it inappropriate use
its resources for program loan.” After arguing that the “two
things should not be tied together,” Belaúnde blamed the Department for its
“uncompromising attitude toward Peruvian armed forces and
suggested we adopt more understanding position of Pentagon.”
Jones reported: “I restrained myself.”
(Telegram 5881 from Lima, June 20; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID(US) 9 PERU)Rusk
486. Editorial Note
On July 6, 1967, the Department instructed the Embassy to discuss the
status of economic assistance with President Belaúnde, particularly in view of legislation before the
Peruvian Congress to expropriate holdings of the International Petroleum
Company. (Telegram 2229 to Lima; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 6 PERU) In a meeting
on July 10 Ambassador Jones recalled Belaúnde’s assurance to Walt Rostow in February 1966 that the
IPC would not be “further impaired”
during his administration. (Telegram 211 from Lima, July 12; ibid., DEF
19–8 US–PERU) Jones also warned of the “adverse
effect this law would have, once promulgated, on US–Peruvian relations,”
referring to the penalties set by the Hickenlooper amendment. (Telegram 190 from Lima, July
11, ibid., PET 6 PERU) Belaúnde
replied that he needed more time to resolve the IPC case and pleaded for action “this week” on the program
loan. After a heated exchange concerning Peruvian efforts to purchase
French aircraft, Belaúnde
complained “with strong words about local forces conspiring against him
to defeat his program of government and force devaluation.” “I have
seldom seen the President so distraught,” Jones
observed. “It was a stormy session.” (Telegram 192 from Lima, July 11;
ibid., DEF 19–8 US–PERU) Telegrams 190 and 192 from Lima were retyped
and forwarded to President Johnson, with a note
from Rostow on July 13. Marvin Watson recorded the President’s
response: “Walt get this over to C[ovey] Oliver. Ask him to talk with
T[ony] Solomon and Tom Mann about it. Oliver give the President a memo of recommendations.”
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. II,
6/65–9/66)
487. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Peru, Vol. II, 1/66–10/67. Secret.Washington, July 15, 1967.
SUBJECT
International Petroleum Company Case in Peru
The Peruvian Congress has adopted and sent to President Belaunde a law purporting to
expropriate a portion of the properties of the International Petroleum
Company (IPC). Belaunde must now decide (1) either to
sign or act otherwise on this legislation, and (2) once the law is
promulgated to take one of several alternative actions to carry out its
terms. Our latest information indicates that Belaunde is trying to postpone signing the measure until
late this month, in the hope that meanwhile he can work out an
acceptable solution to this problem. We believe that the best such
solution would be for Belaunde to
conclude the long-pending negotiations with the company for a 25year
service contract—in return for the company’s ceding its claim to surface
or sub-surface rights on its oil property in northern Peru.
We have had Ambassador Jones set out our views on
this problem to President Belaunde and Foreign Minister Vasquez.Jones met the Foreign Minister on July 13 to
discuss the issues raised in his meeting with Belaúnde, July 10. (Telegram 251
from Lima, July 13, National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 15–2 PERU) We have sent our
Deputy Chief of Mission in Lima to London to talk with Haya De La Torre,
leader of Belaunde’s political
opposition, to urge him to take some of the pressure off Belaunde on the IPC issue.IPC representatives,
Jones recommended Siracusa for an “urgent”
mission to secure Haya’s support in the IPC case. (Telegram 231 from Lima, July 13; ibid., PET
6 PERU) The Department authorized Siracusa’s trip to London after consultation in
Washington. (Telegram 6379 to Lima, July 13; ibid.) We have
also suggested following up your exchange of letters with Belaunde of February of last year by
sending a letter to him from Walt
Rostow urging a reasonable settlement.Bowdler wrote the following
note on the memorandum: “Walt
Rostow has asked your views on whether to do this.”
Rostow also sought guidance in a July 15
memorandum to the President. The President decided that Rusk should write the letter;
Read was so informed on
July 17. (Ibid.) No evidence has been found that Rusk sent the letter to Belaúnde.
We are considering still further steps. Depending on developments, we
could send a high-level emissary to Lima to urge Belaunde to reach a settlement with
IPC. We are also trying to use our
other assets to help Belaunde
reach a reasonable decision, and our best means for this purpose would
be the immediate approval and announcement of the pending $15 million
program loan to his country. Our objectives are to convince Belaunde that the IPC decision is up to him, and him alone,
and to use all the means available to us to persuade him to reach the
right decision.
C.T.O.
488. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. II, 1/66–10/67.
Secret.Washington, July 15, 1967, 17 p.m.
Mr. President:
President Belaunde faces probably
the toughest situation of his three-year administration. He is engaged
in three hard, interrelated fights: —with his military on the acquisition of French supersonics
and higher military expenditures.—with his Congress on the IPC
expropriation.—with his Congress and business interests on higher import
duties and taxes.
At the end of May, with your authorization, we offered to negotiate a $40
million program loan contingent on four conditions: —an IMF standby
agreement.—$157 million in new revenue measures.—$15 million cutback in expenditures.—no French supersonic aircraft.
Belaunde made a good try to meet
these conditions. He succeeded in: —negotiating the IMF
standby.—raising at least $90 million of the $157 million of new
revenue.—making the expenditure cutback.
Because of his military and Congress, he fell short
in: —putting through new taxes.—getting a commitment from the military not to buy French
supersonics, although he has so far staved off their closing a
deal.
Covey Oliver ask your approval
(Tab A)Tab A was memoranda to the President
from Gaud and Schultze, July 12 and July 15;
attached but not printed. for their negotiating a $15 million
program loan—an amount equivalent to the first tranche of the $40
million package, with the balance to come later if he delivers on the
original conditions. This would: —acknowledge his self-help efforts to date.—encourage him to press forward with the other tax
measures.—strengthen his hand with the Congress on IPC and the military on
supersonics.—ultimately, perhaps, save him from a political crisis in
which he would quit or be toppled.
The $15 million would be conditioned on: —drawing at least $21 million of the IMF standby.—submitting new tax legislation to the Congress in
August.—holding the 1968 military budget to the 1967 level.—agreeing not to buy supersonics until 1969–70 when we plan to
make available F–5’s in Latin America.—working out a satisfactory arrangement on IPC.
On the IPC
problem, Covey Oliver
describes the current situation and steps he has taken, and proposes to
take, in the memo at Tab B.Document 487.
In recommending approval of the $15 million program loan, Charlie
Schultze includes a personal note on the F–5 issue (Tab C).Tab C was a memorandum from Schultze to the President, July 15;
attached but not printed. The background to this problem is
that in 1965, when the Latin Americans were pressing to acquire
supersonic aircraft, Bob McNamara agreed to program F–5’s for delivery in 1969–70
to delay purchases. The military in Peru, and now in Brazil, impatient
to acquire supersonics, have started negotiations with the French. If we
are to head off these deals, we must: —renew our willingness to provide F–5’s.—begin purchase talks with the interested countries toward the
end of this year, with delivery date in late 1969 or 1970 (lead
time is 20 months).—use our economic assistance as a lever in getting these
countries not to go supersonic until then.
I recommend that you approve the $15 million program loan with the five
stipulated conditions.
Walt
ApproveNone of the
options is checked but the President wrote the following
instructions for Rostow
at the top of the first page of the memorandum: “get Bob
Mc[Namara’s] opinion on plane deal & his judgment as well as
Rusk on effect this
will have in Congress on Hickenlooper et al. & call me.”
Disapprove
See me
489. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. II, 1/66–10/67.
Confidential.Washington, July 18, 1967.
Mr. President:
I suggest we consider under the “Other” item of our “Tuesday Lunch”See Document
490. agenda the Peruvian program loan and the related
issues of IPC and supersonic aircraft.
Rusk and McNamara will come prepared to give
you their views.
Prospects on IPC
Belaunde told the IPC representative yesterday that he had
four options for handling the IPC bill: Form a dummy corporation with majority Peruvian capital and
enter into an operating contract with it. (IPC won’t buy this formula.)Veto the bill. (Politically Belaunde can’t afford to do this.)Sign the bill and drag out implementation indefinitely.Promulgate the law and send it back to Congress for
clarification as to whether it permits him to enter into an
operating contract with a foreign company.
He did not commit himself to which option he would follow. What scant
evidence we have indicates that he would go for the fourth option if
Haya De La Torre (head of the opposition APRA Party) will give assurances that APRA will not attack him if he makes an
operating contract with IPC.
We have a man in London now talking to Haya De La Torre.In a meeting at Oxford on July 18 Siracusa told
Haya that the “highest levels of the United States Government” were
closely monitoring the IPC case; the
Department thought the case had reached a “critical and climactic
moment” that could have “far reaching effects for better or for
worse on US–Peruvian relations.” Haya replied with the following
“unequivocal” assurances: he was opposed to “petroleum exploitation
by the state”; he would clarify his position in a public speech upon
his return to Lima; and he would privately assure Belaúnde that APRA would not attack the government
if it sought a negotiated contract with IPC. (Telegram 496 from London, July 19; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
PET 15 PERU) Rostow forwarded a copy of this
telegram to the President under the cover of a memorandum dated July
20. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the
President, Walt W. Rostow,
Vol. 35)July 20. and, if he is so inclined,
could reach an understanding with Belaunde in time for Belaunde to follow the fourth option. If Haya won’t play
ball, the betting is that Belaunde will start with the fourth option and then slip into the
third so as to maintain the “no impairment” agreement he has with
you.
One related favorable development is that the Peruvian Government
yesterday announced that agreement had been reached with ITT over the telephone system. Over a
three-year period: —ITT will make an immediate
modest expansion of telephone facilities.—Peruvian users will be able to “buy out” the company.—A much larger expansion of service will follow, open to
international bidding in which ITT can take part.
The Background on Supersonics
Beginning in 1963, the larger South American countries indicated their
interest to go supersonic. To hold them off, McNamara agreed then to sell them
F–5’s in 1969–70 if their economic position permitted.
Since 1965, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela have bought planes from us,
the U.K. and West Germany, respectively—but they were all subsonic.
Peru, and recently Brazil, have shown impatience over waiting until
1969–70 for F–5’s and have started negotiations with the French for
Mirages.
The situation we now face is: —We can’t make F–5’s available, or enter into negotiations,
right away because of the adverse impact it would have in
Congress on the Alliance and MAP.—Unless we have an attractive alternative, Peru and Brazil
will buy Mirages and the Congressional reaction will be just as
severe.—Our best strategy is to reiterate the McNamara pledge and
tell them to be patient until later in the year on
implementation.
Behind this strategy lie these considerations: —Northrop could start talks in October or November after the
Congress adjourns.—The lead time for F–5’s is 20 months, which would place
delivery in the time frame of 1969–70.
Walt
P.S.—I have just learned that the House
Foreign Relations Committee has approved an amendment to the AID bill (Ross Adair introduced it)
banning aid of any kind to any Alliance country that acquires
supersonic military jet aircraft from any source or by any
means.
This amendment is mischievous in the extreme, since some countries
will obtain such aircraft whether we like it or not. To the proud
Latins, sanctions of this nature produce the opposite effect of what
they are intended to achieve.
I can see much of the good work of the Summit going down the drain if
this amendment is maintained.
490. Notes of MeetingSource: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Meeting Notes. Literally Eyes
Only. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was scheduled as a
substitute for the Tuesday luncheon meeting.
(Rostow to Rusk, July 18, 11:25 a.m.; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls
7/1/67–7/24/67)Washington, July 18, 1967, 6:06–7:30 p.m.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT’S MEETING WITH SECRETARY RUSK SECRETARY McNAMARA WALT ROSTOW GEORGE CHRISTIAN
[Omitted here is discussion of other matters.]
On the subject of supplying supersonic fighters to Peru, it was agreed
that the Peruvian government wanted these planes primarily for prestige
value and not for any practical defense purposes. The President cited a
ticker item which said Congress had proposed that the U.S. would not
provide aid to any country with supersonic planes.
Secretary Rusk pointed out that the
proportion of aid funds committed to defense has been steadily dropping
in Latin American countries. The President said a briefing should be
arranged on the subject, especially with the Congress in mind.
Secretary McNamara pointed out
that the total number of tanks in Latin America is less than the number
in Bulgaria alone. The Secretary said the number of aircraft in the 21
Latin American countries is less than the number operated by Sweden
alone.
Secretary McNamara said that the
politicians do, however, depend on the Army.
The President asked, “Isn’t there some way we can show the Congress what
happened in Venezuela?” Secretary Rusk said that he and Secretary McNamara had talked to the Congress
many times about this. Secretary Rusk said there is a very real guerrilla problem
there.
The President said it seemed to him as though it would be a wise course
to get out some of those old Cuba speeches and show the Congress what
could happen if we aren’t able to help these countries. The President
said there will be many other Cubas in Latin America unless we do. The
President said Assistant Secretary Oliver thinks we should give the $15 million in aid to
Peru.
Secretary McNamara said he would
give the $15 million in aid if they met the conditions which have been
set forth. Secretary Rusk said
Peru would not buy the conditions.
The President said that Rusk and
McNamara and
Rostow should get together and clear up this
matter and come back to him with a recommendation.No evidence has been found that Rusk and McNamara submitted a written
recommendation to the President.
[Omitted here is discussion of other matters.]
491. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to
the Department of StateSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. II, 1/66–10/67.
Confidential; Priority. Forwarded to the President under the cover
of a July 27 memorandum from Rostow. (Ibid.)
Additional documentation on the meeting is in telegram 443 and
airgram A–44 from Lima, both July 27. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 15–2 PERU and
POL PERU–US,
respectively)Lima, July 25, 1967,
2300Z.
432. Subject: Program Loan Negotiations and Military Spending. Ref: State
9115.Telegram 9115 from Lima, July 19,
contained the Department’s instructions on the program loan
negotiations and military spending. (Ibid., AID(US) 9 PERU)
Stedman, Acting AID Mission Director, and I called on
President this morning. Said we had come in response to his request
made to Dentzer and me
earlier this month (Lima 192)See Document 486. for emergency
financial assistance; that we were instructed to leave a memorandum
with him embodying offer and requirements accompanying it. However
before going over memorandum I said I would like to make a few
observations orally. Belaunde
agreed and I proceeded as follows: Program loan offered in memorandum was additional to
regular program of project lending.All negotiations for program loan would be terminated if
position of IPC was
permitted to deteriorate. In view of pending legislation on
expropriation and nationalization La Brea y Parinas and its
anticipated promulgation into law USG could not continue negotiations on program
loan or later conclude loan agreement or later disperse
funds under it if position of IPC were impaired.President interrupted me to explain that position of IPC would not be altered even with
promulgation of new law which he said he was going to sign last
possible moment (we assume July 26 or 27); otherwise Congress would
promulgate law for him which was politically undesirable in light
all his other problems with legislative body. He intends issue
supreme decree at time of signing law providing for status quo at La
Brea y Parinas until final solution its future operation can be
worked out. While status of IPC
would thus he said not be impaired, he expressed irritation at what
he considered constant interference over the years of this company
with his development program. He complained that company was
stubborn and had refused to make concessions necessary for him
politically to reach agreement. He referred again to formation of
dummy corporation with majority Peruvian shareholders which he said
would make it easy for him to sign operating contract immediately.
Otherwise he implied negotiations would have to continue beyond
30-day period granted by pending bill.My third observation on program loan, I continued, related to
level of military expenditures. I explained that domestic political
facts of life in US were such that it was not possible for US to
provide program loan assistance to countries whose military
expenditures were substantial. For example purchase of supersonic
aircraft by Peru now would endanger Foreign Assistance Appropriation
for this year not only for Peru but for all LA. To negotiate program loan we would require
understanding with GOP that budget
of armed forces next year would be no greater than this and of
course that there be no purchase of supersonic fighters. President
reacted violently to this point saying he could not limit Peruvian
military in their defense requirements nor could he admit of any
interferences in internal affairs of Peru for $15 million or $50
million or $100 million. Said he must make it absolutely clear that
he would sign no document which limited sovereign powers of Peru. If
this were our requirements he would forget about assistance from US
and “seek other routes.”I explained again problems of administration in Washington with
Congress over this sensitive issue and showed President copy of
draft Congressional amendment to Foreign Aid act introduced into
lower House committee making mandatory suspension of aid to
countries that purchase supersonic aircraft. Said I understood
similar amendment had also been introduced in US Senate. While
administration was opposed to this kind of limitation and amendment
to Foreign Aid bill it was reflective of attitude of Congress and of
political problem which Department and White House had at moment in
relation to our overall foreign aid program.I handed President memorandum (section b of reftel with informal
Spanish translation). He went through first paragraphs hurriedly
until he came to $15 million figure where he expressed some
disappointment that it
was not $40 million figure originally discussed with him. I said
lower figure might be considered “first tranche” and then if various
steps outlined in memorandum were successfully completed we could
begin next year discussion of remaining $25 million. I urged
President to study memorandum carefully, discuss it with his
advisors and, if he decided to proceed along these lines, to inform
us when Stedman could begin
negotiations with FinanceMin and President Central Reserve Bank. I
said USG had no desire to limit
Peruvian sovereignty as he had suggested but rather we hoped that
with understanding of political problems in Washington, President
would be willing in spirit of collaboration to work out with us
various understandings necessary to proceed promptly with program
loan. We spoke of relationship of this offer to IMF standby, to Peru’s self-help
efforts and to our desire help Peru not only with its development
but with its immediate financial problem. Because Belaunde had said earlier he would
never put his signature to any agreement that mentioned military or
limited their activities Stedman and I assured him that understanding on
level of military expenditures would not need be reduced to written
agreement.Belaunde was obviously upset
by various conditions regarding program loan offer, particularly
those relating to limitations on military. He spoke of his happy
relations with military which so essential to any regime in Peru and
with some bitterness over what he felt USG was doing to weaken its relations with Peruvian
military who were bulwark against Communist infiltration in this
continent. We were together one hour and 10 minutes and I believe at
end, although we left him somewhat dejected, he had decided to make
effort to meet conditions surrounding program loan offer.On August 3 the Peruvian Government informed
the Embassy that the terms of the program loan were
unacceptable; the amount of the loan was too small in relation
to the severity of its conditions. The government also had
“great problems” in discussing the aircraft issue, since
military matters were secret and “not subject to negotiations
with foreign governments.” (Telegram 542 from Lima, August 4;
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1967–69, AID(US) 9 PERU)
The Embassy recommended shelving the program loan until
developments allowed a more favorable opportunity for
negotiation. The Embassy admitted, however, that a policy of
withholding financial assistance could lead to “further cooling
in US–Peru relations,” which, by its own assessment, “have not
been at such low ebb for several years.” (Telegram 602 from
Lima, August 8; ibid.) The Department concurred. (Telegram 18729
to Lima, August 10; ibid.)Jones
492. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in the United KingdomSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PERU. Secret;
Immediate; Nodis. Text received
from the White House and approved by Francis Meehan (S/S). A draft message to Prime Minister
Wilson that was nearly identical to the final version, was enclosed
in a July 27 memorandum from Rusk to the President. (Ibid.)
Rostow forwarded the draft to the President
under the cover of a July 27 memorandum. A handwritten note
indicates that Johnson returned this memorandum
on July 28, evidently implying his approval of the message. (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 26)Washington, July 28, 1967,
2113Z.
13904. For Ambassador Only. Following message, dated July 28, 1967, from
the President to the Prime Minister, sent by WH Private Channel, is for Embassy FYI only:
Begin Text
I have reviewed your request on the sale of Canberras to Peru with the
greatest care.Rostow forwarded Wilson’s request under the
cover of a memorandum to the President, July 26. Wilson acknowledged
the “right of the U.S. government to withhold permission in this
case, since these aircraft are partly M.D.A.P.-funded.” The Prime
Minister maintained, however, that the sale should be approved; Peru
already had Canberra aircraft and could acquire “less suitable
aircraft” from other sources, e.g. the French. “Indeed, in his
present mood,” Wilson argued, “De Gaulle might regard this as an
excellent opportunity to make trouble for and between us; and, of
course, between yourselves and the Peruvians.” (Ibid.) Additional
documentation on the Canberra issue is in the National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5
PERU. I appreciate your consulting with us on this matter and
the cooperation we have had from your Government on military sales to
Latin America.
Congressional feeling on the acquisition of unnecessary military
equipment by under-developed countries receiving economic assistance
from us has reached such a point that the whole foreign aid program is
threatened.
Peru is at present seeking substantial economic assistance. Were they to
use scarce foreign exchange on military procurement at a time when we
are furnishing dollars to tide them over financial difficulties, the
Congressional and public reaction would be so strong that our ability to
continue supporting the Alliance for Progress would be seriously
endangered. Earlier this week our Ambassador in Lima informed President
Belaunde of our willingness
to conclude a sizeable loan provided we could agree, among other things,
on a total level of military spending, with special attention to costs
of major equipment purchases such as aircraft.
President Belaunde understands
that the purchase of French Mirage aircraft would make it impossible for
us to go forward with the loan. Unfortunately the Canberras also fall
within our general conditions to Peru about levels of military spending,
and we could not successfully explain to Congress why under such
circumstances we have given consent to sell Canberras to Peru.
I feel that I must do all that I can at this time to meet widely and
deeply held Congressional objections to unnecessary arms expenditures by
countries such as Peru. This includes equipment of United States origin.
Certain influential Congressmen have for the moment expressed their
concern about supersonic military aircraft, because it is the supersonic
Mirage that has been the major problem. But I am sure that if I did
consent to the sale of the sub-sonic but medium-range Canberra,
Congressional reactions would be equally strong.
For these reasons, and with full understanding of the embarrassing
position in which the British aircraft representatives in Lima will find
themselves, I must conclude that we cannot alter the negative decision
on the proposed sale.
I realize that the United Kingdom group will have to tell the Peruvians
why the Canberra sale cannot go forward, and I have no objection to
their doing so. While there is some added risk that the denial of
Canberras might of itself trigger a Peruvian decision to spurn American
assistance and buy Mirages, I have some doubt that this would occur. It
seems to me that it is a risk which we will have to take, given our
major problems with the Congress with our foreign aid programs. End text.
Rusk
493. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PERU. Secret;
Limdis; No Distribution Outside Department.Lima, September 27, 1967,
2246Z.
1469. For Oliver from Ambassador.
Subj: Supersonic Aircraft and Peruvian Stability.
[less than 1 line of source text not
declassified] of 24 and 26 September,Not found. cites parallel information
from several good sources to effect that Peru has signed contract
for twelve Mirage jets costing $28 million. While this is not
documentary evidence of a purchase, we have long believed that some
commitment to French company has been made and consider the sources
good enough to constitute confirmation of purchase short of
documentary evidence or official announcement.In telegram 1508 from Lima, September 29, the
Embassy reported that Peru had agreed to purchase 14 Mirage
fighters from France, including the delivery of two training
aircraft, before the end of 1967. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5
PERU)We have made abundantly clear in reporting recent developments our
belief that a prompt negotiating of US program loan assistance will
be an imperative element for the restoration of confidence so sorely
needed if Peruvian situation is to be stabilized and economic
recovery and continued progress thereafter initiated.On July 27 the parliamentary coalition
supporting the Belaúnde
administration refused to attend sessions of Congress, citing
the controversial election of an opposition candidate to the
presidency of the Senate. The resulting constitutional crisis
was further aggravated by a crisis in the government’s finances;
a run on the foreign exchange reserve eventually forced the
administration to devalue the currency on September 1. The
immediate political effect of devaluation included: (a) the
installation of the new Congress on September 4; and (b) the
formation of a new Cabinet on September 7. An INR analysis of the crisis is in a
memorandum from Denney to the Secretary, September 14; an
Embassy assessment is in telegram 1359 from Lima, September 20.
(Ibid., FN 17 PERU and POL 15–2
PERU, respectively) If this is not done, and unless there
is a restoration of confidence in the next few months, it is our
judgment that authoritarian intervention in one form or another is
highly likely. Yesterday we reported General Doig’s remark that
unless situation improved there would be no elections in 1969.As reported in telegram 1444 from Lima,
September 26. (Ibid., POL 15–1
PERU) General Julio Doig Sanchez was the new Peruvian Minister
of Defense.Since we assume the single most inflexible impediment to our
providing program loan assistance is the reported purchase of
Mirages, I urge that every force be used at this time to achieve a
decision permitting us promptly to make a firm and specific
counter-offer of F–5’s. I cannot assure that such a counter-offer
would be sufficient to undo what has probably already been done to
acquire Mirages, since it is likely that a substantial down-payment
has been made. However, unless we have authority to counter the
French deal with a firm offer now and then go ahead with a program
loan, it is our considered opinion that Peru’s fine democratic
experience under President Belaunde is not likely to survive to end
of his term. A military intervention in Peru would be such a blow to our general
policies under the Alliance for Progress that an all-out effort to
save the situation is now imperative.I know you will do everything possible to obtain the kind of
authority we request with regard to F–5’s and thus give us a chance
to resume our constructive policies of support for Belaunde administration and Peru’s
other democratic institutions.Jones
494. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–1/69.
Secret.Washington, October 5, 1967.
SUBJECT
Latin American Purchase of Supersonic Aircraft
The Peruvians have contracted to buy French
Mirages despite our repeated warnings of the consequences. The
story broke publicly in the New York Times
yesterday morning.According to the article,
written by Neil Sheehan, French aircraft industry sources confirmed
that “Peru had signed a contract about two months ago to purchase
approximately 12 Mirage V’s from Marcel Dassault General
Aerodynamics, the French aircraft manufacturer.”
Peru’s action—unless we can turn it around—threatens a supersonic
aircraft race among the larger South American countries. It also means
serious trouble for us with Congress on MAP and Alliance for Progress appropriations. For Peru it
will result in no program assistance at a time when Belaunde is in
critical need of help for his stabilization and development
programs.
Belaunde finds himself in this
bind because of his weak political position. The military looms large in
the political structure and they have been pressing hard for
modernization of old equipment. The opposition-controlled Congress has
played politics by authorizing, on its own initiative, a substantial
amount for military purchases. Belaunde was unable to block Congressional action, and
he has not felt strong enough to order his military to drop the Mirage
deal.
There is a possibility that we can turn this situation
around if we do two things:—renew our offer to negotiate a $40 million program loan which
you authorized last May (Belaunde was then unable to meet our conditions.
Now, with increased taxes, spending limitations, IMF standby and devaluation, he is
close to doing so, provided he stops the Mirage deal.).—tell Belaunde what we
told Costa e Silva last July—that we would allow Northrop to
sell them F–5’s for delivery in 1969–70.
Covey Oliver and Bill Gaud
recommend that you approve negotiation of the program loan based on the
substantial economic self-help measures taken by Belaunde since May (Tab A).Tab A was a memorandum from Gaud to the President, October 4;
attached but not printed. On the basis of previous reviews of
the loan package, BOB and Treasury have
no problem with the substance of the proposal.
A condition for the loan would continue to be no
Mirages. I believe there is a chance of Belaunde making the military backtrack
if he can: —demonstrate that their action is depriving the nation of
vital economic assistance.—offer them the alternative of F–5’s by 1969/70.
Before proceeding further in our offer of F–5’s
in Latin America, the SIGSenior Interdepartment Group, Nick Katzenbach is
chairman. [Footnote in the source text.] believes that we should touch base with Congress. SIG proposes: —a frank discussion of our military policy toward Latin
America.—a detailed explanation of how little of Latin American
military expenditures goes into hardware (most goes for salaries
and allowances).—the serious consequences for the Alliance for Progress if we
do not provide a reasonable alternative to limited modernization
of military equipment, specifically F–5’s.
SIG (Katzenbach, Nitze, Gaud and
myself) has approved the scenario and talking points paper at Tab B for
the handling of the F–5 issue.Both dated
October 3; attached but not printed. The SIG discussed U.S. policy toward Latin American
security forces, including F–5 aircraft, at its meeting on September
28; see Document 65. Secretary
McNamara and Secretary
Rusk concur. Everyone
recognizes that consultation on selling F–5’s may adversely affect
foreign aid legislation while the bill is pending in Congress. However,
the consequences of doing nothing about the Peruvian purchase, or
offering our own supersonics behind Congress’s back are far more
severe.
I am convinced that unless we help Belaunde reverse the action taken by his military, we
will be in deep trouble in Peru, and our ability to support for Alliance
for Progress seriously weakened.
I strongly recommend that you authorize consultations with Congress along
the lines of the scenario paper and that subject to the results of these
talks, you approve renegotiation of the program loan on the basis of the
conditions in the Gaud memo.
Walt
1. Approve consultation with CongressThe President checked this option.
Disapprove
See me
2. Approve program loan renegotiation, subject to
Congressional talksThe President
checked this option.
Disapprove
See me
495. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in PeruSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID(US) 9 PERU. Secret; Immediate;
Limdis. Repeated to USCINCSO,
Sao Paulo, and Brasilia. Drafted by Bloomfield; cleared by Bowdler, Glaessner, Sharp, and Hartman; cleared in draft by Gaud, Lang, Fowler, Palmer, Sayre, Breen,
and E. Jay Finkel at Treasury; and approved by Oliver.Washington, October 17, 1967,
2323Z.
55490. Subject: Authority to Negotiate Program Loan; Offer of F–5’s. Ref:
State 55492.In telegram 55492 to Buenos
Aires, Caracas, Lima, Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, Sao Paulo, and
Brasilia, October 17, the Department reviewed U.S. policy toward the
sale of F–5 aircraft to Latin America as “guidance for further
discussions by addressee posts with host countries.” (Ibid., DEF
19–8 US–LA) For Ambassador and
AID Mission Director.
You are authorized to open negotiations with GOP for $40 million program loan on
terms and conditions set forth in AID Administrator’s Memorandum for the President of October 4,
1967.Not printed. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III,
10/67–1/69) You should keep Department informed of
progress of negotiations. Agreements reached are subject to normal
approval procedures in Washington. You should also inform Belaunde that USG has authorized Northrop to begin
direct negotiations immediately with GOP for sale F–5 aircraft.In making your presentation to President Belaunde, you should inform him
that President Johnson has approved loan offer
and sale of F–5’s because of great importance he attaches to
resolution of Peru’s current difficulties in a manner which will not
jeopardize the United States’ ability to continue supporting Peru’s
public investment program. President Johnson
understands the expanded role which President Belaunde has charted for the
Peruvian Government in creating the basis for a more diversified and
equitable development of the economy and is anxious that USG be able to share in that effort
through financial and technical assistance.Because of the high priority which USG gives to development task in Peru, we are deeply
concerned how military spending situation in Peru will affect US
assistance program. You should point out that the purchase of Mirage
aircraft, and indeed the sharp increase in military expenditure
authorizations in general over the past year, not only affect the
possibility of a program loan but could jeopardize our ability to
provide Peru with economic assistance in other forms as well.
Long-standing USG concern in both
Executive and Legislative branches that scarce resources needed for
economic development not be diverted into unnecessary military
expenditures has lately been heightened by reports of planned
acquisitions by Latin military of expensive armaments. Seriousness
with which Congress views these developments is reflected in
proposed amendment to Senate version of FAA bill (the so-called “Symington Amendment”)Reference is to an amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, sponsored by Senator Stuart
Symington (D–Missouri), which was approved on November 14. (81
Stat. 459) On January 8, 1968, Congress passed a related
amendment to the FAA, sponsored
by Representatives Silvio O. Conte (R–Massachusetts) and
Clarence D. Long (D–Maryland), requiring the President to
withhold economic assistance to any “underdeveloped country”
that used military assistance to acquire sophisticated weapons
systems. The provision did not apply to Greece, Turkey, Iran,
Israel, Taiwan, the Philippines, Korea, or any country that the
President exempted on national security grounds. (81 Stat. 937;
81 Stat. 940) now being considered by House-Senate
Conference. This amendment (text of which pouched to Mission
Director on October 10) would instruct President take into account
the percentage of an aid-recipient’s budget devoted to military
purposes and degree to which country is devoting foreign exchange to
military purchases, and would require him to suspend economic
assistance including
PL 480 sales when such assistance
is “permitting the diversion of other resources to military
expenditures to a degree which interferes with economic
development.” You should also draw Belaunde’s attention to similar provision aimed
specifically at “sophisticated or heavy military equipment” in law
already approved by Congress replenishing Fund for Special
Operations of IDB.Reference is to an amendment to the
Inter-American Development Bank Act, approved September 22,
1967. (81 Stat. 227) It was because of this provision and
its possible interpretations, for example, that USG has been uncertain as to what its
reaction should be to proposed $10 million loan from IDB for Peru’s Industrial Bank.It is for foregoing reasons, and none other, that a condition of
the loan is assurance by President Belaunde that Peru will not acquire supersonic
aircraft from France or third countries.In telegram 55520 to Lima, October 18, the Department corrected
this sentence to read: “It is for foregoing reasons, and none
other, that a condition of the loan is assurance by President
Belaunde that Peru
will not acquire Mirage aircraft from France or similar aircraft
from third countries.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID(US) 9 PERU) This means
that Peru must cancel any arrangements it may have already made for
acquisition of Mirage or similar aircraft.You should tell Belaunde
that we are aware of his difficulties in convincing Peruvian
military that they should forego all modernization, as illustrated
particularly by Air Force’s desire to replace aging pre-Korean War
aircraft, which becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in safe
flying condition. For this reason, USG as long as two years ago promised to make F–5
aircraft available to certain LA
countries in 1969–70 time frame. F–5 is relatively unsophisticated,
light aircraft with much cheaper initial purchase price and
maintenance cost than Mirage and more suited to Latin American Air
Forces’ mission.Financing of F–5’s will have to be through commercial (non-U.S.
Government) sources. Acquisition at present will be limited to one
squadron (12–18 aircraft). Sale of F–5’s will also be conditioned on
non-acquisition of Mirage or of similar aircraft elsewhere. You
should also inform Belaunde
in confidence that, in keeping with our commitments to supply these
aircraft to certain other South American countries in 1969–1970 time
frame, in addition to Peru we are authorizing Northrop to open
negotiations with Brazil, and we are prepared to permit manufacturer
to sell F–5’s to Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela.Report Belaunde’s reaction
soonest.Rusk
496. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID(US) 9 PERU. Secret; Priority;
Limdis. Repeated to USCINCSO
for POLAD.Lima, October 24, 1967,
2254Z.
1949. Subject: Program Loan and F–5’s. Ref: Lima 1886.In telegram 1886 from Lima, October 20,
Jones reported waiting for confirmation of
his appointment with Belaúnde. (Ibid.)
President received me this morning. I thanked him for having seen
Siracusa during my absence in Trujillo last week to discuss new
offer of program loan and sale of F–5’s.Judging it important to move “with greatest speed if Mirage
purchase to be forestalled,” Siracusa requested and received an
appointment with Belaúnde
on October 19. (Telegram 1852 from Lima, October 19;
ibid.) I had received full account of their conversation
and of President’s reaction to terms and conditions of our two
offers. Nevertheless, Washington had instructed me to follow up
Siracusa’s presentation and to seek with President solution to
present impasse.The Department
instructed Jones to return to Lima
immediately and “follow up with Belaunde in order to emphasize great importance
USG at highest level
attaches to our proposal.” (Telegram 56485 to Lima, October 19;
ibid.) I admitted that our offer of F–5’s had arrived
late and that if it had come earlier we might have avoided present
situation. Unhappily this had not been possible for reasons which
Belaunde was aware and I
referred to harsh press and Congressional criticism directed at
Department since announcement of its decision to make F–5’s
available to Peru and Brazil. I referred to desire of President
Johnson and his government in Washington to
assist Belaunde
administration, particularly in its present financial difficulties
but reaffirmed that purchase of French fighters would make this
impossible. USG could not be put in
position of appearing to finance with large program loan Peruvian
purchase of expensive supersonic aircraft in third country such as
France.Belaunde interrupted about
this point to say emphatically that what had been done was done and
could not be changed. He said was waste of time to discuss Mirage
deal further—that it was closed issue. If he were not absolutely
frank with me [we] could pretend there were possibilities of
reversing GOP position but this is
not case and USG had best accept
this as basis for future relations with Peru. If, Belaunde continued, this means end
of economic relations between Peru and US, sooner he knew this the
better.I said I hoped that over past few days he had given consideration
to serious problem which had arisen between us and might have some
suggestions to offer for mutually agreeable solution. I said I had
come as old friend
and personal admirer of Belaunde to see if there were not some way of
circumventing or avoiding Mirage problem and of getting his
government and mine off this particular hook. I suggested that
General Porter, CINCSO, might come to Lima to
discuss possible solution directly with Peruvian military. Belaunde said this would be waste
of time. I then suggested that French military might use Peruvian
commitment and downpayment, if any, as credit against other military
purchases in France, such as Allouette helicopters, as means of
withdrawing from Mirage deal. Belaunde rejected this too as impossible, saying
such action would only replace one problem with another, this time
in ranks of the military. He said it would create “national scandal”
if GOP should now cancel Mirage deal
and not one Peruvian could be counted upon to approve such reversal
of policy which would be made to appear as undermining of national
defense.There then ensued long discourse on Peruvian armed forces’
responsibility to nation; to Peru’s disastrous experience in last
century when she cancelled some arms purchases in England and
subsequently lost war to Chile and rich potassium nitrate
possessions in south. Peru is rich in natural resources and will
defend them; he said and even referred to proximity of Toquepala
(Southern Peru Copper Corporation) to Chilean border. He lamented
fact that so many US Senators were ignorant of Peruvian history and
public sentiment.I asked President for his suggestions as way out. He replied we
should divorce French Mirage from program loan and go ahead with
latter “quietly and without publicity” or that we might extend
amount of some of our present loans such as one to CORPAC (Exim Bank
loan for airports) for which GOP is
having difficulty financing its counterpart.Belaunde seemed harassed by
countless urgent problems arising from generally tense situation in
country and specifically from yesterday’s disturbances Lima–Callao
and to general strike in Arequipa which he fears might proceed to
Puno and Cuzco. He complained of sleepless nights, of wrestling with
salary tables when he should be working on new road projects, and of
Communist agitators taking advantage of situation. He told me again
that his refusal to appear on national television to explain present
crisis to people was because, if he did, he would have to implicate
US Government which had failed to support him in time of need. (He
referred directly to program loan which he believes would have
averted present financial crises.)On this second try I believe we must accept Belaunde’s rejection of Mirage
cancellation as final within limits his capability and authority. I
still think worthwhile Northrop representative come Lima and make
direct contact with PAF in effort persuade them of superiority
Northrop product and terms.Jones
497. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–1/69. Secret.
Apparently drafted by Bowdler
and based on an October 27 memorandum from Oliver to Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, ARA/EP/P Files, 1967: Lot 70 D
139, POL 1 Plans) Bowdler forwarded the Oliver memorandum, and two
intelligence reports (see footnote 2
below), to Rostow under the cover of an October
31 note. Bowdler remarked
that Oliver had apparently
recovered from the “passive attitude” reflected in his memorandum,
i.e., that “the U.S. can probably do little to influence the
situation.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–1/69)Washington, October 31, 1967, 12:30
p.m.
SUBJECT
Tuesday Luncheon: Peru
At today’s luncheon Secretary Rusk
may raise the problem of the deteriorating political and economic
situation in Peru and what we can do about it. Both State’s Intelligence
Bureau and CIA see the possibility of a
military takeover in the next few weeks if Belaunde continues his do-nothing attitude and public
confidence in him keeps on slipping.The
INR assessment is Intelligence
Note No. 857, October 27. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PERU) The CIA estimate is Special Memorandum No. 8–67, October
28. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Peru,
Vol. III, 10/67–1/69)
How Peru got into this Situation
During the past 18 months, increasing Government budget deficits and
excessive use of foreign credits by both the public and private sectors
accelerated the underlying inflationary tendencies and triggered
mounting speculation against the Peruvian currency. These economic
difficulties were intensified by a breakdown in the tenuous political
relationship between the opposition-controlled Congress and the
Executive, leading to an impasse that prevented Congress from meeting
for 39 days in August and September.
The Government finally was forced to allow a devaluation on September 1.
This devaluation of nearly 50% could provide a basis for certain
beneficial adjustments to take place in the economy. However, because of
the Government’s inability to put into effect necessary economic and
financial measures to complement the devaluation and cope with its
effects, a general atmosphere of drift in national leadership has
developed. This has produced a crisis of confidence between the
Government and the Peruvian people which is aggravated by a sudden rise
in the cost of living.
The military is increasingly nervous over this drift and deterioration.
We are getting more frequent reports that the military is ready to oust
Belaunde in order to
introduce a strong economic recovery program and prevent public unrest
from snowballing.
What We Have Tried to Do
We have been urging Belaunde to
take corrective fiscal and budgetary measures for the past 18 months.
You will recall that we offered him a $40 million program loan last May,
conditioned on certain self-help actions. At that time, the Mirage
question was only a cloud on the horizon, but we warned him about it. He
found our conditions too stiff; in fact they were not any more onerous
than those accepted by Chile, Colombia and Brazil for program
assistance.
Belaunde by July had taken
sufficient self-help measures for us to offer him $15 million, with the
remaining $25 million of our original offer to come after he had met the
pending conditions. In the meantime, our information on Peru’s Mirage
acquisition had hardened, so we were more precise in making this a
condition. Belaunde’s reaction to
this offer was that the conditions were too steep for the amount of
money involved.
Early this month we made a third offer to Belaunde: $40 million based on virtually the same
economic conditions and no Mirages. This time
Belaunde said that the Mirage
deal was a fact and not subject to change. If we made it a condition,
then Peru would forego the program loan.
Where We Go From Here
If we allow matters to drift, we can expect a military coup in Peru. This
would trigger a series of reactions—e.g., holding up aid to Peru,
Peruvian military intransigence on Mirages, Brazilian military pressure
to acquire Mirages, and sharp Congressional reaction—which could
seriously undermine your Alliance for Progress effort.
The key issue at this stage is the Mirages. If we can devise some way for
Peru to cancel the contract or resell the aircraft to a third country,
the road is open to give Belaunde
the aid he needs. This kind of support from us translates itself into
public confidence which can enable Belaunde to climb out of the present quagmire.
What I find disturbing is that neither our Embassy nor State are applying
imagination and energy to finding a formula for heading off the
catastrophe. We need to be doing two things: —contact key political and military leaders in Peru to urge
patience and flexibility and asking them for their views on how
to get around the impasse.—develop formulas to offer the Peruvians to get them to cancel
the Mirage contract or resell the Mirages to a third
country.
