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NOTES AND COMMENTS

INDEPENDENCE, MONOTONICITY, AND LATENT INDEX MODELS: AN EQUIVALENCE RESULT

BY EDWARD VYTLACIL¹

1. INTRODUCTION

A COMMON PROBLEM IN ECONOMICS is to evaluate the effect of a treatment when individuals self-select whether to receive the treatment. This problem arises when trying to evaluate the union/nonunion wage differential, the effect of job training on earnings, and the returns to schooling, where being unionized or making a human capital investment is the treatment.

One standard approach to this problem is the use of a selection model as first proposed by Heckman (1976). Under this approach, the researcher models selection into the program by a latent index crossing a threshold, where the latent index is interpreted as the expected net utility of selecting into treatment. However, some statisticians have criticized or even dismissed the use of selection models to estimate treatment effects, arguing that such analysis is inherently driven by distributional and functional form assumptions.² This sentiment has been echoed within economics.

The local average treatment effect (LATE) framework is a form of linear instrumental variables (IV) analysis developed by Imbens and Angrist (1994).³ However, like the

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² See, e.g., the comments and discussions on Heckman and Robb (1986) in Wainer (1986), especially those by Tukey and Holland and the Heckman and Robb rejoinder. There is a large literature on the semiparametric estimation of selection models; see, for example, Ahn and Powell (1993). However, as emphasized by Heckman (1990), estimation of treatment effects requires knowledge of the intercept of the outcome equations, and most of the semiparametric literature does not consider estimation of the intercepts of the outcome equations.

³ See also Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996) for a further exposition of the approach for the special case of a binary instrument.

selection model approach,⁴ and unlike traditional IV analysis,⁵ the LATE framework allows for heterogeneous treatment effects, in particular, for the effect of the treatment to vary across individuals with the same observed characteristics and with selection into treatment possibly dependent on the individual-specific treatment effect. In order to allow for heterogeneous treatment effects, the LATE approach requires additional assumptions not imposed in conventional IV analysis, with these additional assumptions stated directly in terms of the underlying counterfactual variables.

On the surface, the LATE assumptions do not seem connected to the assumption of a selection model. They do not directly involve an unobserved index crossing a threshold or the imposition of any structural economic model. The LATE approach has been advanced as being less restrictive than econometric selection models, but has been attacked for not being motivated by or interpretable as an economic model.⁶

This note shows that the assumption of an unobserved index crossing a threshold that defines the selection model is equivalent to the independence and monotonicity assumptions at the center of the LATE approach. In particular, the selection model assumptions imply the LATE assumptions, and given the LATE assumptions, there always exists a selection model that rationalizes the observed and counterfactual data. The LATE assumptions are not weaker than the assumptions of a latent index model, but instead impose the same restrictions on the counterfactual data as the classical selection model if one does not impose parametric functional form or distributional assumptions on the latter. This equivalence result shows that the LATE analysis of Imbens and Angrist can be seen as an application of a latent index model, and thus directly connects their research to the econometric literature on selection models.

This note proceeds in the following way. I first introduce the switching regression framework and the necessary notation in Section 2. I define and discuss the assumption of a selection model in Section 3 and the LATE assumptions in Section 4. In Section 5, I show that these two sets of assumptions are equivalent: the selection model implies the independence and monotonicity conditions assumed in LATE analysis, and the independence and monotonicity conditions imply that a selection model may be assumed without imposing any additional restrictions.

2. FRAMEWORK

Let $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbf{P})$ denote the probability space. All random variables will be defined on this common probability space. Let ω denote an element of Ω . Let $(Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega))$ denote random variables corresponding, respectively, to the potential outcomes in the untreated and treated states. For those unfamiliar with measure-theoretic notation, it may be most intuitive in the context of this note to think of Ω as denoting the set of all individuals in the universe of interest and of ω as indexing individuals. When translating the LATE assumptions of Imbens and Angrist (1994) into this notation, ω will serve the same role as their individual i subscript.

⁴ See Heckman and Robb (1986) and Björklund and Moffitt (1987).

⁵ Traditional IV approaches are critically dependent on the assumption that either (i) the treatment effect does not vary across individuals, or (ii) the treatment effect does vary across individuals, but individuals do not select into treatment based on their idiosyncratic gains from treatment. See, e.g., Heckman and Robb (1986), Heckman (1997), and Heckman and Vytlacil (2002).

