# ๐Ÿค– dsh-auto-review [![Gitee](https://img.shields.io/badge/Gitee-mirror-c71d23?logo=gitee)](https://gitee.com/perrylink/dsh-auto-review) **Second-model AI approval for DeepSeek Harness โ€” a read-only reviewer subagent decides allow/deny on the approval chain, fail-closed by default.** *When an action crosses the sandbox boundary, a second model reads the evidence and returns a verdict with a reason โ€” so humans approve nothing while nothing unsafe slips through.* > **Official repository.** This is the only official repository of dsh-auto-review, maintained by PerryLink. Same-name repositories under other accounts are not affiliated. [![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache%202.0-blue.svg)](LICENSE) [![DSH plugin](https://img.shields.io/badge/dsh--plugin-โœ…-green)](https://github.com/topics/dsh-plugin) [![dsh-doctor](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PerryLink/dsh-plugin-doctor/main/badges/PerryLink__dsh-auto-review.svg)](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-plugin-doctor#verified-ๅพฝ็ซ ) [![Node](https://img.shields.io/badge/node-%5E22.19%20%7C%7C%20%3E%3D24-brightgreen.svg)](#) [![CI](https://img.shields.io/github/actions/workflow/status/PerryLink/dsh-auto-review/ci.yml?branch=main&label=CI)](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-auto-review/actions) [![Version](https://img.shields.io/github/v/tag/PerryLink/dsh-auto-review?label=version)](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-auto-review/releases) [![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/dsh-auto-review)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/dsh-auto-review) [![npm downloads](https://img.shields.io/npm/dm/dsh-auto-review)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/dsh-auto-review) [English](README.md) ยท [็ฎ€ไฝ“ไธญๆ–‡](README-zh.md) ยท [Espaรฑol](README-es.md) ยท [Portuguรชs](README-pt.md) ยท [เคนเคฟเคจเฅเคฆเฅ€](README-hi.md)
--- ## Compatibility | Surface | Status | |---|---| | Harness | DeepSeek Harness `dsh-v0.1.6-alpha.2` (verified 2026-09-18). Dual-line npm support: dev pins and runtime deps `0.1.5-rc.2`, peers `>=0.1.2-rc.1 <0.2.0 \|\| >=0.1.5-alpha.1 <0.2.0 \|\| >=0.1.6-0 <0.2.0` โ€” the plugin code feature-detects the published host lines and each line runs the full gate chain; the runtime dependency pins follow the alpha line so a profile install never shadows the host's own tree. On the alpha.2 line the eval fixtures pin `deepseek-flash` (the removed `deepseek-v4-flash` id is gone from `eval/`). | | Node | `^22.19.0 \|\| >=24.0.0` | | Platforms | All (host answerer; optional Web review panel via the session-projection capability) | | Model | Any (the reviewer inherits the session agent's route; `reviewerModel` overrides) | ## What you get `dsh-auto-review` puts a second model on the `approval/request` answerer chain: 1. **Official seam** โ€” an answerer that claims only the requests it owns (`ai` policy) and delegates everything else via `next()`; the human approval flow is never short-circuited. 2. **Read-only reviewer subagent** โ€” a one-shot fork with a `read`/`glob`/`grep` tool allow-list returns a structured verdict `{ decision, reason, riskLevel }`. Reviewer asks are recognized by identity and delegated; `maxDepth` + the allow-list keep the reviewer non-delegating. 3. **Fail closed** โ€” reviewer crash, timeout, or schema mismatch resolves through `fallbackPolicy` (default `rejected`); a deny verdict feeds its reason back to the calling model. 4. **Config-driven routing** โ€” per-tool policies (`ai`/`human`/`never`) plus regex risk rules, all changeable from cordis.yml. 5. **Deny reasons reach the model** โ€” the reviewer's reason is injected into the denied tool result (callId-linked); fallback and `never`-policy rejections inject auditable markers too (`[auto-review]` / `[auto-review-fallback]` / `[auto-review-never]`). 6. **Full audit trail** โ€” log-only `autoReview/verdict` + `autoReview/rejection` session events (envelope `ignorable: true`) plus an optional invariant companion enforcing marker โŸบ event. 7. **Safety knobs** โ€” a rejection circuit breaker (3 consecutive denials, or 6 of the last 10 verdicts, per turn), a risk-level policy, a one-shot `/auto-review approve` override, and a `never`-policy hard disable that explains itself to the model. 