We have urged Covey Oliver to work
along these lines (Bill Bowdler
has given him two possible formulas).The
President wrote the following instruction on the memorandum:
“Walt—Let’s meet on
this.” A note on the memorandum indicates that Johnson did not receive it until
7:35 p.m. on October 31. According to the President’s Daily Diary
the Tuesday luncheon group met on October 31 from 1:57 to 4:10 p.m.
(Johnson Library) A handwritten note by Rostow explains that the subject was “important, but
not discussed at lunch.” Another note on the memorandum indicates
Bowdler was notified on
November 1.
Walt
498. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 49. Secret. According to the
President’s Daily Diary the “off record” meeting was held in the
Cabinet Room, 11:35–11:55 a.m. (Johnson Library) Sayre was added to Rostow’s list of attendees. No
other record of the meeting has been found.Washington, November 6, 1967.
SUBJECT
Your 11:30 Meeting Today on Peru
The purpose of the meeting is to review the
modalities of the proposal (Tab A) for persuading Peru to drop the
Mirage deal.Not attached. Reference is
probably to a paper drafted by Bowdler and forwarded to the President under the
cover of a November 2 memorandum from Rostow.
Rostow presented
Johnson with two
alternatives: (a) send a high-level representative to Lima—a man
“who would carry more punch”—to determine whether Belaúnde and the Peruvian military
were willing to negotiate; or (b) send a lower-level official “who
could make the same soundings with less risk of publicity.” The
President indicated he would “prefer to have [a] meeting first” with
representatives from DOD, State and
CIA. (Ibid., National Security
File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–1/69)
Those attending will be: State: Secretary Rusk,
Covey OliverDOD: Paul Nitze, Paul
WarnkeCIA: Dick HelmsWH: Rostow, Bowdler
I suggest you follow this agenda:
1. Workability of the Proposal.
Comment:Covey Oliver has been checking
with Northrop on the availability of F–5’s, commercial credit for their
financing and the training of Peruvian pilots. You might ask him to
report on his findings.
2. Your Emissary to Peru.
Comment: Dr. Eisenhower told
Covey Oliver last FridayNovember 3. Johnson also
raised the idea with former President
Eisenhower: “[Belaúnde] is insisting on buying all these French
planes, and we’re in a hell of a mess, his country is in bad shape,
and I thought he [Milton
Eisenhower] could go down there” and give them “a
fair evaluation of the problem.” Eisenhower
thought his brother “might be susceptive” to the idea. (Ibid.,
Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation
between President Johnson and
Eisenhower, November 4, 1967, 10 a.m., Tape
F67.14, Side B, PNO 3) An informal transcript of the conversation is
ibid., Chron Series. that he could not undertake the
assignment until after Friday. Covey was getting in touch with him again to establish
how soon after Friday he would be available.
Others who might do the job are listed at Tab B.Not attached. Reference is probably to a memorandum
from Rostow to the President,
November 4, which contains a list of possible high-level envoys,
including: Cyrus Vance,
George Ball, Henry Cabot
Lodge, William Scranton, Clark
Clifford, and Lincoln
Gordon. Johnson approved the recommendation to schedule a
meeting at 11:30 a.m., November 6, without indicating his preference
as emissary. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Peru,
Vol. III, 10/67–1/69)
An essential element of the approach to Peru is to make it as free from
publicity as possible.
3. Advisability of Using Brazil to Help with
Peru.
Comment: I sent you a CIA report on Saturday from a reliable source that
President Costa e Silva had
decided not to purchase Mirages.[text not declassified] (Ibid., Brazil, Vol.
VII, 3/67–11/68)We have not been officially informed of this
decision. You might ask Secretary Rusk and Dick Helms how we might get the Brazilians to
so notify us so that we in turn could ask President Costa e Silva if he would help in
persuading President Belaunde not
to go through with the Mirage deal.
W. W. RostowPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
499. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–1/69. Secret. Drafted by
Jones and Bowdler. Copies were sent to
Rostow and Oliver. The meeting was held in the President’s
office and according to the President’s Daily Diary the meeting was
from 5:26 to 5:36 p.m. (Johnson Library) Rostow
had recommended that President Johnson meet
Jones since “it would strengthen his
[Jones’] hand considerably if he could say
to President Belaunde that he
had discussed Peruvian developments with you.” (Memorandum from
Rostow to the President, November 8; ibid.,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III)Washington, November 8, 1967, 17:15
p.m.
PARTICIPANTS
The PresidentAssistant Secretary of State Covey T.
OliverWilliam Bowdler—White
HouseAmerican Ambassador to Peru J. Wesley
Jones
The President asked Ambassador Jones about the
situation in Peru and the chances of survival of the Belaunde Administration. Ambassador
Jones replied that Peru was going through a
severe financial crisis caused by balance of payment difficulties and
devaluation. The crisis however was primarily fiscal and not economic,
since Peru is basically sound with its free enterprise system, its
natural resources and its diversification of exports. The recent
devaluation of the sol had been a shock to all Peruvians, including
President Belaunde.
Unfortunately, he had not prepared the Peruvian people for a
devaluation, but rather had assured them it would never happen. He thus
had painted himself into a corner and found it difficult now to explain
and rationalize to the Peruvian people the sudden drop in the value of
their currency.
The President asked about the Mirage deal and whether the Peruvians would
cancel their contract with the French. Ambassador
Jones replied that on his last of many
conversations he had with President Belaunde on this subject Belaunde had told him categorically, “No”; that what had
been done could not be undone, and that the United States must accept
this as a fact in its future relationship with his country.
Nevertheless, on previous occasions President Belaunde indicated that our F–5s would
be an acceptable substitute. Ambassador Jones told
the President that he would like therefore to have the Northrop
representative authorized to make a firm offer in writing to the
Peruvian Air Force as soon as possible to include training of Peruvian
pilots next year plus the delivery of some aircraft in the latter part
of 1968. Once this offer had been made, Ambassador
Jones would like to be authorized to go back to President Belaunde with a copy in hand and a $40
million program loan to make another try. The conditions for the $40
million would be F–5s for Mirages and improved performance in the fiscal
field. Ambassador Jones confessed to the President
that he was not sanguine that it would work, but he thought it was worth
a try.
Ambassador Jones referred to the danger of a
Peruvian military intervention in the Government of Peru if another
devaluation, followed by increased cost of living, followed by strikes
and violence were to occur. That, Jones said, was
the sort of condition in which the Peruvian Military traditionally moved
to take over the government.
The President said he had not been impressed at Punta del Este with
President Belaunde. In rating him
with all the other Latin Chiefs of State, he put him just above
Arosemena. However, the President noted that Ambassador
Jones seemed to have a good opinion of the
Peruvian President. Ambassador Jones replied that
he saw no alternative to the Belaunde Administration. It was important for Peru’s
democratic and constitutional progress that Belaunde finish his term of office (July 1969). He was
the first President in a long line of military and aristocrats to have
any interest in the development of all of Peru. He was not interested
just in the coast, but in developing the high sierra and the jungle as
well. If Belaunde completed his
term in office, he would be only the fifth President in this century to
do so. Finally, a military take-over of the government was no solution
to Peru’s problems. The military could not make the deficit or balance
of payments problems disappear any more than a civilian government.
At one point in the conversation, Ambassador Jones
said he would like authorization to sign some project loans on his
return to Lima—loans which had been authorized in Washington but never
signed. One particularly was for commercialization of agriculture which
would be not only useful to the agricultural sector, but would be an
evidence of United States interest for Belaunde’s administration.
The President asked what the next step would be if the F–5 ploy were
unsuccessful. Ambassador Jones confessed that we
had not yet reached that point in our thinking. Mr. Oliver said that depending upon the
interpretation given the Symington amendment and the final outcome on
the Conte amendment, he hoped we could continue sector and project
lending, although program assistance would be out.
The President indicated that he thought our offer involving substitution
of F–5s for Mirages did not have much chance for success but wished us
luck if we wished to try.
Finally, as the meeting was breaking up, the President again expressed
his doubts about President Belaunde and his ability and political convictions.
500. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–1/69.
Secret. An attached note to the President states: “Mr.
Rostow asked if you could give your
attention to this memo at your earliest convenience.” Another note
indicates that “the President called Mr. Rostow
about this and talked at 2:47 p[.m.] 11–16–67.” Although the
President’s Daily Diary confirms that the conversation took place,
no substantive record has been found. (Johnson Library)Washington, November 13, 1967.
SUBJECT
Peru
At Tab A is a memorandum from Nick Katzenbach recommending approval of
talking points for Ambassador Jones on the Mirage–
F–5 question.Tab A was a November 13
memorandum from Katzenbach to
the President; attached but not printed. The talking points, drafted
by Bowdler on November 10,
presented the latest proposal to replace the existing Mirage
contract with a similar agreement for F–5 fighter aircraft,
including early pilot training and delivery beginning in December
1968. (Ibid., Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–1/69) In telegram 2347 from Lima, November 20,
Jones proposed to avoid the aircraft issue
in his conversation with Belaúnde, “as means help us evaluate future
IPC impact on our overall
interests here.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 6 PERU) The Department replied that
discussion of the issue was left to Jones’
discretion; the program loan, however, was not to be raised without
further instructions. (Telegram 73160 to Lima, November 22;
ibid.) The talking points have been approved by DOD (Nitze) and AID
(Poats).
Over the weekend three developments in Peru both improve and complicate
the prospects for Peruvian acceptance of our F–5 offer:
1. Flexibility in War Minister Doig’s Attitude on
Mirages.
Jerry O’Leary and our Chargé talked to General Doig (Reports are at Tab
B).Telegrams 2213 and 2215 from Lima,
November 11 and 12. (Both ibid., DEF 12–5 Peru) The telegrams were
retyped and forwarded to the President. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–1/69) Jerry
O’Leary, a Washington Star correspondent, was
in Lima to interview General Doig. Both detected certain
flexibility in his attitude toward the Mirages. Doig noted the
difficulty of making a change now, but he also volunteered the precedent
of the Peruvian switch from French to US helicopters in 1965. The Chargé
thinks we have a fighting chance if we give the Peruvians a firm offer
on F–5s.
General Doig spoke warmly of General Harold
Johnson to O’Leary and our Chargé. Our Chargé recommends
a confidential message from General Johnson to Doig to stimulate him to reverse the Mirage
decision. I am leery of any
written messages, but I think Ambassador Jones could talk to General
Johnson and carry an oral message. We have so suggested to Covey
Oliver.
2. Trouble on the International Petroleum Case.
For the past two years, President Belaunde has skillfully wended his way through the
difficult IPC case to keep his pledge to
me not to impair the Company. Last summer when the opposition-controlled
Congress forced his hand with a law nationalizing IPC’s oil properties, Belaunde came up with what seemed like
a wise solution. He signed the law nationalizing the oil fields which
IPC was willing to give up in
exchange for an operating contract, but he also worked out a formula
allowing IPC to continue operating and
referred to the Fiscal Tribunal the controversial question of IPC past taxes.
This past FridayNovember 10.—on the
eve of senatorial bye-elections—Belaunde published the Fiscal Tribunal’s finding that
IPC has “unjustly enriched itself”
and issued two resolutions instituting judicial proceedings against
IPC to recover IPC profits over the past 15 years and back
taxes over the past 8 years. It is hard to see how Belaunde will be able to continue
delivering on his “no impairment” pledge. But before making a final
judgment, we should await Ambassador Jones’ talk
with him. Belaunde understands
that there is no program loan if his bargain with me is not kept.
Politics seems to have dictated Belaunde’s action.
3. Belaunde
Suffers Reverse in By-elections
An important senatorial by-election was held yesterday. Despite the
grandstand play on IPC, Belaunde’s candidate is running far
behind the opposition candidate. To compound Belaunde’s difficulties, the Christian Democrats
announced on the eve of the elections that they were withdrawing from
their alliance with Belaunde’s
party. These reverses are not likely to improve Belaunde’s capacity for decision and
leadership.
Despite the gloomy outlook, I think it is still in our interest to
proceed with the F–5 offer—if Belaunde is willing to cancel the Mirage contract—and
with the $40 million program loan offer—if he takes the self-help
measures and finds the formula for undoing what he appears to have done
to IPC. Belaunde is a weak reed to lean on but better than a de
facto military junta. We should try to prop him up if he is willing to
do those things which are indispensable for our support. The record should show we did
everything possible, within reason, to preserve constitutional
government in Peru.
I recommend that you approve the talking points.
Walt
Approve talking pointsNeither option is checked, but a note on a copy of the
Katzenbach memorandum
indicates that the talking points were approved by the White
House on November 17. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5
PERU)
See me
501. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 6 PERU.
Confidential; Immediate; Limdis.Lima, November 22, 1967,
2251Z.
President received me at noon today and was with him almost an
hour. I reminded him I had been in Washington for week’s
consultation since we had last met and felt he would be interested
in report of my activities there. Said I had found in Washington
great interest in Peru and sincere desire to help Belaunde administration in these
present difficult moments. I was received by President
Johnson same day I arrived and during
subsequent days my Washington sojourn I had interviews with
Secretary of State,According to the
Secretary’s Appointment Book Jones met Rusk
at 11:45 a.m. on November 13; the Secretary’s next appointment
was scheduled for 12:30 p.m. (Johnson Library) No substantive
record of the meeting has been found. Under Secretary
Katzenbach and of course
Assistant Secretary Oliver.
All I had found very preoccupied by situation in Peru and especially
concerned that Belaunde
administration continue until end its term in July 1969 and that
there be no interruption of constitutional government in Peru. As
President Belaunde was aware
from conversations over past nine months principal obstacle to US
financial assistance had been acquisition of supersonic fighter aircraft. While I was in
Washington there had been serious effort to find way to overcome
this obstacle and I had been encouraged by progress made.
Unfortunately almost at end of my consultations news had arrived of
Peruvian government’s action on November 10 against IPC. This news was so unexpected and
for me inexplicable that I had asked permission return to Peru to
investigate new situation thereby created. To me it seemed I
concluded that position of company had drastically worsened and that
government had taken new tack in its policy La Brea y
Parinas.Belaunde replied that recent
actions involving IPC had been taken
as result of moves made by opposition back in July to force his hand
on this issue. He recalled that law 16674 which expropriated the La
Brea y Parinas reserves, (Lima’s 133)Dated July 8. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 6 PERU) had cancelled
previous law giving him carte blanche to settle petroleum issue in
any way he thought best. This law sponsored by opposition had for
first time mentioned debts owed by company. Since these had to be
determined he had referred matter to fiscal tribunal which was
appropriate authority to determine what if any debts were owed
state. From tribunal would go to courts where it would undoubtedly
result in long drawn-out legal case. Issue is now in courts where it
belongs and IPC can defend its
position there. Company claims no back debts owed while tribunal has
estimated sum to be collected. Courts will have to decide. Action of
tribunal is not final verdict. This can only be made by courts, he
explained.As further explanation government’s action against company
November 10 Belaunde referred
to recent by-elections Lima and Trujillo and said that while
elections had been clean and accepted verdict of voters in electing
opposition candidate, they had nevertheless dragged petroleum issue
into elections. On November 9 Andres Townsend, Aprista congressman,
had in electoral speech on TV charged Belaunde administration with having done nothing to
resolve IPC problem (finding of
tribunal against IPC was actually
dated November 2 although not published until November 11). Finally,
President said, IPC mixed too much
in local politics; that it had some kind of relationship with Pedro
Beltran, publisher of opposition newspaper La
Prensa, and that it also was among those along with Marcona
Mining Company that supported Ravines weekly television program
which had consistently attacked Belaunde administration and had done so much damage
to country. These people would probably like to see someone else in
palace to resolve IPC issue in
hurry, Belaunde said with
some bitterness, adding that perhaps they should bring back General
Odria to do it. I expressed surprise at these charges against IPC and said my knowledge of its
extra-commercial activities in country in support of Peruvian
culture had been favorable. Belaunde admitted that company worked efficiently
and had excellent labor relations. Nevertheless during first 20
years of exploitation of La Brea y Parinas Peru had been badly
cheated. I also remonstrated over Belaunde’s inference that IPC and perhaps even we would prefer military
dictatorship to resolve La Brea y Parinas. I assured him again of
deep interest in Washington in democratic constitutional government
throughout hemisphere and particularly of genuine concern that his
administration survive to end its term as one of principal
objectives of our policies. Belaunde said if anything happened to interrupt his
tenure of office before July 1969 he would, unless they shot him,
never give a moment’s peace to interloper in palace since he would
consider himself until mid-1969 Peru’s legally elected chief of
state. Should he be exiled he would station himself as near Peruvian
border as possible to make life difficult for incumbent until next
elections.In response my repeated request for assurances that IPC’s position had not been impaired by
this recent action, Belaunde
replied that he did not feel company’s position had changed; that it
had always been bad, and that he did not see that it had worsened.
In response my reference to constant unfavorable publicity since
government action November 10, including $150 million worth of
so-called debts and almost daily speeches in Congress against
company as evidence that its position had indeed deteriorated,
President said people already knew that IPC had been reason for hold-up on aid to Peru which he
estimated had cost country $100 million.In response my question President said reference of tax and debt
matter to tribunal had not shut door to continued negotiations with
company. He felt settlement could still be found through direct
talks even while case is in courts. Should additional debts
eventually be confirmed by court verdict company could add some of
its installations or other fixed assets over years to make up
difference. He did not anticipate much change in company’s position
either through early conclusion to negotiations or through court
action. Since company had its authority to continue operating under
petroleum director’s resolution (Lima’s 647)Dated August 10. (Ibid.) he felt things
would continue as they were and that whole issue would continue to
remain unresolved and “somewhat on the shelf.” There would certainly
be no conclusion by end of year as opposition congressman had
suggested last night (Lima’s 2390).Dated November 22. (Ibid.)In response another question Belaunde said he was of course willing continue
negotiations with company and to resume conversation with Espinosa, adding he would
telephone to invite him to palace when company manager had returned
from States. He explained had not seen him before his departure
because had been very busy in those days and because he had new Min
of Development (Carriquiri) whom he wished to introduce into and
make familiar with this old problem. (When Espinosa tried see
Belaunde following
decrees of November 10 he passed him off on Carriquiri.)Supersonic issue came into conversation incidentally on several
occasions during our long meeting. At one point Belaunde said laughingly he kept
hoping Dessault Manufacturing Company might fail so Mirage would
never arrive. In next breath he said whole issue was so unimportant
in relation to Peru’s needs and our assistance program. (I took some
time to explain temper of US Congress on this issue which I had been
able observe first-hand during my recent consultations.) I said of
course supersonic issue had been thoroughly discussed in Washington
and that I would hope sometime within next few weeks to go see him
again to discuss its relationship with our desire to help Belaunde administration. I repeated
again evident concern and willingness to help his government survive
through its constitutional period which I had found at all levels in
Washington. President replied with laugh that what he needed was
“supersonic program assistance” or aid at supersonic speed.In general I found Belaunde
in good humor; even made few jokes and our personal relationship
seemed unimpaired by recent events. However on occasion he spoke of
“many, many problems” besetting him, of his many enemies in country
and somewhat wistfully of final months of his term of office as
period preparing to leave things in good order for his
successor.While assurances on IPC not very
satisfactory I interpreted President’s explanation of recent events
as motivated by domestic political objectives and that continued
negotiations are still possible. I believe it clear President has no
intention of resolving La Brea y Parinas problem during his tenure
in office and that he will accept any tactic that drags issue out
over next 20 months. If, as he says, IPC can continue to operate as usual and take all legal
steps to defend itself in courts, company’s position may well
continue to be tenable during rest of Belaunde administration. It then certain, however,
to be hot issue in 1969 campaign. Consequently I believe press
campaign by company either in US or in Lima at this time not
advisable although no objection certainly to company restating its
position regarding validity its titles and lack of debt GOP in press releases or advertisements
and taking whatever vigorous action is open to it in local courts or
eventually through British government in International Court of
Justice.Jones
502. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 Peru.
Confidential; Immediate; Limdis.
Repeated to USCINCSO and La
Paz. Retyped and sent to the White House as an attachment to a
memorandum from Oliver to the
President, March 4; Rostow forwarded the
memorandum to Johnson the next day. Oliver recommended that the
President postpone any decision as to whether the Symington or
Conte–Long amendments would apply to Peru. “An official finding,” he
argued, “could well provoke a crisis of confidence in the Belaunde Government leading to a
military takeover.” (Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Latin America, Vol. VI, 10/67–4/68) Oliver also gave a brief account of
his trip, including his conversation with Belaúnde, at a meeting of the
NSC on March 6; see Document 69.Lima, February 27, 1968,
1826Z.
3720. Ref: Under Secretary’s Memorandum of Feb 16 to me and Tabs.The February 16 memorandum from Katzenbach to Oliver contained instructions for
Oliver’s trip to Peru,
including talking points for his discussion with Belaúnde. An unsigned copy of the
memorandum is in the National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, ARA Files, 1967–69: Lot 74 D
467, Peru 1968. See also Document 66, and
footnote 5 thereto. Subj: Conversation with
President Belaunde on Military
Expenditures and IPC Case. From
Oliver.
With Ambassador and Fowler, had talk with
President Peru on above subject over period ninety-five minutes
afternoon February 26. Conversation with President based on
reference and tabs, especially talking points in Spanish to which I
had added introductory paragraphs designed to highlight (I)
genuineness wish USG to be of
development assistance to Peru (II) my interest in “opening
interior” programs, and (III) explanation that theme my presentation
was to be “Obstacles To Beginning New Aid Negotiations.” President
met us alone; was cordial throughout; showed some physical tension
during periods I was trying to read out or paraphrase talking
points; intervened repeatedly during my presentation, speaking more
in sorrow than in anger about USG
incomprehension Peru’s military needs and casual effects past
failures aid to assist Peru effectively.Symington and Conte–Long amendments.
Military Budget.
I explained fully to President that Executive Branch
USG was under legal
obligation apply these amendments effectively and fully
proposed do so. Sketched upcoming legislative session.
Tendency of President (as Ambassador had predicted) was
to interrupt in defense of importance of military to
Peru and to blame policies of “State Department” for
denying Peru assistance. With persistence I eventually
got President to focus on point that US Executive has
law to enforce; this was done by getting him to read
Symington amendment in Spanish. In summary (see detail below)
President promised us a memorandum tending to show that
for Peruvian FY 1968
(begins April 1, 1968) budget just now being voted under
leadership PM will present reduction overall budget from
dollars 1.3 billion to 1 billion (“… a superhuman effort
whose repercussions may be far reaching…”); total
military portion Peruvian FY 1968 budget will be down slightly from
1967; additions to new military budget being made in
Congress not only do not reverse downward trend but
represent mainly allowance increases designed to keep up
with price rises following devaluation; identification
portions military budgets going into civic action, pay,
uniforms, food, training, and “services to public.”
Unnecessary Military Equipment.
President was not forthcoming with assurances. While not
objecting on “intervention” grounds, he firmly denied
validity foreign opinion on subject. (At one point I
offered to prepare for his personal consideration a list
of what I would consider tentatively to be “unnecessary”
and/or “sophisticated.” He did not take me up.) I did
get it out that missiles, supersonics, certain naval
vessels in these categories. (Comment: CT
will be following very closely and reporting
developments as to weapons categories, especially with
regard to extent to which we might be able to hold Peru
off from certain naval acquisitions during immediately
critical year ahead.)
President said a number of things related to this
subheading. Most worthy of reflection is this: United
States unfortunately sees South America through twin
veils of Mexico and Caribbean countries. Therefore does
not see it clearly. United States does not stop to think
that Mexico has enviable low military expenditures,
because “… as Diaz Ordaz told me, Mexico is the primary
defense orbit of the United States and knows it.” USG would inevitably and
immediately respond if international aggression or
aggressive subversion should threaten the security of
Mexico. Would US surely and under all circumstances
respond if Peru were similarly threatened? Even during a
Vietnam? Could the US response come soon enough? The
President said that no Peruvian chief of state could
take the risks that these questions imply.
Other presidential observations: as to “jet aircraft” (he did not
use “Mirage”); “they are just a few to experiment with. Flying
is like making love, one does not learn how to do it from a
manual.”
As to Canberras: “You (USG) also
said they had no internal security effectiveness, but they do;
and they fly slower than even the passenger airplanes
subversives could fly in on. Is it not illogical to expect that
the military aircraft of Peru should be slower than the
commercial planes that come into our airports?”
“The Washington Post called the aircraft
our air force wants ‘playthings’; well, when someone is in the
market for a new automobile, he does not buy a 1960 model in
1968.”
“De Gaulle and Lubke while visiting here got nothing from Peru.
Peru buys more from the US than it sells to her. When Vietnam is
over you will be looking to your markets even more seriously
than now.”
Belaunde on USAID: (He never used “Alliance”;
I always did.) For one reason or another AID has never given Peru the capital assistance it
gives to Brazil, Chile, Colombia, all in the hundreds of
millions of dollars. Peru has had to finance its own development
by going to the commercial banks. It is this that caused Peru’s
foreign exchange reserves to go down and forced devaluation.
AID assistance has now
become urgent, because AID can
soften the burden of Peru’s development debt. We have spent what
we borrowed on commercial terms wisely; we did not waste it.
After 4-½ years as President, he had come to have more faith in
Peruvians with pickaxes and shovels than in international
lending agencies. What Peru cannot do for itself, AID should do with soft loans.
(Paraphrased.)
In response to my comment that while Fowler and I were in
Colombia, with lending program absolutely stopped for 15 months,
I had envied Ambassador Jones and had
looked with longing at Peru’s flourishing export trade,
Belaunde said: In
those days when things were going well financially in Peru, you
(USG) told us we were too
prosperous to qualify for aid and now when our reserves are
running out, you say we do not qualify because of poor fiscal
performance.
Belaunde on Chile: “Peru has
lost its national territorial treasure in considerable part to this
neighbor. My own family suffered greatly (his ancestors came from
Arica) and Peru was set back financially until only recently by the
loss of territory to Chile. But we are not revanchists. We have our
military system for domestic protection. We would never move against
another country. We respect our international obligations. But if
out of this country there should come further aggression or
subversion against Peru, we must be able to defend ourselves.”
(Paraphrase of three statements, each substantially along above
lines.)Belaunde on development and
public services by military: The President’s first interruption of
my presentation was to sound this theme. He ranged from civic action
to disaster relief and dealing with urban disorder. (Comment: At no time did Belaunde allude to his political
situation in relationship to armed forces. He did roundly castigate
Odriista group in Congress for irresponsible obstructionism and
stressed the accomplishments of his administration in establishing
democracy.)IPC Case: In closing minutes I
finally got to IPC case as “second
obstacle,” stating that I had had a good lawyer-to-lawyer talk with
his Prime Minister about case (septel ).Telegram 3716
from Lima, February 27. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 LA)Belaunde began complaining
that company did not want to negotiate, that it was continuing to be
intransigent. Went
on to say that only two ways to handle this case: either do nothing
(“company has not had one can of gasoline taken from it”) or settle
it completely with a “good situation”. Ambassador and I both weighed
in on side definitive settlement now, I saying that seemed to me all
elements needed for a complete and fair solution now at hand.
Ambassador pointed out that conversations between company and EPF
most encouraging and asked President to support actively director of
EPF in these negotiations. President said he would.Toward end of conversation Belaunde said he had only 18 more months to serve.
On whole he was pessimistic. He had not had the US support that
would have permitted him to lead Peru where it ought to go. Later at
dinner in honor our traveling group he seemed tense at first but
mellowed as we talked of University of Texas days we had shared
(without knowing each other), mildly insulted Texas A&M and
Rice, exchanged warm toasts to President
Johnson and host. Despite my expectation
based on my suggestion at afternoon meeting, Belaunde did not initiate further
substantive talks after the dinner. Both at dinner and in earlier
meeting Belaunde spoke warmly
of President Johnson: said he realizes
President Johnson has problems of world to cope
with and that Congressional situation sometimes did not permit a US
President to do what he wanted or knew was desirable.Ambassador’s comment: The President had obviously been briefed on
subjects to be broached by Assistant Secretary and at first mention
of “military” interrupted Oliver’s presentation to expound on virtues and
constructive role of armed forces in Peru. (Using authority Deptel 115825 we had already
informed Quintanilla, President’s private secretary, of nature of
Oliver’s mission.)Dated February 15. (Ibid., AID(US) 5) While President
continued to interrupt in defense of military, of his democratic
administration and of Peru’s position in hemisphere, Assistant
Secretary patiently persisted in making full presentation his case
based on instructions referred to above. At end of one hour and 35
minutes I am satisfied Belaunde understood our problem and issues involved
despite his reluctance to discuss military expenditures and
particularly military equipment items. President maintained his
composure throughout though there were signs of emotion when
defending role of military or complaining of lack US support for his
development programs. Although evasive in his replies throughout
President did not cut us short—as he might have done—on grounds of
“national dignity” or unwarranted interference in Peruvian internal
affairs. On balance conversations went well considering President’s
position vis-à-vis military here and delicate nature of subject
discussed.Jones
503. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs (Bohlen)
Washington, May 13, 1968.[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee
Files, c. 69, May 22, 1968. Secret; Eyes Only. 2 pages of source text
not declassified.]
504. Information Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security
Council Staff to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File,
Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–11/68. Confidential. A notation on the
memorandum indicates the President saw it.Washington, July 30, 1968, 5 p.m.
SUBJECT
President Belaunde
Announces International Petroleum Company Settlement
On Sunday, July 28, in his annual message to the Peruvian Congress,
President Belaunde announced
settlement of the long-standing dispute with the International Petroleum
Company (ESSO-N.J.) over the La Brea-Parinas (LB–P) oil fields.
The settlement is based on a formula proposed to Belaunde by IPC. Agreement so far is only in
principle. The detailed agreement remains to be negotiated.
The essential elements of the deal are: —IPC hands over to the
government all subsurface rights in the LB–P oil fields and all
surface installations.—The government gives IPC a
quit-claim on past taxes on LB–P operations, agrees to sell at a
mutually acceptable price all crude, natural gasoline and gas
from LB–P fields to IPC for
processing at its Talara refinery, and grants IPC the right to explore and
produce petroleum in an area outside LB–P.—IPC will expand its Talara
refinery.—The government will grant storage, distribution and marketing
concessions to IPC in
Peru.
The deal is a statesman-like way out of a difficult problem. I hope it
does not founder in the negotiation of the specifics. Until these are
completed, and the agreement signed, it would be premature to consider
the dispute closed.On August 13
Rostow informed the President that the
IPC problem had been finally
settled, thereby removing “this dangerous matter from U.S.-Peruvian
relations once and for all.” (Telegram CAP 81956 to the LBJ Ranch; ibid.)
WGB
505. Editorial Note
In a meeting with Ambassador Jones on September 18,
1968, President Belaúnde
requested U.S. assistance for five transportation projects. Belaúnde expected that the United
States would support the projects “as evidence of its appreciation of
government’s courage in finally resolving this explosive problem [IPC case] and as a token of its support for
government’s fiscal policies and democratic constitutional character.”
(Telegram 7386 from Lima, September 18; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 PERU) While citing several factors that would delay
approval of the request, the Department indicated that “in light of
strong GOP self-help program we have
positive attitude.” (Telegram 245358 to Lima, September 26; ibid.,
AID(US) 9 PERU) In a September 21
letter to Director of the Office of Ecuadorean-Peruvian Affairs
William P. Stedman, Jr.,
Jones made a personal appeal for swift action:
“I cannot overemphasize the urgency of a favorable response to the
Belaunde Administration in
what is perhaps the most precarious period of his entire six years.”
(Johnson Library, Papers of John Wesley
Jones, Classified [Correspondence]) Stedman replied by describing the
bureaucratic difficulties involved in processing the loans: “The
memorandum to get Peru off the Symington black list has been approved by
Mr. Gaud and the White House has
been notified. That opens up the way for the PL 480 for rice for which a memorandum approved by
Secretary Freeman and Mr. Gaud was sent last week to the Bureau of the
Budget for transmittal to the President. We ought to have word soon.”
Stedman insisted, however,
that the Department fully appreciated “the urgency of getting the rice
and the loans.” (Letter from Stedman to Jones, September 30;
ibid.)
506. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA Files, 1967–69: Lot 74 D 467,
September 1968—CTO Chron. Confidential. Drafted by Shumate on September 20 and
cleared by Vaky and Stedman. The memorandum is an
uninitialed copy.Washington, September 20, 1968.
SUBJECT
Peru—Delicate Political Situation Threatens Upset of Recent
Economic Advances and Possibly Constitutional Government
The decisive action of the Hercelles Cabinet to remedy the deteriorating
economic situation in Peru and to solve the long-standing IPC problem has brought about a reaction
from the right and the left which now threatens the stability of the
Cabinet, its economic recovery programs, and quite possibly the
constitutional process.
Background
After a steadily deteriorating economic situation had continued for ten
months, the Peruvian Congress granted the executive branch sixty days of
extraordinary powers to cope with the situation. The Cabinet of Premier
Oswaldo Hercelles acted
quickly to remedy the economic deterioration. New taxes such as a large
gasoline tax increase, however, were bound to elicit adverse
reaction.
The package of measures taken by the Finance Minister, Manuel Ullos, re-established confidence
on the part of the IMF, foreign banks,
and foreign investors, and they are cooperating with the Government on
stand-by arrangements and foreign debt rescheduling.
The Government also arrived at a settlement of the long-standing dispute
with the American-owned International Petroleum Company. A complicated
arrangement was devised in which the Company turned over the disputed
oil lands in return for an exoneration from all alleged past debts and
the right to continue its other operations in Peru.
The good effect of the Peruvian Government’s actions of the past three
months and its capacity to continue its recovery program are now in
jeopardy because of domestic political considerations.
In addition to the public reaction against the new taxes, the IPC settlement is under strong attack.
Die-hard elements on the extreme right and the extreme left have joined
together to attack the solution as being unfavorable to Peru and a
“give-away.” The Peruvian military has been reported as being quite concerned about
the reaction to the IPC solution and
there are even rumors of certain elements considering this as a pretext
for a coup.
Present Situation
At the present moment, according to our Embassy, [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified], and even the
Peruvian Embassy here, the situation is delicate. President Belaunde is in his sixth and final
year, with elections scheduled for June, 1969. The apparent probable
winners of next year’s elections, APRA,
hold one of the keys in the situation. Its majority congressional bloc
supported the President in granting extraordinary powers and on settling
the IPC dispute. Nevertheless, APRA does not wish to be tied to the
program if it becomes unpopular, especially with regard to taxes or the
oil dispute. More importantly, it desperately wants elections to be held
and realizes it must give Belaunde at least enough support to ward off coup-minded
elements. However, influential elements in the military still fear
APRA, and would prefer a coup to a
democratic Aprista victory.
The Peruvian military thus holds another key in the situation. They can,
of course, intervene at a moment’s notice and often have in the past.
During the last year of crises, however, despite the numerous
opportunities at hand, the military has refrained from taking action. As
the presidential elections draw closer, this crisis is a greater danger
to constitutional government.
President Belaunde is the third
key element. He is a skilled politician, and on many occasions has
fashioned solutions from apparently irreconcilable political problems.
His will to finish his term in office and preside over an orderly and
democratic transition is an important element in the equation.
Since the President is not directly threatened by a Cabinet crisis, one
of the safety valves in moments of extreme stress is the resignation of
the Cabinet. In the past year, there have been four Cabinets in Peru.
The present Cabinet is by far the strongest Peru has had in years. Its
demise would be a body blow to the economic recuperation of the country
and would inflict a staggering set-back to confidence both within and
outside of Peru. Further, the fact is there are practically no competent
individuals left who would accept Cabinet positions in this lame duck
Government. Therefore, the military might feel compelled to take over or
to install military officers in key civilian ministeries.
The United States is largely on the sidelines in this situation. Our aid
involvement has varied from minimal to naught (in 1968) and our
relationship has been beset by serious and emotional problems—IPC, the Mirage purchase, tuna boat
seizures, etc. Unfortunately, at almost any moment these U.S.-Peruvian
bilateral issues can create problems of great importance in Peruvian politics. This is
especially true when the problem involves possible application of
legislation such as the Symington, Conte–Long, Hickenlooper, Pelly and Ship Loan
Recall Amendments.
We expect Mr. Hercelles (who holds both Prime and Foreign Minister
portfolios) to attend the UNGA—probably
after October 5—if the political situation is sufficiently calm. We will
provide you with current briefing material when an appointment with you
is arranged.
507. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 PERU. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to USCINCSO for POLAD.Lima, September 28, 1968,
0007Z.
7578. For Oliver from Ambassador.
Subj: Political Atmosphere.
As you have seen from our recent cables reporting the political
battle which erupted out of criticism of the IPC settlement, and the related subsequent split in the
Belaunde Accion Popular
Party, there has been a drastic change in the political atmosphere
in recent weeks. Heretofore, considerable optimism had been
engendered as a result of the Hercelles’ cabinet acting effectively
and capably for ninety days in use of the special powers granted by
the Congress. The fact that the Congress was out of session during
that period also assisted by bringing about a sort of moratorium on
politics. Unfortunately, the feeling of optimism has been seriously
eroded as a result of the spectacle of the President and Vice
President, through their adherants, engaging in demeaning battle
over the party machinery and facilities and the bitter nightly
debate of the issues in the Congress. This together with widespread
mistrust of the government’s handling of the IPC settlement has clearly reduced confidence in the
democratic machinery and has doubtless encouraged many Peruvians to
think along traditional lines of an authoritarian solution. As a
result there is a great deal of talk about golpe and some air of
expectancy.We have not been able to pinpoint anything specific and have
reason to believe that there is considerable lack of unity within
the military itself. However, if a pretext were provided, as for
example by serious public disorders, the military might move
institutionally.Last night a rightist demagogue, Leon Velarde, who manipulates
some Barriada dwellers for his own purposes spoke seriously to a
political officer of the Embassy in terms of the imminence of a
golpe in which he planned to be involved. The Embassy officer, in
response to his query as to our attitude, told him in no uncertain
terms that the US Government and this Embassy is dedicated to the
fulfillment by the Belaunde
administration of its term of office and the democratic selection of
a successor. You may be sure we will lose no opportunity to make
this policy crystal clear wherever we think it should be
stated.I don’t intend that this be an alarmist telegram but believe you
should know that there has now been created an atmosphere of tension
and confusion. Up to this moment, however, all [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and
service attaché sources are negative on specific military plans for
golpe.Rostow repeated this assessment in a note
to the President, October 1: “There is some talk of a military
coup, but it does not appear imminent.” (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III,
10/67–11/68) A CIA information
report on the possibility of a coup is [text
not declassified]; ibid.Jones
508. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–11/68.
Confidential. Received in the President’s office at 4:55 p.m.
Another copy indicates the memorandum was drafted by Lewis. (Ibid.,
Memos to the President, Walt W.
Rostow, Vol. 97)Washington, October 2, 1968, 4:40
p.m.
SUBJECT
Peru—PL 480 Agreement for
Rice
The attached memorandum from Bill Gaud and Orville Freeman (Tab A)Tab
A was a memorandum from Gaud
and Freeman to the President, September 20;
attached but not printed. recommends that you authorize a
$10.7 million PL 480 sales agreement with
Peru for 60,000 tons of rice. Charlie Zwick concurs (Tab B).Tab B was a memorandum from Schultze to the President,
September 30; attached but not printed.
This agreement will be the first major new aid for Peru in over a year. A
proposed AID loan package of about $25
million will also be ready for your approval in the near future. This
proposal serves three important purposes: —to provide much needed food supplies after a severe drought
struck Peru this year;—to provide tangible political support for President Belaunde at a key point in his
administration, after he has taken several difficult development
decisions;—to help increase US commercial sales of rice and counter
Communist Chinese competition.
In recent months, Belaunde has
shown real courage in tackling Peru’s economic problems, including
putting through a major tax reform. He has also resolved the old and
vexing dispute with the International Petroleum Company to IPC’s satisfaction, thereby removing it as
an irritant from US-Peruvian relations. These acts have produced
expected political turmoil, and a Cabinet shake-up has just occurred.
However, the new Cabinet, headed by a respected close friend of
Belaunde, includes the key
Ministers from his predecessor’s Cabinet. It should continue the
encouraging direction the Peruvian Government has recently followed.
Ambassador Jones has appealed for quick action on
this request to help demonstrate our support for Belaunde’s position.In telegram 7619 from Lima, October 1,
Jones reiterated the importance of U.S.
assistance: “It is urgent that I be authorized as soon as possible
to make favorable response to Belaunde’s appeal for help as mark of confidence and
support for him as constitutional President. I had hoped both PL–480 negotiating instructions and
approval of Pucallpa–Aguaytia road project would have been in our
hands by now. Belaunde needs
help and needs it now. Swift approval of either or both these
programs could be significant.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 PERU) I agree that a
show of support at this moment is both warranted and needed.
As outlined in Charlie Zwick’s memorandum, there was a question last year
as to whether Peruvian military expenditures would not warrant
application of the Symington Amendment. Belaunde has held down the level of military spending
since that time, however, and State/AID
have now determined that Peru is not diverting any US assistance to
military expenditures, nor investing its own resources unnecessarily to
a degree that interferes with its development.
All interested parties agree in recommending that you approve the PL 480 program for Peru at this time. The
only difference in view concerns whether some notice should be given to
Congress that you are proposing new aid to Peru after a hiatus.
Katzenbach and Zwick think it
might be advisable to inform key members of the Congress, particularly
Senators Symington and Morse, that Peru does not fall within the purview
of the Symington Amendment. Gaud
and Oliver prefer not to take any initiative towards the
Congress, but are fully prepared to defend the determination should any
question be raised. Mike Manatos
agrees with Gaud and Oliver that the less said the better at
this moment. I also share this view.
Walt
Approve loan
Disapprove loan
Call me
Inform key members of Congress, particularly
Senators Symington and Morse
Do not inform Congress
Call meThe President
checked this option. When Rostow learned that the President had read the
memorandum without taking positive action, he urged Larry
Temple, Special Counsel to the President, to ask that Johnson read the “marked
passages” again. Temple returned the memorandum to the
President. (Memorandum from Temple to the President, October 2,
5:10 p.m.; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country
File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–11/68) According to the President’s
Daily Diary Rostow did
not call Johnson until
11:45 p.m. (Johnson Library) No substantive record of this
conversation, or evidence that it concerned Peru, has been
found.
509. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–11/68.
Confidential. A copy was sent to George
Christian. A notation on the memorandum indicates the
President saw it. Another copy indicates that the memorandum was
drafted by Lewis. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 97)Washington, October 3, 1968, 10:50
a.m.
SUBJECT
Peru Coup
Contrary to our latest intelligence assessments, the Peruvian Army moved
early this morning to oust President Belaunde and install a “Revolutionary Junta”.President Johnson was informed of the coup d’etat at 6:30
a.m., when a briefing officer in the White House Situation Room
forwarded a cable from the Embassy. The officer noted that he had
briefed Rostow. (Note from
Wotring to the President; ibid.) The cable in question, flash
telegram 7639 from Lima, 030859Z, stated: “Apparent golpe in
process, but have no details.” Embassy reports on the progress of
the coup are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9
PERU. Unhappiness over the IPC settlement was one obvious motive.
No violence or active resistance has yet occurred, but some could develop
during the day. Early reports suggest the Navy and Air Force were not
fully supporting the Army.
President Belaunde was arrested by
the Army at his palace and flown to exile in Buenos Aires by the
military.
We will soon have to face the question of recognition of the Junta, but
should not do so until the dust settles.In
telegram 249329 to Lima, October 3, the Department reported:
“Although we have not said so publicly, overthrow of Peruvian
Government has effect of suspending diplomatic relations with GOP. We are assessing details of this
general problem and in meantime know you will observe the cautions
about contact with revolutionary forces.” (Ibid.) Full
consultation with the other OAS
governments will be required. Meanwhile, our AID Mission Director—now here on consultation—will remain
here and AID will suspend plans for new
aid to Peru.
The last coup in Latin America occurred June 1966 in Argentina.
Walt
510. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 PERU. Confidential; Immediate.
Repeated to Buenos Aires, La Paz, Quito, Santiago, USCINCSO for POLAD, DOD for DIA, and USUN. Rostow
forwarded a copy of the telegram to the President on October 3; a
notation on his transmittal memorandum indicates that
Johnson saw the telegram. (Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III,
10/67–11/68)Lima, October 3, 1968,
2045Z.
7661. Subject: Preliminary Analysis of Coup Motives.
Embassy telegram 7578 of September 27 [28]Document 507. reported drastic
deterioration in political atmosphere which reduced confidence in
democratic machinery and produced air of expectancy on possible
coup. It also contained
one clear report of a coup threat. It is our preliminary view that
military move was basically motivated by a determination to prevent
an APRA victory in the election
scheduled for next June. The total disarray of all other political
parties which split along factional lines, culminating in the
division of Belaunde’s Accion
Popular Party into warring factions, one headed by him and one
headed by Vice President Seoane, served to dramatize the fact that
the single, unified and disciplined party remaining was APRA. The fact that APRA leaders were increasingly
confident of victory and insisted that Haya de la Torre would be
their candidate served to ignite the fears of those in the military
determined that Haya would never become President of Peru.In the above conditions, military golpistas could take preventive
action now, utilizing a pretext, or they could wait to see what
happened. Apparently their preference was to execute a preventive
coup rather than risk nullifying the results of an election which
probably, as viewed at this time, would have resulted in an APRA victory.In telegram 7651 from Lima, October 3, the
Embassy reported that Juan Velasco
Alvarado, commanding general of the army and
chairman of the Joint Command, had emerged as the leader of the
coup d’état. The Embassy considered Velasco “highly nationalistic and suspicious of
U.S. policies,” “ambitious, self-confident, not easily
influenced, highly respected, extremely competent and
intelligent,” a “strong anti-Communist” and “firmly anti-APRA.” (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 PERU) In telegram 7705
from Lima, October 4, the Embassy offered a “preliminary
evaluation” of the new military government. (Ibid.)The political confusion and divisions which erupted out of
criticism of the La Brea y Parinas settlement, and general public
believe that the government had not been fully honest in what it
revealed about this settlement, provided a pretext which was seized
by the golpistas.Factors which helped create the atmosphere in which the military
golpistas could find pretext to move were such things as the
unrelenting, bitter attack on the government and its financial and
economic policies made by Pedro Beltran and his La
Prensa newspaper, as well as by El
Comercio newspaper, once a staunch supporter of Belaunde, which was bitter in its
attack on the government over the La Brea y Parinas issue. The
ineptness of APRA leadership which
forced resignation of the Hercelles cabinet and thus contributed to
the atmosphere of political crisis also helped bring on the coup
which APRA did not want.There are undoubtedly many conservative Peruvians who will welcome
this move and some may have been involved in it. Such people have
been increasingly hostile to the general trend of the Belaunde government and to many of
the measures taken by the Hercelles cabinet under its special powers
such as the imposition of a land tax, the tax on profits, the
abolishment of bearer shares, and the reform of the tax collection
system.Jones
511. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–11/68.
Confidential. A copy was sent to George
Christian. A notation on the memorandum indicates the
President saw it. Another copy indicates the memorandum was drafted
by Lewis. (Ibid., Memos to
the President, Walt W.
Rostow, Vol. 97)Washington, October 4, 1968.
SUBJECT
Peru Coup
The Military Junta appears firmly in control in Peru, supported by a
united military establishment and some conservative civilians. Scattered
violent protest acts by students are being quickly suppressed.On October 5 the Embassy received a note,
dated October 3, which officially announced the formation of a new
government under Division General Juan
Velasco Alvarado. The note declared that the
government had decided to respect its international obligations and
intended to maintain cordial relations with the United States.
(Telegram 7726, October 6; National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 PERU) Labor has not
heeded an effort to mount a general strike. Leaders of the majority
APRA party strongly oppose the
coup, but are apparently lacking weapons or capability for active
resistance.
Detailed contingency plans for the coup were drawn up by the Peruvian
Army many months ago which accounts for the smoothness of the operation.
We don’t know exactly what triggered their final decision, but the main
motives apparently included: —the growing conviction that a much hated APRA leader would succeed
Belaunde as President
if elections were held next year;—unhappiness with political instability and economic
doldrums;—lack of confidence in Belaunde’s choice of military ministers and his
disregard of “military interest” in such matters as budgets and
sophisticated weapons;—resentment at the terms of the IPC oil settlement;—personal ambition of General Velasco, Army Chief of Staff, soon to be
retired.
State is carrying on consultations with other OAS governments prior to making any recommendation about
recognition of the new regime. This process could go on for an extended
period, perhaps as long as a month.
Unlike the case of the Argentine coup in 1966, we have made no official
statement condemning the action of the military leaders, although State
officials have made our unhappiness clear on a background basis.
Oliver believes it better to
allow the weight of Latin
American sentiment to register first. So far, only Venezuela has
officially deplored the coup.
Secretary Rusk appears Sunday
morning on “Issues and Answers” and may, of course, be questioned about
these events.Rusk was interviewed, but did
not receive any questions on Peru. For a transcript of the
interview, see Department of State Bulletin,
November 4, 1968, pp. 471–480.
Walt
512. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in PeruSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 PERU. Secret; Priority. Drafted
and approved by Oliver.
Repeated as Tosec 83 to USUN for Rusk, who was attending the 23rd session of the
United Nations General Assembly.Washington, October 6, 1968,
2001Z.
250839. For Ambassador from Oliver. Subject: Recognition Doctrine and the Peruvian
Crisis.
My reply to you Saturday night was approved above me in Department
as to general line.The Embassy had
requested instructions on overtures from individuals claiming to
represent the new government in telegram 7725 from Lima, October
5. (Ibid., POL 23–9 PERU) The
Department’s response, drafted by Oliver and cleared in
substance by Acting Secretary Katzenbach, stated: “Your reception of overtures
should be cool and you should make it clear to intermediaries
that you are only receiving suggestions for transmittal to
Washington. You may add that USG
especially interested in Junta’s plans as to timing return to
elected government.” (Telegram 250828 to Lima, October 5;
ibid.) This message relays for your consideration some so
far entirely individual thoughts of mine as to possible courses for
“post dust-settling” future. Herein I shall seek to open dialogue on
relative desirability in Peruvian case of moving U.S. recognition
doctrine and practice toward a variant of Estrada DoctrineDoctrine espoused in September 1930 by
Mexican Foreign Minister Genero Estrada held that recognition of
another government does not necessarily imply acceptance of its
legitimacy. See Marjorie M.
Whiteman, ed., Digest of
International Law, Vol. 2, pp. 85–89. without
losing positive
elements of Rio Resolution 26Resolution
XXVI of the Final Act of the Second Special Inter-American
Conference, signed on November 30, 1965, in Rio de Janeiro,
recommended that OAS members
consult before recognizing a de facto government, giving due
consideration to: a) whether a foreign country was involved in
the overthrow of the old regime; and b) whether the new regime
promised to hold free elections, to honor its international
obligations, and to respect human rights. After consultation,
each country was free to decide whether to maintain diplomatic
relations. (The OAS Chronicle, February 1966, p.
27) as pressure points in favor of early return to
elected government and assured respect for basic human
freedoms.Your preliminary characterization of JuntaSee Document 510 and
footnote 3 thereto. coincides exactly with my
feelings about it. There was no justification for this heavy-handed
move; and it is very much in doubt whether Junta will be able to
pick up quickly and ably enough the complicated strands of Peru’s
critical fiscal, foreign exchange, credit, and development needs.
Junta officers probably do not have the savvy—and they may not be
able easily to mobilize it outside their uniformed circle—that is
essential if Peru is not to slip into a real economic and financial
tailspin. For example, I wonder today and shall try to find out
early in the week what IMF’s
thinking is about future of standby.On recognition, it is apparent to me that our developing practices
as to responses to coups no longer fits exactly within the textbook
doctrinal pattern, i.e., one that assumes that the constitutional
discontinuity caused by a coup automatically bars all standard
intergovernmental relationships pending a new act of recognition of
a golpista regime as the government of a State. (Hereinafter,
“traditional doctrine.”) Analytically, the main disadvantages of the
traditional doctrine center on (i) historically-based general
Latin-American distrust of USG use
of power to withhold recognition; (ii) inhibition of any substantive
relations, including diplomatic protection, during period of
non-recognition; (iii) vast uncertainties about status of
contractual relations (below international agreements level) between
USG and the other state.
Advantages of traditional view are (i) provident utilization of
pressures arising from extra-constitutional regime’s needs for our
recognition; (ii) symbolization of our dislike of “bad”
extra-constitutional changes, such as Peruvian one is.Rio Resolution 26 may be based on assumption that traditional
doctrine as to recognition will continue. (I have not been able to
research this.) However, it does not seem to me that Rio 26
absolutely requires use of traditional doctrine. And as we know from
Argentine case and current editorial comment about Peru, formal
recognition following
consultations under 26 does “ring hollow”, as October 6 New York Times editorial says.The New York Times editorial reads: “The
State Department has properly withheld diplomatic recognition of
the military junta that has unconstitutionally seized power. But
the announcement that the United States is consulting with Latin
American Governments on how to deal with the situation rings
hollow.”At some appropriate time, I think USG ought to shift toward the notion that a coup
affects the intensity, intimacy and levels of our relations but does
not automatically cut them off. I do not speak for anyone but myself
on this. The question I raise with you in context of this message is
whether the Peruvian coup might be the occasion for announcing and
following a new doctrine. It does not require an immediate response
from you, of course. Moreover, it may be that my personal views will
not be acceptable. You will be kept informed.Another alternative would be to follow in practice, but not
announce, a new doctrine on this occasion. So far our responses
(press briefings and your authorizations) fit within traditional
doctrine, albeit somewhat imperfectly as some uncertainties already
expressed by the involved American public show.Related to para 6 is the problem of divergent attitudes in our
business community arising from conflicting interests as to
continuity or discontinuity in our formal relations. Moreover, if I
may refer to legal matters outside present responsibilities, there
are problems arising from tendency judiciary here to follow
Department’s views as to recognition or not in litigation involving
a revolutionary regime’s authority or lack of it to deal with state
assets and other interests localized in this country or to make laws
and rules that our Courts will treat as having governmental
authority.I want you to know that my personal feeling is one of revulsion
and that if it were otherwise feasible and in our interest, I would
not want to deal with Junta at all. Here I think I only reflect
general feeling in this country. But I know that indefinite
“suspension” is not going to be possible; and I am seeking the best
way, not only to minimize losses, in the public affairs field and
otherwise, but to help develop a more adequate approach to the coup
problem in today’s world.I have cancelled a Southwestern speaking trip under Council for
Foreign Relations auspices and shall tend store here during period
immediately ahead. We are working closely with Cates and Poole (on
TDY) at USUN, and I think that Vaky ought to go up to New York during week. The
Latin Americans are meeting at UN on
morning October 7. We are in close touch as to lines of inquiry and
expect to have rather full readbacks.Nearer to immediate operations, we need to get as clear a view as
we can of circumstances surrounding IPC settlement. Junta’s perjorative statements are
receiving uncritical acceptance here. I do not propose we get into
act, certainly not before IPC
itself; but we do need to know all there is to know.In telegram 7797 from Lima, October 9,
Jones agreed with the “pragmatic
approach” of Oliver’s
recognition policy: “a prolonged suspension of several months or
more would place intolerable stain on traditional ties between
U.S. and Peru, seriously endanger private U.S. interests and
probably prove counter productive in end.” (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 16 PERU)Katzenbach
513. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in PeruSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 PERU. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted and approved by
Oliver.Washington, October 10, 1968,
1701Z.
253028. For Ambassador from Oliver. Reference: Prior Traffic on Recognition
Doctrine.
“Pragmatic” is a term I never use in relationship to our foreign
policy. It simply has too much lustre and anyway it is an incorrect
reference to the philosophies of James, Royce,
and Peirce.ARA/LA had a good talk out with U,
M and L, WednesdayOctober 9.
forenoon. Naturally, the doctrinal point was not central. I very
much doubt that the Peruvian situation, as it is beginning to shape
up (IPC expropriation), will be the
occasion for announcing any new recognition doctrine.On October 9 the Velasco regime issued a decree expropriating
IPC property in Peru,
including La Brea y Pariñas oil fields and the industrial
complex at Talara.But, and this is quite important: it was agreed that we can
communicate with Junta on a wide range of matters, provided we
assert that the act of communication is not “implied” recognition.
This includes activities as to diplomatic protection and of warning
about possible Sugar Act consequences of expropriation. Hereafter
our suggestions and instructions on above and other matters will
take this evaluation
into account. (What has been done, you see, is to free ourselves
from tyranny of concept that a coup automatically cuts permissible
communications during “suspension” down to those rather narrowly
related to the resumption of relations.)As we go forward, there is one thing we have to watch with great
care: our public deprecation of coup has for various reasons been
limited to working levels. (Personally I think it wiser not to
advise public lamentations at very high levels, only to resume
relations, as in 1962, within month. This is not to be taken as a
time estimate this occasion.) But not having rended our garments and
torn our hair in public heretofore, it would be bad in Latin America
and here if we should go very suddenly (even though
happenstantially) into great public outcry after IPC nationalization. Fortunately,
IPC’s parent does not want us
to. We shall not comment on IPC at
press briefing Thursday unless asked; and if we are, response is a
careful one that I drafted.In the press
briefing on Thursday, October 10, the Secretary fielded several
questions, including a query into the expropriation of IPC holdings in Peru. Rusk admitted that “we were
concerned and disappointed about the developments in Peru.” “We
don’t know yet what this announced move against the IPC will involve,” he explained.
“Presumably, the company will be the first to discover that and
see what the issues are. But we shall be following that closely
at the appropriate time.” (Department of State Bulletin, November 4, 1968, p. 481)I am sure you agree that CT and you
have to keep an almost psycho-ward watch on Junta leaders. Balance
between firmness and therapeutic permissiveness is very critical. As
in the World War II story about national character (as told by the
Spanish), we do not want to goad Peru into jumping out of airplane
without a parachute! It is going to be hard, I very well know, to
square what is professionally wise with wide public expectations
based on this or that simplistic notion. But I still have faith that
if we do it right and express ourselves adequately, results will not
be adversely viewed by public here and elsewhere in
Hemisphere.Rusk
514. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–9 PERU. Confidential; Immediate.
Repeated to USCINCSO and USUN.Lima, October 11, 1968,
1602Z.
7870. Ref: (A) State 252730;In telegram
252730 to Lima, October 9, the Department instructed
Jones to deliver an “ordinary business
letter” to General Edgardo Mercado
Jarrin, addressing the new Foreign Minister by
military title only, in response to the revolutionary government’s
note of October 3. “There is no danger,” the Department explained,
“that such a response will itself be taken as marking official
resumption of relations.” The letter asked: (a) when the government
intended to return to constitutional rule; and (b) whether it would
observe the property rights of foreign nationals in accordance with
international law. (Ibid.) (B) Lima 7850;In telegram 7850 from Lima, October 10, the Embassy
doubted that the new government would offer assurances about
property rights “in light of developments yesterday regarding
certain assets of IPC.”
(Ibid.) (C) State 253684.In
telegram 253684 to Lima, October 11, the Department replied: “Your
points carefully considered when sending letter decided and
conclusion reached that essential ask questions.” (Ibid.)
DCM met privately last night with
FonOff SecGen Ambassador Javier Perez de Cuellar and delivered
letter as directed ref. (A). In doing so DCM called attention to fact that communication was a
letter and not a note and that it addressed to General Mercado without further title.
DCM said USG considered it important informally to establish
dialogue for development of essential information without in any way
implying recognition. Perez de Cuellar expressed understanding and
agreement.SecGen noted he career officer devoted without political
inclination to serving his country and therefore continuing with
revolutionary regime. He noted unhappily that General Mercado was his fifth Foreign
Minister in about two years. He expressed opinion that President
General Velasco and cabinet
were patriotic Peruvians; nationalistic but not leftists. He hoped
there could soon be constructive relations with the US so that the
government would not become so frustrated as to find it necessary to
deal with Communist regimes and which was not its desire.SecGen said that he had received alarming information from Carlos
Gibson in Washington about Hickenlooper and Sugar Act implications but in telex
conversation with the Peruvian Chargé had been reassured on basis
that USG had made no drastic public
condemnations either of the golpe or of the expropriation.DCM said the lack of condemnatory
statements by the USG should not be
interpreted as in any way approving either act. DCM said it should be clear to the new
government that the US deplored the interruption of
constitutionalism and hoped for its prompt resumption. As for IPC, the United States recognizes the
right of expropriation but also expects fulfillment of the
obligation under international law to make just compensation. DCM noted then that it was precisely
these concerns which motivated the letter at this time to General
Mercado and that the
questions posed therein were on these two subjects. As for the
IPC matter, DCM said, an important earnest of the
new regime’s good intentions would be for it to put itself in
contact with the company for the purpose of discussing
compensations. Since this obviously is an issue in dispute,
willingness of the regime to submit it to established procedures for
negotiation, mediation or adjudicating of such disputes would be
important.Perez de Cuellar welcomed opportunity for informal contact and
said GOP had already established
such contacts through its missions in Washington and USUN. DCM said for time being it would probably be
inadvisable for any direct meetings between Ambassador and General
Mercado and asked to be
advised whether the latter would wish to communicate informally with
DCM via the SecGen or name
another intermediary without official position in the GOP. SecGen expressed opinion that he
would be intermediary as he had been, as Chief of Protocol, during
the 1962 golpe.General Mercado’s reply
will be communicated as soon as received. Assume Dept will instruct
other ARA posts as to content this
message as needed.Jones
515. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–1/69. Confidential. Another copy
indicates the memorandum was drafted by Shumate on October 10.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL 23–9 PERU) Forwarded to
the President as an attachment to a memorandum from
Rostow, October 14, in which
Rostow explained: “Since Rusk’s memorandum was drafted, the
Junta has announced its intention to hold a national ‘referendum’ on
the question of whether a new constitution is required before any
elections are to be held. None of the Latin governments, except
Venezuela, is disposed to insist on a commitment to hold elections
as a pre-condition for recognition.” (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–1/69)Washington, October 11, 1968.
SUBJECT
The Peruvian Situation
A Military Junta headed by Juan
Velasco, Commanding General of the Army, deposed Peru’s
President Belaunde October 3,
sending him into exile, installing an all-military Cabinet. As a result
of the coup, diplomatic relations are in a state of suspension and U.S.
assistance programs are under review. The Revolutionary Government,
which appears to be highly nationalistic, justified its action on
grounds of general unrest and loss of public confidence in the
Government. The new regime particularly stressed the pretext that the
August 13 agreement with the Government and the International Petroleum
Company (IPC) over the La Brea y Pariñas
oil fields was a sell-out. One of the Junta’s first acts was to declare
null the Act of Talara, which formed the basis of the IPC settlement, and on October 9 the
President announced the expropriation of IPC’s oil fields, refinery, and other assets. In other
statements the regime has given no indication of plans for scheduling of
elections, but it has stated that all international obligations will be
met.
The United States has initiated bilateral consultations through its
Embassies with other Latin American Governments on the situation in Peru
and the question of recognition, in accordance with procedures
established at the Second Inter-American Conference of 1965. Public
comment by Department of State spokesmen has been limited to factual
answers to questions about the situation and expressions of concern
about the coup.
Preliminary indications are that, in addition to those countries which
follow the practice of automatically recognizing new regimes on
continuing relations, most Latin American countries will resume
relations relatively soon.
This would also be true of Western European and other trading nations.
Only Venezuela has announced it is severing relations.
The implications of the IPC expropriation
are being explored, including all relevant U.S. legislative provisions.
These include the FAA and Sugar Act
which can require a cutoff of U.S. assistance and of the sugar quota
when property owned by U.S. citizens is taken without compensation.
Standard Oil of New Jersey, the parent company of IPC, has asked that we take a reserved
public position of the IPC take-over
pending their own exploration of the possibilities of reaching some
acceptable solution with the Peruvian regime.
In the period of “suspended” relations, we are making a realistic attempt
to obtain from the military regime indications of its intentions to
return to constitutional government within a reasonable time. We are
also seeking its views as to international obligations to foreign
citizens and property in Peru. While seeking clarification of these
points, we are maintaining a flexible attitude to lower level
administrative contact with the Military Government so that selectively
we can do what we determine to be in our own interest, such as
protecting American citizens, obtaining clearance for aircraft, and
disbursing on loans to private parties. It is too early to judge when we
will make a recommendation to you on resumption of relations.
Dean Rusk
516. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PERU–US. Confidential; Immediate;
Limdis. Repeated to USCINCSO for POLAD and USUN.Lima, October 16, 1968,
2042Z.
7963. Department for Oliver.
Subject: Meeting With GOP Officials.
Ref: A) State 252730;See footnote 2, Document 514. B) Lima
7923;Dated October 14. (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
POL PERU–US) C) Lima
7888.Dated October 12. (Ibid., POL 15–1 PERU)
Summary: Ambassador and DCM met last
night with revolutionary government Foreign Minister General Mercado and Foreign Office Secretary
General in private home.On October 11 Perez
de Cuellar called Siracusa to
propose a meeting between Mercado and Jones. Siracusa agreed to the meeting,
subject to further instructions from the Ambassador and the
Department. (Telegram 7896 from Lima, October 12; ibid., POL PERU–US) The Department gave its
assent, suggesting, however, that Jones “merely
listen and say only that you will transmit replies or views to
Washington.” (Telegram 254614 to Lima, October 12; ibid.) Re
questions transmitted in letter authorized by ref. (A) General Mercado
indicated the following: Revolutionary government referendum reported ref (C), which will put to people
question whether they wish future elections under the present
constitution, the present constitution amended or a new
constitution, will take place during calendar year 1969. This is
first step in electoral process but date for actual elections
thereafter is indefinite;The revolutionary government’s undertaking to carry out
international obligations does include those under general
international law as to the rights and property of foreign
nationals. The question of compensation for IPC expropriation will be decided
in Peruvian courts. [End summary.] I met last night for about an hour and ten minutes in
a private home with General Mercado. I was
accompanied by the Deputy Chief of Mission and the
General by the Secretary General of the Foreign
Ministry, Javier Perez de Cuellar. The atmosphere of the
meeting was businesslike and cool although not
unfriendly as we have been closely associated for many
years with Perez de Cuellar, a professional diplomat,
and have also had some previous association with General
Mercado on
a friendly social basis. At the outset I referred to my
informal letter of October 10 and said the USG was interested in
knowing the revolutionary government’s position on the
questions posed therein. General Mercado, in responding,
spoke first about the second question regarding
undertakings under international law.With some passion he asserted that the IPC expropriation was a
special case and that the government’s action was
necessary to correct a long standing problem. He said
the action had met with the unanimous approval of the
Peruvian people and was completely irreversible. I
replied that it was not my purpose to discuss
expropriation since the United States recognized the
right of a sovereign nation to take territory within its
jurisdiction for public purposes. I said, however, that
the US also expected fulfillment of the corresponding
obligation under international law to make prompt,
adequate and effective compensation. In this regard I
referred to the notes no.’s 116 and 152 of August 8 and
21, 1967 which we had given the Foreign Ministry making clear
the US position on expropriation and compensation in
specific case of La Brea y Parinas.The texts of the notes are in
telegrams 15548 and 22415 to Lima, August 3 and 17,
1967, respectively. (Ibid., PET 6 PERU) I
suggested General read them. General Mercado replied that
as provided in the Expropriation Act, decree law number
4, the question of compensation would be established in
the Peruvian courts. He said it would be up to the
courts to place a value on the property expropriated and
also to determine the amount of the debts which IPC owed the GOP. The question of
compensation would be solved by the balance of these
accounts. When it was pointed out that the company does
not acknowledge any debts, General Mercado replied that
the Peruvian people nevertheless unanimously believe the
debt existed. The DCM
then suggested that opinion and fact might not be the
same thing and asked whether, if the courts found the
debts not to be real, the GOP would be prepared to make direct
compensation to IPC.
General Mercado
seemed shocked by such a concept, said he could not
imagine any court making such finding, but finally said
that the decision of the courts would be respected. To
illustrate he mentioned a recent decision by the Supreme
Court which found in favor of the Conchan Oil Company
(Calif. Standard) in a habeas corpus suit against the
government on a tax dispute. I then suggested that it
was the responsibility of the GOP, having themselves initiated the
expropriation, also to take the initiative with respect
to compensation which is its obligation and not leave it
to the dispossessed to seek redress.In connection with the foregoing discussion on IPC, General Mercado sought
repeatedly to give assurance as to the “special” nature
of IPC case. He said the
revolutionary government, while it is nationalistic, is
neither statist nor leftist and that it recognizes the
need to protect and encourage private capital and to
attract foreign private investment. He said Peru did not
have the resources for development in any other way. At
the end of the conversation, in response to a direct
question by the DCM, he
vehemently denied that the revolutionary government was
influenced by a group of “Nasserist” colonels. He
asserted that the armed forces were unified as a single
man in determination to carry out their obligations to
their country as they saw them under the constitution
and to bring about necessary revolutionary reforms,
before return to constitutional government. In this
connection, he said the era of “old liberalism” was gone
and the state must interest itself in the development of
the nation. It must therefore take a promotional
interest and that it must establish the channels in
which private enterprise could operate freely.In turning conversation to question number 1 of my
letter regarding human rights and return to
constitutionalism I said it was perhaps more important
fundamentally than the other question we had just
discussed. I felt I should make clear, I continued, how
deeply the USG regretted
the interruption of constitutional government in Peru
and how concerned it was to have assurances of an early
return to constitutionalism. General Mercado nodded his
understanding of US attitude but asserted that the
revolution had been necessary and that in carrying it
out the armed forces had been fulfilling their
obligation under the constitution. He said the
politicians had prevented the constitution from working
(had made a joke of it) and thus had defrauded the
people from achieving their aspirations and blocked
progress. While the legislature was supposed to be the
primary power of the state in representation of the
people, it had not functioned as foreseen in the
constitution and the politicians had prevented
fulfillment of Article 89 of the constitution which
called for a “functional” Senate. This had never been
fulfilled, he said, and the Senate, in being politically
based, was simply a duplication of the Chamber of
Deputies. The revolution had been carried out, he said,
in order to give the people a chance to restructure
their political organization and to correct its
weaknesses. The only way this could be done, including
rewriting constitution, he said, (and in this he was
strongly supported by the Secretary General) was through
the armed forces as the politicians would never set
politics aside long enough to make the changes. He
implied that the trend in recent years had been toward
chaos and if not checked would have led Peru into
communism. He said the only bulwarks for stability in a
society such as Peru’s were the church and the armed
forces. In making these observations he asserted that we
must understand that Peru is different from the United
States and different from other L.A. countries and
having its own character, it also has its own manner of
resolving its problems. Referring to Chile and
Venezuela, he expressed fear that failure of the
democratic regimes there would open gates to
communism.On the specific question of a return to
constitutionalism, General Mercado referred to the announcement of
a referendum by the Prime Minister, General Montagne, on
October 12. He said this was the first step and that the
people would be asked in it whether they wanted to hold
elections under the present constitution, under the
present constitution amended or under an entirely new
constitution. He said the referendum would be held
during 1969, and that political parties would have full
freedom of action in connection with it. He said the
revolutionary government believes the people want to
change the constitution, but that if the referendum
should prove otherwise, it would be considered a rebuff
(vote of no-confidence) and the armed forces would “go
home”. Presumably he meant turn the reins of government
back to
civilians although he did not specify. He said no other
de facto government “had the courage” to consult the
people through plebiscite. Assuming the people opt for a
new constitution or a modification of the present one,
General Mercado said a “broadly based” commission would
be established to do the draft. Asked whether there
would then be a constituent assembly he admitted
possibility but did not consider it necessary. He was
quite vague as to any plans beyond the referendum and
the constitutional change, but asserted that the whole
process was designed to move toward eventual elections.
As an analogy he said the elections were like D Day in
Normandy and that “even Eisenhower” did not know exactly
when D Day would occur.In response to my question, Secretary General said
this informal “non-official” meeting constituted answer
to my letter of October 10.In telegram 7994 from Lima, October 17, the Embassy
judged that the assurances given by Mercado were
sufficient to recommend prompt recognition of the
new government. “Further delay in resuming
relations,” the Embassy maintained, “could only
damage our interests, and would deny us the
opportunity to have contacts which might have a
beneficial influence on the future action of the
revolutionary government.” (Ibid., POL 16 PERU)
Jones
517. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 15–2 PERU.
Confidential; Priority; Limdis.Lima, October 18, 1968,
2252Z.
8032. For Oliver. Ref: State
257311.In telegram 257311 to Lima,
October 17, the Department reported a formal request from officials
of IPC and Jersey Standard to invoke
the Hickenlooper amendment. The Department also issued the following
instructions: “You are authorized in your discretion pass word to
military government that matter now in hands our lawyers; that we
cognizant as we trust they are too of consequences of application of
Hickenlooper; but proceedings are required by law and so we are
bound to act accordingly.” (Ibid.) Subj: IPC.
Reftel discussed at length within
Embassy this morning. We under no illusions as to grave
repercussions on US relations with Peru for years to come, and in
hemisphere if amendments invoked. We nevertheless decided best course was to
advise revolutionary government informally that possible application
of Hickenlooper amendment and Sugar Act as a result of 1967
expropriation is under active consideration in the Department. In
doing so we felt it best not to reveal that IPC and Jersey Standard have asked USG invoke these provisions. We
therefore presented current study by lawyers as a natural
requirement of the law itself which binding on executive.DCM informed FonOff SecGen privately
in latter’s home this afternoon. Siracusa was careful to reiterate that no decision
has been made and that USG respects
the right of expropriation so long as there is compensation. He
presented to the SecGen for ready reference copies in English and
Spanish of our Notes numbers 116 and 152 of August 8 and 21, 1967,
which were presented in reaction to the expropriation at that
time.See footnote 6, Document 516. He also presented
copies of the two amendments in question as well as of our
aide-mémoire of Nov. 7, 1963 presented in reaction to the
nullification in that year of the arbitration award which is basic
to IPC case.A copy of the aide-mémoire is in the National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Lima Embassy Files,
Subject Case File on the International Petroleum Company: Lot 71
F 154, Sep–Dec 1963.Ambassador Perez de Cuellar’s reaction was grave. He said this was
not the kind of a government likely to respond to pressure. He felt
invocation of these acts by the USG
would unify Peruvians against US and that Peru would receive solid
support of other countries in the hemisphere. He thought such acts
would prejudge the legal determination of compensation now in the
courts. (See Lima 7982.)Telegram 7982
from Lima, October 17, reported that the IPC had filed a “habeas corpus action” in an
attempt to nullify expropriation of its property. (Ibid.,
Central Files 1967–69, PET 6 PERU) He promised to inform
the Foreign Minister, General Mercado, with great care so they would not jump to
premature conclusions. He and the DCM agreed on the imperative necessity of keeping this
matter out of the public domain until the two governments had had a
chance to try to deal with it.Comment: We assure IPC and Jersey Standard’s decision to request
invocation of the amendments represents a willingness on their part
to accept the possible total expropriation of their interests in
Peru and a termination of all their activities here. Their attitude
as expressed in para. 3 of reftel
seems clearly to suggest this. If we interpret para. 3 correctly it
would seem almost a challenge to the GOP to intervene or in someway take over, possibly by
expropriation, IPC marketing system
to avoid the exhaustion of stocks implied by the company’s
unwillingness to purchase from the expropriated refinery. We believe
that if matters come to
this the military government will be more unified than ever and, at
the outset at least, will be enthusiastically supported by Peruvians
on a patriotic basis. The reaction would be not only against IPC but US-Peruvian relations would
suffer an historic setback. A wave of anti-Americanism, which might
endanger American lives and property, would result. We hope
therefore that the Department in making its study will do so with
fullest appreciation of potential consequences. Also urge make every
effort to avoid publicity so long as the matter is under study and
the vital decisions have not been taken.With reference to the Embassy telegram no. 7994See footnote 7, Document
516. recommending a prompt resumption of
relations with the revolutionary GOP, we suggest that this is now more desirable than
before. We have already said the GOP
meets the normal requirements and should be recognized. Because of
the seriousness of the subject of this telegram it is important that
the avenues of normal intercourse be opened immediately so that we
can deal with the matter. It is essential that the GOP not get the impression that
recognition is being delayed as a pressure tactic in favor of IPC.Jones
518. Action Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–1/69.
Secret.Washington, October 19, 1968, 3 p.m.
Mr. President:
Sec. Rusk requests your
authorization to resume diplomatic relations with the new Peruvian
Government which took power on October 3. (Tab A)Tab A was a memorandum from Rusk to the President, October 19;
attached but not printed. His memorandum projects this action
on or about Wednesday, October 23. I understand, however, that State may
now wish to recognize as early as Monday, October 21.
—The Military Government is in full control, and no significant
opposition has materialized. It has met all the traditional tests
for recognition.—We have carried out full consultations with other OAS members. Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
and several others have already recognized. Most of the others will
have recognized by Monday.October
21.—The new government has assured it will honor its international
obligations and that it will hold a referendum to decide whether a
new constitution shall be drafted before holding new elections.
However, it may be many months, or even years, before freely elected
government returns to Peru.—The IPC expropriation will
gravely complicate our future relations, but should be kept separate
from the diplomatic recognition question. Prompt recognition may
help us protect IPC’s interest in
obtaining a reasonable settlement.—Resumption of relations does not imply resumption of all
assistance programs.
Events in Panama are also moving toward early recognition by most
countries. State may recommend that we follow suit next week. The Peru
case should be resolved first.
I recommend that you authorize the resumption of diplomatic relations
with Peru whenever Sec. Rusk
wishes to move.No option is checked, but
see Document 519.
Walt
Approved
Disapproved
Call Me
519. Notes of MeetingSource: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson Meeting Notes. No
classification marking. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held
during lunch.Washington, October 22, 1968, 1:20–2:24 p.m.
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The PresidentSecretary RuskSecretary CliffordGeneral WheelerCIA Director HelmsWalt RostowGeorge ChristianTom Johnson
[Omitted here is discussion of other subjects.]
Secretary Rusk: … We recommend that
the USA now recognize Peru, if you
approve.
The President: What does that do?
Secretary Rusk: Colonels have it in
Brazil and Argentina.
The President: What if we didn’t recognize Peru?
Secretary Rusk: It would complicate
ourselves. But we have recognized 50 countries where coup d’etats have
taken place.
Secretary Rusk: We are denied
AID for Peru.
CIA Director Helms: Sugar quota would fall off once the Hickenlooper Amendment takes over.
Secretary Rusk: We don’t get
anywhere by not recognizing them. This is the 62nd coup I’ve lived
through since I’ve been Secretary of State and Dick Helms did not cause
a one of them—contrary to popular belief.
We can’t impose our will over other countries. They will conduct
elections in Peru.
We went two years without a coup in Latin America.At the end of his notes, Tom Johnson recorded the
President’s decision on Peru as follows: “Recognize him [Velasco] as
soon as you want to.” Rostow later told
Benjamin Read that the President had given Rusk a “reluctant go-ahead to
recognize, if that’s what he [Rusk] wants to do.” (Note from Bromley K. Smith to Lois Nivens,
October 22; ibid., National Security File,
Rostow Files, Meetings with the President,
January– December 1968 [1])
[Omitted here is discussion of other subjects.]
520. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Peru, Vol. III, 10/67–1/69.
Confidential. A copy was sent to George
Christian. Another copy indicates the memorandum was
drafted by Samuel W. Lewis.
(Ibid.)Washington, October 25, 1968.
SUBJECT
Resumption of Diplomatic Relations with Peru
At the Tuesday lunchSee Document 519 and footnote 2
thereto. you authorized Secretary Rusk to resume diplomatic relations with
Peru as soon as multilateral and Congressional consultations were
completed.
All countries outside this hemisphere with whom Peru traditionally
maintains relations have now recognized. All major Latin American
countries except Venezuela have also resumed relations.
State has consulted with Senator Hickenlooper (the only Senator accessible) and the
staffs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign
Affairs Committee, as well as staffs of Representatives Mailliard and
Purcell.Representatives William S.
Mailliard (R–California) and Graham Purcell (D–Texas). No
objection to our resumption of relations was voiced.
Secretary Rusk authorized our
Embassy in Lima to answer the Peruvian Government’s note at noon today
(text of our note is attached at Tab A),Attached but not printed. The text of the note is also in telegram
261223 to Lima, October 24. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 PERU) thereby
signalling the resumption of diplomatic relations.
A brief low-key announcement will be made by State’s press spokesman at
the noon briefing today (a copy is attached at Tab B of this
announcement).Attached but not printed.
The text of the announcement is in Department of State Bulletin, November 11, 1968, p. 497.
Walt
521. Telegram From the Embassy in Peru to
the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 PERU. Confidential.Lima, November 6, 1968,
2340Z.
8336. Subj: Call on New President, General Velasco.
General Velasco received me very cordially on my first official
visit since reestablishment diplomatic relations. He had press
photographer present to record event. I told President I was happy
to assure him that my government wished to continue the close and
happy relations which had always existed between our two countries;
that as Ambassador I was happy to have this opportunity to greet him
personally as well as in the name of my government. I added that I
hoped to continue working with his government as I had with past
Governments of Peru in the best interests of Peruvian-American
relations.I informed the President that I had already had the opportunity to
call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs and on the Prime
MinisterA report on
Jones’ meeting with Mercado is in telegram 8201
from Lima, October 30, and a report on his meeting with the
Peruvian Prime Minister, General Ernesto Montagne Sanchez, is in
telegram 8337 from Lima, November 6. (Ibid., PET 6 PERU and
POL 15–1 PERU,
respectively) and that I hoped to call on the other
members of his cabinet within the next days and weeks. I told him
that we had some urgent and important bilateral problems such as
IPC, Cerro de Pasco, fisheries
conference, Investment Guarantee Agreement, etc. I added that I had
discussed the IPC case at some
length with both the Prime and Foreign Ministers and assumed they
would be informing him of our conversations on this subject. I
expressed the hope that, if at any time in the future I needed to
discuss these matters directly with him, he would be good enough to
receive me. He assured me that this was the case and that his “door
was always open to me”.President Velasco then spoke about the revolution and the reasons
why he and the military had felt it necessary to move. He said the
country had gotten into a mess, that the people were desperate,
particularly those in the highlands. He mentioned particularly the
area around Puno where there was near starvation. He referred to the
desperate condition of Indian population and said “something must be
done” for them. This was not one of those military coups in which
the country was prosperous and the participants would benefit. On
the contrary, the position of Peru had been desperate and he and his
“team” had felt it necessary to save Peru from disaster. They did
need help and
understanding from the United States and he hoped that some
assistance would eventually be forthcoming. He said if they failed
they would not only be hanged but the country would fall into either
chaos or a Castro-type of
government. The President said his government had an overall plan of
general improvement but that it could not be revealed all at once
since it was more prudent to proceed one step at a time. He referred
to the chaotic situation of Peruvian universities which he said were
centers of subversion and political agitation rather than of higher
education. He also referred to what he considered were
unsatisfactory conditions within Peruvian labor unions but did not
elaborate. Finally, he referred to the press and insisted that he
had said from the beginning and sincerely felt that freedom of press
was essential. However, two periodicals Caretas and Expreso had exceeded
bounds of correct behavior by insulting and attacking personally
members of the junta. This, he said, could not be tolerated and that
they must learn respect for the uniform. Hence the paper and
magazine have been closed down and will not be permitted to reopen
until November 15, which would require Caretas to miss one of its fortnightly issues. He
expressed appreciation for attitude of daily newspaper El Comercio which supported the junta (he
assured me without their having requested it to do so) and even for
La Prensa which although it had
criticized the government on many issues he felt was the kind of
constructive criticism which the junta could accept. When the
various reforms have been accomplished, the military junta would
look forward to holding elections and turning the government back to
a civilian administration. At that time he and his comrades in arms
would very happily go back to their homes. In response to my
question, he said he could not fix even an approximate date for this
event.Finally he mentioned that the last and decisive meeting of his
group which led to the coup had been held at 7:00 p.m. on the night
of October 1. He said the decision had been very tightly held and
that this group consisted of “only six officers”. He said the
commanders of the five military regions had been informed except for
the date and the hour when the coup would commence. With obvious
relish he recalled he had seen me, the Mayor of Lima, Luis Bedoya
Reyes, and the publisher of La Prensa, Pedro
Beltran, at a dinner party the night of October 1 shortly after the
decisive meeting on the coup. It seemed to please him that none of
us suspected what he had just decided to do.At end of interview I informed President of agrement, of
Fernando Berckemeyer as Peruvian Ambassador
in Washington, saying that I had handed written communication to
this effect to Chief of Protocol that same morning. Velasco
expressed his pleasure at this news and his confidence that
Berckemeyer would serve Peru well in this important post.Jones
Venezuela
522. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the
cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of
the Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Agency
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The United States
Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on February 19.NIE 89–64Washington, February 19, 1964.
PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL STABILITY IN VENEZUELA
The Problem
To estimate the outlook for political stability in Venezuela over the
next two years.
Summary
President-elect Leoni will almost
certainly take office without serious challenge, and will probably enjoy
an initial period of relative political calm. Nonetheless, the problems
of creating and maintaining a viable administration and of coping with
underlying social and economic tensions—together with the likelihood of
further terrorist activities—will almost certainly produce a series of
political crises during the period of this estimate. The Leoni
government probably will survive these crises.
Conclusions
Leoni is an experienced,
generally capable political leader; but his ability to supply vital
national leadership during a crisis is as yet untested. (Para.
15)Leoni’s relations with Congress are likely to start out relatively
peacefully. His political opposition will almost certainly turn more
belligerent over time, but we believe he will be able to maintain
control of Congress on key issues through 1965. (Paras.
16–20)The Communist and Castroist insurgents almost certainly will be
unable to force their way to power during the period of this
estimate, although they will retain a high capability for hit and
run terrorism, including attacks against US personnel and property.
Leoni probably will have
to resort at times to extraordinary measures such as suspension of
constitutional guarantees to contain the insurgency threat within tolerable limits (by
Venezuelan standards), and his timing in initiating these measures
may involve him in difficulties with either Congress or the
military. (Paras. 22–28)The armed forces, the ultimate arbiters of political power in
Venezuela, are generally disposed to support constitutional
government for as long as it proves reasonably effective in dealing
with national problems. In any event, the military is anxious to
avoid an arbitrary move against the government which might alienate
a large segment of the population. Thus a military coup is not
likely unless Leoni becomes
generally discredited with the population. Under such circumstances,
a military coup would probably follow a relatively moderate course
and offer the leftist insurgents little opportunity for substantial
gains. (Paras. 29–31)
Discussion
I. Introduction: The Importance of Venezuela
1. Raul Leoni is scheduled to succeed Romulo Betancourt as President of
Venezuela in March 1964. Leoni’s success or failure in office will be of
great importance to the US. Venezuela is of strategic importance as the
world’s largest exporter of oil. US capital investment in Venezuela
totals about $3 billion, exceeded only by our investments in Canada and
in the UK. Venezuela, moreover, holds great symbolic value for our
policy in Latin America as a country attempting rapid social and
economic progress through constitutional democracy. Venezuela remains a
priority target in Communist efforts to promote violent revolution in
Latin America, primarily because Fidel
Castro cannot afford to allow such an important
democratic reformist regime to succeed. Venezuela is also the only Latin
American country in which leftist extremists, with moral and material
support from Cuba, have been able to sustain an impressive level of
insurgency.
II. Leoni’s Inheritance: Betancourt’s Problems and
Achievements
2. President Betancourt’s political
legacy to his successor is a mixed one. On the one hand, Betancourt has
moved constitutional democracy an important step forward by the very
fact of surviving his legal term and successfully holding free
elections. He also initiated an extensive program of social and economic
reform. Finally, the last few months have been marked by a subsiding of
political tensions, leading to a relatively auspicious environment for
the transfer of power. On the other hand, Leoni will inherit, to one
degree or another, the problems which have created recurrent crises for
Betancourt from 1959 to the present: acute social tensions, limited
national experience with representative government, Communist and
Castroist insurgency, and the threat of a military takeover.
Political and Social Heritage
3. In addition to the direct assaults of leftist extremists and military
dissidents, the Betancourt government has had to withstand harassment by
opposition parties, obstruction of its program in Congress, and
widespread popular indifference to the fate of constitutional democracy.
These latter problems are rooted in Venezuela’s lack of experience and
confidence in representative government and in the acute social tensions
prevailing in urban areas.
4. Venezuela has traditionally been ruled by military dictators; its only
previous experience with democratic reformist government (1945–1948) was
terminated by a military coup which led to the repressive dictatorship
of General Marcos Perez Jimenez (1948–1958). Following his election in
December 1958, Betancourt was able to form a strong multi-party
coalition, because of widespread concern over the threat of another
military intervention. By 1962, however, this coalition had splintered,
and the opposition parties had gained control of the lower house of
Congress. Various opposition parties joined with Communists and
Castroists in a systematic obstruction of government programs,
particularly of measures to control terrorism. The primary objective was
to discredit Betancourt’s
Democratic Action party (AD). The
political opposition apparently had come to fear AD’s domination of the 1963 elections as much as it did the
consequences of a military coup. From time to time the opposition
parties threatened to boycott the elections.
5. Thanks largely to its petroleum, Venezuela has the highest per capita
income in Latin America (over $700), and its government is assured of
substantial revenues, much of which the Betancourt administration has
directed into programs to promote the welfare of the poorest classes.
Nonetheless, one-half of the country’s eight million people lives under
severely depressed conditions. Moreover, because of a large
rural-to-urban migration in recent years, much of the country’s
economically depressed population now lives pressed together in urban
slums, without steady employment or other conventional social ties, and
without much concern for Venezuela and the maintenance of orderly
government. Particularly in Caracas, where lawlessness is prevalent
among the 300,000 slum dwellers, much of the population has regarded the
government and the police—not the terrorists—as its main
antagonists.
Military Dissidence
6. Betancourt has had to contend with rightist military plotting
throughout much of his term. Moreover, of the five garrison rebellions
during 1960–1962, the last two, Carupano and Puerto Cabello, involved
dissident military officers collaborating with leftist extremist
civilians. Betancourt has survived these plots and assaults largely
because the chief military
commanders, and through them the bulk of the armed forces,The Venezuelan armed forces consist of four
separate services with the following numbers of officers and men:
Army—17,800; National Guard (a militarized constabulary)— 12,000;
Navy (including Marines)—5,600; Air Force—2,500. [Footnote in the
source text.] have remained loyal to the government.
Betancourt, recognizing the military to be the ultimate arbiters of
political power in Venezuela, assiduously cultivated this loyalty. He
maintained military perquisites at a high level, flattered the military
with frequent presidential attention and praise, and courted the
personal friendship of key officers and garrisons. Most importantly, he
maintained exceptionally good channels of communication between his
office and all sectors of the armed forces as a means of explaining his
policies and of monitoring the moods and anticipating the demands of the
military. His efforts were favored by a growing political moderation
among the military, stemming in part from an increasing professionalism
among top officers and their fear that another military dictatorship
would encounter stiff civilian opposition. At the same time, the
military, keenly aware of Castro’s extermination of the prerevolutionary military
establishment in Cuba, regarded nervously Betancourt’s politically
motivated reluctance to crack down on leftist subversive agitation and
violence. At times during 1963 a considerable restiveness spread
throughout the military establishment.
Communist and Castroist Insurgency
7. Leftist extremists, led by the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), were the major disruptive force
during the final years of the Betancourt administration. The PCV participated in the 1958 election,
gaining 160,000 votes and nine seats in Congress. The party was
propelled toward “armed struggle” against the government by its
impatience with its limited opportunities to make gains through
“political struggle,” by the example of Castro’s success in Cuba, and by
the opportunities for violent action existing in Venezuela. The
Communists found ready allies for insurgency in other extremist groups,
most notably the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a pro-Castro faction which split off
from the AD party. They also found allies
of convenience among rightist military dissidents.
8. The leftist extremists work through an organization called the Armed
Forces of National Liberation (FALN).
The PCV generally dominates FALN affairs, but undisciplined activists
sometimes initiate terrorist activities on their own. The FALN is well organized and trained,
aggressive and resourceful, but limited in numbers. Although the PCV and MIR
combined probably can count on a political following in the tens of
thousands, we estimate that the FALN
has only some 600 to 800 active trained members, including those
deployed in rural-based guerilla bands. Most members are recruited from among
urban youth, traditionally defiant of authority and extremist in
politics.
9. The FALN has been able to obtain most
of its funds, small arms, and explosives in Venezuela, primarily through
robberies. Almost certainly, however, it has received material and
financial assistance from Cuba. Most notably, government forces last
November discovered a cache of small and medium weapons on the Paraguana
Peninsula.Located in northwest
Venezuela, the major area of FALN
guerrilla activity (see map). [Footnote in source text. The map is
not reproduced. On November 28, 1963, the Venezuelan Government
announced that it had discovered a large arms cache on the coast of
the Paraguaná Peninsula; that an internal investigation had
determined that the arms were of Cuban origin, intended for use in a
guerrilla operation to seize power in Caracas before the
Presidential elections of December 1; and that evidence against Cuba
would be presented to the Organization of American States thereby
justifying retaliatory measures under the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, the so-called “Rio Treaty” of 1947.
Documentation on the subsequent campaign to indict and sanction Cuba
before the OAS is in Documents 1 ff., and Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII,
Documents 169–171.] In addition, more than a hundred FALN members have received paramilitary
training in Cuba and elsewhere in the Communist Bloc. Cuban broadcasts
to Venezuela endorsing the FALN cause
and heralding its exploits have been an important boost to the
insurgents’ morale. Castro’s
moral and material assistance was an important factor in the early
stages of the development of the FALN.
Although Castro probably can call upon some elements in Venezuela to
step up terrorism whenever it suits his purposes, at least over the past
year the FALN has become an aggressive
and effective terrorist organization that does not appear to need
outside prodding.
10. The leftist extremists have used a variety of tactics in attacking
the Betancourt government. During 1960–1962 they tried to force their
way to power directly, first by means of a series of urban riots and
then by a combination of guerrilla warfare in rural areas and the two
garrison rebellions. These attempts only proved that they lacked
sufficient popular and military support for the purpose. By late 1962,
therefore, they turned to terrorism and sabotage as operations which
could be conducted by a relatively few dedicated militants, but which
would serve to discredit and weaken the Betancourt government while
building up their own image and strength. In August 1963, they launched
a major terrorist offensive to disrupt the December elections and
provoke a military coup, hoping to profit from the resultant disorder
and discord.
11. During most of 1963 the FALN was
able to strike at a wide variety of targets, with a good chance of
success, and very little risk of casualties or losses through capture.
The police,Civilian police forces in
Venezuela number nearly 19,000 men. In the Caracas area, there are
five separate civilian forces with a total of over 10,000 men and a
National Guard contingent of 700 men engaged in police duties.
[Footnote in the source text.] handicapped by poor organization, inadequate
training, low morale, and legal restrictions established or enforced in
reaction to the Perez Jimenez dictatorship, were no match for the
terrorists. The political leaders of the FALN were protected from arrest by congressional immunity;
rank and file members were able to take advantage of the legal
sanctuaries provided by the autonomous universities and the de facto
asylums of the slum districts. Moreover, even when arrested, terrorists
often were able to regain their freedom through legal technicalities,
bribery, or escapes.
12. FALN efforts to disrupt the election
through terrorism were thwarted, however, by the combination of a
well-timed government crackdown, a notable improvement in police
performance, and a show of determination by the population not to be
intimidated by the terrorists. Betancourt, using some measures of
doubtful constitutionality, moved to reduce FALN’s disruptive capability, before military restiveness
got out of hand, and after five anti-government candidates had committed
themselves to the presidential race. On 30 September the military was
called upon to assist in a roundup of known extremists and suspected
terrorists, including those hiding out in slum districts. In all, some
300 to 400 were jailed, including several PCV and MIR congressmen. In
October, in response to pressure from the government, school officials
closed Caracas’ Central University, which further reduced the
maneuverability of the terrorists. Starting in October, moreover, the
police in Caracas, political nerve center of the country, proved to be a
better match for the terrorists, inflicting more casualties and taking
more prisoners than previously.US advice
and assistance contributed in large part to the improved performance
of the police. Among other things, we were primarily responsible for
the introduction of training in marksmanship and other practical
subjects and the establishment of improved coordination among
Caracas’ many and often competing police agencies. [Footnote in the
source text.] The FALN still
was able to undertake a large number of hit-and-run raids, especially
outside of Caracas. But because of accumulated losses in manpower and
morale, it was either unable or unwilling to mount an impressive
last-minute attack. Its repeated threats against the voters probably
proved counterproductive. On election day (1 December) the population
went to the polls in overwhelming numbers; FALN attacks were few and ineffectual. Since the election,
the terrorists have been relatively inactive, which is in large part
responsible for the political calm of the final Betancourt months.
[Omitted here is the final section of the estimate, “The Outlook for the
Leoni Administration,” which
includes a detailed discussion of the Inauguration, President Leoni, Political Prospects, Social and
Economic Issues, Leftist Insurgency, Leoni and the Military.]
523. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State RuskSource: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, POL 3 IA. Secret. Drafted by William B. Cobb,
Jr. (EUR/BNA), on July 8. A copy was
sent to Ball. A notation on
the memorandum indicates Rusk
saw it.Washington, July 10, 1964.
SUBJECT
Venezuela’s Interest in British Guiana
A reliable controlled American source reports that Venezuela’s Foreign
Minister Ignacio Irribaren Borges wishes to talk with you privately
during the Latin American Foreign Ministers Conference about British
Guiana. He is expected to tell you that Venezuela is prepared to support
the overthrow of Cheddi Jagan,
and to seek our support for this venture.
Our Ambassador in Caracas has learned from the Minister of the Interior
that Venezuela is ready to provide financial support for Forbes Burnham when the time is ripe
for Jagan’s overthrow.
A report from Georgetown advises that a person with good contacts in
Venezuela is urging Burnham and
D’Aguiar to form a “Revolutionary Government”; attempt a coup with the
assistance of 100 trained men who will have had 30 days special training
in Venezuela, and at the same time Cheddi and Janet Jagan will be kidnapped and taken to
Venezuela.
You may wish to urge restraint on the Venezuelans, pointing out that
plans are underway to seek a political resolution in BG through the democratic process of a
Proportional Representation election. We hope that nothing will happen
to impede this plan and we cannot support the Venezuelans even though we
share their hope that someone other than Jagan will reach the top in British Guiana.According to the Secretary’s Appointment Book
Rusk met Iribarren on July
16 and 20. (Johnson Library) Memoranda of conversation, confined to
discussion of the OAS resolution on
Cuba, are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 3 IA.
No evidence has been found to indicate whether Iribarren raised the
Venezuelan proposal to intervene in British Guiana.
524. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of
Colombian-Venezuelan Affairs (Margolies) to the Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Mann)Source:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, POL 32–1 BRGU–VEN.
Confidential. Drafted by Crowley; cleared by Cobb, Whiteman, and Randolph. A copy was
sent to Adams.Washington, January 13, 1965.
SUBJECT
Venezuela Asks U.S. Intercession in Settling Guiana Boundary
Dispute
The Problem
On December 15, 1964, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister called on Mr.
Ball (then Acting Secretary),
and requested that the U.S. Government use its good offices to help
bring the current negotiations between Venezuela and Great Britain on
the British Guiana boundary dispute to a conclusion favorable to
Venezuela. Mr. Ball told the
Foreign Minister that he could not comment on the problem because he was
not familiar with it, but said he would look into it.According to a memorandum of this conversation
Iribarren said “he hoped that the United States would lend support
to the Venezuelan position.” (Ibid.)
Background
In presenting his views to Mr. Ball, the Foreign Minister handed over a memorandumAttached but not printed. that stated
that the Venezuelan Government has obtained evidence which allegedly
casts some doubt on the integrity of the American citizen members of the
1899 arbitration tribunal. The memorandum states that this information
has not yet been made public, but offers to furnish the evidence to the
Department in confidence for our study.
Another noteworthy development in this situation is the number of recent
confidential reports indicating that the Venezuelan military are very
sensitive to the boundary problem. They view the possibility that
British Guiana may become independent under a pro-Communist government
as opening the way for a Castro
beach-head on the continent. They are also apprehensive because of the
proximity of British Guiana to Venezuela’s developing iron and steel and
hydro-electric complex in Guayana State. There are indications that the
military have already prepared a contingency plan for the seizure of the
area by force should this seem to them necessary at some future
time.
A further complicating factor is that Forbes Burnham, the new Premier of
British Guiana, is reliably reported to believe that the U.S. Government
has sufficient influence with Venezuela to cause the latter to drop its
claim.
ARA/CV’s Views
Our continuing attitude (with which EUR
agrees) toward this boundary dispute is that we hope to see the problem
satisfactorily settled between the two interested governments through
quiet and friendly negotiations without our becoming involved.
We believe that Britain would be most reluctant to modify the 1899
arbitration award, and the head of the UK
Foreign Office desk for Latin America, Mr. John Slater told us recently
that the British experts have found no evidence in the material
submitted to them by the Venezuelans which would in the British view
vindicate the Venezuelan claim.
We believe that Britain in any event will not wish to impose a boundary
change on the present inhabitants of British Guiana against their will.
The Venezuelans are aware of this problem, but nevertheless seek to have
the boundary rectified before independence so as to avoid the
awkwardness of having to demand territory from an independent neighbor.
Responsible leaders in British Guiana also hope that the problem will be
solved before independence, since some of them fear that Venezuela might
actually seize the disputed area from a weak and newly-independent
neighbor.
Recommendations:There is no indication on the memorandum that Mann approved these
recommendations. In a January 28 memorandum to Margolies, Adams dismissed any serious
consideration of “evidence.” “I think it is ridiculous on the part
of the Venezuelan Foreign Minister to seek our ‘good offices’ with
the U.K., and at the same time threaten to blackmail us on the
allegedly fraudulent findings of an American 66 years ago.” Adams
suggested that the United States refuse to accept the evidence if
Venezuela submitted it “in any formal way,” e.g. by diplomatic note.
Otherwise, Adams agreed that the United States should avoid
involvement in the dispute unless it appeared that Castro might
establish a “beach-head” in British Guiana. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–1 BR GU–VEN)
Even though Venezuela regards this problem as a very real one, we believe
that our present position of non-intervention should remain unchanged.
However, since Mr. Ball said that
we would look into it, we propose from a precautionary standpoint the
following: When the documentary evidence is received from the Venezuelan
Government, it should be translated and furnished to L for a
review of the alleged proofs submitted as to any fraud on the
part of members of the arbitration tribunal, and of any possible
implications regarding the U.S. members. Further action, if any,
would depend upon
the authenticity of the evidence submitted by Venezuela as it
might implicate American citizen members of the tribunal.Apart from whatever conclusions the Department might draw from
the evidence provided by Venezuela, it would, of course, be
possible for Venezuela and the United Kingdom, should they so
agree, to submit the question of the existence of any fraud and
any consequent invalidity of the award either to an ad hoc
arbitral tribunal, or to the International Court of Justice. For
the present, however, we do not believe that the U.S. Government
should try to urge this line of action upon the interested
governments.In order to allay the understandable fears of Venezuela that
British Guiana might become a Castro beach-head on the continent
after independence, the U.S. Government should give assurances
to the Government of Venezuela, either through our Ambassador,
or high-level officers of the Department, that we do not intend
to stand idly by and allow such a course of events to take
place, and that on the contrary we would use every resource to
prevent such a development.
Note:
On January 15, Embassy Caracas reported that the visit of Prime Minister
Burnham to Caracas was well
received and that the subject of the boundary dispute was merely
mentioned, and was neither discussed nor debated. (Emb Caracas 962.)Dated January 15. (Ibid.)
525. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 VEN. Confidential; Immediate.
Repeated to USCINCSO.Caracas, March 22, 1965, 8 a.m.
1255. In my first substantive interview with President Leoni late last
week,March 18. Bernbaum first met Leoni on March 4 to present his
credentials. The Embassy reported that “Leoni instead of limiting himself to the diplomatic
pleasantries normal to such occasions lost no time in making a
lengthy statement concerning US petroleum restrictions and the
forthcoming US–Venezuelan petroleum discussions.” (Airgram A–591
from Caracas, March 10; ibid., PET 17 US–VEN) I found him
very in command of situation and fully informed on such varying subjects as Venezuela’s
counterinsurgency efforts, its military equipment procurement program,
its requirements for foreign loans for housing and other social
development projects, and its aspirations for better treatment in US oil
import policy. President was remarkably forthright and outgoing for
first interview and obviously at present intends, within limits his
domestic political situation, cooperate with us on give and take basis
to improve US–Ven relations.
In response to my expression of our concern about possibility of
increased Castro Communist emphasis on and support to guerilla movement,
President expressed realistic assessment of situation, saying he had no
allusions about sustained character of Communist subversion program so
long as Castro in control of
Cuba. He said he was being kept informed of developments and his info
agreed substantially with ours.Reference is
to a U.S. Government memorandum on Cuban subversion. Bernbaum told Leoni “that prior to leaving
Washington, I had had a productive talk with President
Johnson regarding United States-Venezuelan
problems. I had found him greatly interested in the Venezuelan
situation and in the solution to these problems. He had just read a
memorandum covering the likelihood of a new Communist drive through
Cuba against Venezuela and other Latin American countries and asked
that I give a copy of this memorandum to President Leoni.” (Airgram
A–627 from Caracas, March 24; ibid., POL 23 VEN) President Johnson met
Bernbaum and four other
U.S. Ambassadors in Latin America February 8, 5:31–6:25 p.m.
(Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No substantive record of
the meeting has been found. He was familiar with attempted
arms smuggling from Colombia but interested in possible smuggling from
Algeria. He described continuing measures being taken against guerillas
to keep them off balance and efforts to control border and maritime
provinces. He further acknowledged he had been criticized for releasing
a few unimportant prisoners but said this done to sow dissension among
Communists and he had no intention at present of releasing important and
dangerous prisoners. He welcomed my assurance that he could continue to
count on US collaboration in meeting Communist insurgency threat and
specifically expressed appreciation for prompt delivery HU 1B
helicopters.
I questioned President about aircraft procurement program, pointing out
that while Venezuela military was indicating interest in stepping up
credit sales purchases from $10 to $20 million annually from US it was
also purchasing Canberras from UK causing
US some problems. President was fully familiar with Canberra purchase,
underscoring it was necessary purchase for replacement, but was less
sure about other negotiations (presumably for Hawker Hunters) although
he knew question was one of price and availability as between US and
UK. He appeared fully to accept that
Venezuela needed improve aircraft inventory for coastal surveillance and
for defense against Cuba.
As conversation turned to economic subjects, President welcomed my
statement to American Chamber of Commerce that Venezuela (like other
less developed countries) would not be prejudiced by US balance of
payments measures and, while recognizing reasons why aid concessional
loans would no longer be available, he gave great importance to having
continued access to long term IDB loans
especially for housing. With respect to US investment, President
acknowledged difficult position in which oil companies and Orinoco
Mining had been put as result uncertainties about taxes and expressed
hope that compromise could be reached by mutual concessions.
Leoni hit question of
“discrimination” in our oil import policy hard (it is favorite theme of
his) emphasizing it was political as well as economic question. He said
he had sent President Johnson letter on subject
through Minister of Mines Perez Guerrero and thought it essential that
some progress be made at least on some aspects of problem.Leoni claimed that “he had
attempted in this letter to make President
Johnson aware of the necessary relationship
between a satisfactory solution [of the petroleum problem] and
Venezuela’s ability to reach a successful conclusion against the
Communist threat emanating from Cuba.” (Airgram A–635 from Caracas,
March 24; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, PET 17 US–VEN) Leoni’s letter to
Johnson, however, deals exclusively with
petroleum; it does not refer to Cuba or communism. A copy of the
letter, dated March 13 and delivered to the Department of State on
March 19, is ibid., PET 1 US–VEN. He also urged revision of
trade agreement, which he believed archaic, through quiet
negotiations.
Range of subjects covered, some at my initiative and some at his,
impressed me that Leoni is pretty well on top of his job, knows what he
wants, and has a practical politician’s rather than a theoretician’s
approach. It is, of course, too early to form a firm judgment but, this
first interview gives basis for hope this is someone we can work
with.
More detailed memcon follows.Memoranda of
conversation are attached to airgram A–627 from Caracas, March 24
(ibid., POL 23 VEN); airgram A–632
from Caracas, March 24 (ibid., DEF 19–3 US–VEN); and airgram A–635
from Caracas, March 24 (ibid., PET 17 US–VEN).
Bernbaum
526. Letter From the Director of the Office of Colombian-Venezuelan
Affairs (Margolies)
to the Ambassador to Venezuela (Bernbaum)Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, PET 17–2 US–VEN. Confidential;
Official–Informal.Washington, March 22, 1965.
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
SUBJECT
Oil Talks
The oil talks ended up relatively well under the circumstances due to the
intervention of Tom Mann.
As I wrote to you before the talks opened,Letter from Margolies to
Bernbaum, March 9.
(Ibid.) our positions had frozen into a basically negative
stance and I was very worried that the US would have no position other
than a generally negative one.
Fortunately your telegramIn telegram 1219
from Caracas, March 12, the Embassy reported on a speech before the
Venezuelan Congress, March 11, in which Leoni criticized U.S. policy
on oil imports: “The maintenance of this discriminatory regime is a
black blot on existing relations between Venezuela and the United
States.” (Ibid., POL 15–1
VEN) arrived just at the right time and alerted Tom Mann to
the serious political implications that were involved. He later said
that when he saw your reference to the “black spot” in President Leoni’s
speech, his antennae quivered and he felt that it was necessary for him
to take an active interest in the talks.
His intervention introduced a degree of movement in our position, and at
the luncheon on ThursdayMarch 18.
with Secretary Udall, the
Secretary told the Venezuelan delegation that we were giving active
consideration to the possibility of some preferential treatment for
Venezuelan oil in our market as against oil from the Middle East. It
turned out, however, that the Venezuelans insisted on receiving not
merely better treatment than the Middle East but equal treatment with
Canada. We then had rather sticky negotiations on the afternoon of
Thursday and all day Friday in which the Venezuelans adopted a rather
obdurate position in which they insisted that all discrimination between
Venezuela and Canada had to be removed and furthermore that they wished
to have a written assurance that the US Government agreed in principle
with this position, even though we might not be clear as to how we might
work it out technically. They stated that they were prepared to remain indefinitely until we
were in a position to give them such an assurance in writing.
The situation as I say looked rather grim with Interior and the E area
both expressing the view that in asking too much the Venezuelans were
likely to lose the opportunity to gain what appeared to us to be a
substantial advantage in the situation.
This was the way the position rested until we met in Tom Mann’s office
late Friday afternoon. Tom with his customary frankness and directness
explained to them that the issues involved required extensive
consultations on our part with the President, the Congress and with our
domestic industry and with other countries involved. Therefore, it was
not practicable to give them the type of written assurance they
required. He would, however, give them his personal undertaking to see
that the issue was fully explored, although he made it clear that he
could not guarantee any satisfactory results. They were satisfied,
therefore, with the minute which was drafted by Mr. Mann and the Minister of Mines which
was sent to you under cover of Deptel
975.Dated March 19. (National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PET 17–2
VEN)
As Tom outlined the situation there appeared to be only two methods of
fully satisfying the Venezuelan complaint that overland exemptionOn April 30, 1959, the Eisenhower
administration proclaimed an “overland exemption” to the Mandatory
Oil Import Program, thereby allowing Canada and Mexico to avoid
restrictions that applied to other oil exporting countries. (24 Federal Register 3527) was
discriminatory.
One method, which the Venezuelans favored, was to award Venezuela a
country quota. He said that this would in effect allow Venezuela to
determine the amount of oil that we would receive and the price at which
we would receive it. He said that it was politically impossible to work
out a solution along these lines. He said that he had become involved in
this type of question in connection with the coffee agreement and he was
quite clear in his own mind that Congress would never tolerate an
arrangement under which another country could dictate to the United
States the price which it must pay for its imports of a specific
commodity.
The Venezuelans demurred, sought to give assurances that any such power
would be exercised by the Venezuelans with restraint, understanding,
etc. Mr. Mann insisted, however,
that it was hopeless to consider pursuing such a solution in the context
of our political situation.
He said that the other possibility, and it seemed to him the only
alternative, if the Venezuelans demands were to be met in full, was to
set up some sort of Western Hemisphere licensing arrangement under which oil imported from
Canada would be subjected to a licensing arrangement comparable to that
imposed on oil of Venezuelan origin with a preference to Western
Hemisphere oil as against Middle East oil.
He said that this course of action was politically difficult for the
United States and also, in his opinion, involved political risks for
Venezuela. He noted that the Canadians were highly emotional on the
subject of their oil exports to the United States. He said that he hoped
that the Venezuelans would make it clear to the Canadians that they were
the ones that insisted on our exploring such a solution, since he could
well believe that the Canadians would not be pleased by this
development. He noted that the arrangement would also involve a
departure from our traditional policy of avoiding trade preferences
which would stir up opposition at home and also might create problems
with the Middle Eastern oil producing countries who also tended to
become emotional about such issues. He asked whether the Venezuelan
Government would make clear to the Middle East governments concerned
that they had initiated this matter with us and would help to reconcile
the Middle Eastern countries to this policy were it to be adopted by
us.
Mr. Mann said that he had not,
quite frankly, been fully informed of the Venezuelan feeling on the
subject and President Johnson had not been informed
of the matter at all up to the present. He said that he would take steps
to see that the President was informed.
Mr. Mann said that in advancing
the best solution he would not recommend it but would point out that it
was apparently the only feasible answer to the Venezuelan complaint. He
was unable to see how the matter would come out, depending on the
consultations that were involved. The main thrust of his statement to
the Venezuelans, however, was that this issue would be given serious and
urgent consideration. It was on this basis that the Venezuelans left in
a reasonably content frame of mind.
Speaking personally, I believe that it will be very difficult to put
Venezuela and Canada on a completely equal footing. As a matter of fact
the Venezuelans themselves recognize this and therefore suggested that
the word “similar” rather than “equal” be used as identifying their
position.
The new approach will of course require imposing licensing arrangements
on Canadian oil and thereby introducing a form of frontier control
between ourselves and Canada. As you know, we have been working over the
past decades in efforts to limit such border controls and this will be a
retrogressive step. It will undoubtedly give rise to considerable
opposition both within this government and within Canada.
A favorable feature for anticipating some satisfactory solution lies in
the fact that the domestic oil industry and the Department of Interior
have not been satisfied with the rapid growth of Canadian oil imports to
our market, and indeed the Canadian Government itself has been uneasy at
the rate of growth which has been developing over the past year or so.
At any rate we are starting this week to explore this subject in the
Department on an urgent basis and talks with Canada should be held in
the near future which should throw some light on how far we can get.
One of the subjects that arose from time to time during the talks was the
possibility of a multilateral conference before our policy was finally
firmed up. The Venezuelans thought it would be useful to have
themselves, ourselves, and the Canadians around the table at the same
time. It might be that the Mexicans, who also enjoy an overland
exemption (which to be sure is of little economic importance) might have
to be invited as well. The Interior Department seems for some reason
very reluctant to arrange for multilateral talks. Mr. Mann left the question open for the
time being.
I was encouraged by the fact that President Leoni in the message you sent up (Embtel 1255)Dated March 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1
VEN) indicated that he expected progress to be made “at least
on some aspects of the problem” and would be satisfied with a solution
which improved the Venezuelan position in our market and augmenting the
amount of money realized by Venezuela for the sale of its oil, without
insisting that the position of Venezuela should be placed on an exact
parallel with that of Canada. I hope the Venezuelans will take a
realistic view of the situation because I believe that the possibilities
are that something quite favorable to them can be worked out provided
they do not adopt as rigid position as they took prior to our meeting in
Mr. Mann’s office.
With best regards,
Sincerely,
Daniel F. MargoliesPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
527. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs (Solomon) to the President’s Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source:
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Office of Fuels
and Energy, Petroleum Files: Lot 69 D 76, Petroleum 17–2, Oil
Imports, 1965 May. A note on the memorandum indicates it was
hand-carried to the White House on May 27.Washington, May 26, 1965.
SUBJECT
Oil Import Controls and U.S. Relations With Venezuela and
Canada
Since Tom Mann is in New York this afternoon he has asked me to take up
this urgent matter with you.
The fundamental issue is that the Government of Venezuela is
demanding that the new oil import control program covering the next
five years which is to be announced by Presidential Proclamation the
end of next month should provide “equal treatment” for Venezuela
with that given to Canada. This has become a major political issue
within the Venezuelan Government, the opposition parties to the
Government and the Venezuelan public. Ideally they would like to
receive an “over land exemption” like that enjoyed by Canada (that
is no U.S. imposed limitation on oil imports leaving it up to the
Government of Venezuela to control the exports of its oil companies
to the U.S.). Both Interior and State agree that we cannot agree to
this for many reasons. The other method of giving fully “equal
treatment” to Venezuela would be to abolish formally the Canadian
over land exemption (Mexico’s is unimportant) as well as limiting in
fact the rate of increase of Canadian oil exports to the U.S. The
Canadian Government and our own people believe that to do so would
possibly, and perhaps probably, result in the downfall of the
Pearson Government and jeopardization of the bilateral defense and
increasing free trade arrangements between Canada and the U.S. In
brief this can become the hottest political issue in both Canada and
Venezuela vis-à-vis the U.S.Interior and State believe that the most practical and appropriate
solution—although by definition not fully satisfactory to either
side—is that contained in the attached position paper.Not attached. Presidential Proclamation
before the end of June require that the content of this package be
advised to the Canadian technical people in the next day or two and
the Venezuelans shortly thereafter. We probably will need during the
following week a Ministerial level meeting with the Canadians and we
will insist on a Venezuelan meeting at the Ministerial level to extract an
acceptance by them of our proposals which could be issued publicly
after the Presidential Proclamation.
In brief the package consists of: The press release accompanying the Presidential Proclamation
and future public references by us would talk of “planned
coordinated pipeline movements” instead of “over land
exemption”.A private formal commitment to us from the Canadian Government
that it would confine its annual rate of increase in its oil
exports to the U.S. to an over all of five percent. In addition
the Government in Canada would be advised privately that if it
were unsuccessful in meeting this annual commitment, the United
States would take measures to enforce it.The Government of Venezuela would be informed of the Canadian
commitment, and would be assured that we would review with
Venezuela each year Canadian performance, and that if it were
not satisfactory the United States would consider the measures
required to ensure this result.A Western Hemisphere preference formula which would in fact
make it slightly more attractive for U.S. refineries to import
Venezuelan oil as compared to Near Eastern oil. In practice the
Venezuelans could get some modest price increase as well as
modest tonnage increase from this formula.On May 27 Bundy asked the President if the memorandum
required White House action. Johnson
responded he would not be able to consider the issue until
June 1. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts,
Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Bundy, May 27, 1965, 7:29
p.m., Tape F65.42, Side B, PNO 3) The President called
Mann on June 4 to
discuss “a memo on Venezuela and Canadian oil”, an apparent
reference to Solomon’s May 26 memorandum.
Johnson asked Mann “to go over this
carefully from the President’s standpoint and the national
standpoint and see if there isn’t something that can be done
to ride it out for sixty to ninety days.”
Johnson said the proposal had been
represented as “the best solution even though it will make
both countries angry and also our industry.” “It seemed to
him,” however, “the best way out is more of the same. No
change, but we are studying it. Get rid of the Congress and
then do what we need to do.” (Ibid., Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, May
2, 1965–June 2, 1966) Solomon met Perez Guerrero in New York to
explain the President’s decision. A memorandum of the
conversation, June 14, is in the National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PET
17–2 US–VEN.
Anthony M. SolomonPrinted from a copy that
bears this typed signature.
528. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PET 15 US.
Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Rio de Janeiro. Passed to the
White House.Caracas, November 15, 1965,
0215Z.
542. Following summary conversation between Secretary Rusk, President Leoni and others Nov 14 is based on
uncleared memcom is FYINoforn and subject to revision upon
review:
Part I: U.S. Petroleum Restrictions
President Leoni said petroleum
income central to Venezuela’s economy and Venezuela would not be
concerned if U.S. import restrictions were just and non-discriminatory.
He recalled when matter arose during President Eisenhower’s administration latter had agreed necessity of
just solution to problem on basis hemisphere preference.On March 10, 1959, President
Eisenhower signed Proclamation 3279
instituting the Mandatory Oil Import Program. (24 Federal Register 1781) The same day
Eisenhower released the following
statement: “The United States recognizes, of course, that within the
larger sphere of free world security, we, in common with Canada and
with the other American Republics, have a joint interest in
hemisphere defense. Informal conversations with Canada and Venezuela
looking toward a coordinated approach to the problem of oil as it
relates to this matter of common concern have already begun.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Dwight D.
Eisenhower, 1959, pp. 240–241)
Subsequently President Kennedy
had acknowledged agreement called for along hemisphere preference
lines.On February 20, 1963, after 2
days of discussion in Washington, Presidents Kennedy and Betancourt issued a joint statement,
including an agreement “that a strong and healthy petroleum industry
is essential to Venezuela’s prosperity, to the achievement of the
goals set by the Alliance for Progress and for the security of the
Hemisphere as a whole.” (Ibid., , pp.
187–188) To date no progress has taken place. Meantime
Venezuela’s income from petroleum has been decreasing at same time
balance of trade with U.S. turning disadvantageously against Venezuela
and now is at unfavorable rate of over $300 million annually. President
said further drain taking place through reliance on Venezuelan credits
by American firms rather than through use dollar funds or credits. He
said U.S. announcement continuation existing oil import policy without
solution Venezuela problem could create serious difficulties.
Secretary responded that he hoped GOV
understands U.S. faces many problems with its many trading partners in
all parts free world. U.S. desires see Venezuela maximize its income but
our producers also have income problems. Difficulties arise from close
trading relations rather than from ignorance respective problems. The
Secretary added that U.S. would consider what could be done to help
Venezuela but he did not know whether what we could do would be
acceptable. The important
thing was that efforts to find a reasonably acceptable solution will be
continued. Minister Mines Perez Guerrero expounded on petroleum
restriction along lines already well known in Washington. He described
negotiations and impasse due Venezuela’s inability after considerable
study to accept “Solomon”
proposalReference is evidently to the
proposal outlined in Document 527.
and U.S. inability go along with compromise solution of two ticket
system which represented a considerable watering down of Venezuela’s
counter proposal. He also complained against suits instituted by U.S.
Treasury against U.S. petroleum firms attempting to comply with
Venezuelan pricing policies. I explained this due practice of some firms
in paying Venezuelan taxes on basis prices higher than these actually
realized to prevent later tax recovery suits by the GOV thereby reducing taxes due to USG.
President Leoni then invited
former Minister Mines Dr. Juan Pablo Perez
Alfonso to discuss subject. Perez Alfonso said last
year’s trade deficit with U.S. totalled $344 million figure which
represented 5 percent gross national product. He referred also to fact
that U.S. direct investment in Venezuela is 70 percent of total foreign
investment in country and that U.S. interests derive 23 percent return
on investment. He admitted surplus in all-over trade balance but
emphasized declining markets in other areas and difficulties with
countries with which GOV has favorable
trade balances.
Secretary then asked Minister Perez Guerrero given difficulties that
solution he had in mind. Dr. Perez said that at one time in talks with
Secretary Udall two-ticket
proposal had been made and hemisphere preference system also suggested.
Now U.S. had decided neither approach to problem is feasible. Venezuela
he said has no clean-cut answer but takes view that since oil import
restrictions are authored by U.S. an adjustment should be offered by
U.S. He confirmed in later talk with me that revival Solomon proposal
would not be satisfactory. Secretary responded by saying U.S. and GOV should keep in close touch. Although
not expert in this field, Secretary said he would take matter up with
President Johnson and Secretary Udall. He said he could not guarantee an
acceptable solution but would report on matter and perhaps in end
something could be worked out.
Comment:
Secretary requests one more review of problem be made to see if something
can be done to break impasse, even though such review will probably
involve postponement proclamation. Results review should then be
communicated to GOV prior issuance
proclamation. This will fulfill his commitment to President Leoni to look at the problem again.
Bernbaum
529. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in BrazilSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PET 17 US–VEN.
Confidential; Priority; Limdis.
Drafted by Mann, cleared by
Solomon, and approved by
Mann. Rusk was in Rio de Janeiro November
16–24 for the Second Special Inter-American Conference.Washington, November 19, 1965, 7:20
p.m.
Tosec 59. Udall has informed Mann that time for issuance of proclamation covering
period January–June 1966 is fast running out and is pressing for
issuance of proclamation which would not meet Venezuela’s position.
Puerto Ricans also urging prompt action for different reasons.
Udall states if proclamation is
not issued soon we will have to postpone issuance until some time prior
to July 1, 1966. I understand he is personally committed to domestic
industry to make some minor changes in present proclamation.
Would appreciate knowing whether your conversation with Leoni reported in
Caracas 542Document 528. contemplated personal
conversation with President and Udall before final decision reached. Problem has as you
know been under review for several months and even Solomon proposal
which is unacceptable to the Venezuelans was opposed by the industry. We
know of no compromise proposal which would meet Venezuela’s demand which
essentially is that we take away from domestic refiners of Venezuelan
oil approximately 1.25 a barrel and pass on this difference between
price of U.S. and Venezuelan crude to Venezuelan government. In course
of last of several conversations we have had with Perez-Guerrero on this
subject he indicated he would accept for time being passing on a
fraction (say 10 to 20%) of the total involved but indicated that
Venezuelan aim would be to increase this to a full 100% that is to say
“de-ticketing” all Venezuelan crude. As you know this would require a
country quota for Venezuela and in addition to objections of domestic
refiners we would have to face strong opposition of US oil investors in
Venezuela who, with some justification, are convinced Venezuela would
use country quota as a basis for controlling sales of Venezuelan crude
in this market. Since receiving your instructions we have reviewed once
again our position both internally and with the Venezuelans and we have
no new proposal to make. Perez-Guerrero has also sent us word that he
has nothing new to offer other than this “de-ticketing.”
