--- name: epistemology description: "Master epistemology - the theory of knowledge, justification, and belief. Use for: knowledge, justification, skepticism, sources of knowledge, epistemic virtue. Triggers: 'knowledge', 'epistemology', 'justification', 'belief', 'Gettier', 'skepticism', 'certainty', 'evidence', 'testimony', 'perception', 'reason', 'a priori', 'empirical', 'reliability', 'internalism', 'externalism', 'foundationalism', 'coherentism'." --- # Epistemology Skill Master the theory of knowledge: What is knowledge? How is belief justified? Can we know anything? ## Core Questions | Question | Issue | Stakes | |----------|-------|--------| | What is knowledge? | Analysis | Definition of knowledge | | What justifies belief? | Justification | Epistemic norms | | Can we know anything? | Skepticism | Scope of knowledge | | What are sources of knowledge? | Sources | Perception, reason, testimony | --- ## The Analysis of Knowledge ### Traditional Analysis **JTB**: Knowledge = Justified True Belief ``` S knows that P iff: 1. S believes that P (belief condition) 2. P is true (truth condition) 3. S is justified in believing P (justification condition) ``` ### Gettier Problem **Gettier Cases** show JTB is not sufficient: ``` GETTIER CASE #1 ═══════════════ Smith has strong evidence that Jones will get the job (told by company president). Smith also knows Jones has 10 coins in his pocket. Smith infers: "The man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket." Unknown to Smith: HE (Smith) will get the job. And Smith happens to have 10 coins in his pocket. Smith's belief is: ✓ Justified (by evidence about Jones) ✓ True (Smith will get job, has 10 coins) ✗ NOT knowledge (too lucky!) ``` ### Post-Gettier Theories **Fourth Condition Approaches**: - No false lemmas - Causal connection - Defeasibility (no truths that would defeat justification) **Tracking** (Nozick): - S knows P iff: If P were false, S wouldn't believe P - Sensitivity condition **Safety** (Sosa, Pritchard): - S knows P iff: S couldn't easily have been wrong - In nearby possible worlds where S believes P, P is true **Virtue Epistemology**: - Knowledge = true belief from intellectual virtue - Success attributable to cognitive ability --- ## Theories of Justification ### Foundationalism ``` FOUNDATIONALIST STRUCTURE ═════════════════════════ DERIVED BELIEFS ├── Justified by inference ├── From more basic beliefs └── Not self-justifying ↑ │ BASIC BELIEFS ├── Self-justifying ├── Need no support from other beliefs └── Foundation of knowledge ``` **Basic Beliefs**: - Classical: self-evident, incorrigible - Modest: defeasibly justified without inference ### Coherentism ``` COHERENTIST STRUCTURE ═════════════════════ ┌─────────────────────┐ │ │ ┌───▼───┐ ┌─────┴───┐ │ Belief ├──────────►│ Belief │ │ A │◄──────────┤ B │ └───┬────┘ └────┬───┘ │ │ │ ┌─────────┐ │ └────► Belief ◄──────┘ │ C │ └────────┘ No foundations; mutual support ``` **Objection**: Coherent fiction could be well-justified but false (isolation problem) ### Infinitism - No basic beliefs - No circular justification - Infinite regress is not vicious - We can always provide further reasons ### Internalism vs. Externalism | Internalism | Externalism | |-------------|-------------| | Justifiers must be accessible to subject | Justifiers may be external | | What I can know by reflection | Reliable processes suffice | | Epistemic responsibility | Connection to truth matters | | Examples: evidentialism | Examples: reliabilism | --- ## Skepticism ### Cartesian Skepticism ``` SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT ══════════════════ 1. I cannot know I'm not a brain in a vat (BIV) 2. If I know I have hands, I can deduce I'm not a BIV 3. If I can't know the conclusion, I can't know the premise 4. Therefore, I don't know I have hands CLOSURE PRINCIPLE: If S knows P, and S knows P→Q, then S can know Q ``` ### Responses to Skepticism **Moorean Shift**: - I know I have hands - If I have hands, I'm not a BIV - Therefore, I know I'm not a BIV - Common sense trumps skeptical premises **Contextualism**: - "Know" has different standards in different contexts - In everyday contexts, we do know - In philosophical contexts, standards are higher - Both claims are true (in their contexts) **Relevant Alternatives**: - Knowledge requires ruling out relevant alternatives - BIV is not a relevant alternative in normal contexts --- ## Sources of Knowledge ### Perception **Direct Realism**: We perceive external objects directly **Indirect Realism**: We perceive sense-data caused by objects **Idealism**: Objects are mind-dependent **Problems**: - Perceptual error, illusion - Skepticism about external world - Theory-ladenness of observation ### Reason (A Priori Knowledge) **Rationalism**: Some knowledge is innate or a priori **Examples**: Mathematics, logic, conceptual truths **Problems**: - How do we access a priori truths? - Are they merely analytic? - Quine's attack on analytic/synthetic distinction ### Testimony **Reductionism**: Testimony reducible to other sources **Anti-Reductionism**: Testimony is fundamental source **Conditions**: Speaker sincerity, competence, listener's critical uptake ### Memory **Preservative**: Memory preserves justification **Generative**: Memory can generate new knowledge **Problems**: False memories, reliability --- ## Key Concepts ### Epistemic Virtues | Virtue | Description | |--------|-------------| | Intellectual humility | Recognizing limits | | Open-mindedness | Considering alternatives | | Intellectual courage | Pursuing truth despite cost | | Thoroughness | Careful investigation | | Fair-mindedness | Impartial assessment | ### Evidence **Evidentialism**: Justification proportional to evidence **Evidence types**: Perceptual, testimonial, inferential ### Degrees of Belief (Bayesian) - Credences: Degrees of belief (0-1) - Conditionalization: Update on evidence - Bayes' theorem: P(H|E) = P(E|H)·P(H)/P(E) --- ## Key Vocabulary | Term | Meaning | |------|---------| | Justified | Having good reasons | | A priori | Independent of experience | | A posteriori | Dependent on experience | | Analytic | True by meaning | | Synthetic | True by world | | Infallible | Cannot be wrong | | Defeasible | Can be overridden | | Propositional knowledge | Knowledge that P | | Knowledge how | Practical knowledge | | Epistemic luck | Being right by chance | | Closure | Knowledge closed under known entailment | --- ## Integration with Repository ### Related Themes - `thoughts/knowledge/`: Epistemological explorations - `thoughts/consciousness/`: Perception, self-knowledge