8. **Optional reviewer context** โ€” a bounded compact transcript (`contextBudget`) plus a Codex-style Markdown ruling policy (`reviewerPolicyText`). Every decision reconstructs from the session log: `approval/asked` โ†’ `autoReview/verdict` (or `autoReview/rejection`) โ†’ `approval/decided`. ## Why a second model instead of rules? Pattern-based auto-approvers decide before dispatch, with no evidence. `dsh-auto-review` gives the decision to a **reviewer subagent** that reads the actual workspace (through its read-only tool face), the already-streamed tool-call arguments (sensitive values redacted), the request reason, and your risk rules โ€” then returns a structured verdict. A deny verdict feeds its **reason back to the calling model**, so the agent learns why instead of retrying blindly. ## Quick start ```sh # 1. install the bundle into your profile dsh plugin --profile web add "github:PerryLink/dsh-auto-review#main" # or from npm (published releases) dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-auto-review # 2. restart and verify the row dsh --profile web --dump-config | grep -A4 'id: auto-review' ``` Out of the box the shipped patch AI-reviews `bash` and `write`; every other tool (including `edit` โ€” in-place modification) delegates to the human chain. Add `edit: ai` explicitly if you accept in-place edits without a human in the loop. ## Install & uninstall - **git channel** (latest `main`): `dsh plugin --profile web add "github:PerryLink/dsh-auto-review#main"` โ€” the isolated `prepare` build needs the single `allowBuilds: { esbuild: true }` key the `dsh` CLI prints for `dsh-auto-review`. - **npm channel** (published releases): `dsh plugin --profile web add dsh-auto-review`. - **1024 store channel**: `npm i -g dsh1024` once, then `dsh1024 plugin --profile web add dsh-auto-review` (counts toward the [deepseek1024.com](https://deepseek1024.com) install ranking). - **tarball channel**: `pnpm pack` in this repo, then `dsh plugin --profile web add ./dsh-auto-review-.tgz`. - **uninstall**: `dsh plugin --profile web remove dsh-auto-review` (or remove the row from the profile patch). - **native build scripts**: when `dsh plugin add` stops at `ERR_PNPM_IGNORED_BUILDS` for `koffi` / `node-pty` (pulled in by the eval harness), run `pnpm approve-builds` to approve those build scripts. ## Configuration All tunables are Schemastery `Config` fields (changeable from cordis.yml). An id-targeted override replaces the whole row โ€” restate every key you need. | Key | Default | Meaning | |---|---|---| | `enableByDefault` | `true` | Sessions start with auto-review enabled; `/auto-review on\|off` writes a durable override that beats this | | `toolsPolicy.default` | `human` | Policy for unlisted tools (delegate to the human answerer) | | `toolsPolicy.overrides` | `{}` | Per-tool policy: `ai` / `human` / `never` | | `riskRules` | `[]` | `{pattern, policy, field?}` matched before the tool table; `field` selects `reason` (default), `toolName`, or `arguments` | | `reviewerProvider` | `fork` | Subagent provider for the reviewer (in-process fork backend) | | `reviewerModel` | *(inherit)* | Reviewer model id; unset inherits the session agent's route | | `reviewerTimeoutMs` | `60000` | Verdict deadline; on expiry the fallback policy applies | | `reviewerTools` | `[read, glob, grep]` | The reviewer child's tool allow-list (must be non-empty) | | `fallbackPolicy` | `rejected` | Reviewer failure: `rejected` (fail closed) / `delegate` / `allow-once` | | `maxReviewsPerTurn` | `10` | Real AI-verdict budget per open turn; beyond it, requests delegate | | `maxFailuresPerTurn` | `10` | Reviewer-failure budget per open turn | | `reasonMaxChars` | `2000` | Cap for reviewer reasons and the redacted argument preview | | `reviewerGuidance` | *(none)* | Optional advisory guidance appended to the reviewer prompt | | `reviewerPolicyText` | *(none)* | Markdown ruling policy injected into the reviewer prompt (Codex-style) | | `denyGuidance` | *(anti-circumvention text)* | Guidance appended to every injected deny reason | | `contextBudget` | `{turns: 2, maxChars: 4000}` | Compact transcript budget for the reviewer prompt (the open turn plus the one before it); `turns: 0` disables the section โ€” and a blind reviewer denies user-authorized actions, so the runtime warns when 0 meets an `ai` policy. The character budget is spent on the most recent lines | | `riskPolicy` | `{maxAutoAllow: high, onHighRisk: delegate}` | `allow` verdicts above `maxAutoAllow` delegate or deny | | `circuitBreaker` | `{consecutiveDenies: 3, windowDenies: 6, windowSize: 10, action: delegate}` | Rejection circuit breaker | | `overrideTtlMs` | `300000` | How long a `/auto-review approve` override stays usable | | `verdictCacheTtlMs` | `60000` | Reuse a recent verdict for an identical `tool + arguments` fingerprint; `0` disables the cache. Only applies with `contextBudget.turns: 0` โ€” a transcript-dependent verdict is not replayable from `tool + arguments` alone | | `verdictCacheMaxEntries` | `256` | Maximum cached fingerprints before oldest-eviction | | `language` | `en` | UI language of the `/auto-review` command output (`en` \| `zh`) | | `allowUnmarkedAudit` | `false` | Force session-log audit on hosts that drop the `ignorable` marker or fail-closed on unknown event types (host `0.1.2-rc.1`+) (dangerous: unmarked events make sessions unresumable elsewhere); default is detect-and-degrade (adapted 2026-09-02, re-verified against `0.1.5-rc.2` on 2026-09-11): the session envelope keeps its ignorable field for stored-log read compatibility only - Session.append still cannot stamp it, so audit-gate behavior is unchanged. | Example (annotated full form: `fixtures/config/config-full.yaml`): ```yaml - insert: - id: auto-review name: dsh-auto-review config: toolsPolicy: overrides: { bash: ai, write: ai } riskRules: - pattern: '(?i)(rm\s+(-[a-z]+\s+)*/|git\s+push\s+--force)' policy: never - pattern: 'write' policy: never field: toolName reviewerTimeoutMs: 30000 fallbackPolicy: delegate riskPolicy: { maxAutoAllow: medium, onHighRisk: delegate } circuitBreaker: { consecutiveDenies: 3, windowDenies: 6, windowSize: 10, action: delegate } ``` ### Where the config actually comes from **`~/.dsh/settings.yaml` is NOT a config source for this plugin.