⁶ See, e.g., the comments by Heckman (1996) and Moffitt (1996) on Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), and the rejoinder by Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996).

Let $D(\omega)$ be a random variable for receipt of treatment; $D(\omega) = 1$ denotes the receipt of treatment; $D(\omega) = 0$ denotes nonreceipt. Let $Y(\omega)$ be the measured outcome variable so that

$$Y(\omega) = D(\omega)Y_1(\omega) + (1 - D(\omega))Y_0(\omega).$$

I will assume that $Y_1(\omega)$ and $Y_0(\omega)$ have finite first moments and also that $1 > \mathbf{P}[D(\omega) = 1] > 0$.⁷ Let $W(\omega)$ denote a vector of observed covariates. Partition $W(\omega)$ into two sub-vectors, $W(\omega) = [X(\omega), Z(\omega)]$, where X contains the covariates that directly affect the (Y_1, Y_0) outcomes (as well as possibly affecting the treatment decision), and Z contains the covariates that only affect the treatment decision D . Variables in Z are referred to as instruments or excluded variables. In the rest of this note, I do not explicitly consider the observed random variables X ; everything in this note is conditional on X .

Let \mathcal{Z} denote the support of Z , and let z denote a possible realization of Z . For each $z \in \mathcal{Z}$, let $D_z(\omega)$ be the counterfactual variable denoting whether the observation would have received treatment if $Z(\omega)$ had been externally set to z . This defines a collection of random variables, $\{D_z(\omega) : z \in \mathcal{Z}\}$, where the collection of random variables is indexed by the support of Z . Clearly $D(\omega) = D_{Z(\omega)}(\omega)$. To simplify the analysis, I will assume that \mathcal{Z} is countable. This assumption is imposed for expositional purposes only. An Appendix containing the derivations for the more general case where \mathcal{Z} is possibly uncountable is available upon request from the author.⁸

Let

$$(1) \quad p(z) = \mathbf{P}[D(\omega) = 1 | Z(\omega) = z].$$

$p(z)$ is sometimes called the “propensity score” by statisticians and is sometimes called the “choice probability” by economists.⁹

3. LATENT INDEX SELECTION MODELS

The latent index assumption is that the treatment choice is determined by an index crossing a threshold. The most conventional form of the classical selection model imposes a linear index assumption, in particular,

$$(2) \quad D = 1[Z\beta \geq U],$$

where $1[\cdot]$ is the indicator function and U is assumed to be independent of Z . The form of the selection model that I consider (and show is equivalent to the LATE assumptions) revises equation (2) in two ways. First, I relax the linear index assumption to consider

⁷ Following a standard abuse of notation, I will write $[D(\omega) = 1]$ as short for $[\omega : D(\omega) = 1]$.

⁸ The analysis of this note trivially generalizes to the case where \mathcal{Z} is uncountable if one imposes that $\{D_z(\omega) : z \in \mathcal{Z}\}$ is separable, i.e., if one imposes that there exists a countable set $\mathcal{Z}^* \subset \mathcal{Z}$, such that for any $z \in \mathcal{Z}$ there exists a sequence $\{z_1, z_2, \dots\} \subset \mathcal{Z}^*$ such that $\lim_{k \rightarrow \infty} D_{z_k} = D_z$. The appendix shows the equivalence result for the case where \mathcal{Z} is uncountable and a separability assumption has not been imposed.

⁹ The term “propensity score” originates in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), who analyzed its role in the method of matching. See Heckman and Robb (1986) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2002) for a discussion of how the propensity score plays a fundamentally different role in matching models versus selection models.

$D = \mathbf{1}[\nu(Z) \geq U]$ for some function ν . Second, I explicitly impose that the latent index equation continues to hold under hypothetical interventions. In other words, I assume not only that the individual's actual choice be described by the latent index model, but also that the same model describes what her choices would have been had her value of Z been externally set to any other value. Formally, I make the following assumptions:¹⁰

LATENT INDEX SELECTION MODEL (S-1): $D_z(\omega) = \mathbf{1}[\nu(z) \geq U(\omega)]$ for some $\nu : \mathcal{Z} \mapsto \mathfrak{R}$, with (i) $\nu(z)$ a measurable, nontrivial function of z ,¹¹ and (ii) $Z(\omega) \perp\!\!\!\perp (U(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega))$, where " $\perp\!\!\!\perp$ " denotes independence.

