# Optional Linux Cloudflare Tunnel ingress, independent of OpenAI Secure MCP Tunnel.
# Usage (dedicated NEW deployment only): specify the intended Compose project,
# env file and complete overlay set before starting serverfs-mcp + cloudflared.
# For an existing production project, read docs/cloudflare-tunnel.md first;
# never run a generic up that could recreate existing ServerFS/Agent services.
# Create a remotely managed Cloudflare Tunnel and route its public hostname to
# http://serverfs-mcp:8000 (use the configured SERVERFS_HTTP_PORT if changed).
# Put the original Tunnel token in an operator-owned file OUTSIDE the checkout
# and all configured workdirs, mode 0600, owned/readable by CLOUDFLARED_UID.
# Set CLOUDFLARE_TUNNEL_TOKEN_FILE to that absolute path in the untracked .env.
# ServerFS HTTP authentication is configured separately (API Key or OAuth).
services:
  # The base Compose keeps its historical OpenAI Tunnel default. Do not start
  # that separate control-plane client for the Cloudflare-only deployment.
  openai-tunnel:
    profiles: ["openai-tunnel"]

  cloudflared:
    # Tested example: 2026.10.7 on Linux amd64; override CLOUDFLARED_IMAGE as needed.
    # This is a recommended version tag, not a locked image digest.
    image: ${CLOUDFLARED_IMAGE:-cloudflare/cloudflared:2026.10.7}
    restart: unless-stopped
    # Independent connector identity permits a user-owned 0600 token file
    # without altering the ServerFS MCP container UID/GID.
    user: "${CLOUDFLARED_UID:-10001}:${CLOUDFLARED_GID:-10001}"
    depends_on:
      serverfs-mcp:
        condition: service_healthy
    command:
      - tunnel
      - --no-autoupdate
      - run
      - --token-file
      - /run/secrets/cloudflare-tunnel-token
    volumes:
      - type: bind
        source: ${CLOUDFLARE_TUNNEL_TOKEN_FILE:?Set an absolute external token file path in .env}
        target: /run/secrets/cloudflare-tunnel-token
        read_only: true
        bind:
          create_host_path: false
    networks:
      - serverfs_internal
      - tunnel_egress
    read_only: true
    cap_drop:
      - ALL
    security_opt:
      - no-new-privileges:true