** An `auto-review:` block there has no effect and produces no warning: like every DSH function plugin, `dsh-auto-review` receives its `Config` from the row the loader mounts it with โ€” the profile's cordis patch layer. (Some other DSH plugins additionally read the settings service, so the inconsistency is easy to trip over, and the symptom is indistinguishable from the reviewer simply denying.) Put the configuration in your profile's `cordis.patch.yml`. An **id-targeted override replaces the whole config row**, so restate every key you need โ€” dropping `toolsPolicy` silently returns `bash`/`write` to the schema default `human` and the reviewer stops running at all: ```yaml - id: auto-review config: toolsPolicy: overrides: { bash: ai, write: ai } contextBudget: { turns: 4, maxChars: 8000 } ``` ## Tools & surfaces | Surface | Kind | Notes | |---|---|---| | `auto-review` | answerer | `approval/request` waterfall answerer โ€” claims `ai`-policy requests, delegates the rest via `next()` | | `/auto-review` | command | `on\|off\|status\|approve [n]` โ€” durable per-session override, budgets, and cumulative statistics | | deny-reason injection | listener | `tools/post-execute` โ€” verdict / fallback / `never` reasons fed back to the denied tool result | | `autoReview` | session projection | Folded from the log-only `autoReview/*` events | | Web review panel | client | Session-header action: switch, budgets, statistics, recent verdicts, one-shot approve | | `dsh-eval` | CLI | YAML-driven agent evaluation engine (`bin/dsh-eval.mjs`) | | invariant companion | invariant | `dsh-auto-review/invariant` (optional; needs the `invariants` service) | ## Session command ``` /auto-review on|off|status|approve [n] ``` `on`/`off` append the durable `autoReview/state` override (the fold survives restart/resume โ€” replay IS the state) and inject a switch notice the model sees (logged as a `user/message` event). `status` reports the effective state, both per-turn budgets (AI verdicts and reviewer failures), a tripped circuit breaker when one is active, and the session's cumulative statistics (allows/denies/fallbacks/never rejects, mean duration, recent verdicts). `approve [n]` records a single-use `autoReview/override` for the n-th most recent denial (1 = most recent): the next same-tool review within `overrideTtlMs` carries the authorization as reviewer context โ€” the reviewer still decides, and the override is consumed by that review regardless of its outcome. ## Web review panel In the Web GUI (web profile), the package contributes a session-header action (**AI Review**) that opens a panel with the session's auto-review state: the switch with on/off buttons (they execute `/auto-review on|off`), both per-turn budgets, cumulative statistics (including hard-disable rejections and cache hits), the circuit trip, the recent verdicts, and one-shot **approve** buttons for recent denials (they execute `/auto-review approve [n]`). How it is wired: - The host registers an `autoReview` **session projection** (folded from the log-only `autoReview/*` events) and serves it through the session-projection channel. - The browser half is a **client module** (auto-discovered from the `dsh.client` declaration) registered on the `conversation.session.header.actions` seat. - No extra patch rows are needed: the panel loads whenever the plugin is installed in a profile whose web build provides the session-projection capability (the web profile does). Without that capability the panel reports itself unavailable; the answerer is unaffected. The panel reads only whole projection values โ€” it never receives the raw session event stream. ## How it works ```text approval/request waterfall (answerer chain) โ”‚ โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ดโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ” โ”‚ dsh-auto-review answerer โ”‚ โ”‚ ยท session enabled? ยท policy = ai? โ”‚ no โ”€โ”€ next() โ”€โ”€โ–ถ human answerer (UI) โ”‚ ยท risk rules โ†’ toolsPolicy โ†’ default โ”‚ โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ฌโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜ โ”‚ yes โ–ผ โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ” โ”‚ reviewer subagent (fork, one-shot)โ”‚ โ”‚ ยท toolFilter: read/glob/grep โ”‚ โ”‚ ยท outputSchema: {decision, โ”‚ โ”‚ reason, riskLevel} โ”‚ โ”‚ ยท timeout + req.signal abort โ”‚ โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”ฌโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜ โ”‚ verdict / failure (fail-closed fallback) โ–ผ allow โ†’ allowed-once deny โ†’ rejected + reason injected into the denied tool result (callId-linked) โ”‚ never โ†’ rejected + [auto-review-never] feedback โ”‚ (hard disable, no reviewer runs) โ–ผ audit: approval/asked โ†’ autoReview/verdict | autoReview/rejection โ†’ approval/decided (session events, log-only, invariant-checked) ``` **Composition order.