Some of the largest oil investors have been frankly told of the danger of
a nationalistic reaction in Venezuela and they have informed us they
prefer this risk to the risks inherent in the “de-ticketing” and country
quota arrangement.
Would appreciate your instructions.In
telegram Secto 31 from Rio de
Janeiro, November 20, Rusk
replied: “It seemed obvious from my talks in Caracas that no formula
is in sight which offers a solution regarding Venezuelan oil. Simply
as a matter of courtesy, I would hope we could have some kind of
consultation with the Venezuelan Government following my visit to
indicate that we have been unable to find a necessary solution
beyond those already suggested and it will be necessary now to
proceed with the issuance of a proclamation. I look upon this as a
diplomatic courtesy to let them know that their discussion with me
had not been ignored. Probably Department’s 431 to Caracas fully
meets this requirement. Do not believe this issue will affect Rio
Conference significantly.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, ORG 7 S) According to
telegram 431 to Caracas, State and Interior representatives informed
the Venezuelan Embassy on November 17 that, although the U.S.
Government “did not exclude possibility finding new approach,” the
“likelihood of discovering brand new scheme quite slim.” (Ibid., PET
12 VEN)
Ball
530. Editorial Note
On December 10, 1965, President Johnson signed
Proclamation 3693, “Modifying Proclamation 3279 Adjusting Imports of
Petroleum and Petroleum Products.” (30 Federal
Register 15459) The proclamation met the concerns of the
petrochemical industry in Puerto Rico, but Venezuelan concerns for equal
treatment under the oil import program were not addressed. At the press
conference announcing the proclamation, Secretary of Interior Udall admitted that the negotiations
with Canada and Venezuela had not produced “the type of ultimate
consensus that could have resulted in changes.” (Proceedings, December
10; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Office of Fuels
and Energy, Petroleum Files: Lot 69 D 76, Petroleum 17–2, Oil Imports,
1965 December) In an accompanying press statement, however, Udall
proposed continuing discussions with Venezuela and recognized “that the
oil industry in Venezuela has a special position in the contribution it
makes to Western Hemisphere security.” (Circular telegram CA–6451,
December 22; ibid., Central Files 1964–66, PET 17–2 US)
On December 21 the Department of Interior issued several amendments to
the oil import regulation, including an increase in the allocation for
imports to the eastern United States and Puerto Rico, two markets traditionally
dominated by the oil industry in Venezuela. (30 Federal Register 16080) Although the amended regulations did
not specify a system of country quotas, the Department of State
estimated that Venezuela could reasonably expect to increase its oil
imports by 35,000 barrels per day. (Telegram 512 to Caracas, December
22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964–66, PET 17–2 US) The Department was encouraged by the initial
reaction in Venezuela to the proclamation, thereby justifying “the
efforts which Ambassador Bernbaum
and the Department made to have references to the Venezuelan problem
included in Secretary Udall’s
press statement.” (Memorandum from Hill to Vaughn,
December 15; ibid., ARA/NC/V Files:
Lot 66 D 469, PET 17–2 U.S. Import Program, July–September 1965)
On December 31 the Leoni
government informed the oil companies of a new regulation governing
discounts on its residual fuel oil, a measure designed to raise revenue
by raising the price of exports to the United States. (Washington
National Records Center, E/CBA/REP Files:
FRC 72 A 6248, Current Economic Developments, No. 745, January 18,
1966)
531. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Job
79–R01012A, O/DDI Registry. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to
a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central
Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence
organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the
National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board
concurred in this estimate on December 16.NIE 89–65Washington, December 16, 1965.
VENEZUELA
The Problem
To estimate the situation in Venezuela and the prospects under the
Leoni administration (until
general elections in 1968).
Conclusions
Venezuela will probably continue to experience political stability
and a favorable rate of economic growth over the next few years.
However, it will still face deep-seated social problems. Most
economic and social
reform programs will be pushed vigorously through 1966. Thereafter
budgetary restraints are likely to lead to some loss of momentum.
This slowdown will almost certainly become a major issue in the
December 1968 elections.The government and security forces have dealt reasonably
effectively with the leftist insurgency; the capabilities of the
guerrillas and terrorists will probably decline further. The
insurgents are not likely to pose a major threat to the government
during the period of this estimate.Some misgivings regarding the Leoni administration still persist
among the military, but the military establishment is generally
disposed to support the constitutional government. We believe that
there is little chance of a successful military coup within the
period of this estimate.Leoni’s governing coalition will probably hold together at least
until the near approach of the elections scheduled for December
1968. The contest is then likely to be between two center-left
parties, AD and COPEI, each claiming to be the more
effective means of achieving social reform. If, in anticipation of
this contest, Leoni should
initiate a more radical reform program, he might thereby antagonize
the military and increase the chances of a military coup.The administration will make some attempts to increase Venezuelan
influence in Latin American affairs, while holding to the Betancourt
Doctrine of denying recognition to governments which come to power
by overthrowing constitutionally-elected ones. Manifestations of
economic nationalism—and in particular resentment over US
restrictions on the importation of Venezuelan oil—will probably
produce frictions in relations with the US.Bowdler forwarded an
advance copy of the estimate with a December 17 memorandum to
Bundy in which he
noted that “the picture may not be as rosy as described.” Citing
telegram 648 from Caracas, December 16, Bowdler explained that
“Bernbaum is
sufficiently concerned to speak to Leoni about it and, subsequently, to selected
military leaders. I have asked ARA to make sure Bernbaum does not tarry in letting military
leaders know how strongly opposed we are to a coup against
Leoni.” (Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Vol.
II, 8/64–8/66) Leoni told
Bernbaum that he was
not concerned by the rumors, since “there is no real basis for
coup” and not “enough support within the military to stage one.”
Bernbaum reported
that the Embassy would “continue to follow situation closely and
take advantage any opportunities to discourage plotters.”
(Telegrams 648 and 653 from Caracas, December 16 and 17,
respectively; National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1964–66, POL
23–9 VEN)
[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]
532. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
(Mann) to the
President’s Special Assistant (Califano)Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1964–66, PET 17–2 US. Confidential. Drafted by
Mann. President
Johnson called Mann on January 6 to discuss “the resid matter,”
asking if Mann “was going to
be able to work it out.” Mann
told Johnson that “it looked pretty tough for
us to do anything because we do not have leverage. He asked the
President to read the memo sent over today.” (Memorandum of
conversation, January 6; Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, May 2,
1965–June 2, 1966)Washington, January 6,
1966.
The conclusions expressed here supplement the two background memoranda on
Venezuela residual oil, copies of which you have.Neither found. The memorandum of conversation cited
in footnote 1 above notes that the President saw the two memoranda
sent over on January 6. (Ibid.) Johnson may
have seen a paper entitled “Consequences of Proposed Action of
Venezuela re Residual Fuel Oil,” January 4. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, E/ORF FSE Files: Lot 70 D 54, PET
17–2, U.S. Imports, January 1966) No evidence has been found,
however, that the paper was forwarded to the White House.
Our best guess is that Venezuela seeks about 28¢ a barrel increase in the
price of its residual oil.
This would mean a net loss to us balance of payments wise of about 50
million dollars. On the assumption that Interior continues to carry out
its plans to liberalize the import of residual oil, we would expect that
the price increase would be partially off-set by more competition, by a
decline in the value of the “tickets” for imported resid, by the
probable desire of residual oil importers to stay competitive with coal,
and by the continuance of discounts to large users. Moreover, the price
increase would probably be delayed for a while due to existing contracts
but prices would probably gradually rise by almost 10¢ a barrel, if
current ticket premiums are eliminated. There are about 300 million
barrels of residual oil consumed annually in the United States.
If the Venezuelans after further discussion with the companies do not
insist on the companies increasing prices but use the new price as the
basis for tax calculation, it is Interior’s judgment that the companies
for competitive reasons may pass on only the 15 cent cost increase which
will wipe out the ticket value and may result in very little price
increase to the consumer.
On the other hand, efficient oil industries no longer produce resid in
large quantities and we would probably have to admit that the Venezuelan
price of resid is lower than it should be—principally because the
private companies have deliberately kept it low in order to maximize
their sales.
I do not believe the Venezuelan action was the result of our liberalizing
our imports of residual oil since the Venezuelan motivation has been to
capture the ticket premium. More probably it was something that the
Venezuelans have been thinking about doing for some time and which they
were loath to do while they still had hopes of getting us to change our
policy so as to permit Venezuela to realize more on its sale of crude to
the United States.
The oil companies will be negotiating with the Venezuelan Government and
they have some hope of getting the Venezuelans to modify this price
increase. I do not expect, however, that they will allow this to reach a
breaking point with the Venezuelan Government.
We should instruct our Ambassador to support the companies’ effort by
making the following points at a high level: There was no advance consultation with the United
States.The United States is doing everything possible to hold the
line on balance of payments and price problems while carrying a
very heavy load in Viet-Nam and around the world. Venezuela has
both an economic and a security stake in our efforts. The recent
action on residual oil makes it much more difficult for
us.If the purpose of the resid order was to use government action
to force increased prices, this is bad in principle and violates
the terms of the oil concessions. If the purpose of the order is
to modify existing tax arrangements without advance notice and
discussion with the companies, this is also bad in
principle.The price action if carried through rigidly may adversely
affect in the long run the investment decisions of the oil
companies.While Venezuela and the United States have not agreed on the
Venezuelan proposal to de-ticket Venezuelan crude, the United
States is nevertheless the principal market for both Venezuela’s
crude and residual oil. It has been a safe and reliable market
in which Venezuela is earning annually only slightly under a
billion dollars. One of the reasons for this is the attitude of
the United States to encourage preferences for Venezuelan crude.
For example, Canada continues to import large amounts of
Venezuelan crude and has refrained from exporting to the United
States market some 50,000 barrels of crude a day which is
readily available. In Puerto Rico the United States has required
the two refineries and petro-chemical complexes to import feed
stock from the Western Hemisphere, i.e., Venezuela. In spite of
its balance of payments difficulties, the United States has
maintained a requirement that the Defense Department continue to
purchase foreign crude at the 1962 level of 120 million dollars
a year, most of which is supplied by Venezuela. The action of
the Venezuelan Government is inconsistent with these acts of
cooperation.
II
Turning now to the question of leverage, I would be less than candid if I
did not point out that these arguments may have no effect whatever on
Venezuela for the following reasons: Venezuela has a long established policy of trying to raise the
price of its crude and residual oils while discouraging
increased production on the ground that Venezuela is using up
its irreplaceable natural resources too fast. They are not
likely to be impressed with the argument about reducing the
volume of their exports so long as they believe their revenues
will not decline especially in the short term. They can carry
through their new price policy flexibly, so as to preserve their
European market.What GOV wants from us in
essence is an exemption of Venezuelan crude oil imports from our
controls. This would pass to Venezuela the more than a dollar a
barrel which our refineries now make on the “tickets” and, from
their point of view, might result in price increases in the
future in both crude and resid to say nothing of giving them a
stranglehold on U.S. oil companies in Venezuela.Venezuela technicians know that our leverage is very limited
in the short term. While Venezuelan oil prices are somewhat
higher FOB they are competitive in our market because of lower
shipping costs as compared with Near Eastern and North African
oils. And, insofar as resid is concerned, there is no alternate
source to which we could readily turn for comparably priced
residual oils. It is doubtful that the Defense Department could
buy elsewhere more than a fraction of the heavier fuels we now
buy from Venezuela, and to the extent they could buy in the
United States, our balance-of-payments savings would be more
than offset by the loss to our budget. Such measures as this and
the freeing of the refineries and petro-chemical plants in
Puerto Rico to buy elsewhere could be irritants rather than
deterrents but as events develop, it might become advisable to
try them.Opinions of the experts are that the sheer inconvenience and
cost of handling coal as compared with fuel oil make coal
noncompetitive with most users of oil even at the price which
Venezuela has in mind. Further, a sudden demand on the coal
industry for substantial additional amounts of coal for the east
coast would, it is estimated, result in a price increase in
coal.In addition, Venezuela has very considerable leverage on the
United States because of our large investments there—more than 3
billion dollars. In the nationalistic climate which prevails
there, steady pressures on investors in the form of increased
taxes and otherwise is an ever-present danger. Also, it should
be noted that Venezuela holds about $400 million in dollars and
treasury obligations in its reserves and has been resisting
pressures to follow the European pattern of increasing its gold holdings.
There is nothing to prevent them from turning in dollars for
gold.
III
If holding the price line is the decisive consideration, probably the
most effective action—in addition to approaching the Venezuelans as
suggested above—would be to de-control residual oil or so administer it
so as to eliminate the ticket premiums. This would probably have the
effect of eliminating the value of the tickets, currently estimated at
15¢ a barrel, from the resid price. Tighter restrictions on U.S. imports
of Venezuelan residual oil would perpetuate the additional 15¢ a barrel
ticket cost and would put pressure on resid prices in this market. It
would not give us any leverage with Venezuela.
While de-control of residual imports would make economic sense from the
standpoint of holding the price line—especially since the coal industry
is said to be operating at a near capacity level and is experiencing a
scarcity of coal miners—de-control would be strongly opposed by the coal
industry and by those users of resid in this country who would lose the
value of their “tickets.”
Thus, this recommendation involves domestic political questions more than
international ones.
Thomas C. MannPrinted from a copy that
indicates Mann signed the original.
533. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 10 VEN. Secret;
Priority.Caracas, January 12, 1966,
2131Z.
700. 1. All but last paragraph Deptel
554In telegram 554 to Caracas, January
11, the Department instructed the Embassy to “convey at high level
USG concern with recent action
taken by GOV concerning residual
fuel oil,” following the recommendations outlined in Document 532. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PET 17–1
VEN) read in translation to MinMines Perez Guerrero this
morning.
2. Perez clearly not impressed by balance of payments argument, pointing
out that Venezuela also has its own budgetary problems which created by
steady decline prices petroleum and products. He was sympathetic,
however, to the argument regarding internal price stability. While
admitting that the new program would inevitably involve price increases,
he repeated previous assurances of flexibility in application designed
not only to meet problem of competition but also to avoid excessive
consumer impact. He again expressed belief that this could be
facilitated by elimination excessive and unnecessary intermediary
discounts and profit margins.
3. Perez conceded that many American consumers, particularly in New York
area, were considering changeover to alternate fuel sources and that
present measure might accelerate this process, but felt that this
disadvantage far from adequate to outweigh numerous other advantages to
Venezuela of program. One important factor in decision was anticipation
of price decline due to enhanced competition resulting from first easing
and then elimination of fuel oil import quotas. Since companies
themselves could not prevent such a decline due to
U.S. anti-trust laws, felt necessary for GOV to establish new discount procedure and thereby prevent
price deterioration. Second and perhaps even more important, was the
need to demonstrate to the Venezuelan people that the GOV had a clear policy to protect
Venezuela’s interests and knew how to apply it. Failure to take this or
similar “reasonable” measure would have inevitably given clear field to
proponents of more radical solutions to the petroleum problem, such as
currently proposed increased taxes on “excessive petroleum profits” and
even limitation of fuel oil exports to the U.S. While the measure taken
was emphatically not in retaliation for the failure of petroleum
negotiations, it was considered the most reasonable manner of facing up
to the problem created by failure of the negotiations. He repeated this
political argument a number of times.
4. With respect to our complaint regarding lack of prior consultation,
Perez pointed out that we had not been distinguished for our prior
consultations with Venezuela and inquired what would have been our
position if Venezuela had consulted. He answered this by saying that we
would undoubtedly have opposed the projected measure and that Venezuela
would have been forced to go forward in the face of such opposition. He
conceded my point that we might have been able to work out a solution
with which both parties could live, but emphasized the impracticability
of such talks in view of the danger of leaks and the limited time
available.
5. It was made quite clear by Perez, in view of the foregoing, that there
was no chance of reconsideration of the new discount policy but he did
give assurances that all possible, consistent with Venezuela’s “legitimate” aspirations to
protect its own interests, would be done to ensure reasonable,
intelligent and moderate application of variations from the 10 percent
discount which was termed only as a point of departure, depending on
conditions in the various consuming markets. In this regard, Perez
argued that the Venezuelan aspiration for a price increase in fuel oil,
with 1958 prices as the point of departure, was not unreasonable.
Although the dols 2.00 price that year followed the Suez crisis, prices
of manufactured products purchased by Venezuela have risen considerably
since that date, whereas non-U.S. crude and fuel oil prices have
steadily declined. Taking into consideration price inflation during the
past seven years, it seemed to him that the Venezuelan program was quite
reasonable and just. He emphasized that Venezuela has steadily been
suffering from price increases arising from the increased prices of U.S.
products attributable to wage increases as well as U.S. inflation, and
did not see why the U.S. could not accept Venezuela’s attempt to protect
its own position.
6. Perez said that he expected to be in New York City January 18 and 19,
and in Washington January 20 and 21 on business involving the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund in connection with a study on Libya.
He was instructing Perez de la Cova to suggest a luncheon or other
meeting with USG officials at which time
this problem could be discussed further.
Comment:
7. What Perez told me today was essentially similar to what he had told
me January 4 and reported in this Embassy’s A–530Not printed. (Ibid., FN 10 VEN) of January 8
which was presumably received in Washington on January 10. I did not
believe then and I do not believe now that it would be practical to
expect any reconsideration of the GOV
action. I do, however, feel that our talk today and talks to be held in
Washington next week should make more likely implementation of the
announced intention of the GOV to apply
the program with minimum danger to the competitive position of fuel oil
and to the price structure.
8. Having in mind the politically sensitive position of the GOV on petroleum, increased jockeying
within and between the various political groups in anticipation of the
‘68 elections and gov preoccupation over the inadequacy of government
revenues to finance its politically important social and economic
programs, it does not seem realistic to expect any more. Our strongest
cards today are the Venezuelan hope, however remote, of an eventual
breakthrough on restrictions and the special position accorded Venezuela
among petroleum producers on capital movements from the U.S. Our
vulnerabilities are illustrated by the new policy on fuel oil prices, large U.S.
investments and sizeable Venezuelan Central Bank dollar deposits.
9. Although Perez Guerrero intimated that his government’s action on
residual fuel oil and claims for back taxes attributable to inadequate
export prices would forestall more radical measures, I am not optimistic
regarding the future. It seems to me and also to petroleum producers
here that efforts toward increased taxation are most likely, if only
because of the government’s budgetary problem, and that the petroleum
industry will be one of the prime targets.In a January 14 letter to Hill, Bernbaum emphasized that “retaliation by US would
aggravate the Venezuelans—certainly this would be the case with an
open kind of retaliation. And, I am afraid that the political
importance of this issue is so great in Venezuela as to make it more
likely that irritation here will be accompanied by further
retaliation than by back-tracking on positions already taken.”
(Ibid., FN 11 VEN)
Bernbaum
534. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone
Conversations with LBJ, May 2,
1965–June 2, 1966. No classification marking. Drafted by Patricia A.
Saunders. According to the President’s Daily Diary
Johnson called Mann at 10:10 a.m. (Johnson Library)Washington, January 14, 1966, 10:15
a.m.
The President said that Marlin SandlinMarlin
E. Sandlin, chairman of the Pan American Sulphur Company in Houston,
Texas. had raised the price of sulphur $5 a ton. Mr.
Mann said this was the first
he had heard of it. The President said that was the trouble, we were not
on top of it. He said he thought Mr. Mann should call Mr. Sandlin and tell him that we
certainly hope that he does not press this and remind him that if they
keep the price up we will have to go to controls. The President said he
thought this was awful. Mr. Mann
said perhaps he should ask Mr. Sandlin to put a freeze on it and then
come up here for a talk. The President said he thought this would be too
late.
The President asked Mr. Mann if we
had any leverage on Venezuela and Mr. Mann said we did not. The President said he thought it
was foolish to raise the quota when we did. He said it seems almost idiotic for us to take
public funds to feed hungry children while we import extra oil from
Venezuela. He said he thought that we ought to use coal and keep this
oil out and put these people to work in the coal mines.
Mr. Mann said that would be great
if it would work but went on to explain that only about 10% of the big
users—mostly utilities— would be likely to convert to coal soon.
Therefore, the conclusion was that coal could not replace the oil.
Mr. Mann said that the difficulty
in his opinion really stems from the fact that the Venezuelans want the
$1.25 that every refiner gets in this country as a result of his ticket
taken away from the refiners and passed on to Venezuela.
Mr. Mann said that he would talk
to Marlin Sandlin about the sulphur thing and
would also let the President know after he had talked to the Venezuelan
Minister of Mines Perez Guerrero who was coming to town. Mr. Mann told the President he hoped that
Venezuela could administer this order in such a way as not to hurt
us.
The President said if Mr. Mann was unable to reach
him, he should give the info to Mr. Valenti.Immediately
following this conversation, Johnson called
Udall to discuss the
problem of Venezuelan oil. The President urged the Secretary to
“find some way to really bring in a good load of this stuff that we
can protect ourselves a little bit, and then say to Venezuela: ‘When
we try to increase your quota, give you a little relief, why then
you stick a price to us. Now, we’re not going to do that, we’re just
not going to have it. We want a lower price with a bigger quantity
rather than a higher price.’” Johnson suggested
a barter deal, possibly in the Middle East, but was otherwise
emphatic: “I want somebody that’s smarter than Venezuela.” Udall admitted “maybe our people
haven’t looked hard enough at some move that would have the effect
of shaking these Venezuelans.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and
Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President
Johnson and Udall, January 14, 1966, 10:15 a.m., Tape F66.01,
Side B, PNO 5)
535. Editorial Note
On January 14, 1966, the Venezuelan Embassy informed the Department that
Minister of the Interior Gonzalo
Barrios was planning to visit Washington for 1 week
starting January 18. The Embassy requested that Barrios receive an
appointment with President Johnson, possibly in
connection with the Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Manuel Perez Guerrero, who was coming
to Washington for oil consultations. (Telegram 569 to Caracas, January
14; National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 VEN) In a meeting with Ambassador
Bernbaum on January 15,
President Leoni made a separate
appeal for the appointment, explaining that its main purpose would be to
allow “first direct contact with President Johnson
through Barrios, who is most
trusted aid.” Barrios would
deliver a personal letter to Johnson addressing
several issues of mutual concern, including recent petroleum
developments, the Venezuela–British Guiana border dispute, and the
Vietnam war. (Telegram 709 from Caracas, January 15; ibid.)
Under Secretary of State Mann
raised the Venezuelan request with President
Johnson on January 15. According to a
memorandum of the conversation: “The President said that was the last
thing he wanted to do, negotiate on oil. Mr. Mann said that was right but Venezuela is so important
that if the President could see him and then refer him to Udall and State, he thought it would be
a good political move. He said he did not think the President should
discuss details. He said he thought it would be good if the President
could receive him because when the President sends people down to
Leoni they are received by
him and if his people could not get through to the President, it might
hurt feelings. The President said for Mr. Mann to bring him in for five minutes then, and to be
sure that was all he stayed.” (Johnson Library, Papers of Thomas C. Mann, Telephone Conversations
with LBJ, May 2, 1965–June 2, 1966) A
January 19 memorandum from Mann to the President requesting the
appointment for Barrios is in the National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 VEN.
536. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in VenezuelaSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AID(VEN) VIET S. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Hill on January 21, cleared by
Sayre and Bowdler, and approved by Mann. Repeated to London and
Georgetown. According to the President’s Daily Diary the meeting was
held from 12:56 until 1:14 p.m. (Johnson Library)Washington, January 24, 1966, 3:35
p.m.
585. Following summary FYI only and
Noforn. It is based on uncleared
MemCon and subject to amendment upon review MemCon.
President Johnson this noon received President
Leoni’s special emissaries Gonzalo
Barrios and Manuel Perez
Guerrero who delivered letter from Leoni and, as expected, brought up
Vietnam, British Guiana border dispute, and petroleum.As the Venezuelan emissaries waited outside his
office, Johnson returned a telephone call from
Senator Clinton P. Anderson (D–New Mexico). Anderson explained the reason for
his earlier call: “I know the boys from Venezuela are up in town.
I’ve got friends in the petroleum industry that are worried about
that situation.” After a general discussion of Venezuelan oil, the
President asked: “Now, what are we going to do ultimately, Clint, on
this price thing? Now here is an illustration. These people are
happy with what they are getting, they’re doing well. Then we come
along and say ‘we are going to give you a great opportunity to bring
in a lot more’ and they answer us with a hell of a good price
increase.” The Senator suggested: “I think you ought to threaten
them someday with a Price Control Act, have them start exploring it,
hold some hearings on it, they might behave themselves.” (Johnson
Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone
conversation between President Johnson and
Anderson, January 21,
1966, 12:40 p.m., Tape F66.02, Side B, PNO 1) An uncorrected
transcript of the conversation is also ibid., Chron Series.
Barrios opened by expressing
President Leoni’s solidarity with President
Johnson’s policy of peace and said Venezuela wished
express that solidarity by sending food and medicine to South Vietnam.
President Johnson said we would welcome any help in
resisting aggression and keeping Communism from enveloping free
countries.
Barrios then turned to British
Guiana border dispute, stating President Leoni had charged him to say Venezuela wanted peaceful
solution and desired to keep British Guiana out of hands of Communist
demagogues as that would be not only threat to hemisphere but direct
threat to Venezuela. Barrios did
not advance any particular solution but suggested President
Johnson seek to obtain greater understanding of
problem by all parties especially British. President
Johnson said it was U.S. policy avoid getting
involved in boundary disputes and doubted whether such involvement would
be useful or acceptable to parties.
When petroleum came up, Perez Guerrero made presentation of importance
petroleum to Venezuela’s economy and political stability. He underscored
Venezuela did not object to restrictions on imports of crude to U.S. but
did object to discrimination in favor other countries. Described past
conversations with U.S. as conducted with frankness and mutual
understanding but said President Leoni disappointed no solution had been found. Leoni had, however, welcomed indication
that U.S. recognized special position Venezuelan petroleum and was
hopeful something could be worked out in near future. President
Johnson replied that Venezuela was wise in
continuing discussions with Departments State and Interior, as he had
not personally dealt with details oil program since taking office. He
expressed hope mutually satisfactory solution could be worked out.
At close interview, President indicated that, while he personally not
involved in these matters, he would direct officials to work with
Venezuelans here and Caracas towards eventually satisfactory solutions.
Venezuelan delegates expressed themselves as pleased with interview.
Barrios said President
Leoni hoped two Presidents
could meet and President Johnson said he hoped this
would be possible within their respective terms of office.
Ambassador Tejera Paris also attended as did Mann, Sayre and
Hill for Department. Copy
letter being pouched Caracas.A copy of
Leoni’s letter to Johnson is in the National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66,
POL 7 VEN.
Rusk
537. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, PET 6 VEN.
Confidential; Priority. Repeated to USCINCSO, Bogota, Georgetown, and Mexico for Assistant
Secretary Gordon.Caracas, September 29, 1966,
1955Z.
1840. 1. President Leoni’s confident announcement that basis for solution
of problems between petroleum companies and GOV has now been found and final agreement and discussion
of bright economic prospects has pulled rug out from under those
political elements who have been seeking discredit and undermine
stability government. At same time, it is most positive step in last
several months toward restoration economic confidence. Details speech
reported separate tel.Telegram 1846 from
Caracas, September 30. (Ibid., POL 2
VEN) Although Leoni did not
announce the details of the settlement, the government allowed the
companies to sell oil at competitive prices in return for payment of
taxes on the basis of predetermined “reference prices.” The
companies also agreed to pay $155 million in back taxes through
1965. While die-hard opposition sectors will undoubtedly
continue their efforts, without substantive base of crisis between
petroleum sector and government their cries of gloom, doom and communism
will be ineffective. Thus, inspired anxiety (Embtel 1449)In telegram 1449
from Caracas, September 9, the Embassy explained that “uncertainty
in financial community in past month resulted in contraction credit
available and in last week a limited run on dollars. These
developments in turn stimulated concern within the business
community and now within the public at large.” (Ibid., POL 15 VEN) which has existed
past two months should taper off rapidly.
2. Political effects of particular importance include: Opposition groups at ordinary session Congress which opens
October 1 unlikely mount meaningful opposition to government on
pending basic legislation, including tax reform bill.Position of main opposition parties, COPEI, FDP, and
FND, are at tactical
disadvantage and will have hard choices to make when tax reform
bill finally comes to vote.With revenue base assured for remaining two years and several
months of administration, government can move ahead confidently
with social-economic program. AD
party, particularly in states receiving substantial assistance
in public works and alliance for progress projects, will be
assured resources for building a record of
accomplishment.Opposition groups may now concentrate on charges of government
mismanagement and press for investigation of public
expenditures.URD party which had considered
withdrawal from coalition and expressed particular concern re
petroleum policy may now be considerably more reluctant leave
government.
3. Question of attitude Venezuelan military toward government and their
role in nation’s stability (which is always key ingredient) had again
arisen last week as result number top level transfers which purportedly
included replacing two top respected army officers with generals who are
widely considered AD favorites. However
consensus Country Team is that while number of top level changes have
developed, the controversial changes have not yet occurred. Regardless
whether they now do occur or not, government, having removed fundamental
petroleum question from contention, has at same time significantly
reduced possibility that military malcontents could count on national
economic crisis as foundation for Golpe aspirations.
4. In addition, it should be noted that AD
party at its national convention last week emphatically confounded
irresponsible critics and press speculation by unanimously selecting
highly respected Minister of Interior, Gonzalo Barrios, as party’s secretary general. AD sources confirm to us that President
intervened forcefully with party leaders to insure party unity would not
be undermined by personal ambition by various potential presidential
candidates.
5. In short, government agreement in principle with petroleum companies
constitutes fundamental contribution national stability, and outlook
today considerably brighter than it has been for several months.
Cottrell
538. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 VEN. Secret. Repeated to
USCINCSO, Rio de Janeiro,
Bogota, Santo Domingo, Santiago, Buenos Aires, Georgetown, and
Moscow.Caracas, January 31, 1967,
2000Z.
4034. 1. Ever sensitive military-government relationship in Venezuela has
come under particular scrutiny in past month in wake of dramatic
government use of military to intervene in Central University following
Communist efforts to assassinate Army Chief of Staff.On December 13 General Roberto Morean Soto, Chief
of the General Staff of the Army, was wounded in a terrorist attack.
The next day the Leoni administration suspended certain rights
guaranteed by the constitution and occupied the Central University
in Caracas. The Communist effort to generate friction between
government and military establishment has clearly backfired in terms of
welfare of the Communist movement in Venezuela. At this point however,
some speculation is extant re long-range effect on relations between the
civilian government and military officers. On basis government’s
determination to carry through reforms which terminate once and for all
inviolability of university campus (which enabled Communist exploitation
of the campus) our assessment is that these doubts and irritations are
in the process of being resolved.
2. Following Embassy comments are also designed to provide the context
for DAO message no. 0051, January 1967
and [1 line of source text not declassified]Neither found. which reported on
existence military distrust and impatience with government in connection
with university crisis.
3. Possibility that ever present irritations between military and
civilian government could flare up into a significant crisis of
stability is heavily influenced by general state of nation’s economic
and political situation. In a period of political crisis in which law
and order are threatened, such as that which was manifested in Carupano
and Puerto Cabello uprising, that which existed prior to the 1963
elections and on a lesser degree a year ago (see A–537 of January 11,
1966),Airgram A–537 is not printed.
(National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL 23–9 VEN) and
briefly prior to the government’s intervention in the university this
past December, military unrest and dissatisfaction with government
inefficiency inevitably increases. Same holds true, although to a lesser
degree, in periods of economic deterioration. There is little doubt, for
example, that many military officers were watching the crisis between
the government and the
petroleum companies which the government finally resolved last summer.
In all of these periods of strain, when showdown came, military stood
behind government. Both the political and economic situations have now
improved over the past year and there are no fundamental pressures for
the military to consider moving against the government.
4. Although some military officers have expressed serious reservations
about the government’s determination to carry through university
reforms, there is no reason to doubt record to date indicating that
government fully intends to carry through these reforms.
5. University residences which were long a virtual fortress of Communist
activities have been closed and converted into classrooms. University
Hospital which was a particular target for Communist activities is being
fenced out of the campus and incorporated directly into the city.
Government’s draft university regulation which has now been publicly
presented goes further than anyone would have expected and reserves for
the government the responsibility for maintaining law and order within
the campus. Although government spokesmen have indicated that there is
flexibility in some of the more unexpected and sweeping effects of new
regulations, have consistently and publicly reiterated that there is no
flexibility in their determination that government police will patrol
the campus just as though it were part of the city and thus
inviolability of Communist campus haven is terminated once and for all.
This was most recently stated to the Embassy by former Minister of
Interior and present Secretary General of the AD party, Gonzalo
Barrios, on January 27 and in press interview January 28
by present Minister of Interior Leandro.
6. Military officers with particular political interests naturally view
university situation and government’s performance from their own vantage
point. It must, of course, be recognized that government has a much
broader responsibility and it thereby seeks to construct a solution to
national problems which reflects the national interest, which is not
necessarily always exactly the same as the interpretation of national
interest held by some military officers. Thus, some of chronic military
critics are now denouncing government on these grounds.
7. Finally, it is essential in weighing military attitudes to recognize
that Venezuelan military establishment is complex, varied and far from
monolithic as to political attitudes. There are many officers,
particularly at upper levels who are close to AD party or the opposition COPEI party which is also dedicated to constitutional
government. Perhaps a majority of officers are largely apathetic about
political issues and unlikely to actively play a role in such questions.
There are some officers who are devoted to a “golpe” and military
dictatorship regardless of which political party is in power. This
means, of course, that we are not dealing with a solid bloc of military
opinion.
8. In summary, we consider military government relationship has passed a
number of tough tests since 1958 and present politico-economic situation
in general, and government objectives and performances on university in
particular, give ample basis for hope these relations will improve
rather than deteriorate.
Bernbaum
539. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23 VEN. Confidential; Priority.
Repeated to Bogota, Rio de Janeiro, and USCINCSO.Caracas, March 15, 1967,
0030Z.
4778. Subj: Insurgency Problem.
In conversation with Leoni today, he drew parallel between present
insurgency problemReference is to the
assassination on March 3 of Dr. Julio Iribarren Borges, former
Director of Social Security and brother of the Venezuelan
Foreign Minister. On March 4 the Leoni administration reinstated its suspension
of constitutional rights, 2 days after those rights had been
fully restored. Venezuela subsequently blamed Cuba for the
assassination, thereby justifying further retaliatory measures
from the OAS. Leoni raised this
issue with President Johnson at Punta del
Este; see Document 50. and that
faced by President Betancourt
in 1962 prior to electoral period. He said it was important to build
up extra forces for protection of cities and particularly
communities near guerrilla zones so that main body of armed forces
could function normally and provide essential security for electoral
process.Accordingly, Leoni said his
government would require additional arms for special forces which
will be created. He anticipates these arms will come from Western
European countries (he mentioned Belgian guns) and from the U.S. He
emphasized importance of more armament for helicopters so that they
could better attack targets of opportunity, although he stated he
believed for time being armed forces had sufficient numbers
helicopters.Leoni commented that
Colombian insurgency a complicating factor and an even greater
problem than it appears to be on surface. He said he confident
GOV and armed forces can manage
situation in Venezuela.Military credits and MilGrp agreement also discussed but are
subjects of other message.Telegram SCVE
034–67 from the Commander of the U.S. Military Group in
Venezuela to USCINCSO,
March 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, FN 6–1 VEN)Bernbaum
540. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 IA–Summit. Confidential. Drafted
by Seidenman and approved in
the White House on April 28. The memorandum is part 1 of 3; parts 2
and 3 are Documents 541 and 50, respectively. According to George
Christian, the meeting was held at Leoni’s residence in Punta del
Este. (Press statement, April 11; Johnson Library, President’s Daily
Diary) President Johnson attended the meeting
of American Chiefs of State at Punta del Este, April 12–14.Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 11, 1967, 6 p.m.
US/MC–14
SUBJECT
Petroleum Problems
PARTICIPANTS
United StatesPresident JohnsonMr. Walt RostowAssistant Secretary GordonAssistant Secretary SolomonMr. Neil A.
Seidenman, InterpreterVenezuelaPresident LeoniSr. Ignacio Iribarren
Borges, Foreign Minister of Venezuela
President Leoni said that it was
very gratifying for him to receive President
Johnson and to have the opportunity on this
occasion to discuss with him a very serious problem affecting Venezuela
that had already been mentioned through correspondence on two previous
occasions.Leoni raised the oil issue in
two letters to Johnson, March 13, 1965, and
January 17, 1966. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files 1964–66, PET 1 US–VEN and POL 7 VEN, respectively) This was the problem
that had been posed by President Leoni’s personal envoys in the past,
namely former Minister of Mines Guerrero and former Minister of Interior
Barrios, who had discussed the
fundamentals of the matter with the President at the White House.For an account of
Johnson’s meeting with Barrios and Perez Guerrero, January
21, 1966, see Document 536.
President Johnson replied that he was happy to have
the opportunity to visit with President Leoni. He expressed the desire of the Administration to
be of help to Venezuela and said that he had read the letterDated April 4. The Department forwarded the text of
the letter to Punta del Este on April 10. (Telegram 1172104/Tosec 64 to USDEL Punta del Este;
National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL 7 IA SUMMIT) In an April 7 memorandum to
Bowdler, Sayre summarized the letter,
outlined the U.S. position, and suggested points for the President
to make in his meeting with Leoni. (Ibid., ARA/NC/V Files: Lot 69 D 19, PET 17–2, U.S. Import
Program 1967, January–April) from the Venezuelan Government
that had been received the week before. The President added that in the
event that President Leoni got
tired of having those fellows around, he, President
Johnson, would not mind having their very able
services to help him develop our trade relations with many countries in
the world.
President Leoni stated that he
could appreciate the workload being shouldered by the President. At the
same time Venezuela has problems that must be grappled with and to which
solutions must be found. At this particular time the most serious
problem for Venezuela is oil. Today this problem is being compounded and
Venezuela’s prospects are being rendered increasingly obscure by the new
restrictions that have gone into effect relating to the sulphur content
of Venezuelan oil.
President Johnson stated that very careful
consideration is being given to this problem. We realize what oil means
to the Venezuelan economy, so that what we want to do is to try to roll
with the punches and help Venezuela as much as possible. In this respect
what we are aiming at is: 1) to solve the sulphur problem; and 2) to be
able to use more oil from Venezuela. The President added that President
Leoni and his associates have done such a good job in this area that the
United States buys more oil from Venezuela than from any other country.
The percentage involved here is 60 percent of our imports, and Venezuela
has at least 30 percent more of our oil import market than any other
country. We want to keep Venezuela’s oil sales high, and therefore one
thing we are doing at this time is to initiate talks with Canada to see
whether or not we can get Canada to reduce its share (i.e. share of the
growth rate, as Solomon explained
to Mayobre the next day).
The President indicated that he had just signed a very important
amendment to the proclamation on the oil import program that was going
into effect relating to our imports of asphalt.Proclamation 3779, April 10. (32 Federal Register 5919) By this means certification
could be issued by the Secretary of Interior for additional imports of
asphalt based on the situation as evaluated by the Secretary. Such
additional imports of asphalt would appear to be beneficial to Venezuela
and would help us to meet our national requirements. We are studying the asphalt situation, and
various members of the Cabinet have examined the issue of import
controls. We are convinced that with additional imports of asphalt
Venezuela would stand to benefit, and this would be useful to our
people. The Secretary of Interior will have the authority to issue new
allocations and documentation for such imports.
The President pointed out that this new paragraph means that the
Secretary will carry out a continuing study of the supply and demand
situation, and based on his judgment, consistent with our needs and
objectives, will have additional authority to recommend maximum levels
of asphalt importation outside of the present MOIP. This means that he can authorize additional imports
of asphalt on this basis for consumption in our country without
additional allocations or licensing procedures. President
Johnson told President Leoni that if he had no objection to
sending us this additional asphalt at a low price, he would issue the
order the following day.
President Johnson went on to say that he took pride
in, and wished to maintain, the record dollar volume of imports into
this country, from Venezuela, of crude oil, residual oil, and asphalt,
of any period in history. He noted that as he was signing this
proclamation he had noticed some of the figures involved: in the period
of his predecessor’s administration—1961–63—the volume of imports was at
1,394 million barrels; during this administration, from 1964 to 1966,
the volume was 1,604 million barrels. We went from $3.1 billion to $3.5
billion. Those were the three highest years for imports and revenues. In
1964 the figure was $1.127 billion; in 1965, $1.208 billion; and in
1966, $1.314 billion. The President summed up that we want to do three
things: 1) to see what we can do to get the sulphur out of Venezuelan
oil so that we can use it for our cities in a way that will not
aggravate our air-pollution problems; 2) we want to try and see if we
can get Canada to reduce its exports (i.e., its growth rate of exports)
to this country, and the President said, “If I lose friends on the
Canadian side, I hope that you will make them up to me on the Venezuelan
side”; and 3) we would like to increase our purchases of asphalt at low
prices so that we can put in roads for some of our poor farmers. This,
concluded President Johnson, was just about all he could do at this
time. This may make the Canadians mad at him.
President Leoni stated that he
could recognize that we are now importing more volume from Venezuela
than in the past; however, there has been a trend recently in Venezuelan
exports that is not considered good. At present, these exports to the
United States consist of cheaper grades of oil, which bring in smaller
returns. There has been an increasing trend away from the crude oils
toward the residual oils, which of course sell at lower prices, and each
time the price per barrel
goes down by five cents there is a huge loss involved for Venezuela.
This trend has been noticeable and growing since 1959, and there has
been a drop in the price each year. For this reason, the Venezuelan
Government, together with the companies, is grappling with this problem
and an arrangement has been reached by which to curb the downward trend
of the price.
With regard to the sulphur, the Venezuelan Government endorses compliance
with the regulations that have been put into effect by the health and
municipal authorities. The government is working with the companies to
encourage them to adopt the necessary techniques and processing that
will enable them to comply with these standards. The largest American
company operating in this area in Venezuela is, of course, Creole, which
as things now stand will have to invest between $110 million and $118
million in order to be able to meet the new requirements.