In Assumption S-1, without loss of generality, we will impose the normalization that $\nu(z) = p(z)$ and $\mathbf{P}[U(\omega) \leq t] = t$ for any $t \in \mathcal{P}$, where $p(z) = \mathbf{P}[D(\omega) = 1 | Z(\omega) = z]$ and \mathcal{P} is the support of $p(Z(\omega))$.

4. ASSUMPTIONS OF LATE APPROACH

As an alternative to the assumption of a selection model, the two identifying assumptions of the LATE approach of Imbens and Angrist are as follows:¹²

LATE INDEPENDENCE ASSUMPTION (L-1): (i) For all $z \in \mathcal{Z}$, $Z(\omega) \perp\!\!\!\perp (Y_1(\omega), Y_0(\omega), D_z(\omega))$, and (ii) $p(z)$ is a nontrivial function of z .

LATE MONOTONICITY ASSUMPTION (L-2): For all $(z, z') \in \mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{Z}$, either $D_z(\omega) \geq D_{z'}(\omega)$ for all $\omega \in \Omega$, or $D_z(\omega) \leq D_{z'}(\omega)$ for all $\omega \in \Omega$.

The independence assumption is *not* that $Z(\omega)$ is independent of $D_z(\omega)$ conditional on $Z(\omega) = z$. ($Z(\omega)$ is independent of $D_z(\omega)$ conditional on $Z(\omega) = z$ from the usual laws of probability.) Instead, the assumption is that $Z(\omega)$ is independent of each element of $\{D_z(\omega) : z \in \mathcal{Z}\}$. The monotonicity assumption is *not* that $D_z(\omega)$ is nonincreasing or nondecreasing in z . Instead, the assumption is that for any $(z, z') \in \mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{Z}$, the (weak) ordering between $D_z(\omega)$ and $D_{z'}(\omega)$ is invariant to choice of ω .¹³

To help understand these assumptions, assume the $D_z(\omega)$ are generated by the latent variable model $D_z(\omega) = \mathbf{1}[\zeta(z, U(\omega)) \geq 0]$. If $Z(\omega)$ is independent of $(U(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega))$, then $Z(\omega)$ is independent of $(D_z(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega))$ for all $z \in \mathcal{Z}$ and the independence assumption is satisfied. If $Z(\omega)$ is not independent of $U(\omega)$, then

¹⁰ Recall that the analysis of this note is implicitly conditioning on $X(\omega)$, where $X(\omega)$ are any covariates that directly effect the outcome variables. Thus, assumption (ii) is that $Z(\omega) \perp\!\!\!\perp (U(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)) | X(\omega)$.

¹¹ In particular, $\nu(z)$ is a measurable function such that there exists $(z, z') \in \mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{Z}$ with $\nu(z) \neq \nu(z')$.

¹² Recall that the analysis of this note is implicitly conditioning on $X(\omega)$, where $X(\omega)$ are any covariates that directly effect the outcome variables. Thus, making the conditioning on $X(\omega)$ explicit, we have, e.g., that $Z(\omega) \perp\!\!\!\perp (Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega), D_z(\omega)) | X(\omega)$ for all $z \in \mathcal{Z}$; likewise, the monotonicity condition holds conditional on $X(\omega)$.

¹³ Manski (1997) also imposes a monotonicity condition in his analysis, although his monotonicity condition is fundamentally different from the one imposed in LATE analysis. The LATE monotonicity condition is a cross-person restriction on the relationship between different hypothetical treatment choices, with the hypothetical treatment choices defined in terms of an instrument. In contrast, the Manski (1997) monotonicity condition is a monotonicity restriction on the relationship between the treatment and the outcome for each given individual.

in general $Z(\omega)$ will not be independent of $D_z(\omega)$ and the independence assumption will not hold. If the ζ index is separable in z and U , so that $\zeta(z, U(\omega)) = \nu(z) + U(\omega)$, then for any $(z, z') \in \mathcal{X}$, $\nu(z) \geq \nu(z')$ implies that $D_z(\omega) \geq D_{z'}(\omega)$ for all $\omega \in \Omega$. Thus, the additive separability assumption implies the monotonicity assumption. The monotonicity assumption will not necessarily hold without additive separability. For example, it will not hold in the random coefficient latent index model if a given coefficient is both positive and negative with positive probability.