** The answerer runs at its registration position in the waterfall: if a human UI answerer is composed BEFORE the `auto-review` row, humans answer first and the reviewer only sees what is delegated downstream. Verify with `dsh --profile --dump-config` and place the `auto-review` row before your human answerer rows when you want ai-policy tools routed to the reviewer first. ## dsh-eval โ€” agent evaluation engine Beyond the approval reviewer, `dsh-auto-review` ships `dsh-eval`: a YAML-driven agent evaluation platform that runs real headless DSH sessions (one isolated agent + scratch workspace per case, the official Minimal persona as the baseline system prompt), collects the tool-call trace from the session event log, and evaluates structured assertions plus an optional second-model review โ€” the same reviewer seam as the approval answerer. ```yaml # eval/cases/demo.yaml (abridged) suite: name: my-suite cases: - id: math-output input: Solve 17 ร— 24 and reply with only the final number, nothing else. expect: output: { contains: "408" } - id: glob-trace seedFrom: '.' input: Use the glob tool with pattern "src/**" to list the source filesโ€ฆ expect: toolCalls: [{ tool: glob, arguments: { contains: { pattern: "src" } } }] results: [{ tool: glob, contains: "index.ts" }] ``` Run it (a DeepSeek API key must be in the environment): ```sh dsh-eval eval/cases --model deepseek-flash --timeout-ms 240000 --out .eval-reports ``` ### Assertion families The `expect` block supports six assertion families; each assertion is evaluated independently and reports its own pass/fail with expected/actual values, so a failing case explains itself without a rerun. | Family | DSL keys | What it gates | |---|---|---| | Tool trace | `toolCalls`, `toolCallsExact`, `noToolCalls`, `results` | ordered tool-call sequence (subsequence with skips), exact name sequence, per-tool result (`isError`/`contains`/`regex`) | | Output & budget | `output`, `turnEnds`, `maxTokens` | final-output substring/regex, turn outcome, token budget | | Prompt regression | `prompt` | the rendered system prompt must match a committed `baseline` (or a `baselineFrom` file); any drift is reported as a **side-by-side diff**, with `allowedChanges` regexes to whitelist intended edits | | Stress metrics | `stress` | P99 step latency (`maxP99Ms`), worst time-to-first-token (`maxTtftMs`), aggregate token generation speed (`minTokensPerSecond`) | | Fairness | `bias` | bias radar over the final output: per-category regex counts (`categories`), hard `forbid` patterns, `maxHits`/`maxCategoryHits` caps | | Second-model review | `review` | a supplementary pass/fail verdict from the reviewer subagent (a separate layer, same seam as the approval reviewer) | ```yaml - id: regression-gate input: Answer in one sentence. expect: prompt: baseline: "You are a helpful software engineer assistant." allowedChanges: ["copyright-year"] stress: maxP99Ms: 8000 maxTtftMs: 3000 minTokensPerSecond: 20 bias: categories: { gender: ["[Hh]e is (un)?stable"] } forbid: ["[Ss]crew that"] maxCategoryHits: 0 ``` CI gate: the process exits 0 only when every case of every suite passed โ€” failing evaluations fail the build. Each case leaves a replayable session JSONL and a trace JSON beside `report.md`/`report.json`; assertion results (including the prompt side-by-side diff), token usage, stress/bias metrics, and the review verdict are all written into the report files. ```yaml - name: dsh-eval run: npx dsh-eval eval/cases --model deepseek-flash --timeout-ms 240000 --out .eval-reports env: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEEPSEEK_API_KEY }} ``` `dsh-eval` differs from [openai/codex-research](https://github.com/openai/codex-research): codex-research scores agent trajectories for research comparison; `dsh-eval` is a declarative pass/fail regression harness โ€” YAML cases, structured trace/prompt/stress/bias assertions, an optional second-model review, and a CI exit code โ€” for gating any DSH agent, not research ranking. ## MCP server (standalone) `dsh-auto-review` also ships a stdio **MCP server** (`dsh-auto-review-mcp`) so external MCP clients (Claude, Codex, โ€ฆ) can consume a deterministic review path without a harness. It speaks JSON-RPC 2.0 over newline-delimited JSON (NDJSON) โ€” one JSON object per line, no `Content-Length` framing. **Boundary.