President Leoni went on to say
that the problem of the Venezuelan oil market in the United States is
considered not merely from the standpoint of Venezuela’s self-seeking
interests, but also in the light of what Venezuela represents as a
country in the Latin American area. Venezuela is a nation that is
building a democracy with strong foundations. Its policy has reflected
the principles that were endorsed in this very place (Punta del Este) at
the time the Alliance for Progress was launched a few years ago.
Venezuela has brought about a transformation in the lives of its people
in the rural as well as in the urban areas. This has involved
considerable expenditure on the part of the Venezuelan Government. This,
of course, is something that the Venezuelan Government desires, and a
part of this is the wish to promote industry in the country. But
Venezuela in the past has been fertile soil to the natural enemies of
democracy in Venezuela, and of the United States.
President Johnson said in answer to this that he was
in agreement with what President Leoni was saying. He reiterated that we want to buy more
oil from Venezuela so as to raise these purchases in volume and in
dollar value. At present the totals for both of these items stand at
their highest mark in our history, and we want to increase them. We are
now trying to get Canada to reduce their participation in our market, to
help us to do this. The President said that, in the second place, he
wished to lift restrictions on residual oil imports, which from his
political experience he knew would make a lot of miners mad at him. He
added his hope that this would make the Venezuelans love him. The
President explained that by using more residual we are cutting more and
more into the coal market. Number three, we are requiring the Defense
Department to supply its oil needs from Caribbean sources, which would
mean that we would use large amounts of oil from Venezuela for defense purposes. Fourth,
an increase in refining capacity will open up greater opportunities for
Puerto Rico, where Venezuelan oil is used. Finally, the President
pointed out that his own state of Texas produced more oil than all of
the other oil-producing states in the United States. At the present time
the production quota is down to eight or nine days per month. The pumps
are idle during the other twenty-two days of the month. Many people have
gone away as a result—many operators have folded. The President said
that we are doing all of this to help Venezuela sustain a sound economy.
We are aware of the problems that Venezuela has to face and we are aware
of the activities of our natural enemies in Venezuela and in the
Hemisphere.
The President stressed that he hoped President Leoni understood that we were taking an
unprecedented step in these talks with Canada, which involve an attempt
to get Canada to change its trade relations with our country by limiting
Canadian access to the U.S. oil market. As these talks progress, there
is bound to be a strain on relations between the United States and
Canada, but we are doing this in order to insure that the MOIP will not work to the detriment of
Venezuela. This means a change in our treatment of Canada, but we
consider it to be the best way to assure Venezuelan access to the U.S.
market on a high level of sales.
President Leoni stated that the
Venezuelan Government has recognized and appreciated the receptive
approach on the part of the United States authorities toward the problem
faced by Venezuela involving unequal treatment of Venezuelan oil. The
measures that the President mentioned seemed to constitute one more step
in the direction in which Venezuela was striving; namely, to attain
equal treatment of Venezuelan oil vis-à-vis Canadian oil. What the
President said about the talks with Canada would be helpful but the
ideal solution would be to give Venezuela the same treatment as Canada.
The solution to these problems admittedly is no easy undertaking, but
with perseverance Leoni said he was confident
that a way could be found to devise a formula satisfactory to the
interests of both countries.
Going back to a previous point, President Leoni said he wished to call the President’s attention
to the fact that Venezuela, despite guerrilla activities, has developed
a solid and stable political situation. It is sufficient to witness that
labor unrest is no more to be found in Venezuela, whereas if we look
over at the situation in the United States we find that there are
frequent labor-management disputes, and a serious strike seems to be in
the offing at present.
President Johnson interrupted President Leoni to report that a bill he had
proposed in connection with the strike mentioned had just been passed in
the Senate by a vote of 82 to 1, and in the House by a majority of 400
to 8, putting off the strike for a 20-day grace period.On April 11
the U.S. Congress passed the President’s proposal for an additional
20 day “cooling-off” period in the nationwide railroad labor
dispute. The bill was delivered to Punta del Este where it was
signed into law on April 12. (81 Stat. 12) He explained that
at the end of these twenty days something else would very likely have to
be done, but we were not going to have a major railroad strike in the
country. The President explained to Leoni that he thought he would be
interested in this, as the leader of a democracy.
President Leoni went on to say
that several years had gone by without major strikes in Venezuela and
industrial peace in his country now seemed to be on a solid footing. If,
however, Venezuela were unable to maintain budgetary stability and thus
were to run into difficulties in financing programs now underway for
national development and social progress, there was no doubt that
Venezuela would be subject to social upheaval. Our natural enemies have
not been able to gain a foothold in Venezuela heretofore, but if this
were to happen—if Venezuela were to be rocked by social imbalance—this
could provide a welcome opening to them. This is why the oil problem
appeared to be of significance to hemispheric security.
President Leoni said that it would
perhaps be desirable for his Minister of Mines to be in touch with
Assistant Secretary Solomon in
connection with the dispositions that were mentioned by the
President.
President Johnson heartily agreed, adding that if
the President of Venezuela had no objection he would hold off issuing
the asphalt order until the following morning just so that it would not
appear that he had come here to “lose his trousers”.
President Leoni said that this was
encouraging to him, in view of the fact that he had hoped to be able to
take something concrete back to Venezuela with him as a result of the
encounter in Punta del Este. He was glad to receive information of the
forthcoming talks with Canada and hoped that these would lead to the
desired solution.
The President warned President Leoni that he would possibly have to pry him away from
chasing communists in his country in order to get some angry Texans off
his back. President Leoni replied
that he was confident Texans would always be his friends. President
Johnson said that Texans had always been his
friends until he came to Punta del Este and spoke with the Venezuelan
President. He went on to say that if a man is working only eight days a
month, he will get very angry at anyone who tries to take one of those
days away from him, and when they get angry these people sometimes lose
their judgment. President Leoni
reiterated his confidence that Texans would continue to be their
friends, since they had once been “Latin Americans” themselves. He added
the expression of his understanding of the heavy burden the President
had to carry, and that this
problem was not nearly as grave as the struggle the President had to
face in Vietnam, which he does in solitude and with admirable strength
and wisdom.
The President reiterated his desire to cooperate with the Venezuelans in
the work of facing the trials they are going through. The President once
again said that we will try to find a solution to the oil problem
through talks with Canada. The President concluded the conversation by
telling President Leoni that the
latter was fortunate to enjoy the services of one of the most popular
and capable of all the Ambassadors to our country—that he and his wife
were among the best liked members of the Diplomatic Corps.Enrique Tejera-Paris.
541. Memorandum of ConversationSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 IA
SUMMIT. Confidential. Drafted by Seidenman and approved in the White House on April
28. The memorandum is part 2 of 3; parts 1 and 3 are Documents 540 and 50, respectively.Punta del Este, Uruguay, April 11, 1967, 6 p.m.
US/MC–14
SUBJECT
Venezuelan Requirements for Additional Military Equipment
PARTICIPANTS
United StatesPresident JohnsonMr. Walt RostowAssistant Secretary GordonAssistant Secretary SolomonMr. Neil A.
Seidenman, InterpreterVenezuelaPresident LeoniSr. Ignacio Iribarren
Borges, Foreign Minister of Venezuela
President Leoni said that the
Venezuelan Government had reason to believe that there would be an
intensification of communist aggression in the northern region of Latin
America, meaning, he said, Guatemala, Colombia and Venezuela. Besides
the need to combat in Venezuela any step-up in guerrilla activities,
there was also a need to guaranty peaceful elections. This posed a need
for Venezuela to strengthen its military forces in order to provide for
the safety of peaceful, democratic processes. Therefore, Venezuela will
have to undertake additional
outlays from its Treasury to meet defense needs. Ambassador Tejera-Paris
has recently approached U.S. authorities, including the Defense
Department, in order to present Venezuela’s requirements in military
equipment for these purposes. President Leoni stressed that what he was talking about would be
outside of presently existing agreements with us. The principal interest
involved here is a foreshortening of the period of delivery of military
equipment. Failure to obtain the necessary equipment in a brief period
of time would necessitate obtaining this equipment elsewhere. This was
something that the President of Venezuela believed could not be
postponed inasmuch as it was of vital importance to the country. He
suggested that the President might use his good offices to help
Venezuelan authorities solve the problem. Venezuela would make payment
as soon as it could, but again he stressed that this was to be outside
of present arrangements. President Leoni noted that Venezuela’s present dollar commitment
for arms and equipment being purchased from the United States and Europe
amounted to approximately $12 million.
President Johnson asked precisely what kind of
equipment he wanted. President Leoni said that there was no need for rockets or
supersonic aircraft, of course, but only equipment and matériel
necessary for maintaining internal security: ammunition, transportation
vehicles, communications equipment, etc. He stressed, however, that the
principal need here is for a brief delivery time, and not the 18 to 24
months normally required under present arrangements. The desirable
delivery time would be three months.
President Johnson stated that our problem is: first,
we do not want to be the arms merchants of the world; second, that
Congress has forced us to reduce our program for financing military
programs in Latin America to 85 million, including sales and grant;Reference is to an amendment, sponsored by
Senator J. William Fulbright
(D–Arkansas), to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, which set a
ceiling of $85 million per fiscal year for military assistance and
sales to Latin America, not including support for military training
or the Inter-American Peace Force in the Dominican Republic. (80
Stat. 803) thirdly, we do not want the communists to take
over Venezuela. Therefore, we want to help if Venezuela wants to buy
equipment. Fourthly, the problem that we are grappling with in Vietnam
is causing a great drain on our military supplies. The enemy there is
building up to try to overrun us in one area and to keep them from doing
this we are pouring everything over there; this means ammunition,
helicopters and other types of equipment, but if we have an available
surplus in any of the items that Venezuela needs, we can sell them to
her. This is why we would have to know exactly what items Venezuela
would need.
President Johnson noted that he knew Ambassador
Tejera-Paris very well. He had even been at the President’s ranch the
week before, together with his charming wife.President Johnson entertained
most of the Latin American diplomatic corps at his Texas ranch on
April 1. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) He said
that he would go over this with the Ambassador. If we have the equipment
available to sell, and if Venezuela wants it, they can have it, and we
will do everything we can to help. The President said that if there was
a problem of slowness in deliveries he would find a way to clear this up
upon his return to the United States.
The President reiterated his desire to cooperate with the Venezuelans in
the work of facing the trials they are going through. He reiterated our
support for Venezuela’s cause in the OAS
against Cuba, which he said he hoped they would pursue with
aggressiveness; we want to be of help in the matter of military
equipment if we can—because we don’t want Venezuela to have to wait one
minute to chase the communists.On May 12
Venezuela announced the capture of a guerrilla landing party led by
officers of the Cuban army near the village of Machurucuto, 130
miles east of Caracas. Documentation of U.S.-Venezuelan efforts to
seek retaliatory measures against Cuba under the OAS charter is in the regional
compilation. In telegram 6106 from Caracas, May 17, the Embassy
reported that a “US-Venezuelan agreement to provide equipment for 10
new anti-guerrilla battalions, pursuant to President
Johnson–Leoni agreement at Punta del Este is in jeopardy,”
due to DOD concern for the
limitations set by the Fulbright amendment. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–4
US–VEN) The agreement was signed on May 18. In a May 19 memorandum
to the President, Rostow commented: “This is a
nice end to a move initiated by you at the Latin American Summit.”
(Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Venezuela,
Vol. III, 12/66–12/68)
542. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 15 VEN.
Confidential; Immediate. Passed to the White House and USIA.Caracas, June 7, 1967,
1805Z.
6491. 1. I was called this morning to FonOff at request of FonMin, who received me in presence
Minister Mines Mayobre. They told me they were under instructions
President Leoni (a) to pledge
Venezuelan petroleum to
needs of free world in current crisis,Reference is to the outbreak on June 5 of the 1967 Arab-Israeli
war. In response to Egyptian charges of Western support for Israeli
air strikes, most Arab oil-producing states agreed by June 7 to
suspend oil shipments to the United States and Great Britain.
but (b) also to convey request GOV be
included in planning now going on in Washington for distribution this
natural resource.
2. Mayobre said wire service
stories report Emergency Committee on Petroleum is now being convened in
Washington and GOV desires to be
consulted. FonMin asked this request
be telegraphed at once. He added Tejera Paris will be informed.
3. Mayobre stated events convince
GOV that Venezuela is an essential
part of “security zone” and should be accorded corresponding privileges.
He said GOV concerned that great demands
might now be made on its petroleum and, after crisis, market would again
be limited. GOV wants to avoid this
situation and therefore believes status in U.S. market should be
improved.
4. I pointed out at this juncture that dislocation petroleum supply
situation, if crisis continues, would be mainly in Western Europe.
Mayobre agreed. He then said
GOV realized on normal basis Middle
Eastern and African oil more competitive in Europe. Venezuela, on other
hand, from economic, political and hemisphere security point of view has
a natural and complementary relationship with U.S.
Comment:
5. Would appear from foregoing that GOV
believes Middle East crisis supports their contention that Ven oil vital
to U.S. national security and therefore that Ven should receive better
treatment under MOIP.
6. Although Emb of opinion that GOV has perhaps overestimated U.S. need for
additional Venezuelan oil in present situation it nevertheless believes
would be desirable for Dept give consideration to GOV participation, as appropriate, in
meetings to consider effect present situation on petroleum supply and
distribution, and that GOV be kept
informed regarding plans involving increased use Ven petroleum.
7. GOV position re consultation
consistent with text Kennedy–Betancourt
communiqué of Feb 20, 1963.See footnote 3, Document 528.
8. I would appreciate Department’s response soonest to considerations
raised in foregoing conversation with two ministers.In telegram 209131 to Caracas, June 7, the
Department replied that Solomon and Tejera Paris had discussed the impact of
the Arab oil embargo on Western Europe, agreeing to “consult closely
together during the present crisis.” The Department added: “We are
reluctant to go further than bilateral consultations since we see
considerable problems in inviting GOV to participate even as observer in US Foreign
Petroleum Supply Committee.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL ARAB–ISR) Bernbaum later reported
that the Leoni administration
had decided to increase production by 300,000 barrels per day, but
that “production beyond that amount will be subject new conditions.”
(Telegram 6586 from Caracas, June 14; ibid., PET 17–2 VEN)
Herron
543. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Vol. III, Memos,
12/66–12/68. Confidential.Washington, July 28, 1967.
Mr. President:
Venezuelan Ambassador Tejera-Paris called me yesterday to ask for an
appointment with you to deliver a letter from President Leoni. He said he was under
instructions to deliver it to you and make some oral remarks. I gave him
no encouragement but did not close the door. An advanced copy of the
English translation is at Tab A.Dated July
25; attached but not printed.
What Leoni wants is revision of
our Mandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP)
to put Venezuela on a par with Canada and Mexico and permit higher
imports of Venezuelan oil. He looks upon increased demand on Venezuelan
production resulting from the Middle East crisis as further
justification for this request.
We are not in a position to do what Leoni wants on the MOIP. You told him this at the Summit when you outlined the
steps you were prepared to take:
—talks with Canada to restrict their deliveries.—additional imports of asphalt.—assistance in desulphurization technology.
We are moving forward on all three of these commitments as described in
the report at Tab B. Tony Solomon tells us that Stu Udall has not moved faster toward
carrying out the pledge on asphalt because of opposition of his staff
and Congressman Mahon.Congressman George H.
Mahon (D–Texas), chairman of the House Appropriations
Committee.
Because you can’t oblige Leoni on
what he is after, it is inadvisable for you to receive Tejera-Paris.
Were you to see him, it would become known and expectations in Venezuela
aroused. The government might even encourage such hopes. The resulting
let-down of an unforthcoming reply would then be increased. Covey Oliver and Tony Solomon agree
with this assessment.
I recommend that I tell Tejera-Paris that I have consulted you on an
appointment and because of the pressure of business you asked that I
receive him on your behalf.
Walt
You want to receive him
I should receive himJohnson checked this
option.
Speak to me
Tab B
Memorandum From the Director of the Office of
North Coast Affairs (Hill) to William G.
Bowdler of the National Security Council
Staff
Washington, July 27, 1967.
SUBJECT
Venezuelan Petroleum Problems
In the course of the President’s April 11 conversation with President
Leoni at Punta del Este a
number of commitments to actions were made by the President within
the overall context of our desire to help Venezuela as much as
possible by using more oil from Venezuela. These undertakings, and
the current status of the related U.S. actions, are summarized
hereunder:
1. To initiate talks with Canada to see whether or not we can get
Canada to reduce its share in the growth rate of the United States
market (thereby giving Venezuela an opportunity to share in such
growth).
Action taken:
A series of meetings has been held with Canada, the most recent being
to present a U.S. revision of an informal Canadian proposal. This
latest U.S. revision was presented by Assistant Secretary Solomon to Canadian Ambassador
Ritchie on July 26. We feel that our position and degree of
flexibility is fully outlined to the Canadians. At the moment we are
not able to anticipate their willingness to agree to voluntary
limitations of exports at a suitable level. We must await their
response.
The Canadians have been insistent in their desire to expand petroleum
exports to the U.S., and the most that we can expect by limiting the
Canadians is only a small increase in offshore imports rather than
the decline which would otherwise occur. The Venezuelans, while
understanding our strong efforts to keep the Canadians from forcing
a cutback in imports from overseas, will not get significantly more
imports as a result of our negotiations with Canada.
2. The President indicated that he had just signed an important
proclamation relating to U.S. imports of asphalt, enabling the
Secretary of Interior to certify to the need of additional imports
thereof outside the MOIP. The
President indicated that the U.S. would like to increase its
purchase of asphalt and that the matter would be kept under
continuing review.
Action taken:
Following issuance of the proclamation, the Office of Emergency
Planning has progressed with a detailed study of the U.S. asphalt
requirements. Interior has under consideration implementation of the
asphalt authority, and is awaiting the recommendations of the OEP study.
3. An undertaking to “see what we could do to get the sulphur out of
Venezuelan oil”.
Action taken:The White House has established a Committee to coordinate
technical economic research on the impact of air pollution
problems under the chairmanship of HEW and CEA.HEW to make available $2.7
million from FY 1968
contingency funds for research, including desulphurization.
Findings as developed will be made available to Venezuela.
President Leoni
recently called
the attention of Ambassador Linowitz to the latter understanding,
indicating that he was awaiting news.Leoni met
Linowitz in
Caracas on June 26. An account of their discussion on
petroleum was transmitted in telegram 6824 from Caracas,
June 28. (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 15 VEN)Although not specifically discussed at Punta del Este,
residual fuel oil was redefined by a Presidential
Proclamation issued July 17 to include #4 fuel oil as a step
toward air pollution abatement.Proclamation 3794. (32 Federal
Register 10547) The redefinition had
been supported by the GOV.
This redefinition, which has been welcomed by the GOV, could allow Venezuela to
maintain substantially the same level of earnings it has
been receiving by supplying the great bulk of imported
residual and thus offset the potential loss caused by the
fact that the residual Venezuela has been supplying can no
longer be sold under anti-pollution regulations. It will
not, however, result in the use of more oil by the U.S.
Moreover, the GOV, in a
statement welcoming this U.S. action, has expressed serious
concern with regard to a discretionary provision of the
Proclamation which gives the Secretary of the Interior
authority to reimburse with import allocations U.S. refiners
who produce low sulphur residual. Venezuela fears this could
redound to the benefit of non-Venezuelan crudes. Interior
has told Venezuelan representatives that the implementation
of this authority would provide the mechanism for utilizing
traditional Western Hemisphere, low gravity, high sulphur
crude to produce the required low sulphur residual. Interior
is preparing regulations which will be open to public
comment prior to implementation.
4. Passing mention was also made by the President to an increase of
refining capacity in Puerto Rico, where Venezuelan oil is used.
Action taken:
Import applications for supplies to these refineries are still under
study by Interior.
5. The President was categoric in asserting to President Leoni that 1 to 3 above was just
about all he could do at this time. A more fundamental revision of
the MOIP to remove “discrimination”
in favor of overland imports by extending equal treatment to
Venezuela remains a major Venezuelan aspiration. President Leoni in a conversation with
Ambassador Linowitz on June
26 asserted that the Middle East crisis had shown the vital
importance of Venezuela’s oil resources to the United States and
hoped this would be taken into account in the continuing discussions
and negotiations between Venezuela and the U.S. regarding petroleum.
The Venezuelan Ambassador has inquired at the Department of State
about the possibility of revising the MOIP in
Venezuela’s favor (he was given discouragement) and the Venezuelan
press has also played up this theme. Venezuela has increased
production by 300,000 barrels a day (about 9%) and President
Leoni has stated that
increases beyond that amount must be covered by long-term contract.
Venezuela has no intention of increasing production on a crash basis
only to find itself in economic difficulties after the crisis ends,
as in 1956. President Leoni
has used the current crisis to point out that Venezuelan production
is just as strategically important to the U.S. as that of Canada and
Mexico. We can therefore expect greatly increased pressure from
Venezuela as and when the current crisis subsides, precisely at a
time when domestic producers will also be resisting cutbacks.In a letter to Leoni on August 8, President
Johnson outlined the action taken to
support Venezuelan oil, but discounted any hope of further
improvement: “To go beyond these measures would involve a
fundamental and drastic change in our entire petroleum policy
and would bring into question the whole structure of our oil
policy. Indeed, since we last spoke, the crisis in the Middle
East has made it even more difficult to envisage changes in our
oil import program.” (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 VEN) Bernbaum later warned
that relations would deteriorate if Venezuela’s share in the
U.S. oil market declined due to events in the Middle East and
clean-air requirements. (Telegram 1219 from Caracas, August 25;
ibid., PET 17–1 VEN)
544. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in VenezuelaSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–4 VEN. Confidential; Immediate.
Drafted and approved by Hill. Also sent to Georgetown and London and repeated to
USUN, USCINCSO, Recife, and Sao Paulo
for Oliver.Caracas, July 13, 1968,
2159Z.
202053. Following is uncleared memcon:
Under Secretary Katzenbach called
in Venezuelan Ambassador Tejera Paris to discuss July 9 Venezuelan
decree asserting sovereignty over territorial seas from 3 to 12 miles
off of part of Guyana claimed by Venezuela. In cordial but serious
discussion, Under Secretary made following points: Meaning of decree was unclear to us and we would appreciate
explanation, as it was potentially serious both from point of
view international law and point of view internal Guyanese
politics.If intent decree were merely to put world on notice that when
and if Venezuela attained sovereignty over territory it claimed,
Venezuelan law with respect territorial waters would obtain, we
would have no problem with it although it was difficult to see
what advantage there was to Venezuela in issuing it at this
time.If, however, as accompanying explanatory note seemed to
suggest, Venezuela intended immediately to exercise rights of
sovereignty in 3–12 mile zone we would take “most serious” view
of situation. As international lawyer, he himself could not see
how such claim could be asserted and doubted that Ambassador
Tejera would, in his capacity as lawyer, defend it.
International law was clear that maritime rights and rights to
continental shelf (which Guyana always claimed) attached to
coastal state and at present Guyana was clearly the coastal
state. The U.S., therefore, did not accept decree’s validity if
it implied actual exercise of sovereignty and, if matter came up
in international forum, we could not support Venezuela. While we
would not make public statement unless we had to, we would have
to advise U.S. shipping and other private interests if they
asked that we did not accept validity of decree.We also viewed decree as serious in terms Guyanese electoral
situation. It was, we thought, of more immediate interest to
Venezuela than to us and hemisphere that Burnham win elections which
would probably take place in December and that Jagan be excluded. Moves such
as this claim were not helpful as they eroded Burnham electoral strength in
difficult elections and diverted his attention during critical
remaining six month campaign period. It also made it difficult
for us to counsel Burnham to use moderation as he felt obligated
to defend his position.We viewed explanatory note, with allusions such as “physical
act of possession”, as more disturbing than decree itself and
wondered what intent of Venezuela was in light of assurances
President of Venezuela and country’s highest officials had given
that Venezuela would not resort to force. Under Secretary again
emphasized seriousness of our concern if Venezuela intended
exercise sovereignty.
Tejera replied that he knew nothing of decree and explanatory note,
having only received their text, but he would immediately report to
Caracas and ask for instructions. Speaking personally, he at first
attributed decree to Guyanese intransigence in Mixed commission and
especially their refusal to accept Venezuelan proposals for joint
development. He recited history of Venezuela’s frustrations in attempt
to get Guyana to discuss settlement of issue in Mixed Commission and
claimed Venezuela, which desired settlement by peaceful means had used
great restraint in contrast to Burnham’s inflammatory actions such as
his recent speech in Birmingham, U.K. with regard to claim to territorial sea, he was
certain that disputed territory would someday return to Venezuela and it
was only natural and right Venezuela should have territorial waters
which she would have under her Constitution and which are not claimed by
party which wrongfully occupied disputed territory through inheritance
from U.K. He would, however, query Caracas and let Under Secretary know
as soon as he received reply.
For Caracas: You should convey above to President
Leoni as soon as possible
after clearance of memcon, hopefully early Monday.July 15. In telegram 6896 from Caracas, July 16,
the Embassy reported that Venezuelan officials were “piqued over US
position on decree as stated Saturday by Katzenbach.” In a meeting with Bernbaum on July 16, Iribarren
declared that Venezuela’s “territorial claims must take precedence
over any consideration their effect on Guyana’s domestic political
situation.” The same day Minister of Interior Leandro Mora told an Embassy
officer that the Department did not appreciate “Venezuela’s
‘feelings’ on this matter.” (Telegram 6898 from Caracas, July 16;
ibid.)
For London: You should convey substance to
FonOff.
For Georgetown: You may convey general line of
conversation to Burnham in
strictest confidence but should avoid giving him any encouragement to
take matter to international organizations.
Rusk
545. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–4 VEN–CUBA. Confidential;
Immediate.Caracas, November 20, 1968,
2002Z.
8970. 1. President Leoni called me
to Miraflores shortly after noon today to discuss Venezuelan seizure of
575 ton Cuban fishing vessel Alecrin. Although
the President did not indicate the location, he said that the vessel,
when seized, was in Venezuelan territorial waters.
2. He then reviewed the belief of the GOV, based on hard intelligence, that Castro Cuba was
supporting and activating the launching of guerrilla elements along the
coast and Trinidad and probably hoped to stage a dramatic incident
before the Venezuelan elections December 1.
3. As a result of information obtained by the GOV that several Cuban fishing vessels were near Venezuelan
waters, the navy, in the past few days, had intensified patrols and the
seizure of the Alecrin resulted.
4. I asked the President what the facts were with regard to news reports
from Havana that the fishing boat was machine-gunned and perhaps the
target of cannon fire. The President said that he could not answer this
question yet since he did not have all the facts, but that as the facts
came in he would have the Foreign Minister, who was present at the
meeting, let me know.
5. The President said that the seizure of the Alecrin would have to be accepted by Castro in the same way that the U.S.
has had to accept the seizure of the Pueblo by
the North Koreans. He made it quite clear that Venezuela’s patience is
exhausted over Castro Cuba’s continued efforts to intervene subversively
in its affairs. He added that the Communist Party in Venezuela at the
present time is playing a double game. On the one hand it has sought
temporary respectability so that it can participate in the Venezuelan
electoral process while at the same time preparing to resume subversive
and possibly terrorist activities after the election.
6. The President seemed somewhat tense as he discussed this matter and
apparently was seeking through me the moral support of the U.S. It is
also my impression that GOV action in
this case is to give an unequivocal [garbled text] to Cuba to stop its
support of the armed struggle in Venezuela.
Bernbaum
546. Telegram From the Department of State
to the Embassy in VenezuelaSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–4 VEN–CUBA. Secret; Immediate;
Limdis. Drafted by Vaky; cleared by Petersen; cleared
in substance by Fitzgerald, Meeker, and Henry Bardach (EA); and approved by Oliver.Washington, November 21, 1968,
0149Z.
Cuba has circulated note at U.N. violently protesting firing upon
and seizure of Cuban vessel 100 miles from Venezuelan coast and
accusing U.S. of complicity. Cuban Ambassador has appointment with
U.N. SecGen tonight.FYI. As you aware there strong
reasons believe Cuban vessel seized in international waters and that
Venezuelans themselves know it. End FYI.For Ambassador: Possibility additional
incidents as result of continued Venezuelan naval patrols obviously
of great concern. There is no reason to assume that Havana will
permit future incidents, if indeed it permits this one, to pass
without retaliation, and as GOV
aware Cuban air and naval forces have sophisticated equipment.
Moreover there is some outside possibility that repeat incident may
provoke some Cuban act against U.S. Serious confrontation between
Venezuela and Cuba of this nature, or risk of Cuban military action,
is obviously undesirable in terms of U.S., Venezuelan or hemisphere
interests.President Leoni’s comparison of Alecrin
seizure with Pueblo incident was not
felicitous one. USG has maintained
North Korea action in firing upon and seizure Pueblo, even if Pueblo was not in
international waters as we believe it was violation of established
international law. North Korea singularly unfortunate nation for
Venezuela to imitate. Any case we do not wish encourage or stimulate
seizures of vessels especially on high seas.Recognizing provocation which GOV
subject to and noting from reftel
that Leoni probably seeking
U.S. moral support, we think it important cool down Venezuelans and
seek dissuade them from taking this kind of action. We especially
think it important to avoid repetition of vessel seizure.Accordingly you are asked to convey to GOV at appropriate level and in most appropriate way
you think advisable, above concerns and advise them to cool it.
Recognize that you are under constraints re revealing to Venezuelans
that we aware seizure took place in international waters especially
since Leoni told you it took
place in territorial waters. Recognize also that we cannot abandon
GOV in face of insurgency threat
or seem convey unconcern. Hence will take tact to center Venezuelan
attention on tactics used to combat Cuban threat and international
repercussions of incidents such as this one which may not help
Venezuelans. Obviously if there clear evidence Alecrin engaged in subversive mission and this provable
Venezuelan position would be stronger. Our main concern this point
is to dissuade them from seizure in international waters simply on
suspicion which may later prove unwarranted and to avoid risk of
confrontation and retaliation mentioned above.Rusk
547. Telegram From the Embassy in Venezuela
to the Department of StateSource: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–VEN. Secret; Priority; Limdis.Caracas, November 21, 1968,
2325Z.
9001. Ref: Caracas 8987.In telegram 8987
from Caracas, November 21, Bernbaum reported: “Due unavailability
FonMin until tomorrow
morning, I conveyed substance reftel [Document 546] to
Manuel Mantilla SecGen Presidency. He said would immediately inform
President Leoni. He showed
understanding our position but emphasized importance of not giving
Cubans idea US so worried over danger any problem with Cuba as to
give Castro idea he could
operate with impunity. He hoped Cubans would not get this impression
from our position in UN debate. I
said this obviously delicate problem and assured him that what I
just said strictly between US and Venezuelan Government.” (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,
POL US–VEN)
President Leoni’s reaction to my conversation this morning with
Mantilla was prompt and vigorous. I saw him at his request late this
afternoon. The President said he had been greatly concerned by
Mantilla’s description of his conversation with me. Our position
implied to him a US tendency to wash its hands of the situation
because of preoccupation with serious problems in other parts of the
world. He was able to understand this but felt that it left
Venezuela in the position of fending for itself on matters of vital
importance to its security. He asked rhetorically whether it would
not be necessary for Venezuela to turn to France for military
equipment to defend itself now that there was the implication that
the US would not assume responsibility and did not, in any case,
want to furnish Venezuela with equipment at least equal in quality
to that secured by the Cubans from the Soviet Union. He said that
Venezuela might even find itself in the position of being forced to
come to terms with the Soviet Union for its own protection. The
President spoke in this vein for some time and I listened patiently,
knowing from experience that he was blowing off steam.After he finished, I read suitable excerpt from Deptel 275231Document 546. to give him the
flavor of the Department’s position as I had previously described it to
Mantilla. This then produced another monologue along the same
lines.In a November 29 letter to
Vaky, Bernbaum expressed fear that
emphasizing Cuban access to “highly sophisticated equipment” may
have backfired, noting “the emotional reactions of both
Leoni and Leandro Mora to our admonition
as an indication that they could not count on U.S. support.”
Although Leoni only hinted at the consequence, Leandro Mora was more explicit:
if the Venezuelans “did not get the necessary equipment from us
they would turn to Europe.” Bernbaum admitted: “I have been
kicking myself for having conveyed that portion of the
Department’s telegram to Leoni. We are now, unfortunately, in the
position of having stimulated a desire, even demand, by the
Venezuelans for the kind of equipment we don’t want to furnish
them and probably cannot furnish them in view of the temper of
our Congress. I am afraid that both ARA and I fell down on this one.” (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1967–69, POL 33–4
VEN–CUBA)[I] then told the President that in my opinion he was
misinterpreting the Department’s position. We were most definitely
not washing our hands of Venezuela’s problem. We understood and
appreciated Venezuela’s position at this critical electoral period
with respect to very clear efforts by the Cubans to cause trouble.
We had access to the same intelligence information he did. The
Department’s reaction, I said, was that of a friend and ally
offering advice. We were counseling caution and the importance of
playing the game according to the rules to avoid giving our common
enemy an argument against Venezuela which could be used effectively
in the UN and other international
forums and as an excuse for reprisal. This was the tactic followed
by us in our dealings with Cuba, the Soviet Union and the Communist
world as a whole in the face of provocation. We felt it important
for Venezuela to act only when sure of its position. In effect, I
said, we were asking the President to “cool it.” This apparently
struck his fancy since he smiled broadly and visibly relaxed.The President said that there was no question that the Cubans
would allege that the vessel was seized outside of Venezuelan
territorial waters. Venezuela’s position was that the vessel was
seized within Venezuela’s territorial waters. There was no reason to
believe the Cubans more than the Venezuelans. In the case of the Pueblo, the North Koreans claimed that it was
seized within North Korean territorial waters while we claimed it
was seized outside of territorial waters. As far as the President
was concerned, Venezuela has acted in accordance with the rules and
very definitely intended to do so in the future—that is, exercise
its sovereignty over suspicious vessels when they were in Venezuelan
territorial waters. He said Venezuela had no desire to impede the
right of innocent passage. The important thing was that the passage
had to be innocent. If foreign vessels wanted to transmit Venezuelan
waters, there was nothing to prevent them from doing so by notifying
the Venezuelan authorities of their intention. If, however, foreign vessels were
found in Venezuelan waters, particularly vessels of countries to be
considered hostile, it was incumbent upon the GOV to make certain of their bona
fides. In this case, the Cuban fishing vessel was called upon to
stop. Instead of acceding to this legitimate request, it ignored it,
therefore rendering itself suspect. The President said that as far
as he was concerned, any Cuban vessel found in Venezuelan
territorial waters was going to be looked upon as suspicious. Fidel
Castro was now on notice to that effect.The conversation then turned to the domestic situation. The
President said that the Communists presumably with Cuban assistance
were planning to stage disturbances in Caracas with the allegation
of electoral fraud. Subversive elements were infiltrating Caracas
for that purpose. Recent assistance from Cuba was substantial and
was continuing. A UPA announcement published in Ultimas Noticias on November 18 for all practical purposes
represented a declaration of war. The GOV did not look upon this threat as dangerous but it
was required to take all precautionary measures. The investigation
of the Cuban vessel had to be appraised in the light of this
situation.Although I do not think that the President’s ire and preoccupation
over our position has been eliminated, I do believe that I left him
in a considerably more relaxed state of mind and conscious of the
need for caution in the future. I think it important that we have
his problem in mind during any UN
debate which may ensure and avoid statements which might tend to
exacerbate GOV suspicions and
concern without necessarily supporting this specific Venezuelan
action, in the debate which may take place, reference by us to
historically demonstrated Cuban subversive intervention in Venezuela
and to its continuation would be in order and well received in
Venezuela and other parts of LA. The
Communists would do no less for their allies.The Alecrin was allowed
to return to Cuba on December 20, nearly 3 weeks after the
Presidential elections on December 1. The Venezuelan Foreign
Ministry released a statement admitting that, “although vessel’s
way of proceeding was suspicious, no proof was found to confirm
that ship was being used for transport of guerrillas or
weapons.” (Telegram 9396 from Caracas, December 21; ibid.,
POL 33–4 CUBA–VEN)Bernbaum
548. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to
President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Country File, Venezuela, Filed by LBJ Library. Confidential. A notation
on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.Washington, December 9, 1968, 6:35
p.m.
SUBJECT
Venezuelan Elections
The Christian Democratic candidate, Rafael Caldera, has finally been
declared winner in Venezuela by the narrowest of margins.In a December 3 memorandum to the President,
Rostow reported that the election was
“still too close to call,” with Caldera clinging to a narrow lead
over Barrios, the AD candidate.
Rostow noted: “Either man would be
satisfactory from our viewpoint, although Caldera would probably
take a somewhat more nationalistic position on economic matters.”
(Ibid.) He won by about 30,000 votes, or a margin of
approximately 29 percent to 28.4 percent for his nearest rival. The
election was held in remarkably good order, and there is every
indication that power will pass peacefully to the opposition next March
for the first time in Venezuela’s recent history.
President-elect Caldera is founder of Venezuela’s Christian Democratic
Party, and has run unsuccessfully several times before for the
presidency. He is able, responsible, and a moderate leftist—an expert in
the field of labor law—and a strong anti-communist. He knows the United
States well, and has supported the Alliance for Progress in general
while criticizing “errors of operation”.
Caldera’s Party will be the second largest in the Congress and will have
to form a coalition to put through a program. He may be somewhat more
nationalistic in his dealings with American oil companies in Venezuela,
but the general lines of Venezuelan policy toward the United States
should continue after he takes office.In
telegram 9245 from Caracas, December 10, the Embassy analyzed the
election results. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG
59, Central Files, 1967–69, POL 14
VEN) In airgram A–1366 from Caracas, December 13, the Embassy
assessed the implications of the election for the United States.