It will be convenient to define the following sets:

$$D_z^{-1}(1) = \{\omega : D_z(\omega) = 1\},$$

$$D_z^{-1}(0) = \{\omega : D_z(\omega) = 0\}.$$

Speaking loosely of ω as an ‘‘individual,’’ $D_z^{-1}(1)$ is the set of people who would select into treatment if the instrument were externally set to z , and $D_z^{-1}(0)$ is the set of people who would not select into treatment if the instrument were externally set to z . Using this notation, the monotonicity condition can be equivalently stated as follows:

EQUIVALENT MONOTONICITY CONDITION: *For all $(z, z') \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{X}$, either $D_z^{-1}(1) \subseteq D_{z'}^{-1}(1)$ or $D_z^{-1}(1) \supseteq D_{z'}^{-1}(1)$.*

Given the above assumptions, Imbens and Angrist (1994) show that the linear instrumental variables estimand can be interpreted as a weighted average of treatment effects. In particular, they show that if Z is binary, $\mathcal{X} = \{0, 1\}$, with $D_1(\omega) \geq D_0(\omega)$, then the linear instrumental variables estimand identifies $E(Y_1 - Y_0 | D_1 = 1, D_0 = 0)$,

$$\frac{E(Z(Y - E(Y)))}{E(Z(D - E(D)))} = E(Y_1 - Y_0 | D_1 = 1, D_0 = 0).$$

They show that if Z is not binary, then the linear instrumental variables estimand identifies a particular weighted average of such terms.

5. EQUIVALENCE OF IDENTIFYING ASSUMPTIONS

The central hypothesis of this note is that the independence and monotonicity assumptions of the LATE approach are equivalent to the assumption of a latent index model as specified in S-1. Since one can trivially show that the latent index model defined by S-1 implies conditions L-1 and L-2, we need only to show that conditions L-1 and L-2 imply a latent index representation of the form given by S-1. The analysis proceeds as follows. Given conditions L-1 and L-2, I show that one can construct a latent index with implied counterfactual treatment variables $\{\tilde{D}_z(\omega)\}_{z \in \mathcal{X}}$, such that (i) the constructed latent index satisfies all conditions of S-1, and (ii) $\tilde{D}_z(\omega) = D_z(\omega)$ for all ω outside of a set of \mathbf{P} -measure zero, for all $z \in \mathcal{X}$.

We now construct the latent index representation implied by the LATE assumptions. The latent index representation will have the form

$$\tilde{D}_z(\omega) = \mathbf{1}[p(z) \geq U(\omega)].$$

The random variable $U(\omega)$ is by definition a real valued measurable function, and we now construct this function.

We will define the $U(\omega)$ function to take different values depending on whether ω is in the sets $N, A,$ or $C,$ with these sets defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 N &\equiv \bigcap_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} D_z^{-1}(0), \\
 A &\equiv \bigcap_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} D_z^{-1}(1), \\
 C &\equiv (N \cup A)^c = \left(\bigcup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} D_z^{-1}(0) \right) \cap \left(\bigcup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} D_z^{-1}(1) \right).
 \end{aligned}$$

By construction, the sets $N, A,$ and C form a partition of $\Omega.$ $D_z^{-1}(1)$ is a measurable set for any $z \in \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{Z}$ is countable by assumption, and thus the sets $A, N,$ and C are measurable. Again loosely speaking of ω as indexing individuals, we have that N is the set of individuals who would not select in for any value of the instrument, A is the set of individuals who would select in for all values of the instrument, and C is the set of individuals who would select in for some values of the instrument but would not for other values. In the terminology of Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), $\omega \in N$ are referred to as *never-takers*, $\omega \in A$ are referred to as *always-takers*, and $\omega \in C$ are referred to as *compliers*.