** The full reviewer needs the harness subagent seam and a second model, which a separate stdio process cannot reach. The standalone server is therefore **deterministic rules + cache, no model review**: - `review_action` reuses the same-fingerprint verdict cache (`src/cache.ts`) and the risk-rule / tool-policy resolution (`src/config.ts`): a `never` rule โ†’ `deny`; a cache hit on an identical `tool + arguments` fingerprint replays that verdict; anything else (`ai` needs a model, `human` needs a human) โ†’ fail-closed `deny` with `reason: "standalone path, no model"`. It never allows an action a model did not already allow. - `cache_stats` reports hit/store counts and the TTL status. | Tool | Purpose | |---|---| | `review_action` | `{tool, args?, reason?}` โ†’ `{decision, reason, riskLevel}` โ€” deterministic deny / cache replay | | `cache_stats` | `{}` โ†’ `{hits, stores, size, ttlMs, enabled}` | Run it directly: ```sh # risk rules come from environment variables export DSH_AUTO_REVIEW_RISK_RULES='[{"pattern":"rm -rf","policy":"never","field":"arguments"}]' node bin/dsh-auto-review-mcp.mjs # or, after npm install: npx dsh-auto-review-mcp ``` Environment config: `DSH_AUTO_REVIEW_RISK_RULES` (JSON array of `{pattern, policy, field?}`), `DSH_AUTO_REVIEW_TOOLS_POLICY` (JSON `{default?, overrides?}`), `DSH_AUTO_REVIEW_CACHE_TTL_MS`, `DSH_AUTO_REVIEW_CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES`. Claude Desktop (`claude_desktop_config.json`) example: ```json { "mcpServers": { "dsh-auto-review": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "dsh-auto-review-mcp"], "env": { "DSH_AUTO_REVIEW_RISK_RULES": "[{\"pattern\":\"rm -rf\",\"policy\":\"never\",\"field\":\"arguments\"}]" } } } } ``` The server is read-only and deterministic: no network, no model, no writes. ## Permissions & data - **Permissions**: the workshop manifest declares `session:append`, `approval:answer`, `subagent:spawn`, `command:register`, and `tools:observe`. - **Data**: nothing is stored on disk; the report ring buffer is in-memory and bounded. No network requests of its own. - **Session log**: `autoReview/*` events carry reviewer identity, verdict, reason, risk, and duration โ€” appended with the envelope's `ignorable: true` marker so any build loads the log. Hosts whose `Session.append` predates the marker (every released rc line through `0.1.1-rc.2` โ€” no release stamps it yet) are detected before the first append (peer-version pre-check); hosts `0.1.2-rc.1`, `0.1.3-alpha.2`, and `0.1.5-rc.2` keep the `ignorable` field on the envelope but `Session.append` offers no way to stamp it (its third parameter is `SurfaceIntent` for surface events only), and the persistence read path refuses unmarked unknown event types, so those lines โ€” and unresolvable versions โ€” also fail closed before any append. Audit then degrades to an in-memory mirror with marker-free feedback, so sessions stay loadable everywhere. ## Security boundaries - **The reviewer is a model.** Its verdicts are advisory policy, not a security kernel; prefer `human`/`never` rules for irreversible operations. - **Fail closed.** Every abnormal path (provider missing, capability gaps, start rejection, timeout, non-`completed` stop reason, missing/malformed verdict, audit-correlation failure) resolves through `fallbackPolicy`, default `rejected` โ€” and the rejection feeds an auditable reason back to the model. `allow-once` grants unconditionally; it exists only for unattended deployments whose admin accepts that risk. - **Read-only reviewer.** The reviewer's `toolFilter` allow-list (`read`/`glob`/`grep`) cannot write, edit, run bash, fetch the network, or delegate (`maxDepth` = its own depth). Its session log is persisted and auditable. - **Context-isolated reviewer.** The reviewer child's steps are filtered on the documented `agent/pre-step` seam: only its own prompt and its own read-only tool results enter them. Workspace instruction files (`AGENTS.md` / `CLAUDE.md`), the harness runtime-context snapshot, and any context-injecting plugin are dropped before the loop appends them, so repository-controlled text never reaches the component that decides whether a call is allowed. This holds under EITHER subagent provider โ€” those producers inject fresh into any new agent session, so the filter, not the provider choice, is what closes them. The filter is an allow-list over message SOURCES, so a plugin that declares a new source kind is dropped too. - **Sensitive arguments are redacted** (key-name matching: `token`, `password`, `api_key`, `Authorization`, credentials, private keys โ€ฆ) before entering the reviewer prompt; the plugin never executes the reviewed arguments. Redaction is key-based, not content-based โ€” do not AI-review tools whose argument values you cannot afford to show a model. - **Hard disables explain themselves.