2026-10-07 (WEDNESDAY): EXPLOITATION OF CVE-2026-90817 FOR EVASIVE CRYPTOCURRENCY MINING CAMPAIGN AUTHORS: - Nithin Chenthur Prabhu, Somil Tyagi, Alex Payne REFERENCES: - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/weve-observed-in-the-wild-exploitation-of-ugcPost-7515577085759963136-eS2m/ - https://x.com/Unit42_Intel/status/2109811397617992120 NOTES: - Attackers are actively exploiting CVE-2026-90817 - CVE-2026-90817 allows for Remote Code Execution (RCE) in vulnerable versions of public-facing REDCap servers - Successful exploitation leads to an in-memory execution chain utilizing: -- Native bash networking -- Steganographic payload delivery disguised as image files -- Process masquerading -- Anti-forensic measures - This in-memory execution chain has deployed Monero (XMRig) cryptocurrency miners - Intelligence derived from the configured XMRig mining pool wallet confirms: -- An active campaign -- At least four live worker instances concurrently mining cryptocurrency - Per REDCap: -- Research Electronic Data Capture (REDCap) is committed to maintaining a secure platform and responding promptly to identified vulnerabilities. -- After learning of this vulnerability in September, REDCap released a software update addressing it within two days. -- We will continue to work closely with REDCap partner institutions and their administrators to provide timely, transparent communication about security-related matters. DETAILS: Initial Access for Exploitation: - Attackers attempt to exploit CVE-2026-90817 through an unauthenticated HTTP POST request: - The request is: POST /redcap/surveys/?s=NXCJMDCWXE&__passthru=%2569ndex.php&route=DataImportController%3Aindex Web Shell Staging: - These exploitation attempts leverage: -- An accessible public survey hash parameter (s=NXCJMDCWXE) to route execution through 'php-fpm' --- 'php-fpm' runs under web server permissions -- A successful execution stages a transient Blade template web shell under: /var/www/html/redcap/temp/cache/d3f11fc8ee9c2d986425eff26ecace5b4004eb8e.bladec Fileless Reverse Shell & Payload Delivery: - The webshell uses an injected command to execute a Base64-encoded bash cradle entirely in memory - The cradle opens a raw socket to an S3 bucket via native bash networking -- This is done to evade perimeter network inspection and avoid dropping binaries - An HTTP GET request fetches a secondary payload -- The payload is disguised as a JPEG image (URL ending in /banner_avp_800x800.jpg) -- HTTP response headers are stripped using 'sed' -- The resulting bash script is piped directly into execution (| bash) - The secondary payload is an archive for XMRig v6.26.0 Cryptocurrency Miner Staging & Execution: - The XMRig archive is saved to a hidden, host-derived staging directory established at: /var/tmp/.syslog-a224be51/xmrig.tar.gz - The miner is configured via a multi-pool configuration file -- This configuration file is also fetched as a disguised image (URL ending in /banner-ver2_800x800.jpg) -- This configuration directs mining to auto.c3pool[.]org -- Uses a 0% donation fee and binds an administrative JSON-RPC API to 127.0.0.1:50001 with bearer token '123' Campaign Telemetry: - Public telemetry from the mining pool reveals the attackers' configured XMR payout wallet at: 87maYgt7bMvgDxQsBavYNVDr6BQgJNaaRKXg2yBh8A3GLVoizCq9eeycBT7v6kdnm8f41Vfz84x6XLeEUJDRqvYbSrhvzTw -- This wallet activity confirms at least four active worker nodes currently mining -- These four nodes indicate wider ongoing exploitation Defense Evasion & Process Masquerading: - The cryptocurrency miner binary is executed using 'exec -a' -- The 'exec -a' command uses randomized, syslog-themed process names (e.g., syslog-ng-{hash}) -- These syslog-themed process names are an attempt to blend into legitimate Linux system services - An inline, Base64-obfuscated watchdog daemon (syslog-helper) runs in a continuous 0.1-second loop -- It polls the 'w' command to detect interactive user sessions -- This daemon looks for active sessions with idle times under 300 seconds --- If detected, the daemon pauses mining via the local JSON-RPC API --- This is likely an attempt to avoid detection Competitor Miner Neutralization: - The deployment script actively inspects running process memory and strings -- This is done to identify and kill rival mining instances -- Matching strings for rival mining instances include 'stratum+tcp' or 'randomx' - Known competitor staging directories are locked by changing file permissions to '000' -- Examples of these directory paths include '/dev/shm/duet' and '/var/tmp/.bin Persistence & Anti-Forensics: - The script modifies system crontabs to establish scheduled execution -- The script periodically pulls payloads (grepb2.jpg) - An unauthorized RSA public key is appended to all accessible 'authorized_keys' files across user profiles -- The associated fingerprint is: Ant3qLKQ9 - Attackers modify '~/.profile' - Attackers also explicitly wipe session history by unsetting 'HISTFILE' and purging '~/.bash_history' INDICATORS: - 202.61.130[.]221 -- Attacker IP address (exploit source) - 39a435123dc1fffd499aa2acf11ef46e3ee2e805bf137811af0c2c5b12546920 -- SHA-256 hash for secondary stage payload script (dropper for cryptocurrency miner) - /var/www/html/redcap/temp/cache/d3f11fc8ee9c2d986425eff26ecace5b4004eb8e.bladec -- Path for dropped web shell file - /var/tmp/.syslog-a224be51/xmrig.tar.gz -- Path for staged cryptocurrency miner archive - 87maYgt7bMvgDxQsBavYNVDr6BQgJNaaRKXg2yBh8A3GLVoizCq9eeycBT7v6kdnm8f41Vfz84x6XLeEUJDRqvYbSrhvzTw -- Address for attacker's XMRig wallet (used by active worker fleet)