I will set $U(\omega) = 1$ for $\omega \in N$ and set $U(\omega) = 0$ for $\omega \in A.$ For $\omega \in C,$ I proceed as follows. Let

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathcal{Z}_0(\omega) &= \{z \in \mathcal{Z} : D_z(\omega) = 0\}, \\
 \mathcal{Z}_1(\omega) &= \{z \in \mathcal{Z} : D_z(\omega) = 1\}.
 \end{aligned}$$

The sets $\mathcal{Z}_0(\omega)$ and $\mathcal{Z}_1(\omega)$ partition $\mathcal{Z},$ where the partition is a function of $\omega.$ $\mathcal{Z}_0(\omega)$ is the set of instrument values such that the individual would not select into treatment if her Z had been externally set to those values; $\mathcal{Z}_1(\omega)$ is the set of instrument values such that the individual would select into treatment if her Z had been externally set to those values. Critical to construction of $U(\omega)$ for $\omega \in C$ is the following result, where $p(z)$ is the propensity score defined in equation (1).

LEMMA 1: *Assume L-1 and L-2. Then for all $\omega \in C,$*

$$\sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0(\omega)} p(z) \leq \inf_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_1(\omega)} p(z).$$

PROOF: See Appendix A.

Lemma 1 essentially says that, for any fixed $\omega \in C,$ the sets $\mathcal{Z}_1(\omega)$ and $\mathcal{Z}_0(\omega)$ can be separated based on the propensity score. In other words, for any fixed individual who would select in for some values of the instrument but would not select in for other values of the instrument, the propensity score corresponding to any instrument value for which the person selects in is always at least as large as the propensity score corresponding to any instrument value for which the person would not select in.

We now construct the $U(\omega)$ function:

$$U(\omega) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \omega \in N, \\ 0 & \text{if } \omega \in A, \\ \inf_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_1(\omega)} p(z) & \text{if } \omega \in C. \end{cases}$$

Given this construction of $U(\omega)$, the following lemma shows that $U(\omega)$ is a random variable.

LEMMA 2: *Given L-1 and L-2, we have that $U(\omega)$ is a random variable, i.e., the function $U, U : \Omega \mapsto \mathfrak{R}$, is measurable \mathcal{F} .*

PROOF: See Appendix A.

The following lemma shows that $Z(\omega)$ is independent of $(U(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega))$.

LEMMA 3: *Given L-1 and L-2, we have*

$$Z(\omega) \perp (U(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)).$$

PROOF: See Appendix A.

We now define a selection model using the propensity score, $p(z)$, as the index and the random variable $U(\omega)$ as the threshold:

$$\tilde{D}_z(\omega) = \mathbf{1}[p(z) \geq U(\omega)].$$

From L-1, we have that $p(z)$ is a nontrivial function of z , so that the selection model satisfies condition (i) of S-1. Given L-1 and L-2, Lemma 3 states that the selection model satisfies condition (ii) of S-1. The following theorem shows that the hypothetical choices implied by the selection model agree with the original hypothetical choice variables with probability one.

THEOREM 1: *Given L-1 and L-2, we have, for any $z \in \mathcal{Z}$,*

$$D_z(\omega) = \tilde{D}_z(\omega) \quad \text{w.p.1.}$$

PROOF: See Appendix A.

Theorem 1 shows that it is possible to construct a latent index selection model that agrees with the original hypothetical choice variables w.p.1 and such that both conditions of S-1 hold. Thus, the independence and monotonicity assumptions imply that there exists a latent index representation for participation in treatment. The LATE conditions and the selection model impose exactly the same restrictions on $(Z(\omega), Y_1(\omega), Y_0(\omega), \{D_z(\omega)\}_{z \in \mathcal{Z}})$. The LATE conditions and the selection model are not only indistinguishable based on observational data, but they cannot be distinguished based on any hypothetical intervention or experiment. The two models are equivalent.¹⁴

¹⁴ This equivalence result is related to a result of Glickman and Normand (2000). They consider the LATE assumptions L-1 and L-2 augmented with the additional assumptions that (i) Z is a scalar random variable and (ii) $z \leq z' \Rightarrow D_z(\omega) \leq D_{z'}(\omega)$. Note that assumptions L-1 and L-2 do not imply these conditions; in particular, note that the LATE monotonicity condition does not imply condition (2). They show that LATE, when augmented with these additional assumptions, is equivalent to the latent variable model $D_z = \mathbf{1}[z \geq U]$. This result can be seen as a special case of the equivalence result of this note. In particular, this note shows that LATE (without the additional assumptions) is equivalent to $D_z = \mathbf{1}[v(z) \geq U]$. Imposing conditions (i) and (ii) implies that v is invertible so that under their conditions we have $D_z = \mathbf{1}[z \geq V]$ with $V = v^{-1}(U)$.

