--- name: philosophy-of-language description: "Master philosophy of language - meaning, reference, truth, speech acts. Use for: semantics, pragmatics, meaning theory, reference. Triggers: 'meaning', 'reference', 'Frege', 'sense', 'Kripke', 'speech act', 'semantics', 'pragmatics', 'truth conditions', 'propositions', 'names', 'descriptions', 'rigid designator', 'natural kind', 'context', 'indexical'." --- # Philosophy of Language Skill Master the philosophical study of language: How do words mean? How does reference work? What is truth? ## Core Questions | Question | Issue | |----------|-------| | How do words mean? | Theory of meaning | | How do names refer? | Reference theory | | What is truth? | Truth theories | | What do we do with words? | Speech act theory | --- ## Theories of Meaning ### Frege: Sense and Reference ``` FREGEAN SEMANTICS ═════════════════ REFERENCE (Bedeutung) ├── What expression picks out ├── "Venus" refers to Venus └── Compositional: Reference of whole from parts SENSE (Sinn) ├── Mode of presentation ├── Cognitive significance ├── "Morning star" vs. "Evening star" └── Same reference, different sense WHY BOTH? ├── "Hesperus = Phosphorus" is informative ├── "Hesperus = Hesperus" is trivial ├── Same reference, different sense └── Sense determines reference ``` ### Russell: Descriptions **The Problem**: "The present King of France is bald" - No King of France exists - What does the sentence mean? **Russell's Analysis**: ``` "The F is G" = ∃x(Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → y=x) ∧ Gx) "There is exactly one F, and it is G" Not a referring expression but a quantified claim False (not meaningless) because no unique F exists ``` ### Direct Reference **Kripke's Revolution**: - Names are rigid designators - Refer to same thing in all possible worlds - Not abbreviated descriptions ``` KRIPKE'S ARGUMENTS ══════════════════ MODAL ARGUMENT: "Aristotle might not have been a philosopher" ├── Makes sense ├── But "The teacher of Alexander might not have taught Alexander" │ └── Would make Aristotle not Aristotle └── Names ≠ descriptions EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT: We can discover "Hesperus = Phosphorus" ├── A posteriori necessary truth ├── Same thing in all worlds └── But discovered, not known a priori SEMANTIC ARGUMENT: Reference is causal-historical ├── Not by fitting description ├── Baptism + chain of communication └── Name-using practice ``` --- ## Meaning and Use ### Wittgenstein: Meaning as Use **Early**: Meaning is picturing reality **Later**: "Meaning is use in a language game" **Language Games**: - Meaning depends on context, rules, practice - No single essence to "meaning" - Family resemblance **Private Language Argument**: - No purely private meanings - Rule-following requires community - Meaning is public ### Speech Act Theory (Austin, Searle) ``` SPEECH ACT THEORY ═════════════════ THREE TYPES OF ACTS: LOCUTIONARY ├── Saying something with meaning └── Uttering words with sense and reference ILLOCUTIONARY ├── What you do in saying it ├── Promising, warning, asserting └── Force of the utterance PERLOCUTIONARY ├── Effect on hearer ├── Persuading, frightening, amusing └── Consequences of saying FELICITY CONDITIONS: ├── Preparatory: Appropriate circumstances ├── Sincerity: Speaker means it ├── Essential: Counts as the act └── Infelicity: Act fails (not false, but unhappy) ``` --- ## Reference and Names ### Descriptivist Theory **Frege/Russell**: Names = disguised descriptions - "Aristotle" = "The teacher of Alexander" (or cluster) - Reference determined by satisfying description **Problems** (Kripke): - Modal: Could have failed to satisfy description - Epistemic: Can discover identity - Semantic: Reference even with false beliefs ### Causal-Historical Theory **Kripke/Putnam**: - Initial baptism fixes reference - Reference transmitted through causal chain - Community-based reference ### Natural Kind Terms **Putnam's Twin Earth**: ``` TWIN EARTH ══════════ Scenario: ├── Twin Earth exactly like Earth ├── Except "water" is XYZ, not H₂O ├── XYZ phenomenally identical to H₂O └── 1750: No one knows difference Question: Does "water" mean the same? Putnam: No! ├── "Water" on Earth refers to H₂O ├── "Water" on Twin Earth refers to XYZ ├── "Meanings ain't in the head" └── Natural kind terms refer to natural kinds ``` --- ## Truth ### Correspondence Theory - Truth = correspondence to facts - "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white - Problems: What are facts? What is correspondence? ### Coherence Theory - Truth = coherence with other beliefs - System of beliefs that hangs together - Problems: Coherent fictions? ### Pragmatic Theory - Truth = what works - Useful beliefs are true - Problems: Useful ≠ true ### Deflationism - "True" is just a device for endorsement - "Snow is white" is true = Snow is white - No substantial property ### Tarski's Semantic Theory ``` TARSKIAN TRUTH ══════════════ T-SCHEMA: "S" is true iff S EXAMPLE: "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white Requirements: ├── Object language (mentioned) ├── Metalanguage (used) ├── Hierarchy avoids liar paradox └── Truth defined for formal languages ``` --- ## Context and Indexicals ### Indexicals - "I", "here", "now", "this" - Reference depends on context of utterance - Kaplan: Character vs. Content ``` KAPLAN'S THEORY ═══════════════ CHARACTER ├── Rule for determining reference ├── "I" = speaker of context └── Constant across contexts CONTENT ├── What's said in context ├── "I am tired" said by me └── Proposition about me ``` ### Contextualism - Meaning of many expressions context-dependent - Not just indexicals - "Knows", "tall", "ready" --- ## Key Vocabulary | Term | Meaning | |------|---------| | Sense | Mode of presentation | | Reference | What expression picks out | | Rigid designator | Same reference in all worlds | | Indexical | Context-dependent expression | | Proposition | What is said, content | | Speech act | Action performed in speaking | | Illocutionary force | Type of speech act | | Compositionality | Meaning of whole from parts | | Use theory | Meaning is use | | Direct reference | Names refer without sense | --- ## Integration with Repository ### Related Skills - `analytic-philosophy`: Core tradition - `logic`: Formal semantics ### Related Themes - `thoughts/knowledge/`: Language and thought