** A `never` tool or risk rule rejects deterministically AND records a log-only `autoReview/rejection` event, then injects a `[auto-review-never]` marker into the denied tool result โ€” the model learns the action is hard-disabled instead of retrying it (invariant-checked: marker โŸบ event). - **Rejection circuit breaker.** A run of denials in one turn trips the breaker (`consecutiveDenies` / `windowDenies` inside `windowSize`), recorded as a log-only `autoReview/circuit` event; later requests follow its `action` (`delegate` / `reject` / `abort-turn`). - **Reviewer context is presented transcript.** `contextBudget` feeds already-presented session content to the reviewer. With the default same-route reviewer model that content stays inside one provider; configure `reviewerModel` to a different provider only if you accept presenting that transcript to it. - **`never` is one-way at this layer.** A `never` tool or risk rule rejects before the human chain sees the request โ€” a lockdown knob, not a default. ## Known limitations - **Two different exposures, two different answers โ€” neither substitutes for the other.** *Injected* context (workspace instruction files, the runtime-context snapshot, third-party plugin injections) is injected fresh into any new agent session, so it reaches the reviewer identically under `reviewerProvider: fork` and `reviewerProvider: spawn` โ€” measured byte-identical across both on the same request. The `agent/pre-step` source filter is what closes it, under either provider; **`spawn` alone does NOT keep workspace instructions out of the reviewer.** Separately, `fork` seeds the child with the delegating session's completed turns: that history is already the child's own log rather than a message entering a step, so the filter cannot touch it and only `spawn` avoids it, with the reviewer prompt's untrusted-transcript fence as the mitigation in between. In the two traces above the seeding produced no additional messages, so its practical impact is unquantified. - The reviewer needs a working LLM route (inherited by default); without one every review falls back per `fallbackPolicy` โ€” never a silent grant. - `reviewerTools` names must exist as global tools in the profile; an unknown name fails the reviewer child loudly at the earliest point and falls back. - Risk rules match the request `reason`, the `toolName`, or the redacted call `arguments` per their `field`; other conditions belong in `toolsPolicy.overrides`. - The `/auto-review approve` override authorizes the next same-tool review, not the exact historical call; a different action on the same tool consumes it. - The verdict events are log-only; the Web review panel reads the folded `autoReview` projection (the raw event stream never reaches browser plugins). - `autoReview/state` and `autoReview/verdict` are appended with the envelope's `ignorable: true` marker on hosts that honor it, so any harness build loads the log โ€” readers that do not know the out-of-repo types simply skip those records. On released rc hosts (rc.1โ€“rc.8) the runtime detects the dropped marker and never writes these events (the in-memory mirror keeps the command, budgets, breaker, and `approve` working for the session); sessions already polluted by pre-0.5.1 versions can be repaired with `scripts/repair-session-logs.mjs` from `dsh-permission-rules` (its default target set covers all five `autoReview/*` event types). - The git channel needs the single `allowBuilds` key the `dsh` CLI prints for `dsh-auto-review` itself. The repo ships its own `pnpm-workspace.yaml` with `allowBuilds: { esbuild: true }`; `typescript` + `tsdown` are regular `dependencies`. - The optional invariant companion needs the `invariants` service (agent-spine compositions such as headless/ACP); the plain web profile does not provide it, so the row ships commented out in the bundle patch. ## Related work - [Andy8647/dsh-auto-approval](https://github.com/Andy8647/dsh-auto-approval) โ€” two-state allow/deny classifier on the `tools/pre-execute` waterfall with file-log audit. `dsh-auto-review` deliberately differs: official **answerer** chain, always delegates what it does not own, read-only second model with a structured verdict, deny reasons fed back to the model, session-log audit. - [ACP automation bridge](https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness/tree/master/packages/acp/acp) โ€” one-shot machine decisions for its own ACP-owned agents. `dsh-auto-review` is session- and tool-policy-scoped for the interactive harness; it never infers durable grants. ## Development ```sh pnpm install # node ^22.19 || >=24 pnpm run typecheck # tsc: src + tests against the local harness checkout pnpm test # vitest: 25 spec files pnpm run build # tsc declarations + tsdown bundles (lib/, incl. the client bundle) pnpm run verify:self-contained pnpm pack # the published tarball ``` Repository layout: `src/index.ts` (plugin contract) ยท `src/config.ts` (Schemastery schema + resolution) ยท `src/runtime.ts` (answerer, command, deny-reason