This derivation has used the assumption that \mathcal{Z} is finite or countable. This assumption has been imposed for expositional purposes only, and an Appendix containing the derivations for the more general case where \mathcal{Z} is possibly uncountable is available upon request from the author. The analysis of this note has not imposed the assumption that the distribution of the threshold U be absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, and the random variable U constructed above from the LATE assumptions will have a distribution that is not in general absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. However, this does not imply that selection models with continuous U are more restrictive than the LATE assumptions. An Appendix, available upon request from the author, shows that, for a selection model with the distribution of U not absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, there will exist on some probability space an alternative selection model with U distributed absolutely continuously with respect to Lebesgue measure and implying the same joint distribution for all variables of interest, i.e., the same distribution of potential outcomes, hypothetical choices, and covariates. Finally, the analysis of this note has used $p(z)$ as the latent index of the selection model. This normalization is convenient for the derivation. This is only a normalization, and applying any monotonic transformation to $p(z)$ and U will result in an equally valid representation for the latent index. The use of $p(z)$ as a normalization in the above derivation is not dissimilar to proofs of the existence of a utility function. Utility functions are only defined up to monotonic transformations, and proofs by construction for utility functions typically involve representations for the utility function that are convenient for the derivation but not necessarily natural otherwise (see, e.g., Debreu (1959)).

The equivalence result of this paper implies that results developed within the LATE framework apply equally to the selection model framework, and vice versa. The identification analysis for treatment parameters developed under the LATE assumptions (e.g., Imbens and Angrist (1994)) apply to the identification of treatment parameters under the assumption of a selection model. Likewise, identification analysis for treatment parameters under the selection model assumption (e.g., Heckman (1990) and Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2001a)) apply to identification of treatment parameters under the LATE conditions. The sharp bounds on the average treatment effect, $E(Y_1 - Y_0)$, under the LATE assumptions with Y_1 , Y_0 , and Z binary (Balke and Pearl (1997)), are also the sharp bounds for the average treatment effect under a selection model assumption with Y_1 , Y_0 , and Z binary. And likewise, the bounds on the average treatment effect, shown by Heckman and Vytlacil (2001b) to be sharp under the selection model assumption without requiring Y_1 , Y_0 , or Z to be binary, are also the sharp bounds on the average treatment effect under the LATE assumptions without requiring Y_1 , Y_0 , or Z to be binary. The relationship between treatment parameters under the selection model assumption (see Heckman and Vytlacil (2000)) also holds under the LATE assumptions. In addition, there is a large literature within econometrics on the semiparametric and nonparametric estimation of selection models (e.g., Ahn and Powell (1993), Andrews and Shafgans (1998), and Das, Newey, and Vella (2000)). The equivalence result of this paper implies that these estimation methods can be applied under the LATE conditions. In either the LATE or selection model approach, auxiliary assumptions are sometimes imposed, and the analysis of this paper may be adapted to show what the auxiliary assumptions stated in terms of one approach translate into in terms of restrictions in the alternative approach.

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APPENDIX: PROOFS

PROOF OF LEMMA 1: Proof is by contradiction. Assume there exists $\omega \in C$ such that $\sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0(\omega)} p(z) > \inf_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_1(\omega)} p(z)$. Then there exists (z, z') such that $D_z(\omega) = 0, D_{z'}(\omega) = 1$, and $p(z) > p(z')$. By the monotonicity and independence conditions (L-1 and L-2), $p(z) > p(z')$ implies $D_z^{-1}(1) \supseteq D_{z'}^{-1}(1)$, which contradicts the assumption that $D_z(\omega) = 0, D_{z'}(\omega) = 1$.

PROOF OF LEMMA 2: First consider the sets A, N , and C . $D_z^{-1}(1)$ is a measurable set for any $z \in \mathcal{Z}$, \mathcal{Z} is finite or countable by assumption, and thus the sets A, N , and C are measurable.