(Ibid., POL VEN)
Walt
Index
Note: All references are to document numbers
Ackley, H. Gardner, 289Acosta Bonilla, Manuel, 104, 106, 108, 118Adair, Charles W., Jr., 433, 440, 443, 444, 447, 448,
449, 450, 452, 455Adair, E. Ross, 249, 489Adams, Robert W., 18, 26, 28, 74, 149, 151, 188, 190, 193, 198, 200, 201, 203, 208, 255, 266, 272, 349, 524Adenauer, Konrad, 346Adhemar Pereira de Barros, 182, 184, 186, 187, 201, 209AFL-CIO, 81, 117, 152Agüero Rocha, Fernando, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94,
95, 96Ahumada, Jorge, 274, 276Aiken, George, 39Ailes, Stephen, 279, 368, 419, 421, 424,
425Akers, Robert Wood, 302Alejos, Roberto, 75Aleman, Roberto, 450Alessandri Rodriguez, Jorge, 260, 261, 264Alexander, Archibald S. 65Allen, Ward R, 4, 5, 7, 14, 58Allende Gossens, Salvador, 16, 173, 303Chilean Presidential election of 1964, 247, 249, 250, 251, 253, 254, 259, 260, 261, 264, 268, 269U.S. assessment of, 251Alliance for Progress: Central American Export Development Program, 119Coordinator for, proposed, 43Counterinsurgency program, 3, 4, 6, 28, 61, 63Democracy and dictators, approach to (Mann Doctrine), 10Economic program, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 62, 69, 71Fourth Anniversary celebration of, 30Frontier development in South America, 40Funding for, 15Gordon appointment as Assistant Secretary of State, 37Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress
(CIAP), 1, 2, 10, 12, 13, 40, 67, 330Johnson visit to Central American, 111,
112Johnson meeting with Latin American Ambassadors, 13Johnson meeting with Latin American Foreign Ministers, 21Johnson meeting with U.S.Ambassadors to Latin America, 18Johnson speech (1964), 10Kennedy visit to Latin American, 31, 32, 33Military program, 11, 25, 29, 65, 66, 67Oliver appointment as Assistant Secretary of State, 43Oliver visit to Latin American, 68, 69Presidents’ meeting in 1965, proposed, 26Press coverage, 2, 10, 12, 17, 49, 52Public relations efforts, 31, 43Rusk visit to Latin American, 33Alsogaray, Alvaro C, 136, 138, 143Alsogaray, Gen. Julio R., 128, 136Alter, Gerald M., 313Alves, Osvino, 205Alves Bastos, Comdr. Justino, 192, 201American and Foreign Power Company (AMFORP), 183, 212, 214Ampuero Diaz, Raul, 251, 260Anaconda Copper Company, 257, 278, 282, 284, 285, 287, 289Ancora, Gen. Armando de Morais, 203Anderson, Clinton P., 353, 536Anderson, Robert B., 1, 284, 452, 456Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 408,
409, 410,
417, 419,
421, 425,
427, 428,
429, 432,
434, 435,
437, 438,
440Andrade, Victor, 159Andreazza, Mario David, 230Angueiras, 456Anthis, Gen., 28Aragao, Adm. Candida, 191, 205Aragao, Gen. Moniz de, 240Arango, Augusto, 371, 450Arango, William, 375Arco Galindo, Juan de, 398Arenales Catalan, Emilio, 103, 113Argentina: Bolivia, relations with, 164Chile, relations with, 136Common market for Latin America, 62Coup of 2966, 124, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136, 143Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 21, 22Economic situation, 145Johnson meeting with Ongania, 145Oil expropriations, 16, 121, 122, 123, 126, 143Ongania government policies, 136, 138, 143Ongania government prospects, 146Political situation under Illia, 124Rusk meeting with Alsogaray, 143Rusk visit to, 33Uruguay, relations with, 463, 464U.S. economic/development assistance, 121, 122, 123, 126, 132, 142U.S. military/security assistance, 66,
125, 128,
129, 132,
142, 144U.S. policy toward Ongania government, 142U.S. recognition of Ongania government, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141U.S. trade relations with, 123Arguedas, Antonio, 178, 179Arias Espinosa, Ricardo M., 422, 434, 435Arias Madrid, Arnulfo: Panama, 376, 386, 388, 395Coup of 1968, 448, 449, 450, 451,
452Coup threat in 1964, 377Coup threat in 1966, 430Presidential election of 1964, 398, 415,
416Presidential election of 1968, 436, 442,
443, 445, 446, 447Robles, impeachment of, 443,
444, 445U.S. policy toward Arias following coup, 453, 456U.S. recognition of military junta, 455Arosemena Gomez, Otto: Ecuador: Appointment of new U.S. Ambassador, 341, 344Arosemena Gomez, Otto—Continued
Ecuador—ContinuedArosemena criticism of Alliance for Progress, 330, 331,
333, 334, 335, 336Elections of 1966, 330Johnson meeting with Arosemena, 51Rapprochement with United States, 343, 344Recall of U.S. Ambassador, 340U.S. economic/development assistance, 332OAS Summit meeting of 1967, 51Arrais, Miguel, 182, 209Arriaga, Col. Rafael, 101Artime, Manuel (Buesa), 73Aspinall, Wayne N., 353Assis Brasil, Gen. Argemiro, 205Assumpcao, Gen. Henrique, 240Baeza, Antonio, 254Baker, H. W, 473Balaguer, Joaquin, 59, 61Ball, George W, 193, 196, 198, 375, 498Alliance for Progress, 13, 26Argentina, 126, 128, 132, 134, 135, 139Brazil, 5, 76,
208Political crisis of 1964, 199, 201,
202, 203, 204, 205, 206,
207Chile, 256, 285, 286, 287, 288Panama, 368, 377, 383, 384, 393, 433Venezuela, 524, 529Baltra, Alberto, 297Barall, Milton, 266Barboza, Gibson, 238Bardach, Henry, 546Barneby, Malcolm R., 472, 478Barnes, Donald E, 292, 346, 352, 356Barr, Joseph W, 48, 65,
67, 309Barrientos Ortuno, Gen. Rene, 59, 68Bolivia, 154Communist subversion, 163Co-presidential arrangement of Barrientos and Ovando, 155, 156,
158Coup of 1964, 147, 149, 150, 151Guevara capture and execution, 173Johnson meetings with Barrientos, 162, 176Political crisis of 1968, 178, 179Presidential election of 1966, 147, 159,
160, 161Rusk meeting with Barrientos, 162U.S. covert political action program, 147, 153U.S. economic/development assistance, 176, 177U.S. military/security assistance, 154, 155, 163, 166U.S. recognition of Barrientos government, 152Barrios, Gonzalo, 535, 536, 538, 548Bartlett, Charles, 315Batista, Fulgencio, 459Batlle, Luis, 461Beale, Tom, 271Bedoya Reyes, Luis, 521Behrman, Jack N., 3Belaunde Terry, Fernando, 62, 65, 162Peru: Coup of 1968, 497, 499, 501, 506,
509, 510, 511Elections of 1967, 501Johnson attitude toward Belaunde, 499Johnson communications with Belaunde, 475, 477Military aircraft purchases and U.S. economic assistance,
485, 491, 492, 494, 495,
496, 499, 500, 501, 502Oil expropriations and U.S. economic assistance, 470, 472,
475, 476, 477, 478, 479,
480, 483, 484, 486, 487,
489, 491, 500, 501, 502,
504Oliver visit to, 68, 69U.S. economic/development assistance, 505, 508Belize. SeeBritish Honduras.Bell, David E., 11, 25,
28, 122, 208, 216, 224, 256, 275, 276, 281, 288, 329Bell, John O., 18, 75,
77Belton, William, 236, 254, 255Beltran, Pedro, 501, 510, 521Beltran, Washington, 33Benedetti, Eloy, 375Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., 18, 356Berckemeyer, Fernando, 521Berdecio, Jaime, 154, 162Bergold, Harry, 349Berle, Adolf A., 31, 37,
47, 49, 74, 187, 284Berlin, Lawrence H., 334, 344Bernbaum, Maurice M., 55, 56, 58, 314Venezuela: British Guiana border dispute, 544Communist subversion, 525, 538, 539,
545, 547Coup threat, 531, 538Cuban fishing vessel, seizure of, 545, 546, 547Johnson meeting with Barrios, 535Oil exports to United States, 525, 526, 528, 533,
542, 543University crisis of 1967, 538U.S. military/security assistance, 525, 539, 547Bernstein, Enrique, 270Betancourt, Romulo, 8, 13, 465, 522,
528Bloomfield, Richard J., 495Bogart, Gen., 375Bohlen, Charles E., 69, 306, 503Bolivia, 2Argentina, relations with, 164Chile, relations with, 162Common market for Latin America, 62Communist subversion, 59, 61, 63, 163, 164, 167, 169, 170, 172, 173Co-presidential arrangement of Barrientos and Ovando, 155, 156, 158Coup of 1964, 147, 149, 150, 151Cuba, possible war with, 165Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 20, 21, 22, 23Debray trial, 164, 167, 168, 171, 173Guevara, capture and execution of, 163,
164, 167,
168, 170,
171, 172,
173Johnson meetings with Barrientos, 162,
176Mining industry problems, 154, 155, 157Oliver visit to, 68Political crisis of 1968, 178, 179Presidential election of 1964, 147, 149Presidential election of 1966, 147, 159, 160, 161Rusk meeting with Barrientos, 162U.S. covert political action program, 147, 148, 153, 158, 161, 174U.S. economic/development assistance, 165, 175, 176, 177, 180U.S. military/security assistance, 154,
155, 163,
164, 165,
166, 170U.S. objectives and courses of action, 157U.S. recognition of Barrientos government, 152Bosch, Juan, 217, 278,
465Boster, Davis E., 200Bowdler, William G., 33, 42, 43, 45,
48, 54, 56, 61, 62, 64, 68,
69, 81, 82, 83, 85, 87, 88,
109, 133, 135, 139, 140, 165, 166, 176, 177, 178, 219, 220, 231, 281, 289, 295, 297, 301, 305, 307, 308, 318, 325, 327, 328, 335, 337, 338, 443, 453, 475, 476, 481, 487, 495, 497, 498, 499, 500, 504, 531, 536, 540, 543Boyd, Aquilino Edgardo, 395Boyd, Maj. Federico, 376, 449Brady, Lee, 303Braga, Nei, 182, 187,
221Bravo, Douglas, 59Brazil, 2, 16, 18, 32, 33, 314, 338,
498Argentinian coup of 1966 and, 129Castello government, U.S.assessments of, 213, 218, 226Castello selection as President, 209,
211, 212Coffee agreement with United States, 208Common market for Latin America, 62Communist dictatorship, threat of. SeePolitical crisis of 1964
below.Communist subversion, 24, 230Costa e Silva government, U.S. assessments of, 226, 229, 233, 235Costa e Silva policies, 243Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 20, 21, 22, 23Dominican crisis, 217Economic situation, 215, 218, 224, 229, 235Institutional Acts restricting civil liberties, 209, 211, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 236, 237, 238, 241Johnson meeting with Costa e Silva, 228Military dictatorship, 214, 221, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 244Political crisis of 1964, 182Coup against Goulart, 195, 197, 199,
201, 203, 205, 206, 207Domestic conditions giving rise to, 185Goulart campaign to seize dictatorial power, 183, 184,
187, 190, 197, 211Goulart departure from Brazil, 203, 204, 207Mazzilli appointment as Acting President, 204, 205,
206, 207Military preparations to act against Goulart, 186, 187,
192Rusk summary of events for Congressional Leaders, 208U.S. contingency planning, 181,
185U.S. information policy re, 188,
193, 197, 200, 202U.S. recognition of new government, 203, 204, 205, 206U.S. support for anti-Goulart forces, 187, 188, 189, 190,
191, 193, 194, 196, 197,
198, 199, 201, 202, 203,
205, 206Political crisis of 1965, 219Political purges, 209, 214Presidential election of 1966, 214, 218, 220, 226Rusk meeting with Castello, 223Trade relations with United States, 183Uruguay, relations with, 463, 464U.S. economic/development assistance, 196, 208, 212, 214, 215, 216, 220, 223, 224, 227, 229, 232, 234, 238, 242, 244U.S. military/security assistance, 65,
66, 181, 230, 231U.S. policy to support moderation and discourage extremism, 223Vietnam war, Brazilian troops for, 224,
225Breen, John R., 495Brewin, Roger C, 151, 152Brezhnev, Leonid I., 164Brinckerhoff, Charles M., 257, 287British Guiana, 24, 523, 524, 536,
544British Honduras, 76, 77, 78, 103, 113Brizzola, Leonel, 24, 182, 183, 184, 185, 201,
205, 209, 463Broe, William V, 98, 161, 166, 171, 172, 173,
291, 298, 304, 306, 457Bronheim, David, 51Brown, Aaron S., 18, 90,
91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96Brown, George S., 109Bueso Arias, Jorge, 72Bulhoes, Otavio, 215Bulkeley, Adm. John D., 2Bundy, McGeorge, 6, 7,
13, 40, 75, 81, 82, 83, 193,
196, 197, 214Alliance for Progress, 3, 10, 17, 18, 21Military program, 11, 25, 29Argentina, 125Bolivia, 149, 150, 152, 155, 156, 157, 158Brazil, 219, 223Institutional Acts restricting civil liberties, 220Political crisis of 1964, 185, 187,
188, 189, 191, 199, 202,
203U.S. economic/development assistance, 216Vietnam war, Brazilian troops for, 225Chile, 249, 279Copper price problem, 282, 283, 284,
286Cuba, break in relations with, 265Dungan appointment as Ambassador, 271Presidential election of 1964, 246, 248,
250, 253, 256, 257, 258,
259, 261, 262, 264, 267,
268, 269U.S. covert political action program, 246, 248, 250, 253,
256, 257, 258, 262, 267U.S. economic/development assistance, 281Colombia, 314, 315, 317Cuba: Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 3, 4, 9, 19, 21, 22Trade restrictions re, 3, 9, 19U.S. military action in response to Cuban aggression,
issue of, 19Guatemala, 84, 85Mexico, 350, 353, 354, 355Organization of American States, resolution on Cuban arms cache in
Venezuela, 3, 4,
9, 19, 21, 22Panama: Anti-American demonstrations, 420, 422Communist subversion, 377Inter-American Peace Committee involvement in
Panamanian-U.S. conflict, 371,
377OAS action on Panamanian-U.S. conflict, 390, 392,
399, 405Presidential election of 1964, 415Rioting of 1964, 368U.S. interdepartmental organization for Panamanian
affairs, 414U.S.-Panamanian relations, breaking and resumption of,
399, 400, 403, 404, 405,
406U.S. program to improve relations with Panama, 420, 422Panama Canal treaty negotiations: Base rights issue, 420, 423Congressional involvement, 425,
427, 429Joint management issue, 427New treaty for existing canal, 420, 423Process of reaching agreement to initiate negotiations,
371, 373, 375, 378, 379,
388, 389, 390, 392, 396,
397, 399, 400, 403, 404,
405, 406, 407Sea-level canal issue, 420, 423U.S. policy development for, 421, 423, 425Paraguay, 462Peru, 475Venezuela, 527, 531Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 3, 4, 9, 19, 21, 22Bunker, Ellsworth, 3, 4, 7, 14, 16, 20,
21, 33, 46, 455Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 384, 387, 388, 402,
404, 405, 406, 407, 409Burnham, Forbes, 523, 524, 544Burrows, Charles R., 72, 74, 90, 91,
98, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106, 118Burton, Ralph J., 181, 185, 187, 188, 190, 191,
193, 200, 201, 202, 205, 215Busby, Horace, Jr., 21Business Group for Latin America, 253Bustos, Ciro Roberto, 174Byington, Alberto, 187Caamano, Col. Francisco, 278Caldera, Rafael, 548Califano, Joseph A., Jr., 3, 4, 279, 284,
286, 287, 288, 289, 532Calle Restropo, Diego, 310, 311Camara, Helder, 240Camara, Jayme, 240Campos, Milton, 214Campos, Roberto de Oliveira, 212, 215Canada, 16, 34, 230, 288Oil trade, 526, 527, 530, 532, 540, 543Cantilo, Jose Luis, 127Cantinflas, 356Caram, Angel R., 143Cardenas, Lazaro, 16Carias Castillo, Tiburcio, 117, 118Carlson, Frank, 39, 433Carlson, Reynold E., 323Caro, Gen. Carlos Augusto, 131, 134, 136Carrillo Flores, Antonio, 31, 34, 42, 46,
350, 352, 356, 360Carriquiri, Pablo, 501Carter, Albert E., 412Carter, Lt. Gen. Marshall S., 252, 255, 272Carvalho Pinto, Carlos Alberto Alvers de, 182Castello Branco, Gen. Humberto,
26, 32, 129, 229, 465Brazil, 217Castello government, U.S. assessments of, 213, 218,
223, 226Castello selection as President, 209, 211, 212Economic situation, 215, 224Institutional Acts restricting civil liberties, 220, 221,
223Military dictatorship, 214, 221Political crisis of 1964, 186, 187,
192, 203, 205, 207Political purges, 209, 214Presidential election of 1966, 214, 218,
220Vietnam war, Brazilian troops for, 224, 225Castilho, Gen., 240Castillero Pimentel, 422Castro, Raul H., 179Castro Ruz, Fidel, 3, 6,
16, 23, 24, 59, 60, 63, 64,
101, 120, 164, 173, 178, 179, 259, 270, 356, 369, 377, 465, 522, 525Guevara comments on, 172Castro Sanchez, Eduardo, 134, 136Cater, S. Douglass, Jr., 67Cates, John M., Jr., 117, 512Cavalcanti, Col. Boaventura, 240Central American Bank, 110Central American Export Development Program, 119Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (see alsoNational Intelligence Estimates; Special National Intelligence Estimates), 75Bolivia: Communist subversion, 164, 167, 170,
173Coup of 1964, 151Debray, trial of, 168Guevara, capture and execution of, 163, 164, 167, 168,
170, 171, 172Political crisis of 1968, 179U.S. covert political action program, 147, 148, 153, 158,
161U.S. military/security assistance, 155, 165, 166Brazil, 193, 195Chile, 270, 277, 298Presidential election of 1964, 245, 247,
248, 250, 252, 253, 256,
257, 258, 262, 268, 269U.S. covert political action program, 245, 247, 248, 250,
252, 253, 256, 257, 258,
262, 269, 273, 277, 304,
306Colombia, 319Counterinsurgency program in Latin America, 28Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 53, 54Guatemala, 84, 98Mexico, 365Panama, 377, 388, 422, 445, 448, 450, 454, 455Presidential election of 1964, 415, 416Peru, 471, 497Cerqueira, Benedito, 209Chamorro, Pedro Joaquin, 94, 95, 96Chaplin, Maxwell, 362, 363Chase, Gordon, 3, 4, 6, 7, 17, 150, 185,
188, 249, 256, 315, 373, 415Chayes, Abram J., 7, 8,
9, 203, 377Chiari, Roberto E, 368, 416Panama: Chiari, downfall of, U.S. planning for, 386, 388Communist subversion, 372Chiari, Roberto R—Continued
Panama—ContinuedCoup threat in 1964, 377Flag issue, 372Johnson discussions with Chiari, 370, 410Rio Hato base evacuation by United States, 376Rioting of 1964, 369, 370,
372, 375, 395U.S.-Panamanian relations, breaking and resumption of,
372, 376, 379, 395, 403,
410Panama Canal treaty negotiations: Chiari miscalculations in dealing with United States, 386, 395Process of reaching agreement to initiate negotiations,
370, 372, 375, 376, 377,
379, 395, 396, 403, 410Chile, 32Agrarian reform, 292Argentina, relations with, 136Bolivia, relations with, 162 “Camelot”
military research project, 279, 280Common market for Latin America, 62Communist electoral victory, threat of. SeePresidential election of 1964
below.Communists’ alliance with Christian Democrats, 300, 301, 302, 304Communists’ political resurgence, 298Congressional by-election of 1964, 248, 250Congressional elections of 1965, 273, 277Congressional elections of 1969, 304, 306, 309Constitutional amendment, 290Copper price problem, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 295, 302Coup threat, 305Cuba, break in relations with, 265Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 64Dominican crisis, 278, 281Dungan appointment as Ambassador, 271Economic situation, 249Frei government, U.S. policy toward, 266, 272Frei government prospects, U.S. assessments of, 270, 293, 303Frei conflicts within Christian Democratic Party, 296, 297, 298, 299Frei struggle with political opposition, 290, 305Johnson invitation for Frei to visit United States, 290Johnson meeting with Frei, 292Kennedy visit to, 33Korry appointment as Ambassador, 296Municipal elections of 1967, 291, 293National Committee election of 1967, 294Peru, relations with, 502Presidential election of 1964,
16, 20, 24, 254, 260, 274Allende/Communist victory, U.S. concerns about, 249, 251,
259, 264Duran candidacy, 254, 258Forecasts re, 261, 268Results of voting, 269U.S. analysis of possible voting patterns, 250U.S. business support for Frei, 253, 257U.S. covert political action program, 245, 246, 247, 248,
250, 252, 253, 254, 255,
256, 257, 258, 262, 263,
267, 269“Revolution in Liberty” program, ending of, 303U.S. covert political action program (see also
underPresidential election of 1964
above), 272, 273, 277, 291, 294, 304, 306U.S. economic/development assistance, 252, 253, 256, 260, 274, 275, 276, 278, 281, 289, 292, 295, 307, 308, 309U.S. military/security assistance, 66China, People’s Republic of, 24, 346Chonchol, Jacques, 303Christian, George E., 50, 63, 490, 509,
511, 519, 520, 540CIAP SeeInter-American Committee of the Alliance for
ProgressunderAlliance for Progress.Cienfuegos, Camilo, 172Cintra, Gen. Jose Pinheiro de Ulhoa, 187, 192Cities Service, 16Clark, Edward W., 420, 421, 431, 439Clavel Mendez, Archbishop Tomas Alberto, 443Clifford, Clark M., 69, 284, 458, 498, 519Cline, Ray S., 155Cobb, William B., Jr., 523, 524Coelho, Juliao Marco Antonio, 209Coerr, Wymberley deR.: Chile, 278Ecuador, 326, 327, 328, 331, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 340Uruguay, 460, 461, 463Cole, Charles W, 245, 249, 250, 252, 253, 260,
263, 269, 272Collins, V. Lansing, 72, 367, 368, 377, 386, 415Colombia, 20, 62, 64, 68, 345Communist subversion, 28, 59, 61, 63, 70, 316, 323Congressional elections of 1966, 316, 318Coup threat, 310, 312, 313, 314, 316Panama crisis, 369Political/economic crisis, U.S. efforts to deal with, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 321Presidential election of 1966, 318, 320Sea-level canal issue, 377, 421, 423, 424, 428U.S. covert political action program, 319U.S. economic/development assistance, 317, 321, 322, 325Colwell, Thomas C, 312Communism in Latin America (see also specific
countries): “Communist Potentialities in Latin America” report, 24Conference of Representatives of Latin American Communist Parties,
28Guerrilla problem in various countries, 59, 60, 61 “Insurgency in Latin America”report, 38 “Potential for Revolution in
Latin America” report, 70U.S. counterinsurgency program, 3, 4, 6, 28, 61, 63U.S.-Soviet discussions re, 60Congo, 172, 284Congress, U.S., 2Alliance for Progress: Economic program, 44, 45, 48,
49, 51Funding for, 15Military program, 65Argentina, 141, 142, 144Bolivia, 152Brazil, 208Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 249Mexico, 358OAS charter amendments, 39Panama, 368, 447Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 409,
417, 425,
427, 428,
429, 433Peru, 489, 490, 491, 492, 494, 495, 508, 520Connell, Col, 189Conte, Silvio O., 66, 495Cooley, Harold D., 16Cordeiro de Farias, Gen. Osvaldo, 192Cornford, F. M., 215Correa, Jose Antonio, 13Corrigan, Robert E, 101Corvalan, Luis, 251Costa, Gen. Joao, 205Costa e Silva, Gen. Arturo da, 211, 223, 498Costa e Silva government, U.S. assessments of, 226, 229, 233, 235Johnson meeting with Costa e Silva, 228Military dictatorship, 240, 244Political crisis of 1964, 203, 205Political situation in Brazil, 209, 230, 238, 243Presidential election of 1966, 226U.S. military/security assistance, 230,
231Costa Mendez, Nicanor, 138, 140, 145Costanzo, Henry J., 311Costa Rica, 16Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 20Johnson meeting with Orlich, 73Johnson meeting with Trejos, 110Presidential election of 1966, 79, 80, 81, 85Sea-level canal issue, 421, 423, 424, 428Costa Santos, Max da, 209Cottrell, Sterling J., 388, 395, 400, 537Crawford, Boyd, 141Crawford, Gen., 188Crimmins, John H., 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 61Crockett, William J., 17Crowley, John J., Jr., 340, 344, 524Cruz Martinez, Rogelia, 100Cuba, 356Batista overthrow, 459Bolivia, possible war with, 165Bolivian guerrillas and, 163, 164, 167, 168, 173Castro ouster, U.S. interest in, 16Chile, break in relations with, 265Chilean Presidential election of 1964 and,
259Colombian guerrillas and, 323Communist potentialities in Latin America and, 24Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64Guerrilla infiltration of various countries, 59, 60Guevara comments on, 172Panamanian Communist activity and, 376,
377Political situation, 16Trade restrictions re, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 16, 19, 56U.S. military action in response to Cuban aggression, issue of,
7, 8, 9, 14, 16, 19U.S. policy toward, 6Venezuelan guerrillas and (see also Cuban
headings above), 522, 525, 547Venezuelan seizure of Cuban fishing vessel, 545, 546, 547Cuba, Simon, 172Cunha Rodrigues, Adm. Paulo Mario, 191Cutter, Curtis C, 479D’Aguiar, Peter, 523Dany, Maj. Gen., 449Daza, Pedro, 292Dearborn, Henry, 310Debray, Jules Regis, 164, 167, 168, 171, 173De Gaulle, Charles, 129, 183, 212, 346, 465, 492,
502De la Garza, Eligio, 355De la Rosa, Diogenes, 421, 435, 438De Lavalle, Juan Bautista de, 401, 405, 406, 407Delfim Neto, Antonio, 232, 238Del Mar, Maj. Gen. Roland, 65Devalle, Max, 444Denney, George C, Jr., 155, 158, 179Dentzer, William T., Jr., 150, 157, 253, 254, 255, 266, 274, 275, 276, 491De Seabra, Jose A., 228Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo, 42, 347, 502Mexico, 348, 349, 359Student disturbances of 1968, 362, 363,
364, 365, 366Trade relations with United States, 352, 356, 358OAS Summit meeting of 1967, 52Dillon, C. Douglas, 9Dios Aguilar, Juan de, 87Dios Carmona, Juan de, 254Dirksen, Everett M., 48, 208, 344Dodd, Bill, 369Doig Sanchez, Gen. Julio, 493, 500Dominican Republic, 16, 18, 20, 30,
32, 33, 42, 217, 278, 281, 313, 356, 465Communist subversion, 59, 61Dreier, John, 118Dreyfuss, John T., 128, 132, 134DuBois, Jules, 200Duke, Angier Biddle, 13, 21, 352Dulles, John Foster, 382Dungan, Ralph A., 3, 7,
17, 18, 30, 32, 144, 187, 191, 199, 202Chile, 248, 271, 275, 278, 293, 296“Camelot” military research project, 279, 280Copper price problem, 282, 283, 284,
286, 287Presidential election of 1964, 246, 250,
268U.S. covert political action program, 246, 250, 273, 277,
291, 294Mexico, 348Panama, 368, 376, 377, 378, 387, 400, 404Dunkerly Harold, 310Duran Neumann, Julio, 245, 247, 248, 250, 253, 254,
261, 268, 269, 293Dutra, Gen. Eurico Gaspar, 187, 192, 211Earle II, Ralph, 109Eaton, Samuel D., 52, 313, 314Echandi, Mario, 80Economic integration in Latin America. SeeAlliance for Progress.Ecuador, 20, 51, 62, 342Appointment of new U.S. Ambassador, 341, 343, 344Arosemena criticism of Alliance for Progress, 330, 331,
333, 334, 335, 336Communist subversion, 59, 61Counterinsurgency program, 326Elections of 2966, 327, 328, 330Political crisis of 2966, 327,
328Rapprochement with United States, 343, 344Recall of U.S. Ambassador, 337,
338, 339, 340U.S. economic/development assistance, 329, 332, 333, 334,
336, 339, 340Eder, Richard G., 479Edwards, Augustin, 257Eisenhower, Dwight D., 60, 369, 370, 382, 384, 421,
498, 528Eisenhower, Milton S., 31, 47, 49, 67,
498Eleta Almaran, Fernando, 421, 422, 424, 433, 434, 435, 440, 441Elizalde, Felix, 130El Salvador, 20, 111,
112Emrich, Viola, 31Engle, James B., 28, 94Ensor, Andrew E, 121, 122Escalon, Lt. Col. Armando, 72Espinosa, 501Export-Import Bank, 79, 126, 130, 215, 274, 282,
314, 356Facio, Gonzalo J., 73Favell, Thomas R., 272, 274Febres Cordero, Agustin, 330Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 455Fehmer, Marie, 475Fico, Gen. Nicolau, 205Figueres, Jose “Pepe,” 465Finkel, E. Jay, 495Fisher, Glen H., 51Fitch, Lt. Gen. Alva R., 150FitzGerald, Desmond, 3, 4,
9, 28, 74, 154, 155, 158, 163, 166, 187, 188, 191, 193, 202, 248, 250, 254, 257, 268, 272, 415, 422Fitzgerald, John E, 546Fleming, Robert J., 367, 372, 418Flood, Dan, 378, 427Ford, Gerald R., 48Ford Motor Company, 359Foster, William C, 65Fowler, Henry H., 3, 41,
44, 69, 71, 227, 232, 289, 295, 310, 317, 322, 329, 334, 466, 483, 495Fowler, James R., 335, 502Fox, Lt. Col. Edward J., Jr., 149France, 16, 125, 168, 183, 212, 230, 231, 346Peruvian military aircraft purchases, 485, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496Franco, Francisco, 129Frank, Richard A., 103, 113, 439Frankel, Charlie, 358Frankel, Max, 2, 49Fredley, Dottie, 307, 308Freeman, Fulton “Tony,” 345, 347, 358, 361Freeman, Orville L., 180, 256, 308, 309, 332, 358,
505, 508Frei Montalva, Eduardo, 49, 271, 278, 290, 292, 303Chile, 52, 292,
300, 305Copper price problem, 283, 285, 286,
287, 288Frei government, U.S. policy toward, 266, 272Frei government prospects, U.S. assessments of, 270, 293,
303Frei conflicts within Christian Democratic Party, 296, 297,
298, 299Frei struggle with political opposition, 290, 305Presidential election of 2964, 16, 20, 245, 250, 253, 254,
257, 260, 261, 262, 263,
268, 269U.S. covert political action program, 245, 250, 253, 254,
262, 263, 273, 291U.S. economic/development assistance, 276, 281, 289, 292,
307, 308Friedkin, Joseph E, 352, 358Friedman, Alvin, 28Friendly, Alfred, 2Frixione, 94Fulbright, J. William, 31, 32, 39, 43,
49, 51, 141, 142, 208, 392, 393, 406, 409, 433, 541Furtado, Celso, 212Gaitan, Jorge Eliecer, 319Galindo, Juan de Arco, 415, 416Gama e Silva, Luis Antonio da, 237, 240Gander, James, 358Garcia, Sergeant, 209Gardner, James R., 168, 174Gaud, William S., 28, 44, 48, 65, 67, 112, 119, 142, 180, 227, 232, 234, 289, 295, 307, 308, 309, 322, 332, 339, 432, 433, 466, 468, 483, 484, 488, 494, 495, 505, 508Geneen, Harold S., 256Gerli, Edmundo, 80Gestido, Gen. Oscar, 461, 466, 467, 468Getzin, Edmund E., 284Gibson, Carlos, 514Glaessner, Philip J. W, 495Goldwater, Barry, 382Gomez, 254Gonzalez, Celio, 117Gonzalez Torres, Dionisio, 465Goodpaster, Gen. Andrew J., 188, 196Goodwin, Richard M., 17, 245Gordon, A. Lincoln, 18, 32, 34, 43,
47, 50, 87, 88, 127, 132, 142, 159, 162,
219, 330, 431Appointment as Assistant Secretary of State, 37Argentina, 128, 129, 135, 136, 141, 143, 144Brazil, 217Castello selection as President, 209, 211, 212Economic situation, 215Institutional Acts restricting civil liberties, 209, 211,
220, 221, 222, 223Johnson meeting with Costa e Silva, 228Military dictatorship, 214, 221Political crisis of 1964, 182, 183,
185, 186, 187, 190, 191,
192, 194, 195, 197, 198,
201, 202, 203, 205, 206,
207, 211Political purges, 209, 214Presidential election of 1966, 214Trade relations with United States, 183U.S. economic/development assistance, 212, 215, 216, 220,
223, 224U.S. military/security assistance, 181U.S. policy to support moderation and discourage
extremism, 223Vietnam war, Brazilian troops for, 224, 225Chile, 289, 292, 293U.S. covert political action program, 291, 294Colombia, 318, 319, 320Economic program in Latin America, 41,
42, 44, 45, 52Frontier development in South America, 40Mexico, 357, 358Nicaragua, 91OAS charter amendments, 39OAS Summit meeting of 1967, 41, 44, 45, 51, 52Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 432,
433, 434,
435Peru, 475, 476, 483, 484, 498Venezuela, 540, 541Gordon, Allen D., 149Gordon, Kermit, 215Gore, Albert, 433Gorostiza, Jose, 21Goulart, Joao, 2, 181,
182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 190, 197, 201, 203, 204, 207, 208, 211, 221, 463Graham, Katharine M., 2Greenfield, James L., 193Gresham, 201, 203Gruening, Ernest, 10, 462Guatemala, 20, 24, 34, 89, 356Assassination of U.S. Ambassador, 114,
115, 116Assassinations of U.S. military personnel, 99, 100, 101, 102British Honduras dispute, 76, 77, 78, 103, 113Communist subversion, 28, 59, 61, 63, 70, 75, 86, 87, 99, 100, 115, 116, 120Counterinsurgency program, 100, 101, 102, 109Coup threat, 84, 85, 86, 98Presidential election of 1966, 84, 86, 87, 88Situation reports, 75, 86U.S. military/security assistance, 109Guerrero Gutierrez, Lorenzo, 93, 94Guevara Arce, Walter, 174, 175Guevara de la Serna, Ernesto “Che,” 59, 63, 163, 164, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 178, 179Gutierrez-Olivos, Sergio, 260Haiti, 21, 22, 28, 42, 338, 462Halperin, Ernst, 259Hammer, Mike, 117, 118Hand, Lloyd N., 26Harriman, W. Averell, 121, 375Argentina, 122Bolivia, 152Brazil, 217, 224, 225Chile, 278, 285, 286, 287, 288Counterinsurgency program in Latin America, 28Dominican Republic, 30Honduras, 72Kennedy, visit to Latin America, 32OAS Rio Conference of 2965, 34Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 421Hartman, Arthur A., 65, 66, 302, 457,
495Hatcher, Andrew, 345Haya de la Torre, Raul Victor, 474, 487, 489, 510Hayden, Carl T., 16, 208, 348, 353, 447Hegarty, James, 447Helms, Richard M., 66, 69, 157, 161,
171, 172, 173, 188, 196, 298, 368, 376, 432, 433, 441, 445, 498, 519Henderson, Douglas, 22, 148, 151, 153, 154, 155,
158, 159, 162, 163, 166, 174, 175, 176, 178Hendon, Robert R., 312Hendrix, Harold V, 43Herbert, Ray, 273Hercelles, Oswaldo, 506Herr, Donald E, 300Herrera Lane, Felipe, 264Herron, Francis W., 542Herz, 230Hickenlooper, Bourke B., 21, 48, 49, 122,
141, 249, 409, 427, 429, 433, 472, 476, 479, 514, 520Hill, John Calvin, Jr., 314, 319, 533, 536, 543, 544Hilliker, Grant G., 149Holt, Pat, 144Honduras, 20, 28, 72Elections of 2964, 74Elections of 2968, 104, 105, 106, 108El Salvador, conflict with, 112Rusk meeting with Zuniga, 117U.S. anti-government involvement, alleged, 117, 118U.S. anti-Zuniga policy, 74, 106, 107, 108Hoover, J. Edgar, 365Hornig, Donald E, 67Hoyt, Henry A., 22, 122, 123, 459,
460, 463Hughes, Thomas L., 35, 66, 179, 252,
255, 270, 272, 290, 412, 446, 447Humphrey, Hubert H., 10, 67, 69, 409Costa Rica, 79, 80, 81Hurwitch, Robert A., 253, 255, 258Ibanez, 303Illia, Arturo Umberto, 33, 121, 124, 127, 130, 131,
133, 134Illia, Ricardo, 138Illueca, Jorge E., 16, 417, 421Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP). See underAlliance for Progress.Inter-American Cultural Conference, 67, 68Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 41, 45, 48, 67, 71, 75,
342, 478, 495Inter-American Peace Committee, 368, 371, 375, 377, 378,
379, 383, 384Interior Department, U.S., 348, 353, 354, 358, 526, 527, 530, 532International Development Association (IDA), 13International Monetary Fund (IMF), 175, 215, 224, 234, 253, 309, 311, 483, 488, 506Colombia, 311, 313, 314, 315, 317, 325International Petroleum Company (IPC). SeeOil expropriations and U.S. economic assistanceunderPeru.International Telegraph and Telephone Company (ITT), 256, 278, 470, 489Intriago Arrata, Jose Federico, 51Iribarren Borges, Ignacio, 20, 50, 55, 523,
524, 540, 541, 542, 544Iribarren Borges, Julio, 50, 539Irwin, John N., II, 426, 427, 428, 432, 433, 435Jackson, Andrew, 382Jagan, Cheddi B., 523, 524Jair, Gen. Warmin, 186, 201Jamaica, 34Jaramillo Giraldo, Jose, 320Javits, Jacob K., 142, 144Jenkins, Walter W, 17, 377Jessup, Peter, 158, 161, 166, 246, 257, 262,
267, 421Johnson, Gen. Harold K., 65, 500Johnson, Lyndon B., 75, 117, 132Alliance for Progress, 2, 10, 13, 18, 21, 37, 40, 67, 68, 119Central American visit, 111,
112Counterinsurgency program, 61,
63Economic program, 41, 42, 44,
45, 48, 49, 51, 62, 69, 71Fourth Anniversary celebration of, 30Funding for, 15Military program, 11Presidents meeting in 1965,
proposed, 26Press coverage, 2, 10, 12,
49Public relations efforts, 31,
43Rusk visit to Latin American visit, 33Vaughn appointment as U.S. Ambassador, 409, 410Argentina, 16, 125, 130, 133, 135, 139, 140, 141, 145Bolivia, 2, 157,
160, 161,
163, 164,
166, 167,
168, 171,
173, 177,
178, 179,
180Meetings with Barrientos, 162,
176U.S. recognition of Barrientos government, 152Brazil, 16, 217, 220Castello selection as President, 212Costa e Silva government, U.S.assessments of, 233Meeting with Costa e Silva, 228Military dictatorship, 244Political crisis of 1964, 187, 189,
193, 199, 202, 203, 204,
205, 206, 207, 208U.S. economic/development assistance, 208, 224, 227, 229,
232, 234U.S. military/security assistance, 230, 231Vietnam war, Brazilian troops for, 225British Guiana, 536Central American visit, 111, 112Chile, 252, 280Copper price problem, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 295Cuba, break in relations with, 265Dominican crisis, 278Dungan appointment as Ambassador, 271Frei conflicts within Christian Democratic Party, 296, 298,
299Invitation for Frei to visit United States, 290Meeting with Frei, 292Presidential election of 1964, 16, 253,
256, 257, 261, 267, 269U.S. economic/development assistance, 256, 278, 289, 295,
307, 308, 309Colombia: Congressional elections of 1966,
318Political/economic crisis, U.S.efforts to deal with, 312, 314, 315,
317, 321U.S. economic/development assistance, 317, 321, 322Communism in Latin America: Guerrilla problem in various countries, 59, 60, 61U.S. counterinsurgency program, 61, 63U.S.-Soviet discussions re, 60Costa Rica, 73, 110Cuba: Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 8, 9, 14, 16,
19, 21, 22Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 50, 53,
55, 57, 59, 60, 64Dominican Republic, 16, 30, 278Ecuador: Appointment of new U.S. Ambassador, 343, 344IDB loan, 342Meeting with Arosemena, 51Political crisis of 1966, 327, 328Rapprochement with United States, 343Recall of U.S. Ambassador, 337,
338U.S. economic/development assistance, 329, 332, 333, 334Guatemala, 84, 87, 88, 99Image in Latin America, 43Mann appointment as Assistant Secretary of State, 1, 10Mexico, 2, 356,
358Border restrictions, 359, 361Freeman appointment as U.S.Ambassador, 345Meetings with Diaz Ordaz, 352,
356, 360, 366Meeting with Lopez Mateos, 346Migrant workers in United States, 346, 352Presidential election of 1964, 16, 347Salinity problem of river water from United States, 346, 348,
350, 352, 353, 355Student disturbances of 1968, 365, 366Trade relations with United States, 352, 356, 357Nicaragua, 92, 96Organization of American States, 39Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 8, 9, 14, 16,
19, 21, 22Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 50, 53,
55, 57, 59, 60, 64Rio Conference of 1965, 34Summit meeting of 1967, 41, 42,
44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50,
51, 52Panama, 2, 384Anti-American demonstrations, 420, 422Communist subversion, 369, 371, 377,
382, 396Coup of 1968, 443, 448, 449, 450,
451, 452Coup threat in 1964, 377, 396Discussions with Russell, 369,
373, 382, 383, 391, 396,
401Economic situation, 441Flag issue, 373, 374Inter-American Peace Committee involvement in
Panamanian-U.S. conflict, 371Meetings with Chiari, 370, 410Meetings with Robles, 434, 435Mansfield views on U.S. policy, 385OAS action on Panamanian-U.S. conflict, 386, 393,
399, 401, 405Presidential election of 1964, 415Presidential election of 1968, 443, 445Rioting of 1964, 368, 369,
370, 377, 387Robles’ impeachment, 443, 444, 445U.S. economic/development assistance, 382, 431, 432, 433U.S. interdepartmental organization for Panamanian
affairs, 414U.S. military intervention, planning for, 381U.S. military/security assistance, 457, 458U.S.-Panamanian relations, breaking and resumption of,
383, 396, 400, 403, 404,
405, 406, 407, 410U.S. policy toward Arias following coup, 456U.S. program to improve relations with Panama, 417, 419,
420, 421U.S. recognition of military junta, 451, 452, 455Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 16Agreement on treaty terms, 439Anderson appointment as U.S.representative, 408, 409, 410Congressional involvement, 409,
425, 427, 428, 429Delays in signing of treaties, 440, 441, 442Discussions with Robles re, 434,
435Joint management issue, 426,
427Mexican position, 346New treaty for existing canal, 421Process of reaching agreement to initiate negotiations,
370, 371, 373, 374, 375,
377, 378, 379, 382, 383,
388, 389, 390, 391, 392,
393, 396, 397, 399, 400,
401, 403, 404, 405, 406,
407, 410Public statement on U.S. policy re negotiations, 401Renegotiation of agreed terms, 441, 442Sea-level canal issue, 378, 419, 420Status reports on, 428, 433, 437,
438U.S. contingency planning for failure of negotiations,
432, 433U.S. policy development for, 421, 423, 425, 431Paraguay, 469Peru, 470Attitude toward Belaunde, 499Communications with Belaunde, 475, 477Coup of 1968, 497, 499, 507, 509,
510, 511, 515Military aircraft purchases and U.S. economic assistance,
488, 489, 490, 492, 494,
495, 497, 498, 499, 500Oil expropriations and U.S. economic assistance, 16, 475,
476, 477, 478, 479, 480,
481, 483, 484, 486, 487,
488, 489, 500, 504, 515U.S. economic/development assistance, 508U.S. recognition of military junta, 509, 511, 515, 518,
519, 520Sayre appointment to NSC staff, 17Uruguay, 16, 459, 466, 468Vaughn appointment as Assistant Secretary of State, 27Venezuela: British Guiana border dispute, 536Communications with Leoni, 525,
543Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 8, 9, 14, 16,