injection) ยท `src/review.ts` (reviewer orchestration, prompt, sanitization) ยท `src/events.ts` (session-event vocabulary + folds) ยท `src/audit.ts` (host `ignorable`-marker capability detection) ยท `src/projection.ts` + `src/projection-types.ts` (the `autoReview` session projection) ยท `src/invariant.ts` (invariant companion) ยท `src/eval/` (the dsh-eval engine) ยท `eval/` (shipped evaluation composition) ยท `bin/dsh-eval.mjs` (CLI launcher) ยท `src/client/` (browser half) ยท `test/` ยท `fixtures/`. ## Topics `deepseek-harness`, `dsh`, `dsh-plugin`, `cordis`, `approval`, `auto-review`, `second-model`, `ai-safety`, `sandbox`, `subagent` ## Contributors - [@PerryLink](https://github.com/PerryLink) โ€” creator and maintainer: the approval answerer, the reviewer subagent, risk policy and circuit breaker, the session-projection review panel, the invariant companion, dsh-eval, and the five-language docs. - [@weipeng1999](https://github.com/weipeng1999) โ€” proposed independent reviewer provider/model routing ([#11](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-auto-review/issues/11), [discussion #12](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-auto-review/discussions/12)), which shipped as `reviewerProvider` / `reviewerModel`. - [@alexchenzl](https://github.com/alexchenzl) โ€” listed the plugin on the DSH plugin directory ([#10](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-auto-review/issues/10)). ## PerryLink DSH Plugin Family This project is one of the [40 DeepSeek Harness plugins](https://github.com/PerryLink) maintained by [PerryLink](https://github.com/PerryLink). If this one helps you, the others likely will too: | Plugin | One-liner | |---|---| | **[dsh-background-agents](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-background-agents)** | Durable background child agents with a Web UI sidebar, messaging and interrupt | | | **[dsh-budget](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-budget)** | Cost governance for DeepSeek Harness: budgets, carbon, and latency in one panel. | | | **[dsh-checkpoint-rewind](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-checkpoint-rewind)** | Claude Code /rewind-equivalent: snapshots, session forks, one-shot restore | | | **[dsh-claude-move](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-claude-move)** | Migrate Claude Code sessions, memory, skills and CLAUDE.md into DSH | | | **[dsh-click](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-click)** | Cross-platform native desktop control for DeepSeek Harness โ€” Windows first. | | | **[dsh-composer-history](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-composer-history)** | Terminal-style input history for the web composer: arrows, Ctrl+R search | | | **[dsh-data-quality](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-data-quality)** | Dataset quality checks and citation cross-checks (the optional numeric bridge consumed here) | | | **[dsh-defend](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-defend)** | Prompt-injection, jailbreak, and secret-leak defense for DeepSeek Harness. | | | **[dsh-doublecheck](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-doublecheck)** | Engineering-discipline guard: requirements grill, test gates, adversary review | | | **[dsh-draw](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-draw)** | Unified static-image generation routing for DeepSeek Harness. | | | **[dsh-fast](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-fast)** | Read-only performance diagnostics for DeepSeek Harness. | | | **[dsh-fund-research](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-fund-research)** | Deterministic research reports for Chinese public mutual funds | | | **[dsh-github](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-github)** | GitHub PR/issues integration for DSH, every write gated by approval | | | **[dsh-industry-research](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-industry-research)** | Industry research orchestration that seals its deliverables through this plugin's `ctx.researchReport.assemble` | | | **[dsh-library](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-library)** | Local document knowledge base for DeepSeek Harness. | | | **[dsh-local-ai](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-local-ai)** | Local-model (Ollama) integration for DeepSeek Harness. | | | **[dsh-lsp-actions](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-lsp-actions)** | LSP diagnostics, formatting, completion, code actions and rename over language servers | | | **[dsh-mask](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-mask)** | PII masking middleware: anonymize at the model boundary, restore at the display layer | | | **[dsh-mcp-panel](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-mcp-panel)** | Read-only MCP runtime panel: /mcp command + Settings tab with status, tools and errors | | | **[dsh-memento](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-memento)** | Approval-gated cross-session memory: ctx.memory seam + SQLite + memory tool | | | **[dsh-observe](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-observe)** | OpenTelemetry and Langfuse observability exporter for DeepSeek Harness. | | | **[dsh-output-styles](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-output-styles)** | Claude Code outputStyles-equivalent runtime style switching | | | **[dsh-reach](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-reach)** | Multi-channel approval/question bridge: WeChat/Telegram/Feishu, session console | | **[dsh-permission-rules](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-permission-rules)** | Claude Code-style declarative allow/deny/ask permission rules with audit | | | **[dsh-personal-directive](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-personal-directive)** | Personal directive injector with top-bar toggle (framework edition) | | **[dsh-plugin-guide](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-plugin-guide)** | Plugin-development knowledge base as an on-demand agent skill | | | **[dsh-plugin-doctor](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-plugin-doctor)** | Zero-dependency static + sandbox smoke detector for DSH plugins | | | **[dsh-research-report](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-research-report)** | Verifiable research-report engine: content-addressed evidence ledger and sealed versions | | | **[dsh-score](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-score)** | Multi-dimensional quality scoring for DeepSeek Harness plugins. | | | **[dsh-session-pin](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-session-pin)** | Pin sessions in the Web sidebar with durable ordering | | | **[dsh-session-sync](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-session-sync)** | Cross-device session sync for DeepSeek Harness โ€” a dedicated git mirror of your session store. | | | **[dsh-skill-pack-security](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-skill-pack-security)** | Security-audit skill pack: secret scan, dependency and supply-chain review | | | **[dsh-talk](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-talk)** | Voice-first session loop for DeepSeek Harness: talk to it, hear it answer. | | | **[dsh-test-drive](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-test-drive)** | Isolated install-and-smoke test drives for DeepSeek Harness plugins. | | | **[dsh-ticktick](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-ticktick)** | TickTick/Dida365 task bridge: session-header panel + 11 tools | | **[dsh-translate](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-translate)** | Vendor parameter translation and deterministic JSON repair for DeepSeek Harness. | | | **[dsh-wechat](https://github.com/pan17/dsh-wechat)** | WeChat โ†” DSH bridge (Tencent iLink bot): text/image/file/voice, approvals in chat | | **[dsh-autotier](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-autotier)** | Automatic strong/cheap model-tier routing with deterministic risk guards and a `/tier` command | | | **[dsh-catalog](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-catalog)** | DSH Desktop Market standard catalog source for the PerryLink family | | | **[dsh-cert-mcp](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-cert-mcp)** | Read-only MCP server exposing the certification registry: grades, snapshots and five-dimension evidence | | | **[dsh-kit](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-kit)** | One-command starter pack that installs the core family | | | **[dsh-plugin-certification](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-plugin-certification)** | Community certification registry with repro-checkable grades and badges | | | **[dsh-plugin-kit](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-plugin-kit)** | Shared zero-runtime-dependency toolkit for the PerryLink DSH plugins | | | **[dsh-plugin-portal](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-plugin-portal)** | Zero-dependency static portal rendering the whole plugin family as one page | | | **[dsh-plugin-upgrade-015](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-plugin-upgrade-015)** | Merged `0.1.3-alpha.1` โ†’ `0.1.5-rc.1` upgrade corridor card plus a zero-dependency seam scanner | | | **[dsh-team-rooms](https://github.com/PerryLink/dsh-team-rooms)** | Cross-session team rooms: shared message bus, task board and timeline | | ### Install from the DSH Desktop Market All PerryLink plugins are browsable in the built-in DSH Desktop Market: **Market โ†’ Sources โ†’ add source โ†’ paste** `https://perrylink-dsh-catalog.perrylink.workers.dev/catalog-source.json` **โ†’ select it**. Installation still goes through the Market's npm-identity verification and your confirmation. ## License [Apache License 2.0](LICENSE) ยฉ 2026 dsh-auto-review contributors