We now show that U is a measurable function. For any $t \in [0, 1]$, $\{\omega \in C : \inf_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_1(\omega)} p(z) < t\} = \bigcup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}(t)} [C \cap D_z^{-1}(1)]$, where $\mathcal{Z}(t) = \{z \in \mathcal{Z} : p(z) < t\}$. Since $D_z^{-1}(1)$ is a measurable set for any $z \in \mathcal{Z}$ and \mathcal{Z} is finite or countable by assumption, we have that $\bigcup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}(t)} [C \cap D_z^{-1}(1)]$ is measurable $C \cap \mathcal{F}$ for any $t \in [0, 1]$. Thus, the restriction of U to C is measurable. The restrictions of U to N and to A are trivially measurable. Finally the sets N, A , and C are measurable and form a partition of Ω , and we thus have that $U(\omega)$ is a random variable, i.e., the function $U, U : \Omega \mapsto \mathfrak{R}$, is measurable \mathcal{F} .

PROOF OF LEMMA 3: We first show that $U(\omega)$ is independent of $Z(\omega)$ conditional on $(Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega))$. For any fixed t , consider

$$\mathbf{P}[U(\omega) < t | Z(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)].$$

Define $\mathcal{Z}(t) = \{z \in \mathcal{Z} : p(z) < t\}$. If $\mathcal{Z}(t)$ is nonempty, then using the construction of $U(\omega)$ and Lemma 1, we have that

$$\mathbf{P}[U(\omega) < t | Z(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)] = \mathbf{P}\left[\bigcup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}(t)} D_z^{-1}(1) \middle| Z(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)\right].$$

Let \mathbb{N} denote the set of natural numbers. By L-2, we can construct a sequence $\{z_j \in \mathcal{Z} : j \in \mathbb{N}\}$, such that $D_{z_j}^{-1}(1) \subseteq D_{z_{j+1}}^{-1}(1)$ for all $j \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\bigcup_{j \in \mathbb{N}} D_{z_j}^{-1}(1) = \bigcup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}(t)} D_z^{-1}(1)$. Thus

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{P}[U(\omega) < t | Z(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)] &= \mathbf{P}\left[\bigcup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}(t)} D_z^{-1}(1) \middle| Z(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)\right] \\ &= \lim_{j \rightarrow \infty} \mathbf{P}[D_{z_j}^{-1}(1) | Z(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)] \\ &= \lim_{j \rightarrow \infty} \mathbf{P}[D_{z_j}^{-1}(1) | Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)], \end{aligned}$$

where the first equality follows from the definition of $U(\omega)$, the second equality follows from continuity from below, and the third equality follows from L-1. Following the same reasoning,

$$\mathbf{P}[U(\omega) < t | Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)] = \lim_{j \rightarrow \infty} \mathbf{P}[D_{z_j}^{-1}(1) | Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)],$$

and thus

$$\mathbf{P}[U(\omega) < t | Z(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)] = \mathbf{P}[U(\omega) < t | Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)]$$

for any t such that $\mathcal{Z}(t)$ is nonempty. If $\mathcal{Z}(t)$ is empty, then $\{\omega : U(\omega) < t\} = \bigcap_{z \in \mathcal{Z}} D_z^{-1}(1)$, and a parallel argument shows that $\mathbf{P}[U(\omega) < t | Z(\omega), Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)] = \mathbf{P}[U(\omega) < t | Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega)]$ for t such that $\mathcal{Z}(t)$ is empty. Thus, $U(\omega) \perp\!\!\!\perp Z(\omega) | (Y_1(\omega), Y_0(\omega))$. Using that $Z(\omega) \perp\!\!\!\perp (Y_0(\omega), Y_1(\omega))$ by assumption L-1, we now have that $Z(\omega) \perp\!\!\!\perp (U(\omega), Y_1(\omega), Y_0(\omega))$.

PROOF OF THEOREM 1: Define $\tilde{D}_z(\omega) = \mathbf{1}(p(z) \geq U(\omega))$. Recall that \mathcal{P} denotes the support of $p(Z(\omega))$. Pick any $z \in \mathcal{Z}$. Consider

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{P}[\omega : D_z(\omega) \neq \tilde{D}_z(\omega)] &= \mathbf{P}[\omega \in N : D_z(\omega) \neq \tilde{D}_z(\omega)] \\ &\quad + \mathbf{P}[\omega \in A : D_z(\omega) \neq \tilde{D}_z(\omega)] + \mathbf{P}[\omega \in C : D_z(\omega) \neq \tilde{D}_z(\omega)]. \end{aligned}$$

We will prove that each of the three terms on the right-hand side of this expression is zero.