19, 21, 22Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 50, 53,
55, 57, 59, 60, 64Meeting with Barrios, 535, 536Meeting with Leoni, 50, 540, 541Oil exports to United States, 525, 526, 527, 530,
532, 534, 536, 540, 543Presidential election of 1968, 548U.S. military/security assistance, 61, 541Johnson, U. Alexis, 3, 4,
5, 188, 193, 196, 201, 202, 203, 205, 207, 222, 250, 257Johnson, W. Thomas, 42, 69, 490, 519Johnston, James D., 285, 472Johnston, James R., 91Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 25, 29, 65, 192, 196, 198, 206, 381,
471Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 394,
420, 421,
437Jones, J. Wesley, 33, 311, 478Peru: Constitutional government, proposed return to, 516Coup of 1968, 499, 501, 507, 510,
516, 521Military aircraft purchases and U.S. economic assistance,
485, 491, 493, 495, 496,
499, 500, 501, 502Oil expropriations and U.S. economic assistance, 470, 472,
474, 475, 477, 479, 480,
486, 491, 501, 514, 516,
517U.S. economic/development assistance, 505, 508U.S. recognition of military junta, 512, 513, 514, 516,
517Jones, James R., 59, 63,
234, 332, 359, 484Jorden, William J., 399Jova, Joseph John, 74, 104, 107, 108, 117, 118,
251, 252, 254, 255, 260, 263, 272, 276Jurema, Abelardo, 205Kampelman, Max, 79Karamessines, Thomas H., 171, 172, 304Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 65, 66, 67, 71,
103, 105, 109, 110, 144, 300, 302, 339, 364, 469, 494, 500, 502, 508, 512, 544Kaunda, Kenneth, 285Kemper, James S., 338Kendall, Brig. Gen. M.W, 449Kennecott Company, 278, 282, 285, 288Kennedy, Jacqueline, 183Kennedy, John R, 3, 73,
208, 346, 369, 370, 372, 376, 465, 528Kennedy, Robert R, 37, 94, 162, 208,
469, 479, 480Latin American visit, 31, 32, 33U.S. counterinsurgency program in Latin America, 3Kent, Sherman, 441Khrushchev, Nikita S., 16Kilday Lowell C, 341Killoran, Thomas R, 98, 113, 117King, Col. J. C, 148, 187, 188, 191, 202, 203,
206, 245, 248, 252, 255, 256, 257, 377King, Thelma, 376Kitchen, Jeffrey C, 196Klein, Dave, 17Klutznick, Philip, 433Knoche, Enno Henry, 245Knowlton, Winthrop, 48Kohler, Foy D., 56, 58,
174, 294, 324Komer, Robert W., 28, 87, 88, 318, 477, 479, 480Koren, Henry L.T., 35Korp, Ralph, 215Korry, Edward M., 296, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302,
303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 309Kosygin, Alexei N., 60Krebs, Max V., 114, 116Krieg, William L., 128, 134, 141, 142Krieger, Daniel, 240Kruel, Gen. Amaury, 186, 192, 201, 203, 211, 214Kubisch, Jack B., 185, 191, 214, 215, 222, 223,
237, 239, 241Kubitschek, Juscelino, 16, 182, 184, 185, 187, 197,
201, 211, 214, 215, 219, 220, 221Kurzman, Dan, 2, 480Labor organizations, 24Lacerda, Carlos, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 200,
201, 209, 214, 215, 219, 220, 221, 223, 233Lagarrigue, Javier, 283, 286, 287Lang, William E., 65, 109, 142, 166, 302, 457,
495Larrea, Gustavo, 343, 344Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), 62Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO), 63, 296Laugerud Garcia, Col. Kjell, 101Lausche, Frank, 433Lavendero, Jorge, 297Leber, Maj. Gen. Walter P., 449, 452Leandro Mora, Reinaldo, 538, 544, 547Lechin Oquendo, Juan, 147, 148, 149, 154, 158Leddy, John M., 76, 78Leitao da Cunha, Vasco, 34, 217, 228, 229, 231Leonhardy Terrence G., 76Leoni Otero, Raul, 20, 32, 296, 310,
314Venezuela, 531, 536Communist subversion, 522, 525, 538,
539, 545, 547Cuban fishing vessel, seizure of, 545, 546, 547Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 50, 55,
59, 64Johnson communications with Leoni, 525, 543Johnson meeting with Barrios, 535Johnson meeting with Leoni, 50,
540, 541Oil exports to United States, 525, 526, 528, 530,
537, 540, 543Oliver, visit to, 68Political situation, 522, 530Rusk meeting with Leoni, 33, 528University crisis of 2967, 538U.S. military/security assistance, 61, 525, 539, 541,
547Lewis, Samuel W, 308, 448, 451, 452, 453, 454,
455, 456, 457, 509, 511, 520Lilienthal, David, 40Lima, Francisco R., 13Linder, Harold E, 79, 126, 215, 275Linowitz, Sol M., 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 56, 58, 292,
434, 483, 543Little, Edward S., 200Lizano, Eduardo, 73Lleras, Alberto, 314Lleras Restropo, Carlos, 108, 310, 314Colombia: Communist subversion, 59, 61, 316,
323Oliver, visit to, 68Presidential election 2966, 318,
320U.S. covert political action program, 319U.S. economic/development assistance, 322, 325Lodge, Henry Cabot, 498Lombardo Toledano, Vicente, 16Long, Clarence D., 66, 495Lopes, Lucas, 214Lopez Arellano, Gen. Oswaldo, 72, 74, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 111, 118Lopez Mateos, Alfonso, 10, 346, 350, 356Lord, Peter P., 320Lorscheider, Aluisio, 240Lott, Henrique Batista Duffles Teixeira, 221Lowenfeld, Andreas E, 122, 132Lowry, W McNeil, 221Lubke, Heinrich, 502Luevano, Daniel M., 345Luisi, Hector, 467Lunn, Harry H., Jr., 274Lyon, S. C, 228Macedo Soares e Silva, Edmundo, 228Machado, Gen. Bina, 240MacKenna, Lucho, 303Macomber, William B., Jr., 49Maechling, Charles, Jr., 28Magalhaes Kelly, Juracy, 214, 219, 220, 221Magalhaes Pinto, Jose de, 182, 187, 192, 197, 230, 233, 238Magnet, Alejandro, 292Mahon, George H., 543Mailliard, William S., 21, 48, 520Manatos, Mike N., 49, 508Mann, Thomas C, 21, 47,
49, 67, 75, 126, 214Alliance for Progress, 2, 10, 13, 15, 18, 26, 37Mexico, 2, 345, 352Appointment as Assistant Secretary of State, 1, 10Press coverage, 2, 10, 12Public relations efforts, 31Argentina, 16, 121, 122, 123Bolivia, 2, 157Coup of 1964, 151U.S. covert political action program, 148, 153U.S. recognition of Barrientos government, 152Brazil, 2, 16,
185, 215Political crisis of 1964, 181, 182,
187, 191, 193, 196, 197,
199, 200U.S. economic/development assistance, 216British Guiana, 524Chile, 275“Camelot” military research project, 280Congressional elections of 1965,
273Copper price problem, 284, 285, 286,
287, 288Dominican crisis, 278, 281Dungan appointment as Ambassador, 271Frei government, U.S. policy toward, 266, 272Presidential election of 1964, 16, 245,
247, 248, 250, 252, 253,
254, 255, 257, 260, 261,
268U.S. covert political action program, 245, 247, 248, 250,
252, 253, 254, 255, 257,
273U.S. economic/development assistance, 274, 275, 276, 278,
281Colombia, 313Political/economic crisis, U.S. efforts to deal with, 310, 311,
312, 314, 317U.S. covert political action program, 319Costa Rica, 16, 73Cuba, 3, 7, 8, 9, 16, 20Dominican Republic, 16, 278, 281Haiti, 462Honduras, 72, 74Presidential election of 1964, 16, 347,
349Salinity problem of river water from United States, 348, 350,
353Trade relations with United States, 357OAS resolution on Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, 3, 7, 8,
9, 16, 20Panama, 2, 384Anti-American demonstrations, 422Chiari, downfall of, U.S. planning for, 386, 388Communist subversion, 372, 375, 377,
395Coup threat in 1964, 377Flag issue, 372, 374, 375Inter-American Peace Committee involvement in
Panamanian-U.S. conflict, 375, 378OAS action on Panamanian-U.S. conflict, 386, 388,
392Rio Hato base evacuation by United States, 376Rioting of 1964, 368, 369,
370, 372, 375, 377, 395U.S. military intervention, planning for, 381U.S.-Panamanian relations, breaking and resumption of,
372, 375, 376, 383, 395,
403, 406U.S. policy toward Arias following coup, 453U.S. program to improve relations with Panama, 419, 422Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 16Anderson appointment as U.S. representative, 408Chiari miscalculations in dealing with United States, 386, 395Congressional involvement, 429Johnson public statement on U.S.policy re negotiations, 401Process of reaching agreement to initiate negotiations,
372, 373, 374, 375, 376,
377, 378, 380, 383, 391,
392, 395, 396, 397, 399,
401, 403, 404, 406Sea-level canal issue, 377, 378, 419,
421, 424U.S. policy development for, 421, 425Peru, 16, 470,
472, 475,
478, 479,
486Sayre appointment to NSC staff, 17Uruguay, 16Coup threat, 459, 463Political reform, U.S. encouragement of, 460, 461,
463Vaughn appointment as Assistant Secretary of State, 27Venezuela: British Guiana border dispute, 524Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 3, 7, 8, 9, 16, 20Johnson meeting with Barrios, 535, 536Oil exports to United States, 526, 527, 529, 532,
534Manning, Robert J., 2Mansfield, Mike, 42, 48,
49, 371, 383, 385, 409, 429Mantilla, Manuel, 547Mantilla Ortega, Carlos, 333, 334, 338, 341Manzoli, Mary K., 312Marambio, Gen. Tulio, 305Marcy, Carl, 144Margain, Hugo B., 357Margolies, Daniel R, 20, 524, 526Marinho, Gilberto, 240Mariz, Dinarte, 240Marks, Leonard H., 43, 69Martin, Edwin M., 1, 65,
122, 123, 126, 127, 128, 129, 132, 143, 144, 148, 245, 252, 302, 368, 375, 377, 378, 379, 380, 388Martinez, Maj. Boris, 448, 449Martinez Paz, Enrique, 141Matthews, Herbert L., 2Mattox, Henry E., 149Mayobre, Jose Antonio, 540, 542Mazzilli, Pascoal, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209McCarthy, Eugene, 39, 280McCausland, Nicholas V, 149, 471McClellan, Andrew, 117McCloy John J., 183, 210McCone, John A., 1, 3,
23, 187, 191, 196, 197, 202, 206, 208, 210Chilean Presidential election of 1964, 245, 252, 256, 257, 267, 269Counterinsurgency program in Latin America, 28Panama, 368, 374, 377, 387, 407, 409, 421, 423Vaughn appointment as Assistant Secretary of State, 27McCormack, Richard L., 103McDougal, Myres S., 7McGee, Gale, 433McGiffert, 302McNamara, Robert S., 11, 69, 96, 121,
157, 171, 172, 187, 191, 193, 196, 197, 357Argentina, 125Brazil, 199, 202, 206, 230Chile, 280, 284, 286, 287, 288Military program in Latin America, 25,
29Panama, 367, 368, 371, 373, 374, 377, 378, 381, 394, 396, 414U.S. program to improve relations with Panama, 417, 419Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 421,
423, 437Peru, 485, 488, 490, 494McNaughton, John T., 29, 187, 191, 196, 203McPherson, Harry C, Jr., 369, 469Meehan, Francis, 492Meeker, Leonard C, 76, 78, 103, 113,
121, 420, 421, 546Mein, John Gordon, 84, 85, 86, 88,
98, 99, 100, 102, 109, 113, 114, 115, 184, 201, 203Mejia, Gabriel, 118Melgar, Maj. Juan, 72Melo, Gen. Francisco de Assis Correia de, 203,
211Mendez Montenegro, Julio, 61, 75, 87, 88,
89, 98, 99, 109, 111, 113, 115, 120Meneghetti, lido, 182, 187, 205Mercado Jarrin, Gen. Edgardo, 514, 516, 517, 521Mexico, 2, 502Alliance for Progress, 346Border restrictions, 361British Honduras dispute, 76, 78Chamizal land transfer, 346, 358, 360Common market for Latin America, 62Communism concerns, 346, 365Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 64Cultural exchanges with United States, 356, 358Economic situation, 356, 366Freeman appointment as U.S.Ambassador, 345Guatemalan Communist problem and, 100Gulf of California nuclear desalinization plant, 358Johnson meetings with Diaz Ordaz, 352,
356, 360,
366Johnson meeting with Lopez Mateos, 346Living standards in border communities, 358Migrant workers in United States, 346,
352Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 346Presidential election of 1964, 16, 347, 349Salinity problem of river water from United States, 346, 348, 350, 352, 353, 354, 355, 358Student disturbances of 1968, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366Trade relations with United States, 352,
356, 357,
358Meyer, Cord, 248Michelini, Zelmar, 461Midence, Ricardo, 117, 118Mills, Hawthorne Q., 156, 346Minotto, James, 201, 447Miranda, Col., 209Molina Silva, Sergio, 270, 274, 275, 276Moniz de Aragao, Augusto Cesar, 192Monroe, Lt. Comdr. Ernest, 99Montagne Sanchez, Gen. Ernesto, 516, 521Montiel, Gen., 90Moody, C. G., Jr., 28Moraes Rego, Maj., 192Morales, 90Morales, Morgan, 372, 375Mora Otera, Jose A., 21Morean Soto, Gen. Roberto, 538Moreira Alves, Marcio, 236, 238Moreno, Miguel J., Jr., 383, 384, 395, 398, 402, 404,
405, 407Moreno Sanchez, Manuel, 348Morgan, Thomas E., 31Morris, Patrick E, 159, 162, 300, 301, 305Morse, Wayne L., 10, 21,
31, 37, 39, 49, 141, 144, 208, 407, 409,
462, 508Moscoso, Teodoro, 1, 12,
13, 470, 478Mota, Silvio, 191Moura, Lt. Col. Arthur S.,, 375Moura Andrade, Auro de, 204, 205Mourao Filho, Gen., 195Moyers, Bill D., 133, 140, 202, 268, 318, 321,
327, 328, 357, 358, 368, 377, 403, 433Murphy, Charles S., 16, 123National Intelligence Estimates (see
alsoSpecial National Intelligence Estimates), 218, 316, 522, 531NIE 80/90–64, 24NIE 80/90–66, 38NIE 80/90–68, 70NIE 82–66, 89NIE 91–65, 124NIE 91–67, 146NIE 92–67, 169NIE 93–66, 226NIE 93–68, 235NIE 94–63, 246National Security Action Memoranda: No. 296, 414No. 297, 11No. 323, 423No. 371, 119National Security Council (NSC) meetings 9, 23, 69, 206, 208, 407, 409Negrao de Lima, Francisco, 221, 223Neiva Moreira, 209Newberg, Dick, 215New York Times, 2, 10, 12, 49, 156, 188,
221, 387, 479, 494, 512Nicaragua: Communist subversion, 63Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 20Hotel siege, 92, 93, 94, 96Johnson meeting with Somoza, 96“Political Prospects in Nicaragua” report, 97Presidential election of 2967, 90, 91, 92, 95Sea-level canal issue, 377, 421, 423, 424, 428U.S. policy toward Somoza administration, 95, 96Nitze, Paul H., 65, 69,
494, 498, 500Nivens, Lois, 519Nixon, Richard M., 49Noland, 193Obregon, Roberto, 100O’Brien, Lawrence R, 2, 13, 427Oduber Quiros, Daniel, 73, 79, 80, 81Oechsli, L. Paul, 333O’Leary, Jerry, 101, 500Oliver, Covey T., 18, 31, 37, 56, 64, 69, 166, 168Alliance for Progress, 67Central American Export Development Program, 119Counterinsurgency program, 61,
63Economic program, 62, 69Military program, 65Appointment as Assistant Secretary of State, 43Bolivia, 68, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176Brazil, 229, 231, 232, 239Costa e Silva government, U.S. assessments of, 233U.S. economic/development assistance, 234British Honduras, 103, 113Chile, 295, 302, 306, 307, 309Communists’ alliance with Christian Democrats, 300Coup threat, 305Colombia, 324Political/economic crisis, U.S. efforts to deal with, 310, 313,
314, 317U.S. covert political action program, 319Visit to, 68Ecuador, 335Appointment of new U.S. Ambassador, 341, 344Rapprochement with United States, 343, 344Recall of U.S. Ambassador, 338,
339U.S. economic/development assistance, 333, 334, 339Guatemala, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 109Honduras, 104, 108, 117, 118Latin American visit, 68, 69Mexico, 362, 363, 364Panama, 444, 448, 450, 451, 452, 456, 457Peru, 503Coup of 2968, 497, 506, 507,
511Military aircraft purchases and U.S. economic assistance,
485, 493, 494, 495, 497,
498, 499, 500, 502Oil expropriations and U.S. economic assistance, 484, 486,
487, 488, 502, 506, 516,
517U.S. recognition of military junta, 512, 513Visit to, 68, 69Uruguay, 466, 467Venezuela, 68, 543, 544, 546O’Meara, Gen. Andrew P., 187, 191, 193, 196, 199, 202, 367, 369, 372, 375, 377, 382, 396Ongania, Lt. Gen. Juan Carlos, 127, 128, 129, 131, 134, 141, 143, 145, 146, 465Ordonez Monteagudo, Carlos Francisco, 115Organization of American States (OAS), 160Charter amendments, 34, 39, 46Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64Dominican crisis, 217, 278Panamanian coup of 1968, 451, 452Panamanian Presidential election of 1968,
443Panamanian-U.S. conflict, action on (see
alsoInter-American Peace Committee), 384, 386, 388, 390, 392, 393, 399, 401, 405, 406Rio Conference of 1965, 32, 34Summit meeting of 1967, 41,
42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52Organization of Central American States (ODECA), 111Orlich Bolmarchich, Francisco, 73, 392Ortega, Salvador, 114Orwat, Gen., 65, 109,
302Osorio, Gen. Oromar, 201Ovando Candia, Gen. Alfredo, 151, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 166Pacheco Areco, Jorge, 468Pagliai, Bruno, 365Palmer, Gen. Bruce, 465Palmer, Donald K., 62, 313, 495Palza, Galo, 327, 340Panama (see alsoPanama Canal treaty negotiations), 2, 18Anti-American demonstrations (see alsoRioting of 1964 below), 420, 421, 422Canal, strategic importance of for U.S., 394Chiari, downfall of, U.S. planning for, 386, 388Communist subversion, 368, 369, 371, 372, 375, 376, 377, 382, 395, 396, 398, 421, 430Coup of 1968, 443, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 454Coup threat in 1964, 377, 396, 398Coup threat in 1966, 430Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 20Economic situation, 441Flag issue, 367, 372, 373, 374, 375, 417Inter-American Peace Committee involvement in Panamanian-U.S.
conflict, 368, 371, 375, 377, 378, 379, 383, 384Johnson discussions with Chiari, 370,
410Johnson discussions with Russell, 369,
373, 382,
383, 391,
396, 401Johnson meeting with Robles, 434, 435Mansfield views on U.S. policy, 385OAS action on Panamanian-U.S. conflict, 384, 386, 388, 390, 392, 393, 399, 401, 405, 406Presidential election of 1964, 398, 415, 416Presidential election of 1968, 436, 442, 443, 445, 446, 447Rio Hato base evacuation by United States, 376Rioting of 1964, 367, 368, 369, 370, 372, 375, 377, 387, 395Robles government, U.S. relations with, 416, 418Robles, impeachment of, 443, 444, 445U.S. economic/development assistance, 382, 431, 432, 433U.S. interdepartmental organization for Panamanian affairs, 414U.S. military intervention, planning for, 381U.S. military/security assistance, 457,
458U.S.-Panamanian relations, breaking and resumption of, 371, 372, 375, 376, 379, 383, 395, 396, 399, 400, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 410U.S. policy toward Arias following coup, 453, 456U.S. program to improve relations with Panama, 417, 419, 420, 421, 422U.S. recognition of military junta, 451,
452, 454,
455Vaughn appointment as U.S. Ambassador, 409, 410Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 16Agreement on treaty terms, 439Anderson appointment as U.S. representative, 408, 409, 410Base rights issue, 420, 423, 428, 439Chiari miscalculations in dealing with United States, 386, 395Congressional involvement, 409, 425, 427, 428, 429, 433Delays in signing of treaties, 440, 441, 442JCS position, 394Johnson discussions with Robles re, 434,
435Johnson public statement on U.S. policy re negotiations, 401Joint management issue, 426, 427, 428Mexican position, 346New treaty for existing canal, 420, 421, 423, 428, 437, 439Panamanian issues of concern, 384Process of reaching agreement to initiate negotiations, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 384, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 395, 396, 397, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 410Renegotiation of agreed terms, 441, 442, 454Sea-level canal issue, 377, 378, 394, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 423, 424, 428, 437, 439Status reports on, 421, 428, 433, 437, 438U.S. contingency planning for failure of negotiations, 432, 433U.S. policy development for, 421, 423, 425, 431Vaughn views on, 418Panama Review Committee, 414Panama Review Group, 414, 415, 435Pan American Sulphur Company, 345, 356, 534Paraguay, 20, 28, 62U.S. economic and military assistance, 462, 465, 469Parker, Col. David, 367Parkinson, Charles Jay, 284Passarinho, Jarbas, 221Passman, Otto E., 15Pastor de la Torre, Celso, 470, 472, 478Paz Estenssoro, Victor, 2, 10, 22, 147,
148, 149, 150, 151, 465Peace Committee. SeeInter-American Peace Committee.Peace Corps, 37, 328Penna Marinho, Ilmar, 217Peralta Azurdia, Col. Enrique, 75, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88Peredo, Roberto, 59Pereira dos Santos, Maj. Gen. Adalberto, 192Perez Alfonso, Juan Pablo, 528Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 514, 516, 517Perez de la Cova, Carlos, 533Perez Guerrero, Manuel, 525, 527, 528, 529, 533, 535,
536Perez Jimenez, Gen. Marcos, 522Perez Zujovic, Edmundo, 303Peru, 32, 162Chile, relations with, 502Common market for Latin America, 62Communist subversion, 28, 59, 61, 471Constitutional government, proposed return to, 516Copper exports, 288Coup of 1968, 497, 499, 501, 506, 507, 509, 510, 511, 515, 516, 521Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 20, 22Elections of 1967, 500, 501Johnson attitude toward Belaunde, 499Johnson communications with Belaunde, 475, 477Kennedy visit to, 33Land reform, 473Military aircraft purchases and U.S. economic
assistance, 485, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502Oil expropriations and U.S. economic assistance, 16, 33, 470, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 483, 484, 486, 487, 488, 489, 491, 500, 501, 502, 504, 506, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517Oliver visit to, 68, 69Political crisis of 1967, 493Special Police Emergency Unit, 471Tuna conflict with United States, 483U.S. economic/development assistance (see
alsoMilitary aircraft purchases and U.S. economic
assistanceabove;Oil expropriations and U.S. economic
assistanceabove), 505, 508U.S. military/security assistance (see alsoMilitary aircraft purchases and U.S. economic
assistanceabove), 65, 66, 471U.S. recognition of military junta, 509,
511, 512,
513, 514,
515, 516,
517, 518,
519, 520Petersen, Lawrence L., 546Phelps Dodge company, 282Phillips, Richard I., 10Phillips, Robert M., 334, 340Pico Mantilla, Galo, 51Pinera, Jose, 274, 275Pinheiro, Israel, 221, 223Pinilla Fabrega, Col. Jose, 448Pistarini, Gen. Pascual Angel, 127, 128, 131, 134Plaza, Galo, 451Poats, Rutherford M., 109, 500Ponciano, Col. Miguel Angel, 84, 85, 87, 101Poole, Richard A., 512Porras, Hernan, 435Portela de Melo, Jaime, 237, 240Porter, Gen. Robert W., Jr., 65, 101, 443, 452, 496Prado, Julio, 340, 343Prat, Jorge, 250Prestes, Luis Carlos, 183, 214, 221Pringle, Sandy M., 142Proper, Datus C, 237Pryce, William T., 255, 272Puerto Rico, 530, 532,
540Pugliese, Juan C, 123, 127, 129Punta del Este Conference. SeeSummit meeting of 1967 under
Organization of American States.Purcell, Graham, 520Quesada Zapiola, Carlos A., 143Quintanilla, 502Quintero, Col. Abel, 456Quiros Sasso, Mario, 73Rabanal, Ruben, 138Rademaker Griinewald, Augusto Hamann, 211Ramirez, Roberto, 108Randolph, Virgil B., 524Ray, Manolo, 73Raymont, Henry, 2Read, Benjamin H., 26, 149, 155, 156, 157, 314,
355, 457, 481, 487, 519Reed, Lear, 455Reedy, George E., 21, 193, 202, 345, 409Reid Cabral, Donald, 21Reis, Herbert K., 76Reis, Gen. Newton, 240Resor, Stanley R., 432, 437Reston, James B., 49Reuss, Henry S., 48Reuther, Walter, 81Reynaga Gordillo, Aniceto, 172Reynaldo, Gen., 240Rhodesia, 284, 285,
288Richardson, Ralph W, 248Richardson, Richard, 175Rielly, John, 79Rimestad, Idar, 339Ritchie, Edgar, 543Rivas, 94Rivers, Mendel, 429Roberts, Juanita, 475Robinson, John P., 254, 274, 276Robles Mendez, Marco: Panama: Anti-American demonstrations, 422Coup threat in 1964, 377Coup threat in 1966, 430Johnson meeting with Robles, 434, 435Presidential election of 1964, 398, 415,
416Presidential election of 1968, 443, 445Robles government, U.S. relations with, 416, 418Robles, impeachment of, 443,
444, 445U.S. economic/development assistance, 433Panama Canal treaty negotiations: Agreement on treaty terms, 439Delays in signing of treaties, 440, 441, 442Johnson discussions with Robles re, 434, 435Sea-level canal issue, 418, 424Rockefeller, David, 49, 253, 257Rodriguez Adame, 356Rogers, William D., 18, 215, 266, 274Rogers, William P., 309Rojas Pinilla, Gen. Gustavo, 319, 320Romero Loza, Jose, 175Roosevelt, Franklin D., 384Rostow, Walt W, 15, 39,
50, 68, 69, 112, 119, 132, 145, 165, 292Alliance for Progress, 13, 40, 61, 63, 67Economic program, 41, 42, 44,
45, 48, 62, 71Military program, 25, 65, 67Public relations efforts, 31Argentina, 130, 133, 135, 139, 140Bolivia, 160, 161, 166, 175, 176, 179, 180Guevara, capture and execution of, 163, 164, 167, 168,
171, 172, 173Brazil: Costa e Silva government, U.S.assessments of, 229, 233U.S. economic/development assistance, 216, 227, 229, 232,
234, 244U.S. military/security assistance, 230, 231Chile: Copper price problem, 289, 295Frei conflicts within Christian Democratic Party, 296, 297,
298, 299U.S. economic/development assistance, 289, 295, 307, 308,
309Colombia, 321, 322, 325Communism in Latin America, 59, 61Costa Rica, 110Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 64Ecuador, 335, 342, 343Recall of U.S. Ambassador, 337,
338U.S. economic/development assistance, 329, 332, 333Mexico, 356, 358, 359Border restrictions, 361Student disturbances of 1968, 365Trade relations with United States, 357Nicaragua, 92Organization of American States: Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 53, 54,
55, 56, 57, 59, 64Rio Conference of 1965, 34Summit meeting of 1967, 41, 42,
44, 45, 47, 48Panama, 435Coup of 1968, 443, 448, 449, 450,
451, 452, 454Economic situation, 441Presidential election of 1968, 442, 443,
445Robles impeachment of, 443, 444, 445U.S. economic/development assistance, 432, 433U.S. military/security assistance, 457, 458U.S. policy toward Arias following coup, 456U.S. recognition of military junta, 451, 452, 455Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 435Congressional involvement, 433Delays in signing of treaties, 440, 441, 442Renegotiation of agreed terms, 441, 442Status reports on, 433, 437, 438U.S. contingency planning for failure of negotiations,
432, 433Paraguay, 469Peru, 473Coup of 1968, 497, 507, 509, 510,
511Elections of 1967, 500Military aircraft purchases and U.S. economic assistance,
488, 489, 490, 492, 494,
497, 498, 499, 500Oil expropriations and U.S. economic assistance, 475, 476,
477, 480, 481, 483, 484,
486, 487, 488, 489, 500,
504U.S. economic/development assistance, 508U.S. recognition of military junta, 509, 511, 515, 518,
519, 520Uruguay, 466, 468Venezuela, 61, 540, 541, 543, 548Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 53, 54,
55, 56, 57, 59, 64Rowan, Carl T., 28Rowell, Edward M., 72Rowen, Henry, 433Ruda, Jose Maria, 123Ruiz Novoa, Maj. Gen. Alberto, 310, 314, 319Ruser, Claus W, 109Rusk, Dean, 27, 32, 69, 73, 75, 84, 86,
96, 112, 119, 252, 357Alliance for Progress, 30Economic program, 41, 45, 46,
48, 52Johnson meeting with Latin American Foreign Ministers,
21Military program, 11, 25Press coverage of, 52Visit to Latin American, 33Argentina, 121, 126, 130, 134, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145Visit to, 33U.S. trade relations with, 123Bolivia, 168, 171, 172, 179Coup of 1964, 151Meeting with Barrientos, 162U.S. recognition of Barrientos government, 152Brazil, 217Coffee agreement with United States, 208Costa e Silva government, U.S. assessments of, 233Economic situation, 224Institutional Acts restricting civil liberties, 222, 223,
241Meeting with Castello, 223Military dictatorship, 237, 239, 241Political crisis of 1964, 187, 191,
193, 194, 196, 197, 198,
199, 200, 201, 202, 203,
206, 207, 208Political crisis of 1965, 219U.S. economic/development assistance, 224, 244British Guiana, 523, 544British Honduras, 77, 78, 103Chile: Agrarian reform, 292 “Camelot”
military research project, 280Communists’ alliance with Christian Democrats, 301Coup threat, 305Dungan appointment as Ambassador, 271Frei government, 270, 272, 290,
305Johnson meeting with Frei, 292Presidential election of 1964, 20, 252,
253, 268U.S. economic/development assistance, 275, 309Colombia, 318Political/economic crisis, U.S. efforts to deal with, 313, 314Presidential election of 1966, 320Costa Rica, 79Cuba: Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 3, 5, 8, 9, 14, 20,
22, 23Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 54, 56,
58, 64U.S. military action in response to Cuban aggression,
issue of, 8, 9, 14Venezuelan seizure of Cuban fishing vessel, 546Ecuador: Appointment of new U.S. Ambassador, 341Arosemena criticism of Alliance for Progress, 330Recall of U.S. Ambassador, 337,
338U.S. economic/development assistance, 334Guatemala, 77, 78, 99, 103, 115, 116Honduras, 117Mexico, 349, 358, 360Salinity problem of river water from United States, 348, 354Student disturbances of 1968, 362, 363,
366Organization of American States: Charter amendments, 39Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 3, 5, 8, 9, 14, 20,
22, 23Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 54, 56,
58, 64Rio Conference of 1965, 34Summit meeting of 1967, 41, 44,
45, 46, 48, 52Panama, 374, 375, 444, 446, 447Chiari, downfall of, U.S. planning for, 386, 388Coup of 1968, 450Coup threat in 1964, 377Inter-American Peace Committee involvement in
Panamanian-U.S. conflict, 371,
377Johnson meeting with Robles, 435OAS action on Panamanian-U.S. conflict, 384, 386,
388, 393Rioting of 1964, 368U.S. economic/development assistance, 431U.S. interdepartmental organization for Panamanian
affairs, 414U.S. military/security assistance, 458U.S.-Panamanian relations, breaking and resumption of,
371, 403, 406, 407U.S. policy toward Arias following coup, 456U.S. recognition of military junta, 452Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 420,
423, 432Agreement on treaty terms, 439Chiari miscalculations in dealing with United States, 386Congressional involvement, 409Delays in signing of treaties, 440Johnson public statement on U.S. policy renegotiations,
401Joint management issue, 426,
427Pre-negotiations agreement, 371,
372, 375, 377, 379, 380,
392, 393, 396, 399, 401,
403, 406, 407Status reports on, 437U.S. policy development for, 431Paraguay, 465Peru: Coup of 1968, 497, 506, 511, 515Military aircraft purchases and U.S. economic assistance,
485, 490, 492, 494, 495,
498Oil expropriations and U.S. economic assistance, 473, 487,
506, 513, 515U.S. military/security assistance, 471U.S. recognition of military junta, 512, 513, 515, 518,
519, 520Uruguay: Coup threat, 459, 463Economic and political situation, 467Political reform, U.S. encouragement of, 463Visit to, 33Venezuela: British Guiana, possible intervention in, 523British Guiana border dispute, 544Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 3, 5, 8, 9, 14, 20,
22, 23Cuban fishing vessel, seizure of, 546Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 54, 56,
58, 64Meeting with Leoni, 33, 528Oil exports to United States, 528, 529Russell, Richard B., 369, 373, 382, 383, 391, 396,
401, 429Saccio, Leonard J., 131, 132, 136, 137, 138Saez, Raul, 286, 287,
288, 292, 299, 303Salans, Carl E, 76, 103, 142Salimei, Jorge, 143Salinger, Pierre, 2, 368, 400Saltonstall, Leverett, 409Samudio Avila, David, 375, 443, 445, 446, 447Sanchez, Camilo, 116Sanchez de Lozada, Enrique, 151Sanchez Gavito, Vicente, 2, 16, 21, 387,
388, 392, 399Sanders, Irving L., 467Sanders, Terry B., Jr., 448Sandlin, Marlin E., 16, 345, 534Sandoval, 104, 106Sanjines-Goytia, Julio, 162, 165Sanz de Santamaria, Carlos, 2, 13, 311, 314,
330Sapena Pastor, Raul, 462, 465Sarmento, Gen. Siseno, 192, 205, 237, 240Saunders, Patricia A., 284Sause, Oliver L., Jr., 76Sayre, Robert M., 11, 18, 21, 22, 25, 26, 30, 32, 48,
52, 56, 58, 65, 67, 69, 75,
76, 78, 91, 99, 102, 105, 106, 107, 126,
132, 134, 141, 142, 144, 152, 155, 158, 165, 166, 214, 216, 222, 263, 291, 293, 294, 300, 306, 312, 313, 319, 330, 334, 337, 339, 350, 352, 354, 357, 419, 421, 437, 439, 440, 462, 467, 472, 485, 495, 498, 536, 540Appointment to NSC staff, 17Schick, Rene, 85Schilling, Paulo, 182Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., 12, 13, 27Schnittker, John, 468Schultze, Charles L., 44, 45, 48, 227,
232, 281, 289, 295, 317, 322, 329, 332, 466, 468, 483, 488Schweitzer, Pierre-Paul, 325Scranton, William, 382, 498Sea-level canal issue. See underPanama Canal treaty negotiations.Seddon, Comdr., 448, 450, 456Sedgwick, Charles, 80Seeger, Pete, 362Seidenman, Neil A., 50, 435, 473, 540, 541Seixas Doria, Joao, 209Selden, Armistead I., Jr., 21, 31, 48, 64,
141Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), 65, 66, 109, 302, 494Seoane, Edgardo, 470, 510Sessions, Edson O., 344Sevilla Sacasa, Guillermo, 108Shankle, A. Perry, 300, 305Sharp, Frederick D., Ill, 495Shaw, Gen., 129Sheehan, Neil, 494Shlauderman, Harry, 455Shriver, R. Sargent, 37Shullaw, J. Harold, 76, 103Shumate, John P., Jr., 506Siles, Hernan, 149Siracusa, Ernest V., 487, 496, 516, 517Slater, John, 524Sloan, Frank K., 185, 196, 205Smathers, George, 48Smith, Bromley K., 9, 23,
41, 69, 139, 192, 206, 208, 346, 377, 407, 409, 445, 476, 481, 519Smith, Ian D., 284Smith, J. E, 334Smith, W. Y., 21Snow, William P., 462, 465Sola, Angel A., 127, 145Solis, Galileo, 371, 372, 375, 376, 378, 379Solomon, Anthony M., 18, 41, 50, 51,
56, 58, 62, 145, 196, 274, 275, 276, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 359, 486, 527, 529, 540, 541, 542, 543Somoza, Gen. Anastasio “Tachito,” 79, 85, 90, 91, 92, 93,
94, 95, 96, 97, 108, 111Somoza, Luis, 94, 95Sorensen, Theodore C., 7, 382, 389Sosa, Yon, 75Souto Malan, Alfredo, 192Soviet Union, 3, 6, 9, 28, 183, 259, 264, 356Communism in Latin America, 24, 60Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 58, 60Sowash, William B., 78Special Group, 245, 246, 247, 248, 250, 252,
257, 258Special Group (CI), 28, 72, 151, 471Special National Intelligence Estimates, 120, 213SNIE 80/902–68, 66SNIE 833–67, 97SNIE 84–1, 68,
454SNIE 84–64, 398SNIE 84–66, 430SNIE 8–67, 436SNIE 98–65, 464Standard Oil of Indiana, 16Starzel, Robert E, 101, 108Stedman, William P., Jr., 491, 505, 506Steins, Kenedon P., 76Sternfeld, Ray, 67, 142Stevenson, Adlai E., 9, 382, 389, 392, 419Stewart, C. Allen, 4, 310Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 56Stroessner, Gen. Alfredo, 10, 462, 465, 469Suarez, Leopoldo, 121Suarez Guzman, Gen. Hugo, 151Sukarno, Ahmed, 221Sullivan, Leonor K., 427, 429Sulzberger, Arthur O., 49Sweet, William, 230Swett, Herbert D., 117Symington, Stuart, 66, 495, 508Szulc, Tad, 2, 10, 12Taubman, Louis, 346Tavares, Gen. Lyra, 240Taylor, A. Thomas, 252Taylor, Henry L., 406Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 3, 4, 187, 191,
196, 199, 202Panama, 367, 381, 394Taylor, Adm. Rufus L., 65Teitelboim, Volodia, 303Teixeira, Brig. Gen. Francisco, 205Tejera Paris, Enrique, 20, 375, 384, 536, 541, 542,
543, 544Telles, Raymond, 73, 80,
81, 358Temple, Larry, 508Tennessee Gas, 16Then, Joe, 118Thompson, Llewellyn E., 9, 153, 158, 267, 269, 277,
279303 Committee, 147Bolivia, 153, 158, 161, 167, 168, 174Chile, 262, 267, 269, 273, 277, 294, 306Ecuador, 326Thurston, Raymond L., 338Time magazine, 310Timmons,Benson E.L., 22Tomic, Radomiro, 274, 275, 286, 287, 292, 298,
300, 301, 303Torrijos Herrera, Lt. Col. Omar, 448, 449, 452, 454Townsend, Andres, 501Trejos Fernandez, Jose, 80, 81, 108, 110,
111Trinidad and Tobago, 34, 52Tristan, Fidel, 73Trivelli, Hugo, 303Trouyet, Carlos, 357Trucco, Manuel, 380Trueheart, William C, 174, 179Truman, Harry S, 287, 406Turkel, Harry, 358Tuthill, John W, 37, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232,
233, 238, 240, 242, 243Tyler, William R., 523Udall, Stewart, 350, 353, 354, 358, 526, 528,
529, 530, 534, 543Ullos, Manuel, 506Unger, Maj. Gen. RT., 381United Fruit Company, 117United Kingdom, 284, 285British Guiana border dispute, 524, 536British Honduras dispute, 76, 77, 78, 103, 113Cuba, trade restrictions re, 16Peruvian military aircraft purchases, 492Peruvian oil expropriations, 470, 473, 478United Nations, 371Uribe, Eduardo, 314Urrutia, Col. Bolivar, 448, 449, 456Uruguay, 16Argentina and Brazil, relations with, 463, 464Coup threat, 459, 463, 464Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 20, 21, 22, 23Economic and political situation, 464,
467Political reform, U.S. encouragement of, 460, 461, 463Rusk visit, 33U.S. economic/development assistance, 466, 468Vaky, Viron P., 102, 113, 115, 179, 237, 239,
241, 453, 455, 457, 506, 512, 546, 547Valdes Subercaseaux, Gabriel, 270, 275, 278, 292, 303Valencia, Guillermo Leon, 311, 312, 314, 315, 316Valenti, Jack, 381, 382, 534Vallarino, Col. Bolivar, 367, 375, 377, 398, 443, 444, 447, 448, 449, 456Vance, Cyrus R., 3, 4,
28, 75, 157, 158, 202, 257, 267, 421, 485, 498Panama, 368, 369, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 381, 382, 384, 391, 396, 415Van Reigersberg, Fernando A., 51, 123, 143Vasquez Salas, Jorge, 473, 487Vaughan, Jack Hood, 16, 18, 29, 31,
47, 49, 74, 75, 81, 84, 86,
154, 156, 157, 222, 271Alliance for Progress, 27, 30, 32British Honduras, 76Colombia, 313, 314Costa Rica, 79Guatemala, 76OAS Rio Conference of 2965, 34Panama, 390Anti-American demonstrations, 421, 422Appointment as U.S. Ambassador to, 409, 410Communist subversion, 421Presidential election of 2964, 415, 416Robles government, U.S. relations with, 416, 418U.S. program to improve relations with Panama, 417, 419,
422Panama Canal treaty negotiations, 418,
420, 427U.S. policy development for, 421, 425Peace Corps appointment, 37Peru, 471, 472, 473Velarde, Fabian, 378Velarde, Leon, 507Velasco Alvarado, Gen. Juan, 510, 511, 513, 514, 521Velasco Ibarra, Jose Maria, 344Venezuela, 16, 32, 296, 314British Guiana, possible intervention in, 523British Guiana border dispute, 524, 536, 544Common market for Latin America, 62Communist subversion (see also Cuban headings below), 20, 24, 28, 63, 70, 522, 525, 531, 538, 539, 545, 547Coup threat, 531, 537, 538Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, OAS resolution on, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23Cuban fishing vessel, seizure of, 545,
546, 547Cuban infiltration of Venezuela, OAS action on, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64Johnson communications with Leoni, 525,
543Johnson meeting with Barrios, 535, 536Johnson meeting with Leoni, 50, 540, 541Oil exports to United States, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 532, 533, 534, 536, 537, 540, 542, 543Oliver visit to, 68Political situation, 522, 530, 537Presidential election of 1968, 548Rusk meeting with Leoni, 33, 528University crisis of 1967, 538U.S. military/security assistance, 61,
66, 525, 539, 541, 547Vidal Zaglio, Luis, 33Vidigal, Gastao, 205Vietnam war, 224, 225,
465Villeda Morales, Ramon, 72, 107Walker, Robert G., 272Walters, Col. Vernon A., 181, 192, 209, 214, 217, 221, 223, 225, 239Warner, Leland W, Jr., 105Warnke, Paul C, 69, 498Washington Post, 2, 188, 221, 469, 502Watson, W. Marvin, Jr., 31, 285, 427, 486Webber, Col. John, Jr., 99, 101, 102Webster, Bethuel M., 78, 103, 113Weed, Clyde E., 257Weismann, H. Andre, 26Welles, Ben, 335Wessin y Wessin, Gen. Elias, 465Wheeler, Gen. Earle G., 28, 65, 69, 206,
437, 519White, Robert, 117, 118Whiteman, Marjorie M., 7, 524Wiggins, Guy A., 101, 103Wilkowski, Jean M., 104Williams, G. Mennen, 2Williams, Murat W, 153, 159Williams, William L. S., 151Willis, James P., 80Wilson, Donald M., 3, 4,
28, 368Wilson, Harold, 492Wilson, Henry H., Jr., 429Wimert, Lt. Col. Paul, 156Winchell, Walter, 389Wolfe, Gregory B., 312Woodward, Robert E, 427, 428World Bank, 79, 110,
130, 215, 234, 309Colombia, 313, 314,
315, 317, 325Yarborough, Ralph, 355, 358Yarborough, Gen. William, 129Yerovi, Clemente, 327, 328, 329Yohn, Michael, 363, 364Yriart, Juan, 459, 460, 467Zabala, Jose, 275Zaldivar, Andres, 303Zambia, 284, 285, 288Zavala Ortiz, Miguel, 123Zuniga Augustinius, Ricardo, 72, 74, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 117, 118Zwick, Charles J., 180, 234, 307, 308, 309, 508