Consider the first term of the expression. If $\{1\} \in \mathcal{P}$, then $\Pr[N] = 0$ and trivially $\mathbf{P}[\omega \in N : D_z(\omega) \neq \tilde{D}_z(\omega)] = 0$ for all $z \in \mathcal{Z}$. Now assume $\{1\} \notin \mathcal{P}$ so that $p(z) < 1$ for any $z \in \mathcal{Z}$. For $\omega \in N$, we have $D_z(\omega) = 0$, and $\tilde{D}_z(\omega) = \mathbf{1}(p(z) \geq 1) = 0$ for any $z \in \mathcal{Z}$, so $D_z(\omega) = \tilde{D}_z(\omega)$ for all $\omega \in N$, and thus $\mathbf{P}[\omega \in N : D_z(\omega) \neq \tilde{D}_z(\omega)] = 0$ for all $z \in \mathcal{Z}$.

Consider the second term of the expression. For any $\omega \in A$, $D_z(\omega) = 1$, $\tilde{D}_z(\omega) = \mathbf{1}(p(z) \geq 0) = 1$, so that $D_z(\omega) = \tilde{D}_z(\omega)$ for all $\omega \in A$. Thus, $\mathbf{P}[\omega \in A : D_z(\omega) \neq \tilde{D}_z(\omega)] = 0$ for all $z \in \mathcal{Z}$.

Now consider the third term of the expression. If $\mathbf{P}[\omega \in C] = 0$, then trivially $\Pr[\omega \in C : D_z(\omega) \neq \tilde{D}_z(\omega)] = 0$. Now assume $\mathbf{P}[\omega \in C] > 0$. We have $D_z(\omega) = 0$ and $\tilde{D}_z(\omega) = 0$ if z is such that $p(z) < U(\omega)$, and $D_z(\omega) = 1$ and $\tilde{D}_z(\omega) = 1$ if z is such that $p(z) > U(\omega)$. But, if z is such that $p(z) = U(\omega)$, then $D_z(\omega) = 1$ and $D_z(\omega)$ may equal 0. The event $\tilde{D}_z(\omega) = 1$ and $D_z(\omega) = 0$ will occur for some z values if $\sup_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_0(\omega)} p(z) = \inf_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_1(\omega)} p(z)$. Thus, $\{\omega \in C : D_z(\omega) \neq \tilde{D}_z(\omega)\} = \{\omega \in C : U(\omega) = p(z), D_z(\omega) = 0\}$. So we need to show that $\{\omega \in C : U(\omega) = p(z), D_z(\omega) = 0\}$ is a set of zero measure in the case where $\mathbf{P}[\omega \in C] > 0$. We will now show $\mathbf{P}[\omega : U(\omega) = p(z), D_z(\omega) = 0 | \omega \in C] = 0$ by a proof by contradiction. Let $\mathbf{P}[\omega : U(\omega) = p(z), D_z(\omega) = 0 | \omega \in C] = r$, and assume $r > 0$. There are two cases to consider, first where there does not exist $z' \in \mathcal{Z}_1(\omega)$, such that $p(z') = \inf_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_1(\omega)} p(z)$ (the inf is not attained), and second where the inf is attained. First consider the case where the inf is not attained. By construction, the event $[U(\omega) = p(z), D_z(\omega) = 0]$ implies $D_z(\omega) = 1$ for any z^* such that $p(z^*) > p(z)$. Thus, for any such z^* , $p(z^*) \geq p(z) + r\mathbf{P}[\omega \in C]$, and thus $(p(z), p(z) + r\mathbf{P}[\omega \in C]) \cap \mathcal{P} = \emptyset$. But then $U(\omega) \neq \inf_{z \in \mathcal{Z}_1(\omega)} p(z)$, a contradiction. Now consider the case where the inf is attained. Then there exists z' such that $p(z') = p(z)$ and $D_{z'} = 1$ and $D_z = 0$. The independence and monotonicity assumptions (assumptions (L-1) and (L-2)) immediately imply that this is a zero probability event.

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